{"document_id": "1953_1_1001_1009_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1001\n\nBUDDU SATYANARAYA\"N'A AND OTHERS\n\nKONDURU VENKATAPAYYA AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nInam arant-Presumption of lost grant-When a, rises- Whether grant is of mel waram only or land itself-Gonstrnction of grant-Suit for ejectment ·-Rights of arch.kas,\n\nThough a presumption of an origin in some lawful title may in certain circumstances be made to support possessory rights long and quietly enjoyed where no actual proof of title is forthcoming, that presumption cannot be ma<le where there is sufficient evidence and convincing proof of the nature of tbe grant and of the persons to whom it was made.\n\nIn the case of an inazn grant, the mere fact that the amount shown in the Inam Register as the assessment was the same as the amount shown in the Ina1n Statement under the heitding \"in co1ne from the ina1n\" does not lead to an inference that the grant co1nprised only the 1nelvarani, rights and not the land itself, 'rhough in a, proceeding for franiing a sche1ne relating to a temple it may be permissible to take into account the claims, mora.l tJiough not legal, of the archakas and to make some provision to protect their interest, such considera.tions are out of place in a suit for ejectment of the archakas on proof of title, especially when they set up an adverse title and deny the title of the temple,\n\n[On tbe facts their Lordships held (i) that there was clear evidence that the inam grant in question was made by the grantor in favour of the temple and that in the face of this definite evidence as to the nature of the grant no presumption.of a lost grant can he made in favour of the archakas of the temple; and\n\n(ii) that the grant WILS of the land itself and notofmelvaram rights only,]\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLA1'E\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1951.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated 15th December, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Subba Rao <md Panchapakesa Ayyar JJ.) in Appeal No. 474of1945 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated 31st July, 1946, of the Court of the Subordinate .Judge of Teuali in Original Suit No. 24 of 1944.\n\nFeb. Z6.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1963 1~1.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for India, (N. Subrahmanyam and K. R. Chowdhury, with him)\n\nBuddu for the appellants. a.t.yanarayana\n\nand Others K. s. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar (111. Seshachalav. pathi, with him) for the respondents.\n\nKondu1u V enkatapayya\n\nand Othere.\n\n1953. February 26.\n\nThe J udgmcnt of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS J.~This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of possession of certain immovable properties measuring about 93 acres and 33 cents which are more fully and particularly set out and described in Schedule A to the plaint. That suit was instituted by Konduru Venkatapayya, respondent No. 1, in his capacity as the Executive Officer appointed by the Government on the 15th July, 1942, in respect of Sri Somasekharaswami Temple at Kotipalle, hamlet of Donepudi, a temple notified on the 26th October, 1939, under the provisions of Chapter VIA of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (Act II of 1927).\n\nThe suit was instituted informa pauperis. The claim for ejectment of the defendants was founded on the allegation that the propert.ies belonged to t.he temple, having been given to it by an Inam grant made in 1770 A.D. by Janganna Rao, the then Zamindar of Rachur, that the defendants 1 to 16 and their predecessors were Archakas rendering Nitya N\" aivcdya Deeparadhana services and as such were in possession of the properties for and on behalf of the temple and that defendants 17 to 43 were the lessees under the Archakas and that the defendants 1 to 16 were wrongfully claiming the properties as their own and the other defendants claimed to be in possession of portions of the properties as their lessees.\n\nThe plaintiff instituted this suit after having given registered notice to the defendants to make over possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff as the Executive Officer of the temple but the defendants were still continuing in such possession in spite of such notice. The defendants filed written statements raising various contentions\n\nand issues to which it is not necessary now to refer. The learned Subordinate Judge by his judgment dated the 31st July, 1945, decreed the plaintiff's suit.\n\nSome of the defendants preferred an appeal to the High Court but the High Court dismissed the same.\n\nThose defendants obtained leave of the High Court to appeal to the Federal Court and that appeal has now come up for hearing before us.\n\nThe only two points which were raised before us, as before the High Court, are (1) whether the Inam grant was made in favour of the temple or whether the grant was made in favour of the Archakas burdened with the duties of service, and (2) what right did the grant confer on the granteewhether it was a grant of the land itself or only of the melvarwn interest in the properties.\n\nRe 1.--lt is urged by the learned Attorney-General that as the defendants and their predecessors have been in possession of the properties from ancient times it should be presumed that their possession originated in some lawful title conferred on them. In short, tho contention, founded on several judicial decisions, is that the principle of a lost grant should be applied in this case in favour of the Archakas who have been in quiet possession for over a century and a half. There is no doubt, on the authorities, that a presumption of an origin in some lawful title may in certain circumstances be made to support possessory rights long and quietly enjoyed where no actuo, l proof of title is forthcoming but it is equally well established that that presumption cannot be made where there is sufficient evidence and convincing proof of the nature of the grant and the persons to whom it was made. It is true that the original grant is not forthcoming but turning to the evidence we find two documents which appear to us to be decisive on the question of title. The first one is Exhibit P ;3, a copy of the relevant entries in the Inam Register of 1860. This Inam Register was prepared after enquiries made by the Inam Deputy Collector and the statements furnished at that time by the hen Archakas were taken into consideration for\n\nBuddu Satyanarayana\n\nand Others\n\nKonduru V enkatapayya and OtherB.\n\nDaaJ.\n\n191!3\n\nBuddu Satyanarayana\n\nand Others\n\nKonduru V enkatapayya\n\narid Others.\n\nDa•J.\n\n1004.\n\nSUPREME COURT :R:El>ORTS [1953\n\npreparing the register. The copy of the statement filed by the then Archakas before the lnam Deputy Collector was exhibited in this case as Exhibit D /3. ln the Inam Register (Ex. P/3) under the several columns grouped under the general heading \" Class extent and value of Inam\" this Inam is classified in column 2 as Devadayam. In column 3 are set out the survey numbers together with the word ' Dry' indicating the nature of the land comprised within the survey numbers. The areas are set out in column 5. The heading of column 7 is \" where no survev has been made and no assessment fixed by Goverment, the cess paid by the ryot to the Inamtlar, or the a, verage assessment of similar Govemment land should be entered in column (7) \". Under this heading are set out the amounts of rcsvccti ve assessments against the three survey numbers totalling Rs. 198-13-9. \\Ve then pass on the next group of columns under the general heading \" Description, tenure and documents in support of the Inam \". Under column 8 'description oflnam' is entered the remark \"For the support of a Pagoda.\n\nNow kept up\". The entry in column 9 shows that the Inam was free of tax, i.e., sarvadumbala. Under column 10 headed \"Hereditary, unconditional for life only or for two or more lives\" is mentioned ' Permanent '. The name of the grantor as stated in column 11 is J anganna Rao and the year of grant is fasli 1179, A.D. 1770. In column 13 the name of the temple is set out as the original grantee. The name of the temple and the location of the temple a.re also set out under columns 16 and 17. Turning ;:iow to the statement Ex. D /3 ca used to be written and filed by the then Archakas during the Inam Inquiry held in 1859-60 Sree Somasekharaswa.mi V am is given as the name of the Inamdar and the present enjoyer. The name.of the temple is also set out under columns 3,5, G and 12.\n\nUnder the heading \"Income derived from the Inamwhether it is sarvadumbala or jodi. Ifjodi the amount\" in column 13 is stated \" sari; adu1nbala Inam. Cist according to the rate prevailing in the neighbouring fields -Rs. 2G6-3-I.\" This statement (Ex. D /3) bears\n\nS.C.R. strf>REME COlJR'r REPOR'l'S i005\n\nthe signature of the Karnams and the witnesses. It will be noticed that neither in the Inam Register Ex. P /3 nor in the statement Ex. D /3 is there any moo~k~~~~w~m~~ matter of that, having any the least interest, personal or otherwise, in the subject-matter of the Inam grant.\n\nThe two exhibits quite clearly indicate that the Inam grant was made in favour of the temple by the grantor and that in the face of this definite evidence and proof of the nature of the grant, no presumption of a lost grant can be made in favour of the Archakas. \\Ve, therefore, in agreement with the High Court, hold that the deity w11s the grantee and the first question raised before us must be answered against the appellants.\n\nRe 2.--The learned Attorney-General next contends that, assuming that the Inam want was made in favom of the temple, it was only a grant of melvararn interest and that the Archakas who have the kudivarmn rights cannot be ejected. He relies strongly on an unreported judgment of the Madras High Co mt in Appeal No. 213 of 1942 (The Board of Comrnissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, 1vladras v.\n\nParasaram Veeraraghavacharyulii and others) where it was held:-\n\n\"The records of the lnam settlement really contain only one clear indication as to the precise extent of this grant. The statement at the Inam Inquiry, Exhibit V, upon which the decision of the Inam Commissioner was presumably based contains a column headed \" Income realised from the Inam sarva du.rnbala \" and in that column we find the entry\n\n\"Hs. H 8arvadurnbala\".\n\nOn its face this entry seems to show that the income of the Inam was Hs. 14 free from all charges. \\Ve find, however, from the Inam\n\nRegister, Exhibit I\\', that the assessment of the Inam on the basis of the enjoyment of 16·97 acres is also Rs. 14.\n\nThis seems to inclimite that the extent of the Inam was the amount of the assessment. * * * * * It seems, therefore, that the decision must rest on the rec!tal in Exhibit V that the income of the Inam\n\nBuddu Satyanarayana\n\nand Others\n\nKonduru Venkatapayya and Other3.\n\nDaaJ.\n\nBuddu 8att; anarayar1.(/\n\nanr'l Other8\n\nJ\\.onduru V cnatapay yn\n\naftd Others.\n\nJ)as J.\n\nconsists of Rs. 14, read along with the recital in Exhibit IV that the assessment on the fand also comes to Rs. 14.\n\nOn these materials we confirm the findings of the learned District Judge, although we do not accept his reasoning, and hold that the grant is a grant of melvaram only.\"\n\nThe facts of that case appear to us to be different from those in the present case. The Archakas in that case were found to have the kudivaram rights from before the lnam grant was made. In the copies of the Inam Register and Inam Statement filed in that case the Archakas were shown as the grantees and the present enjoyers of the Inam grant and the amount shown under the heading in column 2 of the Inam register as the assessment was the same as the amount shown under column 3 of the Inam Statement under the heading \"Income derived from Inam\". In the case before us the Arohakas are nowhere mentioned in either Exhibit P /3 or in Exhibit D /3, there is no evidence that they had any title to kudivaram rights and finally the amount of assessment shown under column 7 of the Inam register, Exhibit P /3, is Rs. 198-13-9, whereas the amount shown as income derived from the Inam as shown in column 13 of the Inam Statement, Exhibit D /3, is Rs. 266-3-1.\n\nApart from these points of distinction the decision relied on by the learned Attorney-General appears to us to be of doubtful authority.\n\nAs will appear from the passages quoted above, the decision rested mainly, if not entirely, on the fact that the amount of assessment and the amount of income were the same and the conclusion was drawn that the Inam grant comprised only of the revenue assessment, i.e., of melvaram rights.\n\nWe are unable to follow the reasoning.\n\nWhether the Inam comprised the land itself, that is to say, both melvaram and kudivaram rights or only the melvaram rights, the entries had to be made in the Inam Register in the same form and even in the case of the grant of the land itself comprising both the rights the amount of assessment had to be , set out under column 7 of the Inam Register for it is not\n\nsuggested that a different form had to be used where the grant comprised both the rights. It follows, therefore, that no inference that the Inam grant comprised only melvaram rights can be inferred from the fact that under column 7 only the amount of assessment is set out, and, therefore, the reasoning on which the decision relied on by the learned Attorney-General was founded cannot be supported as correct. Indeed, that decision has been dissented from by another Bench of the Madras High Court in Yelmnanchili Venkatadri & another v. Vedantam Seshacharyulu and others (1). In the present case the High Court was, in our opinion, clearly right in preferring the last mentioned decision to the unreported decision mentioned above. Having regard to the different entries under the different columns in Exhibit P/3 and Exhibit D /3 tpere is no escape from the position that this Inam grant in favour of the temple comprised both the interests in the land.\n\nAn argument was sought to be raised by the learned Attorney-General that the grantor Janganna Rao was only the Collector of the revenue and as such could not grant more than what he had got. Reference was made to the Kistna District Manual by Gordon Mackenzie but it appeared that the person therein mentioned was not the same grantor as we are concerned with in this case and the point was not pursued and nothing further need be said about it. :Finally, the learned Attorney-General submits that these Archakas who were rendering services faithfully from generation to generation from ancient times should not, in equity, be ejected from the entire 111nds and that they should be allowed to remain in possession of the lands and be permitted to appropriate to themselves the expenses of the services and a reasonable remuneration and the rest of the income should be made over to the temple as its property.\n\nReference was made to two unreported deoisions of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 218 of 194()\n\n(I) A.LR, 1948 :Mad. 72,\n\nBuddu Satyanarayana\n\nand Others\n\nv. /{onduru l' enkatapayya . and Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\nBuddu Sat, yanorayana\n\nand Othera\n\nKonduru Venkatapayya\n\nand Othera.\n\nDas_ J,\n\nSUPREME COL\"RT REPORTS [1953]\n\nDandibhotla K uturnba Sastrulu v. Kontharapu Venkatalingam, and in Appeal No. 709 of 1944; Buddu Satyanarayana v. Dasari Butchayya, Executive O.fficer of the Temple of Sri: 111alleswaraswami Varu,, China Pulivaram. In a proceeding for the framing of a scheme relating to a temple it may be permissible to take into account tho claims, moral if not legal, of the Archakas and to make some provision for protecting their rights, but those considerations appear to us to be entirely out of place in a suit for ejectment on proof of title.\n\nIf the two decisions lay down, as it is contended they do, that the principles which may have a bearing on a proceeding for framing of a scheme or for enforcing the scheme that is framed may be applied to a case of the kind we have now before us it will be difficult for us to uphold them either on authority or on principle.\n\nFurther what is the conduct of the Archakas defendants appearing on the record of this case ? Although they are Archakas they actually asserted an adverse right in the face of the honest admission of their predecessors-in-title, made in the Inam statement Exhibit D-3. Such conduct cannot but be regarded as disentitling them from any claim founded on equity.\n\nThe explanation put forward for the first time in paragraph 7 of their present statement of case filed in this Court explaining t.he absence of a claim to the property by their predecessors at the time of the Inam Inquiry namely, respect for the deity enjoined by Agama Shastra is not at all convincing. Further, the giving of such equitable relief must depend on questions of fact, namely, the income of the property, t.he reasonable expenses and remuneration for the services, the amounts appropriated by them all this time and so forth which have not been investigated into in this case, bEcause, no doubt, this question of equitable relief has been put forward as a last resort after having lost their battle. vVe do not think in the circumstances ::if the cttse any indulgence should be shown to the Archalrns cwen if it were permissible for the Court in a suit of this description to give such reli1Jf, '\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for appellant: S. Subramaniam.\n\nAgent for respondent : M.S.K. Aiyangar.\n\nNAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI\n\nNARMADABAI AND OTHERS [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nLease-Condit.ion that the lessee's rights shall terminate if rent is not paid--Notice in writing by lessor to terrninate lease-Whether necessary-S!!it for ejectment withotlt notice-Maintainability- Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882 as amended in 1929), s. 111( g)-Whether based on justice, equity and good conscience-Appli. cability to lease deeds executed before 1st April, 1930.\n\nThe provision as to notice in writing of the lessor's intention to determine the lease, containei1 in section l ll(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as amended in 1929, is not based on any princjple of justice, equity or good con; cience and is not applicable to leases executed prior to 1st April, 1930.\n\nWhere a lease deed executed before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, came into force, provided that the lessee's rights should come to an end on default of payment of rent, and, as rent was not duly paid, the lessor instituted a suit for ejectment of the lessee without giving him a notice in writing of his (the lessor's) intention to determine the lease: Held, that the suit was maintainable,\n\nUmar Pulavar v.\n\nDawood Rowther (A.LR. 194 7 :VIa<l. 68), Bralvmayya v. Sundaramma (A.LR. 48 }fad. 275), Tatya Savla S11drik v. Yeshwanta Kondiba Mulay (52 Born. hR. 909) disapproved.\n\nToleman v. Portbury (L.R. 6 Q.13. 245), Prakash Chandra Das v. Rajendra Nath Basu (I.L.R. 58 Cal. 1359), Rama Ai11angar\n\nv. Gumswami Chetty (35 l'vl.L.J. 129), Venkatachari v. Ranga\n\nswami Aiyar(36 llf.L.J. 532) and Krishna Shetti v. Gilbert Pinto (I.L.R. 42 !Yfad. 654) relied on.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar v. Ponnuswamy Padayachi IA.LR. 1935 Mad; 918), Aditya Prasad v. Ram Ratanlal (57L-A. 173), Muhammad Raza v. Abbas Bandi Bi/Ji. (59 I.A. 236), Roberts v. Davey (110 E.R. 606) distinguished.\n\nCrvn. A1'PELLA'l'E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 23rd June, 1949, of the High\n\n13!\n\nBud Wit Satyanarayana and Others\n\nKonduru Venkatapayya\n\nand Other\"~.\n\nFeb. 27.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "BUDDU SATYANARAYA\"N'A AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BUDDU SATYANARAYA\"N'A AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KONDURU VENKATAPAYYA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KONDURU VENKATAPAYYA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1899, "end_char": 1933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated 15th December, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Subba Rao <md Panchapakesa Ayyar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1935, "end_char": 1944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated 15th December, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Subba Rao <md Panchapakesa Ayyar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Panchapakesa Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1949, "end_char": 1967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated 15th December, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Subba Rao <md Panchapakesa Ayyar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2193, "end_char": 2201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (N. Subrahmanyam and K. R. Chowdhury, with him)\n\nBuddu for the appellants."}}, {"text": "N. Subrahmanyam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2232, "end_char": 2247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (N. Subrahmanyam and K. R. Chowdhury, with him)\n\nBuddu for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chowdhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2252, "end_char": 2267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (N. Subrahmanyam and K. R. Chowdhury, with him)\n\nBuddu for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswamy Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2339, "end_char": 2360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a.t.yanarayana\n\nand Others K. s. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar (111."}}, {"text": "Seshachalav. pathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2367, "end_char": 2385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seshachalav."}}, {"text": "Konduru Venkatapayya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2774, "end_char": 2794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That suit was instituted by Konduru Venkatapayya, respondent No.", "canonical_name": "KONDURU VENKATAPAYYA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "26th October, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3008, "end_char": 3026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, in his capacity as the Executive Officer appointed by the Government on the 15th July, 1942, in respect of Sri Somasekharaswami Temple at Kotipalle, hamlet of Donepudi, a temple notified on the 26th October, 1939, under the provisions of Chapter VIA of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (Act II of 1927)."}}, {"text": "Chapter VIA of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3052, "end_char": 3108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Janganna Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3350, "end_char": 3362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim for ejectment of the defendants was founded on the allegation that the propert.ies belonged to t.he temple, having been given to it by an Inam grant made in 1770 A.D. by Janganna Rao, the then Zamindar of Rachur, that the defendants 1 to 16 and their predecessors were Archakas rendering Nitya N\" aivcdya Deeparadhana services and as such were in possession of the properties for and on behalf of the temple and that defendants 17 to 43 were the lessees under the Archakas and that the defendants 1 to 16 were wrongfully claiming the properties as their own and the other defendants claimed to be in possession of portions of the properties as their lessees.", "canonical_name": "J anganna Rao"}}, {"text": "Rachur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3385, "end_char": 3391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim for ejectment of the defendants was founded on the allegation that the propert.ies belonged to t.he temple, having been given to it by an Inam grant made in 1770 A.D. by Janganna Rao, the then Zamindar of Rachur, that the defendants 1 to 16 and their predecessors were Archakas rendering Nitya N\" aivcdya Deeparadhana services and as such were in possession of the properties for and on behalf of the temple and that defendants 17 to 43 were the lessees under the Archakas and that the defendants 1 to 16 were wrongfully claiming the properties as their own and the other defendants claimed to be in possession of portions of the properties as their lessees."}}, {"text": "31st July, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4297, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Subordinate Judge by his judgment dated the 31st July, 1945, decreed the plaintiff's suit."}}, {"text": "Archakas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5368, "end_char": 5376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In short, tho contention, founded on several judicial decisions, is that the principle of a lost grant should be applied in this case in favour of the Archakas who have been in quiet possession for over a century and a half."}}, {"text": "Buddu Satyanarayana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6300, "end_char": 6319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Inam Register was prepared after enquiries made by the Inam Deputy Collector and the statements furnished at that time by the hen Archakas were taken into consideration for\n\nBuddu Satyanarayana\n\nand Others\n\nKonduru V enkatapayya and OtherB.\n\nDaaJ.\n\n191!3\n\nBuddu Satyanarayana\n\nand Others\n\nKonduru V enkatapayya\n\narid Others.", "canonical_name": "BUDDU SATYANARAYA\"N'A AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Konduru V enkatapayya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6333, "end_char": 6354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Inam Register was prepared after enquiries made by the Inam Deputy Collector and the statements furnished at that time by the hen Archakas were taken into consideration for\n\nBuddu Satyanarayana\n\nand Others\n\nKonduru V enkatapayya and OtherB.\n\nDaaJ.\n\n191!3\n\nBuddu Satyanarayana\n\nand Others\n\nKonduru V enkatapayya\n\narid Others.", "canonical_name": "KONDURU VENKATAPAYYA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "J anganna Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7843, "end_char": 7856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The name of the grantor as stated in column 11 is J anganna Rao and the year of grant is fasli 1179, A.D. 1770.", "canonical_name": "J anganna Rao"}}, {"text": "Karnams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8689, "end_char": 8696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D /3) bears\n\nS.C.R. strf>REME COlJR'r REPOR'l'S i005\n\nthe signature of the Karnams and the witnesses."}}, {"text": "Madras High Co", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9662, "end_char": 9676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He relies strongly on an unreported judgment of the Madras High Co mt in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "DaaJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10738, "end_char": 10743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DaaJ.\n\nBuddu 8att; anarayar1.(/\n\nanr'l Other8\n\nJ\\.onduru V cnatapay yn\n\naftd Others."}}, {"text": "J\\.onduru V cnatapay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10785, "end_char": 10805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DaaJ.\n\nBuddu 8att; anarayar1.(/\n\nanr'l Other8\n\nJ\\.onduru V cnatapay yn\n\naftd Others."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13394, "end_char": 13400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, that decision has been dissented from by another Bench of the Madras High Court in Yelmnanchili Venkatadri & another v. Vedantam Seshacharyulu and others (1)."}}, {"text": "Gordon Mackenzie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14114, "end_char": 14130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to the Kistna District Manual by Gordon Mackenzie but it appeared that the person therein mentioned was not the same grantor as we are concerned with in this case and the point was not pursued and nothing further need be said about it. :"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14836, "end_char": 14853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to two unreported deoisions of the Madras High Court in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "/{onduru l' enkatapayya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14944, "end_char": 14967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "72,\n\nBuddu Satyanarayana\n\nand Others\n\nv. /{onduru l' enkatapayya .", "canonical_name": "KONDURU VENKATAPAYYA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Buddu Sat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14990, "end_char": 14999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DasJ.\n\nBuddu Sat, yanorayana\n\nand Othera\n\nKonduru Venkatapayya\n\nand Othera."}}, {"text": "Agama Shastra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16589, "end_char": 16602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The explanation put forward for the first time in paragraph 7 of their present statement of case filed in this Court explaining t.he absence of a claim to the property by their predecessors at the time of the Inam Inquiry namely, respect for the deity enjoined by Agama Shastra is not at all convincing."}}, {"text": "S. Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17372, "end_char": 17386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for appellant: S. Subramaniam."}}, {"text": "M.S.K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17412, "end_char": 17427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondent : M.S.K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "NAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17430, "end_char": 17449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI\n\nNARMADABAI AND OTHERS [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Maintainability- Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17694, "end_char": 17735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 111( g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17769, "end_char": 17779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintainability- Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Maintainability- Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18023, "end_char": 18053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1st April, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18194, "end_char": 18209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provision as to notice in writing of the lessor's intention to determine the lease, containei1 in section l ll(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as amended in 1929, is not based on any princjple of justice, equity or good con; cience and is not applicable to leases executed prior to 1st April, 1930."}}, {"text": "Where a lease deed executed before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18212, "end_char": 18281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18727, "end_char": 18730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Where a lease deed executed before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "Where a lease deed executed before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Bud Wit Satyanarayana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19430, "end_char": 19451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bud Wit Satyanarayana and Others\n\nKonduru Venkatapayya\n\nand Other\"~.\n\nFeb. 27.", "canonical_name": "BUDDU SATYANARAYA\"N'A AND OTHERS"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1009_1028_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1009\n\nThe result, therefore, is that this appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for appellant: S. Subramaniam.\n\nAgent for respondent : M.S.K. Aiyangar.\n\nNAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI\n\nNARMADABAI AND OTHERS [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nLease-Condit.ion that the lessee's rights shall terminate if rent is not paid--Notice in writing by lessor to terrninate lease-Whether necessary-S!!it for ejectment withotlt notice-Maintainability- Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882 as amended in 1929), s. 111( g)-Whether based on justice, equity and good conscience-Appli. cability to lease deeds executed before 1st April, 1930.\n\nThe provision as to notice in writing of the lessor's intention to determine the lease, containei1 in section l ll(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as amended in 1929, is not based on any princjple of justice, equity or good con; cience and is not applicable to leases executed prior to 1st April, 1930.\n\nWhere a lease deed executed before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, came into force, provided that the lessee's rights should come to an end on default of payment of rent, and, as rent was not duly paid, the lessor instituted a suit for ejectment of the lessee without giving him a notice in writing of his (the lessor's) intention to determine the lease: Held, that the suit was maintainable,\n\nUmar Pulavar v.\n\nDawood Rowther (A.LR. 194 7 :VIa<l. 68), Bralvmayya v. Sundaramma (A.LR. 48 }fad. 275), Tatya Savla S11drik v. Yeshwanta Kondiba Mulay (52 Born. hR. 909) disapproved.\n\nToleman v. Portbury (L.R. 6 Q.13. 245), Prakash Chandra Das v. Rajendra Nath Basu (I.L.R. 58 Cal. 1359), Rama Ai11angar\n\nv. Gumswami Chetty (35 l'vl.L.J. 129), Venkatachari v. Ranga\n\nswami Aiyar(36 llf.L.J. 532) and Krishna Shetti v. Gilbert Pinto (I.L.R. 42 !Yfad. 654) relied on.\n\nVenkatarama Aiyar v. Ponnuswamy Padayachi IA.LR. 1935 Mad; 918), Aditya Prasad v. Ram Ratanlal (57L-A. 173), Muhammad Raza v. Abbas Bandi Bi/Ji. (59 I.A. 236), Roberts v. Davey (110 E.R. 606) distinguished.\n\nCrvn. A1'PELLA'l'E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 23rd June, 1949, of the High\n\n13!\n\nBud Wit Satyanarayana and Others\n\nKonduru Venkatapayya\n\nand Other\"~.\n\nFeb. 27.\n\nSUPREME COUR, T REPORTS [l!l53]\n\nJ%3 Court of Judicature at Bombay ,(Chagla C. J.\n\nNamd; a- Lokmanand Gajendragadkar J.) in Second Appeal No. 557 of\n\nLodhi 1945 against the Judgment and Decree dated the v. 19th March, 1945, of the Court of Small Causes, Nmmadabai Poona, in Civil Appen, l No. 175 of 1943, arising @d Otltera. from the Decree dated the 31st March, 1943, of the\n\nMahajan J. Court of the Extra , Joint Sub-Judge of Poona in Suit\n\nNo. 858 of 1941.\n\nK. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (.!. B. Dadachanji, with him) for the appellant.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde for the respondents.\n\n1953. February 27.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by defendant No. I from the decree of the High Court. of Judicature at Bombay in Second Appeal No. 557 of 1945, whereby the High Court confirmed the decree of the lower courts granting possession of land to the respondents on the forfeiture of a lease. The appeal is confined to survey No. 86 /2 at Mundhava in Poona district.\n\nThe principai question arising for decision in the a ppeal is whether notice as contemplated by sectionlll(g) of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary for the determination of a, lease for non-payment of rent even where such lease was executed before the coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act. The only other question that falls for determination is whether the High Court should have interfered with the discretion of the lower courts in refusing relief against forfeiture in the circumstances of this case.\n\nThe present respondents arethe daughter and grandsons of the original plaintiff Vinayakbhat. His adoptive mother was Ramabai. She owned two inam lands at Mundhava which -were then numbered Pratibhandi Nos. 71 and 72. Present survey Nos. 86/1 and 86/2 together correspond to old Pratibhandi No. 71. On 1st July, 1863, Ramabai, while she was in financial difficulties, passed a permanent lease of both these numbers to one Ladha Ibrahim Sheth. The lessee paid a premium of Rs. 999 for the lease, and also agreed to pay\n\ns.c.it.\n\nSUPREME COURT i:tEPORTS ioli\n\na yearly rent of Rs. 80 to Ramabai during her lifetime 1953 and after her death a yearly amount equal to the assessf th 1 d I h . f R b .\n\nNamdeo Lokman ment o . e two an s to t 10 eITs o .ama a1.\n\nThe Lodhi lease provided that in default of payment of rent the v. tenant's rights would come to an end. On 18th August, Narmadabai 1870, Ladha Ibrahim sold his tenancy rights to one and Oth'\"· Girdhari Bala ram Lodhi for Rs. 7 ,999. The sale deed provided that in default of payment of rent to Ramabai or Mahajan J, her heirs, the purchaser would have no rights whatsoever left over the property. On the same day the purchaser passed a rent note in favour of Ramabai. The rent note provided for the payment of the agreed rent in the month of Poush every year, and stated that in case of default the tenant or his heirs would have no right over the land. Defendant No. 1 and the other defendants are the grandsons of Seth Girdhari Balaram.\n\nIn spite of the nullity clause in the lease it appears that the lessee has been more or less a habitual defaulter in the payment of rent. In the year 1913, rent for six years was in arrears. Vinayakbhat filed Suit No. 99 of 1913 in the coµrt of the II Class Sub-Judge, Poona, against the present defendants for possession of the demised premises on the ground of forfeiture. A rnunber of defences were raised by them. Inter alia, it was pleaded that as no notice had been given to them the forfeiture was not enforceable. These contentions were negatived but the court granted relief against forfeiture.\n\nDefendant No. 1 was a minor at that time and became a major in or about 1925.\n\nIn the year 1928 again rent for two years was in arrears. Vinayakbhat filed Civil 8uit No. 258 of 1928 against the present defendants for possession on the ground of forfeiture. The plaintiff subsequently waived the forfeiture by accepting three years' rent which by then had fallen in arrears and costs of the suit.\n\nIn the year 1931 rent for three years again fell into arrears. The amount was then sent by money order and the landlord accepted it.\n\nIn the year 1934 again rent for three years remained unpaid. At that time prooeedinrrs were started by Government for the acquisition of the old survey No. 72.\n\nI •\n\n1012 SUPREME COURf REPORTS [1953]\n\n19\"3 The landlord claimed that he was entitld to the whole\n\n\" .o -L k compensation money as the tenant's rights had ceased 1v anw, eo o man .\n\nLodhi by forfeiture for non-payment of rent.\n\nDefendant v.\n\nNo. 1 through his pleader sent a notice to Vinayakbhat Narmadabai to come and take the arrears of rent. He agreed and\n\ntind Othe<•. accepted the arrears of rent and the forfeiture was\n\nMahajan J. again waived. As a result of this the defendants got Rs. 32,000 by way of compensation for the permanent tenancy rights in old survey No. 72, while Vinayakbhat got Rs. 1,400 for compensation for the acquisition of his rights as landlord in that land.\n\nIn 1938 rent for four years was again in arrears.\n\nVinayakbhat filed Civil Suit No. 982 of 1938 in the court of the I Class Sub-Judge at Poona against all the present defendants for possession of survey Nos. 86 / l and 86 /2 on the ground that the lease had determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent. In that suit defendant No. 1 pleaded that there was no forfeiture because no rent was fixed in respect of the suit property and also because it was for the plaintiff to recover rent and not for the defendants to go to the plaintiff and pay it. These contentions were negatived.\n\nIt was held that forfeiture had occurred but relief against forfeiture was again granted.\n\nOn plaintiff's appeal in this case, the learned District Judge refused to interfere with the discretion of the trial judge in granting relief against forfeiture but observed that the defendants having obtained relief against forfeiture thrice before should not expect to get it for a fourth time if they again make default in the payment of rent.\n\nThe default which has given rise to the present suit occurred on 28th January, 1941, and the plaintiff filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for possession on the ground of forfeiture and for the arrears of rent which remained unpaid. It was alleged in the plaint that the rent due on 28th January, 1941, was not paid, though demanded. Plaintiff asked for possession of survey Nos. 86 /1 and 86 /2 after removal of the structures thereon. Defendant .N' o. 1 pleaded that as a result of partition rights in survey .Nu. 86 /2 had fallen to\n\nhis share, that according to the terms of the rent note 1953 it was for the plaintiff to approach the defendants and \" d-L k not for the defendants to go to the plaintiff and pay it,\n\n1 '\"\"' odh~ malt that as the plaintiff did not approach the defendants v. and no demand for rent was made, no forfeiture occur- Na,,,1adabai red, that defendant No. 1 did offer the rent to the and Othe,,, plaintiff, but the plaintiff fraudulently refused to accept h h 1 . 'ff\" h h Mahajan J. it, t at t e p a111t1 oug t to ave sent a notice according to law if he wanted to enforce the right of forfeiture and that without prejudice to the above contentions he should be granted relief against for feiture.\n\nThe trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit and negatived the contentions raised by the defendants. In awarding possession of the entire property to the plaintiff the trial court imposed a condition that defendant No. 1 should continue to be in possession of the two structures in survey No. 86 /2 till the end of March, 1950. On the question\n\n1 whether a notice was necessary before the lease could be terminated, the trial court expressed the view that the provision in the rent note that on non-payment of rent the rights of the tenant would come to an end was a clause of nullity and not merely a clause of forfeiture and that. the lease was therefore determined under section 111 (b) and not under section 111 (g) of the Transfer of\n\nProperty Act and that no notice as required by sec- . tion 111 (g) was necessary for terminating the lease in suit. On the issue whether forfeiture should be relieved against, the trial court said that relief could have been given to the lessee against forfeiture under section 114 had it not been for the fact that the defendants had disentitled themselves to relief by contumacious conduct on their part, that even this paltry rent had never been paid in time during the last twenty years at any rate, and that after defendant No. 1 had attained majority and got the estate in his charge in 1922-23 he had uniformly defaulted in the payment of rent and that the defendants raised totally false defences and in every suit a false excuse was set up in an attempt to justify the arrears of rent.\n\nioi4 stri>kE:M~E cobRT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19°3 In pursuance of the trial court's decree plaintiff took\n\nN nd-L k possession of all the suit lands in Apr!l, 1943, except a1eO oman . h . , Lodhi one acre whrnh e took possess10n on 13th September,\n\n1943. Defendant No. 1 remained in possession of the Narmadabai two structures on survey No. 86/2. Against the cleciand Othus. sion of the trial judge defendant No. 1 alone filed an appeal to the District Judge of Poona. The lower Mahctjan J, appellate court confirmed the decree of the trial court with two modifications. Defendant No. 1 was allowed to remove the buildings on survey No. 86!2 and also the trees therein within three months. On the issue whether a notice was necessary, the appellate court found that the lease came to an end not under section 11 l(b) but under section 111 (g) of.the Transfer of Property Act, but that no notice of forfeiture was necessary as the lease had been executed prior to the coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act. The appellate court saw no valid reason for interfering with the finding of the•trial judge 011 the question concerning relief against forfeiture.\n\nFrom this appellate decree defendant No. 1 filed tL second appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The plaintiff filed cross-objections in regard to tho trees and costs. The High Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-objections. An application was made for leave to appeal to the Supreme Comt and it\n\nw11s granted with reference to survey No. 86/2.\n\nThe law with regard to the determination of a lease by forfeiture is contained is section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. !Y't; nder that provision a lm1se is determined by forfeiture in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter, or in case the Jessee renounces his character as such by setting up tt title in a third person or by claiming title in himself, or the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may reenter on the happening of such event and a certain further act is done by the lessor as thereinafter mentioned.\n\nPrior to its amendment by Act XX of 1929, this sub-section further provided:-\n\n\"And in any .of these cases the lessor or his trans-\n\nJ.963 feree does some act showing his intention to determine -- the lease.\" l\\7amd~:a~; kman By Act XX of 1929, this sub-section was amended v. and the amended sub-section now reads:- Narmadabai A d ' f h h ] ] ' and Others. \" n m any o t ese cases t e essor or us transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intcn- Mahajan J. ti on to determine the lease.\" v' Section 111 (g) in terms makes the further act an integral condition of the forfeiture.\n\nIn other words, without this act there is no completed forfeiture at till. Under the old section an overt ftct evidencing the requisite intention \\yas essential. As the law stands today under the Act, notice in writing by the lftndlord is a condition cedent to ft forfeiture and the right of re-entry. Section 63 of Act XX of 1929, restricts the operation of this amendment to transfers of property nrnde ftfter 1st April, 1930. The lease in this case was executed before the Transfer of Property Act came into force in 1882. The amendment therefore made in this sub-section by Act XX of 1929 not being retrospective, cftnnot touch the present lease and it is also excluded from the reach of the Transfer of Property Act by the provisions of section 2.\n\nThe position was not seriously diputed in the High Court\n\nor before us that the statutory provisions of section ·\n\n11 l(g) as such cannot he made to govern the present lease which was executed in the year 1870. It was however strongly argued that the amendment made in 1929 to section lll(g) of the Act embodies ft principle of justice, equity and good conscience 11nd notwithstanding section 2 of the Act, that principle WftS applicable in this case and there can be no forfeiture unless notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease by the lessor had been given . ./It is ftxiomfttic that l he eonrts must apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to transactions which come up before them for determination even though the statutory provisions of the Transfer of\n\nSDPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19;3 Property Act are not made applicable t9 these transac-\n\n.J -L k tions. It follows therefore that the provisions of the anweo o man A h' ] b t t 't' f th 1 Lodhi ct w IC iare ut a sta u ory recogn1 rnn o e ru es\n\nv. of justice, equity and good conscience also govern\n\nNarmadaliai those transfers. ff, therefore, we are satisfied that and Othm. the particular principle to which the legislature has now given effect by the amendment to section lll(g) Mahajan J. did in fact represent a principle of justice, equity and good conscience, undoubtedly the case will have to be decided in accordance with the rule laid down in the section, although in express terms it has not been made applicable to leases executed prior to 1929 or even prior to the Transfer of Property Act coming into force.\n\nThe main point :'or consideration thus is whether the particular provision introduced in sub-section (g) of section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act in 1929 is but a statutory recognition of a principle of justice, equity and good conscience, or whether it is merely a procedural and technical rule introduced in the section by the legislature and is not based on any well established principles of equity. The High Court held, and we think rightly, that this provision in sub-section\n\n(g) of section 111 in regard to notice was not based upon any principle of justice, equity and good conscience. In the first instance it may be observed that it is erroneous to suppose \\hat every provision in the Transfer of Property Act and every amendment effected is necessarily based on principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It has to be seen in every case whether the particular provisions of the Act relied upon restates a known rule of equity or whether it is merely a new rule laid down by the legislature without reference to any rule of equity and what is the true nature and character of the rule.\n\nNow, so far as section lll(g) of the Act is concerned, the insistance therein that the notice should be given in writing is intrinsic evidence of the fact that the formality is merely statutory and it cannot trace its origin to any rule of equity. Equity does not concern itself with mere forms or modes of procedure. If the purpose of the rule as to notice is to indicate the intention of the lessor to\n\n' '\n\ndetermine the lease and to avail himself of the tenant's 1953 breach of covehant it could as effectively be achieved - b 1 . t' t' b 'tt . h t . Namdeo Lokman y an ora m 1ma 10n as ya wr1 en one wit ou m L dh' any way disturbing the mind of a chancery judge. :. ' The requirement as to written notice provided in the Narmadabai section therefore cannot be said to be based on any and Others. general rule of equity.\n\nThat it is not so is apparent from the circumstance that the requirement of a notice Mahajan J. in writing to complete a forfeiture has been dispensed with by the legislature in respect to leases executed before 1st April, 1930. Those leases are still governed by the unamended sub-section (g) of section 111. All that was required by that sub-section was that the lessor was to show his intention to determine the lease by some act indicating that intention. The principles of justice, equity and good conscience are not such a variable commodity, that they change and stand altered on a particular date on the mandate of the legislature and that to leases macle between 1882 and 1930 the principle of equity applicable is the one contained in sub-section (g) as it stood before 1929, and to leases executed after 1st April, 1930, the principle of equity is the one stated in the sub-section as it now stands. Question may also be posed, whether according to English law a notice is a necessary requisite to complete a forfeiture. ~\n\nThe English law on the subject is stated in Foa's General Law of Landlord and Tenant (7th edition) at page 316 in these terms :-\n\n\"In no case can the lessee take advantage of the proviso for re-entry in order to avoid the lease, even where it is in the form (not that the lessor may reenter, but) that the term shall cease, or that the lease shall be void for all purposes, or 'absolutely forfeited'; for expressions of this kind only mean that the tenancy shall determine at the option of the lessor ......... This has been usually expressed by saying that the lease is voidable and not void ; but the true principle appears to be that the lease does become void to all intents and purposes, though this is subject to the condition that the party who is seeking to set up its invalidity\n\nJ.)2\n\n1953 is not himself in default, for otherwise he would be\n\nN d--L , taking advantage of his own wrong. rt follows that an1 eo Oll'?nan • .\n\nLodhi where the proviso makes the lease v01d, the landlord v, must, in order to take advantage of it, do some un-\n\nNannadabai equivocal act notified to the lessee, indicating his intenand Others. tion to avail himself of the option given to him.\n\nThe service upon the lessee in possession of a writ in ei'ect- Mahajan J. ment is sufficient''.\n\nThe Law of Property Act, 1925, by section 146 has consolidated the law in Engln, nd on this subject. The provision with regard to the giving of notice before a right of re-entry accrues to the landlord is expressly excluded by sub-section (11) in cases of re-entry on forfeiture for non-payment of rent. In England it is not necessary in case of non-payment of rent for a landlord to give notice before a forfeiture results. It cannot, therefore, be said that what has been enacted in sub-section (g) of section 111 is a matter which even today in English law is considered as a matter of justice, equity and good conscience.\n\nIn English law the bringing of an action which corresponds to the institution of a suit in India is itself an act which is definitely regarded as evidencing an intention on the part of the lessor to determine a lease with regard to which there has been a breach of covenant entitling the lessor to re-enter : vide Toleman v. Portbury (1 ), and Prakashchandra Das v. Rajendranath Basu(').\n\nIn India there is a substantial body of judicial authority for the prnposition that in respect of leases made before the Transfer of Property Act forfeiture is incurred when there is a disclaimer of title or there is non-payment of rent.\n\nAny subsequent act of the landlord electing to take advantage of a forfeiture is not a condition precedent to the right of action for ejectment. The bringing by a landlord of a suit for ejectrnent is simply a mode of manifesting his election.\n\nThe principle of these cases rests upon the ground that the forfeiture lli complete when the breach of the condition or the denial of title occurs. But as it is left to the lessor's optwn to take advantage of it or not, the\n\n(1) L.R. 6 q.B. 245.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS lOHI\n\nelection is not a condition precedent to the right of 1953 action and the' i1rntitution of the action is a sufficient -- c t t\" f th J t\" TJ • l Nmndco Lokmun ma1111es a 1011 o e e ec 1011. le same prmmp e 1s L di . a pp lied for actions for relief on the grnund of fraud. ~\"\" [vide Padmanabhaya v. Ranga(1); Korapalu v. Nara- Narmndabai yana(')].\n\nIn Rama Aiyangar v. Gurusami Chetty('), and Others. it was said that as the lease was not governed by the Transfer of Property Act, the institution of the suit JtahaJan .r. was a sufficient determination of the lease and no other previous act determining the same such as a notice to quit was necessary for maintaining the action. The same view was expressed in V enkatachari\n\nv. Rangasami Aiyar(').\n\nIn Venkatarama Aiyar v.\n\nPonnuswami Padayachi(\"), it was observed that the forfeiture will not be produced merely by the unilateral act of ceasing to comply with the conditions upon which the property is held, but it must involve also some expression of intention to enforce the forfeiture on the part of the lessor. In other words, the lessee cannot by his unilateral act terminate the lease and cannot take advantage of his own wrong. That is an intelligible principle and is based on a maxim of equity.\n\nBut the defaulting lessee cannot claim the benefit of a notice in writing to complete the forfeiture he has incurred. The lessor has to simply express an intention that he is going to avail of the forfeiture and that can be done by the filing of a suit, as in English law, in all cases not governed by the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nAgain in Ramakrishiw Mallaya v. Baburaya (\"), it was said that in an ejectment suit based on leases executed prior to the Transfer of Property Act, no act on the part of the landlord showing that ho elected to take advantage of the forfeiture for non-payment of rent was necessary. The contrary view expressed in Nourang Singh v. Jancirda.n Kishor('), that the institution of a suit for cjectment could not be regard- • ed as a requisite act to show the intention of a\n\n(1) (1911) l, L.R. 34 'lad. r6r.\n\n(21 (1915) l.L.H. 38 'lad. 445,\n\n(3) (1918) 35 M.L.J. 129.\n\n(4) (1919) 361\\l.L.J. 532.\n\n(5) A.LR. 1935 i\\lad. 918.\n\n(6) (1914) 24 I.C. 139.\n\n(7) (1918) l.L.R. 45 Cal. 469.\n\n1953 landlord to determine a lease within the meaning ef sec- N de--;, k tion 111 (g}, was dissented from in Prakashchandra\n\nam ;,.dh; man Das v. Rajendranath Basu(1); and it was said that\n\nv. there is no special reason why the lessor's election\n\nNarmadaba.i must be made at some time prior to the institution\n\nand Others. of a suit and that it was difficult to find a raison d'etre for the view that the cause of action has not com- Mahajan J. pletely accrued if the election is made at the moment when the suit is instituted, i.e., the moment the plaint is presented. The cause of action for the suit can arise simultaneously with the presentation of a plaint.\n\nIn our opinion the provision as to notice in writing as a preliminary to a suit for ejectment based on forfeiture of a lease is not based on any principle of justice, equity or good conscience and cannot govern leases made prior to the coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or to leases executed prior to 1st April, 1930. The rights and obligations under those leases have to be determined according to the rules oflaw prevailing at the time and the only rule applicable seems to be that a tenant cannot by his unilateral act and by his own wrong determine the lease unless the lessor gives an indication by some unequivocal expression of intention on his part of taking advantage of the breach. On no principle of equity is a tenant entitled to a notice in writing telling him that the lease has been determined. The High Court was therefore right in the view that it took of the matter and there are no valid reasons for taking a contrary view.\n\nConsiderable reliance was placed by Mr. Daphtary on the decision of Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. sitting singly in the case of Uniar Pulavar v. Dawood Rowther( 2}, wherein the learned Judge said that section 111 (g) as amended in 1929 em bodied a principle of justice, equity and good conscience and must be • held to govern even agricultural leases and where there was a forfeiture by denial of the landlord's title, a notice in writing determining the lease was necessary.\n\nIt was there observed that the principle so embodied\n\n(1) (1931) l.L.R. ; S Cal. 1359,\n\n(z) A.LR. 1947 lad. 68.\n\nin the sub-section as a result of the amendment\n\n19SJ becomes, so to say, a principle of justice, equity and - d Th l d J d i: h' .\n\nNamdeo Lokman goo conscience. e earne u ge 1or t 1s vww L di . placed reliance on the decision in Krishna Shetti v.\n\n0v.\" Gilbert Pinto('), in which it was said that the Transfer Narwulabai of Property Act was framed by eminent English lawand Others. yers to reproduce the rules of English law, in so far as\n\nthey are of general application and rest on principle as Mahajan J, well as authority and its provisions are binding on us as rules of justice, equity and good conscience. vVith respect, we are constrained to observe that this is too broad a statement to make. It seems that the attention of the learned judges was not drawn to the fact that the provision as to notice for determining a lease for non-payment of rent was not a part of the English law. It also does not seem to have been fully appreciated that the rule enunciated in sub-section (g) of section 111 prior to its amendment in 1929 and which still governs leases executed before 1st April, 1930, on the reasoning of the decision would also be a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and according to it the institution of a suit for ejectment would be sufficient indication on the part of the landlord for determination of the lease and a notice in writing as required by the amended section would not be a prerequisite for institution of such a suit. In our judgment, this case was wrongly decided and we are unable to support it.\n\nAs pointed out by Napier J. in Krishna Shetti v.\n\nGilbert Pinto (1), the courts should be very careful in applying statutory provisions and the assistance of the Transfer of Property Act as a guide on matters which have been excluded from the purview of the Act by express words should not be invoked, unless the provisions of the Act embody principles of general application.\n\nMr. Daphtary also placed reliance on certain observations contained in the ]foll Bench decision Brahinayya\n\nv. Sundarainina (2 ). There it was said that although section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not\n\n(r) (I9I9) l.L.R. 42 lad. 654.\n\n(2) A.I.R. r948 lllad. 275.\n\nio22\n\n' ' ,. .,- SUPl'tEME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 apply to leases for agricultural purp<!sc by virtue of --L k section 117 of the Act, neveitheless the rules in seu- Naindeo o man . 10(' d. ti ] . ( . 105 t llf') L dhi tion J an m 10 ot 1er sect10ns seot10ns o J 0 v. in Chapter V of the Act are founded upon reason and Narmadubai equity and they are the prinuiples of English law and aud Others. should be adopted as the statement of the hiw in India applicable v.Jso to agricultuml leases. In our 1l!ahujanJ. h 1. 1 opinion, t e auove statement is again formu ated in too wide a language. Section 105 gives a statutory definition of the word \"lease''. It enunciates no principle of equity. The relation of lessor and lessee is one of contract and in Bacon's Abridgement a lease is defined as a contract between the lessor and the lessee for the possession and profits of land on the one side and recompense by rent or other consideration on the other. The statute has given a more comprehensive definition of the term.\n\nSection 107 makes registration of a lease compulsory. This section again does not concern itself with any principle o~ justice or equity.\n\nSection 108 (j) enacts that the lessee may transfer absolutely by way of mortgage or sublease the whole or any part of his interest in the property and any transferee of such interest or part may again transfer it. The l:J, w in India and England on this subject is not the same and it cannot be said that this sub-section enacts or enunciates any general principle of equity. Pads of sections 109, 110 and 111 contain mere rules of procedmc or rules of a technical nature. These certainly cannot be said to be based on any principles of equity. In our judgment, thcrcforn, the statement in this decision that sections 105 to 116 of the Transfer of Property Act are founded upon principles of reason and equity cannot be accepted either as correct or precise. Of comse, to the extent that those sections of the Act give statutory recognition to principles of justice, equity aml good conscience they are applicable also to cases not governed by the Act.\n\nReference was also made to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Tatya Sada Suwrik v. Yeshwanta Kondiba Mulay ( 1 ) where it was said that the\n\n(1) (1950) 52 Bom. L.R. 909.\n\nprinciple embodied in section 11 l (g) of the Transfer of 19o3 Property Act that in the case of forfeiture by denial N a-:;: k of landlord's title a notice in writing determining the am ~:ai.: man lease must be given is a principle of justice, equity and v. good conscience which must be held to govern even Narmadabai agricultural leases. In that case it was contended that and Other•. following upon forfeiture which had been incurred a Mahajan J. suit was filed by the plaintiffs in eviction and nothing more needed to be done by the plaintiffs. For this contention reliance was placed on two earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court, Venlccji Krishna Nadlcarni\n\nv. Lalcshrnan Devji Kanclar (1) and Viclyavardha, lc Sanu Co. v. Avva, ppa ('). This contention was negatived in view of the decision of Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. above referred to, and also in view of a binding decision of a-\n\nDivision Bench of that court in Mahibooblchan, Wuracllchan v. Ghanashyarn Jarnnaji('). The learned Chief .Justice in the judgment under appeal has explained the distinction between the present case and that case and has not followed his own earlier decision in arriving at his conclusions here.\n\nWith respect we think that that decision did not state the law on the point correctly.\n\nUnder English law the institution of a suit for ejectment haH always been considered an unequivocal act on the part of the landlord for taking advantage of the default of the tenant and for enforcing the forfeiture in case of non-payment of rent, and even in other cases except where statutory provisions were made to the contrary.\n\nReference was also made to the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Aclitycc Prasad v.\n\nRmnratan Lal('). Their Lordships dealing with the question whether a certain document created a charge upon a village observed that the appellant could not redeem it without paying both the mortgage debt and the amount subsequently raised mid it was said that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act on the point were identical with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The observation made in that case must he limited to that case and cannot be\n\n(r) (1896) I.LR. 2a B01n. 354 F.B.\n\n(2) (1925) 27 Born. L.R. II52.\n\n(3) Unreported.\n\n(4) (1930) 57 I.A. 17~.\n\n1953 held as applicable i.o all cases irrespective of the nature - of the provisions involved. Similar observations are Nmndeo Lokman . d h d · fth J d h. fth Lodhi contame m anot er e01s10n o en or s 1ps o e v.\n\nPrivy Council in Muhammad Raza v. Abbas Bandi Bibi xa,,, wdabai ('), which concerned the provisions of section 10 of the and Othm.\n\nTransfer of Property Act which recognizes the validity of a partial restriction upon a power of disposition in Mahajan J. the case of a transfer inter vivas. It was held that there was no authority tha.t a different principle applied in India before the Act was passed and that under English law a partial restriction was not repugnant even in the case of a testamentary gift.\n\nLastly, Mr. Daphtary drew our attention to the . decision in Roberts v. Davey('), which relates to a licence. There it was observed that it was necessarv for the licensor to have done some act showing his inte11tion to determine the licence and until such act was shown, it contimrnd in force. Littledale J. in this case said that the instrument was \"a mere licence to dig, and did not pass the land. An actual entry, therefore, was unnecessary to avoid it; but by analogy to what is required to be dm;, e in order to determine a freehold lease which, by the terms of it, is to be void on the non-performance of covenants, it seems to follow that, to put an end to this licence, the grantor should have given notice of his intention so to do\". The basis of the decision was that some act amounting to an exercise of the option had to be proved before the licence was determined.\n\nThis decision therefore does not in any way affect the decision of the High Court in this case.\n\nOn the questio:i. whether the tenant should have been given relief against forfeiture the High Court held that the matter was one of discretion and both the lower courts had exercised their discretion against the appellant and that being so, unless they were satisfied that the discretion was not judicially exercised or was exercised without proper materials they would not ordinarily interfere with it in second appeal. It was said that the non-payment in this case seems to have\n\n'1) (19:;2) 59 I.A. 236.\n\n(z) IIo E.R, 606,\n\nbecome chronic and that this was not a case for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction.\n\nN a1ndeo Lok1nan Mr. Daphtary contended that the High Court Ladhi failed to appreciate the rule applicable for the exercise of the discretion in such cases and that the rule is that if at the time relief is asked for the position has been altered so that relief cannot be given without causing injury to third parties relief will be refused, but if that position is not altered so that no injustice will be done there is no real discretion and the court should make the order and give the relief. Reference was made to the decision of Page J. in Debendralal Khan v. F.M. A. Cohen (1), 111herein it was said that the court normally would grant relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent under section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act and that if the sum required under the section was paid or tendered to the lessor at the hearing of the suit the court has no discretion in the matter and must grant relief to the tenant. We do not think that the learned Judges intended to lay down any hardand fast rule. Indeed the learned Judge proceeded to observe as follows :-\n\n\"In exercising the discretion wjth which it is invested under section 114 a court in India is not bound by the practice of a court of Chancery in England, and I am not disposed to limit the discretion that it possesses.\n\nThose who seek equity must do equity, and I do not think merely because a tenant complies with the conditions laid down in section 114 that he becomes entitled as of right to relief.\"\n\nIn our opinion, in exercising the discretion, each case must be judged by itself, the delay, the conduct of the parties and the difficulties to which the landlord has been put should be weighed against the tenant.\n\nThis was the view taken by the Madras High Court in Appayn Shetty v. Mohnmmad Beari (2), and the matter was discussed at some length. We agree with the ratio of that decision. It is a maxim of equity that a person\n\n(1) (1927) I.L.R,54 Cal. 485.\n\n(2) (19r6) 1.L.R, 39 Mad. 834.\n\nJJJ\n\nN arm, adabai and Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n1953 who comes in equity must do equity and must come\n\n\" 1-; k with clean hands and if the conduct of the tenant is \"amreo M man ] h d' . 1 h l' f . . h Lodhi sue l t at it rnentit es im to re ie m eqmty, t en v. the court's hands arc not tied to exercise it in his\n\nNarm.arfolwi favour.\n\nReference in this connection may also be and Others. made to Ramakrishna JY!allya v. Baburaya( 1), and Ramabrahmam v. Rmni Reddi ('). lr.1 ahafar1 J.\n\nThe argument of Mr. Daphtary that there was no real discretion in the court and relief could not be refused except in cases where third p!trty interests intervene is completely negatived by the decision of the House of Lords in Hyman v. Rose (3). Relief was claimed , in that case under the provisions of section 14(2) of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, agftinst forfeiture for breaches of covenant in the lease.\n\nThe appellants offered as the terms on which relief should be granted to deposit a sum sufficient to ensure the restoration of the premises to their former condition at the end of the term and make full restitution. It was argued that tho matter was one of discretion and the court should lean to relieve a tenant against forfeiture and if full recompense can be made to the landlord the relief should be granted. Lord Lore burn in delivering the opinion of the House observed as follows:- \"I desire in the first instance to point out that the discretion given by the section is very wide. The court is to consider all the circumstances and the conduct of the parties. Now it seems to me that when the Act is so express to provide a wide discretion, .meaning, no doubt, to prevent one man from forfeiting what in fair dealing belongs to some one else, by taking advantage of a breach from which he is not commensurately and irreparably damaged, it is not advisable to lay down any rigid rules for guiding that discretion. I do not doubt that the rules enunciated by the Master of the Rolls in the present case are useful maxims in general, and that in general they reflect the point of view from which judges would regard\n\n(r) (1914) 24 J.C. IJ9•\n\n(2) A.LR. 1928 Mad. 250.\n\nan application for relief.\n\nBut I think it ought to be 1953 distinctly understood that there may be cases in - h. h ll f th b d' d d If Namdeo Lokman w IC any or a o em may e 1sregar e . it L dh. were otherwise the free discretion given by the statute\n\n0v.' would be fettered by limitations which have nowhere Narmadabai been enacted. It is one thing to decide what is the and Othera. true meaning of the language contained in an Act of Parliament. It is quite a different thing to place Mahajan' conditions upon a free discretion entrusted by statute to the court where the conditions are not based upon statutory enactment at all. It is not safe, I think, to say that the court must and will always insist upon certain things when the Act does not require them, and the facts of some unforeseen case may make the court wish it had kept a free hand.\"\n\nWith great respect we think that the observations cited above contain sound principles of law. We are, therefore, unable to accede to the contention of Mr.\n\nDaphtary that though section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act confers a discretion on the court, that discretion except in cases where third party interests intervene must always be exercised in favour of the tcnaut irrespective of the conduct of the tenant. It is clear that in this case the tenant is a recalcitrant tenant and is a habitual defaulter. For the best part of 25 years he has never paid rent without being sued in court. Rent has been in arrears at times for six years, at other times for three years and at other times for four years and so on, and every time the landlord had to file a suit in ejcctment which was always resisted on false defences.\n\nNo rule of equity, justice or good conscience can be invoked in the case of a tenant of this description. He cannot always be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and to plead relief against forfeiture on every occasion, particularly when he was warned by the court of appeal on a previous occasion. He had already had relief three times on equitable grounds and it is time that the court withheld its hands and ordered his ejcctment. In this situation the High Court was fully justified in finding that in second appeal it would not interfere with the\n\nSUPREME COURT HEFORTS [1953]\n\n1953 c:liscretion of the courts below in re.(using to grant ,, d--L ' relief against forfeiture . ..L\\ ani ea 011.'m, an Lodhi The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is v. dismissed with costs.\n\nNaNnadabai\n\nan; d Others.\n\nMa, y 7.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for appellant: R. A. Govind.\n\nAgent for respondents: Rajinder Narain.\n\nNATIONAL SEWING THREAD CO. LTD. v.\n\nJAMES CHADvVICK & BROS. LTD. (J. & P. COATS LTD., Assignee) REGISTHAR OF THADE MAHKS-Intervener. [MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, VIVIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]\n\nTrade Marks Act, 1940, ss. 8, 76-Application for registration of trade mark -Dismissal by Registrar -Appeal to High Co11rt-\n\nJttdgment of Single Jnd.ge--TVhether appealable to Division Bench- Lettcrs Patent (Bombay), cl. 15--Government of India Act, 1915, s. ZOS-Constit11tion of India, 1950, s. 226-Power of Registrar w reject application if nirirk is likely to deceive ot cause confusion- Decision in passina ofl action, whether conclitisivc.\n\nSection 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, provides that an appeal shall lie from any decision of the Registrar under the Act or the rules made thereunder, to the High Court having jurisdiction, but the Act did not make any provision with regard to the procedure to be followed by the High Court in the appeal or as to whether the order of bhe High Court was appealable: Held, that the High Court had to exercise its appellate jurisdiction under s. 76 of the Act in the same manner as it exercised its other appellate jurisdiction, and \\vhen such jurisdiction was exercised by\n\na Single Judge, his judgment was appealable under cl. 15 of the\n\nletters Patent.\n\nNational Televhone Co. v. Postmaster General ([l 913] A.C. 546), R. M.A. R. A. Adaikavva Chettiar v. Ra. Chandrasekham Thevor (74 I.A. 264), Secretary of State v. Chellikani Ram'\" Rao (I.L.R. 39 Mad. 617) referred to.\n\nThe power conferred by s. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, on tbe High Courts, of making rules for the exercise of their jurisdiction by Single Judges or by Divisio~ Courts could be exercised not only in respect to such jurisdiction", "total_entities": 135, "entities": [{"text": "S. Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for appellant: S. Subramaniam."}}, {"text": "M.S.K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 211, "end_char": 226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondent : M.S.K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "NAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 229, "end_char": 248, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NARMADABAI AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 250, "end_char": 271, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARMADABAI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 273, "end_char": 291, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 296, "end_char": 309, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Maintainability- Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 493, "end_char": 534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 111( g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 568, "end_char": 578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintainability- Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Maintainability- Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 822, "end_char": 852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1st April, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 993, "end_char": 1008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provision as to notice in writing of the lessor's intention to determine the lease, containei1 in section l ll(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as amended in 1929, is not based on any princjple of justice, equity or good con; cience and is not applicable to leases executed prior to 1st April, 1930."}}, {"text": "Where a lease deed executed before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1011, "end_char": 1080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1526, "end_char": 1529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Where a lease deed executed before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "Where a lease deed executed before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Bud Wit Satyanarayana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2229, "end_char": 2250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bud Wit Satyanarayana and Others\n\nKonduru Venkatapayya\n\nand Other\"~.\n\nFeb. 27."}}, {"text": "Konduru Venkatapayya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2263, "end_char": 2283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bud Wit Satyanarayana and Others\n\nKonduru Venkatapayya\n\nand Other\"~.\n\nFeb. 27."}}, {"text": "Chagla C. J.\n\nNamd", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COUR, T REPORTS [l!l53]\n\nJ%3 Court of Judicature at Bombay ,(Chagla C. J.\n\nNamd; a- Lokmanand Gajendragadkar J.) in Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2771, "end_char": 2782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (.!.", "canonical_name": "K. Daphtary"}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2817, "end_char": 2830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2862, "end_char": 2876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2963, "end_char": 2970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan J"}}, {"text": "High Court. of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3034, "end_char": 3069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I from the decree of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Mundhava", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3291, "end_char": 3299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "86 /2 at Mundhava in Poona district."}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3303, "end_char": 3308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "86 /2 at Mundhava in Poona district."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3437, "end_char": 3461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3604, "end_char": 3628, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Vinayakbhat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3926, "end_char": 3937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present respondents arethe daughter and grandsons of the original plaintiff Vinayakbhat.", "canonical_name": "Vinayakbhat Narmadabai"}}, {"text": "Ramabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3963, "end_char": 3970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His adoptive mother was Ramabai."}}, {"text": "1st July, 1863", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4147, "end_char": 4161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st July, 1863, Ramabai, while she was in financial difficulties, passed a permanent lease of both these numbers to one Ladha Ibrahim Sheth."}}, {"text": "Ladha Ibrahim Sheth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st July, 1863, Ramabai, while she was in financial difficulties, passed a permanent lease of both these numbers to one Ladha Ibrahim Sheth.", "canonical_name": "Ladha Ibrahim Sheth"}}, {"text": "18th August, Narmadabai 1870", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4709, "end_char": 4737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 18th August, Narmadabai 1870, Ladha Ibrahim sold his tenancy rights to one and Oth'\"· Girdhari Bala ram Lodhi for Rs."}}, {"text": "Ladha Ibrahim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4739, "end_char": 4752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 18th August, Narmadabai 1870, Ladha Ibrahim sold his tenancy rights to one and Oth'\"· Girdhari Bala ram Lodhi for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ladha Ibrahim Sheth"}}, {"text": "Mahajan J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4907, "end_char": 4916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale deed provided that in default of payment of rent to Ramabai or Mahajan J, her heirs, the purchaser would have no rights whatsoever left over the property.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan J"}}, {"text": "Seth Girdhari Balaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5318, "end_char": 5339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and the other defendants are the grandsons of Seth Girdhari Balaram."}}, {"text": "II Class Sub-Judge, Poona", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5591, "end_char": 5616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "99 of 1913 in the coµrt of the II Class Sub-Judge, Poona, against the present defendants for possession of the demised premises on the ground of forfeiture."}}, {"text": "Vinayakbhat Narmadabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6925, "end_char": 6947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 through his pleader sent a notice to Vinayakbhat Narmadabai to come and take the arrears of rent.", "canonical_name": "Vinayakbhat Narmadabai"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7067, "end_char": 7074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He agreed and\n\ntind Othe<•. accepted the arrears of rent and the forfeiture was\n\nMahajan J. again waived.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan J"}}, {"text": "I Class Sub-Judge at Poona", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7446, "end_char": 7472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "982 of 1938 in the court of the I Class Sub-Judge at Poona against all the present defendants for possession of survey Nos."}}, {"text": "28th January, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8421, "end_char": 8439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The default which has given rise to the present suit occurred on 28th January, 1941, and the plaintiff filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for possession on the ground of forfeiture and for the arrears of rent which remained unpaid."}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10271, "end_char": 10282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10301, "end_char": 10312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10607, "end_char": 10618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lodhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11317, "end_char": 11322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lodhi one acre whrnh e took possess10n on 13th September,\n\n1943."}}, {"text": "13th September,\n\n1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11359, "end_char": 11380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lodhi one acre whrnh e took possess10n on 13th September,\n\n1943."}}, {"text": "District Judge of Poona", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11571, "end_char": 11594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 alone filed an appeal to the District Judge of Poona."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11928, "end_char": 11938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11954, "end_char": 11965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11977, "end_char": 12001, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12119, "end_char": 12143, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12366, "end_char": 12400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 filed tL second appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Supreme Comt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12594, "end_char": 12606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application was made for leave to appeal to the Supreme Comt and it\n\nw11s granted with reference to survey No."}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12746, "end_char": 12757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12769, "end_char": 12793, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "By Act XX of 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13521, "end_char": 13538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Narmadabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13612, "end_char": 13622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l\\7amd~:a~; kman By Act XX of 1929, this sub-section was amended v. and the amended sub-section now reads:- Narmadabai A d ' f h h ] ] ' and Others. \""}}, {"text": "Section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13801, "end_char": 13812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By Act XX of 1929", "statute": "By Act XX of 1929"}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14192, "end_char": 14202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By Act XX of 1929", "statute": "By Act XX of 1929"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14366, "end_char": 14390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14586, "end_char": 14610, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14632, "end_char": 14641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15029, "end_char": 15038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16235, "end_char": 16259, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", 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'", "canonical_name": "NAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI"}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18516, "end_char": 18527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19298, "end_char": 19301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nThe English law on the subject is stated in Foa's General Law of Landlord and Tenant (7th edition) at page 316 in these terms :-\n\n\"In no case can the lessee take advantage of the proviso for re-entry in order to avoid the lease, even where it is in the form (not that the lessor may reenter, but) that the term shall cease, or that the lease shall be void for all purposes, or 'absolutely forfeited'; for expressions of this kind only mean that the tenancy shall determine at the option of the lessor ......... This has been usually expressed by saying that the lease is voidable and not void ; but the true principle appears to be that the lease does become void to all intents and purposes, though this is subject to the condition that the party who is seeking to set up its invalidity\n\nJ.)2\n\n1953 is not himself in default, for otherwise he would be\n\nN d--L , taking advantage of his own wrong."}}, {"text": "Law of Property Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20537, "end_char": 20562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20567, "end_char": 20578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Law of Property Act, 1925", "statute": "The Law of Property Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Engln", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20607, "end_char": 20612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law of Property Act, 1925, by section 146 has consolidated the law in Engln, nd on this subject."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20840, "end_char": 20847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England it is not necessary in case of non-payment of rent for a landlord to give notice before a forfeiture results."}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21037, "end_char": 21048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Law of Property Act, 1925", "statute": "The Law of Property Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21251, "end_char": 21256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In English law the bringing of an action which corresponds to the institution of a suit in India is itself an act which is definitely regarded as evidencing an intention on the part of the lessor to determine a lease with regard to which there has been a breach of covenant entitling the lessor to re-enter : vide Toleman v. Portbury (1 ), and Prakashchandra Das v. Rajendranath Basu(')."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21670, "end_char": 21694, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22770, "end_char": 22794, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23878, "end_char": 23902, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24027, "end_char": 24051, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prakashchandra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24691, "end_char": 24705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1953 landlord to determine a lease within the meaning ef sec- N de--;, k tion 111 (g}, was dissented from in Prakashchandra\n\nam ;,.dh; man Das v. Rajendranath Basu(1); and it was said that\n\nv. there is no special reason why the lessor's election\n\nNarmadaba.i must be made at some time prior to the institution\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25507, "end_char": 25537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26253, "end_char": 26261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. Daphtary on the decision of Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. sitting singly in the case of Uniar Pulavar v. Dawood Rowther( 2}, wherein the learned Judge said that section 111 (g) as amended in 1929 em bodied a principle of justice, equity and good conscience and must be • held to govern even agricultural leases and where there was a forfeiture by denial of the landlord's title, a notice in writing determining the lease was necessary.", "canonical_name": "K. Daphtary"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26281, "end_char": 26301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Considerable reliance was placed by Mr. Daphtary on the decision of Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. sitting singly in the case of Uniar Pulavar v. Dawood Rowther( 2}, wherein the learned Judge said that section 111 (g) as amended in 1929 em bodied a principle of justice, equity and good conscience and must be • held to govern even agricultural leases and where there was a forfeiture by denial of the landlord's title, a notice in writing determining the lease was necessary."}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26408, "end_char": 26419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27791, "end_char": 27802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Napier", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28359, "end_char": 28365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Napier J. in Krishna Shetti v.\n\nGilbert Pinto (1), the courts should be very careful in applying statutory provisions and the assistance of the Transfer of Property Act as a guide on matters which have been excluded from the purview of the Act by express words should not be invoked, unless the provisions of the Act embody principles of general application."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28503, "end_char": 28527, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28881, "end_char": 28892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28900, "end_char": 28924, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29111, "end_char": 29122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter V of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29271, "end_char": 29291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29591, "end_char": 29602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "Bacon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29752, "end_char": 29757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relation of lessor and lessee is one of contract and in Bacon's Abridgement a lease is defined as a contract between the lessor and the lessee for the possession and profits of land on the one side and recompense by rent or other consideration on the other."}}, {"text": "Section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30022, "end_char": 30033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30161, "end_char": 30172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "sections 109, 110 and 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30546, "end_char": 30571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 105 to 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30771, "end_char": 30790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30798, "end_char": 30822, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31163, "end_char": 31180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was also made to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Tatya Sada Suwrik v. Yeshwanta Kondiba Mulay ( 1 ) where it was said that the\n\n(1) (1950) 52 Bom."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31315, "end_char": 31325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33293, "end_char": 33317, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33793, "end_char": 33796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33910, "end_char": 33920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33939, "end_char": 33963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Littledale", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34611, "end_char": 34621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Littledale J. in this case said that the instrument was \"a mere licence to dig, and did not pass the land."}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36610, "end_char": 36621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36629, "end_char": 36653, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37049, "end_char": 37060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37331, "end_char": 37342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37639, "end_char": 37656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was the view taken by the Madras High Court in Appayn Shetty v. Mohnmmad Beari (2), and the matter was discussed at some length."}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38675, "end_char": 38688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conveyancing Act, 1881", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38696, "end_char": 38718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39199, "end_char": 39203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Lore burn in delivering the opinion of the House observed as follows:- \"I desire in the first instance to point out that the discretion given by the section is very wide."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40491, "end_char": 40501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "true meaning of the language contained in an Act of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40542, "end_char": 40549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is quite a different thing to place Mahajan' conditions upon a free discretion entrusted by statute to the court where the conditions are not based upon statutory enactment at all.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan J"}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41085, "end_char": 41096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41104, "end_char": 41128, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "NaNnadabai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42533, "end_char": 42543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NaNnadabai\n\nan; d Others."}}, {"text": "R. A. Govind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 42610, "end_char": 42622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for appellant: R. A. Govind."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 42648, "end_char": 42663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondents: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "NATIONAL SEWING THREAD CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42666, "end_char": 42696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NATIONAL SEWING THREAD CO."}}, {"text": "JAMES CHADvVICK & BROS. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42702, "end_char": 42729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nJAMES CHADvVICK & BROS."}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42800, "end_char": 42819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, VIVIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42821, "end_char": 42832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, VIVIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHA DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42838, "end_char": 42852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, VIVIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42859, "end_char": 42880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 8, 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42882, "end_char": 42891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "cl. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43076, "end_char": 43082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43084, "end_char": 43113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43152, "end_char": 43158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Section 76(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43305, "end_char": 43318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43326, "end_char": 43347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43752, "end_char": 43757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "cl. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43934, "end_char": 43940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44208, "end_char": 44214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44222, "end_char": 44251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1028_1048_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "SUPREME COURT HEFORTS [1953]\n\n1953 c:liscretion of the courts below in re.(using to grant ,, d--L ' relief against forfeiture . ..L\\ ani ea 011.'m, an Lodhi The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is v. dismissed with costs.\n\nNaNnadabai\n\nan; d Others.\n\nMa, y 7.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for appellant: R. A. Govind.\n\nAgent for respondents: Rajinder Narain.\n\nNATIONAL SEWING THREAD CO. LTD. v.\n\nJAMES CHADvVICK & BROS. LTD. (J. & P. COATS LTD., Assignee) REGISTHAR OF THADE MAHKS-Intervener. [MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, VIVIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]\n\nTrade Marks Act, 1940, ss. 8, 76-Application for registration of trade mark -Dismissal by Registrar -Appeal to High Co11rt-\n\nJttdgment of Single Jnd.ge--TVhether appealable to Division Bench- Lettcrs Patent (Bombay), cl. 15--Government of India Act, 1915, s. ZOS-Constit11tion of India, 1950, s. 226-Power of Registrar w reject application if nirirk is likely to deceive ot cause confusion- Decision in passina ofl action, whether conclitisivc.\n\nSection 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, provides that an appeal shall lie from any decision of the Registrar under the Act or the rules made thereunder, to the High Court having jurisdiction, but the Act did not make any provision with regard to the procedure to be followed by the High Court in the appeal or as to whether the order of bhe High Court was appealable: Held, that the High Court had to exercise its appellate jurisdiction under s. 76 of the Act in the same manner as it exercised its other appellate jurisdiction, and \\vhen such jurisdiction was exercised by\n\na Single Judge, his judgment was appealable under cl. 15 of the\n\nletters Patent.\n\nNational Televhone Co. v. Postmaster General ([l 913] A.C. 546), R. M.A. R. A. Adaikavva Chettiar v. Ra. Chandrasekham Thevor (74 I.A. 264), Secretary of State v. Chellikani Ram'\" Rao (I.L.R. 39 Mad. 617) referred to.\n\nThe power conferred by s. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, on tbe High Courts, of making rules for the exercise of their jurisdiction by Single Judges or by Divisio~ Courts could be exercised not only in respect to such jurisdiction\n\nas the High Court~ possessed when the Act of 1016 came into 1933 force but also in respect of jurisdictions conferred on the High -- Court by subsequent legislation, e.g., s. 76 of the Trade :\\larks Act . .Vational Sewing\n\nCoder the rules of construction enunciated in s. 8 of the Thread Go. Ltd.\n\nGenernl Clauses Act and s. 38 of the Interpretation Act, which v. . are of general application, the reference to s. 108 of the Govern Jrunes Chadwick ment of India Act, 1915, in cl. 15 of the Letters Patent should, awl Bros. Ltd. after the enactment of the Constitution of 1950, be read as reference to the corresponding provisions of art. 225 of the Constitution.\n\nThe ambit of the power conferred on the High Courts by s. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, is not limited by s. 106(1) of the said Act or by cl. 16 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court.\n\nIndian Electric Works v. RIJ!listrar of Trade Marks (A.LR. 194 7 Cal. 49) overruled.\n\nSecretary of State v. Jlask & Co. (67 I.A. 222) and the Gttrdwara Case (63 I.A. 180) distinguished.\n\nThe respondents, a company registered in England, manufactured sewing thread with the device of an Eagle with outspread wings kno\\vn as the \"Eagle l\\fark\" as their trade mark, and since 1896 this thread was being sold in the Indian markets on an ex-\n\nLensi \\'e scale.\n\nThe appellants, a company registered in India, began in 1940 to sell sewing thread with the device of a bird resembling an eagle with wings fully spread out with the words\n\n\"Eagle Brand\" as their mark.\n\nOn the objection of the respondents the appellants subsequently changed the name to \"Vulture Brand\" without changing the mark in other respects. The respondents instituted an action against the appellants for passing off, but that was dismissed.\n\nThe appellants subsequently applied for registration of their trade mark but their application was dismissed by the Registrar on the ground that the appellants' mark so nearly resembled the respondents' mark as to be likely to deceive the public and cause confusion.\n\nThis order was reversed by a Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay but restored on appeal by a Division Bench: Held (i) that the judgment of the Division Bench upholding the order of the Registrar rejecting the application, on the ground that the mark was likely to deceive and cause confusion, was right;\n\n(ii) that the considerations relevant in a passing off action are somewhat different from those which are relevant in an application for registration of a trade mark under the Trade Marks Act, and the earlier judgment of the High Court in the action for passing off \\Vas not conclusive on the matter. ·\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 135 of 19.52.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 19th March, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at\n\nl030 siJ:PREME coun:r REPORTS [1953j\n\n19;3 Bombay in Appeal No. 95 of 1950 aiising from the . - . Order dated the 28th August, 1950, of the said High\n\n~~~' 0 ':;/0\n\n8'\"/::i;9 Court exercising its Ordinary Original Civil J urisdicre v. o. tion in Civil Miscellaneous No. 2 of 1950.\n\nJames Oluuiwick Bishan Narain (Sri Narain Andley with him) for and Bros. Ltd. the appellants.\n\n11:!. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for Indi.a, and G. K. Daphtary, Solicitor.General for India (J. B.\n\nDadachanji, with them) for the respondents.\n\nRegistrar of 'l'rade JYJarlcs in person.\n\n1953. May 7.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal on a certificate under section lO!J( c ), Civil Procedure Code, from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay reversing the judgment of Mr. Justice S. C. Shah in Civil Miscellaneous No. 2 of 1950 and restoring the order of the Registrar of 'l'ra.de Marks refusing to register the appellants' trade mark.\n\n'l'he two questions that were canvassed before us and that fall for our determination are (1) whether the judgment of Mr. Justice Shah was subjeut to appeal under clause 15 of the Lettern Patent of the Bombay High Court and (2) whether Mr. Justice Shah was right in interfering w[th the discretion exercised by tho Registrar in refusing registration of the appellants' mark. 'l'he relevant facts shortly stnted are these. 'l'he appellants are a limited liability compnny incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, having their registered office at Chidambaram, South Arcot District, in the Province of Mndras and carrying on the business of manufacturing cotton sewing thread. 'l'he respondents are also a limited liability company registered under tlw English Companies Act. They have their registered office at Eagley Mills, Bolton, (England) where they manufacture sewing thread.\n\nOne of the trade marks used by them on such thread consists of the device of an Eagle with\n\noutspread wings known as \"Eagle Mark\".\n\nThis mark 1953 was first advertised in the Calcutta Exchange Gazette N . -;-s . of 5th , June, 1896.\n\nSince then sewing thread bearing T~;:::; 00. ''J:i~g this mark is being regularly imported into and sold in v. the Indian markets on an extensive scale.\n\nJamea Chadwick Ronncl about the year 1940 the appellants started and Bros. Ltd, selling cotton sewing thread under a mark consisting Mahajan J. of the device of a bird with wings folly spread out perched on a cylinder of cotton sewing thread, with the words \" Eagle Brand \" and the name of the appellant company printed on the mark.\n\nThe respondents objected to the mark, upon which the appellants substituted the words \"Vulture Br1tnd\" in the place of the words \" Eagle Brand\". Thereafter in the year 1942 the appellants applied to the Registrar of Trade Marks, Bombay, for registration of their amended mark as a trade mark, in class 23, in respect of cotton sewing thread claiming that the mark had been in use by them since the year 1939.\n\nThough on the objection of the respondents the appellants had named the Eagle in their mark a \"Vulture\" in every other respect the mark remained unchanged.\n\nThe respondents to redress their grievance started a passing off action in the Dist.rid, Court of South Arcot against the appellants. That action failed on the ground that the evidence offered on their behalf was meagre and they failed in proving that there was any probability of purchasers exercising ordinary caution being deceived in buying the defendants' goods under the impression that they were the plaintiff's goods. The result was that the grievance of the respondents remained unredressed.\n\nAs above stated, in 1942, the appellants made an application to the Registrar of Trade Marks at Bombay for the registration of their mark \"Vulture\n\nBrand\" under the Trade Marks Act, 1940.\n\nThe respondents gave notice of their opposition to that application under section 15(2), Rule 30, of the Trade Marks Act, 1940.\n\nBy his order dated 2nd September, 1949, the Registrar of Trade Marks allowed the respondents' opposition and rejected the application\n\n1953 made by the appellants. He came to the conclusion\n\nNational-Sewing that the appellants' mark so nearly resembled he\n\nThread 0 0 • LUI. mark of the respondents as to be likely to deceive\n\nv. or cause confusion.\n\nHe further held that to James Chadwick describe the mark of the appellants as \" Vulture\n\nand Bros. Ltd. Brand \" when the device was that of an eagle\n\nMahajan J. was misleading and liable to cause confusion. The appellants preferred an appeal against the order of the Registrar to the High Court of Bombay as permitted by the provisions of section 76 of the Trade Marks Act. Mr. Justice Shah allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Registrar and directed the Registrar to register the mark of the appellants as a trade mark.\n\nFrom the judgment of Mr. Justice Shah an appeal was preferred by the respondents under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. The appeal was allowed and the order of the Registrar was restored with costs throughout. Hence this appeal.\n\nIn our judgment both the questions canvassed in this appeal admit of an easy answer in sp:te of a number of hurdles and difficulties suggested during the arguments. It is not disputed that the decision of Mr. Justice Shah does constitute a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. That being so his judgment was subject to a.ppeal under that clause, the material part of which relevant to this enquiry is :-\n\n\"And We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay from the judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act.\"\n\nIt was said thaithe provisions of this clause could not be attracted to an appeal preferred to the High Court under section 7() of the Trade Marks Act and further that the clause would have no application in a case, where the judgment could not be said to have been delivered pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915.\n\nBoth these objections in our opinion are not well-founded.\n\nSection 76 ( 1) provides;\n\n\"Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act 1953 an appeal shal!'lie, within the period prescribed by the N • 1 .\n\nC t 1 G t f d . . f th R . atrnna Sewing en ra ovenmen , rom any ec1s10n o e eg1s- Thread 00. Ltd. trar under this Act or the rules made thereunder to v. the High Court having the jurisdiction.\" Jame• Chadwick The Trade Marks Act does not provide or lay down and Bros. Ltd. any procedure for the future conduct or career of that Mahajan J, appeal in the High Court, indeed section 77 of the Act provides that the High Court can if it likes make rules in the matter. Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court. This rule was very succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L.C. in National Telephone Go., Ltd. v. Postmaster-General (1), in these terms :-\n\n\"When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also t.hat any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches.\"\n\nThe same view was expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar\n\nv. Ra. Chandrasekhara Thevar ('), wherein it was said:-\n\n\"Vi'here a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal.\"\n\n(1) (1913] A.C. 546.\n\n(z) (1947) 74 I, A. 264,\n\nJ.J4\n\n1953 Again in Secretary of State for India. v. Chellikani\n\nN t . -,-s . Rama Rao ('), when dealing with the case under the\n\nn iona ewing Madr F A h . J d h' J d Tlmad co. Ltd. as orest ct t elf , or s tps o iserve as\n\nv. follows:- James Chadwick \"It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In their Lordships'\n\nand Bros. Ltd.\n\n1\\.fahajan .J.\n\nopinion this objection is not well-founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply.\"\n\nThough the facts of the cases laying down the above rule were not exactly similar to the facts of the present case, the principle enunciated therein is one of general application and has an apposite application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the High Court and says nothing more about it. That being so, the High Court being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by section 76 it has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction is exercised by a single Judge, his iudgment becomes subject to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act.\n\nThe objection that Mr. Justice Shah's judgment having been delivered on an appeal under section 76 of the Trade Marks Act could not be said to have been delivered pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act is also without force and seems to have been based on a very narrow and limited construction of that section and on an erroneous view of its true intent and purpose. Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, provides :-\n\n\" Each High Court may by it~ own rules provide as it thinks fit for the exercise, by one or more fudges, or by division courts constituted by two or more Judges\n\n\\1) (1916) l.L.R. 39 Mad. 617.\n\nof the High Court, of the original and appellate juris- 1953 diction vested in the Court.\"\n\n, . , National Sewing 'Ihe scct10n is an enablmg enactment and confers Thread oa. Ltd. power on the High Courts of making rules for the v. exercise of their jurisdiction by single Judges or byJames Chadwick division courts. The power conferred by the secand Bros. Ltd. tion is not circumscribed in any manner whatever Maha.fan J. and the nature of the power is such that it had to be conferred by the use of words of the widest amplitude. There could be no particular purpose or object while conferring the power in limiting it qua the jurisdiction already possessed by the High Court, when in the other provisions of the Government of India Act it was contemplated that the existing jurisdiction was subject to the legislative power of the Governor-General and the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court was liable to be enlarged, modified and curtailed by the Legislature from time to time.\n\nIt is thus difficult to accept the argument that the power vested in the High Court under subsection ( 1) of section 108 was a limited one, and could only be exercised in respect to such jurisdiction as the High Court possessed on the date when the Act of 1915 came into force.\n\nThe words of the sub-section \"vested in the court\" cannot be read as meaning \"now vested in the court\". It is a well-known rule of construction that when a power is conferred by a statute that power may be exercised from time to time when occasion arises unless a contrary intention appears. This rule has been given statutory recognition in section 32 of the Interpretation Act.\n\nThe purpose of the reference to section 108 in clause 15 of the Letters Patent was to incorporate that power in the charter of the Court itself, and not to make it moribund at that stage and make it rigid and inflexible. We are therefore of the opinion that section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, conferred power on the High Court which tlmt Court could exercise from time to time with reference to its jurisdiction whether existing at the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1915, or whether conferred on it by any subsequent legislation.\n\nl036\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 It was argued that simultaneously with the repeal\n\n~. . -l 8 . of section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, \"' ationa ewing d f th t f \"t . . . t' 223 Thread co. Ltd. an o e enactmen o I s prov1s10ns m sec 10n v. of the Government of India Act of 1935 and later on James Chadwick in article 225 of the Constitution of India, there had and Bros. Ltd.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nnot been any corresponding amendment of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and the reference to section 108 in clause 15 of the Letters Patent could not therefore be taken as relating to these provisions, and, that being so, the High Court had no power to make rules in 1940 when the 'I'rade Marks Act was enacted under the repealed section and the decision of Mr. Justice Shah therefore could not be said to have been given pursuant to section 108. This objection also in our opinion is not well-founded as it overlooks the fact that the power that was conferred on the High Court by section 108 still subsists, and it has not been affected in any manner whatever either by the Government of India Act, 1935, or by the new Constitution.\n\nOn the other hand it has been kept alive and reaffirmed with great vigour by these statutes.\n\nThe High Courts till enjoy the same unfettered power as they enjoyed under section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, of making rnles and providing whether an appeal has tu be heard by one Judge or more Judges or by Division Courts consisting of two or more Judges of the High Court. It is immaterial by what label or nomenclature that power is described in the different statutes or in the Letters Patent. The power is there and continues to be there and can be exercised in the same manner as it could be exercised when it was originally conferred. As a matter of history the power was not conferred for the first time by section 108 of the Government of India Act,\n\n1915. It had already been conferred by section 13 of the Indian High Courts Act of 1861. We are further of the opinion that the High Court was right in the view that reference in clause 15 to section 108 should be read as a reference to the corresponding provisions of the 1935 Act and the Constitution. The canon of construction of statutes enunciated in section 38 of the\n\nInterpretation Act and reiterated with some modifica- 1963 tions in section 8 of the General Clauses Act is one of general application where statutes or Acts have to be N;, ion~ 0\n\n8\"ng construed and there is no reasonable ground for holdrea v.\n\n0 • td. ing that that rule of construction should not be applied James Chadwick in construing the charters of the different High Courts. and Bros. Ltd.\n\nThese charters were granted under statutory powers and are subject to the legislative power of the Indian Mahajan J.\n\nLPgislature. Assuming however, but not conceding, that strictly speaking the provisions of the Interpretation Act and the General Clauses Act do not for any reason apply, we see no justification for holding that the principles of construction enunciated in those provisions have no application for construing these charters. For the reasons given above we hold that the High Court was perfectly justified in overruling the preliminary objection and in holding that an appeal was competent from the judgment of Mr. Justice Shah under clause 15 of the Letters\n\nPatent.\n\nReliance was placed by the appellants in tho High Court and before us on the decision of the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta in Indian Electric Works v.\n\nRegistra.r of Trade 2ll arks( 1) wherein a contrary view was expressed.\n\nAfter a full consideration of the very elaborate and exhaustive judgment delivered in that case by both the learned Judges of the Bench that heard the appeal and with great respect we think that that case was wrongly decided and the decision is based on too narrow ancl restricted a construction of section 108 of tho Government of India Act, 1915, and that in that decision full effect has not been given to the true intent and purpose of clause 44 of the Letters Patent.\n\nBoth tho learned Judges there took the view that the authority given by. section 108(1) of the 1915 statute to make rules for the exorcise by one or more Judges of the Court's appellate jurisdiction was limited to the jurisdiction then vested in the Court by section\n\n(1) A.LR. 1947 Cal. 49\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l953J\n\n1953 106 (1) of the Act and by clause 16 of the Letters\n\nN . - 1- 8 . Patent. It was held that such rules thus could not ationa ewing 1 . . 1 t' f' d b A l f TMead co. Ltd: re ate to Jlmsc lC 10n con erre y an ct passec a ter v. the commencement of the 1915 statute nor to an ap- Jaines Chadwick peal heard by the Court pursuant to such an Act, since and Bros. Ltd. the jurisdiction to hear such appeal having been conferred by the particular Act could not be said to have Mahaja1~ J. been conferred upon, or vested in, the Court by section 106(1) and by clause lG of the Letters Patent. This argument suffers from a two-fold defect.\n\nIn the first place it does not take into consideration the other provisions of the Government of India Act, 1915, particularly the provision contained in sections 65 and 72.\n\nBy section 65(1) of the Government of India Act, 1915, the Governor-General in Legislative Council was given power to make laws for all persons, for all courts, and for all places and things, within British India.\n\nBy section 72 he was also given power for promulgating ordinances in cases of emergency. By the Charter Act of 1915 therefore the High Court possessed all the jurisdiction that it had at the commencement of the Act and could also exercise all such jurisdiction that would be conferred upon it from time to time by the Legislative power conferred by that Act. Reference to the provisions of section !) of the Indian High Courts Act of 1861 which section 106 (1) of the Government of Inditi Act, 1915, replaced makes this proposition quite clear.\n\nIn express terms section 9 made the jurisdiction of tlie High Courts subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council. Section lOG only conferred on the High Court \" jurisdiction and power to make rules for regulating the practice of the court, as were vested in them by Letters Patent, and subject to the provisions of any such Letters Patent, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were vested in those comts at the commencement of the Act. \" The words \"subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General\" used in section 9 of the Charter Act of 1861 were omitted from the section, because of the wide power conferred on the Governor-General by section 65 of the Government of India Act, 1915. The\n\njurisdiction couferred on the High Courts from the very 1993 inception was all the time liable to and subject to N t. -l-\" 'ng . , , , , a iona oewi alterat10n by appropnate leg1slat10n. It 1s therefore Thread co. Ltd. not right to say that section 108 (1) of the Governv. ment of India Act, 1915, empowered the High Courts to James Chadwick make rules only concerning the jurisdiction that those and Rroa. Ltd. courts exercised when that Act was passed ; on the Mahajan J. other hand power was also conferred on them to make rules in respect of all jurisdiction then enjoyed or with which they may be vested hereafter.\n\nClause 16 of the Letters Patent on which reliance was placed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta Court is in these terms :-\n\n\" The High Court shall be a Court of appeal from the civil Courts of Bengal and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as are subject to appeal to the said High Court by virtue of any laws or regulations now in force.\"\n\nThis clause is also subject to the legislative power of the appropriate Legislature as provided in clause 44 of the Letters Patent. This clause is in these terms:\n\n\"The provisions of the Letters Patent are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council.\"\n\nThat being so the last words of the clause \"now in force \" on which emphasis was placed in the Calcutta judgment lose all their importance, and do not materially affect the point. The true intent and purpose of clause 44 of the Letters Patent was to supplement the provisions of clause 16 and other clauses of the Letters Patent. By force of this clause appellate jurisdiction conferred by fresh legislation on the High Courts stands included within the appellate jurisdiction of the court conferred by the Letters Patent. A reference to clause 1.5 of the Letters Patent of 1861, which clause 16 replaced, fully supports this view. This clause included a provision to the following effect :-\n\n\" or shall become subject to appeal to the said High Court by virtue of such laws and regulations\n\n1953 relating to Civil Procedure as shall be hereafter made\n\nN . 1 8 by the Governor in Council,\" J.: attona ewing Thread c •. Ltd. in addition to the words\" laws or regulations now in\n\nv. force\".\n\nThe words above cited were omitted from\n\nJ:':i'8,~~-\"1~:k clause 16 of the late~ charter, nd only th? worrls \"laws\n\nor regulations now m force were rctamcd, because Mahajan J. these words were incorporated in the Letters Patent and were made of general application as governing all the provisions thereof by a separate clause.\n\nThe Judges who gave the Calcutta decision on the other hand inferred from this change that the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as specified in clause 16 was confined only to the jurisdiction to hear appeals from the the civil Courts mentioned in that clause and appeals under Acts passed and regulations in force up to the year 1865. In our opinion the learned Judges were in error in thinking that the appellate jurisdiction possessed by the High Court under the Letters Patent of 1865 was narrower than the jurisdiction it possessed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of 1861. Whatever jurisdiction had been conferred on the High Court bv clause 15 of the Letters Patent of 1861 was incorporated in the Letters Patent of 1865 (as amended) and in the same measure and to the same extent by the provisions of clauses 16 and 44 of that charter.\n\nvVe are further of the opinion that the Calcutta decision is also erroneous when it expresses the view that the range and ambit of the power conferred on the High Court by section 108 of the Government of India Act of 1915 was limited by the provision of section 106 (1) of the Act or by the provisions of clause 16 of the Letters Patent. There is no justification for placing such a construction on the plain and unambiguous words of that section. Section 108 is an enactment by itself and is unrestricted in its scope, and covers a much wider field than is covered by section 106 of the Government of India Act. The only association it has with section 106 is that in sequence it follows that section. It confers a power on the High Court to make rules in respect not only of the jurisdiction that it\n\nenjoyed in 1915 but it also conferred power on it to 1953 make rules in respect of jurisdiction which may here- N . - . f b \" d . b ational Sewing a ter e con1erre on it y the enactments enacted by Thread 00. Ltd: the Governor-General in Legislative Council. v.\n\nOn the line of thought adopted in the Calcutta deci-James Chadwick sion the learned Judges were forced to the conclusion and Bros. Ltd. which seems somewhat strange that the jurisdiction Maha.janJ. conferred by the Letters Patent on the Calcutta High Court is much more limited and restricted than has been conferred on some of the new High Courts in India by their Letters Patent. Illustratively, Clause 11 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court issued in 1916 provides as follows:-\n\n\"And We do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall be a Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence, and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as were, immediately before the date of the publication of these presents, subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Fort \\Villiam in Bengal by virtue of any law then in force, or as may after that date be declared subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicutiire at Patna by any law made by competent legislative authority for India \".\n\nThe Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, the High Court of Rangoon and the Letters Patent of th@ Nagpur High Court also contain identical clauses. It is clear from these clauses that in respect of cases subject to appeal to these High Courts the civil appellate jurisdiction is flexible and elastic. Mr. Justice Das in the Calcutta decision under discussion took the view that omission of the words underlined in clause 11 from clause 16 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court made the civil appellate jurisdiction of that court under clause 16 as rigidly fixed, and that it could be exercised only over courts and only in respect of cases mentioned therein.\n\nWhen the attention of the learned Judge was drawn to the provisions of clause 44 of the Letters Patent he\n\n1963 was constrained to say that inflexibility had to a\n\nN 1• -;:s . great extent been modified by preserving the powers\n\n; h~= 0/~;; a of Indian Legislative authority in section 9 of the v.\n\nHigh Courts Act, by the amended clause 44 of the\n\nJames Oha:lwick Letters Patent and by section 223 of the 1935 Act.\n\nand Bro ... Ltd. The learned Judge however felt that there was still a difference of a vital character between the Letters MahajanJ. Patent of the Calcutta High Court and of the newly constituted High Courts inasmuch as cases subsequently declared by any Indian enactment to be subject to appeal to the Calcutta High Court could not strict. ly speaking come within its appellate jurisdiction under clause 16 although the High Court exercised appellate jurisdiction over these.\n\nVvT e have not been able to appreciate this distinction and it seems to us it is based on some misapprehension as to the true intendment of clause 44 of the Letters Patent. The purpose and intent of clause 44 of the Letters Patent was to declare that in addition to the jurisdiction eonferred by clause 16 it would also exercise the appellate jurisdiction which from time to time would be conferred on it. by subsequent enactments. It is inconceivable that larger appellate jurisdiction and greater powers in the matter of making rules would have been conferred upon the newly constituted High Courts than upon the High Court of Calcutta. The words \"pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act 1915\" occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent do not in any way restrict the scope of the right of appeal conferred by that clause to appeals that come to the High Court under its appellate jurisdiction under clause 16 of the Letters Patent only.\n\nOn the other hand we think that these rules have application to all appellate jurisdiction exercised by that court whether existing or conferred upon it by subsequent legislation.\n\nThe learned Judges in the Calcutta case negatived the applicability of the principle enunciated in 1913 Appeal Cases 546 and applied by the Privy Council in several cases to the matter before them, on the following reasoning set out by Mr. Justice Das : -\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPQR, TS 1043\n\n\"The incidents and powers attached to the Registrar 1963 as a tribunal fall far short of those which were attached ,. . -l \" . h 'b 1 . h G d (1) d 1 . h \"\"t\"'na uewing to t e tn una !Il t e ur wara case an to w uc Thread co. Ltd.\n\nSir George Rankin particularly and pointedly referred. v.\n\nHaving regard to the plain language of clm18e 16, and Jumea Ohmlwick in the absence therein of like words which appear and Bros. Ltd. in the concluding portions of the corresponding Mahaja-n J. clauses of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts, to which I have already referred and which make their appellate jurisdiction flexible and elastic it is impossible to hold that section 76 of the Trade Marks Act has merely extended the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under clause lG by the addition of a new subject-matter of appeal so as to attract the general principle enunciated in 1913 Appeal Cases 546 ......... The truth is that the Trade Marks Act has created new rights, e.g., a right to get a trade mark registered and has given certain new advantages consequent upon such registration. It has created new Tribunals for its own purposes and it has conferred lt new appellate jurisdiction on this Court. It has authorised this Court to make rules regulating the conduct and procedure of the proceedings under the Act before it. This Court has framed separate set of rules accordingly. This very fact makes it impossible to attract the ordinary rules of procedure regarding appeals in this Court and indicates that an appeal under section 76 of the Act involves the exercise of a new appellate jurisdiction regulated by new rules\".\n\nThis reasoning in our opinion is faulty on a number of grounds.\n\nThe first error lies in the assumption that the Gmdwara Act did not create new rights and did not create new appellate jurisdiction in the High Court which it did not possess before. The Uurdwara Act created peculiar rights in religious bodies and negatived the civil rights of large bodies of JVIahants .and other persons. Such rights were unknown before in civil law. The High Court as an established court of record was constituted a court of appeal from the decisions of the Gurdwara Tribunal. The principle enunciated in 1913 Appeal Cases 546 was applied by\n\n(I) 63 I.A. 180.\n\n1953 Sir George Rankin to appeals heard by the High Court . . -- . under its newly created appellate juristliction, and we l'iatwnal Sewing k \"th t · t Th ad 0 Ltd spea w1 great respec , m our opm10n, very correc - re v. 0 · ly. We have not been able to appreciate the special\n\nJames Chadwick peculiarities of the rights created by the Trade Marks and Bros. Ltd. Act which place the appellate jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by section 76 on a ddferent level Mahajan J. from the jurisdiction created by the special provisions of the Gurdwara Act.· The rights created by the Trade Marks Act are civil rights for the protection of persons carrying on trade under marks which have acquired reputation.\n\nThe statute creates the Registrar a tribunal for safeguarding these rights and for giving effoct to the rights created by the Act, and the High Court as such without more hPs been given appellate juriodiction over the decisions of this tribunal. It is not easy to understand on wha.t grounds it can be said that the High Court while exercising this appellate jurisdiction has to exercise it in a manner different from its other appellate jurisdiction. It seems to us that this is merely an addition of a new subject matter of appeal to the appellate jurisdiction already exercised by the High Court.\n\nThe second error lies in the assumption that the appellate jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Calcutta is much more limited than that possessed by the other High Courts. The matter has been discussed at length in an earlier part of this judgment.\n\nWe have also not been able to appreciate the emphasis laid to negative the applicability of clause 15 of the Letters Patent by reference to the provisions of section 77 of the Act.\n\nThe provisions of that section are merely enabling provisions and, as already pointed out, it is open to the High Court to make use of them or not as it likes.\n\nThere is nothing in the provisions of that section which debars the High Court from hearing appeals under section 76 of ths Trade Marks Act according to the rules under which all other appeals are heard, or from framing rules for the exercise of that jurisdiction under section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, for hearing those\n\nappeals by single judges or by division benches. 1953 Even if section 77 had not been enacted it could not --- b 'd th h H h C t Id h h National Sewing e . sat at t e 1g our wou t en ave no Threa.d Oo. Ltd. power to make rules for the hearmg of appeals under v. section 76. There are a number of legislative enactments Jamea Chadwick which have conferred appellate jurisdiction on the and Bros. Ltd.\n\nHigh Court without more and the High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction conferred by these enactments Mahajan J. by framing its own rules under the powers it already possesses under its different charters and under the various statutes which have conferred power on it.\n\nIt was suggested that the reasoning of the High Court is supported by the rule laid down in Secretary of State v. Jt!ask and Co.(1). In our opinion that rule has neither any relevancy in this case nor is it in any manner in conflict with the rule laid down in 1913 Appeal Uases 546 or in the later Privy Council decisions above referred to. There, by section 188 of the Sea Customs Act the jurisdiction of the civil courts was excluded, and an order made by the Collector on an appeal from an order of the Assistant Collector was made final.\n\nA suit was filed to challenge the order of the Collector on the ground that the fimility declared by section 188 was no bar to such a suit in a civil court. That contention was negatived on the ground that when a liability not existing in common law is created by a stajj!tte which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it, with respect to that class it has always been held that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute. The Trade Marks Act has not created any special forum for the hearing of an appeal as had been ereated by the Sea Customs Act. On the other hand, the Trade Marks Act has conferred appellate I jurisdiction on an established court of law. :Further, the Sea Customs Act had made the order of the Collector passed on an appeal final.\n\nThere is no such provision in the Trade Marks Act.\n\nIt has only declared that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from tho order of the Registrar and has said nothing more about it. Clearly, thereforn, to this case the rule\n\n(I) 67 I.A. 222\n\nSUPREME COU11T REPORTS [1953)\n\nws.J enunciated in 1913 Appeal Cases 546 had application,\n\nN . -l 8 . and the rule stated in irl ask' s case (1) had no bearing at-tona etJJing . .\n\nThread Go. Ltd. on this pomt. v.\n\nAs regards the merits of the case we are in entire James Chadwick agreement with the decision of the High Court and and BrM. Ltd. with the reasons given in that decision. The relevant\n\nMahajan J. part of section 8 of the Trade Marks Act is in these terms :\n\n\"No trade mark nor part of a trade mark shall be registered which consists of, or contains, any scandalous design, or any matter the use of which would by reason of its being likely to deceive or to cause confusion or otherwise, be clisentitled to protection in a court of justice\".\n\nUnder this section an application made to register a trade mark which is likely to deceive or to cause confusion has to be refused notwithstanding the fact that the mark might have no identity or close resemblance with any other trade mark. The Registrar has to come to a conclusion on this point independently of making any comparison of the mark with any other registered trade mark.. What the Registrar has to see is whether looking at the circumstances of the case a particular trade mark. is likely to deceive or to cause confusion.\n\nThe principles of law appWi:able to such cases are well-settled. 'l'he burden of proving that the trade mark which a person seeks to register is not likely to deceive or to cause confusion is upon the applicant. It is for him to satisfy the Registrar that his trade mark does not fall within the prohibition of section 8 and therefore it should be registered. Moreover, in deciding whether a particular trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion that duty is not discharged by arriving at the result by merely comparing it with the trade mark which is already registered and whose proprietor is offering opposition to the registration of the mark..\n\nThe real question to decide in such cases is to see as to how a purchaser, who must be looked upon as an average man of ordinary intelligence, would _react to a\n\n(1) 67 I.A. 222.\n\nparticular trade mark, what association he would form\n\nI953 by looking at the trade mark, and in what respect heN . -1 8 .\n\nId . . ati.ona ewin~ wou connect the trade mark with the goods whwh Thread 00. Ltd. he would be purchasing. v.\n\nSo far as the present case is concerned the goods sold Jamea Chadwick under the respondents' trade mark are well-known and and Bros. Ltd. are commonly asked for as \"Eagley\" or \"Eagle\", and Ma;;;,;;; n J. the particular feature of the trade mark of the respondents by which the goods are identified and which is associated in the mind of the purchaser is the representation of an E<igle appearing in the trade mark. If the trade mark conveys the i\\].ea of an Eagle and if an unwary purchaser is likely to accept the goods of the appellants as answering the requisition for Eagle goods, then undoubtedly the appellants' trade mark is one which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. It is clear to us that the bird in the appellants' trade mark is likely to be mistaken by an average man of ordinary intelligence as an Eagle and if he asked for Eagle goods and he got goods bearing this trade mark of the appellants it is not likely that he would reject them by saying that this cannot ho an Eagle. Two years prior to the application for registration, the respondents described this particular bird an Eagle and called their brand Eagle Brand, The same bird was later on described by them a vulture and the explanation offered was that they so described owing to an honest arid bona .fide mistake.\n\nWe have no hesitation in holding that the appellants' camouflaging an Eagle into a vulture by calling it such is likely to cause confusion.\n\nWhatever else may be said about the bird in the appellants' trade mark, it certainly does not represent a vulture or look like a vulture of any form or shape. \\Vhat has been named by the plaintiffs as a vulture is really an eagle seated in a different posture.\n\nThat being so, the High Court was perfectly right in the view that Mr. Justice Shah was in error in interfering with tho discretion possessed and exercised by the Registrar, and that the appellants had failed to discharge the onus that rested heavily on them to prove that the trade mark which they wantecl the Registrar\n\n1953 to register was not likely to deceive or cause confu-\n\nNationalewinf sion. • Thread oo. Ltd.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants contended v. that the question whether his clients' trade mark was James Chadwick likely to deceive or cause confusion had been concluded and 8' 0\"· Ltd. by the earlier judgment of the Madras High Court in\n\nMahajan J. the passing off action and already referred to in an early part of the judgment. It is quite clear that the onus in a passing off action rests on the plaintiff to prove whether there is likelihood of the defendant's goods being passed off as the goods of the plaintiff.\n\nIt was not denied that the general get up of the a pp el !ants' trade mark is different from the general get up of the respondents' trade mark. That being so, it was held by the Madras High Court in the passing off action that on the meagre material placed on record by the plaintiffs they had failed to prove that the defendants' goods could be passed off as the goods of the plaintiffs. The considerations relevant in a passing off action are somewhat different than they are on an application made for registration of a mark under the Trade l\\farks Act and that being so the decision of the Madras High Court referred to above could not be considered as relevant on the questions that the Registrar had to decide under the provisions of the Act.\n\nFor the reasons given above we are of the opinion that this appeal must fail and we accordingly dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppeal dism.issed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : R. A. Govind.\n\nAgent for the respondents : Rajinder Narain.", "total_entities": 213, "entities": [{"text": "SUPREME COURT HEFORTS [1953]\n\n1953", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT HEFORTS [1953]\n\n1953 c:liscretion of the courts below in re.(using to grant ,, d--L ' relief against forfeiture . .."}}, {"text": "R. A. Govind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 316, "end_char": 328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for appellant: R. A. Govind."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 354, "end_char": 369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondents: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "NATIONAL SEWING THREAD CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 372, "end_char": 402, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATIONAL SEWING THREAD CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAMES CHADvVICK & BROS. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 408, "end_char": 435, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAMES CHADVICK & BROS. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 527, "end_char": 538, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 544, "end_char": 562, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 565, "end_char": 586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 8, 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 588, "end_char": 597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "cl. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 790, "end_char": 819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 858, "end_char": 864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Section 76(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1011, "end_char": 1024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1032, "end_char": 1053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1458, "end_char": 1463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "cl. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1640, "end_char": 1646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1928, "end_char": 1957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2306, "end_char": 2311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2357, "end_char": 2361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2403, "end_char": 2407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vational Sewing\n\nCode", "statute": "Vational Sewing\n\nCode"}}, {"text": "Genernl Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2432, "end_char": 2451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2456, "end_char": 2461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Genernl Clauses Act", "statute": "Genernl Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "s. 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2545, "end_char": 2551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Genernl Clauses Act", "statute": "Genernl Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Govern Jrunes Chadwick ment of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2559, "end_char": 2605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2610, "end_char": 2616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Govern Jrunes Chadwick ment of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Govern Jrunes Chadwick ment of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "art. 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2767, "end_char": 2775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Govern Jrunes Chadwick ment of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Govern Jrunes Chadwick ment of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "s. 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2853, "end_char": 2859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Govern Jrunes Chadwick ment of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Govern Jrunes Chadwick ment of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2867, "end_char": 2896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 106(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2916, "end_char": 2925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2948, "end_char": 2954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2984, "end_char": 3003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3502, "end_char": 3507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, a company registered in India, began in 1940 to sell sewing thread with the device of a bird resembling an eagle with wings fully spread out with the words\n\n\"Eagle Brand\" as their mark."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was reversed by a Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay but restored on appeal by a Division Bench: Held (i) that the judgment of the Division Bench upholding the order of the Registrar rejecting the application, on the ground that the mark was likely to deceive and cause confusion, was right;\n\n(ii) that the considerations relevant in a passing off action are somewhat different from those which are relevant in an application for registration of a trade mark under the Trade Marks Act, and the earlier judgment of the High Court in the action for passing off \\Vas not conclusive on the matter. ·"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4666, "end_char": 4681, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "James Oluuiwick Bishan Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "James Oluuiwick Bishan Narain (Sri Narain Andley with him) for and Bros. Ltd. the appellants."}}, {"text": "Narain Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5273, "end_char": 5286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "James Oluuiwick Bishan Narain (Sri Narain Andley with him) for and Bros. Ltd. the appellants."}}, {"text": "G. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5339, "end_char": 5350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for Indi.a, and G. K. Daphtary, Solicitor."}}, {"text": "G. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5385, "end_char": 5399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for Indi.a, and G. K. Daphtary, Solicitor."}}, {"text": "J. B.\n\nDadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5430, "end_char": 5447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General for India (J. B.\n\nDadachanji, with them) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5582, "end_char": 5589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal on a certificate under section lO!J( c ), Civil Procedure Code, from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay reversing the judgment of Mr. Justice S. C. Shah in Civil Miscellaneous No.", "canonical_name": "Maha.fan"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5653, "end_char": 5673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5700, "end_char": 5734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal on a certificate under section lO!J( c ), Civil Procedure Code, from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay reversing the judgment of Mr. Justice S. C. Shah in Civil Miscellaneous No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5773, "end_char": 5783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal on a certificate under section lO!J( c ), Civil Procedure Code, from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay reversing the judgment of Mr. Justice S. C. Shah in Civil Miscellaneous No."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6060, "end_char": 6064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'l'he two questions that were canvassed before us and that fall for our determination are (1) whether the judgment of Mr. Justice Shah was subjeut to appeal under clause 15 of the Lettern Patent of the Bombay High Court and (2) whether Mr. Justice Shah was right in interfering w[th the discretion exercised by tho Registrar in refusing registration of the appellants' mark. '"}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6093, "end_char": 6102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'l'he two questions that were canvassed before us and that fall for our determination are (1) whether the judgment of Mr. Justice Shah was subjeut to appeal under clause 15 of the Lettern Patent of the Bombay High Court and (2) whether Mr. Justice Shah was right in interfering w[th the discretion exercised by tho Registrar in refusing registration of the appellants' mark. '"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6424, "end_char": 6450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Arcot District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6505, "end_char": 6519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he appellants are a limited liability compnny incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, having their registered office at Chidambaram, South Arcot District, in the Province of Mndras and carrying on the business of manufacturing cotton sewing thread. '"}}, {"text": "Mndras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6540, "end_char": 6546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he appellants are a limited liability compnny incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, having their registered office at Chidambaram, South Arcot District, in the Province of Mndras and carrying on the business of manufacturing cotton sewing thread. '"}}, {"text": "English Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6691, "end_char": 6712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jamea Chadwick Ronncl about the year 1940 the appellants started and Bros. Ltd, selling cotton sewing thread under a mark consisting Mahajan J. of the device of a bird with wings folly spread out perched on a cylinder of cotton sewing thread, with the words \" Eagle Brand \" and the name of the appellant company printed on the mark.", "canonical_name": "Maha.fan"}}, {"text": "Registrar of Trade Marks, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7747, "end_char": 7779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter in the year 1942 the appellants applied to the Registrar of Trade Marks, Bombay, for registration of their amended mark as a trade mark, in class 23, in respect of cotton sewing thread claiming that the mark had been in use by them since the year 1939."}}, {"text": "Registrar of Trade Marks at Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8681, "end_char": 8715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As above stated, in 1942, the appellants made an application to the Registrar of Trade Marks at Bombay for the registration of their mark \"Vulture\n\nBrand\" under the Trade Marks Act, 1940."}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8778, "end_char": 8799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8876, "end_char": 8889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8907, "end_char": 8928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8950, "end_char": 8969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his order dated 2nd September, 1949, the Registrar of Trade Marks allowed the respondents' opposition and rejected the application\n\n1953 made by the appellants."}}, {"text": "James Chadwick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9306, "end_char": 9320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further held that to James Chadwick describe the mark of the appellants as \" Vulture\n\nand Bros. Ltd. Brand \" when the device was that of an eagle\n\nMahajan J. was misleading and liable to cause confusion.", "canonical_name": "James Chadwick"}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9621, "end_char": 9631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9639, "end_char": 9654, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9901, "end_char": 9910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940", "statute": "the Trade Marks Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10340, "end_char": 10349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10701, "end_char": 10712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7()", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10863, "end_char": 10874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10882, "end_char": 10897, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11035, "end_char": 11046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11054, "end_char": 11083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11146, "end_char": 11156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11174, "end_char": 11226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chadwick The Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11494, "end_char": 11522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11666, "end_char": 11676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chadwick The Trade Marks Act", "statute": "Chadwick The Trade Marks Act"}}, {"text": "Viscount Haldane L.C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12320, "end_char": 12341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule was very succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L.C. in National Telephone Go.,"}}, {"text": "Rama Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13326, "end_char": 13334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rama Rao ('), when dealing with the case under the\n\nn iona ewing Madr F A h ."}}, {"text": "1\\.fahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13730, "end_char": 13740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In their Lordships'\n\nand Bros. Ltd.\n\n1\\.fahajan .J.\n\nopinion this objection is not well-founded."}}, {"text": "Section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14313, "end_char": 14323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14331, "end_char": 14346, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14517, "end_char": 14527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14737, "end_char": 14746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14812, "end_char": 14827, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14918, "end_char": 14928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14936, "end_char": 14951, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15005, "end_char": 15016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15214, "end_char": 15225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15233, "end_char": 15262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "secand Bros. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15814, "end_char": 15831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The power conferred by the secand Bros. Ltd. tion is not circumscribed in any manner whatever Maha.fan J. and the nature of the power is such that it had to be conferred by the use of words of the widest amplitude."}}, {"text": "Maha.fan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15881, "end_char": 15889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The power conferred by the secand Bros. Ltd. tion is not circumscribed in any manner whatever Maha.fan J. and the nature of the power is such that it had to be conferred by the use of words of the widest amplitude.", "canonical_name": "Maha.fan"}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16568, "end_char": 16579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17080, "end_char": 17090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17151, "end_char": 17162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17166, "end_char": 17175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17377, "end_char": 17388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17396, "end_char": 17425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17792, "end_char": 17803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17811, "end_char": 17840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17936, "end_char": 17942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "article 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18017, "end_char": 18028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18036, "end_char": 18057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18137, "end_char": 18146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18190, "end_char": 18201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18205, "end_char": 18214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18531, "end_char": 18542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18679, "end_char": 18690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18773, "end_char": 18802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19002, "end_char": 19013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19021, "end_char": 19050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19558, "end_char": 19569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19577, "end_char": 19600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19642, "end_char": 19652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915"}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19782, "end_char": 19791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915"}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19795, "end_char": 19806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915"}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19959, "end_char": 19969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20046, "end_char": 20055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act,\n\n1915"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20063, "end_char": 20082, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20617, "end_char": 20636, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21028, "end_char": 21037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21156, "end_char": 21192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed by the appellants in tho High Court and before us on the decision of the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta in Indian Electric Works v.\n\nRegistra.r of Trade 2ll arks( 1) wherein a contrary view was expressed."}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21594, "end_char": 21605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21613, "end_char": 21642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21735, "end_char": 21744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 108(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21842, "end_char": 21856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22122, "end_char": 22131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Jaines Chadwick peal heard by the Court pursuant to such an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22371, "end_char": 22434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 106(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22624, "end_char": 22638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jaines Chadwick peal heard by the Court pursuant to such an Act", "statute": "Jaines Chadwick peal heard by the Court pursuant to such an Act"}}, {"text": "sections 65 and 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22880, "end_char": 22898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the first place it does not take into consideration the other provisions of the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "In the first place it does not take into consideration the other provisions of the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 65(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22904, "end_char": 22917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the first place it does not take into consideration the other provisions of the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "In the first place it does not take into consideration the other provisions of the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22925, "end_char": 22954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23119, "end_char": 23129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23561, "end_char": 23572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of Inditi Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23584, "end_char": 23614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23679, "end_char": 23688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Inditi Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of Inditi Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24225, "end_char": 24234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Inditi Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of Inditi Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24356, "end_char": 24366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of Inditi Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of Inditi Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24374, "end_char": 24403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24651, "end_char": 24662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24691, "end_char": 24706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25031, "end_char": 25040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1915", "statute": "India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25121, "end_char": 25135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 16 of the Letters Patent on which reliance was placed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta Court is in these terms :-\n\n\" The High Court shall be a Court of appeal from the civil Courts of Bengal and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as are subject to appeal to the said High Court by virtue of any laws or regulations now in force.\""}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25227, "end_char": 25233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 16 of the Letters Patent on which reliance was placed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta Court is in these terms :-\n\n\" The High Court shall be a Court of appeal from the civil Courts of Bengal and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as are subject to appeal to the said High Court by virtue of any laws or regulations now in force.\""}}, {"text": "clause 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25547, "end_char": 25556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1915", "statute": "India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25833, "end_char": 25841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That being so the last words of the clause \"now in force \" on which emphasis was placed in the Calcutta judgment lose all their importance, and do not materially affect the point."}}, {"text": "clause 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25949, "end_char": 25958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26017, "end_char": 26026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26276, "end_char": 26284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26324, "end_char": 26333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26786, "end_char": 26795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27208, "end_char": 27217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27606, "end_char": 27615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27709, "end_char": 27718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28085, "end_char": 28096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28168, "end_char": 28179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28219, "end_char": 28228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28362, "end_char": 28373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28483, "end_char": 28494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28560, "end_char": 28571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thread 00. Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28915, "end_char": 28929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b ational Sewing a ter e con1erre on it y the enactments enacted by Thread 00."}}, {"text": "Clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29378, "end_char": 29387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29413, "end_char": 29429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illustratively, Clause 11 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court issued in 1916 provides as follows:-\n\n\"And We do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall be a Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence, and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as were, immediately before the date of the publication of these presents, subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Fort \\Villiam in Bengal by virtue of any law then in force, or as may after that date be declared subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicutiire at Patna by any law made by competent legislative authority for India \"."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29503, "end_char": 29536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illustratively, Clause 11 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court issued in 1916 provides as follows:-\n\n\"And We do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall be a Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence, and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as were, immediately before the date of the publication of these presents, subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Fort \\Villiam in Bengal by virtue of any law then in force, or as may after that date be declared subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicutiire at Patna by any law made by competent legislative authority for India \"."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Fort \\Villiam in Bengal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29836, "end_char": 29887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illustratively, Clause 11 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court issued in 1916 provides as follows:-\n\n\"And We do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall be a Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence, and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as were, immediately before the date of the publication of these presents, subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Fort \\Villiam in Bengal by virtue of any law then in force, or as may after that date be declared subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicutiire at Patna by any law made by competent legislative authority for India \"."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicutiire at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29987, "end_char": 30021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illustratively, Clause 11 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court issued in 1916 provides as follows:-\n\n\"And We do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall be a Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts of the Province of Bihar and Orissa and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence, and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as were, immediately before the date of the publication of these presents, subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Fort \\Villiam in Bengal by virtue of any law then in force, or as may after that date be declared subject to appeal to the High Court of Judicutiire at Patna by any law made by competent legislative authority for India \"."}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30113, "end_char": 30130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, the High Court of Rangoon and the Letters Patent of th@ Nagpur High Court also contain identical clauses."}}, {"text": "High Court of Rangoon", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30136, "end_char": 30157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, the High Court of Rangoon and the Letters Patent of th@ Nagpur High Court also contain identical clauses."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30188, "end_char": 30205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, the High Court of Rangoon and the Letters Patent of th@ Nagpur High Court also contain identical clauses."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30403, "end_char": 30406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Das in the Calcutta decision under discussion took the view that omission of the words underlined in clause 11 from clause 16 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court made the civil appellate jurisdiction of that court under clause 16 as rigidly fixed, and that it could be exercised only over courts and only in respect of cases mentioned therein."}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30504, "end_char": 30513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30519, "end_char": 30528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30636, "end_char": 30645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30832, "end_char": 30841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31039, "end_char": 31048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31060, "end_char": 31075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31092, "end_char": 31101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Courts Act", "statute": "High Courts Act"}}, {"text": "section 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31148, "end_char": 31159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Courts Act", "statute": "High Courts Act"}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31576, "end_char": 31585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Courts Act", "statute": "High Courts Act"}}, {"text": "clause 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31796, "end_char": 31805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Courts Act", "statute": "High Courts Act"}}, {"text": "clause 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31855, "end_char": 31864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Courts Act", "statute": "High Courts Act"}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31952, "end_char": 31961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Courts Act", "statute": "High Courts Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32271, "end_char": 32293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is inconceivable that larger appellate jurisdiction and greater powers in the matter of making rules would have been conferred upon the newly constituted High Courts than upon the High Court of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32318, "end_char": 32329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32337, "end_char": 32365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32380, "end_char": 32389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act 1915"}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32575, "end_char": 32584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act 1915"}}, {"text": "George Rankin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33326, "end_char": 33339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Il t e ur wara case an to w uc Thread co. Ltd.\n\nSir George Rankin particularly and pointedly referred."}}, {"text": "Jumea Ohmlwick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33435, "end_char": 33449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nHaving regard to the plain language of clm18e 16, and Jumea Ohmlwick in the absence therein of like words which appear and Bros. Ltd. in the concluding portions of the corresponding Mahaja-n J. clauses of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts, to which I have already referred and which make their appellate jurisdiction flexible and elastic it is impossible to hold that section 76 of the Trade Marks Act has merely extended the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under clause lG by the addition of a new subject-matter of appeal so as to attract the general principle enunciated in 1913 Appeal Cases 546 ......... The truth is that the Trade Marks Act has created new rights, e.g., a right to get a trade mark registered and has given certain new advantages consequent upon such registration."}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33759, "end_char": 33769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33777, "end_char": 33792, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34027, "end_char": 34042, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34626, "end_char": 34636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurdwara Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35272, "end_char": 35289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court as an established court of record was constituted a court of appeal from the decisions of the Gurdwara Tribunal."}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35812, "end_char": 35822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35958, "end_char": 35973, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37034, "end_char": 37043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37100, "end_char": 37110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37391, "end_char": 37401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37409, "end_char": 37424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37555, "end_char": 37566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trade Marks Act", "statute": "Trade Marks Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37574, "end_char": 37603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37686, "end_char": 37696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Threa.d Oo. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37814, "end_char": 37830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sat at t e 1g our wou t en ave no Threa.d Oo."}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37886, "end_char": 37896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Jamea Chadwick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37943, "end_char": 37957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are a number of legislative enactments Jamea Chadwick which have conferred appellate jurisdiction on the and Bros. Ltd.\n\nHigh Court without more and the High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction conferred by these enactments Mahajan J. by framing its own rules under the powers it already possesses under its different charters and under the various statutes which have conferred power on it.", "canonical_name": "James Chadwick"}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38651, "end_char": 38662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38674, "end_char": 38685, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38944, "end_char": 38955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39320, "end_char": 39335, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39430, "end_char": 39441, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39466, "end_char": 39481, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39571, "end_char": 39582, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "is no such provision in the Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39653, "end_char": 39696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40309, "end_char": 40318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no such provision in the Trade Marks Act", "statute": "There is no such provision in the Trade Marks Act"}}, {"text": "Trade Marks Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40326, "end_char": 40341, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41497, "end_char": 41506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44613, "end_char": 44630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants contended v. that the question whether his clients' trade mark was James Chadwick likely to deceive or cause confusion had been concluded and 8' 0\"· Ltd. by the earlier judgment of the Madras High Court in\n\nMahajan J. the passing off action and already referred to in an early part of the judgment."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1049_1056_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH\n\nCOURT OF WARDS, AJMER,\n\nAND ANOTHER.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MDKHERJEA, GHULAM\n\nHASAN, BHAGWATI and JAGANNADHADAsJJ.]\n\nOonstitzdion of India, 1950, a1'ls. 19(1) (J), 19(5), 31-A-Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act (XLII of I950) s. 112-Ajmer Gm>ernment Wards Regulation (I of 1888), ss. 6, 7-Law declaring landlords who habitually infringe the rights of a tenant to be disqualified prop1'ieto1's and empoweri1zg Court of Wa,.ds to assume management of their lands - Validity-Infringement of fundamental right-Reasonableness-Scope of article 31-A-\" Modifioation of rights,\" meaning of.\n\nSection 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act (XLII of 1950) provided that \"if a landlord l1abitually infringes the rights of a tenant under this Act, he shall, notwithstanding anything in section 7 of the ~-'\\jmer Governu1ent Wards Regulation, 1888 (I of 1888) be deemed to be a 'landlord who is disqualified to manage bis own property' 'vithin the meaning 0£ section 6 of the said Regulation and his property shall be liable to be taken under the superintendence of the Court of W .rds.\" Section 6 of Regulation I of 1888 provided that the Court of Wards may, with the previous sanction of the Chief Corr1missioner, assume the superin~ tendence of the property of any landholder who is disqualified to manage his property. The petitioner, whose estate was taken over by the Court of Wards under the above-mentioned provisions of law, applied for relief under art. 32 of the Constitution for restoration of his estate and other appropriate reliefs: Held, (i) that the result of the combined operation of s. 112 of Act XLII of 1950 and the provisions of ss. 6 and 7 of Regulation I of 1888 was that the Court of Wards could in its own discretion and on its subjective determination assume the superinten. dance of the property of a landlord who habitually infringed the rights of his tenants, and the exercise of .the discretion of the Court of Wards cannot be questioned in a civil court: s. 112 of Act XLII of 1950 read with the provisions of Regulation I of 1888 therefore infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed by art. 19 (1) of the Constitution and was to that extent void;\n\n(ii) the provisions of s. 112 cannot be regarded as a \"reasonable\" restriction imposed in the interests of the general public on the exercise of the right conferred by art. 19 (1) (f), because they completely negatived the right by making its enjoyment depend on the mere discretion of the executive;\n\nMay 15.\n\n(iii) that s. 112 was not validated by art. 31-A of the Consti- Thalmr tntiou as it was not \"a law providing for the acquisition by the Raghubir Singh State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinction v or modification of any such rights\" within the meaning of art.\n\nThe ourl of 31-A.\n\nThe word \"modification\" in the context of art. 31-A only Wrtrds, AjJner, 1neans a modfication of the proprietary right of a citi.zen like\n\nand Another an extingnishn1ent of thttt right anCT cannot include within its ambit a mere suspension of the right of inanagernent of the estate for a time, definite or indefinite.\n\nMahajan .l.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 29 of l!l53.\n\nPetition under article 32 of the Constitution of India praying that the Court of \\Vards, Ajmer, be ordered to forbear from carrying on the superintendence of the istimrari estate and other properties of the petitioner and for restoration of possession and management of the said estate and properties.\n\nJ. B. Dadachan, ii and H. C. Sogain for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Bhava Datta Sharma, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1953.\n\nMay 15. The , Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution seeking relief against alleged infringement of certain fundamental rights of the petitioner and arises in these circumstances.\n\nThe petitioner owns an \"istimrari estate\" in the State of Ajmer under an istimraii sanad granted to his ancestor in the year 1875. He enjoys therein a life interest with an obligation to perform certain duties as prescribed by the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation (II of 1877).\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner of Ajmer, who is the Court of Wards constituted under the Ajmer Government \\Yards Regulation (I of 1888), took over possession and assumed superintendence of the said estate on the 18th September, 1952, purporting to act under sections 6 and 7 of the Regulation read with section 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950 (XLII of 1950), and hence this petition for a writ of mandamus or one in the nature thereof, or for the issue\n\nof a direction to the Court of Wards for restoration of 19s3 possession of tlle estate and for an order directing it tu Tl k forbear from carrying on the superintendence of the Rayhu~:;; ingh estate. v.\n\nThe order made by the Court of Wards on the 7'he Oourt of 18th September, 1952, is impuaned as being void and Ward.<, Ajmer, '-' and Another of no effect whatever, because it is alleged that the statutory provisions under which it is purported to Mahajan J. have been made contravene the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and take away and abridge the petitioner's rights guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution.\n\nSection 112 of Act XLII of 1950 is one of a group of 7 sections in Chapter X of the Act which deals with the subject of\" Compensation and Penalties''. The section prescribes penalties for habitual infringement of rights of tenants and reads thus:-\n\n\"If a landlord habitually infringes the rights of a tenant under this Act, he shall, notwithstanding anything in section 7 of the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888 (I of 1888), be deemed to be a\" landlord who is disqualified to manage his own property\" within the meaning of section 6 of the said Regula ti on\n\nttnd his property shall be liable to be taken under the superintendence of the Court of Wards \".\n\nThe preceding section 110 is in these terms:-\n\n\" If a landholder or his agent collects from a tenant any lag or neg, he shall be deemed to have committed an offence of extortion within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) \".\n\nJust as section 110 declares an illegal exaction by a landlord to be an offence under the Indian Penal Code, in like manner, section 112 declares a landlord who habitually infringes the rights of a tenant \"a person disqualified to manage his own property\" within the meaning of section 6 of Regulation I of 1888, the consequence being that his property becomes liable to be taken over by the Court of Wards. The section is an ingenious and novel device to punish landlords who habitually infringe the rights of tenants. It authorizes\n\n1953 the use for punitive purposes of the machinery of Regulation I of 1888 enacted to make better. provision for 2'ha.kur. the superintendence of Government Wards in Ajmer- Raghubir Singh\n\nB \"' f h d 1 · t• 112 f v.\n\nMerwara. y iorce o t e ec arat10n m sec 10n o\n\nThe court of the Act, landlords who habitually infringe the rights Ward•, Ajmer, of the tenants fall within the category of persons inand Another capable of managing their own property and come within the ambit of section 6 of the Regulation, which MahajanJ: is in these terms :-\n\n\"The Court of Wards may, with the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner, assume the superintendence of the property of any landholder who is rusqualified to manage his own property \".\n\nThe result therefore of the combined operation of section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 and of the provisions of Regulation I of 1888, is that the Court of Wards can in its own discretion and on its subjective determination, assume the superintendence of the property of a landlord who habitually infringes the rights of his tenants.\n\nThe condition precedent to such assumption of superintendence is the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner, the giving of which is also a matter entirely resting on his discretion. Section 27 of Regulation I of 1888 provides that \"the exercise of any discretion conferred on the Court of vVards or the Chief Commissioner by this Regulation shall not be called in question in any civil court \". It was conceded by the learned Attorney-General appearing for the State of Ajmer, that there was nothing in the contents of either Act XLII of 1950 or Itegulation I of 1888 which provided a machinery for determining the question whether a certain landlord was a .person who was habitually infringing the rights of his tenants. Under Regulation I of 1888, the assumption by the Court of Wards of the superintendence of the property of a disqualified proprietor depends merely on the subjective determination of the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner or of the Chief Commissioner, and the exercise of this discretion cannot be questioned in any manner in a civil court. Act XLII of 1950 says nothing whatsoever on this subject.\n\nThe contention that the provisions of section 112 of 1953 Act XLII of 1950 read with the provisions of Hegulation I of 1888 infringe the fundamental right of the R ;'hbakur . 't' d b . 1\n\nf) f ay, m ir Singh pet1 10ner guarantee y art1c e 19 ( l) ( o the Conv. stitution, is, in our opinion, well-founded and does not The court of require any elaborate discussion. The petitioner's right Ward•, Ajmer, to hold the istimrari estate and his power of disposal and Anather over it stand abridged by the act of the Court ofWards authorized by these provisions. His right to manage the Mahajan J. estate and enjoy possession thereof stands suspended indefinitely and until the time that the Court ofWards chooses to withdraw its superintendence of the property of the petitioner. During this period, he can only receive such sums of money for his expenses as the Court of Wards decides in its discretion to allow. Thus, the provisions of section 112 of Act XLII of HJ50 clearly abridge the fundamental right of the petitioner under article 19 (1) (f) and are to that extent void.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General canvassed for the validity of the provisions of section 112 on three grounds. He contended that the determination of the question whether a certain landholder was a person who habitually infringed the rights of his tenants did not depend on the opinion of the Court of Wards, but was a matter that could be agitated and canvassed in a civil court. It was said that there were no words in the section from which it could be inferred that the determination of this fact depended on the subjective determination of the Court of Wards. It was emphasized that the section had not used the familiar language \"in its opinion\" or words like that, which are usually employed to indicate whether a matter depends on the subjective determination of an authority or whether it can be agitated in a civil court. This contention, in our opinion, is not well-founded. As already pointed out, Act XLII of 1950 has prescribed no machinery for the determination of the question whether a landlord is guilty of habitually infringing the rights of his tenants, and rightly so, because section 112 of the Act is mere! y of a dcclara tory charatl er and\n\n. . . 1054 SUPREME COURT REPOl~TS [1953]\n\n1953 declares such a landlord as being under a disability\n\nThakur and suffering from an infirmity. This declaration be- Raghubir Sinyh comes operative and effective only when the Court of\n\nWards in its discretion decides to assume superintend- Th• Oaurt af ence of the property of such a proprietor. In other Wards, Ajmer, words, when the Deputy Commissioner or the Comand Another missioner or the Chief Commissioner is of the opinion\n\nMahajan J. that such a proprietor should be deprived of possession of his property, this determination then operates to the prejudice of the landlord, but he cannot challenge the exercise of the discretion by these officers in view of the provisions of section 27 of Regulation I of 1888.\n\nThe result then is that by the subjective determination of the Court ofWards, both the questions whether a particular person habitually infringes the rights of his tenants and whether his property should be taken over by the Court of Wards, stand settled and the landlord cannot have recourse to a civil court on these questions. The learned Attorney-General was not able to draw our attention to any provision in the Comt of Wards Act or in Act XLII of 1950 which enabled the landlord, held to be a habitual infringer of the rights of his tenants, to have recourse to a civil court to test the conectness of the determination made by the Court of\\Vards. The provisions of Regulation I of 1888 clearly indicate the contrary.\n\nNext, it was argued that the provisions of section 112 amount to reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right confened by article 19 ( 1) ( f) of the Constitution on a citizen, and these restrictions are in the interests of the general public. In our judgment, this argument also is not sound. As indicated above, the provisions of section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 are penal in nature and are intended by way of punishment of a landlord who habitually infringes the rights of his tenants. He is punished by being placed at the mercy of the Court of Wards and by being made subject to the stringent provisions of Regulation I of 1888. An enactment which prescribes a punishment or penalty for bad behaviour or for misconduct of a landlord cannot possibly be regarded as restriction on a fundamental\n\nright. Indeeq, a punishment is not a restriction. This 1953 was frankly conceded by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nTh k It is still more difficult to regard such a provision as a Raghub:,.\"; ingh reasonable restriction on the fundamental right. v. 'Vhen a law deprives a person of possession of his pro- The Court of perty for an indefinite period of time merely on the Wards, Ajme•, subjective determination of an executive officer, such and Another a law can, on no construction of the word \"reasonable\" MahajanJ. be described as corning within that expression, because it completely negatives the fundamental right by making its enjoyment depend on the mere pleasure and discretion of the executive, the citizen affected having no right to have recourse for establishing the contrary in a civil court. Section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 cannot therefore be held valid as coming within the scope of article 19 (5) of the Constitution.\n\n' Lastly, it was contended by the learned Attorney.\n\nGeneral that section 112 was valid by reason of the curative provisions of article 31-A of the Constitution.\n\nThat article validates laws which would otherwise contravene the fundamental right in article 31(2) of the Constitution, but its operation is restricted to laws providing for acquisition of estates etc.\n\nIt runs as follows:-\n\n\" Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part ...... \"\n\nSection 112 of Act XLII of 1950, intended to regulate the rights of landlords and tenants, is obviously not a law providing for \"the acquisition by the State\" of the estates of the landlords, or of any rights in those estates. It is also not a law providing for the extinguishrnent or modification of any such rights. The learned Attorney-General laid emphasis on the word \"modification\" used in article 31-A.\n\nThat word in\n\n1953 the context of the article only means a.modification of\n\nThakur the proprietary right of a citizen like an extinguish- Raghubfr Sin[lh ment of that right and cannot include within its ambit\n\nv. a mere suspension of the right of management of estate The Oourt of for a time, definite or indefinite. Historically speak- IVards, Apn,,·, ing, article 31-A which has relation to article 31(2) of and A11oth~1 the Constitution, has no relevancy whatsoever to the\n\nMahajan J. law enacted in section 112 of the Act XLII of 1950.\n\n]for the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that the law enacted in section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 is not saved either by clause (5) of article 19 or by article 31-A of the Constitution. It manifestly infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. That being so, the petitioner is entitled to a direction that possession of his estnte be restored to him. We accordingly direct the Court of vVards, Ajmer-l\\forwara, constituted under the Ajmer Government Wa, ds Regulation, I of 1888, to forbear from carrying on superintendence of the petitioner's istimrari estate and the other properties taken possession of, and to restore their possession to the petitioner. The petitioner will have the costs of this petition.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\nAgent for the petitioner : J. N. Shroff.\n\nAgent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "THAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAKUR RAGHUBIR SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COURT OF WARDS, AJMER,\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COURT OF WARDS, AJMER, AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 231, "end_char": 265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 281, "end_char": 287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act", "statute": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 6, 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 335, "end_char": 343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act", "statute": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 585, "end_char": 595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act", "statute": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act"}}, {"text": "Section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 638, "end_char": 649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act", "statute": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act"}}, {"text": "Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 657, "end_char": 691, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 835, "end_char": 844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act", "statute": "Ajmer Revenue and Land Records Act"}}, {"text": "Wards Regulation, 1888", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 873, "end_char": 895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1007, "end_char": 1016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1136, "end_char": 1145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1507, "end_char": 1514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1651, "end_char": 1657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "ss. 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2036, "end_char": 2042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2187, "end_char": 2194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2417, "end_char": 2424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2571, "end_char": 2577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2599, "end_char": 2606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raghubir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2696, "end_char": 2710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31-A of the Consti- Thalmr tntiou as it was not \"a law providing for the acquisition by the Raghubir Singh State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinction v or modification of any such rights\" within the meaning of art."}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2905, "end_char": 2912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan .l.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3261, "end_char": 3271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3279, "end_char": 3300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3549, "end_char": 3563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B. Dadachan, ii and H. C. Sogain for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. C. Sogain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3572, "end_char": 3584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B. Dadachan, ii and H. C. Sogain for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Bhava Datta Sharma, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Bhava Datta Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3650, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Bhava Datta Sharma, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3763, "end_char": 3770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The , Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution seeking relief against alleged infringement of certain fundamental rights of the petitioner and arises in these circumstances.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3799, "end_char": 3809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ajmer", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4016, "end_char": 4021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner owns an \"istimrari estate\" in the State of Ajmer under an istimraii sanad granted to his ancestor in the year 1875."}}, {"text": "18th September, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4443, "end_char": 4463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner of Ajmer, who is the Court of Wards constituted under the Ajmer Government \\Yards Regulation (I of 1888), took over possession and assumed superintendence of the said estate on the 18th September, 1952, purporting to act under sections 6 and 7 of the Regulation read with section 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950 (XLII of 1950), and hence this petition for a writ of mandamus or one in the nature thereof, or for the issue\n\nof a direction to the Court of Wards for restoration of 19s3 possession of tlle estate and for an order directing it tu Tl k forbear from carrying on the superintendence of the Rayhu~:;; ingh estate."}}, {"text": "sections 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He enjoys therein a life interest with an obligation to perform certain duties as prescribed by the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation", "statute": "He enjoys therein a life interest with an obligation to perform certain duties as prescribed by the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation"}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4534, "end_char": 4545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He enjoys therein a life interest with an obligation to perform certain duties as prescribed by the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation", "statute": "He enjoys therein a life interest with an obligation to perform certain duties as prescribed by the Ajmer Land and Revenue Regulation"}}, {"text": "Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4553, "end_char": 4593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5156, "end_char": 5163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<, Ajmer, '-' and Another of no effect whatever, because it is alleged that the statutory provisions under which it is purported to Mahajan J. have been made contravene the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and take away and abridge the petitioner's rights guaranteed by article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5304, "end_char": 5314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950", "statute": "the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5345, "end_char": 5356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950", "statute": "the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Chapter X of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5412, "end_char": 5432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5707, "end_char": 5716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X of the Act"}}, {"text": "Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5724, "end_char": 5763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5875, "end_char": 5884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6023, "end_char": 6034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6213, "end_char": 6230, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6261, "end_char": 6272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6343, "end_char": 6360, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6378, "end_char": 6389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6531, "end_char": 6540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888", "statute": "the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation, 1888"}}, {"text": "Merwara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7006, "end_char": 7013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the superintendence of Government Wards in Ajmer- Raghubir Singh\n\nB \"' f h d 1 · t• 112 f v.\n\nMerwara."}}, {"text": "sec 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7042, "end_char": 7048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7267, "end_char": 7276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MahajanJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7302, "end_char": 7310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "y iorce o t e ec arat10n m sec 10n o\n\nThe court of the Act, landlords who habitually infringe the rights Ward•, Ajmer, of the tenants fall within the category of persons inand Another capable of managing their own property and come within the ambit of section 6 of the Regulation, which MahajanJ: is in these terms :-\n\n\"The Court of Wards may, with the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner, assume the superintendence of the property of any landholder who is rusqualified to manage his own property \".", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ"}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7575, "end_char": 7586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8041, "end_char": 8051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Ajmer", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8320, "end_char": 8334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was conceded by the learned Attorney-General appearing for the State of Ajmer, that there was nothing in the contents of either Act XLII of 1950 or Itegulation I of 1888 which provided a machinery for determining the question whether a certain landlord was a .person who was habitually infringing the rights of his tenants."}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9024, "end_char": 9035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9918, "end_char": 9929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10012, "end_char": 10022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10138, "end_char": 10149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11155, "end_char": 11166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11954, "end_char": 11964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12760, "end_char": 12771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12847, "end_char": 12857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13057, "end_char": 13068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14328, "end_char": 14339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He is punished by being placed at the mercy of the Court of Wards and by being made subject to the stringent provisions of Regulation", "statute": "He is punished by being placed at the mercy of the Court of Wards and by being made subject to the stringent provisions of Regulation"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14421, "end_char": 14431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14524, "end_char": 14535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14586, "end_char": 14596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14707, "end_char": 14720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15231, "end_char": 15242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15627, "end_char": 15637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16000, "end_char": 16010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16035, "end_char": 16048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16145, "end_char": 16156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16259, "end_char": 16270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16328, "end_char": 16338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16345, "end_char": 16355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16457, "end_char": 16467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17011, "end_char": 17023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner : J. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17053, "end_char": 17071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1057_1068_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "s.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nK. M. S. LAKSHMANIER AND SONS\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND\n\nEXCESS PROFITS TAX, MADRAS.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MuKHEl~JEA, CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BosE and GmcLAM\n\nHASAN J.J.]\n\nExcess Profits Tax Act (XV of 1940)-Riiles under Schedule II, R, 2-A-Computation of average ca.pital ·-Secnrity deposit received fronb ci1istoniers-Whether ''borrowed capital\"-\" Depo$it\" and \"Loan\" -Essentials of.\n\nThe assessees, who were the sole selling agents of a yarn manufacturing company a, nd 'vbo distributed yarn to several constituents under forward contracts, kept two accounts for each constituent, vi.~., a \"contract deposit account\" and a \"current yarn account\", crediting the mone)'S 'vhich they recejved in advance from the constituents in the former account and trans ferring them to the current yarn account in adjustment of the price of the bales supplie<i tben ancl tbere, that is to say, when deliveries were made uncler the contract.\n\nOn the 5th May, 1944, they decided to keep the advance amounts under a new heading \"Contracts Adv.nee Fixed Deposit Account\" and to return the advance amounts in full after the completion of each contract and payment of the full value of the bales supplied.\n\nOn the 5th December, 1944, they changed the name of this account into \"Security Deposit\" account, and on the 14th February, 1945, the assessees decided to rnodify the arrangement further and demand a certain sum from each customer towards Security Deposit and keep the same with the assessees so long as the business connection with the customer under the forward contracts continued. Interest was also allowed on the amount of the deposit. The question being whether the advance amounts received by the assessees as deposit were \"borro\\ved money,'' within the meaning of Rule 2-A of the Rules in the Second Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, and should not be deducted in computing the average capital used for the purposes of the business: Held, (i) that the advance amounts received before the 5th }!fay, 1944, were only advance payments of tbe price, to be adjusted on delivery, and could in no sense he regarded as borrowed money;\n\n(ii) the amounts received after the 5th )fay, 1944, up to 14th February, 1945, were also, having regard to the terms of 137\n\nJanuary 23.\n\n1953 the arrangement then in force, more in the nature of tradirig - receipts than of security deposits as they were reaJly advance K. ~~· S. Lalcsh. payments in regard to each contr.ct, and tho transaction provided ma11ter and Sons in substance and effect for the adjustment of the mutual obligav, lions on the completion of each contract; .The Con1imis-\n\n(iii) the method of dealing adopted after the 14th Februsioner of nc01ne . , d E ary, 1945, had all the essential elements of a transact10n of !attn, Ta.\"C an xcesA . d . t . d f h t d t \"b d \"\n\nP 1. T ancl the epos1 s receive a ter t a a e were orrowe money '';, t; ax, for the purposes of Rule 2-A, as the amount of deposit had no a ras. relation to the price of the goods to be delivered under each contract, the price of the goods supplied was to he paid by the cnsto- Patanjali 1ner in full, the assessees were allowed to use the money for their $astri O.J. own business pa)-'ing interest to the customers, and the amounts were returnable only at the end of the business connection.\n\nThe terms \"loan\" and\n\n11deposit\" are not mutually exclusive, and the fact that a deposit is made with the object of inducing tho person with whom the deposit is made to have dealing with the depositor and for the specillc purpose of being held as security for the duo performance by the depositor of bis pMt of the contract, would not prevent a deposit from being really in the nature of a loan.\n\nNawab Major Sir Mohamed Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh (L. R. 63 I.A. 279) relied on. Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Port of London Anthority (L.R. [1923] A.O. 507) and Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rowntree ([1948] l All E.R.\n\n482) distinguished.\n\nDavies , •. The Shell Go. of China (32 Tax Oas. 133) applied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 71 of 1952.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment dated 9th January, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Satya. narayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri JJ.) in Case Referred No. 67 of 1947.\n\nG. S. Pathak (G. R. Jaga, disan, with him) for the appellants.\n\n111. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953. January 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C., J.-This appeal arises out of a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench, under section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).\n\nThe appellants are merchants carrying on business in 1953 yarn in Madura and are the sole selling agents for yarn r\n\n-L .,, manufactured by the Madura Mills Co., Ltd., distribnt-!~!;. 8 n/~; n~ ing yarn to several constituents under forward conv. tracts in respect of which they obtained advances of The .Oom>ni•· moneys from their constituents. During the chargesioner of Income able accounting period (13th May, 1944, to 12th April, Tax and E~\"'\"\n\nProfit\"1 Tax,\n\n1945) the appellants received from their customern sums amounting to Rs. 7,69,569 and they claimed before the Excess Profits Tax Officer that the said sum should be treated as \"borrowed monev\" within the meaning of Rule 2-A of the Rules in the Second Schedule to the Act and, on that footing, no excess profits tax was payable by them for the chargeable accounting period. The Excess Profits Tax Officer rejected the claim and assessed them to excess profits tax of Rs. 25,404, holding that, having regard to the terms of the agreement under which the amounts were received, they could not in law be reganled as \"borrowed money\" within the meaning of that Rule. Appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal having failed, the appellants applied to the Tribunal for reference of the question of law arising in the case to the High Court at Madras for its determination, and the Tribunal accordingly referred the following question:\n\n\"Whether in the circumstances of this case, the moneys deposited by customers with the assessee firm as security deposits were \"borrowed money\" within the meaning of Rule 2-A of the Serond Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, either throughout the chargeable accounting period ended 12th April, 1945, or during any part of that chargea hie accounting period ? \"\n\nThe reference was lieard by a Division Bench of the Court (Satyanarayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri JJ.) and the learned judges by their judgment dated 9th June, 1950, decided the question against the appellants but granted them leave to appeal to this Court.\n\nAs is well known, during the period of the war, profits arising from a trade or business were much higher\n\nMadra, s.\n\nPatanjali 80.stri 0 .. 1.\n\n1953 than the pre-war standard of profits and the State -- wanted to catch a portion of such profits which it K. M. s.ndLask•hdeemed to be in excess of the normal or \"standard\" manier a ons . v. profits. The Act accordmgly charges a tax on the\n\nThe Oominis- \"excess profits\" earned under war conditions and\n\n•ioner of Inconie makes provision, inter alia, for cases where, as here, Tax aid Exe\"• there is an increase of capital used for purposes of\n\nProfit., Tax, the business in the chargeable accounting period.\n\nIn Madras. such cases the standard profits are to the increased by\n\n.PatanjaU an amount calculated by applying the \"statutory Sastri O.J. percentage\" (varying from 8 to 12 per cent. in different classes of cases) to the increase in capital. Thus, with the increase in the capital employed in the chargeable accounting period, there would be an increase in the standard profits and a decrease in the excess profit~.\n\nWhere the increase in the capital is brought about with borrowed money, it is but fair that such money, which plays its part in earning the larger profits, of which the Sta.te claims a substantial share, should not be deducted in computing the average capital used for the purposes of the business.\n\nRule 2-A of the Rules in the Second Schedule to the Act accordingly provides that in computing the average capital during the chargeable accounting period and the relative standard period \"no deduction shall be made in respect of borrowed money\". In the present case, the appellants having admittedly received no security deposits during the standard period, the increase in the average capital employed in the chargeable accounting period would be much greater than what it has been computed to be, if the security deposits received, which were all used for the appellants' business, were treated as borrowed money and part of the average capital of their business for the chargeable accounting period, and that, as stated above, would result in a considerable reduction of the excess profits as now assessed.\n\nV\\That then is the true legal character of these security deposits?\n\nThe sums in question were received by the appelants under three different arrangements with their\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS 1061\n\ncustomers evidenced by the circulars issued to them. 1953 The . first o.f the.se circulars issued on 5th May, 1944, K. M.ZLak•h was m the followmg terms : manier and SoM \"You are quite aware of the fact that we are and v. . will be, so long as the existiilg contracts of bales are .The\n\n0~\"1 \"'\"'\" . h . sioner OJ nconie closed, transferrmg t e Contract Advance Deposit Ta.\" and Excess amounts to the credit of current yarn account for tho Profits Tax, bales supplied to you then and there.\n\nMadras.\n\nNow, what we have decided in this connection is not Patanjali to do so as stated above, but to keep such advance Sa•tri o.J. amounts under the new heading \"Contracts Advance Fixed Deposit Account\" and return in cash or by bank's cheque or by insured post the advance amount of the bales booked and supplied in full under certain contract number only after completion of that contract with the bank's commission etc. expenses that may be incurred therein on your account.\n\nThe value of the bales delivered or to be delivered for each and every time should be paid in full and this system is applicable to our future booking of contracts only.\"\n\nThis was followed by another issued on 5th December, 1944, which runs thus :\n\n\"This is to inform you that we have changed the heading of your \" Contracts Advance :Fixed Deposit\" account into \" Security Deposit\" account. As such, we have transferred the amount which is to your credit in the former to the credit of your latter account. This is with effect from 1st November, 1944. Kindly note.\"\n\nThe arrangement was further modified by the last circular dated 14th February, 1945, which was in these terms:\n\n\"Instead of calling for amounts from you towards 'Security Deposit ' due to hales for which we are entering into forward contracts with you and returning the same to you from the said deposit then and there, as we are doing now, and in order to make it feasible, we have decided to demand from you a certain sum towards Security Deposit and keep the\n\n1062 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 same with us so long as our business connection under -- forward contracts will continue with yo11.\n\nK. M. B. Laksh manier and 8ons In your case, we have fixed a sum of Rs ......... for v. the said deposit, which amount we have to keep with .The Commis us on your approval. Against the said amount, a sum •ioner of Income f R t d l't 'th th d ,,, o s ............... s an. s creu w1 . us now m e Tax an ,; xcess . d . l'h c } b l f R d Profits Ta; i; said epos1t. ere1ore, t ie a ance o s............ ue Madras. ' by you /to you, is to be remitted/will be returned.\n\nKindly let us have your reply immediately in this I'atanjali connection. 8astr1: Ci.J.\n\nPlease note that interest of 3 per cent. per annum will be allowed as usual to the said deposit amounts until further notice.\"\n\nIt will be seen that before the 5th May, 1944, which covers the first seven weeks of the chargeable accounting period, the appellants had two accounts for each constituent, namely, a \" contract deposit account \" and a \" current yarn account \", crediting the moneys received from the customers in the former account and transferring them to the yarn account in adjustment of the price of the bales supplied \"then and there\", that is, as and when deliveries were made under a contract either in instalments or in full. It is clear that the amounts received from the customers under this arrangement were merely advance payments of the price which were to be adjusted against the value of the bales supplied from time to time under the forward contracts and they can in no sense be regarded as borrowed money. This indeed was not disputed by :Mr. Pathak. lt was also conceded by him that the circular of 5th December, 1944, which merely changed the heading of the account in which the moneys received were credited, did not alter the legal position as it then stood. Accordingly, the question arises only with reference t, o the amounts received between 5th May, 1944, aml 14th February, 1945, which covers the major part of the chargeable accounting period and those received thereafter till the end of that period.\n\nIt will be convenient to deal first with the amounts received during the last part of that period, for, if we\n\naccept the view of the learned judges below that those 1953 amounts were \"not. borrow.ed money, then a fortiori K. M. s. Lak•hmust amounts received durmg the second part be held manier and sons not to be borrowed money. v.\n\nThe circular of the 14th February, 1945, marks a .The On 1 imis- . sioner oJ ncome clear departure from the mode of dealmg followed by Tax and Exce\" the parties before the 5th May, 1944. The amount Profits Tax, deposited by a customer was no longer to have any Madras. relation to the price fixed for the goods to be delivered under a forward contract-either in instalments or Patanjali S h b 'd] Sastri O.J. otherwise. uc price was to e pa1 JY the customer in full against delivery in respect of each contract without any adjustment out of the deposit, which was to be held by the appellants as security for the due performance of his contracts by the customer so long as his dealings with the appellants by way of forward con tracts continued, the appellants paying interest at 3 per cent. in the meanwhile, and having, as appears from the course of dealings between the parties, the use of the money for their own business. It was only at the end of the \"business connection\" with the appellants that an adjustment was to be made towards any possible liability arising out of the customer's default.\n\nApart from such a contingency arising, the appellants undertook to repay an equivalent amount at the termination of the dealings.\n\nThe transaction had thus all the essential elements of a contract of loan, and we accordingly hold that the deposits received under the final arrangement constitute borrowed money for the purpose of Rule 2-A.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General laid great stress on the fact that the amounts were deposited with the object of inducing the appellants to have dealings with the customers and for the specific purpose of being held as security for the due performance by the customers of their forward contracts, and that the appellants themselves fixed the amount. to be deposited in each case.\n\nThese features, according to him, distinguished these transactions from a real borrowing or a real lending which the expression \"borrowed money\" in Rule 2-A must be taken to connote. vVe are unble to see how\n\n1953 the object which the customers had in view in making\n\nK. M. s. Lakshthe deposits can affect the essential cliaracter of the manier and Son• transaction. If A pays money to B who agrees to v. return not the identical eurrency in specie but an\n\n_The Oommisequivalent sum subsequently, no bailment arises but mnrr of Income simply a loan owing by B to A.\n\nThe fact that it is Tax and Excess\n\nll. d d \" k d\"CC A ' Profits Tax, ca e a \" epos1t can ma e no l!1erence. s pomted Madras. out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Nawab JVfajor Sir J11ohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Patanfali Singh (1), the two terms are not mutually exclusive.\n\nSastri O.J. \"A deposit of money is not confined to a bai!ment of specific currency to be returned in specie.\n\nAs in the case of a deposit with a hanker, it does not necessarily involve the creation of a trust hut may involve only the creation of the relation of debtor and creditor, a loan under conditions\". The fact that one of the conditions is that it is to be adjusted against a claim arising out of a possible default of the depositor cannot alter the character of the transaction. :N\" or can the fact that the purpose for which the deposit is made is to provide a security for the due performance of a collateral contract invest the deposit with a different character. It remains a loan of which t-he repayment in full is conditioned by the due fulfilment of the obligations under the collateral contract.\n\nThe Attorney-General placed strong reliance, as did the learned judges in the High Court, on the English decisions in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Port of London Authority (2) and Inland Revenue Commissioners\n\nv. Rowntree & Co. Ltd. (3). In the first case it was held that the stock issued by the Port of London Authority as consideration for the acquisition of the property of certain dock companies of London, which carried interest and was redeemable after twenty years, could not be regarded as representing \" borrowed money \" under Rule 2 of Part III of Schedule IV of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915, as that expression referred to \"a real borro\"'ing and a real lending \". The transaction was held to be a purchase of assets for consideration in the shape of the stock i:; sned, though it was attended\n\n(1) (1936) LR. 63 I.A. 279.\n\n(2) L.R. [1923) A.C. 507.\n\nwith incidents in some respects similar to those which 1953 would have en°sued if there had been a borrowing. It K. M.Oahh\n\nmay well be conceded that the term \" borrowedmanier and Sons money\" must be construed in its natural and ordinary v. meaning and implies a real borrowing and a real lend- .The Oommia- .\n\nB t th h ld\" th \" h th\" f th aioncr of Income mg. u e o mg at t ere was no mg o e Taz and Excess kind \" in the issue of stock as consideration for the P\"ofits Ta.v, purchase of certain assets, where \"no money passed Madras. directly or indirectly between the parties to the transaction \" is not of much assistance in determining the Patanjali issue whether the security deposits now in question Saatri o.J. involved a real borrowing and a real lending. For the reasons already indicated, we are satisfied that they do answer to that description and constitute borrowed money within the meaning of Rule 2-A.\n\nThe other case cited is still less helpful. Under certain arrangements for financial facilities, A drew 'fiills on B who accepted them and then, as an agent of A, discounted them with C and paid over the proceeds to A, who agreed to put him in funds before the maturity of the bills for paying them off. The Court of Appeal held that the money thus raised was not \"borrowed money\" within the meaning of paragraph 2 (1) of Part II of the Seventh Schedule to the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1939, which provided that \"any\n\nborrowed money shall be deducted\" (for the purpose of Excess Profits Duty). After referring to the Port of London case (supra) as authority for the view that the words \" borrowed money \" require the existence of a borrower and a lender and that there must be a real borrowing in the legal sense of the word, the learned judges proceeded to inquire who oould be the lender, if any, in the circumstances of the case and found there was none-not B, for an acceptor of a bill need not have any money in his hands at all to lend, not C who was only acquiring certain rights in the bill under the law merchant but was not lending money.\n\nThey accordingly found it\" impossible to discover that there was such a relationship\" (of lender and borrower) either between A and B or between A and C.\n\nIn the\n\n1953 present case, the relationship of lender. and borrower -- in all its essential features is plainly recognisable bet- K. M. 8 C, okahth d 't d th !!' t d ti t d . mauier ond Son.• ween e epos1 ors an , e appe an S, an Ia ectv. sion does not affect the matter one way or the other.\n\nThe Gommis On the other hand, a more recent decision sirmer of Inconn f h E ]' h (' f A ] ' D ' Th Ta\" awl 1'xcess 0 t e ng IS .. ourt 0 ppea Ill a vies V, e Profits Tm:, Shell Company of China (1), which Mr. Pathak Madras. brought to our notice, is more in . point. A British Company, which sold petroleum products in Patanjnfi China through Chinese agents, required the latter to 80' 1ri o.J. deposit with the company a sum of money in Chinese dollars to be held as security against possible default by the agent in payment for the products consigned to them and to be repaid when the agency came to an end. These deposits were, during the war, transferred to the United Kingdom for reasons of safety and were there held in sterling. Subsequently, when the Chine134il dollar depreciated in relation to sterling, the amounts required to repay the deposits in Chinese dollars were much less than the sums held by the company as sterling equivalents of the deposits, and the question arose whether such deposits were trading receipts or receipts of a capital nature. In holding that they were capital receipts and the profit was therefore a capital gain, Jenkins L.J., who delivered the leading judgment, observed :\n\n\"If the agent's deposit had in truth been a payment in advance to be applied by the company in discharging the sums from time to time due from the agent in respect of petroleum products transferred to the agent and sold by him, the case might well be difficult and might well fall within the ratio decidendi of Landes Bros. v. Simpson(') and Imperial Tobacco Co. v.\n\nKelley.(') But that is not the character of the deposits here in question. The intention manifested by the terms of the agreement is that the deposit should be retained by the company, carrying interest for the benefit of the depositor throughout the terms of the agency. It is to be available during the\n\n(1) (1951) 32 Tax Cas. 133.\n\n(~) (1934) 19 Tax Cas. 62,\n\n(3) (1943) 25 Tax Cao. 292,\n\n• •\n\nderiod of the. agency for making good the agent's\n\nJ9S3\n\npfaltsin te event of ny efault by him; hut.other- K. M.-~~Laksh wise 1t remams, as I see 1t, snnply as a loan owmg by 11ianie' a11J Sona the company to the agent and repayable on the termi. v. nation of the agency; and I do not see how the fact The Oommis that the purpose for which it is given is to provide <c sioncr of l:wonie security against any possih!ll default by the agent can Tax \"'.\"1 Ecesa . t 't 'th tl .h t f t d' . \" Profits 1 ax, mves 1 -w1 ie c arac er o a ra mg receipt.\n\nMadraa, The Attorney.General relied also upon certain deci sions holding that security deposits received from Patmijali 1 . d . h fid . h Saatri O, J, emp oyees were 1mpresse wit a umary c aracter so that the depositors were entitled to preferential payments from the assignee in bankruptcy of the depositee. He admitted, however, that there were decisions holding the other way, and we do not think it necessary to discuss that class of cases, as the manner in which such sums have to he dealt with under the Insolvency Acts has no direct bearing on the question now under consideration.\n\nTurning now to the deposits received by the appellants from 5th May, 1944, to 14th February, 1945, we are of opinion that, having regard to the terms of the arrangement then in force, they partake more of the nature of trading receipts than of security deposits. It will be seen that the amounts received were treated as advance payments in relation to each \"contract number\" and though the agreement provided for the payment of the price in full by the customer and for the deposit being returned to him on the completion of delivery under the contract, the transaction is one providing in substance and effect for the adjustment of the mutual obligations on the completion of the contract. We hold accordingly that the sums received during this period cannot be regarded as borrowed money for the purposes of Rule 2.A.\n\nLastly, Mr. Pathak suggested that the case having proceeded both before the Excess Profits Tax authorities and the High Court on the footing that if the sums received from the customers during any part of the chargeable accounting period were held to be borrowed,\n\nw.; J money, they must be included in the computation of\n\nK M.~Laksh the aveage pr?fits for h~ wole of the chargeable manier and Sons accountmg period, no d1stmct1on should now be made v. between one part of the period and another for this\n\n_The Gommispurpose. We cannot accept th1_1t view. It is true to \"oner of Income say that no such distinction was in fact made at any Tax and Excess r b th t b 't h Id th t Profits Tax, stage so iar, ut a is ecause 1 was e a none Madras. of the sums received under any of the arrangements was borrowed money within the meaning of Rule 2-A.\n\nPatanjali But, if it be held that the amounts received under one 8astri 0 .. 1. or more, but not all, of the agreements are borrowed moneys, then, obviously, the computation of average capital in accordance with Rule 2-A must take into account the different character of the sums received nuder each of the agreements which was in force during a part only of the chargeable accounting period.\n\nThe form of the question referred to the court clearly recognises this and admits of a distinction being made, if necessary, between parts of the chargeable accounting period.\n\nIn the result we set aside the order of the court below and answer the question referred in the affirmative with reference to the last part of the chargeable accounting . period, namely, 14th February, 1945, to 12th April, 1945, and in the negative with reference to the rest of that period. We make to order as to costs.\n\nOrder set aside.\n\nAgent for the appellants : N aunit Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhya.ksha.", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "K. M. S. LAKSHMANIER AND SONS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. M. S. LAKSHMANIER AND SONS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND\n\nEXCESS PROFITS TAX, MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 182, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 195, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HASAN J.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 218, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Excess Profits Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 221, "end_char": 243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 270, "end_char": 281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excess Profits Tax Act", "statute": "Excess Profits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "5th May, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 986, "end_char": 999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th May, 1944, they decided to keep the advance amounts under a new heading \"Contracts Adv.nee Fixed Deposit Account\" and to return the advance amounts in full after the completion of each contract and payment of the full value of the bales supplied."}}, {"text": "5th December, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1245, "end_char": 1263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th December, 1944, they changed the name of this account into \"Security Deposit\" account, and on the 14th February, 1945, the assessees decided to rnodify the arrangement further and demand a certain sum from each customer towards Security Deposit and keep the same with the assessees so long as the business connection with the customer under the forward contracts continued."}}, {"text": "14th February, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1347, "end_char": 1366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th December, 1944, they changed the name of this account into \"Security Deposit\" account, and on the 14th February, 1945, the assessees decided to rnodify the arrangement further and demand a certain sum from each customer towards Security Deposit and keep the same with the assessees so long as the business connection with the customer under the forward contracts continued."}}, {"text": "Rules in the Second Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1826, "end_char": 1890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "5th }!fay, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2046, "end_char": 2061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question being whether the advance amounts received by the assessees as deposit were \"borro\\ved money,'' within the meaning of Rule 2-A of the Rules in the Second Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, and should not be deducted in computing the average capital used for the purposes of the business: Held, (i) that the advance amounts received before the 5th }!"}}, {"text": "January 23.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2311, "end_char": 2322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fay, 1944, were only advance payments of tbe price, to be adjusted on delivery, and could in no sense he regarded as borrowed money;\n\n(ii) the amounts received after the 5th )fay, 1944, up to 14th February, 1945, were also, having regard to the terms of 137\n\nJanuary 23."}}, {"text": "L. R. 63 I.A. 279", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3818, "end_char": 3835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4194, "end_char": 4228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment dated 9th January, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Satya."}}, {"text": "Satya. narayana Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4230, "end_char": 4249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment dated 9th January, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Satya.", "canonical_name": "Satya. narayana Rao"}}, {"text": "Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "narayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri JJ.)"}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4311, "end_char": 4323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak (G. R. Jaga, disan, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "G. R. Jaga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4325, "end_char": 4335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak (G. R. Jaga, disan, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4380, "end_char": 4391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4421, "end_char": 4433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C., J.-This appeal arises out of a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench, under section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4653, "end_char": 4663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4671, "end_char": 4699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4805, "end_char": 4811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are merchants carrying on business in 1953 yarn in Madura and are the sole selling agents for yarn r\nL .,,"}}, {"text": "Madura Mills Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4883, "end_char": 4905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "manufactured by the Madura Mills Co., Ltd., distribnt-!~!;."}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5448, "end_char": 5463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "High Court at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6070, "end_char": 6090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal having failed, the appellants applied to the Tribunal for reference of the question of law arising in the case to the High Court at Madras for its determination, and the Tribunal accordingly referred the following question:\n\n\"Whether in the circumstances of this case, the moneys deposited by customers with the assessee firm as security deposits were \"borrowed money\" within the meaning of Rule 2-A of the Serond Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, either throughout the chargeable accounting period ended 12th April, 1945, or during any part of that chargea hie accounting period ? \""}}, {"text": "Serond Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6359, "end_char": 6410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12th April, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6469, "end_char": 6485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal having failed, the appellants applied to the Tribunal for reference of the question of law arising in the case to the High Court at Madras for its determination, and the Tribunal accordingly referred the following question:\n\n\"Whether in the circumstances of this case, the moneys deposited by customers with the assessee firm as security deposits were \"borrowed money\" within the meaning of Rule 2-A of the Serond Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, either throughout the chargeable accounting period ended 12th April, 1945, or during any part of that chargea hie accounting period ? \""}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6608, "end_char": 6625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference was lieard by a Division Bench of the Court (Satyanarayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Satya. narayana Rao"}}, {"text": "9th June, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6700, "end_char": 6714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the learned judges by their judgment dated 9th June, 1950, decided the question against the appellants but granted them leave to appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7471, "end_char": 7477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Madras."}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8213, "end_char": 8228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. M.ZLak•h", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9317, "end_char": 9328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "first o.f the.se circulars issued on 5th May, 1944, K. M.ZLak•h was m the followmg terms : manier and SoM \"You are quite aware of the fact that we are and v. ."}}, {"text": "1st November, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10707, "end_char": 10725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is with effect from 1st November, 1944."}}, {"text": "K. M. B. Laksh manier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11347, "end_char": 11368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. B. Laksh manier and 8ons In your case, we have fixed a sum of Rs ......... for v. the said deposit, which amount we have to keep with .The Commis us on your approval."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12873, "end_char": 12879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This indeed was not disputed by :Mr. Pathak."}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16362, "end_char": 16368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sastri O.J. \"A deposit of money is not confined to a bai!ment of specific currency to be returned in specie.", "canonical_name": "Sastri"}}, {"text": "Port of London Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17476, "end_char": 17500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first case it was held that the stock issued by the Port of London Authority as consideration for the acquisition of the property of certain dock companies of London, which carried interest and was redeemable after twenty years, could not be regarded as representing \" borrowed money \" under Rule 2 of Part III of Schedule IV of the Finance (No."}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17738, "end_char": 17749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1936) LR. 63 I.A. 279", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17990, "end_char": 18012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Saatri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18748, "end_char": 18754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "directly or indirectly between the parties to the transaction \" is not of much assistance in determining the Patanjali issue whether the security deposits now in question Saatri o.J. involved a real borrowing and a real lending.", "canonical_name": "Sastri"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19398, "end_char": 19414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gommis", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20560, "end_char": 20566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gommis On the other hand, a more recent decision sirmer of Inconn f h E ]' h (' f A ] ' D ' Th Ta\" awl 1'xcess 0 t e ng IS .. ourt 0 ppea Ill a vies V, e Profits Tm:, Shell Company of China (1), which Mr. Pathak Madras."}}, {"text": "Shell Company of China", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20727, "end_char": 20749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gommis On the other hand, a more recent decision sirmer of Inconn f h E ]' h (' f A ] ' D ' Th Ta\" awl 1'xcess 0 t e ng IS .. ourt 0 ppea Ill a vies V, e Profits Tm:, Shell Company of China (1), which Mr. Pathak Madras."}}, {"text": "Pathak Madras", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20765, "end_char": 20778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gommis On the other hand, a more recent decision sirmer of Inconn f h E ]' h (' f A ] ' D ' Th Ta\" awl 1'xcess 0 t e ng IS .. ourt 0 ppea Ill a vies V, e Profits Tm:, Shell Company of China (1), which Mr. Pathak Madras."}}, {"text": "Patanjnfi China", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20875, "end_char": 20890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A British Company, which sold petroleum products in Patanjnfi China through Chinese agents, required the latter to 80' 1ri o.J. deposit with the company a sum of money in Chinese dollars to be held as security against possible default by the agent in payment for the products consigned to them and to be repaid when the agency came to an end."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21222, "end_char": 21236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These deposits were, during the war, transferred to the United Kingdom for reasons of safety and were there held in sterling."}}, {"text": "Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21710, "end_char": 21717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In holding that they were capital receipts and the profit was therefore a capital gain, Jenkins L.J., who delivered the leading judgment, observed :\n\n\"If the agent's deposit had in truth been a payment in advance to be applied by the company in discharging the sums from time to time due from the agent in respect of petroleum products transferred to the agent and sold by him, the case might well be difficult and might well fall within the ratio decidendi of Landes Bros. v. Simpson(') and Imperial Tobacco Co. v.\n\nKelley.(')"}}, {"text": "Madraa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23083, "end_char": 23089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madraa, The Attorney."}}, {"text": "Patmijali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23193, "end_char": 23202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General relied also upon certain deci sions holding that security deposits received from Patmijali 1 ."}}, {"text": "N aunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26280, "end_char": 26291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : N aunit Lal."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhya.ksha.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26320, "end_char": 26340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhya.ksha."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1069_1129_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nAND ANOTHER\n\nTHE UNITED MOTORS (INDIA) LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA,\n\n. STATE OF BIHAR,\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS,\n\nSTATE OF MYSORE,\n\nI I\n\nI ' '\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL,\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, STATE OF PUNJAB and\n\nSTATE OF TRAV ANCORE-\n\nI )- Interveners.\n\nCOCHIN\n\nI I i j\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI , JJ.l\n\nBombay Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952). ss. 2 (14), 5, 6, 7, 11 -Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, l'I'. 5, 6-State law imposing sales tax-Validity-Powei of States to levy tax on inter-State sales -Limitations-Rules-Whether form part of Act-Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 286 (Z) and (2), 14, 301, 304, 226 -ilieaning and scope of art. 286 (1) and art. 286 (2)-Application under art. 226 -D11ty of High Court to find whether fundamental rights have been infringed.\n\nThe Legislature of Bombay passed an Act entitled the Bombay Sales Tax ,\\ct, 1952, which imposed (by s. 5) a general tax on every dealer \\Vhose turnover in resper; t of saJes within tho State of Bombay during the prescribed period exceeded Rs. 30,000 and (by s. 10) a special tax on every dealer whose turnover in respect of sales of special goods made within the State of Bombay exceeded Rs. 5,000 during the prescribed period. 'fhe term 'sale' was defined [in s. 2 (l4)] as meaning any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and an Explanation to this definition provided th; t the sale of auy goods which have actually been clelivered in the State of Bombay as a direct result of such sale for the purpose of consun1ption in the said State shall be deemed, for the purposes of the Act, to have taken place in the said State irrespective of the fact that the property in the goods has 1 hy reason of c; nch sn.le, passed in 139\n\nMarh JO\n\n1070 SUPREME coeRT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 another fltate.\n\nRules 5 and 6 of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, which were brought into force on the sane day on which The State of Bomss. 5 and 10 of the Bombay Sales Tax \\ct came into force providtm11 aml Another ed for the deduction of the following sales in calculating the taxv. able turnover, viz., sales which take place (a) in the course of the The Unih'd import o! the goods into, or the export of the goods out of, the .\\lotor\" (India) territory of India, and (b) in the course of inter-State trade or Ltd. and Other-\" commerce (being the two kinds of sales referred to cl. (l)(b) and cl.\n\n(2) respectively of art. 286 of the Constitution). Rule 5 (2) (i), however, required, as a conditon of the aforesaid deductions, tho, t the goods should be consigned by a railway, shipping or aircraft company or country boat registered for carrying cargo or public motor transport service or by registered post.\n\nIn •n application under art. 2% of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Act and praying inter alia for a writ against the State of Bombay and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, restraining them from enforcing the provisions of the Act, the High Court of Bombay held that the definition of 'sale' in the Act was so wide as to include the three categories of sale exempted by art. 286 of the Constitution from the imposition of tax by the States, and as the Act imposed a tax on all such sales, it was wholly void. On appeal\n\nHeld, per (Pata; ija.li Sastri 0. J., Nukherjea, Ghulam Rasan and Bhagwati JJ,-Bose J. dissenting)-that the Bombay Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952) was not nltra vires the State Legislature on the ground that it contravened art. 14 or art. 286 of the Constitution. Bui clause (i) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, was nltra vires in so far as it provided that in order that sales mentioned in clause (1) (b) and clause (2) of art. 286 of the Constitution may be exempt from tax, the goods shall be consigned only through a railway, shipping or aircraft company or country boat registered for carrying cargo or public motor transport service or by registered post.\n\nThese provisions of Rule 5 (2) (i) were, however, severable from the other provisions of the Act and could be ignored.\n\nPer Bose J.-The Bomba)' Sales Tax Act, 1952, is wholly ultra vires.\n\nPer Patanjali Sastri O.J., Mukherjea and Ghulain Hasan JJ. -Arbicle 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution read with the Explanation thereto and constrned in the light of art. 301 and art.\n\n304 prohibits the taxation of sales or purchases invo!Ying inter.\n\nState elements by all States except the State in which the goods are delivered for the purpose of consu1nption therein.\n\nThe latter State is left free to tax such sales or purchases and it derives this power not by virtue of the Explanation to art. 286 (1) but under art. 246 (3) read with entry 54 of List II. The view that the Explanation does not dep1ive the State in which the p1operty in the goods passed, of its taxing power and that consequently both the State in which the property in the goods passes and t]je State\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'l' REPOH'l'S 1071\n\nin 'vhich the goods are delivered for constunption lHt\\'e the pu\\'ler 1953 to tax, is not corl'flct.\n\n(\") . \" '1.'hcState ofBu1n 11 The expression for the purpose of consumption in ba\" ,,,~ ' ti S \" ·\n\nE 1 ( ) . .., ! r\" 11 no i.cr that late m the xp anat10n to cl. 1 of art. 286 must be un- '\" derstood as having reference not merely to the individual importer J'lw u iei or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to \\lotors ;7 ~· consumers n general within the State, and all buyers 'vitin the itd. aud 0\n\n1, ih:;:!\n\nSta to of dehvery from out-of-State sellers, except those buy mg for re-export out of the State, would he liable to be taxecl by the State.\n\n(iii) Clause (:l) of art. 286 does not affect the power of the State in which deliyery of goods is made to tax inter-State sales or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation to cl. (i).\n\nThe effect of the Explanation is that such transactions are sayed from the ban imposed by art. 286 (2).\n\n(iv) The fact that sales which take plt1Ce (a) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, tho territory ol India and (h) in the course of inter-State tracle or commerce, are not expressly exempted by the Born hay Sales Tax Act could not render the Act 1!ltra vires inasmuch as the Rules framed under the Act and brought into force simultaneously must be read as a part of the Act and Rules 5 and 6 of these Rules exempt •uch sales.\n\nDelhi Laws Act, In re ([1951] S.C.R. 747) referred to. (\\') The fact that the Bombay flales Tax Act dues not expreHsly exclude from its operation the transactions mentioned in art. 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution, vi .. , sales and purchases outside the State, l1oes not render the A.ct u, ltra vires inasmuch as) on a true construction of the Explanation to art. 286 (1) (a) sales or purchases in respect of goods delivered for consuinption outside Bombay are not lttxable under the Act, eyen if the goods are in Bombay and the sale is effected there.\n\n(vi) The provisions of the charging sections 5 and 10 of tbe Act fixing Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 5,000 as tbe minimum taxable turnover for general tax and special tax resPectively are not dis criminatory and void under art. 14 rea1l with art. 13 of the Constitution aS snch classification is perfectly reasonable and no discrimination is involved in it.\n\n(vii) Taxing statutes imposing tu, x on subjects divisihle in their nature which do not exclude in express ter1us subjects exempted by the Constitution, should not for that_eason be declal'ed wholly nltra vires and void, for, i:1 such (jases it is al\\vays feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those levied on exempted subjects and to exclude tbe latter in the assessment to tax. In such cases the statute itself should bo allowed to stand, the taxing authority being prevented by injunction from imposing the tax on subjects exempted by the Constitution.\n\n> [1953]\n\n1963 Bowman v. Continental Co. (256 U. S. 642; 65 L. l!ld. 1130) relied on. Punjab Province v. Dattlat Singh tind Another ([1942] The State of Boin- F.C.R. 67) distinguished.\n\nbay and Anothe, r\n\n(viii) A sale \"in the course of inter-State trade\" in art.\n\nT ' vu. . 286 (2) of the Constitution includes a sale by a trader in one \"' mted 0 S Tl · t .., (I a ) otate to a consumer in another tate. ie expression ;.s no con- n.otor8 11 ia Ltd. aiul Others fined to sales between t\"'O traders only.\n\n(ix) The expression \"for such State 01 any part thereof\" in art. 246 (3) of the Constitution cannot be taken to import into entry 54 of List II the restriction that the sale or purchase referred to must take place within the territory of that State. All that it means is that the laws which a State is empowered to make must be for the purposes of that State.\n\n(x) It is always desirable when relief under art. 226 is sought on allegations of infringement of fundamental rights, that the Court should satisfy itself that such allegations are well founded before proceeding further with the matter.\n\nBose J.-(i) Article 286 (2) cannot be construed in the light of art. 304 (l) as the two articles deal with different matters.\n\n(ii) The basic idea underlying art. 286 is to prohibit taxation in the case of inter-State trade and commerce until the ban under cl. (2) of the said article is lifted by Parliament, and always in the case of imports and exiiorts.\n\nWhen the ban is lifted, the l!lxplanation to cl. (l) of 286 comes into play to determine the situs of the sale. This Explanation does not govern cl. (2) of art. 286 and, as it can only apply to transactions which in truth and in fact take place in the course of inter-State trade and commerce, there is no need to call it in aid until the ban is removed.\n\n(iii) Explanation (2) to the definition of sale in s. 2 (14) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952, which embodies word for word the provisions of the l!lxp!anation to art. 286 (1) directly offends\n\ncl. (2) of the said article as the ban under cl. (2) has not been lifted by the Parliament.\n\n(iv) Assuming that the Bombay Sales Tax Rules exclude all sales which are exempt from taxation under the Constitution, they cannot save the Act, for the Rules are made by a subordinate authority which is not the legislature and the validity of an Act of the legislature cannot be made to depend on what a subordinate authority choses to do or not to do.\n\n(v) The good portion of the Act cannot be separated from the bad in this case, even if the Explanation to s. 2 (14) is expunged and the whole Act is therefore ultra vires.\n\nBllagwati J.-(i) Under the general law relating to sale of goods, a sale must be regarded as having \"taken place\" in the State in which the property in the goods sold bas passed to the\n\npurchaser and that State is entitled to tax the sale or purchase 1953 as having taken place inside the State. The Explanation to art. -- 286 (1) does not take away the right which the State in which TJ,, \"'\"'' 0/Bom the property in the goods passed has to tax the sale or purchase bn!f and Another but only deems such purchase or sale, by a legal fiction, to haYe v. taken place in the State in which the delivery of the goods bas The Unitcrl been made for consumption therein so as to enable the latter ,\\lotvrs (India) State also, to tax the sale or purchase in question. The Explana Lid. and Others\n\ntion only lifts the ban imposed by cl. (1) (a) on taxation of s>eles or purchases which take place outside the State, to the extent of the transactions mentioned in the Explanation to enable the delivery State also to tax them.\n\n(ii) Delivery of the goods for the purpose of consumption in the delivery State means delivery for the purpose of use by the consumers, and does not include delivery to a dealer purchasing the goods across the border for dealing with or disposing of the same in the ordinary course of trade, and the J<lxplanation to art. 286 (1) therefore only covers those cases where, as a direct result of the sale or purchase, goods are delivered for consumption in the delivery State by the consumer and the delivery State can tax only this limited class of transactions under the Explanation.\n\n(iii) The genernl provision enacted in arL 286 (2) against the imposition 'Of tax on the sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade 01 commerce should give way to the special provision which is enacted in the Explanation to art. 286\n\n(1) {a) enabling the delivery State to tax such sale or purchase in the limited class of cases covered by the Explanation, the transactions covered by the Explanation lJeing thus lifted out of the category of transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and assimilated to transactions of sale or purchase \\vhich take place inside the State and thus invested with the character of an intra-State sale or purchase so far as the delivery State is concerned.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE J URISDIC'l'lON : Civil Appeal No. 204 of 1952.\n\nAppeal under article 132 (l) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 11th December, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Dixit J.) in Miscellaneous Application No. 289 of 1952.\n\nThe material facts are stated in the judgment.\n\n1vf. P. Arnin, AdvocuteGeneral of Bornbuy, (M .. ilf.\n\nDesai and G. N. Joshi, with him) for the appellants.\n\nN. ltf. Seervai and J.B. Dadachanji for the respondents.\n\n. , 1074 SUPREME COUR'r REPOR'fS [1953]\n\n1953 Jvl. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Porus - A. 1l1ehta, with him) for the Union of I1'idift. ~-~-- , . ,. . bay aud Another Lal Narain Sinha for the State of B1har.\n\nv. .\n\nV. K. '!'. Chari, Advowte-General of Jl!Iadms, (A.\n\nThe Umtcd_ Kuppuswami, with him) for the State of Madras.\n\nJlotors (Indra) .\n\nLtd. \"\"'l Othcro.\n\nA. R. Soinanatha Iyer, Advocate-Cleneral of 1l1ysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the State of Mysore.\n\nB. Sen for the State of West Bengal.\n\nK. L. 1lfisro, Adrncate-General of Uttar Pradesh, K. B. Asthanrt, with him) for the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nS. JV]. Sikri, Advocate-Geneml of Punjab, ( 111. L.\n\nSethi, with him) for the State of Punjab.\n\n'l.'. N. Subrahmanya Iyer, Advocate-Cleneml of 'L'ravancore-Oochin State, (1vl. R. Krishnrt Pillrti, with him) for the State of Travancorc-Oochin.\n\n1953. l\\farch 30. The judgment of Patanjali Sastri 0. J., Mukherjea and Ghulam Hasan JJ. was delivered by Patanjali Sastri 0. J. Vivian Bose and Bhagwati JJ. delivered separate judgments.\n\nPATANJALI S,1sTR1 C. , J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay <leclaring the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952, (Act XXIV of 1952), itltra vires the State Legislature and issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus against the State of Bombay and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, appellants herein, directing them to forbear and desist from enforcing the provisions of the said Act against the respondents who are dealers in motor cars in Bombay.\n\nThe Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\") and it was brought into force on October 9, 1952, hy notification issue\\! under section 1 (3) of the Act, except sections 5, 9, 10 and 47 which came into operation on November 1, 1952, as notified under section 2 (3). On the same day the rules made by the State Government in exercise of the power conferred by section 45 of the Act also came into force.\n\nOn November 3, 1952, the respondents 1 to 6, who 1953 are companies incorporated unrlPr the Indian Com- Ti 8 ---- . ' 9 3 d I l\\T h' w tateofBompames \"\"\"ct, 1. l , an respom ent \"'o. 7, a partners ip l>mi and Another firm, all of whom are carrying on business in Bombay '\" of buying and selling motor cars, presented a petition The Unitfd to the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution Motors (India) challenging the validity of the Act on the ground that Ltd. and Othm it is ultra vires the State Legislature, inasmuch as it l\n\nJ)afanjnli lnu1Jorted to tax sales anc rmrchases of goods regard- '--' ._, 8aNtti C, J, less of the rc8trictions imposed on r-ltate legislative power by article 28G of the Constitution. It was also alleged that the provisions of the Act \\VC; re discriminatory in their effect and, therefore, void under article\n\n14 read with article 13 of the Constitution. The respondents accordingly prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus against the appellants preventing them from enforcing the provisions of the Act against the respondents.\n\nA further ground of attack was added by amendment of the petition to the effect that the Act being wholly ultra vires and void, the provisions requiring dealers to apply for registration in some cases and to obtain a licence in some others as a condition of carrying on their business, infringed the fundamental rights of the respondents under article HJ (1) (g) of the Constitution.\n\nIn the affidavit filed in answer the appellants traversed the allegations in the petition and contended, inter alia, that the Act was a complete code and provided for special machinery for dealing with all questions arising under it, inclurling questions of constitutionality, and, therefore, thr petition was not maintainable, that the present case was not an appropriate one for the issue of a writ under article 226 as the validity of the imposition of a tax was questioned, that no assessment proeeedings having been initiated against the respondents and no demand notice having been iswed, ihe respondents had no cause of action, and that, properly construed, the Act and the Rules did not contravene aitiele 286 or any other provisions of the Constitution and did not infringe :my fundamental right of the respondents,\n\n1963 The petition was heard by a Division Bench of the\n\nThe State of Bom. High et; urt cosistin& o: Chagla _C. J: and D!x!t J. bay. and Another Chagla C. J., \\\\ho delivered the Judgment, D1x1t J. v. concurring, overruled the preliminary objection dis- Tke United tinguishing the decisions cited in support thereof by Motors (Indw) pointing out that the principle that a (;()Hrt would Ltd. and Othm t t\" \"t J d t 1 _ no issue a preroga 1ve wr1 w ien an a equa e a ter-\n\nPatanjali native remedy was available could not apply where,\n\nsa,, tri o.J. as here, a party came to the court with an allegation tliat his fundamental rights had been infringed and sought relief under article 226.\n\nThe learned Judges however thought, in view of the conclusion they had come to on the question of competency of the State Legislature to pass the Act, it was \"not necessary to consider the challenge that has been made to the Act under articles 14 and 19\" and expressed no opinion on the alleged infringement of the respondents' fundamental rights.\n\nOn the merits, the learned .Judges held that the definition of \"sale\" in the Act was so wide as to include the three categories of sale exempted by article 286 . from the imposition of sales tax by the Rtates, and, as the definition governed the charging sections 5 and 10, the Act must be taken to impose the tax:; on such sales also in contravention of article 286.\n\nThe.Act must, therefore, be declared wholly void, it being impossible to sever any specific offending provision so as to save the rest of the Act, as \"the defini. tion pervades the whole Act and the whole scheme of the Act is bound up with the definition of sale\". The learned .Judges rejected the argument that the Act and the Rule(must be read together to see whether the State has made a law imposing a tax in contravention of article 286, remarking that \"if the Act itself is bad, the rules, made under it cannot have any greater efficacy\". Nor was the Government, which was authorised to make rules for earrying out the purpose of the Act, under an obligation to exclude the exempted sales. The rules, too, did not exclude all the three categories of exempted sn, les but only two of them, anrl even stwh exrlnsion was hedged\n\nIn view of the importance of the issues involved, 19\"3\n\nnotice of_ the appeal was issued to the Advocates-The State of Bom.\n\nGeneral oi States under Order XLI, Rule l, and many bay and Another of them intervened and appeared before us.\n\nThe v.\n\nAttorney-General of India, to whom notice was also The United sent, intervened on behalf of the Union of India. We ~~ 0\" ~~·ia) have thus had the assistance of a full argument deal- \"..'.'._ t ers. ing with all aspects of the case.\n\nPatanjali The Advocate-General of Bombay, appearing on behalf of the appellants, took strong :exception to the manner in which the learned Judges below disposed of the objection to the maintainability of the petition. He complained that, having entertained the petition on the ground that infringement of fundamental rights was alleged, and that the remedy under article 226 was, therefore, appropriate, the learned Judges issued a writ without finding that any.fundamental right had in fact been infringed. Learned counsel for the State of West Bengal also represented that parties in that State frequently got petitions under article 226 admitted by alleging violation of some fundamental right, and the court sometimes issued the writ asked for without insisting on the allegation being substantiated. We are of opinion that it is always desirable, when relief under article 226 is sought on allegations of infringement of fundamental. rights, that the court should satisfy itself that such allegations are well founded before proceeding further with the matter. In the present case, however, the appellants can have no grievance, as the respondents' allegation of infringement of their fundamental right under article 19 (1) (g) was based on their contention that the Act was ultra vires the State Legislature, and that contention having been accepted by the Court below, there would clearly be an unauthorised restriction on the respondents' right to carry on their trade, registration and licence being required only to facilitate collection of the tax imposed. As !\\fr. Seervai for the respondents rightly submitted, the fact that the Court below left the question undecided, though the point was concluded by the\n\nSastri 0 .J.\n\ni 9s3 decision of this Court in .'l!ohammad Yasin v. Tlze\n\nTh 8 --., B Town Area Committee, Jalalabad ('); which was e tate oJ 01n- . bay and Another brought to the notice of the learned Judges, was not v. the fault of the respondents and gave no real cause The United for complaint. 11Iot<>rs (India) . . .\n\nLtd. and Others Before cons1dermg whether the appellant State has made a law imposing, or authorising the imposition Patanjali of, a tax on sales or purchases of goods in disregard\n\n8ast1'i O.J. of constitutional restrictions on its legislative power in that behalf, it is necessary to aseert.ain the scope of such power and the nature and extent of the restrictions placed upon it by article 286. The power is conferred by article 246 (3) read with entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Legislature of any State has, under these provisions, the exclusive power to make laws \"for such State or any part thereof\" with respect to \"taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers\".\n\nThe expression \"for such State or any part thereof\" cannot, in our view, be taken to import into entry 54 the restriction that the saJe or purchase referred to must take place within the territory of that State. All that it means is that the laws whieh a State is empowered to make must be for the purposes of that State. As pointed out by the Privy Council in the Wallace Brothers case (') in dealing with the competency of the Indian Legislature to impose tax on the income arising abroad to a non-resident foreign company, the constitutional validity of the relevant statutory provisions did not turn on the possession by the legislature of extra-territorial powers but on the existence of a sufficient territorial connection between the taxing State and what it seeks to tax. In the case of sales-tax it is not necessary that the sale or purchase should take place within the territorial limits of the State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale like the agreement to sell, the passing of title, delivery of the goods, etc., should have a territorial connection with the State. Broadly speaking, local activities of buying or selling carried on in the State in relation to local goods would be a suffieient basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, provided of course, such\n\nIr) [1952] S.C.R. 572.\n\n(2) [1948] S.C.R. r.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE~1E COUR'l' UE.PORTS 1079\n\nsale or 1953 activities ulti1?ately resulted in a concluded purchase to be taxed. '}_'he State of Boniln exercise of the legislative powor conferred upon bay \"'\"1 Another them in substantially similar terms by the Governv. ment of India Act, 1935, the Provincial Legislatures The United d 1 l\n\n.£\" il'.lotor;.: (India) enacte sa es-tax aws 1or their respective Provinces, Ltd. and Other.•. acting on the principle of territorial nexus referred to above; that is to say, they picked out one or more of Patanjat1. the ingredients constituting a sale and made them the 8a.•tri O.J. basis of their sales-tax legislation. Assam and Bengal made among other things the actual existence of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxability. In Bihar the production or manufacture of the good~ in the Province was made an additional ground.\n\nA net of the widest range perhaps was laid in Central Provinces and Berar where it was sufficient if the goods were actually \"found\" in the Province at any time after the contract of sale or pure hase in respect thereof was made.\n\nWhether the territorial nexus put forward as the basis of the taxing power in each case would be sustiiined as sufficient was a matter of doubt not having been tested in a court of law.\n\nAnd such claims to taxing power led to multiple taxation of the same trnnsaction bv difforent Provinces and cumulation of the burdei; falling ultimately on the consuming public.\n\nThis situation posed to the Constitution makers the problem of restrieting the taxing power on sales or purchases involving inter-State elements, and alleviating the tax burden on the consumer. At the same time they were evidently anxious to maintain the State power of imposing non-discriminatory taxes on goodH\n\nimported from other States, while upholding the economic unity of India by providing for the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce. In their attempt to harmonise and achieve these somewhat conflicting objectives they enacted articles 286, 301 aml 304.\n\nThese articles read as follows : 286.\n\n(1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of good8 where sueh sale or purchase takes place-\n\n(a) outside the State ; or\n\n1'heStateofBom-\n\n(b) in the course of the iport oft!1e go_ods iuo, bay and Another or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.\n\nv. .\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), ,}1\" U(nlttedd. J a sale or 1mrchase shall be deemed to have ta ken ,1.r.1.otors n 1a . . 1 Ltd. and Others place in the State m which the goods have actual y\n\n- . been delivered as a direct result of such sale or pur- Patanjali chase for the purpose of consumption in that State, SaslYi o.J. notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.\n\n(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce : Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any\n\nState immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day of March, 1951.\n\n(3) So law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.\n\n301. Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.\n\n304. Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law-\n\n(a) impose on goods imported from other States any tax to which similar goods manufactured or\n\nproduced in that State are subject, so, however, as not\n\nJ&5J to discriminate !Jetween goods so imported and goods Tl s -.,8 '-' , w tate oJ 01n so manufactured or produced ; and bay and Another\n\n(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the v. f. d f d ' t h 'l'hc Unite4 ree om o tra e, commerce or Ill ercourse wit or }J t (I d' J within that State as may be required in th0 public t~.\n\n0 ;:d 0;,.;~. interest:\n\nProvided that no Bill or amendment for the pur- Patan}ali 8astri O.J. poses of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President.\n\nIt will be seen that the principle of freedom of inter- 8tate trade and commerce declared in article 301 is expressly subordinated to the State power of taxing goods imported from sister States, provided only no discrin1ination is made in favour of similar goods of local origin. Thus the States in India have full power of imposing what in American State legislation is called the use tax, gross receipts tax, etc. not to speak of the familiar property tax, subject only to the condition that such tax is imposed on all goods of the same kind produGed or manufactured in the taxing State, although such taxation is undoubtedly calculated to fetter inter-State trade and commerce. In other words, the commercial unity of India is made to give way before the State-power of imposing \"any\" non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from sister States.\n\nHaving thus provided for the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce subject to the important qualification mentioned above, the authors of the Constitution had to devise a formula of restrictions to be imposed on the State-power of taxing sales or purchases involving inter-State elements which would avoid the doubts and difficulties arising out of the imposition of sales-tax on the same transaction by several Provincial Legislatures in the country before the commencement of the Constitution. This they did by enacting clause (1) (a) with the Explanation and clause (2) of article 286. Clause (1) (a) prohibits the taxation of all sales or purchases which take place oul8ide the State,\n\n1953 but a localised sale is a troublesome coi; i.cept, for, a sale\n\nS - 1\n\nB is a composite transaction involving as it does several The tateo om ] h 11 c f bay and Another e ements sue as agreement to se , trans1er o ownerv. ship, payment of the price, delivery of the goods and Tlte United so forth, which may take place at different places.\n\nMotor• (India) How, then, is it to be determined whether a particular Ltd. and Others. sale or purchase took place within or outside the State ?\n\nPainjalt It is difficult to say that any one of the ingredients\n\nsastri o.J. mentioned above is more essential to a sale or purchase than the others. To solve the difficulty an easily applicabie test for determining what is an outside sale had to be formulated, and that is what, in our opinion, the Explanation was intended to do. It provides by means of a legal fiction that the State in which the goods sold or purchased are actually delivered for consumption therein is the State in which the sale or purchase is to be considered to have taken place, notwithstanding the property in such goods passed in another State. Why an \" outside \" sale or purchase is explained by defining what is an inside sale, and why actual delivery and consumption in the State are made the determining factors in locating a sale or purchase will presently appear. The test of sufficient territorial nexus was thus replaced by a simpler and more easily workable test: Are the goods actually delivered in the taxing State, as a direct result of a sale or purchase, for the purpose of consumption therein ? Then, such sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in that State and outside all other States. The latter States are prohibited from taxing the sale or purchase; the former alone is left free to do so. Multiple taxation of the same transaction by different States is also thus avoided.\n\nIt is, however, argued on behalf of Bombay that the Explanation does not say that the State of delivery is the only State in which the sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place. If that was the intention, it would have been easy to say so. On the other hand, the non-obstante clause in the Explanation is said to indicate that, apart from cases covered by the legal fiction, the passing of property in the goods is to determine the place of sale. Thus, both the State of delivery\n\nand the State in which the property in the goods sold 1953 passes are, it is'claimed, empowered to tax. We are --- unable to accept this view. It is really not necessary 7'he State of Boin-\n\n• • . . bay and An.other m the context to use the word \"only ' m the way v. suggested, for, when the Explanation says that a sale The United or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in Motors (l11dia) a particular State, it follows that it shall be deemed Ltd. and Others, lilso to have taken place outside the other States. Nor Patanjali can t.lie non-obstante clause be understood as implying Sast•i o.J. that, under the general law relating to the sale of goods, the paosing of the property in the goods is the determining factor in locating a sale or purchase.\n\nNeither the Sale of Goods Act nor the common law relating to the sale of goods has anything to say as to what the situs of a sale is, though certain rules have heen la id down for ascertaining the intention of the contracting parties as to when or imder what conditions the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer. That question often raises ticklish problems for lawyers and courts, and to make the passing of title the determining factor in the location 0f a sale or purchase would be to replace old uncertainties and difficulties connected with the nexus basis with new ones. Nor would the hardship of multiple taxation be obviated if two States were still free to impose tax on the same transaction. In our opinion, the non-obstante clause was inserted in the Explanation simply with a view to make it clear beyond all possible doubt that it was immaterial where the property in the goods passed, as it might otherwise be regarded as indicative of the place of sale.\n\nIt is also to bP noted in this connection that, on the construction suggested by the Advocate-General of Bombay, namely, that the Explanation was not intended to deprive the State in which the property in the goods passed of its taxing power, but only to exclude the sales or purchases of the kind described in the Explanation from the operation of clause (1) (a) which prohibits taxation of outside sales or purchases, the Explanation would operate, not as an explanation, but ris an exception or a proviso to that clause. It\n\nma may be that the description of a provjsion cannot be\n\nTh S --JB decisive of its true meaning or interpretation which e tate o omd d 1 d d h b h bay and Another must epen Ont le WOr S USC t erem, ut, W en two v. interpretations are sought to be put upon a provision, The United that which fits the description which the legislature Motors (India) has chosen to apply to it is, according to sound canons Ltd. and Othm of construction, to be adopted provided, of course, it is consistent with the language employed, in preference Patanjali h to the one which attributes to t e provision a different Sastri 0.J. effect from what it should have according to its description by the legislatnre.\n\nIt was then said that the formula of delivery for consumption within a State could only cover the comparatively few cases of sales or purchases taking place directly between the consumers in the delivery State and dealers in other States, and inter-State sales or purchases between dealers in either State, which must be larger in number and volume, would still be outside the scope of the Explanation, which could not, therefore, have been intended to empower only one State, namely, the delivery State, to tax all inter-State sales or purchases. We see no force in this objection.\n\nIt is to be noted that the Explanation does not say that the consumption should be by the purchaser himself. Nor do the words \" as a direct result \" have reference to consumption. They qualify \"actual delivery\". The expression \" for the purpose of consumption in that State\" must, in our opinion, be understood as having reference not merely to the individual importer or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to consumers in general within the State. Thus all. buyers within the State of delivery 1 from out-of-State sellers, except those buying for I' re-export out of the State, would be within the scope of the Explanation and liable to be taxed by the State on their inter-State transactions. It should be remembered here that the Explanation deals only with inter- State sales or purchases and not with purely local or domestic transactions. That these are subject to the taxing power of the State has never been questioned.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that article 286 (1) (a) read with the Explanation prohibits taxation of sales\n\n• •\n\nor purchases involving inter-State elements by all\n\nI96J States except the State in which the goods are deli- -- d c th f • h . . h The State of Bom- Vre 1or e purJ.>OSe o consumpt10n t erem m t e bay and Another wider sense explamed above. The latter State is left v. free to tax such sales or purchases, which power it The United derives not by virtue of the Explanation but under Mot<w• (India) article 246 (3) read with entry 54 of List II.\n\nLtd. and Other•-.\n\nWe will now consider the effect of article286(2) on Patanjali the taxability of inter-State sales or purchases of the Sastri a.J. kind envisaged by the Explanation to clause(l)(a).\n\nAs both the Explanation and clause (2) deal only with inter-State transactions, it may appear at first blush that whatever taxing power the Explanation may have reserved to the State of delivery is nullified by clause (2), at any rate until Parliament chooses to lift the ban under the power reserved to it by the opening words of clause (2). As one way of avoiding this result it was suggested by the Advocate-General of Bombay that the expression \"inter-State trade and. commerce\" in clause (2) may be construed as meaning dealings between a trader in one State and a trader in another, so that the clause would be applicable only to sales or purchases in the course of dealings between such traders. The ban under clause (2) could not, in that view, affect the taxability of a sale by a trader in one State to a consumer or user in another. We cannot agree with this restrictive interpretation of the expression \" inter-State trade and commerce\". The sale by a trader in one State to a user in another would be a sale \"in the course of inter-State trade\" according to the natural meaning of those words, and we can see no reason for importing the restriction that the transaction should be one between two traders only. This is, however, not to say that the ban under clause (2) extends to the taxing power which the delivery State\n\nis left free, under the Explanation, to exercise. We are of opinion that the operation of clause (2) stands excluded as a result of the legal fiction enacted in the explanation, and the State in which the goods are actually delivered for consumption can impose tax on inter-State sales or purchases.\n\nThe effect of the\n\n1953 Explanation in regard to inter-State de, alings is, in our view, to invest what, in truth, is an inter-State transac- The State of Bomtion with an intra-State character in relation to the State\n\nba11 and Another d l\" l (2) h £ h of e ivery, and c ause can, t ereiore, ave no\n\n1'/w nited application. It is true that the legal fiction is Motor., (Iadia) to operate \"for the purposes of sub-clause (a) of Ltd. aad oaie,.s. clause (1)\", !mt that means merely that the Explanation is designed to explain the meaning of the expres- Patanjati \"d h S ' J\n\n(1) ( ) Wh sion \"outs1 e t e , tate' m c. a use a . en once, ,\"o'astri G.J. d h . l fi . however, it is etermined with t e aid of tie ctwnal test that a particular sale or purchase has taken place within the taxing State, it follows, as a corollary, that the transaction loses its inter-State character and falls outside the pm-view of clause (2), not because the definition in the Explanation is used for the purpose of clause (2), but because such sale or purchase becomes in the eye of the law a purely local transaction. It is sttid that even though all the essential ingredients of a sale took place within one State and the sale was, in that sense, a purely intra-State transaction, it might involve transport of the goods across the State-boundary, and that would be sufficient to bring it within the scope of clause (2). 'Ve find it difficult to appreciate this argument.\n\nAs already stated, the Explanation envisages sales or purchases under which out-of-State goods are imported into the State. That is the essential element which makes such a transaction inter-State in character, and if it is turned into an intra-State transaction by the operation of the legal fiction which blots out from view the inter-State element, it is not logical to say that the transaction, though now become local and domestic in the eye of the law, still rebiins its inter-State character. The statutory fiction completely masks the inter-State character oft.he sale or purchase which, as a collateral result of such making, falls outside the scope of clause (2).\n\nIt is said that, on this view, clause (2) would become practically redundant, as clause (1) (a) read with the explanation as construed by us would itself preclude taxation by other States of inter-State sales m purchases of the kind referred to in the explanation. As\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME UOURT REPORTS 1087\n\nwe have already pointed out, the Explanation does not 1953\n\ncover cases of inter-State sales or pmchases under 1'hc.Stateof Bomwhich the goods are imported into the State for rebay and Anothn export to other States and possibly other categories of v. sales or purchases which do not satisfy all the require- 1'he United rnents of the explanation. W'hether such transactions ~1;;\",.': ~; ta) are sufficiently numerous for the Omstitution to take \"_\" _ \"' note of is a matter of opinion and it cannot have much Patanjali bearing on the question of construction.\n\nSastri GI On the other hand there are, in om judgment, cogent considerations which tend to support the view we have expressed above that clause (2) was not intemkd to affect the power of the delivery State to tax inter-State sales or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation. As we ha1•c seem, in our\n\nConstitution the principle of freedom of inter-State trade and commerce is made to give way before the 8tate-powp1 of imposing non-discriminatory taxes on go<ids imported from othel' States. Now, article 286(2) is but one phase of the protection aceorded to inter- State tmde anrl l'ommerce from the fettering power of State taxation.\n\nAs ari.icle 286 deals with restrictions on the power of the St>itcs to impose tax on the sale or purchase of goodH, the Constitution makers evidently thought that it should contain also a specific provision safeguarding sales or purchases of an inter-State <'haracter a.gainst the taxing power of the 8tatl's.\n\nIt is, howrver, reasonable to suppose that this particnlar form of protection to inter-State trade and commerce provided in article 286(2) was not intended to have a wider operation than what is contemplated in Part XIII which declares the general principle of free dom of inter-State connnerc:c and defines the measure of constitutional protection it should enjoy. 1f sueh protection is intended to give way before the State-power of taxing goods imported from sister 8tates, subjeet only to the condition against discrimination. it is legitimate to suppose that the ban under article 286(2) should not operate so as to nullify that power. True, article 304 (a) deals with the restrictions as to imposition of tax on goods, while article 286\n\n1088 SUPREME COUR; r REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 deals with the restrictions as to imposition of tax on sales or purchases of goods.\n\nBu't this distinc- The State of Bom tion loses its practical importance in the case of ~-h- . . h v. sales-tax imposed by the delivery State under t e\n\nThe United conditions mentioned in the Explanation, for, if we look Motors (India) behind tho labels at the substance of the matter, it Ltd. and Oth<rs. becomes olear that a tax on sales or purchases imposed by the State in which the goods are delivered for con PatanJllli h ]r d 1 ' d Saatri o.J. sum ption, in t e sense a ea y exp ame , is, m economic effect practically indistinguishable from a tax on the consumption or use of the goods. The words \"in which the goods have actually been delivered\" ensure that the goods have come into the State, and the expression \" for the purpose of consumption in the State\" shows that, though the tax is formally laid on sales, its incidence is aimed at the consumers in the State. Discussing the true nature of a duty of excise and a tax on the sale of goods, Gwyer C. J. observed in the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax case (1):\n\n\"It is common ground that the Court is entitled to look at the real substance of the Act imposing it, at what it does and not merely at what it says, in order to ascertain the true nature of the tax. Since writers on political economy are agreed that taxes on the sale of commodities are simply taxes on the commodities themselves, it is possible to regard a tax on the retail sale of motor spirit and lubricants as a tax on those commodities\". Therefore, sales-tax, the incidence of which is really directed against the consumer, is, in substance, a tax on the goods imposed, no doubt, on the occasion of the sale as a taxable event. It will now be seen why the Explanation insists on actual delivery of the goods in the State and their consumption in the State, and why an \" outside\" sale or purchase is explained by defining what is an inside sale. The object clearly is to assimilate the conditions, under which the delivery State is left free to tax inter-State sales or purchases, to those under which a State is empowered to impose tax on goods imported into the State from other States under article 304 (a). If then, a non-discriminatory use or consumption tax imposed under\n\n(1) [1939) F.C.R. 18, 42.\n\n196J article 304 on goods imported from other States does not infringe the freedom of inter-State commerce tl ] l b t' J 301 't f l l' The State of Bomec rec y ar IC e , pan y o reason anc po ICY bay and Anoth6r reqmres that a tax on sales or purchases imposed by v. the State in which the goods are actually delivered for 1'he United consumption in the State should not be regarded as Motors (India) violative of the ban under article 286 (2), and that is Lrd. and Othm. what the statutory fiction enacted in the Explanation Patanjali was, in our judgment, designed to achieve by divesting Sastri o.J. the sale or purchase of the kind referred to in the Explanation of its inter-State eharacter in relation to the State of delivery.\n\nThere is another important consideration which strongly supports the view we have indicated above, namely article 286 (2) does not affect the taxation of such sale or purchase by the State of delivery. If both the exporting State and the delivery State were entitled, notwithstanding article 286(2), to tax the inter-State sale or purchase, as suggested by the Advocate-General of Bombay, it would mean that the transaction is subjected to double taxation as compared with a sale by a local dealer which pays only one tax. It is precisely this type of discriminatory lmrtlen which the principle of freedom of inter-State commerce seeks to avoid, for, it places inter-State tra<, l.e at a disadvantage in competition with local trade. On the other hand, if neither State could tax such sale or purchase as is referretl to in the explanation, until Parliament lifted the ban, as the Advocate-General of Madras was inclined to think, the result would be that consumers could get out-of-State goods more cheaply than local goods, and local dealers would suffer competitive disadvantage as compared with outside dealers. Does the principle of freedom of inter-State commerce require that a State should foster such commerce to the detriment of domestic trade 'I It is one thing to avoid impeding inter-State commerce by imposing discriminatory burdens upon it which internal trade does not have to bear, but quite another to place local\n\nproducs and local business at a disadvantage in competition with outside goods and dealers. It would be\n\n1:153 a curious perversion of the principle pf freedom of inter-State commerce to drive local custom across thf~ TheStateoJBmnborder to ontside dealers, and that, in our opinion, bay an~. Another could not have been contemplated.\n\nThe United The view which we have expressed above avoids Motors (India) either anomitly and would place local trade and inter- Ltd. and Othm. S d 1 c n'h d l' \"t t __ , tate tra e on an equa tootmg. .L e e 1very ,~ a e\n\nPatanjali would tax both local and out-of-State goods equally sa, tri c.J. without discrimination against either and that, we think, is the only measure of protection which article 286 could reasonably be supposed to accord to inter- State sales or purchases, when it is constrned in the light of articles 301 and 304.\n\nThe question next arises as to whether the Act contravenes all or any of the restrictio1rn imposed by article\n\n286. It is the respondents' case that the sales and purchases made by them in Bomba.y, in the course of their business, include all the three categories excluded from the scope of State-taxation by article 286, and the Ad seeking to bring all of them within its scheme of taxation is bad. It is, therefore, necessary to make a brief smvey of the main provisions of the Act and of the rules made thereunder, in order to see whether the respondents' complaint is well-fonnded, and, if so, whethet the whole or any part of the Act is to be declared unconstitutional and void.\n\nThe Act provides for levy of two kinds of taxes, nalled the \"general tax\" and the \"special tax\", by the two charging sections 5 and 10 respectively. \"Dealer\" is defined in section 2 (7) as a person who carries on the business of selling goods in the State of Bombay whether for commission, remuneration or otherwise and includes a State Government which carries on such business and any society, club or association which sells goods to its members. The Expla- . nation (2) to this definition provides that the manager\n\nor agent of a dealer who resides outside the State of Bombay and carries ou the business of selling goods in the State of Bombay shall, in respect of such business, be deemed to be a dealer for the purpose of the Act. \"Sale\" is defined by section 2 (14) with all\n\n• •\n\nits grammatiml variations and cognate expressions as 1953 meaning a. ny transfer of property in 0ooodR for cash or Th 8 - 18 . • e tate o uni deferred payment or other valuable cons1derat1011 andb\"'' and Another includes any supply by a society, a club, or an asso- v. ciation to its members on payment of price or of fees 1•1oe United or subsrriptions but does not include a mortgage, Moto1w (India) hypothecation, diarge or pledge. The words \"buy\" LM. and Othm. and \"purchase\" are to be construed accordingly. l'a-;:,,, jaU There arr two Explanations attached to this definition 3,,,11; o.J. of which tht seeond, which is ohviouslv hasell on the Explanation to clause (1) (a) of articl~· 286, provides that the sale of any goods which have actually been delivered in the l:ltate of Bombay as a direct result of sueh sale for the purpose of consumption in the said\n\n::-ltate, shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have taken place in the said State, irrespective of the fact that the property in the goods has, by reason of such sale, passed in another State. \"Turnover\" is defined by section 2(21) as tho aggregate of the amount;; of sale price received and receivable by a dealer in l'espect of an~· sale of goods made 1luring a given period after deducting the nmount, if any, refunded by the dealer to a purchaser\n\nin respect of any goods purchased and returned by the purchaser within th1 prescribed period. Section 5 imposes the general tax on every dealer whose tmnover in respect of sales within the Rtate of Bombay during any of the three consecutive years immediately preceding the first day of April, 1952, has exceeded Rs. 30,000 or whose turnover in respect of such sales exceeds the said. limit during the yc>ar commencing on the first day of April, 1952. The tax is to be levied on his taxable turnover in respect of sales of goods made on or after the appointed day, i.e., 1st November, 1952, at the rate of 3 pies in the rupee (section 6). By section 7 the taxable turnover is to he determined by first deducting from thP turnover of the dealer in respect of all his sales of goods during any period of his liability to pay the general tax, his turnover during that period, in respect of (a) sales of any goods declared from time to time as tax-free under section 8 and(b) \"such other sales as may be prescribed.\" No dealer\n\n1953 liable to pay the general tax shall carry•on business as\n\nThe State of Boma dealer unless he ha.s pplied for rgistrat.ion (section bay and Anotl<er 9).\n\nA more or less s1m1lar scheme 1s provided for the v. levy of a special tax on the sale of certain special The United goods specified in Schedule IL By section IO every Motors (India) dealer whose turnover in respect of sales of special Ltd. and!!_thers. goods made within the State of Bombay has exceeded\n\nPatanjali Rs. 5,000 during the year ended 31st March, 1952, or sa., tri c.J. exceeds the said limit during the year commencing from 1st April, 1952, is charged with a special tax at the rate specified in Schedule II on his taxable turn over in respect of the sales of special goods made on or after the appointed day, i.e., 1st November, 1952.\n\nBy section 11 the taxable turnover is to be determined by first deducting, from the turnover of the dealer in respect of his sales of special goods during any period of his liability, his turnover in respect of (a) sales of special goods purchased by him on or after the appointed day at a place in the State of Bombay from a dealer holding a licence under section 12 and (b) \" such other sales as may be prescribed.\" Every dealer liable. to pay the special tax is required to obtain a licence as a condition of his ca.rrying on his business (section 12).\n\nThen follow certain provisions for returns,. assessment, payment and recovery of tax. Section 18 imposes a purchase tax at the rate of 3 pies in the rupee on the purchases of such goods as may be notified by the State Government from time to time which have been despatched or brought from any place in India outside the State of Bombay or are delivered as a direct result of a sale to a buyer in the State of Bombay for consumption therein, and also an additional tax if the goods are special goods. Section 21 (2) prohibits any person selling goods from collecting from the purchaser any amount by way of tax unless he is a. registered dealer or a licensed dealer and is liable to pay the tax under this Act in respect of such sale. Chapter VI contains provisions for production of accounts, supply of infor. mation and cancellation of registration or licence.\n\nChapter VII deals with proceedings including appeals\n\nand revision and the determination of certain ques- 1953 tions of law by 'reference to the High Court. Section 45 empowers the State Government to make rules \"for The Stateaf Bom- . h f h' A . bay and Another carrymg out t e purposes o t 1s ct.\" In particular, such rules may prescribe, among other things, \"the The ;;, ited other sales, turnover in respect of which may be Motors (India) deducted from a dealer's turnover in computing his Ltd. and Othcro. taxable turnover as defined in section 7 and in section -- 11\" [sub-section (2) (e)].\n\nPatanjali In exercise of the powers conferred by this section, the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, which were brought into force on the same day on which the charging sections 5 and 10 of the Act were also brought into force, namely, :N\"ovember 1, 1952.\n\nOf these, Rules 5(1) and 6(1) are important, and they provide for the deduction of the following sales in calculating taxable turnover under section 7 (general tax) and section 11 (special tax): (i) sales which take place (a) in the course of the import of the goods into or export of the goods out of the territory of India or (b) in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. It is to be noted that these are the excluded categories of sales or purchases under article 286 ( 1) ( b) and ( 2) respectively. Rule .5(2) (i) requires, as a condition of the aforesaid deductions, that the goods should be consigned by certain specified modes of transport.\n\nClause (v) lays down a rule of presumption to be acted upon in the absence of evidence of actual consignment of the goods within three months of the sale, that the sale has not taken place in the course of export or of inter-State trade as the case may be. It is not necessary to refer to the provisions of the other rules.\n\nNow, it will be seen from the provisions summarised above that the Act does not in terms exclude from its purview the sales or purchases taking place outside the State of Bombay while it does include, by Explanation (2) to the definition of \"sale\", the sales or purchases under which the delivery and consumption take place in Bombay which, by virtue of the Explanation to article 286(l)(a), are to be regarded as local\n\nSastri C.J.\n\n1953 sales or purchases.\n\nOn the construction we have - placed upon that Explanation, sales or purchases 7'he SiateofBomeffected in Bombay in respect of croods in Bombay but boy and Anolhri d l' d f' · t .Od B b t v e ivere or consumption ou s1 e om ay are no\n\nThe United taxable in Bombay. :N\"ow, the respondents complain Motors (India) that the latter category of sales or purchases thus held Ltd. and Othc,.s. not to be taxable are not expressly excluded by the Act which, therefore, contravenes article 286 (l)(a). No\n\ns:~:;, n~ 0 ~. doubt, there is no provision in the Act excluding in express terms sales of the kind referred to above, but neither is there any provision purporting to impose tax on such sales or purchases. On the other hand, the two charging sections of the Act, section 5 and section 10, purport, in express terms, to impose the tax on all sales made \"within the State of Bombay\", and section 18, which lays the tax on purcha3es, is limited in its operation to purchases of goods delivered to a buyer in the State of Bombay for consumption therein, that is to say, to purchases which unquestion, ably are taxable by Bombay according to both parties. 'The charging sections cannot, therefore, be taken to cover the class of sales or pmchases whieh, on our construction of the Explanation, are to be regarded as taking place outside the State of Bombay. vVe see no force, therefore, in the argument that the Act contra, venes the provisions of article 286(l)(i.) by purporting to charge sales or purchases excluded by that article from State-taxation.\n\nAs regards the other two categories of sales or pnr, chases excluded by article 286 ( 1 )(b) and (2), it is true that the Act taken by itself does not provide for their exclusion.\n\nBut, a, s pointed out akeady, rules 5 and 6, which deal respectively with deduction of certain sales in calculating the taxable turnover under sections 7 and 11 exclude these two categories in express terms, and these rules were brought into force simultaneously with the charging sections 5 and 10 on November 1, 1952.\n\nThe position, thereforn, was that, on the date when the general tax and the special tax became leviable under the Act, sales or purch, ises of the kind described under article 286( 1) (b) and ( 2) stood in fact excluded from taxation, and the State of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS 1095\n\nBombav cannot be considered to have made a \"law 195a\n\nimposiIg 01' authorising the imposition of a tax\" on - sales or purchases excluded under the aforesaid clausesbTheStadteoAif Btohm\n\n, ' ~- M• of :irtrnle 286. The Act :ind the rnles havmg been v. hrought into operation simultaneously, there is no The United olwious reason why the rules framed in exercise of Motor• (India) the power delegated by the Legislature should not be Ltd. and Others, re0\"arded as part of the \"law\" made by the State. rsee --\n\nv l Patanjali observations at page 862 in the Delhi Laws Act Sastri a.J. case(1 )]. The position might be different if the rules\n\nhtd come into operation sometime later than the charging sections of the Act, for, in that case, it is arguable that if the legislation, without excluding the two classes of siiles or purchases, was beyond the competence of the Legislature at tho date when it was passed, the exclusion subsequently effected by the rules cannot validate such legislation. But, as already stated, that is not the position here, :tnd the learned Judges below foll into an error by overlooking this crucial fact when they say \"If the Legislature had no competence on the date the Jaw was passed, the rules subsequently framed 0a1111ot uonfer competence on the Legislature\".\n\nEven so, it was contended, the exclusion of the sales covered by clause (l)(b) and clause (2) of article 286 was hedged round with conditions and qualifications which neither the Legislature nor the rule-making authority was competent to impose on the exclusion and, therefore, such rules, even if read as part of the Act, could not cure the constitutional transgression. The conditions and qualifications complained of are mostly found to relate to mere matters of proof, e.g., rule 5(2), Explanation (2), which insists on the production of a certificate from an appropriate authority, before a motor vehicle, despatched to a place outside the State of Bombay by road and driven by its own power, could be exempted as an article sold in the course of inter- State trade. o objection can reasonably be raised if the taxing authority insists on certain modes of prooi being adduced before a claim to exclusion can be allowed.\n\nObjection was also taken to clause (i) of\n\n(1) (1951] s.c.R. 747.\n\n1953 sub-rule (2) of rule 5 as imposing an unauthorised limitation upon the exemption of sales and purchases TheState 0! Boni-allowed by rule 5(1), that is to say, while rule 5(l)(i)\n\nbay and Another allows the deduction of the sales covered by clause ( 1)\n\nThe ; nited\n\n(b) and (2) of article 286 in calculating taxable turn-\n\nMotors (India) over, sub-rule (2) (i) of the same rule provides that, in Ltd. and Othere. order to claim such deduction the goods shall be consigned only through a railway, shipping or aircraft Patanjali company or country boat registered for carrying cargo Sastri 0 .J. d or public motor transport service or by registere post.\n\nIt is said that there is no reason why sales of goods despatched by other modes of transport should not also be deducted from the taxable turnover, because article 286 (2) in exempting sales in the course of inter-State trade, makes no distinction between modes of transport by which the goods are despatched.\n\nThis limitation, it was claimed, was beyond the competence of the rule-making authority. The argument is not without force, and it must be held that rule 5(2)(i) is ultra vires the rule-making authority and therefore void. But it is clearly severable from rule 5(l)(i). The restriction regarding the mode of transport of the goods sold or purchased in. the course of inter-State trade, to which alone sub-rule (2)(i) relates, can be ignored and the exemption under rule 5(l)(i) may well be allowed to stand.\n\nFinally, Mr. Seervai attempted to make out that the provisions of the charging sections 5 and 10 fixing Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 5,000 as the minimum taxable turnover for general tax and special tax respectively were discriminatory and void under article 14 read with article 13 of the Constitution, and he gave us several tables of figures showing how the imposition of the tax actually works out in practice in hypothetical cases. It is unnecessary to go into the details of these cases which have been worked out in figures, for it must be conceded that the general effect of fixing these minimum limits must neces>arily\n\nbe to enable traders whose taxable turnover is below those limits to sell their goods at lower prices to their customers than dealers whose turnover exceeded\n\nthose limits, for the latter have to add the sales-tax\n\nW53 to the prices o'f their goods.\n\nBut no discrimination is, - involved in this classification which is perfectly reason- The StateoJB.om\n\nbl h . . b . . d h h S bay and Another a e wen it 1s orne m mm t att e tate may not v. consider it administratively worthwhile to tax sales The United by small traders who have no organisational facilities Motors (India) for collecting the tax from their buyers and turn it Ltd. and Others. over to the Government. Each State must, in imposing - Patanjali a tax of this nature, fix its own limits below which it sa, tri a.J. does not consider it administratively feasible or worthwhile to impose the tax. It is idle to suggest that any discrimina.tion is involved in such classification.\n\nApart from the considerations set forth above which tend to support the constitutional validity of the Act, it was broadly contended before us that taxing statutes imposing tax on subjects divisible in their nature which do not exclude in express terms subjects exempted by the Constitution, should not, for that reason, be declared wholly ultra vires and void, for, in such cases, it is always feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those levied on exempted subjects and to exclude the latter in the assessment of the tax. In such cases, it is claimed, the statute itself should be allowed to stand, the taxing authority being prevented by injunction from imposing the tax on subjects exempted by the Constitution.\n\nOur attention was called to certain American cases where this principle has been consistently followed: (see Bowman v. Continental Compdny( 1), where all the previous cases are collected). In the present case the tax is imposed, in ultimate analysis, on receipts from individual sales or purchases of goods effected during the accounting period, and it is therefore possible to separate at the assessment the receipts derived from exempted sales or purchases and allow the State to enforce the statute with respect to the constitutionally taxable subjects, it being assumed that the State intends naturally to keep what it could lawfully tax, even where it purports to authorize the taxation of what is constitutionally exempt. The principle, as it\n\n(r) 256 i::.s. 642 ; 65 L. Ed. rr30.\n\n1098 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [i953J\n\n1963 is tersely put in the American case, is that severability ·- in such cases includes separability in enforcement.\n\nThe Stat6 of Honibay and Another Our attention was drawn to the decision of the Pri\\-y \": .\n\nCouncil in Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh and The United Others(') as condemnatory of this principle. The case Motors (lndia) . h ] 1 d' . . h ble Th . L d h' itJ nd 011 is owever, c e3, r y JStmgms a '. eir or s ips \"·-- wrs. were dealing with a Provincial miactment providing\n\nPatanfali for the avoidance of benami transactions as theres\"\"'' o.J. in specified and tho question was whether it was ultra vires the Legisla tnre as contravening section 298( l) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which forbade the prohibition, inter alia, of disposition of property by an Indian subject on certain grounds which included \"descent\". It was found that in some cases the impugned enactment would operate as a prohibition on the ground of descent alone.\n\nThe .Federal Court(') by majority expressed the view that the Act could not, for that reason, be invalidated as a whole but that the circumstances in which its provisions would be inoperative must be limited to cases where the statute actually operated in contravention of the constitutional inhibition.\n\nDisagreeing with this view their Lordships made the following observations which were strongly relied on before us :\n\n\" The majority of the Federal Court appell.r to have contemplated another form of severability, namely, by a classification of the particular cases on which the impugned Act may happen to operate, involving an inquiry into the circumstances of each individual case.\n\nThere are no words in the Aet capable of being so construed, and such a course would in effect involve an amendment of the Act by the court, a course which is beyond tho competency of the court, as has long been well established.\"\n\nThe subject of the constitutional prohibition w3, s single and indivisible, namely, disposition of property on grounds only of (among other things) descent and if, in its actual operation, the impugned statute was found to transgress the consti tu tiona] mandate, the whole Act had to be held void as the words used\n\n!r) [1946] F.C.R. r.\n\n(2) [1942] F.C.R. 67.\n\n, •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 1099\n\ncovered both what was constitutionally permissible 19.;3 and what was'not.\n\nThe same principle was applied - hy this court in the Cross Roads case(1). It was, TbheStadteoA'.f Bothem- . d d · ay an no r m ee , applied also m Bowman's case(') with respect v. to the licence tax imposed generally on the entire 1'he Unitw business conducted includin\" inter-State commerce Motors ! India) 0 as well as domestic business, but was not applied, as Ltd. and Others. stated above, with respect to excise tax which was Patanjali laid on every gallon of gasolene sold and was thus Sastri o.J. divisible in its nature. It is a sound rule to extend severabi!ity to include separability in enforcement in such cases, and we are of opinion that the principle should be applied in dealing with taxing statutes in in this country, We accordingly set aside the declaration made by the court below and quash the writ issued by it except in regard to rule 5 (2) (i). An injunction shall, however, issue restraining the appellants from imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax on sales and purchases which are exempted from taxation by article 286 as interpreted above.\n\nEach party will hear its own costs throughout.\n\nBosE J.-I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brother Bhagwati. I regret I am unable to agree with either. The range of disagreement is not large but unfortunately it vitally affects the result.\n\nI agree with the construction which my Lord has placed upon entry No. 54 of List II. I also agree that the object of the Explanation is to fix the locus of a sale or purchase by means of a fiction, hut with respect I cannot agree with my brother Bhagwati that the non-obstante clause enunciates the general law on this point. I know of no general law which fixes the situs of a sale, not even the Sale of Goods Act. What the gcnerallaw does is to determine the place where the property passes in the ttbsence of a special agreement, but the place where the property passes is not necessarily the place where the sale takes place, nor\n\n(I) [1950] S.C.R 59·1\n\nM 256 U.S. 642 .\n\nllOO\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 has that ever been regarded as the determining factor. - What, in my opinion, happened was this.\n\nThe State of Boni. bay and Another Before the passing of the Constitution, different v.\n\nStates (or Provinces as they then were) claimed the\n\nThe United. right to tax the samo transaction for a variety of reasons Motors (India) which have been pointed out by my Lord the Chief Ltd. and Others. J t\" Th 1 th t th f t _ us ICe. e resu t was a e prwe o cer am\n\nBose J. commodities became inordinately high.\n\nTake, for ex.ample, the case of steel rails manufactured by the Tata Iron and Steel Works at Tatanagar and purchased by the Government of India for its railways.\n\nThe Central Government found itself called upon to pay a sale or purchase tax to different States on a single transaction of purchase.\n\nI am not sure how many times over it. had to pay but on the notions then current it was open to Bihar to claim the right to tax because the goods were manufactured there, to Bengal because the transaction of sale took place at Calcutta where the head offices of the company were, to a third Province because the goods were delivered there and to a fourth because they were \"found\" there.\n\nIt hardly matters whether all or any of this would have stood scrutiny in a court of law because the fact remains that various States were actually taxing the one transaction of sale on the nexus theory and a real danger existed of more and more of them coming in to claim a share of the spoils. It seems to me that the Constitution makers considered this detrimental to the development and exercise of trade and commerce and so determined to put a stop to the practice but at the same time left Parliament a discretion to restore a part of the status quo .if and when it should think it safe and desirable to do so.\n\nThe narrowing of the powers was accomplished by stating in article 286 that no State can impose a tax on a sale or purchase which takes place outsi'.de the State, by stating that it cannot tax a sale or purchase in the course of import or export and by prohibiting taxes on sales and purchases which take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce unless Parlia- µient chooses to lift the ban. Reading these together\n\nin a simple and straightforward way it seems clear to 1963 me that the id.ea was to permit States to tax only Th 8 ,, 8 h I h\n\n]J S I d h e tateo, om. w at m1g t ca mtra-1 tate sa es an pure ases, at bay and Another any rate, to begin with. v. ·\n\nB t ] ] t t ]' •t f ] The United u m ega enac men s s1mp 101 Y o anguage Motors (India) seldom evokes clarity of thought. So long as the ban Ltd. and Others. imposed by clause (2) remains, there is no difficulty because when parts of a sale take place in different Bose J.\n\nStates the transaction is inter-State and no tax can be imposed.\n\nOn the other hand, when all the ingredients are intra.State clause (2) is not attracted.\n\nComplications only arise when the ban is lifted. The Constitution makers had before them the existing practice of the States based on the nexus theory, and so it became necessary to define just where a sale takes place in order to carry out the main theme that only intra-State sales can be taxed.\n\nThe difficulty is apparent when one begins to split a sale into its component parts and analyse them.\n\nWhen this is done, a sale is found to consist of a number of ingredients which can be said to be essential in the the sense that if any one of them is missing there is no sale. The following are some of them: (1) the existence of goods which form the subject-matter of the sale, (2) the bargain or contract which, when executed, will result in the passing of the property in the goods for a price, (3) the payment, or promise of payment, of a price, (4) the passing of the title.\n\nV\\'hen all take place in one State, there is no diffi. culty. The situs of the sale is the place in which all the ingredients are brought into being. But when one or more ingredients take place in different States, what criterion is one to employ ? It is impossible to say that any of these ingredients is more essential than any other because the result is always the same the moment you take one away. There is then no sale. Therefore, one either has to adopt the ultra logical view and hold that the only State which can tax is the one in which all the ingredients take place and that no State can tax when a single ingredient\n\n1953 takes place elsewhere, or resort to the , old view and\n\nThe State of Bomhold that every State in which any single ingredient bay and Another takes place can tax. The only alternative to these v. extremes is to make an arbitrary selection or to The United introduce a fiction.\n\nThe Constitution chose the Motors (India) latter course and enacted the Explanation.\n\nLtd. and Others. . I have deemed it proper to refer to the then exist-\n\nBose J. ing practice regarding taxation because in construing a statute it is legitimate to take into account exist. ting laws and the manner in which they were acted upon and enforced. [See Gwyer C. J. in In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938(') and Croft v. Dunphy(')]. I think this rule is even more appropriate in the case of the Constitution because the Constitution itself continues in force all laws which were in existence at the date when it came into being except those which are inconsistent with itself.\n\nI am with respect unable to agree that article 286\n\n(2) is to be interpreted in the light of article 304 (a).\n\nIn my opinion, the two articles deal with different things. Article 286 is concerned with sales and purchases, while article 304 relates to goods imported from other States. The stress in the one case is on the transaction of sale or purchase ; in the other, on the goods themselves and on the act of import. Article 286 is related to Entry No. 54 of List II and to Entries 41 and 42 in List I. Article 304(a) to Entries 26 and 27 of List II read with Entry 33 in List III and to Entries 51, 52 and 56 of List II. The distinction is, I think, clear when it is realised that (apart from the Explanation) a sale or a purchase can be taxed even though the goods are never actually delivered and even if they never reach the taxing State, for the right is to tax the sale or purchase and that is something quite independent of actual delivery.\n\nThe goods might be destroyed by flood or fire before there is any chance of actual delivery. They might, as in the case of the steel rails purchased by the\n\n(1) [1939] F.C.R. 18 at 53.\n\n(2) [1933] A.C. 156 at 165.\n\nGovernment of India, be delivered in a totally different 1968 State, but the \"tax could still be levied if there was no - Explanation to stop it. I find it difficult to see how bThe /SeadteoA'.f 80 1hm 1 2 (2) .\n\nId . t \"' . 1 'f ay an 110 \" artic e 86 cou ever come m o euect1ve p ay 1 v. article 304 is applied to sales and purchases which take The United place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Moror• (I>Zdia) I do not thinkthe change in language, \"a tax on the Led. and Othm.\n\nsale or purchase of any goods\" in the one case and a tax on \"goods imported from other States\" was accidental, nor do I think we will be justified in ignoring the fact that the two are placed in different parts of the Constitution. I therefore prefer to hold that articles 286 and 304 deal with different things and to construe article 286 without reference to 304. In this I agree with my brother Bhagwati.\n\nComing back to the Explanation, its object is, I think, to resolve the difficulty regarding the situs of a sale. The Constitution having decided that the only State which can tax a sale or a purchase is the State in which the transaction takes place, and having before it the conflict of views regarding nexus and situs, resolved the problem by introducing the fiction embodied in the Explanation.\n\nThe purpose of the Explanation is, in my view, to explain what is not outside the State and therefore what is inside. With respect I cannot agree that the Explanation is really an exception, and I do not think the non-obstante clause means that under the general law the place where the property passes was regarded as the place where the sale takes place, for that in itself would be a fiction.\n\nThere is no such law. In my opinion, all it means is that there was a school of thought' which regarded that as the crucial element on the nexus view and that the Constitution has negatived that idea.\n\nI am also unable to agree that the Explanation governs clause (2) of article 286, for it limits itself in express terms to sub-clause (a) of clause (1). It says that is an Explanation \"for the purposes of sub-clause\n\n(a)\". In view of that I do not feel justified in carrying it over to clause (2) and holding that it governs there as well. In my judgment, the only purpose of the\n\nBose J.\n\n1953 Explanation is to explain where the sitU§ of a sale is.\n\nClause (2) has a different object. Its purpose is to The State of Bom h'b' t' 1 d h h' h t k b nd A ther pro i it taxa 10n on sa es an pure ases w ic a e ay a no 1 ' h f S d v. p ace m t e course o mtertate tra e or com- The United merce.\n\nMotors (India) If h E 1 · d t 1\n\n(2) 't Ltd. and Other•. t _e xp.anat10n is carr1e over ? cause i __ must, m my Judgment, be equally applicable to sub- Bose J. clause (b) of clause (1). As I understand the argument, the reasoning is this. The Explanation turns an inter-State sale into an intra-State sale by means of a fiction.\n\nHaving served its purpose it follows as a corollary that there is no inter-State transaction left and so clause (2) is not called into play. In my opinion, by parity of reasoning, if the sale is intra-State and cannot now be regarded as external to the State, it equally cannot be said to take place in the course of export or import in a case of that kind, for export and import predicate the movement of goods across a boundary just as surely as inter-State trade and commerce. But such a contention would militate against our decision in The State of Travancore-Oochin & Others\n\nv. The Boinbay Co. Ltd.(1).\n\nThis line of reasoning does not appeal to me for another reason also. It concentrates on the situs of the sale and does not give sufficient weight to the words \"in the course of\". When we apply a fiction all we do is to assume that the situation created by the fiction is true. Therefore, the same consequences must flow from the fiction as would have flown had the facts supposed to be true been the actual facts from the start. Now, even when the situs of a sale is in truth and in fact inside a State, with no' essential ingredient taking place outside nevertheless if it takes place in the course of inter-State trade and commerce, it will behit by clause (2) just as surely as it is hit by sub-clause (b) when it takes place in the course of export or import. When we examine clause (2) and sub-clause (b), it is not enough, in my judgment, to see where the sale took place. We have also to see\n\n(1) [19;.zJ .s.c.R. '\"\"\n\nwhether it was in the course of inter-State trade and !968 commerce in the one case, or in the course of export or Th St-'B . . . h h ,. h f .\n\nS d e ateo, om import mt e ot er, 1or t e stream o mtertate tra e bay and Another and commerce, as also that of export and import, will v. catch up in its vortex all sales which take place in its The United course wherever the situs of the sale may be.\n\nAll Motors (India) that the Explanation does is to shift the situs from Ltd. and Others. point A or B or C in the stream to a point X, also in Bose J. the stream. It does not lift the sale out of the stream in those cases where it forms part of the stream.\n\nI have also another criticism to meet. The Explanation can only come into play when the transaction is in truth and in fact inter-State, and the argument runs that if clause (2) is to ban taxation in every such case, the Explanation becomes useless. The answer to that is two-fold. Clause (2) has a proviso. Under it the President is empowered to direct the continuation for a period of a tax which was being lawfully levied at the date of the Constitution even though the transaction is of an inter-State character ; and we find that in some of the cases which have come before us that was done the moment the Constitution came into force.\n\nTherefore, the Explanation operated from the start on that kind of case. But of course that means that the empowering can only be in favour of the State in which the goods are actually delivered for the purpose of consumption in that State as a direct result of a purchase or sale effected for that purpose. It will be noticed that the proviso is limited to cases in which the imposition of the tax would be \"contrary to this clause\", that is clause (2) and not to the Explanation to clause (l)(a).\n\nIn the second place, Parliament is empowered to lift _the ban imposed by clause (2). So long as the ban exists there is no need for the Explanation, for the explanation only covers sales or purchases which are inter-State. But the moment the ban is lifted, the difficulties I have mentioned above arise and have to be met. I am clear that the Constitution makers envisaged this and resolved the don bts in the manner\n\nI91iJ I have indicated; nor can I see anything inconsistent\n\nTl S -:-, B or illogical in this. The basic idea ' is to prohibit \" tateo, om- . .\n\nJ f .\n\nS t d d bay and Another taxation 111 t Je case o mterta .e tra e an v. commerce unless and until the ban under clause The United\n\n(2) is lifted, and always in the case of exports and MotoTB (India) imports ; and when the ban is lifted, the Explanaf.td. and Others, tion is there to settle a matter of considerable contro-\n\nBose J. versy regarding the situs of a sale. It is true it makes an arbitrary selection but then almost any selection would have to he arbitrary and this is as good as any other.\n\nThe question however arises what is to happen to clause (l)(a) while the ban lasts if the Explanation is to be ignored during that period? How is the situs of a sale to be determined in the difficult class of cases which arose before the Constitution and which, in my view, occasioned the ban. My answer is that that class of case can only arise in the course of inter-State trade and commerce, for the moment any one of the essential ingredients of a sale occurs in a State different from the taxing State and the goods are contracted to move across a boundary, you get a sale in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. Therefore, the problem about situs does not arise. Sales and purchases which are in truth and in fact intra-State (and the bulk of sales and purchases in the States are of that character) can of course be taxed. The ban does not apply and there is no need to call in aid the Explanation, for I repeat that the Explanation is limited to cases which in truth and in fact take place in the course of inter-State trade and commerce.\n\nOn the view I take the need for the Explanation only arises when the ban is lifted.\n\nI now come to matters of greater detail. \"\\-Vhat do the words \"for the purpose of consumption\" mean?\n\nThis is best understood by reference to a concrete case: A, a dealer in Bombay, actually delivers goods to B, a dealer in Madras, for the purpose of sale by B, the Madras dealer, to purchasers C, D and E in Madras.\n\nCan either the sale by A to B or the purchase by .B\n\n' •\n\nfrom A be taxed? In my view, it cannot, for Bis in my\n\nI9S3 judgment, as much a consumer as C, D and E. It is l'h 8 - 8 h d b d . 'd ]] e tateof om. true t e wor can e use m a w1 e as we as a narbay and Another row sense but I see no reason to restrict its meaning v. in the present case. \\Vhat after all does \"consump- The United tion\" mean? In its economic sense it is just the use which Motor. ! India) a purchaser chooses to make of the goods purchased Ltd. and Other•. for his own purposes. He does not have to destroy Bose J. them nor does he have to ..diminish their value or utility. A man who purchases a valuable piece of sculpture or painting for preservation in a national museum does not destroy it nor does he use it himself except for the purposes of presenting it to the museum.\n\nBut he is a consumer. In the same way, a man who purchases goods for use in his business so that his business can be carried on by the constant feeding of a stream uses the goods and therefore \"consumes\" them even though he does not keep them himself. This of course means that a dealer who purchases from another dealer outside the State is a \"consumer\" and can be taxed if the ban is lifted even if he purchases for reexport outside the State. But when he re-exports, his sale to the outside consumer cannot be taxed if the Explanation is attracted.\n\nI cannot agree that goods cannot be \"consumed\" more than once. It all depends on how you view the matter. Little fishes swallow smaller fishes and are in turn eaten by fishes larger than themselves. In the end, the smallest of the series is consumed by the biggest. Consider the case of a curio dealer who collects antiques for the purposes of sale. The older they are and the more they have been used, the more valuable they become, but that would not prevent them from being \"consumed\" over again when a \"collector\" buys them for display in his house. Broadly speaking, the object here is to stop multiple taxation on any single act of sale or purchase made in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. I would therefore construe \"consumption\" to mean the usual use made of an article for the purposes of trade and commerce.\n\nWhen dealer buys from dealer that is \"consumption\"\n\n1953 for the purposes of the purchaser dealer's trade; when an ultimate purchaser buys from a retailer, that is also TheStoteofBom \" 1' h\" \"'h 1' • bay ana Another \"consumpt10~ ior ts purposes.\n\n1. e_re1ore,. m my v. judgment, neither the sale by A to B m the 1llustra- Tlw United tion put nor the purchase by B from A can be taxed Motors (India) so long as the ban under clause (2) remains. But the Lta. aml Others. sales by B to U, D and E can each be taxed by the -- State of Madras as they are intra-State sales. If this -~ h is found to work hardship on t e States in practice, then Parliament, which has been given the power to regulate inter-State trade and commerce under Entry 42 of List I, can step in and lift the ban. In that event, the Explanation comes into play and Madras can tax both transactions but Bombay cannot.\n\nOn the other hand, if A, the Bombay dealer, sells direct to the consumers 0, D and E in Madras and actually delivers the goods to them for the purpose of consumption in Madras, neither State can tax unless the ban is lifted, and then Madras alone will be able to tax.\n\nNext, what do the words \"actually been delivered\" mean? In the normal course, a dealer in Bombay, who sends goods either to a dealer or consumer in Madras, would put them on a train or send them by a public or a private carrier. The cases in which a dealer would take them himself to Madras and hand them over in person or send one of his own men there would be exceptional. In the former class of case, the carrier would normally be regarded as the agent of the Madras purchaser and the result would be that delivery would in that event be deemed to be delivery in Bombay and that would give Bombay the right to tax and not Madras. See Badische Anilin Und Soda Fabrik v.\n\nBasle Chemical Works, Bindschedler ('), Badische Anilin\n\nUnd Soda Fabrik v. Hickson ('). But such a construction would make the Explanation useless.\n\nI think that is the reason why the words \"actually\" and \"consumption\" have been used. If the normal rule were to apply, there would be no need for the word \"actual\", as delivery to the carrier in Bombay would of course\n\n(I) [1898] A.C. 200.\n\n12) ;1900] A.C. 419.\n\nbe actual in the sense that it would be physical and 1953 not notional. 1 think therefore that the words \"actually delivered\" and \"as a direct resul.t\" f the sale or:.~ !'.~\n\n1 '~',,!1~::· purchase \"for the purpose of consumpt10n m the State\" v. have been used to signify that in such a case the carrier The United must be regarded as the agent of the Bombay seller.\n\nMotors (India) So far as the words \" in the course of\" in clause Ltd. and Others\n\n(2) are concerned, the \"course\" we have to consider Bose J. is the course of the inter-State trade and commerce.\n\nIn my opinion, the inter-State character of the course ends when the goods reach the first consumer in the taxing State. When he in turn sells to the ultimate consumer in that State, a different course begins, namely the course of intra-State trade. It is necessary to draw this distinction because inter-State trade and commerce is a matter for the Centre, intra-State for that of the States. We have therefore to determine where the inter-State course ends and the intra-State\n\ncourse begins.\n\nI think the point at which I have drawn the line is logical and convenient. I do not think the same considerations will apply in the next set of cases where we are dealing with the Travancore- Cochin law relating to export and import. But it is not necessary to explain why in this case.\n\nIt was contended in argument that the view I take of the ban on inter-State trade and commerce imposed by clause (2) would place the local dealer at a disadvantage. But that would only arise in one class of case and I cannot see how inequality of this kind can be avoided in every case even on my Lord the Chief Justice's view. There are bound to be some inequalities, whichever view is taken.\n\nConsider these concrete cases. We have A, a dealer in Bombay, B, a dealer in Madras, and C, a consumer also in Madras. If A sells directly to C in such a way as to satisfy the Explanation, then, assuming always that the ban is still in existence, this sale is not taxable on my view.\n\nBut if B in Madras sells to C in Madras, it is.\n\nOf course, B is then at a disadvantage vis-a-vis A.\n\nBut so is A vis-a-vis B with regard to\n\n19,53 consumers in Bombay. Consequently the tendency of - the consumer in one State to buy Hom a cheaper The State of Bom market in the other evens up in the Iona run.\n\nBut /; ay and Another 0 h' f v. that apart, what happens on my Lord the C ie\n\nTh• United Justice's view?\n\nAiotors (India) [Jtd. and Others.\n\nBose J.\n\nA very large volume of the feasibly taxable trade in this country, if not the bulk of it, at any rate in most States, is in the hands of retail dealers resident in the various States. They obtain their wares from wholesale importers or large dealers in other States.\n\nIn the illustration I have put above, if B in Madras gets his goods from A in Bombay, then, on the learned Chief Justice's view, B pays a purchase tax on his purchase from A and again a sales tax on his sale to the consumer C.\n\nThe consumer is therefore saddled with a double tax. But if C, still in Madras, purchases direct from A in Bombay, there is only one tax in the transaction on my Lord's view. That still gives A an advantage over B. Therefore, there is a large class of cases in which the local dealer is at a disadvantage even on the other view.\n\nThe only class of case in which the local dealer is not at a disadvantage on my Lord's view, and is on mine, is when the goods are manufactured locally. In that event, B, the manufacturer in Madras, pays no initial sales tax. He only pays when he sells to the consumer C in Madras. If the goods can also be manufactured locally in Bombay, then the dealer A in Bombay does have a theoretical advantage over the dealer B in Madras.\n\nBut if the goods cannot also be manufactured in Bombay, the advantage disappears, for A then pays an initial tax on his purchase from the outside State.\n\nI do not think considerations of this kind should influence the construction of these articles because, in the first place, some inequalities are inevitable and, in the next, the disadvantage is more theoretical than practical. For example, a wholesale importer, who also chooses to sell retail in the State of import, ha.s a theoretical advantage over retailers who have to buy\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'rs 11i1\n\nthrough him. But that did not prevent this Court 1953 from holding in 'The State of Travancore-Cochin & Other8\n\nv. The Bombay Co. Ltd.( 1) that the sale which occasionb1'heStadteoA'.f Bo1m . . . f h I d h' k ay an not wr ed !us import 1s free o tax. So ere. o not t 111 v. this consideration should weigh.\n\nThe United But apart from this, the matter is, I think, largely LMdotored(Oiihidia) h . 1 l . .c t. ] t . au t \"' t eoretwa save per iaps 111 a 1ew excep 10na cases. __ _ In this class of case, the trade usually adjusts its Buse J. own differences by allowing the local dealer a discount; in fact, in the case of many commodities, local dealers have to give an undertaking not to sell below a certain price in order to maintain a steady price level over the local market and avoid cut throat competition. That is how most of the large motor agencies work, mid the same a pp lies to radios and petrol and kerosene oil. The price the ultimate consumer pays is the same wherever he purchases in a given area.\n\nAlso the type of consumer who will take the trouble to buy in a cheaper foreign market with all the annoyances of delay, transport, octroi and other import restrictions, is small. Most people prefer to pay the extra price and save themselves endless trouble.\n\nI now come to the impugned legislatiuntlie Bombay Sales Tax Act (No. XXIV of 1952).\n\nAs mine is a dissenting view which will not affect the result, I will content myself with very briefly indicating why I consider the Act, or at any rate the relevant provisions in it, ultra vi res, and to begin with I will ignore the rules altogether and consider what would happen if the rules were not there at all or had been brought into existence after the Act.\n\nThe taxing sections 5 and 10 empower a levy of tax on all sales made within the Shitc of Bombay when the turnover reaches a certain figure.\n\nThis would include sales made in the course of inter-l:ltate trade and commerce, sales made in the comse of export and import and sales falling within the Explanation made to consumers in outside States.\n\nAs I have explained above, the mere fact that a sale is made in the State\n\n(r) [ry52] S.C. R, IIIl.\n\nr •\n\ni112 SUPREME COURT HEPORi'S [i953]\n\n1903 of Bombay will not prevent it from being a sale effect-\n\nT' S -.,8 ed in the course of inter-State trade or ommerce or in w tate OJ om . bay and Another the comse of export or import. Even when the whole v. transaction of sale is constituted in Bombay in the\n\n'l'hc United sense that every essential ingredient necessary to cons- Motors (India) titute a sale takes place there, (that is to say, even Ltd. and Others. when the Explanation is not called into play), the sale\n\nBose J. would, given other considerations, be in the course of export or import or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. An illustration will make my point clear.\n\nA, a Bombay dealer, sells goods to B, a dealer in Madras, for consumption in Madras. I will assume that delivery is made to B himself in Bombay and that he carries the goods across in person. If that is the normal way in which trade and commerce in that particular line of goods flows across the boundary, then that would, in my opinion, be a sale in the course of inter-State trade and commerce despite the facts, including delivery, mentioned above.\n\nOrdinarily, goods of this nature are delivered to a carrier but that makes my point all the stronger. So long as the ban imposed by clause (2) remains the situs of the sale and the place of delivery are not material provided the sale is caught up in the vortex of inter-State trade and commerce. Similar considerations apply in the case of exports and imports.\n\nOn this view, the preamble to the Act and the short title which limit the ambit of the law to the levy of tax on sales and purchases of goods in the State of Bombay, do not serve to save the Act, nor do the definitions of the words \"sale \", \"dealer \" and \" turnover\". Actually, Explanation (2) to the definition of \" sale\" directly offends clause (2) of article 286. It embodies almost word for word every provision of the Explanation to article 286(1)(a). That would be unobjectionable if the ban imposed by clause (2) had been lifted by Parliament. But as it has not been lifted, the provision is ultra vire8 on the view which I take of the Constitution.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREiE COUl'tT REPORTS 1113\n\n1953 The Act came into force on 9th October, 1952, with the exception of tl1e taxing sections. The rules were published in the Gazette on 29th October, 1952, and they, The State 01 Boin t tl 't] th t t' ff' bay and Another oge ·, ier w1 i e axmg sec 10ns, came mto e ect \"· simultaneously on 1st November, 1952. It was argued 1'he United that the rules save the Act in the following way. Under Motors (India) sections 7 and 11 a dealer is entitled to deduct from his Ltd. and Others taxable turnover sales which are from time to time declared to be tax-free under section 8 and \"such other sales as may be prescribed.\" It is said that the rules have excluded all sales which offend the Constitution, therefore under the \"law\" (by which is meant the Act and the rules read together), which came into being on 1st November, 1952, no sale exempted by the Constitution can be taxed. It follows that the\" law\" which is sought to be impugned is intra vires.\n\nI need not examine the rules for this purpose. I will assume without deciding that they do exclude all sales which are exempt under the Constitution, nevertheless I am not prepared to agree that rules can save an Act.\n\nRules are made by a subordinate authority which is not the Legislature and I cannot agree that the validity of an Act of a competent Legislature can be made to depend upon what some subordinate authority chooses to do or not to do.\n\nThe rules were not passed by the Legislature and in theory the particular shape they took was not even in contemplation.\n\nSay the rules were to be amended tomorrow by striking out these saving clauses, which would be ultra vires, the Act or the rules ? It would be impossible to hold that the rules are ultra vires the Act, for they would not in the event I am contemplating travel one whit beyond the Act. lt is the Act which would be bad.\n\nAnd if the Act is held to be ultra vires in an event like that, would it be competent to the rule-making authority to come to the rescue of the Legislature and rehabilitate the Act by re-enacting the rules which it had deleted a few days before ? It would, in my judgment, be no more competent for a rule-making authority to do that than it would have been competent for it to validate this Act if the rules had been brought into\n\nBo8c J.\n\n' ' 1114 SUPI~EME COURT REPOR'l'S\n\n[1953J\n\n1963 being even one day after sections 5 and 10 came into force. • The State of Bmn bay and Another I can understand this court saying to a petitioner: v. '.'You are not yet hurt by this Act nor is there any The United immediate likelihood of your being hurt and until that Motors (India} happens we are not aoing to entertain vour petition Ltd. and Others. c h \" h th t\"· J. • t ' _ 1or we are not ere to oxammc ypo e wa s1tua 10ns Bose J. which may never arise.\" But that sort of objection cannot lie in this case for the reasous my Lord the Chief Justice has given. We are therefore called upon to determine the validity of the Act and in doing so\n\nve must, in my opinion, ignore the rules.\n\nI have now to consider two more points. One is about severability and the other is whether a taxing statute is to be treated differently from other laws.\n\nOn the question of severability, I cannot sec how the good can be separated from the bad in this case even if the Explanation to section 2 (14) be expunged unless the Constitution be read as part of the Act and we are to read into the Act some such provision as follows:\n\n\";\\lotwithstanding t1nything which is siid in any part of this Act, all sales which the State is prohibited to tax under the Constitution are excluded from the srope of this Act..\"\n\nBut, in my opinion, judges are not entitled to rewrite an Act.\n\nOffending provisions can be struck out but if we do that the whole Act goes because the defect here is that all sales are permitted to be taxed provided they are within the State of Bombay, and the rule. making authority is not restricted to taxation which is constitutionally permissible. On the contrary, section 45 says that the Government may make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and one of the purposes is to tax all sales which the State Government wishes to tax.\n\nThe other matter is based 011 the American view which treats taxing statutes differently from others and holds that in a taxing statute one looks to the\n\n1963 individual item of taxation and not to the generality of the powers. 'With all respect to the American Judges who hold that view, I would prefer not to make excep- TbheStatde oAJ Bohm-\n\n. \\\"h h . . h h A f l ay an 11ot \" t1011s. 1' en t e quest10n is w et er an ct o t 10 V.\n\nLegislature is ultra vires, the same principles should The u11ited govern throughout.\n\nI would therefore hold that the Motor\" (India) Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952 (Bombay Act No. XXIV Ltd. and Others of 1952) is ultra vire.s the Constitution of India.\n\nBHAGWATl J.-I had tho benefit ofreading the judgment just delivered by my Lord the Chief J usticc.\n\nWhile agreeing in the main with the conclusions reached therein I am however unable to subscribe to the reasoning as also the constrnction put upon the Explanation to article 286(1) (a).\n\nI wish to place on record therefore my points of disagreement and the reasons for the same.\n\nThe power given to a State Legislature to tax the sales or purchases of goods i; i derived from article 246\n\n(3) read with Entry ii+ of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. That power has got to be widely construed and it would embrace the power to tax the sales or purchases of goods by reason of a sufficient territorial connection between the taxing f; tatc and what it seeks to tax. This was also the position which obtained before the Constitution and was responsible for double or muJt.iple taxation of the same transaction by different States. The Constitution makers therefore thought it fit to impose restrfrtions on the imposition hy the States of taxes on the sales or purchases of goods by enacting article 286. These restrictions were threefold :-( 1) no tax could be imposed on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place outside the State, (2) no tax could be imposed on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of the import of goods into or the export of the goods out of the territory of India, and (3) no tax could be imposed on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or\n\nHhagwat£ J,\n\n19.;,1 commerce except in so far as Parliament. might by law - otherwise provide. These were the three categories of The State of Bomsales or purchases which came within the ban imposed ba11 and Another J ' v. by article 286.\n\nThe phraseo ogy used m the article The united laid particular stress on the fact that the sale or pur- Motors (India) chase should \" take place \" so as to fall within one or Ltd. and Othm. the other of these categories. The intention was that the sale or purchase should take place, i.e., should be Bhagwati J. d completed either outsi e the State or in the course of import or export or in the course of inter.\n\nState trade or commerce.\n\nWhereas before the Constitution the taxing power could be exercised by reason of a sufficient territorial connection involving either one or more of the ingredients of a sale in the shape of agreement to sell, the payment of price, transfer of ownership, delivery of goods etc. the completion of a transaction of sale or purchase by the transfer of ownership or the passing of the property in the goods was enacted to be the sole criterion for taxability in article 286.\n\nThe sales or purchases could be divided into two broad categories-( I) sales or purchases which take place inside the State and (2) sales or purchases which take place outside the State and those which took place , outside the State were certainly outside the taxing powers of the State. In regard to the sales or purchases which took place inside the State, the sales or purchases which took place in the course of import or export and in the course of inter-State trade or commerce were also brought within the ban leaving the taxing power of the State unfettered in regard to the other sales or purchases which took place inside the State. The restrictions which were thus imposed on the taxing power of the State confined themselves to sales or purchases which took place outside the State and those sales or purchases which took place inside the State but took place in the course of import or export and in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nOnce the transfer of ownership or the passin\" of the property in the goods was accepted as the sol~ criterion of taxability it was not necessary at all to define what was a sale or purchase which took plaoe\n\ninside the State. Whether a sale or purchase took 1963 place inside the State could be determined by applying - the general law relating to the sale of goods and ascer- TheStateof Bom . . h. bay and A not her ta1mng where the transfer of owners 1p took place or v. the property in the goods passed. It was only when The United the transfer of ownership took place or the property in Motors (India) the goods passed that the sale or purchase was complet- Ltd. and Others. ed and the sale or purchase took place and the situs or h 1 Bhagwati J. t e ocation of the sale or purchase was in the place where the transfer of ownership took place or the property in the goods passed under the generallaw relating to the sale of goods. [See Badische Aniline Und Soda Fabi'ick v. Basle Chemical Works, Bind Schedler(') and Badische Aniline Und Soda Fabrick v. Hickson(').] The situs or location of the sale or purchase therefore assumed an importance under article 286 and the Constitution makers had before them not only the legislative practice prevailing in the the varic; ms States before the Constitution but also the concept of sale as defined in the Indian Sale of Goods Act. They therefore incorporated in article 286 the notion of a sale or purchase taking place, i.e., being completed by the transfer of ownership or the passing of property in the goods under the general law relating to sale of goods and enacted that those sales or purchases which took place outside the State or which even though they took place inside the State took place in the course of the import or export or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce should come within the ban imposed therein.\n\nThe Constitution makers however took count of the fact that even though the property in the goods by reason of the sale or purchase passed in a particular State the goods might as a direct result of such sale or purchase be delivered in another State for the purpose of consumption in that State. They wanted to give the delivery State in that event the power to tax such sale or purchase and therefore introduced by the Explanation to article 286 (l)(a) a legal fiction 'by which\n\n(1) [1898] A. C. 200.\n\n(2) [1906] A. C. ~19.\n\n1118 SUPREME COURT l'tEPORTS [1953]\n\n1%3 the sale or purchase in that event was deemed to have\n\n0 -., B taken place in the delivery State. What otherwise ieotnle oJ om- - • . lm•i and Another would have been a sale or purchase wluch took place\n\n v. outside the State within the meaning of article 286 (1)\n\nThe United\n\n(a) was thus by legal fiction deemed to have taken\n\nMotorR (India) place inside the delivery State, thus assimilating the Ltd. and Othm. position to a sale or purchase which took place inside\n\nBhagwnti J. the delivery State enabling the delivery State to tax the sale or purchase in question. This legal fiction was thus introduced not for defining what was a sale or purchase which took place inside the State as distinct from a sale or purchase which took place outside the\n\nSt~.te. The purpose of the enactment of the Explanation was not to provide a definition of a sale or purchase which took place inside the State. That was determined under the general law relating to the sale of goods by ascertaining where the transfer of ownership took place or the property in the goods passed, which was in another State and not the delivery State. what was a sale or purchase which took place outside the State was by reason of the Explanation and the legal fiction enacted therein deemed to be a sale or purchase which took place inside the State so as to enable the delivery State to tax the sale or purchase in question.\n\nThe sale or purchase transactions which are covered by the Explanation are moreover ofa limited character, viz., those in which as a direct result of such sale or purchase the goods have actually been delivered in the delivery State for the purposes of consumption in that State. They do not comprise all the transactions of sale or purchase which take place inside the State because besides those there are a large number of transactions of sale or purchase which take place inside the State and in which no element of inter-State trade or commerce enters the transaction. The transactions of sale or purchase which take place between dealers :md dealers and dealers and customes all within the State ar(\\ really comprised in the category of transactions of sale or purchase which take place inside the\n\nState and these transactions do not at all fall within the purview of the Explanation. It would be surprising\n\nS.C.R. 8UPREME COURT R8POR'l'S 1119\n\nto find a defiuition of a transaction of sale or pur- 1953 chase which takes place inside the State given in the - h' h 't 11 d h b d h The State of Bommanner 111 w ic i is a ege to ave een one 111 t e b d A 1 . . . •\" ~- Explanation covermg only those transactions of sale or v. purchase in which the goods have actually been deliver- The United ed in the delivery State as a direct result of such sale Motors (India) or purchase for \"the purpose of consumption in that Ltd. and Others. 8tatc. A definition, if at all it has any significance, Bhaywati J. should cover all the transactions which come within that particular category and cannot be enacted in the form of a legal fiction in the manner it has been done in the Explanation. It is no definition at all. It has no reference to facts but it merely enacts a legal fiction under which a sale which under the general law relating to sale of goods is completed outside the State by the transfer of ownership or the passing of the property in the goods in another State is deemed to have taken place inside the delivery State because of the goods having been actually delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in the delivery State. \\Vhat is otherwise a sale or pmchase which takes place outside the State is thus deemed to have taken place inside the delivery State and that is the only purpose of the enactment of the Explanation. 'l'he contention of the Attorney-General and Shri Seervai that the purpose of the enactment of of the Explanation was to define what was a sale or purchase which took place inside the State is therefore unsound.\n\n'l'he non-obstante clause really takes count of the fact that under the general law relating to the sale of goods the property in the goods by reason of such sale or purchase would pass in another State and that the situs or location of the sale would accordingly be therefore in another State. Not withstanding that fact the Explanation enacts the legal fiction that the particular transaction of s; ile or pur\n\nchase is deemed to have taken place within the delivery 8tate. 'l'he non-obstantc clause ba8 not been incorporated in the Explanation with a view to emphasise the particular aspect of the passing of\n\n1120 SUPREME COURT ltEPORT8 ll953)\n\n~ property in the goods and negativmg the same\n\nThe State ofBom because that was one of the ingredients which had\n\nbay and Another been considered as important territorial connection\n\nv. between the taxing State and what it sought to tax.\n\nThe United.\n\nBesides this ingredient there were various other ingre- MotorBd( londhia) dients which had been similarly considered sufficient Ltd. an t ers. , . 1 t\" d t \"d th t th , ~- terntona connec 10ns an o cons1 er a e mgre-\n\nBhagwati J. dient of the passing of property in the goods was the only ingredient which was considered important to be mentioned in the non-obstante clause is to ignore the facts and do violence to the whole conception underlying the incorporation of the non-obstante clause in the Explanation. It would be a more natural way of reading the non-obstante clause to read into it an intention to state what according to the Constitution makers was the basic idea of fixing the situs or the location of the sale or purchase in the place where the transfer of ownership 'took place or the property in the goods passed and to indicate that notwithstanding that fact a sale or purchase which fell within the category mentioned in the Explanation was none, the, less to be deemed to have taken place inside the delivery State.\n\nIf the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) is construed in the manner indicated above it follows that notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State the sale shall be deemed to have taken place in the delivery State and the delivery State would be entitled to tax the sale or purchase. That does not however mean that it is only the delivery State which will be entitled to tax the sale or purchase. Under the general law relating to the sale of goods the property in the goods having by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State that State will no doubt be entitled to tax the sale or purchase as having taken place inside the State. That position will continue to obtain in spite of the fact that by the enactment of the legal fiction in the Explanation such sale or purchase will be deemed to have taken\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREM.E UOURT REPORTS 1121\n\nplace inside the delivery :::>tate.\n\nThe object of the 1953 Explanation is not and could not be to take away l'h s -., B\n\nh . h h' h th S . h' h h t . th c tate o, onit e ng t w IC e tate m W IC t c proper Y m e b<1y and Another goods passed had to tax the sale or purchase which v. took place inside that State. The object and purpose The United of the Explanation could only to be to deem such pur- Motors (India) chase or sale by reason of the legal fiction to have Ltd. and Others. taken place in the delivery State so as to enable the Bhagwati J. delivery State also to tax the sale or purchase in question. The object of article 286 is to impose restrictions on the imposition of tax on sale or purchase of goods and the only restriction which has been imposed in connection with the sales or purchases which take place in this manner is that a State shall not impose a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State. That is a general ban which has been imposed by article 286( 1)\n\n(a) and what the Explanation seeks to do is to lift the ban to the extent of the transactions of sale or purchase covered by the Explanation and enable the delivery State also to tax such purchases or sales.\n\nIt is no doubt true that in the Explanation the word 'only' has not been used nor has the word 'also' been used and we have to gather the purpose of the enactment of the Explanation from the words of the Explanation itself. In order to arrive at a conclusion whether the object and purpose of the Explanation was to enable the delivery State to tax such sales or purchases either in addition to the State in which the property in the goods had passed or in substitution thereof one has got to bear in mind the basic idea that a State would normally be entitled to tax a sale or purchase where such sale or purchase took place inside the State except in cases covered by article 286( l) (b) and article 286(2). If that power of the State to tax the sale or purchase where such sale or purchase took place inside the State was in any manner whatever sought to be taken away it could only be taken away by an express enactment in that behalf as in article 286 (l)(b) and article 286 (2) and not by the backdoor as it were by enacting a legal fiction as it has been done\n\n1122 SUPREME COUR'l 1 REPOWi'8 [1953]\n\n1953 in the Explanation. The two book cases illustration\n\nmh 8 -., B which was submitted before the court by Shri Seervai , ' uueo, oin. th f h\" . . bay and Another m e course o 1s arguments 1s a ve1y spec10us one. v. l\\Ierely because a book is by a legal fiction deemed to The Unired be in the book case ' B' it does not necessarily cease Mowrs (India) to exist in the book case 'A'. As a matter of physical Ltd. and Others. fact it is in the book case 'A'. It continues in the\n\nBltagwati J. book case 'A' and the physical fact of its existence in the book case 'A' can never be obliterated. The legal fiction only operates to treat it as if it were in the book case 'B' and to involve all the consequences of its being in the book case 'B'. The two positions are not mutually exclusive. They can co-exist side by side and the legal consequences of the actual fact of the book being in the book case 'A' can be worked out simultaneously with the legal consequences of the notional existence of the book in the book case '13' bv reason of the operation of the legal fiction. If this position is borne in mind it is clear that not only would the State in which the property in the goods passed continue to be entitled to tax the sale or purchase because of such sale or purchase having taken place inside the State, but the delivery State would also be entitled to tax such sale or purchase by reason of the operation of the legal fiction in so far as the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase in the delivery State for the purpose of consumption in that State. According to the position as discussed above both the States would thus be entitled to tax such sales or purchases.\n\nBefore I proceed to discuss the effect of article 286\n\n(2) on the taxing powers of both the States it is necessary to consider what is the exact type of sale or purchase which is covered by the Explanation. That sale or purchase has to be one as a direct result of which the goods have actually been delivered in the delivery State for the purpose of consumption in that ::State.\n\nIt is not every transaction which results in the goods being delivered across the border that comes within this category. It is only a transaction of sale or purchase which directly results in the delivery of goods\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSl'PREME COURT REPORTS 1123\n\nfor the purposr; of consumption in the delivery State 1'!53 that comes within the category of transactions covered Th 8 --\n\n1 E .\n\nAd 1. . .\n\nS e lateojBomby t JC xplanat10n. ea er m the delivery tate bay and Another purchasing from a dealer in the State where the prov. perty in the goods passes by reason of such sale or 1'he United purchase cannot be said to have purchased the goods Motors (India) for the purpose of consumption in the delivery State Ltd. and Others.\n\nbecause the obvious purpose for which he purchases Rhagwati J. the goods is for dealing with those goods in the ordinary course of trade and not for consuming the same.\n\nA dealer who deals with the goods after purchasing\n\nthe same does not consume the goods.\n\nHe deals with or disposes of the same in the ordinary course of trade and he is a dealer or a trader in those goods.\n\nHo is not a consumer of those goods. The word \"consumption\" has been thus defined in 'Webster's New International Dictionary, Yo!. I, page 483 :-\n\n\" Oonsumption.-(3) Economics.-The use of\n\n(economic) goods resulting in the diminution or destruction of their utilities; opposed to production.\n\nConsumption may consist in the active use of goods in such a manner as to accomplish their direct and immediate destruction, as in eating food, wearing clothes, or burning fuel; or it may consist in the mere keeping, and enjoying the presence or prospect of, a thing, which is destroyed only by the gradual processes of natural decay, as in the maintenance of a picture gallery. Generally, it may be said that consumption means using things, and production means adapting them for use.\"\n\nIn the Oxford New English Dictionary, Vol. II, page 888, consumption is defined as :\n\n\"(l} The action or fact of consuming or destroying; destruction ............ (7) Pol. Econ. The destructive employment or utilisation of the products of industry.\"\n\nDelivery of goods for the purpose of consumption in the delivery State therefore means the delivery for the purpose of using by the consumer and it has no application to the case of a dealer purchasing the\n\n19°3 goods across the border for dealing witji or disposing\n\n0 ~B of the same in the ordinarv course of trade. The e otate oJ 01n- • •1 bay and Another Explanation therefore covers only those cases where as\n\nv. a direct result of the sale or purchase goods are deli- The United vered for consumption in the delivery State by the Motors (India) consumer and it is only that limited class of transac- Ltd. and Others. tions which are covered by the Explanation and which\n\nBhagwati J. are liable to tax by the delivery State. I do not accept the contention that the words \"for the purpose of consumption\" must be understood in a comprehensive sense as having reference both to immediate and ultimate consumption within the State and ex.eluding only resale out of the State. In my opinion they have reference only to immediate consumption within the State and no further.\n\nIf the matters stood thus and there was no further provision to be considered the position would be that in a transaction of sale or purchase covered by the Explanation construed as above both the\n\nState in which the property in the goods passed and the delivery State would be entitled to tax such sale or purchase, the former by reason of the property in the goods having passed inside that State and the latter by reason of the goods having been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State. We have however got to take count of article 286 (2). The transaction of such sale or purchase even though it be as between a dealer in the one State and the consumer in the delivery State is none-the-less a transaction in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. I do not agree with the contention of the Advocate-General of Bombay that article 286(2) should be interpreted as applying to the cases of transactions of sale or purchase taking place between dealers and dealers only and not as applying to the cases of transactions of sale or purchase taking place between dealers on the one hand and consumers on the other. Whether a transaction of sale or purchase takes place between a dealer on the one hand and a dealer on the other or between a dealer on the one liand and a consumer on the other in the respective\n\nStates all these transactions are in the course of 1968 inter-State trade or commerce and therefore hit by - article 286(2) and the transactions which are coveredbThe StadteoA'.f Bomtheb h 1 .. 1 ayannor y t e Exp ana t10n to artic e 286 ( 1 )(a) would also be v. accordingly hit by the ban imposed under article The United 286 (2).\n\nMot\"1's (India) So far as the State in which the property in the Ltd. and Others. goods has passed is concerned it could certainly not Bhagwati J. tax the sale or purchase in question because the transaction of sale or purchase so far as the particular State is concerned takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and could not be subjected to the imposition of tax except in so far as Parliament might by law otherwise provide. So far however as the delivery State is concerned the Explanation empowers the delivery State to tax such transaction and if article 286(2) be construed as imposing a ban on the taxation of such sale or purchase it will be tantamount to the giving of the right to tax by one hand and the taking away of it by another.\n\nIt was contended and rightly so by the Advocate- General of Bombay that if the transactions which are covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) were thus hit by article 286(2) in the absence of a provision otherwise enacted by Parliament the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) would be rendered nugatory and the Constitution makers could not be held to have contemplated such a possibility at the very inception of the Constitution leaving it to the Parliament by having recourse to the provision contained in article 286\n\n(2) to remedy such a state of affairs. Such a possibility could not be contemplated and an effort should therefore be made in so far as it was reasonably possible to do so to reconcile the provisions of the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) and article 286(2).\n\nIt is a well-known rule of the interpretation of statutes that a \"particular enactment is not repealed by a general enactment in the same statute\". (Beal on the Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation, 3rd Edition, Part VII, Section IX, page 516).\n\nReliance is 116\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1968 placed in support of the above proposition on the fo!low-\n\nTh S -'B ing observations of Best C. J. in Churchill v. Grease('). e late o; oni bay and Anather \"The rule is, that where a general intention is exv. . pressed, and the Act expresses also a particular inten- The U('I\"\"ad ) tion incompatible with the genera] intention, the parti- MotorB 11 ia 1 . t t' . t b 'd d . h t f Ltd. and Others. cu ar m en 10n IS o e cons1 ere m t e na ure o an exception.\"\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nTo the same effect also are the observations of Quain J. in Dryden v. Overseers of Putney (') quoted at page 426 of the same work :-\n\n\"It may be laid down as a rule for the construction of statutes, that where a special provision anda general provision are inserted which cover the same subjectmatter, a case falling within the words of the special provision must be governed thereby and not by the terms of the general provision.\"\n\n(See also Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition (1952) at p. 205; Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 9th Edition (1946) at p. 176 and Crawford on the Construction of Statutes (Interpretation of Laws) 1940 Edition, Ch. XVIII 'Construction of Statutes' at p.265 section 167). It therefore follows that the general provision which is enacted in article 286 (2) against the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce should give way to the special provision which is enacted in the Explanation to article 286 (1) (a) enabling the delivery State to tax such sale or purchase in the limited class of cases covered by the Explanation, transactions covered by the Explanation being thus lifted out of the category of transactions, in the course of inter-\n\nState trade or commerce covered by article 286 (2) and assimilated to transactions of sale or purchase which take place inside the State thus acquiring an intra- State character so far as the delivery State is concerned.\n\nIt was suggested that this result could also be achieved by having resort to the principles which have been enunciated in articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution\n\n(r) (r828) 5 Bing, r77 at p. rSo.\n\n(2) (r876) r Ex. D. 232 at p. i'6,\n\ns.c.H.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS 1127\n\nwhich are included in Part XIII under the caption- 1953 Trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory Th 8 -\"B\n\nf I d.\n\nE th h h . . f h C e tate o, om 0 n ta.\n\nVen ong t ese proVJSlOnS 0 t e Onbay and Another stitution may by analogy support the conclusion that v. a transaction in the course of inter-State trade or com- The United merce is thus lifted out of that category and assimilated Motor. (India) to a transaction of sale or purchase which takes place Ltd. and Ot!tm. inside the State the analogy must stop there and can- Bhagwati J. not be worked any further.\n\nOne cannot construe the provisions of article 286 with reference to the provisions of article 304 (a) as is sought to be done. Article 286 and article 304 (a) refer to different states of affairs. ', Yhereas article 286 provides restrictions on the imposition of taxes on purchase or sale of goods, article 304 (a) gives the 8tate Legislature power to impose on goods imported from other States any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State arc subject so however as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced. ', Yhereas article 286 refers to taxes on sales or purchases of goods, article 304 (a) refers to tax on imported goods. The two concepts are thus entirely different. The only argument which was addressed before us on articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution was by the Government Pleader of Patna who referred to these provisions in order to substantiate his point that only one State, viz., the delivery State, should tax the sales or purchases covered by the Explanantion and argued what the results would be if it was held that both the States could tax or neither of them could tax such sale or purchase.\n\nThis aspect was however not stressed or presented during the course of the arguments and 1 would prefer not to express any opinion on the scope or meaning of article 304.\n\nI would therefore base my construction of the Explanation to article 286 (l)(a) and article 286 (2) on the rule as to the interpretation of statutes which I have referred to above, lifting the transaction of sale or purchase covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) out of the category of the transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and ussimilating: it to\n\n1953 a transaction of sale or purchase which. takes place ins -B side the delivery State thus investing it with the char- The tateof om • 1 h d j' S bay and Another acter of an mtra-State sa e qua t e e 1very tate.\n\nThe result therefore is that the delivery State only\n\nMTthe u(niitedd. J would be entitled to tax the transaction of sale or puro ors n ia b El' Sl Ltd. and Others. chase covered y the xp anat10n. uc 1 transact10n would be a transaction of sale or purchase where as a Bhagwati J. direct result of such sale or purchase the goods are delivered in the delivery State for the purpose of consumption in that State, i.e., where the transaction is between a dealer in the State in which the property in the goods passes and a consumer in the delivery State. The State in which the property in the goods passes would not be able to tax such sale or purchase in the absence of a provision enacted by law by Parliament within the meaning of article 286(2). Once that ban is lifted by the appropriate legislation enacted by the Parliament the State in which the property in the goods passes would also be entitled to tax such sale or purchase but not otherwise.\n\nSave as above, I agree with the conclusions rea, ched by my Lord the Chief Justice in the judgment just delivered. I agree that the Bomba, y Sales Tax Act, 1952, and the rules made, thereunder except Rule 5(2)(i) do not contravene the provisions of a, rticle 286, that Rule 5(2)(i) is clearly severable and citn be ignored, that there is no substance in the contention of Shri Seervai tha, t there is a violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 14 and that the taxation statutes should be construed in a manner so as to allow the statute itself to stand, the taxing authority being prevented by injunction from imposing the tax on subjects excluded by the Constitution from the purview of taxa, tion by the State.\n\nIn the result the declaration made by the court below will be set aside, the writ issued by it will be quashed a, nd the State of Bombay will be prohibited from imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax on sales or purchases which according to the interpretation put above on article 286 are excluded from the purview\n\nof taxation by.the 1:-itate of Bombay. Eal'h party \\rill bear and pay its own costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed:\n\nRAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VrnAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, arts. 13, 14-Sathi Lands (llestoralion) Art, 1950-Law dcclarinu \"ltlcment of land with partimlm individtial void-Validity-Infrinuement of fundamental riuht to cq1wl prntection of the laws - Di.1cri111ination-Pre.1mn1>tion of rea8onablencss.\n\nThe Court of Waras granted to the appellants a large area ol land belonging to the Bettiah Raj which was then under the management of the Court of Wards, on the recommendation of the Board of Revenue, at half the usual rates. A few years later, \\lie Working Committee of the Indian National Congress expressed the opinion that the settlement of the lands was against public interest, and in 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950, which declared that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force the settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and void and that no party to the settlement or his successors in interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or incurred any liability thereunder, and empowered the Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore the lands. The appellants, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional, applied under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus against the State of Bihar restraining it from taking any action under the Act. It was found that there were several other settlements of lands belonging to the Bettiah Raj on similar terms against which the Government had taken no action: Held, that the dispute between the appellants and the Stale was really a private dispute and a matter to be determined by a judicial tribunal in accordance with the law applicable to the case, and, as the Legislature had, in passing the impugll'ed enactment singled out the appellants and deprived them of their right to\n\n'l.'he State of Bonibay and A not.her\n\nv. 'llftc United ,\\{ otors (India) Ltd. and Others.\n\nBhagwari J.", "total_entities": 338, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE UNITED MOTORS (INDIA) LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNITED MOTORS (INDIA) LTD. 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("}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2524, "end_char": 2532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "statute": "the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2841, "end_char": 2847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "statute": "the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2% of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Act and praying inter alia for a writ against the State of Bombay and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, restraining them from enforcing the provisions of the Act, the High Court of Bombay held that the definition of 'sale' in the Act was so wide as to include the three categories of sale exempted by art."}}, {"text": "Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay", "label": "ORG", 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"start_char": 3204, "end_char": 3212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ija.li Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3371, "end_char": 3384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal\n\nHeld, per (Pata; ija.li Sastri 0."}}, {"text": "Nukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3392, "end_char": 3401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J., Nukherjea, Ghulam Rasan and Bhagwati JJ,-Bose J. dissenting)-that the Bombay Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952) was not nltra vires the State Legislature on the ground that it contravened art.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Ghulam Rasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3403, "end_char": 3415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J., Nukherjea, Ghulam Rasan and Bhagwati JJ,-Bose J. dissenting)-that the Bombay Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952) was not nltra vires the State Legislature on the ground that it contravened 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"regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "cl. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5311, "end_char": 5316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5320, "end_char": 5328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5746, "end_char": 5754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6011, "end_char": 6019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6494, "end_char": 6508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6670, "end_char": 6678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6853, "end_char": 6861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7084, "end_char": 7101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7261, "end_char": 7268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7280, "end_char": 7287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "S. 642", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8027, "end_char": 8033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "bay", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8164, "end_char": 8167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bay and Anothe, r\n\n(viii) A sale \"in the course of inter-State trade\" in art."}}, {"text": "Anothe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8172, "end_char": 8178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bay and Anothe, r\n\n(viii) A sale \"in the course of inter-State trade\" in art."}}, {"text": "art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8543, "end_char": 8551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8889, "end_char": 8897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9082, "end_char": 9086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.-(i) Article 286 (2) cannot be 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{"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9848, "end_char": 9852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9865, "end_char": 9891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9961, "end_char": 9969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Assuming that the Bombay Sales Tax Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10090, "end_char": 10130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10546, "end_char": 10550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assuming that the Bombay Sales Tax Rules", "statute": "Assuming that the Bombay Sales Tax Rules"}}, {"text": "Bllagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10613, "end_char": 10622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bllagwati J.-(i) Under the general law relating to sale of goods, a sale must be regarded as having \"taken place\" in the State in which the property in the goods sold bas passed to the\n\npurchaser and that State is entitled to tax the sale or purchase 1953 as having taken place inside the State.", "canonical_name": "Bllagwati"}}, {"text": "Explana Lid", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11377, "end_char": 11388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Explana Lid."}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11948, "end_char": 11956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12457, "end_char": 12465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CIVIL 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"metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal under article 132 (l) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 11th December, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Dixit J.) in Miscellaneous Application No."}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13176, "end_char": 13181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal under article 132 (l) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 11th December, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Dixit J.) in Miscellaneous Application No."}}, {"text": "P. Arnin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13286, "end_char": 13294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Arnin, AdvocuteGeneral of Bornbuy, (M .. ilf."}}, {"text": "G. N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13346, "end_char": 13357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Desai and G. N. Joshi, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "N. ltf. Seervai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13390, "end_char": 13405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. ltf."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13410, "end_char": 13425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seervai and J.B. Dadachanji for the respondents."}}, {"text": "V. K. '!'. Chari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13677, "end_char": 13693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. '!'."}}, {"text": "A. R. Soinanatha Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13826, "end_char": 13847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. 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Asthanrt, with him) for the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "S. JV]. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14083, "end_char": 14096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. JV]."}}, {"text": "N. Subrahmanya Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14185, "end_char": 14204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Subrahmanya Iyer, Advocate-Cleneml of 'L'ravancore-Oochin State, (1vl."}}, {"text": "R. Krishnrt Pillrti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14259, "end_char": 14278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Krishnrt Pillrti, with him) for the State of Travancorc-Oochin."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14399, "end_char": 14411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J., Mukherjea and Ghulam Hasan JJ.", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14456, "end_char": 14467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Vivian Bose and Bhagwati JJ.", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14516, "end_char": 14525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI S,1sTR1 C. , J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay <leclaring the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952, (Act XXIV of 1952), itltra vires the State Legislature and issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus against the State of Bombay and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, appellants herein, directing them to forbear and desist from enforcing the provisions of the said Act against the respondents who are dealers in motor cars in Bombay.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14645, "end_char": 14671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15013, "end_char": 15088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 9, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15162, "end_char": 15177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\") and it was brought into force on October 9, 1952, hy notification issue\\!"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15209, "end_char": 15218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "sections 5, 9, 10 and 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15242, "end_char": 15266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "November 1, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15296, "end_char": 15312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under section 1 (3) of the Act, except sections 5, 9, 10 and 47 which came into operation on November 1, 1952, as notified under section 2 (3)."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15332, "end_char": 15341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15440, "end_char": 15450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "November 3, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15488, "end_char": 15504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 3, 1952, the respondents 1 to 6, who 1953 are companies incorporated unrlPr the Indian Com- Ti 8 ---- . '"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15848, "end_char": 15859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "article 28G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16176, "end_char": 16187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16326, "end_char": 16337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16348, "end_char": 16358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17363, "end_char": 17374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bom. High", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17842, "end_char": 17860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit filed in answer the appellants traversed the allegations in the petition and contended, inter alia, that the Act was a complete code and provided for special machinery for dealing with all questions arising under it, inclurling questions of constitutionality, and, therefore, thr petition was not maintainable, that the present case was not an appropriate one for the issue of a writ under article 226 as the validity of the imposition of a tax was questioned, that no assessment proeeedings having been initiated against the respondents and no demand notice having been iswed, ihe respondents had no cause of action, and that, properly construed, the Act and the Rules did not contravene aitiele 286 or any other provisions of the Constitution and did not infringe :my fundamental right of the respondents,\n\n1963 The petition was heard by a Division Bench of the\n\nThe State of Bom.", "canonical_name": "State of Bom. High"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18453, "end_char": 18464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18702, "end_char": 18720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18964, "end_char": 18975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19071, "end_char": 19088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19171, "end_char": 19182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19615, "end_char": 19626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bom", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20127, "end_char": 20139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rules, too, did not exclude all the three categories of exempted sn, les but only two of them, anrl even stwh exrlnsion was hedged\n\nIn view of the importance of the issues involved, 19\"3\n\nnotice of_ the appeal was issued to the Advocates-The State of Bom.", "canonical_name": "State of Bom. High"}}, {"text": "Attorney-General of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20262, "end_char": 20287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The v.\n\nAttorney-General of India, to whom notice was also The United sent, intervened on behalf of the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Patanjali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20495, "end_char": 20504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali The Advocate-General of Bombay, appearing on behalf of the appellants, took strong :exception to the manner in which the learned Judges below disposed of the objection to the maintainability of the petition.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20858, "end_char": 20869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21027, "end_char": 21047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the State of West Bengal also represented that parties in that State frequently got petitions under article 226 admitted by alleging violation of some fundamental right, and the court sometimes issued the writ asked for without insisting on the allegation being substantiated."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21123, "end_char": 21134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21365, "end_char": 21376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21709, "end_char": 21719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seervai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22072, "end_char": 22079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seervai for the respondents rightly submitted, the fact that the Court below left the question undecided, though the point was concluded by the\n\nSastri 0 .J.\n\ni 9s3 decision of this Court in .'l!ohammad Yasin v. Tlze\n\nTh 8 --.,", "canonical_name": "Seervai"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22925, "end_char": 22936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22964, "end_char": 22975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23017, "end_char": 23033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wallace Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23629, "end_char": 23645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by the Privy Council in the Wallace Brothers case (') in dealing with the competency of the Indian Legislature to impose tax on the income arising abroad to a non-resident foreign company, the constitutional validity of the relevant statutory provisions did not turn on the possession by the legislature of extra-territorial powers but on the existence of a sufficient territorial connection between the taxing State and what it seeks to tax."}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24876, "end_char": 24891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25262, "end_char": 25267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assam and Bengal made among other things the actual existence of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxability."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25272, "end_char": 25278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assam and Bengal made among other things the actual existence of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxability."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25416, "end_char": 25421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bihar the production or manufacture of the good~ in the Province was made an additional ground."}}, {"text": "articles 286, 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26653, "end_char": 26670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SaslYi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27372, "end_char": 27378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "been delivered as a direct result of such sale or pur- Patanjali chase for the purpose of consumption in that State, SaslYi o.J. notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State."}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28704, "end_char": 28715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28719, "end_char": 28730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29574, "end_char": 29585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30911, "end_char": 30922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Boin-", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33572, "end_char": 33586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is really not necessary 7'he State of Boin-\n\n• • . ."}}, {"text": "Neither the Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34161, "end_char": 34190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37926, "end_char": 37937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38404, "end_char": 38415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43793, "end_char": 43807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44368, "end_char": 44382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44822, "end_char": 44836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44891, "end_char": 44902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44975, "end_char": 44986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gwyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46070, "end_char": 46075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Discussing the true nature of a duty of excise and a tax on the sale of goods, Gwyer C. J. observed in the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax case (1):\n\n\"It is common ground that the Court is entitled to look at the real substance of the Act imposing it, at what it does and not merely at what it says, in order to ascertain the true nature of the tax."}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47247, "end_char": 47258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1939) F.C.R. 18", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47336, "end_char": 47352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47364, "end_char": 47375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bomec", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47498, "end_char": 47512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196J article 304 on goods imported from other States does not infringe the freedom of inter-State commerce tl ] l b t' J 301 't f l l' The State of Bomec rec y ar IC e , pan y o reason anc po ICY bay and Anoth6r reqmres that a tax on sales or purchases imposed by v. the State in which the goods are actually delivered for 1'he United consumption in the State should not be regarded as Motors (India) violative of the ban under article 286 (2), and that is Lrd."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47787, "end_char": 47798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47950, "end_char": 47956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "what the statutory fiction enacted in the Explanation Patanjali was, in our judgment, designed to achieve by divesting Sastri o.J. the sale or purchase of the kind referred to in the Explanation of its inter-State eharacter in relation to the State of delivery."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48200, "end_char": 48211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48378, "end_char": 48392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48995, "end_char": 49001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, if neither State could tax such sale or purchase as is referretl to in the explanation, until Parliament lifted the ban, as the Advocate-General of Madras was inclined to think, the result would be that consumers could get out-of-State goods more cheaply than local goods, and local dealers would suffer competitive disadvantage as compared with outside dealers."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50256, "end_char": 50267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 301 and 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50380, "end_char": 50400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50505, "end_char": 50517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bomba.y", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50592, "end_char": 50599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the respondents' case that the sales and purchases made by them in Bomba.y, in the course of their business, include all the three categories excluded from the scope of State-taxation by article 286, and the Ad seeking to bring all of them within its scheme of taxation is bad."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50712, "end_char": 50723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51205, "end_char": 51222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51260, "end_char": 51269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51847, "end_char": 51856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(21)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52975, "end_char": 52988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53303, "end_char": 53312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "first day of April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53634, "end_char": 53658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "limit during the yc>ar commencing on the first day of April, 1952."}}, {"text": "1st November, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53779, "end_char": 53797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tax is to be levied on his taxable turnover in respect of sales of goods made on or after the appointed day, i.e., 1st November, 1952, at the rate of 3 pies in the rupee (section 6)."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53835, "end_char": 53844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53850, "end_char": 53859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54163, "end_char": 54172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Boma", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54299, "end_char": 54312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No dealer\n\n1953 liable to pay the general tax shall carry•on business as\n\nThe State of Boma dealer unless he ha.s pplied for rgistrat.ion (section bay and Anotl<er 9)."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54405, "end_char": 54407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IL", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54526, "end_char": 54537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54738, "end_char": 54754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000 during the year ended 31st March, 1952, or sa.,"}}, {"text": "1st April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54828, "end_char": 54843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tri c.J. exceeds the said limit during the year commencing from 1st April, 1952, is charged with a special tax at the rate specified in Schedule II on his taxable turn over in respect of the sales of special goods made on or after the appointed day, i.e., 1st November, 1952."}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54900, "end_char": 54911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55044, "end_char": 55054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55398, "end_char": 55408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55584, "end_char": 55594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55684, "end_char": 55694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56099, "end_char": 56109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56619, "end_char": 56629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57004, "end_char": 57013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57127, "end_char": 57208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57278, "end_char": 57295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "statute": "the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "N\"ovember 1, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57346, "end_char": 57363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali In exercise of the powers conferred by this section, the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, which were brought into force on the same day on which the charging sections 5 and 10 of the Act were also brought into force, namely, :N\"ovember 1, 1952."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57507, "end_char": 57516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "statute": "the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57535, "end_char": 57545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "statute": "the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57831, "end_char": 57842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "statute": "the State Government made and published rules called the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58720, "end_char": 58737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59023, "end_char": 59025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59280, "end_char": 59291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59568, "end_char": 59577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59582, "end_char": 59592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59691, "end_char": 59701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286(l)(i.)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60248, "end_char": 60266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60429, "end_char": 60440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60681, "end_char": 60698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60819, "end_char": 60836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61027, "end_char": 61042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nS.C.R.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61102, "end_char": 61118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position, thereforn, was that, on the date when the general tax and the special tax became leviable under the Act, sales or purch, ises of the kind described under article 286( 1) (b) and ( 2) stood in fact excluded from taxation, and the State of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS 1095\n\nBombav cannot be considered to have made a \"law 195a\n\nimposiIg 01' authorising the imposition of a tax\" on - sales or purchases excluded under the aforesaid clausesbTheStadteoAif Btohm\n\n, ' ~- M• of :irtrnle 286."}}, {"text": "Bombav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61148, "end_char": 61154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position, thereforn, was that, on the date when the general tax and the special tax became leviable under the Act, sales or purch, ises of the kind described under article 286( 1) (b) and ( 2) stood in fact excluded from taxation, and the State of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS 1095\n\nBombav cannot be considered to have made a \"law 195a\n\nimposiIg 01' authorising the imposition of a tax\" on - sales or purchases excluded under the aforesaid clausesbTheStadteoAif Btohm\n\n, ' ~- M• of :irtrnle 286."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62537, "end_char": 62548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63719, "end_char": 63730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64247, "end_char": 64258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64990, "end_char": 65007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65152, "end_char": 65162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65173, "end_char": 65183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 642", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67976, "end_char": 67982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 298( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68695, "end_char": 68710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68718, "end_char": 68747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1942] F.C.R. 67", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 70269, "end_char": 70285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71453, "end_char": 71464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72034, "end_char": 72042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I also agree that the object of the Explanation is to fix the locus of a sale or purchase by means of a fiction, hut with respect I cannot agree with my brother Bhagwati that the non-obstante clause enunciates the general law on this point.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI , JJ"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72185, "end_char": 72202, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 642", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72454, "end_char": 72460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Boni", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72607, "end_char": 72620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Boni.", "canonical_name": "State of Bom. High"}}, {"text": "Tata Iron and Steel Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73072, "end_char": 73097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take, for ex.ample, the case of steel rails manufactured by the Tata Iron and Steel Works at Tatanagar and purchased by the Government of India for its railways."}}, {"text": "Tatanagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 73101, "end_char": 73110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take, for ex.ample, the case of steel rails manufactured by the Tata Iron and Steel Works at Tatanagar and purchased by the Government of India for its railways."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73132, "end_char": 73151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take, for ex.ample, the case of steel rails manufactured by the Tata Iron and Steel Works at Tatanagar and purchased by the Government of India for its railways."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73175, "end_char": 73193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government found itself called upon to pay a sale or purchase tax to different States on a single transaction of purchase."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 73534, "end_char": 73542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had to pay but on the notions then current it was open to Bihar to claim the right to tax because the goods were manufactured there, to Bengal because the transaction of sale took place at Calcutta where the head offices of the company were, to a third Province because the goods were delivered there and to a fourth because they were \"found\" there."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74373, "end_char": 74384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75015, "end_char": 75021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. ·\n\nB t ] ] t t ]' •t f ] The United u m ega enac men s s1mp 101 Y o anguage Motors (India) seldom evokes clarity of thought.", "canonical_name": "United"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75041, "end_char": 75043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bomhold", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76998, "end_char": 77014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, one either has to adopt the ultra logical view and hold that the only State which can tax is the one in which all the ingredients take place and that no State can tax when a single ingredient\n\n1953 takes place elsewhere, or resort to the , old view and\n\nThe State of Bomhold that every State in which any single ingredient bay and Another takes place can tax.", "canonical_name": "State of Bom. High"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77949, "end_char": 77960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78003, "end_char": 78014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78081, "end_char": 78092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78138, "end_char": 78149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78330, "end_char": 78341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78416, "end_char": 78430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1939] F.C.R. 18", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 79023, "end_char": 79039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79077, "end_char": 79096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of India, be delivered in a totally different 1968 State, but the \"tax could still be levied if there was no - Explanation to stop it."}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79367, "end_char": 79378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 286 and 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79837, "end_char": 79857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79901, "end_char": 79912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81049, "end_char": 81060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88452, "end_char": 88456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He does not have to destroy Bose J. them nor does he have to ..diminish their value or utility.", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "United", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 92659, "end_char": 92665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".~\n\n1 '~',,!1~::· purchase \"for the purpose of consumpt10n m the State\" v. have been used to signify that in such a case the carrier The United must be regarded as the agent of the Bombay seller.", "canonical_name": "United"}}, {"text": "Aiotors (India) [Jtd", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94797, "end_char": 94817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aiotors (India) [Jtd."}}, {"text": "Bombay Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 96788, "end_char": 96803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But that did not prevent this Court 1953 from holding in 'The State of Travancore-Cochin & Other8\n\nv. The Bombay Co. Ltd.( 1) that the sale which occasionb1'heStadteoA'.f Bo1m . . ."}}, {"text": "Bombay Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97986, "end_char": 98006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98407, "end_char": 98424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Bombay Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "1903 of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 98884, "end_char": 98898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r •\n\ni112 SUPREME COURT HEPORi'S [i953]\n\n1903 of Bombay will not prevent it from being a sale effect-\n\nT' S -.,8 ed in the course of inter-State trade or ommerce or in w tate OJ om ."}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100706, "end_char": 100717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100790, "end_char": 100807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "9th October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101080, "end_char": 101097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREiE COUl'tT REPORTS 1113\n\n1953 The Act came into force on 9th October, 1952, with the exception of tl1e taxing sections."}}, {"text": "sec 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101294, "end_char": 101300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101457, "end_char": 101474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101612, "end_char": 101621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103408, "end_char": 103425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bmn", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 103449, "end_char": 103461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bmn bay and Another I can understand this court saying to a petitioner: v. '.'You are not yet hurt by this Act nor is there any The United immediate likelihood of your being hurt and until that Motors (India} happens we are not aoing to entertain vour petition Ltd. and Others."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103800, "end_char": 103802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104357, "end_char": 104366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105053, "end_char": 105063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105801, "end_char": 105827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105894, "end_char": 105915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "BHAGWATl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105918, "end_char": 105926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATl J.-I had tho benefit ofreading the judgment just delivered by my Lord the Chief J usticc.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI , JJ"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106185, "end_char": 106199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106395, "end_char": 106406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106450, "end_char": 106466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107026, "end_char": 107037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107768, "end_char": 107779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108679, "end_char": 108690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 110391, "end_char": 110399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ed and the sale or purchase took place and the situs or h 1 Bhagwati J. t e ocation of the sale or purchase was in the place where the transfer of ownership took place or the property in the goods passed under the generallaw relating to the sale of goods. ["}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110807, "end_char": 110818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 111014, "end_char": 111031, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111064, "end_char": 111075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States before the Constitution but also the concept of sale as defined in the Indian Sale of Goods Act", "statute": "States before the Constitution but also the concept of sale as defined in the Indian Sale of Goods Act"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111973, "end_char": 111984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States before the Constitution but also the concept of sale as defined in the Indian Sale of Goods Act", "statute": "States before the Constitution but also the concept of sale as defined in the Indian Sale of Goods Act"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112354, "end_char": 112365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhagwnti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112576, "end_char": 112584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "position to a sale or purchase which took place inside\n\nBhagwnti J. the delivery State enabling the delivery State to tax the sale or purchase in question.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI , JJ"}}, {"text": "S 1119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114450, "end_char": 114456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhaywati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115002, "end_char": 115010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A definition, if at all it has any significance, Bhaywati J. should cover all the transactions which come within that particular category and cannot be enacted in the form of a legal fiction in the manner it has been done in the Explanation.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI , JJ"}}, {"text": "State ofBom", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 116803, "end_char": 116814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he non-obstantc clause ba8 not been incorporated in the Explanation with a view to emphasise the particular aspect of the passing of\n\n1120 SUPREME COURT ltEPORT8 ll953)\n\n~ property in the goods and negativmg the same\n\nThe State ofBom because that was one of the ingredients which had\n\nbay and Another been considered as important territorial connection\n\nv. between the taxing State and what it sought to tax.", "canonical_name": "State of Bom. High"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118064, "end_char": 118078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119646, "end_char": 119657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120039, "end_char": 120054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120935, "end_char": 120950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120959, "end_char": 120973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121210, "end_char": 121221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121233, "end_char": 121244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seervai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 121486, "end_char": 121493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B which was submitted before the court by Shri Seervai , ' uueo, oin.", "canonical_name": "Seervai"}}, {"text": "Bltagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121852, "end_char": 121861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It continues in the\n\nBltagwati J. book case 'A' and the physical fact of its existence in the book case 'A' can never be obliterated.", "canonical_name": "Bllagwati"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123133, "end_char": 123144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124249, "end_char": 124257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "because the obvious purpose for which he purchases Rhagwati J. the goods is for dealing with those goods in the ordinary course of trade and not for consuming the same.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI , JJ"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127270, "end_char": 127281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127575, "end_char": 127589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128167, "end_char": 128181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128963, "end_char": 128977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129289, "end_char": 129303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129325, "end_char": 129339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129421, "end_char": 129435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129673, "end_char": 129684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129908, "end_char": 129922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129931, "end_char": 129945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Beal on the Cardinal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130097, "end_char": 130123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Quain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130769, "end_char": 130774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati J.\n\nTo the same effect also are the observations of Quain J. in Dryden v. Overseers of Putney (') quoted at page 426 of the same work :-\n\n\"It may be laid down as a rule for the construction of statutes, that where a special provision anda general provision are inserted which cover the same subjectmatter, a case falling within the words of the special provision must be governed thereby and not by the terms of the general provision.\""}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131418, "end_char": 131429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131500, "end_char": 131511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131706, "end_char": 131717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131996, "end_char": 132007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 301 and 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132305, "end_char": 132325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133071, "end_char": 133082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133119, "end_char": 133130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133160, "end_char": 133171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133176, "end_char": 133187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133241, "end_char": 133252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133332, "end_char": 133343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133620, "end_char": 133631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133680, "end_char": 133691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 301 and 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133826, "end_char": 133846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 133900, "end_char": 133905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only argument which was addressed before us on articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution was by the Government Pleader of Patna who referred to these provisions in order to substantiate his point that only one State, viz.,"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134377, "end_char": 134388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134452, "end_char": 134463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134475, "end_char": 134486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134646, "end_char": 134660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135725, "end_char": 135739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 136087, "end_char": 136106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136402, "end_char": 136412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136962, "end_char": 136973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 137119, "end_char": 137142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed:\n\nRAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VrnAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 137160, "end_char": 137174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed:\n\nRAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VrnAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]", "canonical_name": "State of Bom. High"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137212, "end_char": 137221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed:\n\nRAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VrnAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "VrnAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137223, "end_char": 137233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed:\n\nRAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VrnAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137268, "end_char": 137289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 13, 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137297, "end_char": 137309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian National Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 137814, "end_char": 137838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few years later, \\lie Working Committee of the Indian National Congress expressed the opinion that the settlement of the lands was against public interest, and in 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950, which declared that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force the settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and void and that no party to the settlement or his successors in interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or incurred any liability thereunder, and empowered the Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore the lands."}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 137940, "end_char": 137957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few years later, \\lie Working Committee of the Indian National Congress expressed the opinion that the settlement of the lands was against public interest, and in 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950, which declared that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force the settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and void and that no party to the settlement or his successors in interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or incurred any liability thereunder, and empowered the Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore the lands."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138490, "end_char": 138501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 138557, "end_char": 138571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional, applied under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus against the State of Bihar restraining it from taking any action under the Act."}}, {"text": "Bettiah Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 138706, "end_char": 138717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was found that there were several other settlements of lands belonging to the Bettiah Raj on similar terms against which the Government had taken no action: Held, that the dispute between the appellants and the Stale was really a private dispute and a matter to be determined by a judicial tribunal in accordance with the law applicable to the case, and, as the Legislature had, in passing the impugll'ed enactment singled out the appellants and deprived them of their right to\n\n'l.'he State of Bonibay and A not.her\n\nv. 'llftc United ,\\{ otors (India) Ltd. and Others."}}, {"text": "Bhagwari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139199, "end_char": 139207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwari J.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI , JJ"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1129_1144_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1129\n\nof taxation by.the 1:-itate of Bombay. Eal'h party \\rill bear and pay its own costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed:\n\nRAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VrnAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, arts. 13, 14-Sathi Lands (llestoralion) Art, 1950-Law dcclarinu \"ltlcment of land with partimlm individtial void-Validity-Infrinuement of fundamental riuht to cq1wl prntection of the laws - Di.1cri111ination-Pre.1mn1>tion of rea8onablencss.\n\nThe Court of Waras granted to the appellants a large area ol land belonging to the Bettiah Raj which was then under the management of the Court of Wards, on the recommendation of the Board of Revenue, at half the usual rates. A few years later, \\lie Working Committee of the Indian National Congress expressed the opinion that the settlement of the lands was against public interest, and in 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950, which declared that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force the settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and void and that no party to the settlement or his successors in interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or incurred any liability thereunder, and empowered the Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore the lands. The appellants, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional, applied under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus against the State of Bihar restraining it from taking any action under the Act. It was found that there were several other settlements of lands belonging to the Bettiah Raj on similar terms against which the Government had taken no action: Held, that the dispute between the appellants and the Stale was really a private dispute and a matter to be determined by a judicial tribunal in accordance with the law applicable to the case, and, as the Legislature had, in passing the impugll'ed enactment singled out the appellants and deprived them of their right to\n\n'l.'he State of Bonibay and A not.her\n\nv. 'llftc United ,\\{ otors (India) Ltd. and Others.\n\nBhagwari J.\n\n1130 SUPREiIE COURT REPORTS (1953]\n\n1953 have this dispute adjudicated upon by a duly coostitubed Court, the enactment contravened the provisions of article 14 of the Ram Pr<Uad Constitution which guarantees to every citizen the equal protec- Narayan Salii tion of the laws, and was void. and Another Legislation which singles out a particular individual from his v.\n\nTiu, Rtalp, of Bihar and\n\nOther8.\n\nfellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is not imposed upon the others and against which even the right of complaint is taken away is highly discriminatory.\n\nThough the presumption is in favour of the constitutionality - of a legislative enactment and it has to be presumed tbat a Legis- Patan.iaJi Sa.tri lature understands and correctly appreciates tbe needs of its own\n\n0. J. people, yet when on the face of a statute tbere is no classification at all, and no attempt has been made to select any individual or group with reference to any differentiating attribute peculiar to that individual or group and not possessed by others, this presumption is of little or no assistance to the State.\n\nAmecr1lnnissa Beu nm v. Jlfah/Joob Begum [1953] S.C.R. 404 and Gnlf of Colorado etc. Co. v. Ellis [165 U.S. 150] referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 59 of 1952.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated 3rd January, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ). in an application under article 226 of the Constitution registered as Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 204 of 1950.\n\nOriginal Petition No. 20 of 1952 under article 32 of the Constitution was also heard along with this appea.\n\nP. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the appellants.\n\nJV!. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Jliahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with them) for the respondents.\n\n1953. February 20. The court delivered judgment as follows :- p ATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-I concur in the judgment which my learned brother Mukherjea is about to deliver, but I wish to add a few words in view of the important constitutional issue involved.\n\nThe facts are simple. The appellants obtained a settlement Bf about 200 bikhas of land in a village known as Sathi Farm in Bettiah Estate, in Bihar,\n\nthen and ever since in the management of the Court 19;3 of Wards on behalf of the disqualified proprietress who is the second respondent in this appeal. The lands Ram Prasad Narayan Saki were settled at the prevailing rate of rent but the and Another salami or premium payable was fixed at half the usual v. rate as a concession to the appellants who are said to ~'he State af be distant relations of the proprietress. The appel- Bihar and ]ants paid the salami and entered into possession of Others. the lands on the 2nd November, 1946, and P t -:-\n\n1. 8 . h , b . h ] ] O aania i astri ave smce een paymg t e rents regu ar y. n the o. J. 13th June, 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950. The genesis of this legislation is thus explained in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar, the first respondent herein.\n\nReport against the settlement of these lands with the petitioners as well as some other lands to Sri Prajapa ti Mishra and the nnlawful manner in which these settlements were brought abont, was carried to the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress,\n\nwhich body, after making such enquiry as it thought fit, came to the conclusion that the settlement of these lands with the petitioners was contrary to the pro visions of law and public policy and recommended that steps should be to taken by the State of Bihar to have these lands restored to the Bettiah Estate. In pursuance thereof a request was made to the petitioners and to the said Prajapati Mishra to return the lands to Bettiah Estate. \\Vhile Sri Prajapati Mishra returned the land settled with him, the petitioners refused to do so.\n\nThe Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Bill runs thus :\n\n\"As it has been held that the settlement of Sathi lands in the District of Champaran under the Court of Wards with Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahl and Shri Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi is contrary to the provisions of the law and as Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Sri Ram Rekha Narayan Sahi havtl refused to return the lands to the Bettiah Estate, Government\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nhave decided to enact a law to restora these lands to the Bettiah Estate.\" Ram Prasad Narayan sahi The impugned Act consists of three sections. Secand Another tion 2(1) declares that \"notwithstanding anything v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.\n\ncontained in any law for the time being in force\", the settlement obtained by the appellants is \"null and void\", and that \"no party to the settlement or his successor in interest shall be deemed to have Potanjali Sastri acquired any right or incurred any liability therea. J, under\". Sub-section (2) provides that the appellants and their successors in interest \"shall quit possession of the said land from the date of commencement of this Act and if they fail to do so, the Collector of Champaran shall eject them and restore the lands to the possession of the Bettiah vVards Estate\". Subsection (3) provides for the refund of the amount of salami money and the cost of improvement, if any, to the lessees by the estrtte on restomtion to it of the fands in question.\n\nIn the \"case\" lodged in this court for the State of Bihrtr, the legislrttion is sought to be justified and its validity maintained on the following grounds :\n\n\" It is well settled thrtt a Legislature with ph>nary powers so long as it enacts faws within the ambit of its powers, is competent to enrtct a law which may be applicable generally to society or to an individual or a class of individuals only ... It is submitted that grants of the lands belonging to the Bettiah Estate made by the Court of Wards were of doubtful validity; hence they have been dealt with by the impugned Act ... No evidence has been adduced by the appellants, except a bare allegation, which has not been substantiated, that about 2000 acres of land were settled to show that persons in similar circumstances with whom similar settlements were made, were treated differently. It is submitted that in the context the impugned Act has a reasonable basis of classification.\"\n\nThe decision of the majority of this Court in Ohiranjit Lal v. The Union of India(') is relied on in support of these contentions.\n\nIn that case, however, the\n\n(1) [1950] S, C.R; 869,\n\nmajority felt• justified in upholding the legislation,\n\n195J\n\nthough it adversely affected the rights and interest of Ram Pra.ad the shareholders of a particular joint stock company, Narayan SaM\n\nbecause the mismanagement of the company's affairs and Another prejudicially affected the production of an essential v. commodity and caused serious unemployment amongst The State 0! .._, Bihar and a section of the community. Mr.Justice Das and I took Others. the view that legislation directed against a particular _ named person or corporation was obviously discri- Potan, ialiSastri minatory and could not constitutionally be justified a. J. even if such legislation resulted in some benefit to the public. In a system of government by political parties, I was apprehensive of the danger inherent in special enactments which deprive particular named persons of their liberty or property because the Legislature thinks them guilty of misconduct, and I said in my dissenting opinion:\n\n\"Legislation based upon mismanagement or other misconduct as the differentia and made n, pplicable to a specified individ1ml or corporate body is not far removed from the notorious parliamentary procedure formerly employed in Britain of punishing individual delinquents by passing bills of attainder, and should not, I think receive judicial encouragement.\"\n\nMy apprehensions have come true. Recently we had before us a case from Hyderabad (Civil Appeal No. 63 of 1952~Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum)' where the duly constituted legislative authority of that State intervened in a succession dispute between two sets of rival claimants to the estate of a deceased person and \" dismissed \" the claim of the one and adjudged the property to the other by making a special \"law\" to that effect. And now comes this case from Bihar of an essentially similar type. The appellants assert title to certain lands in Bettiah Estate under a settlement which they claim to have lawfully obtained from the Court of Wards, while it is now alleged on behalf of the Estate that the settlement was not for the benefit of the Estate and was contrary to law, as the Court of Wards did not then \".apply its\n\n(r) Since reported as [1953) S.C.R. 401.\n\n!47\n\n1963 mind \" to that question. This is purely.a dispute between private parties and a matter for determination Ram Prasad by duly constituted courts to which is entrusted, in Narayan Sahi f and Another every free and civilised society, the important unction v. of adjudicating on disputed legal rights, after ob.\n\nThe State of serving the well established procedural safeguards Bihar and which include the right to be heard, the right to Others. produce witnesses and so forth. This is the protection\n\nPatanjali Sastii which the .law. guaranes equally o all persons, and\n\nc. J. our Constitut10n proh1b1ts by artwle 14 every State from denying such protection to anyone. The app ellants before us have been denied this protection. A polihical organisation of the party in power decides after making such enquiry as it thought fit, that the settlement in question was \" contrary to the provisions of law and public policy\" and the State Legislature, basing itself on such decison, purports to declare the settlement \"null and void \" and directs the eviction of the appellants and the restoration of the lands to the Estate. The reasons given for this extraordinary procedure are indeed remarkable for their disturbing implications. It is said that \"there was agitation amongst the tenantry of the locality and opposition on the part of persons living in the locality against the appellants' possession of the lands which led to breach of the peace and institution of criminal cases\". Whenever, then, a section of the people in a locality, in assertion of an adverse claim, disturb a person in the quiet enjoyment of his property, the Bihar Government would seem to think that it. is not necessary for the police to step in to protect him in his enjoyment until he is evicted in due course of law, but the Legislature could intervene by making a \"law \" to oust the person from his possession. Legislation such as we have now before us is calculated to drain the vitality from the rule of law which our Constitution so unmistakably proclaims, and it is to be hoped that the democratic process in this country will not function along these lines.\n\nMuKHEaJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on a certificate granted by the High Court of\n\nPatna under article 132 (1) of the Constitution, is directed agaimt a judgment of a Division Bench of that court, dated 3rd January, 1952, by which the learned Judges dismissed a petition of the appellants under article 226 of the Constitution. The prayer in the petition was for a writ in the nature of mandamus, directing the opposite party, not to take any action, under an Act passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly in 1950 and known as The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act which was challenged as void and unconstitutional.\n\nTo appreciate the points in controversy between the parties to the proceeding, it may be necessary to nar. rate the material facts briefly. Maharani Janki Koer, the respondent No. 2 in the appeal, is the present proprietress of an extensive Estate in Bihar known by the name of Bettiah Raj, which is held and managed on her behalf by the Court of Wards, Bihar, constituted under Bengal Act IX of 1879. On 19th July, 1946, the appellants, who are two brothers and are distantly related to the Maharani, made a representation to the Government of Bihar through the Manager of the Estate, praying for settlement in raiyati right, of 200 bighas of land preferably in Sathi farm or Materia farm along with a certain quantity of waste lands. On 20th July, 1946, the then Manager of the Wards Estate wrote a letter to the Collector of Champaran recommending that the applicants might be given settlement of the lands as prayed for, without payment of any selami. The Collector, however, did not agree to this proposal, nor did the Commissioner of the Tirhut Division, and the matter then came up for consideration before the Board of Revenue which recommended that settlement might be made with the applicants provided they were agreeable to pay selami at half the usual rates. On 14th October, 1946, the recommendation of the Revenue Board was accepted by the Provincial Government and six days later the Court of Wards accepted a cheque for Rs. 5,000 from one of the lessees, towards payment of the selami money and rent for the year 1354 1''.S. On the 2nd November, 1946., possession\n\n191J3\n\nRam Prasad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRam Prasad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nof the lands was given to the appellants and on the 18th of November following, the Manager of the Court of Wards recorded a formal order fixing the selami of the land at Rs. 3,988 annas odd and rent at Rs. 797 annas odd per year.\n\nOn the same day, a Hisab Bandobasti form, which is the usual form employed in the Estate for raiyati settlements, was signed by the Circle Officer on behalf of the Court of Wards and bv one of the lessees for himself as well as the constituted attorney of the other lessees. It is not disputed that the lessees continued to possess the lands since then on payment of the stipulated rent.\n\nOn the 3rd June, 1950, the Bihar Legislative Assembly passed an Act known as The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act which received the assent of the Governor on the 13th IJune, 1950.\n\nThe object of the Act, as stated in the preamble, is to provide for restoration of certain lands belonging to the Bettiah Wards Estate which were settled contrary to the provisions of law in favour of certain individuafa. Section 2, which is the only material section in the Act, enacts in the first sub-section that the settlement of Sathi lands (described in the schedule to the Act) on behalf of the Bettiah Court of Wards Estate with the appellants, as per order of the Manager of the Estate dated the 18th November, 1946, is declared null and void and no party to the settlement or his successor-in-interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or incur any liability under the same.\n\nThe second sub-section em bodies a direction to the effect that the said lessees and their successor-in-interest shall quit possession of the lands from the date of the commencement of the Act and if they fail to do so, the Collector of Champaran shall eject them and restore the lands to the possession of the Bettiah Estate. The third and the last sub-section provides that the Bettiah Wards Estate shall on restoration to it of the lands pay to the lessees the selami money paid by them and also such amount as might have been spent by them in making improvements on the lands prior to the commencemen~ of the Act.\n\nIn substance, therefore, the Act declared the lease granted by the Bettiah Wards Estate to the appellants on the 18th November, 1946, to be illegal and inoperative and prescribed the mode in which this declaration was to be given effect to and the lessees evicted from the lands.\n\nOn the 28th August, 1950, the appellants filed the petition, out of which this appeal arises, under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Patna, challenging the validity of The Sathi Lands Act and praying for a writ upon the respondents restraining them from taking any steps under the said Act, or from interfering with the possession of the appellants in respect of the lands comprised in the lease. It was asserted by the petitioners that in passing the impugned legislation the Bihar Legislature actually usurped the power of the judiciary and the enactment was not a law at all in the proper sense of the expression. The other material contentions raised were that the legislation was void as it conflicted with the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under articles 14, 19(1) (f) and 31 of the Constitution.\n\nThe respondents opposite parties in resisting the petitioners' prayer stated inter alia in their counteraffidavit that the settlement of the lands in question with the appellants by the Court of Wards, was not for the benefit of the estate or advantage of the ward and that the transaction was entered into by the Wards Estate without properly applying their mind to it. It was stated further that after the settlement was made, there was a good deal of agitation among the tenants in the locality which led to the institution of certain criminal proceedings.\n\nIn these circumstances, the matter was brought to the notice of the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress and the Working Committee was of opinion that t, he settlement of these lands was against public interest. The lessees, therefore, were asked to vacate the lands and on their refusal the legislation in question was passed.\n\nThe petition was heard by a Division Benclj consisting of Ramaswami and Sarjoo PershadJJ. Ramaswami J .\n\nRa1n Prasad Narayan Sa hi and Another\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.\n\nM ukherjea J.\n\nRam Prasad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\ndecided all the points raised by the petitioners against them and held that the Act wa~ neither ultra vires the Bihar Legislature nor was void under article 13(1) of the Constitution. The learned Judge was further of opinion that it was not a fit case for interference by the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe other learned Judge expressed considerable doubts as to whether a legislation of this type, which in form and substance was a decree of a court of law, was within the competence of the legis lature and warranted by the Constitution. He agreed, however, with his learned colleague that the case was not such as to justify an interference of the High Court in exercise of its discretionary powers under article 226 of the Constitution. The remedy of the petitioners might lie, according to him, in a regularly constituted suit. The result, therefore, was that the appellants' petition was dismissed and it is the pro priety of this judgment that has been assailed before us in this appeal.\n\nMr. P.R. Das, who appeared in support of the appeal, put forward at the forefront of his arguments, the contention raised on behalf of his client in the court below that the impugned legislation was void by reason of its violating the fundamental rights of the appellants under article 14 of the Constitution. The point appeared to us to be of substance and after hearing the learned Attorney.General on this point we were satisfied that the contention of Mr. Das was well founded and entitled to prevail, irrespective of any other ground that might be raised in this appeal.\n\nThere have been a number of decisions by this court where the question regarding the nature and scope of the guarantee implied in the equal protection clause of the Constitution came up for consideration and the general principles can be taken to be fairly well settled.\n\nWhat this clause aims at is to strike down hostile dis crimination or oppression or inequality. As the guarantee applies to all persons similarly situated, it is certainly open to the legislature to classify persons and things to achieve particular legislative objects;\n\n1963 but such selection or differentiation must not be arbitrary and should rest upon a rational basis, having regard to the object which the legislature has in /lam Prasad Narayan Sahi view. It cannot be disputed that the legislation in and Another the present case has singled out two individuals and v. one solitary transaction entered into between them The State of and another private party, namely, the Bettiah Wards Bihar and Estate and has declared the transaction to be a nullity Others. on the ground that it is contrary to the provisions of Mukherjea J. law, although there has been no adjudication on this point by any judicial tribunal. It is not necessary for our present purpose to embark upon a discussion as to how far the doctrine of 'separation of powers has been recognised in our Constitution and whether the legislature can arrogate to itself the powers of the judiciary and proceed to decide disputes between private parties by making a declaration of the rights of one against the other. It is also unnecessary to attempt to specify the limits within which any legislation, dealing with private rights, is possible within the purview of our Constitution. On one point our Constitution is clear and explicit, namely, that no law is valid which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThere can be no question, therefore, that if the legislation in the present case comes within the mischief of article 14 of the Constitution, it has got to be declared invalid. This leads us to the question as to whether the impugned enactment is, in fact, discriminatory and if so, whether the discrimination made by it can be justified on any principle of reasonable classification ?\n\nThe appellants, it is not disputed, are only two amongst numerous leaseholders who hold lands in raiyati right under the Bettiah Wards Estate. It cannot also be disputed that the lands were settled with them on the recommendation of the Board of Revenue after due consideration of the respective views put forward by the Manager of the Estate on the one hand •\n\nand the Collector and the Divisional Commissioner on the other. The appellants are admitteqly paying rents which lj.re l!Ormall! assessed on lands 9f imilar\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 description in the locality. The leaooed Attorney-\n\nR P d General referred in this connection to the provisions am rasa .\n\nNarayan Sahi of section 18 of the Court of Wards Act and argued that and Anather the lease in dispute was granted in contravention of\n\nv. that section. Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act The State of provides as follows :\n\nBombC!Ji. and r Others. \"The Court may sanction the giving of leases or farms of any property under its charge ... and may Mukherjea J. direct the doing of all such other acts as it may judge to be most for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the Ward\".\n\nApparently it makes the Court of Wards the sole judge of the benefit to the estate or advantage of the ward.\n\nBut it is said that the Court of Wards did not apply its mind properly to this matter when it granted lease to the appellants at half the usual rate of selami.\n\nThe Wards Estate thus suffered loss to the extent of nearly Rs. 4,000 which could legitimately have been recovered from any other lessee.\n\nThis contention does not impress us much; the utmost that can be said is that this could have been put forward, for what it is worth and with what result, nobody can say, as a ground for setting aside the lease in a court of law.\n\nBut that is not the question which is relevant for our present purpose at all; we were not called upon to decide whether or not the lease was a proper one or beneficial to the estate. The question for our decision is, whether the statute .contains discriminatory provisions so far as the appellants are concerned and if so, whether these discriminations could be reasonably justified ? It is clearly stated in paragraph 9 of the affidavit made by the appellants in support of their petition that there are numerous other persons to whom leases on similar terms were granted by the Bettiah Wards Estate. Clauses (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph 9 of the affidavit E:tand thus:\n\n\"(b) In this long course of management by the Court of Wards, leases or settlement of lands used to be made without any selami, on proper rent. This state of affairs continued down to recent times during\n\nwhich period. thousands of bighas were so settled with 1953 numerous persons;\n\n(c) in 1945 the authorities decided to make settlements on large scale with war returned soldiers on a selami equal to 5 times the average rent prevailing in the locality for similar lands ;\n\n(d) in 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949 a good number of settlements covering about 2000 acres of lands were settled on the basis of 10 years' rental obtaining in the locality and in some cases for good reasons, at five years' rental.\"\n\nIn paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit put in on behalf of the respondents, these statements are not denied. In fact, they are admitted and the only thing said is, that these leases were granted in due course of management.\n\nRamaswami J. has dismissed this part of the case by simply remarking that no details of these settlements were furnished by the appellants; but no details were at all necessary when the correctness of the statements was not challenged by the respondents. It will be interesting to note that the respondents themselves in paragraph 10 of their counter-affidavit mentioned the name of Shri Prajapati Mishra as one of the persons with whom similar settlement of lands was made by the Bettiah Estate. It is stated in that paragraph that the cases of the appellants as well as of Prajapati Mishra were brought to the notice of the \\Vorking Committee of the Indian National Congress and the Committee came to the conclusion that both the settlements were contrary to the provisions of law. Thereupon a request was made to both these sets of lessees to restore their lands to the Estate, but whereas Prajapati Mishra returned his lands to the Bettiah Estate, the appellants refused to do so. In reply to this statement, the appellants stated in their rejoinder that the said PrajapatiMishra did not vacate the lands but created a trust in respect of the same, he being the chairman of the board of trustees and the lands were still in possession of the board of trustees. Strangely, as it eeins, the State of Bihar raked up this matter again in a\n\n,,~\n\nRam Pra11ad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.\n\nMu.kherjea J,\n\nRani Prasad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v. 'l'he State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.\n\nMuk/lerjea J.\n\nfurther affidavit where it was admitted that the said Prajapati Mishra did execute a trust and that the trustees took possession of the property.\n\nIt was stated, however, that Prajapati Mishra, who was one of the trustees, did actually surrender the lands in two instalments but the other trustees did not, and hence legal advice was being taken to find out ways and means of recovering the property from them.\n\nThe whole thing smacks of disingenuousness and the State of Bihar, it seems, was not well advised in relying upon facts like these in their attempt to repel the appellants' attack on the legislation on the ground of discrimination.\n\nBe that as it may, there is no doubt that the appellants were not the only lessees under the Bettiah Estate who got settlement of lands at a selami of five years' rental. On the sworn statements of the appellants, which are not challenged by the other side, it appears that there are numerous persons occupying the same position as the appellants, who however were not subjected to this expropriatory legislation. But the vice in this legislation goes much deeper than this. It is not merely a question of treating the appellants differently from the other lessees under the Wards Estate, with whom settlements of land have been made on similar or identical terms. If a lease has been given by a Court of Wards, which is not for the benefit of the estate or advantage of the ward, it is for a court of law to decide whether it is warranted by the terms of the Court of Wards Act. If the lessor proceeds to cancel the lease, the lessee has a legal right to defend his claim and satisfy the court that the lease is not in contravention of law. If, on the other hand, the lessee i~ actually dispossessed, he has a right to sue in court for recovery of possession of the property on establishing that he has been illegally turned out. The dispute here, is a legal dispute pure and simple between two private parties. What the Legislature has done is to single out these two individuals and di; ny them the right which every Indian citizen possesses to have his rights adjudicated upon by a judicial tribunal in accordance with\n\nthe law whir.Ii applies to his case. The meanest of citizens has a right of access to a court of law for the redress of his just grievances and it is of this right that the appellants have been deprived by this Act.\n\nIt is impossible to conceive of a worse form of discrimination than the one which differentiates a particular individual from all his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is not imposed upon anybody else and against which even the right of complaint is taken away. The learned Attorney-General, who placed his case with his usual fairness and ability, could not put forward any convincing or satisfactory reason upon which this legislation could be justified. It is true that the presumption is in favour of the constitution ality of a legislative enactment and it has to be presumed that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people.\n\nBut when on the face of a statute there is no classification at all, and no attempt has been made to select any individual or group with reference to any differentiating attribute peculiar to that individual or group and not possessed by others, this presumption is of little or no assistance. to the State. We may repeat with profit what was said by Mr. Justice Brewer in Gulf Colorailo etc. Co. v.\n\nEllis(') that \"to carry the presumption to the extent of holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile and discriminatory legislation is to make the protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment a mere rope of sand\". In our opinion, the present case comes directly within the principle enunciated by this court in Arneerunnissa Begurn v.\n\nJlfahboob Begurn(').\n\nThe result is that we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. A writ in the nature of mandamus shall issue directing the respondents not to take any steps in pursuance of The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act of 1950 or to interfere with the possession of the appellants in respect to the lands\n\n(1) 165 U.S. 150 •\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R.•404,\n\n19/i3\n\nRain Pra8ad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v.\n\n'1. 1he State of Bo11ibay and\n\nOtlilrB.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n. Rani Praaad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOther\".\n\nM nkherjea J.\n\nii44 StJPREl\\fE . COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\ncomprised in the lease referred to in that Act.\n\nThe appellants will have their costs in both c\"ourts .\n\nVIVIAN BosE J.-I am in entire agreement with my Lord the Chief Justice and with my learned brother Mukherjea.\n\nGHULAM HASAN J.--1 agree with my Lord the Chief Justice and with my brother Mukherjea.\n\nBHAGWATI J.-1 entirely agree with the judgment just delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice and my brother Mukherjea and there is nothing which I can usefully add.\n\nAppenl allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: I. N. Shroff.\n\nAgent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA v.\n\nSAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO UNION OF INDIA-Intervener. [PATANJALI SAS'l'RI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWA'rI JJ.]\n\nGonstitntion of India, 1950, a.rts. 132, 102, 2211-High Court -Poiver to issue writs-Liniitatio1u1-Po1oer to issue iurit on persons residinu outside territorial fttrisdiction-Election to 11Iad1'as\n\nAssembly-Reference to l!Jlection Commission, New Dclhi-Jllrisdiction of .iliarlras High Conrt to issue ivrit a{]ainst 00111.rnission-Dis qiwlification before election-Effect of-Appeals from Sin17le Judge,\n\nThe respondent, who had been convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years, was elected a member of the Madras Legislative Assembly. At the instance of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Governor of Madras referred to the Election Commission, which had its offices permanently located at New Delhi, the question whether the respondent was disqualified and could be allowed to sit and vote in the Assembly, The respondent thereupon applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commission from enquiring into bis alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly :\n\nHeld, thJ>t the power of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the twofold limitation", "total_entities": 112, "entities": [{"text": "RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 185, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 216, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 219, "end_char": 235, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAS'l'RI C. J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 243, "end_char": 252, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mu.kherjea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VrnAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 264, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 267, "end_char": 279, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 284, "end_char": 296, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 299, "end_char": 320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 13, 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 328, "end_char": 340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian National Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 845, "end_char": 869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few years later, \\lie Working Committee of the Indian National Congress expressed the opinion that the settlement of the lands was against public interest, and in 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950, which declared that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force the settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and void and that no party to the settlement or his successors in interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or incurred any liability thereunder, and empowered the Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore the lands."}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 971, "end_char": 988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few years later, \\lie Working Committee of the Indian National Congress expressed the opinion that the settlement of the lands was against public interest, and in 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950, which declared that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force the settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and void and that no party to the settlement or his successors in interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or incurred any liability thereunder, and empowered the Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore the lands."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1521, "end_char": 1532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1588, "end_char": 1602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional, applied under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus against the State of Bihar restraining it from taking any action under the Act."}}, {"text": "Bettiah Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1737, "end_char": 1748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was found that there were several other settlements of lands belonging to the Bettiah Raj on similar terms against which the Government had taken no action: Held, that the dispute between the appellants and the Stale was really a private dispute and a matter to be determined by a judicial tribunal in accordance with the law applicable to the case, and, as the Legislature had, in passing the impugll'ed enactment singled out the appellants and deprived them of their right to\n\n'l.'he State of Bonibay and A not.her\n\nv. 'llftc United ,\\{ otors (India) Ltd. and Others."}}, {"text": "State of Bonibay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2145, "end_char": 2161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was found that there were several other settlements of lands belonging to the Bettiah Raj on similar terms against which the Government had taken no action: Held, that the dispute between the appellants and the Stale was really a private dispute and a matter to be determined by a judicial tribunal in accordance with the law applicable to the case, and, as the Legislature had, in passing the impugll'ed enactment singled out the appellants and deprived them of their right to\n\n'l.'he State of Bonibay and A not.her\n\nv. 'llftc United ,\\{ otors (India) Ltd. and Others."}}, {"text": "Bhagwari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2230, "end_char": 2238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwari J.\n\n1130 SUPREiIE COURT REPORTS (1953]\n\n1953 have this dispute adjudicated upon by a duly coostitubed Court, the enactment contravened the provisions of article 14 of the Ram Pr<Uad Constitution which guarantees to every citizen the equal protec- Narayan Salii tion of the laws, and was void.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA'rI"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2392, "end_char": 2402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3461, "end_char": 3467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3612, "end_char": 3645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 3rd January, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ)."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3647, "end_char": 3656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 3rd January, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ)."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prosad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3661, "end_char": 3674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 3rd January, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ).", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo PershadJJ"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3704, "end_char": 3715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3835, "end_char": 3845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. R. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3905, "end_char": 3914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "P. R. Das"}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3916, "end_char": 3922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3960, "end_char": 3971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Jliahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with them) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Jliahabir Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4005, "end_char": 4021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Jliahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with them) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4050, "end_char": 4062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Jliahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with them) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "ATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4161, "end_char": 4176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court delivered judgment as follows :- p ATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-I concur in the judgment which my learned brother Mukherjea is about to deliver, but I wish to add a few words in view of the important constitutional issue involved.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAS'l'RI C. J."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court delivered judgment as follows :- p ATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-I concur in the judgment which my learned brother Mukherjea is about to deliver, but I wish to add a few words in view of the important constitutional issue involved.", "canonical_name": "Mu.kherjea"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4493, "end_char": 4498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants obtained a settlement Bf about 200 bikhas of land in a village known as Sathi Farm in Bettiah Estate, in Bihar,\n\nthen and ever since in the management of the Court 19;3 of Wards on behalf of the disqualified proprietress who is the second respondent in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad Narayan Saki", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4664, "end_char": 4687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands Ram Prasad Narayan Saki were settled at the prevailing rate of rent but the and Another salami or premium payable was fixed at half the usual v. rate as a concession to the appellants who are said to ~'he State af be distant relations of the proprietress.", "canonical_name": "RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "2nd November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5019, "end_char": 5037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the lands on the 2nd November, 1946, and P t -:-\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Prajapa ti Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5487, "end_char": 5504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Report against the settlement of these lands with the petitioners as well as some other lands to Sri Prajapa ti Mishra and the nnlawful manner in which these settlements were brought abont, was carried to the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress,\n\nwhich body, after making such enquiry as it thought fit, came to the conclusion that the settlement of these lands with the petitioners was contrary to the pro visions of law and public policy and recommended that steps should be to taken by the State of Bihar to have these lands restored to the Bettiah Estate.", "canonical_name": "Prajapa ti Mishra"}}, {"text": "Prajapati Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6035, "end_char": 6051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance thereof a request was made to the petitioners and to the said Prajapati Mishra to return the lands to Bettiah Estate.", "canonical_name": "Prajapa ti Mishra"}}, {"text": "Champaran", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6353, "end_char": 6362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Bill runs thus :\n\n\"As it has been held that the settlement of Sathi lands in the District of Champaran under the Court of Wards with Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahl and Shri Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi is contrary to the provisions of the law and as Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Sri Ram Rekha Narayan Sahi havtl refused to return the lands to the Bettiah Estate, Government\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nhave decided to enact a law to restora these lands to the Bettiah Estate.\""}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad Narayan Sahl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6397, "end_char": 6420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Bill runs thus :\n\n\"As it has been held that the settlement of Sathi lands in the District of Champaran under the Court of Wards with Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahl and Shri Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi is contrary to the provisions of the law and as Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Sri Ram Rekha Narayan Sahi havtl refused to return the lands to the Bettiah Estate, Government\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nhave decided to enact a law to restora these lands to the Bettiah Estate.\"", "canonical_name": "RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6430, "end_char": 6459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Bill runs thus :\n\n\"As it has been held that the settlement of Sathi lands in the District of Champaran under the Court of Wards with Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahl and Shri Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi is contrary to the provisions of the law and as Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Sri Ram Rekha Narayan Sahi havtl refused to return the lands to the Bettiah Estate, Government\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nhave decided to enact a law to restora these lands to the Bettiah Estate.\"", "canonical_name": "Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi"}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6512, "end_char": 6535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Bill runs thus :\n\n\"As it has been held that the settlement of Sathi lands in the District of Champaran under the Court of Wards with Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahl and Shri Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi is contrary to the provisions of the law and as Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Sri Ram Rekha Narayan Sahi havtl refused to return the lands to the Bettiah Estate, Government\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nhave decided to enact a law to restora these lands to the Bettiah Estate.\"", "canonical_name": "RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ram Rekha Narayan Sahi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6544, "end_char": 6566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Bill runs thus :\n\n\"As it has been held that the settlement of Sathi lands in the District of Champaran under the Court of Wards with Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahl and Shri Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi is contrary to the provisions of the law and as Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Sri Ram Rekha Narayan Sahi havtl refused to return the lands to the Bettiah Estate, Government\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nhave decided to enact a law to restora these lands to the Bettiah Estate.\"", "canonical_name": "Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi"}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad Narayan sahi The impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6741, "end_char": 6781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6883, "end_char": 6897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secand Another tion 2(1) declares that \"notwithstanding anything v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "State of Bo11ibay"}}, {"text": "Potanjali Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7115, "end_char": 7131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contained in any law for the time being in force\", the settlement obtained by the appellants is \"null and void\", and that \"no party to the settlement or his successor in interest shall be deemed to have Potanjali Sastri acquired any right or incurred any liability therea."}}, {"text": "State of Bihrtr", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7724, "end_char": 7739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the \"case\" lodged in this court for the State of Bihrtr, the legislrttion is sought to be justified and its validity maintained on the following grounds :\n\n\" It is well settled thrtt a Legislature with ph>nary powers so long as it enacts faws within the ambit of its powers, is competent to enrtct a law which may be applicable generally to society or to an individual or a class of individuals only ... It is submitted that grants of the lands belonging to the Bettiah Estate made by the Court of Wards were of doubtful validity; hence they have been dealt with by the impugned Act ... No evidence has been adduced by the appellants, except a bare allegation, which has not been substantiated, that about 2000 acres of land were settled to show that persons in similar circumstances with whom similar settlements were made, were treated differently."}}, {"text": "Ram Pra.ad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8935, "end_char": 8945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, however, the\n\n(1) [1950] S, C.R; 869,\n\nmajority felt• justified in upholding the legislation,\n\n195J\n\nthough it adversely affected the rights and interest of Ram Pra.ad the shareholders of a particular joint stock company, Narayan SaM\n\nbecause the mismanagement of the company's affairs and Another prejudicially affected the production of an essential v. commodity and caused serious unemployment amongst The State 0! ..,"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9250, "end_char": 9253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.Justice Das and I took Others.", "canonical_name": "Das"}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10025, "end_char": 10032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a system of government by political parties, I was apprehensive of the danger inherent in special enactments which deprive particular named persons of their liberty or property because the Legislature thinks them guilty of misconduct, and I said in my dissenting opinion:\n\n\"Legislation based upon mismanagement or other misconduct as the differentia and made n, pplicable to a specified individ1ml or corporate body is not far removed from the notorious parliamentary procedure formerly employed in Britain of punishing individual delinquents by passing bills of attainder, and should not, I think receive judicial encouragement.\""}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10229, "end_char": 10238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Recently we had before us a case from Hyderabad (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Narayan Sahi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11212, "end_char": 11224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is purely.a dispute between private parties and a matter for determination Ram Prasad by duly constituted courts to which is entrusted, in Narayan Sahi f and Another every free and civilised society, the important unction v. of adjudicating on disputed legal rights, after ob."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastii", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11539, "end_char": 11555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is the protection\n\nPatanjali Sastii which the .law.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAS'l'RI C. J."}}, {"text": "Bihar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12669, "end_char": 12685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whenever, then, a section of the people in a locality, in assertion of an adverse claim, disturb a person in the quiet enjoyment of his property, the Bihar Government would seem to think that it."}}, {"text": "MuKHEaJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13180, "end_char": 13189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHEaJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on a certificate granted by the High Court of\n\nPatna under article 132 (1) of the Constitution, is directed agaimt a judgment of a Division Bench of that court, dated 3rd January, 1952, by which the learned Judges dismissed a petition of the appellants under article 226 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Mu.kherjea"}}, {"text": "High Court of\n\nPatna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13263, "end_char": 13283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHEaJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on a certificate granted by the High Court of\n\nPatna under article 132 (1) of the Constitution, is directed agaimt a judgment of a Division Bench of that court, dated 3rd January, 1952, by which the learned Judges dismissed a petition of the appellants under article 226 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13290, "end_char": 13301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "3rd January, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13398, "end_char": 13415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHEaJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on a certificate granted by the High Court of\n\nPatna under article 132 (1) of the Constitution, is directed agaimt a judgment of a Division Bench of that court, dated 3rd January, 1952, by which the learned Judges dismissed a petition of the appellants under article 226 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13490, "end_char": 13501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13673, "end_char": 13699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prayer in the petition was for a writ in the nature of mandamus, directing the opposite party, not to take any action, under an Act passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly in 1950 and known as The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act which was challenged as void and unconstitutional."}}, {"text": "Maharani Janki Koer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13947, "end_char": 13966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharani Janki Koer, the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bengal Act IX of 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14186, "end_char": 14207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "19th July, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14212, "end_char": 14227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 19th July, 1946, the appellants, who are two brothers and are distantly related to the Maharani, made a representation to the Government of Bihar through the Manager of the Estate, praying for settlement in raiyati right, of 200 bighas of land preferably in Sathi farm or Materia farm along with a certain quantity of waste lands."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14338, "end_char": 14357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 19th July, 1946, the appellants, who are two brothers and are distantly related to the Maharani, made a representation to the Government of Bihar through the Manager of the Estate, praying for settlement in raiyati right, of 200 bighas of land preferably in Sathi farm or Materia farm along with a certain quantity of waste lands."}}, {"text": "20th July, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14546, "end_char": 14561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20th July, 1946, the then Manager of the Wards Estate wrote a letter to the Collector of Champaran recommending that the applicants might be given settlement of the lands as prayed for, without payment of any selami."}}, {"text": "14th October, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15081, "end_char": 15099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14th October, 1946, the recommendation of the Revenue Board was accepted by the Provincial Government and six days later the Court of Wards accepted a cheque for Rs."}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15395, "end_char": 15418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "possession\n\n191J3\n\nRam Prasad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15469, "end_char": 15478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nRam Prasad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Mu.kherjea"}}, {"text": "3rd June, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16199, "end_char": 16213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 3rd June, 1950, the Bihar Legislative Assembly passed an Act known as The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act which received the assent of the Governor on the 13th IJune, 1950."}}, {"text": "13th IJune, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16352, "end_char": 16368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 3rd June, 1950, the Bihar Legislative Assembly passed an Act known as The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act which received the assent of the Governor on the 13th IJune, 1950."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16593, "end_char": 16602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18th November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16877, "end_char": 16896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2, which is the only material section in the Act, enacts in the first sub-section that the settlement of Sathi lands (described in the schedule to the Act) on behalf of the Bettiah Court of Wards Estate with the appellants, as per order of the Manager of the Estate dated the 18th November, 1946, is declared null and void and no party to the settlement or his successor-in-interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or incur any liability under the same."}}, {"text": "28th August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17974, "end_char": 17991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th August, 1950, the appellants filed the petition, out of which this appeal arises, under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Patna, challenging the validity of The Sathi Lands Act and praying for a writ upon the respondents restraining them from taking any steps under the said Act, or from interfering with the possession of the appellants in respect of the lands comprised in the lease."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18067, "end_char": 18078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18106, "end_char": 18125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th August, 1950, the appellants filed the petition, out of which this appeal arises, under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Patna, challenging the validity of The Sathi Lands Act and praying for a writ upon the respondents restraining them from taking any steps under the said Act, or from interfering with the possession of the appellants in respect of the lands comprised in the lease."}}, {"text": "articles 14, 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18758, "end_char": 18776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sarjoo PershadJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19785, "end_char": 19801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was heard by a Division Benclj consisting of Ramaswami and Sarjoo PershadJJ.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo PershadJJ"}}, {"text": "Ra1n Prasad Narayan Sa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19818, "end_char": 19840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ra1n Prasad Narayan Sa hi and Another\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Rani Prasad Narayan Sahi"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19978, "end_char": 19987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\ndecided all the points raised by the petitioners against them and held that the Act wa~ neither ultra vires the Bihar Legislature nor was void under article 13(1) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Mu.kherjea"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20141, "end_char": 20154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20285, "end_char": 20296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20724, "end_char": 20735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P.R. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21016, "end_char": 21024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P.R. Das, who appeared in support of the appeal, put forward at the forefront of his arguments, the contention raised on behalf of his client in the court below that the impugned legislation was void by reason of its violating the fundamental rights of the appellants under article 14 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "P. R. Das"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21290, "end_char": 21300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21472, "end_char": 21475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General on this point we were satisfied that the contention of Mr. Das was well founded and entitled to prevail, irrespective of any other ground that might be raised in this appeal.", "canonical_name": "Das"}}, {"text": "Prasad Narayan Sahi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22298, "end_char": 22317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the guarantee applies to all persons similarly situated, it is certainly open to the legislature to classify persons and things to achieve particular legislative objects;\n\n1963 but such selection or differentiation must not be arbitrary and should rest upon a rational basis, having regard to the object which the legislature has in /lam Prasad Narayan Sahi view."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23603, "end_char": 23613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24574, "end_char": 24584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24710, "end_char": 24720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BombC!Ji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24783, "end_char": 24791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act The State of provides as follows :\n\nBombC!Ji."}}, {"text": "Bettiah Wards Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26273, "end_char": 26293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clearly stated in paragraph 9 of the affidavit made by the appellants in support of their petition that there are numerous other persons to whom leases on similar terms were granted by the Bettiah Wards Estate."}}, {"text": "PrajapatiMishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28367, "end_char": 28382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to this statement, the appellants stated in their rejoinder that the said PrajapatiMishra did not vacate the lands but created a trust in respect of the same, he being the chairman of the board of trustees and the lands were still in possession of the board of trustees.", "canonical_name": "Prajapa ti Mishra"}}, {"text": "Ram Pra11ad Narayan Sahi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28645, "end_char": 28669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Strangely, as it eeins, the State of Bihar raked up this matter again in a\n\n,,~\n\nRam Pra11ad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mu.kherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28720, "end_char": 28730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mu.kherjea J,\n\nRani Prasad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v. 'l'he State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Mu.kherjea"}}, {"text": "Rani Prasad Narayan Sahi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28735, "end_char": 28759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mu.kherjea J,\n\nRani Prasad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v. 'l'he State of Bihar and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Rani Prasad Narayan Sahi"}}, {"text": "Muk", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28811, "end_char": 28814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muk/lerjea J.\n\nfurther affidavit where it was admitted that the said Prajapati Mishra did execute a trust and that the trustees took possession of the property."}}, {"text": "lerjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28815, "end_char": 28821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muk/lerjea J.\n\nfurther affidavit where it was admitted that the said Prajapati Mishra did execute a trust and that the trustees took possession of the property."}}, {"text": "Brewer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32264, "end_char": 32270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may repeat with profit what was said by Mr. Justice Brewer in Gulf Colorailo etc."}}, {"text": "S. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33068, "end_char": 33074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rain Pra8ad Narayan Sahi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33109, "end_char": 33133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A writ in the nature of mandamus shall issue directing the respondents not to take any steps in pursuance of The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act of 1950 or to interfere with the possession of the appellants in respect to the lands\n\n(1) 165 U.S. 150 •\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R.•404,\n\n19/i3\n\nRain Pra8ad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another v.\n\n'1.", "canonical_name": "Rani Prasad Narayan Sahi"}}, {"text": "State of Bo11ibay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33159, "end_char": 33176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1he State of Bo11ibay and\n\nOtlilrB.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n.", "canonical_name": "State of Bo11ibay"}}, {"text": "Rani Praaad Narayan Sahi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33208, "end_char": 33232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rani Praaad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOther\".", "canonical_name": "Rani Prasad Narayan Sahi"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33440, "end_char": 33451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VIVIAN BosE J.-I am in entire agreement with my Lord the Chief Justice and with my learned brother Mukherjea."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33627, "end_char": 33637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAM HASAN J.--1 agree with my Lord the Chief Justice and with my brother Mukherjea.", "canonical_name": "Mu.kherjea"}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33846, "end_char": 33858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: I. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33888, "end_char": 33906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "ELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33909, "end_char": 33935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA v.\n\nSAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO UNION OF INDIA-Intervener. ["}}, {"text": "SAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33940, "end_char": 33977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA v.\n\nSAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO UNION OF INDIA-Intervener. ["}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAS'l'RI C. J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33991, "end_char": 34015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAS'l'RI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWA'rI JJ.]", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAS'l'RI C. J."}}, {"text": "BHAGWA'rI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34059, "end_char": 34068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAS'l'RI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWA'rI JJ.]", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA'rI"}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34718, "end_char": 34737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Governor of Madras referred to the Election Commission, which had its offices permanently located at New Delhi, the question whether the respondent was disqualified and could be allowed to sit and vote in the Assembly, The respondent thereupon applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commission from enquiring into bis alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly :\n\nHeld, thJ>t the power of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the twofold limitation"}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34784, "end_char": 34793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Governor of Madras referred to the Election Commission, which had its offices permanently located at New Delhi, the question whether the respondent was disqualified and could be allowed to sit and vote in the Assembly, The respondent thereupon applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commission from enquiring into bis alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly :\n\nHeld, thJ>t the power of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the twofold limitation"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34942, "end_char": 34962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Governor of Madras referred to the Election Commission, which had its offices permanently located at New Delhi, the question whether the respondent was disqualified and could be allowed to sit and vote in the Assembly, The respondent thereupon applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commission from enquiring into bis alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly :\n\nHeld, thJ>t the power of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the twofold limitation"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34969, "end_char": 34980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35192, "end_char": 35203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1144_1159_EN", "year": 1953, "text": ". Rani Praaad Narayan Sahi\n\nand Another\n\nThe State of Bihar and\n\nOther\".\n\nM nkherjea J.\n\nii44 StJPREl\\fE . COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\ncomprised in the lease referred to in that Act.\n\nThe appellants will have their costs in both c\"ourts .\n\nVIVIAN BosE J.-I am in entire agreement with my Lord the Chief Justice and with my learned brother Mukherjea.\n\nGHULAM HASAN J.--1 agree with my Lord the Chief Justice and with my brother Mukherjea.\n\nBHAGWATI J.-1 entirely agree with the judgment just delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice and my brother Mukherjea and there is nothing which I can usefully add.\n\nAppenl allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: I. N. Shroff.\n\nAgent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA v.\n\nSAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO UNION OF INDIA-Intervener. [PATANJALI SAS'l'RI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWA'rI JJ.]\n\nGonstitntion of India, 1950, a.rts. 132, 102, 2211-High Court -Poiver to issue writs-Liniitatio1u1-Po1oer to issue iurit on persons residinu outside territorial fttrisdiction-Election to 11Iad1'as\n\nAssembly-Reference to l!Jlection Commission, New Dclhi-Jllrisdiction of .iliarlras High Conrt to issue ivrit a{]ainst 00111.rnission-Dis qiwlification before election-Effect of-Appeals from Sin17le Judge,\n\nThe respondent, who had been convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years, was elected a member of the Madras Legislative Assembly. At the instance of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Governor of Madras referred to the Election Commission, which had its offices permanently located at New Delhi, the question whether the respondent was disqualified and could be allowed to sit and vote in the Assembly, The respondent thereupon applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commission from enquiring into bis alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly :\n\nHeld, thJ>t the power of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the twofold limitation\n\nthat such writs cannot run beyond the territories subject to its 1953 jurisdiction and th& person or authority to whom the High Court is empOVi'ered to issue such \\Vrits must be amenable to the juris- Election Com-- diction of the High Court either hy residence or location \"rithin niission, India the territories subject to its jurisdiction.\n\nThe High Court of Saka ~; nkata liladras bad therefore no jurisdiction to issue a writ unc1er article Subba. Rao 226 of the Constitution against the Election Commission.\n\nHeld f!!rther, that articles 190(3) and 192(1) are applicable l'alanjali Sastri only to disqualifications to which a member becomes subject after o. J. heis elected as such, and neither the Governor nor the Election Commission had jurisdiction to enquire into the respondent's disqualification which arose long before his election.\n\nA tribunal or authority permanently located and normally carrying on its activities outside the territorial limits of a High Court cannot be regarded as functioning within those territorial limits and therefore amenable to the jurisdiction of that High Court, , merely because it exercises jurisdiction within those territorial limits so as to affect the rights of parties therein.\n\nThe fact that the matter referred to it for decision related to the opposite party's right to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly at Madras and the parties to the dispute resided in the State of Madras could not give jurisdiction to the High Court of ?i.iadras to issue such a writ against the Election Commission.\n\nAn appeal lies to the Supreme Court under article 132 of the Constitution even from a judgment, decree or final order of a Single Judge of a High Court, provided the requisite certificate is given.\n\nCrvn, APPELLATE JumsDH\"rlON: Civil Appm1l No. 205 of 1952.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order elated the 16th September, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Subba Rao J.) in Writ Petition No. 599 of 1952 filed under the Special Original Jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the\" Constitution of India.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attoi•ney-Genernl for Indict (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the appellant and Intervener.\n\nMohan Kumaramangalam, for the respondent.\n\n1953. February 27. The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C.J,.-'l'his is an appeal from an order of a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras issuing a writ of prohibition restraining the\n\n19.;3 Election Commission, a statutory authority corntituted by the President and having its offices permanent- Election Com,- mission India ly located at New Delhi, from enquiring into the allegv. ed disqualification of the respondent for membership Saka Venkata of the Madras Legislative Assembly.\n\nSubba Rao Th d t . d b th S .\n\nJ d . _ e respon en was convwte y e ess10ns u ge Patanjali Scrntri of East Godavari and sentenced to a term of seven\n\nc. J. years' rigorous imprisonment in 1942, and he was released on the occasion of the celebration of the Independence Day on 15th August, 1947. In June, 1952, there was to be a by-election to a reserved seat in the Kakinada constituency of the Madras Legislative Assembly, and the respondent, desiring to offer himself as a candidate but finding himself disqualified under section 7 (b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as five years had not elapsed from his release, applied to the Commission on 2nd April, 1952, for exemption so as to enable him to contest the election. No reply to the application having been received till 5th May, 1952, the last day for filing nominations, the respondent filed his nomination on that day, but no exception was taken to it either by the Returning Officer or any other candidate at the scrutiny of the nomination papers. The election was held on 14th June, 1952, and the respondent, who secured the largest number of votes, was declared elected on 16th June, 1952. The result of the election was published in the Fort St.\n\nGeorge Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19th June, 1952, and the respondent took his seat as a member of the Assembly on 27th June, 1952. Meanwhile, the Commission rejected the respondent's application for exemp tion and communicated such rejection to the respond. ent by its letter dated 13th May, 1952, which however was not received by him. On 3rd July, 1952, the Speaker of the Assembly read out to the House a communication received from the Commission bringing to his notice \"for such action as he may think fit to take\", the fact that the respondent's application for exemption had been rejected. A question as to the respondent's disqualification having thus been raised, the Speaker referred the question to the Governor of\n\n' •\n\nMadras who forwarded the case to the Commission for 19153 its \"opinion\" as' required bv article 192 of the Constitu-\n\nJ Election Oo1n tion. The respondent having thereupon challenged the mission, India competency of the reference and the action taken there- 8 k vv. k b h G h C . . 'fi d h a a en at• on y t e overnor, t e omn11ss10n not1. e t e res Snbba Rao pondent that his case would be heard on 21st August, - 1952.\n\nAccordingly, the Chief Election Commissioner Patan{!l~ Sastri (who was the sole Member of the Commission for the time · being) went down to Madras and heard the respondent's counsel and the Advocate-General of Madras on 21th August, 1952, when it was agreed that, in case the petitioner's counsel desired to put forward any further representations or arguments, the same should be sent in writing so as to reach the Commission in Delhi by 28th August, 1952, and the Commission should take them into consideration before giving its opinion to the Governor.\n\nOn the same day (21st August, 1952) the respondent applied to the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution contending that article 192 thereof was applicable only where a member became subject to a disqualification after he was elected but not where, as here, the disqualification arose long before the election, in which case the only remedy was to challenge the validity of the election before an Election Tribunal.\n\nHe accordingly prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus or of prohibition directing the Commission to forbear irom proceeding with the reference made by the Governor of Madras who was not, how@ver, made a party to the proceeding. On receipt of the rule nisi issued by the High Court, the Commission demurred to the jurisdiction of the court to issue the writs asked for, on the ground that the Commission was not \"within the territory in relation to which the High Court exercised jurisdiction\". A further objection to the maintainability of the application was also raised to the effect that the action of the Governor in seeking the opinion of the Commission could not be challenged in view of the immunity provided under article 361 (1), and that the Commission itself, which had not to \"decide\" the question of disqualification, but had merely to give its\n\n196J \"opinion\", could not be proceeded aglj-inst under article 226. On the merits, the Commission contended that Election Oonimission, India article 192 was, on its true construction, applicable to v. cases of disqualification arismg both before and after Saka Venkata the election and that both the reference of the ques-\n\nSubba Rao tion as to the respondent's disqualification to the\n\nP -. ,-. s. . Governor of Madras and the latter's reference of the\n\natanb~ ;,' \"''\" same to the Commission for its opinion were competent and valid.\n\nThe application was heard by Subba Rao J. who overruled the preliminary objections and held that article 192 on its true construction applied only to cases of supervening disqualifications and that the Commission had, therefore, no jurisdiction to deal with the respondent's disqualification which arose long before the election took place.\n\nHe accordingly issued a writ prohibiting the Commission from proceeding with the enquiry in regard to the question referred to it by the Governor under article 192. The learned Judge, however, granted a certificate under article 132 that the case involved substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and the Commission has accordingly preferred this appeal.\n\nA preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam, who argued the case for the respond-. ent with marked ability, that the appeal brought from the judgment of a single Judge was baned under article 133(3) of the Constitution despite the certificate granted by the learned Judge ovenuling the same objection which was also raised before him. It has been urged that, so far as civi, l matters are concerned, the more comprehensive provisions in article 133(1) (c) for the grant of a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court completely overlap article 132(1) which relates only to one specific ground, namely, a substantial question of law being involved as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and that the court's power, therefore, to grant a certificate of fitness on any ground including the ground referred to above, must be deemed to arise under iirticle 133(1) (c), with the result that the CJ\\Prcfae of su0h power is eirn\\mjed by the o_penmg\n\n• ' •\n\nwords of clause (3) of that article which bars an 19.;3 appeal from the judgment, decree or final order of one J d f H, l C Th t h Election Com,. u ge o a 1g 1 ourt. e argumen was song t to mission, India be reinforced by reference to clause (2) of that article v. and the proviso to article 145(3) both of which con- Saka Venkata template appeals involving substantial questions of\n\nSubba Rao\n\nlaw as to the interpretation of the Constitution being Patanjali sa., tri brought without a certificate having been obtained o. J. under article 132. The argument has no force. 'While it is true that constitutional questions could be raised in appeals filed without a certificate under article 132, the terms of that article make it clear that an appeal is allowed from \"any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court\" provided, of course, the requisite certificate is given, and no restriction is placed on the right of appeal having reference to the number of Judges by whom such judgment, decree or final order was passed.\n\nHad it been intended lo exclude the right of appeal iu the case of a judgment etc., by one Judge, it would have been easy to include a reference to article 132 also in the opening words of article 133(3), as in the immediately preceding clause. If the respondent's contention were accepted, not only wonld article 132 become redundant so far as it relates to civil proceedings, but the object of the Explanation to that article, which was designed to supersede the decision of the Federal Court in S. Kuppuswami Rao\n\nv. The King (1) and thus to secure a speedy determination of constitutional issues going to the root of a case, would be defeated, as the Explanation is not made applicable to the same expression \"final order\" used in article 133(1 ).\n\nThe whole scheme of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court clearly indicates that questions relating to the interpretation of the Constitution are placed in a special category irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in which they may arise, and a right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed in cases involving such questions. We accordingly overrule the preliminary objection and hold that the appeal is maintainable,\n\n(1) [1947] F.C.R r8o,\n\nll50\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n195a Turning now to the question as to the powers of a\n\nElection Cow- High Court under article 226, it will be noticed that mission, India article 225 continues to the existing High Courts the\n\nsaka vnkata same jurisdiction and powers as they possessed, imme-\n\nSubba Rao diately Lefore the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nl'at, mjali Sastri Though there had been some conflict of judicial opio. J. nion on the point, it was authoritatively decided by the Privy Council in the Parlakimerli case(') that the High Court of Madrasthe High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta were in the same po8ition-had no power to issue what were known as high prerogative writs beyond the local limits of its original civil jurisdiction, and tho power to issue such writs within those limits was derived by the court as successor of the Supreme Court which had been exercising jurisdiction over the Presidency Town of Madras and was replaced by the High Court established in pursuance of the Charter Act of 1861. The other High Courts in India had no power to issue such writs at all. In that situation, the makers of the Constitution, having decided to provide for certain basic safeguards for the people m the new set up, which they called fundamental right.s, evidently thought it necessary to provide also a quick and inexpensive remedy for the enforcement of such rights and, finding that the prerogative writs which the Courts in England had developed and used whenever urgent necessity demanded immediate and decisiYe interposition, were peculiarly suited for the purpose, they conferred, in the States' sphere, new and wide powers on the High Courts of issuing directions, orders, or writs primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the power to issue such directions, etc., \"for any other purpose\" being also included with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as the Court of King's Bench in England. But wide as were the powers thus conferred, a two-fold limitation was placed upon their exercise. In the first place, the power is to be exercised \"throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction\", that is to say, the writs issued\n\n(1) 70 1.A. 129:\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT R8l'OR1'S 1151\n\nby the court cannot run beyond the territories subject 1903 to its jurisdictibn. Secondly, the person or authority Election Oum to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such mi.ssiou, bulin v. writs must be \"within those territories'', which clearly suka Venka1a implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction Subba Rau either by residence or location within those te1Ti- Patan.iali sa.,1ri tories. o. J.\n\nSuch limitation is indeed a logical consequence of the origin and development of the power to issue prerogative writs as a special remedy in England. Such power formed no part of the original or the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench. As pointed out by Prof. Holdsworth (History of English Law, Vol. I, p. 212 et seq.) these writs had their origin in the exercise of the King's prerogative power of superintendence over the due observance of the law by his officials and tribunals, and were issued by the Court of King's Bench-haheas corpus, that the King may know whether his subjects were lawfully imprisoned or not; certiorari, that he may know whether any proceedings commenced against them are conformable to the law; mandamus, to ensure that his officials did such acts as they were bound to do under the law, and prohibition, to oblige tho inferior tribunals in his realm to function within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. See also the introductory remarks in the judgment in the Parlakimedi case(').\n\nThese writs were thus specifically directed to the persons or authorities against whom redress was sought and were made returnable in the court issuing them and, in case of disobedience, were enforceable by attachment for contempt. These characteristics of the special form of remedy rendered it neces sary for its effective use that the persons or authorities to whom the court was asked to issue these writs should be within the limits of its tetTitorial jurisdiction.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the learned Judge below that if a tribunal or authority permanently located and normally carrying on its a9tivities elsewhere exercises jurisdiction within those territorial\n\n(1) 70 I.A. 129, 140 .\n\nElection Comniis8ion, Ind1'.a\n\nSalca V cnkata Subba lfao\n\nSUPREME COURT R.EPORTS [1953]\n\nlimits so as to affect the rights of parties therein, such tribunal or authority must be regarded as ;'functioning\" within the territorial limits of the High Court and being therefore amenable to its jurisdiction under article 226.\n\nIt was, however, urged by the respondent's counsel Patanjali SaBtri that the High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ to\n\nc. J. the Commission at New Delhi because the question referred to it for decision related to the respondent's right to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly at Madras and the parties to the dispute also resided in the State of Madras. The position, it was claimed, was analogous to the court exercising jurisdiction over persons outside the limits of its jurisdiction, provided the cause of action arose within those limits. Reliance was placed upon the following observations of the Privy Council in the Parlakimedi case( 1 ): \"The question of jurisdiction must be regarded as one of substance and that it would not have been within the competence of the Supreme Court to claim juisdiction over such a matter as the present of issuing certiorari to the Board of Revenue on the strength of its location in the town.\n\nSuch a view would give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in the matter of the settlement of rents of ryoti holdings in Ganjam bet\\veen parties not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction, which it would not have had over the Revenue Officer who dealt with the matter at first instance.\" We cannot accede to this argument.\n\nThe rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority \"within the territories\" in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Nor is much assistance to be derived from the observations quoted above.\n\nThat case arose out of proueedings before a special Revenue Officer for settlement of fair rent for certain holdings within the zemindary estate of Parlakimedi situated beyond the local limits of the original civil jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.\n\nDissatisfied\n\n(I) 70 !, A, 129.\n\nwith the settlement made by the Revenue Officer, the 1953 ryots appealed\" to the Board of Revenue which had its Election 00111 _ offices at Madras. The appeal was accepted by a mission, India single member of the Board who reduced the rent as v, desired by the ryots. The zemindar appealed by way of revision to the Collective Board which sanctioned an enhancement. Thereupon the ryots applied to the Patanjali Sastri High Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to bring\n\n0 J.\n\nSaka Venkata\n\nSubba Rao\n\nup and quash the proceedings of the Collective Board which passed the order complained of in the town of Madras. The Privy Council considered the question of jurisdiction from two separate standpoints:--\n\n\"(a) independently of the local civil jurisdiction which the High Court exercises over the Presidency town; or\n\n(b) solely by reason thereof, as au incident of the location of the Board of Revenue within the town.\"\n\nOn question (a), they examined the powers of the Supreme Court at Madras to issue certiomri beyond the Presidency Town under clause 8 of the Charter of\n\n1800, as it was suggested that the High Court succeeded to the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court which had been granted the same powers of issuing prerogative writs as the Court of King's Bench in England throughout the Province, and they recorded their conclusion thus:\n\n\"Their Lordships are not of opinion that the Supreme Court would have had any jurisdiction to correct or control a country court of the company deciding a dispute between Indian inhabitants of Ganjam about the rent payable for land in that district.\"\n\nThen, dealing with question ( b) and referring to their decision in Besant' s case(') that the High Courts of Calcutta, l\\fadras and Bombay had power to issue certiorari in the exercise of their local jurisdiction, they held that the principle could not be applied\n\n\"to the settlement of rent for land in Ganjam merely on the basis of the location of the Board of Revenue as a body which is ordinarily resident or locl), t<'d within\n\n(1) 46 LA. 176 .\n\nii54 SUPREME cot:R'r REPORTS [l953j\n\n19.53 the town of Madras, or on the basis that the order\n\nElection 00111• complained of was made within the to\\\\rn. If so, it mi,.ion, India would seem to follow that the jurisdiction of the High\n\nCourt would be avoided by the removal of the Board of Saka T\"enlcrtta Revenue beyond the outskrits of the town and that it Subba Rau\n\nwould never attach but for the circumstance that an\n\nPatanjali Sastri appeal is brought to, or proceedings in revision taken o. J. by, the Board of Revenue.\"\n\nThen followed the passage already quoted on which the respondent's counsel laid special stress. It will thus be seen that the decision is no authority for dispensing with th.e necessity of the presence or location, within the local limits of the court's jurisdiction, of the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued, as the basis of its power to issue it. Their Lordships considered, in the peculiar situation they were dealing with, that the mere location of the appellate authority alone in the town of l\\fadrns was not a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction whereas both the subject-matter, viz., the settlement of rent for la.nds in Ganjarn, and the Revenue Officer authorised to make the settlement at first instance were outside the loc>tl limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court. , If the court in Madras were recognised as having jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari to the appellate authority iu Madras, it would practically be recognising the court's jurisdiction over the Revenue Officer in Ganjarn and the settlement of rents for hmds there, which their Lordships held it never had. That w:i, s the \"whstance\" of the matter they were looking :i, t, and their observations lend no support to the view that if the subject-matter or the cause of action :tnd the parties eoncerned were within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction, the High Court could issue prerogative writs to persons or authorities who are not within those limits. In any case, the decision did not turn on the construction of a statutory provision similar in scope, purpose or wording to article 226 of the Constitution, and is not of much assistance in the construction of that article.\n\nIt was said .that it could not have been contem- 19;3 plated that an inh11bitant of the f':ltate of Madras, f. l' d b d c h Electio1i Ooni.· ee mg aggrieve y a threatene mterierence wit mission, India the exercise of his rights in that State by an authority , v. 1 ] D !h' d 'th · d' h ld .Saka Venkata ocatec m e 1 an actmg wt out Jllrts JCt10n, s ou sbba Rao seek his remedy under article 226 in the Punjab - High Court. It is a sufficient answer to this argument Patanbl~ 0 -' 1\" of inconvenience to say that, the language of the article being reasonably plain, it is idle to speculate as to what was or was not contemplated.\n\nOur 11ttcntiu11 has been called to certain decisions of High Courts dealing with the situation where the authority claiming to exercise jurisdiction over a matter at first instance is located in one State and the a ppellate authoritv is locatecl in another State. It is not necessary for\" the purposes of this appeal to decide which High Court would have jurisdiction in such\n\ncircunrntances to issue prerogative writs under article 226.\n\nIn the view we have expressed above as to the applicability of article 2-26 to the present case, it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of the question whether article 192(1) applies only to members who, having been already elected, have become subject to a disqualification by re11son of events happening after their election; but having heard the point fully argued before us, we think it right to express our opinion thereon, especially as both sides have invited us to do so in view of its general importance.\n\nThe relevant provisions of the Constitution on which the determination of the question turns are as follows:\n\n190. (3) If a member of a House of the Legislature ofa State-\n\n(a) becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) of article 191; or\n\n(b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, his seat shall thereupon become vacant,\n\nSUPREME COL'RT REPORTS [1953]\n\nJ.?53\n\n191. ( l) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Election Ooni- 1\n\nL ' 1 r< 'l f St t Assemb y or egrs atrve ,, ouncr o a , a e- 11iission, India\n\n(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Saka Jlwkata Government of India or the Government of any State,\n\nSubba Rao specified in the First Schedule, other than an office\n\nPatanjali Sastr1 declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to o. J. disqualify its holder;\n\n(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; ( c) if he is an undischarged insolvent ; ( d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or is under any acknowledgment of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State;\n\n(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any Jaw made by Parliament.\n\n192. (1) If any question arises as to whether a member of a House of the Legislature of a State has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause ( 1) of article 191, the question shall be referred for the decision of the Governor and his decision shall be final.\n\n(2) Before giving any decision on any such question, the Governor shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion.\n\n193. If a person sits or votes as a member of the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council of a State ............ when he knows that he is not qualified or that he is disqualified for membership thereof, or that he is prohibited from so doing by the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of the State, he shall be liable in respect of each day on which he so sits or votes to a penalty of five hundred rupees to be recovered as a debt due to the State.\n\nAs has been stated already, the respondent's conviction and sentence in 1942 disqualified him both for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Asseµrbly under article 191(1) (e) read with section 7 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,\n\npassed by Pa!liament, the period of five years since 1953 his release on 15th August, 194 7, not having elapsed El . 0 b I! h f h 1 Th d J , eclton u.ne1ore t e date o t e e eotion. e respon ent iavmg mission India thus been under a disqualification since before his v'. nomination on 15th March, 1952, could he be said to Saka Venkata have \"become\" subject to that disqualification within Subba Raa the meaning of article 192? The rival contentions of P 7s . the parties centred round the true interpretation to be atani;_ 'J. astri placed on that word in the context of the provisions quoted above.\n\nThe Attorney-General argued that the whole fasciculus of the provisions dealing with \"disqualifications of members\", viz., articles 190 to 193, should be read together, and as articles 191 and 193 clearly cover both pre-existing and supervening disqualifications, articles 190 and 192 should also be similarly understood as relating to both kinds of disqualification. According to him all these provisions together constitute an integral scheme whereby disqualifications are laid down and machinery for determining questions arising in regard to them is also provided. The use of the word\n\n\"become\" in articles 190 (3) and 192 (1) is not inapt, in the context, to include within its scope preexisting disqualifications also, as becoming subject to a disqualification is predicated of \"a member of a House of Legislature\", and a person who, being already disqualified, gets elected, can, not inappropriately, be said to \"become\" subject to the disqualification as a member as soon as he is elected. The argument is more ingenious than sound. Article 191, which lays down the same set of disqualifications for election as well as for continuing as a member, and article 193 which prescribes the penalty for sitting and voting when disqualified, are naturally phrased in terms wide enough to cover both pre-existing and supervening disqualifications ; but it does not necessarily follow that articles 190 (3) and 192 (1) must also be taken to cover both. Their meaning must depend on the language used which, we think, is reasonably plain.\n\nIn our opinion these two articles go together and\n\n1158 Sl'PREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 provide a remedy when a member incurs 11 disqualifica-\n\nE . 0 tion after he is elected asamernbrr. Not only do the lection •Omd . b b. ,. - . 1 190(3) d \"h wis., ion India WOl' S '' eCOlllCS SU Ject . lll al'tlC e an as v'. become subject\" in article 192(1) indicate a change in the\n\nSaka Venkata position of the member after be was elected, but the\n\nSubba Rao provision that his seat is to become thereiipon vacant, -. that is to say, the seat which the member was filling Palanjal1 Sa8/ri h c b h' b d'\n\nc. J t eretQ1ore ecomes vacant on is ecommg is- . qualified, further reinforces the view that the article contemplates only a sitting member incurring the disability while so sitting.\n\nThe suggestion that the language used in article 190(3) can equally be applied to a pre-existing disqualification as a member can be supposed to vacate his seat the moment he is elected is a strained and farfotched construction and cannot be accepted. The Attorney-General admitted that if the word \" is\" were substituted for \"becomes\" or \"has become\", it would more appropriately convey the the meaning contended for by him, but he was unable to say why it was not used.\n\nIt was said that on the view that articles 190(3) and 192(1) deal with disqualifications incurred after election as a member, there would be no way of unseating a member who became subject to a disqualification after his nomination and before his election, for, such a disqualification is no ground for challenging the election by an election petition under article 329 of the Constitution read with section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. If this is an anomaly, it arises out of a lacuna in the latter enactment which could easily have provided for such a contingency, and it cannot be pressed as an argument against the respondent's construction of the constitutional provisions. On the other hand, the Attorney-General's contention might, if accepted, lead to conflicting decisions by the Governor dealing with a reference under article 192 and by the Election Tribunal inquiring into an election petition under section 100 of the Parliamentary statute referrred to above.\n\nFor the easons indicated we agree with the learned Judge below in holding that articles 190(3) and 192(1)\n\n' •\n\nare applicable only to disqualifications to which a 1953 member beccrmes subject after he is elected as such, Election 0 01,.. and that neither the Governor nor the Commission mission, India has jurisdiction to enquire into the respondent's disv. qualification which arose long before his election.\n\n8 ~\",;, h~';!:ta As, however, we have held that the High Court was , . . . not competent under article 226 to issue any pre- 1 ata.nJali 808\"' rogative writ to the appellant Commission, the appeal is allowed and thewrit of prohibition issued by the learned Judge is quashed. We make no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant and the Intervener : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nAgent for the respondent: S. Siibramaniam.\n\nASRUMATI DEBI v.\n\nKUMAit ItUPENDRA DEB RAIKOT\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MUKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BOSE and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nLetters Patent (Calcntta High Court), els. 18, 15-0rder for tmnsfer of suit 1mde>· cl. 18-Whetlier \"jiul, gment\"-Appealability -Meaning of \"judgment\".\n\nAn order for transfer of a suit, made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court is not a \"judgment\" within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and no appeal lies therefrom under the Letters Patent, as it neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor terminates or disposes of the suit on any ground.\n\n[Meaning of the word \"judgment\" rliscussed].\n\nKhatizan v. Sonairam (I.L.R. 4 7 Cal. 1104), Jttstices of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Co. (8 Beng. L.R. 433), Dayabhai v. Muiugappa Chettiar (I.L.R. 13 Rang. 457), 'l'uljarain\n\nv. Alagappa (I.L.R. 35 l\\fad. 1), Matlmra Sundari v. Haranchandra (I.L.R. 48 Cal. 857), Chandicharan v. Jnanendra (29 C.L.J. 225), £e,, Badin v. Upendra l'>fohan RmJ Chowdhry (39 C.W .N. 155), Kunwar Lal Singh v. Uina Devi (A.I.R. 1945 Nag. 156), Smikrw Deo v. Kalyani (A.LR. 1948 Nag. 85), Sha/lzadi Begum v. Alaknath (I.L.H. 57 All. 983), Shaw Bari \"· Sonalwwl Beli R\"m (I.hR. 23\n\na.J.\n\nli'eb. 27", "total_entities": 126, "entities": [{"text": "VIVIAN BosE J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 234, "end_char": 248, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "with my learned brother Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 309, "end_char": 342, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 360, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 433, "end_char": 444, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 640, "end_char": 652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: I. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 682, "end_char": 700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "ELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 703, "end_char": 729, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 734, "end_char": 756, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1489, "end_char": 1495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Governor of Madras referred to the Election Commission, which had its offices permanently located at New Delhi, the question whether the respondent was disqualified and could be allowed to sit and vote in the Assembly, The respondent thereupon applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commission from enquiring into bis alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly :\n\nHeld, thJ>t the power of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the twofold limitation\n\nthat such writs cannot run beyond the territories subject to its 1953 jurisdiction and th& person or authority to whom the High Court is empOVi'ered to issue such \\Vrits must be amenable to the juris- Election Com-- diction of the High Court either hy residence or location \"rithin niission, India the territories subject to its jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Governor of Madras referred to the Election Commission, which had its offices permanently located at New Delhi, the question whether the respondent was disqualified and could be allowed to sit and vote in the Assembly, The respondent thereupon applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commission from enquiring into bis alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly :\n\nHeld, thJ>t the power of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the twofold limitation\n\nthat such writs cannot run beyond the territories subject to its 1953 jurisdiction and th& person or authority to whom the High Court is empOVi'ered to issue such \\Vrits must be amenable to the juris- Election Com-- diction of the High Court either hy residence or location \"rithin niission, India the territories subject to its jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1763, "end_char": 1774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1986, "end_char": 1997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Saka", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2404, "end_char": 2422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Saka ~; nkata liladras bad therefore no jurisdiction to issue a writ unc1er article Subba."}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2549, "end_char": 2568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao 226 of the Constitution against the Election Commission."}}, {"text": "articles 190(3) and 192(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2591, "end_char": 2617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of ?i.iadras to", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3529, "end_char": 3555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the matter referred to it for decision related to the opposite party's right to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly at Madras and the parties to the dispute resided in the State of Madras could not give jurisdiction to the High Court of ?"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3630, "end_char": 3643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal lies to the Supreme Court under article 132 of the Constitution even from a judgment, decree or final order of a Single Judge of a High Court, provided the requisite certificate is given."}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3650, "end_char": 3661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3978, "end_char": 3987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Order elated the 16th September, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Subba Rao J.) in Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4095, "end_char": 4106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4115, "end_char": 4136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4139, "end_char": 4153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attoi•ney-Genernl for Indict (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the appellant and Intervener."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4185, "end_char": 4197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attoi•ney-Genernl for Indict (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the appellant and Intervener."}}, {"text": "Mohan Kumaramangalam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4244, "end_char": 4264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Kumaramangalam, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Kumaramangalam"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C.J,.-'l'his is an appeal from an order of a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras issuing a writ of prohibition restraining the\n\n19.;3 Election Commission, a statutory authority corntituted by the President and having its offices permanent- Election Com,- mission India ly located at New Delhi, from enquiring into the allegv.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4432, "end_char": 4466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C.J,.-'l'his is an appeal from an order of a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras issuing a writ of prohibition restraining the\n\n19.;3 Election Commission, a statutory authority corntituted by the President and having its offices permanent- Election Com,- mission India ly located at New Delhi, from enquiring into the allegv."}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4520, "end_char": 4539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C.J,.-'l'his is an appeal from an order of a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras issuing a writ of prohibition restraining the\n\n19.;3 Election Commission, a statutory authority corntituted by the President and having its offices permanent- Election Com,- mission India ly located at New Delhi, from enquiring into the allegv.", "canonical_name": "ELECTION COMMISSION, INDIA"}}, {"text": "Saka Venkata", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4765, "end_char": 4777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ed disqualification of the respondent for membership Saka Venkata of the Madras Legislative Assembly.", "canonical_name": "SAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4815, "end_char": 4824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao Th d t .", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5090, "end_char": 5107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e respon en was convwte y e ess10ns u ge Patanjali Scrntri of East Godavari and sentenced to a term of seven\n\nc. J. years' rigorous imprisonment in 1942, and he was released on the occasion of the celebration of the Independence Day on 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5338, "end_char": 5347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5359, "end_char": 5397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "2nd April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5476, "end_char": 5491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In June, 1952, there was to be a by-election to a reserved seat in the Kakinada constituency of the Madras Legislative Assembly, and the respondent, desiring to offer himself as a candidate but finding himself disqualified under section 7 (b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as five years had not elapsed from his release, applied to the Commission on 2nd April, 1952, for exemption so as to enable him to contest the election."}}, {"text": "5th May, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5606, "end_char": 5619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No reply to the application having been received till 5th May, 1952, the last day for filing nominations, the respondent filed his nomination on that day, but no exception was taken to it either by the Returning Officer or any other candidate at the scrutiny of the nomination papers."}}, {"text": "14th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5862, "end_char": 5877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election was held on 14th June, 1952, and the respondent, who secured the largest number of votes, was declared elected on 16th June, 1952."}}, {"text": "16th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5964, "end_char": 5979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election was held on 14th June, 1952, and the respondent, who secured the largest number of votes, was declared elected on 16th June, 1952."}}, {"text": "19th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6073, "end_char": 6088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of the election was published in the Fort St.\n\nGeorge Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19th June, 1952, and the respondent took his seat as a member of the Assembly on 27th June, 1952."}}, {"text": "27th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6154, "end_char": 6169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of the election was published in the Fort St.\n\nGeorge Gazette (Extraordinary) on 19th June, 1952, and the respondent took his seat as a member of the Assembly on 27th June, 1952."}}, {"text": "13th May, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6322, "end_char": 6336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ent by its letter dated 13th May, 1952, which however was not received by him."}}, {"text": "3rd July, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6380, "end_char": 6394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 3rd July, 1952, the Speaker of the Assembly read out to the House a communication received from the Commission bringing to his notice \"for such action as he may think fit to take\", the fact that the respondent's application for exemption had been rejected."}}, {"text": "article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Snbba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7122, "end_char": 7131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e t e res Snbba Rao pondent that his case would be heard on 21st August, - 1952.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Patan{!l~ Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7239, "end_char": 7255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Chief Election Commissioner Patan{!l~ Sastri (who was the sole Member of the Commission for the time · being) went down to Madras and heard the respondent's counsel and the Advocate-General of Madras on 21th August, 1952, when it was agreed that, in case the petitioner's counsel desired to put forward any further representations or arguments, the same should be sent in writing so as to reach the Commission in Delhi by 28th August, 1952, and the Commission should take them into consideration before giving its opinion to the Governor."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7624, "end_char": 7629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Chief Election Commissioner Patan{!l~ Sastri (who was the sole Member of the Commission for the time · being) went down to Madras and heard the respondent's counsel and the Advocate-General of Madras on 21th August, 1952, when it was agreed that, in case the petitioner's counsel desired to put forward any further representations or arguments, the same should be sent in writing so as to reach the Commission in Delhi by 28th August, 1952, and the Commission should take them into consideration before giving its opinion to the Governor."}}, {"text": "28th August, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7633, "end_char": 7650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Chief Election Commissioner Patan{!l~ Sastri (who was the sole Member of the Commission for the time · being) went down to Madras and heard the respondent's counsel and the Advocate-General of Madras on 21th August, 1952, when it was agreed that, in case the petitioner's counsel desired to put forward any further representations or arguments, the same should be sent in writing so as to reach the Commission in Delhi by 28th August, 1952, and the Commission should take them into consideration before giving its opinion to the Governor."}}, {"text": "21st August, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7768, "end_char": 7785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day (21st August, 1952) the respondent applied to the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution contending that article 192 thereof was applicable only where a member became subject to a disqualification after he was elected but not where, as here, the disqualification arose long before the election, in which case the only remedy was to challenge the validity of the election before an Election Tribunal."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7834, "end_char": 7845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7882, "end_char": 7893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8904, "end_char": 8915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9096, "end_char": 9107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9182, "end_char": 9193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Governor of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9442, "end_char": 9460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Governor of Madras and the latter's reference of the\n\natanb~ ;,' \"''\" same to the Commission for its opinion were competent and valid."}}, {"text": "article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9675, "end_char": 9686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10072, "end_char": 10083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10141, "end_char": 10152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mohan Kumaramangalam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10352, "end_char": 10372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam, who argued the case for the respond-.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Kumaramangalam"}}, {"text": "article 133(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10513, "end_char": 10527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10766, "end_char": 10780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10878, "end_char": 10892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 145(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11582, "end_char": 11596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11830, "end_char": 11841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11979, "end_char": 11990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12473, "end_char": 12484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 133(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12514, "end_char": 12528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12631, "end_char": 12642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 133(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13060, "end_char": 13075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13665, "end_char": 13676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13717, "end_char": 13728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madrasthe High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14087, "end_char": 14145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. nion on the point, it was authoritatively decided by the Privy Council in the Parlakimerli case(') that the High Court of Madrasthe High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta were in the same po8ition-had no power to issue what were known as high prerogative writs beyond the local limits of its original civil jurisdiction, and tho power to issue such writs within those limits was derived by the court as successor of the Supreme Court which had been exercising jurisdiction over the Presidency Town of Madras and was replaced by the High Court established in pursuance of the Charter Act of 1861."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14596, "end_char": 14601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other High Courts in India had no power to issue such writs at all."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14994, "end_char": 15001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that situation, the makers of the Constitution, having decided to provide for certain basic safeguards for the people m the new set up, which they called fundamental right.s, evidently thought it necessary to provide also a quick and inexpensive remedy for the enforcement of such rights and, finding that the prerogative writs which the Courts in England had developed and used whenever urgent necessity demanded immediate and decisiYe interposition, were peculiarly suited for the purpose, they conferred, in the States' sphere, new and wide powers on the High Courts of issuing directions, orders, or writs primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the power to issue such directions, etc., \""}}, {"text": "S 1151", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15840, "end_char": 15846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Holdsworth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16542, "end_char": 16552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Prof. Holdsworth (History of English Law, Vol."}}, {"text": "Parlakimedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17283, "end_char": 17294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See also the introductory remarks in the judgment in the Parlakimedi case(')."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18312, "end_char": 18323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patanjali SaBtri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18377, "end_char": 18393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, urged by the respondent's counsel Patanjali SaBtri that the High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ to\n\nc. J. the Commission at New Delhi because the question referred to it for decision related to the respondent's right to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly at Madras and the parties to the dispute also resided in the State of Madras.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Ganjam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19391, "end_char": 19397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a view would give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in the matter of the settlement of rents of ryoti holdings in Ganjam bet\\veen parties not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction, which it would not have had over the Revenue Officer who dealt with the matter at first instance.\""}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19727, "end_char": 19738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20255, "end_char": 20272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That case arose out of proueedings before a special Revenue Officer for settlement of fair rent for certain holdings within the zemindary estate of Parlakimedi situated beyond the local limits of the original civil jurisdiction of the Madras High Court."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20709, "end_char": 20736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the ryots applied to the Patanjali Sastri High Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to bring\n\n0 J.\n\nSaka Venkata\n\nSubba Rao\n\nup and quash the proceedings of the Collective Board which passed the order complained of in the town of Madras."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21286, "end_char": 21309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On question (a), they examined the powers of the Supreme Court at Madras to issue certiomri beyond the Presidency Town under clause 8 of the Charter of\n\n1800, as it was suggested that the High Court succeeded to the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court which had been granted the same powers of issuing prerogative writs as the Court of King's Bench in England throughout the Province, and they recorded their conclusion thus:\n\n\"Their Lordships are not of opinion that the Supreme Court would have had any jurisdiction to correct or control a country court of the company deciding a dispute between Indian inhabitants of Ganjam about the rent payable for land in that district.\""}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21362, "end_char": 21370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Besant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21993, "end_char": 21999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, dealing with question ( b) and referring to their decision in Besant' s case(') that the High Courts of Calcutta, l\\fadras and Bombay had power to issue certiorari in the exercise of their local jurisdiction, they held that the principle could not be applied\n\n\"to the settlement of rent for land in Ganjam merely on the basis of the location of the Board of Revenue as a body which is ordinarily resident or locl), t<'d within\n\n(1) 46 LA."}}, {"text": "High Courts of Calcutta, l\\fadras and Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22020, "end_char": 22064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, dealing with question ( b) and referring to their decision in Besant' s case(') that the High Courts of Calcutta, l\\fadras and Bombay had power to issue certiorari in the exercise of their local jurisdiction, they held that the principle could not be applied\n\n\"to the settlement of rent for land in Ganjam merely on the basis of the location of the Board of Revenue as a body which is ordinarily resident or locl), t<'d within\n\n(1) 46 LA."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22798, "end_char": 22814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If so, it mi,.ion, India would seem to follow that the jurisdiction of the High\n\nCourt would be avoided by the removal of the Board of Saka T\"enlcrtta Revenue beyond the outskrits of the town and that it Subba Rau\n\nwould never attach but for the circumstance that an\n\nPatanjali Sastri appeal is brought to, or proceedings in revision taken o. J. by, the Board of Revenue.\"", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Ganjarn", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23566, "end_char": 23573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the settlement of rent for la.nds in Ganjarn, and the Revenue Officer authorised to make the settlement at first instance were outside the loc>tl limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court. ,"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24515, "end_char": 24526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".Saka Venkata", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24905, "end_char": 24918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h' d 'th · d' h ld .Saka Venkata ocatec m e 1 an actmg wt out Jllrts JCt10n, s ou sbba Rao seek his remedy under article 226 in the Punjab - High Court.", "canonical_name": "SAKA VENKATA SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24999, "end_char": 25010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Punjab - High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25018, "end_char": 25037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h' d 'th · d' h ld .Saka Venkata ocatec m e 1 an actmg wt out Jllrts JCt10n, s ou sbba Rao seek his remedy under article 226 in the Punjab - High Court."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25671, "end_char": 25682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25748, "end_char": 25757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 192(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25851, "end_char": 25865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26458, "end_char": 26469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27006, "end_char": 27020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastr1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27044, "end_char": 27060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Election Ooni- 1\n\nL ' 1 r< 'l f St t Assemb y or egrs atrve ,, ouncr o a , a e- 11iission, India\n\n(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Saka Jlwkata Government of India or the Government of any State,\n\nSubba Rao specified in the First Schedule, other than an office\n\nPatanjali Sastr1 declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to o. J. disqualify its holder;\n\n(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; ( c) if he is an undischarged insolvent ; ( d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or is under any acknowledgment of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State;\n\n(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any Jaw made by Parliament.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27500, "end_char": 27510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Election Ooni- 1\n\nL ' 1 r< 'l f St t Assemb y or egrs atrve ,, ouncr o a , a e- 11iission, India\n\n(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Saka Jlwkata Government of India or the Government of any State,\n\nSubba Rao specified in the First Schedule, other than an office\n\nPatanjali Sastr1 declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to o. J. disqualify its holder;\n\n(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; ( c) if he is an undischarged insolvent ; ( d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or is under any acknowledgment of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State;\n\n(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any Jaw made by Parliament."}}, {"text": "article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27688, "end_char": 27699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 191(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28622, "end_char": 28636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28651, "end_char": 28660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "articles 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29913, "end_char": 29925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30352, "end_char": 30363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30471, "end_char": 30482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30700, "end_char": 30712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 192(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31184, "end_char": 31198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 190(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31673, "end_char": 31687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 190(3) and 192(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32139, "end_char": 32165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32463, "end_char": 32474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32505, "end_char": 32516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": 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Siibramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33928, "end_char": 33943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: S. Siibramaniam."}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34031, "end_char": 34040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MUKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BOSE and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34043, "end_char": 34054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MUKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BOSE and BHAGWATI JJ.]", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE J."}}, {"text": "cl. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34157, "end_char": 34163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34270, "end_char": 34279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34371, "end_char": 34380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shaw Bari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35180, "end_char": 35189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "983), Shaw Bari \"· Sonalwwl Beli R\"m (I.hR. 23\n\na.J.\n\nli'eb."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1159_1169_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "' •\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1159\n\nare applicable only to disqualifications to which a 1953 member beccrmes subject after he is elected as such, Election 0 01,.. and that neither the Governor nor the Commission mission, India has jurisdiction to enquire into the respondent's disv. qualification which arose long before his election.\n\n8 ~\",;, h~';!:ta As, however, we have held that the High Court was , . . . not competent under article 226 to issue any pre- 1 ata.nJali 808\"' rogative writ to the appellant Commission, the appeal is allowed and thewrit of prohibition issued by the learned Judge is quashed. We make no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant and the Intervener : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nAgent for the respondent: S. Siibramaniam.\n\nASRUMATI DEBI v.\n\nKUMAit ItUPENDRA DEB RAIKOT\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MUKHERJEA,\n\nVIVIAN BOSE and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nLetters Patent (Calcntta High Court), els. 18, 15-0rder for tmnsfer of suit 1mde>· cl. 18-Whetlier \"jiul, gment\"-Appealability -Meaning of \"judgment\".\n\nAn order for transfer of a suit, made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court is not a \"judgment\" within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and no appeal lies therefrom under the Letters Patent, as it neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor terminates or disposes of the suit on any ground.\n\n[Meaning of the word \"judgment\" rliscussed].\n\nKhatizan v. Sonairam (I.L.R. 4 7 Cal. 1104), Jttstices of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Co. (8 Beng. L.R. 433), Dayabhai v. Muiugappa Chettiar (I.L.R. 13 Rang. 457), 'l'uljarain\n\nv. Alagappa (I.L.R. 35 l\\fad. 1), Matlmra Sundari v. Haranchandra (I.L.R. 48 Cal. 857), Chandicharan v. Jnanendra (29 C.L.J. 225), £e,, Badin v. Upendra l'>fohan RmJ Chowdhry (39 C.W .N. 155), Kunwar Lal Singh v. Uina Devi (A.I.R. 1945 Nag. 156), Smikrw Deo v. Kalyani (A.LR. 1948 Nag. 85), Sha/lzadi Begum v. Alaknath (I.L.H. 57 All. 983), Shaw Bari \"· Sonalwwl Beli R\"m (I.hR. 23\n\na.J.\n\nli'eb. 27\n\n' •\n\nSUPREME COUR'I' REPORTS [1953)\n\n1953 Lab. 49l), Sonebai v. Ahmedbhai (9 Born. H.O.R. 398) and Vaghoji\n\nv. Gmnaji (I.L.R. 29 Born. 249) referred to. kri.1hna Reddi v.\n\nAsrnmati Debi 1'hanikachala (I.L.R. 47 Mad. 136) disapproved.\n\nKumar;;, pendra CIVIL APPELLA'rE JURISDIC'l'ION: Civil Appeal\n\nDeb Roikot No. 92 of 1952.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16th May, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C. J. and Das J.) in Appeal from Original Order No. 136 of 1949 arising out of Judgment and Order dated the 25th April, 1949, of the said High Court (Banerjee J.) in Extraordinary Suit No. 2of1948.\n\nN. 0. Chatterjee (B. Sen, with him) for the appellant.\n\nS. P. Sinha (A. K. Dutt, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953. February 27. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on special leave, is directed against a judgment of an Appellate Bench of the Calcutta High Court, dated the 16th May, 1951, by which the learned Judges dismissed an appeal taken against an order, made by a single Judge on the Original Side of that Court, under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, on the preliminary ground that the appeal was not competent in law.\n\nThere is no dispute about the material facts of the case which lie within a short compass. On 7th August, 1947, a suit was filed by the respondent Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Jalpaiguri in 'Vest Bengal,-being Title Suit No. 40 of 194 7 ,-for recovery of possession of a large estate known as Baikunthapur Raj situated in that di8triut, on the allegation that he, being the eldest son of late Prosanna Deb Raikot, the last holder of the estate, became entitled to the properties on the death of his father under a custom of the family which excludes all females from inheritance and follows the rnle of lineal\n\n' •\n\nprimogeniture jn matters of succession.\n\nProsanna 1953 died in December, 1946, and Asrumati Debi, the appel- . .\n\nI ant before us, is admittedly his widow. There was no , i,, rumati Debi son born to her and her only child is a daughter namedKnnuir; pendra Prativa. According to the plaintiff respondent, his Deb Raikot mother Renchi :Qebi, who is a Lepcha by birth was anan'l Other.\" other lawfully wedded wife of Prosanna and was married to the latter in what is known as the \"Gandharba\" Mukherjea J. form. Prosanna had three sons by this wife, the plaintiff being the eldest. Asrumati, it is alleged, took possession of the bulk of the properties comprised in the estate on the death of her husband, although she had no legal right to the same and it was to evict her from these properties that this suit was brought. Besides Asrumati, the plaintiff also impleaded three other agnatic relations of the deceased (who are defendants Nos. 2 to 4) and also his own two younger brothers as defendants to the suit.\n\nAsrumati filed her written statement on January 19, 1948, and the main defence put forward by her was that there was no legal marriage between her husband and the plaintiff's mother, the latter being only one of the several mistresses of her husband. She denied that there was any custom in the family under which females were excluded from inheritance. The defendants 2 to 4 also filed written statements, challenging the legitimacy of the plaintiff and his claim to succession, and put forward their own rights as heirs under\n\nthe customary law obtaining in the family.\n\nOn 30th April, 1948, the plaintiff presented an application in the Original Side of the High Court of Calcutta under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, praying for transfer of the suit filed in the Jalpaiguri court to the High Court to be tried in its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. This application was heard by Banerjee J. sitting singly and by his order dated the 25th of April, 1949, the learned Judge allowed the application, substantially on the ground that having regard to the atmosphere of prejudice that was created in the locality by supporters of the defendant, who wielded\n\n1953 considerable influence in the district, the plaintiff might\n\nAsrurnati Debi have a legitimate apprehension that' he would not v. get fair trial in the district court.\n\nKumar Rupendra Against this decision the defendant No. 1 took an Deb Raikat appeal to the Appellate Bench of the High Court of and Others.\n\nCalcutta and the learned Judges (Trvor Harries C. J.\n\nMukherjea J. and Das J.) dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order appealed againt was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It is the propriety of this decision that has been challenged before us in this appeal.\n\nThe High Court of Calcutta in holding the appeal before it to be incompetent based its decision entirely upon an earlier pronouncement of a Division Bench of the same court, where it was held by MookerjeeA.C.J. sitting with Fletcher J. that an order for transfer of a suit made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 (1 ).\n\nReliance was placed by the learned Judges for this view upon the pronouncement of Sir Richard Couch C. J. in the well-known and often cited case of The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company ('), where the learned Chief Justice said as follows:-\n\n\"We think that 'judgment' in clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability.\n\nIt may be either final or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined.\"\n\nThe identical question, whether an order for transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is a 'judgment' for purposes of appeal, was pointedly raised before the Madras and the Rangoon High Courts, and while the Madras High Court (3) answered the question in the affirmative, a definitely negative answer was given by\n\n(1) See Khatizan v. Sona.irain, I.L.R. 47 Cal. r104.\n\n(2) 8 Ben. L.R. 433.\n\n(3) Vide Krishna Reddi v. '1.Thanikachala, I.L.R. 47 :i.\\Iad. 1,36.\n\n. .\n\nI ' •\n\nthe Rangoon High Court('). The Madras decision pur- 1963 ports to be in accordance with the view enunciated by\n\nA.s1 u1nafi Debi a Full Bench of that court in T, uljaram v. Alagappa(') v. where Sir Arnold \\Vhite C, J. sitting with Krishna- Kumar Rupendra swami Aiyar and Ayling JJ. formulated a definition Deb Raikot of 'judgment' in a comprehensive manner differing from and Othera, the wide interpretation put upon the term in the earlier case of DeSouza v. Coles('). \"The test seems to Mukherjea J, me,\" thus observerl the learned Chief Justice, \"to be not what i8 the form of the adjudication, but what is its effect on the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause.\" This decision, it may be pointed out, has not only been adhered to in Madras since then without any comment, but the Calcutta High Court has in several instances manifested a marked leaning towards it (').\n\nOn the other hand, a Full Bench ( 1) of the Rangoon High Court presided over by Page C.J. took a view altogether different from that of the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts as regards the meaning of the word ' judgment' in clause 13 of the Rangoon Letters Patent, whioh corresponds to clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts. It was held by the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court that the term ' judgment ' in the Letters Patent means and is a decree in a snit by which the rights of the parties in the suit are determined.\n\nIn other words, a ' judgment ' is not what is defined in section 2 (9) of the Civil Procedure Code as being the statement given by the judge of the grounds of a decree\n\n(1) Dayabha.'i v. J'\\, Jurugappa (}hettiar, 13 Rang. 457 (F.B.).\n\n(2) 35 Mad,' (F, R),\n\n(3) 11, H, C, R, 384,\n\n(4) \\Tide 1l1.athura Sundari v. Haran Ohandra I.L.R. 43 Cal. 857; Chandi Charan v. Jnanendra 29 C.L.J. 225 at 229; Lta Badin v. Upendra llfohan Rov Ohaudhury, 39 C.\\V. ~. 155.\n\nI •\n\n1953 or order, but is a judgment in its final and definitive\n\n. n . sense embodying a decree. A final\n\n0 judgment is an Asrumati ,, ebi d' d\" t\" h\" h 1 . l d . h . h v. a JU ica .10n w 10 cone us1 ve y etermmes t e rig ts\n\nKumar Rupeudra of the parties with regard to all matters in issue in the\n\nDeb Raikot suit, whereas a preliminary or interlocutory judgment and Others. is a decree by which the right to the relief claimed in the suit is decided but under which further proceedings Mukherjea J. are necessary before a suit in its entirety can be disposed of.\n\nSave and except final and preliminary judgments thus defined, all other decisions are ' orders' and they do not come within the description of 'judgments' under the relevant clause of the Letters Patent.\n\nNo 'order ' is appealable unless an appeal is expressly provided against it by the Oivil Procedure Code or some other Act of the Legislature. In this view an 'order' for transferring a suit from a subordinate court to the High Court could not possibly be regarded as a ' jndgment ', and consequently no appeal would lie against such an order. This definition of' judgment' has been accepted in several cases by the Nagpur High Court (1 ), and substantially this seems to be the view of the Allahabad High Court also (2).\n\nA Full Bench of the Lahore High Court(\"), however, has refused to accept this view and has preferred to follow the tests enumerated by the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts. The Bombay High Court accepted the Calcutta view from the very beginning (4).\n\nIn view of this wide divergence of judicial opinion, it may be necessary for this court at some time or other to examine carefully the principles upon which the different views mentioned above purport to be based and attempt to determine with as much definiteness as possible the true meaning and scope of the word ' judgment ' as it occurs in clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court and in the corresponding clauses of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts. We are, however, relieved from embarking\n\n(I) Vide Kunwa:r Lal Singh v. U1na De1li, A.LR. I945 Nag. 156; Shankar Deo v. f(alyani, A.LR. 1948 Nag. 85.\n\n(2) Vide Shahzadi Begam. v. Alakhnath, 57 All. 983 (F.B.)\n\n(3) Shaw Hari v. Sonah 1lfol Beli Rarn, I.L.R. 23 Lah, 491. {4) Vide•Soneba.i v. Ahtnedbhai, 9 Born, H.C.R. 398 .\n\nI v\n\non such enqqiry in the present case as we are satisfied 1953 that in none of the views referred to above could f\n\nA~~~ an order o the character which we have before us, be regarded as a 'judgment ' within the meaning of Kumar; pendra\n\nclause 15 of the Letters Patent.\n\nDeb Raikot Couch C.J., as said already, defined 'judgment' to be a decision which determines some right or liability affecting the merits of the controversy between the parties. It is true that according to the learned Chief J\"ustice an adjudication, in order that it might rank as a ' judgment', need not decide the case on its merits, but it must be the final pronouncement of the court making it, the effect of which is to dispose of or terminate the suit or proceeding. This will be apparent from the following observations made by Couch C.J. in the course of his judgment in the case referred to above:\n\n\"It is, however, said that this eourt has already put a wider construction upon the word ' judgment' in clause 15 by entertaining appeals in cases where the plaint has been rejected as insufficient, or as showing that the claim is barred by limitation, and also in oases where orders have been made in execution. These however are both within the above definition of a judgment, and it by no means follows that, because we hold the order in the present case not to be appealable, we should be bound to hold the same in the oases referred to. For example, there is an obvious difference between an order for the admission of a plaint and an order for its rejection. The former determines nothing, but is merely the first step towards putting the case in a shape for determination. The latter determines finally so far as the court which makes the order is concerned that the suit, as brought, will not lie.\n\nThe decision, therefore, is a judgment in the proper sense of the term.\"\n\nIt cannot be said, therefore, that according to Sir Richard Couch every judicial pronouncement on a right or liability between the parties is to be regarded\n\nlfjf\n\nand Other:;,\n\nM ukher jea J.\n\n1963 as a 'judgment', for in that case there would be any . . number of judgments in the course of a suit or pro- Asntmati llel>t cceding, each one of which could be challenged by way\n\nKumar ; upe11dra of appeal. The judgment must be the final pronounce-\n\nDeb Raikot mcnt which puts an end to the proceeding so far as a 11d Other.. the conrt dealing with it is concerned. It cnrtainly involves the determination of some right or liability, MttklterJea J. though it may not be necessary that there must be a decision on the merits. This view, which is implied in the observations of Sir Richard Couch C.J. quoted above, has been really made the basis of the definition of 'judgment ' by Sir Arnold White C.J. in the Full Bench denision of the Madras High Court to which reference has been made (1).\n\nAccording to White C.J. to find out whether an order is a 'judgment' or not, we have to look to its effect upon the particular suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect is to terminate the suit or proceeding, the decision would be a 'judgment' but not otherwise. As this definition covers not only decisions in suits or actions but 'orders' in other proceedings as well which start with applications, it may be said that any final order passed on an application in the course of a suit, e.g., granting m refusing a party's prayer for adjournment of a suit or for examination of a witness, would also come within the definition.\n\nThis seems to be the reason why the learned Chief Justice qualifies the general proposition laid down above by stating that \"an adjudication on an application, which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit, is not a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.\"\n\nAs stated already, it is not our purpose in the present ease to frame an exhaustive definition of the word ' judgment' as used in clause 15 of the Letters Patent. vVe have indicated what the essential features of a ' judgment' are according to both the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts and all that we need say is that, in our opinion, an order under clnuse 18 of the Letters Patent does not satisfy the tests of a ' judgment' as fonnulateci by either of these High Courts,\n\n(T) Vide T1tljara111 v . .'!l(lgoppa, 35 \",\\Jad, r,\n\ns.c.:R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1'S 1167\n\nThe questipn that requires determination in an I9b3 application under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is, . . h th . l . l Id b d f\" As,., nnati Debi w e er a partrcu ar smt s iou e remove rom any v court which is subject to the superintendence of the\"\"\"'\"' R\n\n0 nvendra High Court and tried and determined by the latter as Deb Raikot a court of extraordinary original jurisdiction. It is nnd Other.,. true that unless the parties to the suit are agreed on h. h b h .11uklwrjea , l. t 1s pomt, t ere must arise a controversy etween t em which has to be determined by the court. In the present case, a single Judge of the High Court has decided this question in favour of the plaintiff in the suit; but a decision on any and every point in dispute between the parties to a suit is not necessarily a ' judgment'.\n\nThe order in the present case neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose .of t.he suit on any ground. An order for transfer cannot be placed in the same category as an order rejecting a plaint or one dismissing a suit on a preliminary ground as has been referred to by Couch C.J. in his observations quoted above. An order directing a plaint to be rejected or taken off the file amounts to a final disposal of the suit so far as the court making the order is concerned. That suit is completely at an end and it is immaterial that another suit could be filed in the same or another court after removing the defects which led to the order of rejection.\n\nOn the other hand, an order of transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is, in the first place, not at all an order made by the court in which the suit is pending. In the second place, the order does not put an end to the suit which remains perfectly alive aucl that very suit is to be tried by another court, the proceedings in the latter to be taken only from the stage at which they were left in the court in which the suit was originally filed.\n\nMr. Chatterjee in the course of his arguments pfo, eed considerable reliance upon t, Jrn pronouncement of the Calcutta High Court in Hadjee Ismail v. Hadjee 1lf ahomed ( 1 ), where it was held by C'ouch c .. J. and\n\n(I) 13 Beng. L.R. 91.\n\n1168 8UPREME COURT HEPOR'l'8 [i953]\n\n1953 Pontifex J. that an order refus1ng to .rescind leave\n\nAsrumati Debi to sue granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent v. was a ' judgment ' under clause 15 and could be Kumar Rupendra challenged by way of appeal.\n\nThis decision was\n\nDeb Raikot followed by the Bombay High Court in Vaghoji v.\n\nan.d Othm.\n\nOamaji( 1); and it is argued by Mr. Chatterjee that there is no difference in principle between an order of Mukherjea J. that description and an order transferring a suit under clause 13 of the Letters Patent. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee undoubtedly receives support from the judgment of the Madras High Court in Krishna Reddy\n\nv. 'l'hanikachala('), where precisely the same line of reasoning was adopted. In our opinion, this reasoning is not sound and there is an essential difference between an order rescinding or refusing to rescind leave to sue granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and one removing a suit from a subordinate court to the High Court under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, and this distinction would be apparent from the observations of Sir Arnold White C.J. in the Madras Full Bench case( 3) mentioned above, to which sufficient attention does not appear to have been paid by the learned Judges of the same court who decided the later case. Referring to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Vaghoji v. Oamaji( 1), White C.J. observed as follows:\n\n\"As regards the Bombay authorities I may refer to Vaghoji v. Oamaji( 1), where it was held that an appeal lay from an order dismissing a Judge's summons to show cause why leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent should not be rescinded and the plaint taken off the file.\n\nHere the adfudication asked for, if made, u; ould have disposed of the suit. So also would an order made under an application to revoke a submission to arbitration. I think such an order is appealable.\"\n\nLeave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent constitutes the very foundation of the suit which is instituted on its basis. If such leave is rescinded, the\n\n( ') l.L.R. z9 Born. 2l9.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 47 ;\\lad. 136.\n\n(3) Vide T11ljaram v, Alagappa, 35 Mad. I (F.B.) .\n\n' I\n\ns.c . .R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'L'S li69\n\nsuit automatiqally comes to an end and there is no 1953 doubt that such an order would Le a judgment. If, 011\n\n. D . h h I d d . d d' . . !l Asrumatt ebi t e ot er iau , an or er IS ma e 1sm1ssmg ·. ie v.\n\nJudge's summons to show cause why the leave shouldKumarRupendm not be rescinded, the result is, as Sir Lawrence Deb Raikot Jenkins pointed out(1), that a decision on a vital point and Others. adverse to the defendant, which goes to the very root of the suit, becomes final and decisive against him so Mukherjea ' far as the court making the order is concerned. This brings the order within the category of a 'judgment' as laid down in the Calcutta cases. 'Ve need not express any final opinion as to the propriety or otherwise of this view. It is enough for our purpose to state that there is a difference between an order refusing to rescind leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and one under clause 13 directing the removal of a suit from one court to another, 11nd there is no good reason to hold that the principle applicable to one applies to the other also.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that, in our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is right and this appeal should fail, and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose.\n\nAgent for the respondent No. 1: Sukimwr Ghose for P. 0. Dutt.\n\nBRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS 19o3\n\nV. 1lfay 8\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA, s. R. DAS,\n\nGHULAJVI HASAN and BHAGWA'l'l .JJ.]\n\nOontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926, s. 3 -Reflection on conduct or character of Judicial OJ)ir-ers - When wnonnts to contempt of court -Contempt proceedings-Guiding principles - Jlc!tters to be considerecl- Relevancy nf S1tj'rounrlin.q circnni.tanre.fj-J11risrl.iction to be spa.ringly exercised.\n\n(1) 'Tide Vaghoji v. Ca1naji, I.L, H. 29 Born. 149 .", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 226, "end_char": 231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' •\n\nare applicable only to disqualifications to which a 1953 member beccrmes subject after he is elected as such, Election 0 01,.. and that neither the Governor nor the Commission mission, India has jurisdiction to enquire into the respondent's disv."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 436, "end_char": 447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 709, "end_char": 727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant and the Intervener : G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "S. Siibramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 756, "end_char": 771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: S. Siibramaniam."}}, {"text": "ASRUMATI DEBI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 774, "end_char": 787, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Asrurnati Debi", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 835, "end_char": 851, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 859, "end_char": 868, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 871, "end_char": 882, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 899, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "cl. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 985, "end_char": 991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1098, "end_char": 1107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1137, "end_char": 1156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An order for transfer of a suit, made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court is not a \"judgment\" within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and no appeal lies therefrom under the Letters Patent, as it neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor terminates or disposes of the suit on any ground."}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1199, "end_char": 1208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shaw Bari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2008, "end_char": 2017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "983), Shaw Bari \"· Sonalwwl Beli R\"m (I.hR. 23\n\na.J.\n\nli'eb."}}, {"text": "Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar;;, pendra CIVIL APPELLA'rE JURISDIC'l'ION: Civil Appeal\n\nDeb Roikot No."}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2512, "end_char": 2519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16th May, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C. J. and Das J.) in Appeal from Original Order No."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2530, "end_char": 2533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16th May, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C. J. and Das J.) in Appeal from Original Order No."}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of 1949 arising out of Judgment and Order dated the 25th April, 1949, of the said High Court (Banerjee J.) in Extraordinary Suit No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2737, "end_char": 2743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee (B. Sen, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2775, "end_char": 2786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (A. K. Dutt, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "A. K. Dutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2788, "end_char": 2798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (A. K. Dutt, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2894, "end_char": 2903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on special leave, is directed against a judgment of an Appellate Bench of the Calcutta High Court, dated the 16th May, 1951, by which the learned Judges dismissed an appeal taken against an order, made by a single Judge on the Original Side of that Court, under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, on the preliminary ground that the appeal was not competent in law.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "16th May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3054, "end_char": 3068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on special leave, is directed against a judgment of an Appellate Bench of the Calcutta High Court, dated the 16th May, 1951, by which the learned Judges dismissed an appeal taken against an order, made by a single Judge on the Original Side of that Court, under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, on the preliminary ground that the appeal was not competent in law."}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3207, "end_char": 3216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3403, "end_char": 3419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7th August, 1947, a suit was filed by the respondent Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Jalpaiguri in 'Vest Bengal,-being Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3456, "end_char": 3481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7th August, 1947, a suit was filed by the respondent Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Jalpaiguri in 'Vest Bengal,-being Title Suit No.", "canonical_name": "Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot"}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge at Jalpaiguri", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3489, "end_char": 3533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7th August, 1947, a suit was filed by the respondent Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Jalpaiguri in 'Vest Bengal,-being Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "Prosanna Deb Raikot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3740, "end_char": 3759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40 of 194 7 ,-for recovery of possession of a large estate known as Baikunthapur Raj situated in that di8triut, on the allegation that he, being the eldest son of late Prosanna Deb Raikot, the last holder of the estate, became entitled to the properties on the death of his father under a custom of the family which excludes all females from inheritance and follows the rnle of lineal\n\n' •\n\nprimogeniture jn matters of succession."}}, {"text": "Prosanna 1953", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4004, "end_char": 4017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prosanna 1953 died in December, 1946, and Asrumati Debi, the appel- . ."}}, {"text": "Asrumati Debi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4046, "end_char": 4059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prosanna 1953 died in December, 1946, and Asrumati Debi, the appel- . .", "canonical_name": "Asrurnati Debi"}}, {"text": "namedKnnuir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4199, "end_char": 4210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no , i,, rumati Debi son born to her and her only child is a daughter namedKnnuir; pendra Prativa."}}, {"text": "Renchi :Qebi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4289, "end_char": 4301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the plaintiff respondent, his Deb Raikot mother Renchi :Qebi, who is a Lepcha by birth was anan'l Other.\""}}, {"text": "Gandharba\" Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4441, "end_char": 4461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other lawfully wedded wife of Prosanna and was married to the latter in what is known as the \"Gandharba\" Mukherjea J. form."}}, {"text": "Asrumati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4541, "end_char": 4549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asrumati, it is alleged, took possession of the bulk of the properties comprised in the estate on the death of her husband, although she had no legal right to the same and it was to evict her from these properties that this suit was brought.", "canonical_name": "Asrurnati Debi"}}, {"text": "Asrumati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4975, "end_char": 4983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asrumati filed her written statement on January 19, 1948, and the main defence put forward by her was that there was no legal marriage between her husband and the plaintiff's mother, the latter being only one of the several mistresses of her husband.", "canonical_name": "Asrurnati Debi"}}, {"text": "January 19, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5015, "end_char": 5031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asrumati filed her written statement on January 19, 1948, and the main defence put forward by her was that there was no legal marriage between her husband and the plaintiff's mother, the latter being only one of the several mistresses of her husband."}}, {"text": "30th April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5551, "end_char": 5567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30th April, 1948, the plaintiff presented an application in the Original Side of the High Court of Calcutta under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, praying for transfer of the suit filed in the Jalpaiguri court to the High Court to be tried in its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "25th of April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5925, "end_char": 5944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was heard by Banerjee J. sitting singly and by his order dated the 25th of April, 1949, the learned Judge allowed the application, substantially on the ground that having regard to the atmosphere of prejudice that was created in the locality by supporters of the defendant, who wielded\n\n1953 considerable influence in the district, the plaintiff might\n\nAsrurnati Debi have a legitimate apprehension that' he would not v. get fair trial in the district court."}}, {"text": "Asrurnati Debi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6211, "end_char": 6225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was heard by Banerjee J. sitting singly and by his order dated the 25th of April, 1949, the learned Judge allowed the application, substantially on the ground that having regard to the atmosphere of prejudice that was created in the locality by supporters of the defendant, who wielded\n\n1953 considerable influence in the district, the plaintiff might\n\nAsrurnati Debi have a legitimate apprehension that' he would not v. get fair trial in the district court.", "canonical_name": "Asrurnati Debi"}}, {"text": "Kumar Rupendra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6318, "end_char": 6332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar Rupendra Against this decision the defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot"}}, {"text": "High Court of and Others.\n\nCalcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6431, "end_char": 6466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 took an Deb Raikat appeal to the Appellate Bench of the High Court of and Others."}}, {"text": "Trvor Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6491, "end_char": 6504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Calcutta and the learned Judges (Trvor Harries C. J.\n\nMukherjea J. and Das J.) dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order appealed againt was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6512, "end_char": 6521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Calcutta and the learned Judges (Trvor Harries C. J.\n\nMukherjea J. and Das J.) dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order appealed againt was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6646, "end_char": 6655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6772, "end_char": 6794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Calcutta in holding the appeal before it to be incompetent based its decision entirely upon an earlier pronouncement of a Division Bench of the same court, where it was held by MookerjeeA.C.J. sitting with Fletcher J. that an order for transfer of a suit made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 (1 )."}}, {"text": "MookerjeeA.C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6963, "end_char": 6978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Calcutta in holding the appeal before it to be incompetent based its decision entirely upon an earlier pronouncement of a Division Bench of the same court, where it was held by MookerjeeA.C.J. sitting with Fletcher J. that an order for transfer of a suit made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 (1 )."}}, {"text": "Fletcher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6992, "end_char": 7000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Calcutta in holding the appeal before it to be incompetent based its decision entirely upon an earlier pronouncement of a Division Bench of the same court, where it was held by MookerjeeA.C.J. sitting with Fletcher J. that an order for transfer of a suit made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 (1 )."}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7052, "end_char": 7061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Richard Couch", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7230, "end_char": 7243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed by the learned Judges for this view upon the pronouncement of Sir Richard Couch C. J. in the well-known and often cited case of The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company ('), where the learned Chief Justice said as follows:-\n\n\"We think that 'judgment' in clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability.", "canonical_name": "Richard Couch"}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7444, "end_char": 7453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7898, "end_char": 7907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras and the Rangoon High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8002, "end_char": 8036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The identical question, whether an order for transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is a 'judgment' for purposes of appeal, was pointedly raised before the Madras and the Rangoon High Courts, and while the Madras High Court (3) answered the question in the affirmative, a definitely negative answer was given by\n\n(1) See Khatizan v. Sona.irain, I.L.R. 47 Cal."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8052, "end_char": 8069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The identical question, whether an order for transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is a 'judgment' for purposes of appeal, was pointedly raised before the Madras and the Rangoon High Courts, and while the Madras High Court (3) answered the question in the affirmative, a definitely negative answer was given by\n\n(1) See Khatizan v. Sona.irain, I.L.R. 47 Cal."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8430, "end_char": 8432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arnold \\Vhite C", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8514, "end_char": 8529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras decision pur- 1963 ports to be in accordance with the view enunciated by\n\nA.s1 u1nafi Debi a Full Bench of that court in T, uljaram v. Alagappa(') v. where Sir Arnold \\Vhite C, J. sitting with Krishna- Kumar Rupendra swami Aiyar and Ayling JJ.", "canonical_name": "Arnold \\Vhite C"}}, {"text": "Krishna- Kumar Rupendra swami Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8547, "end_char": 8582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras decision pur- 1963 ports to be in accordance with the view enunciated by\n\nA.s1 u1nafi Debi a Full Bench of that court in T, uljaram v. Alagappa(') v. where Sir Arnold \\Vhite C, J. sitting with Krishna- Kumar Rupendra swami Aiyar and Ayling JJ."}}, {"text": "Ayling", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8587, "end_char": 8593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras decision pur- 1963 ports to be in accordance with the view enunciated by\n\nA.s1 u1nafi Debi a Full Bench of that court in T, uljaram v. Alagappa(') v. where Sir Arnold \\Vhite C, J. sitting with Krishna- Kumar Rupendra swami Aiyar and Ayling JJ."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9454, "end_char": 9460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision, it may be pointed out, has not only been adhered to in Madras since then without any comment, but the Calcutta High Court has in several instances manifested a marked leaning towards it (')."}}, {"text": "Rangoon High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9635, "end_char": 9653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, a Full Bench ( 1) of the Rangoon High Court presided over by Page C.J. took a view altogether different from that of the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts as regards the meaning of the word ' judgment' in clause 13 of the Rangoon Letters Patent, whioh corresponds to clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts."}}, {"text": "Calcutta and the Madras High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9731, "end_char": 9766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, a Full Bench ( 1) of the Rangoon High Court presided over by Page C.J. took a view altogether different from that of the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts as regards the meaning of the word ' judgment' in clause 13 of the Rangoon Letters Patent, whioh corresponds to clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts."}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9817, "end_char": 9826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9879, "end_char": 9888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta and Madras High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9918, "end_char": 9949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, a Full Bench ( 1) of the Rangoon High Court presided over by Page C.J. took a view altogether different from that of the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts as regards the meaning of the word ' judgment' in clause 13 of the Rangoon Letters Patent, whioh corresponds to clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10209, "end_char": 10218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kumar Rupeudra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10837, "end_char": 10851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h v. a JU ica .10n w 10 cone us1 ve y etermmes t e rig ts\n\nKumar Rupeudra of the parties with regard to all matters in issue in the\n\nDeb Raikot suit, whereas a preliminary or interlocutory judgment and Others.", "canonical_name": "Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot"}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11798, "end_char": 11815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This definition of' judgment' has been accepted in several cases by the Nagpur High Court (1 ), and substantially this seems to be the view of the Allahabad High Court also (2)."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11873, "end_char": 11893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This definition of' judgment' has been accepted in several cases by the Nagpur High Court (1 ), and substantially this seems to be the view of the Allahabad High Court also (2)."}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11925, "end_char": 11942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court(\"), however, has refused to accept this view and has preferred to follow the tests enumerated by the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts."}}, {"text": "Calcutta and the", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12044, "end_char": 12060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court(\"), however, has refused to accept this view and has preferred to follow the tests enumerated by the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts."}}, {"text": "Madras High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12061, "end_char": 12079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court(\"), however, has refused to accept this view and has preferred to follow the tests enumerated by the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12085, "end_char": 12102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay High Court accepted the Calcutta view from the very beginning (4)."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12116, "end_char": 12124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay High Court accepted the Calcutta view from the very beginning (4)."}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12504, "end_char": 12513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13209, "end_char": 13218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deb Raikot Couch", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13243, "end_char": 13259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deb Raikot Couch C.J., as said already, defined 'judgment' to be a decision which determines some right or liability affecting the merits of the controversy between the parties.", "canonical_name": "Deb Raikot Couch"}}, {"text": "Couch", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13779, "end_char": 13784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This will be apparent from the following observations made by Couch C.J. in the course of his judgment in the case referred to above:\n\n\"It is, however, said that this eourt has already put a wider construction upon the word ' judgment' in clause 15 by entertaining appeals in cases where the plaint has been rejected as insufficient, or as showing that the claim is barred by limitation, and also in oases where orders have been made in execution."}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13956, "end_char": 13965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Richard Couch", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14885, "end_char": 14898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot be said, therefore, that according to Sir Richard Couch every judicial pronouncement on a right or liability between the parties is to be regarded\n\nlfjf\n\nand Other:;,\n\nM ukher jea J.\n\n1963 as a 'judgment', for in that case there would be any . .", "canonical_name": "Richard Couch"}}, {"text": "Deb Raikot", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15283, "end_char": 15293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment must be the final pronounce-\n\nDeb Raikot mcnt which puts an end to the proceeding so far as a 11d Other.. the conrt dealing with it is concerned.", "canonical_name": "Deb Raikot Couch"}}, {"text": "MttklterJea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15467, "end_char": 15478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cnrtainly involves the determination of some right or liability, MttklterJea J. though it may not be necessary that there must be a decision on the merits."}}, {"text": "Arnold White", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15717, "end_char": 15729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view, which is implied in the observations of Sir Richard Couch C.J. quoted above, has been really made the basis of the definition of 'judgment ' by Sir Arnold White C.J. in the Full Bench denision of the Madras High Court to which reference has been made (1).", "canonical_name": "Arnold \\Vhite C"}}, {"text": "White", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15839, "end_char": 15844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to White C.J. to find out whether an order is a 'judgment' or not, we have to look to its effect upon the particular suit or proceeding in which it is made."}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16905, "end_char": 16914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 1167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17336, "end_char": 17342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17414, "end_char": 17423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18930, "end_char": 18939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19344, "end_char": 19354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee in the course of his arguments pfo, eed considerable reliance upon t, Jrn pronouncement of the Calcutta High Court in Hadjee Ismail v. Hadjee 1lf ahomed ( 1 ), where it was held by C'ouch c .. J. and\n\n(I) 13 Beng."}}, {"text": "Pontifex", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19621, "end_char": 19629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1168 8UPREME COURT HEPOR'l'8 [i953]\n\n1953 Pontifex J. that an order refus1ng to .rescind leave\n\nAsrumati Debi to sue granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent v. was a ' judgment ' under clause 15 and could be Kumar Rupendra challenged by way of appeal."}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19710, "end_char": 19719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19770, "end_char": 19779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20106, "end_char": 20115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20499, "end_char": 20508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20604, "end_char": 20613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21207, "end_char": 21216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21523, "end_char": 21532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lawrence Deb Raikot Jenkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22127, "end_char": 22154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ie v.\n\nJudge's summons to show cause why the leave shouldKumarRupendm not be rescinded, the result is, as Sir Lawrence Deb Raikot Jenkins pointed out(1), that a decision on a vital point and Others."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22325, "end_char": 22334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "adverse to the defendant, which goes to the very root of the suit, becomes final and decisive against him so Mukherjea ' far as the court making the order is concerned.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22687, "end_char": 22696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22733, "end_char": 22742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23097, "end_char": 23107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose."}}, {"text": "Sukimwr Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23142, "end_char": 23155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1: Sukimwr Ghose for P. 0."}}, {"text": "BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23173, "end_char": 23194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS 19o3\n\nV. 1lfay 8\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH."}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23230, "end_char": 23252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS 19o3\n\nV. 1lfay 8\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH."}}, {"text": "s. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23291, "end_char": 23300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA, s. R. DAS,\n\nGHULAJVI HASAN and BHAGWA'l'l .JJ.]"}}, {"text": "GHULAJVI HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23303, "end_char": 23317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA, s. R. DAS,\n\nGHULAJVI HASAN and BHAGWA'l'l .JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23340, "end_char": 23369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23371, "end_char": 23375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926", "statute": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23555, "end_char": 23557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926", "statute": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1169_1183_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "' I\n\ns.c . .R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'L'S li69\n\nsuit automatiqally comes to an end and there is no 1953 doubt that such an order would Le a judgment. If, 011\n\n. D . h h I d d . d d' . . !l Asrumatt ebi t e ot er iau , an or er IS ma e 1sm1ssmg ·. ie v.\n\nJudge's summons to show cause why the leave shouldKumarRupendm not be rescinded, the result is, as Sir Lawrence Deb Raikot Jenkins pointed out(1), that a decision on a vital point and Others. adverse to the defendant, which goes to the very root of the suit, becomes final and decisive against him so Mukherjea ' far as the court making the order is concerned. This brings the order within the category of a 'judgment' as laid down in the Calcutta cases. 'Ve need not express any final opinion as to the propriety or otherwise of this view. It is enough for our purpose to state that there is a difference between an order refusing to rescind leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and one under clause 13 directing the removal of a suit from one court to another, 11nd there is no good reason to hold that the principle applicable to one applies to the other also.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that, in our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is right and this appeal should fail, and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose.\n\nAgent for the respondent No. 1: Sukimwr Ghose for P. 0. Dutt.\n\nBRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS 19o3\n\nV. 1lfay 8\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA, s. R. DAS,\n\nGHULAJVI HASAN and BHAGWA'l'l .JJ.]\n\nOontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926, s. 3 -Reflection on conduct or character of Judicial OJ)ir-ers - When wnonnts to contempt of court -Contempt proceedings-Guiding principles - Jlc!tters to be considerecl- Relevancy nf S1tj'rounrlin.q circnni.tanre.fj-J11risrl.iction to be spa.ringly exercised.\n\n(1) 'Tide Vaghoji v. Ca1naji, I.L, H. 29 Born. 149 .\n\n1170 SUPREME COUR'L' REPOR'l'S [1953)\n\n1953 The object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection - to judges personally from imputations to which they may be\n\nBraima Prakash exposed as individuals, but is intended to be a protection to the\n\nSharma and public whose interest would be very much affected if, by the act Others or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered v. and the sense of confidence which the people have in the adminis- The State of tration of justice by it is weakened.\n\nU Uar P-radesh When the court itself is attacked, tirn summary jurisdiction by way of contempt proceedings must be exercised 'vith scrupulous care and only< when the case is clear antl beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nThere are two primary considerations which should \\Veigh 'vith the court in such cases, viz., fir:lt wLether the reflection on the conduct or character of tho judge is within the limits of fair and reasonable criticism, and secondly, whether it is a mere libel or defamation of the judge or amounts to a contempt of tho court.\n\nIf it is a mere defamatory attack on the judge and is not calculated to interfere with the due comse of justice or th.a proper administration of the law by such conrt, it is not proper to pro ceed by way of contempt.\n\nWhere the question arises whether a defamatory statement directed against a judge is calculated to undermine the confidence of the public in the competency or integrity of the judge or is likely to deflect the court itself from a strict and unhesitant performance of its duties, all the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the statement was made &nd the degree of publicity that was given to it would be relevant circumstances. The c1uestion is not to be cletermined solely with reference to the' language or contents of the statement made.\n\nThe Executive Committee of a District Bar Association received several complaints against the way in which the Judicial Magistrate and the Revenue Officer of the District dispos.ed of cases and behaved towards litigants and lawyers, and passed a resolution which stated that ''it was their considered opinion that the two officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire confidence in their judicial work, aie given to stating wrong facts when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the litigant public and lawyers alike\" and gave a list of various complaints against the officers.\n\nThi:i resolution was passed in camera, typed out by the President himself and forwarded confidentially to the District Magistrn, te. Commissioner of the Division, and the Chief Secretary and Premier of the State. The District Magistrate moved the High Court of Allahabad to take action against the appellants, who had passed the resolution, for contempt of court.\n\nThe High Con.rt held that the appellants were guilty of contempt bul; accepted their apology. On appeal: Held, that in the light of all the circumstances of the case, the contempt, if any, was only of a technical character and that after the affidavitS\" bad been filed on behall of the appellants before the High Court, the proceedings against them should have been dropped .\n\n, I\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT l{EPORTS' 1171\n\n195.l CRIMISAL APfELLAT.E J URISDH\"fIOC\\': Orimin<tl Appeal No. 24 of 1951.\n\nBrah1na Prakash\n\nSharm.a and\n\nOthers\n\nAppeal by special leave granted by the Snpreme Conrt on the 2nd April, 1951, from the Jndgment and Order dated the 5th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous\n\nCase No. 34 of 1949.\n\nThe State o.f U ttar Pradesh.\n\n, vJ. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K. S.\n\nKrishnaswarny A iya11gar and 8. P.Sinha ( V. N. Sethi, K. B. Asthana, N. G. Sen,!(. N. Aggarwala, Shaukat\n\nHussain, K. P. Gupta, M. D. Upadhyaya and G. 0.\n\nMathur, with them) for the appellants.\n\nGopalji 1Vl ehrotra and J agdish Chandra for the rEispondent.\n\n1953.\n\nMay 8.\n\nThe J'udgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHER.JEA J.-This appeal which has come before us, on special leave, is directed against a judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, dated 5th May, 1950, by which the learned judges held the appellants guilty of contempt of court; and although the apology tendered by the appellants was accepted, they were directed to pay the costs of the respondent\n\nState.\n\nThe appellants, six in number, are members of the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association at l\\fozaffarnagar within the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the contempt proceedings were started against them, because of certain resolutions passed by the Committee on 20th April, 1949, copies of which were forwarded to the District Magistrate and other officers by a covering letter signed by appellant No. l as\n\nPresident of the Bar Association.\n\nTo appreciate t.he contentions that have been raised in this appeal, it would be necessary to state a few relevant facts.\n\nThe resolutions which form the basis of the contempt proceedings relate to the Qonduct of two judicial officers, both of whom functioned flt\n\nI •\n\n1953 Muzaffarnagar at the relevant time. One of them\n\nB h P k I named Kanhaya Lal Mehra was a Judicial Magistrate ram.a ra asi .\n\nSharma and while the other named Lalta Prasad was a Revenue Otliers Officer. It is said that the first appellant as President v. of the Bar Association received numerous complaints The State af regarding the way in which these officers diposed of Uttar Pradesh h d b h d d h 1 cases in t eir courts an e ave to war s t e a wyers\n\nMukherjea J. and the litigant public. The Executive Committee of the Association took the matter in hand and, after satisfying themselves that the complaints were legitimate and well-founded, they held a meeting on 20th April, 1949, in which the following resolutions were passed:- Resolved that-\n\n\"Whereas the members of the Association have had ample opportunity of forming an opinion of the judicial work of Sri Kanhaya Lal, Judicial Magistrate, and Shri Lalta Prasad, Revenue Officer,\n\nIt is now their considered opinion that the two officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire confidence in their judicial work, are given to stating wrong facts when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the litigant public and the lawyers alike. Besides the above-mentioned defects common to both of them, other defects are separately catalogued as hereunder :- * * * * (The complaints against each of the officers separately were then set out under specific heads).\n\nResolved further that copies of the resolution be sent to the Honourable Premier, the Chief Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Government, the Commissioner and the District Magistrate for suitable action; , Resolved that the District Magistrate and Collector be requested to meet a deputation of the following in this connection at an early date;\"\n\n(The names of 5 members who were to form the deputati<m were then mentioned.)\n\n, ' •\n\nIt is not disputed that this meeting of the Execu- I9; a tive Committee of the Bar Association was held in - d b Brahma Prakash caera an no 1101~-mem er was allowed to be present Sharma at 1t. The resolut10ns were typed out by the President and Others himself and the proceedings were not recorded in the v.\n\nMinute Book of the Association at all.\n\nOn the follow- The State of ing day, that is, on 21st April, HJ49, the President sent Uttar Pradesh.\n\na copy of the resolutions with a covering letter marked Mukherjea J. \"confidential\" to the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar. Copies of the resolutions were similarly despatched to the Commissioner of the Division, the Chief Secretary and the Premier ofUttar Pradesh. It is not disputed that the District Magistrate was the immediate superior of the officers concerned, and the other three were the higher executive authorities in the official hierarchy. One paragraph of this covering letter contained the following statement:-\n\n\"Complaints against these offirrrs had been mounting and a 'stage was reached when the matter had to be taken up formally.\n\nThe resolution is not only well-considered and unanimous but represents a consensus of opinion of all practitioners in the Criminal and Revenue side.\"\n\nThe post-script of the letter addressed to the District Magistrate contained a prayer that he might find it convenient to fix an early date to meet the deputation of 5 members as indicated in the third resolution.\n\nThe Divisional Commissioner, by his letter dated 27th April, 1949, addressed to a.ppellant No. 1, acknowledged receipt of the copy of the resolutions and requested the addressee to supply specific details of cases tried by these officers in support of the allegations contained in the resolution. Without waiting for this information, however, the Commissioner on the day following wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary of the U.P. Government suggesting that the matter should be brought to the notice of the High Court\n\ninasmuch as instances were not rare where influential members of the Bar got resolutions like these passed by their associations with a view to put\n\n15?\n\n' •\n\n1953 extra-judicial pressure upon the judicial officers so\n\nB I - as to make them amenable to their wishes which ranna Prakash , • b 0 0 h u 94 d Sharma often were quest10na le. n l t may, l 9, a epuand Othen tation of 5 members waited upon the District Magisv. trate and discussed with the latter the entire situation.\n\nThe State af The Magistrate also told the deputation that the\n\nUttar Prade\"\"· details of complaints as required by the Commissioner\n\nMukhr,.jca .1. should be furnished at an early date. These details were sent to the District Magistrate by the appellant No. 1 on 20th June, 1949, and specific instances were cited, the accuracy of which was vouched by a number of senior lawyers who actually conducted those cases.\n\nOn 20th July, 1949, the District Magistrate through the Divisional Commissioner wrote a. letter to the Registrar of the High Court of Allahabad requesting the latter to draw the attention of the High Court to the resolutions passed on 20th April, 1949, and other remarks made by the members of the Committee and suggesting that suitable action might .be taken against them under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1926. On 16th November, 1949, the High Court directed the issue of notices on 8 members of the Committee to show cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court in respect of certain portions of the resolution which were set out in the notice.\n\nIn answer to these notices, the opposite parties appeared and filed affidavits. The case was heard by a Bench of three Judges who, by their judgrne11t elated 5th May, 1950, came to the conclusion that with the exception of two of the opposite parties who were not members of the Executive Committee at the relevant date, the remaining six were guilty of contempt of court. It was held that the opposite parties were not actuated by any personal or improper motive8; the statement made on their behalf that their object was not to interfere with but to improve the administration of justice was accepted by the court, but nevertheless it was observed that the terms used in the resolution were little removed from personal abuse and whatever might have been the motive, they clea.rly were likel; Y to bring the Magistrate into contempt and\n\n1953 lower their authority. The concluding portion of the judgment stands as follows :- .\n\nB1'ahnia Prakash \"We thmk that the opposite parties acted under Sharma a misapprehension as to the position, but they have and Othm expressed their regrets and tendered an unqualified v. apology. In the circumstances, we accept their 2'1\"\" State 0! 1 b h Uttar Pradesh. apo ogy, ut we direct t at they pay the costs of the Government Advocate which we assess at Rs. 300.\"\n\nIt is the propriety of this judgment tlmt has been assailed before us in this appeal.\n\nAccording to the learned judges of the High Court, the allegations made against the judicial officers in the present case come within the category of contempt which is committed by \"scandalising the court\". The learned judges observed on the authority of the pronouncement of Lord Russell in Reg. v. Gray('), that this class of contempt is subject to one important qualification. The judges and courts are alike open to criticism and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no court could treat that as contempt of court. In the opinion of the learned judges, the complaint lodged by the appellants exceeded the bounds of fair and legitimate criticism and in this respect the members of the Bar Association could not claim any higher privilege than ordinary citizens. No distinction, the High Court held, could also be made by reason of the fact that the charges against the judicial officers in the present case were embodied in a representation made to authorities who were the official superiors of the officers concerned and under whose administrative control the latter acted.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General who appeared in support of the appeal, characterised this way of approach of the High Court as entirely wrong. His contention is that any act or publication which is calculated to lower the authority or dignity of a judge does not per\n\n8e amount to contempt of court. The test is whether the allegations are of such character or are made m\n\n(1) [1900] 'Q.B. 36 .\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nI •\n\n1176 SUPREME COURT Rl~PORTS [195:lj\n\n1958 such circumstances as would tend ljo obstruct or\n\nB h -P k interfere with the course of justice or the due adminisra ma ra ash • fl\n\nR ]' 1 db h' th' Sharma trat10n o aw. e iance was pace y im m is conand Others nection upon certain pronouncements of the Judicial\n\nCommittee which held definitely that an imputation\n\n7'/w State of affecting the character or conduct of a judge, even Uttar Pradesh. though it could be the subject-matter of a libel pro-\n\nMukherjea J. ceeding, would not necessarily amount to a contempt of court. The Attorney-General laid very great stress on the fact that the resolutions passed and the representations made by the appellants in the present case were not for the purpose of exposing before the public the alleged shortcomings of the officers concerned ; the whole object was to have the grievances of the lawyers and the litigating public which were genuinely felt, removed by an appeal to the authorities who alone were competent to remove them. Such conduct, it is argued, cannot in any way be calculated to interfere with the due administration of law and cannot be held to be contempt of court. The points raised are undoubtedly important and require to be examined carefully.\n\nIt admits of no dispute that the summary jurisdiction exercised by superior courts in punishing contempt of their authority exists for the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice andfor maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the courts. It would be only repeating what has been said so often by various judges that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered and the sern; e of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened.\n\nThere are indeed innumerable ways by which attempts can be made to hinder or obstruct the due\n\nadministrtion of justice in courts. One type of such\n\n' ' •\n\nS.O.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REl'ORTi:l 1177\n\ninterference is found in cases where there is an act or 1963 publication wliich \"amounts to scandalising the court -- itself\" - an expression which is familiar to English Brahma Prakash lawyers since the days of Lord Hardwick('). This scans; 1c;;:• dalising might manifest itself in various ways but, iu \"\" v'. ers. substance, it is an attack on individual judges or the 7'he State of court as a whole with or without reference to parti- Uttar Pradesh. cular cases, casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character or ability of the judges.\n\nSuch conduct is punished as contempt for this reason that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in the courts which are of prime importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties.\n\nThere arc decisions of English courts from early times where the courts assumed jurisdiction in taking committal proceedings against persons who were guilty of publishing any scandalous matter in respect of the court itself. In the year 1899, Lord Morris in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in 211acLeod v. St. Aubin(') observed that \"committals for contempt by scandalising the court itself have become obsolete in this country. Courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion attacks or comments derogtitory or scandalous to them.\" His Lordship said further : \"The power summarily to commit for contempt is considered necessary for the proper administration of justice. It is not to be used for the vindication of a judge as a person. He must resort to action for libel or criminal information.\"\n\nThe observation of Lord Morris that contempt proceedings for scandalising the courts have become obsolete in England is not, strictly speaking, correct; for, in the very next year, such proceedings were taken in Reg. v. Gray('). In that case, there was a scandalous attack of a rather atrociou8 type on Darling J. who was sitting at that time in Birmingham Assizes and was trying a man named Wells who was indicted\n\niufff alici for selling and publishing obscene literature.\n\n(1) Vide In re Read and Hnggon.<?on (1742) 2 Atk. 469, 471.\n\n(2) [1899) A. C. 549.\n\n(3) [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 .\n\n• •\n\n1178 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l; S [1953]\n\n195.J The judge, in the uourse of the trial, glwe a warning - to the neswspaper press that in reporting the proceed- Brahma Prakash ings of the court, it was not proper for them to give\n\nShanaa bl' 't d tt th 1 d d ' and Othm p~ IC! y tom cent ma ers at wer~ revea e ur.mg v. trial. Upon this, the defendant published an article\n\nThe State of in the Birmingham Daily Argus, under the heading Uttar Pradesh. \"An advocate of Dece110y\", whern Darling J. was\n\nabused in scurrilous language. '!'he case of 'Velis was\n\nMu.herjea J. h b h A ']] · 'l'h t en over ut t e ss1zes were st1 . s1ttmg. ere can he no doubt that the publication amounted to contempt of court and such attack was calculated to interfere directly with proper administration of justice.\n\nLord Russell in the course of his judgment, however, took care to observe that the summary jurisdiction by way of contempt proceedings in such cases where the court itself was attacked has to be exercised with scrupulous care and only when the case 1s clear and beyond reasonable doubt. \"Because\", as his Lordship said, \"if it is not a case beyond reasonable doubt, the court should and ought to leave the Attorney-General to proceed by crimin:; J information\". In 1943, Lord Atkin, while delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Devi Prashad \\'. J( ing Emperor('), observed that cases of contempt, which consist of scandalising the court itself, are fortunately rare and require to be treated with much discretion. Proceedings for this species of contempt should be used sparingly and always with reference to the administration of justice. \"If a judge is defamed in such a way as not to affect the administration of justice, he has the ordinary remedies J\n\nfor defamation if he should feel impelled to use them.\"\n\nIt seems, therefore, that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in case~ of contempt committed by \"scandalising\" the court itself. In the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in\n\n(I) 70 I. A. 216.\n\n• ' •\n\nrespect of public acts done in tho seat of juHtice. It is J9fJ3 not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can -- be created. \"The path ofcriticism'', said Lord Atkin('), Brahma Prakash \"is a public way. The wrong-headed are permitted to ai~~;~;., err therein; provided that members of the public abstain v. from imputing motives to those taking part in the The State of administration of justice and are genuinely exercising Uttar Pradesh. a right of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempt Mukherjea J. to impair the administration of justice, they are immune.\"\n\nIn the second placr, when attacks or comments a.re made on a judge or judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the judge and what amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned does not necessarily make it a contempt.\n\nThe distinction between a libel and a contempt was pointed out by a Committee of the Privy Council, to which a reference was made by the Secretary of State in 1892 (2 ).\n\nA man in the Bahama Islands, in a letter published in a colonial newspaper criticised the Chief Justice of the Colony in an extremely ill-chosen language which was sarcastic and pungent. There was a veiled insinuation that he was an incompetent judge and a shirker of work and the writer suggested in a way that it would be a providential thing if he were to die.\n\nA strong Board constituting of 11 members reported that the letter complained of, though it might have been madP the subject of proceedings for libel, was not, in the circumstances, calculated to obstruct 01 interfere with the course of justice or the due adminiskation of the law and t.hereforc did not constitute a contempt of court. The same principle was reiterated by Lord Atkin in the case of Devi Prashad v. King Ernperor( 3 ) referred to above. It was followed and approved of by the High Court of Australia in King v.\n\nNicholls('), and has been accepted as sound by this\n\n(1) Ariibard '' Attorneu-GeneralforT1inidad and '1 1oba(Jo, [1936] A.C. 322 at p. 335.\n\n(2) In the 1natler of a special reference from the Bah,11na Islands [1893]\n\nA. C. 138. '\n\n(3) 70 I.A. 21(>.\n\n14) 12 Com. L. R. 280,\n\n1953 Court in Reddy v. The State of 1f adras (1). The position -- therefore is that a defamatory attack on a judge may Brahma Prakash be a libel so far as the judcre is concerned and it would\n\nSharma\n\n- b t ] . o d . t tl l'b 11 . and Others e open o 11m to procee agams . ie 1 e or m a\n\nv. proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publi-\n\nTha State of cation of the disparaging statement is cfllculated to\n\nUttar Prade_,1,, interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished M ukherjea J. summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the judge\n\nµersonally while the other is a wrong done to the public.\n\nIt will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter a.ctual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties.\n\nIt is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law (2) • .../\n\nIt is in the light of these principles that we will proceed to examine the facts of the present case.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that in regard to matters of contempt, the members of a Bar Association do not occupy any privileged or higher position than ordinary citizens. The form in which the disparaging statement is made is also not material, but one very important thing has to be noticed in the case before us, viz., that even assuming that the statement was derogatory to the dignity of the judicial officers, very little publicity was given to this statement, and in fact, the appellants made their best endeavours to keep the thing out of the knowledge of the public.\n\nThe representation was made to 4 specified persons who were the official superiors of the officers concerned; and it has been found as a fact by the High Court that the appellants\n\n(1) [1952) s. c. R. 452_ (:>.)Mr. Moo\"kerjea J. in In re Motilal Ghosh and 'Jthe1's, I.L.R. 45 Cal. 269 at 283. \\\n\n• •\n\nacted bona fiJ, e with no intention to interfere with the 191!8 administration of justice though they might have been B h --; k under a misapprehension regarding the precise legal posi. ra ~~ ... ,~: ash\n\ntion. No copies of the resolution were even sent to the and Others officers concerned. Apart from the contents of the reprev. sentation by the appellants and the language used 2'he Stato f therein, this fact would have a bearing on the question Uttar Pradesh. as to whether the conduct of the appellants brought Ilfokherjea J. them within the purview of the law of contempt.\n\nThe first question that requires consideration is whether in making the allegations which they did against the two judicial officers, the appellants exceeded the limits of fair and legitimate criticism. There were three resolutions passed at the meeting; the second and third were of a mere formal character and do not require any consideration. The offending statement is to be found in the first resolution which again is in two parts. In the first part, there are allegtttions of a general nature against both the officers, but the second part enumerates under specific heads the complaints which the Committee had against each of them separately.\n\nWith regard to Kanhaya Lal, the allegations are that he does not record the evidence in cases tried by him properly, that in all criminal matters transferred to his court, where the accused are already on bail, he does not give them time to furnish fresh sureties with the result that they are sent to jail, and lastly, that he is not accommodating to lawyers at all. So far as the other officer is concerned, one serious allegation made is, that he follows the highly illegal procedure of hearing two cases at one and the same time, and while he records the evidence in one case himself, he allows the Court Reader to do the thing in the other. It is said also that he is short-tempered and frequently threatens lawyers with proceedings for contempt. Some of these complaints are not at all serious and no judge, unless he is hypersensitive, would at all feel aggrieved by them. It is undoubtedly a grave charge that the Revenue Officer hears two cases simultaneously and allows the Court Reader to do the work for b.im. If true,\n\nJqq\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ Hlii3]\n\n1963 it is a patent illegality and is predsely a: matter which - should be brought to the notice of the District l\\fagis- Brahma PrakaRh h ti d · t t' h d f ti ffi Sharma tra.te w o is . ie a mm1s ra ive ea o iese o cers.\n\no nd Otlu:1's\n\nThe Stltte of U!tar Pradesh.\n\n1itukherjr, a J.\n\nAs regards the first part of the resolution, the allegations are made in general terms that these officers do not state facts correctly when they pass orders and that they are discourteous to the litigant public. These do not by any means amount to scandalising the court.\n\nSuch complaints are frequently heard in respect of many subordinate courts and if the appellants had a genuine grievance, it cannot be said that in ventilating their grievances they exceeded the limits of fair criticism.\n\nThe only portion of the resolution to which prima facie objection can be taken is that which describes these officers as thoroughly incompetent in law and whose judicial work does not inspire confidence. These remarks are certainly of a sweeping nature and can scarcely be justified. Assuming, however, that this portion of the resolution is defamatory, the question arises whether it can be held to amount to contempt of court.\n\nTo answer this question, we have to 8ee whether it is in any way calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice in these courts, or, in other words, whether such statement is likely to give rise to an apprehension in the minds of litigants as to the ability of the two judicial officers to deal properly with cases coming before them, or even to embarrass the officers themselves in the <lischarge of their duties.\n\n'Ve are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that whether or not the representation made by the appellants in the present case is calculated to produce these results is to be determined solely and exclusively with reference to the language or contents of the resolutions themselves; and that no other fact or circumstance can be looked into for this purpose, except perhaps as matters which would aggravate or mitigate the offence of contempt, if such offence is found to have been committed. It mav be that pleas. of justification or privilege are not strictly speaking available to the defondant in contempt\n\n• •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' Rl!:PORTS 1183\n\nproceedings. • The question of publication also in the m;; technical sense in which it is relevant in a libel action B 1 - b . . f' rci una Prulash may e mappropl'late to the law o contempt.\n\nBut, S'ha l , . rnui eavmg out cases of e; c Jacie contempt, where the quesand Others tion arises as to whether a defamatory statement v. directed against a judge is mtlrulated to undermine the 1'/w State of confidence of the public in the capacity or integrity of Uttac Pradesh. the ]\n\n0 udge, or is likely to deflect the court itself from Mukherjeu J. a strict and unhesitant perfonnan('c of its duties, all the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the statement was made and the degree of publicity that was given to it would undoubtedly be relevm1t circumstances. It is true as the learned counsel for the respondent suggests that the matter was discussed in the present case among the members of the Btu, and it might have been the subject-matter of discussion amongst the officers also to whom copies of the resolutions were sent.\n\nNo doubt, there was publication as is required by the law of libel, but in contempt proceedings, that is not by any means conclusive. What is material is the nature and extent of the publication and whether or not it was likely to have an injurious effect on the minds of the pn blic or of the .iudiciary itself and thereby lead to interference with the administration of justice. On the materials before us, it is difficult to say that the uircumstances under which the representation was made by the ttppellants was calculated to have such effect. There might have been some remote possibility but that rannot be taken note of.\n\nWe are clearly of the opinion that the contempt, if any, was only of a technical character, and that after the affidavits were filed on belmlf of the appellants before the High Court, tl10 proceedings against them should have been dropped. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. 'rhere will be no order for costs either here or in the court below in favour of eitlwr party.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: 8. 8. Shukla.\n\nAgent for the respondents : O. P. 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DAS,\n\nGHULAJVI HASAN and BHAGWA'l'l .JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1568, "end_char": 1597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1599, "end_char": 1603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926", "statute": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1783, "end_char": 1785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926", "statute": "Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926"}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2166, "end_char": 2172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1170 SUPREME COUR'L' REPOR'l'S [1953)\n\n1953 The object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection - to judges personally from imputations to which they may be\n\nBraima Prakash exposed as individuals, but is intended to be a protection to the\n\nSharma and public whose interest would be very much affected if, by the act Others or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered v. and the sense of confidence which the people have in the adminis- The State of tration of justice by it is weakened.", "canonical_name": "Sharm.a"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4600, "end_char": 4623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate moved the High Court of Allahabad to take action against the appellants, who had passed the resolution, for contempt of court."}}, {"text": "CRIMISAL APfELLAT.E J URISDH\"fIOC\\", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5144, "end_char": 5178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", I\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT l{EPORTS' 1171\n\n195.l CRIMISAL APfELLAT.E J URISDH\"fIOC\\': Orimin<tl Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Brah1na Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5215, "end_char": 5230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brah1na Prakash\n\nSharm.a and\n\nOthers\n\nAppeal by special leave granted by the Snpreme Conrt on the 2nd April, 1951, from the Jndgment and Order dated the 5th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous\n\nCase No.", "canonical_name": "BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS"}}, {"text": "Sharm.a", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5232, "end_char": 5239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brah1na Prakash\n\nSharm.a and\n\nOthers\n\nAppeal by special leave granted by the Snpreme Conrt on the 2nd April, 1951, from the Jndgment and Order dated the 5th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous\n\nCase No.", "canonical_name": "Sharm.a"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5481, "end_char": 5486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State o.f U ttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "G. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", vJ. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K. S.\n\nKrishnaswarny A iya11gar and 8."}}, {"text": "K. S.\n\nKrishnaswarny A iya11gar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5555, "end_char": 5586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", vJ. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K. S.\n\nKrishnaswarny A iya11gar and 8."}}, {"text": "P.Sinha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5594, "end_char": 5601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.Sinha ( V. N. Sethi, K. B. Asthana, N. G. Sen,!(."}}, {"text": "V. N. Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5604, "end_char": 5615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.Sinha ( V. N. Sethi, K. B. Asthana, N. G. Sen,!(."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5617, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.Sinha ( V. N. Sethi, K. B. Asthana, N. G. Sen,!(."}}, {"text": "N. G. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5632, "end_char": 5641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.Sinha ( V. N. Sethi, K. B. Asthana, N. G. Sen,!(."}}, {"text": "N. Aggarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5646, "end_char": 5658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Aggarwala, Shaukat\n\nHussain, K. P. Gupta, M. D. Upadhyaya and G. 0."}}, {"text": "Shaukat\n\nHussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5660, "end_char": 5676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Aggarwala, Shaukat\n\nHussain, K. P. Gupta, M. D. Upadhyaya and G. 0."}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5678, "end_char": 5689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Aggarwala, Shaukat\n\nHussain, K. P. Gupta, M. D. Upadhyaya and G. 0."}}, {"text": "M. D. Upadhyaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5691, "end_char": 5706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Aggarwala, Shaukat\n\nHussain, K. P. Gupta, M. D. Upadhyaya and G. 0."}}, {"text": "G. 0.\n\nMathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5711, "end_char": 5724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Aggarwala, Shaukat\n\nHussain, K. P. Gupta, M. D. Upadhyaya and G. 0."}}, {"text": "Gopalji 1Vl ehrotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5758, "end_char": 5777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopalji 1Vl ehrotra and J agdish Chandra for the rEispondent."}}, {"text": "J agdish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5782, "end_char": 5798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopalji 1Vl ehrotra and J agdish Chandra for the rEispondent."}}, {"text": "MuKHER.JEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5881, "end_char": 5891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J'udgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHER.JEA J.-This appeal which has come before us, on special leave, is directed against a judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, dated 5th May, 1950, by which the learned judges held the appellants guilty of contempt of court; and although the apology tendered by the appellants was accepted, they were directed to pay the costs of the respondent\n\nState.", "canonical_name": "MuKHER.JEA"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6005, "end_char": 6025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J'udgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHER.JEA J.-This appeal which has come before us, on special leave, is directed against a judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, dated 5th May, 1950, by which the learned judges held the appellants guilty of contempt of court; and although the apology tendered by the appellants was accepted, they were directed to pay the costs of the respondent\n\nState."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6395, "end_char": 6408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, six in number, are members of the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association at l\\fozaffarnagar within the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the contempt proceedings were started against them, because of certain resolutions passed by the Committee on 20th April, 1949, copies of which were forwarded to the District Magistrate and other officers by a covering letter signed by appellant No."}}, {"text": "20th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6524, "end_char": 6540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, six in number, are members of the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association at l\\fozaffarnagar within the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the contempt proceedings were started against them, because of certain resolutions passed by the Committee on 20th April, 1949, copies of which were forwarded to the District Magistrate and other officers by a covering letter signed by appellant No."}}, {"text": "Kanhaya Lal Mehra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7045, "end_char": 7062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of them\n\nB h P k I named Kanhaya Lal Mehra was a Judicial Magistrate ram.a ra asi .", "canonical_name": "Kanhaya Lal Mehra"}}, {"text": "Lalta Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7138, "end_char": 7150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sharma and while the other named Lalta Prasad was a Revenue Otliers Officer."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7435, "end_char": 7444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that the first appellant as President v. of the Bar Association received numerous complaints The State af regarding the way in which these officers diposed of Uttar Pradesh h d b h d d h 1 cases in t eir courts an e ave to war s t e a wyers\n\nMukherjea J. and the litigant public.", "canonical_name": "MuKHER.JEA"}}, {"text": "Kanhaya Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7850, "end_char": 7861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Executive Committee of the Association took the matter in hand and, after satisfying themselves that the complaints were legitimate and well-founded, they held a meeting on 20th April, 1949, in which the following resolutions were passed:- Resolved that-\n\n\"Whereas the members of the Association have had ample opportunity of forming an opinion of the judicial work of Sri Kanhaya Lal, Judicial Magistrate, and Shri Lalta Prasad, Revenue Officer,\n\nIt is now their considered opinion that the two officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire confidence in their judicial work, are given to stating wrong facts when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the litigant public and the lawyers alike.", "canonical_name": "Kanhaya Lal Mehra"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8534, "end_char": 8558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Resolved further that copies of the resolution be sent to the Honourable Premier, the Chief Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Government, the Commissioner and the District Magistrate for suitable action; , Resolved that the District Magistrate and Collector be requested to meet a deputation of the following in this connection at an early date;\"\n\n(The names of 5 members who were to form the deputati<m were then mentioned.)"}}, {"text": "Brahma Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8969, "end_char": 8983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", ' •\n\nIt is not disputed that this meeting of the Execu- I9; a tive Committee of the Bar Association was held in - d b Brahma Prakash caera an no 1101~-mem er was allowed to be present Sharma at 1t. The resolut10ns were typed out by the President and Others himself and the proceedings were not recorded in the v.\n\nMinute Book of the Association at all.", "canonical_name": "BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS"}}, {"text": "Muzaffarnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9419, "end_char": 9432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a copy of the resolutions with a covering letter marked Mukherjea J. \"confidential\" to the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar."}}, {"text": "ofUttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9559, "end_char": 9574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Copies of the resolutions were similarly despatched to the Commissioner of the Division, the Chief Secretary and the Premier ofUttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "27th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10378, "end_char": 10394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Divisional Commissioner, by his letter dated 27th April, 1949, addressed to a.ppellant No."}}, {"text": "U.P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10756, "end_char": 10771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Without waiting for this information, however, the Commissioner on the day following wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary of the U.P. Government suggesting that the matter should be brought to the notice of the High Court\n\ninasmuch as instances were not rare where influential members of the Bar got resolutions like these passed by their associations with a view to put\n\n15?"}}, {"text": "ranna Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11122, "end_char": 11135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' •\n\n1953 extra-judicial pressure upon the judicial officers so\n\nB I - as to make them amenable to their wishes which ranna Prakash , • b 0 0 h u 94 d Sharma often were quest10na le.", "canonical_name": "BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS"}}, {"text": "20th June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11593, "end_char": 11608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 on 20th June, 1949, and specific instances were cited, the accuracy of which was vouched by a number of senior lawyers who actually conducted those cases."}}, {"text": "20th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11749, "end_char": 11764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20th July, 1949, the District Magistrate through the Divisional Commissioner wrote a. letter to the Registrar of the High Court of Allahabad requesting the latter to draw the attention of the High Court to the resolutions passed on 20th April, 1949, and other remarks made by the members of the Committee and suggesting that suitable action might .be taken against them under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1926."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12125, "end_char": 12134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12142, "end_char": 12164, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "16th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12177, "end_char": 12196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16th November, 1949, the High Court directed the issue of notices on 8 members of the Committee to show cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court in respect of certain portions of the resolution which were set out in the notice."}}, {"text": "5th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12585, "end_char": 12598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was heard by a Bench of three Judges who, by their judgrne11t elated 5th May, 1950, came to the conclusion that with the exception of two of the opposite parties who were not members of the Executive Committee at the relevant date, the remaining six were guilty of contempt of court."}}, {"text": "B1'ahnia Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13358, "end_char": 13374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B1'ahnia Prakash \"We thmk that the opposite parties acted under Sharma a misapprehension as to the position, but they have and Othm expressed their regrets and tendered an unqualified v. apology.", "canonical_name": "BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS"}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14099, "end_char": 14106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned judges observed on the authority of the pronouncement of Lord Russell in Reg."}}, {"text": "Hardwick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17826, "end_char": 17834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One type of such\n\n' ' •\n\nS.O.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REl'ORTi:l 1177\n\ninterference is found in cases where there is an act or 1963 publication wliich \"amounts to scandalising the court -- itself\" - an expression which is familiar to English Brahma Prakash lawyers since the days of Lord Hardwick(')."}}, {"text": "Morris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18672, "end_char": 18678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1899, Lord Morris in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in 211acLeod v. St. Aubin(') observed that \"committals for contempt by scandalising the court itself have become obsolete in this country."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19349, "end_char": 19356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observation of Lord Morris that contempt proceedings for scandalising the courts have become obsolete in England is not, strictly speaking, correct; for, in the very next year, such proceedings were taken in Reg."}}, {"text": "Darling", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19543, "end_char": 19550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, there was a scandalous attack of a rather atrociou8 type on Darling J. who was sitting at that time in Birmingham Assizes and was trying a man named Wells who was indicted\n\niufff alici for selling and publishing obscene literature."}}, {"text": "Birmingham", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19586, "end_char": 19596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, there was a scandalous attack of a rather atrociou8 type on Darling J. who was sitting at that time in Birmingham Assizes and was trying a man named Wells who was indicted\n\niufff alici for selling and publishing obscene literature."}}, {"text": "Wells", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19632, "end_char": 19637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, there was a scandalous attack of a rather atrociou8 type on Darling J. who was sitting at that time in Birmingham Assizes and was trying a man named Wells who was indicted\n\niufff alici for selling and publishing obscene literature."}}, {"text": "whern Darling", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20301, "end_char": 20314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An advocate of Dece110y\", whern Darling J. was\n\nabused in scurrilous language. '!'"}}, {"text": "Velis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20369, "end_char": 20374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he case of 'Velis was\n\nMu.herjea J. h b h A ']] · 'l'h t en over ut t e ss1zes were st1 ."}}, {"text": "Mu.herjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20380, "end_char": 20389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he case of 'Velis was\n\nMu.herjea J. h b h A ']] · 'l'h t en over ut t e ss1zes were st1 .", "canonical_name": "MuKHER.JEA"}}, {"text": "ss1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20429, "end_char": 20432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20447, "end_char": 20449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21095, "end_char": 21100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1943, Lord Atkin, while delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Devi Prashad \\'.", "canonical_name": "Atkin"}}, {"text": "Devi Prashad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21156, "end_char": 21168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1943, Lord Atkin, while delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Devi Prashad \\'."}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22328, "end_char": 22333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The path ofcriticism'', said Lord Atkin('), Brahma Prakash \"is a public way.", "canonical_name": "Atkin"}}, {"text": "Bahama Islands", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23293, "end_char": 23307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A man in the Bahama Islands, in a letter published in a colonial newspaper criticised the Chief Justice of the Colony in an extremely ill-chosen language which was sarcastic and pungent."}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24137, "end_char": 24160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was followed and approved of by the High Court of Australia in King v.\n\nNicholls('), and has been accepted as sound by this\n\n(1) Ariibard '' Attorneu-GeneralforT1inidad and '1 1oba(Jo, [1936] A.C. 322 at p. 335."}}, {"text": "Ariibard '' Attorneu-GeneralforT1inidad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24230, "end_char": 24269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was followed and approved of by the High Court of Australia in King v.\n\nNicholls('), and has been accepted as sound by this\n\n(1) Ariibard '' Attorneu-GeneralforT1inidad and '1 1oba(Jo, [1936] A.C. 322 at p. 335."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24640, "end_char": 24646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position -- therefore is that a defamatory attack on a judge may Brahma Prakash be a libel so far as the judcre is concerned and it would\n\nSharma\nb t ] .", "canonical_name": "Sharm.a"}}, {"text": "Uttar Prade_,1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24863, "end_char": 24877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, however, the publi-\n\nTha State of cation of the disparaging statement is cfllculated to\n\nUttar Prade_,1,, interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished M ukherjea J. summarily as contempt."}}, {"text": "ukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24989, "end_char": 24997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, however, the publi-\n\nTha State of cation of the disparaging statement is cfllculated to\n\nUttar Prade_,1,, interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished M ukherjea J. summarily as contempt.", "canonical_name": "MuKHER.JEA"}}, {"text": "Moo\"kerjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26705, "end_char": 26715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moo\"kerjea J. in In re Motilal Ghosh and 'Jthe1's, I.L.R. 45 Cal."}}, {"text": "Ilfokherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27308, "end_char": 27319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as to whether the conduct of the appellants brought Ilfokherjea J. them within the purview of the law of contempt."}}, {"text": "Kanhaya Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28039, "end_char": 28050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to Kanhaya Lal, the allegations are that he does not record the evidence in cases tried by him properly, that in all criminal matters transferred to his court, where the accused are already on bail, he does not give them time to furnish fresh sureties with the result that they are sent to jail, and lastly, that he is not accommodating to lawyers at all.", "canonical_name": "Kanhaya Lal Mehra"}}, {"text": "1itukherjr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29361, "end_char": 29371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1itukherjr, a J.\n\nAs regards the first part of the resolution, the allegations are made in general terms that these officers do not state facts correctly when they pass orders and that they are discourteous to the litigant public."}}, {"text": "Mukherjeu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31948, "end_char": 31957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the ]\n\n0 udge, or is likely to deflect the court itself from Mukherjeu J. a strict and unhesitant perfonnan('c of its duties, all the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the statement was made and the degree of publicity that was given to it would undoubtedly be relevm1t circumstances.", "canonical_name": "MuKHER.JEA"}}, {"text": "Shukla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33574, "end_char": 33580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shukla."}}, {"text": "O. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33611, "end_char": 33620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : O. P. Lal •"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1184_1188_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "• •\n\nMay 22\n\nil84\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT8\n\nNAIN SUKH DAS AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\n[i953]\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\"\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Arts. 14, 15(1), 32-}, fonicipal election -Election on the basis of comin, ina1 electorates-Va1idity- Application tinder Art. 32 for writ to prevent elected candidates from sitting on the Board-Mciintaincib-ility-Remedy of ratepayers.\n\nThe petitioners, who were residents of a municipality, alleging that they had been deprived of their rights to exercise their votes and to seek their election as candidates in certain by. elections to the Municipal Board, as those by-elections were held on communal lines on the basis of separate electorates contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, applied for writs under art. 32 of the Constitution for preventing the elected candidates from acting as members of the Board, and the District Magistrate and Civil Judge from holding any meetings of the Board:\n\nHeld, that, though a law which provides for elections on the basis of separate electorates for members of different religions communities offends against art. 15(1) of the Constitution and an election held after the Constitution in pursuance of such a law subject to cl. 4 would be void, the right which the petitioners claimed as rate-payers in the municipality to insist that the Board should be legally constituted and that persons who have not been properly elected should not be allowed to take part in the proceedings of the Board was outside the purview of art. 32 of the Constitution inasmuch as such a right, even if it existed, was not a fundamental right conferred by Part III of the Constitution.\n\nHeld f1!rther, that the alleged infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioners under art. 15(1) and art. 14, that is, the discrimination practised against them related to rights which they in fact never sought to exercise and took no ste1s to assert while there was occasion for doing so and the petitioners were therefore entitled to no relief under art 32 of the Constitution.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 69of1953.\n\nPetitiop under article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S li85\n\nS. 0. Isaac; s (Jai Prasad Agarwal, with him) for the appellant.\n\nK. B. Asthana, for respondent No. 1.\n\nS. P. Sinha (R. Patnaik, with him) for respondent No. 4.\n\n1953. May 22.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n• •\n\n-.Vain Sukh Das\n\nand Another v. ':Phe State of UUar Pradesh\n\na.nd Others.\n\nP S\n\n,. J 'Th' . 1. .\n\nPatanjali Sa.tri\n\nATANJALI\n\nASTRI V• .- JS IS an app 1cat10n una. J. der article 32 of the Constitution seeking protection of the petitioners' fundamental right under article 15 ( 1) against alleged violation thereof by the respondentB.\n\nThe petitioners are three residents of Etah in Uttar Pradesh. They complain that at the by-elections to the Municipal Board of Etah held on November 2, 1951, December 8, 1951, and March 17, 1952, at which respondents 4, II and 12 were respectively elected, the petitioners were deprived of their rights to exercise their votes and to seek their election as candidates, as thosr by-elections were held on communal lines on the basis of separate electorates rnntrary to the provisions of the Constitution. They also allege that the nomination of respondent 3 as a member of the Board by the Government was an illegal exercise ofits powers, as the interest which that respondent was nominated to represent in the Board was already sufficiently represented. The petitioners accordingly pray for the issue of writs of quo warranto, mandamus and other appropriate writs or directions to respondents 3, 4, II and 12 to show under what authority they are acting as members of the Board and to prevent them from acting as such mem hers. The petitioners also ask for writs on the District :Magistrate and the Civil Judge ofEtah, respondents 2 and 13 respectively, directing them not to hold or permit the holding of any meeting of the Board which is said to be illegally constituted.\n\nNow, it cannot be seriously disputed that any law providing for elections on the basis of separate electorates for members of different religious communities offends againRt article 15 (1) of the Constitution which runs thus: ·\n\n• •\n\n1186 8UPREiVIE COURT REPORT8 tl95:JJ\n\nIVJJ \"15. (1) The State shall not discriminate against auy . - citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, Nain Snkh Das l f b' h f h ,, and Another p ace o 1rt or any o t em.\n\nThis constitutional mandate to the State not to dis- Th• State of criminate against any citizen ou the ground, inter alia, Uttar Pradesh f l' . 1 ] t d t l't' ] 11 t t] . and Other•. o re 1g10n c ear y ex n H o po.' .1a as we as o .o 1r rights, and any elect1011 held atter the Const.itut10n rn\n\nParanjali SaMri pursuance of such a law subject to \"1ause (4) must be held\n\nc. J. void as being repugnant to the Constitution.\n\nBut the question is whether the petitioners are now entitled to the relief they seek in this application under artide :J2.\n\nIt is true, as pointed out in the Cross Roads casc(1 ), that article :J2 provides, in some respects, for a more effective remedy through this court than article 226 does through the High Courts.\n\nBut the scope of the remedy is clearly narrower in that it is restricted solely\n\nto enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. Any right, for instance, which the petitioners may have as rate-payers in the ;}funicipality to insist that t.he Board should be legally const, ituted and that respondents 3, 4, 11 and 12, who are not properly elected or nominated members, should not be permitted to take part in the proceedings of the Board, is outside the purview of article :J2, as such right, even if it exists, is not a fundamental right conferred by Pa.rt III.\n\nPetitioners' learned counsel, however, uontended that the fundamental right conferred by a.rticle 15 (1) on the petitiont'rs a.s citizens oi' India was violated by the elections in question having been held on a basis which discriminated against the petitioners on the ground of their religion in that it precluded them from exercising their franchise in relation to all the candidates and from contesting the elections without regard to the reservation of seats on communal basis. Learned counsel also submitted that the delimitation of the constituencies on communal lines was a denial of equality to the petitioners in the matter of their political rights and in that respect also infringed their\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.H.· 594\n\n• • •\n\nfundamental riht under article 14. We are unable to 1958 accede to theRe contentions. \" . 8 kh .-.\\ain u. Da8 It is plain that the fundamental right conferred by and Another article 15( 1) is conferred on a citizen as an individual v. and is a guarantee against his being subjected to dis- The State f crimination in the matter of the rights, privileges and Uttor Prad'8h\n\n...,. and Others, immunities pertaining to him as a citizen generally. It is not the petitioners' ease that any discrimination is i'ntnnjnli sa,1,.; now being practised or threatened against them. Their o. J. grievance iK that the mode of election by separate electorates formed on communal lines involved dist.rimination against them in relation to seats other than those reserved for their respective eommunities as to which they <:ould not exercise their right to vote or their right to stand as candidates. There is no suggestion that the petitioners actually sought to assert those rights by taking appropriate proceedings to have the bar removed and the election conducted in accordance with the Constitution. In fact, the petitioners acquiesced in the elections being conducted under the old system of separate electorates and felt no discrimination having been practised against them until a no-confidence motion was tabled recently against the former Chairman who has since lost his seat as a result of that motion having bePn carried. Thus, the infringement of their fundamental rights under article 15( 1) and article 14, that is, the discrimination practised against them, of which they now complain, related to rights which they in fact never sought to exercise and took no steps to assert, while there 'ms still room for doing so, and for the exercise of which the opportunity is now lost.\n\nBut, argues Mr. Isaacs, the elention of the respondents 4, 11 and 12 being void, they are no better than usurpers, and tlw petitioners are entitled to prevent them from functioning as members of the Municipal Board.\n\nIt may be, as we have already remarked, that the petitioners could daim such relief as rate-payers of the Municipality in appropriately framed proceedings, but there is no question of enforcing petitioners' fundamental right under article 15(1) or article 14 in such chim, Tlwn' is still less ground for seeking rclief o~\n\n• •\n\nthat basis against respondent 3 who is pnly a nominat ed member.\n\nN ain Sukh Da/J\n\nand Another The petitioners appear to have misconceived their\n\nThe State of U ttar Pradesh\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri\n\n0.J.\n\n.ilfay 22\n\nremedy and their application under article 32 must fail.\n\nThe petition is dismissed with costs, one set.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioners: K. L. 11fehta.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : 0. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 4: S. P. Varma.\n\nRAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nv .\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYAPRADESH.\n\nPATANJALI SASTm C. J., Mt:KHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Art.1. 14, 20-Acts committed in Rewa State in 1949 before Vindhya. Pradesh Ordinance No. XL VIII of 1949-Charge mider said Ordinance and tr-ial under Vindh:yr>\n\nPradesh Criininr<l Law Amendme1't (Special Courts) Ordinance (V of 1949) -Validity of trial and conviction-F\\tncla.>nental rights to equality of laws and against conviction nnrler ex post facto law- Scope of Arts.14 and 20-Integration of States and Vindhwi Pradesh Ordinances, effect of.\n\nThe appellants, who were during the relevant period, the\n\n~Iiuister for Industries and Secretary to the Government respectively of the State of Vindbya Pradesh, were tried by a Special Judge under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Ordinance (No. V of 1949) for charges under ss. 120-B, 16l, 465 and 466 of the Indian Penal Code as adapted by the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No. XLV III of 1949, the facts alleged against them being that they entered into a conspiracy in February, 1949, at Rewa to obtain illegal gratification for revoking a previous Government Order and in pursuance of that conspiracy the second appellant domanded such gratification on 8th March, 1949, at Rewa and the first appellant received Rs. 25,000 towards it on the 11th April, 1949, at New Delhi and forged certain documents purporting to be official orders.\n\nThey were acquitted by the Special Judge but on appeal the first appellant was convicted by the Judicial Commissioner 011 all t.he charges and the second\n\n•ppellanl; on the clrnrges under ss. 120-13 and 161 of the Indian", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "May 22\n\nil84", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 17, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• •\n\nMay 22\n\nil84\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT8\n\nNAIN SUKH DAS AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nAND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "NAIN SUKH DAS AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAIN SUKH DAS AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 176, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 193, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 197, "end_char": 218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 15(1), 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226, "end_char": 245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 843, "end_char": 850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1185, "end_char": 1195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1298, "end_char": 1303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1595, "end_char": 1602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1837, "end_char": 1847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1852, "end_char": 1859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2103, "end_char": 2109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2194, "end_char": 2204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2303, "end_char": 2307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jai Prasad Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2319, "end_char": 2337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Isaac; s (Jai Prasad Agarwal, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2369, "end_char": 2382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Asthana, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2407, "end_char": 2418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (R. Patnaik, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2420, "end_char": 2430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (R. Patnaik, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": ".Vain Sukh Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2530, "end_char": 2544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n• •\n.Vain Sukh Das\n\nand Another v. ':Phe State of UUar Pradesh\n\na.nd Others."}}, {"text": "State of UUar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2567, "end_char": 2588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n• •\n.Vain Sukh Das\n\nand Another v. ':Phe State of UUar Pradesh\n\na.nd Others.", "canonical_name": "State of U ttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sa.tri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2627, "end_char": 2643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sa.tri\n\nATANJALI\n\nASTRI V• .- JS IS an app 1cat10n una.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2700, "end_char": 2710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2794, "end_char": 2804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Municipal Board of Etah", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2973, "end_char": 2996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They complain that at the by-elections to the Municipal Board of Etah held on November 2, 1951, December 8, 1951, and March 17, 1952, at which respondents 4, II and 12 were respectively elected, the petitioners were deprived of their rights to exercise their votes and to seek their election as candidates, as thosr by-elections were held on communal lines on the basis of separate electorates rnntrary to the provisions of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "November 2, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3005, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They complain that at the by-elections to the Municipal Board of Etah held on November 2, 1951, December 8, 1951, and March 17, 1952, at which respondents 4, II and 12 were respectively elected, the petitioners were deprived of their rights to exercise their votes and to seek their election as candidates, as thosr by-elections were held on communal lines on the basis of separate electorates rnntrary to the provisions of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "December 8, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3023, "end_char": 3039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They complain that at the by-elections to the Municipal Board of Etah held on November 2, 1951, December 8, 1951, and March 17, 1952, at which respondents 4, II and 12 were respectively elected, the petitioners were deprived of their rights to exercise their votes and to seek their election as candidates, as thosr by-elections were held on communal lines on the basis of separate electorates rnntrary to the provisions of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "March 17, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3045, "end_char": 3059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They complain that at the by-elections to the Municipal Board of Etah held on November 2, 1951, December 8, 1951, and March 17, 1952, at which respondents 4, II and 12 were respectively elected, the petitioners were deprived of their rights to exercise their votes and to seek their election as candidates, as thosr by-elections were held on communal lines on the basis of separate electorates rnntrary to the provisions of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4314, "end_char": 4324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5301, "end_char": 5312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6695, "end_char": 6705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6846, "end_char": 6860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8147, "end_char": 8161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8166, "end_char": 8176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8466, "end_char": 8472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, argues Mr. Isaacs, the elention of the respondents 4, 11 and 12 being void, they are no better than usurpers, and tlw petitioners are entitled to prevent them from functioning as members of the Municipal Board."}}, {"text": "article 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8915, "end_char": 8925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N ain Sukh Da", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9061, "end_char": 9074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N ain Sukh Da/J\n\nand Another The petitioners appear to have misconceived their\n\nThe State of U ttar Pradesh\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "State of U ttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9145, "end_char": 9168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N ain Sukh Da/J\n\nand Another The petitioners appear to have misconceived their\n\nThe State of U ttar Pradesh\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "State of U ttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9183, "end_char": 9199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri\n\n0.J.\n\n.ilfay 22\n\nremedy and their application under article 32 must fail.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9253, "end_char": 9263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. L. 11fehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9372, "end_char": 9385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioners: K. L. 11fehta."}}, {"text": ". P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9418, "end_char": 9426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : 0."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9457, "end_char": 9468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4: S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9471, "end_char": 9493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nv ."}}, {"text": "STATE OF VINDHYAPRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9516, "end_char": 9539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF VINDHYAPRADESH."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9542, "end_char": 9557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTm C. J., Mt:KHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9577, "end_char": 9588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTm C. J., Mt:KHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHA DAS JJ."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHA DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9608, "end_char": 9622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTm C. J., Mt:KHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHA DAS JJ."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9628, "end_char": 9649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9657, "end_char": 9662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts.14 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10026, "end_char": 10040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Integration of States and Vindhwi Pradesh Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10041, "end_char": 10092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10408, "end_char": 10415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Integration of States and Vindhwi Pradesh Ordinance", "statute": "Integration of States and Vindhwi Pradesh Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10443, "end_char": 10460, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rewa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10621, "end_char": 10625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XLV III of 1949, the facts alleged against them being that they entered into a conspiracy in February, 1949, at Rewa to obtain illegal gratification for revoking a previous Government Order and in pursuance of that conspiracy the second appellant domanded such gratification on 8th March, 1949, at Rewa and the first appellant received Rs."}}, {"text": "8th March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10787, "end_char": 10802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XLV III of 1949, the facts alleged against them being that they entered into a conspiracy in February, 1949, at Rewa to obtain illegal gratification for revoking a previous Government Order and in pursuance of that conspiracy the second appellant domanded such gratification on 8th March, 1949, at Rewa and the first appellant received Rs."}}, {"text": "11th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10874, "end_char": 10890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25,000 towards it on the 11th April, 1949, at New Delhi and forged certain documents purporting to be official orders."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10895, "end_char": 10904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25,000 towards it on the 11th April, 1949, at New Delhi and forged certain documents purporting to be official orders."}}, {"text": "ss. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11157, "end_char": 11164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_1188_1220_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "• •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nthat basis against respondent 3 who is pnly a nominat ed member.\n\nN ain Sukh Da/J\n\nand Another The petitioners appear to have misconceived their\n\nThe State of U ttar Pradesh\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri\n\n0.J.\n\n.ilfay 22\n\nremedy and their application under article 32 must fail.\n\nThe petition is dismissed with costs, one set.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioners: K. L. 11fehta.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : 0. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 4: S. P. Varma.\n\nRAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nv .\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYAPRADESH.\n\nPATANJALI SASTm C. J., Mt:KHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Art.1. 14, 20-Acts committed in Rewa State in 1949 before Vindhya. Pradesh Ordinance No. XL VIII of 1949-Charge mider said Ordinance and tr-ial under Vindh:yr>\n\nPradesh Criininr<l Law Amendme1't (Special Courts) Ordinance (V of 1949) -Validity of trial and conviction-F\\tncla.>nental rights to equality of laws and against conviction nnrler ex post facto law- Scope of Arts.14 and 20-Integration of States and Vindhwi Pradesh Ordinances, effect of.\n\nThe appellants, who were during the relevant period, the\n\n~Iiuister for Industries and Secretary to the Government respectively of the State of Vindbya Pradesh, were tried by a Special Judge under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Ordinance (No. V of 1949) for charges under ss. 120-B, 16l, 465 and 466 of the Indian Penal Code as adapted by the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No. XLV III of 1949, the facts alleged against them being that they entered into a conspiracy in February, 1949, at Rewa to obtain illegal gratification for revoking a previous Government Order and in pursuance of that conspiracy the second appellant domanded such gratification on 8th March, 1949, at Rewa and the first appellant received Rs. 25,000 towards it on the 11th April, 1949, at New Delhi and forged certain documents purporting to be official orders.\n\nThey were acquitted by the Special Judge but on appeal the first appellant was convicted by the Judicial Commissioner 011 all t.he charges and the second\n\n•ppellanl; on the clrnrges under ss. 120-13 and 161 of the Indian\n\n• •\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSUPREiVIE COURT REPOHTS 1189\n\nPenal Code.\n\nTqe validity of the trial and convictions was cha!- 1963 longed on appeal to the Supreme Court inter alia on the ground that they contrnvenecl arts. 14 and 20 of the Constitution and on Rao Shiv the ground that no appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioner from Bahadur Singh the order of the Special Judge. and Another\n\nHeld (i) that, as s. 5 (2) of the Vindbya Pradesh Ordinance, Th ;; t if\n\n1949. provided that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code v d~ ~·~ h shall apply to the proceedings of a Special Court and that the '\" ya ra\n\nSpecial Judge shall be deemed to be a court of session, the normal right of appeal provided by s. 410 ors. 417, as the case may be, of the Criminal Procedure Code must be taken to have been expressly provided by reference, and the order of the Special Judge was appealable to the Judicial Commissioner.\n\nAttorney-General v. Herman James Sillem (11 H. L. C. 704) distinguished.\n\n(ii) That the trial of the appellants did not contravene art.14 of the Constitution inasmuch as in the Vindbya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code las amended) which was in force at the commencement of the trial (namely 2nd December, 1949) there was no provision requiring all trials before Courts of Sessions to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors, and the fact that the entire Criminal Procedure Code including s. 268 thereof was extended to Vindbya Pradesh on the 16th April, 1950. by the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, could not affect the validity of the trial after that date as s. 4 of the said Act provides that the repeal of the earlier law by that Act shall not affect pending proceedings, and pending proceedings being a class in themselves, a provision saving such proceedings could not contravene art. 14.\n\nSyed Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad ([1952] S.C.R. 710) referred to.\n\n(iii) The prohibition contained in art. 20 of the Constitution against convictions and subjections to penalty under ex post facto laws is not confined in its operation to post-Constitution laws but applies also to ex post facto laws passed before the Constitution in their application to pending proceedings. [The difference between Indian and American law in this respect pointed out.]\n\n(iv) Article 20, however, prohibits only conviction or sentence under an ex post facto law, and not the trial thereof.\n\nSuch trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the offence or by a court different from that which had co npetence al that time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional.\n\n(v) The expression\" law in force\" in art. 20 means a law which was in fact in existence and in operation at the time of the co1nmission of the offanoe (or, in other words, the the11 e:-dsting\n\niii$\n\n' •\n\n1953 law) and does not include a law which by subsequent legislation bas to he deemed to have been in force •t that tii:ne.\n\n11 h \"\"d Shsfr 1\n\n(vi) Though the charges against the appellants were specifia a ur 1ngi ff 0' d A th cally framed with reference lo the o ence under rdmance an no \"e'' No. XLVIIIof 1949, as the acts charged as offencesd1dnot become Tl :i 1 such only hy virtue al the said Ordinance and as they were offenv. 'h\" Pa' dof h ces even under the law which prevailed at the time when the acts m\" '1\" ' 0 \" ' d th Id t b d d t' f were committe , ey cou no e regar e as conv1c ions or violation of a law which was not in force at the time of the commission of the acts charged.\n\n(vii) By virtue of the Orders of the Regent of Rewa of 1921 and 1922, the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code with the necessary adaptations were in force in the Rewa State and either became extended to tho entire Vindhya Pradesh State from the 9th August, 1948, by Ordinance No. IV of 1948, or continued to be in force in the Rewa portion of that State by virtue of the principle laid down in 11fa.yor of Lyons v. East India Co. (1 M.I.A. 175), and were the penal law in force in the relevant area when the acts were committed.\n\n(viii) The amendment of the definition of \"public servant\" in s. 21 of the Penal Code, made by Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 brought about no substantial change in the position of the first appellant as a public servant.\n\n(ix) The Ruler of the Rewa State had prior to 1947 the authority to pass extra.territorial laws relating to offences committed by his own subjects and vesting in his own courts the power to try them, that power was not in any way curtailed either by the integration covenant or the Instrument of Accession, and ss. 3 and 4 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code, at least in so far as they affected the subjects and courts of the State, were \\vi thin the legislative competence of the State.\n\n(x) The conviction of the appell•nts in respect of all the offences with which they were charged including the extra-territorial offence said to have been committed by the first a.ppellant at New Delhi was not illegal under art. 220 on the ground that the conviction was under an ex z)ost facto la'\\\\'.\n\nCRUUNAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1951. Appeal under article 134 (l)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 10th March, 1951, of the Court of the .Judicial Commissioner, Vindhyft Pradesh, Rewa, in Criminal Appeal No. 81. of 1950, arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 26th July, 1950, of the Court of Special Judge. Rewa, in Criminal Case No, l ()f 1949,\n\nG. S. Pathp, k (K. B. Asthana, with him), for the appellant No. 1.\n\nK. B. Asthana, for appellant No. 2.\n\nM. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him), for the respondent.\n\n1953. May 22.\n\nThe Judgment of the dell vered by\n\nCourt was\n\nJAGANNADHADASJ.-This is an appeal against the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh dated 10th March, 1951, by leave granted under article 134( 1) ( c) of the Constitution. The first and the second appellants were at the material period of time respectively the Minister for Industries and the Secretary to the Government, Commerce and Industries Department of the then United State of Vindhya Pradesh. The case for the prosecution against them is as follows : In the State of Panna (one of the component units of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh) there are certain diamond mines. By an agreement dated the 1st of August, 1936, between the Panna Dur bar on the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate on the other part, the latter obtained a lease for carrying out diamond-mining operations for a period of 15 years. It appears that on or about the 31st October, 1947, the Panna Durbar directed the stoppage of the mining work on the ground that the Syndicate was not carrying on the operations properly.\n\nSince then the Syndicate was making strenuous efforts to obtain cancellation of the said order. It is alleged that the two appellants in the course of these attempts, with which, at the material time, they were concerned in their official capacity, entered into a conspiracy about the beginning of February 1949 at Rewa (within the United State ofVindhya Pradesh), to obtain illegal gratification for the purpose of revoking the previous order of stoppage of mining work. In pursuance of the said conspiracy it is alleged that the second appellant demanded on 8th March, 1949, at Rewa illegal gratification from one Xt1gindils 1Iehta, a\n\n• •\n\n196J\n\nRao Shiv Bahadhur Singh\n\nand Another\n\nThe State of V indhya Pradesl~.\n\nJ agannadh.00.\n\n• •\n\n1963 representative of the Panna Diamond fining Syndi- . cate, and that later on, on 11th April, 1949, the first\n\nB :\";\n\n81 ~\" h appellant, in fact, received a sum of Rs. 25,000 to-\n\n:n~ ~:wt~::~ wards it at the Constitution House in New Delhi and v. forged certain documents purporting to be orders The State of passed in official capacity and intended to confer some Vindhya Pradesh. advantages or benefits on the Panna Diamond Mining -- Syndicate.\n\nJ agannadhadas J.\n\nOn these allegations the two appellants were charged for criminal conspiracy and for the taking of illegal gratification by a public servant for doing an official act and for the commission of forgery in connection therewith.\n\nThe charges were under sections 120-B, 161, 4n5 and 466, Indian Penal Code, as adapted by the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No.\n\nXLVIII of 1949, and the trial was held by a Special Judge under t, he Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Ordinance No. V of 1949.\n\nAt the trial both the appellants were acquitted. The State filed an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner against the same whereupon both were convicted under sections 120-B and 161, Indian Penal Code (as adapted). In addition, the first, appellant was convicted under sections 465 and 466, Indian Penal Code (as adapted). He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years and to a fine of .Rs. 2,000 under section 120-B and to rigorous imprisonment for three years under section 161, Indian Penal Code, the two sentences to run concurrently. In respect of his conviction under sections 465 and 466 no separate sentence was awarded. The second appellant was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 under section 120-B, but under section 161 no separate sentence was awarded. The validity of the convictions and sentences has been challenged on the ground that there has been infringement of articles 14 and 20 of the Constitution.\n\nIn addition, a further point has been raised before us by leave that no appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal by the special Judge. It is convenient to deal with this point in the first\n\n• • •\n\ninstance. 'fhe question raised depends 011 a construction 1953 of the provisions of the Vindhya PradeKh Criminal Law Ra Sh.\n\nAmendment (Special Court) Ordinance No. V of 1949 Bahad:r ;;~•uh dated 2nd December, 1949. By section 2 thereof the and Another Vindhya Pradesh Government was given the power by v. notification to constitute Special Courts of criminal .. 2'he Stat• of jurisdiction within the State and by section 3 to hndhya Pradesh. appoint a Special Judge to preside J)ver the Special - C B 4 h Q b • d Jagannadhadas ourt. y sect10n . t e overnment was ant or1se J. to issue notifications from time to time allotting cases for trial by the Special Judge in respect of charges for offences specified in the Schedule to the Ordinance. Sections 5( 1 ), 7 and 8 provide certain departures from the normal procedure or evidence, and section 9 provides for special punishment. Section 5, sub-section\n\n(2) provides as follows :-\n\n\"Save as provided in sub-section (1) the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh, shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Ordinance, apply to the proceedings of a Special Court, and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a Jury or without the aid of Assessors, and a person conducting a prosecution before a Speci:.l Judge shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.\"\n\nSection 6 provides as follows :-\n\n\"The High Court may, subject to the provisions of section 7 regarding transfer of cases, exercise, so far as they may be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh, on a High Court as if the Court of the Special Judge were a Court of Session trying cases without a Jury within the local limits of the High Court's jurisdictions.\"\n\nThe argument oflearned counsel for the appellants is that section 6 above quoted provides only for the powers of the High Court on appeal preferred to it, but that there is no provision at i:tll conferring on an aggrieved party a right of appeal from\n\n• •\n\n1953 the judgment and order of the Sp<icial Judge to\n\nR Sh . the High Court. It is contended that the absence ao iv • l Bahadur Singh ?f a nght f appea may be a lacuna, bll:t tht and Another masmuch as rt has not been expressly provided, rt\n\nv. cannot be implied from the fact that a provision has _The State of been made for the exercise of powers by the appellate VindhyaPradesh court. It is conceded that this line of argument, if\n\nJ -; h d accepted, would .result in there being no appeal even\n\nagan\";. \" as as against a conviction. But it is urged that it is the inevitable consequence of the lacuna. It appears however on careful consideration that no such lacuna exists and that sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance reasonably construed is an express provision conferring a right of appeal to the aggrieved party, whether an accused or the State, against the judgment of the Special Judge. The section, in terms, says that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as adapted and in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Ordinance shall apply to the proceedings of a Special Court, and that for the purposes of the said provisions (that is, the adapted provisions which are not inconsistent and hence apply) the court of a Special Judge is to be deemed a Court of Session. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to the right of appeal are sections 410\n\nand 417, and there is nothing in the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance which is inconsistent with the application of these two sections to the proceedings of a Special Court treated as a Court of Session for the purpose. It follows that the said proceedings are subject to appeal.\n\nBut it is urged that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code that are attracted by sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance to the proceedings of a Special Court are only those provisions which relate to the procedure before the Special Court itself in respect of the proceedings before it and not all the provisions which are connected with or related to those proceedings. There is, in our opinion, no warrant for putting such a limited construction on this sub-section. The only limitation on the application of the provisions of the Cl'iminal Procedure Code to the\n\n• • •\n\nproceedings of the Special Court is the one arising from J9b3 the existence of any inconsistent provisions in the R\n\nS .\n\nOrdinace and not with reference to the conduct of t?e Bah:U.:, ;;,, gh proceedmgs before that very court. Once the Spemal and Anothe~ Court is to be deemed a Court of Session the normal v. right of appeal provided by section 410 or section 417 . The State of as the case may be, mnst be taken to have been VindhyaPradesl\" expressly provided by reference and not as arising by J - ' ] ' agannadhadas mere imp wat1on.\n\nLearned counsel strongly relied on Attorney-Genera.l\n\nv. Herman James Sillem(1) to show that a provision such as the above was meant only to regulate the proceedings in a case within the four walls or limits of the court. The statutory provision which came up for construction in that case was however very differently worded, and was meant to regulate \"the process, practice, and mode of pleadings,'' i.e., the procedurf' in the court and not \"the proceeding\" of the court. While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute and imply a right of appeal, it is incumbent on the court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The construction urged for the appellant renders section 6 futile and leaves even a convicted person without appeal. We have no hesitation in rejecting it.\n\nOut of the constitutional points raised, that which relates to the alleged violation of article 14 has no substance. In reliance on Lakshmandas Ahuja's case(') it was sought to be argued that though the trial in this case under Ordinance No. V of 1949 related to offences committed prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the continuance thereof under the special procedure prescribed by the Ordinance was discriminatory and hence unconstitutional. It is to be noticed that the trial commenced on 2nd December, 1949, the acquittal by the Sessions Judge was on 26th July, 1950, and the conviction by the Judicial Commissioner on appeal therefrom was on 10th March, 1~51. In the\n\n(1) 10 H, L. Cas. 704; It E. R. 1200,\n\n(2) [1952] S.C.R. 710.\n\n• •\n\nT9S3 light, however, of the later decision of the Supreme\n\nRao Shiv Court in Syed Qasim Razvi v. The 8tcite of Hyderabad('), s .. hadur Singli it was recognised that this point was unsubstantial, and Anoth,,·. unless some material prejudice in the matter of prov. cedure was shown.\n\nIn this context the learned J'he State 0!\n\nAttorney-General brought to our notice that even Vindhya Pradesh. before the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court)\n\nJagoi;;:;,, hadas Ordinance No. V of 1949, dated 2nd December, 1949,\n\n J. came into force there was in operation the Code of Criminal Procedure Adaptation (Amendment) Ordinance No. XXVIII ofl949 dated 3rd May, 1949, whereby section 268, Criminal Procedure Code, requiring all trials before a Court of Session to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors was deleted from the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code as adapted. Therefore by the date when the trial in the present case commenced before the Special Court there was no substantial or material prejudice caused to an accused who was tried by the Special Court, and the continuance of such procedure after the Constitution came into force would make no serious difference. What, however, was relied upon was a subsequent change in the situation as a result of section 3 of Central Act No. XXX of 1950 [Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950], whereby Acts and Ordinances specified in the Schedule to the Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949 (LIX of\n\n1949) were extended to Vindhya Pradesh, and one of the Acts specified in that Schedule was the entire Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThis therefore had the effect of reviving section 268, Criminal Procedure Code, in its application to Vindhya Pradesh, repealing by section 4 of the Act the pre-existing law in this behalf in the State. It was accordingly argued that to the l!xtent the trial continued under the old procedure subsequent to 16th April, 1950, there were inevitable discrimination and necessary prejudice. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the repealing section 4 of Act No. XXX of 1950 contained a saving clause providing that \"the repeal shall not affect (a) the previous operation of any such law, or (b) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect\n\n(1) [1952] S. C. R. 71<\"\n\nof any offence.committed against any such law, or (c) 1963 any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in res- R sh pect of any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment, Baha~:r ; ngh and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy and Another may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such v. penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as .The State 0! if this Act had not been passed.'' It is to be noticed Vindhya Pradesh. that the saving provision applies equally to proceedings Jagannadhadas previously commenced and then pending, whether J. before the special court or the ordinary 0ourt, and that therefore in respect of two persons equally situated in this behalf, one under trial by the ordinary court and the other by the special court, the position continues what it was before, i.e., the continuance of trial does not involve any substantially discriminatory and prejudicial procedure. Learned counsel however attempted to argue that the very saving clause was a discriminatory provision and hence unconstitutional and invalid. But there is no reason, \\rhy pending proceedings cannot be treated by the legislature as a class by themselves having regard to the exigencies of the situation which such pendency itself calls for.\n\nThere can arise no question as to such a saving provision infringing article 14 so long as no scope is left for any further discrimination inter se as between persons affected by such pending matters.\n\nThe next and the only serious question that arises in this case is with reference to the objections raised in reliance on article 20 of the Constitution. This question arises from the fact that the charges as against the two appellants, in terms, refer to the offences committed as having been under the various sections of the Indian Penal Code as adapted in the United States of Vindhya Pradesh by Ordinance No. XLVIII\n\nof 1949. This Ordinance was passed on llth September, 1949, while the offences themselves are said to have been committed in the months of Fehrnary, March and April, 1949, i.e., months prior to the Ordinance. It is nrged thernfore that the convictions in this case which were after t lw Corrnhtution r\"nie. into fon'u\n\nJ.).i\n\n• •\n\n1198 Sl!PREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 are in respect of an ex post facto law creiiting offences after the commission of the acts charged as such 1-tao Shiv llahadur Singh offences and hence unconstitutional. This contention\n\nand Another raises two important questions, vfa., (1) the proper\n\nv. construction of article 20 of the Constitution, and The State 01 (2) whether the various acts in respect of which the Viudhya I'radeBh. appellants were convicted constituted offences in this\n\nJagannruthadas area only from the date when Ordinance No. XLVIII J. of 1949 was passed or were already so prior thereto.\n\nArticle 20(1) of the Constitution is as follows:\n\n\"No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.\"\n\nThis article in its broad import has been enacted to prohibit convictions and sentences under ex post facto laws. The principle underlying such prohibition has been very elaborately discussed and pointed out in the very learned judgment of Justice 'Villes in the well known case of Phillips v. Eyre(') and also by the Supreme Court of U. S. A. in Calder v. Bull (2). In the English case it is explained that ex post facto laws are laws which voided and punished what had been lawful when done. There can be no doubt as to the paramount importance of the principle that such ea: post facto laws, which retrospectively create offences and punish them are bad as being highly inequitable and unjust. In the English system of jurisprudence repugnance of such laws to universal notions of fairness and justice is treated as a ground not for invalidating the law itself but as compelling a beneficent construction thereof where the language of the statute by any means permits it.\n\nIn the American system, however, such ex post facto laws are themselves rendered invalid by virtue of article l, sections ll and 10 of its Constitution. It is contended by the learned Attorney-Genera! that article 20 of the Constitution\n\n(1) (1870) 6Q.B.D. 1, at 13 and 25.\n\n(2) 3 Dallas 386; I Lav.', Edition 64S at 6491\n\nwas meant t<> bring about nothing more than the i:i.;3 invalidity of such ex post facto laws in the post-Con- . t't t' . d b h h I'd' f h C Raa Sim• s u on per10 ut t at t e va 1 1ty o t e preon- JJahadur Sinylt stitut10n laws in this behalf was not intended to be and Another affected in any way. The case in Keshavan 1vladhavan v. 11l enon v. The 8tate of Bombay ( 1) has been relied on to 2'he state of show that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Vindhya Pradesh the Constitution have no retrospective operation, and J -dhad that the invalidity of laws brought about by article 13 agan~;.\n\n( 1) of the Constitution relates only to the future operation of the pre-Constitution laws which are in violation of the fundamental rights. On this footing it was argued that even on the assumption of the convictions in this case being in respect of new offences created by Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 after the commission of the offences charged, the fundamental right guaranteed under article 20 is not attracted thereto so as to invalidate such convictions.\n\nThis contention, however, cannot be upheld.\n\nOn a careful consideration of the respective articles, one is struck by the marked difference in language used in the Indian and American Constitutions. Sections9(3) and 10 of article 1 of the American Constitution merely say that \"No ex post facto law shall be passed ... \" and \"No State shall pass ex post facto law .... \" But in article 20 of the Indian Constitution the language used is in much wider terms, and what is prohibited is the conviction of a person or his subjection to a penalty under ex post fa.eta laws. The prohibition under the article is not confined to the passing or the validity of the law, but extends to the conviction pr the sentence and is based on its character as an ex post facto law.\n\nThe fullest effect must therefore be given to the actual words used in the article. Nor does such a construction of article 20 result in giving retrospective operation to the fundamental right thereby recognised.\n\nAll that it amounts to is that the future operation of the fundamental right declared in article 20 may also in certain cases\n\n(1) [I95I] S.C. R. 2'8.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953] .\n\n1953 result from acts and situations which.had their commencement in the pre-Constitution period. In The Rao Shlv CJ Bahadur Singh Queen v. St. Mary Whitechapel (1) Lord Denman . . and Another pointed out that a statute which in its direct operation v. is prospective cannot properly be ealled a retrospeetive The State of statute because a part of the requisites for its action is Vindhya Prade•h. drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. The\n\n.Jagannadhadas general principle therefore that the fundamental rights J. have no retrospective operation is not in any way affected by giving the fullest effect to the wording of article 20.\n\nThis article must accordingly be taken to • prohibit all convictions or subjections to penalty after the Constitution in respect of ex post facto Jaws whether the same was a post-Constitution law or I!- pre- Constitution law.\n\nThat such is the intendment of the wording used in article 20 ( l) is confirmed by the similar wording used in articles 20 (2) and 20 (3).\n\nUnder article 20 (2), for instance, it cannot be reasonably urged that the prohibitioE of double jeopardy applies only when both the occasions therefor arise after the Constitution.\n\nSimilarly, under article 20 (3) it cannot be suggested that a person accused before the Constitution can be compelled to be a witness against himS<Jlf, if after the Constitution he case is pending.\n\nIn this context it is necessary to notice that what is prohibited under article 20 is only conviction or sentence under an ex post fatto law and not the trial thereof.\n\nSuch trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional.\n\nA person accused of the commission of an offence has no fundamntal right to trial by a particular court or by a particular procedn 1e, except in so far as any constitutional objt:iction by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved.\n\nIn this connection our attent.ion has been drawn to the fact that the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance XLVIII of 1949, though enacted on 11th September,\n\n(1) u6 E.H. 8n at 814.\n\n\\ •\n\ns.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'rs 1201\n\n1949, i.e., aftr the alleged offences were committed, 1963 was in terms made retrospective by section 2 of the Rao Shiv said Ordinance which says that the Act \" shall be Bahadur Singh deemed to have been in force in Vindhya Pradesh and Another from the 9th day of August, 1948,\" a date long prior v. to the date of the commission of the offonces. It was . 2'he State 0! accordingly suggested that since such a law at the Vindhya Pradesh. time when it was passed was a valid law and since this Jayannadluula• law had the effect of bringing this Ordinance into J. force from 9th August, 1949, it cannot be said that the convictions are not in respect of \"a law in force\" at the time when the offences were committed. This, however, would be to import a somewhat technical meaning into the phrase \"law in force\" as used in article 20. \"Law in force\" referred to therein must be taken to relate not to a law \"deemed\" to be in force and thus brought into force but the law factually in operation at the time or what may be called the then existing law.\n\nOtherwise, it is clear that the whole purpose of article 20 would be completely defeated in its application even to ex post facto laws passed after the Constitution. Every such ex post facto law can be made retrospective, as it must be, if it is to regulate acts committed before the actual passing of the Act, and it can well be urged that by such retrospective operation it becomes the law in force at the time of the commencement of the Act. It is obvious that such a construction which nullifies article 20 cannot possibly be adopted. It cannot therefore be doubted that the phrase \"law in force\" as used in article 20 must be understood in its natural sense as being the law in fact in existence and in operation a.t the time of the commission of the offence as distinct from the law \"deemed\" to have become operative by virtue of the power of legislature to pass retrospective laws. It follows that if the :>ppellants are able to substantiate their contention that the acts charged as offences in this case have become such only by virtue of Ordinance No. XL VIII of 1949 which has admittedly been passed subsequent to the commission thereof, then they would be entitled to the benefit of article 20 of\n\n. i202\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\n1953 the Constitution and to have their oonvictions set\n\nR Sh . aside. This leads to an examination of the relevant <to iv • • ] Bahadur Singh pre-ex1stmg aw.\n\nand Anather But before taking up that examination, it is conv. venient to deal with a. contention which has been rev ~~' s; ie; J h peatedly pressed on us, viz., that the validity of the\n\nin ya ra \" convictions in this case cannot be upheld on a con-\n\nJagannadha<ias sideration of the pre-existing state of law, because\n\n(1) the charges are specifically with reference to the offences under Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949, and (2)\n\n, '\n\nthe said Ordinance itself has repealed the pre-existing • law.\n\nThis contention is, however, without any substance. An examination of the pre-existing state of law in this behalf as on the date of the commission of the offence is not for the purpose of converting the convictions under Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 into those under the previous Jaw. The convictions in this case are clearly and legally referable only to Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949, which was the law applicable to the offence at the tir.ae of the commission thereof on account of the retrospective operation validly given to that law by section 2 of the Ordinance.\n\nIt is only for the purpose of considering the constitutional validity of those convictions that the factual position as regards the previous law in this behalf becomes necessary to be examined. This is a question which arises on the contention of the appellants themselves, and is not an objection to the frame of the charge or the legality of the conviction othe1'- wise than on the footing of constitutional invalidity.\n\nNor is there any question of prejudice involved, since that question has been raised on behalf of the appellants in the trial court itself, and the burden of making out the facts requisite fur the constitutional invalidity of the convictions is on them.\n\nThe argument that on the very terms of 0l'Clinance No. XLVIII of 1949 there is no pre-existing law with reference to which the constitutionality of the convictions under article 20 is to be judged is based on 8ections 2 and 3 (I) of the said Ordinance, which run as follows:\n\n• •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUitT REPOitTS 1203\n\n1953 Section 2: !'The Indian Penal Code as in force generally in the Provinces of India immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance shall applv, and B 1Bado Sh3fo 1 . . . .\n\nJ a 1a ur zng 1 shall be 111 force 111 V 111dhya Pradesh, subject to the and Anothc; adaptation and modifications set out in the Schedule, v. and the said Code as so applied shall be deemed to The State of have been in force in Vindhya Pradesh from the 9th Vindhya PradCBli. day of August, 1948.\"\n\nSection 3 (1 ): \"If immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance there is in force .in Vindhya Pradesh or any part thereof any law corresponding to the Indian Penal Code, such law is hereby repealed.\"\n\nIt is urged that as a result of these two provisions the pre-existing law, if any, has been repealed as from 9th August, 1948, and that therefore the period between 9th August, 1948, and 11th September, 1949, on which date Ordinance No. XL VIII of 1949 came into force must be taken to be a period of no penal law in this territory for judging the constitutionality of any conviction subsequent to 11th September, 1949, for an alleged offence committed during that period. This argument is self-contradictory, and proceeds on misconception. What is relevant for the application of article 20 is not the result brought about by repeal and the retrospective operation thereof, but the factual state of law as it existed prior to the date when the repeal came into operation. The repeal itself posits the pre-existence of the law, and it is that law which is relevant for our present purpose.\n\nIt therefore becomes necessary to examine in some detail what was the criminal law factually in force during the months of February, March and April, 1949, when the acts charged as offences against the appellants were committed, and to see whether it was anything different from what wa.s enacted by Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949. Since the valid existence of such law has been, in the course of the arguments, contended as depending on the administrative set-up at the relevant period ancl the legiRlative authorityfunctioning\n\n, J agannadhadaa\n\n1204 SUPRENIE COVRT REPOR'l'S [1953]\n\n1953 in that set-up, it becomes necessary. to have a\n\nRao Shiv correct appreciation of the events which resulted in BahadurSinuh bringing about a United State of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nand Another The State ofVindhya Pradesh consists of as many \"· as 35 pre-existing native States known as Bundelkhand ,,, Tdhle 81P01'a0f 1 and Baghhelkand States of which the State of Rewa •in iya '\" e.n 1 h 1 .\n\nI d' 1 f was apparent y t e argest umt. mme iate y a ter\n\nJauannarlhadaB the passing of the Indian Independence Act of 1947\n\nJ, which by virtue of section 7 thereof resulted in the lapse of the suzerainty of the British Government in India, these various States executed in favour of the Government of India Instruments of Accession under section 6 of the Government of India Act in accordance with the form which is found at pages 165 and 169 of the White Paper on Indian States issued by the Government of India in March 1951.\n\nAt about the • same time they executed also standstill agreements as per form given at page 173 of the W'hite Paper.\n\nShortly thereafter and in pursuance of the policy of the Government of India all these 35 States executed, with the concurrence of the Government of India, an inter se Covenant dated 18th March, 1948, for the establishment of a UnitedState ofVindhyaPradesh comprising the territories of these 35 States with a common executive, legislature and judiciary. That Covenant provided for common administrative arrangements and for the election of a Rajpramukh. Article 9 of the Covenant vested in the Rajpramukh the entire legislative authority of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh until a Constitution to be framed by the appropriate body for the said United State ofVindhya Pradesh provided otherwise. The Maharajah of Rewa became the first Rajpramukh of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, and we are informed that though the Covenant provided the 1st day of May, 1948, as the date within which the administration is 'to be made over to the Rajpramukh by each of the States, some did not, and that, as a fact, the integrated administration by the Rajpramukh in respect of all States came into operation only from the 9th of August, 1948. j\\1eanwhile, however, it appears to have\n\n\\ •\n\nbeen thought.expedient that a fresh Instrument of 1953 Accession shoul~ be executed b.y the Rajpramukh on Rao Shiv behalf of the Umted State of Vmdhya Pradesh replac. Bahadur Singh ing the individual Instruments of Accession which and Another were executed in the months of August, September, v.\n\nOctober and Novembr, 1947. Consequently a fres? Vi:::::v:;;:;; sh.\n\nInstrument of Access10n was executed by the RaJpramukh on behalf of the United State of Vindhya Jagannadhadas Pradesh on the 20th of July, 1948, and was accepted J. by the Governor-General of India on the 13th of September, 1949. It may be incidentally mentioned that one of the important differences between the previous individual Instruments of Accession executed by the various rulers and the later Instrument of Accession executed by the Rajpramukh is that while under the former, accession was only in respect of three matters, viz., Defence, External Affairs and Communications, under the later Instrument dated the 20th of July, 1948, all matters enumerated in Lists Nos. I and III of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, were accepted as the matters in respect of which the legislature of India, then called the Dominion Legislature, might make laws for the United State of Vindhya Pradesh. It may also be mentioned that on the 25th November, 1949, the Rajpramukh of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh issued a proclamation whereby he declared that the Constitution of India which was then shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall be the Constitution for the Vindhya Pradesh as for the other parts of India and specifically superseded and abrogated all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith which were then in force in this State.\n\nThese arrangements brought about an integrated United State of Vindhya Pradesh within the frame work vf the Dominion of India but only by way of accession. Further steps, however, had the effect of merging these United States as part of the territory of India. It is unnecessary to notice those steps in detail, as they fall beyond the period with which we ii.re concerned for the present purpose.\n\n1953 It is against this background of events constituting the integration of these various ruler S'tates into the B a; Sh;~ z \"Cnited State of Vindhya Pradesh within the Union of\n\n;,,',; ;;,0,;~;' India by accession thereto that the question as to what v. was the criminal law in force by February, March and\n\nThe State of April, 1949, has got to be judged. From the above Vindhya P'\"desh. narration it will be noticed that at the relevant period\n\nJ ---; it was the Government of the United State of Vindhya agannadaadas p d h 't t d b h ' t t' C J ra es consti u e y t e inter se m egra 10n ove- . nant dated the 18th March, 1948, that was functioning under the authority of the Rajpramukh of Vindhya Pradesh and subject to the Instrument of Accession with the Dominion of India executed by him on the 20th July, 1948. As already stated, the actual integrated administration under these arrangements came into operation for the entire United State only on the 9th of August, 1948.\n\nWe may now start with the fact above noticed that the various component States became the \"Cnited State of Vindhya Pradesh on the 18th March, 1948.\n\nIn the normal course and in the absence of any attempts to introduce uniform legislation throughout the State the pre-existing laws of the various component States would continue to be in force on the well-accepted principle laid down by the Privy Council in .Mayor of Lyons v. East India Company(').\n\nThe first step towards the introduction of some uniformity in the laws for the entire State was taken by the Rajpramukh by issuing on the 31st July, 1948, an Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws Ordinance No. IV of 1948. Section 2 of that Ordinance provided as follows :-\n\n\"All Acts, Codes, Ordinances and other laws, and rules and regulations made thereunder, which have, by publication in the Rewa Raj Gazette, been enforced in the Rewa State, and continue to be in force, are extended so as to be applicable to the whole of Vindhya Pradesh, Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any local law, rules, regulation or custom having the force of law, which relates to matters connected with land revenue or tenancy.\"\n\n(1) 1 M.I.A. 175, at 2701 271.\n\n' • •\n\nThis Ordinnce extended to the whole of Vindhya 19.53 Pradesh, and was to come into force with effect from the 9th ?f August, 1948, by virtue of section 1 there?f. Ba:au~,~ngh The Ordmance was amended later by another Ordmand Another ance No. XX of 1949 which deleted from section 2 v. of the previous Ordinance the words \"by publication The State of in the Rewa Raj Gazette\". The effect of these two VindhyaPradesh.\n\nOrdinances, so far as we are concerned, was to extend J --:; h d to the entire State of Vindhya Pradesh the criminal agan\";_\n\n0 as law which was in force previously in the Rewa State.\n\nThat law is to be found by reference to Orders Nos. IV of 1921 and VI of 1922 issued by the then Regent of Rewa acting for the Maharajah on the 18th February, 1921, and 9th March, 1922, respectively. A perusal of these two Orders and in particular of paragraph 10 of the 1921 Order as interpreted by the 1922 Order makes it perfectly clear \"that the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure were introduced in the Rewa 8tate, in the letter and in the spirit with due adaptation to local conditions.'' It is not disputed that this continued to be the position so far as Rewa State was concerned until the United State ofVindhya Pradesh was formed. It follows that the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure with necessary adaptations were bro\\jght into operation in the entire Pnited State of Vindhya Pradesh shortly after the introduction of the integrated administration under the Rajpramukh.\n\nIt has been urged, however, that though this may have been the intention, the intention did not become operative for reasons to be presently stated. Section 2 of Ordinance No. IV of 1948 while extending the laws of Rewa State to the rest of Vindhya Pradesh refers to the publication of such laws in the Rewa Gazette as\n\n<t requisite therefor, and it is pointed out that the Rewa Gazette itself came into existence only in October 1930 ( vide page 386 of the printed paper book), whereas the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code were brought into operation in the Rewa State in 1921 and\n\n1922. lt is also pointed out that the deletion of the\n\n1953 requirement of previous publication in the Rewa Gazette by Ordinance No. XX of 1949 caine into oper- Rao Shiv . 1 h th t 0 d' bl' j d , h Bahadu,· Singh at10n on y w en a r mance was pu ts ie m t e and Another Vindhya Pradesh Gazette, i.e., on the 15th May, 1949,\n\nv. sometime after the commission of the offence in this\n\n. The Slate vf case. To substantiate the view that only such of the Vmdhya Prade8/i. Rewa laws which were previously published in the\n\nJ - Rewa Gazette were understood as having been origiagmmadhadas 11 t d d t v dh p d h b 0 d' N J na y ex en e o m ya ra es y r mance o. lV of 1948, a decision of the Vindhya Pradesh High Court dated the 29th October, 1949, in Criminal Appeal No. 27 has been brought to our notice which assumes that the Prisoners' Act in force in India was not in force in Vindhya Pradesh as there was no previous publication of it in the Rewa Gazette. On the other side a notification of Vindhya Pradesh Government dated the 19th March, 1949, and published in the Vindhya Pradesh Gazette dated the 30th ;\\Iarch, 1949, has been brought to our notice which specifically mentions all the laws by then in force in Vindhya Pradesh and shows \"Indian Penal Code-mutatis mutandis-with necessary adaptations\" as item 86 thereof. This is relied on to show that there must have been a previous publication thereof in the Rewa Gazette before integration, There seems to be considerable force in this argument that in respect of the varis Rewa State laws which have been enumerated in the above-mentioned Gazette as having been brought into force in Vindhya Pradesh (some of these are Acts prior to 1930) there must have been previous publication in the Rewa Gazette .sometime after 1930, and that neither Ordinance No. XX of 1949 nor the decision of Vindhya Pradesh High Court relating to Prisoners' Act (which is not one enumerated in the above Gazette) can be taken to negative it. We are prima f acie inclined to accept this view and to think that tho Indian Penal Code as in force in Rewa became extended to V indhya Pradesh\n\nby Ordinance No. IV of 1948. But even assuming that section 2 of the Ordinance failed to achieve its purpose on account of misconception as to the previous publication of any particular Rewa law in the Rewa Gazette,\n\n' •\n\nit is clear that that Rewa law would continue to be in 1953 force in the Rew'a portion of the United State ofVindhya R\n\nS' . . ao 1iiv Pradesh, as the Vmdhya Pradesh law therefor, on the Bahadar Singh principle recognised in 1ffoyor of Lyons v. East India and Another.\n\nCompany (1), that on change of sovereignty over an v. inhabited territory the pre-existing laws continue to .1'he Staie of be in force until duly altered. Since in the present Vindhya Prad,, h. case we are concerned with offences committed in rela- Jagannadhadas tion to the Rewa State portion of Vindhya Pra- J. desh, there can be no reasonable difficulty in holding that the criminal law of Itewa State, i.e., the lndian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code with adaptations mutatis mutandis, was the relevant law for our present purpose by the date of integrated administration, viz., the 9th August, 194.8.\n\nNow the subsequent alterations therein by Ordinances of the Rajpramukh may be shortly noticed. So far as the substantive penal law is concerned, there was the Anti-corruption Ordinance o. XII of 1948 dated the 16th December, 1948, and the Indian Penal Code (Application to Vindhya Pradesh) Ordinance No.\n\nXLVIII of 1949 dated the 11th September, 1949. The former being prior to the dates of commission of the offences in the present case does not require any further notice. So far as the Criminal Procedure Code is concerned, there were two Ordinances: ( 1) the Criminal Procedure Code Adaptation Ordinance .N\"o. XV of 1948 dated the 31st December, 1948, and (2) the Criminal Procedure Code Adaptation (Amendment) Ordinance\n\nu. XXVII of 1949 dated the 3rd May, 1949. In view of what has been found above, viz., that by virtue of the Orders of the Regent of Rewa dated 1921 and 1922 the Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code with the necessary adaptations rnutatis mutandis were in force in Itewa 8tate and either became extended to the entire Vindhya Pradesh State from the 9th August, 1948, by Ordinance :N\"u. IV of 1948 or continued tu be in force in the ltcwa portion ofVindhya Pratlesh State\n\nhy virtue of the principle in \"vlayor of Lyons' case ( 1) it is prima facie correct to say that the penal law in force\n\n(r) 1 M. I. A. 175 •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR.TS (1953]\n\n1953 in the relevant area was substantially , the same both before and after the above-mentioned amendments Rao Shiv d b h R . kh Bahadur Singh ma e y t e aJprarnu .\n\nand Another It is urged however that in two important respects\n\nv. relevant for our present. purpose there is a difference.\n\nVi~~;, v~\n\n1 ;:01,, h. It is poine.d out hat thre is an amendment. as regards _ the defimt10n of \"public servant\" by Ordmance No.\n\nJagannadhadas XL VIII of 1949. It is also urged that sections 3 and J. 4 of the Indian Penal Code and section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which are extra-territorial in operation could not have been brought into force into Rewa or Vindhya Pradesh by adaptation or legislation for lack of legislative competence in this behalf at the relevant times. The points thus raised assume importance since the cha.rges against the fiIBt appellant, who is a Minister, is in his capacity as a public servant and since also one of the charges against him is in respect of acts done in New Delhi-completely outside Vindhya Pradesh. It is true that Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 amended the Indian Penal Code by substituting for the previous first clause of section 21 thereof relating to the definition of a \"public servant\" the phrase\n\n\"Every Minister of State\". But it does not follow that \"a Minister of State\" was not a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code even before this amendment. Clause 9 of section 21, Ind, an Penal Code, shows that every officer in the service or pay of the Crown for the performance of any public duty is a \"public servant\". The decision of the Privy Council in King-Ernperor v. Sibnath Banerji(') is decisive to show that a Minister under the Government of India Act is \"an officer\" subordinate to the Governor. On the same reasoning there can be no doubt that the Minister of Vindhya Pradesh would be an \"officer\" of the State of Vindhya Pradesh. Therefore, prior to the p:1ssing of Ordinance No. XL VIII of 1H49 and on the view that the Indian Penal Code with necess0-ry ad:1ptations inutatis rnutandis was in force at least in the Rewa portion of Vindhya Pmdesh (if not in the entirety of VindhyaPradesh) the first :1ppellant was a public servant\n\n(r) (1945] F. C.R. 195 at 222.\n\n1953 as defined in section 21, Indian Penal Code, as adapted.\n\nThe amendment of the said section bro112:ht about there- ,_, Ilao Shiv fore no substantial change in the position of the first Bahadur Singh appellant. It has been faintly suggested that, even so, and Another under the pre-existing law the definition of public serv. vant could have reference only to an officer of the . The State of Rewa State, and that the change brought about by VnidhyaPmdesh.\n\nOrdinance No. XL VIII of 1949 made only the Minister JagannadhadM of Vindhya Pradesh State a public servant. This argu- .1. ment is fallacious. It is implicit in the continuance of Rewa law after integration that from the moment of such continuance it became the Vindhya Pradesh law for the Rewa portion of Vindhya Pradesh territory with the requisite implied adaptation consonant to the new set-up. There is therefore no substance in the argument that the amendment of section 21, Indian Penal Code, by Ordinance No. XL VIII of 1949 brought about any change in the situation of the first appellant as a public servant.\n\nThe furthAr qirnstion that remains to be considered is whether under the Vindhya Pradesh law, acts committed outside the State are offences and are triable by Vindhya Pradesh courts, and whether in any case there was any such law in factual operation at the date when the acts charged as offences in this case were committed at New Delhi in April, 1949. Under the normal Indian law the relevant legislative provisions are sections 3 and 4, Indian Penal Code, and section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, and the question is whether by express or implied adaptation rnutatis mutandis these sections can be held to have been validly in force in Vindhya Pradesh at thA relevant period. It is contended that the rulers of native States had no authority for extra-territorial legislation, and that consequently any adaptation in this behalf cannot be implied and if expressly purporting to be made, cannot be valid. There can be no doubt that the provisions of the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code are in the nature of extra-territorial legislation, and that every sovereign legislative authority has the power to pass such laws also. [See Macleod\n\n• •\n\nSUPR.EME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nv. Attorney-General for New South , Wales(')].\n\nIn the present case we are concerned only with that por- Rao Shiv tion of the releYant extra-territorial law which renders Bahadur Singh\n\nand Another an act committed hy a subject of the State outside the\n\nv. limits of the State •tn offence triable by the courts of 2'he State of the State. In 1he course of the arguments it has Vindhya Pradesh. been suggested that to that limited extent no question\n\n -- of extra-territori::dity of the relevant legislation arises.\n\nJagan; adhodas But the concept of extra-territorial legislation appears\n\n to comprehend such cases also, if the passages relied on before us from Pitt-Gobbet's International Law, 5th Edition, at page 216 as also at pages 225 and 226paragraphs l.01 and 102, are to be accepted as correct.\n\nAssuming without deciding that this is so, the argument has been advanced that no ruler of the Indian\n\nStates, before the 15th August, 1947, and much less the Rajpramukh of Vindhya Pradesh, had any such full sovereign status as to entitle them to pass extraterritorial laws. It is well-known that these rulers had no external sovereignty, as it was taken out of them and exercised by the suzerain British power.\n\nBut for internal purposes or municipal purposes the rulers were generally considered as having full sovereign status except to the extent that the suzerain power assumed to itself any function of such internal sovereignty either on specific occasions, or generally but for specified and limited purposes.\n\nIn their relation with the rulers of the native States, the suzerain British power acted on the juristic theory propounded by Sir Henry Maine that \"sovereignty is divisible, though independence is not\"-See Ilbert's Government of India, page 425-a theory accepted in the Butler Committee Report on Indian States (1928-29) at page 25, paragraph 44. The pitssages at pages 398, 399 and 426 of Ilbert's Government; of India would show that what may have been left of internal sovereignty <; o a particular ruler may in exceptional mises be nothing more than titular.\n\nThe general position of these Native States in India prior to 15th August, 194 7, appears fairly clearly from certain instructive passages at pages 422 and 423 of Ilbert and is correlative\n\n(r) [1891] A.C. 455,\n\nto the actual a.xercise of British jurisdiction within those States as appears from the following passages:-\n\n• •\n\n195-3\n\nJ{ao Shiv Bahadur Singh\n\nand Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\n\"In point of fact the jurisdiction of the Governor- General in Council within the territories of Native States is exercised- ( a) over European British subjects in all cases;\n\n(b) over native Indian subjects in certain cases; ( c) over all classes of persons, British or foreign,\n\nV indhya Pradesh.\n\nwithin certain areas.\n\nIt is the policy of the Government of India not to allow native courts to exercise jurisdiction in the case of European British subjects but to require them either to be tried by the British courts established in the Native State, or to be sent for trial before a court in British India.\n\nThe Government of India does not claim similar exclusive jurisdiction over native Indian subjects of His Majesty when within Native States, but doubtless would assert jurisdiction over such persons in cases where it thought the assertion necessary ............ \"\n\n\"The Government of India does not, except within specified areas, or under special circumstances, such as during the minority of a native prince, take 9ver or interfere with the jurisdiction of the courts of a Native State in cases affecting only the subjects of that State, but leaves such cases to be dealt with by the native courts in accordance with native laws.\"\n\nLee Warner in his book on \"Protected Princes of India\" states the position at pages 351 and 352. The following extract from paragraph 143 at page 351 is instructive :\n\n\"But where, as in the case of European British subjects, material distinctions in religion, education, 11nd social habits separate them from the native community, and justify the extension to them of those rights of ex-territoriality, which are still obtained for them by C11pitulations a, nd agreements with foreign\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n• •\n\nIP63 non-Christian nations, these distinctiol'.l$ are absent in\n\nHao Shiv the case of nat!ve nd!an sbjects ?f er Majesty. Te Bahadur 8ingh systems of native Justice, if not s1mtlar to those m\n\nand Anot11e; British territory, are more or less assimilated, and prov. vided that the trial of native Indian subjects by the\n\nThe State of ordinary tribunals of the States, whose laws thev have\n\nVindh!fn Praae., h. offended, is supervised by the British agent, the\n\nJnryn,,:, dhana general rule is to leave to the Native States jurisd:ction\n\n J. 8 over such British subjects who break their laws, even where the offence committed is also cognisable under the law of India. The British Government goes still farther, since it extradites to the Native State a native Indian subject, who, after the commission of an extraditable offence in the Native principality, seeks shelter in British territory, provided that the political agent is satisfied that the crime can be properly tried in the courts of the Native State. The powers of the sovereigns of the States, in respect of the trial of native Indian subjects, have been generally classified. Some chiefs can try any person, whether their own or a native Indian subject, for a capital offence without express permission; others can only try a native Indian subject for such an offence with permission.; and others, again, cannot pass a final sentence of death without the confirmation of Government to it.\"\n\nThese passages, while showing that the extent of the exercise of internal sovereignty by each of these rulers in actual practice, is a matter for evidence, when called in quest.ion, indicate that full jurisdiction over the rulers' own subjects was never denied but generally conceded, except where a sentence of death was involved. There is therefore no reason at all to think that the rulers had no authority to pass laws binding their own subjects and regulating their own courts in respect of acts committed outside their State assuming such laws to be extra-territorial. In this context an old treaty of 1813 between Rewa State and the British Government and a fairly recent judgment of the Rewa High Court in 1945 have been brought to our notice to show the contrary at least so far as Rewa State is concerned. The treaty is to be found at page 255 of\n\n.. • •\n\nVolume V of i\\itchison's Treaties, ngagements and 19~3 Sanads. Article 6 thereof which is relied on only pro- R . 'd f il' . ,. th\n\n. G ,. 11 aoShw v1 es ac 1t1es ror e suzeram overnment to 10 ow Bahadur Singh and pursue into Rewa State, offenders who having and Another committed offences in British India escape away into v. the State. This does not negative the authority of . The State of the Rewa State to enact legislation concerning its own Vindhya Prad .. h. subjects when they commit such oences outside the Jagannadhad\"> State. 1945 Rewa Law Reports 84 1s no doubt a case ;1, in which the High Court assumed that the court had no jurisdiction to try an offence committed outside the State by a subject of the State. There is no discussion in the judgment of the question involved, and this single instance is not enough to make out either the absence of the State's legislative authority in this behalf or the factual non-existence of the relevant law.\n\nIt must therefore be held that the rulers of the native State~ had prior to 1947, the authority to pass extra-territorial laws relating to offences committed by their own subjects and vesting in their own courts the power to try them, except where the contrary is made out by evidence in the case of any individual State, and that so far at least as Rewa State is concerned, the contrary cannot be held to have been proved.\n\nThe further point that has been raised is that whatever may be the position of the Rewa State before 1947 the attempt of the Rajpramukh of the State of Vindhya Pradesh in so far as he purported to extend the extra-territorial portion of any of the Rewa laws to Vindhya Pradesh by Ordinances Nos. IV of 1948 and XX of 1949 and his attempt to introduce into Vindhya Pradesh the extra-territorial portion of the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code by Ordinances Nos. XLVIII of 1949 and XXVIII of 1949 respectively, must fail as he had no such authority for extra-territorial legislation with reierence to the basic covenants from which his authority was derived. These basic covenants are as aheady above shown the inter se integration agreement\n\n• •\n\nlJJJ dated 18th March, 1948, executed by aJl the rulers of\n\nRao Shiv the component States .of Vindhya Pradesh and the /Jahadnr Singh Instrument of Access10n da, ted 20th July, 1948, and Another executed by the Rajpramukh in favour of the v.\n\nDominion of India. Under the inter se integration . The State of agreement and by article IX, clause (3) thereof, ViitdhyaPradesh. the Rajpramukh was vested with the power to\n\nJagannadhadas make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace\n\n.f. and good government of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh or of any part thereof. Under the Instrument of Accession and by clause (3) thereof the Rajpramukh accepted all matters enumerated in Lists I and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, as matters in respect of which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the United State. It has been strenuously argued before us that in view of these provisions the authority of the Rajpramukh for legislation was in substance reduced to the powers of the Provincial Legislature within the framework of the\n\nConstitution of India as it then was.\n\nSection 6, subsection (1), of the Indian Independence Act and section 99(2) as amended are relied on to show that the Provincial Legislature has no power to make extra-territorial laws. It is accordingly argued that the Rajpramukh had no power at least after the execution of the Instl'ument of Accession to amend or adapt the Indian Penal Code or the Criminal Procedure Code so as to bring into opera ti on sections 3 and 4, Indian Penal Code, and section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, with the necessary modifications in the State of Vindhya Pradesh. Though this argument appears plausible, a careful scrutiny of the scheme of the integration and accession covenants as also of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act and the Indian Independence Act shows clearly that such an argument is not tenable. The provisions under the Government of India Act under which the Instrument of Accession has been executed keep the position of the Provinces distinct from the position of the acceding States.\n\nSection 5(1) of the Government of India Act while making the Provinces as well as the acceding States,\n\n• •\n\npart of the Pominion of India enumerates the two 19.53 under separate categories by clauses (a) and (b).\n\nSub- Rao Shiv section (2) of section 6 specifically provided that, Bahadur Singh \"An Instrument of Accession shall specify the and Another matters which the Ruler accepts as matters with resh v. pect to which the Federal Legislature may make laws v;'!:a: ste ;1 h for his State, and the limitations, if any, to which the\n\nY~._:_\" \" power of the Federal Legislature to make laws for his Jagannadhadas State, and the exercise of the executive authority of J. the Federation in his State, are respectively to be subject.\"\n\nSection 101 of the Government of India Act in, terms says that,\n\n\"Nothing in the Act shall be construed as empowering the Federal Legislature to make laws for a Federated State otherwise than in accordance with the Instrument of Accession of that State and any limitation contained therein.\"\n\nIf the argument put forward by the appellants' counsel is correct, viz., that the mere reference to the legislative items in respect of which the Dominion Legislature could make laws applicable to the State of Vindhya Pradesh as Lists I and III carried with it the necessary implication that the Dominion Legislature alone had the power to make laws for the State with extra-territorial operation, and to that extent therefore curtailed the legislative authority of the Rajpramukh, it would be tantamount to the importation of all the limitations under sections 99 to 104 into the Instrument of Accession. This would be contrary to section 101 of the Government of India Act. There is no justification for such a view merely because of the reference to the enumerated items as Lists I and III which may have been a matter of convenience for reference.\n\nOn the other hand, the Instrument of Accession in terms states by clause 9 as follows :\n\n\"Save as provided by or under this Instrument nothing contained in this Instrument shall affect the exercise of any power, authority and rights.enjoyed by the Rajpramukh or the validity of any law for the\n\n• •\n\nRao Shiv\n\ntime being in force in the United State, or any part thereof.\"\n\nBahadur Singh The authority of the Rajpramukh which is referred and Another to in this clause is not only the unfettered legislative\n\nThe ;1~1, of authority \"to make and promulgate Ordinances for\n\nVindhyaPradesh. the peace and good government of the United States _ or any part thereof\" vested in him by Article IX of\n\nJagannadhadas the integration Covenant dated 18th March, 1948, but J. also that which is vested in him under article VI of the said agreement. This article vests in him \"all rights, authority, and jurisdiction belonging to the ruler of each Covenanting State and incidental to the government thereof.\" There can be no doubt therefore that if, as has been pointed out above, the various Cov. enanting States and in particular the State of Rewa, had the power to pass extra-territorial laws at least to the extent of making certain acts committed outside the State by its subjects as offences and to vest in the State courts authority to deal with such offences, that power has not in any way been cmtailed either by the integration Covenant or the Instrument of Accession.\n\nIt follows therefore that sections 3 and 4, Indian Penal\n\nCode, and section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, at least in so far as it affected the subjects and courts of the State, were entirely within the legislative competence of the States concerned for all purposes of adaptation or amendments.\n\nNow, so far as sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Penal Code are concerned, the amendment brought about by Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 is nothing more and nothing less than a mere adaptation of these sections for the new set-up and this, as shown above, was exactly the law already in force without formal amendment. Hence it would follow that the conviction of the appellants in respect of all the offences of which they are charged including the extra-territorial offence said to have been committed by the first appellant at New Delhi is not open to the objection under article 20 on the ground that it. is a conviction under an ex post facto law .\n\n. '\n\n• • •\n\nAs regards t, he amendments in th\\l Criminal Proced- 1953 ure Code brought about .by Ordinances Nos. XV of Rao Shiv 1948 dated the 31st December, 1948, and XXVII of Bahad'\" Singh 1949 dated the 3rd May, 1949, no detailed consideraand Another tion is necessary in view of what has been held at the v. outset that the constitutional objection under artiv::a~.::~~;{.h. cle 20 does not apply to a change in procedure or change of court. Items 62 and 63 of section 2 of JagannadhadM Ordinance No. XV of 1948 would seem to indicate J. that the jurisdiction which the criminal courts of Vindhya Pradesh previously had to try extra-territorial offences was probably lost thereby. If so, that jurisdiction was restored under Ordinance XXVII of 1949 by the amendment thereby of the said items 62 and 63 thus bringing it into line with section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, with the requisite adaptations.\n\nHence the power of the Vindhya Pradesh courts to hold trials for extra-territorial offences which was probably interrupted from 31st December, 1948,\n\nwas restored on 3rd May, 1949, before the trial in this case commenced with retrospective operation, i.e., as from the date of the prior Orclinance, i.e., 31st December, 1948.\n\nIn the result, we hold that ( 1) The appeal to the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal by the Special Judge was competent; (2) The trial of the appellants under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Ordinance No. V of 1949 is not open to objection under article 14 of the Constitution; (3) The criminal law relating to the offences charged against the appellants at the time of their commission was substantially the same as that which obtained at the time of the convictions and sentences by the appellate court. This was so both in respect of offences committed within the limits of the State of Vindhya Pradesh and those committed outside it ;\n\n(4) The law relating to the offence committed by the first appellant outside the State of Vindhya Pradesh (at New Delhi) was perfectly within the competence of the appropriate legislative authority at t.he relevant\n\n• • •\n\n1953 time; and (5) Conequent on 3 and 4 ab, ove, the objection to the convictions and sentences of the appellants Rao Shiv under article 20 is not sustainable.\n\nBahadur Singh\n\nand Another The appeal is accordingly directed to be posted for\n\n\"'h 3v. ' consideration whether it is to be heard on the .1. e tateoJ .\n\nVindhya Pradesh. Il101'ItS.\n\nJ a.gannadhadas\n\nOrder accordingly.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha .", "total_entities": 274, "entities": [{"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 223, "end_char": 239, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. L. 11fehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 412, "end_char": 425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioners: K. L. 11fehta."}}, {"text": "P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 460, "end_char": 466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Lal."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 497, "end_char": 508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4: S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 511, "end_char": 545, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF VINDHYAPRADESH.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 552, "end_char": 580, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 617, "end_char": 628, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 631, "end_char": 643, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 668, "end_char": 689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 697, "end_char": 702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts.14 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1066, "end_char": 1080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Integration of States and Vindhwi Pradesh Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1081, "end_char": 1132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1448, "end_char": 1455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Integration of States and Vindhwi Pradesh Ordinance", "statute": "Integration of States and Vindhwi Pradesh Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1483, "end_char": 1500, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "8th March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1827, "end_char": 1842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XLV III of 1949, the facts alleged against them being that they entered into a conspiracy in February, 1949, at Rewa to obtain illegal gratification for revoking a previous Government Order and in pursuance of that conspiracy the second appellant domanded such gratification on 8th March, 1949, at Rewa and the first appellant received Rs."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1935, "end_char": 1944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25,000 towards it on the 11th April, 1949, at New Delhi and forged certain documents purporting to be official orders."}}, {"text": "ss. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2197, "end_char": 2204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2274, "end_char": 2284, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2368, "end_char": 2381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tqe validity of the trial and convictions was cha!- 1963 longed on appeal to the Supreme Court inter alia on the ground that they contrnvenecl arts."}}, {"text": "arts. 14 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2430, "end_char": 2445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bahadur Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2546, "end_char": 2559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 and 20 of the Constitution and on Rao Shiv the ground that no appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioner from Bahadur Singh the order of the Special Judge.", "canonical_name": "Bahadur Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623, "end_char": 2627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 410", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2923, "end_char": 2929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3263, "end_char": 3269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vindbya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3309, "end_char": 3324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) That the trial of the appellants did not contravene art.14 of the Constitution inasmuch as in the Vindbya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code las amended) which was in force at the commencement of the trial (namely 2nd December, 1949) there was no provision requiring all trials before Courts of Sessions to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors, and the fact that the entire Criminal Procedure Code including s. 268 thereof was extended to Vindbya Pradesh on the 16th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "2nd December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3422, "end_char": 3440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) That the trial of the appellants did not contravene art.14 of the Constitution inasmuch as in the Vindbya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code las amended) which was in force at the commencement of the trial (namely 2nd December, 1949) there was no provision requiring all trials before Courts of Sessions to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors, and the fact that the entire Criminal Procedure Code including s. 268 thereof was extended to Vindbya Pradesh on the 16th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3592, "end_char": 3615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 268", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3626, "end_char": 3632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "16th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3680, "end_char": 3696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) That the trial of the appellants did not contravene art.14 of the Constitution inasmuch as in the Vindbya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code las amended) which was in force at the commencement of the trial (namely 2nd December, 1949) there was no provision requiring all trials before Courts of Sessions to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors, and the fact that the entire Criminal Procedure Code including s. 268 thereof was extended to Vindbya Pradesh on the 16th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3799, "end_char": 3803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4024, "end_char": 4031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4142, "end_char": 4149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4500, "end_char": 4510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4857, "end_char": 4864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5811, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5948, "end_char": 5963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(vii) By virtue of the Orders of the Regent of Rewa of 1921 and 1922, the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code with the necessary adaptations were in force in the Rewa State and either became extended to tho entire Vindhya Pradesh 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6832, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6837, "end_char": 6843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7230, "end_char": 7238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7388, "end_char": 7399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7414, "end_char": 7435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathp", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7732, "end_char": 7743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rewa, in Criminal Case No, l ()f 1949,\n\nG. S. Pathp, k (K. B. Asthana, with him), for the appellant No."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7748, "end_char": 7761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rewa, in Criminal Case No, l ()f 1949,\n\nG. S. Pathp, k (K. B. Asthana, with him), for the appellant No."}}, {"text": "M. G. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7837, "end_char": 7851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7882, "end_char": 7894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "article 134( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8139, "end_char": 8154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government, Commerce and Industries Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8319, "end_char": 8365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first and the second appellants were at the material period of time respectively the Minister for Industries and the Secretary to the Government, Commerce and Industries Department of the then United State of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "United State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8378, "end_char": 8409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first and the second appellants were at the material period of time respectively the Minister for Industries and the Secretary to the Government, Commerce and Industries Department of the then United State of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Panna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case for the prosecution against them is as follows : In the State of Panna (one of the component units of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh) there are certain diamond mines."}}, {"text": "1st of August, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8618, "end_char": 8637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement dated the 1st of August, 1936, between the Panna Dur bar on the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate on the other part, the latter obtained a lease for carrying out diamond-mining operations for a period of 15 years."}}, {"text": "Panna Dur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8651, "end_char": 8660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement dated the 1st of August, 1936, between the Panna Dur bar on the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate on the other part, the latter obtained a lease for carrying out diamond-mining operations for a period of 15 years."}}, {"text": "Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8689, "end_char": 8719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement dated the 1st of August, 1936, between the Panna Dur bar on the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining Syndicate on the other part, the latter obtained a lease for carrying out diamond-mining operations for a period of 15 years."}}, {"text": "31st October, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8868, "end_char": 8886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on or about the 31st October, 1947, the Panna Durbar directed the stoppage of the mining work on the ground that the Syndicate was not carrying on the operations properly."}}, {"text": "Rewa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9340, "end_char": 9344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that the two appellants in the course of these attempts, with which, at the material time, they were concerned in their official capacity, entered into a conspiracy about the beginning of February 1949 at Rewa (within the United State ofVindhya Pradesh), to obtain illegal gratification for the purpose of revoking the previous order of stoppage of mining work."}}, {"text": "ofVindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9370, "end_char": 9387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that the two appellants in the course of these attempts, with which, at the material time, they were concerned in their official capacity, entered into a conspiracy about the beginning of February 1949 at Rewa (within the United State ofVindhya Pradesh), to obtain illegal gratification for the purpose of revoking the previous order of stoppage of mining work."}}, {"text": "Rao Shiv Bahadhur Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9674, "end_char": 9697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the said conspiracy it is alleged that the second appellant demanded on 8th March, 1949, at Rewa illegal gratification from one Xt1gindils 1Iehta, a\n\n• •\n\n196J\n\nRao Shiv Bahadhur Singh\n\nand Another\n\nThe State of V indhya Pradesl~.\n\nJ agannadh.00."}}, {"text": "State of V indhya Pradesl~.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9716, "end_char": 9743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the said conspiracy it is alleged that the second appellant demanded on 8th March, 1949, at Rewa illegal gratification from one Xt1gindils 1Iehta, a\n\n• •\n\n196J\n\nRao Shiv Bahadhur Singh\n\nand Another\n\nThe State of V indhya Pradesl~.\n\nJ agannadh.00.", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesl~."}}, {"text": "J agannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10218, "end_char": 10232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J agannadhadas J.\n\nOn these allegations the two appellants were charged for criminal conspiracy and for the taking of illegal gratification by a public 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"Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11029, "end_char": 11046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11153, "end_char": 11164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11218, "end_char": 11229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11231, "end_char": 11248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 465 and 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11324, "end_char": 11344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11480, "end_char": 11491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11505, "end_char": 11516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11667, "end_char": 11685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12142, "end_char": 12151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12337, "end_char": 12346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 5( 1 ), 7 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12667, "end_char": 12691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12762, "end_char": 12771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12805, "end_char": 12814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12916, "end_char": 12942, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13369, "end_char": 13378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13453, "end_char": 13462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13564, "end_char": 13599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13878, "end_char": 13887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code", "statute": "Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code"}}, {"text": "VindhyaPradesh court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14443, "end_char": 14463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f a nght f appea may be a lacuna, bll:t tht and Another masmuch as rt has not been expressly provided, rt\n\nv. cannot be implied from the fact that a provision has _The State of been made for the exercise of powers by the appellate VindhyaPradesh court."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14782, "end_char": 14791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15054, "end_char": 15080, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 410\n\nand 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15478, "end_char": 15499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "is urged that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15773, "end_char": 15832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15874, "end_char": 15883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But it is urged that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "But it is urged that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 410", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16709, "end_char": 16720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But it is urged that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "But it is urged that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16724, "end_char": 16735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But it is urged that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "But it is urged that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17727, "end_char": 17736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17923, "end_char": 17933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Lakshmandas Ahuja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17967, "end_char": 17984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reliance on Lakshmandas Ahuja's case(') it was sought to be argued that though the trial in this case under Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "26th July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18402, "end_char": 18417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to be noticed that the trial commenced on 2nd December, 1949, the acquittal by the Sessions Judge was on 26th July, 1950, and the conviction by the Judicial Commissioner on appeal therefrom was on 10th March, 1~51."}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nRao Shiv Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18638, "end_char": 18661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• •\n\nT9S3 light, however, of the later decision of the Supreme\n\nRao Shiv Court in Syed Qasim Razvi v. The 8tcite of Hyderabad('), s .. hadur Singli it was recognised that this point was unsubstantial, and Anoth,,·."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19148, "end_char": 19174, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "3rd May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19232, "end_char": 19245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXVIII ofl949 dated 3rd May, 1949, whereby section 268, Criminal Procedure Code, requiring all trials before a Court of Session to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors was deleted from the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code as adapted."}}, {"text": "section 268", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19255, "end_char": 19266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19268, "end_char": 19291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19857, "end_char": 19866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court of Session to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors was deleted from the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Court of Session to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors was deleted from the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20135, "end_char": 20161, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 268", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20206, "end_char": 20217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court of Session to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors was deleted from the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Court of Session to be either by jury or with the aid of assessors was deleted from the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20219, "end_char": 20242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20296, "end_char": 20305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20613, "end_char": 20622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21357, "end_char": 21370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the saving provision applies equally to proceedings Jagannadhadas previously commenced and then pending, whether J. before the special court or the ordinary 0ourt, and that therefore in respect of two persons equally situated in this behalf, one under trial by the ordinary court and the other by the special court, the position continues what it was before, i.e., the continuance of trial does not involve any substantially discriminatory and prejudicial procedure.", "canonical_name": "J agannadhadas"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22182, "end_char": 22192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22437, "end_char": 22447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22643, "end_char": 22660, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22679, "end_char": 22692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question arises from the fact that the charges as against the two appellants, in terms, refer to the 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principle underlying such prohibition has been very elaborately discussed and pointed out in the very learned judgment of Justice 'Villes in the well known case of Phillips v. 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Bull (2)."}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25210, "end_char": 25220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25906, "end_char": 25916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26315, "end_char": 26325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26611, "end_char": 26620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26767, "end_char": 26777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27269, "end_char": 27279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27456, "end_char": 27466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28180, "end_char": 28190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28471, "end_char": 28481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28531, "end_char": 28542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of 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the effect of bringing this Ordinance into J. force from 9th August, 1949, it cannot be said that the convictions are not in respect of \"a law in force\" at the time when the offences were committed."}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30642, "end_char": 30652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30920, "end_char": 30930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31371, "end_char": 31381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31483, "end_char": 31493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32066, "end_char": 32076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33320, "end_char": 33329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34197, "end_char": 34207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34351, "end_char": 34360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34368, "end_char": 34385, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34828, "end_char": 34837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh or any part thereof any law corresponding to the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34924, "end_char": 35006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "11th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35226, "end_char": 35246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged that as a result of these two provisions the pre-existing law, if any, has been repealed as from 9th August, 1948, and that therefore the period between 9th August, 1948, and 11th September, 1949, on which date Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35620, "end_char": 35630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vindhya Pradesh or any part thereof any law corresponding to the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Vindhya Pradesh or any part thereof any law corresponding to the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "BahadurSinuh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36630, "end_char": 36642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to have a\n\nRao Shiv correct appreciation of the events which resulted in BahadurSinuh bringing about a United State of Vindhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "Bahadur Singh"}}, {"text": "State ofVindhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36710, "end_char": 36733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Another The State ofVindhya Pradesh consists of as many \"· as 35 pre-existing native States known as Bundelkhand ,,, Tdhle 81P01'a0f 1 and Baghhelkand States of which the State of Rewa •in iya '\" e.n 1 h 1 .", "canonical_name": "State of V indhya Pradesl~."}}, {"text": "JauannarlhadaB the passing of the Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36965, "end_char": 37022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37054, "end_char": 37063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JauannarlhadaB the 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Covenant vested in the Rajpramukh the entire legislative authority of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh until a Constitution to be framed by the appropriate body for the said United State ofVindhya Pradesh provided otherwise."}}, {"text": "Maharajah of Rewa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38259, "end_char": 38276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Maharajah of Rewa became the first Rajpramukh of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, and we are informed that though the Covenant provided the 1st day of May, 1948, as the date within which the administration is 'to be made over to the Rajpramukh by each of the States, some did not, and that, as a fact, the integrated administration by the Rajpramukh in respect of all States came into operation only from the 9th of August, 1948."}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38294, "end_char": 38304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Maharajah of Rewa became the first Rajpramukh of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, and we are informed that though the Covenant provided the 1st day of May, 1948, as the date within which the administration is 'to be made over to the Rajpramukh by each of the States, some did not, and that, as a fact, the integrated administration by the Rajpramukh in respect of all States came into operation only from the 9th of August, 1948.", "canonical_name": "Rajpramukh"}}, {"text": "1st day of May, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38403, "end_char": 38423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Maharajah of Rewa became the first Rajpramukh of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, and we are informed that though the Covenant provided the 1st day of May, 1948, as the date within which the administration is 'to be made over to the Rajpramukh by each of the States, some did not, and that, as a fact, the integrated administration by the Rajpramukh in respect of all States came into operation only from the 9th of August, 1948."}}, {"text": "9th of August, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38672, "end_char": 38691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Maharajah of Rewa became the first Rajpramukh of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, and we are informed that though the Covenant provided the 1st day of May, 1948, as the date within which the administration is 'to be made over to the Rajpramukh by each of the States, some did not, and that, as a fact, the integrated administration by the Rajpramukh in respect of all States came into operation only from the 9th of August, 1948."}}, {"text": "RaJpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39149, "end_char": 39159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instrument of Access10n was executed by the RaJpramukh on behalf of the United State of Vindhya Jagannadhadas Pradesh on the 20th of July, 1948, and was accepted J. by the Governor-General of India on the 13th of September, 1949.", "canonical_name": "Rajpramukh"}}, {"text": "20th of July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39230, "end_char": 39248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instrument of Access10n was executed by the RaJpramukh on behalf of the United State of Vindhya Jagannadhadas Pradesh on the 20th of July, 1948, and was accepted J. by the Governor-General of India on the 13th of September, 1949."}}, {"text": "13th of September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39310, "end_char": 39333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instrument of Access10n was executed by the RaJpramukh on behalf of the United State of Vindhya Jagannadhadas Pradesh on the 20th of July, 1948, and was accepted J. by the Governor-General of India on the 13th of September, 1949."}}, {"text": "III of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39791, "end_char": 39855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "legislature of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39910, "end_char": 39930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and III of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, were accepted as the matters in respect of which the legislature of India, then called the Dominion Legislature, might make laws for the United State of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "25th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40064, "end_char": 40083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may also be mentioned that on the 25th November, 1949, the Rajpramukh of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh issued a proclamation whereby he declared that the Constitution of India which was then shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall be the Constitution for the Vindhya Pradesh as for the other parts of India and specifically superseded and abrogated all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith which were then in force in this State."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40190, "end_char": 40211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40557, "end_char": 40588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These arrangements brought about an integrated United State of Vindhya Pradesh within the frame work vf the Dominion of India but only by way of accession."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40618, "end_char": 40635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These arrangements brought about an integrated United State of Vindhya Pradesh within the frame work vf the Dominion of India but only by way of accession."}}, {"text": "State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41043, "end_char": 41067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1953 It is against this background of events constituting the integration of these various ruler S'tates into the B a; Sh;~ z \"Cnited State of Vindhya Pradesh within the Union of\n\n;,,',; ;;,0,;~;' India by accession thereto that the question as to what v. was the criminal law in force by February, March and\n\nThe State of April, 1949, has got to be judged."}}, {"text": "Government of the United State of Vindhya agannadaadas", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41375, "end_char": 41429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "narration it will be noticed that at the relevant period\n\nJ ---; it was the Government of the United State of Vindhya agannadaadas p d h 't t d b h ' t t' C J ra es consti u e y t e inter se m egra 10n ove- ."}}, {"text": "18th March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41523, "end_char": 41539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nant dated the 18th March, 1948, that was functioning under the authority of the Rajpramukh of Vindhya Pradesh and subject to the Instrument of Accession with the Dominion of India executed by him on the 20th July, 1948."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41671, "end_char": 41688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nant dated the 18th March, 1948, that was functioning under the authority of the Rajpramukh of Vindhya Pradesh and subject to the Instrument of Accession with the Dominion of India executed by him on the 20th July, 1948."}}, {"text": "20th July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41712, "end_char": 41727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nant dated the 18th March, 1948, that was functioning under the authority of the Rajpramukh of Vindhya Pradesh and subject to the Instrument of Accession with the Dominion of India executed by him on the 20th July, 1948."}}, {"text": "31st July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42481, "end_char": 42496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first step towards the introduction of some uniformity in the laws for the entire State was taken by the Rajpramukh by issuing on the 31st July, 1948, an Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42501, "end_char": 42567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42584, "end_char": 42593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43277, "end_char": 43286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43405, "end_char": 43414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws Ordinance"}}, {"text": "18th February, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43879, "end_char": 43898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IV of 1921 and VI of 1922 issued by the then Regent of Rewa acting for the Maharajah on the 18th February, 1921, and 9th March, 1922, respectively."}}, {"text": "9th March, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43904, "end_char": 43919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IV of 1921 and VI of 1922 issued by the then Regent of Rewa acting for the Maharajah on the 18th February, 1921, and 9th March, 1922, respectively."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44085, "end_char": 44102, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44111, "end_char": 44137, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44414, "end_char": 44431, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44440, "end_char": 44466, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44805, "end_char": 44814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45147, "end_char": 45157, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "15th May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45557, "end_char": 45571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 h th t 0 d' bl' j d , h Bahadu,· Singh at10n on y w en a r mance was pu ts ie m t e and Another Vindhya Pradesh Gazette, i.e., on the 15th May, 1949,\n\nv. sometime after the commission of the offence in this\n\n."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45933, "end_char": 45959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To substantiate the view that only such of the Vmdhya Prade8/i. Rewa laws which were previously published in the\n\nJ - Rewa Gazette were understood as having been origiagmmadhadas 11 t d d t v dh p d h b 0 d' N J na y ex en e o m ya ra es y r mance o. lV of 1948, a decision of the Vindhya Pradesh High Court dated the 29th October, 1949, in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "29th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45970, "end_char": 45988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To substantiate the view that only such of the Vmdhya Prade8/i. Rewa laws which were previously published in the\n\nJ - Rewa Gazette were understood as having been origiagmmadhadas 11 t d d t v dh p d h b 0 d' N J na y ex en e o m ya ra es y r mance o. lV of 1948, a decision of the Vindhya Pradesh High Court dated the 29th October, 1949, in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46239, "end_char": 46265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other side a notification of Vindhya Pradesh Government dated the 19th March, 1949, and published in the Vindhya Pradesh Gazette dated the 30th ;\\Iarch, 1949, has been brought to our notice which specifically mentions all the laws by then in force in Vindhya Pradesh and shows \"Indian Penal Code-mutatis mutandis-with necessary adaptations\" as item 86 thereof."}}, {"text": "19th March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46276, "end_char": 46292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other side a notification of Vindhya Pradesh Government dated the 19th March, 1949, and published in the Vindhya Pradesh Gazette dated the 30th ;\\Iarch, 1949, has been brought to our notice which specifically mentions all the laws by then in force in Vindhya Pradesh and shows \"Indian Penal Code-mutatis mutandis-with necessary adaptations\" as item 86 thereof."}}, {"text": "30th ;\\Iarch, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46349, "end_char": 46367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other side a notification of Vindhya Pradesh Government dated the 19th March, 1949, and published in the Vindhya Pradesh Gazette dated the 30th ;\\Iarch, 1949, has been brought to our notice which specifically mentions all the laws by then in force in Vindhya Pradesh and shows \"Indian Penal Code-mutatis mutandis-with necessary adaptations\" as item 86 thereof."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46488, "end_char": 46505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47294, "end_char": 47311, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47421, "end_char": 47430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "United State ofVindhya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47685, "end_char": 47707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But even assuming that section 2 of the Ordinance failed to achieve its purpose on account of misconception as to the previous publication of any particular Rewa law in the Rewa Gazette,\n\n' •\n\nit is clear that that Rewa law would continue to be in 1953 force in the Rew'a portion of the United State ofVindhya R\n\nS' . ."}}, {"text": "Itewa State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48254, "end_char": 48265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since in the present Vindhya Prad,, h. case we are concerned with offences committed in rela- Jagannadhadas tion to the Rewa State portion of Vindhya Pra- J. desh, there can be no reasonable difficulty in holding that the criminal law of Itewa State, i.e., the lndian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code with adaptations mutatis mutandis, was the relevant law for our present purpose by the date of integrated administration, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48284, "end_char": 48326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "9th August, 194.8", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48459, "end_char": 48476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 9th August, 194.8."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48718, "end_char": 48735, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "So far as the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48954, "end_char": 48991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49114, "end_char": 49133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XV of 1948 dated the 31st December, 1948, and (2) the Criminal Procedure Code Adaptation (Amendment) Ordinance\n\nu. XXVII of 1949 dated the 3rd May, 1949."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49366, "end_char": 49383, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49531, "end_char": 49552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that by virtue of the Orders of the Regent of Rewa dated 1921 and 1922 the Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code with the necessary adaptations rnutatis mutandis were in force in Itewa 8tate and either became extended to the entire Vindhya Pradesh State from the 9th August, 1948, by Ordinance :N\"u."}}, {"text": "Rao Shiv", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49966, "end_char": 49974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IV of 1948 or continued tu be in force in the ltcwa portion ofVindhya Pratlesh State\n\nhy virtue of the principle in \"vlayor of Lyons' case ( 1) it is prima facie correct to say that the penal law in force\n\n(r) 1 M. I. A. 175 •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR.TS (1953]\n\n1953 in the relevant area was substantially , the same both before and after the above-mentioned amendments Rao Shiv d b h R .", "canonical_name": "Rao Shiv"}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50334, "end_char": 50344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50361, "end_char": 50378, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50383, "end_char": 50394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50964, "end_char": 50981, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51031, "end_char": 51041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51227, "end_char": 51237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51245, "end_char": 51262, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51291, "end_char": 51299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51303, "end_char": 51313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51323, "end_char": 51333, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Minister under the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51557, "end_char": 51599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51872, "end_char": 51889, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1945] F. C.R. 195", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 52088, "end_char": 52106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52135, "end_char": 52145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Minister under the Government of India Act", "statute": "Minister under the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52147, "end_char": 52164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Rewa State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52504, "end_char": 52523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Rewa State, and that the change brought about by VnidhyaPmdesh."}}, {"text": "VnidhyaPmdesh.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52562, "end_char": 52576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Rewa State, and that the change brought about by VnidhyaPmdesh."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53048, "end_char": 53058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53060, "end_char": 53077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 53358, "end_char": 53380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The furthAr qirnstion that remains to be considered is whether under the Vindhya Pradesh law, acts committed outside the State are offences and are triable by Vindhya Pradesh courts, and whether in any case there was any such law in factual operation at the date when the acts charged as offences in this case were committed at New Delhi in April, 1949."}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53621, "end_char": 53637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53639, "end_char": 53656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53662, "end_char": 53673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53675, "end_char": 53698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "can be no doubt that the provisions of the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54113, "end_char": 54198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pitt-Gobbet", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55048, "end_char": 55059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagan; adhodas But the concept of extra-territorial legislation appears\n\n to comprehend such cases also, if the passages relied on before us from Pitt-Gobbet's International Law, 5th Edition, at page 216 as also at pages 225 and 226paragraphs l.01 and 102, are to be accepted as correct."}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55313, "end_char": 55330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming without deciding that this is so, the argument has been advanced that no ruler of the Indian\n\nStates, before the 15th August, 1947, and much less the Rajpramukh of Vindhya Pradesh, had any such full sovereign status as to entitle them to pass extraterritorial laws."}}, {"text": "Henry Maine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56040, "end_char": 56051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In their relation with the rulers of the native States, the suzerain British power acted on the juristic theory propounded by Sir Henry Maine that \"sovereignty is divisible, though independence is not\"-See Ilbert's Government of India, page 425-a theory accepted in the Butler Committee Report on Indian States (1928-29) at page 25, paragraph 44."}}, {"text": "Ilbert", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56300, "end_char": 56306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pitssages at pages 398, 399 and 426 of Ilbert's Government; of India would show that what may have been left of internal sovereignty <; o a particular ruler may in exceptional mises be nothing more than titular."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57459, "end_char": 57472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the policy of the Government of India not to allow native courts to exercise jurisdiction in the case of European British subjects but to require them either to be tried by the British courts established in the Native State, or to be sent for trial before a court in British India."}}, {"text": "Lee Warner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58108, "end_char": 58118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lee Warner in his book on \"Protected Princes of India\" states the position at pages 351 and 352."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58594, "end_char": 58607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following extract from paragraph 143 at page 351 is instructive :\n\n\"But where, as in the case of European British subjects, material distinctions in religion, education, 11nd social habits separate them from the native community, and justify the extension to them of those rights of ex-territoriality, which are still obtained for them by C11pitulations a, nd agreements with foreign\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n• •\n\nIP63 non-Christian nations, these distinctiol'.l$ are absent in\n\nHao Shiv the case of nat!ve nd!an sbjects ?", "canonical_name": "J agannadhadas"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58790, "end_char": 58792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59288, "end_char": 59306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The British Government goes still farther, since it extradites to the Native State a native Indian subject, who, after the commission of an extraditable offence in the Native principality, seeks shelter in British territory, provided that the political agent is satisfied that the crime can be properly tried in the courts of the Native State."}}, {"text": "Rewa State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60691, "end_char": 60701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this context an old treaty of 1813 between Rewa State and the British Government and a fairly recent judgment of the Rewa High Court in 1945 have been brought to our notice to show the contrary at least so far as Rewa State is concerned."}}, {"text": "Rewa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 60765, "end_char": 60780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this context an old treaty of 1813 between Rewa State and the British Government and a fairly recent judgment of the Rewa High Court in 1945 have been brought to our notice to show the contrary at least so far as Rewa State is concerned."}}, {"text": "Article 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60999, "end_char": 61008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of the Rewa State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61320, "end_char": 61343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of the Rewa State to enact legislation concerning its own Vindhya Prad .. h. subjects when they commit such oences outside the Jagannadhad\"> State."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62734, "end_char": 62751, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64153, "end_char": 64174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64192, "end_char": 64201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nConstitution of India", "statute": "the\n\nConstitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 99(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64254, "end_char": 64267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nConstitution of India", "statute": "the\n\nConstitution of India"}}, {"text": "Accession to amend or adapt the Indian Penal Code or the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64487, "end_char": 64567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64600, "end_char": 64616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Accession to amend or adapt the Indian Penal Code or the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Accession to amend or adapt the Indian Penal Code or the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64618, "end_char": 64635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64641, "end_char": 64652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64654, "end_char": 64677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65205, "end_char": 65217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65449, "end_char": 65458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65940, "end_char": 65951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 99 to 104", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66786, "end_char": 66804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66865, "end_char": 66876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67152, "end_char": 67160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68578, "end_char": 68594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68610, "end_char": 68614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68620, "end_char": 68631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal\n\nCode", "statute": "Indian Penal\n\nCode"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68633, "end_char": 68656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68864, "end_char": 68880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68888, "end_char": 68905, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69419, "end_char": 69429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69964, "end_char": 69973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70337, "end_char": 70348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70350, "end_char": 70373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71016, "end_char": 71026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Rao Shiv", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71747, "end_char": 71755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was so both in respect of offences committed within the limits of the State of Vindhya Pradesh and those committed outside it ;\n\n(4) The law relating to the offence committed by the first appellant outside the State of Vindhya Pradesh (at New Delhi) was perfectly within the competence of the appropriate legislative authority at t.he relevant\n\n• • •\n\n1953 time; and (5) Conequent on 3 and 4 ab, ove, the objection to the convictions and sentences of the appellants Rao Shiv under article 20 is not sustainable.", "canonical_name": "Rao Shiv"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71762, "end_char": 71772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 72039, "end_char": 72054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 72083, "end_char": 72101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_503_519_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "s.ci.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 503\n\nplaced on them by the senior Judge in the High 1952 Court and that was the true construction of these two sub-sections.\n\nThis argument, in our opinion, h~ no Commissioner 01 l'd' Th d' h d . . b Income-tax va i ity. e epartment c ange its vew su se- Madras ' quently and amended the manual.\n\nThe mterpretav. tion placed by the department on these sub-sections K Srinivasa\" cannot be considered to be a proper guide in a matter and K. Gopa!an like this when the construction of a statute is involved.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nThe result is that we allow the appeal and hold that the answer given by the senior Judge to the question referred was wrong and that the answer given by Viswanatha Sastri J. was the correct one. In the circumstances of this case we would ma.ke no order as to costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nAgent for the respondent: M. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\nKALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER 19oa v.\n\nPALANI BALA DEVI AND OTHERS.\n\n[MUKHERJEA, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, and\n\nGHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nHindii law-Religious endownients-Shebaiti right-Succession by widow-Nature and extent of widow's rights-Alienation by widow-Suit by reversioner against alienee-Liniitation-Article applicable-Starting point-Adverse possession against widow, whether adverse to reversioner-Li11iitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts. 124, 141.\n\nThough there is an element in shebaiti right which has the 111g\\l, l (lh\\l,!Mt11ristics of property, shebaitship is property of a peculiar and anomalous character and it cannot come under the category of immoveable property as it is known in law.\n\nOn the other hand it is clear that a shebaiti right is a hereditary office and as\n\nJan.16.\n\nKalipada Chakraborti and Anoth13r\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.\n\nsuch comes within the express language of Art. 124 of the Limitation ... ct. A. suit by a reversioner for recovery of a shebaiti right from persons to whom a Hindu widow, who had succeeded to the rlght on the death of her husband, had alienated it, is governed by Art. 124 of the Limitation Act and not by Art. 141, and the possession of the alienee becomes adverse to the reversioner and the period of limitation begins to run against the reversioner only when the succession opens to him, as be does not claim under the widow but under the last male holder.\n\nGnanasambanda v. Velit ([1900] 27 I.A. 69) explained.\n\nWhatever might be said about the office of a trustee, which car1ies no beneficial interest with it, a shebaitship combines in it both the elements of office and property. As the shebaiti interest is heritable and follows the line of inheritance from the founder, when the heir is a female she must be deemed to have what is known as , vidow's estate in the shebaiti interest. Ordinarily there\n\nare two limitations upon a widow's estate. In the first place, her rights of alienation are restricted and in the second place, after her death the property goes not to her heirs but to the heirs of the last male owner. The second element is present in the case of succession to the rights of a female shebait. As regards the first, it is quite true that regarding the powers of alienation, a female shebait is restricted in th8 same manner as the male shebait, but that is because there are certain limitations and restrictions attached to and inherent in the shebaiti right itself which exist irrespective of the fact whether the shebaitship vests in a male or a female heir.\n\nPydigantan v. Rania Dass ([1905] I.L.R. 28 Mad. 197) and.\n\nLilabati v. Bishen ([1907] 6 O.L.J. 621) commented upon.\n\nThe rule that adverse possession against a Hindu wido\\V cannot be reckoned as adverse possession against the reversionary heirs, is not a special rule which rests entirely upon the particular provision of Art. 141 of the Limitation Act and confined in its operation to cases \\vhich come within the purview of that article.\n\nIt is in accordance with the ackno\\\\•ledged principles of Hindu law and the general principle that as the right of the reversioner::; is in the nature of spes successionis and they do not trace that title through or from the widow, it would be manifestly unjust if they are to lose their rights by the negligence or sufferance of the widow.\n\nSrinath Kuer v. Promnno Kwnar {[1883] I.L.R. 9 Cal. 934), Ranchordas v. Parvati °([1899] 26 I.A. 71), Jaggo v. atsava ([1929] 56 I.A. 267) approved.\n\nKatama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivcu; miga ([1925] 52 I.A. 332) referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated 19th June, 1950, of the High Court of\n\n. >\n\n. i. --\n\nJudicature at Calcutta (Das and Guba JJ.) in Appeal from Original Decree No. 48 of of 1949, a.rising out of Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd Dece1ber, 1948, of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court, 24-Pargauas, in Title Suit No. 53 of 1944.\n\nN. c. Chatterjee (A. K. Dutt, with him) for the appellants.\n\nPanchanan Ghose (Radha Kanta Bhattacharya, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953. January 16. The Judg, meut of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-'rhis appeai is on behalf of the plaintiffs and is directed against the judgment and decree of a Division -Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated June 19, 1950, reversing, on appeal, those of the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, 24-Pargauas, passed in Title Suit No. 53 of 1944.\n\nThe facts material for our present purpose are not in dispute and the controversy between the parties practically centres round one short point, namely, whether or not the plaintiffs' suit is barred by limitation.\n\nThe trial court decided this point in favour of the plaintiffs, while the High Court has taken a contrary view in appeal.\n\nThe subject-matter of dispute is one-third share of shebaiti right in respect of a private debutter dedicated to an idol known by the name of Dakshiueshwar Jew and situated at a village called Dhop Dhopi within the district of 24-Pargauas in West Bengal.\n\nThe deity is au ancient one and its reputed founder and first she bait was one U dhab Chandra Pandit. It is not disputed that by successive devolutions the rights of the shebait came to vest in one Iswar Chandra Chakroborti, who was the common ancestor of the parties to this suit.\n\nThe following genealogical table will make clear the relationship of the several persons who figure as parties to the present litigation as between themselves ud also to their commo~ !l>ncestor.\n\nKalipada Ghakraborti and Anoth•r\n\nPalani Bala\n\nD•vi and Others.\n\nMukhe•'jea J.\n\nKaUpada Ghakraborti and Another\n\nv, Palani Bala\n\nDevi an.d Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nr-\n\nAshutsh\n\n(dead)\n\nIswar\n\n- -T- .. -\n\n1 -1---~I- I Govinda Gopal Sadananda Tralokhya Haran I I I m. Rajlakshmi I\n\nSurendra Sashi (adopted) I I\n\nni. Tarakali A bani (w) (Dett. •) ---·~---c\n\nN .I .\n\nI .\n\nKalt 1ma1 (Plfl, No. 2)\n\n1~.---i-- I Mon1 Sarat Surendra (dead)\n\n. I (adopted B1dhu by Gopa1) (Deft. 3) Bala (Deft. 1)\n\n(Plfl. No. I)\n\nI Nagendra\n\nPa Jani\n\nIswar died leaving six sons as his heirs and they were Ashutosh, Govinda, Gopal, Sadananda, Trailokhya and Haran. These six sons when they divided the properties of their father, divided the shebaiti right also which devolved upon them in six equal shares, and this 'division was by the method known as palaa or turns of worship, which means that to each one of the sons was allotted the right of worshipping the deity for 5 days every month and during these days he alone was to discharge the functions of the shebait and receive the emoluments attached to the office.\n\nGradually, a custom grew up in the family according to which these palas could be bought and sold or otherwise alienated amongst the members of the shebait's family.\n\nGovinda, who was the father of the plaintiffs and who got 5 days' pala every month in his share, sold his interest in the shebaiti to Haran, a brother of his, and the result was that Haran acquired 10 days' pala every month or onethird share in the entire shebaiti right.\n\nHaran died without any issue leaving him surviving, his widow Rajlaks)lmi as his sole heir under the Hindu law and Rajlakshmi continued to hold this one-third share of shebaiti right along with other properties of the deceased.\n\nOn 17th June, 1920, .Rajlakshmi granted an ijara lease of her shebaiti right for a term of two years to one Satish Chandra Dey. On 1st of April, 1921, Satish sold this leasehold interest in respect to the palas to one Ram Ra, khal Gh9s~.\n\nPrevious to that, on 6th of August, 1920, Ram Rakhal had himself taken a lease from Rajlakshmi of her shebaiti right for a period of 5 years, this leas~ to commence at the close of the previous lease in favour of Satish. Ram Rakhal admittedly got possession of the office of shebait and began to exercise his rights as such on and from the 1st of April, 1921. By a deed of conveyance dated the 7th of November, 1921, 1 Rajlakshmi made an out and out sale of her shebaiti right in favour of Ram Rakhal and twenty days after this purchase, that is to say, on 27th November, 1921, Ram Rakhal m his turn sold this interest to N agendra and Surendra, two of the sons oJ Trailokhya. Surendra died some time afterwards and on 20th of June, 1925, his widow Tarakali sold her husband's share iu the shebaiti right to N agendra, her husband's brother. Thus Nag~1i<lra in addition to what he had inherited from hid own father came to hold the entirety of a third share in the shebaiti right, represented by 10 days' pala every month,. which was previously held by Haran. Rajlakshmi died on 22nd December, 1943, and the two plaintiffs, who are the two surviving sons of Govinda, filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for recovery of possession of this one-third shebaiti right of Haran on the allegation that they were the next heirs of Haran at the time of Rajlakshmi's death.\n\nN agendra had died in the meantime and the first and the principal defendant in the suit is his daughter Palani Bala, who is a minor and is represented by her husband as guardian. The second defendant is the receiver, who has been placed in charge of the properties of Palani Bala in a guardianship proceeding pending before the District Judge of 24- Parganas. The defendants 3 and 4 are the surviving descendants of Iswar who hold the remaining interest in the shebaiti rig'ht.\n\nThe case of the plaintiffs, in substance, is that the one-third share of the shebaiti right, which was held by Haran during his lifetime, devolved upon his widow Rajlabhmi who had only the retricted right~\n\nKalipada Ohakraborti and Another\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.\n\nMukhe,.jea J.\n\nKfllipada Chakraborti and. Another\n\nI'alani Bala\n\nDevi and Others.\n\n}rf1ikherJea J.\n\n508 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS (1953)\n\nof a Hindu widow in. respect to the same.\n\nOn the death of the widow, the interest vested in the plaintiff~, who were the nearest heirs of Haran at the time of Rajlakshmi's death. .They, accordingly, prayed for being put in possession of this one-third share of the shebaiti right represented, as stated aforesaid, by 10 days' pala every month after evicting the defendant No. 1 therefrom. There was a claim also for mesne_profits from the date of the widow's death. In ' the plaint a description has been given of the temple, its appurtenant lands and also of the structures standing thereupon, but there is no prayer for possession in rspect of these properties.\n\nThe suit was resisted on behalf of defendant No. 1 and the main contention raised was that as the sale of her shebaiti right by Rajlakshmi, the widow of Haran, was a void tr-ansaction which did not create any right in the transferee, the possession of Ram Rakhal and after him his vendees, who were the predecessors of defendant No. 1, was adverse against all the shebaits, and the defendant No. 1 consequently acquired an indefeasible title to this third share in the shebaiti right by adverse possession and the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation.\n\nSeveral other contentions were raised but they are not material for our present purpose.\n\nT, he trial Judge by his judgment dated the 22nd December, 1948, overruled the pleas taken by the defendant and gave the plaintiffs a decree.\n\nOn the question of limitation, the Subardinate Judge held that althaugh article 141 of the Indian Limitation Act was not attracted to this case, yet the plaintiffs' suit was not barred by limitation. 'fwo reasons have been assigned for this view. It has been said in the first place that N agendra purported to purchase only the life interest of Rajlakshmi;. consequently his position as puryhaser was in recognition af the interest of the reversionary heirs of Haran. It is said fmther that as Rajlakshmi and N agendra were both co-shebaits af the deity, the possession of the\n\nlatter coqld not h::ive been advwse to the former1\n\n. ;\n\nr -\n\nthey being in th, e position of co-sharers in law and nothing like ouster being alleged or proved in this ca.se. • Against this judgment, the defendants 1 and 2 took an appeal to the Calcutta High Court and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Das and Gu ha J J. The learned Judges while affirming all the other findings arrived at by the trial judge disagreed with the latter on the question of limitation.\n\nIt was held by the High Court that the proper article to apply in this case-was article 124 of the J1imitation Act, and as the defendant No. 1 and her predecessors had been in possession of the hereditary office of the shebait adversely to the plaintiff for more than 12 years prior to the institution of the suit, the plaintiffs' claim was barred by limitation. [n this view, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the plaintiffs' suit dismissed.\n\nThe only point canvassed before us in this appeal is that of limitation and the arguments that have been advanced before us on this point by the learned counsel on both sides really raise two questions for our determination. The first is, whether on the facts of the present case the plaintiffs' suit is governed by article 124 or article 141 of the Limitation Act? If article 141 is the appropriate article, it is not disputed that the praintiffs' suit is well within time; but if article 124 is applicable, the other point that would require consideration .is, when did the defendant or her predecessors take possession of the hereditary office of shebait adversely to the plaintiffs? Was their possession adverse from the very date of the transfer by Rajlakshmi or did it become so only at her death ?\n\nThe proposition is well established that the alienation of the shebaiti right by a shebait in favour of a stranger is absolutely void in Hindn law and cannot be validated even on the footing of a cnstom.\n\nThe alienee of the right is, therefore, a trespasser out and out and his possession as against the transferor is adverse from the very beginning. Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the plaintiffs appellants has not assailed\n\nKalipada Ohakraborti and Another v.\n\nPalani Bala\n\nDevi and Others.\n\nM ulcher j ea J.\n\nalipada Chakraborti and Another\n\nPatani Bala\n\nDevi a1id Others.\n\nMukherjsa J.\n\nthe correctness of this proposition Qf law ;'his contention is that the possession of shebaitiright by defendant No. 1 and her predecessors might have been adverse against Rajlakshmi ever since the date of transfer and on the strength of such pdssession they might have acquired a statutory title against her in respect of the shebaiti interest; but such adverse possession for more than the statutory period though it might bar the widow would not bar the reversioners who do .not derive their title from or through her.\n\nThis, it is said, is the principle underlying the law of limitation in India ever since 1871 and article 141 of the Limitation Act expressly recognises and gives effect to it. It is contended by Mr. Chatterjee that even if article 141 does not apply to the facts of the present case and article 124 is taken to be the appropriate article, the plaintiffs' suit would be quite within time as the defendant or her predecessors must be held to have taken possession of thA officA of the shebait adversely to the present plaintiffs only when the widow died and not before that.\n\nOn the other hand, it has been argued by Mr.\n\nPanchanan Ghose that there is nothing like a general principle of law that adverse possession against a Hindu .widow could not be reckoned as adverse possession against her reversionary heirs. That, it is said, is only a special rule which rests entirely upon the particular provision of article 141 of the Limitation Act and is cqnfined in its oyeration to cases which come within the purview of that article. Mr. Ghose's contention is that article 141 has no application to the facts of this case and consequently there is no reason for holding that adverse possession against the widow if it was continued for the statutory period would not bar the reversionary heirs also. 'rhis, he says, was the law prior to the introduction of article 141 into the statute bciok and that is the law which governs all cases even now which do not directly come under that article. According to the learned counsel, article 124 is the proper article which governs this case and the possession of the transferee of the\n\nshebaiti interest being admittedly adverse to the holder of the office at the date of the transfer, it would be adverse against the next holder also, no matter whether strictly he derives his title from tlie\n\nprevious holder or not. It is urged that in the case of a hereditary office like that of a she bait, the powers of a female shebait are in no way more restricted than those of a male shebait and as the trust estate during the incumbency of a female shebait resides in her completely and effectually as in a male trustee, the male trustee who comes after her cannot claim the benefit of the principle upon which article 141 of the Limitation Act is founded. The points raised are no doubt important and require careful examination.\n\nIt may be mentioned at the outset that in the old Limitation Act (Act XXIV of 1859) there was no specific provision relating to suits by reversioners for recovery of possession of property held by a Hindu widow in her restricted right.\n\nThere were provisions only of a most general character contained in sections\n\n12 and 16 of the Act, .under which limitation for suits to recover immovable and movable properties was 12 and 6 years resp'ectively \" from the time the cause of action arose \".\n\nEven before this Act was passed, in a case (1) decided by the Supreme Court of Calcutta, Peel, C. J. made the following observation:\n\n\"It has been invariably considered for many years that the widow fully represented the estate, and it is also settled law that adverse possession which bars her bars the heir after her, wh1ch would not be the case if she were a mere tenant for life, as known to the English law \".\n\nIn 1863 the case of Katama Natchier v. Rajah of Shivagunga (2) was decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the proposition was laid down, which has not been questioned since then, that \"when the estate of a deceased Hindu has vested in a female heir, a decree fairly and properly obtained\n\n(I) Goluckmani v. Digambar, (1852) Macpherson on Mortgage, 2nd ed., 20.\n\n(2) (1861·63) 9 Moo. I.A, 539,\n\nKalipada Ghalcraborti and Another\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.\n\nMukharj•a J.\n\n19!J3\n\nKaZipada Chakraborti and Another v.\n\nPalani Bala\n\nDevi and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nagainst her in regard to her estate is in the absence of fraud or collusion binding on the reversionary heir\". 'l'urner L.J., who delivered the judgment of the B'oard, observed in course of his judgment :\n\n\" The whole estate would for the time be vested in her, a.bsolutely for some purposes, though, in some respects, for a qualified interest; and until her death it eould not be ascertained who would be entitled to succeed.\n\nThe same principle which has prevailed in the courts in this country as to tenants-in-tail representing the inheritance, would seem to apply to the case of a. Hindu widow; and it is obvious that there would be tbe greatest possible inconvenience in holding that the succeeding heirs were not bound by a decree fairly and properly obtained against the widow\". 'rhe case proceeded entirely on the footing that although the widow for some purposes has only a partial interest in her husband's estate, for other purposes the whole estate vests in her, and that her interest is somewhat akin to that of a tenant-in-tail under the English law. If the suit was not in respect of a personal claim against the widow but in respect of the estate which, in law, she fully represents, a decree fairly aud properly obtained would bind the reversionary interest('). There was absolutely no question of adverse possession raised in this case but the rule enunciated in it was relied upon in deciding several cases under the Limitation Act of 1859, where the questi_on arose as to whether adverse possession for more than .the statutory period, which bars the widow, would bar her reversionary heirs also.\n\nThe leading pronouncement on this point is to be found in Nobin Chunder v. Issur Chunder(') upon which Mr.\n\nGhosh has laid very great stress. In that case a trespasser had taken possession of the estate against the widow and it was held that such adverse possession was effective against the reversioners as well.\n\nThe cause of action, it was said, accrued to the widow and\n\n(1) Vide in this connection Jugal Kishore v, Jotendro, 1 c I.A. 66.' 73.\n\n(•) 9 W.R. 505,\n\n,. ..\n\na suit by her or by her reversioner must he brought within 12 years from the date of dispossession as laid down in section 12 of the Limit!l.tion Act of 1859.\n\nThe decision can certainly be justified on the law of limitation as it then stood. 'fhe Act of 1859 did not provide a separate rule as regards revers10ners and all suits for recovery of possession of immoveable property had to be brought within 12 years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. If there was a trespass against the widow, the commencement of the trespass would constitute the cause of action for the suit and a suit against the trespasser would have to be brought within 12 years, no matter whether it was brought by the widow or by the reversioner.\n\nThe learned Judges could not overlook the fact that it was not possible for the reversionary heirs to institute a suit for possession during the lifetime of the widow.\n\nThe difficulty, however, was got over by invoking the principle of \"representation of the estate by the widow\". enunciated in the Shivagunga case. Sir\n\nBarnes Peacock, C.J. observed as follows:\n\n\"It is said that the reversionary heirs could not sue for possession during the lifetime of the widow, and that therefore they ought not to be barred by any adverse holding against the widow at a time when they could not sue.\n\nBut when we look at the widow as a representative and see that the reversionary heirs are bound by decrees relating to her husband's estate which are obtitined against her without fraud or collusion, we are of opinion that they are also bound by limitation by which she, without fraud or collusion, is barred.\"\n\nSince an adverse decision against a widow was held binding upon a reversioner on the principle of representation of the estate, a similar result was held to follow in the case of adverse possession against her so as to put an end to the reversionary interest.\n\nThis principle was affirmed by the Privy Council in Aumirtolall v. Ra;'onee Kant(1) and Sir Barnes Peacock, who delivered the judgment, expressly affirmeq th()\n\n(r) (1874-75) 2 I.A. II~ .\n\nKalipada Ohakraborti and Another\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nKalipada Chakraborti\n\nand Another v.\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others ..\n\nMukherjea J,\n\ndecision in Nobin Ohunder v. Issur Ohunder (').\n\nIb may be noted here that though the Privy Council judgment in this case was passed in the year 1875 it\n\nw~1s a decision uuder the old Limitation Act of 1859.\n\nIn 1871 a new Limitation Act was passed which repealed the ear!i, er Act of 1859.\n\nArticle 142 of this Act (which corresponds to article 141 of the present Act) expressly prescribed a period of limitation of 12 years for a suit by a Hindu entitled to possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindn female heir, the limitation to run from the time when the female heir died.\n\nThis provision, extended further so as to include a suit by a Mohammedan, was reproduced in the Act of 1877 and again in article 141 of the present Act. 1t seems to us to be a correct view to take that this was a change deliberately m11de by the legislature in the existing law.\n\nArticle 141 speaks of a.\" like suit and this means that it is a snit for possession of immovable property which is provided for in the previous article.\n\nThe earlier Article relates to a suit by a l'emainderman or a reversioner in the technical sense of the English lawyers and lest there be confusion if the expression \" reversioner\" is used with reference to the estate of a Hindu or Mahommedan female heir, the legislature deliberately used the words \"a Hindu or l\\fahommedan entitled to possession of property on the death of a female heir.\" '11he estate of a Hindu female heir, as is well known, is extremely anomalous in its character; it cannot be described either as an estate of inheritance or one for life, though it partakes of the nature of both. The intention of the legislature in introducing this' provision was obviously to do away with these anomalies for the purpose of applying the law of limitation and for this purpose the Hindu widow's estate was completely assimilated to that of a tenant for life. This was the view taken, and in our opinion quite rightly, by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court iri Brinath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar(') and by the Bombay High\n\nCourt in Vundravandas v. oursondas(8), the decision\n\n(t) 9 W.R. 50, s.\n\n(2) (1883) 9 Cal. 9>i l>} (18~7) u jlom. 646.\n\nin the latter case being affirmed by the Privy Council in Rnnchordas v. Parvati(1). The decisiou in Ranchordas's case has all along been treafled as an authority for the proposition that the statute of limitation does not begin to run against the reversioner when there is dispo3session of a Hindu female holding a limited estate; and in such cases the reversioner has a right to institute a suit within 12 years from the death of the female heir when the estate actlially falls into possession. It is to be noticed that the Judicial Committee in Ranchordas's case expre;; sly laid down that even in respect of moYables to which article 141 does not apply, the reversioner's right to property accrues on the death of the widow and not before that.\n\nOpinion was expressed in some cases(2) that the view taken iu Ranchordas's case was shaken to a considerable extent by the later pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Vaithialinga v. Srirangath( 3 ), and that the principle of representation of the eotate by the widow upon which the rnle in Shivagunga's case rested, could be applied to a case of adyerse possession agaimt the widow. But all doubts ou this point were set at rest by the decision of the Privy Council itself in Jaggo v. Utsava (4) and the law can now be taken to be perfectly well settled that except whllre a dec1'ee\n\nbas been obtained fairly and properly and without fraud and collusion against the Hindu female heir in respect to a property held by her as a limited owner, the cause of action for a suit to be instituted by a reversioner to recoyer such property either against an alienee from the female heir or a trespa;; ser who held adYersely to her accrues only on the death of the female heir. 'EhiR principle, which has been recognised in the law of limitation in this country ever since 1871 seems to us to be quite in accordance with the acknowledged principles of Hindu law. The right of reversionary heirs is in the nature of spes siwcessionis, and as the reversioners do not trace their ti tie through or frorn the widow, it would be manifestly\n\n{T) (1899) 26 I.A. 7r.\n\n(3) (1925) 52 I.A. 3H\n\n(2) Vide Aurobind•L v. Monoraina (1928) 55 Cal. 903,\n\n(~) (1929) 56 LA. 267.\n\n.Kriz.ip1da Ohakraborti and Anothei\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.\n\nMukherjeri J .\n\nKaUp!!da Chakraborti and Another\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nSUPREME COURI1 REPORTS [1953)\n\nunjust if they are to lose their rights simply because the widow has suffered the property to be destroyed by the adverse possession of a strnnger.\n\nThe contntion raised by Mr. Ghose as regards the general principle to be applied in such cases cannot, therefore, be regarded as sound.\n\nComing now to the specific points raised in the c:i.se, the first thing that requires consideration is, whether the present suit is governed by article 124 or . article 141 of the Limitation Act? 'l'he learned Judges of the High Court have held and quite properly that the benefit of article 141 could be claimed only if there was a qualified estate in the female heir after whose death the plaintiff was entitled to the property as the heir of the last male holder. According to the learned J ndges, however, this condition was not fulfilled in the present ease, inasmuch as the subject matter of dispute was the right of shebaitship and the rights of a female shebait, it is said, are not in any way more restricted or qualified than those of a male she bait, although she cannot transmit this office to her own heirs.\n\nR.eliance has been placed in this connection upon a decision of the Madras High Court in Pydigantan v. Rarnx Dass('), which was followed by\n\na Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Lilabati v. Bishen(').\n\nThis method of approach seems to us to be open to doubt. Whatever might be said about the office of a trustee, which carries no beneficial interest with it, a shebaitship, as is now well settled, combines in it both the elements of office and pro-· perty.\n\nAs the shebaiti interest is heritable and follows the line of inheritance from the founder, obviously when the heir is a female, she must be deemed to have, what is known, as widow's estate in the shebaiti interest.\n\nOrdinarily there are two limitations upon a widow's estate. In the first place, her rights of alienation are restricted and in the second place, after her death the property goes not to her heirs but to the heirs of the last male owner. It is admitted that the second element is present in the\n\n(11 (1905) 28 Mad. 197,\n\n(2) (1907) 6 C.L.J. 621,\n\n• ' .. ...\n\n8.0.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT Kl~PORTS 517\n\ncase of succession to the rights of a female shebait.\n\nAs regards the first, it is quite true that regarding the powers of alienaLion, a female shebait is restricted in the same manner as the male shebait, but that ;_s because there are certain limitations and restrictions attached to and inherent in the shebaiti right itself which exist irrespective of the fact whether the shebaitship vests in a male or a female heir (1) .\n\nBut although we may not approve of this line of reasoning adopted by the High Court, we are in agreement with the learned Judges that the proper article to be applied in this case is article 124 and not article 141. There could be no doubt that there is an element in the shebaiti right which has the legal characteristics of property; but shebaitship is property of a peculiar and anomalous character, and it is difficult to say that it comes under the category of immovable property as it is known iu law.\n\nArticle 141 refers expressly to immovable property and not to property in the general sense of the word.\n\nOu the other hand, it is quite settled that a shebaiti right is a hereditary office and as such comes within the express language of article 124 of the Limitation Act.\n\nWe think that when there. is a specific article in the Limitation Act which covers a particular case, it is not proper to apply another article, the application of which is not free from doubt.\n\nWe hold, therefore, that article 124 is the proper article to be applied, and the question now aries as to whether the plaintiffs' suit is barred by limitation under this article, as has been held by the learned J udg@s of the High Court ?\n\nArticle 124 relates to a suit for possession of a hereditary office and the period of limitation prescribed for such suit is 12 years from the date when the defendant takes possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff.\n\nThe intention of the legislature is obviously to treat hereditary office like land for the J)\\11'])01; e of b11.rring suits for possession of such office and extinguishing the right to the possession thereof\n\n(I) Vide Angurbal~ v. Debabrata, [1Q51) S.C.R. 1125, u36.\n\nKalipad1i Ohakrabort; and Another v.\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Other•.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nKalipnda Ohakraborti and Another\n\nPa.lani Bala\n\nDevi and Others.\n\nMukhcrjea J.\n\nSU.PH.1£ME OOUHT R[<}POHTS (1950]\n\nafter a certain period.\n\nThe question is, when did the defendaut or her predecessor take possession of th-e office of shebait adversely to the plaintiffs ? It\n\ni~ conceded that the possession was adverse to llajlakshmi, the holder of shebaiti at that time; but the contention of :Mr. Chatterjee is that as the plaintiffs did not claim through or from Hajlakshmi, the defendant could not be regarded as taking possession of the office adversely to the plaintiffs.\n\nHe refers in this connection to the definition of \"plaintiff\" iu section 2 (8) of the Limitation Act, where it is stated that plaintiff includes any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives bis right to sue.\n\nIn answer to this, it is argued by Mr. Gbose that a shebait like a trustee represents the entire trust estate and the next truste\\)_, even though be may not strictly claim through or from the previous bolder of the office, must be deemed to be bound by acts or omissions of the latter; and in support of this contention be relies upon the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Gnanasambanda v. Velu (').\n\nWe do not think that this contention is right.\n\nArticle 124 relates to a hereditary office and this means that the office goes from one person to another solely by the reason of the latter being a heir to the former.\n\nUnder the Hindu Law of Inheritance, when a female heir intervenes, she holds dllring her lifetime a limited interest in the estate and after her death succession opens out not to her heirs but to the heirs of the last male holder. It bas not been and cannot be disputed that the same rule applies in the ease of succession to shebaitsbip.\n\nHeading article 124 of the Limitation Act along with section 2 (8), the conclusion is irresistible that to defeat the title of the plaintiff .under article 124 it is necessary to establish that the defendant bad taken possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff or somebody from or through whom the plaintiff derives bis title, more than 12 years prior to the institution of the suit. 'l'l; iis is exactly what is laid down in Gnanasambanda v. Velu(').\n\nIn I\" (1900) •7 l. A. 69,\n\n8.U.R SUPRrnME COURT Rl!}PORTS 519\n\nthis case two persons, who were hereditary trustees of a religious endowment, sold their right of management and transferred the entire endowed property to the defendant appellant. 'l'be sales were null amd void irnd the possession taken by the purchaser was adverse to the vendors from the very beginning. '1 1he plaint, iff Velu was the son and heir of one of the hereditary trustees and be instituted the suit more than l '2 years after the date of the transaction claiming possession of the office along with the heir of the other trustee who was joined as a defendant in the suit. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the plaintiff's suit was barred and the reason given is that \"the respondent Velu could only be entitled as heir to his father N ataraja, and from him and through him, and consequently bis suit was barred by article 114.\" This portion of the judgment, it seems, was overlooked by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court and also by the Madras High Court in the case referred to above.\n\nThe fact that under the ordina.ry law of inheritance the plaintiffs would come as the heirs of the husband of Hajlakshmi is immaterial. '1 1hat would not be deriving their right to sue through and from the widow, and in this view of the case the plaintiffs' suit cannot be held to be barred.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore those of the trial judge with costs to the appellants in all courts.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Sukwmar Ghose.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : R.R. Biswas.\n\nKalipada Ohakraborti\n\nand Another v.\n\nPalani Ba la\n\nDevi and Others.\n\nMukherjea J", "total_entities": 157, "entities": [{"text": "K. Gopa!an", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 467, "end_char": 477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion placed by the department on these sub-sections K Srinivasa\" cannot be considered to be a proper guide in a matter and K. Gopa!an like this when the construction of a statute is involved."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 870, "end_char": 888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 917, "end_char": 934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: M. S. K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 937, "end_char": 969, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PALANI BALA DEVI AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 979, "end_char": 1006, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PALANI BALA DEVI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1010, "end_char": 1019, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mukhe•'jea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1021, "end_char": 1041, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1048, "end_char": 1064, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 124, 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1369, "end_char": 1383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kalipada Chakraborti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1726, "end_char": 1746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalipada Chakraborti and Anoth13r\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Palani Bala Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1761, "end_char": 1777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalipada Chakraborti and Anoth13r\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.", "canonical_name": "PALANI BALA DEVI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1833, "end_char": 1841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2055, "end_char": 2063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2071, "end_char": 2085, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097, "end_char": 2105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3802, "end_char": 3810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3818, "end_char": 3832, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i. --\n\nJudicature at Calcutta (Das and Guba JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Guba", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4675, "end_char": 4679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i. --\n\nJudicature at Calcutta (Das and Guba JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. c. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4896, "end_char": 4912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. c. Chatterjee (A. K. Dutt, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. K. Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4914, "end_char": 4924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. c. Chatterjee (A. K. Dutt, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Panchanan Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4957, "end_char": 4972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchanan Ghose (Radha Kanta Bhattacharya, with him) for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Panchanan Ghose"}}, {"text": "Radha Kanta Bhattacharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4974, "end_char": 4998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchanan Ghose (Radha Kanta Bhattacharya, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5095, "end_char": 5104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judg, meut of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-'rhis appeai is on behalf of the plaintiffs and is directed against the judgment and decree of a Division -Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated June 19, 1950, reversing, on appeal, those of the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, 24-Pargauas, passed in Title Suit No.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe•'jea"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5228, "end_char": 5247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judg, meut of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-'rhis appeai is on behalf of the plaintiffs and is directed against the judgment and decree of a Division -Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated June 19, 1950, reversing, on appeal, those of the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, 24-Pargauas, passed in Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "June 19, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5254, "end_char": 5267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judg, meut of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-'rhis appeai is on behalf of the plaintiffs and is directed against the judgment and decree of a Division -Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated June 19, 1950, reversing, on appeal, those of the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, 24-Pargauas, passed in Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Third Court, 24-Pargauas", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5304, "end_char": 5347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judg, meut of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-'rhis appeai is on behalf of the plaintiffs and is directed against the judgment and decree of a Division -Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated June 19, 1950, reversing, on appeal, those of the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, 24-Pargauas, passed in Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5967, "end_char": 5978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The subject-matter of dispute is one-third share of shebaiti right in respect of a private debutter dedicated to an idol known by the name of Dakshiueshwar Jew and situated at a village called Dhop Dhopi within the district of 24-Pargauas in West Bengal."}}, {"text": "U dhab Chandra Pandit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6060, "end_char": 6081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deity is au ancient one and its reputed founder and first she bait was one U dhab Chandra Pandit."}}, {"text": "Iswar Chandra Chakroborti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6179, "end_char": 6204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that by successive devolutions the rights of the shebait came to vest in one Iswar Chandra Chakroborti, who was the common ancestor of the parties to this suit."}}, {"text": "Kalipada Ghakraborti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalipada Ghakraborti and Anoth•r\n\nPalani Bala\n\nD•vi and Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Palani Bala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6494, "end_char": 6505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalipada Ghakraborti and Anoth•r\n\nPalani Bala\n\nD•vi and Others.", "canonical_name": "PALANI BALA DEVI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Mukhe•'jea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6525, "end_char": 6535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhe•'jea J.\n\nKaUpada Ghakraborti and Another\n\nv, Palani Bala\n\nDevi an.d Others.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe•'jea"}}, {"text": "KaUpada Ghakraborti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6540, "end_char": 6559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhe•'jea J.\n\nKaUpada Ghakraborti and Another\n\nv, Palani Bala\n\nDevi an.d Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6608, "end_char": 6617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nr-\n\nAshutsh\n\n(dead)\n\nIswar\n-T- .. -\n\n1 -1---~I- I Govinda Gopal Sadananda Tralokhya Haran I I I m. Rajlakshmi I\n\nSurendra Sashi (adopted) I I\n\nni.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe•'jea"}}, {"text": "Ashutsh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6626, "end_char": 6633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nr-\n\nAshutsh\n\n(dead)\n\nIswar\n-T- .. -\n\n1 -1---~I- I Govinda Gopal Sadananda Tralokhya Haran I I I m. Rajlakshmi I\n\nSurendra Sashi (adopted) I I\n\nni."}}, {"text": "Iswar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6982, "end_char": 6987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I)\n\nI Nagendra\n\nPa Jani\n\nIswar died leaving six sons as his heirs and they were Ashutosh, Govinda, Gopal, Sadananda, Trailokhya and Haran.", "canonical_name": "Iswar"}}, {"text": "Govinda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7047, "end_char": 7054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I)\n\nI Nagendra\n\nPa Jani\n\nIswar died leaving six sons as his heirs and they were Ashutosh, Govinda, Gopal, Sadananda, Trailokhya and Haran."}}, {"text": "Gopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7056, "end_char": 7061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I)\n\nI Nagendra\n\nPa Jani\n\nIswar died leaving six sons as his heirs and they were Ashutosh, Govinda, Gopal, Sadananda, Trailokhya and Haran."}}, {"text": "Sadananda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7063, "end_char": 7072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I)\n\nI Nagendra\n\nPa Jani\n\nIswar died leaving six sons as his heirs and they were Ashutosh, Govinda, Gopal, Sadananda, Trailokhya and Haran."}}, {"text": "Trailokhya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7074, "end_char": 7084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I)\n\nI Nagendra\n\nPa Jani\n\nIswar died leaving six sons as his heirs and they were Ashutosh, Govinda, Gopal, Sadananda, Trailokhya and Haran."}}, {"text": "Haran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7089, "end_char": 7094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I)\n\nI Nagendra\n\nPa Jani\n\nIswar died leaving six sons as his heirs and they were Ashutosh, Govinda, Gopal, Sadananda, Trailokhya and Haran."}}, {"text": "Rajlaks)lmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8055, "end_char": 8066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haran died without any issue leaving him surviving, his widow Rajlaks)lmi as his sole heir under the Hindu law and Rajlakshmi continued to hold this one-third share of shebaiti right along with other properties of the deceased.", "canonical_name": "Rajlaks)lmi"}}, {"text": "Rajlakshmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8108, "end_char": 8118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haran died without any issue leaving him surviving, his widow Rajlaks)lmi as his sole heir under the Hindu law and Rajlakshmi continued to hold this one-third share of shebaiti right along with other properties of the deceased.", "canonical_name": "Rajlaks)lmi"}}, {"text": "17th June, 1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8225, "end_char": 8240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17th June, 1920, .Rajlakshmi granted an ijara lease of her shebaiti right for a term of two years to one Satish Chandra Dey."}}, {"text": ".Rajlakshmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8242, "end_char": 8253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17th June, 1920, .Rajlakshmi granted an ijara lease of her shebaiti right for a term of two years to one Satish Chandra Dey.", "canonical_name": "Rajlaks)lmi"}}, {"text": "Satish Chandra Dey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8330, "end_char": 8348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17th June, 1920, .Rajlakshmi granted an ijara lease of her shebaiti right for a term of two years to one Satish Chandra Dey."}}, {"text": "1st of April, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8353, "end_char": 8371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st of April, 1921, Satish sold this leasehold interest in respect to the palas to one Ram Ra, khal Gh9s~.\n\nPrevious to that, on 6th of August, 1920, Ram Rakhal had himself taken a lease from Rajlakshmi of her shebaiti right for a period of 5 years, this leas~ to commence at the close of the previous lease in favour of Satish."}}, {"text": "Satish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8373, "end_char": 8379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st of April, 1921, Satish sold this leasehold interest in respect to the palas to one Ram Ra, khal Gh9s~.\n\nPrevious to that, on 6th of August, 1920, Ram Rakhal had himself taken a lease from Rajlakshmi of her shebaiti right for a period of 5 years, this leas~ to commence at the close of the previous lease in favour of Satish."}}, {"text": "Ram Ra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8440, "end_char": 8446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st of April, 1921, Satish sold this leasehold interest in respect to the palas to one Ram Ra, khal Gh9s~.\n\nPrevious to that, on 6th of August, 1920, Ram Rakhal had himself taken a lease from Rajlakshmi of her shebaiti right for a period of 5 years, this leas~ to commence at the close of the previous lease in favour of Satish.", "canonical_name": "Ram Rakhal"}}, {"text": "6th of August, 1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8482, "end_char": 8501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st of April, 1921, Satish sold this leasehold interest in respect to the palas to one Ram Ra, khal Gh9s~.\n\nPrevious to that, on 6th of August, 1920, Ram Rakhal had himself taken a lease from Rajlakshmi of her shebaiti right for a period of 5 years, this leas~ to commence at the close of the previous lease in favour of Satish."}}, {"text": "Ram Rakhal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8503, "end_char": 8513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st of April, 1921, Satish sold this leasehold interest in respect to the palas to one Ram Ra, khal Gh9s~.\n\nPrevious to that, on 6th of August, 1920, Ram Rakhal had himself taken a lease from Rajlakshmi of her shebaiti right for a period of 5 years, this leas~ to commence at the close of the previous lease in favour of Satish.", "canonical_name": "Ram Rakhal"}}, {"text": "Satish. Ram Rakhal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8674, "end_char": 8692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st of April, 1921, Satish sold this leasehold interest in respect to the palas to one Ram Ra, khal Gh9s~.\n\nPrevious to that, on 6th of August, 1920, Ram Rakhal had himself taken a lease from Rajlakshmi of her shebaiti right for a period of 5 years, this leas~ to commence at the close of the previous lease in favour of Satish."}}, {"text": "7th of November, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8855, "end_char": 8876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a deed of conveyance dated the 7th of November, 1921, 1 Rajlakshmi made an out and out sale of her shebaiti right in favour of Ram Rakhal and twenty days after this purchase, that is to say, on 27th November, 1921, Ram Rakhal m his turn sold this interest to N agendra and Surendra, two of the sons oJ Trailokhya."}}, {"text": "27th November, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9018, "end_char": 9037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a deed of conveyance dated the 7th of November, 1921, 1 Rajlakshmi made an out and out sale of her shebaiti right in favour of Ram Rakhal and twenty days after this purchase, that is to say, on 27th November, 1921, Ram Rakhal m his turn sold this interest to N agendra and Surendra, two of the sons oJ Trailokhya."}}, {"text": "N agendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9083, "end_char": 9092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a deed of conveyance dated the 7th of November, 1921, 1 Rajlakshmi made an out and out sale of her shebaiti right in favour of Ram Rakhal and twenty days after this purchase, that is to say, on 27th November, 1921, Ram Rakhal m his turn sold this interest to N agendra and Surendra, two of the sons oJ Trailokhya.", "canonical_name": "N agendra"}}, {"text": "Surendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9097, "end_char": 9105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a deed of conveyance dated the 7th of November, 1921, 1 Rajlakshmi made an out and out sale of her shebaiti right in favour of Ram Rakhal and twenty days after this purchase, that is to say, on 27th November, 1921, Ram Rakhal m his turn sold this interest to N agendra and Surendra, two of the sons oJ Trailokhya."}}, {"text": "20th of June, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9180, "end_char": 9198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surendra died some time afterwards and on 20th of June, 1925, his widow Tarakali sold her husband's share iu the shebaiti right to N agendra, her husband's brother."}}, {"text": "Tarakali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9210, "end_char": 9218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surendra died some time afterwards and on 20th of June, 1925, his widow Tarakali sold her husband's share iu the shebaiti right to N agendra, her husband's brother."}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9540, "end_char": 9559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajlakshmi died on 22nd December, 1943, and the two plaintiffs, who are the two surviving sons of Govinda, filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for recovery of possession of this one-third shebaiti right of Haran on the allegation that they were the next heirs of Haran at the time of Rajlakshmi's death."}}, {"text": "N agendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9837, "end_char": 9846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N agendra had died in the meantime and the first and the principal defendant in the suit is his daughter Palani Bala, who is a minor and is represented by her husband as guardian.", "canonical_name": "N agendra"}}, {"text": "Palani Bala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9942, "end_char": 9953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N agendra had died in the meantime and the first and the principal defendant in the suit is his daughter Palani Bala, who is a minor and is represented by her husband as guardian.", "canonical_name": "PALANI BALA DEVI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Iswar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10254, "end_char": 10259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants 3 and 4 are the surviving descendants of Iswar who hold the remaining interest in the shebaiti rig'ht.", "canonical_name": "Iswar"}}, {"text": "Rajlabhmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10479, "end_char": 10488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the plaintiffs, in substance, is that the one-third share of the shebaiti right, which was held by Haran during his lifetime, devolved upon his widow Rajlabhmi who had only the retricted right~\n\nKalipada Ohakraborti and Another\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.", "canonical_name": "Rajlaks)lmi"}}, {"text": "Kalipada Ohakraborti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10524, "end_char": 10544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the plaintiffs, in substance, is that the one-third share of the shebaiti right, which was held by Haran during his lifetime, devolved upon his widow Rajlabhmi who had only the retricted right~\n\nKalipada Ohakraborti and Another\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mukhe,.jea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10588, "end_char": 10598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhe,.jea J.\n\nKfllipada Chakraborti and.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe•'jea"}}, {"text": "Kfllipada Chakraborti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10603, "end_char": 10624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhe,.jea J.\n\nKfllipada Chakraborti and."}}, {"text": "I'alani Bala\n\nDevi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10639, "end_char": 10657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another\n\nI'alani Bala\n\nDevi and Others."}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12081, "end_char": 12100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T, he trial Judge by his judgment dated the 22nd December, 1948, overruled the pleas taken by the defendant and gave the plaintiffs a decree."}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12252, "end_char": 12263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12278, "end_char": 12292, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13091, "end_char": 13093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this judgment, the defendants 1 and 2 took an appeal to the Calcutta High Court and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Das and Gu ha J J. The learned Judges while affirming all the other findings arrived at by the trial judge disagreed with the latter on the question of limitation."}}, {"text": "ha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13094, "end_char": 13096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this judgment, the defendants 1 and 2 took an appeal to the Calcutta High Court and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Das and Gu ha J J. The learned Judges while affirming all the other findings arrived at by the trial judge disagreed with the latter on the question of limitation."}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13328, "end_char": 13339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14023, "end_char": 14034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14038, "end_char": 14049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14057, "end_char": 14071, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14076, "end_char": 14087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14189, "end_char": 14200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14868, "end_char": 14878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the plaintiffs appellants has not assailed\n\nKalipada Ohakraborti and Another v.\n\nPalani Bala\n\nDevi and Others."}}, {"text": "alipada Chakraborti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15023, "end_char": 15042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M ulcher j ea J.\n\nalipada Chakraborti and Another\n\nPatani Bala\n\nDevi a1id Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mukherjsa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15088, "end_char": 15097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjsa J.\n\nthe correctness of this proposition Qf law ;'his contention is that the possession of shebaitiright by defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe•'jea"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15696, "end_char": 15701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, it is said, is the principle underlying the law of limitation in India ever since 1871 and article 141 of the Limitation Act expressly recognises and gives effect to it."}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15722, "end_char": 15733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15741, "end_char": 15755, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15848, "end_char": 15859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15912, "end_char": 15923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Panchanan Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16245, "end_char": 16260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, it has been argued by Mr.\n\nPanchanan Ghose that there is nothing like a general principle of law that adverse possession against a Hindu .widow could not be reckoned as adverse possession against her reversionary heirs.", "canonical_name": "Panchanan Ghose"}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16533, "end_char": 16544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16552, "end_char": 16566, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16660, "end_char": 16665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ghose's contention is that article 141 has no application to the facts of this case and consequently there is no reason for holding that adverse possession against the widow if it was continued for the statutory period would not bar the reversionary heirs also. '", "canonical_name": "Ghose"}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16687, "end_char": 16698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16979, "end_char": 16990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17148, "end_char": 17159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17871, "end_char": 17882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17890, "end_char": 17904, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18042, "end_char": 18056, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections\n\n12 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18297, "end_char": 18316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18548, "end_char": 18573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even before this Act was passed, in a case (1) decided by the Supreme Court of Calcutta, Peel, C. J. made the following observation:\n\n\"It has been invariably considered for many years that the widow fully represented the estate, and it is also settled law that adverse possession which bars her bars the heir after her, wh1ch would not be the case if she were a mere tenant for life, as known to the English law \"."}}, {"text": "Kalipada Ghalcraborti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19316, "end_char": 19337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.A, 539,\n\nKalipada Ghalcraborti and Another\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mukharj•a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19381, "end_char": 19390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukharj•a J.\n\n19!J3\n\nKaZipada Chakraborti and Another v.\n\nPalani Bala\n\nDevi and Others.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe•'jea"}}, {"text": "B'oard", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19644, "end_char": 19650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'urner L.J., who delivered the judgment of the B'oard, observed in course of his judgment :\n\n\" The whole estate would for the time be vested in her, a.bsolutely for some purposes, though, in some respects, for a qualified interest; and until her death it eould not be ascertained who would be entitled to succeed."}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20921, "end_char": 20935, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21211, "end_char": 21216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leading pronouncement on this point is to be found in Nobin Chunder v. Issur Chunder(') upon which Mr.\n\nGhosh has laid very great stress.", "canonical_name": "Ghose"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21691, "end_char": 21701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shivagunga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22614, "end_char": 22624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "enunciated in the Shivagunga case."}}, {"text": "Barnes Peacock", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22636, "end_char": 22650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir\n\nBarnes Peacock, C.J. observed as follows:\n\n\"It is said that the reversionary heirs could not sue for possession during the lifetime of the widow, and that therefore they ought not to be barred by any adverse holding against the widow at a time when they could not sue.", "canonical_name": "Barnes Peacock"}}, {"text": "Barnes Peacock", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23571, "end_char": 23585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This principle was affirmed by the Privy Council in Aumirtolall v. Ra;'onee Kant(1) and Sir Barnes Peacock, who delivered the judgment, expressly affirmeq th()\n\n(r) (1874-75) 2 I.A. II~ .", "canonical_name": "Barnes Peacock"}}, {"text": "Kalipada Ohakraborti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23668, "end_char": 23688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalipada Ohakraborti and Another\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Kalipada Chakraborti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23746, "end_char": 23766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J,\n\nKalipada Chakraborti\n\nand Another v.\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others ..\n\nMukherjea J,\n\ndecision in Nobin Ohunder v. Issur Ohunder (').", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24014, "end_char": 24028, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24053, "end_char": 24067, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24122, "end_char": 24133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24168, "end_char": 24179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24545, "end_char": 24556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24704, "end_char": 24715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25876, "end_char": 25894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was the view taken, and in our opinion quite rightly, by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court iri Brinath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar(') and by the Bombay High\n\nCourt in Vundravandas v. oursondas(8), the decision\n\n(t) 9 W.R. 50, s.\n\n(2) (1883) 9 Cal."}}, {"text": "Ranchordas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26108, "end_char": 26118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decisiou in Ranchordas's case has all along been treafled as an authority for the proposition that the statute of limitation does not begin to run against the reversioner when there is dispo3session of a Hindu female holding a limited estate; and in such cases the reversioner has a right to institute a suit within 12 years from the death of the female heir when the estate actlially falls into possession."}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26637, "end_char": 26648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anothei\n\nPalani Bala Devi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28242, "end_char": 28267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Kriz.ip1da Ohakraborti and Anothei\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others."}}, {"text": "Mukherjeri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28281, "end_char": 28291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjeri J .", "canonical_name": "Mukhe•'jea"}}, {"text": "KaUp!!da Chakraborti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28297, "end_char": 28317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KaUp!!da Chakraborti and Another\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28836, "end_char": 28847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28853, "end_char": 28864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28872, "end_char": 28886, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28976, "end_char": 28987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29582, "end_char": 29599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.eliance has been placed in this connection upon a decision of the Madras High Court in Pydigantan v. Rarnx Dass('), which was followed by\n\na Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Lilabati v. Bishen(')."}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31206, "end_char": 31217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31226, "end_char": 31237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31532, "end_char": 31543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31771, "end_char": 31782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31790, "end_char": 31804, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31862, "end_char": 31876, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32027, "end_char": 32038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32243, "end_char": 32254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kalipad1i Ohakrabort", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32738, "end_char": 32758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalipad1i Ohakrabort; and Another v.\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Other•.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nKalipnda Ohakraborti and Another\n\nPa.lani Bala\n\nDevi and Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Kalipnda Ohakraborti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32820, "end_char": 32840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalipad1i Ohakrabort; and Another v.\n\nPalani Bala Devi and Other•.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nKalipnda Ohakraborti and Another\n\nPa.lani Bala\n\nDevi and Others.", "canonical_name": "KALIPADA CHAKRABORTI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mukhcrjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32886, "end_char": 32895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhcrjea J.\n\nSU.PH.1£ME OOUHT R[<}POHTS (1950]\n\nafter a certain period.", "canonical_name": "Mukhe•'jea"}}, {"text": "llajlakshmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33142, "end_char": 33153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It\n\ni~ conceded that the possession was adverse to llajlakshmi, the holder of shebaiti at that time; but the contention of :Mr. Chatterjee is that as the plaintiffs did not claim through or from Hajlakshmi, the defendant could not be regarded as taking possession of the office adversely to the plaintiffs."}}, {"text": "Hajlakshmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33286, "end_char": 33296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It\n\ni~ conceded that the possession was adverse to llajlakshmi, the holder of shebaiti at that time; but the contention of :Mr. Chatterjee is that as the plaintiffs did not claim through or from Hajlakshmi, the defendant could not be regarded as taking possession of the office adversely to the plaintiffs.", "canonical_name": "Rajlaks)lmi"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33464, "end_char": 33473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33485, "end_char": 33499, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gbose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33654, "end_char": 33659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to this, it is argued by Mr. Gbose that a shebait like a trustee represents the entire trust estate and the next truste\\)_, even though be may not strictly claim through or from the previous bolder of the office, must be deemed to be bound by acts or omissions of the latter; and in support of this contention be relies upon the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Gnanasambanda v. Velu (')."}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34068, "end_char": 34079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "shebaitsbip", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34564, "end_char": 34575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It bas not been and cannot be disputed that the same rule applies in the ease of succession to shebaitsbip."}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34586, "end_char": 34597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34605, "end_char": 34619, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34631, "end_char": 34640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34726, "end_char": 34737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8.U.R SUPRrnME COURT Rl!}PORTS 519", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35067, "end_char": 35101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In I\" (1900) •7 l. A. 69,\n\n8.U.R SUPRrnME COURT Rl!}PORTS 519\n\nthis case two persons, who were hereditary trustees of a religious endowment, sold their right of management and transferred the entire endowed property to the defendant appellant. '"}}, {"text": "Velu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35809, "end_char": 35813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Judicial Committee that the plaintiff's suit was barred and the reason given is that \"the respondent Velu could only be entitled as heir to his father N ataraja, and from him and through him, and consequently bis suit was barred by article 114.\""}}, {"text": "N ataraja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35859, "end_char": 35868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Judicial Committee that the plaintiff's suit was barred and the reason given is that \"the respondent Velu could only be entitled as heir to his father N ataraja, and from him and through him, and consequently bis suit was barred by article 114.\""}}, {"text": "article 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35940, "end_char": 35951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukwmar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36646, "end_char": 36659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Sukwmar Ghose."}}, {"text": "R.R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36691, "end_char": 36702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : R.R. Biswas."}}, {"text": "Palani Ba la\n\nDevi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36743, "end_char": 36761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalipada Ohakraborti\n\nand Another v.\n\nPalani Ba la\n\nDevi and Others.", "canonical_name": "PALANI BALA DEVI AND OTHERS"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_520_533_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "19-53\n\nJan. 16.\n\n5'20\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [191)3] .\n\n'rURNBR MORRISON & CO., L1'D\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS, VIVIAN BosE and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nIndian Inc\"'1ie-tax Act (XI of 1922), ss. 4(1) (a), 4 (1) (c), 42, 48-Non-resident cornpany-Sale in India uf goods 1nan11, factured outside India-Person e.-O'ecting sales in India-Whether agent of non-resident-Proji, ts received in India.from sales-Whether assessable under s. 4 (1) (a) ors. 42-Liability of agent-Scope of s. 43.\n\n'l'he Port Said Salt Association Ltd., a company incorporated in the United Kingdom carried on business in Egypt and had its headquarters in Egypt. It manufactured salt in Egypt and part of the salt so manufactured was consigned to Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd., (the assessee) for sale in India.\n\nThe assessee effected sales in India through brokers at prices approved by the A_ssociation, collected the sale proceeds and received a commission of 2-!% generally on all sales.\n\nAfter deducting the expenses and commission the balance was remitted to the Association in Egypt.\n\nOn these facts the assessee was treated as agents of the Association under s. 43 of the Indian Income-tax Act and assessed to incometax under s. 4 (1) (a) or alternatively under s. 4 (1) (c) of the Act on the income derived by the Association fron) the sale of salt in India.\n\nThe High Court of Calcutta held that tbe income in question was chargeable t.o income-tax under s. 4 (1) (a) as income received in India and not under s. 42 of the Act: Held, (i) that, as the assessee was entrusted with the selling of goods consigned to them for sale, handling the cargoes, issuing delivery orders, collecting the proceeds etc., they were agents of the Association, and did not act merely as a post office;\n\nPondicherry Railway Co. v. OonMnissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1931) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 691 referred to.\n\n(ii) as the goods were neitheiimported nor sold by the assessees on their own account but on account of the Association the income received by the assessees v'lere received by them on behalf of the Association and not on their own account.\n\nEx parte White (L.R. 6 Oh. A. 397) distinguished.\n\n(iii) As the assessees were authorised not only to sell but to collect the price from the purchasers, the income was received by the assessee as agents of the Association.\n\nBi; twick v. Grant (L.R. [1924] 2 K.B. 483) distinguished.\n\n19-58\n\n(iv) The fact that the assessees as agents had a right to retain the expenses incurred by them and their commission out of the proceeds could not make the sale proceeds received by them as Turner agents any the less the proporty of their principals.\n\nMorrison ct Co., • Ltd.\n\nColquhoun v. Brooks (2 Tax Oas. 490) and Saiyid Ali Imam v. v.\n\nKing Emperor ([19:J5] I.L.R. 4 Pat. 210) referred to.\n\nCommissioner of\n\n(v) When the gross sale proceeds were received by the agents Income-tare, in India they necessarily received whatever profits and gains were West Bengal. lying dormitnt in them. If on taking accounts there were income, profits or gains, then the proportionate part thereof attributable to the sale proceeds received by the agents in India was income, profits and gains received by them at the moment the gross sale proceeds were received by them in India, and s. 4 (1) (a) of the Income-tax Act was _immediately attracted and the income, profits and gains so received became chargeable to tax under s. 4 (1) (a) read with s. 3.\n\nGrainger ct Son v. William Lane Gough (L.R. [1896] A.O. 325) ielied on.\n\n(vi) Where income, profits and gains are actually received in India s. 4 (1) (a) applies and it is no longer necessary for the revenue to resort to the fiction introduced by s. 42, and the assessees were properly assessed under s. 4 (1) (a) and not under s. 4\n\n(1) (c), Section 4(1) (a) applies to all categories of assessees including non-residents.\n\nHirn Mills v. Income-tax Officer, Cawnpore ([1946] 14 I.T.R. 417), Burugu Nagayya v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras ([1949] 17 LT .R. 194J and Pondicherry Railway Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras ([1931] I.L.R. 54 Mad. 691) relied on.\n\n(vii) The mere fact that the assessees were treated as agents under s. 43 of the Act did not 1nake it compulsory on the part of the revenue authorities to assess under s. 42, for an appointment as agent under s. 43 is for all the purposes of the Act and not only for the purposes of s. 42.\n\nIniperial Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. v. Secretary of State for India ([1922] I.L.R. 49 Cal. 721!, Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Metro Goldwyn Ma, yer (India) Ltd. ([1939] 7 I.T.R.176), Caltex Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City ([1952] 21 I.T .R. 278) explained.\n\nJudgment of the Calcutta High Court affirmed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1952. Appeal from a Judgment and Decree dated 25th July, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Oalcul:.1:.a. (Sen 11nd Chunder JJ.) exercising\n\nSpecial Jurisdiction (Income-tax) in Income-tax Reference No. 31 of 1949,\n\n522 SUPREME COUR'r R~JPORTS [1953]\n\n1958 S. Mitra (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellant.\n\nTurner AforriBon & Co., C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P. A.\n\nLtd.\n\nMehta, with him) for the respondent. v.\n\nCo11anissioner of\n\nInconie-tax, TVcst Bengal.\n\n1953.\n\nJanuary 16.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDaa J.\n\nDAs J.-'l'his appeal arises out of six references made by the Calcutta Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, two of them relating to the incometax assessment years 1943-44 and 1944-45 and the remrtining four re_lating to excess profits tax for the chargeable accounting periods ending on the 31st December of each of the years 1940, 1941 1943 and 1943 respectively.\n\nThe relevant facts ap-pearing in the statements of the case are as follows: Messrs. Port Said Salt Association Ltd, (hereinafter referred to as \"the Association\") is a company incorporated in the United Kingdom and has its registered office there. 'rhe Association, however, carries on business in Egypt and its head office is situate in Alexandria where tbe annual general meetings of its shareholders are held.\n\nNot being resident in the United Kingdom the Association pays no British income-tax on its profits.\n\nFor the purposes of assessment under the Indian Income-tax Act the As'sociation has been considered to be a non-resident.\n\nThe association manufactures salt in ]gypt where it has certain concessions and the salt as manufactured is sent for sale in any country where there is.a ~.uitable market.\n\nPart of the salt so manufactured by the Association is consigned to Messrs. Turner Morrison & Company Ltd.\n\nfor sale in India.\n\nAll shipping operations, i e., chartering of steamer, loading, insurance etc., are effected in Egypt by the Association wlio sends the documents to Messrs. Turner Morrison & Company Ltd. Messrs. Turner Morrison aud Company Ltd. (lffect sales i11 India through brokers at the best price\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME OOURT REPORTS 523\n\nobtainable at or above the prices approved by the 1959 Association.\n\nTurner Morrison & Company Ltd. are T paid commission at the rate of 2-1£ per cent. generally lviorri;;:~; co., on all the sales except in some cases where It pe1 Ltd. cent. is paid. All handling of the cargoes when they v. arrive at Calcutta and the necessary disbursementsOommissionei of in connection therewith are carried out and made by Income-tax, Turner Morrison & Company Ltd. The sale proceeds West Bengal. are collected by rrurner Morrison & Company Ltd.\n\nDas J. and credited to the account kept in their own name with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.\n\nAfter deducting the expenses including their commission the balance is remitted by Turner Morrison & Company Ltd. to the Association in Egypt. On these facts the Income-tax Officer treated Turner Morrison & Company Ltd. as the agents of the Association under section 43 of the Indian Income-tax Act and assessed them to income-tax for the two assessment years mentioned above under section 4 (1) (a) or, alternatively, under the first part of section 4 (1) (c). They were also assessed to excess profits tax for the four chargeable accounting periods hereinbefore mentioned.\n\nTurner Morrison & Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Agents) preferred appeals against the aforesaid assessment orders to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who, however, dismissed the appeals.\n\nThe Agents took a further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nThe submission of the Agents before the Tribunal was that the asse;:.sment under section 4(1) (a) was bad and that the assessment should have been made under section 42 of the Act.\n\nThe 'l'ribunal, on a co1isideration of the facts, came to the conclusion that the assessment was properly made under section 4( 1) (a) and incidentally the Tribunal also came to the conclusion that the alternative contention of the Income-tax authorities that the assessment should be made under the first part of section 4(1) (c) was also well-founded and that section 42 had no application to the Cfli'i<'.\n\nf?8\n\n1968 The result was that the Tribunal confirmed the findings of the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate\n\nAfon~:;:~ Go., Assistant Commissioner and dismissed the appeals.\n\nLtd. • On the application of the Agents made under v. section 66 (1) of the Act the Appellate Tribunal Commissioner of referred the following questions to the High Court:-\n\nJncnne-tax, H , . west Bengal. (1) 'Whether, m the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in holding that Das J. the income, profits and gains derived from the sale of salt in British India are assessable to tax as income, profits and gains received or deemed to be received under section 4(1) (a) ?\n\nAnd if the answer to .the first question is in the negative, ,-\n\n(2) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in accepting the contention of the Department that the income accrued or arose or is deemed to accrue or arise in India and is assessable to tax as contemplated by section 4 (1) (c)? (3) whether the Tribunal was right in the cir- cumstances of this cse in rejecting the contention of the assessee (applicant) that the income, profits and\n\ngains am chargeable to tax from the sale of salt in British India under section 42 only?\"\n\n'rhe reference came up for disppsal before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of Sen and Chunder JJ. The learned Judges gave the following answers to the questions:-\n\n\" Question (1).\n\nThe answer is in the affirmative so far as income.tax is assessed. Excess profits tax, however, cannot be levied on this basis.\n\nQuestion (2). 'l'he Tribunal was wrong in accepting the contention of the department that the income accrued or arose in India.\n\nThe Tribunal did not hold that the income is income which should be deemed to accrue or arise in India.\n\nThe part of the question which states that the Tribunal did so is not iu accordance with fact.\n\nWe find that the iucome,\n\n profits and gains must be deemed to have arisen or 1953 accrued in India so far as excess profits tax is concerned and that section 42(3) of the Income-tax M T\"r\"\": 0 A t 1. h 1 f fi b . • arr.so\" \"' o., c a pp ies to t e evy o excess pro ts tax y virtue Ltd. of section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. v.\n\nQuestion (3).\n\nThe Tribunal was right in reject- Oommissionei 01 ing the contention that the income, profits and gains Inconie-tax, West Bengal. are chargeable to tax under section 42 only.\n\nThey are also chargeable to income-tax as falling within Das J. the purview of section 4 (1) (a) of the Income-tax Act as income received in India on behalf of the assessee company.\n\nIn such a case section 42 of the Income-tax Act would have no application.\" It will be noticed that the Agents succeeded in their contentions so far as they related to the assessment of ecess profits tax.\n\nThe answers given by the High Court, however, went against them in so far as they related to the assessment of income-tax for both the assessment years.\n\nThe Agents thereafter made two applications to the High Court under section 66A for leave to appeal to this Court in respect of the income-tax assessments for each of the two assessment years.\n\nThe High Court certified that the cases were fit for app_eal to this Court and granted leave to appeal and directed that the two appeals be consolidated.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax, \\Vest Bengal, however, has not preferred any appsial from that part of the judgment of the High Court which sets forth its opinion on the questions in so far as they relate to the assessment of excess profits tax.\n\nThis appeal is, therefore, concerned only with the answers given by the High Court to the questions in so far as they relate to the assessments of income-tax only.\n\nThe first main contention urged by Mr. S. Mitra appearing in support of this appeal is that no income, profits and gains were received in India by or on be~ half of the Association.\n\nHe seeks to make good this contention on a variety of reasons all of which are not quite consistent with each other and some of\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [1953)\n\n1953 which may even he mutually destructive.\n\nRelying ori\n\nT . the decisions in Narasammal v. The Secretary of State Morri:;,;•; 0 0.,•for India( 1 ) and Pondicherry Railway Company Ltd.\n\nLtd.\n\nv. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras('), Mr. Mitra v, urges that no income, profits and gains were Oommissionmof \"received\" in India at all, for the Agents were nothing ;\";•;•-taxi but \"an animated Post Office\". \\Ye are bound to\n\n\" '\"9\" • reject this reasoning as unsound on the same grounds\n\nDas J. on which the Privy Council rejected a similar contention in the case of Pondicherry Railway Company Ltd.('). In the language of Lord Macmillan the functions of the Agents far transcended the mere mechanical act of transmitting the sums collected by them to the Association in .B; gypt. They were entrusted with important duties on behalf of the Association, namely, selling of the goods consigned to them for sale, handling the cargoes, issuing delivery orders, collecting the sale proceeds and then to remit the same after deducting the exenses incurred by them and their own commission.\n\nThe description of \"an animated Post Office\" can hardly apply to an agent of this description.\n\nMr. Mitra thereupon shifts his ground and urges that even if income, profits and gains were received . in India, the receipt was not by or on behalf of the< Association. 1'he contention is that though the Agents are described as agents, they were not so in fact or in law and reliance is P.laced on the well known case of Ex parte White(').\n\nA perusal of that case will clearly show that there the person to whom goods were consigned, together with a price list, was, by their course of dealings, entitled to sell the . goods at any price he liked and that he remitted to the consignor of the goods only the listed price.\n\nIn other words, although the parties looked upon their dealings as constituting an agency the consignee did not in fact sell. the goods as agent of the consignor but did so on his own account and any price realised in excess of the listed price was his own\n\nII) [19t6] l.L.R. 39 Mad, 885, (2/ I 1931jLL.R. ;4 Mad, 691; LR. 58 I.A. 239.\n\n(3) L.R. 6 Ch. A. 397\n\nprofit.\n\nOn the facts found by the Tribunal, which 1958 the _learned counsel is not entitld to . ch.allen.ge Tnrner for the pu.rposes of these proceedmgs, it is q.rnte Morrison & co., clear that the goods were not imported by the Ltd.\n\nAgents on their own account and they never became v. a purchaser at any stage. 'l'hey could not sell the Commissioner of goods at any price they liked, for they had to sell Income-tax, h t b h . d b h A . !Vest Bengal. t em a or a ove t e price approve y t e ssomation. If the sale was at a rate above the approved Das J. price the excess was never retained and appropriated by the Agents as their own profits.\n\nMr. Mitra thereupon contends that assuming that the Agents had sold the goods as agents of the Association they did not necessarily have the authority to receive payment of the price.\n\nReliance is placed on Butwick v.\n\nGrant(1) in support of the proposition that an authority to sell does not of necessity imply an authority to receive payment of the price.\n\nThe argument is then formulated that as the Agents had no authority to receive the price, it cannot be said that the receipt was by or on behalf of the Association.\n\nThis argument again overlooks the course of business as found by the 'l'ribunal which clearly implies that the Agents were not only agents for selling the s.alt but also for collecting the sale proceeds.\n\nThe third ground urged in support of the first main contention is that the entire amounts collected by the Agents were not receivable by the Association, for the agents were entitled to a portion of it, namely, the amount spent by them in meeting the handling charges and their own commission. On the authority of Oolqtthoun v. Brooks(2) and Saiyid Ali Imam v. King-\n\nEmperor(3) Mr. Mitra contends that the sale proceeds collected by the Agents were not so completely under the control of the Association that it could by an act of its own have the entire sale proceeds actually transferred to it in Egypt. This argument is obviously fallacious.\n\nThe concession that the Agents were\n\n(r) [1924] 2 K.B. 483.\n\n(2) 2 Tax Cas. 490.\n\n(3J (1925) I.L.R. 4 Pat, 210; A.LR. 1925 Pat, 381,\n\nl95B entitled to deduct their disbursements and their com-\n\nT mission out of the sale proceeds clearly implies that\n\nMorri:::~ co., th~ sale proceeds belonged to the Association, for the Ltd.\n\nAgents could not deduct the dues by the Assov. ciation from something which did not belong to the Oommissfoner of Association.\n\nSection 217 of the Indian Contract Act Income-ta•1• gives to an agent the right to retain, out of any sum West Benga • d f h · 1 h b receive on account o t e prmmpa m t e usmess\n\nDas J. of the agency, all moneys due to himself in respect of advances made or expenses properly incurred by him in conducting such business and such remuneration as may be payable to him for acting as agent.\n\nSection 221 also confers a right on the agent to retain the goods, papers and other property of the principal received by him until the amount due to him for commission, disbursements and services in respect of the same has been paid or accounted for to him. The right of retainer and lien conferred on the agent does not make the amount received by the agent on behalf of the principal any the less the property of the principal.\n\nThe principal is the full owner and has complete control over his properties in the hands of the agent subject only to the latter's statutory right of retainer and lien .. It follows, therefore, that the entire sale proceeds received by the Agents in the case before us were received on behalf of the Association and belonged to i~ subject to the rights of the Agents.\n\nFinally, Mr. Mitra urges that the gross sale proceeds were not really income, for they were only credit items in the account and that several amounts were to be debited in the same account and if there remained any credit balance, such balance alone could be regarded as stamped with the formal impress of the character of income, profits and gains and capable of being dealt with as such and income, profits and gains could be said to have been received only at that stage.\n\nWe have been referred, in support of this contention, to certain observations in the cases, of Commissioner of Taxes v. The•Melbourne Trust Ltd.('), Russell v. Aberdeen Town and County Bank('), Re Rogers Pyatt Shellac\n\nltJ (1914] A.C. 1001 at p. 10II.\n\n(2) 2 Tax Cas. 321 at p. 3z7.\n\n& Co. v. Secretary of State for India(1), Commissioner 1953 of Income-tax, Bombay City v. Agarwal & Company, Turner Bombay(2), In re Govind Ram Tansukh Rai(3), and Morrison ct co., other cases.\n\nThe observations in those several cses Ltd. have to be read in the light of the facts of those cases . v'. and the subi'ect which was then under discussion. So Comm.sB<oner of Income-tax, read those observations can have no application to West Bengal.' the facts of this case.\n\nThe case Morley v. Tattersall(4) also relied on by Mr. Mitra is clearly distinguishable because the liability for t.he sale proceeds received by the auctioneers continued to exist even\n\nDa• J.\n\nafter the unclaimed balances were transferred to the\n\naccoun~ of the partners and, therefore, they could not be regarded as trade receipts.\n\nOn the other hand, the case of Grainger & Son v. William Lane Gough(5 ) will clearly show that the moneys received by an agent on behalf his foreign principal could be regarded as including trade profits within the meaning of section 41 of the-English Income Tax Act of 1842 (See per Lord Herschel'l at p. 337 and Lord Morris at p. 345). The several passages quoted in the judgment under appeal from the cases of Neilson Anderson & Company v. Collins and Taru v. Scanlan(6) clearly indicate that the net sale proceeds are included in the gross sale proceeds.\n\nThe same principle, as pointed out inBangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,\n\nMadras(7) is implicit in the decisions of the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Presidency and Aden v. Chunilal B. 111ehta(8 ) and Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S. L. Mathias(°). There ean, therefore, be no question that when the gross sale proceeds were received by the Agents in India they necessarily received whatever income, profits and gains were lying dormant or hidden or otherwise embedded in them.\n\nOf course, if on the taking of accounts it be found that there was no\n\n(r) [1925) LL R. 52 Cal. r at p. 3r.\n\n(2) [I952] 2I I.T, R. 293.\n\n(6) Il Tax Cas gr.\n\n(3) (1944] 12 I.T.R. 450,\n\n(7) [1950] r8 I.T.R. 423 at p. 438.\n\n(4) [1938] 3 All E.R. 296,\n\n(8) (1938) 65 I.A. 332.\n\n(~) [1896) A.C. 32~,\n\n(9) I.L.R. [19391Mad.178; 7I.T.R.1s.\n\n1958 profit during the year then the question of receipt of\n\nTnrner inco11!e, profits and gains w?uld not arise but if. there , irorrison & Go., were mcome., profits and gams, then the proport10nate\n\nLtd. par~ thereof attributable to the sale proceeds received v. by the Agents in India were income, prnfits and gains Commissioner 0/received by them at the moment the gross sale\n\nIncome-tax, proceeds were received by them in' India and that\n\n1Ve,<f Bengal. b th \"t• th . f t\" 4 (1) ( ) emg e pos1 10n e prov1s10ns o sec 1011 a\n\nDa.• J. were immediately attracted and the income, profits and gains so received became chargeable to tax under\n\nsection 3 of the Act.\n\nIn our opinion, there is no ) substance in the first main contention adumbrated by Mr. S. Mitra ..\n\nMr. Mitra's second.main point is that, assuming that there was receipt of income, profits and gains within India, such income, profits and gains clearly arose through or from a business connection in India and, therefore, the provisions of section 42( l) would apply and such income, profits and gains should be dealt with as income; profits and gains deemed to accrue or arise in India and consequently the inclusion of such income, profits and gains in the total income should be under section 4 ( 1) (c) for the Association is nonresident.\n\nMr. Mitra urges that the charging under section 3 is to be \" in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this Act\".\n\nLikewise, section 4 (1) is also \" subject to the provisions of this Act.\" This, according to Mr. Mitra, at once attracts section 42 and such income, profits and gains being within section 42 must be included in section 4 ( l) (c) and the other alternative, i.e.; section 4 (1) (a), is no longer applicable. In other words, according to Mr. Mitra's contention, section 4\n\n(1) (a) becomes a dead letter so far as income, profits and gains arising or accruing to a non-resident are concerned, We are unable to accede to this contention.\n\nSection 42 only speaks of deemed income. 'rhe whole object of that section is to make certain income, profits and gains to be deemed to arise in India so as to bring them to charge.\n\nThe receipt of the income, profits and gains being one of the yests of liabilit; v1\n\nwhere the income, profits and gains are actually 1953 received in India it is no longer necessary for the revenue authorities to have recourse to the fiction u Turn; 0 and this has been held quite clearly in Hira Mills?, td. omt~. o.,\n\nv. Income-tax Officer, Cawnpore (1) and in Burugu v.\n\nNagayya and Rajanna v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Commissioner of Madras (2). '!'his is also implicit in the decision of Incorne-tax, h\n\nP .\n\nC '] . n d' h R 'l C West Bengal. t e n vy ounc1 m ron io erry ai way ompany Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras( 3), to which Das J. reference has already been made.\n\nSection 4( J) (a) in terms is, unlike section 4 (1) (b) or 4 (1) (c), not confined in its application to any particular category of assessees.\n\nSection 4 (1) (a) is general and applies to a resident or a non-resident person. The second proviso to section 4 (1), although it relates to the case of a person not ordinarily resident, also indicates that income, profits and gains wh :ch accrue or arise to such . a person without the taxable territories can be included in his total income if they are brought into or received in the taxable territories and become chargeable to tax under section 3 read with section 4\n\n(1) (a).\n\nFor reasons hereinbefore stated this contention of Mr. Mitra must be rejected. It may be that the construction we are adopting in agreement with the High Court may operate harshly against nonresidents in that income, profits and gains attributable to business operations outside India may also be brought to charge as having been received in India and such consequence may deter non-resideRt merchants from doing business in India. These indeed are serious considerations but the Courts have to construe the statute according to the plain language and tenor thereof and if any untoward consequences result therefrom it is for authority other than this\n\nCourt to rectify or prevent the same.\n\nThe last main point urged by Mr. Mitra is that as soon as Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd., were treated as agents under section 43, the provisions of section 42 were immediately attracted. In support of this contention Mr. Mitra relies on the decisions in Imperial\n\n(1) [1946] 14 I.T.R. 417 at p. 423.\n\n(2) [1949] 17 I.T.R. 194,\n\n(3) (1931) I.L.R. 54 Mad, 691; L.R, 58 I.A. 239.\n\nt; i9\n\nrnsa Tobacco Company of India Ltd. v. The Secretary of\n\nTurner State for India (1), Commissioner of Income-tax,\n\nMor.ison .t Go., Bombay v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer (India) Ltd.(2) and Ltd.\n\nCaltex (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, _v._ Bombay City('), where it has been held that section 43 Oommiss.aner of is only a machinery for giving effect to section 42.\n\nIncome-tam.\n\nTo say that section 43 is really only machinery for lVest Bengal.\n\ngiving effect to section 42 is not to say that section Das J. 43 has no other purpose. Section 42 refers to income, profits or gains accruing or arising directly or indirectly through or from (i) any business connection in India, (ii) any property in India or (iii) any assets or sources of income in India, or (iv) any money lent at interest and brought into India in cash or in kind or (v) the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset in India. All these incomes by virtue of this section have to be deemed to be income accruing or arising within India and where the person entitled to such income, profits or gains is a non-resident such income, profits and gains are .made chargeable to income-tax either in his name or in the name of his agent who is to be deemed to be for all the purposes of this Aet the assessee in respect of such income-tax.\n\nSection 43, however, refers to a person (a) employed by or on behalf of a non-resident, (b) having any business connection with such non-resident or (c) through whom such non-resident is in receipt of any income, profits or gains. A person who comes within one or other of these three categories, may, under this section, be treated by the Incomectax Officer as agent of the non-resident and such person is for all the purposes of this Act to be deemed to be such agent. 'rhe third category refers to a person through whom the non-resident is in receipt of any income, profits or gains.\n\nThe portion of section 43 which refers to the person through whom the non-resident is in receipt of any income, profits or gains does not necessarily attract the provisions of section 42, for the income, profits and gains received by the person\n\n(t) (1922) l.L.R. 49 Cal. 721.\n\n(2) ~1939) 7 I.T.~. 176.\n\n' ,. --\n\nwho is treated as agent under section 43 may not fall\n\n19S3 within any of the several categories of income, profits T f d ' 4\" Th 1 urnar or gams re erre to m section :6. e anguage Mmrison ct co., of section 43 will also attract the provisions of Ltd. section 40, for that section also contemplates a v. person who is entitled to receive on behalf of the Commissioner 01 non-resident any income, profits and gains chargel~cotnBie-tao:, t b d . d h . 'es enga • a le un er this Act an may even attract t e provi- sions of section 4(l)(a). In our opinion there is no Das J. warrant for the contention that an appointment of a person as a statutory agent under section 43 only attracts section 42 for such appointment is for all purposes of the Act and not only for the purposes of section 42.\n\nIn our judgment, for reasons stated above, the answers given to the questions by the High Court, in so far as they relate to the assessment of incometax with which alone we are now concerned, are correct and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. K. Mukherii.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Raiadhyaksha.\n\nN ALINAKHYA BY SA OK\n\nSHYAM SUNDER HALDAR AND OTHERS. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS, and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nWest Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act (XVII of 1950), s. 18 (I)- T-Vhether applies to orders for recovery of possession made by Presidency Small Cause Court-\" Decree for recovery of possession \"-Construction of stat1ites-Mistakes of legislature.\n\nThe expression \"decree for recovery of possession\" in s. 18\n\n(1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act (Act XVII of 1950) does not include an order for recovery of possession made under s. 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, and a person against whom an order fo1\n\nJan. 29.", "total_entities": 135, "entities": [{"text": "D\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 183, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224, "end_char": 232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 460, "end_char": 464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 509, "end_char": 514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Port Said Salt Association Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 523, "end_char": 554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'l'he Port Said Salt Association Ltd., a company incorporated in the United Kingdom carried on business in Egypt and had its headquarters in Egypt."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 586, "end_char": 600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'l'he Port Said Salt Association Ltd., a company incorporated in the United Kingdom carried on business in Egypt and had its headquarters in Egypt."}}, {"text": "Egypt", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 624, "end_char": 629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'l'he Port Said Salt Association Ltd., a company incorporated in the United Kingdom carried on business in Egypt and had its headquarters in Egypt."}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 749, "end_char": 777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It manufactured salt in Egypt and part of the salt so manufactured was consigned to Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd., (the assessee) for sale in India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 806, "end_char": 811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It manufactured salt in Egypt and part of the salt so manufactured was consigned to Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd., (the assessee) for sale in India."}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1168, "end_char": 1173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1188, "end_char": 1202, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1235, "end_char": 1239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1271, "end_char": 1275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1374, "end_char": 1396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Calcutta held that tbe income in question was chargeable t.o income-tax under s. 4 (1) (a) as income received in India and not under s. 42 of the Act: Held, (i) that, as the assessee was entrusted with the selling of goods consigned to them for sale, handling the cargoes, issuing delivery orders, collecting the proceeds etc.,"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1466, "end_char": 1470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1521, "end_char": 1526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3302, "end_char": 3306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3322, "end_char": 3336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3441, "end_char": 3445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3464, "end_char": 3468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3612, "end_char": 3616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3718, "end_char": 3723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3799, "end_char": 3803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3814, "end_char": 3826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4213, "end_char": 4218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4313, "end_char": 4318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4354, "end_char": 4359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4428, "end_char": 4433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4735, "end_char": 4754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Calcutta High Court affirmed."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5092, "end_char": 5107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 of 1949,\n\n522 SUPREME COUR'r R~JPORTS [1953]\n\n1958 S. Mitra (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5163, "end_char": 5177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turner AforriBon & Co., C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P. A.\n\nLtd.\n\nMehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. A.\n\nLtd.\n\nMehta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5208, "end_char": 5226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turner AforriBon & Co., C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P. A.\n\nLtd.\n\nMehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Daa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5373, "end_char": 5376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDaa J.\n\nDAs J.-'l'his appeal arises out of six references made by the Calcutta Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, two of them relating to the incometax assessment years 1943-44 and 1944-45 and the remrtining four re_lating to excess profits tax for the chargeable accounting periods ending on the 31st December of each of the years 1940, 1941 1943 and 1943 respectively."}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5381, "end_char": 5384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDaa J.\n\nDAs J.-'l'his appeal arises out of six references made by the Calcutta Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, two of them relating to the incometax assessment years 1943-44 and 1944-45 and the remrtining four re_lating to excess profits tax for the chargeable accounting periods ending on the 31st December of each of the years 1940, 1941 1943 and 1943 respectively.", "canonical_name": "DAS"}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5501, "end_char": 5514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5529, "end_char": 5543, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Port Said Salt Association Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts ap-pearing in the statements of the case are as follows: Messrs. Port Said Salt Association Ltd, (hereinafter referred to as \"the Association\") is a company incorporated in the United Kingdom and has its registered office there. '"}}, {"text": "Alexandria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6141, "end_char": 6151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhe Association, however, carries on business in Egypt and its head office is situate in Alexandria where tbe annual general meetings of its shareholders are held."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6380, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "gypt", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6479, "end_char": 6483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The association manufactures salt in ]gypt where it has certain concessions and the salt as manufactured is sent for sale in any country where there is.a ~.uitable market."}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison & Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6690, "end_char": 6720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Part of the salt so manufactured by the Association is consigned to Messrs. Turner Morrison & Company Ltd.\n\nfor sale in India."}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison aud Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6937, "end_char": 6969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are effected in Egypt by the Association wlio sends the documents to Messrs. Turner Morrison & Company Ltd. Messrs. Turner Morrison aud Company Ltd. (lffect sales i11 India through brokers at the best price\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME OOURT REPORTS 523\n\nobtainable at or above the prices approved by the 1959 Association."}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7133, "end_char": 7158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turner Morrison & Company Ltd. are T paid commission at the rate of 2-1£ per cent."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7366, "end_char": 7374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All handling of the cargoes when they v. arrive at Calcutta and the necessary disbursementsOommissionei of in connection therewith are carried out and made by Income-tax, Turner Morrison & Company Ltd. The sale proceeds West Bengal."}}, {"text": "rrurner Morrison & Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7565, "end_char": 7596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are collected by rrurner Morrison & Company Ltd.\n\nDas J. and credited to the account kept in their own name with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7598, "end_char": 7601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are collected by rrurner Morrison & Company Ltd.\n\nDas J. and credited to the account kept in their own name with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.", "canonical_name": "DAS"}}, {"text": "Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7665, "end_char": 7706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are collected by rrurner Morrison & Company Ltd.\n\nDas J. and credited to the account kept in their own name with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation."}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7968, "end_char": 7978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7993, "end_char": 8007, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8091, "end_char": 8100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8152, "end_char": 8161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison & Company Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8285, "end_char": 8315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turner Morrison & Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Agents) preferred appeals against the aforesaid assessment orders to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who, however, dismissed the appeals.", "canonical_name": "Turner Morrison & Company Ltd."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8532, "end_char": 8561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Agents took a further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8645, "end_char": 8657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8722, "end_char": 8732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8863, "end_char": 8876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9060, "end_char": 9072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9108, "end_char": 9118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9387, "end_char": 9397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9809, "end_char": 9821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10139, "end_char": 10148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10386, "end_char": 10396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10497, "end_char": 10500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'rhe reference came up for disppsal before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of Sen and Chunder JJ."}}, {"text": "Chunder", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10505, "end_char": 10512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'rhe reference came up for disppsal before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of Sen and Chunder JJ."}}, {"text": "section 42(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11210, "end_char": 11223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11349, "end_char": 11359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11568, "end_char": 11578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11665, "end_char": 11674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11690, "end_char": 11704, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11784, "end_char": 11794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11802, "end_char": 11816, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 66A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12197, "end_char": 12208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax, \\Vest Bengal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12482, "end_char": 12522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Income-tax, \\Vest Bengal, however, has not preferred any appsial from that part of the judgment of the High Court which sets forth its opinion on the questions in so far as they relate to the assessment of excess profits tax.", "canonical_name": "D\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL"}}, {"text": "S. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12929, "end_char": 12937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first main contention urged by Mr. S. Mitra appearing in support of this appeal is that no income, profits and gains were received in India by or on be~ half of the Association.", "canonical_name": "S. Mitra"}}, {"text": "Pondicherry Railway Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13800, "end_char": 13832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Ye are bound to\n\n\" '\"9\" • reject this reasoning as unsound on the same grounds\n\nDas J. on which the Privy Council rejected a similar contention in the case of Pondicherry Railway Company Ltd.(')."}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13861, "end_char": 13870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the language of Lord Macmillan the functions of the Agents far transcended the mere mechanical act of transmitting the sums collected by them to the Association in .B; gypt."}}, {"text": "Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14418, "end_char": 14423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mitra thereupon shifts his ground and urges that even if income, profits and gains were received ."}}, {"text": "LR. 58 I.A. 239", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15356, "end_char": 15371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17877, "end_char": 17888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17896, "end_char": 17915, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18266, "end_char": 18277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20262, "end_char": 20273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So Comm.sB<oner of Income-tax, read those observations can have no application to West Bengal.'"}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20862, "end_char": 20872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "English Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20880, "end_char": 20902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Morris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20955, "end_char": 20961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the case of Grainger & Son v. William Lane Gough(5 ) will clearly show that the moneys received by an agent on behalf his foreign principal could be regarded as including trade profits within the meaning of section 41 of the-English Income Tax Act of 1842 (See per Lord Herschel'l at p. 337 and Lord Morris at p. 345)."}}, {"text": "sec 1011", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22599, "end_char": 22607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22724, "end_char": 22733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22834, "end_char": 22842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, there is no ) substance in the first main contention adumbrated by Mr. S. Mitra ..\n\nMr. Mitra's second.main point is that, assuming that there was receipt of income, profits and gains within India, such income, profits and gains clearly arose through or from a business connection in India and, therefore, the provisions of section 42( l) would apply and such income, profits and gains should be dealt with as income; profits and gains deemed to accrue or arise in India and consequently the inclusion of such income, profits and gains in the total income should be under section 4 ( 1) (c) for the Association is nonresident.", "canonical_name": "S. Mitra"}}, {"text": "section 42( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23087, "end_char": 23101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23335, "end_char": 23344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23431, "end_char": 23440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23526, "end_char": 23535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23637, "end_char": 23647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23696, "end_char": 23706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23727, "end_char": 23736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23779, "end_char": 23788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23876, "end_char": 23885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24051, "end_char": 24061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4( J)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24927, "end_char": 24940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24965, "end_char": 24974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25071, "end_char": 25080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25174, "end_char": 25183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25513, "end_char": 25522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25533, "end_char": 25542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26304, "end_char": 26329, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Turner Morrison & Company Ltd.", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26361, "end_char": 26371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26391, "end_char": 26401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26914, "end_char": 26924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26982, "end_char": 26992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27020, "end_char": 27030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27092, "end_char": 27102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27162, "end_char": 27172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27933, "end_char": 27943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28536, "end_char": 28546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28697, "end_char": 28707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28864, "end_char": 28874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29034, "end_char": 29044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29086, "end_char": 29096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29355, "end_char": 29370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29492, "end_char": 29502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29517, "end_char": 29527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29613, "end_char": 29623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. K. Mukherii", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29921, "end_char": 29935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: P. K. Mukherii."}}, {"text": "G. H. Raiadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29964, "end_char": 29982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Raiadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "N ALINAKHYA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29985, "end_char": 29996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N ALINAKHYA BY SA OK\n\nSHYAM SUNDER HALDAR AND OTHERS. ["}}, {"text": "SHYAM SUNDER HALDAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30007, "end_char": 30026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N ALINAKHYA BY SA OK\n\nSHYAM SUNDER HALDAR AND OTHERS. ["}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30161, "end_char": 30166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30408, "end_char": 30413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30570, "end_char": 30575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30583, "end_char": 30622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_533_545_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "' ,. --\n\nS.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 533\n\nwho is treated as agent under section 43 may not fall\n\n19S3 within any of the several categories of income, profits T f d ' 4\" Th 1 urnar or gams re erre to m section :6. e anguage Mmrison ct co., of section 43 will also attract the provisions of Ltd. section 40, for that section also contemplates a v. person who is entitled to receive on behalf of the Commissioner 01 non-resident any income, profits and gains chargel~cotnBie-tao:, t b d . d h . 'es enga • a le un er this Act an may even attract t e provi- sions of section 4(l)(a). In our opinion there is no Das J. warrant for the contention that an appointment of a person as a statutory agent under section 43 only attracts section 42 for such appointment is for all purposes of the Act and not only for the purposes of section 42.\n\nIn our judgment, for reasons stated above, the answers given to the questions by the High Court, in so far as they relate to the assessment of incometax with which alone we are now concerned, are correct and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. K. Mukherii.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Raiadhyaksha.\n\nN ALINAKHYA BY SA OK\n\nSHYAM SUNDER HALDAR AND OTHERS. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS, and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nWest Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act (XVII of 1950), s. 18 (I)- T-Vhether applies to orders for recovery of possession made by Presidency Small Cause Court-\" Decree for recovery of possession \"-Construction of stat1ites-Mistakes of legislature.\n\nThe expression \"decree for recovery of possession\" in s. 18\n\n(1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act (Act XVII of 1950) does not include an order for recovery of possession made under s. 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, and a person against whom an order fo1\n\nJan. 29.\n\nNalinakhya\n\nBysaclc\n\nShyam Sunder\n\nHaldar. and Others.\n\n534 SUPR:E:ME dOURT REPORTS (1953]\n\nrecovery of possession has been passed under s. 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, is not therefore entitled to claim relief under the provisions of s. 18 (1) of Act XVII of 1950.\n\n•Bai Bahadiir Atiilya Dhan Banerjee v. Siidhangsu Bhiisan Dutta([l951] 55 0.W.N. 343), Dhanesh Prakash Pal v. Lalit Mohan Ghosh ([1951] 55 O.W.N. 347), Mohan Lal Khettry v. Ohuni Lal Khettry ([1951] 55 O.W.N. 421) Jethmull Sethia v. Aloke Ganguly ([1951] 55 O.W.N. 563), Iswari Prasad Goenka v. N. R. Sen ([1951] 55 O.W.N. 719) overruled.\n\nIn construing a statute it is not com:Petent to any court' to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made\n\na mistake and even if there is some de:fect in. the phraseology used by the Legislaure, the Court cannot aid the defective Phrasing of an Act or add and amend, or by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act.\n\nOom1nissioner for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel ([1891] A.O. 531); Crawford v. Spooner ([1846-51] 4 l\\LI.A. 179) and Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liqi<idator of Dehra D\"n Mi<ssourie Electric Tramway Go. Ltd. ([1933] 60 I.A. 13) referred to.\n\nCrvIL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th April, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Sen and Chunder JJ.) in Civil Rule No. 1038of1950 arising out of the Order dated the 4th July, 1950, of the Court of the 6th Judge, Presidency Small Causes Court, Calcutta, in Ejectment Suit No. 6571 of 1949.\n\nArun Kumar Dutta and Shivdas Ghosh for the appellant. -.\n\nPanchanan Ghose (S. P. Ghose, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1053. January 29. The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by . , DAS J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a Bench of the Calcutta High Uourt passed on the 9th April, 1951, iu Civil Rule No.1038 of 1950. The facts leading up to this appeal may be shortly stated as follows : The respondents were, according to the appellant, monthly tenants under the appellant in respect of three rooms, one kitchen, one privy and a bathroom on the groundfioor of premises No. 6, Roy Began\n\n. -\n\nStreet, Calcutta, at a monthly rent of Rs. '35 payable according to the Bengali calendar month.\n\nOn the 29th Baisakh 1356 B. S. the appellant gave notice to the respondents to quit the premises on or before the\n\n7th Jaistha 1356 B.S. The respondents having failed to comply with tqe notice the appellant on the 1st June, 1949, instituted proceedings under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, for the eviction of the respondents from the demised premises on the allegation that the tenancy had determined ipso fact.J for non-payment of rent for three consecutive months in terms of section 12 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1948. The respondents on the 6th July, 1949, deposited into Court Rs. 233-7-0 and on the 8th July, 1949, entered appearance and filed a written statement denying that they were in arrears with their rent or that their tenancy had been ipso facto determined.\n\nThe said proceedings came up for hearing on the 27th February, 1950, and the respondents not having appeared it wa3 heard ex parte and an order was made directing the delivery of possession of the premises to the appellant on the 3rd May, 1950. In the meantime on the 31st March, 1950, the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 (Act XVII of 1950) came into force.\n\nOn the 29th May, 1950, the respondents filed an application in the trial Court under section 18 of the said Act for vacating the order for possession.\n\nOn the 5th June, 1950, the trial Court made an order upon terms which, as set out in the respondents' case, are as follows :\n\n\"5 .. 6-50.\n\nOn consent all arrears of rent up to J aistha 1357 B.S. with interest at 9% p.a. along with the costs of the suit including half Pleader's fee amounting to Rs. 399-3-0 on consent in total to be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff by 4-7-50. The date fixed for payment arid final orders. All proceedings :a.nd execution stayed until further orders.\"\n\nThe agreed amount having been paid the order for possession was vacated on the 4th July, 1950.\n\nThe\n\nNalinakhya\n\nBy sack\n\nv Shyam Sunder\n\nHaldar and Others.\n\nDas J .\n\n' . [1953]\n\n1953 order as recorded in the order sheet reads as follows:- Nalinakhya\n\nBysaak • \"4-7-50. Parties present as before. Defendant\n\nv. carries out the order of the learned Court, dated 5th Shyam s,.nder June, 1950.\n\nMoney deposited in Court as ordered.\n\nHaldai Accordingly order of decree for possession \\s vacated. and Others.\n\nMoney in Court is allowed to be withdrawn by the Das J. plaintiff's pleader under power.\"\n\nThe appellant on the 1st August, 1950, moved the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the order of the trial Court passed on the 4th July, 1950. While the application was pending before the High Court the West Bengal Premises Hent Control (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1950 (Act LXII of 1950) came into force on the 30th November, 1950. On the 9th April, 1951, the High Court following an earlier .decision of another Bench of that Court in Rai Bahadur Atulya Dhan Banerjee v. Sudhangsii Bhusan Dutta(') dismissed the. application.\n\nOn the 30th November, 1951, the High Court granted leave to the appellant to appeal to this Court and issued a certificate under the provisions of article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India ..\n\nAs already stated, the proceedings out of which 'the present appeal arises were instituted under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.\n\nChapter VII of that Act which is intituled \"Recovery of Possession of Immovable Property\" allmvs the landlord, in certain circumstances, to \"apply to the Small Cause Court for a summons against the occupant calling upon him to show cause on a day therein appointed why he should not be compelled to deliver up the property.\" Section 43 provides that if the occupant does not appear at the time appointed or show cause to the contrary, the applicant landlord shall, if the Court is satisfied that he is entitled to apply under section 41, be entitled to an order addressed to a Bailiff of the Court directing\n\n(I) (1951 J 55 C.W.N. 343\n\n\" ' . ·\"\"\n\nhim to give possession of the property to the applicant on such date as the Court thinks fit to name in\n\nNalinakhya such order.\n\nAlthough under the rules framed under Bv,, ack the Act this application under section 41 is initiated v. by a plaint there is no dispute that the proceeding is Shyam Sunde,.\n\nnot 'a suit and the order for delivery of possession Haldar k. d f and Others. does not strictly spea mg amount to a ecree or recovery of possession. [See Rai Meherbai Sorabji Master v. Pherozshaw Sorabji Gazdar(1 ) ].\n\nIndeed, section 19 of the Act peremptorily provides, inter alia, that the Small Causes Court shall have no jurisdiction in suits for recovery of immovable property.\n\nThe only question for consideration, therefore, is whether section 18(1) of Act XVII of 1950 applies to an order for possession made under section 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.\n\nSection 18(1) and the marginal note to that section run as follows :\n\n\"18. (1). where any decree for recovery Gf possession of any premises has been made Power of Court to rescind or vary on the ground of default in payment\n\ndecree~ and rdei:s of arrears of rent under the provisions or to give rehef in . rending suits in of the vVest Bengal Premises Rent certaincases.\n\nControl (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, but the possession of such premises has not been recovered from the tenant, the tenant may apply to the trial Court within sixty days of the coming into force of this Act for vacating the decree for ejectment against him and within such period no order for delivery of possession shall be made by any Court, nor if an application is made by the tenant under this sub-section till the application has been dismissed under sub-section ( 4).\"\n\nIn Rai Bahadur Atulya Dhan Banerjee v. Sudhangsu Bhu, san Dutta it was held that the expression \"decree for recovery of possession\" in subsection (1) of section 18 includes an order for recovery of possession made under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. This case\n\n(l) (1927) I.L.R. 51 Born, 385,\n\n(2) (1951) 55 C.W, N. i3•\n\nDas J.\n\nNalinakhya\n\nBysack v.\n\nShyam Sunder\n\nHaldar and Others.\n\nDas J.\n\nwas followed, without further discussion, by different Benches of the same High Court in Dhanesh Prakash Pal v. Lalit Mohan Ghose ('), Mohan Lal Khettry v.\n\nC\"kuni Lal Khettry ('), Jethmull Sethia\n\nv. Aloke Ganguly (') and also in the present case.\n\nFinally, the question was again considered by a larger Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Iswari Prasad Goenka v.\n\nN. R. Sen(').\n\nThe learned Judges agreed with the earlier decision in Rai Bahadur Atulya Dhan Banerjee v.\n\nSudhangsu Bhusan Dutta (5 ).\n\nAfter hearing the able arguments advanced before us and giving the most anxious consideration to the decisions in the cases mentioned above we are unable to accept the conclusion arrived at by them in those cases as correct.\n\nApart from the question whether the marginal note can at all be refened to in construing the provisions ol a section of an Act, it is quite clear, on the authorities, that the marginal note cannot control the meaning of the body of the section if the language employed therein is clear and unambiguous. If the language of the section is clear then it may be that there is an accidental slip in the marginal note rather than that the marginal note is correct and the accidental slip is in the body of the section itself.\n\nTake for instance section 11 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1948.\n\nThe section says that notwithstanding anything contained in certain Acts specified therein, \"no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made so long as the tenant pays to the full extent the rent allowable by this Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy.\" The marginal note to that section simply says: \" No order for ejectment ordinarily to be made if rent paid at allowable rate.\" In the marginal note the words \"or decree\" do not find a place at all, a fact which clearly shows that the marginal note was not prepared carefully and that it was not a sure guide in the matter of the\n\n(1) (1951) 55 C.W.N. 347\n\n' (2) (1951) 55 C.W.N. 421.\n\n(3) (r951) 5~ C.w N. 563.\n\n(4) (195r) 55 C.WN. 719.\n\n(5) (1951) 55 C.W.N. J43\n\ninterpretation of the body of the section.\n\nWe have, therefore, to r'ead the words used in the body of section 18(1) of the 1950 Act and if we find the meaw:iing clear and unambiguous, the marginal note should not be permitted to create an ambiguity in the section.\n\nSection 18 (1), as it stood on the 4th July, :1.950, when the order for possession passed on the 27th February, 1950, was vacated, gave relief to a tenant aga.inst whom any decree for recovery of possession of any premises had been made on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent under the provisions of the 1948 Act, provided that the possession of the premises had not been recovered from him.\n\nThe relief given by this section is clearly against a decree for possession which \"has been made\" under the 1948 Act.\n\nThe language of section 18 (1) of the 1950 Act and in particular the specific reference therein to the Act of 1948 take us back to that Act. Section 11 of the 1948 Act refers \"to order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises\".\n\nThe reference in the non obstante clause of section 11 to the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, clearly indicates that the order for the recovery of possession refers to orders passed under section 43 of the last mentioned Act on applications made under section 41 thereof.\n\nSection 11 speaks of both \"order\" for the recovery of possession and \" decree \" for the recovery of possession.\n\nTherefore, there can remain no manner of doubt that the two words \" order \" and \" decree \" in section 11 connote two different things. '.l'his is further made clear by the use of two words \"suit\" or \"proceeding\" in section 12 of the 1948 Act.\n\nI~ is, thus, quite clear that in the 1948 Act \"suit\" is different from \"proceeding\" and \"order\" is different from \"decree\".\n\nTherefore, in construing the 1948 Act there can be no occasion for giving any extended meaning to the word\" decree\" so as to include \"order\", for the two are distinctly and separately provided for.\n\nSection 18 (I) of Act XVII of 1950 does not refer to \"decree\"\n\n. 1953\n\nNa!inakhya Bysack\n\nV, Shyam Sunder\n\nHaldar and Others.\n\nDas J.\n\nNalinakhya Bysack v.\n\nShyavi Sunder\n\nHaldar and OtherR,\n\nDas J.\n\nsimpliciter but to \"auy decree for recovery of possession of any premises on the grouud of default in payment of arrears of rent under the pravisions of\" the 1948 Act.\n\nTurning then to that Act we find that a decree for possession on the ground of non-payment of rent under that Act is treated distinctly from an order for possession on the ground of non-payment of rent under the same Act.\n\nA decree for the recovery of possession within the meaning of that Act can, therefore, only mean a decree in a snit for recovery of possession and eannot cover an order for possession passed under section 43 on an application made under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. In short, section 18(1) of Act XVII of 1950 expressly attracts the 1948 Act and under that Act there can be no necessity for giving an extended . t th d \"d \" f \" d \" . meamng o e wor ecree , or or er 1s separately dealt with in that Act.\n\nIt is said that whatever the word \"decree\" may mean in the 1948 Act it is immaterial for the purposes of construing Act XVII of 1950 for the Court has to ascertain the meaning of the word ''decree\" as u\"sed in section 18(1) of the last mentioned Act. It has been already stated that the language of section 18\n\n(1) attracts the relevant provisions of the 1948 Act and, therefore, the word \"decree\" occurring in section 18(1) must necessarily be construed in the light of the 1948 Act and it is clear that so construed it cannot cover \"order\" for possession made under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. Apart from that consideration, the question still remains: What does the word \"decree\" in section 18 (1) mean? 'fhat word has not been defined either in the 1948 Act or in Act XVII of 1950 or in the Bengal General Clauses Act. '!.'hat word, however, has been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and, as there defined, it means the formal ex.pression of an adjudica.tion which determines the rights of the parties with regard to the matter in controversy in the suit which last word prima facie means a civil proceeding initiated by a plaint (secti<; m 26 1J, nd Order IV, rule 11\n\nCivil Procedure Code). This is the ordinary accepted meaning of the word \" decree\" and if that meaning is attributed to the word \" decree \" occurring in section 18(1) then clearly it cannot cover an order Jor\n\nNalinakhya By sack v. possession passed under section 43 of the Presidency Shyam Sunder Small Cause Courts Act on an application made under Haldar seotion 41 of that Act. and Others.\n\nIt is, however, urged that the word \" decree\" in section 18 (1) of Act XVII of 1950 should not be read in its strict sense. It is said that although the word \"suit\" ordinarily means a proceeding instituted by a plaint, it is also used in a wider sense so as to cover proceedings which are not instituted by a\n\nplant and, therefore, an adjudication in those proceedings which are also suits in that extended meaning may well be said to be a \"decree\". Reference is made to the explanation of sub-section (1) of section 12 of Act XVII of 1~50, which expressly provides that in the proviso to sub-section (1) the term \"suit\" does not include proceeding under Chapter VII of the Presidency Bmall Cause Courts Act, 1882, and it is urged that this explanation inferentially means that tlie word \"suit\" occurring in the other sections of Act XVII of 1950 may include a proceeding under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and, therefore, an order made on such a proceeding may be described as an adjudication in a suit and, therefore, a decree. It is not quite clear how this inference, even if it can be properly drawn, can have any bearing on the construction of the word \"decree\" in sub-section (1) of section 18 of the Act XVII of 1950\n\nwhere the word \" suit\" is not used at all.\n\nBe that as it may, the argument founded on the aforesaid inference sought to be drawn from the explanation to section 12 (1) of Act XVII of 1950 will clearly appear to be untenable when the provisions of that Act are closely scrutinised, for it will then be found that the word \"suit\" does not and was not intended to cover any proceedin'g under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.\n\nSection 12 (1) prohibits the making of any order or decree for the\n\nDas J.\n\nNalinakhya\n\nBysack v.\n\nShyam Sundllr\n\nHaldar and Others.\n\nDas J.\n\nrecovery of possession by any Court, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act or !:ow.\n\nThis sub-section (1), standing by itself, means that no oriler for possession can be passed by the Presidency Small Cause Court notwithslanding the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and no decree for possession can be made by any Court in any suit notwithstanding the 'rransfer of Property Act or the Contract Act or the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.\n\nThe proviso to sub-section (1), however, saves \"any suit for decree for such recovery of possession\" against certain tenants or in certain circumstances.\n\nTherefore, it is clear that the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 12 does not save proceedings under Chapter VII of. the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. The explanation to that sub-section stating that the word \"suit\" in the proviso does not include a proceeding under Chapter VII of the Presidency SmaU Cause Courts Act appears to have been inserted out of abundant caution to put the position beyond any doubt. Section 16 of Act XVII of 1950 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law a suit by a landlord against a tenant for recovery of possession \"of any premises to which the Act applies shall lie to the Courts as set out in Schedule B and that no other Court shall be competent to entertain or try such suit. According to Schedule B, where the premises are situate on land wholly within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court aud when the rent does not exceed Rs. 500 per month, the Chief Judge of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes shall entertain and try such suit .as a Court of the District Judge, provided that he shall be entitled to transfer the suit to any other Judge of that Court who shall try it as a Court of the Subordinate Judge.\n\nThe result of sections 12 and 16 read with Schedule 'B is for all practical purposes to suspend the operation of Chapter VII oft.he Presidency Small Cause Courts Act in Calcutta for no one will take proceedings in which no order can be made. The effect of those sections is to confer a new jurisdiction on the\n\n• ...\n\nS.C.R.\n\n1953 Chief Judge of the Calcutta Small Cause Court to entertain and try suits by landlords -against tenants for recovery of possession of premises situate within Nalinakhya By sack the ordinary original ci vii ju.risdiction of the Calcu1'ta v.\n\nHigh Court when the monthly rent does not exceed Shyam Sundei Rs. 500.\n\nThus after Act XVII of 1950 came into Haldar force the Calcutta Small Cause Court has ceased to and Others. have any power to pass an order for possession under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and the Small Cause Court of Calcutta can, under that Act, only pass a decree for possession in a suit which is saved by the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 12 and with regard to which a special jurisdiction is conferred on that Court by section 16 of that Act. That being the position, the word\" suit \" in none of the sections of Act XVII of 1950 can be said to have been used as including a proceeding under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.\n\nTherefore, the reasoning advanced in support of attributing an extended meaning to the word \"suit\" and then inferentially to the word \"decrne\" in section 18 (1) cannot be sustained.\n\nIt is next argued that if the word \"decree\" is construed strictly it will give rise to startling results in that poor tenants against whom orders for possession had been made under the 1948 Act will be deprived of the benefit of section 18 (1) while the wealthy tenants paying rents above Rs. 500 per month will get relief under that section and this will frustrate the i1:1tention of the Legislature. This argument proceeds on the assumption that the Legislature intended .to give relief to all tenants against whom orders or decrees for possession had been made. The language of section 18 (1) clearly shows that the intention of the Legislature was to give relief only to certa; in tenants in certain circumstances. In the first place relief is given only with respect to decree for possession made on the specified ground and not with respect to a decree for possession made on any other ground. In the next place reliHf is given only when the possession of the premises in respect of which a\n\nDas J.\n\nNalinakhya\n\nBy sack v.\n\nShyani Sunder\n\nHaldar and Others.\n\nDasJ.\n\ndecree for possession had been made had not been made over by the tenant. Thus tenants against whom a decree for possession had been made on grounds other than the.ground specifid in the subsection and even tenants against whom a decree for possession had been made on the specified ground but who had, voluntarily or otherwise, delivered possession of the premises get no relief under section 18 (1).\n\nAn order for possession i.s niade by the Presidency Small Cause Court under Section 43 on a summary application under section 41 and the order directs the Bailiff of the Court to deliver possession to the applicant. This'order for the recovery of possession which under section 37 of the Presidency Small Cause\n\nCourts Act is final and conclusive and from which there is no appeal or a new trial under section 38 of that Act does not ordinarily take much time to be obtained or to be carried out and certainly much less than what is taken to obtain a decree for possession in a snit and to execute such decree, because both the decree for possession in a suit arid the order for execution thereof are subject to appeal.\n\nThe Legislature may well have thought that cases where orders for possession had been made under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act with respect ' to premises which were situate within the small area of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and which, in spite of such orders, were sti]j in the possession of the tenants at the date of the commencement of Act XVII of 1950 would be few in number as compared to the number . of cases where decrees for possession had been made with respect to premises which were situate within a very much larger area and which were still in the possession of the tenants and, therefore, did not think fit to provide for those few cases.\n\nIt, must always be borne in mind, as said by Lord Halsbury in Commissioner for Special Piirposes of Income Tax\n\nv. Pemsel ('), that it is not competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature\n\n(I) L, R. [t891) A. C, 531 at p. 5+9\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'r REPORTS 545\n\nhas made a mistake.\n\nThe Court must proceed on the 1958 footing that the Legislature intended what it has Nalinakhya said.\n\nEven if there is some defect in the phraseology Bysack . used by the Legislature the Court cannot, as poinwed v. out in Crawford y. Spooner (1), aid the Legislature's Shyam Sunder defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend or, Haldar d fi · h' h l f and Others. by construction, make up e ciencies w 10 are e t in the Act.\n\nEven where there is a casus omissus, it is, as said by Lord l:tussell of Killowen in Hansraj Gupta\n\nv. Official Liquidator of Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co., Ltd. (2), for others tlian the Courts to remedy the defect.\n\nIn our view it is uot right to gi.ve to the word \" decree\" a meaning other than its ordinary accepted meaning and we are bound to say, in spite of our profound respect for the opinions of the learned Judges who decided them, that the several cases relied on by the respondent were not correctly decided.\n\nReference was made, in course of argument, to section 6 of the West Bengal Act LXII of 1950.\n\nThat section refers to orders or decrees made between the commencement of Act XVII of 1950 and Act LXII of 1950, i.e., between the 30th March, 1950, and the 30th November, 1950, and cannot have any application to the order for possession made in this case on the '27th February, 1950.\n\nFor reasons stated above this appeal must be allowed and the order made by the High Court should be set aside and the respondents' application under section 18 (1) of Act XVII of 1950 should be dismissed and we order accordingly. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs except that the parties should bear their own costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: S. C. Bannerji.\n\nAgent for' the rspondent : Sukumar Ghose.\n\n(1) 6 Moo. P.C. l; 4 MJ.A. 179\n\n(2) (19~3) L.R. 60 I.A, 13; A.l.R. 193~ P.C. 6~,\n\nDas J .", "total_entities": 140, "entities": [{"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 83, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243, "end_char": 253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 295, "end_char": 305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 564, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 701, "end_char": 711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 726, "end_char": 736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 822, "end_char": 832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. 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P. Ghose, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3563, "end_char": 3574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchanan Ghose (S. P. Ghose, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Uourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3753, "end_char": 3772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAS J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a Bench of the Calcutta High Uourt passed on the 9th April, 1951, iu Civil Rule No.1038 of 1950."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4119, "end_char": 4127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Street, Calcutta, at a monthly rent of Rs. '"}}, {"text": "29th Baisakh 1356 B. S.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4215, "end_char": 4238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th Baisakh 1356 B. S. the appellant gave notice to the respondents to quit the premises on or before the\n\n7th Jaistha 1356 B.S. The respondents having failed to comply with tqe notice the appellant on the 1st June, 1949, instituted proceedings under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, for the eviction of the respondents from the demised premises on the allegation that the tenancy had determined ipso fact."}}, {"text": "1st June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4422, "end_char": 4436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th Baisakh 1356 B. S. the appellant gave notice to the respondents to quit the premises on or before the\n\n7th Jaistha 1356 B.S. 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24301, "end_char": 24311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Presidency Small Cause Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24736, "end_char": 24769, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25390, "end_char": 25398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, must always be borne in mind, as said by Lord Halsbury in Commissioner for Special Piirposes of Income Tax\n\nv. Pemsel ('), that it is not competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature\n\n(I) L, R. [t891) A. C, 531 at p. 5+9\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'r REPORTS 545\n\nhas made a mistake."}}, {"text": "Shyam Sunder defective phrasing of an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25923, "end_char": 25964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26663, "end_char": 26672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shyam Sunder defective phrasing of an Act", "statute": "Shyam Sunder defective phrasing of an Act"}}, {"text": "Bengal Act LXII of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26685, "end_char": 26708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27146, "end_char": 27156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Act LXII of 1950", "statute": "Bengal Act LXII of 1950"}}, {"text": "S. C. Bannerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27397, "end_char": 27411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: S. C. Bannerji."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27441, "end_char": 27454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for' the rspondent : Sukumar Ghose."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27539, "end_char": 27542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. 193~ P.C. 6~,\n\nDas J ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_546_558_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "195,,\n\nJan.19.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nKALAWATI AND ANOTHER v. 'THE srATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA, CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE and GHULAM\n\nHASAN JJ.]\n\nIiidian Penal Gode (XLV of 1860), ss. 114, 201, 802-Gharges under ss. 302 and 114, and s. 201-0onviction under s. 201 and acquittal on other chafge in Sessions Gonrt-Oonviction nnder ss. 114 and 802. and acquittal under s. 201 i1b High Gozwt-Avpeal to Su, preme Oourt-Poioer to restore conviction under s. 201, when State ha.< not apvealed-Gonstitution of India, 1950, Art. 184 (1) ( c) -Leave to appeal-Certificate of fitness-Death sentence passed by .Judicial Commissioner.\n\nThe accused was charged under ss. 114 and 302, Penal Code, with abetment of murder.\n\nThe Sessions Judge acquitted her of this charge and convicted her under s. 201, Penal Code, for suppressing evidence of murder and giving false information.\n\nOn appeal by the accused aswell as the State, the Judicial Commissioner set aside tbe conviction under s. 201 and convicted the accused under ss. 114 and 302:\n\nHeld, that it was open to the Supreme Court, in an appeR.l preferred by the accused, to restore the conviction under s. 201 on setting aside the conviction under ss.114 and 302, even though the State had not appealed, as the acquittal under s. 201 was intimately connected with the conviction under ss. 114: and 302, and took place only because the accusd was co'nvicted of the main charge under ss. 114 and 302.\n\nBegu v.King Emperor (52 I.A.191) applied.\n\nThe fact that in a p.rticular State there is only one Judicial Commissioner as the ultimate appellate authority and there is no Bench of tv.o Judges as in the High Courts to confirm death sentences is not an adequate ground for granting a certificate that a case where the death sentence has been awarded is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under article 134 (1) ( c) of the Constitution.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 73 and 74 of 1952. Appeals under article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the i6th June, 1952, of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, Himachal Pradesh\n\nt Simla, in ll,1urqer Referen9e No.~ of l91H ~cl\n\n• -\n\nCriminaJ Appeals Nos. 10 of 1951 and 2 of 1952 arising . outof the Judgment dated the 5th December, 1951, of the Court of the Sessions Judge, Mahasu, and Sirmur Districts, Simla-I, in Sessions Trial No. 7 .of 1951.\n\nTara Chand Mathur for the appellant Kalawati.\n\nBawa Shiv Charan Singh for the appellant R!j.njit Singh .\n\nG. 0. Mathur for the respondent in both the appeals, the State of Himachal Pradesh.\n\n1953. January 19. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. -One Kanwar Bikram Singh was a relation of the Rana of Kuthar.\n\nHe was a jamindar with some properties.\n\nBishanpura within the police station, Solan. was his summer resort.\n\nManimajra in the Ambala, District was his place of residence on the plains.\n\nHe had married in 1938 Kalawati, one of the two appellants.\n\nShe was herself a daughter of the late Raja of Nalagarh through a mistress.\n\nKanwar Bikram Singh was murdered during the early mornirlg hours of 16th July, 1951, as he lay asleep on the roof of his haveli or mansion at Bishanpura. He had several incised injuries on his person.\n\nThe case for the prosecution is that Ranjit Singh, the other appellant, who was a distant cousin of the deceased, committed the murder with the help and conniva.nce of Kalawati. It is .stated for the prosecution that the two appellants developed an illicit intimacy with ea0h other, and that they got rid of Kanwar Bikram Singh, as he was cruel in his behaviour to Kalawati. The last act of ill-treatment is said to have been on the 6th July, when Kanwar Bikram slapped his wife.\n\nUnable to endure the continued humiliation at the hands of her husband, and in the hope that her intrigue with Ranjit Singh would be facilit11tecl, Ralawati is said to have conspired with Ranjit Singh to do away with her husba.nd,\n\nKa!awati and Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nHimacha!\n\nPrade•h.\n\n• •\n\nR1tnjit Singh wits charged with murder under sec tion 302, Indian Penal Code, find Kalaw1tti was Kalawati and•Another charged under sections 114 and 302, Indian Penal\n\nv, Oode, with abetment of murder, which was committed The State of in consequence.\n\nThe Sessions Judge of Mahas'.l and Himachal Sirmur found Ranjit Singh guilty of the offence and Prndesh. sentenced him to the extreme penalty .of the law. He\n\nChandrasekhar• acquitted Kalawati of the offence of abetment under .\n\nAiyar J. section 302 read with section 114, but found her guilty under section 201, Indian Penal Code, as she suppressed the evidence, screened Ranjit Singh, and gave false information in respect of the murder; and he sentenced her to five years' rigorous imprisonment.\n\n'l'he two appellants preferred appeals to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, and the State preferred an appeal against the acquittal of Kalawati on the charge of murder.\n\nThe Judicial Commissioner allowed Kalawati's appeal, aud set aside her conviction and sentence under section 201.\n\nAt the same time, he allowed the State appeal against her and convicted her of an offence under section 302 read with section 114, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced her to transportation for life.\n\nRanjit Singh 's appeal was dismissed.\n\nAn application was made to the Judicial Commissioner under article 132 (1) of the Constitution for a certificate that the case involved substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.\n\nHe granted the certificate, but he also added that the case was otherwise also a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under article 134 (1) (c). He thought that as the confirmation of sentence of death as a matter of practice prevailing in the High Courts was generally made by a Bench of two Judges at least, it was not fit and proper that the matter should rest with his own decision sit.ting singly. We feel bound to state that the reason he has given for certifying the case as a fit one for appeal nnqer :J, rticle 134 (1) (c) is not sound. If iq any\n\nS.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'l 1S 549\n\nparticular State there is only one Judicial Commis-\n\nI95B sioner as the ultimate appellate authority, and if the Kalawati confirmation of sentence of death has to be made by and Another him, the procedure laid down must be followed. 'ffie v. fact that there is not a Bench of two Judges as in The State of the High Courts to deal with death sentences is not Himachal an adequate ground for converting the Supreme Court Pradesh. into an ordinary court of appeal and confirmation in Ohandrasekhara .. such matters. It is unnecessary, however, to pursue .iiya•· J. 4 this subject further, as we have heard the two appeals on their merits as well.\n\n'fhere is no substance in the constitutional points sought to be raised on behalf ofthe appellants. Both the appellants have made confessions of their guilt which were recorded under section 164, Criminal\n\nProcedure Code, but they retracted them in the Committing Magistrate's court. 'fhe confessions were used against them at the sessions trial and in their examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure\n\nCode. Each was asked about certain details of the confession made by the other.\n\nIt was contended that if an accused person retracted his or her confession, it should not be used against him or her at all, as it would contravene article 20\n\n(3) of the Constitution; which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It is difficult to see the force of this point. A confession has to be voluntary before it can be used against a person making it, and a magistrate is bound to satisfy himself that it is being made without any inducement, threat or promise.\n\nNo person accused of a crime is bound to make a confession, and if there is any compulsion or threat, it has to be ruled out as irrelevant and inadmissible.\n\nSub-section (3) of article 20 does not apply at all to a case where the confession is made without any inducement, threat or promise. It is true that a retracted confession has only little Yalue as the basis for a conviction, and that the confession of one accused is not evidence against a co-accused tried jointly for the same offence, but can only be taken\n\nI95B into consideration against him.\n\nThis deals with its\n\nKalawati probative value and has nothing to do with any and Another repugnancy to the Constitution.\n\nv. lt was also urged that as sub-clause (2) of article The State 0! 20 of the Constitution provides that no person shall\n\n;;:::::. 1 be prosecuted aI).d punished for the same offence more\n\nnhan once, the Government cannot have any right of Chandrasekhar• appeal against an acquittal. If there is no punish- Aiyar J. ment for the offence as a result of the prosecution, the sub, section has no application ; and secondly, an appeal against an acquittal wherever such is provided by the procedure is in substance a co.ntinuation of the prosecution.\n\nMr. Tarachand, who appeared for Kalawati, ultimately desisted from pursning these constitntional objections and addressed himself to the merits.\n\nA few facts and dates may be set out here as relevant to the proper appreciation of the arguments addressed on behalf of the appellants. The murder took place, as already stated, on the open roof of Bikram Singh's haveli about 4 a. m. on 16th July, 1951. Mst. Shibbi\n\n(P.vV.3) who wasa cook in the family and who was sleeping on the same roof at a little distance was the first to wake up on hearing some strange noise, and she saw a man going away from near her bed and getting down the ladder at the back of the house. She raised a hue and cry and found Bikram Singh fallen down from his bed with his face downwards.\n\nThe other servants in the house, namely, J ora and Dayaram and P.W.3's husband, Nathu, who were all sleping downstairs, came on to the roof.\n\nOne Laik Ram also arrived with a gas light. Kalawati who was sleeping by the side of her husband was not in her bed; she was standing in the room near the steps. It was discovered that Bikram Singh had been the victim of a fatal attack. 'l'he commotion reached-the ears of P .W. 7, who lived at some distance, and he shouted to the police station near by.\n\nHis cries brought on the scene, at about 4-40 a.m. the head constable (P.W. 24) to whom Kalawati made a statement to the\n\nS.C.R. SUPREME CQURT REPORTS 55i\n\neffect that some unknown dacoits had invaded her house, killed her husband and robbed her of her jewels.\n\nAs he was proceeding with the investigation, the station-house officer, Solan, (P.W. 38) arriv'ed\n\nand took it up.\n\nKalawati and Another\n\nThe State of Himachal Various articles were recovered in the course of Pradesh. the investigation.\n\nA scabbard was discovered on 16th July, 1951, itself by P.W.19 at a distanceofoneOhandrasekhara furlong from the house of the deceased.\n\nTwo days Aiyar J • later, i.e., on 18th July, 1951, a shirt and a kachha were discovered by P. W. 22 from underneath a stone in a water channel about a mile further away.\n\nOn 24th July, 1951, Ranjit Singh was arrested, and it is stated that he took the police and took out a sword from a bush to the west of the place of occurrence a.t a distance of 100 yards.\n\nSome bushes had to be cut at the instance of the accused before the sword was discovered.\n\nCertain ornaments, thirty-five in number, and said to belong to Kalawati were unearthed by the accused himself on 27th October, 1951, from a room of his house in Basdhera.\n\nThey were all in a. metal box, and the box was in an earthen pot which lay buried in the earth.\n\nKalawati made a confession on 28th July, 1951, before the Magistrate, Sri Antani (P. W. 31). The confession of Ranjit Singh was recorded by the same Magistrate on 3rd August, 1951.\n\nThe material evidence in the case consists of these two confessions and the evidence given by the maidservant, Shibbi (P.W. 3).\n\nThe other evidence adduced relates to motive and the several discoveries, on which the prosecution relies as corroborative circumstances to support the substantial truth of the confessions, which were retracted even before the Committing Magistrate by both the appellants.\n\nIt is abundantly clear that the relationship between Kala.wati and her deceased husband, Bikram Singh, was strained. As early as 1946, she had complained against him of violence and threat to kill, and his a, rms licence was cancelled. He was addicted. to drink,.\n\n1953 and often used to quarrel with her and ill-treated her.\n\nSince 1948 or thereabouts, Ranjit Singh, a fairly Kalawau 1 d h f c ose relat10n, entere mto t e p10ture as a requent and Another v. viitor at Manimajra or Bishanpura. He developed The State of intimate relations with Kalawati, which led to suspi- Himaoha! cion of her misconduct with him.\n\nThe evidence of Pradesh.\n\nBalbir Singh, brother -of the deceased, Baldev Singh, - ' the manager of the estate, and Dropadi, mistress of Oh•ndra8'khara h f b f b d d d p ur 1 2 d A' J t e at er o t e ecease , examme as . \"s. , an •yar 5 respectively, establishes this. In her confession marked Exhibit P.A.A., Kalawati points out bow and why her relations with her husband became strained, and refers to her liaison with Ranjit Singh, the conspiracy between them to get rid of Bikram Singh, the\n\np.Jan laid out for this purpose, and the fatal assault early in the morning of the 16th July. She throws the entire blame on Ranjit Singh, to whose scheme she agreed, out of sheer disgust for her husband.\n\nShe telis us that she made a confession so as to remove the load of sinfulness from her soul.\n\nThe confession of Ranjit Singh, Exhibit P.A.C., which was also retracted, is more or less on the same lines, but he says that Kalawati was primarily responsible for the scheme, and be concludes it thus:\n\n\"Had Kalawati not asked me, I would not have thought of murdering Kanwar.\n\nThe fault of worsening the relations between Kalawati and Kanwar lies on the Kanwar. He had illicit connections, witb his father's keep.\"\n\nHe admits that be inflicted the injuries found on Bikram Singh with a sword. Before the Committing Magistrate, be , did not impeach this confession in any manner when be was examined under section 342.\n\nBut in the Sessions Court be went back on it as regards every material detail almost, and stated that it was entirely dictated to the Magistrate by two police Sab-Inspectors, and that he was a passive listener to what they said. He signed the document out of fear as the police had beaten him.\n\nShibbi, who on the fatal night was sleeping at some l953 distance on the same terrace with Bikram Singh and Kalawati Kalawati, woke up on hearing a slashy noise, and and Anothei found Ranjit Singh pass near her bed and going don v. the ladder at the back of the house.\n\nShe raised The State of shouts, and the servants who were sleeping in the Himachal\n\nK 1 d Pradesh. courtyard downstairs came up. a awat1 was stan - _ ing near the steps of an adjoining room. \\Vhen she Chandrnsekhara told her that Hanjit Singh was running away Kalawati Aiyar J . denied that it was Ranjit Singh, and stated that some dacoits had come and robbed her of her ornaments.\n\nHer evidence was accepted by the, courts below, and there is a ring of truth about it. If she was a false witness, there was nothing to prevent her from saying that she saw Ranjit Singh attacking Bikram Singh with a sword.\n\nBut she tells us that she did not see the commission of the murder, and saw only the back of Rarijit Singh when he was hurrying down at a distance of a yard or so from her bed. She could not identify the weapon in his hand, except to the extent of stating that he was holding something shining.\n\nIt is true that she did not mention the name of Ranjit\n\nSingh at any time earlier than in the Oommitf1ing Magistrate's court, but this was because Kalawati had scolded her and ased her to keep quiet. The suggestion that her husband, Nathu, was probably responsible for the murder, as his hands were admittedly bloodstained when people had gathered there, is unlikely. He had no motive whatever to kill his master.\n\nIt might well be that when he came up along with the servants and the crowd had gathered, he came into touch with the body in ascertaining what had happened or for giving water to the injured man in his last gasp, about which there is some evidence.\n\nKalawati had given the police a story of an attack by dacoits, and till the investigation advanced, it is only natural that suspicion should have fastened itself on several people. Laik Ram, a shopkeeper, who carries on his business opposite the place of occurrence, who was examined as P. W. 23, told the police that he suspected many sets of peorl1:1\n\n1958 -namely, Shibbi and Nathu, Kalawati, a Sikh ser-\n\nKalawoti vant of the deceased, Balbir 8ingh, the brother of the and Another deceased himself, and the driver, who was formerly a\n\nS11b-Iuspector, and two Sikhs who were seen in the The State of jungle at 8 p.m. the previous night.\n\nHimachal Apart from the confessions, there are definite Pradeh. . d _ circumstances which m ica.te beyond reasonable Chandrasekhar• doubt the guilt of Ranjit Singh. He is a resident\n\nAiyar J, of Bashdera, but his sword and scabbard were found near the place of occurrence, and it was he who recovered the sword from a bush.\n\nHis kacha (underwear) remained concealed under a stone in a channel near the place of occurrence.\n\nKalawati herself stated in her confession that the kachha seemed to belong to Ranjit Singh, as she knew he had purchased the cloth, and it was sewn on hr own sewing machine aud in her presence at Manimajra.\n\nMore important is the discovery of the ornaments of Kalawati on 29th July, 1951, in the presence of Ranjit Singh and with his assistance. 'rhey were buried underneath the earth in a room of his house in Ba'shdera. It was urged that as the room was an open one with no doors and no roof, it was probable they were planted there.\n\nAccording to Kalawati's confession, she had left them at Manimajra, and she says that Baldev Singh, the manager, had the keys, suggesting thereby that he might have handed over the jewels to the police for implantation.\n\nRanjit tells us that as he was being taken to Bishanpura in a jeep, Baldev handed them to the Sub-Inspector, Prithiram.\n\nWe are not prepared to differ from the Judicial Commissioner on this point.\n\nBaldev was not asked a single question in cross-examination about his enmity with Kala.wati and there was no suggestion why he should have colluded with the police in the manner alleged .. The Sub-Inspector was not asked either about Ranjit Singh's allegation.\n\nMuch argument was addressed to the effect that it was not at all likely that Ranjit Singh would have buried the ornaments il\\ hjs oWI\\ house 11tnd in an open room1 and tlia~ if h~\n\n. •\n\nwanted to conceal traces of the crime, he would have l953 concealed them elsewhere. 'I'he ornaments had to Kahwati be returned in all probability, and he might h0ave and Another thought that their careful preservation was his duty. v.\n\nHad he concealed them in a locked room or box, it The stat• of would have been much more damaging to him if Biin1chal they were. discovered by the police who would Pradesh. inevitably search his house.\n\nIt was not till the - f th\" 27th' th t }7 1 t' d f Chandrasekh-ira even mg o. e a i.a awa i ma . e a con ess10n Aiyar J • to the police, and there was hardly any time for them to take hold of the ornaments from Manimajra, proceea to Basdhera, implant them in the house of Ranjit\n\nSingh, return to Bishanpura, and take Ranjit to his house on the 29th so that he could show the place of concealment. \\Ve are not prepared to differ from the learned Judicial Commissioner, who rejected the criticisms of the Sessions Judge about this recovery and accepted the prosecution story as trua.\n\nAs regards Kalawati the case is suspicious, no doubt. 1 t is possible that she aided and abetted Ranjit Singh in the criminal deed.\n\nBut we think it is possible also that though she wa> aware of the intentions of Ranjit Singh expressed from time to time for the sake of protecting her from ill-treatment and cruelty at the hands of her husband, she might not have believed that he was going to put his threat into actual execution.\n\nAs pointed out already in more than one place, each of the accused charges the other with the active formulation of the scheme to get rid of an inconvenient obstacle and a cruel brute. There is one defect in Kalawati's confession which , might be noticed here.\n\nA careful crutiny of it leads to the conclusion that phe final hatching of the plot was on the afternoon of'the 8th July, andthat the entrustment of the ornaments into Ranjit Singh's hands was on the morning of the 9th. 'I'his is in apparent conflict with the diary of Bikram Singh marked P. W. 38/3, where there is this entry under the date of 8th July: ''Ranjit Singh gone to Simla for his personal work to enquire about his application.\n\nThen he will proceed Manimajra.\" If this is correct, the story of\n\n556 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1953)\n\nthe plot on the 8th and the entrustment on the 9th Ka!•wati is somewhat damaged, unless it was possible for and Another Ranjit Singh to go to Simla on the afternoon of. the\n\nThe State of\n\nHimnchl'l-l Pradesh.\n\n8th' and return to Bishanpura on the morning of the 9th, on which aspect, however, there is no evidence one way or the other.\n\nWe have to assume that the 8th of Jnly was the date of the secret tlk between\n\nOhandrasekhan K:tlawati and Ranjit Singh from the 'fact that Balbir\n\nAiya>· J.\n\nSingh (P. W. 1) says that he left Bishanpura for Manimajra with the children on the 7th of Jnly, and she says that the arrangement was on the day after the children left. 'rhere may be some mistake about the dates.\n\nApart from this infirmative circmµstance, there is yet another, which renders it unsafe to take Kalawati's confession at its face value.\n\nShe was prepared to make a confession on the 27th evening, and she was actually taken to the Magistrate.\n\nNot only was she prepared, but she insisted on making it, and there was no particular reason why the recording was postpo'.led to the next day.\n\nShe alleges that the Sub- Inspector asked for time stating that her condition was bad, and she should be given 12 hours to think O\\er it. 'l'he confession contains minute details which would not normally find a place in such a document.\n\nFor instance, she says:\n\n\"We had become so close that I can claim to have seen all his clothes, because he used to keep his boxes usually 'Yith me and his room was also next to mine. He may not have seen all my clothes, but those that I wore must have been seen by him.\n\nNormally ) he would have seen only the jewellery which I wore.\n\nHe had not known of my jewellery box.\"\n\nThe conversation between Kalawati and Ranjit Singh in the presence of a maid-servant near the well where she had gone to wash her clothes is rather incredible. For these reasons, we hesitate to act upon the confession of Kalawati and find her guilty of aiding and abetting the offence of murder.\n\nBnt there can scarcely be any doubt that she mnst have witnessed the murder 9f her bqsl; J:J, nd lying next\n\nS.C.l\\.\n\nStJPREMm COURT REPORTS 557\n\nto her on a charpai.\n\nSbibbi who was at a distance of 19.53 18 feet was roused by the sound of a sword attack. l Kalawati Kala, wati must have woke up a so at least during the and Anothsr course of the assault if not at its commencement, v. several injuries having been in11icted in succession.\n\nThe Stats of vVhen Shibbi woke up, Kalawati's bed was empty, and Hiniachaz she was found in a room nearby and not at the place Pradech. of occurrence.\n\nShe trotted out an elaborate story of Oh d-k' d h h t b d n . f an rase , cara acorty, w rc can no e accepte as true.\n\nP, ven 1 Aiyar J. in terror she ran away from her bed and stood at a distance, she is almost sure to have known who was the offender, unless he had bis face muffled.\n\nThe first version Rhe gave to the police head corntable when he appeared on the st!ene immediately after the occurrence is, we think, false, and we are of opinion that she knew or believed it to be false.\n\nThe border line between abetment of the offence and giving false information to screen the offender is rather thin in her case, but it is prudent to err on the safe side, and hold her guilty only of an offence under section 201, Indian Penal Code as the learned Sessions Judge did.\n\nIt was urged for her by Mr. Mathur that as she was acquitted of this offence by the Judicial Commissioner, and as there has been no appeal by the Govermp.ent against the acqujttal, she cannot nowbe convicted of the same by this Court. This argument proceeds on. a fallacy. Section 201 is not restricted to the case of a person who screens the actual offender; it can be a pp lied even to a person guilty of the main offence, though as a matter of practice a Court will not convict a person both, of the main offence and under section 201.\n\nThe Judicial Commissioner acquitted Kalawati of the offence under section 201 for which she was convicted by tlle Sessions Judge, only because he thought that the main offence itself, namely, murder, was brought home to her.\n\nBut if we think for the reasons given above tba't it would not be safe to convict her of the main offence, the ;:i, cquittal is no legal impediment to her conviction under section 201. It was held by the Privy Council\n\n558 SUPREME cobR'l' REPORTS Li953j\n\n1953 in Begu v. King-Emperor(') that in a charge of murder under section 302 a conviction under section .Kala.wati and Anothor 201 without a further charge being made was warrantv. ed • hy the provisions of section 237, Criminal The State of Procedure Code. If Kalawati had been acquitted\n\nHiniachal of an offence under section 201 independently of the Pradesh. charge of murder against her, it would have been a\n\nCha d;;;.khara different matter. But as her acquittal is so intimately\n\n :iyar J. related to the charge of the main offence, and as it took place only for the reason that she was held guilty of murder, there is no bar to the restoration of the conviction under section 201.\n\nThe result is that Raujit Singh's Appeal No. 74 of 1952 is dismissed, but we 'substitute for the sentence of death the sentence of transportation for life, having regard to the time that has now elap>ed since the occurrence and the probable motive of prevention of cruelty to a helples!t woman.\n\nKalawati's Appeal No. 73 of 1952 is allowed, and her conviction and sentence under section 302 discharged, but we convict her of an offence under section 201, Indian Penal Code, and sentence her to three years' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nAppeal N.i. 73 allowed.\n\nAppeal No. 74 dismissed.\n\nSentence reduced.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Appeal No. 73: B. R .. Anand.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\n(1) 119>5) 52 I. A. 11)1.", "total_entities": 147, "entities": [{"text": "KALAWATI AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALAWATI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE srATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 161, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 174, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 196, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 114, 201, 802", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 233, "end_char": 250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 302 and 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 265, "end_char": 280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 286, "end_char": 292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 114 and 802", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382, "end_char": 397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 419, "end_char": 425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 502, "end_char": 508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 184", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 568, "end_char": 576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 114 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 706, "end_char": 721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 733, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 833, "end_char": 839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 841, "end_char": 851, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1022, "end_char": 1028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 114 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1061, "end_char": 1076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1109, "end_char": 1122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "114 and 302:\n\nHeld, that it was open to the Supreme Court, in an appeR.l preferred by the accused, to restore the conviction under s. 201 on setting aside the conviction under ss.114 and 302, even though the State had not appealed, as the acquittal under s. 201 was intimately connected with the conviction under ss."}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1196, "end_char": 1202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss.114 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1320, "end_char": 1326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1378, "end_char": 1385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 114 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1475, "end_char": 1490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1892, "end_char": 1903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2024, "end_char": 2035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2051, "end_char": 2072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tara Chand Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2455, "end_char": 2472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tara Chand Mathur for the appellant Kalawati.", "canonical_name": "Tara Chand Mathur"}}, {"text": "Kalawati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2491, "end_char": 2499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tara Chand Mathur for the appellant Kalawati.", "canonical_name": "KALAWATI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Bawa Shiv Charan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2502, "end_char": 2524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the appellant R!j.njit Singh ."}}, {"text": "R!j.njit Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2543, "end_char": 2557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the appellant R!j.njit Singh ."}}, {"text": "G. 0. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2561, "end_char": 2573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. 0."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2708, "end_char": 2728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. -One Kanwar Bikram Singh was a relation of the Rana of Kuthar.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Kanwar Bikram Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2737, "end_char": 2756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. -One Kanwar Bikram Singh was a relation of the Rana of Kuthar.", "canonical_name": "Kanwar Bikram Singh"}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2923, "end_char": 2929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manimajra in the Ambala, District was his place of residence on the plains."}}, {"text": "16th July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3189, "end_char": 3204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kanwar Bikram Singh was murdered during the early mornirlg hours of 16th July, 1951, as he lay asleep on the roof of his haveli or mansion at Bishanpura."}}, {"text": "Bishanpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3263, "end_char": 3273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kanwar Bikram Singh was murdered during the early mornirlg hours of 16th July, 1951, as he lay asleep on the roof of his haveli or mansion at Bishanpura."}}, {"text": "Ranjit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3360, "end_char": 3372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case for the prosecution is that Ranjit Singh, the other appellant, who was a distant cousin of the deceased, committed the murder with the help and conniva.nce of Kalawati.", "canonical_name": "Ranjit\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Kalawati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3491, "end_char": 3499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case for the prosecution is that Ranjit Singh, the other appellant, who was a distant cousin of the deceased, committed the murder with the help and conniva.nce of Kalawati.", "canonical_name": "KALAWATI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Kanwar Bikram Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3631, "end_char": 3650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is .stated for the prosecution that the two appellants developed an illicit intimacy with ea0h other, and that they got rid of Kanwar Bikram Singh, as he was cruel in his behaviour to Kalawati.", "canonical_name": "Kanwar Bikram Singh"}}, {"text": "Kanwar Bikram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3771, "end_char": 3784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last act of ill-treatment is said to have been on the 6th July, when Kanwar Bikram slapped his wife.", "canonical_name": "Kanwar Bikram Singh"}}, {"text": "Ranjit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3915, "end_char": 3927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unable to endure the continued humiliation at the hands of her husband, and in the hope that her intrigue with Ranjit Singh would be facilit11tecl, Ralawati is said to have conspired with Ranjit Singh to do away with her husba.nd,\n\nKa!awati and Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nHimacha!", "canonical_name": "Ranjit\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Ralawati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3952, "end_char": 3960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unable to endure the continued humiliation at the hands of her husband, and in the hope that her intrigue with Ranjit Singh would be facilit11tecl, Ralawati is said to have conspired with Ranjit Singh to do away with her husba.nd,\n\nKa!awati and Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nHimacha!", "canonical_name": "KALAWATI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHimacha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4065, "end_char": 4082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unable to endure the continued humiliation at the hands of her husband, and in the hope that her intrigue with Ranjit Singh would be facilit11tecl, Ralawati is said to have conspired with Ranjit Singh to do away with her husba.nd,\n\nKa!awati and Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nHimacha!"}}, {"text": "R1tnjit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4100, "end_char": 4113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• •\n\nR1tnjit Singh wits charged with murder under sec tion 302, Indian Penal Code, find Kalaw1tti was Kalawati and•Another charged under sections 114 and 302, Indian Penal\n\nv, Oode, with abetment of murder, which was committed The State of in consequence."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4159, "end_char": 4176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 114 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Mahas'.l and Himachal Sirmur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4356, "end_char": 4402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge of Mahas'.l and Himachal Sirmur found Ranjit Singh guilty of the offence and Prndesh."}}, {"text": "Ranjit Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4409, "end_char": 4421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge of Mahas'.l and Himachal Sirmur found Ranjit Singh guilty of the offence and Prndesh.", "canonical_name": "Ranjit\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Prndesh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4448, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge of Mahas'.l and Himachal Sirmur found Ranjit Singh guilty of the offence and Prndesh."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhar•", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4511, "end_char": 4525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He\n\nChandrasekhar• acquitted Kalawati of the offence of abetment under .", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4581, "end_char": 4586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aiyar J. section 302 read with section 114, but found her guilty under section 201, Indian Penal Code, as she suppressed the evidence, screened Ranjit Singh, and gave false information in respect of the murder; and he sentenced her to five years' rigorous imprisonment.", "canonical_name": "Aiyar"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4590, "end_char": 4601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4612, "end_char": 4623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4652, "end_char": 4663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4665, "end_char": 4682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'l'he two appellants preferred appeals to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, and the State preferred an appeal against the acquittal of Kalawati on the charge of murder."}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5147, "end_char": 5158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5257, "end_char": 5268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5279, "end_char": 5290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'l 1S 549", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6169, "end_char": 6204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If iq any\n\nS.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'l 1S 549\n\nparticular State there is only one Judicial Commis-\n\nI95B sioner as the ultimate appellate authority, and if the Kalawati confirmation of sentence of death has to be made by and Another him, the procedure laid down must be followed. '"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6611, "end_char": 6632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ffie v. fact that there is not a Bench of two Judges as in The State of the High Courts to deal with death sentences is not Himachal an adequate ground for converting the Supreme Court Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Ohandrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6687, "end_char": 6701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "into an ordinary court of appeal and confirmation in Ohandrasekhara .. such matters.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "section 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7034, "end_char": 7045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7057, "end_char": 7071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7228, "end_char": 7239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal\n\nProcedure Code", "statute": "Criminal\n\nProcedure Code"}}, {"text": "Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7261, "end_char": 7265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7490, "end_char": 7500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure\n\nCode", "statute": "Criminal Procedure\n\nCode"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8051, "end_char": 8061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure\n\nCode", "statute": "Criminal Procedure\n\nCode"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhar•", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8793, "end_char": 8807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 be prosecuted aI).d punished for the same offence more\n\nnhan once, the Government cannot have any right of Chandrasekhar• appeal against an acquittal.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Tarachand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9105, "end_char": 9114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Tarachand, who appeared for Kalawati, ultimately desisted from pursning these constitntional objections and addressed himself to the merits.", "canonical_name": "Tara Chand Mathur"}}, {"text": "Bikram Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9446, "end_char": 9458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The murder took place, as already stated, on the open roof of Bikram Singh's haveli about 4 a. m. on 16th July, 1951."}}, {"text": "Shibbi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9507, "end_char": 9513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibbi\n\n(P.vV.3) who wasa cook in the family and who was sleeping on the same roof at a little distance was the first to wake up on hearing some strange noise, and she saw a man going away from near her bed and getting down the ladder at the back of the house."}}, {"text": "J ora", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9908, "end_char": 9913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other servants in the house, namely, J ora and Dayaram and P.W.3's husband, Nathu, who were all sleping downstairs, came on to the roof."}}, {"text": "Dayaram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9918, "end_char": 9925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other servants in the house, namely, J ora and Dayaram and P.W.3's husband, Nathu, who were all sleping downstairs, came on to the roof."}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9947, "end_char": 9952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other servants in the house, namely, J ora and Dayaram and P.W.3's husband, Nathu, who were all sleping downstairs, came on to the roof."}}, {"text": "Laik Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10013, "end_char": 10021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Laik Ram also arrived with a gas light."}}, {"text": "Kalawati", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10053, "end_char": 10061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalawati who was sleeping by the side of her husband was not in her bed; she was standing in the room near the steps."}}, {"text": "S.C.R. SUPREME CQURT REPORTS 55i", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10488, "end_char": 10520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His cries brought on the scene, at about 4-40 a.m. the head constable (P.W. 24) to whom Kalawati made a statement to the\n\nS.C.R. SUPREME CQURT REPORTS 55i\n\neffect that some unknown dacoits had invaded her house, killed her husband and robbed her of her jewels."}}, {"text": "Solan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10700, "end_char": 10705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As he was proceeding with the investigation, the station-house officer, Solan, (P.W. 38) arriv'ed\n\nand took it up."}}, {"text": "State of Himachal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10770, "end_char": 10787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalawati and Another\n\nThe State of Himachal Various articles were recovered in the course of Pradesh."}}, {"text": "18th July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11038, "end_char": 11053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two days Aiyar J • later, i.e., on 18th July, 1951, a shirt and a kachha were discovered by P. W. 22 from underneath a stone in a water channel about a mile further away."}}, {"text": "24th July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11178, "end_char": 11193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 24th July, 1951, Ranjit Singh was arrested, and it is stated that he took the police and took out a sword from a bush to the west of the place of occurrence a.t a distance of 100 yards."}}, {"text": "27th October, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11570, "end_char": 11588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain ornaments, thirty-five in number, and said to belong to Kalawati were unearthed by the accused himself on 27th October, 1951, from a room of his house in Basdhera."}}, {"text": "Basdhera", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11618, "end_char": 11626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain ornaments, thirty-five in number, and said to belong to Kalawati were unearthed by the accused himself on 27th October, 1951, from a room of his house in Basdhera."}}, {"text": "28th July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11756, "end_char": 11771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalawati made a confession on 28th July, 1951, before the Magistrate, Sri Antani (P. W. 31)."}}, {"text": "Antani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11800, "end_char": 11806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalawati made a confession on 28th July, 1951, before the Magistrate, Sri Antani (P. W. 31)."}}, {"text": "Ranjit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11837, "end_char": 11849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The confession of Ranjit Singh was recorded by the same Magistrate on 3rd August, 1951."}}, {"text": "3rd August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11889, "end_char": 11905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The confession of Ranjit Singh was recorded by the same Magistrate on 3rd August, 1951."}}, {"text": "Kala.wati and", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12364, "end_char": 12377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is abundantly clear that the relationship between Kala.wati and her deceased husband, Bikram Singh, was strained.", "canonical_name": "KALAWATI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Balbir Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12955, "end_char": 12967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Balbir Singh, brother -of the deceased, Baldev Singh, - ' the manager of the estate, and Dropadi, mistress of Oh•ndra8'khara h f b f b d d d p ur 1 2 d A' J t e at er o t e ecease , examme as . \"", "canonical_name": "Balbir Singh"}}, {"text": "Kanwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13995, "end_char": 14001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The confession of Ranjit Singh, Exhibit P.A.C., which was also retracted, is more or less on the same lines, but he says that Kalawati was primarily responsible for the scheme, and be concludes it thus:\n\n\"Had Kalawati not asked me, I would not have thought of murdering Kanwar."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14332, "end_char": 14343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shibbi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14641, "end_char": 14647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibbi, who on the fatal night was sleeping at some l953 distance on the same terrace with Bikram Singh and Kalawati Kalawati, woke up on hearing a slashy noise, and and Anothei found Ranjit Singh pass near her bed and going don v. the ladder at the back of the house."}}, {"text": "Kalawati Kalawati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14749, "end_char": 14766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibbi, who on the fatal night was sleeping at some l953 distance on the same terrace with Bikram Singh and Kalawati Kalawati, woke up on hearing a slashy noise, and and Anothei found Ranjit Singh pass near her bed and going don v. the ladder at the back of the house."}}, {"text": "Anothei", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14811, "end_char": 14818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibbi, who on the fatal night was sleeping at some l953 distance on the same terrace with Bikram Singh and Kalawati Kalawati, woke up on hearing a slashy noise, and and Anothei found Ranjit Singh pass near her bed and going don v. the ladder at the back of the house."}}, {"text": "\\Vhen she Chandrnsekhara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15102, "end_char": 15126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Vhen she Chandrnsekhara told her that Hanjit Singh was running away Kalawati Aiyar J ."}}, {"text": "Hanjit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15141, "end_char": 15153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Vhen she Chandrnsekhara told her that Hanjit Singh was running away Kalawati Aiyar J .", "canonical_name": "Ranjit\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Kalawati Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15171, "end_char": 15185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Vhen she Chandrnsekhara told her that Hanjit Singh was running away Kalawati Aiyar J .", "canonical_name": "KALAWATI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Rarijit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15612, "end_char": 15625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But she tells us that she did not see the commission of the murder, and saw only the back of Rarijit Singh when he was hurrying down at a distance of a yard or so from her bed."}}, {"text": "Ranjit\n\nSingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15863, "end_char": 15876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that she did not mention the name of Ranjit\n\nSingh at any time earlier than in the Oommitf1ing Magistrate's court, but this was because Kalawati had scolded her and ased her to keep quiet.", "canonical_name": "Ranjit\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Oommitf1ing Magistrate's court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15909, "end_char": 15939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that she did not mention the name of Ranjit\n\nSingh at any time earlier than in the Oommitf1ing Magistrate's court, but this was because Kalawati had scolded her and ased her to keep quiet."}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16048, "end_char": 16053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suggestion that her husband, Nathu, was probably responsible for the murder, as his hands were admittedly bloodstained when people had gathered there, is unlikely."}}, {"text": "Balbir 8ingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16921, "end_char": 16933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laik Ram, a shopkeeper, who carries on his business opposite the place of occurrence, who was examined as P. W. 23, told the police that he suspected many sets of peorl1:1\n\n1958 -namely, Shibbi and Nathu, Kalawati, a Sikh ser-\n\nKalawoti vant of the deceased, Balbir 8ingh, the brother of the and Another deceased himself, and the driver, who was formerly a\n\nS11b-Iuspector, and two Sikhs who were seen in the The State of jungle at 8 p.m. the previous night.", "canonical_name": "Balbir Singh"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17020, "end_char": 17023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manimajra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17742, "end_char": 17751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalawati herself stated in her confession that the kachha seemed to belong to Ranjit Singh, as she knew he had purchased the cloth, and it was sewn on hr own sewing machine aud in her presence at Manimajra."}}, {"text": "29th July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17818, "end_char": 17833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "More important is the discovery of the ornaments of Kalawati on 29th July, 1951, in the presence of Ranjit Singh and with his assistance. '"}}, {"text": "Ba'shdera", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17957, "end_char": 17966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhey were buried underneath the earth in a room of his house in Ba'shdera."}}, {"text": "Baldev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18169, "end_char": 18181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Kalawati's confession, she had left them at Manimajra, and she says that Baldev Singh, the manager, had the keys, suggesting thereby that he might have handed over the jewels to the police for implantation.", "canonical_name": "Baldev Singh"}}, {"text": "Ranjit", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18304, "end_char": 18310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ranjit tells us that as he was being taken to Bishanpura in a jeep, Baldev handed them to the Sub-Inspector, Prithiram.", "canonical_name": "Ranjit\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Baldev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18372, "end_char": 18378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ranjit tells us that as he was being taken to Bishanpura in a jeep, Baldev handed them to the Sub-Inspector, Prithiram.", "canonical_name": "Baldev Singh"}}, {"text": "Prithiram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18413, "end_char": 18422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ranjit tells us that as he was being taken to Bishanpura in a jeep, Baldev handed them to the Sub-Inspector, Prithiram."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekh-ira", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19440, "end_char": 19455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not till the - f th\" 27th' th t }7 1 t' d f Chandrasekh-ira even mg o. e a i.a awa i ma .", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Simla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21046, "end_char": 21051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I'his is in apparent conflict with the diary of Bikram Singh marked P. W. 38/3, where there is this entry under the date of 8th July: ''Ranjit Singh gone to Simla for his personal work to enquire about his application."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHimnchl'l-l Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21390, "end_char": 21419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the\n\nThe State of\n\nHimnchl'l-l Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Ohandrasekhan K:", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21628, "end_char": 21644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have to assume that the 8th of Jnly was the date of the secret tlk between\n\nOhandrasekhan K:tlawati and Ranjit Singh from the 'fact that Balbir\n\nAiya>· J.\n\nSingh (P. W. 1) says that he left Bishanpura for Manimajra with the children on the 7th of Jnly, and she says that the arrangement was on the day after the children left. '", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21663, "end_char": 21668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have to assume that the 8th of Jnly was the date of the secret tlk between\n\nOhandrasekhan K:tlawati and Ranjit Singh from the 'fact that Balbir\n\nAiya>· J.\n\nSingh (P. W. 1) says that he left Bishanpura for Manimajra with the children on the 7th of Jnly, and she says that the arrangement was on the day after the children left. '"}}, {"text": "Balbir", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21689, "end_char": 21695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have to assume that the 8th of Jnly was the date of the secret tlk between\n\nOhandrasekhan K:tlawati and Ranjit Singh from the 'fact that Balbir\n\nAiya>· J.\n\nSingh (P. W. 1) says that he left Bishanpura for Manimajra with the children on the 7th of Jnly, and she says that the arrangement was on the day after the children left. '"}}, {"text": "Manimajra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21757, "end_char": 21766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have to assume that the 8th of Jnly was the date of the secret tlk between\n\nOhandrasekhan K:tlawati and Ranjit Singh from the 'fact that Balbir\n\nAiya>· J.\n\nSingh (P. W. 1) says that he left Bishanpura for Manimajra with the children on the 7th of Jnly, and she says that the arrangement was on the day after the children left. '"}}, {"text": "vVhen Shibbi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23678, "end_char": 23690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stats of vVhen Shibbi woke up, Kalawati's bed was empty, and Hiniachaz she was found in a room nearby and not at the place Pradech."}}, {"text": "Rhe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24121, "end_char": 24124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first version Rhe gave to the police head corntable when he appeared on the st!ene immediately after the occurrence is, we think, false, and we are of opinion that she knew or believed it to be false."}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24525, "end_char": 24536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24538, "end_char": 24555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24620, "end_char": 24626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged for her by Mr. Mathur that as she was acquitted of this offence by the Judicial Commissioner, and as there has been no appeal by the Govermp.ent against the acqujttal, she cannot nowbe convicted of the same by this Court."}}, {"text": "Section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24865, "end_char": 24876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25118, "end_char": 25129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25198, "end_char": 25209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25530, "end_char": 25541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25678, "end_char": 25689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25820, "end_char": 25831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal The State of Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25833, "end_char": 25869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hiniachal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25903, "end_char": 25912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Kalawati had been acquitted\n\nHiniachal of an offence under section 201 independently of the Pradesh."}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25933, "end_char": 25944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal The State of Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal The State of Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "iyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26101, "end_char": 26105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as her acquittal is so intimately\n\n :iyar J. related to the charge of the main offence, and as it took place only for the reason that she was held guilty of murder, there is no bar to the restoration of the conviction under section 201.", "canonical_name": "Aiyar"}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26288, "end_char": 26299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal The State of Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal The State of Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Raujit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26321, "end_char": 26333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result is that Raujit Singh's Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Ranjit\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26681, "end_char": 26692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal The State of Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal The State of Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26744, "end_char": 26755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal The State of Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal The State of Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26757, "end_char": 26774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "B. R .. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26945, "end_char": 26958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "73: B. R .. Anand."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26987, "end_char": 27005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_559_571_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.U.R.\n\nSUPRmME COURT REPORTS 559\n\nr, AL BHAGvVANT SINGH\n\nv. •\n\nRA! SAHIB LALA SRI KISHEN DAS\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nCivil Procedure Code (Vo/ 1908), s. 144-Compromise decree- Stipulation to sell property to decreeholder within a week for amoiint due-Amendment of decree allowing judgment-debtor to pay in instalments, whole amount being payable on default of 8 instalments- Original decree restored by High Court-Sale in execution-Amended decree restored by Privy Council- Validity of sale-Restitution- U. P. Encumbered Estates Act (1984 as amended in 1989)-Proceedings under s. 4 quashed by Board of Revenue-Sale of judgment\n\ndebtor's property before Aniendment Act-Application under Amendnient Act to amend previous application-Whether fresh proceedings --Validity of sale.\n\nUnder a compromise decree the amount due to the plaintiff was fixed by mutual consent and it was further agreeii that the defendant should within one week of the date of the decree convey to the plaintiff immoveable properties sufficient to satisfy the decree.\n\nThe U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act of 1934 having come into force, the decree was subsequently amended by the Civil Judge by reducing the amount and -directing that the amount may be paid in 12 annual instalments with the condition that if three instalments were in default the whole amount was to become immediately payable.\n\nThe amended decree was set aside by the Chief Court in 1938. The decreeholder applied for execution, and a sale deed\" was executed by the Civil Judge in 1939 for' the entire decree amount.\n\nThe Privy Council reversed the decree cif the Chief Court and restored the amended decree of the Civil Judge in 1944.\n\nThe judgment debtor applied for restoration of theproperties with mesne profits by way of restitution: Held, confirming the decree of the Chief Court, that, as the judgment-debtor had not obtained any order staying the operation of the amended decree pending the decreeholder's appeal to the Chief Court he was bound to carry out the terms of the amended decree, and, as the Privy Council had merely restored the amended decree without altering the provisions as to payment by instalments or extending the time for payment by instalments and its decree did not in any way alter the position of the parties as it stood under the amended decree, and, the sale was not in consequence of any error in a decree which was reversed on appeal by the Privy Council, the judgment-debtor was not entitled to restitution.\n\nDayal Sardar v. Tari Deshi (I.L.R. 59 Cal. 647) and Gansu Rani v. Parvati Kuer (A.LR. 1941 Pat. 130) appraved.\n\n195/J\n\nJan. 31\n\nSU!':REMB COURT RBPORTS [19.53)\n\n1953 The judgment-debtor. in the above mentioned case aJ>plied under s. 4 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, for ad- Lal Bhngwa1it ministration of his estate i111936 but the proceedings \\Yere qua.shed\n\nSingh by J; he Board of Revenue in 1938.\n\nAs no order for stay af exev. cution was obtained, a sale was effected in execution of the decree\n\nBi Shib Lala in :B1ebruary, 1939. The U. P. Encu1nbered Estates (An1endment) Sr1 Kisheii Das. Act, 1939, can1e into force after the date of the sale and the\n\njudgment-deb\\01' applied on the 10th October, 1939, for amending his former application, but it was ultimately decided by the Chief Court that the amendment application of 1939 must be treated as fresh proceedings : .\n\nHelcl, confirming the decision of the Chief Oourt1 that as the proceedings which were started in 1936 v.•ere quashed by the Board of Revenue in 1938, \\be saie held in February, 1939, was unaffected by the bar imposed by s. 11 of the Act.\n\nThe order rr1ade on the application of the 10th October was an order on a fresh application under s. 4 and it had no retrospective effect and could not affect the validity of the sale. effected when no application under s. 4 was pending.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE .JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. lOl, 102 and 103 of 1951.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 101 of 1951 was an appeal from the Judgment and decree dated the 13th March, lfl46, of the Chief Court of Avadh at Lucknow in First\n\nCivil Appeal No. 132 of 1943 arising out of the Judgment dated the 25th September, 1943, of the Court of Special J\\1dge, 1st Grade, Sitapur in E. E. Act Suit\n\nNo. 27/l of 1938. Civil Appeals Nos. 102 and 103 of 1951 were appeals from the Judgment and Decree dated tlre 13th March, 1946, of the Chief Court of Avadh at Lucknow in Execution of Decree Appeals Nos. 103 of 1944 and 23 of 1945 arising out of the Judgment dated the 16th November, 1944, of the Court of Additional Civil .Judge, Lucknow, in Miscellaneous\n\nCase No. 70 of 1944.\n\nB. I. Bishan Singh for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad (Nazimuddin Siddique, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953.\n\nJanuary 21. 'rhe Judgment of the Court \\Vas deJi, ered by MAHAJAN J.\n\n. ..\n\n-.(\n\nMAHAJAN J.-Shortly stated, the facts , giving rise 1953 to these three appeals are these: La! Bhagwa nt On the 4th July, 1933, Rai Bahadur Lala Hari Singh Kishen Das obtained from the court of the civil judge, v.\n\nSitapur, a final compromise decree in the sum of Ri Shib Lala.\n\nRs. 3,88,300-'2-6 with pendente lite and future interest Sn Kishen Das. and costs, on the foot of two simple mortgages Mahajan J. executed in his favour in 1928 and 1931 by Thakur Raghuraj Singh. It was provided in the compromise that Raghuraj Singh would within a week sell to Hari Kishen Das at agreed prices some villages out of the mortgaged property selected by him and sufficient to satisfy the decree.\n\nHe reserved to himself the right to get back the sold villages after five years and before the expiry of fifteen years on payment of the stipulated prices. 'rhe computation of the price of the sold lands was to be made in the manner laid down in clause (6).\n\nHari Kishen Das made a selection of eight villages, and deeds of sale and relinquishment in respect of them were duly prepared and executed on 4th July, 1933.\n\nBefore they could be presented for registraition, the parties received information that a notification for assumption by the Court of W a.rds of the management of the talukdar's estate had been issued a.nd that it was likely to render the conveyances ineffectual. In view of the impending notification the sale transaction fell through and a refund was obtained oi the amount spent on the stamp papers.\n\nOn the 20th January, 1934, the Court of Wards decided that it would not take the estate under its supervision. Hari Kisben Das then revived his demand against the judgment-debtor for the completion of the sale deeds but the judgment-debtor did not pay any heed to his request with the result that on 26th May, HJ34, be made an application for execution of the compromise decree. 'ro the execution of this decree a number of objections we.re raised by Raghnraj Singh.\n\nBefore the disposal of these objections the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (XXVII of\n\n1934) and the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act (XXV\n\n1953 of 1934) came into operation.\n\nUnder the provisions of Act XXVII of 1934, the judgment-debtor became La! Bhagwa\"t entitled to the amendment of the decree by reduction Singh\n\nv. of•interest, and for payment of the decretal sum in R•i Sahib Lala instalments. Under the other Act, a landlord debtor Sri Kishen Das. whose property was encumbered could apply to the court for the administration of his estate for 1iquida- Mahajan J. tion of his debts.\n\nRaghuraj Singh was not slow in seeking the aid of these laws to reduce the amount of his indebtedness and to save his property.\n\nHe made applicatior1s under both the Acts. In the application under the Relief Act he prayed for the scaling down of the amonnt .of the decree and for instalments. In the application under section 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act he asked for liquidation of his debts by the civil judge.\n\nOn the 11th January, 1936, the civil judge of Sitapur altered the decretal amount of Rs. 3,88,300-2-6 to Rs. 3, 76, 790-4-3 exclusive pf costs and future interest and directed Raghnraj Singh to pay the money in twelve equal annual instalments payable in the month of December of each year, the first instalment being payable in \"December, 1936, and also provided that in the case of default in payment of three instalments, the whole amount then due woulii become immediately payable. Against this order, Hari Kishen Das filed an application in revision to the Chief Court and was successful in having the amended decree set aside on 15th February, 1938.\n\nIn the proceedings commenced under the Encum-.\n\nbred Estates Act on 29th October, 1936, Ragburaj\n\nSingh obtained an order under section 6 of the Act but this order was eventually quashed by the Board of Revenue on 13th August, 1938, and the debtor's application under section 4 was dismissed.\n\nHaving succeeded in bis application in re>ision in the Chief Court, Hari Kishen Das revived the proceedings in execution of the compromise decree and called upon 'Raghuraj Singh to execute a sale deed in respect of the selected villages in bis favour.\n\nOn his failure to comply with this demand, the court\n\n,..\n\n• -\n\nexecuted a deed of sale in his favour on 24th Febru- 1953 ary, 1939, and in due course delivered to him posses- Lal Bhagwa .. t sion of the property covered by .the deed. • Singh Thakur Raghuraj Singh died in the year 1941, v. leaving him surviving the present appellant as his Ri Sahib Lala successor in interest.\n\nAn appeal had .been taken by Sn Kislien Das. him against the decision of the Chief Court dated Mahajan J. 15th February, l 938, setting aside the amended decree to His Majesty in Council.\n\nBy an order of His Majesty in Council passed on 20th January, 1944, the decision of the Chief Court dated 15th February, 1938, was reversed and the amended decree passed by the Civil Judge of Sitapur on 11th January, 1936, was restored.\n\nLiberty was given to the appellant to apply to the court of the civil judge, Sitapur, for such relief as he might be entitled to with reference to the recovery of possession of the property.\n\nIn view of the decision of the Privy Council, Bhagwant Singh (appellant) made an application for restoration of possession and for recovery of profits wrongfully reali1rnd by Hari Kishen Das and after his death by his adopted son Sri Kishen Das.\n\nThis application was strenuously resisted by the creditor and it was pleaded by him that even under the amended decree a sum of Rs. 4,31, 148-9-9 including interest and costs had become due to the decreeholder on the date of the sale since three instalments which had till then fallen due had remained unpaid and the default clause had come into operation and the sale in execution could not be sett aside, as it has not caused any injury to the judgment-debtor and had not in any way caused loss to him in the absence of proof that he had the money to pay the instalments. 'rhe subordinate judge allowed the application for restitution conditional on Bhagwant Singh paying within two months the accumulated sum that had fallen due to the decreeholder under the unpaid in- .stalments up to the date of the order. He held that the arrears up to December, 1943, came to Rs. 3,58,914-8-9, and deducting from this amount the net profits\n\n19~8 realized during the period of his possession amounting to Hs. 73, 294-8-5 and the cMts of appeal allowed Lal Bhngwant Singh by the Privy Council, a sum of Rs. '2,81),620-0-4 was v. du~ and directed that if this amount was not deposit- Rai Sahib Lala ed in court within two months, the application would Sri Ki•hen Das.stand dismissed.\n\nBhagwant Singh applied for extension of time but this application was summarily Mahajan J. dismissed.\n\nRai Sahib Sri Kisben D:>s and Bhagwant Singh both appealed to the Chief Court against this deci- sion. 'l'he appeal of Sri Kisben Das was numbered as 103 of 1944.\n\nHis contention was that the judgment-debtor was not entitled to restitution at all.\n\nThe appeal of Bhagwant Singh was numbered as 23 of 1945.\n\nHis grievance was that he was entitled to restitution without any condition.\n\nThe Chief Court allowed the decreeholder's appeal (103 of 1944) with costs and dismissed the judgment-debtor's appeiol\n\n('23 of 1945) but without costs, and dismissed the application of the judgment-debtor for restitution on the 13th March, 1946. Appeals 102 and 103 of 1951 arise out of this decision. Appeal No. 101 of 1951 arises out of another decision of the Chief Court dated I.3th March, 1946, which confirmed the decree dated 26th September, 1943, of the special judge of Sitapur under the Encumbered Estates Act. 'l'he facts about this matter are these:\n\nAs already stated, m 28t\\i October, 1936, Thakur Haghuraj Singh applied under section 4 of the U.P. ) Encumbered Estates Act (XXV of 1934) for administration of his estate so as to liquidate his debts amounting to about 14 lakhs.\n\nOn 13th August, 1938, tbe Board of Revenue quashed the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act initiated by 'l'bakur Haghuraj Singh.\n\nAs no order for stay of execution proceeding.s was obtained by Raghuraj Singh from the Chief Court or the Privy- . Council, the civil judge to whom the execution proceedings had been, tra, nsferred, on 13th\n\n\n::;.C.R.\n\nSU.PREME COURT REPOR'fS 565\n\nFebruary, 1939, ordered the judgment-debtor to execute a sale deed and on his makin 0(J a default the civil\n\nLal Bhagwinl judge on '24th February, 1939, execnted a sale deed S.ingh on behalf of the judgment-debtor in favour of .lai v.\n\nBahadur Hari K1she11 Das.\n\nThe 0 . .P. Encumbered Rrii Sahib Lala.\n\nEstates Amendment Act (XI of ] 939) came into Sri KishenDas. operation after this sale. It allowed the applicants Mahajan J. to amend their applications, proceedings in respect of which had been quashed previously.\n\nOn the 10th October, 1939, Raghuraj Singh applied for amendment of his application.\n\nThis application was allowed by the sub-divisional officer who passed an order under section 6 of the U .P. Encumbered Estates Act on 18th October, 1939, and forwarded the amended application to the special judge, .first grade, Sitapur.\n\nOn 31st July, 1940, the special judge passed an order to the effect that the proceedings would start afresh.\n\nRaghuraj Singh went up in revision to the Uhief Court against this ordr contending that the proceedings should not be deemed as fresh proceedings.\n\nThe Chief Court dismissed the revision on 9th December, HJ40. On a notification issued under section 11 of the _b; ncumbered Estates Act, Hari Kishen Das filed objection on 14th August, h142, under section 11 clail'1ing that the villages sold to him were his property and wore not liable to be attached and sold for the debts of Raghuraj Singh. 'fhis objection was contested by the debtor.\n\nThe special judge by his decree dated 25th September, HJ43, declared Rai Bahadur Hari Kishen Das to be the proprietor of all the eight villages included in the sale deed of 24th February, 193\\:1.\n\nAgainst the decree of the special judge an appeal was filed in the Chief Court which confirmed that decree on 13th March, 1946. Appeal No. 101 of 1951 now before us is directed against that decree.\n\nThis appeal can be shortly disposed of.\n\nThe proceedings under the _b; ncumbered .Estates Act having been quashed by the Board of Revenue in August, 1938, the sale held in February, 1939, was unaffected by the bar imposed by section 7 of the Act. lu\n\n566 SUPREME ootJR1' REPO R'fS tHJ53)\n\nwsa view of the decision of the Chief Court dated 9th December, 1940, the appellant could not be allowed Lal Bhagwant h h h d h Singh to agitate t e_pomt t at t e procee in gs s ould have v. beep deemed to be pending in February, 1939, be- Rai Sahib Lala cause of the provisions of the amending Act.\n\nThis Sri Kish•?• Das. point was stressed before us by the Jearued counsel for the appellant and he contended that the provi- Mahajan J. sions of the amending Act XI of 1939 should have been given retrospective operation and the date of his original application shonld have been treated as the date of the start of the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act.\n\nThis contention, in our opinion, was rightly negatived in the courts below, and it was rightly held that the order made under section 6 on 18th Ocober, 1939, was made on a fresh application under section 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act preferred on 10th October, 1939, and this could not affect the validity of the sale deed executed at a time when no application under section 4 was pending. It was argued in the courts below that the sale deed was a nullity because it was executed while execution proceedings were pending before the collector under schedule III of the Code of Civil Procedure. 'rhe point was not argued before us in this appeal.\n\nThis appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. • As regards appeals Nos. 102 and 103, the main point for decision is whether in the circumstances of this case the appellant was entitled to restitution by way of restoration of possession and grant of mesne profits after the reversal of the compromise decree by the Privy Council and the restoration of the amended decree as passed by the civil judge under the Relief Act.\n\nHaving regard to the provisions of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Chief Court was of the opinion that the sale in 1939 was inevitable and conld not have been avoided if the amended decree had been then in force and that if it was set aside it wonld confer on the appellant an advantage to which\n\npis predecessor was not entitled, he having defaulted\n\n• .. • , i..\n\nin the payment of three instalments before the sale 1953 took place. 'rhe following passage from the judg- Lal Bhagwant ment of the Chief Court expresses the view that it Singh took on this point :- • v. \"For purposes of section 144 we have in the words R11i Sahib Litl11 of the section 'to place the parties in the position Sri KishenDas. which thy would have occupied but for such decree J.Iahajrin J. or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed.' So placing them the issue which falls for determination is.whether the judgment-debtor would have paid the accumulated amount of three instalments namely Rs. 1,37,839-1-11 in December, 1939.\n\nOn the evidence the lower court. has come to the conclusion with which we agree that Thakur Raghuraj Singh owed no less than rupees fourteen lakhs to other creditors, and computing the v0, lue of the entire landed property at the rate specified in the compromise of 1133, it was only rupees nine lakhs. Lal Bhagwant Singh produced no evidence to 'establish that his father was otherwise in a position to pay the amount of three instalments in December, 1938. We may mention that no objection has been taken at the bar to the estimate of indebtedness or to the evaluation of the estate.\n\nTaking them, therefore, to be correct it is impossible to believe that the judgmeiltdebtor could have prevented the sale on 24th February, 1939, if the parties were then governed by the decree of 1936.\n\nThe result which followed was inevitable and cannot be attributed solely to the erroneous order passed by this court in February, 1938.\"\n\nIn our opinion, no exceptin can be taken to the judgment of the Chief Court in the facts and circumstances of this case and both these appeals would therefore have to be dismissed.\n\nOn account of the order of His Majesty in Council the amended decree passed by the civil judge, Sitapur, on 11th January, 1936, must be deemed to have been subsisting all a.long. 'All the terms of the compromise were embodied in the amended decree and there was no difference in the tw@ decrees except for the reduction of\n\nSUPREME COUHT HEPORTS [1953)\n\n1953 the sum due from Rs. 3,88,300-2-6 to Rs. 3,76,790-4-3 and the reduction of pendente lite and future interest Lal Bhagwant\n\nSingh and for provision for instalments.\n\nThe compromise •• dcree with the necessary adaptations and amend- Rai Sahib, Lala ments became the amended decree and was enforceable Sri Kishe,.Das.as such. It gave the judgmentdebtor, an opportunity to satisfy the decree by instalments if he committed MahajanJ. l d h f b no defau t an to save t e property ram emg sold in satisfaction of it but in case the whole amount of the decree became due according to its terms or if any portion of it remained unpaid, it yet had to be satisfied in the same manner as the original compromise decree.\n\nDuring the pendeucy of the decreeholder's appeal before the Chief Court the judgmentdebtor did not obtain any order staying the operation of the amended decree.\n\nHe was th us boun'd to carry out the terms of that decree but be failed to pay any of the instalments that fell due in 1986 or 1937. 'fhe third instalment, it is true, fell nue in December, 1938, after the amended decree had been set aside by the Chief Court but the judgment-debtor had appealed for its restoration to the Privy Council.\n\nHe should therefore have taken steps to protect himself against being in default with payment of three instalments. ln order therefore to avoid the default which he would otherwise commit by non-payment of the third instalment it was obligatory on him to pay or offer to pay to the decreeholder an amount equal to the amount of one instalment so that three instalments will not be in. arrear, or to obtain au order from the Privy Council absolving him from complying with the terms of the amended decree set aside by the Chief Court, even if it was eventually restored. Failing that, he should have obtained a fresh order from the Privy Council fixing the instalments and time for the payment.\n\nHe, however, did nothing and adopted the attitude that he need make no payment and considered himself absolved. from satisfying either the original decree or the amended decree. 'fhe result of this attitude was that the whole of the decretal amount became due on his\n\nfailure to pay the third instalment provided for under 1963 the amended decree in December, 1938, and he Lal Bhagwa t thus lost the benefit of paying the decretal amount Singh \" by instalments. The amount due from him .in v February, 1939 under the decree was the same sum Ri Sahib Lala for which the property was sold in execution of the Sn Kishen Das, original decree.\n\nIn this situation it cannot be said Mahajan J. that there was any alteration in the position of the parties by the Privy Council setting aside the compromise decree and restoring the decree passed by the civil judge, Sitapur, in 1936.\n\nThe position would have been the same if that decree was a subsisting one and was in execution. If the judgment-debtor could have shown that he was in a position to pay the aggregate amount of the instalments in December, 1938, or at least one instalment so that he could not be said to have defaulted in the payment of three instalments, then the sale made in February, 19'39, could not possibly be regarded as one under the amended decree but could only have been made iri consequence of the original compromise decree, and that compromise decree having been superseded and the amended decree having been restored, the sale held under the rever, ied decree would surely have to be set a, side.\n\nOn the other hand, if the sale could not have been avoided even if the amended decree which was eYentually restored bad been in operation at the time of the sale by reason of default of payment of three instrdments and the sale was also a necessary consequence under the decree of the civil judge and was inevitable, then it cannot be said that the sale held in February, 1939, was the re:i11lt and • consequence of the reversed decree. It is true that it is one of the first and the highest duty of a court to take care that its. acts do not injure any of the suitors and if any injary was caused to the judgrrientdebtor by the sale held in February, 1931, it was our duty to undo the wrong caused to him.\n\nIt, however, cannot be said that in this case any wrong bas been done to the judgment-debtor which we are called upon to redress, It is not possible to bold that he\n\n1953 was under no obligati6n to satisfy either one or , the\n\nL 1 B-;:- t other of the two decrees, and that he was absolved • Sin';;:.. from satisfying the instalmenLdecree because it had v.. been set aside by the Chief Court and he was also\n\nRai B'•hib Loia_ absolved from satisfying the original decree because Sri Kish•~ Das. it was later on set aside by the Privy Council. Having\n\n, - himself appealed to the Privy Council for the res-\n\nMahai\"\"_~· toration of the instalment decree, it was obligatory on him to carry out the terms of that decree if he wanted to take advantage of its provisions. Having defaulttld in this, he must take its consequences, which are\n\nnow different from the consequences of the original decree. Indeed, if in this case the prayer of the . judgment-debtor. for restitution was granted, it would result in doing not only an injuetice but a wrong to the decreeholder and the court wouldnot be acting fairly and rightly towards him. As already said; in February 1939 both under the original decree and the amended'decree a sum of.over rupees four lakhs became due to him and he was entitled to get a sale of the villages seleGJted by him in his favour towards satisfaction of this decretal debt. If this sale is set aside and possession of eight villages is restored to the judgment-debtor and mesne profits are decreed in his favour, the decreeholder would be deprived of the fruits of his decree which is certainly not the purpose of restitution in law or equity; it would place the judgment-debtor in a position of advantage to which he is not entitled.'. The executing court de- • creed restoration of possession of the eight villages in favour of the appellant conditional on his paying the amount due to the decreeholder under the amended decree till the date of that order. This obviously favourable order passed in his favour by the trial judge was not availed of by the judgment-debtor .. as he has no means whatsoever to make any payment.'\n\n.~ An order of restitution in the manner asked for in the circumstances of this case would be contrary to the - principles of the doctrine of restitution which is that on the re.versa! of a judgment the law raises an obligation on the party to the record who reQeived the.\n\n• ....\n\n' .\n\nbenefit of the erronP')US judgment to make restitution 195 to the other party for what he had lost and that it is L l B-;:- the duty of the court to enforce that obligation \"' Sin:wa.nt unless it is shown that restitution would be clearly v. contrary to the real justice of the case.\n\nThe decree- Ra.i Sahib Lala holder in the present case has derived no advantage Sri Kishen Da.s. to which he was not entitled and the judgment-debtor MahajanJ. has lost nothing. In either event he had to discharge and satisfy the decretal debt due from him whether under the first decree or under the second and that debt could only be discharged by sale of the villages selected by the decreeholder. In the words of Rankin\n\nC. J. in Dayal Sardar v. Tari Deshi(1), the judgmentdebtor is not entitled to reqover the properties except upon showing that the sale was in substance and truth a consequence of the error in the reversed decree.\n\nThe sale being inevitable under the amended decree the judgment-debtor was clearly not entitled to restitution. It was held in Gansu Ram v. Parvati Kuer (2), that where a judgment-debtor could not have paid even the reduced decretal amount and the sum realized at the sale was less than the decretal amount the situation could not have been altered in any way had the decree been modified before, instead of after the sale, and the judgment-debtor could not invoke the provisions of section 144, except by showing that the sale was in substance and truth a consequence of the error in the original decree. The observations made in t4is case have apposite application to the faets and circumstances of this case.\n\nFor the reasons given above we are of the opinion that there is no merit in either of these appeals anti we dismiss both of them with costs.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: 0. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent: Rajinder Narain.\n\n(1) (1932) I.L.R. 59 Cal. 6f7,\n\n(•) A.I.R. 1941 Pat. no.", "total_entities": 101, "entities": [{"text": "AL BHAGvVANT SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Lal Bhagwant h h h d h Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v. •\n\nRA! SAHIB LALA SRI KISHEN DAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAI SAHIB LALA SRI KISHAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 532, "end_char": 554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 599, "end_char": 603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act"}}, {"text": "Aniendment Act-Application under Amendnient Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 675, "end_char": 722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Agriculturists Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1072, "end_char": 1097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2740, "end_char": 2744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Encumbered Estates Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2758, "end_char": 2786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bi Shib Lala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3022, "end_char": 3034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cution was obtained, a sale was effected in execution of the decree\n\nBi Shib Lala in :B1ebruary, 1939.", "canonical_name": "Ri Sahib Lala"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3619, "end_char": 3624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act, 1934", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act, 1934"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3736, "end_char": 3740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act, 1934", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act, 1934"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. I. Bishan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4642, "end_char": 4660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. I. Bishan Singh for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4681, "end_char": 4695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad (Nazimuddin Siddique, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Nazimuddin Siddique", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4697, "end_char": 4716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad (Nazimuddin Siddique, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhe Judgment of the Court \\Vas deJi, ered by MAHAJAN J.\n\n. ..", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ."}}, {"text": "Rai Bahadur Lala Hari Singh Kishen Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 5002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwa nt On the 4th July, 1933, Rai Bahadur Lala Hari Singh Kishen Das obtained from the court of the civil judge, v.\n\nSitapur, a final compromise decree in the sum of Ri Shib Lala."}}, {"text": "Ri Shib Lala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5100, "end_char": 5112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwa nt On the 4th July, 1933, Rai Bahadur Lala Hari Singh Kishen Das obtained from the court of the civil judge, v.\n\nSitapur, a final compromise decree in the sum of Ri Shib Lala.", "canonical_name": "Ri Sahib Lala"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5234, "end_char": 5241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and costs, on the foot of two simple mortgages Mahajan J. executed in his favour in 1928 and 1931 by Thakur Raghuraj Singh.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ."}}, {"text": "Thakur Raghuraj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5288, "end_char": 5309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and costs, on the foot of two simple mortgages Mahajan J. executed in his favour in 1928 and 1931 by Thakur Raghuraj Singh.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Raghuraj Singh"}}, {"text": "Raghuraj Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5350, "end_char": 5364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was provided in the compromise that Raghuraj Singh would within a week sell to Hari Kishen Das at agreed prices some villages out of the mortgaged property selected by him and sufficient to satisfy the decree.", "canonical_name": "Ragburaj\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Hari Kishen Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5393, "end_char": 5408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was provided in the compromise that Raghuraj Singh would within a week sell to Hari Kishen Das at agreed prices some villages out of the mortgaged property selected by him and sufficient to satisfy the decree.", "canonical_name": "Hari Kishen Das"}}, {"text": "4th July, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5927, "end_char": 5941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hari Kishen Das made a selection of eight villages, and deeds of sale and relinquishment in respect of them were duly prepared and executed on 4th July, 1933."}}, {"text": "20th January, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6355, "end_char": 6373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th January, 1934, the Court of Wards decided that it would not take the estate under its supervision."}}, {"text": "Hari Kisben Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6459, "end_char": 6474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hari Kisben Das then revived his demand against the judgment-debtor for the completion of the sale deeds but the judgment-debtor did not pay any heed to his request with the result that on 26th May, HJ34, be made an application for execution of the compromise decree. '", "canonical_name": "Hari Kishen Das"}}, {"text": "26th May, HJ34", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6648, "end_char": 6662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hari Kisben Das then revived his demand against the judgment-debtor for the completion of the sale deeds but the judgment-debtor did not pay any heed to his request with the result that on 26th May, HJ34, be made an application for execution of the compromise decree. '"}}, {"text": "Raghnraj Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6799, "end_char": 6813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ro the execution of this decree a number of objections we.re raised by Raghnraj Singh.", "canonical_name": "Ragburaj\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6922, "end_char": 6944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kishen Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7256, "end_char": 7266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the other Act, a landlord debtor Sri Kishen Das.", "canonical_name": "Kislien Das"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7722, "end_char": 7731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act"}}, {"text": "11th January, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7828, "end_char": 7846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th January, 1936, the civil judge of Sitapur altered the decretal amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Sitapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7867, "end_char": 7874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th January, 1936, the civil judge of Sitapur altered the decretal amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "15th February, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8455, "end_char": 8474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order, Hari Kishen Das filed an application in revision to the Chief Court and was successful in having the amended decree set aside on 15th February, 1938."}}, {"text": "29th October, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8545, "end_char": 8563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bred Estates Act on 29th October, 1936, Ragburaj\n\nSingh obtained an order under section 6 of the Act but this order was eventually quashed by the Board of Revenue on 13th August, 1938, and the debtor's application under section 4 was dismissed."}}, {"text": "Ragburaj\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8565, "end_char": 8580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bred Estates Act on 29th October, 1936, Ragburaj\n\nSingh obtained an order under section 6 of the Act but this order was eventually quashed by the Board of Revenue on 13th August, 1938, and the debtor's application under section 4 was dismissed.", "canonical_name": "Ragburaj\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8605, "end_char": 8614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13th August, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8691, "end_char": 8708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bred Estates Act on 29th October, 1936, Ragburaj\n\nSingh obtained an order under section 6 of the Act but this order was eventually quashed by the Board of Revenue on 13th August, 1938, and the debtor's application under section 4 was dismissed."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8745, "end_char": 8754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th Febru- 1953 ary, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9129, "end_char": 9155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On his failure to comply with this demand, the court\n\n,..\n\n• -\n\nexecuted a deed of sale in his favour on 24th Febru- 1953 ary, 1939, and in due course delivered to him posses- Lal Bhagwa .. t sion of the property covered by .the deed. •"}}, {"text": "Singh Thakur Raghuraj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9261, "end_char": 9288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh Thakur Raghuraj Singh died in the year 1941, v. leaving him surviving the present appellant as his Ri Sahib Lala successor in interest."}}, {"text": "Ri Sahib Lala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9366, "end_char": 9379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh Thakur Raghuraj Singh died in the year 1941, v. leaving him surviving the present appellant as his Ri Sahib Lala successor in interest.", "canonical_name": "Ri Sahib Lala"}}, {"text": "Kislien Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9436, "end_char": 9447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal had .been taken by Sn Kislien Das.", "canonical_name": "Kislien Das"}}, {"text": "20th January, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9641, "end_char": 9659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order of His Majesty in Council passed on 20th January, 1944, the decision of the Chief Court dated 15th February, 1938, was reversed and the amended decree passed by the Civil Judge of Sitapur on 11th January, 1936, was restored."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge of Sitapur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9770, "end_char": 9792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order of His Majesty in Council passed on 20th January, 1944, the decision of the Chief Court dated 15th February, 1938, was reversed and the amended decree passed by the Civil Judge of Sitapur on 11th January, 1936, was restored."}}, {"text": "Bhagwant Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10069, "end_char": 10083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the decision of the Privy Council, Bhagwant Singh (appellant) made an application for restoration of possession and for recovery of profits wrongfully reali1rnd by Hari Kishen Das and after his death by his adopted son Sri Kishen Das.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwant Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhagwant Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10922, "end_char": 10936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhe subordinate judge allowed the application for restitution conditional on Bhagwant Singh paying within two months the accumulated sum that had fallen due to the decreeholder under the unpaid in- .stalments up to the date of the order.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwant Singh"}}, {"text": "Lal Bhngwant Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11314, "end_char": 11332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "73, 294-8-5 and the cMts of appeal allowed Lal Bhngwant Singh by the Privy Council, a sum of Rs. '", "canonical_name": "Lal Bhagwant h h h d h Singh"}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib Lala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11444, "end_char": 11458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,81),620-0-4 was v. du~ and directed that if this amount was not deposit- Rai Sahib Lala ed in court within two months, the application would Sri Ki•hen Das.stand dismissed.", "canonical_name": "Ra.i Sahib Lala"}}, {"text": "Ki•hen Das.stand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11516, "end_char": 11532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,81),620-0-4 was v. du~ and directed that if this amount was not deposit- Rai Sahib Lala ed in court within two months, the application would Sri Ki•hen Das.stand dismissed."}}, {"text": "Kisben D:>s", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11662, "end_char": 11673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rai Sahib Sri Kisben D:>s and Bhagwant Singh both appealed to the Chief Court against this deci- sion. '", "canonical_name": "Kislien Das"}}, {"text": "Kisben Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11771, "end_char": 11781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he appeal of Sri Kisben Das was numbered as 103 of 1944.", "canonical_name": "Kislien Das"}}, {"text": "26th September, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12467, "end_char": 12487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "101 of 1951 arises out of another decision of the Chief Court dated I.3th March, 1946, which confirmed the decree dated 26th September, 1943, of the special judge of Sitapur under the Encumbered Estates Act. '"}}, {"text": "Sitapur under the Encumbered Estates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12513, "end_char": 12553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Thakur Haghuraj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12639, "end_char": 12660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he facts about this matter are these:\n\nAs already stated, m 28t\\i October, 1936, Thakur Haghuraj Singh applied under section 4 of the U.P. ) Encumbered Estates Act (XXV of 1934) for administration of his estate so as to liquidate his debts amounting to about 14 lakhs.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Raghuraj Singh"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12675, "end_char": 12684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sitapur under the Encumbered Estates Act", "statute": "Sitapur under the Encumbered Estates Act"}}, {"text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12699, "end_char": 12721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Board of Revenue quashed the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12854, "end_char": 12927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raghuraj Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13030, "end_char": 13044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As no order for stay of execution proceeding.s was obtained by Raghuraj Singh from the Chief Court or the Privy- .", "canonical_name": "Ragburaj\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Lal Bhagwinl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13324, "end_char": 13336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Council, the civil judge to whom the execution proceedings had been, tra, nsferred, on 13th\n\n::;.C.R.\n\nSU.PREME COURT REPOR'fS 565\n\nFebruary, 1939, ordered the judgment-debtor to execute a sale deed and on his makin 0(J a default the civil\n\nLal Bhagwinl judge on '24th February, 1939, execnted a sale deed S.ingh on behalf of the judgment-debtor in favour of .lai v.\n\nBahadur Hari K1she11 Das.", "canonical_name": "Lal Bhagwant h h h d h Singh"}}, {"text": "Estates Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13519, "end_char": 13540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "10th October, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13742, "end_char": 13760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th October, 1939, Raghuraj Singh applied for amendment of his application."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13905, "end_char": 13914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Estates Amendment Act", "statute": "Estates Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13928, "end_char": 13950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "18th October, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13954, "end_char": 13972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was allowed by the sub-divisional officer who passed an order under section 6 of the U .P. Encumbered Estates Act on 18th October, 1939, and forwarded the amended application to the special judge, .first grade, Sitapur."}}, {"text": "31st July, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14061, "end_char": 14076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31st July, 1940, the special judge passed an order to the effect that the proceedings would start afresh."}}, {"text": "Uhief Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14210, "end_char": 14221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghuraj Singh went up in revision to the Uhief Court against this ordr contending that the proceedings should not be deemed as fresh proceedings."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14409, "end_char": 14419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14514, "end_char": 14524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act"}}, {"text": "25th September, HJ43", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14745, "end_char": 14765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The special judge by his decree dated 25th September, HJ43, declared Rai Bahadur Hari Kishen Das to be the proprietor of all the eight villages included in the sale deed of 24th February, 193\\:1."}}, {"text": "Rai Bahadur Hari Kishen Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14776, "end_char": 14803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The special judge by his decree dated 25th September, HJ43, declared Rai Bahadur Hari Kishen Das to be the proprietor of all the eight villages included in the sale deed of 24th February, 193\\:1."}}, {"text": "13th March, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15014, "end_char": 15030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the decree of the special judge an appeal was filed in the Chief Court which confirmed that decree on 13th March, 1946."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15328, "end_char": 15337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lal Bhagwant h h h d h Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15497, "end_char": 15525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lu\n\n566 SUPREME ootJR1' REPO R'fS tHJ53)\n\nwsa view of the decision of the Chief Court dated 9th December, 1940, the appellant could not be allowed Lal Bhagwant h h h d h Singh to agitate t e_pomt t at t e procee in gs s ould have v. beep deemed to be pending in February, 1939, be- Rai Sahib Lala cause of the provisions of the amending Act.", "canonical_name": "Lal Bhagwant h h h d h Singh"}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib Lala cause of the provisions of the amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15632, "end_char": 15690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16184, "end_char": 16193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rai Sahib Lala cause of the provisions of the amending Act", "statute": "Rai Sahib Lala cause of the provisions of the amending Act"}}, {"text": "18th Ocober, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16197, "end_char": 16214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention, in our opinion, was rightly negatived in the courts below, and it was rightly held that the order made under section 6 on 18th Ocober, 1939, was made on a fresh application under section 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act preferred on 10th October, 1939, and this could not affect the validity of the sale deed executed at a time when no application under section 4 was pending."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16254, "end_char": 16263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rai Sahib Lala cause of the provisions of the amending Act", "statute": "Rai Sahib Lala cause of the provisions of the amending Act"}}, {"text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16276, "end_char": 16298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16433, "end_char": 16442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16631, "end_char": 16658, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17181, "end_char": 17192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17196, "end_char": 17223, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17749, "end_char": 17760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KishenDas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17857, "end_char": 17866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhe following passage from the judg- Lal Bhagwant ment of the Chief Court expresses the view that it Singh took on this point :- • v. \"For purposes of section 144 we have in the words R11i Sahib Litl11 of the section 'to place the parties in the position Sri KishenDas.", "canonical_name": "Kislien Das"}}, {"text": "J.Iahajrin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17918, "end_char": 17928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which thy would have occupied but for such decree J.Iahajrin J. or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed.'"}}, {"text": "Lal Bhagwant Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18481, "end_char": 18499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Bhagwant Singh produced no evidence to 'establish that his father was otherwise in a position to pay the amount of three instalments in December, 1938.", "canonical_name": "Lal Bhagwant h h h d h Singh"}}, {"text": "24th February, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18889, "end_char": 18908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taking them, therefore, to be correct it is impossible to believe that the judgmeiltdebtor could have prevented the sale on 24th February, 1939, if the parties were then governed by the decree of 1936."}}, {"text": "Lal Bhagwa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21925, "end_char": 21935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe result of this attitude was that the whole of the decretal amount became due on his\n\nfailure to pay the third instalment provided for under 1963 the amended decree in December, 1938, and he Lal Bhagwa t thus lost the benefit of paying the decretal amount Singh \" by instalments.", "canonical_name": "Lal Bhagwant h h h d h Singh"}}, {"text": "Rai B'•hib Loia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24242, "end_char": 24257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, cannot be said that in this case any wrong bas been done to the judgment-debtor which we are called upon to redress, It is not possible to bold that he\n\n1953 was under no obligati6n to satisfy either one or , the\n\nL 1 B-;:- t other of the two decrees, and that he was absolved • Sin';;:.. from satisfying the instalmenLdecree because it had v.. been set aside by the Chief Court and he was also\n\nRai B'•hib Loia_ absolved from satisfying the original decree because Sri Kish•~ Das."}}, {"text": "Kish•~ Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24316, "end_char": 24326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, cannot be said that in this case any wrong bas been done to the judgment-debtor which we are called upon to redress, It is not possible to bold that he\n\n1953 was under no obligati6n to satisfy either one or , the\n\nL 1 B-;:- t other of the two decrees, and that he was absolved • Sin';;:.. from satisfying the instalmenLdecree because it had v.. been set aside by the Chief Court and he was also\n\nRai B'•hib Loia_ absolved from satisfying the original decree because Sri Kish•~ Das.", "canonical_name": "Kislien Das"}}, {"text": "Ra.i Sahib Lala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26564, "end_char": 26579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree- Ra.i Sahib Lala holder in the present case has derived no advantage Sri Kishen Da.s.", "canonical_name": "Ra.i Sahib Lala"}}, {"text": "Kishen Da.s", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26636, "end_char": 26647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree- Ra.i Sahib Lala holder in the present case has derived no advantage Sri Kishen Da.s.", "canonical_name": "Kislien Das"}}, {"text": "MahajanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26702, "end_char": 26711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to which he was not entitled and the judgment-debtor MahajanJ. has lost nothing.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ."}}, {"text": "Rankin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26969, "end_char": 26975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Rankin\n\nC. J. in Dayal Sardar v. Tari Deshi(1), the judgmentdebtor is not entitled to reqover the properties except upon showing that the sale was in substance and truth a consequence of the error in the reversed decree."}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27674, "end_char": 27685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ". P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28092, "end_char": 28100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: 0."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28129, "end_char": 28144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: Rajinder Narain."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_572_581_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "57'2\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1953]\n\n195a\n\nGAYA ELECTRIC SUPPT1Y CO., LTD.\n\nFeb. 8.\n\nV. •\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS, and GHULAM\n\nHASAN JJ.]\n\nIndian Arbitration Act (X of 1940), s. 34-Contract containing arbitration clause-Rescissio1~ of contract and suit by one party- Application for stay of rnit-Scope of arbitration clause-Construction of cla\"se.\n\nIf the arbitration agreement is broad and comprehensive and embraceEI' any dispute between the parties in respect of the agreement, or in respect of any provision in the agreement, or in respect of anything arising out of it, and one of the parties seeks to avoid the contract, the dispute is referable to arbitration if the avoidance of the contract arises out of the terms of the contract itself.\n\nWhere, however, the party seeks to avoid the contract for reasons dehors it, the arbitration clause cannot be resorted to as it goes along with other terms of the contract. In other words, a party cannot rely on a term of the contract to repudiate it and still say the arbitration clause should not apply.\n\nWhere, however, an arbitration clause is not so comprehen sive and is not drafted in the broad language namely \"in respectt of\" any agreement, or \"in reSpect of something arising out of it\", that proposition does not hold good.\n\nThe arbitration clause is a written submission agreed to by the parties in a contract and like every written submission to arbitration must be considered according to its language and in the light of the circumstances in which it is made.\n\nDisputes which arose between the State of Bihar and an Electric Supply Company whose licence bad been revoked by the\n\nState were settled by an agreement which provided that the State should make an advance payment of Rs. 5 lakbs to the company, '<nd the company should hand over the undertaking to the State.\n\nThe undertaking was to be valued within 3 months and if any money was'found due to the company as per the Government valuation over 5 lakbs it will be paid to the company and if the valuation \\Vas less than 5 lakhs the company would refund the excess received by it.\n\nThe agreement contained an arbitration clause which ran as follows: '' In the case of any difference or dispute between the parties over the valuation as arrived at by the Government and that arrived at by the company any such difference or dispute including the claim for additional compensation of 20% shall be referred to arbitration.\" The company instituted a suit against the State alleging that the State had failed to make its\n\n' '\n\n• •\n\nvaluation and to make payment of the excess within the time 1953 fixed and as time was of the essence of the contract, it had rescinded the agreement, and praying for a declaration that the Gaya Electric undertaking belonged to it, for damages and appointment Qf a Supply Co., Ltd. receiver. The State applied under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act v. for stay of the suit:.\n\nThe State of Held, that the scope of the arbitration clause was very Bihar. narrow; it conferred jurisdiction on the arbitrator only on the question of valuation of the undertaking pure and simple .\n\nQuestions relating to the breach of contract or its rescission were outside the scope of the clause and the suit could not be stayed under s. 34.\n\nHeyman v. Darwins Ltd. ([1942] A.O. 356) referred to.\n\nHarinagar 811, gar 111.ills Ltd. v. Skoda (India) Ltd. (A.LR. 1948 Cal. 230) 'and Governor-General in Council v. Associated Livestock Farrn, Ltd. ([1937] 41 O.W.N. 563) distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 175 of 1951.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Order and Decree dated the 30th March, 1-051, of the High\n\nCourt of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Rai JJ.) in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 19 of 1951 arising out of the Order dated the 18th December, 1950, of the Court of the Additional Sub-Judge Second at Gaya in Title Suit No. 47 of 1950.\n\nN. 0. Chatterjee (Rameshwar Nath, with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (R. J. Um- \\ rigar with them) for the respondent.\n\n1953.\n\nFebruary 3: The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This appeal by special leave arises out of an application made by the State of Bihar against the Gaya Electric Supply Co. Ltd. under section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act for stay of proceedings in a suit .filed by the company on 28th September, 1950. The facts relevant. to this enquiry are these.\n\n~ A licence for the supply of electric energy in the Gaya Electric town of Gaya was obtained by one Khandelwal in the Supply Go., Ltd.year 1928 under the Indian Electricity A.ct, 1910. v.\n\nWtth the required sanction of the Government the The State of licence was transfocred to the company in 1932.\n\n. B•har. a notification dated 23rd June, 1949, the licence was\n\nMahajan J. revoked by the Government with effect from 9th July,\n\n1949. 'l'hereupon the company filed a suit against the State for a declaration that the revocation of the licence was arbitrary, mala fide and ultra vires. During the pendency of the suit negotiations started between the company and the State for a settlement of the dispute and ultimately on 28th October, 1949, a deed of agreement was arrived at between them. The effect of the . agreement and the correspondence referred to therein was substantially as follows:- .(a) That the company would withdraw the suit No. 58 of 1949 unconditionally on 25th October, 1949.\n\n(b) 'rhat within three days of the withdrawal of the suit the State of Bihar would make an advance payment of rupees five lakhs to the company, and simultaneously the company would formally hand over the possession of the undertaking to an authorized officer of the Government.\n\n(c) That both parties will make their respective valuations with\"in three months of taking over the undertaking and any balance of money found due to the company as per Government valuation will be paid to the company and in case of over-payment, the excess paid to the company on account of the \"on account payment\" of rupees five lakhs will be refunded to the Government.\n\n(d) That in the case of a, ny difference or dispute between the parties over the payment of the balance which may be found due after valuation such dispute shall .be submitted to the sole arbitration of a single arbitrator who should be a high government officer of the provincial government of rank equal to or higher than a Divisional Commissioner and his award shall be binding and final on both parties.\n\n' .. . \\.\n\nThe arhitration clause is c6ntained in a letter dated 1953 13th October, 1949, and was substantially accepted by the company in its letter dated 17t_h <?ctober_, 19j9. s:;:~ ~\n\n1 :t~d.\n\nAs set out by the State Government rn 1ts application v. under section 34, it runs as follows :- The State of \"In the case of any differsnce or dispute between Bihar. the parties over the valuation as arrived at by the Government and that arrived at by the company,· such difference or dispute, including the claim for additional compensation of 20 % shall be referred to arbitration ... \" In pursuance of the agreement the respondent took over the undertaking on 28th October, 1949, and also made a payment of rupees five lakhs to the company.\n\nOn the 19th January, 1950, the company sent a statement of valuation of the assets amounting to Rs. 22,06,072 to the Chief Electrical Engineer, Bihar. The Chief Electrical Engineer characterized the valuation of 22 lakhs by the company as fantastic and stated that according to a rough valuation the amount would be approximately five lakhs and that the final valuation would be settled after the company had furnished a detailed history of the plants and machineries.\n\nThe company declined to give any further details and stated that time was of the essence of the contract and it would be extended from 28th January, to 15th February, 1950. On 6th April, 1950, the Chief Electrical Engineer intimated that the valuation amounted to Rs. 5,56,221. No reply to this letter was received and the State Government intimated to the company that as difference and dis pute had arisen relating to valuation, Mr. M. S. Rao, I.C.S., was being appointed as sole arbitrator to decide the dispute.\n\nOn 28th September, 1950, the company instituted the suit, the subject-matter of the application for sbay, after necessary notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the plaint it was alleged lihat as the State Government had failed and neglected to make its valuation or to make payment to the\n\nMahaja\" J,\n\n1953 company by the 15th 'March, 1950, it committed a\n\nG E ' t . breach of the agreement and by reason of this breach aya eo rto .\n\nSupply co., Ltd. th\" company bad rescmded the agreement and bad v. forfeited the sum of five lakbs paid as advance by the The Stat• of State. 'l'be comp:my prayed inter alia for the reliefs\n\nBihar. of declaration that the electrical undertaking be-. longed to them, for damages, for appointment of Mahajan J, receiver and for injunction.\n\nOn the 9th October, 1950, the State Government filed the present application under section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act. It was stated therein that the company had with a dishonest and mala fide motive and with a view to avoid the decision of the matter in dispute in arbitration instituted the suit on incorrect and false allegations, that the arbitration agreement was still subsisting and valid and binding on the parties and could not be taken as having been rescinded as alleged by the company, that the cause of action as alleged in the plaint being non-compliance with the agreement the suit arose out of and related to the agreement and was covered by the arbitration clause and that the State Government was ready and willing to have the dispute setled by arbitration.\n\nThe company denied the allegations of mala fides and pleaded that the arbitration clause was no longer in existence and that even assuming it to be in existence, the suit was in no way connected with .the same and it was contended that the suit should not be stayed. 'l'he subordinate judge held that the suit was not in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, and that the court had no jurisdiction to stay the proceedings. In the result the stay application was dismissed. Against this order the State Government appealed to the High Court.\n\nThe High Court held that the dispute in the suit was one which arose out of or was in respect of the agreement and that the question in the suit was directly within the scope of the :ubitration clause. By an order of this Court dated 22nd May, 1951, the company wa, s granted special leave under article 136(1) of the Constitution. .\n\n~ '\n\nSection 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act runs 1958 thus:- • Gaya Electric \"Where a.ny party to an arbitration ....... commen- Supply co., Ltd. ces any legal proceedings against any other party•to v. the agreement ..... . in respect of any matter agreed to be The State 0!\n\nBihar. referred, any party to such legal proceedings may, ...... apply to the judicial authority before whic, h the pro- Mahajan. 'J, ceedings are pending to stay the proceedings, and if satisfied that there is no sufficient rason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement and that the applicant was, at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, such authority may make an order staying the proceed- . \" mgs.\n\nFrom the language of the section it is quite clear that the legal proceeding which is sought to be stayed must be in respect of a matter which the parties have agreed to refer and which comes within the ambit of the arbitration agreement.\n\nWhere, however, a suit is commenced as to a matter which lies outside tbe submission, the court is bound to refuse a stay. In the words of Viscount Simon L. 0. in Heyman v.\n\nDarwins Ltd. (1). the answer to the question whether a dispute falls within an arbitration clause in a contract must depend on (a) what is the dispute, and (b) what disputes the arbitration clause covers. If the arbitration agreement is broad and comprehensive and embraces any dispute between the parties \"in respect of\" the agreement, or in respect of any provision in the agreement, or in respect of anything arising out of it, and one of the parties seeks to avoid the contract, the dispute is referable to arbitration if the avoidance of the contract arises out of the terms of the contract itself.\n\nWhere, however, the party seeks to avoid the contract for reasons dehors it, the arbitration clause cannot be resorted to as it goes along with other terms of the contract. In other' words, a party cannot rely on a term of the con, tra9t\n\n1968 to repudiate it and still say the arbitration clause\n\nGaya Electric should not apply. If he relies upon a contract, he SupplyOo., Ltd.must rely on it for all purposes.\n\nWhere, however v. an' arbitration clause is not so comprehensive and i~ The State of not drafted in the broad language which was used ih\n\nBihar. the House of Lords case, namely, \"in respect of\" any\n\nfahajan J. agreement, or \"in respect of something arising out of it\", that proposition does not hold good .. The arbitration cla, use is a written submission agreed to by the parties in a contract and like every 1written submission to arbitration must be considered according to its language and in the light of tho circumstances in which it is made.\n\nNow as regards the first question, viz., what is the present dispute about, the answer is to be gathered from paragraphs 14 to 17 of the .plaint. It is averred therein that the Government of Bihar committed breach of the agreement and failed to make any valuation of the unde'rtaking or pay the balance of the compensation money, that time being of the essence of the contract, the defendant failed and neglected to complete the valuation within the time originally fixed or the extended time, and that by reason of the breach of contract the plaintiff rescinded the agreement and forfeited the sum of rupees five lakhs and that it is entitled to compensation for the wrongful deprivation of the use of its property.\n\nNo claim has been made in the plaint for the valuation of the undertaking or for the payment of any compensation for the undertaking; on the other hand, the claim in the suit is founded on the rescission of the agreement containing the arbitration clause and on a breach of that agreement.\n\nThese are matters which may well be said to arise out of the agreement and if the arbitration clause was broadly worded and stated that all disputes arising out of the agreement would be referred to arbitration, it could then probably have been said that the scope of the suit was within the ambit of the arbitration clause, but the clause here is differently worded.\n\nThe clause here is that if any difference or dispute\n\nrises between the parties over the payment of the •\n\n. •\n\nbalance which may be found due after valuation such 1953 dispnte shall be submitted to the sole arbitration of _a Gaya Electric single arbitrator.\n\nThe scbeme of the agreement is supply co., Ltd. that the Government was to make a valuation as laid v. down in the Indian Electricity Act . within •three The State of months of taking over the _undertaking and any Bihar. balance of money found due to the company as per Mahajan J.\n\nGovernment valuation was to be paid by the Government, and in case of over-payment, the excess paid to the com2any on account of the \"on account payment\" of rupees five lakhs mentioned in paragraph 1 had to be refunded to Government. In the case of any . difference between the parties over the valuation as arrived at by the Government and that arrived at by the company, such difference or dispute, including the claim for i.dditional compensation of twenty per cent. had to be referred to arbitration.\n\nThe scope of this arbitration clause is a very narrc, w one. It only confers jurisdiction on the arbitrator on the question of valuation of the undertaking pure and simple and does not say tbat all disputes arising out of the agreement or in respect of it will be decided by arbitration.\n\nQuestions relating to the breach of contract or its rescission are outside the reach of this clause.\n\nThe arbitrator has not been conferred the power by this clause to pronounce on the issue whether the plaintiff was justified in claiming that time was of the essence of the contract and whether the State Government committed a breach of the contract by not making a valuation within the time specified.\n\nThis clause is therefore no answer to the company's querry \"Show me that I have agreed to refer the subject-matter of the suit to an arbitrator.'' Besides this clause in the agreement there is nothing else which can deprive the court of its jurisdiction to decide the plaintiff's suit as brought.\n\nRamaswami J., with whom Rai J. concurred, held that upon a perusal of the terms of the contract and of the correspondence it was obvious thH.t no stipulation was made tha.t the compensation money\n\nJ95B should be paid within the period of three months, and that on the contrary, the intention of the parties Gaya Electric h t h G Id .\n\nS P. z 0 Ltd was t a t e overnment wou pay compensat10n up y o., .J • v. monGy only a, fter the award had been made by the The Stateof arbitrator.\n\nNow this is the very point which would Bihar. be in issue in the snit itself, and the learned Judge was in error in considering and deciding this point in Mahajan J. this enquiry under section 84.\n\nThe validity of the plaintiff's contentionin the suit cannot be gone into by that court exernising jurisdiction under this section as its function is a very limited one.\n\nThe only point in such cases to be decided is whether the claim which is brought-whether it is good, bad or indifferent-comes within the submission to arbitration. H maybe that there are grounds upon which the defendant would be able to satisfy the proper tr, bunal that the plaintiff's claim'was frivolous and vexatious, but those considerations, as pointed out by Banks L. J. in Monro v. Bognar Urban Council ('), are material only if the question to be considered is whether the case made was a frivolous and vexatious one and ought to have had no weight at all upon the question of what the plaintiff's claim in fact was and one can only find out what his claim is by looking at the-plaint.\n\nThe learned Judges in the High Court seem to have thought that the arbitration clause here had been drafted broadly and that all \"disputes arising out of or in respect of the agreements were referable to arbitration. 'l'heir reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nv. Skoda India Ltd. (9) in support of the decision indicates the error.\n\nIn that case the arbitration clause wa, s drafted in a comprehensive language and stated that a dispute arising out of the agreement had to be referred to arbitration.\n\nTheir reference to the case of Governor-General in Council v. Associated Livestock Farm Ltd. (') also shows that they were under the same erroneous impression. In this ca.se tb e arbitration clause was in these terms:-\n\n(1)\n\n(1915] 3 K.B, 167.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1948 Cal. •Jo,\n\n(2) (1937) 41 C.W.N. 563.\n\n. •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME ootJ:R•r REPORTS 58i\n\n\"Any dispute or difference arising out of the con- 1953 tract shall be referred to the arbitration of the officer G El t . sanctioning the con tract whose decision shall be final su::l~ 00~\" ~d. and binding.\" •\n\nv. ' It is obvious that these decisions could have no The State of relevance to the arbitration clause as drawn up in the Bihar. present case. If the nature of the claim is as we Mahajo.n J. have indicated above, it seems plain that it does not come within the scope of the submission.\n\nIn our judgment, therefore, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was right and the Judges of the High Court were in error in reversing it.\n\nIn the result the only course open to us is to allow the appeal with costs and to say that the plaintiff's claim is not within the scope of the submission and that the petition under section 34 was rightly dismissed by the Subordinate Judge.\n\nAgent for the appellants : Agent for the respondent :\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nRaj inder Narain.\n\nP. K. Chatterji.\n\nRIZWAN-UL-HASAN AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.]\n\nContempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 3-Proceedings before Sub-Divisional Magistrate-Application by respondents to District Magistrate containing allegations against trying Magistrate and the bona fides of the pending proceedings-Transmission of application to Sub-Divisional Magistrate for report-Whether amounts to contempt of Court-Question of prejudice .\n\n. The jurisdiction in contempt of court is not to be invoked unless tbere is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice.\n\nThe purport of the court's action is a practical purpose and the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety.\n\nDuring the pendency of pioceedings against A and B under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, in the court of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, A and B made an application to the District Magistrate alleging that the proceedings were not bona fide and\n\nFeb. 5.", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "GAYA ELECTRIC SUPPT1Y CO., LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GAYA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Arbitration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197, "end_char": 202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Arbitration Act", "statute": "Indian Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1580, "end_char": 1594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disputes which arose between the State of Bihar and an Electric Supply Company whose licence bad been revoked by the\n\nState were settled by an agreement which provided that the State should make an advance payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Gaya Electric undertaking", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2760, "end_char": 2785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company instituted a suit against the State alleging that the State had failed to make its\n\n' '\n\n• •\n\nvaluation and to make payment of the excess within the time 1953 fixed and as time was of the essence of the contract, it had rescinded the agreement, and praying for a declaration that the Gaya Electric undertaking belonged to it, for damages and appointment Qf a Supply Co., Ltd. receiver."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2886, "end_char": 2891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Held", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2946, "end_char": 2959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Held, that the scope of the arbitration clause was very Bihar."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3281, "end_char": 3286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harinagar 811", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3344, "end_char": 3357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harinagar 811, gar 111.ills Ltd. v. Skoda (India) Ltd. (A.LR."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3529, "end_char": 3557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High\n\nCourt of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3676, "end_char": 3710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Order and Decree dated the 30th March, 1-051, of the High\n\nCourt of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Rai JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3712, "end_char": 3721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Order and Decree dated the 30th March, 1-051, of the High\n\nCourt of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Rai JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Rai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3726, "end_char": 3729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Order and Decree dated the 30th March, 1-051, of the High\n\nCourt of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Rai JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. 0. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3917, "end_char": 3933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. 0."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3935, "end_char": 3949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee (Rameshwar Nath, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": ". Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3985, "end_char": 3995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4029, "end_char": 4043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (R. J. Um- \\ rigar with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. J. Um- \\ rigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4072, "end_char": 4089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (R. J. Um- \\ rigar with them) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4185, "end_char": 4192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 3: The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This appeal by special leave arises out of an application made by the State of Bihar against the Gaya Electric Supply Co. Ltd. under section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act for stay of proceedings in a suit .filed by the company on 28th September, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan J"}}, {"text": "Gaya Electric Supply Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 3: The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This appeal by special leave arises out of an application made by the State of Bihar against the Gaya Electric Supply Co. Ltd. under section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act for stay of proceedings in a suit .filed by the company on 28th September, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28th September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4429, "end_char": 4449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 3: The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This appeal by special leave arises out of an application made by the State of Bihar against the Gaya Electric Supply Co. Ltd. under section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act for stay of proceedings in a suit .filed by the company on 28th September, 1950."}}, {"text": "Gaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4552, "end_char": 4556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ A licence for the supply of electric energy in the Gaya Electric town of Gaya was obtained by one Khandelwal in the Supply Go.,"}}, {"text": "Khandelwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4599, "end_char": 4609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ A licence for the supply of electric energy in the Gaya Electric town of Gaya was obtained by one Khandelwal in the Supply Go.,"}}, {"text": "23rd June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4829, "end_char": 4844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a notification dated 23rd June, 1949, the licence was\n\nMahajan J. revoked by the Government with effect from 9th July,\n\n1949. '"}}, {"text": "9th July,\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4917, "end_char": 4932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a notification dated 23rd June, 1949, the licence was\n\nMahajan J. revoked by the Government with effect from 9th July,\n\n1949. '"}}, {"text": "28th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5221, "end_char": 5239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the suit negotiations started between the company and the State for a settlement of the dispute and ultimately on 28th October, 1949, a deed of agreement was arrived at between them."}}, {"text": "25th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5474, "end_char": 5492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58 of 1949 unconditionally on 25th October, 1949."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6818, "end_char": 6828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6915, "end_char": 6920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s:;:~ ~\n\n1 :t~d.\n\nAs set out by the State Government rn 1ts application v. under section 34, it runs as follows :- The State of \"In the case of any differsnce or dispute between Bihar."}}, {"text": "19th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7308, "end_char": 7326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 19th January, 1950, the company sent a statement of valuation of the assets amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "28th January, to 15th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7906, "end_char": 7942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company declined to give any further details and stated that time was of the essence of the contract and it would be extended from 28th January, to 15th February, 1950."}}, {"text": "6th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7947, "end_char": 7962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th April, 1950, the Chief Electrical Engineer intimated that the valuation amounted to Rs."}}, {"text": "M. S. Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8206, "end_char": 8215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No reply to this letter was received and the State Government intimated to the company that as difference and dis pute had arisen relating to valuation, Mr. M. S. Rao, I.C.S., was being appointed as sole arbitrator to decide the dispute."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8423, "end_char": 8433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8437, "end_char": 8464, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "15th 'March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8631, "end_char": 8648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the plaint it was alleged lihat as the State Government had failed and neglected to make its valuation or to make payment to the\n\nMahaja\" J,\n\n1953 company by the 15th 'March, 1950, it committed a\n\nG E ' t ."}}, {"text": "Mahajan J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9041, "end_char": 9050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "longed to them, for damages, for appointment of Mahajan J, receiver and for injunction.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan J"}}, {"text": "9th October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9089, "end_char": 9106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th October, 1950, the State Government filed the present application under section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9165, "end_char": 9175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10648, "end_char": 10662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order of this Court dated 22nd May, 1951, the company wa, s granted special leave under article 136(1) of the Constitution. ."}}, {"text": "article 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10710, "end_char": 10724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10754, "end_char": 10764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gaya Electric", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10814, "end_char": 10827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ '\n\nSection 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act runs 1958 thus:- • Gaya Electric \"Where a.ny party to an arbitration ....... commen- Supply co., Ltd. ces any legal proceedings against any other party•to v. the agreement ..... ."}}, {"text": "Gaya Electric", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12905, "end_char": 12918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other' words, a party cannot rely on a term of the con, tra9t\n\n1968 to repudiate it and still say the arbitration clause\n\nGaya Electric should not apply."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13748, "end_char": 13767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is averred therein that the Government of Bihar committed breach of the agreement and failed to make any valuation of the unde'rtaking or pay the balance of the compensation money, that time being of the essence of the contract, the defendant failed and neglected to complete the valuation within the time originally fixed or the extended time, and that by reason of the breach of contract the plaintiff rescinded the agreement and forfeited the sum of rupees five lakhs and that it is entitled to compensation for the wrongful deprivation of the use of its property."}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15331, "end_char": 15346, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15479, "end_char": 15486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "balance of money found due to the company as per Mahajan J.\n\nGovernment valuation was to be paid by the Government, and in case of over-payment, the excess paid to the com2any on account of the \"on account payment\" of rupees five lakhs mentioned in paragraph 1 had to be refunded to Government.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan J"}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17658, "end_char": 17668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banks", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18208, "end_char": 18213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H maybe that there are grounds upon which the defendant would be able to satisfy the proper tr, bunal that the plaintiff's claim'was frivolous and vexatious, but those considerations, as pointed out by Banks L. J. in Monro v. Bognar Urban Council ('), are material only if the question to be considered is whether the case made was a frivolous and vexatious one and ought to have had no weight at all upon the question of what the plaintiff's claim in fact was and one can only find out what his claim is by looking at the-plaint."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18795, "end_char": 18814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'heir reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nv. Skoda India Ltd. (9) in support of the decision indicates the error."}}, {"text": "Mahajo.n", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19821, "end_char": 19829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the nature of the claim is as we Mahajo.n J. have indicated above, it seems plain that it does not come within the scope of the submission.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan J"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20261, "end_char": 20271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raj inder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20393, "end_char": 20409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj inder Narain."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20412, "end_char": 20427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterji."}}, {"text": "RIZWAN-UL-HASAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20430, "end_char": 20445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RIZWAN-UL-HASAN AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH."}}, {"text": "STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20463, "end_char": 20486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RIZWAN-UL-HASAN AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH."}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20523, "end_char": 20545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20561, "end_char": 20565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21262, "end_char": 21268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21270, "end_char": 21293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_581_588_EN", "year": 1953, "text": ". •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME ootJ:R•r REPORTS 58i\n\n\"Any dispute or difference arising out of the con- 1953 tract shall be referred to the arbitration of the officer G El t . sanctioning the con tract whose decision shall be final su::l~ 00~\" ~d. and binding.\" •\n\nv. ' It is obvious that these decisions could have no The State of relevance to the arbitration clause as drawn up in the Bihar. present case. If the nature of the claim is as we Mahajo.n J. have indicated above, it seems plain that it does not come within the scope of the submission.\n\nIn our judgment, therefore, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was right and the Judges of the High Court were in error in reversing it.\n\nIn the result the only course open to us is to allow the appeal with costs and to say that the plaintiff's claim is not within the scope of the submission and that the petition under section 34 was rightly dismissed by the Subordinate Judge.\n\nAgent for the appellants : Agent for the respondent :\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nRaj inder Narain.\n\nP. K. Chatterji.\n\nRIZWAN-UL-HASAN AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.]\n\nContempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 3-Proceedings before Sub-Divisional Magistrate-Application by respondents to District Magistrate containing allegations against trying Magistrate and the bona fides of the pending proceedings-Transmission of application to Sub-Divisional Magistrate for report-Whether amounts to contempt of Court-Question of prejudice .\n\n. The jurisdiction in contempt of court is not to be invoked unless tbere is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice.\n\nThe purport of the court's action is a practical purpose and the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety.\n\nDuring the pendency of pioceedings against A and B under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, in the court of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, A and B made an application to the District Magistrate alleging that the proceedings were not bona fide and\n\nFeb. 5.\n\n1953 containing statements in the nature of a countercharge. The 2nd appellant who was then officiating as the District l\\fagistrate sent Ril!!wan-ulthis application to the Sub-Divisional l\\iagistrate for report and Hasan on reeeiving a report from him' that A and B should be asked to and Anothl!r file a formal complaint before him, advised them to do so.\n\nA v. brother of A sent a similar petition to the District l\\Iagistrate\n\nTh~ State of containing also allegations against the trying \"Th-fagistrate.\n\nThe Uttar P1adesh. 1st appellant, who was the District Magistrate, forwarded them to the Sub-Divisional l\\1agistrate for report, itnd on receiving his 'report passed an order that he saw' no reason to withdraw the file from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The High Court of Allahabad held that as the applications contained allegations which might interfere with the course of tbe trial of the proceedings under s. 145, in transmitting the applications the appellants had acted without due circumspection and thought though they had no intention to influence the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the appellants were therefore guilty of contempt of court: Held, (i) that in transmitting the applications received by them to the Sub-Divisional l\\fagistrate and calling for a report the appellants were not in any way iiiterfering with the course of justice but were only doing their duty as superior officers.;\n\n(ii) it was not possible to hold that any prejudice had.been caused by the two applications being sent by the appellants to the Sub-Divisional l\\iagistrate or that any action was necessary to protect the Sub-Divisional I\\iagistrate who was hearing the case and the appellants were not guilty of any contempt of court.\n\nAnantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson([l931] I.L.R.58 Cal. 884) referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JurusDIOTION: Criminal Appeal No. 79of1952. Appeal by special leave from a Judgment and Order dated 16th April, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Dayal and Desai JJ.) in Criminal MiscellaneousNo.17 of 1950.\n\nK. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the appellants.\n\nN. G. Sen for the respondent.\n\n1953.\n\nFebruary 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 16th April, 195 l, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 17 of 1950.\n\nThe two appellants are members of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service.\n\nIn Marcb, 1950, appellant No. I (Rizwan-ul-Hasan) was posted as District Magistrate, Jalaun, and appellant No. 2, Mohammad Munawar, was posted as rJ.\n\nMagistrate in the same district, having officiated as .District Magistrate for some time in the early part of March, 1950.\n\nOn 2nd March, 1950, one Phundi Singh commenced proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of J alaun on the allegation that Kedarnath and Matadin were about to cut his standing crop by force and that there was an imminent danger of a breach of the peace.\n\nThe magistrate issued notices to the parties complained against and ordered -attachment of the standing crop.\n\nOn 4th March, 1950, one Shriram, brother of Kedarnath, filed a counter application before the court making certain allegations against one 'rhakur Pratap Singb, said to be the real person behind the proceedings commenced by Phundi Singh. Kedarnath and Matadin, the respondents in Phundi Singh's\n\napplication, also filed an application similar to that of Shriram before the District Magistrate on the same date. This application was accompanied by a recommendatory letter written to the District Magistrate by Lalla Ram Dwivedi, Secretary, District Congress Committee. It was received by the second appellant who was then officiating as District Magistrate and was sent by him to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun, in whose court Phundi Singh's application was pending, for report.\n\nThe Sub-Divisional Magistrate returned it with the remark that a proper comp la.int should be made in his court in the ordinary way on the allegations made in the application.\n\nThereupon the second appellant returned the application to Kedarnath and Matadin and advised them to move the Sub-Di vision al Magistrate ill a formal and proper manner.\n\nOn the application of Phundi Singh made before the High Court of Allahabad under section 3 of the\n\nRizwan-ul- Hasan and Another v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\n5s4 SUPREME cob:RT REPORTS [1953)\n\n1953 Contempt of Courts Act, the second appellant was\n\nRizwan-ulheld guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magis- Hasan trate on the following reasoning :-\n\nand Another ' \" Shri Mohammad M unawar opposite party No. 5\n\n7, h 8 ~· t 1 forwarded application given by the opposite parties utt:r p;.~; sh. Nos. 2 and 3 together with introductory letter-to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalann. We do not think Mahajan J. that he had any intention to influence the Sub-Divisional Magistrate with respect to his action in the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nBut intention is not of importance so far as the question of commission of contempt is concerned. He certainly acted without due circumspection and thought.\n\nIt must have been clear to him that the application contained expression which affected the due c.onsiderations of the points in dispute in the proceeding under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. He says in his affidavit and we can accept it that he sent this application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate just for taking action for the protection of opposite parties No. 2 and No. 3 and their crop about which an allegation was made that sollle action was to be taken by the other party the night following.\n\nHe should in the circumstances either pass an order for the police himself which he could have very well done, or he could have just conveyed a gist of the complaint necessitating protection of life and property immediately.\n\nHis conduct in transmitting the allegations made by the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 to the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun, in whose court the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was pending, did amount to the commission of contempt of that court.\"\n\nAs regards the first appellant, the facts are that on 22nd March an application was received by post in the office of the District Magistrate signed by Shriram containing allegations against the trying Magistrate.\n\nOn 25th March, 1950, this application was sent by the appellant for report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate with the following endorsement:-\n\n...\n\n\"S.D,0. Please look into these allegations and let 1953 me have a reporG.\" On 4th April, 1950, the Sub- Riewan-ul Divisional Magistrate submitted a report and the first Haean appellant having been satisfied that the allegation~ and Another were baseless passed the following order:- v. . d The State of \" I do not see any reason to with raw the case Uttar Pradesh. from your file.\" ' • On the application of Phundi Singh mentioned Mahajan J. above made before the High Court of Allaha, bad under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act this appellant a.long with others was also held guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's Court,\n\non the following reasoning :-\n\n\"Similarly transmission of the application sent by Shriram on the '25th' March to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, J alaun, amounted to commission of contempt of court by opposite party No. 6.\n\nThe mere fact that he had to take action in view of the allegations against the magistrate in that application would not affect this question.\n\nThe application contained, afil already stated, expressions showing that Phundi Singh was a history sheeter and that the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was fictitious and was instituted at the instance of Pratap Singh.\n\nHe should not have transmitted the entire application. He could have necessary extracts which related to the allegations against the magistrate sent to the court concerned in the circumstances when the applicants introduced matter irrelevant for transfer application. It may also be mentioned here that the application could be treated as a transfer application . though no such request was made in that application.\n\nJ;'he application was neither properly presented nor was it accompanied by an affidavit nor was it stamped.\n\nThe a.pplicant wanted some action for the protection of his crop from bad characters.\" Having found both the appellants guilty of contempt of court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun, the High Court took no action a.gainst them because they happened to commit contempt of court rather due to their ca.relessness a.nd la.ck of vigilance\n\nthan with any 'deliberate ii; i.tention to commit it. It was observed that officers who have to transmit com- Rizwan-ul-\n\nHasan munications to conrts of justice should be vigilant\n\nand Another <tnd careful to see that nothing is transmitted which can have any effect, even remotely on, the merits of The St, te of a case.\n\nUttar Pfadesh.\n\nIn our judgment, the proceedings for contempt of Mahajan J. court against the two appellants on the facts stated are misconceived and have to be quashed.\n\nBoth the appellants were superior officers of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate at the time when they sent the applications of Kedarnath and Matadin for report.\n\nThey were under a duty to supervise his work. It is difficult to see how by transmitting the applications received by them to him, an~ asking him for his views they were in any way interfering with the course of justice and were committing contempt of his court.· Their action cannot be characteriioed as having a tendency to interfere with the course of justice.\n\nThe applications were transmitted to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the usual and normal course of the official practice and we 'cannot subscribe to the view of the High Court that only extracts of these applications should.have been sent to him for his views and not the applications as such as they contained material which had a tendency to interfere with the course of justice.\n\nThe second appellant, when he was officiating a.s\n\nDisrict .Magistrate, received the application of Kedarnath and Matadin with a letter of recommendation from the Secretary of the Congress Committee.\n\nThis application was in the nature of a counter complaint, and the appellant acted propedy in sending it to the magistrate who was seised of the original application. He was under no duty to censor it and to cut it into pieces and then forward the relevant parts only to the magistrate.\n\nThe recommendatory letter was an annexure to the application and it had to go with it. The conduct of the Secretary of the\n\nCongress Committee in writing a recommendatory letter a.l/911t the fa.cts of the ca.se to the District\n\nI Magistrate was undoubtedly a coclmunication for 1953 the purpose of influencing his decision and was Rizwan-ulrightly reprobated by the High Court. Such a, course Hasan is calcula, ted, if tolerated, to divert the course of and Another justice and ought more frequently than it is, to be v. treated as what it really is, namely, a high contempt The State of of court. 'rhe Congress Secretary has been rightly Uttar Pradesh. held guilty of contempt and punished. He has not Mahajan J. come to this Court and we are no longer concerned with him.\n\nBut we are unable t, o find how the conduct of the appellant in sending the application which, as we have already stated, was in the nature of counter charge to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who was seiJ; ed of the original complaint in any way amounted to contempt of court.\n\nThere are three different sorts of contempts known to law in such matters.\n\nOne kind of contempt i\" scandalizing the court itself. There may likewioe be a contempt of the court in abusing parties who are concerned in ca.uses in that court. There may also be a contempt of court in prejudicing mankind against persons before the cause is heard. The act of the appellant could not fall in either of these three categories.\n\nSo far as the first appellant is concerned, under the provisions of section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, .he had authority to withdraw the case under section 145 of the Code pending in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.\n\nOn the application of 22nd March made by Kedarnath and Matadin containing allegations against the Sub-Divisional Magistrate he was entitled to use his powers under that section if the allegations contained therein were substantiated. It is usual to send such applications to the court concerned for its remarks and that is precisely what he did, and as soon as the :remarks we1re received and he was satisfied that the allegations we:re baseless, he declined to withdraw the case. We have not been able to see how such an action on the part of the District Magistrate, done in the normal and usual course of the discharge of his duties as sueh magistrate, could be held to interfere with the 76\n\nSUPREME OOURT RE.PORTS [1953]\n\n1959 course of adnilnistration of justice or to create pre-\n\nRizwan-uljudice of any kind against the complainant in the Hasan proceedings under section 145 of the Code of and Another Criminal Procedure. '!.'here is nothing in section 528\n\nv. of the Criminal Procedure Code which disables a The State 01 magistrate from taking action unless he is set in Uttar Praesh. motion by the petition of one of the parties and\n\nMahajan J. nothing in the Code prevents any person from bringing facts to the notice of the District Magistrate which might suggest to that magistrate that it was advisable to see whether the magistrate should remain in charge of a particular case.\n\nIn our judgment, therefore, the High Court was in erro1 in thinking that the two appellants acted without due circumspection and thought and were guilty of contempt of the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.\n\nWe are further of the opinion that it was not possible to hold on those facts that any prejudice arose in the case by these two applications being sent by the appellants to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or that any action was necessary for the protection of the tribunal which was engaged in hearing the case nuder section 145, Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nAs observed by Rankin C.J. in Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson('), the jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice and that the purpose of the court's action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably clear on the authorities that the court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety.\n\nThe result is that we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court against the two appellants and acquit them of the charge under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: S. Subramanian.\n\nAgent for the respondent: 0. P. Lal.\n\n(1} (1931) 58 Cal, 884 at 895.\n\n'.I", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 874, "end_char": 884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raj inder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1006, "end_char": 1022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj inder Narain."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1025, "end_char": 1040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterji."}}, {"text": "RIZWAN-UL-HASAN AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1043, "end_char": 1070, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RIZWAN-UL-HASAN AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1072, "end_char": 1099, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1103, "end_char": 1121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1136, "end_char": 1158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1174, "end_char": 1178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1875, "end_char": 1881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1883, "end_char": 1906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar P1adesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Uttar P1adesh.", "canonical_name": "Uttar P1adesh"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2838, "end_char": 2861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Allahabad held that as the applications contained allegations which might interfere with the course of tbe trial of the proceedings under s. 145, in transmitting the applications the appellants had acted without due circumspection and thought though they had no intention to influence the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the appellants were therefore guilty of contempt of court: Held, (i) that in transmitting the applications received by them to the Sub-Divisional l\\fagistrate and calling for a report the appellants were not in any way iiiterfering with the course of justice but were only doing their duty as superior officers.;"}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2990, "end_char": 2996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4028, "end_char": 4065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from a Judgment and Order dated 16th April, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Dayal and Desai JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4067, "end_char": 4072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from a Judgment and Order dated 16th April, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Dayal and Desai JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4077, "end_char": 4082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from a Judgment and Order dated 16th April, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Dayal and Desai JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4129, "end_char": 4155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4157, "end_char": 4170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "N. G. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4203, "end_char": 4212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. G. Sen for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 16th April, 195 l, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "I (Rizwan-ul-Hasan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4579, "end_char": 4597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I (Rizwan-ul-Hasan) was posted as District Magistrate, Jalaun, and appellant No."}}, {"text": "Mohammad Munawar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4663, "end_char": 4679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Mohammad Munawar, was posted as rJ.\n\nMagistrate in the same district, having officiated as .District Magistrate for some time in the early part of March, 1950."}}, {"text": "2nd March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4827, "end_char": 4842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2nd March, 1950, one Phundi Singh commenced proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of J alaun on the allegation that Kedarnath and Matadin were about to cut his standing crop by force and that there was an imminent danger of a breach of the peace."}}, {"text": "Phundi Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4848, "end_char": 4860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2nd March, 1950, one Phundi Singh commenced proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of J alaun on the allegation that Kedarnath and Matadin were about to cut his standing crop by force and that there was an imminent danger of a breach of the peace.", "canonical_name": "Phundi Singh"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4889, "end_char": 4900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4908, "end_char": 4934, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate of J alaun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2nd March, 1950, one Phundi Singh commenced proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of J alaun on the allegation that Kedarnath and Matadin were about to cut his standing crop by force and that there was an imminent danger of a breach of the peace."}}, {"text": "Kedarnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5015, "end_char": 5024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2nd March, 1950, one Phundi Singh commenced proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of J alaun on the allegation that Kedarnath and Matadin were about to cut his standing crop by force and that there was an imminent danger of a breach of the peace."}}, {"text": "Matadin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5029, "end_char": 5036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2nd March, 1950, one Phundi Singh commenced proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of J alaun on the allegation that Kedarnath and Matadin were about to cut his standing crop by force and that there was an imminent danger of a breach of the peace."}}, {"text": "4th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5261, "end_char": 5276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 4th March, 1950, one Shriram, brother of Kedarnath, filed a counter application before the court making certain allegations against one 'rhakur Pratap Singb, said to be the real person behind the proceedings commenced by Phundi Singh."}}, {"text": "Shriram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5282, "end_char": 5289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 4th March, 1950, one Shriram, brother of Kedarnath, filed a counter application before the court making certain allegations against one 'rhakur Pratap Singb, said to be the real person behind the proceedings commenced by Phundi Singh."}}, {"text": "rhakur Pratap Singb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5398, "end_char": 5417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 4th March, 1950, one Shriram, brother of Kedarnath, filed a counter application before the court making certain allegations against one 'rhakur Pratap Singb, said to be the real person behind the proceedings commenced by Phundi Singh."}}, {"text": "Lalla Ram Dwivedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5767, "end_char": 5784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was accompanied by a recommendatory letter written to the District Magistrate by Lalla Ram Dwivedi, Secretary, District Congress Committee."}}, {"text": "District Congress Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5797, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was accompanied by a recommendatory letter written to the District Magistrate by Lalla Ram Dwivedi, Secretary, District Congress Committee."}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5941, "end_char": 5974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was received by the second appellant who was then officiating as District Magistrate and was sent by him to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun, in whose court Phundi Singh's application was pending, for report."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6473, "end_char": 6482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6604, "end_char": 6626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not think Mahajan J. that he had any intention to influence the Sub-Divisional Magistrate with respect to his action in the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7132, "end_char": 7143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "statute": "Contempt of Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7145, "end_char": 7168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7490, "end_char": 7501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7503, "end_char": 7526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8160, "end_char": 8194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 3 to the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun, in whose court the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was pending, did amount to the commission of contempt of that court.\""}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8226, "end_char": 8237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8239, "end_char": 8262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8553, "end_char": 8569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th March, 1950, this application was sent by the appellant for report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate with the following endorsement:-\n\n...\n\n\"S.D,0."}}, {"text": "4th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8775, "end_char": 8790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Please look into these allegations and let 1953 me have a reporG.\" On 4th April, 1950, the Sub- Riewan-ul Divisional Magistrate submitted a report and the first Haean appellant having been satisfied that the allegation~ and Another were baseless passed the following order:- v. ."}}, {"text": "Sub- Riewan-ul Divisional Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8796, "end_char": 8832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Please look into these allegations and let 1953 me have a reporG.\" On 4th April, 1950, the Sub- Riewan-ul Divisional Magistrate submitted a report and the first Haean appellant having been satisfied that the allegation~ and Another were baseless passed the following order:- v. ."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9047, "end_char": 9060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d The State of \" I do not see any reason to with raw the case Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Phundi Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9105, "end_char": 9117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of Phundi Singh mentioned Mahajan J. above made before the High Court of Allaha, bad under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act this appellant a.long with others was also held guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's Court,\n\non the following reasoning :-\n\n\"Similarly transmission of the application sent by Shriram on the '25th' March to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, J alaun, amounted to commission of contempt of court by opposite party No.", "canonical_name": "Phundi Singh"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allaha", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9161, "end_char": 9181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of Phundi Singh mentioned Mahajan J. above made before the High Court of Allaha, bad under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act this appellant a.long with others was also held guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's Court,\n\non the following reasoning :-\n\n\"Similarly transmission of the application sent by Shriram on the '25th' March to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, J alaun, amounted to commission of contempt of court by opposite party No."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9193, "end_char": 9202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9210, "end_char": 9232, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9842, "end_char": 9853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9855, "end_char": 9878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pratap Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9933, "end_char": 9945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application contained, afil already stated, expressions showing that Phundi Singh was a history sheeter and that the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was fictitious and was instituted at the instance of Pratap Singh."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pfadesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11141, "end_char": 11154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uttar Pfadesh.", "canonical_name": "Uttar P1adesh"}}, {"text": "section 528", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14251, "end_char": 14262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14270, "end_char": 14296, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14343, "end_char": 14354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15294, "end_char": 15305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 528", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15376, "end_char": 15387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16345, "end_char": 16356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16358, "end_char": 16381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rankin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16399, "end_char": 16405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Rankin C.J. in Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson('), the jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice and that the purpose of the court's action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably clear on the authorities that the court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16964, "end_char": 16973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16981, "end_char": 17003, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. Subramanian", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17048, "end_char": 17062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: S. Subramanian."}}, {"text": "P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17094, "end_char": 17100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Lal."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_589_644_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "' •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS , 589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI\n\nTHE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS\n\n(and other cases)\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE and GHULAM\n\nHASAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, arts. 13, 14, 21-Special Tribunal Regulation (V of 1358-F, Hyderabad)-Trial under Regulation commenced before 26th January, 1950-Trial continued after that date-Validity of conviction-Regulation, whether discriminatory and void-Question whether discriminatory provisions were applied in fact after 26th January, whether relevant.\n\nThe Military Governor of the Hyderabad State promulgated on October 30, 1948, a Regulation called the Special Tribunal Regulation, V of 1358 Fasli, under which a Special Tribunal was constituted consisting of three members appointed by the Military Governor.\n\nThe Regulation provided that the Military Governor may, by general or special order, direct that any offence or class of offences should be tried by such Tribunal, and the procedure for trial laid down in the Regulation differed from the provisions of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code in the following material particulars among others, viz., the Tribunal had power to take cognisance of offences without committal, there was no provision for trial with jury or assessors, the language of the Tribunal was to be English, only a memorandum of the evidence need be taken, there was no provision for de novo trial on change of personnel, and there was no provision for transfer, revision or confirmation of sentences. The cases against the petitioners, who were charged with rioting, dacoity, arson and other offences, wern• directed to be tried by the Special Tribunal on' October 6, 1949.\n\nThe accused were convicted in September, 1950, and the conviction on some of the charges was upheld by the High Court on appeal in April, 1951.\n\nThe accused appealed to the Supreme Court and also applied under art. 32 of the Constitution of India for quashing the orders of the High Court and the Special Tribunal on the ground that the Special Tribunal Regulation became void on the 26th January, 1950, as its provisions contravened articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution which came into force on that date, and the continuation of the trial and conviction of the petitioners after that date was illegal: Held, per PATANJALISASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR JJ. (BOSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ. dissenting). (i) Article 13 of the Constitution had no retrospective effect and, even\n\nJan. 19.\n\nSyed Q,;, si1n\n\nR11zvi\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and OthtJrs.\n\nthough some of the provisions of the impugned Regulation contravened art. 14, the Regulation must he held to be valid for all past transactions and for enforcing rights and liabilities accrued before the advent of the Constitution, and on this principle the order made by the Military Governor referring the cases to the\n\nSpcial Tribunal cannot be impeached, and the Special Tribunal must be deemed to have taken cognisance of the cases properly and its proceedings up to the date of the coming in of the Constitution must be regarded as valid.\n\n(ii) In a case like this where part of the trial could not be challenged as bad, it is incumbent on the court to consider, first, ¥vhether the discriminatory provisions of law could be separated from the rest and even without them a fair measure of equality in the matter of procedure could be secured to the accused and secondly, whether the procedure actually followed did or did not proceed upon the discriminatory provisions. A mere threat or possibility of unequal treatment is not sufficient to invalidate the subsequent proceedings.\n\n(iii) On the facts the accused had substantially the benefit of a normal trial, though there wer6 deviations in ce:rtain particulars and the conviction of the petitioners could not be set aside merely because the Constitution of India came into force before the completion of their trial.\n\nBOSE J.-(i) Under Art. 13 (1) of the Constitution atrial cannot be legally continued after the Constitution on the basis of a law which offends the fundamental provisions of the Constitution and therefore wbich1 though good when made, would have been bad if it had been passed after the Constitution, because the most vital part of a trial is its conclusion and therefore a conviction after the Constitution based on matter, or as a result of procedure, which is abhorrent to the Constitution would be bad.\n\nThis is not giving retrospective effect to the Constitution because the conviction in such a case is after the Constitution and would be based on matter which offends its £unB.amental guarantees.\n\n(ii) In testing the validity of a law it is irrelevant to consider what has been done under it, for a law is either constitutional or not and its validity or otherwise cannot depend on what\n\nhas been accomplished under its provisions.\n\n(iii) The provisions of the Special Tribunal Regulation which confer an unfettered discretion on the l\\1ilitary Governor to direct any case or cases to the Tribunal without laying down any basis for classification of the cases, the absence of committal Proceedings, the depr\"ivation of the rights of revision and transfer and of the right to a de nova trial, the right of the Tribunal to adopt a summary procedure, and in particular the elimination of the Urudu language which is the Court language of Hyderabad and of the right to have sentences confirmed, are all discriminatory provisions; most of these provisions cannot he separa; e4 fro~ th~\n\n' ..\n\n. ..\n\ngood portions of the Regulation. The whole Regulation therefore became void on the 26th of Ja.nuary, 1950, and the trial of the petitioners after that date was under a void law; there was also discrimination in fact after the 26th January as the proceedings were conducted in English even after that date. The conviciion of the petitioners was consequently illegal.\n\nGHULAM HASAN J.-The discriminatory provisions of the Regulation stood in the way of the petitioners even after the 26th J auuary, 1950, and prevented them from exercising their right to apply for bail, for transfer or for revision and this was quite sufficient for holding that the Regulation violated art. 14 and was therefore void under art. 13. The question whether the discriminatory provisions were in fact applied to the petitioners' cases after the 26th January, 1950, was irrelevant. The discriminatory provisions are not severable from the rest of the Regulation and the tria~ held under the Regulation was therefore void under art. 13 read with arts. 14 and 21 and the conviction of the petitioners was illegal.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal ([1952) S.O.R. 284), Lachmandas Kewalram Ah1ija v. The State of Bombay ([1952] S.O.R. 710) explained and dittinguished.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION.\n\nPetitions Nos. 172 and 368 of 1952 under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Cases Nos. 276, 277, 278, '279 and 280 of 1951, being appeals under Arts. 132 (1) and 134 of the Constitution from the Judgment and Order of the 13th April, 1951, of the Hyderabad High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1449 and 1453 of 1950 were also heard along with these petitions.\n\nA. A. Peerbhoy and J. B. Dadachanji for the petitioners-appellants.\n\nV. Rajaram Iyer, Advocate-General of Hyderabad (K.S.R. Chari, with him) for the respondent (State of Hyderabad).\n\n1953.\n\nJanuary 19. 'l'he Judgment of Patanjali Sastri O. J. and Mukherjea and Ohaudrasekhara Aiyar JJ. was delivered by Mukherjea J. Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ. delivered separate judgments. (Petition No. 172 of 1952 and Case No. 276 of 1951).\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-Syed Qasim Razvi, the appellant in this appeal, was one of the accused in what i~ .\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nTh~ State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nknown as the Bibinagar dacoity case which took place within the State of Hyderabad and in which, according to the prosecution, a serious raid was committed by a party of armed Razakars in village Bibinat:ar, about 21 miles from. the city of Hyderabad, attended with robbery, looting, arson, assault and other violent acts on the afternoon of 10th January, 1948.\n\nThe First Information Report was lodged pn the day following, but the police administration of the State of Hyderabad was at that time under the complete control of the Razakars and they tried to minimise the gravity of the occurrence as far as possible and there was neither any proper police investigation nor any serious attempt to arrest the culprits or bring them to trial. It was on the 28th of August, 1949, that is to say, after a lapse of 19 months after the occurrence, that a charge-sheet was presented before the Special Tribunal No. 4 at Trimulgherry, Secunderabad, against the appellant and six other persons. The Tribunal was constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Specal Tribunal Regulation (Regulation V of 1358F) and as provided fo\"r in section 2 of the Regulation, it consisted of three members appointed by the Military Governor. Under\n\nsection 3 of the Regulation,.it was competent to tile Military Governor by general or special order to direct that any offence or class of offences should be tried by such tribunal and the procedure to be followed by such tribunal was laid down in section 4 of the Regulation. The case against the appellant and his co-accused was formally referred to the Special Tribunal by an order of the Military Governor dated the 6th of October, 1949; but as the charge-sheet had been submitted on a previous date, anoth.er order was passed on 8th of October, 1949, validating the presentation of the charge-sheet.\n\nThe trial commenced before the Special Tribunal on 24th October, 1949, and on that day the Special Public Prosecutor opened the case on behalf of the prosecution.\n\nThe procedure followed in the case was the warrant procedure and the prosecution examined 40 witnesses in\n\nall before closing its case.\n\nThe examination-in-chief of all these witnesees was finished on the 21st November, 1949, and the appellant, at that stage, chose to cross-examine only one witness, namely, the fortieth or the last one and this was done on the 22nd N oveinber, 1949.\n\nOn 29th November, 1949, the accused was examined under section 273 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code which corresponds to section 342 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, and on the 5th of December following, charges were framed against him under sections 123, 124, 330 and 177 read with section 66 of the Hyderabad Penal Code.\n\nThe cross-examination of 18 prosecution witnesses was finished before the 26th of January, 1950, and the rest of the witnesses were cross-examined after that date. The accused was examined again on 26th February, 1950.\n\nBy their judgment dated the 11th September, 1950, the Special Tribunal convicted the appellant on all the charges mentioned above and sentenced him to 2 years' rigorous imprisonment under each of the sections 123, 124 and 177 read with section 66 and to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment under section 330, the sentences to run concurrently.\n\nThere was an appeal taken by the appellant against this decision to the High Court of Hyderabad. The High Court by its judgment dated the 13th of April, 1951, allowed the appeal to this extent only, namely, that it acquitted the accused of the charge under section 123 of the Hyderabad Code, but otherwise dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the Special Tribunal.\n\nOn 6th of August, 1951, the High Court gave leave to the accused to appeal to this court under aricles 132 and 134 of the Constitution; and an appeal has been filed in pursuance of this certificate. The records of the appeal have not been printed as yet, but in the mean time the appellant presented an application under article 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the orders of the High Court as well as of the Special Tribunal\n\nSyed Qasini\n\nRazvi\n\nv, The Stote of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nSyed Qasim Razvi v.\n\nThe State of Ifyderabad and Others.\n\nMukhCrjea J.\n\n. \\ 594\n\nSUPREME COURT REPQRTS tl953j\n\nreferred to above and for releasing him on the ground that the proceedings before the Special Tribunal became void after 26th of January, 1950, as they co, nflicted with the provisions of articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.\n\nAs the trial became bad in law a.fter 26th Jannary, 1950, the resulting conviction and sentence were, it is said, illegal also, and the appellant is entitled to be released from his imprisonment.\n\nWhen this petition came up for hearing, a question was raised by the learned Advocate-General for the\n\nState of Hyderabad as to whether a petition under article 32 wonld be the proper remedy in a case like this having regard to the fact that the High Court, which was a properly constituted court and was competent to go into the question of jurisdiction of the Special 'fribunal, had already dealt with this matter.\n\nWithout expressing any opinion on this point, we decided to hear arguments on the questions raised treating them as preliminary points in the appeal itself.\n\nWhether the appeal will be heard further on its merits will depend upon the decision we arrive at in the present hearing.\n\n'l'he contention of Mr. Peerbhoy, who appeared in support of the appeal, mainly is that the procedure laid down in the Special Tribunal Regulation for trial of offences departs, in material particulars, from that under the ordinary law obtaining in Hyderabad and these differences do abridge the rights of the accused and deprive them of benefits to which otherwise they would have been entitled under the general law.\n\nPrirna facie, therefore, the procedure for trial under the Special Tribunal Regulation is discriminatory. It is urged that this discrimination could not be justified on any reasonable principle of classification. No attempt was made in the Regulation to classify the offences either with regard to their nature or the area in which they were committed.\n\nAn unfettered discretion was left to the Military Governor to refer any and every case as he liked to be tried by the Special 'fribnnal without any rule or principle to\n\n...\n\n-\\_\n\nguide his discretion.\n\nThe whole procedure, therefore, was void according to the principles laid down by this court in the case of Anwar Ali Sarkar\n\nv. The State of West Bengal(1). It is true that in this case the Constitution had not come irito force when. the trial was commenced and a portion of the trial had already been gone through prior to the 26th of January, 1950; but it is urged that as the continuance of the procedure became void on and from the date of the Constitution, the conviction and sentence resu !ting from the adoption of such procedure could not be upheld. In this connection, reliance bas been placed upon the case of Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay( 2 ) decided by this court which the learned counsel contends exactly covers the present point.\n\nThe questions raised are uni:J.oubtedly important and they involve an examination of some of the earlier , pronouncements of this court.\n\nThe first question that requires consideration is as to whether the procedure for trial of criminal offences laid down in the Special Tribunal Regulation is discriminatory in its character and offends against the provision of article 14 of the Constibution? If it is found that some of the provisions at least are discriminatory, the question would then arise as to what exactly is the legal position in a case like this where admittedly a considerable portion of the trial was gone through prior to the coming into force of the Constitution and that portion is immune from challenge on the ground of discrimination, as the rights guaranteed under the Constitution are not retrospective in their operation. If the procedure subsequently followed was also discriminatory, it is not disputed that the conviction of the accused could not stand. But if it is found that there was no occasion after the 26th of January, 1950, to apply any of the provisions of the Regulation which are discriminatory in their character and if as a matter of fact the procedure that was actually followed was substantially\n\n(r) r952j S.C.R. 284.\n\n(2) [r952] S.C, R, (ro, .\n\nSyed Qasim Razvi v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nSyed Qasim Razv_i v The State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nMukherjaa J.\n\n596 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS (1953]\n\nthe same as obtains under the ordinary law, could it be said that the whole trial is vitiated and the result-.\n\ning conviction and sentence must necessarily be set aside?\n\n°Looking first of all to. the provisions of the Special Tribunal Hegulation, it is to be noticed that the preamble to the Hegulation does not specify the object of the enactment or the legislative policy behind it.\n\nApparently an unfettered discretion has been vested in the Military Governor and he can send any offence or class of offences to be tried by the Special Tribunal in any way he likes and there is no objective expressly stated in the statute itself in relation to which his discretion is to be guided or controlled. It is indeed a matter of common knowledge that this Hegulation was promulgated just after the termination of the police action i.n Hyderabad when a most alarming and unsettled state of affairs prevailed in the State. There was undoubtedly ample justification for a special measure like this; but the question still arises whether there are provisions iu the Regulation, which being repugnant to the fundamental rights enunciated in the Constitution, could not be enforced after the Constitution came into force? The provisions in the Regulation were undoubtedly intended to shorten criminal trials and constitute special courts which would be left in entire charge of the cases referred to them, leaving the ordinary courts to do their normal work. Under section 6 of the Hegulation, a Special Tribunal has been given all the powers which are conferred on a court of session by the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nSection 4(1) provides that it can take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to it for trial; and under sub-section (7) of this section, the tribunal is enjoined to follow the procedure prescribed for summary trials by Magistrates, though it may, when it considers proper, follow the warrant procedure. It is open to the 8pecial Tribunal to direct that the proceedings before it should be conducted in the English language.\n\nThe Tribun1>l is not bonni\\ tQ\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'fS 597\n\ntake down evidence at length in writing and it need only cause a memorandum of the substance of what each witness deposes to be taken down in English.\n\nBut here again if it considers proper, it can direct that the entire evidence should be taken d€>wn.\n\nAmong other changes, the Regulation provides that the tribunal would not be bound to adjourn any trial for any purpose, there would be no de nova trial if there is a change in its personnel, it can try any accused person in his absence if it is satisfied that the absence has been brought about by the accused himself with a view to impede the course of justice, and if it considers proper, it can exclude the public from any proceeding.\n\nSection 7 provides that the tribunal can pass any sentence authorised by law and an appeal would lie against its orders to the High Court in the same way as orders of the Sessions Court would be appealable under the provisions of the Hydernbad Criminal Procedure Code. The powers of revision and transfer are wholly taken away and so also are the provisions relating to confirmation of sentences.\n\nThese, in brief, are the features of the procedure laid dcfwn for trial before the Special Tribunal.\n\nIt is admitte~ that at present no system of jury trial obtains in the State of Hyderabad; there is no doubt the provision for trial with the aid of assessors in the city of Hyderabad itself. but there is no such provision for areas outside the city.\n\nUnder the ordinary procedure, the present case could not have been tried with the aid of assessors and the appellant cannot complain of inequality in this respect .• The committal proceedings are undoubtedly eliminated )Jut it has been brought to our notice by the learned\n\nAdvocate-General appearing for the State of Hyderabad that the preliminary enquiry before committal is not compulsory under the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code; and under section 267-A of. the Code, a Magistrate is competent without recording any evidence, or after recording some portion of the evidence, to commit an accused for trial by the\n\nSyed Qasim Razvi v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nMitkherjea J.\n\n19~3\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRaz vi v.\n\nThe State of.\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nMukherjea. J.\n\nSessions Court if he is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for such committal. It appears therefore that the elimination of the committal proceeding is not by itself a substantial departure from the norrf!al procedure.\n\nMr. Peerbhoy laid much stress upon the provision of the Regulation which authorises the tribunal to direct that the proceedings before it shall be conducted in the English language. This again cannot be held to be discriminatory as the Hyderabad Code nowhere prescribes any particular language to be the language of the court.\n\nThere is no doubt that ordinary court proceedings in Hyderabad are conducted in Urdu, but Urdu is certainly not the spoken language of even the majority of the people within the Hyderabad State .. If the accused in a particular case is not acquainted with the English language and if by reason of the absence of adequate arrangements to have the proceedings interpreted to him in the language he understands, he is prejudiced in his trial, obviously it might be a ground which may be raised en his behalf in an appeal against his conviction.\n\nBut in our opinion it cannot be said that the provision in the Regulation relating to proceeding being conducted in .English if the tribunal so desires per se violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.\n\nThe power of granting adjournment rests, even under ordinMy law. in the exercise of a sound discretion by the court and is not a matter of much consequenoe.\n\nThe court can also under the ordinary law exclude members of the public or particular persons from the court room in such circumstances as it considers proper (vide section '283 of the Hyderabad Code). As regards denovo trial, when there is a change in the personnel of the court, the provision of section 350 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code is to the effect that when a case after being heard in part goes for disposal before another Magistrate, the accused has the right to demand, before the second Magistrate commences the proceedings, that he witnesses\n\nalready examined should be re-examined and reheard.\n\nUnder the corresponding section (section 281) of the Hyderabad Code, however, though the accused can demand re-exammation of the witnes:ies, the Magistrate can disallow such prayer if he considers pr'oper, although the disallowing of such prayer may be a\n\nground for ordering a retrial by the High Court.\n\nObviously, the provision in the Special Regulation deviates only to this extent from the ordinary procedure.\n\nThe continuance of a trial in the abJence of the accused when the court is satisfied that the absence has been brought about by the accused himself to impede the course of justie, is another special feature of the trial before the Special Tribunal. Th, e two material departures from the normal procedure are to be found in the provisions contained in subsections (2) and (7) of section 4 of the Regulation.\n\nSub-section (2) authorises the tribunal to dispense with recording the evidence in extenso and provides that a record of the memorandum Df the substance of the deposition of each witness would be sufficient.\n\nThere is a. proviso introduced by sub-section (2) (a) which says that the above provision shall not preclude a special Tribunal from directing in respect of any trial that the evidence should be taken down at length.\n\nSub-section (7) lays down that unles something to the contrary has been provided for in the llegulation, the tribunal should follow the procedure of summary trial, though even here it can adopt the warrant procedure for reasons which it has got to record in writing. .\n\nThe provision relating to summary trial irrespective of the nature of the offence and also that relating to recording of evidence in a summary manner may be considered prejudicial to the accused and may norma.lly deprive him of benefits which are enjoyed by other persons similarly situated who are tried under the ordinary law.\n\nOne thing noticeable in the Special .Regulation with regard to these provisions is that an option has been given to the Special Tribu- 11al to adopt the warrant procedure in such cases as\n\nSyed Qllsim\n\nRazvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHydernbnd llnd Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nSyed Qasim_\n\nRaz vi v, The State of\n\nHyderabrld and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n.it considers necessary and it can also direct that the evidence should be taken down in extenso.\n\nIn the case before us it is admitted that evidence was recorded in full and the procedure followed was the warrant and \"not the summary procedure.\n\nMr. Peerbhoy argues that a law, which allows the summary procedure to be followed or the recording of evidence to be dispensed with at the discretion of the court without any attempt to specify the .class of cases where such exceptional provisions should be applied, is prima facie discriminatory and is invalid under article 14 of the Constitution irrespective of the fact as to . whether or not such provisions were actually applied\n\nip a particular case.\n\nWhatever may be the position where provisions of this character are laid down in a\n\nstatute enacted after the Ccmstitution came into force, in a case like the present, where the proceedings prior to 26th January, 1950, would have to be assumed to be valid, the question as to what procedure was actually followed after that date may be relevant for the purpose of determining whether the trial could be regarded as vitiated on the ground of infringement of the equal protection rule.\n\nWe will have to deal with this matter more fully later on.\n\nMr. Peerbhoy argues that even the substitution of warrant procedure for sessions procedure constitutes a substantial difference. We cannot accept this contention as sound. If we leave out the committal proceeding, which is not compulsory under the Hyderabad law, the accused could not be in a really worse position by reason of the warrant procedure being followed instead of the sessions procedure. In the case before us it appears that the prosecution had examined all their witnesses before the framing of the charge and the accused was given an opportunity to cross-examine them at that stage.\n\nHe chose to cross-examine only one of these witnesses and after the framing of the charge all the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined by him. Our a.ttention has been drawn to the provision of section 267-A (2)\n\n(b) of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code which\n\nS.C.R. stJPRE1ME1 cotJRT REPORTS 601\n\nspeaks of recross-examination by the accused in a sessions case. It appears that under the provisions of the Hyderabad Code, in a sessions trial the prosecution witnesses are first examined and as soon as the examination-in-chief of each one of them is finished they cou Id be cross-examined on behalf of the accused.\n\nAfter the prosecution has closed its case and before the acc,µsed produces his defence witnesses, he is allowed to recross-examine, if he so desires, any of the prosecution witnesses, though such recross-examination is limited to matters which were not put to the witnesses in the previous cross-examination. Neither side cou_ld enlighten us on the point as to whether this is allowed only when the committing Magistrate does not examne any witness before the commitment order or it is applicable also when the prosecution witnesses are examined and cross-examined at the committal stage. We do not think, however, that it is correct to say that during the sessions trial itself there are three rights of cross-exmination given to the accused as Mr. Peerbhoy contends. The accused can crossexamine the prosecution witnesses as and when they are examined by the prosecution and he has a right of second cross-examination at the end of the prosecution case and before he calls his own witnesses, though the l{l, tter right is a thin and attenuated one, being confined to such matters as were omitted during the first cross-examination.\n\nIn the warrant procedure which has been followed in the present case, the accused also got two rights of cross-examination, one before the framing of the charge and the second after the charge was framed. In our opinion, this cannot be said to be a substantial difference in the procedure resulting in prejudice to the accused.\n\nMr .. Peerbhoy further argued that the provision for appeal contained in the RegulatiQn deprived him of the right of second appeal which is allowed under the Hyderabad Code. This argument, in our opinion, is based upon a misconception. It appears from secti9n 355 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code that there are second appeals allowed under the\n\n.Syed Qasim\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Other&.\n\nMukhsrjoa J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi v. , The State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nMukhsrjea J.\n\nHyderabad law even in criminal cases; and when it is said that an appeal lies to the High Court from the order of a Sessions Judge, it contemplates that the order of the Sessions Judge may be passed by him tiither as au original court or in appeal from the decision of a District Magistrate or Assistant Sessions Judge. But in the present case the original trial was by the Special Tribunal which was invested with the powers of a sessions court and consequently only one appeal would lie to the High Court. It is said that the case could have been tried .by the District Magistrate and in that case the accused could have one appeal to the Sessions Judge and a second one to the High Court under the Hyderabad law. 'I'his contention rests on a pure speculation and is hardly tenable. One of the charges against the accused was a charge of dacoity under section 330 of the Hyderabad Penal Code.\n\nOn a conviction under this section the court is empowered to sentence the accused to a term of rigorous imprisonment which may extend up to 10 years.\n\nUnless, therefore, the District Ma11is- • • 0 trate was of the opm10n that the case did not merit a sentence beyond 4 years of rigorous imprisonment, he was bound to refer the case to be tried by a court of session.\n\nThis is not a matter of which really any\n\nrievance could be made.\n\nThe other departure noticeable in the Special Regulation is the withdrawal of the provisions relating to revision and transfer. Another thing that has been omitted from the Special Tribunal Regulation is the provision relating to the confirmation of certain sentences which under the ordinary law have to be confirmed by higher authorities. According to the Hyderabad Code, the High Court has not only to confirm death sentences, but also sentences of transportation for lifll and of imprisonment for a period exceeding 10 years.\n\nThe death sentences have got to be further confirmed by the Nizam.\n\nIt would appear from what has been stated above that there are a few provisions in the procedure for trial by a Special Tribunal appointed under the\n\nRegulation mentioned above, which differ from ordinary procedure, and they are prima facie prejudicial to the accused. Under article 13 (1) of the Constitution, all laws in force iu the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution in so far as they are inconsistent with the fundamental rights under Part III of the Cou.titution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.\n\nThe argument of Mr. Peerbhoy seems to be that it may be that all the provisions relating to trial by a Special\n\nTribunal are not bad, but as some of them undoubtedly are, the whole law on the face of it is discriminatory and must be held to be void as conflicting with the equal protection clause, and the question as to how it was actually worked out iu a particular case is not a material fact for consideration at all. In support of this contention the learned counsel relies upon the view accepted by the majority of this court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar('). In our opinion, the position here is materially different from that iu Anwar Ali Sarkar's case('). Iu Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (') the opinion expressed by the majority of this court was that section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act was ultra vires the Constitution iu so far as it authorised the State Government to direct any case to be tried by the Special Court.\n\nThe clause was held to be invalid, as the Act, which was passed after the coming into force of the Constitution, did not mention in what cases or offences such directions could be given, uor did it purport to lay down the criterion or the basis upon which the classification was to be made.\n\nAs this portion of section 5 (1) of the statute was ou the face of it discriminatory, the question as to how it was applied on the facts of a particular case could not and did uot arise.\n\nIu the case bfore us, the impugned Regulation was in operation from long before the date of the Constitution. Section 3 of the Regulation, which is similar to section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special\n\n(1) (1952] S.C.R. 284.\n\nSyed Qastm\n\nRazvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Othera.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nSyed Qasim Razvi. v.\n\nThe Stat• of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nCourts Act, might be in conflict with the provision of article 14 of the Constitution, but as has been held by this court in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case (1),\n\nthe effect of article 13 (1) of the Coustitution is not to obliterate the entire operation of the inconsistent laws or to wipe them out altogether from the statute book; for to do s9 will be to give them retrospective effect which they do not possess.\n\nSuch laws must be held to be valid for all past transactions and for enforcing rights and liabilities accrued before the advent of the Constitution.\n\nOn this principle, the order made by the Military Governor, referring this case to the Special Tribunal, cannot be impeached and consequently the Special Tribunal must be deemed to have taken cognizance of the case quite properly, and its proceedings up to the date of the coming in of the Constitution would also have to be regarded as valid. To quote the observation of our brofoer Das J. in Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v.\n\nThe State of Bombay (2), \" as the Act was valid in its entirety before the date of the Constitution that part of the proceeding before the Special Judge which up to that date had been regulated by the special procedure cannot be questioned.\" The question now arises, how is the validity of the proceedings subsequent to the date of the Constitution to be determined ?\n\nIt is not disputed that under article 13 (1) of the Constitution those provisions of the Special 'rribunal Regulation which are in couflict with article 14of the Constitution, became void as soon as the Constitution came into force; but article 13 (1) does not make the whole statute invalid, it invalidates only those provisions which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Pa, rt III of the Constitution and simply because the trial was continued even after 26th January, 1950, under the same Regulation, would not necessarily render the subsequent proceedings invalid. All that the accused could claim is that what remained of the trial must not deviate\n\n(1) (1951) S, C.R, 228,\n\n(2) [1952] S.C.R.710.\n\nfrom the normal standard in material respects so a.s to amount to a denial of the equal protection of laws within the meaning of article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nFor the purpose of determining whether the accused was deprived of such protection, we have got to see first of all whether after eliminating the discriminatory provisions in the Regulation it was still possible to secure to the accused substantially the benefits of a trial under the ordinary law; and if so, whether that was actually done in the present case?\n\nMr. Peerbhoy argues that once it is held that there are in the Special Tribunal Regulation provisions which are obnoxious to the equal protection clause, any proceeding under the Regulation after the 26th of January, 1950, must be held to be totally invalid under article 13 (1) of the Constitution, and it is not material to enquire whether the trial could go on without the discriminating provisions or whether as a matter of fact these provisions were at all applied. It is the possibility of unequal application of law or the threat to equality that makes the Regulation invalid after the Constitution comes into force and consequently the question of actual prejudice to the accused is not a relevant matter for consideration.\n\nIn support of this contention the learned counsel relies strongly upon the decision of this court in Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of.\n\nBombay (' ).\n\nWe are not convinced that this line of reasoning is correct. In Lachmandas's caso( 1) the trial was held before a Special Tribunal constituted under section 10 of the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, and in accordance with the procedure laid down in that Act.\n\nThe procedure was pronounced to be discriminatory in material particulars and though that part of the trial, which was held prior to 26th January, 1950, could not be assailed, the continued application of the discriminatory procedure after that date was held to be illegal; and the result was that the conviction of the accused\n\n(1) [195z] S.C.R. 710,\n\nSyed Qa.!im\n\nRavi\n\nThe Stat• of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n1958\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nBazvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nwas set aside and a retrial ordered. It appears to us that in Lachmandas's case(!) the present question was neither raised nor considered, namely, as to whether after eliminating the discriminatory provisions in the statute it was still possible to go on with the trial and secure to the accused substantially the benefits of a trial under the normal procedure.\n\nOn the other hand, it was assumed throughout that it was not possible to proceed with the trial without following the discriminatory procedure and as that procedure became void on the coming into force of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Special Judge practically came to an end.\n\nDas J. who delivered the majority judgment of this Court in Lachmandas's case(•) expressly observed as follows:\n\n\"Indeed in a sense the Special Judge's jurisdiction came to an end, for he was enjoined to proceed only according to the special procedure and that procedure having become void as stated above, he could not proceed at all as a Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act.\"\n\nWhether this assumption was well-founded or not it is not profitable for us to discuss at the present stage; but it is clear that this aspect of the case was not presented to the court at all by the learned counsel on either side and so was not considered by the court.\n\nThe decision in Lachmandas's case(') cannot, therefore, be put forward as an authority against the view which we have indicated above. In cases of the type which we have before us where part of the trial could not be challenged as bad and the validity of the other part depends on the question as to whether the accused hai been deprived of equal protection in matters of procedure, it is incumbent upon the court to consider, firstly, whether the discriminatory or unequal provisions of law could be separated from the rest and even without them a fair measure of equality in the matter of procedure could be secured to the accused. In the second place, it has got to consider whether the procedure actua.lly\n\n(1) [195z] S.C.R, 710, (;) [t9.I•) S.C, R. 710, 735,\n\n'I.\n\nfollowed did or did not proceed upon the basis of the discriminatory provisions. In our opinion, a mere threat or possibility of unequal treatment is not sufficient. If actually the accused has been discriminated against, then and then only he can complain, not otherwise.\n\nWe may mention here that the impossibility of giving the accused the substance of a trial according to normal procedure at the subsequent stage may arise not only from the fact that the discriminatory provisions were not severable from the rest of the Act and the court consequently had no option to continue any other -than the discriminatory procedure; or it may arise from something done at the previous stage which though not invalid at that time precludes the adoption of a different procedure subsequently.\n\nThus if the normal procedure is trial by jury or with the aid of assessors, and as a matter of fact there was no jury or assessor trial at the beginning, it would not be possible to introduce it at any subsequent stage.\n\nSimilarly having once adopted the summary procedure, it is not possible to pass on to a different procedure on a later date. In such cases the whole trial would have to be condemned as bad.\n\nAs has been said above, the case of Lachmandas Kewalram Ahujci v. The State of Bombay (1) proceeded on the assumption that it was not possible . for the Special Court to avoid the discriminatory procedure even after 26th January, 1950.\n\nThe matter was not investigated but that was the assumption upon which this court proceeded.\n\nOne reason why this assumption was not combated might have been that the ordinary trial in that case should have been with the aid of assessors and as there was no assessor trial at the beginning, it was not possible to adopt it afberwards.\n\nWe will now proceed to examine the facts of this case in the light of the principles enunciated above.\n\nIt may be mentioned here that after the learned counsel on both sides.bad finished their arguments\n\n~I) [r952]S C.R. 7ro,\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRas vi\n\nThe State of\n\nHydorabad and Otht.ra.\n\nMukherj.a J.\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRfl&Vi\n\nThe' State of Hyderabad and Othe.rs.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\non questions of law, we gave the appellant an opportunity to place materials before us for the purpose of showing to what extent he had been actually discriminated against and prejudiced in the trial that was held after the coming into force of the Constitution.\n\nHe ha3 filed a long affidavit setting out in an elaborate manner his alleged grievances and we gave the parties a further hearing upon it.\n\nAs we have already stated, no exception could be taken to the Special Tribunal's taking cognizance of the case under an order of the Military Governor as all this happened long before the advent of the Constitution; and it cannot be urged that the creation of a Special Court by itself was an inequality in the eye of law.\n\nApart from other circumstances, the present case was undoubtedly a big one and the trial was expected to take a considerable period of time before it could be completed. To allow it to go before tbe ordinary court would mean nothing else but blocking the hearing of all other cases for an indefinite length of time.\n\nThere was nothing per se unreasonable in appointing a Special Court and section 13 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code expressly empowers the Government to confer the powers of a court on any Government servant in any local area or with respect to a particular case or cases . and such person is denominated a special judge.\n\nAs regards the procedure to be followed by the Special 'fribunal, the Regulation undoubtedly prescribes the procedure for summary trial by a Magistrate. If the tribunal had adopted that procedure, we would have no other alternative but to declare the whole trial as invalid for although the summary procedure could uot have been challenged as illegal prior to the coming in of the Constitution, it could not possibly have been changed to a different procedure after 26th January, 1950.\n\nThe entire procedure would then have to be held as invalid as conflicting with the equal protection clause.\n\nThe tribunal however adopted the warrant procedure which it was entitled oo do under the Regulation itself; and as we have\n\n1953 indicated already, the committal proceeding not being compulsory under the Hyderabad Code, the difference between a warrant procedure and a ses- Syed Qasim Razvi sions procedure is not material. The recording of a v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nmemorandum of evidence in a snmmary manner is another discriminatory feature in the Regulation, but here again the Regulation gave an option to the tribunal to direct the recording of evidence in extenso and the tribunal actually did give that direction in Mukherj•a 1• the present case.\n\nThere can be no doubt that if the option had been exercised in the other way, it would have been impossible to give the accused the substance of an ordinary trial alter the passing of the Constitution. The use of the English language during the trial is not at all discriminatory as we have already said and so far as the present appellant is concerned, he could not possibly make any grievance of it.\n\nNo complaint has been made by the appellant that the Special Tribunal refused to grant any adjournment that he prayed for and as there was no change in the personnel of the tribunal during the whole period of the trial, no que.>tion of de novo trial could at all arise.\n\nThere was also no occasion for holding the trial in the absence of the accused; the appellant however in his affidavit has made a grievance of the fact that when the second local inspection was held by the court, neither he nor his lawyer was present and he merely gave a note of certain places and things for information of the tribunal.\n\nIn reply to this it is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State that the appellant did not want to be present and he gave a note to the tribunal stating therein all that he wanted to state. Whatever the actual facts might have been, it seems to us that this is not a matter which is connected in any way with the provision of the Regulation which enables the tribunal to proceed with the trial in the absence of the accused.\n\nThe Regulation authorises the tribunal to go on with a trial in the absence of the accused only when it is satisfied that the absence has been brought about by th'e accused himself to impede\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRaevi\n\nTh• State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nMukhorjea J,\n\nthe course of justice.\n\nObviously it was not under this provision that the tribunal went to inspect the spot of occurrence in the absence of the accused. In fact, the Regulation does not say anything at all about local inspection.\n\nThe. provision for local inspection is contained in section 528 of the Hyderabad Code which corresponds to section 539A of the Indian Code.\n\nIt is important to note that the Hyderabad Code does not say anything about giving notice to the parties before holding any local inspection, though that is necessary under the Indian law.\n\nIt may be said that it is eminently desirable that the court should make the local inspection in the presence of both parties.\n\nBut if there was any irregularity in this respect, that is a point which could be raised on the merits of the appeal ; it has nothing to do with any provision of the Regulation in regard to which a question of conflict with the equal protection clause can arise.\n\nThe omission of the provisions relating to revision and transfer in the Regulation apparently seem to be discriminatory, but even on this point the grievance of the appellant appears to be more imaginary than real.\n\nWhen a Special Court is validly set up to try a particular case, a transfer of that case to some other court cannot normally be contemplated. The absence of the right of transfer in such cases is an incident of the establishment of the Special Court.\n\nUnder the Regulation there is plenary power of transfer given to the Military Governor and he can exercise such power in any way he likes without any restriction or limitation. It may be that this provision was deemed sufficient to meet any exceptional circumstance that might arise.\n\nAs regards the right of revision, it appear8 that there was only one application for revision filed by the appellant sometime before 26th of January, 1950.\n\nThe. allegations were want of jurisdiction of the Special Court and also irregularity of the trial by reason of misjoinder of charges.\n\nThat application was dismissed on 27th February,, 1950, and the order\n\n.I'\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME 00.URT REPORTS 611\n\nshows that it was not rejected on the ground that the Regulation does not allow any revision to the accused, but that it was not proper to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. The questions which the appellant wanted to raise were all raised by him in the appeal from the final judgment and they have been considered by the High Court. If there is any error committed by the High Court in this respect, the appellant would be at liberty to raise that point when the appeal is heard on its merits.\n\nConsidering all these facts, we have no hesitation in holding that although there were deviations in certain particulars, the accused had substantially the benefit of a normal trial in this case.\n\nThe question of confirmation of sentence, we may say, is not at all relevant, for the sentences, which have been passed upon the accused, do not require any confirmation under the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nIn cataloguing his grievances the appellant has stated inter alia in his affidavit that he was kept in military custody and also in a solitary cell, that he was separated from his fellow prisoners, that the tribunal was completely dominated by the Executive and that a stenographer was kept sitting behind him all the time that the trial was going on who took down every word that passed between him and his counsel. It is not at all necessary for us to inquire into the truth or falsity of these allegations, for even if they are true, they are irrelevant to the present enquiry. These are matters not related in any way to the question of inequality in connection with the provisions of the Special Tribunal Regulation.\n\nFinally Mr. Peerbhoy raised an objection based on article 21 of the Constitution and contended that the appellant was not tried in accordance with the procedure established by law.\n\nWhat he said is, that the Military Governor had no authority under section 3 of the Regulation to refer an individual case to the Special Tribunal for trial, for it authorised him to direct the Special Tribunal to try \"any offence\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nBasvi\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nMukherjea J\n\nSyed Qasitn\n\nRavi\n\nv Th• Slat• of Byderabad and Other&.\n\nMukher;'a J.\n\nwhether committed before or after the commencement of this Regulation or any classes of offences\", but not any individual case.\n\nA distinction is made between an \"offence\" aud a \"case\", and the learned counsel points out that an offence could be described as a case only when it is connected with a particular perwn who is alleged to have committed it.\n\nThe direction to try \"any offence\" must, therefore, mean a direction to try an offence described as such in the Hyderabad Penal Code, no matter by whom it is committed and not an offence committed by any particular person which is a case.\n\nWe see no force in this argument.\n\nWhA.tever interpretation may be put upon the words \"offence\" and \"case\" in a context where both are used in the same provision, as for instance, in section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, which was under consideration in Anwar Ali Sarkar's caseC) we are of opinion that section 3 of the Regulation contemplates no such distinction and that it empowers the Military Governor to direct a Special Tribunal to try an offence committed by a particular person, in other words, to try an individual case.\n\nThis view derives support from the language employed in the Hyderabad Special Tribunals (Termination) and Special Judges (Appointment) Regulation, 1359 F., whereby it was provided that a Special Judge appointed under that Regulation shall try \"suc::i\" offences of which the trial was pending before a Special Tribunal immediately before its dissolution as were \"made over\" to him for trial by specified authorities [section 5(1) ].\n\nThis is clearly a provision for transfer of the cases pending trial before the Special Tribunals dissolved under that Regulation to Special Judges appointed in their place. As both th8 B.egulations must be read together dealing as they do with the constitution and termination of the same bodies and, as the later Regulation clearly uses the word \"offences\" in the sense of cases, it must receive the same meaning in the earlier Regulation V of 1358 F.\n\n(1) [1952) s.c.R 284.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the preliminary point raised by the appellant cannot succeed.\n\nThe petition under article 32 shall stand dismissed and the appeal will be posted for hearing on its merits in the usual course.\n\n(Petition No. 368 of 1952 and Cases Nos. 277 to 280 of 1951).\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-The above order in Criminal Appeal No. 276 of 1951 will govern connected Appeals Nos. 277, 278, 279 and 280 of 1951, which have been preferred respectively by Kbadar Ali Khan, Mohd. Hazi Khan, Mab bat Khan and Syed Nazir Ali, the four co-accused of Qasim Razvi in the Bibiuagar dacoity case, who were tried along with him by the Special Tribunal No. IV at Trimulgherry.\n\nThey were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on charges of dacoity, rioting, etc. by the Special Tribunal and the convictions and sentences were affirmed with slight modification by the High\n\nCourt of Hyderabad in appeal. 'rhey have now come up to this court on the strength of a certificate granted by the Hyderabad High Court under articles 132 and 134 of the Constitution.\n\nThe appeals are not yet ready for bearing, but as in Qasim Razvi's case, the appellants have filed a petition under article 32 of the •Constitution-being Petition No. 368 of 1952-attackiug the validity of the trial by the Special Tribunal on the same cousti- tutioual grounds as have been urged by Qasim Razvi in bis petition.\n\nWe beard arguments on these questions treating them as preliminary points in the appeals. 'rhe points are identically the same as in Qasim Razvi's case; only in the affidavits, which have been filed by the petitioners at the conclusion of the hearing on questions of law, each one of them bas attempted to state in his own way bow be was actually prejudiced at the trial by reason of the procedure adopted by the Special Tribunal. We have been taken through these affidavits and we find nothing in\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nBaavi.\n\nThe Stat1 of Hyderabad and Othera.\n\nMukherjea J~\n\nSyed Qasim Razvi v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad aiid Othe1s.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nthem which would justify us in taking a view different from that taken in Qasim Ra.zvi's case.\n\nIt has been conceded by Mr. Peerbhoy that the cases of Khadar Ali Khan and Mahbat Khan stand exactly on the same footing as that of Qasim Razvi.\n\nWith regard to Syed Nazir Ali and Hazi Khan the special facts alleged are that both of them were undefended during the trial by the Special Tribunal and no lawyer was engaged on their behalf. It is said further that they were both ignorant of the English language in which the proceedings were conducted, that the presiding Judge Mr. Pinto did not understand Urdu and consequently they had no opportunity of making themselves heard. Without entering into the truth or otherwise of these allegations, it would be enough to state for our present purpose that they do not involve any constitutional point, and as we have said in the main case, the direction to conduct proceedings in English does not per se offend against the provision of article 14 of the Constitution. If as a matter of fact the accused did not get a fair trial or were prejudiced in their defence, these matters can very well be raised when the appeals are heard on their merits. These, however, are not questions which arise at the present stage when we are concerned only with infraction, if any, of the fundamental rights guarateed under Part III of the Constitution. The result, therefore, is that the pre liminary points raised in these appeals are overruled and the appeals would be posted for hearing on their. merits in the usual course.\n\nThe application under article 32 will stand dismissed. (Petitions Nos. 172 and 368 of 1952 and Cases Nos. 276 to 280of1951.)\n\nBosE J.-J am unable to distinguish these cases in principle from The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar('), Kathi Baning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra(2) and Laohmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another v. The State of Bombay(') and in particular\n\n(1) [1952] S, C, R. 284,\n\n(2) (1952] S.C.R. 435.\n\n(3) (1952] s.c.R. 710,\n\nfrom the last which is more akin to these in that there also there was a trial under a special law ..yhich held good until the Constitution of India came into force, but which was held to be bad after that date because it offended article 14 (1).\n\nBefore 'he Constitution the State of Hyderabad was not part of the Dominion of India. Its ruler, the Nizam, was sovereign in all material respects and had a.bsolute powers over his subjects, including the power to legislate as he wished at his will and even at his caprice, if he so chose.\n\nSoon after the partition of India, and in particular in the year 1948, there occurred grievous disturbances in the State which led to what is popularly known as \"police action\" on the part of India. In the course of these disturbances many grievous crimes were committed, and in particular, complaints were laid before the authorities of a series of grave offences said to have been committed on the 10th of January, 1948.\n\nThose are the offences with which we are concerned. The first information report relating to them was lodged the following day.\n\nSome eight months later, namely on 13th September, 1948, there came the police action. It lasted for three days and swift on its conclusion a Military Governor was appointed for the State of Hyderabad.\n\nThe Governor was immediately invested by the Nizam, who was still in law the absolute rular of the State, with authority to legislate for the State by way of Regulation. In exercise of those powers the Military Governor promulgated the Regulation, which is now impugned, on 31st October, 1948.\n\nSections 2 and 3 of the Regulation empowered the Military Governor to constitute Special Tribunals by general or special order, to direct them to try any offences or classes of offences he chose to name and, further, to transfer the trial of any particular case he liked from the ordinary courts of the State to one or other of these Special Tribunals.\n\nThe Regulation also prescribed a special procedure which differed from the procedure of the ordinary cour~~.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRas vi v.\n\nTh• Stat• of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nBose J.\n\nSyed Qa.sim\n\nRazvi v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nBose J.\n\nIn pnrsnance of these powers the Military Governor made an order on 21lth June, 1949, constituting certain Special Tribunals, among them the one with which •we are concerned. Later, on 6th October, 1949, he made another order in which he selected the offences which the present appellants and their ooaccused were suspected to have committed, namely, dacoity, grievous hurt, wrongful confinement, arson, riot and destruction of evidence, he furnishe_d particulars of time and place and gave a general descripticn of the victims included, he named the appellants :tnd others as accused in relation to these specific occurrences and directed that they be tried by the Special Tribunal for these offences.\n\nI am not able to regard this as a general oraer directing that all offences of dacoity, grievous hurt, arson, riot, enc., by whomsoever commi0ted, shall be tried by the Special Tribunal.\n\nThe order, in my opinion, is a specific, and, what I might call \"unclassified\", selection of these special handpicked offences suspected to have been committed by these particular accused.\n\nThe trial proceeded. The charge was framed on 5th December, 1949, and up till 26th January, 1950, (the date of the Constitution) forty witnesses were examined for the prosecution.\n\nOf them, eighteen were cross-examined before 26th January, 1950, and twenty-two were cross-examined after.\n\nThe appell8'nts were convicted on 11th September, 1950, and their convictions were upheld on appeal by the High Court of Hyderabad on 13th April, 1951. It is conceded that the trial was valid and regular up to the 26th of January, 1950.\n\nThe question is whether it could be validly continued by the same Tribunal and under tbe same proceaure, after that aate.\n\nThis, to my mind, involves consiaeration of three distinct things: (1) does the Regulation itself, or any part of it, contravene article 14 (1)?\n\n(2) does the Order maae on the strength of the Regulation do so? and (3) does the procedure adopted by the Tribunal do so?\n\nAs to the first, namely the Regulation itself, article 13(1) falls to be considered. It runs:\n\n\"All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions oi this l:'art, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.\"\n\nThat, to my mind, raises this query: if this law had been passed after the Constitution and the present trial had commenced after it, would either have been valid? If not, I cannot see how a conviction can be • based after the Constitution on a procedure and on matter which is abhorrent to its fundamental chapter howevermuch all that was done may have been good up to that date. This, to my mind, is not giving retrospective effect to the Constitution because the vital part of a trial is its conclusion. I am not prepared to construe these fundamental provisions in a narrow way. Paraphrasing them broadly, they breathe a message of hope to those who have not known equality of treatment before, and give a guarantee of security to those who have, a guarantee which came into effective being the moment the Constitution was born. Assuming this Regulation to be a law which offends the Comtitution and therefore which could not have been upheld after it, we have the Constitution saying to every man who can claim its protection: \"You shall not be convicted, nor will you be sent to jail, under laws which infringe the fundamental rights hereby guaranteed to you.\" In my judgment, it is a breach of this fundamental guarantee to convict on the basis of a law which cannot hold good after the Constitution.\n\nThis, to my mind, is the decision in Lachmandas's case('). I refer in particular to the following passages in the majority judgment :\n\n\"As the Act was valid in its entirety before the date of the Constitution, that part of the proceeding before the Special Judge, which, up to that date, had been regulated by this special procedure cannot be\n\n(1) [•95•] $.C.R. 710,\n\nSyed Qasini\n\nRazvi\n\nThe Stat• of Hyderabad and Other&.\n\nBose J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRasvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Oth6rs.\n\nBoae J.\n\nquestioned, however discriminatory it may have been, but if the discriminatory procedure is continued after the date of the Constitution, surely the accused person may legitimately ask: 'Why am I today being treated differently from other persons accused of similar offences in respect of procedure?'\n\n• * * It is therefore clear ............ that such continuation of the application of the discriminatory procedure to their cases after the date of the Constitution constituted a breach of their fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 and being inconsistent with the provisions of that article the special procedure became void under article 13 ............ Their complaint is npt for something that had happened before 26th J anuary, 1950, but is for unconstitutional discriminatwn shown against them since that date.\n\n* * * Therefore, the continuation of the trial after that date according to the discriminatory procedure resulting in their conviction and sentence cannot be supported. Indeed in a sense the Special Judge's jurisdiction came to an end, for he was enjoined to proceed only according to the special procedure and that procedure having become void as stated above, he could not proceed . at all as a Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act.\"\n\nI now proceed to consider whether this Regulation could have been upheld as good law if it had been promulgated after the Constitution; and here it is necessary to emphasise tha1; in testing the validity of a law it is irrelevant to consider what has been done under it, for a law is either constitutional or not and its validity or otherwise cannot depend upon what • has been accomplished under its provisions. That, to my mind, is self-evident, but it also seems to follow from that portion of the majority decision in the West Bengal case(') which is summarised iri headnote (ii) at page 285 and head-note ( v) at page 286.\n\n(I) [1952] S.C.R. 284.\n\nNow in Laohmandas's case( 1) there is this important passage at page 733:\n\n\"Further, the supposed basis of the alleged classification, namely the fact of reference to the Special Court before the Constitution came into effect, has no reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act.\"\n\nThis, in my opinion, shows that the majority considered it relavant and important to determine the post-constitutional validity of an enactment which was valid up to the date of the Constitution by the. application of post-constitutional standards and tests.\n\nIn the present case, the impugned Regulation does not set out any objects. I do not think that is fatal but I do think that when that is the case, the Courts are called upon to determine what the objects are from t'he Act itself and the surrounding circumstances, as best they may, and if the objects so determined cannot be reasonably related to the basis of the classification, the Regulation must, on the authority of Laohmandas's case(1), be considered postconstitutionally improper.\n\nNow, looking to the surrounding circumstances, I can only conceive of two objects: (1) speedier trials,\n\n(2) more convenient disposal of certain unspecified cases. The first has been condemned as discriminatory in the West Bengal case(•) in the following words:\n\n\"Assuming that the preamble throws any light on the section, the necessity of speedier trial is too vague, uncertain and elusive a criterion to form a rational basis for discrimination.\" By parity of reasoning the second is even more objectionable.\n\nThe next point on which the West Bengal Special Courts Act was considered objectionable by at least four of the seven Judges wa.s that the Act did not Jay down any basis for classification of the cases\n\n(1) [1952) S.C.R. 710,\n\n(2) (1952) S.C.R. 284.\n\nSy•d QaS1m\n\nRa1vi\n\nTh• State of\n\nHydsrabad and Othera.\n\nBose J.\n\nSy•d Qasim\n\nRazvi v.\n\nTh• Stal• of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nBos~ J.\n\nwhich could be sent to the Special Court for trial under a procedure which varied substantially from that of the Criminal Procedure Code and that it left the selection of the offences and the cases to the uncontrolled discretion of the State Government.\n\nIn the Saurashtra case(') the majority of the Judges held that the mere fact that an Act authorises a State Government to direct that offences or classes of offences or classes of cases are to be tried by a special court does not offend article 14.\n\nReading this with the earlier judgment, I conclude that the true principle is that it is not the setting up of spe.cial courts which matters, unless of course their composition is objectionable, but the procedure which they are directed to follow. If the special judges are selected from a class of judicially qualified and experienced men of recognised impartiality and they are enjoined to follow a procedure which does nob differ substantially from that of the ordinary courts, there can be no reasonable objection, but if the procedure deprives the accused of substantial ad vantages which other accused similarly placed can demand, then article 14 comes into play.\n\nThe impugned Regulation in the present case suffers from the same defects.\n\nUnder it the Military Governor is authorised ho direct that any offence, whether committed before or after the commencement of the Regulation, or any class of offences, shall be tried by a Special Court, also to transfer any particular case from the ordinary criminal courts to a Special Tribunal.\n\nHis discretion is unfettered and absolute.\n\nSo far as the special procedure is concerned, three of its features have been considered in one or other of the three earlier decisions and criticised as abhorrent to article 14. Those features are (1) an absence of committal proceedings, (2) deprivation of the right o! (a) revision, (b) transfer and (c) of the right to demand a de nova trial in certain circumstances, 9-lld\n\n111 fr95•j s.c.~. 435.\n\n(3) the right of the Special Tribunal to adopt a summary procedure iu cases where that would uot ordinarily be permissible.\n\nIn the present case, the question of a de nova trial is not only linked up with the absence of a right of transfer but with the fact that even when the constitution Of the Special Bench is changed by an alteration of its personnel there is no right to demand a denovo trial.\n\nIn addition to these, there are certain features of discrimination in the Regulation which are peculiar to Hyderabad, namely the elimination of the Urdu language, which in practice is the language of the Courts there, and the right to have certain sentences confirmed.\n\nThe Hyderabad High Court made an attempt to cut out those objectionable portions and re-write the Regulation without them in Abdur Rahim ct others v.\n\nJoseph A. Pinto ct others('), but that can only be.done if it is possible to sever the bad from the good in such a way as to leave the Act a workable whole so that on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that the legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires at all. That is the test accepted in The State of Bombay\n\nv. F. N. Balsara(').\n\nIt is however diffieult to see how this cutting out process could be made to work.\n\nConsider but one feature.\n\nThe Regulation prescribes that the proceedings are to be summary, though for spec.ial reasons (to be recorded in writing) the warrant procedure may be followed.\n\nWhich of these two is to be struck out as bad?\n\nUntil an actual case arises and is sent to the Special Tribunal for trial it would be impossible to say.\n\nFurther, if we strike out the portion relating to the summary procedure, then cases of simple hurt would have to be tried by the more cumbrous warrant procedure; on the other hand, if we strike out the clause which covers the warrant procedure then we will get serious offences which would\n\n(I) A.I.R. I95I Hyd. \"•\n\n(2) [1951] S.C, R, 682 at 727,\n\nSyed Qasim Raz vi\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nBoss J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRaevi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and OthtJrs.\n\nBose J.\n\n622 SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS [1953]\n\nnormally be committed to sessions tried summarily. I cannot see how the good can be separated from the bad in this particular case and the Regulation still be left workable.\n\nHowever, all that is based on the classification hypothesis of which I am not enamoured. I prefer to found on the narrower issue, namely, was there discrimination in fact and did it continue after the Constitution? 'l'he most glaring instance of this lies in the fact that the proceedings were conducted in the English language whereas Urdu is the language of .the courts in Hyderabad, at any rate in practice.\n\nOne of the appellants knows English but at leas& one does not and a third has only a smattering knowledge of it. That of course would not have mattered much had the court language in that area been English, for in that event there would have been no discriminatio.n. It would only have been one of the accidents of fortune which befall many an accused who is tried in an area where the court language is one which he does not understand. But when the de facto language of the courts is his own mother tongue and all other Urdu knowing persons in that area are tried in the language which they and he understand and he alone is discriminated against by being sent for trial to a court whose proceedings are conducted in a language which he does not know, or, at best, understands but imperfectly, the matter assumes a very different hue.\n\nIn Hyderabad the court language in practice is Urdu a nil so great is the importance attached to it that neither judges nor counsel are permitted to function there unless they know that language. Indeed, the matter was carried to such lengths that one of the appellant was refused the services of an eminent King's Counsel from England on the ground that the latter did not know the court language Urdu. But at the same time the appellants were tried in a language which the gentleman in question did know and which was the language of the Special Tribunal. And an even greater anomaly, the President of the Tribunal bims!)lf did not know Urdu, l a!ll unable to brush this .. .. .\n\n- ....\n\naside as a matter of no consequence. It is to my mind material and vital and cuts at the root of this trial. I find it impossible to say that this is not discrimination within the meaning of article 14 and it is patent that the discrimination continued after the Constitution.\n\nI still prefer to base broadly on what I called, in an earlier case, the social conscience of a sovereign democratic republic as seen through Indian eyes and as reflected in the Constitution of India. The judges of the land are the keepers and interpreters of that conscience even as the rord Chancellor was, and in theory still is, the keeper of the King's conscience in England.\n\nI can find no more difficulty in determining a case along these lines than do judges and juries who are called upon to apply the standards of a reasonable man to a given case where that is required. In my view, there is something fundamentally wrong in guaranteeing a man equality before the law with one hand and with the other permitting an arbitrary discrimination which could not have been supported after the Constitution to continue after it just because it had commenced at an earlier date.\n\nThere is to my mind something grotesquely fantastic in insisting on Urdu knowing counsel in a tribunal whose proceedings are to be conducted in English and at the same time rigidly excluding counsel who do not know Urdu and who do know English. It may be that these are the rules of the Hyderabad Bar but that is based on the assumption that the language of the courts is Urdu. If the one rule can be waived or relaxed or altered, so also can the other.\n\nTo apply both at tbe 8ame time makes, in my judgment, for the type of discrimination which article 14 forbids, for either Urdu has special significance in this area or it is an unimportant fact. If it is material and important, then we have grave discrimination. If it Is not, then again there is grave discrimination in not allowing the accused counsel of his choice which others simil.arly situated could claim, on the sole ground that the counsel chosen knows\n\nSyed Qaaim\n\nRa.vi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nBose J.\n\n191i8\n\nSyed Qasim Razvi v.\n\nThe. State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nBose J,\n\nSUPREME COORT REPORTS [1953\n\nthe language in which the proceedings are to be conducted and does not know another language which is not the court language for the purposes of this special trial.\n\nI must not be understood to say that the appellants were treated unfairly by the Tribunal.\n\nAs far as I can see, much was stretched in their favour, aud in the matter of counsel to defend them funds were provided and spent by the State on a lavish scale. I have little doubt that the conduct of the appellants in discharging those eouusel after they had been generously paid by the State evidences their bad faith and their desire to thwart a fair and proper trial, fair and proper that is to say before the Constitution.\n\nBut the issue before us is not fairness but discrimination within the meaning of article 14.\n\nThe money and time which would .be wasted were my view to prevail would be unfortuna.te but all that is part of the price to be paid for the maintenance of the principles which our Constitution guarantees, part of the price of democracy.\n\nAs regards the question of revision and confirmation of sentences and transfer and bail, it is in my opinion no answer to say that the sentences imposed would not have been subject to confirmation even in an ordinary court and that there were no applications for transfer or revision or bail after the Constitution.\n\nThe point is that the Regulation forbids all this and,' therefore, in the words of the majority decision in Lachmandas's case( 1), the Special Judge's jurisdiction came to an end. 'l'he diserimination lies in the trial itself, or the continuation of it, and the accused does not have to wait till its conclusion on the ground that he might after all be acquitted or granted a nonappealable sentence. His right is to complain of a trial, or a material portion of it, by a tribunal which, according to the decision in Lachmandas's case('), ceases to have jurisdiction after the Constitution. In my opinion, all these convictions should be set aside and a fresh trial in accordance with the\n\n(1) [•95'] S.C.R. 710.\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS 625\n\nnormal procedure of the State in that area should be ordered.\n\nGHULAM HASAN J.-The question which is canvassed before us on behalf of the petitioner Syed Qasim Razvi raises the constitutional point whether his trial and conviction by the Special Tribunal IV at Trimulgherry, Secunderabad, in respect of certain offen0es alleged to have been committed by him are void as being in contravention of articles 14 and 21, read with article 13 of the Constitution. The Special Tribunal consisting of a President and two members was constituted by the Military Governor of Hyde'rabad under section 3 of the Special Tribunal Regulation V of 1358-Fasli. It is common knowledge that the police action took place in Hyderabad on September 13, 1948. The Regulation in question was pro~ mulgated by the Military Governor on October 30, 1948.\n\nAn armed dacoity was committed on January 10, 1948, between 5 p.m. and 7-30 p.m., at Bibinagar village and its Railway Station, about 21 miles from Hyderabad, and Syed Qasim Razvi and his co-accused were charged with the offences of rioting, rioting with deadly weapons, dacoity, arson, causing grievous injuries to persons and destroying evidence of the crime.\n\nThe First Information Report of the occurrence was made on the following day but the charge-, sheet was not submitted to the Special Tribunal till August 28, 1949, as some of the accused were absconding and the investigation bad to be carried out under difficult circumstances.\n\nOn October 6, 1949, the Military Governor acting under section 3 of the Regulation directed that the 'l'ribunal shall try the offences specified as Serial Nos. 1 & 2. Serial\n\nNo. 1 mentioned the offence of murder of one Shoebulla Khan alleged to have been committed by .\n\nS'yed Qasim Raz vi and his co-accused and Serial No. 2 referred to the offences in respect of the Bibinagar dacoity against Syed Qasim Razvi and 20 other persons. we are not concerned with the first incident\n\n19M\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRasvi\n\nThe Stat• of Hyderabad and Oth1rs.\n\nGhu.la.m Hasan J.\n\nSy•d Qasim\n\nRaev1\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulant HasanJ.\n\nand we understand that Razvi was acquitted of the charge of murder.\n\nIn the second case forty prosecution witnesses were examined-in-chief up to November 21, 1949, eighteen were cross-examined between this date and January 26, 1950, and 22 were cross-examined after that date.\n\nRazvi was exa.mined on November 29, 1949, and again ou February 26, 1950.\n\nThe charges were framed on December 5, 1949.\n\nHe was convicted on September 11, 1950, and was sentenced to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment under section 330 of the Hyderabad Penal Code, corresponding to section 395 of the Indian Penal Code, and 2 years' rigorous imprisonment under each of the _following sections, section 124 corresponding to section 148, Indian Penal Qode, section 177 corresponding to section 201, Indian Penal Code, and Bection 177 /66 corresponding to section 109, Indian Penal Code, the sentences to run concurrently.\n\nSimilar sentences were passed against the co-accused. Their convictions and sentences were upheld on appeal by the High Court at Hyderabad on April 13, 1951. In August, 1951, they obtained leave to appeal to this court under articles 132 and 134 of the Constitution.\n\nWhile these appeals were pending and the record was in course of preparation, Razvi filed a petition under article 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the record of the High Court and quashing the orders dated September 11, 1950, and April 13, 1951, and ordering his release.\n\nThe petition challenges Regulation V of 1358-Fasli, as having become void after the 26th of January, 1950, as the procedure laid down by the Regulation is discriminatory against the petitioner and violates his fundamental right under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe petition also challenges the continuation of the trial of the petitioner unde.I'. the provisions of the said Regulation after the 26th of January, 1950, as being an infringement of his rights under articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.\n\nThe conviction an.d sentence are sought to be set\n\n1958 a.side as being illegal and without jurisdiction.\n\nThis contention is also raised in the appeal bnt as the d . . d Syed Qasim appeal is not rea y, we were mv1te by Mr. Peerbhoy, Ra.vi counsel for the petitioner, to decide the question of the validity of the impugned Regulation without waiting for the printing of the record.\n\nAccordingly we decided to hear the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary point in the appeal.\n\nTh• State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nGhuZam Mr. Peerbhoy, counsel for the petitioner, before Hasan J. giving us a detailed list of the discriminatory features in the impugned Regulaion attacked the Regulation as being without a preamble specifying the objects of the Regulation such as promotion of speedy trial, maintenance of public order, safety of the State etc. which form a common feature of Security Acts and Regulations.\n\nThis defect need not be fatal, for it is possible to gather the object of the Regulation from its provisions considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 'fhere is little douhb that in view of the disturbed conditions prevailing in the State a.t the time, the commission of numerous offences and\n\nthe threat to commit further acts of violence, the Military Governor may well have been advised to simplify and shorten the procedure for trial of offenders so as to bring them to speedy justice. 'fhe appointment of Special Judges or Special Tribunals was conceived in the same spirit, i.e., to expedite the disposal of cases, so that justice may not be delayed.\n\nBy section 3 of the \"Regulation it was provided that the Military Governor\" may by general or special order direct that the special Tribunal shall try any offence whether committed before or after the commencement of the Regulation, or any class of offences and may by any such order direct the transfer to a special Tribunal of any particular case from any other special Tribunal or any other Criminal Court or direct the transfer from a special Tribunal of any particular case to any other Criminal Court.\" It is contended not without force that no notification was issued in pursuance of section 3 as to what offence or . . - - .. . .\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRaevi\n\nclass of offences shall be tried by the Tribunal.\n\nThe petitioner, it is urged, would have had no grievance if a certain class of offences in the State or in any\n\nTh• State of\n\nHyderaJJad and Others.\n\nparticular portion thereof, committed by all and sundry, were with a view to expeditious disposal tried by a Special •rribunal, but the particular case of the petitioner was alone singled out for trial by the Special Tribunal, while all offences, irrespective of their nature or gravity committed in Bibinagar village before or after the occurrence, were tried in the ordinary courts according to the normal procedure, laid down in the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThere was no basis, much less any rational basis for the exceptional treatment. The trial of the petitioner by the Tribunal, according to a special procedure, was, it was contended, discriminatory, and took away his right of equality before the law. l tis further objected that ths Regulation prescribed no qualifications for the members of the Tribunal and their appointment was left to the unfettered discretion of the Military Governor.\n\nNo procedure requiring any academic qualifications and legal training has been referred to.and this point may be regarded as unsubstantial.\n\nThe Tribunal constituted for the trial of the present case may not perhaps be open to the criticism that fit and proper\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\n persons were not appointed except the fact that the President was not acquainted with the language of the accused, but there was nothing to prevent the Military Governor from appointing any one who lacked proper qualifications.\n\nHis power of appointment was not circumscribed by any restrictions and it would be no answer to say that he did not abuse this power.\n\nMr. Peerbhoy attacked the following provisions of the Regulation as discriminatory. 1.\n\nThe right of the Special Tribunal to take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to it for trial.\n\nThere is no provision that the trial shall be qelcl with the aicl _; if jury or witl\\ assessors,\n\nEnglish shall be the language of the Tribunal. 4.\n\nEvidence shall not be taken down at length, but only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence shall be prepared.\n\nThe Tribunal shall not be bound to adjourn the case.\n\nThere is no provision for a de nova trial by reason of change in personnel.\n\n7. A Special Tribunal is entitled to follow summary procedure but it may follow the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases. 8.\n\nTrial is permitted in the absence of the accused. where such absence is due to his behaviour in or outside court for the purpose of impeding the course of justice. 9.\n\nRight to bail or habeas corpus is taken away. 10.\n\nThere is no right to re-cross-examine the prosecution witnesses before the accused opens his defence. 11.\n\nThe Special Tribunal is treated under the Regulation as a Court of Sessions exercising original jurisdiction, hence there is only one right of appeal to the High Court. If the case had been tried by a Magistrate of the 1st Class or a District Magistrate, a second appeal would have been competent where the sentence did not exceed four years. 12.\n\nThere is no right of transfer. 13.\n\nThere is no right of revision. 14.\n\nThere is no right of confirmation of sentence which existed under the Hyderabad Code in favour of the High Court, the Government and the Nizam in certain cases.\n\nWithout minimizing the importance of the other provisions, I shall prefer to deal with the more sub stantial ones given as Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13 and 14.\n\n1. The relevant provision of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code hereinafter called the Code\n\nSyed Qasoim\n\nRa•vi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRasvi\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam Haaan J.\n\nis section 267 A, which unlike Chapter XVIII of the Indian Code docs not make it obligatory that every case triable by a Cour; of Sessions should be committed to it by a Magistrate.\n\nDirect commitment to the Sessions without a preliminary inquiry is, however, permissible where the accused himself does not want such an inquiry, or where on being questioned, he admits facts which constitute an offence fit to be tried by a Sessions Court.\n\nBarring these two cases the Magistrate without recording any evidence or after recording some portion of the evidence may, if satisfied, that there are sufficient grounds for committing the case to the Sessions, commit the accused.\n\nSection 4 ( 1) of the Regulation definitely excludes the commitment proceedings. 2.\n\nSection 414 of the Code empowers the Government by a notification to direct that any particular class of cases shall be tried in the High Court by Jury and in any Court of Sessions either by Jury or with the aid of assessors. This power is absent in the Regulation. It is true that there is no general procedure of trial by Jury or with the aid of assessors in the State, but it is open to the Government to exercise its powers and direct that any particular class of cases shal 1 be so tried. 3.\n\nBy section 286 the evidence of witnesses is to be recorded in the language of the court and by sections 294 and 295 the judgment of the court shall be writt'en and pronounced in the language of the court.\n\nNeither party referred to any provision of the Code showing what was the language of the court, but Mr. Peerbhoy stated that it is Urdu.\n\nHe sa, id that the State laws are enaoted in Urdu, the arguments are addressed in Urdu, judgments are given in Urdu and the reports of decisions are also published in Urdu.\n\nThe Code which was referred to us was in Urdu but the only section which specifically refers to Urdu is section 230 which requires that every charge which is framed shall be written i'n Urdu. It is not improbable that the court language is Urdu which was the language of the ruling class, though\n\nit may not be spoken by the majority of the people iu the State.\n\nSection 286 of the Code requires that the evidence of each witness shall be taken down in the language of the court in the form of a continuous statement, whereas section 4, sub-section (2) of the Regulation states that the Special Tribunal need not take down the evid'ence at length but it shall take down the substance of what each witness deposes.\n\nPower is, however, given to the Tribunal to direct in respect of any trial that the evidence shall be taken down at length. It is obvious that while the Code lays down peremptorily that the evidence shall be recorded at length, the Regulation provides to the contrary and makes it directory in respect of certain trials only.\n\nSection 281 of the Code corresponding to section 350 of the Indian Code provides for the right of a de nova trial a~ the instance of the accused, in cases where the Magistrate having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in any case ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein and is succeeded by another Magistrate.\n\nThe Magistrate has, however, got the power to reject the accused's demand either wholly or partly but in that case he is bound to record reasoua. It is true that the right to demand a de novo trial is subject to the Magistrate's power of refusal, coupled with the obligation to record reasons, but the language of the Code appears to suggest that such a refusal should be au exception rather than the rule. It is pointed out by the learned Advocate-General for the State that the question of a de novo trial did not arise in point of fact but the possibility of a vacancy arising by reason of circumstances beyond human control could not be eliminated. 9.\n\nUnder section 468 of the Code any person accused of a nonbailable offence may be released ou bail, unless there appears reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of an offence\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRasvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Oth13rs.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\n19~8\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam Hasan J,\n\n632 SUPREME cotJRT REPOR'rS [1953]\n\npunishable with death or transportation for life. 'fhe right to ask for bail is excluded by section 6, subsection (2) of the Regulation which clearly says that no court shall have any jurisdiction of any kind in respect of any proceedings before a Special Tribunal. l 2.\n\nChapter XXXVIII of the Code deals with the power of transfer and section 494 confers a wide power upon the High Court to transfer cases from one court to another, whereas under section 3 of the Regulation, the Military Governor alone has got the power of transfer. That power is apparently to be exercised suo motu, but an accused has no right to move for transfer.\n\n13. Section 360 of the Code confers the power of revision upon the High Court, the Court of Sessions and the District Magistn;, te against the orders of the subordinate courts, but section 7, sub-section (2) of the Regulation excludes the right of revision. 14.\n\nSection 20 of the Code lays down that no sentence passed by a Sessions Judge shall be enforced, unless it is confirmed\n\n(a) in the case of a sentence of imprisonment exceeding ten years, by the High Court;\n\n(b) in the case of life imprisonment, by the Government and\n\n(c) in the case of death by his Exalted Highness the N izam.\n\nSection 7, sub-section (2) of the Regulation, excludes the power of confirmation by any authority whatsoever.\n\nMr. Peerbhoy, counsel for the petitioner, strongly relies upon the case of Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja\n\nv. The State of Bombay (1) in support of his contentiou that the impugned Regulation is void under article 14 and submits that the case should be decided in accordance with the principles laid down by the majority in that case.\n\nFortunately for me it is not necessary to at.tempt an exposition of the principles which should regulate the decision of a case like the\n\n(I) [1952]_ S.C.R. 710.\n\nS.C.R\n\nSOPREME COURT REPOR'J!S\n\n63S\n\npresent, as the matter has been exhaustively dealt with in The State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar (1) where my Lord the Chief Justice and my other learned brothers in this Bench have expressed views separately and collectively on the exact meaning and scope of article 14.\n\nSo far as I am concerned, the majority view expressed by Mr. Justice Das iu the Bombll; y case with which Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Bose J J. concurred, my Lord the Chief Justice dissenting, is conclusive.\n\nI shall take np Lachmandas's case(') first.\n\nIt appears that a broad daylight robbery took place at 'Ahmedabad in which a driver and a peon of the Central Bank were shot dead on May 26th, 1949, while they were carrying bank money in a motorvan.\n\nBy section 12 of the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, which was in the same terms as section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Act and section 11 of the Saurashtrn Ordinance it was provided that \"a Special Judge shall try such offences or class of offences or such cases or class of cases as the Provincial Government may by general or special order in writing direct.\" i:lection 10 empowered the Government by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute special courts of criminal jurisdiction for such areas as may be specified in the notification.\n\nAccordingly by a notifica.tion issued in August, 1949, the i:ltate of Bombay exercising its power under section 11 appointed the District and Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad as the Special Judge to try the accused.\n\nThe charges against the accused were framed on January 13, l\\!50, without any committal by the Magistrate. Seventeen prosecution witnesses were examined before January 26, 1950, and 45 after that date.\n\nThe accused were convicted on March 30, 1950, and sentenced to death. 'rheir appeal was dismissed by the Bombay High Court, but they preferred appeals to this court after obtaining a certificate under article 132 (1) of the Constitution. '.l'he question which arose for consideration was whether\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 284.\n\n(2) [1952] S.C.R. 710.\n\nRasvi v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRa1vi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and OthiJrs.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nthe Bombay Act or that part of section 12 which authorises the State Government to direct specific cases to be tried by a Speci:tl Judge appointed under that Act offends against the equal protection of law guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution, and is as such void under article 13 on the princi pies laid down by this court in two previous cases, The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (')and Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (').\n\nMr.\n\nJustice Das who delivered the judgment of the majority in which Mahajan, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. concurred answered the question in the affirmative and held that the accused are entitled after the Constitution not to be discriminated against in the matter of procedure and are entitled to be tried according to the ordinary law.\n\nA retrial there- upon was ordered.\n\nMr. Justice Das examined the provisions of the Act in detail, summarising the position at page 726 as follows:-\n\n\"Thus besides providing for enhanced punishment and whipping the Act eliminates the committal proceedings (seetion 13 (1)), permits the Special Judge to record only a memorandum of the evidence, confers on him a larger power to refuse to summon a defence witness than what is conferred on a court by section '257 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also deprives the accused of his right to apply for a transfer or for revision.\n\nThat these departures from the ordinary law cause prejudice to persons subjected to the procedure prescribed by the Act cannot for a moment be denied.\n\nThis court has, by its decisions in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar(') and in Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra ('), recognized that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure and that the procedure prescribed by the corresponding provisions in the West Bengal Special Courts Act and the Saurashtra Ordinance which introduced similar departures from the ordinary law of procedure constituted\n\n(I! [1952] S.C.R. 284.\n\n(2) [1952] S.C.R. 435.\n\na. discrimination against persons tried by thA Special Judge according to procedure prescribed by those pieces of legislation and finally that, in any event, section 5 (I) of the West Bengal Act and section 11 of the Saurnshtra Ordinance, both of which corresponded to section 12 of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, in so far as they authorised the Government to direct specific and particular 'cases' to be tried by the Special Judge, was unconstitutional and void. In view of the departures from the ordinary law brought about by the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, which are noted above, it cannot but be held, on a parity ofreasoning, that at any rate section 12 of the Act, in so far as it authorises the Government to direct particular 'cases' to be tried by a Special Judge, is also unconstitutional.\" Dealing with the argument that the special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act constitutes a departure from the ordinary law of procedure and is, in some important respects, detrimental to the interest of the persons subjected to it and as such is discriminatory he observed:-\n\n\"The discrimination does not end with the taking of cognizance of the case by the Special Judge without the case being committed to him but continues even in subsequent stages of the proceedings in that the person subjected to it cannot, even at those subsequent stages, have the benefit of having the evidence for or against him recorded in extenso, may not get summons for all witnesses he wishes to examine in defence only on the ground that the Special Judge does not consider that such evidence will be material and cannot exercise his right to apply to a superior court for transfer of the case even though the Special Judge has exhibited gross bias against him or to apply for revision of any order made by the Special Judge.\n\nAs the Act was valid in its entirety before the date of the Constitution, that part of the proceeding before the Special Judge, which, up to that date, had been regulated by this special procedure cannot he questioned, however discriminatory it may\n\nSyed Qa•im\n\nRasvt\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam HasanJ.\n\n19/iB\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nv, Tho State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nhave been, but if the discriminatory procedure is continued after the date of the Constitution, surely the accused person may legibimately ask : vVhy am I to-day being treated differently from other persons accused of similar offences in respect of procedure ?\"\n\nAfter holding that there was no nexus which connected the basis on which the supposed classification was founded with the objects of the Act he went on to observe :-\n\n\"In the absence of a rational basis of classification, as explained above, there can be no justification, after the advent of the Constitution, for depriving the appellants of the right to move the Court for transfer or for revision or to obtain process for the attendance of defence witnesses or of having the evidence of the witnesses recorded as in an ordinary trial which is available to other persons accused oi similar offences aud prosecuted according to the ordinary procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is, therefore, clear that in this case the discrimination continued after the Constitution came into force and such continuation of the application of the discriminatory procedure to their cases after the date of the Constitution constituted a breach of their fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 and being inconsistent with the provisions of that article the special procedure became void under article 13 and as there is no vested right or liability in matters of procedure, the appellants are entitled to be tried according to the ordinary procedure after the date of the Constitution. 'rheir complaint is not for something that had happened before 26th January, 1950, but is for unconstitutional discrimination shown :Lgainst them since that date.\n\n* • • * Indeed in a sense the Special Judge's jurisdiction came to an end, for he was enjoined to proceed only according to the special procedure and that procedure qa, vin& become voiq as stiited a, bove, he could not\n\nproceed at all as a Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act ....... The poiut for decision now is whether the continuation of the procedure by the Act after the Constitution came into force operates to the prejudice of the appellants aud, as such, offends against their newly acquired fundameutal right of equal protectiou of law guaranteed by article 14. The Constitution has no retrospective operation to invalidate that part of the proceedings that has already been gone through but the Constitution does not permit the special procedure to stand in the way of the exercise or enjoyment of post-constitutional rights and must, therefore, strike down the discriminatory procedure if it is sought to be adopted after the Constitution came into operation.\"\n\nThe view taken by my Lord the Chief Justice was that the provisions of the Constitution relating to fundamental dghts have no retrospective operation and do not affect the criminal prosecution commenced before the Constitution came into force even though section 12 of the Bombay Act is held to be discriminatory and void.\n\nI have given not without reluctance copious quotations from the majority judgment because its meaning has been the subject of much controversy before us.\n\nWhile on the one hand, Mr. Peerbhoy contends that the Act was condemned as bad by the majority because of the discriminatory provisions appearing on the face of it and the question whether such provisions were applied in fact to the accused of that.case after the coming into force of the Constitution was considered entirely irrelevant the learned Advocate-General urges that the court did not apply its mind to the question whether the Act should be declared void even when the discriminatory provisions are not applied.\n\nThe whole trend and the reasoning of the judgment to my mind point to the conclusion that the court did not consider it necessary to go into the question whether the discriminatory provisions were applied as that question was irrelevant in view of their finding that the Act became\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRazvi\n\nThe Stale of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nvoid after the coming into force of the Constitution on the simple ground that it contained discriminatory provisions on the face of it.\n\nThere were four identical features which are common in the two cases, namely absence of committal proceedings, power to record only a memorandum of the evidence, absence of a right to apply for transfer or for revision. It is not easy to see how the right to' apply for a transfer or for revision could be exercised under the Regulation after the 26th of January.\n\nDuring the course of cros>-examination of 22 witnesses if the Tribunal overruled the objection of the accused or passed any adverse order, the accused could not challenge it by way of revision, nor if it showed any bias in the recording of the evidence, could the accused apply for transfer. Indeed there is evidence that an order of the Tribunal dated the 15th of December, 1949, was cs.rried in revision to the High Court, but the revision was dismissed on February 27, 1950.\n\nThe office, it appears, noted that under section 7, clause 2 of the Regulation there could not be any revision but the learned Chief Justice in rejecting the revision petition merely said that he saw no reason to interfere \"at this stage\".\n\nI do not think that the order of rejection meant that the stage of interference was not appropriate and that he would have the right to interfere at a later stage, say at the time of the appeal.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice could not have been unaware of the fact that no revision was competent against an order of the Tribunal under the Regulation. It is significant that this order was passed after the coming into force of the Constitution.\n\nSimil:i.rly if the accused had asked for bail, and it had been refused, he could not have been able successfully to move the High Court in revision against the order of refusal.\n\nIt is obvious therefore that just as in Lachmandas's case ( 1 ) the procedure under the Regulation could not be continued without eliminating the right to apply for transfer 9r for revision, in the same\n\n\\') [1952) S.C.R. 28'1\n\nway the trial of the petitioner could not go on without bhese discriminatory provisions after the 26th of Jan nary. Again the right to confirmation of the sentences passed by the Tribunal could not be given effect to as the Regulation definitely negatived such a right. Whether in the events that happened the question of confirmation did not arise is besides the point. It could well have arisen if a sentence exceeding ten years had been passed by the Tribunal.\n\nI can see no real ground for any distinction between Lachmandas's case(') and the present case. My learned brothers are certainly in a better position to interpret the decision in Lachmandas's case (1) aud to say whether their intention was not to declare the Act bad, whether or not its discriminatory provisions were applied in fact. It is impossible for me to go behind the actual words used in the decision and.my conclusion is based entirely upon the language and the reasoning adopted in that case.\n\nThe conclusion I have arrived at is fortified by the observations of Mr. Justice M ukherjea in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case('), at page 3::H, \"but when the statute itself makes a discrimination without any proper or reasonable basis, the statute would be invn.lidated for being in conflict with the equal protection clause, and the question as to how it is actually worked ou\\ may not necessarily be a material fact for consideration.\" My learned brother Mr. Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar also emphasised in that case\" that the question which falls to be considered under article 14 is whether the legislation is discriminatory in its nature and this has to be determined not so much by its purpose or object; but by its effects\" (page 349).\n\nIt will be convenient to refer to the West Bengal case(') at this stage. In this case the accused who were charged with various offences committed by them in the course of an armed raid on the Jessop Factory at Dum Dum were convicted by a Special Court appointed under section 5 .(1) of the West Bengal\n\n(1) [195•] S.C.R. 710.\n\n(z) [1952] S.C.R. zB1\n\nSyed Q•\"m\n\nRasvi . v.\n\nThe Stat• of\n\nHyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nSyed Qasim Razvi v,\n\n' Tne State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nSpecial Courts Act No. X of 1950. The Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court which was moved by the accused uuder article 226 for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the conviction and the sentence held that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to try the case, as section 5 (lJ of the Act was void under article 32, as it denied to the accused the equal protection of the laws enjoined by article 14.\n\nOn appeal by the State the majority of six learned Judges of this court upheld the view, my Lord the Chief Justice dissenting.\n\nThe observations of the learned Judges constituting the majority deal effectively with the contentions raised in the present case and may best be reproduced in their own words:-\n\n\" Mahajan J. -That the Special Act lays down substantially different rules for trial of offences and cases than laid down in the general law of the land, i.e., the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be seriously denied. It short-circuits that procedure in material particulars ........ .\n\nNot only does the special law deprive them of the safeguard of the committal procedure and of the trial with the help of jury or assessors, but it also deprives them of the right of a de novo trial.in case of transfer and makes them liable for conviction and punishment for major offences other than those for which they may have been charged or tried ....... '1 10 a certain extent the remedies to which an accused person is entitled for redress in the higher courts have been cut down.\n\nEven if it be said that the statute on the face of it is not discriminatory, it is so in its effect and operation, inasmuch as it vests in the executive government unregulated official discretion, and therefore has to be adjudged unconstitutional.\"\n\n\"Mukherjea J.-T agree with the Attorney-General that if the differences are not material, there may not be any discrimination in the proper sense of the word and minor deviations from the general standard\n\nmi?ht not amount to denial of equal rights.\n\nI find\n\nit difficult, however, to hold that the difference in the procedure that has been introduced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act is of a minor or unsubstantial character which has not prejudiced the interest of the accused. The first differeuce is that made in section 6 of the Act which lays down that the Special Court may take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial, and that in trying the accused it has to follow the procedure for trial! of warrant cases by Magistrates. It is urged by the Attorney-General that the elimination of the com mittal proceedings is a matter of no importance and that the warrant procedure, which the Special Court\n\nhas got to follow, affords a scope for a preliminary examination of the evidence against the accused be fore a charge is framed .......\n\nUnder section 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when a case after being heard in part goes for disposal before another Magistrate, the accused has the right to demand, before the second Magistrate com: mences the proceedings, that the witnesses already examined should be re-examined and re-heard. This right has been taken away from the accused in cases where a case is transferred from one Special Court to another under the provision of section 7 of the Special Courts Act. Further the right of revision to the High Court does not exist at all under the new procedure, although the rights under the Constitution of India are retained. It has been pointed out and quite correctly by one of the learned counsel for respondents that an application for bail cannot be made before the High Court on behalf of an accused after the Special Court has refused bail.\n\nThese and other provisions of the Act make it clear that the rights of the accused have been curtailed in a substantial manner by the impugned. legislation; and if the rights are curtailed only in certain cases and not in others, even though the circumstances in the latter cases are the same, a question of discrimiqation may certainly arise ....... As I have said already\n\nSytJd Qasim\n\nRaevi.\n\nv, The Stat• of Hyderabad and Other!.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\n19.53\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRq, svi\n\nTh• State of\n\nHydBrabad and Others.\n\nGhultitn Has'ln J.\n\nin the present case the discrimination arises on the terms of the Act itself. The fact that it gives unrestrained power to tl:e State Government to select in any way it likes the particular cases or offences which should go to a Special Tribunal and withdraw in such cases the protection which the accused normally enjoy under the criminal law of the country, is on the face of it discriminatory.\"\n\n\"Das J.-'fhe elimination of the committal proceedings and of trial by jury (section 6), the taking away of the right to a de novo trial on transfer (section 7), the vesting of discretion in the Special Court to refuse to summon a defence witness if it be satisfied that his evidence will not be material (section 8), the liability to be convicted of an offence higher than that for which the accused was sent up for trial under the Act (section 13), the exclusion of interference of other courts by way of revision or transfer or under section 491 .of the Code (section 16) are some of the glaring instances of inequality brought about by the impugned Act.\"\n\n\"Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.-Preliminary inquiry before committal to the sessiona, trial by jury or with the aid of assessors, the right of a de novo trial on transfer of a case from one court to another, have been taken away from the accused who are to be tried by a Special Court.\"\n\n\"Bose J.-We find men accused of heinous crimes called upon to answer for their lives and liberties.\n\nWe find them picked out from their fellow;;, and however much the new procedure may give them a few crumbs of advantage, in the bulk they are deprived of substantial and valuable privileges of defence which, others similarly charged, are able to claim\".\n\nI do not propose to go into the question that discriminatory provisions were not as a matter of fact applied to the petitioner's case as contended for by the learned Advocate-General for the State. I have already observed that the discriminatory provisions\n\nstood in the way of the petitioner even after the 26th of January and prevented him from exercising the right to apply for bail, for transfer or for revision and this in my opinion is quite sufficient for holdiug that the Regulation violates article 14 and is, therefore, void under article 13.\n\nI do not think that the discriminatory provisions are severable from the rest of the Regulation. Iudeed it is doubtful whether the Military Governor would\n\nha..ve promulgated the Regulation in the truncated form if these provisions are taken out.\n\nFor us to do so would be to assume the power to legislate and to frame a new Regulation in place of the one promulgated by the Military Governor.\n\nHaving regard to the scheme and objects underlying the Regulation, a severance of the discriminatory provisions would affect the integrity of the Regulation itself.\n\nThe object of expediting the trial will be defeated if the discriminatory provisions are eliminated. The Regulation stands as a whole and falls if those provisions are eliminated. In Attorney-General for Alberta v.\n\nAttorney-General for Canada(') the Privy Council had to deal with two parts of the Act of the Alberta Bill of Rights Act, 1946, Part I of which declared certain existing righto of Alberta citizenship described therein and Part II provided a method of making effective the provisiom of Part I by conferring certain powers ·\n\non the province.\n\nIt was held that Part II was ultra vires being beyond the powers of the provincial legislature to enact; that Part I of the Act was not severable, that the whole Act hung together and therefore the whole was invalid.\n\nI hold that the trial held under the Regulation is void under article 13, read with articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and the conviction and sentence of the petitioner should be set aside.\n\nFollowing the view taken in Lachmandas's case(') I direct that the petitioner shall be tried according to law.\n\nThis order will govern petition No. 368 relating to the other petitioners.\n\n(t) [1947) A.C. ,; o~,\n\n(•) [19,;2) S.C.R. 710,\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nThs State of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nGhulani Hasan J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nThe Stat• of Hyderabad and Others.\n\nDec. 5.\n\nORDER.\n\nBY THE CounT :-As the Constitutional issue~ raised in the petitions have also been raised in the appeals preferred by the petitioners they have been dealt with in the appeals by consent of parties, and the petitions are dismis•ed. The constitutional points in the appeals having been decided against the appellants by the maiority the appeals will be heard on other points when the appeals are ready for hearing. ' Petitions dismiss ea.\n\nAgent for the petitioners/a, ppellants: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nSISIR KUMAR DUTTA v.\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL UNION OF INDIA-Intervener.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI, C.J., MuKHERJEA, CHANDRA-\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE and GHULAM\n\nHASAN JJ).\n\nEssential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, s. 4-Extension of Act up to 31st March, 1951, by resol!ttion of Constituent Assembly - Validity-Powers of Constituent Assembly-India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, ss. 4, 4k-India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947-Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 372, 379 (1), 394.\n\nThe Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949.\n\nThe appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of the provisions of Art. 379 (1) of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to\n\n~11tend the duration o! the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950;", "total_entities": 369, "entities": [{"text": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mitkherjea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 184, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197, "end_char": 206, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HASAN JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "arts. 13, 14, 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238, "end_char": 254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Special Tribunal Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 255, "end_char": 282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Regulation called the Special Tribunal Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 649, "end_char": 698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 6, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1705, "end_char": 1720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cases against the petitioners, who were charged with rioting, dacoity, arson and other offences, wern• directed to be tried by the Special Tribunal on' October 6, 1949."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1896, "end_char": 1909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused appealed to the Supreme Court and also applied under art."}}, {"text": "art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1933, "end_char": 1940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1948, "end_char": 1969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution of India for quashing the orders of the High Court and the Special Tribunal on the ground that the Special Tribunal Regulation became void on the 26th January, 1950, as its provisions contravened articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution which came into force on that date, and the continuation of the trial and conviction of the petitioners after that date was illegal: Held, per PATANJALISASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR JJ. ("}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2157, "end_char": 2175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PATANJALISASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2339, "end_char": 2354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution of India for quashing the orders of the High Court and the Special Tribunal on the ground that the Special Tribunal Regulation became void on the 26th January, 1950, as its provisions contravened articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution which came into force on that date, and the continuation of the trial and conviction of the petitioners after that date was illegal: Held, per PATANJALISASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR JJ. (", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2361, "end_char": 2370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution of India for quashing the orders of the High Court and the Special Tribunal on the ground that the Special Tribunal Regulation became void on the 26th January, 1950, as its provisions contravened articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution which came into force on that date, and the continuation of the trial and conviction of the petitioners after that date was illegal: Held, per PATANJALISASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR JJ. (", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2375, "end_char": 2397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution of India for quashing the orders of the High Court and the Special Tribunal on the ground that the Special Tribunal Regulation became void on the 26th January, 1950, as its provisions contravened articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution which came into force on that date, and the continuation of the trial and conviction of the petitioners after that date was illegal: Held, per PATANJALISASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR JJ. (", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2403, "end_char": 2407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.", "canonical_name": "BOSE"}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2412, "end_char": 2424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.", "canonical_name": "Ghulant HasanJ."}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2446, "end_char": 2456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Syed Q", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2526, "end_char": 2532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syed Q,;, si1n\n\nR11zvi\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and OthtJrs.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "State of Hyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2554, "end_char": 2572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syed Q,;, si1n\n\nR11zvi\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and OthtJrs.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2656, "end_char": 2663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3982, "end_char": 3989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5407, "end_char": 5416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) The provisions of the Special Tribunal Regulation which confer an unfettered discretion on the l\\1ilitary Governor to direct any case or cases to the Tribunal without laying down any basis for classification of the cases, the absence of committal Proceedings, the depr\"ivation of the rights of revision and transfer and of the right to a de nova trial, the right of the Tribunal to adopt a summary procedure, and in particular the elimination of the Urudu language which is the Court language of Hyderabad and of the right to have sentences confirmed, are all discriminatory provisions; most of these provisions cannot he separa; e4 fro~ th~\n\n' ..\n\n. .."}}, {"text": "26th of Ja.nuary, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5649, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole Regulation therefore became void on the 26th of Ja.nuary, 1950, and the trial of the petitioners after that date was under a void law; there was also discrimination in fact after the 26th January as the proceedings were conducted in English even after that date."}}, {"text": "26th J auuary, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAM HASAN J.-The discriminatory provisions of the Regulation stood in the way of the petitioners even after the 26th J auuary, 1950, and prevented them from exercising their right to apply for bail, for transfer or for revision and this was quite sufficient for holding that the Regulation violated art."}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6235, "end_char": 6242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6272, "end_char": 6279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "arts. 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6588, "end_char": 6603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6887, "end_char": 6894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6984, "end_char": 6993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. A. Peerbhoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7199, "end_char": 7213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. A. Peerbhoy and J. B. Dadachanji for the petitioners-appellants."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7218, "end_char": 7234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. A. Peerbhoy and J. B. Dadachanji for the petitioners-appellants."}}, {"text": "V. Rajaram Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7268, "end_char": 7283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Rajaram Iyer, Advocate-General of Hyderabad (K.S.R. Chari, with him) for the respondent (State of Hyderabad)."}}, {"text": "K.S.R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7316, "end_char": 7328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Rajaram Iyer, Advocate-General of Hyderabad (K.S.R. Chari, with him) for the respondent (State of Hyderabad)."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7419, "end_char": 7435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he Judgment of Patanjali Sastri O. J. and Mukherjea and Ohaudrasekhara Aiyar JJ.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7446, "end_char": 7455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he Judgment of Patanjali Sastri O. J. and Mukherjea and Ohaudrasekhara Aiyar JJ.", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "Ohaudrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7460, "end_char": 7480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he Judgment of Patanjali Sastri O. J. and Mukherjea and Ohaudrasekhara Aiyar JJ.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7515, "end_char": 7526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Mukherjea J. Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ.", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE"}}, {"text": "Ghulam Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7531, "end_char": 7543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Mukherjea J. Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ.", "canonical_name": "Ghulant HasanJ."}}, {"text": "J.-Syed Qasim Razvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7642, "end_char": 7661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-Syed Qasim Razvi, the appellant in this appeal, was one of the accused in what i~ .", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7730, "end_char": 7740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7785, "end_char": 7795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nTh~ State of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "10th January, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8196, "end_char": 8214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the city of Hyderabad, attended with robbery, looting, arson, assault and other violent acts on the afternoon of 10th January, 1948."}}, {"text": "State of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8316, "end_char": 8334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The First Information Report was lodged pn the day following, but the police administration of the State of Hyderabad was at that time under the complete control of the Razakars and they tried to minimise the gravity of the occurrence as far as possible and there was neither any proper police investigation nor any serious attempt to arrest the culprits or bring them to trial."}}, {"text": "28th of August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on the 28th of August, 1949, that is to say, after a lapse of 19 months after the occurrence, that a charge-sheet was presented before the Special Tribunal No."}}, {"text": "Special Tribunal No. 4 at Trimulgherry, Secunderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8742, "end_char": 8794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on the 28th of August, 1949, that is to say, after a lapse of 19 months after the occurrence, that a charge-sheet was presented before the Special Tribunal No."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8986, "end_char": 8995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9088, "end_char": 9097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9336, "end_char": 9345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th of October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9508, "end_char": 9528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case against the appellant and his co-accused was formally referred to the Special Tribunal by an order of the Military Governor dated the 6th of October, 1949; but as the charge-sheet had been submitted on a previous date, anoth.er order was passed on 8th of October, 1949, validating the presentation of the charge-sheet."}}, {"text": "8th of October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9622, "end_char": 9642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case against the appellant and his co-accused was formally referred to the Special Tribunal by an order of the Military Governor dated the 6th of October, 1949; but as the charge-sheet had been submitted on a previous date, anoth.er order was passed on 8th of October, 1949, validating the presentation of the charge-sheet."}}, {"text": "24th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9745, "end_char": 9763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial commenced before the Special Tribunal on 24th October, 1949, and on that day the Special Public Prosecutor opened the case on behalf of the prosecution."}}, {"text": "22nd N oveinber, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10221, "end_char": 10242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The examination-in-chief of all these witnesees was finished on the 21st November, 1949, and the appellant, at that stage, chose to cross-examine only one witness, namely, the fortieth or the last one and this was done on the 22nd N oveinber, 1949."}}, {"text": "29th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10248, "end_char": 10267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29th November, 1949, the accused was examined under section 273 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code which corresponds to section 342 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, and on the 5th of December following, charges were framed against him under sections 123, 124, 330 and 177 read with section 66 of the Hyderabad Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 273", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10300, "end_char": 10311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10374, "end_char": 10385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th of December", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10436, "end_char": 10451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29th November, 1949, the accused was examined under section 273 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code which corresponds to section 342 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, and on the 5th of December following, charges were framed against him under sections 123, 124, 330 and 177 read with section 66 of the Hyderabad Penal Code."}}, {"text": "sections 123, 124, 330 and 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10501, "end_char": 10531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10542, "end_char": 10552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10570, "end_char": 10580, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10657, "end_char": 10678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cross-examination of 18 prosecution witnesses was finished before the 26th of January, 1950, and the rest of the witnesses were cross-examined after that date."}}, {"text": "26th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10781, "end_char": 10800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused was examined again on 26th February, 1950."}}, {"text": "11th September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10831, "end_char": 10851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By their judgment dated the 11th September, 1950, the Special Tribunal convicted the appellant on all the charges mentioned above and sentenced him to 2 years' rigorous imprisonment under each of the sections 123, 124 and 177 read with section 66 and to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment under section 330, the sentences to run concurrently."}}, {"text": "sections 123, 124 and 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11003, "end_char": 11028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11039, "end_char": 11049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 330", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11094, "end_char": 11105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11215, "end_char": 11238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was an appeal taken by the appellant against this decision to the High Court of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "13th of April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11281, "end_char": 11300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court by its judgment dated the 13th of April, 1951, allowed the appeal to this extent only, namely, that it acquitted the accused of the charge under section 123 of the Hyderabad Code, but otherwise dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the Special Tribunal."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11400, "end_char": 11411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th of August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11547, "end_char": 11566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th of August, 1951, the High Court gave leave to the accused to appeal to this court under aricles 132 and 134 of the Constitution; and an appeal has been filed in pursuance of this certificate."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11865, "end_char": 11875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasini", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12021, "end_char": 12032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The records of the appeal have not been printed as yet, but in the mean time the appellant presented an application under article 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the orders of the High Court as well as of the Special Tribunal\n\nSyed Qasini\n\nRazvi\n\nv, The Stote of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "MukhCrjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12152, "end_char": 12161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MukhCrjea J.\n\n. \\", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPQRTS tl953j", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12175, "end_char": 12203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "594\n\nSUPREME COURT REPQRTS tl953j\n\nreferred to above and for releasing him on the ground that the proceedings before the Special Tribunal became void after 26th of January, 1950, as they co, nflicted with the provisions of articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12393, "end_char": 12411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12784, "end_char": 12794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Peerbhoy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13354, "end_char": 13362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'l'he contention of Mr. Peerbhoy, who appeared in support of the appeal, mainly is that the procedure laid down in the Special Tribunal Regulation for trial of offences departs, in material particulars, from that under the ordinary law obtaining in Hyderabad and these differences do abridge the rights of the accused and deprive them of benefits to which otherwise they would have been entitled under the general law.", "canonical_name": "Peerbhoy"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15438, "end_char": 15448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjaa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16490, "end_char": 16499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjaa J.\n\n596 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS (1953]\n\nthe same as obtains under the ordinary law, could it be said that the whole trial is vitiated and the result-.", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17996, "end_char": 18005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18159, "end_char": 18171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Tribunal has been given all the powers which are conferred on a court of session by the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Special Tribunal has been given all the powers which are conferred on a court of session by the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19366, "end_char": 19375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 267", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20564, "end_char": 20575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mitkherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20795, "end_char": 20805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mitkherjea J.\n\n19~3\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRaz vi v.\n\nThe State of.", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasi1n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20816, "end_char": 20827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mitkherjea J.\n\n19~3\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRaz vi v.\n\nThe State of.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Raz", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20829, "end_char": 20832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mitkherjea J.\n\n19~3\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRaz vi v.\n\nThe State of.", "canonical_name": "Razvi"}}, {"text": "State of.\n\nHyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20844, "end_char": 20864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mitkherjea J.\n\n19~3\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRaz vi v.\n\nThe State of.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "section 350", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22667, "end_char": 22678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 281", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23020, "end_char": 23031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23782, "end_char": 23791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Syed Qllsim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25028, "end_char": 25039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One thing noticeable in the Special .Regulation with regard to these provisions is that an option has been given to the Special Tribu- 11al to adopt the warrant procedure in such cases as\n\nSyed Qllsim\n\nRazvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHydernbnd llnd Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHydernbnd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25052, "end_char": 25071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One thing noticeable in the Special .Regulation with regard to these provisions is that an option has been given to the Special Tribu- 11al to adopt the warrant procedure in such cases as\n\nSyed Qllsim\n\nRazvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHydernbnd llnd Others.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25740, "end_char": 25750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 267", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27223, "end_char": 27234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Syed Qasim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29469, "end_char": 29480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from secti9n 355 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code that there are second appeals allowed under the\n\n.Syed Qasim\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Other&.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29486, "end_char": 29505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from secti9n 355 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code that there are second appeals allowed under the\n\n.Syed Qasim\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Other&.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "Mukhsrjoa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29519, "end_char": 29528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhsrjoa J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi v. , The State of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "Mukhsrjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29592, "end_char": 29601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhsrjea J.\n\nHyderabad law even in criminal cases; and when it is said that an appeal lies to the High Court from the order of a Sessions Judge, it contemplates that the order of the Sessions Judge may be passed by him tiither as au original court or in appeal from the decision of a District Magistrate or Assistant Sessions Judge.", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "section 330", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30460, "end_char": 30471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30489, "end_char": 30499, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Another thing that has been omitted from the Special Tribunal Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31065, "end_char": 31137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "According to the Hyderabad Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31278, "end_char": 31309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31811, "end_char": 31821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "According to the Hyderabad Code", "statute": "According to the Hyderabad Code"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31885, "end_char": 31890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 13 (1) of the Constitution, all laws in force iu the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution in so far as they are inconsistent with the fundamental rights under Part III of the Cou.titution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void."}}, {"text": "iu Anwar Ali Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32759, "end_char": 32778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the position here is materially different from that iu Anwar Ali Sarkar's case(').", "canonical_name": "iu Anwar Ali Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Iu Anwar Ali Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32790, "end_char": 32809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iu Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (') the opinion expressed by the majority of this court was that section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act was ultra vires the Constitution iu so far as it authorised the State Government to direct any case to be tried by the Special Court.", "canonical_name": "iu Anwar Ali Sarkar"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32882, "end_char": 32891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33380, "end_char": 33389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33659, "end_char": 33668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33708, "end_char": 33717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Syed Qastm\n\nRazvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33774, "end_char": 33791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syed Qastm\n\nRazvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Othera.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33971, "end_char": 33981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Keshavan Madhava Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34041, "end_char": 34063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nCourts Act, might be in conflict with the provision of article 14 of the Constitution, but as has been held by this court in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case (1),\n\nthe effect of article 13 (1) of the Coustitution is not to obliterate the entire operation of the inconsistent laws or to wipe them out altogether from the statute book; for to do s9 will be to give them retrospective effect which they do not possess."}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34091, "end_char": 34101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34257, "end_char": 34259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "brofoer Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34856, "end_char": 34867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To quote the observation of our brofoer Das J. in Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v.\n\nThe State of Bombay (2), \" as the Act was valid in its entirety before the date of the Constitution that part of the proceeding before the Special Judge which up to that date had been regulated by the special procedure cannot be questioned.\""}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35303, "end_char": 35313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35418, "end_char": 35428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35510, "end_char": 35520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36131, "end_char": 36141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Peerbhoy argues that once it is held that there are in the Special Tribunal Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36531, "end_char": 36617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36791, "end_char": 36801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Peerbhoy argues that once it is held that there are in the Special Tribunal Regulation", "statute": "Peerbhoy argues that once it is held that there are in the Special Tribunal Regulation"}}, {"text": "Lachmandas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37483, "end_char": 37493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Lachmandas's caso( 1) the trial was held before a Special Tribunal constituted under section 10 of the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, and in accordance with the procedure laid down in that Act.", "canonical_name": "Lachmandas"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37568, "end_char": 37578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Peerbhoy argues that once it is held that there are in the Special Tribunal Regulation", "statute": "Peerbhoy argues that once it is held that there are in the Special Tribunal Regulation"}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37586, "end_char": 37625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Syed Qa.!im\n\nRavi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38041, "end_char": 38058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The procedure was pronounced to be discriminatory in material particulars and though that part of the trial, which was held prior to 26th January, 1950, could not be assailed, the continued application of the discriminatory procedure after that date was held to be illegal; and the result was that the conviction of the accused\n\n(1) [195z] S.C.R. 710,\n\nSyed Qa.!im\n\nRavi\n\nThe Stat• of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim\n\nBazvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38116, "end_char": 38133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\n1958\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nBazvi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38839, "end_char": 38842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J. who delivered the majority judgment of this Court in Lachmandas's case(•) expressly observed as follows:\n\n\"Indeed in a sense the Special Judge's jurisdiction came to an end, for he was enjoined to proceed only according to the special procedure and that procedure having become void as stated above, he could not proceed at all as a Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act.\""}}, {"text": "Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39179, "end_char": 39238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42283, "end_char": 42293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here that after the learned counsel on both sides.bad finished their arguments\n\n~I) [r952]S C.R. 7ro,\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRas vi\n\nThe State of\n\nHydorabad and Otht.ra.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHydorabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42307, "end_char": 42326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here that after the learned counsel on both sides.bad finished their arguments\n\n~I) [r952]S C.R. 7ro,\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRas vi\n\nThe State of\n\nHydorabad and Otht.ra.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "Mukherj.a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42341, "end_char": 42350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherj.a J.\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRfl&Vi\n\nThe' State of Hyderabad and Othe.rs.", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasi1n", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42355, "end_char": 42366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherj.a J.\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRfl&Vi\n\nThe' State of Hyderabad and Othe.rs.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43545, "end_char": 43555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim\n\nRaevi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46716, "end_char": 46733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regulation authorises the tribunal to go on with a trial in the absence of the accused only when it is satisfied that the absence has been brought about by th'e accused himself to impede\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRaevi\n\nTh• State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Mukhorjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46772, "end_char": 46781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhorjea J,\n\nthe course of justice.", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "section 528", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47070, "end_char": 47081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 539A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47125, "end_char": 47137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th February,, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48821, "end_char": 48841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was dismissed on 27th February,, 1950, and the order\n\n.I'\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME 00.URT REPORTS 611\n\nshows that it was not rejected on the ground that the Regulation does not allow any revision to the accused, but that it was not proper to interfere with the proceeding at that stage."}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50591, "end_char": 50601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These are matters not related in any way to the question of inequality in connection with the provisions of the Special Tribunal Regulation", "statute": "These are matters not related in any way to the question of inequality in connection with the provisions of the Special Tribunal Regulation"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50790, "end_char": 50799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These are matters not related in any way to the question of inequality in connection with the provisions of the Special Tribunal Regulation", "statute": "These are matters not related in any way to the question of inequality in connection with the provisions of the Special Tribunal Regulation"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasitn\n\nRavi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51023, "end_char": 51040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J\n\nSyed Qasitn\n\nRavi\n\nv Th• Slat• of Byderabad and Other&.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51570, "end_char": 51580, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51871, "end_char": 51880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51953, "end_char": 51969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WhA.tever interpretation may be put upon the words \"offence\" and \"case\" in a context where both are used in the same provision, as for instance, in section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, which was under consideration in Anwar Ali Sarkar's caseC) we are of opinion that section 3 of the Regulation contemplates no such distinction and that it empowers the Military Governor to direct a Special Tribunal to try an offence committed by a particular person, in other words, to try an individual case."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52002, "end_char": 52011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Special Judge appointed under that Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52418, "end_char": 52463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52647, "end_char": 52659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Judge appointed under that Regulation", "statute": "Special Judge appointed under that Regulation"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53254, "end_char": 53264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Judge appointed under that Regulation", "statute": "Special Judge appointed under that Regulation"}}, {"text": "Kbadar Ali Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53600, "end_char": 53615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "277, 278, 279 and 280 of 1951, which have been preferred respectively by Kbadar Ali Khan, Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Kbadar Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "Mohd. Hazi Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53617, "end_char": 53632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "277, 278, 279 and 280 of 1951, which have been preferred respectively by Kbadar Ali Khan, Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mab bat Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53634, "end_char": 53646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hazi Khan, Mab bat Khan and Syed Nazir Ali, the four co-accused of Qasim Razvi in the Bibiuagar dacoity case, who were tried along with him by the Special Tribunal No."}}, {"text": "Syed Nazir Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53651, "end_char": 53665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hazi Khan, Mab bat Khan and Syed Nazir Ali, the four co-accused of Qasim Razvi in the Bibiuagar dacoity case, who were tried along with him by the Special Tribunal No."}}, {"text": "Qasim Razvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53690, "end_char": 53701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hazi Khan, Mab bat Khan and Syed Nazir Ali, the four co-accused of Qasim Razvi in the Bibiuagar dacoity case, who were tried along with him by the Special Tribunal No.", "canonical_name": "Qasim Ra.zvi"}}, {"text": "Special Tribunal No. IV at Trimulgherry", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 53770, "end_char": 53809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hazi Khan, Mab bat Khan and Syed Nazir Ali, the four co-accused of Qasim Razvi in the Bibiuagar dacoity case, who were tried along with him by the Special Tribunal No."}}, {"text": "High\n\nCourt of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 54006, "end_char": 54030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Special Tribunal and the convictions and sentences were affirmed with slight modification by the High\n\nCourt of Hyderabad in appeal. '"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 54127, "end_char": 54147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhey have now come up to this court on the strength of a certificate granted by the Hyderabad High Court under articles 132 and 134 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "articles 132 and 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54154, "end_char": 54174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54313, "end_char": 54323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim\n\nBaavi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55024, "end_char": 55041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have been taken through these affidavits and we find nothing in\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nBaavi.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Stat1 of Hyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55048, "end_char": 55066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stat1 of Hyderabad and Othera.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "Qasim Ra.zvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55240, "end_char": 55252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nthem which would justify us in taking a view different from that taken in Qasim Ra.zvi's case.", "canonical_name": "Qasim Ra.zvi"}}, {"text": "Khadar Ali Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55317, "end_char": 55332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been conceded by Mr. Peerbhoy that the cases of Khadar Ali Khan and Mahbat Khan stand exactly on the same footing as that of Qasim Razvi.", "canonical_name": "Kbadar Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "Mahbat Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55337, "end_char": 55348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been conceded by Mr. Peerbhoy that the cases of Khadar Ali Khan and Mahbat Khan stand exactly on the same footing as that of Qasim Razvi."}}, {"text": "Hazi Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55442, "end_char": 55451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to Syed Nazir Ali and Hazi Khan the special facts alleged are that both of them were undefended during the trial by the Special Tribunal and no lawyer was engaged on their behalf."}}, {"text": "Pinto", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55742, "end_char": 55747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said further that they were both ignorant of the English language in which the proceedings were conducted, that the presiding Judge Mr. Pinto did not understand Urdu and consequently they had no opportunity of making themselves heard."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56145, "end_char": 56155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56745, "end_char": 56755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57300, "end_char": 57321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57404, "end_char": 57414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57488, "end_char": 57505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before 'he Constitution the State of Hyderabad was not part of the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "Nizam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57522, "end_char": 57527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its ruler, the Nizam, was sovereign in all material respects and had a.bsolute powers over his subjects, including the power to legislate as he wished at his will and even at his caprice, if he so chose."}}, {"text": "10th of January, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58112, "end_char": 58133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of these disturbances many grievous crimes were committed, and in particular, complaints were laid before the authorities of a series of grave offences said to have been committed on the 10th of January, 1948."}}, {"text": "13th September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58300, "end_char": 58320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some eight months later, namely on 13th September, 1948, there came the police action."}}, {"text": "31st October, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58742, "end_char": 58760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of those powers the Military Governor promulgated the Regulation, which is now impugned, on 31st October, 1948."}}, {"text": "Sections 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58763, "end_char": 58779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stat• of Hyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59254, "end_char": 59272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regulation also prescribed a special procedure which differed from the procedure of the ordinary cour~~.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRas vi v.\n\nTh• Stat• of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59286, "end_char": 59290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nSyed Qa.sim\n\nRazvi v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "BOSE"}}, {"text": "21lth June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59431, "end_char": 59447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nIn pnrsnance of these powers the Military Governor made an order on 21lth June, 1949, constituting certain Special Tribunals, among them the one with which •we are concerned."}}, {"text": "6th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59548, "end_char": 59565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, on 6th October, 1949, he made another order in which he selected the offences which the present appellants and their ooaccused were suspected to have committed, namely, dacoity, grievous hurt, wrongful confinement, arson, riot and destruction of evidence, he furnishe_d particulars of time and place and gave a general descripticn of the victims included, he named the appellants :tnd others as accused in relation to these specific occurrences and directed that they be tried by the Special Tribunal for these offences."}}, {"text": "5th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60491, "end_char": 60509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge was framed on 5th December, 1949, and up till 26th January, 1950, (the date of the Constitution) forty witnesses were examined for the prosecution."}}, {"text": "13th April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60868, "end_char": 60884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appell8'nts were convicted on 11th September, 1950, and their convictions were upheld on appeal by the High Court of Hyderabad on 13th April, 1951."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61224, "end_char": 61234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61412, "end_char": 61425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasini", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63366, "end_char": 63377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I refer in particular to the following passages in the majority judgment :\n\n\"As the Act was valid in its entirety before the date of the Constitution, that part of the proceeding before the Special Judge, which, up to that date, had been regulated by this special procedure cannot be\n\n(1) [•95•] $.C.R. 710,\n\nSyed Qasini\n\nRazvi\n\nThe Stat• of Hyderabad and Other&.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Boae", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63487, "end_char": 63491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Boae J.\n\nquestioned, however discriminatory it may have been, but if the discriminatory procedure is continued after the date of the Constitution, surely the accused person may legitimately ask: 'Why am I today being treated differently from other persons accused of similar offences in respect of procedure?'"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64025, "end_char": 64035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64135, "end_char": 64145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th J anuary, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64221, "end_char": 64240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•   It is therefore clear ............ that such continuation of the application of the discriminatory procedure to their cases after the date of the Constitution constituted a breach of their fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 and being inconsistent with the provisions of that article the special procedure became void under article 13 ............ Their complaint is npt for something that had happened before 26th J anuary, 1950, but is for unconstitutional discriminatwn shown against them since that date."}}, {"text": "Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64718, "end_char": 64777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 65307, "end_char": 65318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That, to my mind, is self-evident, but it also seems to follow from that portion of the majority decision in the West Bengal case(') which is summarised iri headnote (ii) at page 285 and head-note ( v) at page 286."}}, {"text": "Laohmandas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65441, "end_char": 65451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now in Laohmandas's case( 1) there is this important passage at page 733:\n\n\"Further, the supposed basis of the alleged classification, namely the fact of reference to the Special Court before the Constitution came into effect, has no reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act.\"", "canonical_name": "Lachmandas"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHydsrabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67275, "end_char": 67294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sy•d QaS1m\n\nRa1vi\n\nTh• State of\n\nHydsrabad and Othera.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67876, "end_char": 67886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68531, "end_char": 68541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69146, "end_char": 69156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim Raz", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71377, "end_char": 71391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) [1951] S.C, R, 682 at 727,\n\nSyed Qasim Raz vi\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim\n\nRaevi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71441, "end_char": 71458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Boss J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRaevi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and OthtJrs.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 73295, "end_char": 73302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the matter was carried to such lengths that one of the appellant was refused the services of an eminent King's Counsel from England on the ground that the latter did not know the court language Urdu."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73848, "end_char": 73858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74113, "end_char": 74134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75362, "end_char": 75372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Syed Qaaim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 75735, "end_char": 75745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it Is not, then again there is grave discrimination in not allowing the accused counsel of his choice which others simil.arly situated could claim, on the sole ground that the counsel chosen knows\n\nSyed Qaaim\n\nRa.vi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76673, "end_char": 76683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim Razvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78141, "end_char": 78157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAM HASAN J.-The question which is canvassed before us on behalf of the petitioner Syed Qasim Razvi raises the constitutional point whether his trial and conviction by the Special Tribunal IV at Trimulgherry, Secunderabad, in respect of certain offen0es alleged to have been committed by him are void as being in contravention of articles 14 and 21, read with article 13 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Secunderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 78267, "end_char": 78279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAM HASAN J.-The question which is canvassed before us on behalf of the petitioner Syed Qasim Razvi raises the constitutional point whether his trial and conviction by the Special Tribunal IV at Trimulgherry, Secunderabad, in respect of certain offen0es alleged to have been committed by him are void as being in contravention of articles 14 and 21, read with article 13 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78388, "end_char": 78406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78418, "end_char": 78428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hyde'rabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 78557, "end_char": 78567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Tribunal consisting of a President and two members was constituted by the Military Governor of Hyde'rabad under section 3 of the Special Tribunal Regulation V of 1358-Fasli."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78574, "end_char": 78583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 13, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78709, "end_char": 78727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common knowledge that the police action took place in Hyderabad on September 13, 1948."}}, {"text": "October 30, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78802, "end_char": 78818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regulation in question was pro~ mulgated by the Military Governor on October 30, 1948."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78855, "end_char": 78871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An armed dacoity was committed on January 10, 1948, between 5 p.m. and 7-30 p.m., at Bibinagar village and its Railway Station, about 21 miles from Hyderabad, and Syed Qasim Razvi and his co-accused were charged with the offences of rioting, rioting with deadly weapons, dacoity, arson, causing grievous injuries to persons and destroying evidence of the crime."}}, {"text": "Bibinagar village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 78906, "end_char": 78923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An armed dacoity was committed on January 10, 1948, between 5 p.m. and 7-30 p.m., at Bibinagar village and its Railway Station, about 21 miles from Hyderabad, and Syed Qasim Razvi and his co-accused were charged with the offences of rioting, rioting with deadly weapons, dacoity, arson, causing grievous injuries to persons and destroying evidence of the crime."}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim Razvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78984, "end_char": 79000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An armed dacoity was committed on January 10, 1948, between 5 p.m. and 7-30 p.m., at Bibinagar village and its Railway Station, about 21 miles from Hyderabad, and Syed Qasim Razvi and his co-accused were charged with the offences of rioting, rioting with deadly weapons, dacoity, arson, causing grievous injuries to persons and destroying evidence of the crime.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "28, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79338, "end_char": 79346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The First Information Report of the occurrence was made on the following day but the charge-, sheet was not submitted to the Special Tribunal till August 28, 1949, as some of the accused were absconding and the investigation bad to be carried out under difficult circumstances."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79518, "end_char": 79527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shoebulla Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79683, "end_char": 79697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 mentioned the offence of murder of one Shoebulla Khan alleged to have been committed by ."}}, {"text": "S'yed Qasim Raz vi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 79735, "end_char": 79753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S'yed Qasim Raz vi and his co-accused and Serial No.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasim\n\nRasvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 79949, "end_char": 79966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we are not concerned with the first incident\n\n19M\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRasvi\n\nThe Stat• of Hyderabad and Oth1rs.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Ghulant HasanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80078, "end_char": 80093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulant HasanJ.\n\nand we understand that Razvi was acquitted of the charge of murder.", "canonical_name": "Ghulant HasanJ."}}, {"text": "Razvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 80118, "end_char": 80123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulant HasanJ.\n\nand we understand that Razvi was acquitted of the charge of murder.", "canonical_name": "Razvi"}}, {"text": "November 21, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80240, "end_char": 80257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the second case forty prosecution witnesses were examined-in-chief up to November 21, 1949, eighteen were cross-examined between this date and January 26, 1950, and 22 were cross-examined after that date."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80310, "end_char": 80326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the second case forty prosecution witnesses were examined-in-chief up to November 21, 1949, eighteen were cross-examined between this date and January 26, 1950, and 22 were cross-examined after that date."}}, {"text": "November 29, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80396, "end_char": 80413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Razvi was exa.mined on November 29, 1949, and again ou February 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "February 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80428, "end_char": 80445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Razvi was exa.mined on November 29, 1949, and again ou February 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80475, "end_char": 80491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charges were framed on December 5, 1949."}}, {"text": "September 11, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80514, "end_char": 80532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was convicted on September 11, 1950, and was sentenced to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment under section 330 of the Hyderabad Penal Code, corresponding to section 395 of the Indian Penal Code, and 2 years' rigorous imprisonment under each of the _following sections, section 124 corresponding to section 148, Indian Penal Qode, section 177 corresponding to section 201, Indian Penal Code, and Bection 177 /66 corresponding to section 109, Indian Penal Code, the sentences to run concurrently."}}, {"text": "section 330", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80592, "end_char": 80603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80621, "end_char": 80631, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80650, "end_char": 80661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80669, "end_char": 80686, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80762, "end_char": 80773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80791, "end_char": 80802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80823, "end_char": 80834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80852, "end_char": 80863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80865, "end_char": 80882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80921, "end_char": 80932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80934, "end_char": 80951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court at Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 81104, "end_char": 81127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their convictions and sentences were upheld on appeal by the High Court at Hyderabad on April 13, 1951."}}, {"text": "April 13, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81131, "end_char": 81145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their convictions and sentences were upheld on appeal by the High Court at Hyderabad on April 13, 1951."}}, {"text": "articles 132 and 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81214, "end_char": 81234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81364, "end_char": 81374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81813, "end_char": 81823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82048, "end_char": 82066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Peerbhoy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 82313, "end_char": 82321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d Syed Qasim appeal is not rea y, we were mv1te by Mr. Peerbhoy, Ra.vi counsel for the petitioner, to decide the question of the validity of the impugned Regulation without waiting for the printing of the record.", "canonical_name": "Peerbhoy"}}, {"text": "Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82664, "end_char": 82669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GhuZam Mr. Peerbhoy, counsel for the petitioner, before Hasan J. giving us a detailed list of the discriminatory features in the impugned Regulaion attacked the Regulation as being without a preamble specifying the objects of the Regulation such as promotion of speedy trial, maintenance of public order, safety of the State etc.", "canonical_name": "HASAN JJ."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83678, "end_char": 83687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulaion attacked the Regulation as being without a preamble specifying the objects of the Regulation", "statute": "Regulaion attacked the Regulation as being without a preamble specifying the objects of the Regulation"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84266, "end_char": 84275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHyderaJJad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84500, "end_char": 84520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, it is urged, would have had no grievance if a certain class of offences in the State or in any\n\nTh• State of\n\nHyderaJJad and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "is no right of confirmation of sentence which existed under the Hyderabad Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87590, "end_char": 87668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Syed Qasoim", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 88004, "end_char": 88015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant provision of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code hereinafter called the Code\n\nSyed Qasoim\n\nRa•vi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Ghulam Haaan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88133, "end_char": 88145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Haaan J.\n\nis section 267 A, which unlike Chapter XVIII of the Indian Code docs not make it obligatory that every case triable by a Cour; of Sessions should be committed to it by a Magistrate.", "canonical_name": "Ghulant HasanJ."}}, {"text": "section 267", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88153, "end_char": 88164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no right of confirmation of sentence which existed under the Hyderabad Code", "statute": "There is no right of confirmation of sentence which existed under the Hyderabad Code"}}, {"text": "Chapter XVIII of the Indian Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88181, "end_char": 88213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88824, "end_char": 88833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVIII of the Indian Code", "statute": "Chapter XVIII of the Indian Code"}}, {"text": "Section 414", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88909, "end_char": 88920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVIII of the Indian Code", "statute": "Chapter XVIII of the Indian Code"}}, {"text": "section 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89410, "end_char": 89421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 294 and 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89502, "end_char": 89522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 230", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90029, "end_char": 90040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90288, "end_char": 90299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90451, "end_char": 90460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 281", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90967, "end_char": 90978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 350", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91008, "end_char": 91019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91963, "end_char": 91974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92429, "end_char": 92438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92609, "end_char": 92636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92674, "end_char": 92685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92786, "end_char": 92795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92980, "end_char": 92991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93157, "end_char": 93166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93239, "end_char": 93249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93569, "end_char": 93578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXVIII of the Code"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93881, "end_char": 93891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S\n\n63S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94203, "end_char": 94209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94479, "end_char": 94489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das iu the Bombll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94561, "end_char": 94578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as I am concerned, the majority view expressed by Mr. Justice Das iu the Bombll; y case with which Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Bose J J. concurred, my Lord the Chief Justice dissenting, is conclusive."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94609, "end_char": 94629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as I am concerned, the majority view expressed by Mr. Justice Das iu the Bombll; y case with which Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Bose J J. concurred, my Lord the Chief Justice dissenting, is conclusive.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA- SEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 94810, "end_char": 94819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that a broad daylight robbery took place at 'Ahmedabad in which a driver and a peon of the Central Bank were shot dead on May 26th, 1949, while they were carrying bank money in a motorvan."}}, {"text": "Central Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94856, "end_char": 94868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that a broad daylight robbery took place at 'Ahmedabad in which a driver and a peon of the Central Bank were shot dead on May 26th, 1949, while they were carrying bank money in a motorvan."}}, {"text": "May 26th, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94887, "end_char": 94901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that a broad daylight robbery took place at 'Ahmedabad in which a driver and a peon of the Central Bank were shot dead on May 26th, 1949, while they were carrying bank money in a motorvan."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94958, "end_char": 94968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 94976, "end_char": 95015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95048, "end_char": 95057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95089, "end_char": 95099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 95583, "end_char": 95589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly by a notifica.tion issued in August, 1949, the i:ltate of Bombay exercising its power under section 11 appointed the District and Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad as the Special Judge to try the accused."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95617, "end_char": 95627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "District and Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 95642, "end_char": 95682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly by a notifica.tion issued in August, 1949, the i:ltate of Bombay exercising its power under section 11 appointed the District and Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad as the Special Judge to try the accused."}}, {"text": "January 13, l\\!50,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 95772, "end_char": 95790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charges against the accused were framed on January 13, l\\!50, without any committal by the Magistrate."}}, {"text": "March 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 95958, "end_char": 95972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused were convicted on March 30, 1950, and sentenced to death. '"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 96033, "end_char": 96050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rheir appeal was dismissed by the Bombay High Court, but they preferred appeals to this court after obtaining a certificate under article 132 (1) of the Constitution. '"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96129, "end_char": 96140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rasvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 96273, "end_char": 96278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rasvi v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad and Others."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Hasan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 96319, "end_char": 96331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRa1vi\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and OthiJrs.", "canonical_name": "Ghulant HasanJ."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96471, "end_char": 96481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96660, "end_char": 96670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96718, "end_char": 96728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96968, "end_char": 96975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nJustice Das who delivered the judgment of the majority in which Mahajan, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ."}}, {"text": "Justice Das examined the provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97289, "end_char": 97335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97722, "end_char": 97748, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kathi Raning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98077, "end_char": 98089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This court has, by its decisions in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar(') and in Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra ('), recognized that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure and that the procedure prescribed by the corresponding provisions in the West Bengal Special Courts Act and the Saurashtra Ordinance which introduced similar departures from the ordinary law of procedure constituted\n\n(I! ["}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98144, "end_char": 98154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Justice Das examined the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Justice Das examined the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98663, "end_char": 98672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98704, "end_char": 98714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98774, "end_char": 98784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99178, "end_char": 99188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In view of the departures from the ordinary law brought about by the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "In view of the departures from the ordinary law brought about by the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Syed Qa•im", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 100598, "end_char": 100608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Act was valid in its entirety before the date of the Constitution, that part of the proceeding before the Special Judge, which, up to that date, had been regulated by this special procedure cannot he questioned, however discriminatory it may\n\nSyed Qa•im\n\nRasvt\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Ghulam HasanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100654, "end_char": 100668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam HasanJ.\n\n19/iB\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nv, Tho State of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "Ghulant HasanJ."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101684, "end_char": 101710, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102007, "end_char": 102017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102117, "end_char": 102127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102714, "end_char": 102773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103058, "end_char": 103068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act", "statute": "Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103727, "end_char": 103737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act", "statute": "Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "Syed Qasi1n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 104831, "end_char": 104842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J.\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRazvi\n\nThe Stale of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Stale of Hyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 104855, "end_char": 104873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J.\n\nSyed Qasi1n\n\nRazvi\n\nThe Stale of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "26th of January", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 105389, "end_char": 105404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not easy to see how the right to' apply for a transfer or for revision could be exercised under the Regulation after the 26th of January."}}, {"text": "15th of December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 105764, "end_char": 105786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed there is evidence that an order of the Tribunal dated the 15th of December, 1949, was cs.rried in revision to the High Court, but the revision was dismissed on February 27, 1950."}}, {"text": "February 27, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 105866, "end_char": 105883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed there is evidence that an order of the Tribunal dated the 15th of December, 1949, was cs.rried in revision to the High Court, but the revision was dismissed on February 27, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105927, "end_char": 105936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105938, "end_char": 105946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th of Jan nary", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 107075, "end_char": 107091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is obvious therefore that just as in Lachmandas's case ( 1 ) the procedure under the Regulation could not be continued without eliminating the right to apply for transfer 9r for revision, in the same\n\n\\') [1952) S.C.R. 28'1\n\nway the trial of the petitioner could not go on without bhese discriminatory provisions after the 26th of Jan nary."}}, {"text": "M ukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108029, "end_char": 108039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conclusion I have arrived at is fortified by the observations of Mr. Justice M ukherjea in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case('), at page 3::H, \"but when the statute itself makes a discrimination without any proper or reasonable basis, the statute would be invn.lidated for being in conflict with the equal protection clause, and the question as to how it is actually worked ou\\ may not necessarily be a material fact for consideration.\"", "canonical_name": "Mitkherjea"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108514, "end_char": 108524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dum Dum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 108896, "end_char": 108903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case the accused who were charged with various offences committed by them in the course of an armed raid on the Jessop Factory at Dum Dum were convicted by a Special Court appointed under section 5 .(1) of the West Bengal\n\n(1) [195•] S.C.R. 710."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108954, "end_char": 108963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Syed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 109036, "end_char": 109040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(z) [1952] S.C.R. zB1\n\nSyed Q•\"m\n\nRasvi .", "canonical_name": "589\n\nSYED QASIM RAZVI"}}, {"text": "Stat• of\n\nHyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 109063, "end_char": 109082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe Stat• of\n\nHyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "Special Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109189, "end_char": 109207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109302, "end_char": 109313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Courts Act", "statute": "Special Courts Act"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109461, "end_char": 109470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Courts Act", "statute": "Special Courts Act"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109501, "end_char": 109511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Courts Act", "statute": "Special Courts Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109586, "end_char": 109596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Courts Act", "statute": "Special Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110070, "end_char": 110096, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111456, "end_char": 111465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 350", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112025, "end_char": 112036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112461, "end_char": 112470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112623, "end_char": 112644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHydBrabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 113366, "end_char": 113385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J.\n\n19.53\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRq, svi\n\nTh• State of\n\nHydBrabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of.\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113894, "end_char": 113903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113967, "end_char": 113976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114123, "end_char": 114132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114255, "end_char": 114265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114354, "end_char": 114365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114380, "end_char": 114390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115614, "end_char": 115624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115655, "end_char": 115665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Privy Council had to deal with two parts of the Act of the Alberta Bill of Rights Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116480, "end_char": 116571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part I of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116897, "end_char": 116914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117067, "end_char": 117077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the Act", "statute": "Part I of the Act"}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117089, "end_char": 117107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the Act", "statute": "Part I of the Act"}}, {"text": "Ghulani Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117486, "end_char": 117499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulani Hasan J.\n\nSyed Qasim\n\nRazvi\n\nThe Stat• of Hyderabad and Others.", "canonical_name": "Ghulant HasanJ."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 118054, "end_char": 118069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioners/a, ppellants: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 118098, "end_char": 118116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118336, "end_char": 118340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118517, "end_char": 118525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 118572, "end_char": 118593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 372, 379", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118601, "end_char": 118615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 118820, "end_char": 118836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949."}}, {"text": "20th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 118955, "end_char": 118974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949."}}, {"text": "24th October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 119055, "end_char": 119073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant who was convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no power to extend the Act in view of the provisions of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 379", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119175, "end_char": 119183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_652_655_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "March 12\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1953)\n\nRAM NARAYAN SINGH\n\nTHE srATE OF DELHI AND OTHERS. [PATANJALr SAs1nr C. J., MrKHER.TEA, S. R. DAs, GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nCriminal trial-Adjouriiment of case -No order remanding accused to custody - Legality of detention ·-Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 344-Habeas corpus.\n\nIn habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings.\n\nSection 344 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires a Magis trate, if he chooses to adjourn a case, \" to remand by warrant the accused if in custody\" and provides further that every order made under this section by a Court other than a High , Court shall be in writing. Where a trying Niagistrate adjourned a case by an order in writing but there was nothing in writing on the record to show that he made an order remanding the accused to custody: Held, that the detention of the accused after the order of adjournment was illegal.\n\nThose who feel called upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of ovhat they conceive to be their duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 54 of 1953.\n\nPetition under Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nJai Gopal Sethi and Veda Vy'.Ls (S. K. K'ip1ir, A. K. Dutt, A. N. Chana, R. Pathnaik and A. N. Sinha, with them) for the petitioners.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1953. March Ll. The J udgmeut of the Court was delivered by the Chief Justice.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by one Ham Narayan\n\nSingh on behalf of four gentlemen, namely, Dr. S. P.\n\nMukerjee, Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Pandit Nandlal Sharma and Pandit Guru Dutt Vaid, who are the\n\nral petitioners in the case.\n\nThese persoIJ, s were\n\narre.sted on the evening of the 6th March, 1953, and they are now being prosecuted for alleged defiance of an order prohibiting meetings and processions in the area in question, au offence punishable under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nTheir detention is sought to be justified ou the basis of two remand orders, the one alleged to have been passed by :\\1 r. Dhillon, Additional District Magistrate, Delhi; at about 8 p. m. on the 6th March, 1953, aud the other alleged to have been passed by the tryiug Magistrnte at about 3 p. m. on the 9th March while adjourning the case on the re.presentation made before him that a habeas corpu.i petition was being moved in this Court.\n\nVarious questions of law and fact have been argued before us by Mr. Sethi on behalf of the petitioner, but we consider it unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of tho, e questions, as it is now conc'eded that the first order of remand d::ited the. 6th March even assuming it was a valid one expired on the 9th :\\larch and is no longer in force.\n\nAs regard; the order of remand alleged to have been made by the trying Magistrate on the 9th March, the position is as follows :-The trying Magistrate was obviously proceeding at that >tage nuder section 344 of the Criminal Procedure\n\nCode, which requires him, if he chooses to adjourn the case pending before him, \"to remand by warrant the accused if in custody,\" and it goes on to provide: Every order made under this section by a court other than a High Court shall be in writing signed by the presiding Judge or Magistrate.\n\nThe order of the\n\n~Iagistrate under this section was produced before us in compliance with an order of this Court made on the 10th March, which directed the production in this Court as early as possible of the records before the Additional District Magistrate and the trying l\\if.agistrate together with the remand papers for inspection by Counsel for the petitioner.\n\nThe order produc\"ed merely directs the adjournment of the case till the 11th March and coutains no direction for remanding the accused to custody till that date. Lasb\n\nRiun. Narayan\n\nSingh\n\nThe State of Delhi and Others.\n\nPatanjaii Sastri 0. J,\n\nWb8\n\nRa11t Narayan\n\nSingh\n\nTh• State of Delhi and Othdrs.\n\nPatanjali Sastri G. J.\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPOHTS (1953]\n\nevening, four slips oJ paper were' handed to. the Registrar of this Court at 5-20 p. m.\n\nOn one side they purport to be warrants of detention dated 6th March and addressed to the Superintendent of Jail, Delhi, directing the accused to be kept in judicial lock-up and to be produced in court on the 9th March 1953.\n\nThese warrants contain on their back the following endorsements : '''Remanded to judicial till 11th March, 1953.\" , ' In a question of habeas corpus, when the lawfulness or otherwise of the custody of the persons concerned is in question, it is obvious that these documents, if genuine would be of vital importance, but they were not produced, notwithstanding the clear direction contained in our order of the 10th March. 'rhe court records produced before us do not contain any order of remand made on the 9th March.\n\nAs we have already observed, we have the order of the trying Magistrate merely adjourning the case to the 11th.\n\nTbe Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the Government explains that these slips of paper, which would be of crucial importance to the case, were with a police officer who was present in court yesterday, but after the Court rose in the evening the latter thong ht that their production might be of some importance and therefore they were filed before the .Registrar at 5-20 p. m. vVe cannot take notice of documents produced in such circumstances,. and we are not satisfied that there was any order of remand committing the accused to further custody till the 11th March. It has been held by this Court that in habeas corpus proceedings, the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings. The material date on the facts of this case is the 10th March, when the affidavit on behalf of the Government was filed justifying the detention as a lawful one.\n\nBut the position, as we have stated, is that on that date there was no order remanding the four persons to custodv. !j'his Court has often reiterated before that those who\n\nfeel called upon to deprive other persons of their persoi; ial liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be then duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law.\n\nThat . has not been done in this case.\n\nThe petitioners now before us are therefore entitled to be released and they are set at liberty forthwith. ' Petition allowed.\n\nAgent for the petitioner: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyakshri.\n\nSATISH CHANDHA ANAND\n\nTHE UNION OF iNDIA.\n\n(PATANJALI SASTRI 0.J.,'MUKHEHJEA, VIVIAN BOSE,\n\nGHULA~I HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1050, Arts. 14, 16, 311- Civil servant- Appointment on contract for 5 years-Continuation of appointment on temporary service basis-Tarrnination of service on one month's notice-Legality- Fundamental rights-Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, r. fi.\n\nThe petitioner was employed by the Government of India on . a five year contract in the Resettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour. When bis contract was due to expire the Government made him a n.ew offer to continu~ him n service in his post temporarily for the period of the Resettlement and Employment Organisation on the condition that he will be governed by the Central Ciyil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, which provided for termination of the contract by one month's notice on either side. He accepted \\be offer and continued in service, but subsequently his services were terminated after giving him one month's notice. Thepetitioner applied for reiief under Art. 32 (1) of the Constitution alleging Iba\\ his fundamental rights under Arts. 311, 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution were infringed: Held, (i) that Art. 311 bad no application as this was not a case of dismissal or removal from service nor a reduction in rank but only an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice under one of its clauses,· the difference between dismiesal and\n\nRani Narayan.\n\nSingh\n\nv • Th• Stat• of\n\nDelhi and Othsr3.\n\nPatanja.lS\n\nSatl'i 0. I.\n\nMar•k la", "total_entities": 46, "entities": [{"text": "RAM NARAYAN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM NARAYAN SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE srATE OF DELHI AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF DELHI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULA~I HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 167, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 271, "end_char": 300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 302, "end_char": 308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "Section 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517, "end_char": 528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1322, "end_char": 1332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jai Gopal Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1397, "end_char": 1412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Gopal Sethi and Veda Vy'."}}, {"text": "Veda Vy'.Ls", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1417, "end_char": 1428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Gopal Sethi and Veda Vy'."}}, {"text": "S. K. K'ip1ir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1430, "end_char": 1443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ls (S. K. K'ip1ir, A. K. Dutt, A. N. Chana, R. Pathnaik and A. N. Sinha, with them) for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "A. K. Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1445, "end_char": 1455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ls (S. K. K'ip1ir, A. K. Dutt, A. N. Chana, R. Pathnaik and A. N. Sinha, with them) for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "A. N. Chana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1457, "end_char": 1468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ls (S. K. K'ip1ir, A. K. Dutt, A. N. Chana, R. Pathnaik and A. N. Sinha, with them) for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "R. Pathnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1470, "end_char": 1481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ls (S. K. K'ip1ir, A. K. Dutt, A. N. Chana, R. Pathnaik and A. N. Sinha, with them) for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "A. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1486, "end_char": 1497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ls (S. K. K'ip1ir, A. K. Dutt, A. N. Chana, R. Pathnaik and A. N. Sinha, with them) for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1532, "end_char": 1546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1577, "end_char": 1591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1705, "end_char": 1721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by one Ham Narayan\n\nSingh on behalf of four gentlemen, namely, Dr. S. P.\n\nMukerjee, Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Pandit Nandlal Sharma and Pandit Guru Dutt Vaid, who are the\n\nral petitioners in the case.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Ham Narayan\n\nSingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1788, "end_char": 1806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by one Ham Narayan\n\nSingh on behalf of four gentlemen, namely, Dr. S. P.\n\nMukerjee, Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Pandit Nandlal Sharma and Pandit Guru Dutt Vaid, who are the\n\nral petitioners in the case."}}, {"text": "S. P.\n\nMukerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1848, "end_char": 1863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by one Ham Narayan\n\nSingh on behalf of four gentlemen, namely, Dr. S. P.\n\nMukerjee, Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Pandit Nandlal Sharma and Pandit Guru Dutt Vaid, who are the\n\nral petitioners in the case."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1870, "end_char": 1886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by one Ham Narayan\n\nSingh on behalf of four gentlemen, namely, Dr. S. P.\n\nMukerjee, Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Pandit Nandlal Sharma and Pandit Guru Dutt Vaid, who are the\n\nral petitioners in the case."}}, {"text": "Pandit Nandlal Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1888, "end_char": 1909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by one Ham Narayan\n\nSingh on behalf of four gentlemen, namely, Dr. S. P.\n\nMukerjee, Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Pandit Nandlal Sharma and Pandit Guru Dutt Vaid, who are the\n\nral petitioners in the case."}}, {"text": "Pandit Guru Dutt Vaid", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by one Ham Narayan\n\nSingh on behalf of four gentlemen, namely, Dr. S. P.\n\nMukerjee, Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Pandit Nandlal Sharma and Pandit Guru Dutt Vaid, who are the\n\nral petitioners in the case."}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2209, "end_char": 2220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2228, "end_char": 2245, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2757, "end_char": 2762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Various questions of law and fact have been argued before us by Mr. Sethi on behalf of the petitioner, but we consider it unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of tho, e questions, as it is now conc'eded that the first order of remand d::ited the."}}, {"text": "section 344", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3232, "end_char": 3243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lasb\n\nRiun. Narayan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4096, "end_char": 4115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lasb\n\nRiun."}}, {"text": "State of Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4128, "end_char": 4142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayan\n\nSingh\n\nThe State of Delhi and Others."}}, {"text": "Patanjaii Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4156, "end_char": 4172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjaii Sastri 0.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri G. J.\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPOHTS (1953]\n\nevening, four slips oJ paper were' handed to.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6774, "end_char": 6784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyakshri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6814, "end_char": 6833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyakshri."}}, {"text": "SATISH CHANDHA ANAND", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6836, "end_char": 6856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SATISH CHANDHA ANAND\n\nTHE UNION OF iNDIA."}}, {"text": "UNION OF iNDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6862, "end_char": 6876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SATISH CHANDHA ANAND\n\nTHE UNION OF iNDIA."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6914, "end_char": 6925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(PATANJALI SASTRI 0.J.,'MUKHEHJEA, VIVIAN BOSE,\n\nGHULA~I HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "GHULA~I HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6928, "end_char": 6941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(PATANJALI SASTRI 0.J.,'MUKHEHJEA, VIVIAN BOSE,\n\nGHULA~I HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]", "canonical_name": "GHULA~I HASAN"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6961, "end_char": 6982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 16, 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6990, "end_char": 7007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7289, "end_char": 7308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was employed by the Government of India on ."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7955, "end_char": 7962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 311, 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8030, "end_char": 8050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8106, "end_char": 8114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rani Narayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8350, "end_char": 8362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "311 bad no application as this was not a case of dismissal or removal from service nor a reduction in rank but only an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice under one of its clauses,· the difference between dismiesal and\n\nRani Narayan."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8365, "end_char": 8370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh\n\nv • Th• Stat• of\n\nDelhi and Othsr3."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_655_661_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 655\n\nfeel called upon to deprive other persons of their persoi; ial liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be then duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law.\n\nThat . has not been done in this case.\n\nThe petitioners now before us are therefore entitled to be released and they are set at liberty forthwith. ' Petition allowed.\n\nAgent for the petitioner: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyakshri.\n\nSATISH CHANDHA ANAND\n\nTHE UNION OF iNDIA.\n\n(PATANJALI SASTRI 0.J.,'MUKHEHJEA, VIVIAN BOSE,\n\nGHULA~I HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1050, Arts. 14, 16, 311- Civil servant- Appointment on contract for 5 years-Continuation of appointment on temporary service basis-Tarrnination of service on one month's notice-Legality- Fundamental rights-Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, r. fi.\n\nThe petitioner was employed by the Government of India on . a five year contract in the Resettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour. When bis contract was due to expire the Government made him a n.ew offer to continu~ him n service in his post temporarily for the period of the Resettlement and Employment Organisation on the condition that he will be governed by the Central Ciyil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, which provided for termination of the contract by one month's notice on either side. He accepted \\be offer and continued in service, but subsequently his services were terminated after giving him one month's notice. Thepetitioner applied for reiief under Art. 32 (1) of the Constitution alleging Iba\\ his fundamental rights under Arts. 311, 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution were infringed: Held, (i) that Art. 311 bad no application as this was not a case of dismissal or removal from service nor a reduction in rank but only an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice under one of its clauses,· the difference between dismiesal and\n\nRani Narayan.\n\nSingh\n\nv • Th• Stat• of\n\nDelhi and Othsr3.\n\nPatanja.lS\n\nSatl'i 0. I.\n\nMar•k la\n\n-656\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1953)\n\n1968 removal being that the former ordinarily disqualifies from future employment but not the latter; Batish Chandra\n\n(ii) Art. 14 had no application as he bad not been discrimin- Anand ated against and had not been denied the protection of any laws v, which others similarly situated could claim ; The Union of\n\n(iii) Art. 16 was equally inapplicable as the petitioner was India not denied equal opportunity in a matter relating to appointment or employment but had been treated just like any other person to whom an offer of temporary _employment under these conditions was made.\n\nThe State can enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who choose to accept those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, even as the State is bound.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition (No. 201of1952) under Art. 32 of Lhe Oomtitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nR. K. Varma and G. 0. Mrithur for the petitioner.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Por1is A. Mehta, with him) for th~ -respondent.\n\n1953. March 13. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-'l'his is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution in which the petitioner seeks redress for what, according to bim, is a breach of bis fundamental rights under articles 14 aud 16(1) of the Constitution. It was argued at considerable length by the petitioner in person.\n\nThen, wben our judgment was nearly ready, he put in a petition asking for a rehearing aud for permission to file some fresh paper,;.\n\nWben that was refused be came again on another day and asked for leave to engage an agent and appear through counsel as he felt he bad not been able tO do justice to bis case in person. (It may be mentioned that tbougb he had originally engaged an agent he dismissed him before the bearing when he appeared in person.) vVe granted bis request and counsel roargued the case for him but has not carried the matter any funher. The facts are these .•\n\nIn October, 1945, the petitioner was employed by 1968 the Government of India on a five year contract in . - . the Directorate General of Resettlement and Employ..J''h'~ Ohndro men\\ of the Ministry of Labour. This was after selec- ::• tiou by the Federal Public Service Commission. The U•ion of After a short period of practical training, he was fodia posted in January, 1946, at Jabalpur as the Manager of the Sub-Regional Employment Exchange and was later confirmed in this appointment.\n\nThis contract of service was due to expire in 1950.\n\nShortly before its expiration the Government of India made him a new offer, embodied in its letter dated the 30th June, l 950, to continue him in service on the expiry of his contract on the terms specified in that\n\nletter. Among them were the following:\n\n\"(3) Other conditions of service :-On the termi- . nation of your contract you will be allowed to continue in your post temporarily for the period of the Resettlement and Employment Organisation and will be governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) .Kules, 1949, nnless you are a permanent Government servant.\"\n\nHe was asked in the letter to intimate to the Ministry of Labour whether he was willing to continue in service on those terms and he admits that he accepted the offer and continued in service. Heiwas not a permanent Government servant though it was contended in argument that he was, for he was Oil a five year contract and tlie work for which he was employed, namely Hesettlement alld Employment, was itself only of a temporary character.\n\nTherefore, the Temporary Service Rules applied.\n\nOn those rules, rule 5 is material. It runs as follows:\n\n\"5. (a) '.!.'he service of a temporary Government servant who is not in quasi-permanellt service shall be liable to terminatioll at any time by notice ill writing given either by the Government servant to the appointillg authority, or by tbe appointing authority to the Government senant.\n\nBose J.\n\n(b) The period of such notice shall be one month,\n\nS t . , Ck a unless otherwise agreed to by the Government and a uri an .ra..i.. h t \" Ana\"d .., y t e Government servan . v.\n\nQuasi-permanent service is defined in the rules and Tk• Union °1 it is clear that the petitioner does not come within India that class. It is also an undisputed fact that there\n\n80,. J. was no agreement between the petitioner and Government regarding the period of the notice. 'rherefore, according to this rule, which was a term in the petitioner's contract of further service, his services were liable to termination at any time by one month's notice in writing. 'rhis notice was given on 25th November, 1950, and he was told that his services would terminate on the expiry of one month from 1st December, 1950.\n\nA large field was cove.red in the course of the arguments, and had the matter not been re-argued we would, for the petitioner's satisfaction, have dealt with the contentions raised more fully than will be necessary now that counsel has appeared.\n\nThe petition is under article 32(1) of the Constitution and so it must be shown that a fundamental right has been infringed. It was argued that the rights infringed are the ones conferred by articles l 4 and 16(1).\n\nTaking a:rticle 14 first, it must be shown that the petitioner has been discriminated against in. the exercise or enjoyment of some legal right which is open to others who are similarly situated.\n\nThe rights which he says have been infringed are those confered by article 311. He says he has either been dismissed or removed from service without the safeguards which that article confers. In our opinion, article 311 has no application because this is neither a dismissal .nor a removal from service, nor is it a reduction in rank. It is au ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice under one of its clauses.\n\nThe services in lndi~ have long been afforded certa.in statutory guarantees and safeguards against arbitrary dismissal or reduction in rank.\n\nUnder\n\nS.C.R SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S 659\n\nsection 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the 1958 safeguards were limited to those two cases .. Under 8 . k-O d th C . . h' d dd d l atu kan ra e preseut onst1tut10n, a t tr was a e , name y Anand removal from service. In order to understand the v, difference between \"dismissal\" and \"removal\" from Th• Union of service, it will be necessary to turn to the Rules which fodia governed, and with modifications still govern, the \"services\" in India. because of article 313 of the Constitution.\n\nPart XII of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules relating to Conduct and Discipline includes rule 49 which sets out the various penalties to which a member of the services can be subjected for indiscipline and misconduct.\n\nThey are seven in number and include censure, suspension, reduction in rank, removal from service and dismissal from service. The Act of 1935 selected only two of these possible penalties as serious enough to merit statutory safeguards, namely reduction in rank and dismissal from service.\n\nThe Constitution has added a third to the list.\n\nThe distinction which is drawn between the two is explained in rule 49.\n\nThere is first removal from service \"which does not disqualify from futu.re employment\" and there is next dismissal from service \"which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment.\"\n\nThen follows an Explanation: \"The discharge-\n\n(c) of a person engaged under contract, in ac- cordance with the t, erms of his contract, does not amount to removal or dismissal within the meaning of this rule.\"\n\nThese terms are used in the same sense in article311.\n\nIt follows that the article has no application here and so no question of discrimination arises, for the \"law\" whose protection the petitioner seeks has no application to him.\n\nThere was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did.\n\nHe was as free under the law as any other person to accept or to reject the\n\nBose J.\n\nz9; s offer which was made to him.\n\nHavig a, ccepted, he\n\nS t . h-Ch a still has open to him all the rights and remedies\n\na\" Anann '\"available to other persons similarly situated to env. force any rights under bis coritract which have been Th• Union of denied to him, assuming tbere are any, and to pursue\n\nI.idi• in tbe .ordinary courts of the land such remedies for a breach as are open to him to exactly the same extent Bose J. as other persons similarly situated.\n\nHe has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated could claim. 'I'he remedy of a writ is misconceived.\n\nArticle 16(1) is equally inapplicable.\n\nThe whole matter rests in contract. 'When the petitioner's first contract (tbe five year one) came to an end, he was\n\nnot a permanent Government servant and Government was not bound either to re-employ him or to continue him in service.\n\nOn the other hand, it was open to Government to make him the offer it did of a continuation of l)is employment on a temporary and contractual basis. Though the employment was continued, it was iu point of fact, and in the eyes of the law, under a new and fresh contract which was quite separate and distinct from the old eveu though many . of its terms were the same.\n\nArticle 16(1) deals with equality of opportunity in all matters relatiug to employment or appointment to any office under the State. '1 1he petitioner has not been denied any opportunity of employment or of appointment. He has been treated just like any other person to whom au offer of temporary employment under these conditions was made. His grievance, when flnalysed, is nob one of personal differentiation but is against an offer of temporary employment; ou special terms as opposed to permanent employment. But of comse the State can enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who choose to accept those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, even as the State is bound.\n\nWhen the employment is permanent there are certain statutory guarantees but in the absence of\n\nany such limitations Government is, subject to the 1958 qualification mentioned above, as free to make special 8 . h-C d . . atis han ra contracts of service with temporary employees, engag- Anand ed in works of a temporary nature, as any other v. employer.\n\nThe Union of Various matters .relating to the meritsof the case India. were referred to but we express no opinion about Bo\" J. whether the petitioner has other rights which he can enforce in other ways.\n\nWe are dealing here with a writ under article 32 to enforce a fundamental right and the only point we decide is that no fundamental right bas been infringed.\n\nWhen the matter was first argued we had decided not to make any order about costs but now that the petitioner has persisted in reopening the case and calling the learned Attorney-General here for a second time, we have no alternative but to dismiss the petition with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioner: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha .\n\nHABF,.EB MOHAMED\n\nv. • rHE STA'rE OF HYDERABAD.\n\n[PATAl\\JALI SAS1'RI C.J., MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS,\n\nGm; LAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.] Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 13, 14-Hyderabad Regula tion X of 1359 F.-Trial by special jwlqe under Reg•tlation X after\n\n26th January, 1950-Provisions of Regulation different from Criminal Procedure Code-Equal protection of the law - Validity of trial-Tests of validity-Effect of cu.rtailment of committal proceed ings and of right to transfer, revision, confinnation of death sentence.\n\nIn determining the validity or otherwise of a pre.Constitution statute on the ground of any of its provisions being repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Constitution, two principles\n\nMarch 30.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 428, "end_char": 438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyakshri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 468, "end_char": 487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyakshri.", "canonical_name": "G. H. Rajadhyakshri"}}, {"text": "SATISH CHANDHA ANAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 490, "end_char": 510, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SATISH CHANDRA ANAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF iNDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 512, "end_char": 530, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 534, "end_char": 550, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATAl\\JALI SAS1'RI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 568, "end_char": 579, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULA~I HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 582, "end_char": 595, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 600, "end_char": 612, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 615, "end_char": 636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 16, 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 644, "end_char": 661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1609, "end_char": 1616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 311, 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1684, "end_char": 1704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1760, "end_char": 1768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2019, "end_char": 2024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh\n\nv • Th• Stat• of\n\nDelhi and Othsr3."}}, {"text": "Batish Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2237, "end_char": 2251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nMar•k la\n656\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1953)\n\n1968 removal being that the former ordinarily disqualifies from future employment but not the latter; Batish Chandra\n\n(ii) Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2258, "end_char": 2265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2454, "end_char": 2461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3047, "end_char": 3054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. K. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3118, "end_char": 3129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Varma and G. 0."}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3175, "end_char": 3183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Por1is A. Mehta, with him) for th~ -respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3221, "end_char": 3229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Por1is A. Mehta, with him) for th~ -respondent."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3358, "end_char": 3368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3499, "end_char": 3510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Federal Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4438, "end_char": 4471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was after selec- ::• tiou by the Federal Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Jabalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4571, "end_char": 4579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U•ion of After a short period of practical training, he was fodia posted in January, 1946, at Jabalpur as the Manager of the Sub-Regional Employment Exchange and was later confirmed in this appointment."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4768, "end_char": 4787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly before its expiration the Government of India made him a new offer, embodied in its letter dated the 30th June, l 950, to continue him in service on the expiry of his contract on the terms specified in that\n\nletter."}}, {"text": "30th June, l 950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4843, "end_char": 4859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly before its expiration the Government of India made him a new offer, embodied in its letter dated the 30th June, l 950, to continue him in service on the expiry of his contract on the terms specified in that\n\nletter."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Labour", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5365, "end_char": 5383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was asked in the letter to intimate to the Ministry of Labour whether he was willing to continue in service on those terms and he admits that he accepted the offer and continued in service."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6156, "end_char": 6160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\n(b) The period of such notice shall be one month,\n\nS t . ,"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nQuasi-permanent service is defined in the rules and Tk• Union °1 it is clear that the petitioner does not come within India that class."}}, {"text": "25th November, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6833, "end_char": 6852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhis notice was given on 25th November, 1950, and he was told that his services would terminate on the expiry of one month from 1st December, 1950."}}, {"text": "1st December, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6936, "end_char": 6954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhis notice was given on 25th November, 1950, and he was told that his services would terminate on the expiry of one month from 1st December, 1950."}}, {"text": "article 32(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7226, "end_char": 7239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7684, "end_char": 7695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7825, "end_char": 7836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S 659", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8220, "end_char": 8225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8227, "end_char": 8238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8246, "end_char": 8275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8694, "end_char": 8705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10829, "end_char": 10842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11476, "end_char": 11489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12873, "end_char": 12883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13316, "end_char": 13331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13360, "end_char": 13378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha .", "canonical_name": "G. H. Rajadhyakshri"}}, {"text": "HABF,.EB MOHAMED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13382, "end_char": 13398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HABF,."}}, {"text": "PATAl\\JALI SAS1'RI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13432, "end_char": 13450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATAl\\JALI SAS1'RI C.J., MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS,\n\nGm; LAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]", "canonical_name": "PATAl\\JALI SAS1'RI"}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13457, "end_char": 13466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATAl\\JALI SAS1'RI C.J., MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS,\n\nGm; LAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S.R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13468, "end_char": 13476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATAl\\JALI SAS1'RI C.J., MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS,\n\nGm; LAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "LAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13483, "end_char": 13492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATAl\\JALI SAS1'RI C.J., MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS,\n\nGm; LAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13511, "end_char": 13532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 13, 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13540, "end_char": 13552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Provisions of Regulation different from Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13657, "end_char": 13720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_661_677_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 661\n\nany such limitations Government is, subject to the 1958 qualification mentioned above, as free to make special 8 . h-C d . . atis han ra contracts of service with temporary employees, engag- Anand ed in works of a temporary nature, as any other v. employer.\n\nThe Union of Various matters .relating to the meritsof the case India. were referred to but we express no opinion about Bo\" J. whether the petitioner has other rights which he can enforce in other ways.\n\nWe are dealing here with a writ under article 32 to enforce a fundamental right and the only point we decide is that no fundamental right bas been infringed.\n\nWhen the matter was first argued we had decided not to make any order about costs but now that the petitioner has persisted in reopening the case and calling the learned Attorney-General here for a second time, we have no alternative but to dismiss the petition with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioner: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha .\n\nHABF,.EB MOHAMED\n\nv. • rHE STA'rE OF HYDERABAD.\n\n[PATAl\\JALI SAS1'RI C.J., MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS,\n\nGm; LAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.] Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 13, 14-Hyderabad Regula tion X of 1359 F.-Trial by special jwlqe under Reg•tlation X after\n\n26th January, 1950-Provisions of Regulation different from Criminal Procedure Code-Equal protection of the law - Validity of trial-Tests of validity-Effect of cu.rtailment of committal proceed ings and of right to transfer, revision, confinnation of death sentence.\n\nIn determining the validity or otherwise of a pre.Constitution statute on the ground of any of its provisions being repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Constitution, two principles\n\nMarch 30.\n\nHabMb Mohamed\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad.\n\n66'2 SUPREME COCR'l' REPOR'l'S [1953]\n\nhave to be borne in mind. Firstly, the clause bas no retrospective\n\neffect and even if the law is in any sense discriminatory, it must be held to be valid for all past transactions and for enforcement of rights and liabilities accrued before the coming into force of tho Constitution. Secondly, Art. 13 (l) of the Constitution doeg not necessarily make the whole statut~ innlid even after the advent of the Constitution. It invalidates only those provisions which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution . • Further, the fact that trial was continued even after 26th January, 1950, under the earlier Regulation which is in some res. pacts discriminatory would not necessarily render the subsequent proceedings invalid. All that the accused could claim is that what remains of the trial must not duviate from the normal standard in material respects, so as to amount to a denial of the equal pro tection of laws within the meaning of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nFor the purpose of determining whether the accused was deprived of such protection, the Court has to see first of all whether after eliminating the discriminatory provisions in the Regulation, it was still possible to secure to the accused substantially the benefits of a trial under the ordinary law.; and if so, whether that was actually done in the particular case.\n\nOn the 5th January, 1950, he case of the accused who was charge.cl with murder, arson, ricting and other offences which was pending before a Special Tribunal was made over to a Special .Tudge in pursuance of the provieions of the Hyderabad Regulation X of 1359 F., which abolished t.1e Special Tribunal Regulation o_f\n\n1949. The trial commenced on the 11th February, 1950, after the ne\\V Constitution came into force and the accused was convicted and sentenced to death. His appeal was dismissed and the sentence of death was ultimately atmfirmed by the High Court. It was contended that the entire trial was il)Jlgal inasmuch as the Regulation under which the accused, was tried contained several provisions which were in coafiict with the equal -protection clause (Art. 14) of the Constitution and became void after the 26th January, 1950.\n\nHeld, (1) The provisions in the Regulation eliminating committal proceedings and substituting the warrant procedure for sessions procedure in the trial of offences did not render the trial illegal as the committal proceeding was r:ot an indispensable preliminary to a sessions trial under the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code.\n\n(2) On a proper interpretation of s. 8 of the Regulation the right of an accused to apply fer transfer of his case was not taken away and the right of revision was taken away only in respect of non-appealable sentences.\n\n(3) Section 8 of the Regulation was void in so far as it took away the provisions relating to confirmation of sentences but as this part of the Regulation was sevora\\>le from the remainin~\n\ns.c.:R. , ur . ~ME COURT REPORTS 663\n\nportion of the section tbe provisions of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code relating to confirmation of sentences could be followed, and those provisions did not in any way affect the procedure for trial laid down in the Regulation.\n\n(4) The fact that the Nizam's consent had not been obtained could not vitiate the trial as such consent is necessary only before execution of the sentence.\n\nHeld also, that the delegation of the authority of the Chief Minister to make over cases for trial to the Special .Tudge, by a general notifipation authorising all civil administrators of tbe districts to exerci•e within their respective jurisdictions the powers of the Chief Minister under s. 5 (b) was not invalid.\n\nSection 5 (b) does not require that the delegatee must be mentioned by name.\n\nQasini Razvi' s case ([1953] S.C.R. 589) applied.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 1952 and Petition No. 178 of 1952.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 11th May, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the l lth December, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad (Manohar Prasad J.) In Criminal Appeal No. 598 of 1950, and Petition nnder Article 02 of the Constitution.\n\nA. A. Peerbhoy (J. B. Dadachanji, with him) for the appellant.\n\nV. Rajaram Iyer, Advocate-General of Hyderabad (R. Ganapathy Iyer;, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953.\n\nMarch 30. The Judgment of PATANJALI 8ASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, and BHAGWATI , JJ. was delivered by MuKHERJEA J. Gm::LAM HASAN J. delivered a separate but concurring judgment.\n\nMuKHEHJEA J.-'rhe appellant before us, who in the year 1947 was a Revenue Officer in the District of vVarangal within the State of Hyderabad, was brought to trial before the Special Judge of Warangal appointed under Regulation X of 1359F. on charges of murdar, attempt to murder, arson, rioting and other offenceb\"-punishable under various sections of the Hyderabad Penal Code.\n\nThe offences were alleged to have been committed on or about the 9th of December, 1947, and the First Information Hepor~\n\nHabeeb Mohatned\n\nThe State of Hyderabad.\n\nwas lodged, a c.onsiderable time afterwards, on 31st January, 1949. 0µ 28th August, 1949, the, re was an Habeeb Mohamed order in terms of section 3 of the Special Tribunal\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad.\n\nRegulation No. V of 1358 F., which was in force at that time, directing the appellant to be tried by the Special Tribunal (A). The accused being a public officer, the sanction of the Military Goverupr was M1<kherj•a J. necessary to prosecute him and this sanction was given on 20th September, 1949. On 13th. December, 1949, a new .Regulation, being Regulation No. X of 1359F., was passed by the Hyderabad Government which euded the Special Tribunals created under the previous Regulation on ana. from 16th December, 1949; and consequently upon such termination provided for the appointment, power and procedure of Special Judges. f:lecticin 4 of the Regulation authorised the Chief Minister to appoint, after consulting the High Court, as many Special Judges as may from time to time be required for the purpose of section 5.\n\nSection 5(1) laid down that every Special Judge shall ' try- ( a) such offences of which the trial was immediately before the 16th December, 1949, pending before a Special Tribunal deemed to have been dissolved on that date, and are made over to him for trial by . the Chief Minister or by a person authorised by the .• Chief Minister in this behalf; and\n\n(b) such offences a.s are after the commencement of this Regulation made over to him for trial by the Chief Minister or by a person authorised by the Chief Minister in this behalf.\n\nOn 5th January, 1950, the case against the appellant was made over to Dr. Ijakshman Rao, a Special Judge of Warangal, who was appointed under the above Regulation under an order of the Civil Administrator, Warangal, io whom authority under section 5 of the Regulation was delegated by the Chief Minister and on the same date the Special Judge took cognizance of the offences. The trial commenced on and from 11th February, 19501 and altogether 21 witnesses were examined for th~ prosecution and one for\n\n1953 the defence. 'l'he Special Judge, by his judgment dated the 8th of May, 1950, convicted the appellant HabetJb of all the offences with which he was charged and Mohamed sentenced him to death under section 243 of the v.\n\nHyderabad Penal Code (corresponding to section -302 The state of of the Indian Penal Code) 'and to various terms of Hyderabad. imprisonment under sections 248, 368, 282 and 124of the Code of Hyderabad (which correspond respec- Mukherjea J. tively to sections 307, 436, 342 and 14§ of the Indian\n\nCode).\n\nAgainst this judgment the appellant took an appeal to the High Court of Hyderabad and the appeal was first heard . by a Division Bench consisting of Shripat Rao and S. Ali Khan JJ. On 29th September, 1950, the learned Judges delivered differing judgments, Shripat Rao J. taking the view that the appeal should be dismissed, while the other learned Judge expressed the opinion that the appeal ought to be allowed and the accused acquitted. '.l'he case was then referred to Mr. Justice Manohar Prasad as a third Judge and by his judgment dated the nth of December, 1950, the learned Judge agreed with the opinion of Shripat Rao J. and dismissed the appeal upholdingtheconviction and sentences passed by the Special Judge.\n\nThe appellant then presented an application for leave to appeal to this court. That application was rejected by the High Court of Hyderabad, but special leave to appeal was granted by this court on 11th May, 1951, and it is on the strength of this special leave that the appeal has come before us.\n\nThe present hearing of the appeal is confined to certain constitutional points which have been raised by the appellant attacking the .legality of the entire trial which resulted in his conviction on the ground\n\nthat the procedure for trial laid down in Regulation X of 1359F. became void after the 26th of Janua~, 1950, by reason of its being in conflict with the equal protection clause embodied in article 14 of the Constitution. 'l'hese grounds have been set forth in a separate petition filed by tbe appellant under article 32 of the Constitution and following tbe procedure adopted in the case of Qasim Razvi [Case No. 276\n\nof 1951(1)], we decided to hear arguments on tl; ie constitutional questions as preliminary points in the Habeeb Mohamed appeal itself. Whether the appeal would have to be\n\nheard further or not would depend on the decision Th• st, te of whh1h we arrive at in the present hearing. . .\n\n'Hyderabad.\n\nThe substantial contention put forward by .Mr.\n\nMukherjea J. Peerbhoy, who appeared in support of the appeal, is\n\nthat as the procedure for trial prescribed by Regulation X of 1359F. deviated to a considerable extent from the normal procedure laid down by the general law and deprived the accused of substantial benefits to which otherwise he would have been entitled, the Regulation became void under article 13(1) of the Constitution on and frnm the 26th of January, 1950.\n\nThe conviction and the sentences resulting from the procedure thus adopted must, therefore, be held illegal and inoperative and the judgment of the Special Judge as well as of the High Court shcrnld be quashed. 'rhe other point raised by the learned counsel is t'hat the making over of the case of the appellant to the Special Judge was illegal as the authority. to make over such cases was not properly delegated by the Chief Minister to the Ci vii Administrator in the manner contemphted by section 5 of the Regulation.\n\nAs regards the first point, it is to be noted at the out- . set that the impugned Hegulation was a pre-Constitu'\n\ntion statute. In determimng the validity or otherwise of such legislation on the ground of any of its provisions being repugnant to the equal protection clause, two principles would have to be borne in mind, which were enunciated by the majority of this court in the case of Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad('), decided on tbe 19th of J auuary, 1953, where the earlier decision in• Lackman Das Kewalram v. The State of Bombay(\") was discussed and explained.\n\nFirstly, the Constitution has no retrospective effect and even if the law is in any sense discriminatory, it must be held to be valid for all past tr:msactions and for enforcement of rights and liabilities accrued before the\n\n(1) [1953] S.C.R. 589.\n\n(2) [1952) S.C.R. 710,\n\ncoming into force of the Constitution.\n\nSecondly, article 13(1) of the Constitution does not necessarily make the whole stat11te invlid even after the advent of the Constitution.\n\nIt invalidates only those provisions which are incousi; teut with the fundamental rig)lts guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe statUte becomes void only to the extent of such incousisteµcy but otherwise rem::tius valid and operative.\n\nAs was said in Qasiin Razvi's case(') the fact that \"trial was continued even after 26th January, 1950, under the same Regulation would not necessarily render the subsequent proceedings invalid. All that the accused could claim is that what remained of the trial must not deviate from the normal standard iu material respects, so as to amount to a denial of the equal protection of laws within the meaning of article 14 of the Constitution. For the purpose of determining whether the accused was deprived of such protection, we have to see first of all whether after eliminating the discriminatory provisions in the Regulation, it was still possible to secure to the accused substantially the benefits of a trial under the ordinary law; and if so, whether that was actually • done in the particular case.\" As has been stated already, the Special udge took . , cognizance of this case on the 5th of January, 1.950,\n\nwhich was prior to the advent of the Constitution. It. must be held, therefore, that the Special Judge was lawfully seized of the case, and it is not possible to say that the appointment of a Special Judge was in itself au inequality in the eye of the law.\n\nThe ti'ial undoubtedly commenced from the 11th of February, 1950, that is to say, subsequent to the coming iuto force of the Constitution, and the question that requires consideration is, whether the procedure that was actually followed by the Special Judge acting nuder the impugned Regulation did give the accused the substance of a normal trifl.l, or, in other words, whether he had been given a fair measure of equality in the matter of procedure? .\n\n(1) [1953] S.C.R. 589,\n\nHttbBeb Mohamed v.\n\nThe State of\n\nHyddrabad.\n\nMuk1rn1', fea J,\n\nRabeeb .Afohatned\n\nThe State of Hyderabad.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nMr. Peerbhoy lays stress on two sets of provisions in the impugned Regulation which, according to him, differentiate the procedure prescribed in it from that laid down nuder the ordinary law.\n\nThe first set relates to the elimination of the committal proceeding and the substitution of warrant procedure for the sessions procedure in the trial of offences. The otlier set of provisions conists of those which deny to the accused the rights of revision and transfer and withdraw from him the safeguards relating to c.onfirmation of sentences. The first branch of the contention, in our opinion, is unsustainable having regard to our decision in Qasim Razvi's case('). It was pointed out in that case that under the Hyderabad Criminal Procedme Code the committal proceeding is not au indispensable preliminary to a sessions trial.\n\nUnder section 267 A of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate is quite competent, either without rec-0rding any evidence or after recording only a portion of the evidence, to commit an accused for trial by the sessions court if, in his opinion, there are sufficient grounds for such committal.\n\nIf the committal proceeding is left out of account as not being compulsory, and.its absence did not; operate to ' take away the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to take cognizance of the case before the Constitution, .the difference between a warrant procedure prescribed '\n\nby the impugned Regulation to be followed by the Special Judge, after such cogni1:ance was taken and the sessions procedure at that stage applicable under the\\ general law is not at all substantial, and the minor differences would not bring the case within the mischief of article 14 of the Constitution. 'rhis question having been already decided in Qasim Razvi's case(') it is not open for further arguments in the present one.\n\nWith rega_rd to the other set of provisions, the contention of Mr. P.eerbhoy is based entirely upon the language. of section 8 of the Regulation.\n\nIn our opinion, the interpretation which the learned counsel seeks to put upon the sec; ition is not quite correc1r,\n\n(1) (1953] S.C.R. 589.\n\n...\n\nand it seems to ns that not only the right of an accused to apply for transfer of his case 'has not been taken away by this section, but the right of revision also has been left unaffected except to a small extent.\n\nSection 8 of the Regulation X of 1359 F. is in these terms:-\n\n\"All the provisions of section 7 of the said Regulation shall havQ effect in relation to sentences p:i, sse'd by a Special Judge as if every reference in the said Regulation to a Special Tribunal incluueda reference to a Special Judge.\"\n\nThe expression \"said Regulation\" means and refers to Regulation V of 1358 F. and section 7 of the said Regulation provides inter alia that \"there shall save as hereinbefore provided, be no appeal from any order or sentence passed by a Special Tribunal, and no court shall have authority to revise , such order or sentence or to transfer any case from Special Tribunal or have any jurisdiction of auy kind iu respect of any proceeding before a Special Tribunal and no sentence of a Special Tribunal shall be subject to or submitted for confirmation by any authority whatsoever.\" It will be noticed that what section 8 of the impugned Regulation does, is to incorporate, not the whole of section 7 of the previous Regulation, but only such portion of it as relates to sentences passed by a Special Judge. By\n\n\"sentence\" is meant obviously the final or definitive pronouncement of the criminal court which culminates or ends in a sentence as opposed to an \"order\", interlocutory or otherwise, where no question of infliction of any sentence is involved. The scope of section 7 of the earlier Regulation is thus much wider than that of present section 8 and all the limitations of the earlier statute. have not been repeated in the present one.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that revision against any order which has not ended in a sentence is not interdicted by the present Regulation, nor has the right of applying for transfer, which has no reference to a sentence, been touched at all.\n\nThese rights are expressly preserved by section 10 of the present\n\nHabeb Mohamed\n\nTh• Stat• of\n\nHyderabad.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nHabeeb Mohatned\n\nTho StatP of\n\nHydorabad.\n\nAfukhorjoa J.\n\nRegulation, which .makes the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable iu all matiers except where the Regulation has provided otherwise. Heading section 8 of the present Regulation with section 7 of the earlier one, it may be held that what has been taken away from an accused is, in bhe first place, the right of revision against nou-appealable sentences, aud in the sscond place, the provisions relating to confirmation of.sentences. The first one is immaterial for our present purpose, as no question of any non-appealable sentence arises in the case before us. '1 1he second is undoubtedly a discriminatory feature and naturally Mr. Peerbhoy has laid considerable stress upon it.\n\nSection 20 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code lays down the rule relating to confirmation of sentences in the following manner: Eve1y Sessions J 11dge may pass any sentence authorised by law, but such sentence shall not be carried into effect until ·\n\n(1) in the case of a sentence of 10 years' imprioonment or more, the appropriate Bench of the High\n\nConrt; .\n\n(2) in the case of life imprisonment, the Government; and\n\n(3) in the case of death sentence, H.E.H. the Nizam, shall have assented thereto.\n\nSection 302 provides that when a sessions court has passed a sentence of death or of life imprisonment or of imprisonment exceeding 10 years, the file of the case shall be forwarded to the High Court and the execution of the sentence stayed until manjuri is given in accordance with section 20.\n\nSection 307 further provides that when tbe High Court has affirmed a death sentence or sentence of life imprisonment, then its opinion together with the file of the case shall he forwarded for ratification to the Government within one week and the sentence shall not be carried into effect until alter the assent thereon of H.E.H. the Nizam in the case of death sentences and of .the Government in the case of\n\n8.0.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'r REPORTS 671\n\n!968 sentences of life .imprisonment. Mr. Peerbhoy's complaint is that the sentence imposed upon his client h h Baboeb as, m t e present case, neither been confirmed by Manam•d the High Court, nor by H. E. H. the N izam.\n\nThis, he v. says, is a discrimination which has vito.lly prejudiced Th• State of his client and does afford a ground for setting aside Hyderabad. the sentence in its entirety.\n\nMukhtrjda, J.\n\nIt admits of no dispute that section 8 of Regulation X of 1359F. must be held to be invalid under articles 13(1) and 14 of the Constitution to the extent that it takes away the provision relating to confirmation of sentences as is contained in tbe Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code. 'l.'hig, however, is a severable part of the section and being invalid, the provisions of the Hyderabad Crim;- nal l:'rocednre Code with regrd to the confirmation of sentences must be followed.\n\nThose provisions, however, do not affect in any way tbe procedure for trial laid down in tbe Regulation. All that section 20 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code lays down is that sentences of particular description should not be executed unless :Hscnt of certrtin authorities to tbe same is obtained. The proper stage, therefore, when tbis section comes into operation is the stage of the execution of tbe sentence. Tbe trial or conl'iction of the accused is not affected in any way by reason of the withdrawal of the provision relating to confirmation of sentences in the Regulation. The withdrawal is certainly inoperative and in spite of such withdrawal the accused can insist on the rights provided fol' under the general law.\n\nIn the case before us the records show tbat no reference was made by tbe Special Judge after be , passed the sentence of death upon the appellant in the manner contemplated by section 307 of the Hyderabad Code, which corresponds to section 374 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThere was, however, an appeal preferred by the accused and the entire file of the case came up before the High Courb in that connection.\n\nAs said already, the Division Bench, which heard the appeal, >ms divided in its\n\n672 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS [1953]\n\nopinion and consequently no question of confirmation of the death sentence could or did arise before that Hab .. b Mohamed Bench.\n\nThe question was, however, specifically\n\nThe Stale of\n\nHyderabad.\n\nraised towards the conclusion of the arguments before the third Judge: to whom it was referred; and it is significant to note that some time before that a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court had decided that Mukherjea J.\n\nR 1 1 fi the provision in the egu ation re ating to con rmation of sentences was void and inoperative and consequently in spite of the said provision the sentences were required to be confirmed in accordance with the general law. The question was then raised whether the confirmation was to be made by the third Judge alone or it had to be done by the two Judges who agre@d in dismissing the appeal. Mr. Justice Manohar Prasad decided that as the whole case was referred to him, he alone was competent to make the order for confirmation of the death sentence and be did actually confirm it by writing out in his own hand the order passing the sentence of death according to the provision laid down in the Hyderabad Code. Mr. Peerbhoy contends that this confirmation was illegal and altogether invalid as not being made in conformity with the provisions of the Hyderabad Code. We do not want to express any opinion on this point at the present moment. 'l'bere appears on the face of the record an order for confirmation of the death sentence made by a Judge of the High Court.\n\nIf this order is not in conformity with the provisions of law, the question may be raised before this court when the appeal comes up for hearing on its mer}ts.\n\nThis is, however, not a matter which affects the con- . stitutional question with which only we are concerned at the present stage.\n\nUnder section 20 of the Hyderabad Code, as mentioned above, a death sentence could not be executed unless the assent of H.E.H. the Nizam was obtained.\n\nMr. Peerbhoy points out that this has not been done iu the present case. 'l'o that the obvious reply is that consent of H.E.H. the Nizam is necessary only before the sentence is executed, and that stage apparently\n\nS.d.R. SUPREME COURT HEPORTS 67·3\n\nhas not a\"rrived as yet.\n\nThe final judgment of the High Court in this case was passed on 11th December, 1950. There was an application for leave to appeal presented by the accused immediately after that date aud this application was rejected on 2nd January, 1951.\n\nOn the 5th of February, 1951, an application for special leave was made to this court and the execution of the death sentence was stayed during this period under orders of the High Court itself. The special leave was granted by this court on 11th May, 1951, and the carrying out of the death sentence has been stayed since then under our orders, pending the disposal of the appeal. The question as to whether any further confirmation by H.E.H. the Nizam is necessary could only arise if and when the death sentence passed by the courts below is upheld by this court. Mr. Peerbhoy points out that since the 1st April, 1951, the Indian Criminal Procedure Code\n\nhas been introduced in the State of Hyderabad and there is no power in the Nizam now to confirm a sentence of death, although such confirmation was necessary at the time when the sentence was pronounced both by the Special Judge as well as by the High\n\nCourt on appeal. We do not think that. it is at all necessary for us at the present stage to discuss the effect bf this change of law. If the assent of the Nizam to the execution of a death sentence is a matter of procedure, it may be argued that the procedural law which obtains at the present moment is the proper law to be applied.\n\nOn the other hand, if it was a question of snbstanCive right, it may be open to contention that the law which governed the pa.rties at the date when the trial began is still applicable. We arc, however, not called upon to express any opinion on this point and we deliberately decline to do so. vVe also do not express any opinion as to whether the rights which conld be exercised by the Nizam under section 20 of the Hyderabad Criminal\n\nProcedure Code were appurtenant to his prerogative as a sovereign or were statutory rights exercisable by the perwn de>ignf>ted in the statute. These matters\n\nHabeeb Mohamed\n\nThe State a/ Hyderabad.\n\nMukherjea J\n\nHaboob llfohamuxl\n\nTho State of\n\nHyderabad,\n\nMukherjea J,\n\n&74\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1'8 [l953j\n\nmay be considered when the appeal comes up for final hearing on the merits. Our conclusion is that there has not been any discrimination in matters of procedure in this case which can be said to have affected the trial prejudicially against the accused and the accused is not entitled to have hi,; conviction and sentence set aside on that ground.\n\nThe other question raised by the appellant relates to delegation of the authority by the Chief Minister to make over cases for trial by the Special Judge.\n\nMr. Peerbhoy lays stress on section 5 (b) of the Hegulation which speaks of offences being \"made over to the Special Judge for trial by the Chief Minister or by a person authorised by the Chief Minister iu this behalf \", and it is argued that this section requires that the delegatee is to be mentioned by name. What the Chief Minister has done is that he issued a notification authorising all ciYil administrators of the districts to exercise within their respective jurisdictions the powers of tbe Chief Minister under the said section.\n\nThis, it is argued, is not in compliance with the provisions of tbe section. v\\'e do not think there is any substance in this contention.\n\nThe delegatee can certainly be described by reference to his official designation and the authority piay be vested in the holder of a particular office for the .time being. This,' we think, is quite a proper and convenient way of delegating the powers which are exercisable by the Chief Minister. In our opinion, the constitutional points raised by :\\fr. Peerbhoy fail.\n\nThe application under article 32 of the Constitution is thus rejected and the case is directed to be posted in the usual course for being heard on its merits.\n\nGHULAivI HASAN J. - I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Mr. Justice M ukherjea that the petition under article 32 of the Constitution be dismissed, but I deem it necessary to make a few oberv ations in view of my dissentiug judgment in Qasim Razvi's case(').\n\nThe majority judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Mukherjea on the 19th January, 195.3, in\n\n(I) [1951] S, C.R. 7ro.\n\nQasim Razvi's case(') while interpreting the decision in Lachmandas Kewalram Ahiija v. The State of Bombay(') laid down the principle that the mere fact that son:l.e of the provisions of the impugned Regulation are discriminatory on the face of it, is not sufficient to render the trial and the conviction void under article 14, read with article 13 ( l) of the Constitution and that in such ca, es where the trial is continued after the 26th January, 1950, under the impugned Regulation, it ib necesary to see whether the procedure followed after the material date wa.s such as deprived the accused of the equal protection of laws within the meaning of article 14 of the Constitution and that if the accused under such procedure received substantially the benefits of the trial nuder the ordinary law, the trial and conviction cannot be held as void and illegal.\n\nI take it that the majority decision is binding and that the principle enunciated by the majority is no longer open to question.\n\nWith this preliminary observation I must proceed to express my concurrence generally with the view taken by my learned brother Mr. Justice Mukherjea in the present case.\n\nIt is to be borne in mind that Regulation V of 1358 F. under which the 1 1ribunal was constituted to try Qasim Razvi's case was iu material respects different from Hegulation X of 1359 F. under which the Special Judge tried the petitioner Habeeb Mohammad. r agree with my learned brother in holding that there was no flaw in making over the case of the petitioner for trial to the 8pecial Judge under section 5 (h) of the Hegulation. The Special Judge took cognizance of the case before the ConstitLition came into force, but the entire evidence of the prosecution, unlike Qasim Ra%vi's case, was recorded after the 26th of January, 1950.\n\nThe Regulation in lJUestion was challenged before us as being void under article 14 read with article 13(1) of the Constitution on the following grounds:-\n\n(Ii [1953] S.C.R. 58,_\n\n(2) [1953] S, C, R, 589,\n\n19ft8\n\nHabeb Mohamed v.\n\nThe State of\n\nHyd., abad.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nHabeeb }rfoha1ned\n\nThe Stats of Hyderabad.\n\nGhulani Hasan J.\n\nC76\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [1953]\n\n(1) that the Regulation excludes the committal proceedings,\n\n('J) that the procedure of the sessions trial is replaced by the warrant procedure, ·\n\n(3) that there is no right of transfer, ( 4) that there is no revision,\n\n(5) that the right of confirmation by the Nizam in case of sentences of death has been negatived.\n\nAs regards the first two grounds, Mr. Justice Mukherjea, following the view taken in Qasim Razvi's case(') has held that under section '267 A of the Hydernbad Criminal Procedure Code committal proceedings are not compulsory and that there is no substantial difference between the sessions trial and the warrant procedure which was followed in the petitioner's case. These two grounds of attack therefore disappear. So far agrounds Nos. (3) and (4) are concerned, I agree with Mr. Justice M ukherjea in his interpretation of section 8 of the Regulation and hold in concurrence with the view taken by him that the right to apply for transfer has not been taken away and that the right of revision has been denied only in so far as non-appealable sentences are concerned. 'rhe present is a case of murder and other serious offences which are undoubtedly all appealable.\n\n'!'he only discriminatory feature of the Regulation left therefore is that no sentence of a Special Tribunal shall be subject to or submitted for confirmation by any authority whatsoever contained in section 7\n\n(2) of Regulation V of 1358F. which is made applicable under section 8 of Regulation X of 1359 F., in other words, that the right of the Nizam to confirm the death sentence h:.s been taken away.\n\nThis is unquestionably a Yaluable right available to the accused who is sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge or the High Court as the case may be. vVe were told by Mr. Peerbhoy, counsel for the petitioner, that no death sentence passed by the courts in Hyderabad during the last 50 years or sd has ever been carried into effect and that the Kizam has s, lways exercised\n\n(I) [1953] S.C.R, 589.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'I'S 677\n\nthis right iu favour of commuting the death sentence to a sentence for life. The denial of this right in the Hegulatiou is discriminatory ou the face of it aud deprives the petitioner of a valuable right. I concede, however, that this objectionable feature of the Regulation is severable from the other parts. I further agree that the stage for the exercise of that right has uot yet arisen, for the appeal of the petitioner is still pending iu this court. If the appea, J is allowed, or the sentence is reduced, uo question of the confirmation of the death sentence by the Nizam will arise.\n\nIf, however, the appeal is dismissed, it will be open to the petitioner to claim this right. It would not be desirable at this stage to express au opinion whether this right is a substantive right which vests iu the petitioner or oue relating to a mere matter of procedure, as that question will have to be considered aud decided when the appropriate stage arrives.\n\nI wou Id, therefore, agree iu dismissing the petition.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgeut for the petitioner: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nPOPPATLAL SHAH\n\nv. 1'HE scrATE OF MADRAS.\n\nUNIO~ OF INDIA AND OTHERS-Iuterveuers. [PATANJALT SAsrnr O.J., MuKHERJEA, VrvrAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN aud BHAGWATI JJ.J\n\nMaclras Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939), ss. 2, 3 (before amendment of 1947)-\" Sale within the vrovince\", meaning of-Levy of tax on sales where vroverty in the goods vassed outside the vrovince -Legal ity-Provincial Legislature-Territorial jurisdiction.\n\nUnder the Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939, as it stood before it was amended by the '.\\fadras Act XXV of 1947, the mere fact that the contrnct of sale was entered into within \\he frovjnce of\n\nHabe6b Mohamed\n\nv, Th• Stats of Hyderabad.\n\nGhulam Ha1an J.\n\nMarch 80.", "total_entities": 160, "entities": [{"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of Various matters .relating to the meritsof the case India."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 979, "end_char": 994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "G. 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Rajaram Iyer, Advocate-General of Hyderabad (R. Ganapathy Iyer;, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6196, "end_char": 6213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Rajaram Iyer, Advocate-General of Hyderabad (R. Ganapathy Iyer;, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI 8ASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6280, "end_char": 6296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of PATANJALI 8ASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, and BHAGWATI , JJ.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI 8ASTRI"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6303, "end_char": 6312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of PATANJALI 8ASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, and BHAGWATI , JJ.", "canonical_name": "M ukherjea"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6314, "end_char": 6323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of PATANJALI 8ASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, and BHAGWATI , JJ.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "Gm::LAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6374, "end_char": 6387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by MuKHERJEA J. Gm::LAM HASAN J. delivered a separate but concurring judgment."}}, {"text": "MuKHEHJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6438, "end_char": 6447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHEHJEA J.-'rhe appellant before us, who in the year 1947 was a Revenue Officer in the District of vVarangal within the State of Hyderabad, was brought to trial before the Special Judge of Warangal appointed under Regulation X of 1359F. on charges of murdar, attempt to murder, arson, rioting and other offenceb\"-punishable under various sections of the Hyderabad Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "M ukherjea"}}, {"text": "Special Judge of Warangal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6612, "end_char": 6637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHEHJEA J.-'rhe appellant before us, who in the year 1947 was a Revenue Officer in the District of vVarangal within the State of Hyderabad, was brought to trial before the Special Judge of Warangal appointed under Regulation X of 1359F. on charges of murdar, attempt to murder, arson, rioting and other offenceb\"-punishable under various sections of the Hyderabad Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6804, "end_char": 6814, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "9th of December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6882, "end_char": 6903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The offences were alleged to have been committed on or about the 9th of December, 1947, and the First Information Hepor~\n\nHabeeb Mohatned\n\nThe State of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Habeeb Mohamed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7086, "end_char": 7100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Habeeb Mohatned", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7119, "end_char": 7128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7457, "end_char": 7477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused being a public officer, the sanction of the Military Goverupr was M1<kherj•a J. necessary to prosecute him and this sanction was given on 20th September, 1949."}}, {"text": "13th. December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7482, "end_char": 7502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13th."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7575, "end_char": 7595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X of 1359F., was passed by the Hyderabad Government which euded the Special Tribunals created under the previous Regulation on ana."}}, {"text": "16th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7681, "end_char": 7700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from 16th December, 1949; and consequently upon such termination provided for the appointment, power and procedure of Special Judges."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7995, "end_char": 8004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8007, "end_char": 8019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ijakshman Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8619, "end_char": 8632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th January, 1950, the case against the appellant was made over to Dr. Ijakshman Rao, a Special Judge of Warangal, who was appointed under the above Regulation under an order of the Civil Administrator, Warangal, io whom authority under section 5 of the Regulation was delegated by the Chief Minister and on the same date the Special Judge took cognizance of the offences."}}, {"text": "Warangal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8653, "end_char": 8661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th January, 1950, the case against the appellant was made over to Dr. Ijakshman Rao, a Special Judge of Warangal, who was appointed under the above Regulation under an order of the Civil Administrator, Warangal, io whom authority under section 5 of the Regulation was delegated by the Chief Minister and on the same date the Special Judge took cognizance of the offences."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8785, "end_char": 8794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11th February, 19501", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8953, "end_char": 8973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial commenced on and from 11th February, 19501 and altogether 21 witnesses were examined for th~ prosecution and one for\n\n1953 the defence. '"}}, {"text": "8th of May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9114, "end_char": 9130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he Special Judge, by his judgment dated the 8th of May, 1950, convicted the appellant HabetJb of all the offences with which he was charged and Mohamed sentenced him to death under section 243 of the v.\n\nHyderabad Penal Code (corresponding to section -302 The state of of the Indian Penal Code) 'and to various terms of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "HabetJb", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9156, "end_char": 9163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he Special Judge, by his judgment dated the 8th of May, 1950, convicted the appellant HabetJb of all the offences with which he was charged and Mohamed sentenced him to death under section 243 of the v.\n\nHyderabad Penal Code (corresponding to section -302 The state of of the Indian Penal Code) 'and to various terms of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Mohamed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9214, "end_char": 9221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he Special Judge, by his judgment dated the 8th of May, 1950, convicted the appellant HabetJb of all the offences with which he was charged and Mohamed sentenced him to death under section 243 of the v.\n\nHyderabad Penal Code (corresponding to section -302 The state of of the Indian Penal Code) 'and to various terms of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "section 243", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9251, "end_char": 9262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9274, "end_char": 9294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9346, "end_char": 9363, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 248, 368, 282 and 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9420, "end_char": 9450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad Penal Code", "statute": "Hyderabad Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9501, "end_char": 9510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "imprisonment under sections 248, 368, 282 and 124of the Code of Hyderabad (which correspond respec- Mukherjea J. tively to sections 307, 436, 342 and 14§ of the Indian\n\nCode).", "canonical_name": "M ukherjea"}}, {"text": "sections 307, 436, 342 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9524, "end_char": 9553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad Penal Code", "statute": "Hyderabad Penal Code"}}, {"text": "High Court of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9636, "end_char": 9659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this judgment the appellant took an appeal to the High Court of Hyderabad and the appeal was first heard ."}}, {"text": "Shripat Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9727, "end_char": 9738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by a Division Bench consisting of Shripat Rao and S. Ali Khan JJ."}}, {"text": "S. Ali Khan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9743, "end_char": 9754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by a Division Bench consisting of Shripat Rao and S. Ali Khan JJ."}}, {"text": "29th September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9762, "end_char": 9782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29th September, 1950, the learned Judges delivered differing judgments, Shripat Rao J. taking the view that the appeal should be dismissed, while the other learned Judge expressed the opinion that the appeal ought to be allowed and the accused acquitted. '"}}, {"text": "26th of Janua~, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10896, "end_char": 10916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present hearing of the appeal is confined to certain constitutional points which have been raised by the appellant attacking the .legality of the entire trial which resulted in his conviction on the ground\n\nthat the procedure for trial laid down in Regulation X of 1359F. became void after the 26th of Janua~, 1950, by reason of its being in conflict with the equal protection clause embodied in article 14 of the Constitution. '"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10998, "end_char": 11008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11118, "end_char": 11128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Qasim Razvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11200, "end_char": 11211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'hese grounds have been set forth in a separate petition filed by tbe appellant under article 32 of the Constitution and following tbe procedure adopted in the case of Qasim Razvi [Case No.", "canonical_name": "Qasini Razvi"}}, {"text": "Habeeb Mohamed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11333, "end_char": 11347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "276\n\nof 1951(1)], we decided to hear arguments on tl; ie constitutional questions as preliminary points in the Habeeb Mohamed appeal itself.", "canonical_name": "Habeeb Mohatned"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea J. Peerbhoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11573, "end_char": 11594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J. Peerbhoy, who appeared in support of the appeal, is\n\nthat as the procedure for trial prescribed by Regulation X of 1359F. deviated to a considerable extent from the normal procedure laid down by the general law and deprived the accused of substantial benefits to which otherwise he would have been entitled, the Regulation became void under article 13(1) of the Constitution on and frnm the 26th of January, 1950."}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11927, "end_char": 11940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11977, "end_char": 11998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J. Peerbhoy, who appeared in support of the appeal, is\n\nthat as the procedure for trial prescribed by Regulation X of 1359F. deviated to a considerable extent from the normal procedure laid down by the general law and deprived the accused of substantial benefits to which otherwise he would have been entitled, the Regulation became void under article 13(1) of the Constitution on and frnm the 26th of January, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12494, "end_char": 12503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "of J auuary, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12975, "end_char": 12992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In determimng the validity or otherwise of such legislation on the ground of any of its provisions being repugnant to the equal protection clause, two principles would have to be borne in mind, which were enunciated by the majority of this court in the case of Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad('), decided on tbe 19th of J auuary, 1953, where the earlier decision in• Lackman Das Kewalram v. The State of Bombay(\") was discussed and explained."}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13426, "end_char": 13439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Qasiin Razvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13821, "end_char": 13833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was said in Qasiin Razvi's case(') the fact that \"trial was continued even after 26th January, 1950, under the same Regulation would not necessarily render the subsequent proceedings invalid.", "canonical_name": "Qasini Razvi"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14215, "end_char": 14225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "5th of January, 1.950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14697, "end_char": 14718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cognizance of this case on the 5th of January, 1.950,\n\nwhich was prior to the advent of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "11th of February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15021, "end_char": 15043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ti'ial undoubtedly commenced from the 11th of February, 1950, that is to say, subsequent to the coming iuto force of the Constitution, and the question that requires consideration is, whether the procedure that was actually followed by the Special Judge acting nuder the impugned Regulation did give the accused the substance of a normal trifl.l, or, in other words, whether he had been given a fair measure of equality in the matter of procedure? ."}}, {"text": "Rabeeb .Afohatned", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15522, "end_char": 15539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muk1rn1', fea J,\n\nRabeeb .Afohatned\n\nThe State of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "State of Hyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15545, "end_char": 15563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muk1rn1', fea J,\n\nRabeeb .Afohatned\n\nThe State of Hyderabad.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "Peerbhoy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15584, "end_char": 15592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J,\n\nMr. Peerbhoy lays stress on two sets of provisions in the impugned Regulation which, according to him, differentiate the procedure prescribed in it from that laid down nuder the ordinary law.", "canonical_name": "P.eerbhoy"}}, {"text": "section 267", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16416, "end_char": 16427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17269, "end_char": 17279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P.eerbhoy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17494, "end_char": 17503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With rega_rd to the other set of provisions, the contention of Mr. P.eerbhoy is based entirely upon the language.", "canonical_name": "P.eerbhoy"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17544, "end_char": 17553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17937, "end_char": 17946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18022, "end_char": 18031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Special Judge as if every reference in the said Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18114, "end_char": 18172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18318, "end_char": 18327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Judge as if every reference in the said Regulation", "statute": "Special Judge as if every reference in the said Regulation"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18844, "end_char": 18853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Judge as if every reference in the said Regulation", "statute": "Special Judge as if every reference in the said Regulation"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18923, "end_char": 18932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Judge as if every reference in the said Regulation", "statute": "Special Judge as if every reference in the said Regulation"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19301, "end_char": 19310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19377, "end_char": 19386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19761, "end_char": 19771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Habeeb Mohatned", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19843, "end_char": 19858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nHabeeb Mohatned\n\nTho StatP of\n\nHydorabad.", "canonical_name": "Habeeb Mohatned"}}, {"text": "Afukhorjoa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19886, "end_char": 19896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Afukhorjoa J.\n\nRegulation, which .makes the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable iu all matiers except where the Regulation has provided otherwise."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19930, "end_char": 19956, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20043, "end_char": 20052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20084, "end_char": 20093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Peerbhoy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20535, "end_char": 20543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 1he second is undoubtedly a discriminatory feature and naturally Mr. Peerbhoy has laid considerable stress upon it.", "canonical_name": "P.eerbhoy"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20583, "end_char": 20593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21093, "end_char": 21104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21376, "end_char": 21386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21389, "end_char": 21400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.E.H. the Nizam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21713, "end_char": 21729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 307 further provides that when tbe High Court has affirmed a death sentence or sentence of life imprisonment, then its opinion together with the file of the case shall he forwarded for ratification to the Government within one week and the sentence shall not be carried into effect until alter the assent thereon of H.E.H. the Nizam in the case of death sentences and of .the Government in the case of\n\n8.0.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'r REPORTS 671\n\n!", "canonical_name": "H.E.H. the Nizam"}}, {"text": "H. E. H. the N", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22036, "end_char": 22050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Peerbhoy's complaint is that the sentence imposed upon his client h h Baboeb as, m t e present case, neither been confirmed by Manam•d the High Court, nor by H. E. H. the N izam."}}, {"text": "Mukhtrjda", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22235, "end_char": 22244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhtrjda, J.\n\nIt admits of no dispute that section 8 of Regulation X of 1359F. must be held to be invalid under articles 13(1) and 14 of the Constitution to the extent that it takes away the provision relating to confirmation of sentences as is contained in tbe Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code. '", "canonical_name": "M ukherjea"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22279, "end_char": 22288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 13(1) and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22348, "end_char": 22369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22842, "end_char": 22852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23641, "end_char": 23652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23697, "end_char": 23708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24374, "end_char": 24394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "raised towards the conclusion of the arguments before the third Judge: to whom it was referred; and it is significant to note that some time before that a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court had decided that Mukherjea J.\n\nR 1 1 fi the provision in the egu ation re ating to con rmation of sentences was void and inoperative and consequently in spite of the said provision the sentences were required to be confirmed in accordance with the general law."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25803, "end_char": 25813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Peerbhoy contends that this confirmation was illegal and altogether invalid as not being made in conformity with the provisions of the Hyderabad Code", "statute": "Peerbhoy contends that this confirmation was illegal and altogether invalid as not being made in conformity with the provisions of the Hyderabad Code"}}, {"text": "H.E.H. the Nizam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25917, "end_char": 25933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 20 of the Hyderabad Code, as mentioned above, a death sentence could not be executed unless the assent of H.E.H. the Nizam was obtained.", "canonical_name": "H.E.H. the Nizam"}}, {"text": "11th December, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26289, "end_char": 26308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The final judgment of the High Court in this case was passed on 11th December, 1950."}}, {"text": "2nd January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26445, "end_char": 26462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was an application for leave to appeal presented by the accused immediately after that date aud this application was rejected on 2nd January, 1951."}}, {"text": "5th of February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26472, "end_char": 26493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th of February, 1951, an application for special leave was made to this court and the execution of the death sentence was stayed during this period under orders of the High Court itself."}}, {"text": "11th May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26707, "end_char": 26721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The special leave was granted by this court on 11th May, 1951, and the carrying out of the death sentence has been stayed since then under our orders, pending the disposal of the appeal."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27071, "end_char": 27086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Peerbhoy points out that since the 1st April, 1951, the Indian Criminal Procedure Code\n\nhas been introduced in the State of Hyderabad and there is no power in the Nizam now to confirm a sentence of death, although such confirmation was necessary at the time when the sentence was pronounced both by the Special Judge as well as by the High\n\nCourt on appeal."}}, {"text": "Nizam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28100, "end_char": 28105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vVe also do not express any opinion as to whether the rights which conld be exercised by the Nizam under section 20 of the Hyderabad Criminal\n\nProcedure Code were appurtenant to his prerogative as a sovereign or were statutory rights exercisable by the perwn de>ignf>ted in the statute."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28112, "end_char": 28122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Habeeb Mohamed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28309, "end_char": 28323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These matters\n\nHabeeb Mohamed\n\nThe State a/ Hyderabad.", "canonical_name": "Habeeb Mohatned"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28991, "end_char": 29000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30035, "end_char": 30045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "GHULAivI HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30173, "end_char": 30187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAivI HASAN J. - I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Mr. Justice M ukherjea that the petition under article 32 of the Constitution be dismissed, but I deem it necessary to make a few oberv ations in view of my dissentiug judgment in Qasim Razvi's case(').", "canonical_name": "GHULAivI HASAN"}}, {"text": "M ukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30258, "end_char": 30268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GHULAivI HASAN J. - I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Mr. Justice M ukherjea that the petition under article 32 of the Constitution be dismissed, but I deem it necessary to make a few oberv ations in view of my dissentiug judgment in Qasim Razvi's case(').", "canonical_name": "M ukherjea"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30293, "end_char": 30303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "19th January, 195.3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30514, "end_char": 30533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Mukherjea on the 19th January, 195.3, in\n\n(I) [1951] S, C.R. 7ro."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30881, "end_char": 30891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30903, "end_char": 30913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31218, "end_char": 31228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Habeeb Mohammad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31969, "end_char": 31984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to be borne in mind that Regulation V of 1358 F. under which the 1 1ribunal was constituted to try Qasim Razvi's case was iu material respects different from Hegulation X of 1359 F. under which the Special Judge tried the petitioner Habeeb Mohammad.", "canonical_name": "Habeeb Mohatned"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32131, "end_char": 32140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Qasim Ra%vi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32303, "end_char": 32314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Judge took cognizance of the case before the ConstitLition came into force, but the entire evidence of the prosecution, unlike Qasim Ra%vi's case, was recorded after the 26th of January, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Qasini Razvi"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32443, "end_char": 32453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32464, "end_char": 32477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Habeb Mohamed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32583, "end_char": 32596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regulation in lJUestion was challenged before us as being void under article 14 read with article 13(1) of the Constitution on the following grounds:-\n\n(Ii [1953] S.C.R. 58,_\n\n(2) [1953] S, C, R, 589,\n\n19ft8\n\nHabeb Mohamed v.\n\nThe State of\n\nHyd.,", "canonical_name": "Habeeb Mohatned"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHyd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32605, "end_char": 32618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regulation in lJUestion was challenged before us as being void under article 14 read with article 13(1) of the Constitution on the following grounds:-\n\n(Ii [1953] S.C.R. 58,_\n\n(2) [1953] S, C, R, 589,\n\n19ft8\n\nHabeb Mohamed v.\n\nThe State of\n\nHyd.,", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nHyderabad"}}, {"text": "Ghulam Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32628, "end_char": 32640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J.\n\nHabeeb }rfoha1ned\n\nThe Stats of Hyderabad.", "canonical_name": "GHULAivI HASAN"}}, {"text": "Ghulani Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32689, "end_char": 32702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulani Hasan J.\n\nC76\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [1953]\n\n(1) that the Regulation excludes the committal proceedings,\n\n('J) that the procedure of the sessions trial is replaced by the warrant procedure, ·\n\n(3) that there is no right of transfer, ( 4) that there is no revision,\n\n(5) that the right of confirmation by the Nizam in case of sentences of death has been negatived.", "canonical_name": "GHULAivI HASAN"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33587, "end_char": 33596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34131, "end_char": 34140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34203, "end_char": 34212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 677", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34767, "end_char": 34772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "POPPATLAL SHAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35902, "end_char": 35916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POPPATLAL SHAH\n\nv. 1'HE scrATE OF MADRAS."}}, {"text": "scrATE OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35926, "end_char": 35942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POPPATLAL SHAH\n\nv. 1'HE scrATE OF MADRAS."}}, {"text": "UNIO~ OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35945, "end_char": 35959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNIO~ OF INDIA AND OTHERS-Iuterveuers. ["}}, {"text": "PATANJALT SAsrnr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35985, "end_char": 36001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALT SAsrnr O.J., MuKHERJEA, VrvrAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN aud BHAGWATI JJ.J\n\nMaclras Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939), ss.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI 8ASTRI"}}, {"text": "VrvrAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36019, "end_char": 36030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALT SAsrnr O.J., MuKHERJEA, VrvrAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN aud BHAGWATI JJ.J\n\nMaclras Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939), ss."}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN aud BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36033, "end_char": 36058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALT SAsrnr O.J., MuKHERJEA, VrvrAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN aud BHAGWATI JJ.J\n\nMaclras Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939), ss."}}, {"text": "Maclras Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36065, "end_char": 36086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36101, "end_char": 36109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maclras Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Maclras Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36325, "end_char": 36351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ghulam Ha1an", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36546, "end_char": 36558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Ha1an J.\n\nMarch 80.", "canonical_name": "GHULAivI HASAN"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_677_686_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'I'S 677\n\nthis right iu favour of commuting the death sentence to a sentence for life. The denial of this right in the Hegulatiou is discriminatory ou the face of it aud deprives the petitioner of a valuable right. I concede, however, that this objectionable feature of the Regulation is severable from the other parts. I further agree that the stage for the exercise of that right has uot yet arisen, for the appeal of the petitioner is still pending iu this court. If the appea, J is allowed, or the sentence is reduced, uo question of the confirmation of the death sentence by the Nizam will arise.\n\nIf, however, the appeal is dismissed, it will be open to the petitioner to claim this right. It would not be desirable at this stage to express au opinion whether this right is a substantive right which vests iu the petitioner or oue relating to a mere matter of procedure, as that question will have to be considered aud decided when the appropriate stage arrives.\n\nI wou Id, therefore, agree iu dismissing the petition.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgeut for the petitioner: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nPOPPATLAL SHAH\n\nv. 1'HE scrATE OF MADRAS.\n\nUNIO~ OF INDIA AND OTHERS-Iuterveuers. [PATANJALT SAsrnr O.J., MuKHERJEA, VrvrAN BosE,\n\nGHULAM HASAN aud BHAGWATI JJ.J\n\nMaclras Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939), ss. 2, 3 (before amendment of 1947)-\" Sale within the vrovince\", meaning of-Levy of tax on sales where vroverty in the goods vassed outside the vrovince -Legal ity-Provincial Legislature-Territorial jurisdiction.\n\nUnder the Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939, as it stood before it was amended by the '.\\fadras Act XXV of 1947, the mere fact that the contrnct of sale was entered into within \\he frovjnce of\n\nHabe6b Mohamed\n\nv, Th• Stats of Hyderabad.\n\nGhulam Ha1an J.\n\nMarch 80.\n\n678 SUPREME COUR'f REPOR'I. 18 (1953)\n\n19b3 Madras did not make a transaction which was completed in another province where the property in the goods passed, a sale within the PoppJtlol Shah Province of Madras and no tax could be legally levied upon such a\n\nv. transaction under the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras.\n\nThough a Provincial Leg:slature could not pass a taxation statute which would be binding on any other part of India it was quite competent for a province to enact a legislation imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the province provided there was a sufficient and real territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing province.\n\nThe title and preamble, whatever their value might be as aids to the construction of a statute, undoubtedly throw light on the intention and design of the Legislature and indicate the scope and purpose of the legislation itself.\n\nIt is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the statute.\n\nJudgment of the Madras High Court reversed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE\n\nJUHISDIOTION: Criminal Appeal No. 92 of 1952.\n\nAppeal under articles 132(1) and 134(1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order da, ted the 29th August, 1962, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rajamauuar C.J. and Veukatarama Ayyar J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 1952 arisiugout of the.order dated the 25th February, 195\\l,\n\nof the Court of the VII Presidency Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, in C. T, No. 1368 of the Calendar\n\nfor 1960.\n\nB. Somayya (0. R. Pattabhi Raman, with him) for the appellant .\n\nV. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (V. V.\n\nRaghavan and Alladi Kuppuswami with him) for the respondent.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the Union of India.\n\nB. K. P. Sinha for the State of Bihar.\n\nS. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (M. L.\n\nSethi, with him) for the State of Punjab.\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPOR'l'S 679\n\nA. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore 1958 (R. Ganapathy Iyer, withhim) for the t:)tate of\n\n- 1- 8 h M Poppa! al ha ysore. v.\n\nK. B. Asthana for the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nThe Stat• of T.\n\nN. Subramanya Iyer, Advocate-General of Travancore-Cochin (M. R. Krishna Pillai and Balakrishna Iyer, with him) for the State oi Travancore- Cochin.\n\nV. N. Sethi for the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nHajarnavis for Husain Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. (Intervener No. 8).\n\n1953.\n\nMarch 30.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKH)'RJEA J.-Ths appeal, which has come before us o~ a certificate grauted by the Madras High Court under articles 134(1) (c) and 132(1) of the Constitution, is irected agaimt an appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 1952, by which the learned Judges affirmed an order of the Seventh Presidency Magistrate, Madras, dated February 25, 1952, convicting the appellant of an offence punishable under section 15 of the Madras General Sales 'fax Act and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000; in default to snfler imprisonment for a period of 3 months.\n\nThe appellant is a partner of a firm of merchants called \"Indo-Malayan Trading Company\" which has its head office in the city of Madras and carries on the business of selling and purchasing groundnut oil, sago and kirana articles.\n\nFor the period-April 1, 1947, to December31, 1947-the company was assessed to sales tax under the Madras Act IX of 1939 for an amount of Hs. 37,771 annas odd on a total turnover of Rs. 37,75,257 and for failure to pay the same proceedings were instituted against him under the provision of section 15 of the Act which resulted in his conviction as mentioned above.\n\nThe course of business, which is usually followed by the company\n\nMadras.\n\n6so\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1953)\n\n1968 and which was actually followed during the period for\n\nP --;; Shh which assessment is made, .is as follows: 'I'he com\n\nappat.~ \" pany receives orders in its Madras office from Cal Th• State of cutta merchants for supply of certain articles. 'l'hese\n\nMadras. articles are purchased in the local markets and they are despatched to Calcutta by rail or steamer. 'fhe Mukherjea J. railway receipts and bills of lading are taken in the name of the vendor companyand so also a, re the insurance policies, and they are sent to the company's bankers in Calcutta who deliver the same to the consignees on payment of prices and other charges. The sole point that requires consideration is, whether in bhese circumstances the sale transactions were liable to be taxed under the General Sales Tax Act of Madras?\n\nBefore the High Court both the 'partie~ seem to have accepted the position that if on the faQts stated above, which were not disputed by either side, the sales could be held to have taken place within tbe Province of Madras, the tax could legitimately be levied on them but not otherwise. The parties differ ed, however, as regards the test to be applied, in determining whether the sales did take place within the Province of Madras or not.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant the contention raised was that the place of sale in regard to all the transactions was Cal cutta, as the property in the goods sold admittedly passed to the purchasers in that city. 'l1he contention of the respondent State on the other hand was that the true test for determining the locality of the sale was not where the property in the goods sold passed, but where the actual transaction was put through.\n\nAs the company had its head office in the city of Madras, its accounts were maintained there and the goods were delivered to the common carrier in that city, the sale, according to the respondent, must be deemed to have taken place in Madras even though the property in the goods sold passed outside the province.\n\nThe High Court accepted this contention of the respondent State.\n\nIn the opinion of the learned\n\ns.c.:R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOirrs 6Si\n\nJudges, the word \"sale\" has both a legal and 11 popu- 1958 Jar meaning. In the legal sense, it imports passing of\n\n- 1- 1 Sh h t . h d d , . , h' h h Poppat a a proper y m t e goo s an it is m t is sense t at t e v word is used in the Sale of Goods Act.\n\nIn the popu- Th• s:ate of Jar sense, however, it signifies the transaction itself Madras. which results in the passing of property.\n\nAs the object of the Legislature in the Sales Tax Act is to Mukherj.a J. impose a tax on the occasion of the sale, it is immaterial that the sale has been completed outside the proYince. 'l'he place where the property passes is, it is said, a matter of no concern to the taxing authority and iu such context the popular meaning of the word is more appropriate and should be adopted. The further contention raised on behalf of the appellant, that if this view was accepted, the sales tax would have to be regarded as being extra-territorial in its operation and as such ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. was repelled by the High Court on the authority of the well known decision of the Judicial Committee in Wallace Brothers etc., cf: Company v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay(1).\n\nIt is the propriety of this decisiun that has been challenged before us and the contentious raised by Mr. Somayya, who appeared in support of the appeal, are of a two-fold character: 'l'he learned counsel has argued in the firnt place that the Provincial Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935, was constitutionally incompetent to enact a legislation of this character which according to the interpretation put upon it by the High Court is capable of operating on sale transactions concluded outside the province.\n\nThe other contention is that on a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Madras Sales Tax Act the High Court ought to have held that they do not authorise the imposition of sale tax in respect of a transaction of sale where prop_erty in the goods sold passes outside the provmce.\n\n'l'he first contention appears to us to be unsustainable.\n\nSection 100 (3) of the Government of India\n\n(I) [1948] F.C.R. I (P.C.).\n\n.. 682\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1953}\n\n1963 Act, 1935, upon which Mr. Somayya relied and -tl 1 Sh 1 which corresponds to article 246(3) of the Constitu- Poppa a a i . v. t10n runs as follows :\n\nThe State of\n\n!iladras. -·- Mukherje1. J.\n\n\"Subject to the two preceding sub-sections, the Provincial Legislature has and the Federal Legislature has not, power to make laws for a province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Second Schedule.'' The entry in the Provincial List that is relevant for our purpose is Entry No. 48 and that speaks of \"taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements.\" The entry does not suggest that a legislation imposing tax on sale of goods can be made only in respect of sales taking place within the boundaries of the province; and all tbat section 100(3) provides is that a law could be passed by a Provincial Legi'Slature for purposes of the province itself. It admits of no dispute that a Proviucial Legislature could not pass a taxation statute which would be binding on any other part of India outside the limits of the province, but it would be quite competent to enact a legislation imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the province, provided th&t there was sufficient and a real territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing prnvince. '!'his principle. which i,; based upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Wallace Brothers etc. J: Company v. Commissioner of Incometax, Bombay(') has been held by this court to be applicable to sale tax legislation, in its recent decision in the Bombay Sales Tax Act case (2) and its propriety is ueyond question. As a matter of fact, the legislative practice in regard to sale tax laws adopted by the Provincial Legislatures prior to the coming into force of the Conatitution has been to authorise imposition of taxes on sales and purchases which were related in some manner with the taxing province by reason of some of the ingredients of the transaction having taken phce within the province or by\n\n(1) [1948] F.C.R. 1 (P.G.).\n\n(z) The State of Bombay & Another v. United lrlotors (India) Ltd, cC Othet's-Civil Appeal No. 20• o:f 195i.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'I.\n\n1 REPORTS 683\n\nreason of the production or location of goods within 1958 it at the time when the transaction took place. If in - the Madras Sales 'fax Act the basis adopted for taxa- Popp, tlal Shah\n\ntion is the location of the place of business or of the Th• ;;, t, of goods sold, within the Proviuceof Madras, undoubt- Madras. edly it would be a valid piece of legislation to which no objection on constitutiona1 grounds could be taken.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nThe controversy, therefore, narrows down to the short point as to what exactly has been adopted as the basis of the levy of sale tax by the Madras Legislature.\n\nThis leads us to the question of interpretation of the statute which is involved in the second point raised by Mr. Somayya.\n\nIt is a settled rale of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpo, se and object of the Act itself. The title of the Madras Sales Tax Act describes it to be an Act, the object of which is to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in the Province of Madra~ and the very same words are repeated in the preamble which follows.\n\nThe title and preamble, what-ever their value might be as aids to the construe\n\ntion of a statute, undoubtedly throw light on the intent and design of the Legislature and indicate the scope and purpose of the legislation itself.\n\nThe title and preamble of the Madras Sales Tax Act clearly show that its object is to impose taxes on sales that take place within the province, though these words do not necessarily mean that the property in the goods sold must pass within the province., The expression\n\n\"sale of goods\" is a composite expression consisting of various ingredients or elements.\n\nThus, there are the elements of a bargain or contract of sale, the payment or promise of payment of price, the delivery of goods and the actual passing of title, and each one of them is essential to a transaction of sale though the sale is not completed or concluded unless the purchaser becomes the owner of the property. 'rhe question is what element or elements have been accepted\n\n684 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS [1953]\n\n1958 by the Madras Legislature as constituting a sale in\n\nPo ~-; Sh 1 the province upon which it is the object of the statute ppa:. \"'to levy tax. Section 2(h) gives the definition of \"sale\"\n\nThe State of and it is defined as meaning, \"every transfer of the Madras. property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred Mukhorjea J. payment or other valuab'le consideration, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, . charge or pledge.\"\n\nUnmistakably the stress is laid in this definition on the element of transfer of property in a sale and no other.\n\nThe language gives no indication of the popular meaning of sale in which according to the High Court, the word was used.\n\nIt is to be noticed that there was no provision by way of explanation of this definition, in operation, at the material time to indicate in what cases a sale would be regarded as taking place within the Province of.Madras, although the property in the goods sold did pass outside the boundaries of the province.\n\nSuch explanations were added by the Madras Act XXV of 1947 and one of these explanations, namely explanation 2, provides as follows:\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale or purchase of any goods shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have taken place in this Province, wherever the contract of sale or purchase might have beenmade-\n\n(a) if the goods were actually in this Province, at the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made, or\n\n(b) in case the contract was for the sale or pnrchase of future goods by description, then, if the goods are actually produced in this Province at any time after the contract of sale or pmchase in respect thereof was made.\"\n\nIt would be clear from this that these trnnsacti0ns were not considered by the Legislature to constitute sales within the Province of Madras under the defini.- tion itself, but by resort to a legal fiction they were\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS 685\n\ndeclared to be so, notwithstanding any provision in 1958 the Sale of Goods Act to the contrary which, it was P ~Sh h assumed, would otherwise be applicable.\n\nThe explaoppat: a nation further shows that in defining \"sale\" in sec- The st:,, of tion '2(h), the Legislature had in mind a sale in the Madras.\n\nProvince of Madras and as these words occur in the title and preamble of the Act it was not deemed uecee- Mu/, herjea J. sary to repeat them in the definition or the charging sections. Section 3 is the charging section in the Act and it provides for the levy of a tax on the total • turnover of a dealer for a particular year. A \"turnover\" is defined to be the aggregate amount for which goods are either bought or sold. The charging section purports .to levy a tax on the sale of goods and the tax is on the sale of goods in the Province of Madras as defined in section 2(h) of the Act read in the light of its title and prea.mble.\n\nIn our opinion, the mere fact that the contract for sale was entered into within the Province of Madras does not make the transaction, which was completed admittedly within another province, where the property in the goods passed, a sale within the Province of Madras according to the provisions of the Madras\n\nSales Tali: Act and no tax could be levied upon such a transaction under the provisions of the Act.\n\nA contract of sale becomes a sale under the Sale of Goods Act only when the property in the goods is transferred to the buyer under the terms of the contract itself. The presence of the goods within the province at the time of the contract would undoubtedly make the s:i.le, if subsequently completed, a sale within the province by reason of the exp \\anation added by Act XXV of 1947; but as this explanation was not in operation during the relevant period with which we are concerned, the assessment of sale tax, in our opinion, on the transactions during this period is illegal and not warranted by the provisions of the Act. It is worthwhile to mention in this connection that except for the period in question no tax was . attempted to be levied on similar transactions of the\n\na.ppellant by the taxing authorities in' any of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 previous years, though the Act came iuto operation\n\nPoppatlal Shah as early as the ye11r 1939. It is not disputed also that\n\nv. the company is pa.ying sale tax on its transactions The State of with the Calcutta merchants sirice the explanation\n\nMadras. added by Act XXV of 1947 came into force.\n\nIn our opinion, the appeal should be allowed and the con- Miikhe1j ea J. b 1 viction and sentence passed by the courts e ow should be set aside. The fine and sale tax, if actually paid, should be refunded to the appellant.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the a, ppellant: M. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\nAgent for the respondent (the State of Madras), the L' nion of India, and the States f Punjab, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh and Travancore- Cochin (Interveners): G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nAgent for the State of Bihar : R. 0. Prasad.\n\nAgent for the State of TJ. P. : 0. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for Intervener No. 8: Rajinder Narain.\n\nPUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD.\n\nEMPLOYEES OF THE BANK.\n\n[PATANJALI 8ASTRI 0. J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, S. R. DAS,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Disp11t'8 Act, 1947, s. 33-lnili; strial dispute-Reference to Tribunal-Strike on fresh grounds-Dismissal of strikers during pendency of proceedings before Tribunal-Legality-Scope of s. 33.\n\nDuring the pendency of proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal relating to certain disputes between a bank and its workmen represented by the ur.ion of its employees, the respondents along with other workmen numbering over a thousand commenced a gerieral strike in connection with a fresh dispute.\n\nThe strikers were dismissed and on a reference to another Tribunal, it was held by that Tribunal that, the strike was illegal and the dismissal was legal.\n\nThe Labom Appellate Tribunal held on appeal that though the strike was illegal the bank had condoned it and the dismissal was therefore illegal ancj ordered reinstatelllent, Oq f1nther appeal ; ·", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "S 677", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 35, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1100, "end_char": 1115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ageut for the petitioner: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1144, "end_char": 1162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "POPPATLAL SHAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1165, "end_char": 1179, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "POPPATLAL SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HE scrATE OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1205, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1271, "end_char": 1280, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKH)'RJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VrvrAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1282, "end_char": 1293, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN aud BHAGWATI JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1296, "end_char": 1324, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Maclras Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1328, "end_char": 1349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1364, "end_char": 1372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maclras Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Maclras Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1588, "end_char": 1614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ghulam Ha1an", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1809, "end_char": 1821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Ha1an J.\n\nMarch 80.", "canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1881, "end_char": 1887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "678 SUPREME COUR'f REPOR'I. 18 (1953)\n\n19b3 Madras did not make a transaction which was completed in another province where the property in the goods passed, a sale within the PoppJtlol Shah Province of Madras and no tax could be legally levied upon such a\n\nv. transaction under the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMadras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2148, "end_char": 2164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nMadras."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2277, "end_char": 2282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though a Provincial Leg:slature could not pass a taxation statute which would be binding on any other part of India it was quite competent for a province to enact a legislation imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the province provided there was a sufficient and real territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing province."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3023, "end_char": 3040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Madras High Court reversed."}}, {"text": "articles 132(1) and 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3132, "end_char": 3158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3170, "end_char": 3191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajamauuar C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3294, "end_char": 3309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal under articles 132(1) and 134(1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order da, ted the 29th August, 1962, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rajamauuar C.J. and Veukatarama Ayyar J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Veukatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3314, "end_char": 3331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal under articles 132(1) and 134(1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order da, ted the 29th August, 1962, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rajamauuar C.J. and Veukatarama Ayyar J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B. Somayya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3537, "end_char": 3547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Somayya (0.", "canonical_name": "B. Somayya"}}, {"text": "R. Pattabhi Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3552, "end_char": 3569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Pattabhi Raman, with him) for the appellant ."}}, {"text": "V. K. T. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3602, "end_char": 3616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (V. V.\n\nRaghavan and Alladi Kuppuswami with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "V. V.\n\nRaghavan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3646, "end_char": 3661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (V. V.\n\nRaghavan and Alladi Kuppuswami with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Alladi Kuppuswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (V. V.\n\nRaghavan and Alladi Kuppuswami with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. 0. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3715, "end_char": 3729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3759, "end_char": 3771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3776, "end_char": 3787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "B. K. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3824, "end_char": 3838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. P. Sinha for the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3864, "end_char": 3875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (M. L.\n\nSethi, with him) for the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "M. L.\n\nSethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3905, "end_char": 3917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (M. L.\n\nSethi, with him) for the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "8.C.R.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3955, "end_char": 3961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPOR'l'S 679\n\nA. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore 1958 (R. Ganapathy Iyer, withhim) for the t:)tate of\n1- 8 h M Poppa!"}}, {"text": "S 679", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3986, "end_char": 3991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. R. Somanatha Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3993, "end_char": 4013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPOR'l'S 679\n\nA. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore 1958 (R. Ganapathy Iyer, withhim) for the t:)tate of\n1- 8 h M Poppa!"}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4048, "end_char": 4065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPOR'l'S 679\n\nA. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore 1958 (R. Ganapathy Iyer, withhim) for the t:)tate of\n1- 8 h M Poppa!"}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nK. B. Asthana for the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "T.\n\nN. Subramanya Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4191, "end_char": 4213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stat• of T.\n\nN. Subramanya Iyer, Advocate-General of Travancore-Cochin (M. R. Krishna Pillai and Balakrishna Iyer, with him) for the State oi Travancore- Cochin."}}, {"text": "M. R. Krishna Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stat• of T.\n\nN. Subramanya Iyer, Advocate-General of Travancore-Cochin (M. R. Krishna Pillai and Balakrishna Iyer, with him) for the State oi Travancore- Cochin."}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4279, "end_char": 4295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stat• of T.\n\nN. Subramanya Iyer, Advocate-General of Travancore-Cochin (M. R. Krishna Pillai and Balakrishna Iyer, with him) for the State oi Travancore- Cochin."}}, {"text": "V. N. Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4345, "end_char": 4356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Sethi for the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "MuKH)'RJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4520, "end_char": 4530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKH)'RJEA J.-Ths appeal, which has come before us o~ a certificate grauted by the Madras High Court under articles 134(1) (c) and 132(1) of the Constitution, is irected agaimt an appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras, passed in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "MuKH)'RJEA"}}, {"text": "articles 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4627, "end_char": 4642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4746, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKH)'RJEA J.-Ths appeal, which has come before us o~ a certificate grauted by the Madras High Court under articles 134(1) (c) and 132(1) of the Constitution, is irected agaimt an appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras, passed in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Seventh Presidency Magistrate, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4864, "end_char": 4901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "129 of 1952, by which the learned Judges affirmed an order of the Seventh Presidency Magistrate, Madras, dated February 25, 1952, convicting the appellant of an offence punishable under section 15 of the Madras General Sales 'fax Act and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4984, "end_char": 4994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indo-Malayan Trading Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5198, "end_char": 5226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a partner of a firm of merchants called \"Indo-Malayan Trading Company\" which has its head office in the city of Madras and carries on the business of selling and purchasing groundnut oil, sago and kirana articles."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5387, "end_char": 5400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the period-April 1, 1947, to December31, 1947-the company was assessed to sales tax under the Madras Act IX of 1939 for an amount of Hs."}}, {"text": "Madras Act IX of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5470, "end_char": 5491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5662, "end_char": 5672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act IX of 1939", "statute": "Madras Act IX of 1939"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6182, "end_char": 6190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "articles are purchased in the local markets and they are despatched to Calcutta by rail or steamer. '"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8216, "end_char": 8233, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Wallace Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9082, "end_char": 9098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was repelled by the High Court on the authority of the well known decision of the Judicial Committee in Wallace Brothers etc.,"}}, {"text": "Somayya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9267, "end_char": 9274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the propriety of this decisiun that has been challenged before us and the contentious raised by Mr. Somayya, who appeared in support of the appeal, are of a two-fold character: 'l'he learned counsel has argued in the firnt place that the Provincial Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935, was constitutionally incompetent to enact a legislation of this character which according to the interpretation put upon it by the High Court is capable of operating on sale transactions concluded outside the province.", "canonical_name": "B. Somayya"}}, {"text": "Provincial Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9405, "end_char": 9479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10056, "end_char": 10067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provincial Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Provincial Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1953}\n\n1963 Act, 1935", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10137, "end_char": 10181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. 682\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1953}\n\n1963 Act, 1935, upon which Mr. Somayya relied and -tl 1 Sh 1 which corresponds to article 246(3) of the Constitu- Poppa a a i ."}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10249, "end_char": 10263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provincial Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Provincial Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "State of", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10326, "end_char": 10334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. t10n runs as follows :\n\nThe State of\n\n!", "canonical_name": "State of Madras"}}, {"text": "Mukherje1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10350, "end_char": 10359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherje1.", "canonical_name": "MuKH)'RJEA"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10595, "end_char": 10610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10945, "end_char": 10959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1948] F.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12186, "end_char": 12201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12785, "end_char": 12794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nThe controversy, therefore, narrows down to the short point as to what exactly has been adopted as the basis of the levy of sale tax by the Madras Legislature.", "canonical_name": "MuKH)'RJEA"}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12939, "end_char": 12957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nThe controversy, therefore, narrows down to the short point as to what exactly has been adopted as the basis of the levy of sale tax by the Madras Legislature."}}, {"text": "Madra~", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13519, "end_char": 13525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The title of the Madras Sales Tax Act describes it to be an Act, the object of which is to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in the Province of Madra~ and the very same words are repeated in the preamble which follows."}}, {"text": "Section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14754, "end_char": 14766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Act XXV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15687, "end_char": 15709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15786, "end_char": 15864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16721, "end_char": 16738, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Province of Madras and as these words occur in the title and preamble of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16965, "end_char": 17045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17150, "end_char": 17159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Province of Madras and as these words occur in the title and preamble of the Act", "statute": "Province of Madras and as these words occur in the title and preamble of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17528, "end_char": 17540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Province of Madras and as these words occur in the title and preamble of the Act", "statute": "Province of Madras and as these words occur in the title and preamble of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18055, "end_char": 18072, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19445, "end_char": 19462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the a, ppellant: M. S. K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19495, "end_char": 19510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent (the State of Madras), the L' nion of India, and the States f Punjab, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh and Travancore- Cochin (Interveners): G. H. Rajadhyaksha.", "canonical_name": "State of Madras"}}, {"text": "0. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19676, "end_char": 19685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the State of Bihar : R. 0."}}, {"text": "P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19723, "end_char": 19729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Lal."}}, {"text": "PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19778, "end_char": 19802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI 8ASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19830, "end_char": 19846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI 8ASTRI 0."}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19855, "end_char": 19864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, S. R. DAS,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MuKH)'RJEA"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19866, "end_char": 19875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, S. R. DAS,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19895, "end_char": 19903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, S. R. DAS,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19942, "end_char": 19947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20103, "end_char": 20108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_686_690_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 previous years, though the Act came iuto operation\n\nPoppatlal Shah as early as the ye11r 1939. It is not disputed also that\n\nv. the company is pa.ying sale tax on its transactions The State of with the Calcutta merchants sirice the explanation\n\nMadras. added by Act XXV of 1947 came into force.\n\nIn our opinion, the appeal should be allowed and the con- Miikhe1j ea J. b 1 viction and sentence passed by the courts e ow should be set aside. The fine and sale tax, if actually paid, should be refunded to the appellant.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the a, ppellant: M. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\nAgent for the respondent (the State of Madras), the L' nion of India, and the States f Punjab, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh and Travancore- Cochin (Interveners): G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nAgent for the State of Bihar : R. 0. Prasad.\n\nAgent for the State of TJ. P. : 0. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for Intervener No. 8: Rajinder Narain.\n\nPUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD.\n\nEMPLOYEES OF THE BANK.\n\n[PATANJALI 8ASTRI 0. J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, S. R. DAS,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Disp11t'8 Act, 1947, s. 33-lnili; strial dispute-Reference to Tribunal-Strike on fresh grounds-Dismissal of strikers during pendency of proceedings before Tribunal-Legality-Scope of s. 33.\n\nDuring the pendency of proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal relating to certain disputes between a bank and its workmen represented by the ur.ion of its employees, the respondents along with other workmen numbering over a thousand commenced a gerieral strike in connection with a fresh dispute.\n\nThe strikers were dismissed and on a reference to another Tribunal, it was held by that Tribunal that, the strike was illegal and the dismissal was legal.\n\nThe Labom Appellate Tribunal held on appeal that though the strike was illegal the bank had condoned it and the dismissal was therefore illegal ancj ordered reinstatelllent, Oq f1nther appeal ; ·\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSbPREME COURT BEPOtTS 687\n\nHeld, that even assuming that the strike was illegal and the 1953 bank had not condoned it, as proceedings were pending before another Tribunal between the bank and its workmen in respect P1\"ijab Nationat o( an industrial dispute, under section 33 of the Industrial Dis- Ban1' Ltd. putes Act, 1947, the ban)< could not dismiss the workmen save v, with the permission in writing of that Tribunal which was not Employ8's of obtained and the dismissal was accordingly illegal on this ground. the Ban1'.\n\nSection 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, applies to strikes and lock-outs as well, though it does not appear in Chap. V of the Act which is headed \"Strikes and lock-outs\" but in Chap. VII which is headed \"Miscelhneous.\" '\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRisDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 181 of 1952.\n\nAppeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 16th October, 1952, from the decision dated the 22nd December, 1952, of the Labour Appellate •rribunal of India at Calcutta in Appeals Nos.\n\nCal. 366/51, Cal. 69/52 and Cal. 70/52, arising out of the award dated the 9th Februa, ry, 1952, of the Chairman, Industrial Tribunal, Delhi.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad (Attorney-General for India) and N. 0. Chatterjee (R. L. Agarwal, with them) for the appellant.\n\nA. S. R. Chari and Hardyal Hardy for the respondents.\n\n1953. April 10. '.l 1he Judgment of the Court-, was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI 8ASTRI C. J.· -'rhis is an appeal by special leave from a decision dated September 22, 1952, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Calcutta setting aside an award dated February 9, 1952, made by the Industrial 'l'ribunal constituted to adjudicate on certain disputes between the appellant, the Punjab National Bank Ltd., Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) and its workmen, the respondents represented by their Union.\n\nThe facts leading to this appeal may be briefly stated. Several other disputes between the parties had already been referred on February 21, 1950, to another Industrial Tribunal presided over by Sri K. S.\n\n688 . SUPREME COUR'l' REPORrs (1953]\n\nw; s Campbell-Puri, and during the pendency of the pro- . -;;; 1ceedings before the said Tribunal, the Bank alleged PunJab ., ationa h h h k Bank Ltd. that t e respondents along wit ot er wor men v. numbering more than a t'.1ousand illegally commenced Employees of a general strike on April 18, 1951, in connection with\n\nthe Bank. a fresh dispute. Thereu-:ion, notice was issued to the strikers that unless they returned to work by April Patanjali 24, 1951, they would be deemed to have left service Sastri a. J. of their , own accord. '!.'hat notice having been ignored by the strikers a scond noticEl, was issued to them on April 27, 1951, terminating their service.\n\nThe Government of India thereupon intervened, and as a result of the discussions held between the Government officials and the Ba.uk, the latter agreed to take back all the employees except 150 against whom the Bank had objections on account of their alleged subversive activities and other objectionable and unlawful conduct before and during the strike.\n\nOn July 2, 1951, the Government of India constituted a 'l'ribuual to decide the questions regarding the dismissals etc. of the aforesaid 150 employees, and that 'l'ribunal, after calling for the statements of case on behalf of the parties and hearing them, made an award on J<'ebruary 9, 1951, refusing reinstatement on the sole ground that the respondents had gone on an illegal strike in contravention of section 23(b) of. the Indus- 'trial Disputes Act, and that the Bank was entitled to dismiss them. The Tribunal, however, granted to the respondents compens.ation by way of salary and allow- ·\n\nances at half the rates from the date of dismissal to the date of the publication of the award.\n\n'l'he respondents appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal at Calcutta which, while agreeing with the Industrial 'l'ribunal that the strike was illegal, held that it was condoned by the Bank and it was, therefore, not open to it to justify the dismissal of the respondents on the ground that they had participated in the illegal strike.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal further held that the dismissal of the respondents was wron.gful because no charges were framed against any of them in respect of their alleged aets of violence or\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S 689\n\nsubversive activities and their explanation was not 1958 called for.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal accordingly . -b\" . . h h h h . d Punja l••t•oi>a< t oug t t at furt er ev1 ence was nece1<sary on Banlc Ltd. certain specific points mentioned in its order and rev. served its decision as to whether the respondents were Employees of entitled to reinstatemsn~ till after such evidence was the Bank. taken.\n\nLearned counsel for the Bank advanced a two-fold contention in support of this appeal.\n\nHe challenged the correctness of the conclusion that the Bank had, in the circumstances of the case, condoned the illegal strike by the respondents, and maintained that it was open to the Bank to rely upon the illegal strike as justifying the dismissal of the respondents. On that basis learned counsel argued that there could no longer be any question of reinstating the respondents in the service of the Bank as such reinstatement would in law amount to compelling the Bank to employ these respondents afresh iu its service, which the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to do. He accordingly submitted that this Court should set aside the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal dated\n\nSeptember 22, 1952, obviating the further enquiry directed by the said order.\n\nWe consider it unnecessary to express any opinion on the question of condonation or waiver of the illegal strike; for, assuming that there was no such condonation or waiver and it was open to the Bank to r,!lly upon the illegal strike as a valid ground for dismissing the respondents, we are of opinion that section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, furnishes a short answer to the further contention that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to order reinstatement of the respondents.\n\nThat section provides, inter alia, that no employer shall, during the pendency of any proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute, discharge by way of dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in the dispute save with the permission in writing of the said 'l'ribunal.\n\nAdmittedly, no such permission was obtained. If the pendency of the proceedings before\n\nPalanjali Sastri O. J.\n\n690 SUPREME cotr:RT REPORTS [1953)\n\n1953 Sri Campbell-Puri made the strike of the respondents\n\nPunjab Natwnazillegal under section 23(b) of the Act, the dismissal Bank Ltd. of the respondents by the Bank without obtaining his v. permission as required by section 33 was also illegal.\n\nEmploy\"' of We see no force in the argument of the Attorneythe Ba,.k.\n\nGeneral that the section has no application to the case as strikes and lock-outs are dealt with in a differ- Patanjali.\n\nSastri a. J. ent chapter, Chapter V, and as the respondents were not concerned in the disputes pending adjudication before Sri Campbell-Puri. The terms of section 33 are wide enough to cover the present case, and the fact that it finds place in Chapter VII headed \"Miscellaneous\" is by no means inconsistent with its general application to all cases of discharge on whatever ground it may be based. This is shown by the recent amendment of the section by Act XL VIII of 1950 which has omitted the words \"except for misconduct not connected with the dispute\" in the newly substituted section. It is equally 'clear that the respondents are concerned in the disputes pending before Sri\n\nCampbell-Puri, as it is conceded that any award made by him would bind the respondents. Section 33 being thus applicable to the case, the contention of the Bank that the dismissal of the respondents was lawful and that in consequence the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to direct their reinstatement falls to the ground.\n\nWe therefore see no reason to interfere with the ord'er made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and we accordingly clismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent: V. P. K. Nambiyar", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "Poppatlal Shah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 previous years, though the Act came iuto operation\n\nPoppatlal Shah as early as the ye11r 1939."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 599, "end_char": 616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the a, ppellant: M. S. K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent (the State of Madras), the L' nion of India, and the States f Punjab, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh and Travancore- Cochin (Interveners): G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "R. 0. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 827, "end_char": 839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the State of Bihar : R. 0."}}, {"text": "P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 877, "end_char": 883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Lal."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 914, "end_char": 929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 932, "end_char": 956, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "EMPLOYEES OF THE BANK", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 959, "end_char": 980, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EMPLOYEES OF THE BANK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1009, "end_char": 1018, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1020, "end_char": 1029, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1032, "end_char": 1044, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1049, "end_char": 1061, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1096, "end_char": 1101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1257, "end_char": 1262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2191, "end_char": 2201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2455, "end_char": 2465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2473, "end_char": 2502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2786, "end_char": 2799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 16th October, 1952, from the decision dated the 22nd December, 1952, of the Labour Appellate •rribunal of India at Calcutta in Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "M. 0. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3091, "end_char": 3105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "N. 0. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3139, "end_char": 3155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad (Attorney-General for India) and N. 0."}}, {"text": "R. L. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3157, "end_char": 3170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee (R. L. Agarwal, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3203, "end_char": 3217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and Hardyal Hardy for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Hardyal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3222, "end_char": 3235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and Hardyal Hardy for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3434, "end_char": 3480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".l 1he Judgment of the Court-, was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI 8ASTRI C. J.· -'rhis is an appeal by special leave from a decision dated September 22, 1952, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Calcutta setting aside an award dated February 9, 1952, made by the Industrial 'l'ribunal constituted to adjudicate on certain disputes between the appellant, the Punjab National Bank Ltd., Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) and its workmen, the respondents represented by their Union."}}, {"text": "Punjab National Bank Ltd., Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".l 1he Judgment of the Court-, was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI 8ASTRI C. J.· -'rhis is an appeal by special leave from a decision dated September 22, 1952, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Calcutta setting aside an award dated February 9, 1952, made by the Industrial 'l'ribunal constituted to adjudicate on certain disputes between the appellant, the Punjab National Bank Ltd., Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) and its workmen, the respondents represented by their Union."}}, {"text": "February 21, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3896, "end_char": 3913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Several other disputes between the parties had already been referred on February 21, 1950, to another Industrial Tribunal presided over by Sri K. S.\n\n688 ."}}, {"text": "S.\n\n688", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3970, "end_char": 3977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 27, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".'hat notice having been ignored by the strikers a scond noticEl, was issued to them on April 27, 1951, terminating their service."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4686, "end_char": 4705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India thereupon intervened, and as a result of the discussions held between the Government officials and the Ba.uk, the latter agreed to take back all the employees except 150 against whom the Bank had objections on account of their alleged subversive activities and other objectionable and unlawful conduct before and during the strike."}}, {"text": "Ba.uk", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4809, "end_char": 4814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India thereupon intervened, and as a result of the discussions held between the Government officials and the Ba.uk, the latter agreed to take back all the employees except 150 against whom the Bank had objections on account of their alleged subversive activities and other objectionable and unlawful conduct before and during the strike."}}, {"text": "July 2, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5042, "end_char": 5054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 2, 1951, the Government of India constituted a 'l'ribuual to decide the questions regarding the dismissals etc."}}, {"text": "J<'ebruary 9, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5313, "end_char": 5331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the aforesaid 150 employees, and that 'l'ribunal, after calling for the statements of case on behalf of the parties and hearing them, made an award on J<'ebruary 9, 1951, refusing reinstatement on the sole ground that the respondents had gone on an illegal strike in contravention of section 23(b) of."}}, {"text": "section 23(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5446, "end_char": 5459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5770, "end_char": 5807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'l'he respondents appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal at Calcutta which, while agreeing with the Industrial 'l'ribunal that the strike was illegal, held that it was condoned by the Bank and it was, therefore, not open to it to justify the dismissal of the respondents on the ground that they had participated in the illegal strike."}}, {"text": "S 689", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6293, "end_char": 6298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 22, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7479, "end_char": 7497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He accordingly submitted that this Court should set aside the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal dated\n\nSeptember 22, 1952, obviating the further enquiry directed by the said order."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7866, "end_char": 7876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Palanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8442, "end_char": 8458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the pendency of the proceedings before\n\nPalanjali Sastri O. J.\n\n690 SUPREME cotr:RT REPORTS [1953)\n\n1953 Sri Campbell-Puri made the strike of the respondents\n\nPunjab Natwnazillegal under section 23(b) of the Act, the dismissal Bank Ltd. of the respondents by the Bank without obtaining his v. permission as required by section 33 was also illegal."}}, {"text": "Punjab Natwnazillegal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8561, "end_char": 8582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the pendency of the proceedings before\n\nPalanjali Sastri O. J.\n\n690 SUPREME cotr:RT REPORTS [1953)\n\n1953 Sri Campbell-Puri made the strike of the respondents\n\nPunjab Natwnazillegal under section 23(b) of the Act, the dismissal Bank Ltd. of the respondents by the Bank without obtaining his v. permission as required by section 33 was also illegal."}}, {"text": "section 23(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8589, "end_char": 8602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8721, "end_char": 8731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Campbell-Puri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9070, "end_char": 9083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sastri a. J. ent chapter, Chapter V, and as the respondents were not concerned in the disputes pending adjudication before Sri Campbell-Puri.", "canonical_name": "Campbell-Puri"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9098, "end_char": 9108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Campbell-Puri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9627, "end_char": 9640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is equally 'clear that the respondents are concerned in the disputes pending before Sri\n\nCampbell-Puri, as it is conceded that any award made by him would bind the respondents.", "canonical_name": "Campbell-Puri"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9715, "end_char": 9725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10146, "end_char": 10156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "V. P. K. Nambiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10185, "end_char": 10202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: V. P. K. Nambiyar"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_691_707_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "s.c.B.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 691\n\nEBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHE\"U\n\nTEK CHAND DOL WANI.\n\nEBRAHIM ABOOJ3AKER AND ANOTHER\n\nCUSTODIAN-GENERAL OF EVACUEE\n\nPROPERTY.\n\nEBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER\n\nU. M. MIRCHANDANI.\n\n[PATAN.JALI 8ASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA, DAS, GHULAM\n\nHABAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nAdmi?bistration of Evacuee Property Act (XXXI of 1950), ss. 2(d) and(/), 7-Proceedings fo1 declaring a person an evacuee and his properties evacuee properties -Death of person pending pro. ceedings-Abatement of proceedings-Continuation of proceedings against wccessors~ Legality.\n\nWhere a Mohammedan against whom proceedings are commenced under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, for declaring him an evacuee and his properties evacuee properties dies during the pendency of the proceedings he cannot be declared an evacuee after his death, and his properties which on bis death vest in bis heirs under the Mohammedan law cannot be declared evacuee properties.\n\nCIYJL APPELLATE JL1nrsDICTION: Civil Appeal No. fi5 of 1953.\n\nAppeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on 13th March, 1953, from the Judgment and\n\nOrder dated the 30th July, 1951, of the Custodian General of Eyacuee Property in No. 31-A/Judi./50.\n\nPetition No. 247 of 195Q, a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights, and Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 106 of 1952 were also heard ll; long with\n\nCivil Appeal No. 65 of !9(j; j, ·\n\nApril 10.\n\nEbrahim Aboobake1 and Another v.\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.\n\nGhulam Ha!an J.\n\n692 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1953]\n\nK. T. Desai for, the appellants and petitioners.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (PMus A. Mehta with him) for the respondent in Petition No, 247, .\n\n1953, April 10, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGHULAM HASAN J,-ln order to understand and appreciate the point arising for consideration in this case, it will be necessary to set out a few preliminary facts:--\n\nOne Aboobaker Abdul Rehman, a resident of Bombay, received on December 16, 1949, from the Additional Custodian, Bombay, a notice under section 7 of\n\nOrdinance No, XXVII of 1949 calling npon him to show canse why his interest in certain specific property shonld not be declared to be evacuee property.\n\nA further notice issned 0'1January11, 1950, required him to show cause why he should not be declared an evacuee and all his properties declared to be evacuee properties, On February 8, 1950, foe Additional Custodian decided that Aboobaker was not an evasuee, but at the same time issued a fresh notice to him under section 19, requiring him to show cause why he should not be declared an \"intending evacuee\" and on the following day, February 9, he declared Aboobaker as an \"intending evacuee\" upon the same evidence.\n\nAboobaker does '10t appear to have contested this order, but one Tek Chand Dolwani, first informant, carried the matter in appeal to the Custodian\n\nGeneral, praying that Aboobaker be declared an evacuee and that the Imperial Cinema, one of his properties, be allotted to him, The Ordinanc~ expired on October 18, 1949, and was replaced by Act XXXI of 1950 (The Administration of Evacuee Property Act) which came into operation on April 17, 1950, It is not denied that although the Ordinance was repealed by section 58, the proceedings taken in the exercise of any powers conferred by the Ordinance shall be deemed to have\n\nbeen taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Act as if the Act were in force on the day the proceedings were taken.\n\nThe appeal was heard ou May 13, 1950, when the preliminary objections iu regard to the maintainability of the appeal were argued and the appeal was adjourned to May 15 for orders.\n\nOu May 14, Aboobaker died leaving him surviving three sons and a\n\ndaughter as his heirs under the Mohammedan law, tbe sons taking 2/7th share each and the daughter I/7th.\n\nOn May 15, the Custodian General pronounced the order which was, however, dated May 13.\n\nBy this order he dismissed the preliminary objections and directed that further enquiries should be made and that Aboobaker be examined further on August 19,\n\n1950. The hearing of the appeal was adjourned from time to time and was fixed for final disposal on March 7, 1951. Notice of this hearing was issued to Ebrahim Aboobaker (son) and Hawabai Aboobaker (daughter) who owned between themselves 3/7th share to appear as the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased.\n\nThe petitioners, who are residents of India-their two brothers are said to have migrated to Pakistan-filed on February 26, 1951, Miscellaneous Petition No. 15 of 1951, in the Punjab High Court for a writ of prohibition or for directions or order directing the Custodian General to forbear from proceeding with the hearing of the appeal or making any order in the said appeal or from declaring the properties left by the deceased as evacuee properties. The petitioners contended inter alia that after the death of Aboobaker the Custodian General had no jurisdiction to proceed with the appeal.\n\nThe petition was dismissed on May 24, 1951, the High Court holding that the Custodian General had jurisdiction. Leave to appeal was granted but the High Court did not stay the hearing of the appeal by the Custodian General which was fixed for July 3, 1951, and directed that the Custodian General should not pass final orders until July 23, 1951.\n\nOn July 3, the Custodian General heard the appeal and\n\nEbrahi\"1i Aboob11ker and Another\n\nTsk Chanel\n\nDolwani.\n\nGhulam Haaan I.\n\nEbrahirn Aboobaker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.\n\nGlM, larn Jlasa1i J.\n\n694 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS [1953]\n\non July 30 which wa> the date fixed for final orders he declared Aboobaker to be an evacuee and his properties to be evacuee properties.\n\nOn August 6, 1951, the petitioners filed a petition (Miscellaneous Petition No. 191 of 1951) under article 2:26 of the Constitution in the Bombay High\n\nComt against the Custodian General and the Custodian, Bombay, for a writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the said order and for an order directing the Custodian General and the local Custodian from acting upon the order or from taking possession of the property which was situate in Bombay.\n\nThe petition was dismissed by Shah J. on October 4, 1951, on the ground that the 3ombay High Court had no jurisdiction against the Custodian General and that the petition against the local Custodian was pre mature. Appeal No. 88 of 1951 was filed on October 5, 1951, against the said order to the Bombay High Court.\n\nAn interim order was passed whereby the petitioners undertook to keep accounts and not to dispose of the properties while the Custodian General gave an undertaking not to take possession pending the hearing of tbe appeal.\n\nThe appeal came up for hearing on November '20, 1951, before the Chief Justice and Gajendragadkar J. but it was allowed to stand over with a view to await the decision of this\n\nCourt in appeal against the order of the Punjab High Court as they did not wish to pass any order which might conflict with the decision of this court.\n\nThat appeal was dismissed by this Court on May 26, HJ52.\n\nSee Ebrahim Aboobaker and Another Y. Ciistodian General of Evacuee Property.').\n\nThis Court decided only the preliminary point that Tek Chand Dolwani was entitled to prefer an appeal but left the question about the jurisdiction of. the Custodian General to declare the properties of Aboobaker as evacuee properties after his death open as that question was not raised before it, the order of the 30th July, 1951, having been passed after the filing of the appeal in the Supreme Court and also because that questioI1\n\n(I) (I95•1 S.C.R. 6g6,\n\nwas pending determination in the appeal before the Bombay High Court.\n\nAppeal No. 88 of 1951 was dismissed on 1st/2nd July, 1952, by the Chief Justice and Gajendragadkar J. on the preliminary ground that they had no jurisdiction to quash the order of the Custodian General passed on 30th July, 1951.\n\nThey declined to pass any order against the local Custodian observing that they could not do indirnctly what could not be done directly. A petition for leave to appeal was also rejected by the High Court on the 14th July, 1952.\n\nPetition No. 105 of 1952 is for special leave to appeal against tpe order of the Custodian General dated July 30, 195l. Petition No. 106 of 1952 is against the order of the Appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 1st/2nd July, 1952.\n\nPetition No. 24 7 of 1952 is an independent petition under article 3:.l of the Constitution, challenging the order of the Custodian General dated July 30, 1951, as being in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners and being without jurisdiction. 'rek Chand Dolwani has filed a caveat against the Petition No. 105 of 1952, while the petition under article 32 has been heard upon notice to the Custodian General. In this petition it is submitted that on a true construction of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance and the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, the Custodian General had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal after the death of Aboobaker, or to make any order declaring the properties left by him to be evacuee properties as the appeal abated on his death and the propertie:> 1ested in specific shares in his heirs under the Mohammedan law. It was urged that as the said properties did not fall within the definition of evacuee property on the 30th July, 1951, or at any time after the death of Aboobaker, the Custodian General had no jurisdiction to declare the properties to be evacuee properties.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the deceased had no right, title or interest in the said properties after his death; nor were the said properties acquired by his heirs by any mode of transfer\n\nEbrahim Aboobn.ker and Another\n\nTek Oh•11d\n\nDolwani.\n\nGhula1n Hasan J.\n\nEbr(lhini Aboobaker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.\n\nGhularn Hasan J.\n\nfrom the deceased. The order of the 30th July, 1951, is challenged as heiug void and inoperative as it yiolates the fundamental rights of the petitioners under articles 19(1) (f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. 'rhe petitioners pray for the issue of a writ of certiorari .against the Cuotodian General calling for the records of the case relating to the above order and after looking into the same and going into the question of the legality thereof quash and set aside the same.\n\nThey also ask for a writ of prohibition or mandamus or directions or an order or a writ directing the Custodian General, his servants and agents to forbear from acting upon or enforcing the order dated the 30th July, 1951, or from taking any ;; tops or proceedings in enforcement of the same.\n\nWe heard the petitioners and the Solicitor-General on the petition under article 3:2 and reserved orders till we had heard Dolwani who was the caveator in the application for special leave to appeal.\n\nDolwani was served with a notice personally and through his ageut but neither put in appearance.\n\nWe granted the appliclltion for leave to appeal against the order of the Custodian General and directed the appeal to be posted for hearing along with the application under article 3:2. Dolwani again did not appear and we proceed, therefore, to dispose of the appeal and the petition by a common judgment.\n\nThe crucial question which arises for consideration before us is , whether a person can be declared an evacuee after his death and whether the properties which upon his death vest in his heirs under the Mohammedan law can be declared evacuee properties.\n\nBefore we proceed to determine that question we must notice the objection raised by the Solicitor-\n\nGeneral about the maintainability of the petition under article 3:2 of the Constitution. He contends that t, here is no question of any infraction of fundamental\n\n1righ t in the present case as the petitioners have not beeh deprived of any property without the authority of law.\n\nThe Gustodian General, it is said, undoubtedly purported to act under an express statutory enactment.\n\nHe might have misapplied or\n\nmisappreciated the law or committed an error in the assumption or exercise of jurisdiction, but that would not bring the case within tbe purview of article 31 (1) read with article UJ( I) (f) of the Constitution.\n\nThe point is debatable and we do not desire to express any opinion upon this point as we propose to examine the validity of the order of the Custodian General dated July 30, 1951, in the appeal (Civil Appeal No. 65 of 1953) which arose out of Petition\n\nNo. 105 of 1952 for special leave and not on the petition under article 32.\n\nSection 2 (d) and (f) define \"evacuee\" and \"evacuee property\" respectively as follows:-\n\n(d) \"Evacuee\" means any person,-\n\n(i) who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil distnrbances or the fear of such distnrbances, leaves or has, on or after the 1st day of March, 1947, left, any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India, or\n\n(ii) who is resident in any place now forming part of Pakistan and who for that reason is nnable to occupy, supervise or manage in person his property in any part of the territories to which this Act extends, or whose 'property in any part of the said territories has ceased to be occupied, supervised or managed by any person or is being occupied, supervised or managed by an unauthorised person, or\n\n(iii) who has, after the 14th day of August, 1947, obtained, otherwise than by way of purchase or exchange. any right to, interest in or benefit from any property which is treated as evacuee or abandoned property under any law for the time being in force in Pakistan;\n\n( f} \" Evacuee property \" means any property in which an evacuee has any right or interest (whether personally or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or in any other capacity), and includes any property-\n\n(1) which has been obtained by any person from an evacuee after the 14th day of August, 1947, by\n\nEbrahini Aboobnker and dn.other\n\nT•k Chand\n\nDolwani.\n\nGhulani Hasan J.\n\nEbr11.hint AboobJker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.\n\nGkulani Hasan J.\n\nSUPREME COURT, REPORTS [1953]\n\nany mode of transfer, unless such transfer has been confirmed by the Custodian.\n\nThe u>e of the present tense \"leaves\" or \"has left\" in the definition of evacuee and \"bas\" in the definition of evacuee property is relied upon in support of the contention that tbe object of the legislature in enacting these provisions was to confine their operation to a liviµg psrson only.\n\nThis line of argument may not per se be of any compelling force but it receives support from the rest of the provisions of the Act to which reference will be made hereafter. It may, however, be pointed out here that clause (£) (l) will not apply to the case of the petitioners for they do not claim the property from the evacuee after the 14th day of August, 1947, by any mode of transfer but by right of succession under the Mohammedan law.\n\nSuccession to property implies devolution by operation of law and cannot appropriately be described as a mode of tra.nsfer, a~ contended for by the tiolicitor- General, which ob,-ionsly contemplates a transfer inter vivos.\n\nSection 7 r.efer' to the notification of tbe evacuee property. It lays down that \"where the Custodian is of opinion that any property is evacuee property within the meaning of this Act, he may, after causing notice thereof to be given in such manner as may be prescribed to the persons interested, and after holding such inquiry into the matter as the circumstances of the case permit, pass an order declaring any such property to be evacuee property.\"\n\nRule 6, which is framed in exercise of the powers conferred by section 56 of the Act, lays down the manner of inquiry under section 7 and is as follows:-\n\n\" (1) Where the Custodian is satisfied from information in bis possession or otherwise that any property or an interest therein is prima facie evacuee property, he shall cause a notice to be served, in .Form No. 1, on the person claiming tit'.e to such property or interest and on any other person or persons whom he 9onsiders to be interested in the property.\n\n{2) The notice shall, as far as practicable, mention the grounds on which the proprty is sought to be declared evacuee property and shall specify the provision of the Act under which the person claiming any title to, or interest in, such property is alleged to be an evacuee.\n\n(3) The notice shall be served personally, but if that is not practicable the service may be effected in any manner provided in rule 28. (Tbis rule refers to a mode of substituted service). ( 4) Where a notice has been duly served, and the party called upon to show cause why the property should not be declared an evacuee property, fails to appear on the date fixed for hearing, the cutodian may proceed to hear the matter ex parte and pass such order on the material before him as he deems fit.\n\n(5) Where such party appears and contests the notice he shall forthwith file a written statement ver1 lied in the same manner as a pleading under the Code of\n\nCivil Procedure, 1908, stating the reasons why he should not be deemed to be au evacuee and why the property or bis interest-therein should not be declared as evacuee property. Any person or perwns claiming to he interested in the enquiry or in tbe property being declared as evacuee property, may file a reply to such written statement. Tbe Custodian shall then, either on the same day or on any subsequent day to which the hearing may be adjourned, proceed to hear the evidence, if any, which the party appearing to show cause way produce and also evidence which tbe party claiming to be interested as mentioned above may adduce.\n\n(6) After the whole evidence has been duly recorded in a summary manner, the Custodian shall proceed to pronounce his order.\n\nThe order shall state the points for determination, and the findings thereon with brief reasons.\"\n\nForm No. 1 in Appendix A to the ndes (s a,:; follows:-\n\nEbrahini Aboobiks1 and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwaiii.\n\nGh1, l1un Hasan J.\n\n195.1\n\nEbrahitn Aboob iker and Another v.\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.\n\nGhulatn Hasan J.\n\n\"WHEREAS there is credible information in possession of the Cµstodian that you are an evacuee under clause (iii) of sectiori 2(d) of the Administration of 1£vacuee Property Act on account of the grounds mentioned below:- AND WHEHEAS it is desirable to hear you in person;\n\nNow, therefore, you are hereby called upon to show cause (with all material evidence on which you wish to rely) why orders should not be passed declaring yon an evacuee aud all your property as evacuee property under the provisions of the said Act.\n\nDeputy -------Custodian.\"\n\nAssistant The next important section is secti, on 8 the relevant portion of which is as follows:-\n\n\" (l) Any property declared to be evacuee property under section 7 shall be deemed to have veoted in the Custodian for the State,-\n\n(a) in the case of the property of an evacuee as defined in sub-clause (i) ot clause (d) of section 2, from the date on which he leaves or left any pl.ace in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India;\"\n\nIf we substitute in section 8 the defiriition of evacuee property given in section 2, the meaning of section 8 will become clearer. Any property declared to be:\n\n(i) property in which an evacuee has any right or interest,\n\n(ii) property wbich has been obtained by any person from an evacuee after the 14th of August, 1947, by auy mode of tran8fer unless that transfer has been confirmed by the Custodian under section 7, shall be deemed to have vested in the Custodian for the State:\n\n(a) in the ca8e of the property of an evacuee as. defined in sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of section 2,\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'l' REPOR'l'S 701\n\nfrom the date on which he leaves or left any place in a State for any place outside the territories uow forming part of India.\"\n\nThe language of the rule read with the Form given above, the notice issued to the person claiming interest in the property which, according to the information in the possession of the Custodian, is prima facie evacuee property, the manner of its service and the mode of inquiry, lead to the unmistakable conclusion that the object of section 7 was to take proceedings against a living person and to tbat extent the use of the present tense in the definition of \"evacuee\" and \"evacuee property\" lends corroboration to the contention raised that the proceedings are intended to be applicable to living persons only. 'l'he property which is declared to vest under (i) must be one in which an evacuee has any right or interest but the deceased has no right or interest after bis death as his property vests in his heirs. Nor does (ii) apply as petitioners have not obtained the property from an evacuee by any mode of transfer.\n\nIt is obvious that property must be declared to be eva.cuee property under section 7 before it can vest under. section 8.\n\nThere is no doubt thaR when the property does so vest the vesting takes effect retrospectively, but where the man dies before any such declaration is made, the doctrine of relation-back cannot be invoked so as to affect the vesting of such property in the legal heirs by operation of law.\n\nTo take a simple illustration, if a person leaves India after the 1st of March, 1947, tb, e date given in section 2(d), and dies in Pakistan before any notice is issued to him under section 7 and before any inquiry is held in pursuance thereof, it is obvious that the heirs, who have succeeded to his property, cannot be deprived of it by conducting an inquiry into the status of the deceased and investigating bis right or interest in property which bas already devolved on legal heirs. Section 8 in such a case will not come into play and there can be no vesting of the property retrospectively before such property is declared as e1'acuee\n\nEbrahini Aboobaker and Another\n\nv, • Tek Chand D.olwan.i.\n\nGhulam Hasan J.\n\nJ9!J3\n\nEbrahini Abooba.ker and A1iother\n\nT6lc Cha.nd.\n\nDolwani.\n\nO-h1dain\n\nflasan J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nproperty within the meaning of section 2(£) of the Act.\n\nReading sections 7 and 8 together it appears that the Custodian gets dominion over the property only after the declaration is made. The declaration follows upon the inquiry made under section 7, but until the proceeding is taken nuder section 7, there can be no vesting of the property and consequently no right in the Custodian to take possession of it.\n\nNow if the alleged evacuee dies before the declaration, has the Custodian any right to take possession of the property?\n\nIf he cannot take possession of the property of a living person before the declaration, by the same token he cannot take possession after the death of the alleged evacuee when the property had passed into the hands of the heir>.\n\nThe enquiry under section 7 is a condition precedent to the making of a declaration under section 8 and the rig ht of the Custodian to exercise dominion over the property does not arise until the declaration is made. Tbere is no reason therefore why the heirs should be deprived of their property before-the Custodian obtains dominion. 'rhe matter may be looked at from another point of view. Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code wbich makes the procedure of tbe Court in regard to suits applicable in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction does not apply, as the Custodian is not a Court, thougb the proceedings held by him are of a quasi-judicial nature. 8ection 45 of the Act applies the provisions of the Code only in respect of enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on 011th and compelftng the discovery and production of documents.\n\nThe provisions of the Code relating to substitution are, therefore, inapplicable and there is no other provision in the Act for the heirs to be substituted in place of the deceased so as to continue proceedings against them. If the proceedings cannot be continued against the heirs upon tbe death of the alleged evacuee, it is logical to hold that tb ey cannot be\n\ninitiated against them.\n\nWe hold, therefore, that the proceedings must.Japse upon the death of such person.\n\nThere is no provision in the Act that after a man is dead, his property can be declared evacuee property.\n\nIf such a provision had been made, then the vesting contemplated in section 8 of the Act would have by its statutory force displ:j; ced tbe vesting of the property under the Mohammedan law in the heirs after death. It is a well recognised proposition of law that the est1:1te of a deceased Mohammedan devolves on his heirs in specific shares at the moment of his death, and tbe devQlution is neither suspended by reason -of debts due from the deceased, nor is the distribution of the shares inherited postponed till the payment of !be debts. It is also well understood that property vests in the heir\"s under the Mohammedan law, unlike the.Indian Succession Act, without the intervention of an administrator.\n\nSection 40 of the Act imposes a restriction upon the right of an evacuee to transfer property after the 14th August, 194 7.\n\nThis section prohibits transfers inter vivos but cannot affect devolution by operation of law such as, on death.\n\nAccording to this section where the property of a person is notified or declared to be an evacuee property, he cannot transfer that property after the 14th of August, 1947, so as to confer any right on the transferee unless it is confirmed by the Custodian~ This shows that a transfer between the 1st of March and the 14th of August, 1947, is immune from the disability of being treated as evacuee property notwithstanding the fact that the transferor migrated after the lst of March. If he made a bona fide transfer of bis e\\jtire property before the 14th of August, 1947, then the property does not acquire the character of evacuee property and such a transfer does not require confirmation by the Custodian, althogh all transfers after that date are held suspect. If tbe transfer between the two crucial dates is held valid, then on a parity of reasoning tho death of the transferor before the declaration after the 14th of August should lead to the same reult.\n\nEbrahitii Aboob•ker and Another\n\nTek Ohand\n\nDolwa1i.\n\nGhulani Hasan J.\n\nEbrnhim Aboob'lker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.\n\nGhula.m Hasan J •.\n\n70.4 SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS (1953]\n\nIt was contended before us that the Act aims at fixing the nature of the property from a pa_rticula.r date and that the proceedings taken are agamst the property and not against the person. This argument is fallacious.\n\nThere can be no property, evacuee or otberwisP, unless there is a person wbo owns that property. It is the property of the owner which is declared to be evacuee property by reason of the fact that be is subject to disability on certain grounds.\n\nThe definition of evacuee property in the Act begins by saying \"property in which an evacuee bas any right or interest in any capacity\". The Act alw shows that the p rnperty cannot be notified as evacuee property unless and until the person claiming interest in it bas been given notice.\n\nReference may also be made-to section 43 as indicating that the declaration under section 8 was intended to be made during the lifetime of the alleged evacuee. This section lays down ''where in pursuance of the provisions of this, Act any property has vested in the Custodian neither the death of the evacuee at any time thereafter, nor the fact that the evacuee who had a right or interest in that property bad ceased to be an evacuee at auy material time shall affect the vesting or render invalid anything done in consequence thereof.\" The section shows that where the property bas vested in the Oust, odian, then the death of the evacuee or his ceasingto be an evacuee afterwards shall not affect the vesting or render invalid anything done in consequence thereof. The section seems to suggest that the vesting must take place in the lifetime of the alleged evacuee, otherwise there was po point in providing that the vesting will not be affected by \"the death of the evacuee or the evacuee ceasing to be so.\n\nThe Solicitor-General contended that section 43 embodies th, e principle \"once an evacuee always an evacuee\". This conclrn; ion is hardly justified on the terms of section 43 as explained above and it finds no support from the other provisions of the Act.\n\nThe object and the scheme of the Act leave little doubt\n\nS.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTt; 7o5\n\nthat the Act was intended, as its title shows, to prnvide for the administration of evacuee property and it is common grnund that this property bas ultimately to 'be used for compensating the refugees who bad lost their property in Pakistan'.\n\nThe Act contains elaborate provisions as to how the administration is to be carried out.\n\nSection 9 enables the Custodian to take possession ol the evacuee property vested in him under section 8 and section 10 which defines the powers of the Custodian generally enables him to take such measures as be considers necessary or expedient for the purposes of administering, preserving and managing any evacuee property.\n\nThese are mentioned in detail in sub-section (2) of section 10, clause (j), which authorises the Custodian to institute, defend or continue any legal proceedmgs in any civil or revenue Court on behalf of the evacuee.\n\nSection 15 imposes an obligation on him to maintain a separate account of the property of each evacuee.\n\nSection 16 em powers the Custodian to restore the evacuee property upon application to the evacuee or any person claiming to be his heir provided he produces a certificate from the Central Government that the evacuee property may be restored to him.\n\nUpon restoration the Custodian shall stand absolved of all responsibilities in respect of the property so restored, but such restoration shall not prejudice the rights, if any, in respect of the property which any other person may be entitled to enforce against the person to whom the property bas been so restored. -\n\nBy section 52 of the Act it is open to the Central Government by notific:otion in the Official Gazette, to exempt any person or class of persons or any property or class of property from the operation of all or any of the provisions of this Act. In pursuance of this section the Central Government issued Notification No. S.R.O. 260, dated the 3rd July, 11!50,'which was published in tbe Ga7.ette of India, Part II, section 3,\n\nEbrahim Aboobnker and Another v, Tek Chand Dolwani.\n\nGhutant Hasan J.\n\nEbrahini Aboobnker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.\n\nGhula1n Hasan J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\ndated the 15th July, 1950, page 254, in which broadly three categories of persons were exempted: --\n\n(a) Any person who on or after the 1st day: of March, .1947, migrated from India to Pakistan but had returned to India before the 18th day of July, 1948, and had settled therein;\n\n(b) Any person who has left or leaves for Pakistan on a temporary visit taking with himself a \"No objection to return\" certificate, and has returned, or returns, to India under a valid permit issued under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, for permanent return to India; and\n\n(c) Any person who has come from Pakistan to India before the 18th day of October, l949, under a valid permit issued under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, for permanent resettlement in India.\n\nThese provisions far from suggesting that the person declared an evacuee suffers a civil death and remains an evacuee for all time show on the other hand that the person may cease to be an erncuee under certain circumsta-rces that he is reinstated to his original position and his property restored to him subject to certain conditions and without prejudice to the rights if any in respect of the property wb1cb any other person may he entitled to enforce against him.\n\nThese provisions also establish that tbe fact of a property being evacuee property is not a permanent attribute of rnch property and that it may qease to be so under gi., en conditions.\n\nTbe property does not suffer from any inherent infirmity but becomes evacuee property because of tbe disability attaching to the owner.\n\nOnce that disability ceases, tbe property is rid of that disability and becomes liable to be restored to the owner. • Mr. Desai counsel for the petitioner referred i.n the course of the arguments to section 93 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and section 17 of the Provincial Insolvency Act.\n\nAccording to the former \"if a debtor by or against whom an insolvency peti .. tion has been presented dies, tbe proceedings in the\n\nmatter shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, be continued as if he were alive\".\n\nBy the latter section \"if a debtor by or against whom an insolvency petition has been presented dies, the proceedings in the matter shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, be continued so far as may be necessary for the realisation and distribution of the property of the debtor\". 'rhough there is slight difference in the language of these two sections, the principle underlying the insolvency law seems to be that the death of the insolvent during the pendency of the application for insolvency does not cause the proceedings to abate but that they must be continued so that his property could be administered for the benefit of the creditors.\n\nThere is no snch provision in the Act before us.\n\nIt follows therefore that if the intention of the legislature had been to treat the person proceeded agains1l under section 7 as alive for purposes of the proceedings even after his death, such a provision would have been incorporated into the Act.\n\nAfter giving our best consideration to the case we are of opinion that the order of the 30th July, 19.51, passed by the Custodian General declaring Aboobaker Abdul Rehman deceased as an evacuee and the property left by him as evacuee property cannot stand and must be set aside. We accordingly allow Appeal No. 65 of 19.53, arising out of Petition No. 10.5 of 19.52 and hold that the Custodian General had no jurisdiction to pass the order of the 30th July, 1951, and set it aside. We make no order as to costs.\n\nPetition No. 106 of 1952 is not pressed and no order need be passed in respect thereto. In view of our order in Appeal No. 65 of 1953, no orders are called for in Petition No. 247 of 1952.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants and petitioners: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent in Petition No. 247: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nEbrahim Aboob'1ker and Another v.\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.\n\nGhularn Hasan J.", "total_entities": 136, "entities": [{"text": "U\n\nTEK CHAND DOL WANI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "U\n\nTEK CHAND DOL WANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 190, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 237, "end_char": 246, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 248, "end_char": 251, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 271, "end_char": 283, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 305, "end_char": 325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 342, "end_char": 350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Act", "statute": "Evacuee Property Act"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1064, "end_char": 1077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on 13th March, 1953, from the Judgment and\n\nOrder dated the 30th July, 1951, of the Custodian General of Eyacuee Property in No."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1266, "end_char": 1276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Where a Mohammedan against whom proceedings are commenced under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Where a Mohammedan against whom proceedings are commenced under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Ghulam Ha!an", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1525, "end_char": 1537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Ha!an J.\n\n692 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1953]\n\nK. T. Desai for, the appellants and petitioners.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "K. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1577, "end_char": 1588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Ha!an J.\n\n692 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1953]\n\nK. T. Desai for, the appellants and petitioners."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1630, "end_char": 1641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (PMus A. Mehta with him) for the respondent in Petition No, 247, ."}}, {"text": "PMus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1672, "end_char": 1685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (PMus A. Mehta with him) for the respondent in Petition No, 247, ."}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1799, "end_char": 1811, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Aboobaker Abdul Rehman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1967, "end_char": 1989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1953, April 10, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGHULAM HASAN J,-ln order to understand and appreciate the point arising for consideration in this case, it will be necessary to set out a few preliminary facts:--\n\nOne Aboobaker Abdul Rehman, a resident of Bombay, received on December 16, 1949, from the Additional Custodian, Bombay, a notice under section 7 of\n\nOrdinance No, XXVII of 1949 calling npon him to show canse why his interest in certain specific property shonld not be declared to be evacuee property.", "canonical_name": "Aboobaker Abdul Rehman"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2098, "end_char": 2107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 8, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2438, "end_char": 2454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A further notice issned 0'1January11, 1950, required him to show cause why he should not be declared an evacuee and all his properties declared to be evacuee properties, On February 8, 1950, foe Additional Custodian decided that Aboobaker was not an evasuee, but at the same time issued a fresh notice to him under section 19, requiring him to show cause why he should not be declared an \"intending evacuee\" and on the following day, February 9, he declared Aboobaker as an \"intending evacuee\" upon the same evidence."}}, {"text": "Aboobaker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2494, "end_char": 2503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A further notice issned 0'1January11, 1950, required him to show cause why he should not be declared an evacuee and all his properties declared to be evacuee properties, On February 8, 1950, foe Additional Custodian decided that Aboobaker was not an evasuee, but at the same time issued a fresh notice to him under section 19, requiring him to show cause why he should not be declared an \"intending evacuee\" and on the following day, February 9, he declared Aboobaker as an \"intending evacuee\" upon the same evidence."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2580, "end_char": 2590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tek Chand Dolwani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2849, "end_char": 2866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aboobaker does '10t appear to have contested this order, but one Tek Chand Dolwani, first informant, carried the matter in appeal to the Custodian\n\nGeneral, praying that Aboobaker be declared an evacuee and that the Imperial Cinema, one of his properties, be allotted to him, The Ordinanc~ expired on October 18, 1949, and was replaced by Act XXXI of 1950 (The Administration of Evacuee Property Act) which came into operation on April 17, 1950, It is not denied that although the Ordinance was repealed by section 58, the proceedings taken in the exercise of any powers conferred by the Ordinance shall be deemed to have\n\nbeen taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Act as if the Act were in force on the day the proceedings were taken.", "canonical_name": "U\n\nTEK CHAND DOL WANI"}}, {"text": "October 18, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3085, "end_char": 3101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aboobaker does '10t appear to have contested this order, but one Tek Chand Dolwani, first informant, carried the matter in appeal to the Custodian\n\nGeneral, praying that Aboobaker be declared an evacuee and that the Imperial Cinema, one of his properties, be allotted to him, The Ordinanc~ expired on October 18, 1949, and was replaced by Act XXXI of 1950 (The Administration of Evacuee Property Act) which came into operation on April 17, 1950, It is not denied that although the Ordinance was repealed by section 58, the proceedings taken in the exercise of any powers conferred by the Ordinance shall be deemed to have\n\nbeen taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Act as if the Act were in force on the day the proceedings were taken."}}, {"text": "April 17, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3214, "end_char": 3228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aboobaker does '10t appear to have contested this order, but one Tek Chand Dolwani, first informant, carried the matter in appeal to the Custodian\n\nGeneral, praying that Aboobaker be declared an evacuee and that the Imperial Cinema, one of his properties, be allotted to him, The Ordinanc~ expired on October 18, 1949, and was replaced by Act XXXI of 1950 (The Administration of Evacuee Property Act) which came into operation on April 17, 1950, It is not denied that although the Ordinance was repealed by section 58, the proceedings taken in the exercise of any powers conferred by the Ordinance shall be deemed to have\n\nbeen taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Act as if the Act were in force on the day the proceedings were taken."}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3291, "end_char": 3301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 13, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3561, "end_char": 3573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard ou May 13, 1950, when the preliminary objections iu regard to the maintainability of the appeal were argued and the appeal was adjourned to May 15 for orders."}}, {"text": "August 19,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4126, "end_char": 4142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this order he dismissed the preliminary objections and directed that further enquiries should be made and that Aboobaker be examined further on August 19,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "March 7, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4238, "end_char": 4251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The hearing of the appeal was adjourned from time to time and was fixed for final disposal on March 7, 1951."}}, {"text": "Ebrahim Aboobaker", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4290, "end_char": 4307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notice of this hearing was issued to Ebrahim Aboobaker (son) and Hawabai Aboobaker (daughter) who owned between themselves 3/7th share to appear as the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Hawabai Aboobaker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4318, "end_char": 4335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notice of this hearing was issued to Ebrahim Aboobaker (son) and Hawabai Aboobaker (daughter) who owned between themselves 3/7th share to appear as the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4493, "end_char": 4498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners, who are residents of India-their two brothers are said to have migrated to Pakistan-filed on February 26, 1951, Miscellaneous Petition No."}}, {"text": "February 26, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4565, "end_char": 4582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners, who are residents of India-their two brothers are said to have migrated to Pakistan-filed on February 26, 1951, Miscellaneous Petition No."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was dismissed on May 24, 1951, the High Court holding that the Custodian General had jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Leave to appeal was granted but the High Court did not stay the hearing of the appeal by the Custodian General which was fixed for July 3, 1951, and directed that the Custodian General should not pass final orders until July 23, 1951."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Haaan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5508, "end_char": 5520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Haaan I.\n\nEbrahirn Aboobaker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5872, "end_char": 5881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5912, "end_char": 5918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "191 of 1951) under article 2:26 of the Constitution in the Bombay High\n\nComt against the Custodian General and the Custodian, Bombay, for a writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside the said order and for an order directing the Custodian General and the local Custodian from acting upon the order or from taking possession of the property which was situate in Bombay."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6260, "end_char": 6264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was dismissed by Shah J. on October 4, 1951, on the ground that the 3ombay High Court had no jurisdiction against the Custodian General and that the petition against the local Custodian was pre mature."}}, {"text": "October 4, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6271, "end_char": 6286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was dismissed by Shah J. on October 4, 1951, on the ground that the 3ombay High Court had no jurisdiction against the Custodian General and that the petition against the local Custodian was pre mature."}}, {"text": "3ombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6311, "end_char": 6328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was dismissed by Shah J. on October 4, 1951, on the ground that the 3ombay High Court had no jurisdiction against the Custodian General and that the petition against the local Custodian was pre mature."}}, {"text": "October 5, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "88 of 1951 was filed on October 5, 1951, against the said order to the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6527, "end_char": 6544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "88 of 1951 was filed on October 5, 1951, against the said order to the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "November '20, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6804, "end_char": 6822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal came up for hearing on November '20, 1951, before the Chief Justice and Gajendragadkar J. but it was allowed to stand over with a view to await the decision of this\n\nCourt in appeal against the order of the Punjab High Court as they did not wish to pass any order which might conflict with the decision of this court."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6853, "end_char": 6867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal came up for hearing on November '20, 1951, before the Chief Justice and Gajendragadkar J. but it was allowed to stand over with a view to await the decision of this\n\nCourt in appeal against the order of the Punjab High Court as they did not wish to pass any order which might conflict with the decision of this court."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 7005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal came up for hearing on November '20, 1951, before the Chief Justice and Gajendragadkar J. but it was allowed to stand over with a view to await the decision of this\n\nCourt in appeal against the order of the Punjab High Court as they did not wish to pass any order which might conflict with the decision of this court."}}, {"text": "May 26, HJ52", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7143, "end_char": 7155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That appeal was dismissed by this Court on May 26, HJ52."}}, {"text": "1st/2nd July, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7809, "end_char": 7827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "88 of 1951 was dismissed on 1st/2nd July, 1952, by the Chief Justice and Gajendragadkar J. on the preliminary ground that they had no jurisdiction to quash the order of the Custodian General passed on 30th July, 1951."}}, {"text": "30th July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7982, "end_char": 7997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "88 of 1951 was dismissed on 1st/2nd July, 1952, by the Chief Justice and Gajendragadkar J. on the preliminary ground that they had no jurisdiction to quash the order of the Custodian General passed on 30th July, 1951."}}, {"text": "14th July, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8211, "end_char": 8226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A petition for leave to appeal was also rejected by the High Court on the 14th July, 1952."}}, {"text": "July 30, 195l", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8334, "end_char": 8347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "105 of 1952 is for special leave to appeal against tpe order of the Custodian General dated July 30, 195l."}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8529, "end_char": 8538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 30, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8616, "end_char": 8629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 7 of 1952 is an independent petition under article 3:.l of the Constitution, challenging the order of the Custodian General dated July 30, 1951, as being in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners and being without jurisdiction. '"}}, {"text": "rek Chand Dolwani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8731, "end_char": 8748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rek Chand Dolwani has filed a caveat against the Petition No.", "canonical_name": "U\n\nTEK CHAND DOL WANI"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8831, "end_char": 8841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ebrahim Aboobn.ker", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9783, "end_char": 9801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a matter of fact, the deceased had no right, title or interest in the said properties after his death; nor were the said properties acquired by his heirs by any mode of transfer\n\nEbrahim Aboobn.ker and Another\n\nTek Oh•11d\n\nDolwani.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ghula1n Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9837, "end_char": 9850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghula1n Hasan J.\n\nEbr(lhini Aboobaker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "Ghularn Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9909, "end_char": 9922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghularn Hasan J.\n\nfrom the deceased.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "articles 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10087, "end_char": 10101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10774, "end_char": 10783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dolwani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10824, "end_char": 10831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We heard the petitioners and the Solicitor-General on the petition under article 3:2 and reserved orders till we had heard Dolwani who was the caveator in the application for special leave to appeal."}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11173, "end_char": 11182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11718, "end_char": 11727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gustodian General", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11946, "end_char": 11963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gustodian General, it is said, undoubtedly purported to act under an express statutory enactment."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12222, "end_char": 12232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12605, "end_char": 12615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12618, "end_char": 12627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12809, "end_char": 12817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2 (d) and (f) define \"evacuee\" and \"evacuee property\" respectively as follows:-\n\n(d) \"Evacuee\" means any person,-\n\n(i) who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil distnrbances or the fear of such distnrbances, leaves or has, on or after the 1st day of March, 1947, left, any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India, or\n\n(ii) who is resident in any place now forming part of Pakistan and who for that reason is nnable to occupy, supervise or manage in person his property in any part of the territories to which this Act extends, or whose 'property in any part of the said territories has ceased to be occupied, supervised or managed by any person or is being occupied, supervised or managed by an unauthorised person, or\n\n(iii) who has, after the 14th day of August, 1947, obtained, otherwise than by way of purchase or exchange."}}, {"text": "14th day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13466, "end_char": 13490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2 (d) and (f) define \"evacuee\" and \"evacuee property\" respectively as follows:-\n\n(d) \"Evacuee\" means any person,-\n\n(i) who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil distnrbances or the fear of such distnrbances, leaves or has, on or after the 1st day of March, 1947, left, any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India, or\n\n(ii) who is resident in any place now forming part of Pakistan and who for that reason is nnable to occupy, supervise or manage in person his property in any part of the territories to which this Act extends, or whose 'property in any part of the said territories has ceased to be occupied, supervised or managed by any person or is being occupied, supervised or managed by an unauthorised person, or\n\n(iii) who has, after the 14th day of August, 1947, obtained, otherwise than by way of purchase or exchange."}}, {"text": "Ebrahini Aboobnker", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14010, "end_char": 14028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "any right to, interest in or benefit from any property which is treated as evacuee or abandoned property under any law for the time being in force in Pakistan;\n\n( f} \" Evacuee property \" means any property in which an evacuee has any right or interest (whether personally or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or in any other capacity), and includes any property-\n\n(1) which has been obtained by any person from an evacuee after the 14th day of August, 1947, by\n\nEbrahini Aboobnker and dn.other\n\nT•k Chand\n\nDolwani.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ghulani Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14064, "end_char": 14077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulani Hasan J.\n\nEbr11.hint AboobJker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "Ebr11.hint AboobJker", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14082, "end_char": 14102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulani Hasan J.\n\nEbr11.hint AboobJker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani."}}, {"text": "Gkulani Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14137, "end_char": 14150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gkulani Hasan J.\n\nSUPREME COURT, REPORTS [1953]\n\nany mode of transfer, unless such transfer has been confirmed by the Custodian.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15228, "end_char": 15237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15745, "end_char": 15755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15806, "end_char": 15815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17124, "end_char": 17131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ebrahini Aboobiks1", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18047, "end_char": 18065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in Appendix A to the ndes (s a,:; follows:-\n\nEbrahini Aboobiks1 and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwaiii.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ghulatn Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18185, "end_char": 18198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulatn Hasan J.\n\n\"WHEREAS there is credible information in possession of the Cµstodian that you are an evacuee under clause (iii) of sectiori 2(d) of the Administration of 1£vacuee Property Act on account of the grounds mentioned below:- AND WHEHEAS it is desirable to hear you in person;\n\nNow, therefore, you are hereby called upon to show cause (with all material evidence on which you wish to rely) why orders should not be passed declaring yon an evacuee aud all your property as evacuee property under the provisions of the said Act.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18909, "end_char": 18918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19076, "end_char": 19085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19237, "end_char": 19246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19292, "end_char": 19301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19318, "end_char": 19327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19518, "end_char": 19538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any property declared to be:\n\n(i) property in which an evacuee has any right or interest,\n\n(ii) property wbich has been obtained by any person from an evacuee after the 14th of August, 1947, by auy mode of tran8fer unless that transfer has been confirmed by the Custodian under section 7, shall be deemed to have vested in the Custodian for the State:\n\n(a) in the ca8e of the property of an evacuee as."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19627, "end_char": 19636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19795, "end_char": 19804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 701", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19839, "end_char": 19844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20309, "end_char": 20318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20975, "end_char": 20984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21011, "end_char": 21020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st of March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21379, "end_char": 21397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To take a simple illustration, if a person leaves India after the 1st of March, 1947, tb, e date given in section 2(d), and dies in Pakistan before any notice is issued to him under section 7 and before any inquiry is held in pursuance thereof, it is obvious that the heirs, who have succeeded to his property, cannot be deprived of it by conducting an inquiry into the status of the deceased and investigating bis right or interest in property which bas already devolved on legal heirs."}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21419, "end_char": 21431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21495, "end_char": 21504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21801, "end_char": 21810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ebrahini Aboobaker", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21956, "end_char": 21974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 8 in such a case will not come into play and there can be no vesting of the property retrospectively before such property is declared as e1'acuee\n\nEbrahini Aboobaker and Another\n\nv, • Tek Chand D.olwan.i.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ghulam Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22015, "end_char": 22027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J.\n\nJ9!J3\n\nEbrahini Abooba.ker and A1iother\n\nT6lc Cha.nd.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "Ebrahini Abooba.ker", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22039, "end_char": 22058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulam Hasan J.\n\nJ9!J3\n\nEbrahini Abooba.ker and A1iother\n\nT6lc Cha.nd.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "flasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22107, "end_char": 22113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O-h1dain\n\nflasan J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nproperty within the meaning of section 2(£) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 2(£)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22179, "end_char": 22191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22213, "end_char": 22229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22389, "end_char": 22398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22440, "end_char": 22449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22930, "end_char": 22939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23002, "end_char": 23011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23305, "end_char": 23316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24434, "end_char": 24443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25006, "end_char": 25027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25076, "end_char": 25086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Succession Act", "statute": "Indian Succession Act"}}, {"text": "14th August, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25180, "end_char": 25198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 40 of the Act imposes a restriction upon the right of an evacuee to transfer property after the 14th August, 194 7."}}, {"text": "1st of March", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25612, "end_char": 25624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to this section where the property of a person is notified or declared to be an evacuee property, he cannot transfer that property after the 14th of August, 1947, so as to confer any right on the transferee unless it is confirmed by the Custodian~ This shows that a transfer between the 1st of March and the 14th of August, 1947, is immune from the disability of being treated as evacuee property notwithstanding the fact that the transferor migrated after the lst of March."}}, {"text": "Ebrahitii Aboob•ker", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26281, "end_char": 26300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ebrahitii Aboob•ker and Another\n\nTek Ohand\n\nDolwa1i.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ebrnhim Aboob'lker", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26353, "end_char": 26371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghulani Hasan J.\n\nEbrnhim Aboob'lker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani."}}, {"text": "Ghula.m Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26406, "end_char": 26419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghula.m Hasan J •.\n\n70.4 SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS (1953]\n\nIt was contended before us that the Act aims at fixing the nature of the property from a pa_rticula.r date and that the proceedings taken are agamst the property and not against the person.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27247, "end_char": 27257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27299, "end_char": 27308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28268, "end_char": 28278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28395, "end_char": 28405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTt; 7o5", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28545, "end_char": 28578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object and the scheme of the Act leave little doubt\n\nS.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTt; 7o5\n\nthat the Act was intended, as its title shows, to prnvide for the administration of evacuee property and it is common grnund that this property bas ultimately to 'be used for compensating the refugees who bad lost their property in Pakistan'."}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28914, "end_char": 28923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29009, "end_char": 29018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29023, "end_char": 29033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29293, "end_char": 29303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29459, "end_char": 29469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29564, "end_char": 29574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29745, "end_char": 29763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 16 em powers the Custodian to restore the evacuee property upon application to the evacuee or any person claiming to be his heir provided he produces a certificate from the Central Government that the evacuee property may be restored to him."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30137, "end_char": 30147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd July, 11!50,'which", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30478, "end_char": 30500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.R.O. 260, dated the 3rd July, 11!50,'which was published in tbe Ga7.ette of India, Part II, section 3,\n\nEbrahim Aboobnker and Another v, Tek Chand Dolwani."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30550, "end_char": 30559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ghutant Hasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30615, "end_char": 30628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghutant Hasan J.\n\nEbrahini Aboobnker and Another\n\nTek Chand\n\nDolwani.", "canonical_name": "Ghula1n Hasan"}}, {"text": "18th day of October, l949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31364, "end_char": 31389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghula1n Hasan J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\ndated the 15th July, 1950, page 254, in which broadly three categories of persons were exempted: --\n\n(a) Any person who on or after the 1st day: of March, .1947, migrated from India to Pakistan but had returned to India before the 18th day of July, 1948, and had settled therein;\n\n(b) Any person who has left or leaves for Pakistan on a temporary visit taking with himself a \"No objection to return\" certificate, and has returned, or returns, to India under a valid permit issued under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, for permanent return to India; and\n\n(c) Any person who has come from Pakistan to India before the 18th day of October, l949, under a valid permit issued under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, for permanent resettlement in India."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32425, "end_char": 32430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Desai counsel for the petitioner referred i.n the course of the arguments to section 93 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and section 17 of the Provincial Insolvency Act."}}, {"text": "section 93", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32502, "end_char": 32512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32556, "end_char": 32566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33634, "end_char": 33643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th July, 19.51", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33856, "end_char": 33872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After giving our best consideration to the case we are of opinion that the order of the 30th July, 19.51, passed by the Custodian General declaring Aboobaker Abdul Rehman deceased as an evacuee and the property left by him as evacuee property cannot stand and must be set aside."}}, {"text": "Aboobaker Abdul Rehman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33916, "end_char": 33938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After giving our best consideration to the case we are of opinion that the order of the 30th July, 19.51, passed by the Custodian General declaring Aboobaker Abdul Rehman deceased as an evacuee and the property left by him as evacuee property cannot stand and must be set aside.", "canonical_name": "Aboobaker Abdul Rehman"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34530, "end_char": 34545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants and petitioners: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34594, "end_char": 34612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "247: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_708_713_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "April 16.\n\nSU'PREME COURT REPOR'.I'S (1953]\n\nDR. RAM KRISHAN BHARDWAJ\n\nTHE STATE OF DELHI AND OTHERS. [PATANJAI.t BASTRI C.J., MUKHER.JEA, s. R. DAS,\n\nGm:LAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nPreventive Detention Act, 1952, s. 3-Gonstitution of India, 1950, Arts. 21, 22(5)- Detenu' s ro:ght to be supplied with full particulars- Vague ground-Right to be released-Vagneness of one of several groitnds--E:ff'ect of.\n\nUnder Art. 21 (5) as interpreted by an earlier decision of this court a person detained under the Preventive Detention Act is entitled, in addition to the right to have the ground of bis detention communicated to him, to a further right to have particulars as full and adequate as the circumstances permit furnished to him as to enable him to make a representation against the order of detention and the sufficiency of \"Particulars conveyed in the second communication is a justiciable issue, the test being whether they are sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation which on being considered may give him relief.\n\nThe constitutional requirement that the grounds must not be vague must be satisfied with rEispect to each 0£ the grounds communicated to the person detained subject to the claim of privilege under cl. (6) of Art. 22 of the Constitution. VVhere one of the grounds mentioned was \"you have been organising the movement (Pra, a Parishad Movement) by enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your ca.pa.city as President of the Refugee Association of Bara Hindu Rao\":\n\nHeld, that this ground was vague and even though the other grounds were not vague the tletention was not in accordance with the procedure established by Jaw and was therefore illegal.\n\nDictum: Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liherty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court.\n\n0RIG1NAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 67 of 1958.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nVeda Vyas (V. N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with him) for the petitioner M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondents,\n\nS.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHT::;\n\n7U9\n\n1953.\n\nApril 16.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was ms delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution tor th~ issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus directing the release of the petitioner Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj who is a medical practitioner iu Delhi and is now said to be under unlawful detention.\n\nThe petitioner was arrested on the 10th March, 1953, under an order of the District :Y1agistrate of Delhi made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act as amended.\n\nThe grounds of detention were communicated to the petitioner on the 15th March, 1953. 'rhe first paragrap<l of that communication states that \" the Jan t:iangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the l:tam Rajya Parishad have started :n1 unlawful campaign in sympathy with the Praja Parishad movement of Kashmir for defiance of the law, involving violence and threat to the maintenance of public order\" as evidenced by the subparagraphs which folluw. '!'he incidents referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (l) are said to have ranged from the 4th to the 10th March, 1953, the date on which the petitioner was arrested, but they do not directly implicate the petitioner. '!.'hey merely give particulars of the alleged unlawful activities of the three political organizations referred to above.\n\nSubparagraph (m) is important, as on it is founded the first contention of Mr. Veda Vyas, the learned counsel for the petitioner. It runs as follows:-\n\n\"(m) On the evening of 11th March, 1953, there was very heavy brick-batting indulged in by or at the instance of Jan l:langh and Mahasabha workers in t:iabzimandt when the police dispersed a Jan Sangh\n\nand Hindu Mahasabha procession and several persons including policemen, journalists and other nonofticials were injured. An assault was made on Miss Mridula 8arabhai and Sri Dan Dayal one of her associates received a stab injury.\"\n\nDr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj\n\nThe State of Delhi a.nd Other a.\n\nPatanjali 811st?-i 0. J.\n\nDr. Ra1n Krishan Bhardwaj v.\n\nThe State of\n\nDelhi and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri 0. J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nIt will be noticed that the incidents related in the sub-paragraph are alleged to have taken place on the 11th March, the day after the petitioner was arrested and detained. Mr. Veda Vyas relies upon it as showing that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the alleged necessity for the detention of the petitioner as, if he had done so, he could not possibly have referred to what bappened on the 11th March as a ground of justification for what he did on the 10th.\n\nThe so called grounds on which the detention is said to have been based must, it was suggested, have been prepared by some clerk or subordinate in the District Magistrate's office and mechanically signed by him. The learned Attorney-General explained that the incidents of the 11th March were referred to not as a ground for the arrest and detention of the petitioner, but merely as evidencing the unlawful activities of the movement organized by the Jan Sangh and the other political bodies of which the petitioner was an active member. The explanation is hardly convincing and we cannot but regard this lapse in chronology as a mark of carelessness.\n\nNotwithstanding repeated admonition by this Court that due care and attention must be bestowed upon matters involving the liberty of the individual, it is distressing to find that such matters are dealt with in a careless and casual manner. In view, however, of the statements in the affidavit filed by the District Magistrate before us that he carefully perused and considered the reports and materials placed before him by responsible Intelligence Officers and that he was fully satisfied that the petitioner was assisting the movement and agitation started by the Jan Sangh1 etc., we are not prepared to hold that the District Magistrate failed to apply his mind to the relevant considerations before he made the detention order as suggested for the petitioner.\n\nThe second contention raised by Mr. Veda Vyas is more formida.ble. As already stated, the first para.-\n\ngraph of the statement of grounds, while it sets out the unlawful activities of the three political bodies,\n\n. ,\n\ndoes not directly implicate the petitioner in any of them. The second paragraph shows how the petitioner was concerned in those activities. It begins by stating \" The following facts show that you are personally helping and actively participating in the above mentioned movement which has resulted in violence and threat to maintenance of public order\".\n\nThen follow four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) which refer to private meetings of the Working Committee of the Jan Sangh in January and February, 1953, where, it is alleged, it was decided to launch and intensify the campaign and the petitioner made inflammatory speeches. Sub-paragraph (e) on which this contention is based runs thus:\n\n\"(e) You have been organising the movement by enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your capacity as President of the Refugee Association of the Bara Hindu Rao,\" a local area in Delhi. It is argued by Mr. Veda Vyas that this ground is extremely vague and gives no particulars to enable the petitioner to make an adequate representation against the order of detention and thus infringes the constitutional safeguard provided in article 22 (5). Learned counsel relies on the decision in Atma Rani Vaidya's case(') where this Court held by a majority that the person detained is entitled, in addition to the right to have the grounds of his detention communicated to him, to a further right to have particulars \"as full and adequate as the circumstances permit \" furnished to him so as to enable him to make a representation against the order of dete, ution. It was further held that the sufficiency of the particulars conveyed in the\n\n\"second communication\" is a justiciable issue, the test being whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation \"which, on being considered, may give relief to the detained person\".\n\nOn this interpretation of article 2<l (5) two questions arise for consideratiGn : first, whether the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph {e) is so vague\n\n(1) (1951] S.C.R. 67 .\n\nDr.Ram\n\nKrishan Bha1dwaj\n\nTh• Stat• of\n\nD•lhi and Others.\n\nPatanjaU Sastri O. J.\n\nDr. Bllmi\n\nK1ishan lJhfJ.rdwaj\n\nThe State of Delhi and Other&.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. J,\n\n712 SUPREME COUR'l\n\n1 REPORTS [1953]\n\nas to render it difficult, if not impossible, for the petitioner to make an adequate representation to the appropriate authorities, and second, if it is vague, whether on vague ground among others, which are clear and definite, would infringe the constitutional safeguard provided in article 22(5).\n\nOn the first question, the Attorney-General argued that the grounds must be read as a whole and so read, the ground. mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) could reasonably be taken to mean, that the petitioner was organizing tbe movement by enrolling volunteers from the 4th to 10th March in the area known as Bara Hindu Rao.\n\nThis interpretation is plausible, but the petitioner, who is a layman not experienced iu the interpretation of documents, can hardly be expected without legal aid, which is denied to him, to interpret the ground in the sense explained by the Attorney-\n\nGeueral.\n\nSurely, it is up to the detaining authority to make his me:i.ning clear beyond doubt, without leaving the person deta, iued to his own resource for interpreting the grounds.\n\nWe must, therefore, hold that the the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 is vague in the sense explained above.\n\nOu the second question, there is uo considered pronouncement by this Court, though in some cases it would appear to have been assumed, iu the absence of any argument, that one or two vague grounds could not affect the validity of the detention where there are other sufficiently clear and definie grounds 1io support the detention. Mr. Veda Vyas now argues that even though the petitioner might succeed in rebutting the other grounds to the satisfaction of the Advisory Board, his represe1itation might fail to carry conviction so far as the ground mentioned in 8Ubparagraph (e) was concerned in tbe absence of particulars which he could rebut and the Advisory Board might, therefore, recommend the continuance of his detention.\n\nThe argument is not without force, as the possibility suggested cannot altogether be ruled out. 'rhe Attorney-General drew attention to the recent amendment of section 10 of the Preventive Detention\n\nAct as a result of which the petitioner would be entitled to be heard in person before the Advisory Board if he so desires aud, it was said, that he would thus have the opportunity of getting tbe necessary particulars through the Board who could call upon the appropriate Government to furnish particulars if the Board thought that the demand for them was in the circumstances just and reasonable. The petitioner would thus suffer no hardship or prejudice by reason of sufficient particulars not having been already furnished to him. 'rhe question however is not whether the petitioner will in fact be prejudicially affected in the matter of securing his release by his representation, but whether his coustitutional safeguard has been infringed. v'Preventive detention is a serious invasiou of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Comt. In this case, the petitioner has tho right, under article 22(5), as interpreted by this Court by a majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention \"sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him.\" We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under clause (6) of article 22. 'l'J'hat not ha viug beer1 done in regard to the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the statement of ground,;, the petillioner's detention cannot be held to be il1 accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of article 21. 'l'he petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\nAgent for t.he petitioner: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nDr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v.\n\nThe State of\n\nDelhi ana Others.\n\nPatanjali Sa;:; fri 0. J.", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "RAM KRISHAN BHARDWAJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ra1n Krishan Bhardwaj", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF DELHI AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF DELHI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Gm:LAM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1952", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Arts. 21, 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 249, "end_char": 264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1952", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 413, "end_char": 420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1952", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1254, "end_char": 1261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Refugee Association of Bara Hindu Rao", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1471, "end_char": 1508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VVhere one of the grounds mentioned was \"you have been organising the movement (Pra, a Parishad Movement) by enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your ca.pa.city as President of the Refugee Association of Bara Hindu Rao\":\n\nHeld, that this ground was vague and even though the other grounds were not vague the tletention was not in accordance with the procedure established by Jaw and was therefore illegal."}}, {"text": "0RIG1NAL JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1925, "end_char": 1946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0RIG1NAL JURISDICTION: Petition No."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1989, "end_char": 1996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2004, "end_char": 2025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Veda Vyas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2070, "end_char": 2079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyas (V. N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with him) for the petitioner M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondents,\n\nS.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHT::;\n\n7U9\n\n1953.", "canonical_name": "Veda Vyas"}}, {"text": "V. N. Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2081, "end_char": 2092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyas (V. N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with him) for the petitioner M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondents,\n\nS.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHT::;\n\n7U9\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2097, "end_char": 2108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyas (V. N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with him) for the petitioner M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondents,\n\nS.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHT::;\n\n7U9\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "M. O. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2139, "end_char": 2153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyas (V. N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with him) for the petitioner M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondents,\n\nS.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHT::;\n\n7U9\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2183, "end_char": 2195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyas (V. N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with him) for the petitioner M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondents,\n\nS.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHT::;\n\n7U9\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2331, "end_char": 2347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was ms delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution tor th~ issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus directing the release of the petitioner Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj who is a medical practitioner iu Delhi and is now said to be under unlawful detention.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Krishan Bhardwaj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was ms delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution tor th~ issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus directing the release of the petitioner Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj who is a medical practitioner iu Delhi and is now said to be under unlawful detention.", "canonical_name": "Ra1n Krishan Bhardwaj"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2734, "end_char": 2743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Praja Parishad movement of Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3055, "end_char": 3089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhe first paragrap<l of that communication states that \" the Jan t:iangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the l:tam Rajya Parishad have started :n1 unlawful campaign in sympathy with the Praja Parishad movement of Kashmir for defiance of the law, involving violence and threat to the maintenance of public order\" as evidenced by the subparagraphs which folluw. '!'"}}, {"text": "10th March, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3330, "end_char": 3346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he incidents referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (l) are said to have ranged from the 4th to the 10th March, 1953, the date on which the petitioner was arrested, but they do not directly implicate the petitioner. '!"}}, {"text": "Veda Vyas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3649, "end_char": 3658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subparagraph (m) is important, as on it is founded the first contention of Mr. Veda Vyas, the learned counsel for the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Veda Vyas"}}, {"text": "Mridula 8arabhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4073, "end_char": 4089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An assault was made on Miss Mridula 8arabhai and Sri Dan Dayal one of her associates received a stab injury.\""}}, {"text": "Dan Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4098, "end_char": 4107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An assault was made on Miss Mridula 8arabhai and Sri Dan Dayal one of her associates received a stab injury.\""}}, {"text": "Ram Krishan Bhardwaj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4160, "end_char": 4180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj\n\nThe State of Delhi a.nd Other a.\n\nPatanjali 811st?-i 0.", "canonical_name": "Ra1n Krishan Bhardwaj"}}, {"text": "State of Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4186, "end_char": 4200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj\n\nThe State of Delhi a.nd Other a.\n\nPatanjali 811st?-i 0.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nDelhi"}}, {"text": "Ra1n Krishan Bhardwaj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4246, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nDr. Ra1n Krishan Bhardwaj v.\n\nThe State of\n\nDelhi and Others.", "canonical_name": "Ra1n Krishan Bhardwaj"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nDelhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4276, "end_char": 4291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nDr. Ra1n Krishan Bhardwaj v.\n\nThe State of\n\nDelhi and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nDelhi"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4305, "end_char": 4321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri 0.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Jan Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5290, "end_char": 5299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney-General explained that the incidents of the 11th March were referred to not as a ground for the arrest and detention of the petitioner, but merely as evidencing the unlawful activities of the movement organized by the Jan Sangh and the other political bodies of which the petitioner was an active member."}}, {"text": "Refugee Association of the Bara Hindu Rao", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7287, "end_char": 7328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-paragraph (e) on which this contention is based runs thus:\n\n\"(e) You have been organising the movement by enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your capacity as President of the Refugee Association of the Bara Hindu Rao,\" a local area in Delhi."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7347, "end_char": 7352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-paragraph (e) on which this contention is based runs thus:\n\n\"(e) You have been organising the movement by enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your capacity as President of the Refugee Association of the Bara Hindu Rao,\" a local area in Delhi."}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7596, "end_char": 7606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atma Rani Vaidya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7654, "end_char": 7670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel relies on the decision in Atma Rani Vaidya's case(') where this Court held by a majority that the person detained is entitled, in addition to the right to have the grounds of his detention communicated to him, to a further right to have particulars \"as full and adequate as the circumstances permit \" furnished to him so as to enable him to make a representation against the order of dete, ution."}}, {"text": "article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8341, "end_char": 8350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram\n\nKrishan Bha1dwaj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8494, "end_char": 8515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.Ram\n\nKrishan Bha1dwaj\n\nTh• Stat• of\n\nD•lhi and Others."}}, {"text": "PatanjaU Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8550, "end_char": 8565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PatanjaU Sastri O. J.\n\nDr. Bllmi\n\nK1ishan lJhfJ.rdwaj\n\nThe State of Delhi and Other&.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8983, "end_char": 8996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Geueral", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9572, "end_char": 9579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This interpretation is plausible, but the petitioner, who is a layman not experienced iu the interpretation of documents, can hardly be expected without legal aid, which is denied to him, to interpret the ground in the sense explained by the Attorney-\n\nGeueral."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10778, "end_char": 10788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11835, "end_char": 11848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12269, "end_char": 12279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12537, "end_char": 12547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12712, "end_char": 12722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for t.he petitioner: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12752, "end_char": 12770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_714_719_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "April 17.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1953]\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL v.\n\nH. HIRJEE.\n\n[PATAN.JALI SASTRI C.J., MUKHEHJEA, s. R. DAS\n\nand GHULAM HASAN JJ.]\n\nIndian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 10 (2) (xv)-Business expenditure-Expenses incurred IYy businessman in defending against criminal prosectltion for offence under Hoarding and Profiteering Act-Finding of fact-When final.\n\nThe respondent who c\"\"ried on business was prosecuted under s. 13 of the Hoarding and Profiteering Ordinance of 1943 on a charge of selling goods at an unreasonable price.\n\nHe was finally acquitted and claimed in his assessment for a subsequent year that the suni of Rs. 10,895 which he had spent in defending himself against the charge should be deducted from his income under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act as \"expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for purposes of the business\". The Appellate •rribunal held that in the absence of any evidence that personal liberty was likely to be jeopardised there was only a chance of his being fined, that the object of saving himself from fine was so inexticably mixed with the main purpose of the defence which was solely for the purpose of maintaining the respondent's name as a good bu3inessman a.nd also to save his stock from being undersold, that it could be ignored, and that, therefore, the claim was allowabb under s. 10(2)(xv).\n\nOn a reference the High Court held that tl:te finding of the Tribunal was one of fact and was binding on it. On further appe0, l: Held (i) that the finding of the Tribunal was not one of fact and was not decisive of the reference; (ii) the finding of the Tribunal was vitiated by its refusal to consider the possibility of the prosecution ending in a sentence of imprisonment ancl throwing on the Income-tax authorities the burden to prove that the prosecution might result in his imprisonment ; and the finding was not therefore binding on the Court; (iii) in any event, the expenses could not be said to be \"expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business\" withins. 10(2)(xv) of the Act.\n\nLegal expenses incurred in civil litigation arising out of matters incidental to the carrying on of a business stand an a different :footing as in such a case no question could arise as to the primar.y or secondary purpose for which the expenses could be said to have been incurred.\n\nThe deductibility of such expenses under s. 10 (2) (xv) must depend on the nature and purpose of the legal proceeding and not\n\non the final outcome of it and a distinction cannot therefore be drawn between expenses of a successful and unsuccessful defence 1958\n\nfor purposes of s. 10 (2) (xv).\n\nCommissioner of J.B. Advani v. Commissioner of Income-tax ([1950] 18 I.T.R\n\n557) referred to. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maharajadhirnj of Darbhanga ([1942] L. R. 69 I.A. 15) distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLH'E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 75 of 1952.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment aud Order dated the 16th January, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Banerjee J.) in Incometax Reference No. 46 of 1950.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the appellant.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (P. K. Sen Gupta, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953.\n\nApril 17.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C.J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta answering a reference under section 66-A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in favour of the respondent herein.\n\nThe respondent carries on business as selling agents of the Bengal Potteries Ltd., and he was prosecuted under section 13 of the Hoarding and Profiteering Ordinance, 1943, (Ordinance No. XXXV of 1943) on a charge of selling goods at prices higher than were reasonable in contravention of the provisions of section 6 thereof .. It appears that before the prosecution was launched in August, 1944, respondent's business premises were searched and a part of his stock was seized and taken away. The respondent defended the case, spending a sum of Rs. 10,895, and the prosecution ended in an acquittal on February 16, 1945. In bis assessment to income-tax for the year 1945-46, the respondent claimed the deduction of the said sum of Rs. 10,895 from the profits of his business under section 10(2) (xv) of the Act. The Income-tax Officer\n\nI1ico11ie-tax, Weat Bengal\n\nH. Hirjee.\n\n716 8UPREME COUR'l' REPORTS (1953]\n\nw; s disallowed the claim but the Appellate Assistant Come .-. 1missioner allowed it, and his decision was confirmed ommimonor o h I A II 'T 'b j\n\nC J Iicom..tax by t e ncome-tax ppe ate n una, a cutta U:est Bengl Bench. Thereupon, the Commissioner of Iucome-tax, v.\n\nWest Bengal, applied to the Tribunal to state a case H. Hirjeo. for decision by the High Court under section 66-A of the Act, and the Tribunal accordingly referred the Patanjali · h C f d · Bastri c. J. followmg question to~ at ourt or its ec1s10n :- Whether in the circumstances of this case the Tribunal was rig ht in holding that the sum of Rs.10,895 spent in defending the criminal proceeding was an expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business as contemplated by section 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Iucome-tax Act?\n\nIn dismissing the appeal preferred by the Incometax Officer, the Tribunal observed:\n\n\"It may be stated straight off that it has not been established by any material that the conviction in caseo like this may end in imprisonment. 'The question that personal liberty was likely to be jeopardised therefore will not be considered by us .................. In any case, in the absence of any material in this particular cae that personal liberty was likely to be jeopardised, all that we can say is that there was a chance of conviction in which the respondent might have been fined.\n\nNo doubt, the element of saving himself from the fine, if any, might be there, but it is so inextricably mixed up with the main purpose for the defence that we are prepared to ignore that little element.\n\nIn our opinion, the defence was solely for the purpose of maintaining his name as a good businessman and also to save his stock from being uuderso ld if the Court held that the prices charged by the respondent were uureasoua b le.\"\n\nIn the order made on the reference Harries C. J. (with whom Banerjee J. concurred) remarked:\n\n\"In every criminal prosecution where the matter is defended to protect the good name of a business or\n\na professional man, the fear of possible fine or\n\n8.0.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS 717\n\nimprisonment must always be there. But the Tribunal\n\nI958 have pointed out that this was so inextricably mixed 0 .-.\n\n/ . h th . f h d f h b .\n\n0 \"\" 11'\"' 011 \"\n\n0 up wit e protection o t e goo name o t e us1- Incom•-t•• ness that it can well be found that the money spent w., t Bengl in defence in the criminal prosecution was spent v. solely and exclusively for the purpose of the business.\n\nH. HirJee.\n\nThe finding is a finding of fact and is binding upon Patanjali us.\" 8 a.stri a. J.\n\nThe learned Judges proceeded to refer to a ruling of the Bombay High Court-J. B. Advani v. Commissioner of Income-tax(')-and held that the respondent satisfied both the tests laid down tqere as applicable in such cases: He was charged with regard to a transaction which took place in the ordinary course of business and he was charged in his capacity as a trader. \"If these two tests were satisfied and the Court came to the conclusion that the primary object of incurring the expenditure was to protect the good name of business, then it could be said that the expenditure was wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business\". The learned Judges accordingly answered the question referred to them in the affirmatiye. They, however, granted a certifica.te under section 66-A (2) of the Act that the case is a fit one for appeal to this Court.\n\nWe are unable to' agree that the finding of the Tribunal, to which reference has been made, is binding on the Court as a finding of fact and is decisive of the reference.\n\nThe finding of the Tribunal is vitiated by its refusal to consider the possibility of the criminal proceeding terminating in the conviction and imprisonment of the respondent. As has been stated, the respondent was prosecuted under section 13 which provides : '' Whoever contravenes the provisions of this Ordinance shall be punishable with imprisonme.nt for a term which may extend to five years or with fine or with both.\" The respondent was charged with contravention of section 6, which by sub-sec-. tion (1) prohibits the sale by a dealer or producer of a.n article for a consideration which is unreasonable\n\n(1)[1950) 18 I.T.R. 557.\n\n1958 and sub-section (2) defines \"unreasonable considera- ~~ tion\". The fram@rs of the Ordinance thus appear to\n\naom\"'• 0;\" •!have regarded the offence as one calling for a deter-\n\n;.:m; n~:i rent punishment in view of its anti-social character,\n\nv. and it is idle to suggest that it is for the Income-tax H. Hirjee. authorities to prove in such cases that the conviction might result in a sentence of imprisonment and that,\n\n:.::; tb~\n\n1 ~. in the absence of such proof, there was, at the most, only a chance of conviction and fine.\n\nWe cannot appreciate the remark that \"even this chance of conviction and fine was so inextricably mixed up with the main purpose of the defence that it could be ignored.\" A finding arrived at on this line of reasoning is obviously vitiated by a serious misapprehension regarding the risk involved in a prosecution under the Ordinance and it cannot be regarded as binding on the Court in dealing with the reference.\n\nIf, as the High Court realised, in every criminal prosecution where the matter is defended to protect the good name of a business or a professional man, the fear of possible fine or imprisonment must always be there, it must ordinarily be difficult for any Court to say, that the expenses incurred for the defence, even if they are not to be regarded as the \"personal expenses\" of the person a.ccused, constituted \"expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business\".\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent frankly admitted that he was not able to find a single case in the books where the expenses incurred by a person exercising a trade or profession in def ending a, criminal prosecution, which arises out of his business or professional activities, were allowed to be deducted in the assessment of his profits or gains for income-tax purposes.\n\nReference was made in the course of argument to numerous cases where legal expenses incurred in civil litigation, arising out of matters incidental to the carrying on of a business, were allowed as a deduction in the computation of its profits, e.g., Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga('), where\n\n(1) (1942) L.R. 69 l.i\\.. 15.\n\nthe Privy Council held that law charges incurred in 1968 defending an action brought against a money-lender -'-- for damages for conspiracy, misrepresentation and Gommi,.ion.r 01\n\nb h f d ffi . f d focon••taoo reac o con tract to a vance su c1ent un s to we.t B• '1 finance a company were allowable as business expendv. nga iture.\n\nIn that class of case, no question could arise H. ffirj••· as to the primary or secondary purpose for which the legal expenses could be said to have been incurred as Pata,.jali . h f . . .\n\nSBstri a. J. m t e case o a cnmmal prosecution where the defence cannot easily be dissociated from the purpose of saving the accused person from a possible con viction and imposition of the prescribed penalty.\n\nNor are we satisfied, as at present advised, that a distinction drawn in the Bombay case(') between the legal expenses of a successful and unsuccessful defence is sound.\n\nThe deductibility of such expenses under section 10(2)(xv) must depend on the nature and purpose of the legal proceeding in relation to the business whose profits are under computation, and cannot be affected by the final outcome of that proceeding.\n\nIncome-tax assessments have to be made for every year and cannot be held up until the final result of a\n\nlegal proceeding, which may pass through several courts, is announced.\n\nFor the reasons indicated we allow the appeal and answer the question referred in the negative.\n\nThe appellant will be entitled to his costs both here and in the Court below.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: G. R. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nAgent for the respondent: S. C. Banerjee.\n\n(I) (1950] •8 l.!.R. 5S7", "total_entities": 44, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. HIRJEE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "H. HIRJEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATAN.JALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATAN.JALI SASTRI C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GHULAM HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Business expenditure-Expenses incurred IYy businessman in defending against criminal prosectltion for offence under Hoarding and Profiteering Act", "statute": "Business expenditure-Expenses incurred IYy businessman in defending against criminal prosectltion for offence under Hoarding and Profiteering Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 772, "end_char": 784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Business expenditure-Expenses incurred IYy businessman in defending against criminal prosectltion for offence under Hoarding and Profiteering Act", "statute": "Business expenditure-Expenses incurred IYy businessman in defending against criminal prosectltion for offence under Hoarding and Profiteering Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 792, "end_char": 806, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1382, "end_char": 1394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2454, "end_char": 2459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2691, "end_char": 2696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L. R. 69 I.A. 15", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2868, "end_char": 2884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3034, "end_char": 3070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment aud Order dated the 16th January, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Banerjee J.) in Incometax Reference No."}}, {"text": "Harries C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3072, "end_char": 3084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment aud Order dated the 16th January, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Banerjee J.) in Incometax Reference No.", "canonical_name": "Harries C.J."}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3089, "end_char": 3097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment aud Order dated the 16th January, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Banerjee J.) in Incometax Reference No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3142, "end_char": 3156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3187, "end_char": 3199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3231, "end_char": 3247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (P. K. Sen Gupta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. K. Sen Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3249, "end_char": 3264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (P. K. Sen Gupta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3359, "end_char": 3375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C.J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta answering a reference under section 66-A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in favour of the respondent herein.", "canonical_name": "PATAN.JALI SASTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3427, "end_char": 3458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C.J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta answering a reference under section 66-A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in favour of the respondent herein."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3487, "end_char": 3497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bengal Potteries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3669, "end_char": 3690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent carries on business as selling agents of the Bengal Potteries Ltd., and he was prosecuted under section 13 of the Hoarding and Profiteering Ordinance, 1943, (Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3720, "end_char": 3730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Hoarding and Profiteering Ordinance, 1943", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3738, "end_char": 3779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3915, "end_char": 3924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hoarding and Profiteering Ordinance, 1943", "statute": "the Hoarding and Profiteering Ordinance, 1943"}}, {"text": "February 16, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4210, "end_char": 4227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10,895, and the prosecution ended in an acquittal on February 16, 1945."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hoarding and Profiteering Ordinance, 1943", "statute": "the Hoarding and Profiteering Ordinance, 1943"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Officer\n\nI1ico11ie-tax, Weat Bengal\n\nH. Hirjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4424, "end_char": 4481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer\n\nI1ico11ie-tax, Weat Bengal\n\nH. Hirjee."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4889, "end_char": 4899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5295, "end_char": 5308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6398, "end_char": 6405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the order made on the reference Harries C. J. (with whom Banerjee J. concurred) remarked:\n\n\"In every criminal prosecution where the matter is defended to protect the good name of a business or\n\na professional man, the fear of possible fine or\n\n8.0.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS 717\n\nimprisonment must always be there.", "canonical_name": "Harries C.J."}}, {"text": "H. HirJee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7041, "end_char": 7050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. HirJee.", "canonical_name": "H. HIRJEE"}}, {"text": "Patanjali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7106, "end_char": 7115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The finding is a finding of fact and is binding upon Patanjali us.\"", "canonical_name": "PATAN.JALI SASTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7194, "end_char": 7211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 a.stri a. J.\n\nThe learned Judges proceeded to refer to a ruling of the Bombay High Court-J. B. Advani v. Commissioner of Income-tax(')-and held that the respondent satisfied both the tests laid down tqere as applicable in such cases: He was charged with regard to a transaction which took place in the ordinary course of business and he was charged in his capacity as a trader. \""}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7907, "end_char": 7917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8393, "end_char": 8403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8635, "end_char": 8644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11932, "end_char": 11949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. R. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12537, "end_char": 12555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: G. R. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "S. C. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12584, "end_char": 12598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: S. C. Banerjee."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_720_729_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "195.1\n\n720 SUPREME cotrR~ 1 REPOR'l'S [19531\n\nJIIO'I'fPUR ZAMINDARI CO. LTD. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANO'I'HER.\n\nRAJA JA:N\"JUNATH ROY AND NARENDRA\n\nNATH ROY AND CO. TJTD. v.\n\n'I'HE STA'I'E OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER. [PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs.\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nBihcir Laud Reforms Act, 1950, ss. 2 (o) aiid (r), 3-Applicabil ity of Act to cmnpanies-'iPerson'', \"proprietor'', ''tenure-holder\", meaniuys of . .\n\nThe. word\" person\" in the definitions of\n\n1 ' proprietor\" and \"tenure-holder\" contained in s. 2 (o) and s. 2 (r) respectively of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, includes companies incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. There is nothing repugnant in the subject or context of the Act to prevent the inclusion of a company within the terms \" proprietor\" and\n\n• 0 tenure-holder\".\n\nOn the contrary such inclusion is necessary in order to give full effect to the object of the Act.\n\nPharmaceutical Society v. The London and Provincial Suppl11 Association, Limited (1880) 5 App. Oas. 857 distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 6'2 and 63 of 1953. Appeals under Article 13'2\n\n(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment aud Order dated '22nd December, 195'2, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ.) in Miscellaneous Judicial Cases Nos. '238 and '24'2 of 1952.\n\nP. R. Das (J. C. Sinha and L. K. Chaudhry, with him) for the appellant in both the appeals.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (L. N.\n\nSinha and Bajrang Sahai, with him) for the respondents in both the appeals.\n\n1953. April 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. R. DAS J.\n\n' DAS J.-Tbis judgment disposes of Civil Appeals No. 62 of 1953 and No. 63 of 1953 which have been heard together.\n\nThe Motipur Zamindari Company Ltd., the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1953, was incorporated in 1932 under the Indiau Companies Act and has its registered office in Bengal. It supplies sugar-cane to a sister concern named Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd.\n\nRaja J ankinath Roy and N arendra Nath Roy and\n\nCo., Ltd., the appellant in C. A. No. 63 of 1953, was incorpor:i.ted in 1933 under the Indian Companies Act and also has its registered office in Bengal. This company owns Zamindari properties in Purnea in the\n\nState of Bihar as well as in Maida in the State of West Bengal. It carries on business, amongst others, as banker and financier.\n\nOn the 30th December, 1949, a bill entitled the Bihar Land Reforms Bill was passed by the Bihar\n\nregislature and having been reserved for the consideration of the President received bis assent on the 11th September, 1950. 'l'be Act so passed and assented to was published in the Bibar Gazette on the 25th September, 1950, and was brought into force on the same day by a notification made by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred on it by section 1(3) of the Act. Many of the proprietors and tenureholders of Zamindari estates took proceedings against the State of Bihar for appropriate orders restraining the State Government from taking over the estates under the provisions of the Act which they claimed to be beyond the legislatiye competency of the Bihar Legislature and otherwise void.\n\nOn the 12th March, 1951, a Special Bench of the Patna High Court held that the Act was unconstitutional on account of its contravention of article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe State of Bihar appealed to this Court.\n\nPending that appeal, the provisional Parliament passed the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. The respondents in the main appeal took proceedings in this .Court, contending that the Act amending the Constitution w11s invalid. This\n\nMotipur z.,.mindari\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBiht1r and A not her.\n\nDa11J,\n\nMotipur Za1nindari\n\nOo. Ltd. v.\n\nThe Stato of\n\nBihar and Another.\n\nDa.s J.\n\n• Court, however, on 5th October, 1951, upheld the validity of the amending Act.\n\nOn 6th November, 1951, notifications were issued under section 3 of the Bihar Act declaring that certain Touzies belonging to the appellants specified in the notification had passed to and become vested in the State. Both the appellants made separate applications to the Patna High Court under article 226 of the Constitution praying for mandamus or suitable direc tion or' order restraining the respondent from taking possession of their respective estates or tenures by virtue of the said notifioations and for other ancillary reliefs. The appeals filed by the State of Bi bar against the order of the Special Bench declaring the Act to be void came up for hearing before this Court and this Court upheld the validity of the Act, except as to a few provisions mentioned in the majority judg ment which were held to be severable.\n\nThereafter, the two applications made by the two appellants under article 226 before the Patna High Court came up for bearing and were dismissed by a Bench of that Court on the 22nd December, 1952.\n\nThe present appeals have been filed with leave of the Patna High Court against the said dismissal.\n\nThe question raised before the High Court was whether the Act was, on its true construction, intended to apply to Zamindari estates of companies incorpor ated under the Indian Companies Act. In support of the appellants' contention that it was not, it was urgedthat the Bibar Legislature bad no authority to legislate with respect to trading corporations or non-trading corporations whose objects were not confined to one State. Reference was made to entries 43, 4411.nd 45 of List I to show that it was Parliament alone which was authorized to make law with respect to matters set forth in those entries. 'rbe contention was that the Bibar Legislature in enacting the Act invaded the Union field and so the Act was invalid. '.1 1bis argument was sought to be reinforced by reference to the provisions of t,)ie Act and the winding up provisions of the Companies Act. The Patna. High\n\nCourt overruled this contention and Mr. P.R. Das appearing in support of these appeals has not challenged this part of the decision of the Patna High Court. The main point urged by Mr. P.R. Das is that even if the Bihar Legislature could make a law for acquiring Zamindari estates of incorporated companies it did not, by the Act, in fact do so. Section 3 authorises the State Government to declare by notification that the estates or tenures of a proprietor or tenure-holder have passed to and become vested in the State. It will be recalled that it was under this section that the State Government on the 6th November, 1951, issued thenotificationswith respect to the estates of the appellants situate within the State.\n\nMr. P. R. Das's principal contention is that the appellant companies do not come within the terms \"proprietor\" or \"tenureholder\" as defined by the Act and consequently no part of their estates were intended to be vested or did in fact vest in the\n\nState. \"Proprietor\" -is defined by section 2(o) as meaning a person holding in trust or owning for his own benefit an estate or a part of an estate and includes the heirs and successors-in-interest of a proprietor and, where a proprietor is a minor or of unsound mind or an idiot, his guardian, committee or other legal curator.\n\nTenure-holder is defined by section 2 (r} as meaning a person who has acquired from a proprietor or from any tenure-holder a right to hold land etc. The argument is that the word \"person\" in the two definit'1ons referred to above does not, in the context of the Act, include a company. It is conceded that under section 4(40) of the B1har General Clauses Act the word \"person\" would ordinarily iuclude a company, but it is urged by Mr. P.R. Das that the definitions given in that section apply only where there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context.\n\nHis contention is that the definition of \"proprietor\" and \"tenureholder\" indicates that a company which owns Zamindaries is not covered by that definition. We are unable to accept this contention. It is not disputed 9t\n\nMotipur Zamindari\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Bihar and A not her.\n\nDas J,\n\nMoti1n1, r Za1nindari\n\nGo, Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar and Another.\n\nDas J,\n\nthat a company can own an estate or a part of an estate and, indeed, the appellant companies are fighting these appeals only to protect the estates they own.\n\nTherefore, they CO!lle within the first part of the definition.\n\nThe definition after stating what the word means proceeds to state what else the definition would include under certain specified circumstances, namely, the heirs and successor-in-interest etc.\n\nThe word \"heir\" certainly is inappropriate with regard to a company, but there is nothing inappropriate in the comp:rny having a successor in-interest.\n\nIt is pointed out that there is no provision in the definition of proprietor to include the directors, managing agents and, in case of winding up, the liquidator of the company. This circumstance does not appear to us to be a cogent reason for holdfog that the word \"proprietor\" as defined does not cover a company. It is to be noted that the agent or, in case of insolvency, the official assignee or receiver of an individual proprietor are alw not included in the definition.\n\nReference to proprietor who is a minor or of unsound mind or an idiot and his guardian etc., was obviously necessary because those proprietors suffer from legal disabilities.\n\nM~. P.H. Das refers us to various sections and rules framed under section 43 of the Act to show that only natural persons were intended to be affected by the Act, because, he urges, the company is not competent to do the acts therem referred to.\n\nIt is not disputed by Mr. P. R. Das that there is no difficulty on the part of an incorporated company to do all these acts by its directors or managing agents or other officers empowered in that behalf by its articles of association, but his contention is that tbe provi.'>ions of the Indian Companies Act should not be imported into the consideration of the provisions of hiK Act.\n\nHe relies primrily on the case of PharnMl'eutical Society v. The London and Provincial Snpply Association, Limited(') where it was held that a corporation\n\n('! (1880) L.R. 5 App. Cas. 857.\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOitTS\n\n72S\n\ndid not come within the word \"person\" used in th~ Pharmacy Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vic., Chapter 121).\n\nReliance was placed upon the observations of Lord Selborne L.C. at page 863. 'The preamble to that Act recited, amongst other things, that it was \"expedient for the safety of the public &bat persons keeping open shop for the retailing, dispensing or compounding of poisons, and persons known as chemists and druggists should possess a competent practical knowledge of their business.\" This clearly comtemplated • persons skilled in matters pharmaceutical and not impersonal corporate bodies which would know nothing about that particular business.\n\nIndeed, Ijord Blackburn in bis speech in the House of Lords in the Pharmaceutical Society's case(') referred to this preamble and observed at page 870 :-\n\n\"Stopping there, it is quite plain that those who used that language were not thinking of corporations.\n\nA corporation may in one sense, for all substantial purposes of protecting the public, possess a competent knowledge of its business, if it employs competent directors, managers, and so forth. But it cannot possibly have a competent knowledge in itself.\n\nThe metaphysical entity, the legal 'person', the corporation, cannot possibly have a competent knowledge.\n\nNor, I think, Qan a corporation be supposed to be a 'person known as a chemist and druggist'.\"\n\nHis Lordship then referred to the provisions of sections 1 and 15 of that Act and came to the conclusion that the word \"person\" in that Act . meant a natural person. 'The effect of that case is that whether the word \"person'' in a sLatute can be treated as including a corporation must depend on a consideration of the object of the statute and of the enactments passed with a vie\\v to carry that object into effect.\n\nIn view of the object of that Act as recited in the preamble there could be no manner of doubt that the word \"person\" in that Act could not possibly include a corporation. Lord Selborne towards the end of page 863 indicated, by reference to the 18th\n\n• (11 (1880) L.R. 5 App. Cas. s,57\n\nMotipur Zamind11ri\n\nGo. Ltd. v.\n\nTh• Stat• of\n\nBih(l, r a.nd Another.\n\nDa• J,\n\nMotipur Zamindart\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Bihar a nil Another.\n\nDas J.\n\nstiction, that the Legislature hy the word \"person\"\n\nreferred only to individual persons as it was clearly repugnant to the subject of tha~ Act to include a corporation within the word \"per.<on\" as ued in that Act.\n\nMr. 1'. R Das urges that the judgment of Lord Selborne was founded on the fact that the corporation could not come within the term \"person\" on the ground that it could not make an application in writing signed by it.\n\nFrom this Mr. P. R. Das urges that the necessary implication of this part of the judgment of Lord Selborne is that it was not permissible to take tbe provisions of tbe Companies Act into consideration for construing another Act. If that were the implication of the speech of Lord Selborne, with respect, we are unable to accept the same.\n\nIndeed, one cannot think of a company unless one has in view the provisions of tbe Companies Act, for a company is the creature of the Companies Act.\n\nIts existence, powers and rights are all regulated by that Act. 'fhe trend of the speeches of !he noble Lords in the case relied on by Mr. P. R. Das is that the object of the particular Act uuder consideration was entirely repugnant to the word \"corpora.tion\" being included within the term \"person\" as used in that Act, and as we apprehend it, that decision lays down nothing beyond that.\n\nIn support of his contention tht a company owning an estate was never intended to be affected by the Act, Mr. P. R. Das draws our attention to the winding up sections of the Indian Companies Act and urges tha\"t it is not possible to fit in the scheme of winding up into the scheme of the Bihar Act. If the Zamindari assets of the company are faken over and compensation is paid by non-transferable bonds it will, he contends, he impossible to a.pply the law of winding up in case the company goes into liquidation. '!.'here will, according to him, be conflict of jurisdiction between the Court where the winding up is ptoceeding, which may conceivably be in another State, and the Bihr1t Government and its officers.\n\nWe see no force in this contention.\n\nU pou a\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'fS 727\n\nnotification being issued under section 3, the Zamindari estate will vest in the 8tate and the company will cease to have auy interest in it.\n\nIts only right will be to receive compensation. In case of winding up the liquidator will have to pursue the remedy provided by this Act.\n\nHe or the company will be in no worse position than the official assignee or official receiver of an individual proprietor who may happen to become insolvent in another State.\n\nFinally, Mr. P.R. Das strongly relies on section 41 of the Act and contends that that section would be wholly inapplicable to a company and that circumstance by itself would indicate that the Bthar Legislature did not intend that a company owning an estate should be governed by this Act. A corporation, it is true, cannot be made liable for treason, felony or any misdemeanour involving personal violence or for any offence for which the ouly penalty is imprisonment or corporal punishment. (Halobury, 2nd J!; dition, Volume IX, article 5, p. 14).\n\nSection 41 dot!s not prescribe punishment by imprisonment only. Mr.\n\nP. R. Das suggests that the infliction of imprisonment or fine would depend upon the gravity of the offence and not on the character of the offender.\n\nThis argument, however, would seem to run counter to the opinion of Lord Blackburn set forth at pages 869-870 of the report of the vary case relied on by Mr. P. R. Das. The reeent cases of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Limited( 1 ) and Rex v. I.C.R. Haulage, Limited and Another(2) seem to indicate that a corporation may be convicted even of an offence requiring an act of will or a state of mind.\n\nApart, however, from the consideration whether a company may be held guily of wilful failure or neglect, as to which we need not express any definite opinion on this occasion, there can be no difficulty in applying the provisions of section 41 to the officers or agents of the company.\n\nOn.a notification under section 3(1) being published the estate vests in the State. Section 4 sets out the\n\n(r) [I9H] l K.B. 146.\n\n(2) [r9HJ l K.B. 551.\n\nMotipu.r Zamindari\n\nCo. Ltd. v, The State of\n\nBihrir and An.other.\n\nDas J,\n\nMotipur Zamindrtri\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nTh• St•te of Bihar and Another.\n\nDas J.\n\nconsequences of such vesting. Clause (g) of that section empowers the Collector by written order served in the prescribed manner to require any person in possession of such an estate or tenure or any part thereof to give up possession of the same by a date specified in the order and to take such steps or nse such, force as may be necessary for securing compli:.noe with the said order. If any officer or agent of the company in the possession of the estate wilfully fails or ignores to comply with snob lawful order, then surely he can be proceeded against under section 41.\n\nLikewise, under section 40, the officers therein mentioned are authorized at any time before or after the date of vesting by a written order served in the prescribed manner to require a proprietor or tenureholder or any other person in possession of such an estate or tenure or any agents or employees of such proprietor, tenure-holder or other person to produce at a time and place specified in the order such documents, papers or regiiters or to furnish such information relating to such estate or tenure as such officer may from time to time require for any of the purposes of this Act. A wiliul failure or neglect to comply with such oder would clearly bring the recalcitrant officer or agent of the company within the penalty provided under section 41. Section 41. therefore, does not necessarily preclude Lhe application of the Act to incorporated companies.\n\nIt cannot be denied that a company is competent to own and bold property. 'fhe whole object of the impugned Act is thus stated by Mahajan J. in the State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh\\ 1):\n\n\"Now it is obvious that 0oncentration of big blocks of land in the hands of a few individuals is contrary to the principle on which the Constitution of [ndia is based .. The purpose of the acquisition contemplated by the impugned Act therefore is to do away with the concentration of big blocks of land and means of production in the hands of a few individuals and to so distribute the ownership and contro! of the\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 889 at p. 941.\n\nmaterial resources which come in the hands of the\n\nState as to subserve the common good as best as possible.\n\nIu other words, shortly put, the purpose behind the Act is to bring about a reform in the land distribution system of Bihar for the general benefit 'of the community as advised.\"\n\nIn view of this purpose there is no reason to differentiate between au individual prnprietor and a company which owns egtates or tenures. Indeed, there is not only nothing repugnant in the. subject or context of the Act which should prevent the inclusion of a company owning estate within the definition of \"proprietor\", such inclusion is necessary iu order to give full effect to the very object of the Act.\n\nIn Appeal No. 63 of 1953 Mr. P.R. Das raises an additional point. namely, that the appellant company in that appeal owns estates which are situate in Purnea in the district of Bibar and in Maida in tbe district of West Bengal but it bas to pay a single\n\nGovernment revenue at Purnea. It is further alleged that the appellant company h:i.s let out portion\" of the estates on Patni leases, e:i.ch of the Patnis comprising land situate both within and out, ide Bihar.\n\nThe acquisition of that part of the estate which is situate in Bihar has made it difficult, if not impossible, for the appellant company to pay its revenue or recover its rent.\n\nThat part of the estate which is in Bihar cannot be severed frnm the rest and therefore the notification covering only the portion of the estate situate in Bihar is invalid.\n\nWe do not think there is any substance in this argument. As stated by the High Court it is a simple case of apportionment of the revenue and also apportionment of the rent.\n\nThe necessity for such apportionment cannot possibly affect the validity of the notification.\n\nFor reasons stated above these appeals fail and must be dismissed with co>.ts.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: R. R. Biswas.\n\nAgent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha,\n\nMotipur Za1nindari\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nTho State of Bihar and Another.", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "I'fPUR ZAMINDARI CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOTIPUR ZAMIDARI CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANO'I'HER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOIHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 231, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 239, "end_char": 248, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. 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C. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1391, "end_char": 1402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das (J. C. Sinha and L. K. Chaudhry, with him) for the appellant in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "L. K. Chaudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1407, "end_char": 1421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das (J. C. Sinha and L. K. Chaudhry, with him) for the appellant in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "M. 0. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1473, "end_char": 1487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "L. N.\n\nSinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1517, "end_char": 1529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (L. N.\n\nSinha and Bajrang Sahai, with him) for the respondents in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "Bajrang Sahai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (L. N.\n\nSinha and Bajrang Sahai, with him) for the respondents in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1660, "end_char": 1669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. R. DAS J.\n\n' DAS J.-Tbis judgment disposes of Civil Appeals No.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "Motipur Zamindari Company Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1794, "end_char": 1824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Motipur Zamindari Company Ltd., the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1927, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2018, "end_char": 2044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It supplies sugar-cane to a sister concern named Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd.\n\nRaja J ankinath Roy and N arendra Nath Roy and\n\nCo., Ltd., the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "Raja J ankinath Roy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2046, "end_char": 2065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It supplies sugar-cane to a sister concern named Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd.\n\nRaja J ankinath Roy and N arendra Nath Roy and\n\nCo., Ltd., the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "N arendra Nath Roy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2070, "end_char": 2088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It supplies sugar-cane to a sister concern named Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd.\n\nRaja J ankinath Roy and N arendra Nath Roy and\n\nCo., Ltd., the appellant in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2188, "end_char": 2201, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2240, "end_char": 2246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "63 of 1953, was incorpor:i.ted in 1933 under the Indian Companies Act and also has its registered office in Bengal."}}, {"text": "Purnea", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2290, "end_char": 2296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This company owns Zamindari properties in Purnea in the\n\nState of Bihar as well as in Maida in the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2314, "end_char": 2319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This company owns Zamindari properties in Purnea in the\n\nState of Bihar as well as in Maida in the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Maida", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2334, "end_char": 2339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This company owns Zamindari properties in Purnea in the\n\nState of Bihar as well as in Maida in the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2356, "end_char": 2367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This company owns Zamindari properties in Purnea in the\n\nState of Bihar as well as in Maida in the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "30th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2442, "end_char": 2461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th December, 1949, a bill entitled the Bihar Land Reforms Bill was passed by the Bihar\n\nregislature and having been reserved for the consideration of the President received bis assent on the 11th September, 1950. '"}}, {"text": "25th September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2735, "end_char": 2755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'be Act so passed and assented to was published in the Bibar Gazette on the 25th September, 1950, and was brought into force on the same day by a notification made by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred on it by section 1(3) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2888, "end_char": 2900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3005, "end_char": 3019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Many of the proprietors and tenureholders of Zamindari estates took proceedings against the State of Bihar for appropriate orders restraining the State Government from taking over the estates under the provisions of the Act which they claimed to be beyond the legislatiye competency of the Bihar Legislature and otherwise void."}}, {"text": "Special Bench of the Patna High Court held that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3269, "end_char": 3324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3381, "end_char": 3391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Bench of the Patna High Court held that the Act", "statute": "Special Bench of the Patna High Court held that the Act"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3418, "end_char": 3432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar appealed to this Court.", "canonical_name": "Stato of\n\nBihar"}}, {"text": "Motipur z.,.mindari\n\nCo. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3697, "end_char": 3726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\nMotipur z.,.mindari\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBiht1r and A not her."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBiht1r and A not her", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3735, "end_char": 3765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\nMotipur z.,.mindari\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBiht1r and A not her."}}, {"text": "Stato of\n\nBihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3813, "end_char": 3828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. v.\n\nThe Stato of\n\nBihar and Another.", "canonical_name": "Stato of\n\nBihar"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3989, "end_char": 3998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Bench of the Patna High Court held that the Act", "statute": "Special Bench of the Patna High Court held that the Act"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4228, "end_char": 4239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Bench of the Patna High Court held that the Act", "statute": "Special Bench of the Patna High Court held that the Act"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4832, "end_char": 4843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the two applications made by the two appellants under article 226 before the Patna High Court came up for bearing and were dismissed by a Bench of that Court on the 22nd December, 1952."}}, {"text": "Zamindari estates of companies incorpor ated under the Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bibar Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5335, "end_char": 5352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the appellants' contention that it was not, it was urgedthat the Bibar Legislature bad no authority to legislate with respect to trading corporations or non-trading corporations whose objects were not confined to one State."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5569, "end_char": 5579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to entries 43, 4411.nd 45 of List I to show that it was Parliament alone which was authorized to make law with respect to matters set forth in those entries. '"}}, {"text": "Act and the winding up provisions of the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Patna. High\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5936, "end_char": 5954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Patna."}}, {"text": "P.R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5989, "end_char": 5997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High\n\nCourt overruled this contention and Mr. P.R. Das appearing in support of these appeals has not challenged this part of the decision of the Patna High Court.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6163, "end_char": 6180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main point urged by Mr. P.R. Das is that even if the Bihar Legislature could make a law for acquiring Zamindari estates of incorporated companies it did not, by the Act, in fact do so."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6295, "end_char": 6304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the winding up provisions of the Companies Act", "statute": "Act and the winding up provisions of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "6th November, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be recalled that it was under this section that the State Government on the 6th November, 1951, issued thenotificationswith respect to the estates of the appellants situate within the State."}}, {"text": "P. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6676, "end_char": 6685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. R. Das's principal contention is that the appellant companies do not come within the terms \"proprietor\" or \"tenureholder\" as defined by the Act and consequently no part of their estates were intended to be vested or did in fact vest in the\n\nState. \"", "canonical_name": "S. R. 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Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9414, "end_char": 9422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M~. P.H. Das refers us to various sections and rules framed under section 43 of the Act to show that only natural persons were intended to be affected by the Act, because, he urges, the company is not competent to do the acts therem referred to.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9476, "end_char": 9486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9950, "end_char": 9963, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pharmacy Act, 1868", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10318, "end_char": 10336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Selborne L.C.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10417, "end_char": 10430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed upon the observations of Lord Selborne L.C. at page 863. '", "canonical_name": "Selborne L.C."}}, {"text": "Ijord Blackburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10924, "end_char": 10939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, Ijord Blackburn in bis speech in the House of Lords in the Pharmaceutical Society's case(') referred to this preamble and observed at page 870 :-\n\n\"Stopping there, it is quite plain that those who used that language were not thinking of corporations."}}, {"text": "sections 1 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11682, "end_char": 11699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Selborne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12229, "end_char": 12237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Selborne towards the end of page 863 indicated, by reference to the 18th\n\n• (11 (1880) L.R. 5 App.", "canonical_name": "Selborne L.C."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12454, "end_char": 12468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Da• J,\n\nMotipur Zamindart\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Bihar a nil Another.", "canonical_name": "Stato of\n\nBihar"}}, {"text": "R Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12717, "end_char": 12722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R Das urges that the judgment of Lord Selborne was founded on the fact that the corporation could not come within the term \"person\" on the ground that it could not make an application in writing signed by it."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13095, "end_char": 13108, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13349, "end_char": 13362, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13401, "end_char": 13414, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Das draws our attention to the winding up sections of the Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13924, "end_char": 14002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bihr1t Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14489, "end_char": 14506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".'here will, according to him, be conflict of jurisdiction between the Court where the winding up is ptoceeding, which may conceivably be in another State, and the Bihr1t Government and its officers."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14640, "end_char": 14649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Das draws our attention to the winding up sections of the Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Das draws our attention to the winding up sections of the Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15108, "end_char": 15118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Halobury", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15560, "end_char": 15568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Halobury, 2nd J!;"}}, {"text": "article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15597, "end_char": 15606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15617, "end_char": 15627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Blackburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15910, "end_char": 15919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument, however, would seem to run counter to the opinion of Lord Blackburn set forth at pages 869-870 of the report of the vary case relied on by Mr. P. R. Das."}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16503, "end_char": 16513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16581, "end_char": 16593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16641, "end_char": 16650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17426, "end_char": 17436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17455, "end_char": 17465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18185, "end_char": 18195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18197, "end_char": 18207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18435, "end_char": 18442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe whole object of the impugned Act is thus stated by Mahajan J. in the State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh\\ 1):\n\n\"Now it is obvious that 0oncentration of big blocks of land in the hands of a few individuals is contrary to the principle on which the Constitution of [ndia is based .. The purpose of the acquisition contemplated by the impugned Act therefore is to do away with the concentration of big blocks of land and means of production in the hands of a few individuals and to so distribute the ownership and contro!"}}, {"text": "Bibar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19819, "end_char": 19824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "namely, that the appellant company in that appeal owns estates which are situate in Purnea in the district of Bibar and in Maida in tbe district of West Bengal but it bas to pay a single\n\nGovernment revenue at Purnea."}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20857, "end_char": 20869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: R. R. Biswas."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20899, "end_char": 20917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha,\n\nMotipur Za1nindari\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nTho State of Bihar and Another."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_730_751_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "April 17.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1953) .\n\nMAQBOOL HUSSAIN\n\nTHE STA'l'E OF BOMBAY.\n\nJAGJIT SINGH\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB.\n\nVIDYA RATTAN v.\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB.\n\nPARMAN AND\n\n1!.\n\nTHE SI'ATE OF PUNJAB.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, S.R. DAs,\n\nGHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\n Constitution of India, 1B50, Art. 20(2)-Fundamental rights- \".htre fois acquit\"-When subsequent prosecution barred-Confiscation of goods by Sea Customs Authorities-Whether bars prosecution u11de1 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act-Punishment by Jail Superintendent under Jail Rules - Whether bars prosecntion under Penal Gode-Sea Customs Act (VIII of 1878), s.167-Foreign Excha1'ge Regulation Act (VII of 1947), s. 23-Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, Rule 41.\n\nThe wording of Art. 20 of the Constitution and the words used therein show that the proceedings therein contemplated are proceedings of the nature of criminal proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal and \"prosecution\" in this context would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates tbe procedure.\n\nWhere a person against whom proceedings harl been taken by the Sea Customs Authorities under s. 167 of the Sea Customs Act and an order for confiscation of goods had been passed was subsequently prosecuted before the Presidency Magistrate for an offence under s. 23 of the Foreign Exohange Regulation Act in respect of the same act:\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'r REPORTS 731\n\nHeld, that the proceeding before the Sea Customs Authorities 1958 was not a nprosecution\" and the order for confiscation was not a - \"punishment\" inflicted by a Court or Judicial Tribunal within the Maqboo! H1main meaning of Art. 20(2) of the Constitution and the prosecution was v not barred.\n\nThe Stat• of The detenus in a jail made a general assault on jail officials Bombay. and some of those who were removed to the cells resorted to hunger strike; and they were separately confined and letters and interviews were stopped with regard to them by the Jail Superintendent. Some months after the hunger strike the J •il Superintendent filed complaints against them before a Magistrate under r. 41 (2) of the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules for having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike and for offences under ss. 332 and 353and147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code:\n\nHeld, (i) that the detenus were governed by the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules and not the Prisons Act and the proceedings taken by the Jail Superintendent against the detenus did not constitute a prosecution and punishment within the meaning of Art. 20 (2) so as to prevent a subsequent prosecution for offences under the Indian Penal Code ;\n\n(ii) the Jail Superintendent having taken action under r. 41\n\n(1) for the hunger strike and punished the detenus with stoppage of letters etc. it was not open to him to make a cnmplaint against them again to the }fagistrate for the san1e offence of having com1nitted a jail offence by resorting to hunger strike.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTIO:'I: Criminal Ap.peal No. 81 of l!-!52. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12th February, 1951, of the High Court ol .J udicatare at Bombay in Criminal Application No. 644 of 1950. Petitions Nos. 170, 171and172, being petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution, were also heard along with Appeal No. 81 of 1952 ..\n\nIshwarlal O. Dalal for the appellant.\n\nM. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Poru1 A. Mehta, with him) for the Snate of Bombay.\n\nS. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra Lal, with him) for the State of Punjab.\n\nJagjit Singh, Petitioner in Petition No. 170 of 1951, in person.\n\nOther petitiopers not represented.\n\n1953. April 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhagwati J. 95\n\n732 SUPREME COUR'l. 1 REPOR'l'8 (195'3]\n\n1958 BHAGWATI J.-This appeal by special leave from a ,, b -;--H . judgmeut and order of the High Court of J udicture u<ag ooo µssarn B b . · h v. at om ay raises an irnporta!lt quest10n as to t e Th• Stats of construction of article 20(:J) of the Constitution.\n\nBombay.\n\nThe. appellant, a citiJrnn of Bharat, arrived at the\n\nBhagwau. J.\n\nSanta Cruz airport from Jedd11h on the tith NoYemher, 1949. On landing he did not declare that he had brought in gold with him but on search it was found that he had brought 107.2 tolas of gold in contravention of the notification of the Government of India dated the 25th August, 1948.\n\nThe Customs Authorities thereupon took action under section 167, clanRe (8), of the Sea Customs Act VITI of 1878, and confiscated the gold by an order dat@d the 19th December, 1949. 'rhe owner of the gold was however given the option to pay in lieu of such confiscation a fine of Rs. 12,000, which option was to be exercised within four months of the date of the order.\n\nA copy of the order was sent on the 30th .January, 1950, to the appellant. Nobody came forward to redeem the gold.\n\nOn the 22nd March, 19.50, a complaint was filed in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, aga.inst the appellant charging him with having committed an offence under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act VII of 1947, read with the notification dated the 2.5th August, 1948. 'rhe appellant thereupon on the 12th June, 1950, filed a petition in the High Court of Bombay under article 228 of the Constitution contending that his prosecution in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate wa.s in violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to him under article 20(2) of the Constitution and praying that as the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, tbe determination of which was necessary for the disposal of the case, the case may be withdrawn from the file of tbe Chief Presidency Magistrate to the High Conrt and the High Court may either dispose of the case themselves or determine the question of law and return it to the Chief Presidency Magistrate's Court for disposal. A rule was issued by the High Court ou\n\nthe 26th June, 1950,, which ca.me on for hearing on 1963 the 9th August, 1950, before Ba.vdeka.r and Vyas JJ. . 'l'he rule wa~ made ab,; olute and the High Court Maqbool Hu\"\"'\" directed that the proceedings pending against the The ;; at• of• appellant in the Court of the Chief Presidency Bombay.\n\nMagistrate be withdrawn and brought before the High Court under article 2·28 of the Constitution.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nThe case was thereupon withdrawn ani! brought before the High Court and was heard by the High Court on the 17th October, 1950. The learned Judges of the High Court, Cha.gla. C.J. and Gajendragadkar J. were of the opinion that the appellant could claim the benefit of article 20(2) only if he wa> the owner of the gold which wn.s confi, cated and that before they decided as to whether there had been a prosecution and a. punishment within the meanmg of article 20(.J) it was necesoary that the Chief Presidency Magistrate should determine the question of fact as to whether the appellant was the owner of the gold which had been confiscated and in respect of which an option was given to him as stated above.\n\nThey therefore sent the matter back to the Chief .Presidency Magistrate djrectiug him to find a:; to whether the appellant was or was not the owner of the gold stating that they would deal with the application after the finding was returned. The Chief\n\nPresidency Magistrate recorded evidence and on the 20th January, 1950, recorded the finding hat the appellant was the owner of the gold in q uestiou and returned the finding to the High Court. Chagla C.J.\n\nand Gajendragadkar J. heard the petition further on the 12th February, 1951. They reversed the finding of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, dismissed the application of the appellant and directed that the case should go back to the Chief Presidency M agistrate for dispesal according to law. The appellant obtained on the 1st :'jovember, 1951, special leave to appeal against the judgment and order passed by the\n\nHigh Court.\n\nThe question that arises for our determination in this app.eal is whether by re11.son of the procPedin11s\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1959 taken by the Sea Customs Aut4orities the appellant u b 7; . could be said to have been prosecuted and punished\n\n00 v. \"''\"'for the same offence with which he was charged in\n\n• Th• stats of the Court of the Chief :Presidency Magistrate, Bom- Bombay. h!Ly. There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act as also an\n\nBh.agwati J. offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulation' Act was one and the same, viz., importing the gold in contravention of the notification of the Government of India dated the 25th August, 1948.\n\nThe appellant could be proceeded against under section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act as also under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act in respect of the said acb. Proceedings were in fact taken under section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act which resulted in the confiscation of the gold. Furthr proceedings were taken under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act by way of filing the complaint aforesaid in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, and the plea which was taken by the accused in bar of the prosecution in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, was that he had already been prosecuted and punished for the same offence and by virtue of the provisions of article 20(2) of the Constitution he could not be prosecuted and punished agam.\n\n'l'he word offer; ce has not been defined in the Constitution. But article 367 provides that the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act X of 1897), shall apply for the interpretation of the Constitution.\n\nSection 3(37) of the General Clauses Act defines an offence to mean any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force and there is no doubt that both under the provisions of section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act and section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act the a.ct of the appellant was made punishable and constituted an offence.\n\nIn order however to attract the operati.on of article 20(2) the appellant must have been prosecuted and punished for the same offence when proceedings were ta.ken by the Sea Customs Authorities.\n\nThe\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSbPREME COURT REPORTS 7315\n\nHigh Court did not go into the question as to whether l 968 tbe appellant was prosecuted when proceedings were M b ~H . • k b f h S C A h , , I , aq OO• uss•in .a en e ore t e ea ustoms ut onties. t cons1v. dered the question of punishment in the first instance The State of and thought it necessary to arrive at a finding as ta Bombay. the ownership of the confiscated gold before it could consider the application of the appellant.\n\nIn the Bhagwatt .r. opinion of the High Court the appellant could be said to have been punished only if it were established that he was the owner of the confiscated gold. If he was the owner, the confiscation was a punishment, which would not be so if he W'as not the owner of the gold.\n\nThis question of the ownership of the gold was not in our opinion material. 'l'he gold was found in the possession of the appellant when he landed at the Santa Uruz airport. '!'he appellant was detained and searched by the Customs.Authorities and the gold was seized from his person.\n\nProceedings under section 167 (8) were taken by the Customs Authorities and after examining witnesses an order was passed on the 19th December, 1949, confiscating the gold and giving an option to the owner to pay a fine of Rs. 12,000 in lieu of such confiscation under section 183 of the Sea Customs Act.\n\nCopy of this order was forwarded to the appellant and for all practical purposes the appellant was treated as the owner of the confiscated gold.\n\nAs a matter of fact when evidence was recorded before the Chief Presidency Magistrate on remand the Assistant Collector of Customs gave evidence that no one else had claimed the gold and had the appellant paid the penalty and obtained the Reserve Bank permit and produced the detention slip be would have been given the gold.\n\nOnce the appellant was found. in possession of the confiscated gold the burden of proving that he was not the owner would fall upon whosoever affirmed that he was not the owner. '!.'be complaint which was filed in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, also proceeded on the footing that the appellant committed an offence in so far as he brought the gold without the permit from\n\n736 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [i953j\n\nI95B the Reserve Bank of India, that no permit was.ever - . applied for or granted to the appellant and that the Maqbool Hussa•n l h b · f h ' v appel ant ad een given an opportumty o s owmg ' The s; ate of whether he had obtained such permit but that he\n\nBombay. failed to produce the s:i, me. It appears therefore that the question of the ownership could not assume as BhagwatiJ. much importance s the High Court attached to it.\n\nIf the Court came to the conclusion that the appellant was prosecuted wheu proceedings were taken by the 8ea Customs Authorities there was not much scope left fort-he argument that he was not punished by the confiscation of tlle gold and the option given to him to pay a fine of Rs. 12,000 in lien of such confiscation. 'fo be deprived of the right of possession of valuable goods may well be regarded in certain circumstances as by itself a punishment.\n\nWe have therefore got to determine whether under the circumstances the appellant cau be said to have been prosecuted when proceedings were taken by the Sea Customs Authorities.\n\nThe fundamental right which is guaranteed in article 20(2) enunci&tes the principle of \"autrefois convict\" or \"double jeopardy\". 'fhe roots of that principle are to be found in the well established rule of the common law of England \"that where a person has been convicted of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction the conviction is a bar to all further criminal proceedings for the same offence.\" (Per Charles J. in Reg. v. Miles (1). 'l'o the same effect is the ancient maxim \"Nemo bis debet punire pro uno delicto'', that is to say that uo one ought to be twice punished for one offence or q, s it is sometimes written \"pro eadem causa'', , that is, for the same cause . . :This is the principle on which the party pursued h-as available to him the plea of \"autrefois convict\" or\"autrefois acquit''. \"'rhe plea of 'autrefois convict' or 'autrefois acquit' a,; ers that the defendant has 'been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arrnigned ...... The question for the 'jury\n\n(I) •4 Q.B.D. 423,\n\n on the issus is whether the defendant has previouqly 1953 been ip jeopardy iu re;; pect of the charge on which he,, 6 -;--H . . . d f h l f [ , ; uaq OO• ussain is arra1gne , or t e ru e o aw Is that a person must v. not be put in peril twice for the same offence.\n\nThe ThB Stat• of test is whether the former offence .and the offence no~ Bombay. charged have theme 1ngrer11e.uts IU the sense that - . the facts constitutmg the oue are sufficient to justify Bhagwat• .r. a conviction of the other, not that the facts relied on by the Crown are the same in the two trials.\n\nA plea of 'autrefois acquit' is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of aGquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter.\" (Vide Halsbnry's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 9, pages 152 and 163, paragraph 212).\n\nThis principle found recognition in section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 ,-\n\n\"Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished nuder either or any of those enactment& but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence,\"\n\nand also in section 403 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898,-\n\n\" A person who has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under section 236, or for which he might have been convicted under section 237.\"\n\nThe Fifth Amendment of the American Constitu tion enunciated this principle in the manner follow ing:-\n\n\" ............... nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be witness against himself .......... , .... \"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nt95B Willis in his Constitutional Law, at page .528, obserb -19 . ves that the phrase \"jeopardy of lifo or limb\" indicates Maq oo ussa<n h 1• • • • • d t f h v t at tue 1mmumty 1s restncte o crimes o t e\n\nThe stt• of big best grade, and this is the way Blackstone states Bombay. the rule: \"Yet, by a gradual process of liberal con struction the courts have extended the scope of the Bhagwali J. clause to make i~ applicable to all indictable offences, including misdemeanours.\" .......... \" Under the United States rule, to be put in jeopardy there must be a valid indictment or information duly presented to a court of competent jurisdiction, there must be an arraignment and plea, and a lawful jury must be impanelled and sworn. It is not necessary to have a verdict.\n\nThe protection is not against a second punishment but against the peril in which he is placed by the jeopardy mentioned.\" These wre the materials which formed the background of the guarantee of fundamental right given in article 20(2). It incorporated within its scope the plea of \"autrefois convict\" _as known to the British jurisprudence or the plea of double jeopardy as known to the American Constitution but circumscribed it by providing that there should be not only a prosecution but also a punishment in the fir3t instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence.\n\nThe words \"before a court of law or judicial tribunal\" are not to be found in article 20(2). But if regard be had to the whole background indicated above it is clear that in order that the protection of article 20(2) be invoked by a citizen there must have been a prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence before a court of law or a tribunal, required by law to decide the matters in controversy judicially on evidence on oath which it must be authorised by law to administer and not before a tribunal which entertains a departmental or an administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute but not required to proceed on legal evidence given on oa.th. The very wording of article 20 and the words use<l therein:-\" convicted\", \" commission of\n\nthe act charged as an offence\", \"he subjected to a 1968 penalty\", \"commission of the offence\",\" prnsecutedM b -lH . d . h d\" \" d f ff \" ld aq oo u•M•n an pums e , accuse o any o euce , won v. indicate that the proceedings therein contemplated The state of are of the nature of criminal proceedings before a Bombay, court of law or a judicial tribunal and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or start- Bhagwati ' ing of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure.\n\nThe tests of a judicial tribunal were laid down by this Court in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi(') in the following passage quoted with approval by Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ. from Oocper v. Wilson(') at page 340 :-\n\n\"A true judicial decision presupposes n existing dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites :-(1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) If the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the di, pute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) If the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal argument by the parties; and ( 4) A decision which r\"' disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling npon any disputed question of law.\"\n\nThe question whether the Sea Customs Authorities when they entertained proceedings for confiscation of tbe gold in question acted as a judicial tribunal has got to be determined in accordance with the abov~ tests.\n\nThe Sea Customs Act, 1878, was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the levy of sea customs duties. The hierarchy of the officials are the\n\n(1) (1950] S.C.R. 459,\n\n(2) [1937] 2 K.B. 309. •\n\n1958 Customs Collector, who is the officer of Customs for u b . the time being in separate charge of a custom house,\n\n00 v ussaintbe Chief Customs Officer who is the 'Chief Execu-\n\nTh• Stat• of tive Officer of the Sea Customs for a port and the\n\nBombay.\n\nChief Customs Authority which is the Central Board of Revenue.\n\nSections 18 'and 19 enact prohibitions Bhagwati J. and restrictions on importation and exportation of goods and section 19 (a) provides for detention and confiscation of goods whose importation is prohibited.\n\nAfter making various provisions for the levy of sea customs duties, Chapter XVI enacts offences and penalties and several offences mentioned in the first column of the scheaule to section 167 are made punishable with penalties mentioned in the third column thereof. Item 8 relates to the offence committed by the importation of goods contrary to the prohibition or restriction imposed in that behalf under sections 18 and 19 of the Act and penalty prescribed for such an offence is:-\n\n\"Such goods shall be liable to confiscation; any person concerned in any such offence shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding three times the value of the goods, or not exceeding one thousand rupees.\"\n\nChapter XVII prescribes the procedure relating to offences, appeals, etc. Powers of search are given to the officers of customs but provision is made that a person about to be searched can require the officer to take him previous to search before the nearest Magistrate or Customs Collector. Search warrant can only be issued by the Magistrate and can be executed in the same way and has the same effect as a search warrant issued under a law relating to criminal procedure.\n\nPowers are also given to the officers of Customs to arrest persons reasonably suspected ol _having committed an offence under the Act but the person arrested is to be forthwith taken before the nearest Magistrate or Customs Collector. The Magis\n\ntrate is entitled either to commit such person to jail or order him to be kept in custody of the police for such time as is necessary to enable the Magistrate to communicl'.te with the proper officers of Customs. No\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUH'l' REPORTS 741\n\nsuch power is given to the Customs Collector. Sec- 1953 tion 18l(A) also prnvides for the detention of pack- - · bl . . d h Maqboo! Himain age' conta1111ng cei:t1a1 pu teat100.; unporte mto t e States. Section 182 provides that except in the case Th• ~tao/ of certain offences therein mentioned which involve Bombay. proceedings before a Magistrate confiscation, increased rate of duty or penalty can be adjudged by the Bh?gwati J.\n\nCustoms Authorities therein mentioned and section 183 provides for option to be given to the owner of the goods confiscated to pay in lieu of confiscation such fine as the officer thinks fit. Section 186 provides that the award of any confiscation, penalty or increased rate of duty under the Act by an officer of Customs is not to prevent the infliction of any punish ment to which the person affected thereby is liable under any other law. An :ippea, l is provided under section 188 from a decision or order of the officer of Customs to the Chief Customs Anthoritv who is thereupon to make such further enquiry\" and pass such order as he thinks fit confirming, altering or annulling the deuision or or.der appealed against.\n\nSection 191 provides .for a revision by the Central Government on the application of a person aggr.ieved by any decision or order passed by an officer of Customs or the Chief Customs Authority from which no appeal lies. Section 193 provides for the enforcement of the payment of penalty or increased rate of duty as adjudged against any person by an officer of Customs. If such officer is not able to realise the unpaid amount from other goods in charge he can notify in writing tQ any Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such person may be, his name and residence and the amonnt of penalty or increased rate of duty unrecovered and such Magistrate is thereupon to proceed to enforce payment of the said amount in like manner as if such penalty or increased rate had been a fine inflicted by himself.\n\nIt is clear on a perusal of the above provi,; ions that the powers of search, arrest and detention are given to the Cnstoms Authorities for the levy of sea cnstoms duties and provision is made at the same tie for a\n\n742 SUPREME COURT REPOR'i'S [1953j\n\n1963 reference to the Magistrate in all cases where search\n\nb - 1- . warrants are needed and detention of the arrested Mag oo HuS3a•n · d C ff f t v. person 1s require . ertam o ences o a senous na ure Th• St•te of are to be tried only by Magistrates who are the only Bombay. authorities who can inflict punishments by way of imprisonment. l!; ven though the customs officers are Bhagwati J. invested with the power of adjudging confiscation, increased rates of duty or penalty the highest penalty which can be inflicted is Rs. 1,000. Confiscation is no doubt one of the penalties which the Customs Authorities can impose but that is more in the nature of proceedings in rem than proceedings in parsonam, the object being to confiscate the offending goods which have been dealt with contrary to the provisions of the law and in respect of the confiscation also an option is given to the owner of the goods to pay in lieu of confiscation such fine as the officer thinks fit.\n\nAll this is for the enforcement of the levy of and safeguarding the recovery of the sea customs duties.\n\nThere is no procedure prescribed to be followed by the Customs Officer in the matter of such adjudication and the proceedings before the Customs Officers are not assimilated in any manner whatever to proceedings in courts of law according to the provisions of the Civil or the Criminal Procedure Code. 'l 1he Customs Officers are not required to act judicially on legal evidence tendered on oath and they are not authorised to administer oath to any witness.\n\nThe appeals, if any, lie before the Chief Customs Authority which is the Central Board of Revenue and the power of revision is given to the Central Government which certainly is not a judicial authority. In the matter of the enforcement of the payment of penalty or increased rate of duty also the Customs Officer can only proceed against other goods of the party in the possession of the Customs Authorities. But if such penalty or increased rate of duty cannot be realised therefrom the only thing which he can do is to notify the matter to the appropriate Magistrate who is the only person empowered to enforce payment as if such penalby or\n\nincreased rate of duty had been a fine inflicted by\n\nI9M himself. The process of recovery can be issued only - . b th M . d b h C A h .\n\nMagbool Huuain y e ag1strate an not y t e ustoms ut onty. v All these provisions go to show that far from being Th• s; at• of authorities bound by any rules of evidence or proced- Bombay. ure established by law and invested with power to enforce their own judgments or orders the Sea Cus- Bhagwati J. toms Authorities are merely constituted administrative machinery for the purpose of adjudging confiscation, increased rates of duty and penalty preseribed in the Act.\n\nThe same view of the functions and powers of Sea Customs Officers was expressed in a decision of the Bombay High Court to which our attention was called. (See Mahadev Ganesh Jamsandekar v. The Secretary of State for India in Council(').\n\nWe are of the opinion that the Sea Customs Authorities are not a judicial tribunal and the adjudging of confiscation, increased rate of duty or penalty under the provisions of the Sea Customs Act do not constitute a judgment or order of a court or judicial tribunal necessary for the purpose of supporting a plea of double jeopardy.\n\nIt therefore follows that when the Customs Authorities confiscated the gold in question neither the\n\nproceedings taken before the Sea Customs Authorities constituted a prosecution of the appellant nor did the order of confiscation constitute a punishment inflicted by a court or judicial tribunal on the appellant. The appellant could not be said by reason of these proceedings before the Sea Customs Authorities to have l)een \"prosecuted and punished\" for the same offence with which he was charged before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, in the complaint which was filed against him under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange .Regulation Act.\n\nThe result therefore is that the appeal fails a.nd must be dismissed.\n\nPetitions Nos. 170, 171 and 172 of 1951.\n\n{I) 119221 I.L.R. 46 Bom. 732.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1953j\n\n1958 By an order of this Co.urt dated the26th Novemb - 1- . her, 1952, these petitions were ordered to be heard by Moq\n\n00 vHuss••• the Constitution Bench along with Criminal Appeal The s; ateof No. 81of1952, as the same point as regards \"autre-\n\nBombay. fois convict\" or \"double jeopardy\" was also involved therein. Jagjit Singh, Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand, Bhagwati J. the three petitioners in the respective petitions were detenus under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, detained in the Central Jail, Ferozepur, and governed by the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, framed by the Government of Punjab under section 4(a) of the Act.\n\nOn the 6th J?ebruary, 1950, it is alleged, a general assault on jail officials was made by the detenus including J agjit Singh. An alarm was rung and the warder guard after some time overpowered the detenus who were responsible for the assault.\n\nThirteen jail officials and twelve detenus sustained injuries and the detenus were all removed to cells. On the 7th February, 1950, the three detenu petitioners resorted to a hunger strike which continued upto the 10th April, 1950. They were separately confined from and after the 6th February, 1950. '!'heir letters and interviews were stopped for two months with effect from the 7th February, 1950, and papers and books were stopped with effect from the 8th February, 1950, for the duration of the hunger strike.\n\nThe. hunger strike continued and they continued to be separately confined till the 10th April,\n\n1950. It appears that more than H months after the hunger strike the Jail Superintendent, Shri K. K.\n\nMattu, filed a complaint against .Jagjit ':iingh in the Court of Shri P. L. Soudhi, M.LC., Ferozepur, under rule 41(2) of the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules charging him with having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike. He also filed a complaint before the same Magistrate against Jagjit 8ingh for having committed offences under sections 332 and 353 and sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal\n\nCode.\n\nHe further filed against Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand complaints under rule 41 (2) of the Punjab Communist Datenus Rules for having committed\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'f REPORTS 745\n\na. jail offenoe in resorting to hunger strike.\n\nOn I91iB the 16th February. 1951, the three detenu petitioners M b lH . filed before this Court petitions under article 32 of •q\n\nv. '\"'\"\"' the Constitution asking for the issue of a writ of pro- The state of hibition not to proceed with the prosecutions of the Bombay. petitioners in the said cases on the ground that they had been prosecuted and punished for the same Bhagwati J. offence already by the Jail Superintendent and therefore they could not be prosecuted and punished for the same offence once again and that the prosecutions which were launched against them in the Court of\n\nShri P. L. Soudhi, M.I.C., Ferozepur, could not lie as being in contravention of the fundamental right guaranteed nuder article 20 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nJ agjit Singh argued his own petition in person.\n\nVidya Rattan had intimated to this Court tha.t he would be satisfied with the decision on Jagjit Singh's\n\npetition and wanted his absence to be excused. Parma Nand did not appear at t!:ie hearing even though notice of the hearing was served upon him.\n\nIt was urged by Jagjit Singh that the proceedings which were adopted by the Jail Superintendent against the petitioners amounted to their prosecution and punishment for the same offence and that therefore the prosecution which was now launched against them was not competent as it exposed them to double jeopardy and violated the fundamental right guaranteed to them nuder article 20(2). It was on the other hand urged by the Advocate-General of Punjab that the Jail Superintendent merely took disciplinary action against the petitioners and the punishment if any which was meted out to them was for breaches of discipline within the meaning of section 4(a) of the Act and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, framed thereunder, that there was no prosecution and punishment of the petitioners within the meaning of article 20(2) and that therefore the petitions were liable to be dismissed.\n\nSection 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act No. IV of 1950), provides for power to regulate place and conditions of detention. ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1953)\n\n19sa \" Every person in respect of whom a detention - . order has been made shall be liable- Magbooz Hussa,~.n . v.\n\n(a) to be detained m such place and under such Th• State of conditions, including conditions as to maintenance,\n\nBombay. discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the appropriate Government may, by general or Bhagwati J. . l d . f ,, spema or er, spem y ........... . 'rhe Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, were framed by the Government of Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred by section 4 (a) of the Act.\n\nRules 39, 40 and 41 provide for offences and punishments. Rule 39 lays down certain rules of discipline and rule 40 provides.that any detenu who contravenes any of the provisions of rule 39 or refuses to obey any order issued thereunder, or does any of the acts\n\nentioned in the following portion cf the rule 40, vie.:-\n\n{i) assaults, insults, threatens or obstructs any fellow prisoner, any officer of the jail or any other Government servant, or any person employed in or visiting the jail, or .............. .. (xii-a) goes on hunger-strike (other than a token strike), or .......... shall be deemed to have committed a jail offence.\n\nRule 41 is important and bears particularly on the question which we have to decide. It provides:-\n\n\"(l) Where upon suoh enquiry as 3e thinks fit to make, the Superintendent is satisfied that a detenu is guilty of a jail offence, he may a.ward the detenu one or more of the following punishments :-\n\n(a) confinement in cells for a period not exceeding 14 days .........\n\n(d) cancellation or reduction, for a period not exceeding two months of the privilege of writing and receiving letters or of receiving newspapers and books,\n\n(e) cancellation or reduction, for a period not exceeding two months of the privilege of having inerviews ........ ,\n\n(2) If any detenu is guilty of a jail offence which 19~8\n\nby reason of his having frequently committed such M qboo!Hussain\n\noffences or otherwise is in the opinion of the Superin- \" v. tendent not adequately punishable by him under the Th• Stat• of provisions of sub-rule (1), he may forward such Bombay. detenu to t'he Court of a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction, and such Magistrae shall there- Bhagwati J. upon inquire into and try the charge so brought against the deteuu and upon conviction shall sentence him to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year: Provided that where the act coustit_utiug the offence constitutes an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, nothing in this rule shall preclude the deteuu from being tried and sentenced for such offence in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Penal Code.\"\n\nIt is clear from the above rules that the Jail Superintendent is constituted the authority for determining whether a detenu is guilty of a jail offence and for the award to such a deteuu of one or more of the punishments prescribed in rule 41. If this punishment is considered to be a, dequate the Jail Superintendent is to award him the appropriate punishment. No procedure is prescribed by the rules and the Superintendent is not required to act only on evidence given on oath.\n\nHe can punish after such enquiry as he thinks fit to make.\n\nThus he may not take any evidence or, make any judicial enquiry at all but may yot punish.\n\nIf however the detenn cannot in the opinion of the Ja.il Superintendent be adequately punished by him by reason of his having frequently committed such offence or otherwise the Jail Superintendent is empowered to forward such a detenu to the Court of a Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction and the jail offence in that case can be enquired into by the Magistrate who would try the charge brought against the deteuu, <; onvict him and sentence him to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.\n\nTbe proviso covers the cases where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding 97\n\n1958 one year under the India'.l Penal Code aHd nothing in\n\nMaqbooi Hu,, ain rule 41 is to preclude th,3 detenu from being tried and v. sentenced for such offence in accordance with the Tho Stat• of provisions of the Indian Penal Code. 'l'he whole Bombay. scheme of rule 41 is to constitute the Jail Superintendent only an administrative authority to maintain Bhagwati J. jail discipline and inflict summary punishment on the detenus for breach of that discipline by committing a jail offence. It is only when the Jail Superintendent considers that the offence is not adequately punishable .by him that he can send the case to the Magistrate. If he actually himself punishes he cannot, under this rule, refer the case again to the Magistrate.\n\nA reference by him after punishment will be wholly unauthorised and without jurisdiction and the prosecution before the Magistrate would be illegal and not in accordance with procedure established by law.\n\nIt was contended that nuder sections 45, 46 and 52 of the Prisons Act ([X of 1894) the Jail Superintendent was constituted an authority bound to act judicially for the purposes of enquiry into and trial of the prisoners for similar offences and the detenus under the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, being put in the same category as civil prisoners the proceedings before the Jail Superintendent for having committed the Jail offences under rules 40 and 41 above amounted to a prosecution of the petitioners before him as a judicial tribunal. It was on the other hand contended by the Advocate-General of Punjab that the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, constituted a self-contained code regulating the place and conditions of detention of these detenus, that the aforesaid sections of the Prisons Act, 1894, had no application to their case and the proceedings which took place before the Jail Superintendent in the present case were therefore riot judicial proceedings and there was no prosecution and punishment of the petitioners within the meaning of article 20\n\n(2). We accept the contention of the Advocate- General of Punjab. The petitioners were communist detenus and were governed by the Punjab Communist\n\nDetenus Rutes, 1950, which were framed by the 1959 Government of Punjab under section 4(a) of the Pre-- - . ventive Detention Act set out above and which Maqbooi Hussain constituted the body of rules prescribing the condi- Tho ~to of tions of their maintenance, discipline, etc.\n\nTheir Bombay. confinement in the prisons was for the sake of administrative convenience and was also prescribed by Bhagwati J. the rules themselves and the provisions of the Prisons Act did not apply to them. It could not therefore be validly contended that the proceedings taken against the petitioners by the Jail Superintendent constituted a prosecution and punishment of the petitioners before a judicial tribunal. .\n\nSo far as the jail offence alleged to have been committed by reason of the petitioners having resorted to hunger strike was concerned, the Jail Superintendent obviously considered that he could adequately punish the petitioners for that jail offence and he did not think it necessary to have resort to the provisions of rule 41 (2) and forward the petitioners to the Court of the Magistrate without having himself dealt with them. It .is common ground that the Jail Superintendent acted under rule 41 (1), and having satisfied himself that the petitioners were guilty of that jail offence awarded them one or more of the punishments therein prescribed, viz., stopping the letters and interviews for two months with effect from the 7th February, 1950, .and stopping the papers and books for the duration of the hunger strike. In our opinion this was tantamount to inflicting punishment on all the three petitioners for this jail offence and that having been done it was not competent to the Jail Superintendent after H months of the hunger strike to forward the petitioners to the Court of the Magistrate as he purported to do, and such reference was wholly unauthorised by the rule . and without jurisdiction and the prosecution before the Magistrate is obviously noi in accordance with procedure established by law and the petitioners may well complain of a breach or a threatened breach of the fundamental right guaranteed to them by article 21 of the Constitution in that the prosecution of the\n\n750 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S (1953]\n\n1953 petitioners before the Magistrate for the jail offence - . of having resorted to the hunger strike was not com- Magboo!Huss•in d. h d bl. h db I v. petent a.ccor mg to t e proce ure esta 1s e y aw.\n\nTh• Stateof The Petitions Nos.171of1951and172 of 1951 filed\n\nBombay. by Vidya Hattan and Parma Nand must therefore be accepted rmd their prosecution in the Court of Shri Bh•gwati J, P. L. Sondhi, M.I.C., Ferozepnr, under rule 41(2) of the Punjb Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, for having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike must be quashed.\n\nThe same order will also be passed in the petition of Jagjit Singh, being Petition No. 170 of 1951, in regard to the jail offence committed by him by having resorted to the hunger strike.\n\nJagjit Singh however is being prosecuted in the Court of the Magistrate for having committed offences under sections 332 and 353 as also sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code. It waa contended by the Advocate-\n\nGeneral of Punjab that there was no. prosecution and no punishment awarded to J agjit Singh in regard to these offences and he relied upon tile entries in the punishment register under the date 6th February, 1950, with reference to these offences.\n\nThese entries in the punishment register show tha11 Jagjit Singh was not punished for any of these offonces but he was to be sent up for trial and in the meantime he was to be separately confined.\n\nJagjit Singh on the other hand relied in particular on the evidence of Sher Singh who was the Assistant\n\nSuperintendent of the Central Jail, Ferozepur, at all material times and his evidence would have helped Jagjit Singh considerably had it not been for the fact that the entries in the punishment register completely belie his version and he further states that J agjit Singh was punished not only for the offence of assault but also rioting which could in no event have been done by the Jail Superintendent under the rules.\n\nSo far as the prosecution under sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned that is an\n\noffence which' is not comprised in the jail offences 1963 enumerated iu rlile 40 nor could it have been dealt M b -~ . with by the Jail Superintendent under rule 41 (l). •g\n\n00 v ussa•n 'l'bat offence was moreover covered by the proviso to Th• s;.1, of rule 41(2) and was exclusively triable by the Ma.gist- Bombay. rate. The prosecution of Jagjit Singh therefore before the Magistrate for the offences under sections 332 Bhagwati J. and 353 and sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Pen11.l Code is not in violation of article 20 (2) or article 21 of the Constitution and must therefore proceed.\n\nThe result therefore is that the Petition No. 170 of 1951 filed by Jagjit Singh will be allowed only to the extent that the appropriate writ of prohibition shall issue against the respondent in regard to his prosecution for having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike, but bis prosecution under sections' 332 and 353 and sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code will not be affected by this order. 'l'he Petitions Nos. 171of1951and172 of 1951 filed by Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand respectively 'will be accepted and the appropriate writs of prohibition shall issue against the respondent as prayed for therein.\n\nAppeal No. 81 dismissed.\n\nPetitions Nos. 171 and 172 allowed.\n\nPetition No. 170 partly lillowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant m Criminal Appeal No. 81: P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 81 and Petitions Nos. 170, 171 & 172: G. K.\n\nRaj adhyaksha.", "total_entities": 183, "entities": [{"text": "MAQBOOL HUSSAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAQBOOL HUSSAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 222, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. 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Dalal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3504, "end_char": 3522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "81 of 1952 ..\n\nIshwarlal O. Dalal for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. O. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3543, "end_char": 3557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Poru1 A. Mehta, with him) for the Snate of Bombay."}}, {"text": "A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3593, "end_char": 3601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Poru1 A. Mehta, with him) for the Snate of Bombay."}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3639, "end_char": 3650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra Lal, with him) for the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3680, "end_char": 3690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (Jindra Lal, with him) for the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Jagjit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3728, "end_char": 3740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagjit Singh, Petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "J agjit Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3889, "end_char": 3897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhagwati J. 95\n\n732 SUPREME COUR'l.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "article 20(:J)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4171, "end_char": 4185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4522, "end_char": 4541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On landing he did not declare that he had brought in gold with him but on search it was found that he had brought 107.2 tolas of gold in contravention of the notification of the Government of India dated the 25th August, 1948."}}, {"text": "25th August, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4552, "end_char": 4569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On landing he did not declare that he had brought in gold with him but on search it was found that he had brought 107.2 tolas of gold in contravention of the notification of the Government of India dated the 25th August, 1948."}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4624, "end_char": 4635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4671, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "19th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4733, "end_char": 4752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Customs Authorities thereupon took action under section 167, clanRe (8), of the Sea Customs Act VITI of 1878, and confiscated the gold by an order dat@d the 19th December, 1949. '"}}, {"text": "30th .January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of the order was sent on the 30th .January, 1950, to the appellant."}}, {"text": "22nd March, 19.50", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5066, "end_char": 5083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 22nd March, 19.50, a complaint was filed in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, aga.inst the appellant charging him with having committed an offence under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act VII of 1947, read with the notification dated the 2.5th August, 1948. '"}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5127, "end_char": 5162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 22nd March, 19.50, a complaint was filed in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, aga.inst the appellant charging him with having committed an offence under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act VII of 1947, read with the notification dated the 2.5th August, 1948. '"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5239, "end_char": 5248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Regulation Act VII of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5273, "end_char": 5299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2.5th August, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5338, "end_char": 5356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 22nd March, 19.50, a complaint was filed in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, aga.inst the appellant charging him with having committed an offence under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act VII of 1947, read with the notification dated the 2.5th August, 1948. '"}}, {"text": "12th June, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5390, "end_char": 5405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhe appellant thereupon on the 12th June, 1950, filed a petition in the High Court of Bombay under article 228 of the Constitution contending that his prosecution in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate wa.s in violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to him under article 20(2) of the Constitution and praying that as the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, tbe determination of which was necessary for the disposal of the case, the case may be withdrawn from the file of tbe Chief Presidency Magistrate to the High Conrt and the High Court may either dispose of the case themselves or determine the question of law and return it to the Chief Presidency Magistrate's Court for disposal."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5431, "end_char": 5451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhe appellant thereupon on the 12th June, 1950, filed a petition in the High Court of Bombay under article 228 of the Constitution contending that his prosecution in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate wa.s in violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to him under article 20(2) of the Constitution and praying that as the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, tbe determination of which was necessary for the disposal of the case, the case may be withdrawn from the file of tbe Chief Presidency Magistrate to the High Conrt and the High Court may either dispose of the case themselves or determine the question of law and return it to the Chief Presidency Magistrate's Court for disposal."}}, {"text": "article 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5458, "end_char": 5469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation Act VII of 1947", "statute": "Regulation Act VII of 1947"}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation Act VII of 1947", "statute": "Regulation Act VII of 1947"}}, {"text": "Ba.vdeka.r and", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6240, "end_char": 6254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A rule was issued by the High Court ou\n\nthe 26th June, 1950,, which ca.me on for hearing on 1963 the 9th August, 1950, before Ba.vdeka.r and Vyas JJ. . '"}}, {"text": "Vyas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6255, "end_char": 6259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A rule was issued by the High Court ou\n\nthe 26th June, 1950,, which ca.me on for hearing on 1963 the 9th August, 1950, before Ba.vdeka.r and Vyas JJ. . '"}}, {"text": "Court of the Chief Presidency Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he rule wa~ made ab,; olute and the High Court Maqbool Hu\"\"'\" directed that the proceedings pending against the The ;; at• of• appellant in the Court of the Chief Presidency Bombay."}}, {"text": "article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6516, "end_char": 6525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6551, "end_char": 6561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BhagwatiJ.\n\nThe case was thereupon withdrawn ani!", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "Cha.gla. C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6728, "end_char": 6741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the High Court, Cha.gla."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6746, "end_char": 6760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J. and Gajendragadkar J. were of the opinion that the appellant could claim the benefit of article 20(2) only if he wa> the owner of the gold which wn.s confi, cated and that before they decided as to whether there had been a prosecution and a. punishment within the meanmg of article 20(.J) it was necesoary that the Chief Presidency Magistrate should determine the question of fact as to whether the appellant was the owner of the gold which had been confiscated and in respect of which an option was given to him as stated above."}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6830, "end_char": 6843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20(.J)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7016, "end_char": 7030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7057, "end_char": 7084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J. and Gajendragadkar J. were of the opinion that the appellant could claim the benefit of article 20(2) only if he wa> the owner of the gold which wn.s confi, cated and that before they decided as to whether there had been a prosecution and a. punishment within the meanmg of article 20(.J) it was necesoary that the Chief Presidency Magistrate should determine the question of fact as to whether the appellant was the owner of the gold which had been confiscated and in respect of which an option was given to him as stated above."}}, {"text": "20th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7577, "end_char": 7595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief\n\nPresidency Magistrate recorded evidence and on the 20th January, 1950, recorded the finding hat the appellant was the owner of the gold in q uestiou and returned the finding to the High Court."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7719, "end_char": 7725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chagla C.J.\n\nand Gajendragadkar J. heard the petition further on the 12th February, 1951."}}, {"text": "12th February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7788, "end_char": 7807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chagla C.J.\n\nand Gajendragadkar J. heard the petition further on the 12th February, 1951."}}, {"text": "is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8561, "end_char": 8640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bh.agwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8653, "end_char": 8662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act as also an\n\nBh.agwati J. offence under the Foreign Exchange Regulation' Act was one and the same, viz.,", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "section 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8905, "end_char": 8919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act", "statute": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8931, "end_char": 8942, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8957, "end_char": 8967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act", "statute": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9072, "end_char": 9083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act", "statute": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9099, "end_char": 9110, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9195, "end_char": 9205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act", "statute": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9571, "end_char": 9584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act", "statute": "There is no doubt that the act which constitutes au offence under the Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9719, "end_char": 9730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9749, "end_char": 9774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3(37)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9849, "end_char": 9862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9870, "end_char": 9889, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10048, "end_char": 10059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10075, "end_char": 10086, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10091, "end_char": 10101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10262, "end_char": 10275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10782, "end_char": 10788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dered the question of punishment in the first instance The State of and thought it necessary to arrive at a finding as ta Bombay."}}, {"text": "Santa Uruz", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11330, "end_char": 11340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he gold was found in the possession of the appellant when he landed at the Santa Uruz airport. '!'"}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11479, "end_char": 11490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11730, "end_char": 11741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11753, "end_char": 11764, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12681, "end_char": 12702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".'be complaint which was filed in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, also proceeded on the footing that the appellant committed an offence in so far as he brought the gold without the permit from\n\n736 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [i953j\n\nI95B the Reserve Bank of India, that no permit was.ever - ."}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13782, "end_char": 13795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13961, "end_char": 13968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe roots of that principle are to be found in the well established rule of the common law of England \"that where a person has been convicted of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction the conviction is a bar to all further criminal proceedings for the same offence.\" ("}}, {"text": "Charles", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14148, "end_char": 14155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Charles J. in Reg."}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15678, "end_char": 15688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15696, "end_char": 15721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15990, "end_char": 16001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16013, "end_char": 16042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16415, "end_char": 16426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "section 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16476, "end_char": 16487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17339, "end_char": 17352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the United States rule, to be put in jeopardy there must be a valid indictment or information duly presented to a court of competent jurisdiction, there must be an arraignment and plea, and a lawful jury must be impanelled and sworn."}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17830, "end_char": 17843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18309, "end_char": 18322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18434, "end_char": 18447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18924, "end_char": 18934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19813, "end_char": 19820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tests of a judicial tribunal were laid down by this Court in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi(') in the following passage quoted with approval by Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19825, "end_char": 19834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tests of a judicial tribunal were laid down by this Court in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi(') in the following passage quoted with approval by Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20880, "end_char": 20901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21401, "end_char": 21412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "The Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21513, "end_char": 21523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "The Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21791, "end_char": 21802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "The Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "sections 18 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22017, "end_char": 22035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23479, "end_char": 23490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23752, "end_char": 23763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23902, "end_char": 23913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24183, "end_char": 24194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24437, "end_char": 24448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24481, "end_char": 24499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 191 provides .for a revision by the Central Government on the application of a person aggr.ieved by any decision or order passed by an officer of Customs or the Chief Customs Authority from which no appeal lies."}}, {"text": "Section 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24657, "end_char": 24668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chief Customs Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27088, "end_char": 27111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals, if any, lie before the Chief Customs Authority which is the Central Board of Revenue and the power of revision is given to the Central Government which certainly is not a judicial authority."}}, {"text": "Magbool Huuain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27834, "end_char": 27848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Magbool Huuain y e ag1strate an not y t e ustoms ut onty.", "canonical_name": "MAQBOOL HUSSAIN"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28404, "end_char": 28421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view of the functions and powers of Sea Customs Officers was expressed in a decision of the Bombay High Court to which our attention was called. ("}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28725, "end_char": 28736, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29474, "end_char": 29484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vidya Rattan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30033, "end_char": 30045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagjit Singh, Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand, Bhagwati J. the three petitioners in the respective petitions were detenus under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, detained in the Central Jail, Ferozepur, and governed by the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, framed by the Government of Punjab under section 4(a) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Vidya Rattan"}}, {"text": "Parma Nand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30050, "end_char": 30060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagjit Singh, Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand, Bhagwati J. the three petitioners in the respective petitions were detenus under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, detained in the Central Jail, Ferozepur, and governed by the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, framed by the Government of Punjab under section 4(a) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Parma Nand"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30147, "end_char": 30177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30240, "end_char": 30276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30292, "end_char": 30312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagjit Singh, Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand, Bhagwati J. the three petitioners in the respective petitions were detenus under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, detained in the Central Jail, Ferozepur, and governed by the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, framed by the Government of Punjab under section 4(a) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30319, "end_char": 30331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "statute": "the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "6th J?ebruary, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30352, "end_char": 30371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th J?ebruary, 1950, it is alleged, a general assault on jail officials was made by the detenus including J agjit Singh."}}, {"text": "J agjit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30458, "end_char": 30471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th J?ebruary, 1950, it is alleged, a general assault on jail officials was made by the detenus including J agjit Singh.", "canonical_name": "J agjit Singh"}}, {"text": "7th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30703, "end_char": 30721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th February, 1950, the three detenu petitioners resorted to a hunger strike which continued upto the 10th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "10th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30805, "end_char": 30821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th February, 1950, the three detenu petitioners resorted to a hunger strike which continued upto the 10th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "6th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30872, "end_char": 30890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were separately confined from and after the 6th February, 1950. '!'"}}, {"text": "8th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31047, "end_char": 31065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "heir letters and interviews were stopped for two months with effect from the 7th February, 1950, and papers and books were stopped with effect from the 8th February, 1950, for the duration of the hunger strike."}}, {"text": "10th April,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31190, "end_char": 31207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hunger strike continued and they continued to be separately confined till the 10th April,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "K. K.\n\nMattu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31298, "end_char": 31310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that more than H months after the hunger strike the Jail Superintendent, Shri K. K.\n\nMattu, filed a complaint against .Jagjit ':iingh in the Court of Shri P. L. Soudhi, M.LC.,"}}, {"text": ".Jagjit ':iingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31338, "end_char": 31353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that more than H months after the hunger strike the Jail Superintendent, Shri K. K.\n\nMattu, filed a complaint against .Jagjit ':iingh in the Court of Shri P. L. Soudhi, M.LC.,"}}, {"text": "P. L. Soudhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31375, "end_char": 31387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that more than H months after the hunger strike the Jail Superintendent, Shri K. K.\n\nMattu, filed a complaint against .Jagjit ':iingh in the Court of Shri P. L. Soudhi, M.LC.,", "canonical_name": "P. L. Soudhi"}}, {"text": "Ferozepur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31396, "end_char": 31405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ferozepur, under rule 41(2) of the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules charging him with having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike."}}, {"text": "Jagjit 8ingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31604, "end_char": 31616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also filed a complaint before the same Magistrate against Jagjit 8ingh for having committed offences under sections 332 and 353 and sections 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal\n\nCode.", "canonical_name": "J agjit Singh"}}, {"text": "sections 332 and 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31653, "end_char": 31673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 147 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31678, "end_char": 31698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vidya Rattan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31752, "end_char": 31764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further filed against Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand complaints under rule 41 (2) of the Punjab Communist Datenus Rules for having committed\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'f REPORTS 745\n\na. jail offenoe in resorting to hunger strike.", "canonical_name": "Vidya Rattan"}}, {"text": "Parma Nand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31769, "end_char": 31779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further filed against Vidya Rattan and Parma Nand complaints under rule 41 (2) of the Punjab Communist Datenus Rules for having committed\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'f REPORTS 745\n\na. jail offenoe in resorting to hunger strike.", "canonical_name": "Parma Nand"}}, {"text": "16th February. 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31966, "end_char": 31985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On I91iB the 16th February."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32065, "end_char": 32075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32662, "end_char": 32672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J agjit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32699, "end_char": 32712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J agjit Singh argued his own petition in person.", "canonical_name": "J agjit Singh"}}, {"text": "Jagjit Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32839, "end_char": 32851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vidya Rattan had intimated to this Court tha.t he would be satisfied with the decision on Jagjit Singh's\n\npetition and wanted his absence to be excused.", "canonical_name": "J agjit Singh"}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33374, "end_char": 33387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33447, "end_char": 33453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on the other hand urged by the Advocate-General of Punjab that the Jail Superintendent merely took disciplinary action against the petitioners and the punishment if any which was meted out to them was for breaches of discipline within the meaning of section 4(a) of the Act and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, framed thereunder, that there was no prosecution and punishment of the petitioners within the meaning of article 20(2) and that therefore the petitions were liable to be dismissed."}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33646, "end_char": 33658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33666, "end_char": 33714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33821, "end_char": 33834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "statute": "the Act and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33898, "end_char": 33907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "statute": "the Act and the Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33915, "end_char": 33945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Magbooz Hussa,~.n", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34159, "end_char": 34176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "order has been made shall be liable- Magbooz Hussa,~.n ."}}, {"text": "Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34471, "end_char": 34507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34588, "end_char": 34597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "statute": "Punjab Communist Detenus Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36581, "end_char": 36598, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36784, "end_char": 36801, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38087, "end_char": 38097, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Maqbooi Hu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38114, "end_char": 38124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbe proviso covers the cases where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding 97\n\n1958 one year under the India'.l Penal Code aHd nothing in\n\nMaqbooi Hu,, ain rule 41 is to preclude th,3 detenu from being tried and v. sentenced for such offence in accordance with the Tho Stat• of provisions of the Indian Penal Code. '", "canonical_name": "MAQBOOL HUSSAIN"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38271, "end_char": 38288, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 45, 46 and 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39032, "end_char": 39054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prisons Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39062, "end_char": 39073, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prisons Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39805, "end_char": 39822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40071, "end_char": 40081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prisons Act, 1894", "statute": "the Prisons Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40309, "end_char": 40321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prisons Act, 1894", "statute": "the Prisons Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Maqbooi Hussain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40385, "end_char": 40400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ventive Detention Act set out above and which Maqbooi Hussain constituted the body of rules prescribing the condi- Tho ~to of tions of their maintenance, discipline, etc.", "canonical_name": "MAQBOOL HUSSAIN"}}, {"text": "Prisons Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40685, "end_char": 40696, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42369, "end_char": 42379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vidya Hattan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42744, "end_char": 42756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Vidya Hattan and Parma Nand must therefore be accepted rmd their prosecution in the Court of Shri Bh•gwati J, P. L. Sondhi, M.I.C., Ferozepnr, under rule 41(2) of the Punjb Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, for having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike must be quashed.", "canonical_name": "Vidya Rattan"}}, {"text": "Bh•gwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42842, "end_char": 42850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Vidya Hattan and Parma Nand must therefore be accepted rmd their prosecution in the Court of Shri Bh•gwati J, P. L. Sondhi, M.I.C., Ferozepnr, under rule 41(2) of the Punjb Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, for having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike must be quashed."}}, {"text": "P. L. Sondhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42854, "end_char": 42866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Vidya Hattan and Parma Nand must therefore be accepted rmd their prosecution in the Court of Shri Bh•gwati J, P. L. Sondhi, M.I.C., Ferozepnr, under rule 41(2) of the Punjb Communist Detenus Rules, 1950, for having committed a jail offence in resorting to hunger strike must be quashed.", "canonical_name": "P. L. Soudhi"}}, {"text": "Punjb Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42911, "end_char": 42946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 332 and 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43329, "end_char": 43349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjb Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "statute": "the Punjb Communist Detenus Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "sections 147 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43358, "end_char": 43378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjb Communist Detenus Rules, 1950", "statute": "the Punjb Communist Detenus Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43386, "end_char": 43403, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sher Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43958, "end_char": 43968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagjit Singh on the other hand relied in particular on the evidence of Sher Singh who was the Assistant\n\nSuperintendent of the Central Jail, Ferozepur, at all material times and his evidence would have helped Jagjit Singh considerably had it not been for the fact that the entries in the punishment register completely belie his version and he further states that J agjit Singh was punished not only for the offence of assault but also rioting which could in no event have been done by the Jail Superintendent under the rules."}}, {"text": "sections 147 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44447, "end_char": 44467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44475, "end_char": 44492, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 332", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44927, "end_char": 44939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 147 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44964, "end_char": 44984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45035, "end_char": 45045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45053, "end_char": 45063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 147 and 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45452, "end_char": 45472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45480, "end_char": 45497, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45895, "end_char": 45911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "81: P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "G. K.\n\nRaj adhyaksha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46000, "end_char": 46020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "170, 171 & 172: G. K.\n\nRaj adhyaksha."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_758_766_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "195li\n\nGanpat Rai Hira Lal and Another v.\n\nAggarwal Chamber of Oonimerce Ltd.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\nthe appeals are not competent is, in' om opinion, erroneous.\n\nThe result is that Appeal No. 152 of .1951 is dismissed with costs throughout, while Appeals Nos. 167 and 167 A of 19.51 are allowed with costs throughout.\n\nAppeal No. 12.5 dismissed.\n\nAppeals Nos. 167 and 167 A .allowed.\n\nGhandrasekhara Agents for the a.ppllants in Appeals Nos. 167 AiyarJ. and 167A: Mohan Behan Lal.\n\nMarch 12.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Appeal No. 152 : Kitndan Lal Mehta.\n\nAgent for respondents in Appeals Nos. 167 and 167 A: Naunit Lal.\n\nAgent for respondent in Appeal No. 152: Mohan Behari Lal.\n\nHIRALAL AND OTHERS\n\nBADKULAL AND OTHERS. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nAcknowledgment-Whether gives fresh cause of action-Practice -Party in possession of documentary evidence-Duty to produce.\n\nWhere the defendants who had dealings with the plaintiffs for several years signed the following entry in the plaintiffs' account book underneath the earlier entries:\n\n\"After adjusting the aceounts Rs. 34,000 found correct payable\".\n\nHeld, that this amounted to an unqualified acknowledgment of liability to pay and implied a promise to pay and could be made the basis of the suit and gave rise to a fresh cause of action.\n\nManiram v. Seth Rup Chand (33 I.A. 165), Fateh Chn.nd v.\n\nGanga Singh II.L.R. 10 Lab. 745) and Kahan Chand Dularam v.\n\nDaya1al Amritlal (I.L.R. 10 Lah. 748) relied on. Gh11lam M11rtuza\n\nv. Fasih1mnissa (I.L.R. 57 All. 434) overruled.\n\nIt is not a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the court written evidence which is in their possession which could throw light upon the. issues in controversy and tc rely upon the mere doctrine of onus of proof.\n\nMurugesam Pillai v. Manickavasaka Pandara (44 I.A. 99) referred to.\n\nCIVIL Ar°FELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 168 of 1952.\n\nAppeal from a Judgment and Decree dated 23rd July, 1951, of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, in Civil First Appeal No. 26 of 1951 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated 14th .:\\farch, 1951, of the CouPt of the District Judge, Umaria, in Case No. 32 of 1951.\n\nN. S. Bindra (S. L. Chhibber, with him) for the appellants.\n\nS. P. Sinha (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1953.\n\nMarch 12. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the plaintiff-respondents in the court of the district judge of Umaria, for recovery of Rs. 34,000 principal, and Rs. 2,626 interest, due on foot of muual dealings. The suit was dismissed by the district judge but was decreed on appeal by the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nA certificate for leave to appeal to this Court was granted as the case fulfilled all the conditions and requirements in force relating to appeals to the Supreme Court.\n\nThe defendants did not admit the claim and it was pleaded that no accounts were explained to fihem when the signatures of Bhaiyalal and Hiralal were obtained in the plaintiffs' ledger on 3rd September, 1949, acknowledging the snit amount as due from them.\n\nIt was further pleaded that no suit could be based merely on an acknowledgment of the debt.\n\nIn paragraph 4 of the written statement it was alleged that the plaintiff No. 2 Dipchand having threatened to bring a suit against defendants 1 and 2 whose financial position was bad and having represented that plaintiff No. 1 Badkulal would be angry and abuse plaintiff No. 2, and having assured on oath by placing his hand on a deity in a temple that no suit shall be\n\nlliralal and Others\n\nBadhulal and Others.\n\nHiralal and 0th\"\"'.\n\nBadknlal and Othe1s.\n\n760 SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS [1953]\n\nbrought, and that amouni of interest wouid be reduced, asked defendants 1 and 2 to sign the khata, who signed the same without going through the accounts,' on the faith of these statements made by Dipchand and that foe defendants were not bound by these signatures.\n\nIn paragraph 9 of the written statement it was alleged th'at in• fact Hs. 15,000 or 16,000 as principal sum were due to plaintiffs from defendants but the suit had been filed for a much larger sum than due. Issue 1 framed by the district judge, was in these terms :\n\n\"Did the defendants Hiralal and Bhaiyalal sign on Bhadon Sudi 11 Samvat 2006 in the capacity of manager and head of the family, on the khata of the plaintiffs after understanding the debit and credit accounts and accepting Rs. 34,000 as the correct balance due to the plaintiffs.\"\n\nIt would have been more correct had a separate issue been framed on the two points compositely mentioned in this issue, Be that as it may, the form in which the issue was framed is uot material for the decision of the appeal.\n\nIssue 7 was in t'hese terms : \"Did the plaintiff Dipchand obtain the signature of defendants 1 and 2, in their bahi under the threat of instituting a suit and giving the assurance of the suit being not filed and leaving the interest which is incorrect and very much exaggerated, by saying that Badkulal shall he very angry with him ... \".\n\nThe frame of the issue shows that the learned judge at this stage made no effort to ascertain or apprehend the nature of the plea taken in the written statement.\n\nHe seems to have acted more as an ~.utomaton than as a judge in the discharge of his responsible duties.\n\nBefore framing an issue like this it was his duty to examine the parties and to find out the precise nature of the plea involved within these facts; in other words, whether the a.efendants wished to plead in defence fraud, coercion, undue influence or a mistake of fact entitling them to reopen the accounts.\n\nMr. Bindra for the appellants was unable to tell us\n\nwhat real plea was involved in the facts stated under th is issue.\n\nThe manner in which the learned judge dealt with this issue lends support to our view that he did uot at all apprehend what he had to decide.\n\nIt was held that the defendants did not sign the entry after understanding, settling, and adjusting oi the accounts, hut that plaintiff Dipchand obtained their signatures without explaining the accounts to them.\n\nThe fact that the entry was signed by both the defendants who represented their family was not denied.\n\nHiralal, defendant, in the witness box admitted that the defendants deal in gold, silver and kirana and maintain regular books of account. It was also admitted that two or three muneems are in their employ for maintflining regular boo.ks of the business dealings. Hiralal was questioned \" How much money was due from the defendants-firm to the plaintiflsfirm?\".\n\nThe answer was evasive, viz., \"He could not say how much was due\". When questioned about his accounts, he replied that he had not filed them as he was ill.\n\nHe further deposed that he had looked into his accounts and Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 15,000 as principal and interest were due but he could not say what was the correct amount. vVhen asked whether on the date of signing the acknowledgment he looked into the books to see what amount was due from him, his answer was in the negative. He further said that even after receiving notice he did not look into his own accounts to check as to what the correct balance was .. A leading question was put to him whether on Bhadon Sudi 11 Samvat 2006 there was an entry of Rs. 34,000 in the defendants' kbata as being the balance due from them to the plaintiffs.\n\nThe answer was again evasive. He said \"I couid not say whether there was any such entry in bis books.\" In these circumstances there was no justification for throwing out the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that the accounts were not explained to the defendants by the plaintiffs. The defendants had written the accounts in their own books from which the true, bala.nce co11ld\n\nHiralal and Others\n\nV, Badkulal and Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nHiralal and Others\n\nBadkulal and Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nbe ascertained. An inference from the \"statement of Hiralal can easily be raised that the balance entry of Rs. 34,000 r1lso existed in his own books. Mr. Bindra tried to get out of this situation by urging that it was no part of the defendants' duty to produce the books unless they were called upon to do so and the onus rested on. the plaintiffs to prove their case.\n\nThis argument has to be negatived in view of the observations of their Lordships of he Privy Conncil in Murugesam Pillai v. Manickavasaka Pandara('), which appositely apply here. 'fhis is what their Lordships observed:\n\n\"A practice has grown up in Indian procedtue of those in possession of important documents or information lying by, trusting to the abstract doctrine of the onus of proof,.and failing, accordingly, to furnish to the courts the best material for its decision. With regard to third parties this may be right enonghthey hf1.ve no responsibility for the conduct of the suit; but with regard to the parties to the suit it is, in their Lordships' opinion, an inversion of sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the court the written evidence in their possession which would throw light upon the proposition.\"\n\nThis rule was again reiterated in Rameshwar Singh\n\nv. Rajit Lal Pathak('). . .\n\nOn the evidence of the parties it is clear that both parties are businessmen and each party has been maintaining accounts of their mutual dealings, and they met on 3rd September and in the plaintiffs' book the defendants signed an entry on page 58 of bhe ledger which runs thus:-\n\n\"Rs. 34,000 balance due to be received up to Bhadon Sudi 11 Samvat 2006 made by check and understanding of accounts with Hiralalji's books.\"\n\nThis acknowledgment was made below a number of entries made in this khata on the credit and debi& side and the mutual dealings had continued since\n\n(!) (1917) 44 I.A; 99,\n\n8.0.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'r REPOR'rs 763\n\nseveral years.· The acknowldgment is signed by Hiralal and Bhaiyalal, with the following endorsement:\n\n\"After adjusting the' accounts Rs. 34,000 fonnd correct payab-Ie.\"\n\nIn these circumstances we are not able to understand the view of the district judge that it was not proved that the accounts were explained to the defendants by Dipchand. It was unnecessary to do so because the defendants themselves were keeping accounts and they would not have signed the balance for Rs. 34,000 with the endorsement above cited, without reference to their own books or in the manner suggested in the written statement. Plaintiff Dipchand in the witness box supported the plaintiffs' case as laid in the plaint.\n\nHe deposed that \"This accounting was done by my muneem Puranfai and Ram Prasad, muneem of Hiralal. ........... Muneems explained and Hiralal signed after understanding it.\" In cross-examination he said that muneems were checking the accounts and when both the mnneems said that so much was the bala, nce, Hiralal then signed and that Hiralal and Bhaiyalal themelves did not check any account. The learned district judge and Mr. Bindra criticized the evidence of this witness and it was urged that he had made false and highly . improbable statements with regard to the manner and circumstances in which the entry was signed.\n\nThe discrepancies in the statement relate to matters of no consequence. In our opinion, his evidence along with the entry was sufficient to hold the plaintiffs' case proved when the best evidence of their own books to disprove the plaintiffs' case had been withheld by the defendants. No satisfactory explanation had been given for the non-production of the defendants' books, and the evidence given by Hiralal does not do much credit to him.\n\nMr. Bindra contended that it should have been held that Bhaiyalal did not sign at the same time when the entry was written but he signed later on.\n\nOn this point Hiralal deposed that when he signed Bhaiyalal\n\nHiralal and Others\n\nBadkulal and Others.\n\nMahajan J,\n\nHiralal and Others\n\nBadkulal and Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nwas not present, that he signed afterwttrds, that Kulai muneem came with the bahi s:!.ying that Badkulal and Dipchand had quarrelled among themselves that there should also be the signature of Bhaiyalal, that Bhaiyalal questioned him as to why the witness had signed, that he replied that Dipchand had told him l!.fter pointing his hand towards God that he would take no action so long as he lived, so he did not check, nor any one explained him the accounts, that on this he asked Bhaiy1tlal to sign and on his asking he signed. It was for Bhaiyalal to explain his signature by going into the witness box but he did not give evidence in the case and there is no explanation why he did not do so. Mr. Bindra's contention therefore that it should be held that Bhaiyalal was not present when the acknowledgment was signed cannot be sustained.\n\n'1 1he defendants tried to support their case by the statements of Kulai Prasad, muneem, and the other two muneems Ram Prasad aud Puraulal. So far as Kulai Prasad is concerned, he was in the plaintiffs' service and was dismissed by Badkulal, plaintiff, on 31st March, 1950. Much reliance cannot be placed on the statement of a dismissed and disgruntled employee. He stated that Hiralal was not made to understand auy accounts and Dipchand assured him on oath that he would raise no trouble during his life and asked Hiralal to sign and that Bhaiyalal signed on a different date.\n\nThis evidence is of a partisan character and no reliance can be placed on it.\n\nRam Prasaa stated that he did not check the accounts of the plaintiffs from Bhadon Samvat 2006 and that Hiralal did not sign in bis presence. In cross-examination he admitted that there were mutual dealings between the parties and that Hiralal might have signed after accounting was done. He pretended ignorance of what happened on Bbadon Samvat 2006.\n\nAs regards Puranlal, be stated that after looking inlio the accounts and after mutual talk, Exhibit P-1\n\nwas written on Dip Chand's asking, that accounts might have been told by Dipchand on the basis of the statement which he had with him, that no ac-- counts were explained. He further stated that Hiralal said to Dipchand \"Please see me\", on which Dipchand replied after raising his hand towards the temple \"I shall not do anything unfair in my lifetime.\" In cross-examination he admitted that the words\" signed Bhurey Naik Raghunandan Prasad\n\nBakala.rn Hira Lal\", and the words \" after adjusting the accounts Rs. 34,000 found correctly payable signed Hinllal \" were written by Hiralal himself. It was further elicited in cross-examination that the witness had forged a receipt and for forging that receipt he was sentenced to one year's imprisonment in a criminal case started by Badkulal, plaintiff. 'l'his evidence therefore is not of much consequence in this case.\n\nIn these circumstances we are satisfied that the district judge not only approached the decision of the case from an erroneous point of view but he also incorrectly appreciated the material on the record. The learned Judicial Commissioner was therefore perfectly justified in reversing his decision and in holding that on 3rd September, 1949, there was an adjustment of accounts actually done by the muneems and accepted by the principals and the story of coercion and misrepresentation was false. ·\n\nMr. Bindra next urged that the plaintiff's suit should have been dismissed because it could not be maintained merely on the basis of au acknowledgment of liability, that such an acknowledgment could only save limitation but could not furnish a cause of i>ction on which a suit could be maintained. The Judicial Commissioner took the view that an unqualified acknowledgment like the one in the suit, and the statement of the account under which the entry had been made, were sufficient to furnish a cause of action to the plaintiffs for maintaining the present suit. We are satisfied that no exception can be taken to this conclusion. It was held by the Privy Council in\n\nHiralal and Other's\n\nBodkulol and Others.\n\nltfa, hajan J.\n\nHiralal and Others\n\nBadkulal and Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19/i3j\n\nManiram v. Seth Rupchand('), that an unconditional acknowledgment implies a promise to pay because .that is the natural inference if nothing is said to the contrary. It is what every honest man would mean to do. In Fateh Chand v. Ganga Singh(') the same view was taken. It was held. that a suit on the basis of a balance was competent In Kahanchand Dularam v.\n\nDayaram Amritlal(3) the same view was expressed and it was observed that the three expressions \"balance due\", \" account adjusted \" and \"balance struck\" must mean that the parties had been through the account.\n\nThe defendant there accepted the statement of account contained in the plaintiff's account book, and made it his own by signing it and it thus amounted to an \"accounts stated between them\" in the language of article 64 of the Limitation Act. 'l'he same happened in the present case. The acknowledgment which forms the basis of the suit was made in the ledger of the plaintiffs in which earlier mutual accounts had been entered and truly speaking, the snit was not based merely on this acknowledgment but was based on the mutual dealings and the accounts stated between them and was thus clearly maintainable.\n\nMr. Bindra drew our attention to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ghulam Murtuza v. Fasihunnissa('), wherein it was held that even if an acknowledgment implies a promise to pay it cannot be made the basis of suit and treated as giving rise to a fresh ca use of action. We have examined the decision and we are satisfied that it does not lay down good law.\n\nFor the reasons stated above this appeal has no merits and we accordingly dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Govind Saran Singh.\n\nAgent for the respondents : A. D. Mathur.\n\n(r) (I906) 33 I.A. I65.\n\n(2) (I929) I.L.R, Io Lah, 748.\n\n(3) (I929) l.L.R. Io Lah. 745.\n\n(4) (I935) I.L.R. 57 All. 434,", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "Ghandrasekhara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 394, "end_char": 408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghandrasekhara Agents for the a.ppllants in Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 473, "end_char": 488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167 AiyarJ. and 167A: Mohan Behan Lal.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Behari Lal"}}, {"text": "Kitndan Lal Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 546, "end_char": 563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "152 : Kitndan Lal Mehta."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 619, "end_char": 629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167 and 167 A: Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "Mohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 672, "end_char": 688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "152: Mohan Behari Lal.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Behari Lal"}}, {"text": "HIRALAL AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 691, "end_char": 709, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HIRALAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BADKULAL AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 711, "end_char": 730, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BADKULAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 733, "end_char": 751, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 756, "end_char": 768, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2240, "end_char": 2252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra (S. L. Chhibber, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. L. Chhibber", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2254, "end_char": 2268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra (S. L. Chhibber, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2301, "end_char": 2312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2314, "end_char": 2327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2422, "end_char": 2429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the plaintiff-respondents in the court of the district judge of Umaria, for recovery of Rs.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2760, "end_char": 2775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was dismissed by the district judge but was decreed on appeal by the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2932, "end_char": 2945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A certificate for leave to appeal to this Court was granted as the case fulfilled all the conditions and requirements in force relating to appeals to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Bhaiyalal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3070, "end_char": 3079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants did not admit the claim and it was pleaded that no accounts were explained to fihem when the signatures of Bhaiyalal and Hiralal were obtained in the plaintiffs' ledger on 3rd September, 1949, acknowledging the snit amount as due from them.", "canonical_name": "Bhaiy1tlal"}}, {"text": "Hiralal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3084, "end_char": 3091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants did not admit the claim and it was pleaded that no accounts were explained to fihem when the signatures of Bhaiyalal and Hiralal were obtained in the plaintiffs' ledger on 3rd September, 1949, acknowledging the snit amount as due from them.", "canonical_name": "Hiralalji"}}, {"text": "3rd September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3135, "end_char": 3154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants did not admit the claim and it was pleaded that no accounts were explained to fihem when the signatures of Bhaiyalal and Hiralal were obtained in the plaintiffs' ledger on 3rd September, 1949, acknowledging the snit amount as due from them."}}, {"text": "Dipchand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3378, "end_char": 3386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Dipchand having threatened to bring a suit against defendants 1 and 2 whose financial position was bad and having represented that plaintiff No.", "canonical_name": "Dip Chand"}}, {"text": "Badkulal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Badkulal would be angry and abuse plaintiff No.", "canonical_name": "Badkulal"}}, {"text": "lliralal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3669, "end_char": 3677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, and having assured on oath by placing his hand on a deity in a temple that no suit shall be\n\nlliralal and Others\n\nBadhulal and Others."}}, {"text": "Badhulal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3690, "end_char": 3698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, and having assured on oath by placing his hand on a deity in a temple that no suit shall be\n\nlliralal and Others\n\nBadhulal and Others.", "canonical_name": "Badkulal"}}, {"text": "Hiralal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3712, "end_char": 3719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hiralal and 0th\"\"'.", "canonical_name": "Hiralalji"}}, {"text": "Badknlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3733, "end_char": 3741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badknlal and Othe1s.", "canonical_name": "Badkulal"}}, {"text": "Dipchand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3987, "end_char": 3995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "760 SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS [1953]\n\nbrought, and that amouni of interest wouid be reduced, asked defendants 1 and 2 to sign the khata, who signed the same without going through the accounts,' on the faith of these statements made by Dipchand and that foe defendants were not bound by these signatures.", "canonical_name": "Dip Chand"}}, {"text": "Bhaiyalal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4356, "end_char": 4365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Issue 1 framed by the district judge, was in these terms :\n\n\"Did the defendants Hiralal and Bhaiyalal sign on Bhadon Sudi 11 Samvat 2006 in the capacity of manager and head of the family, on the khata of the plaintiffs after understanding the debit and credit accounts and accepting Rs.", "canonical_name": "Bhaiy1tlal"}}, {"text": "Bhadon Sudi 11 Samvat 2006", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4374, "end_char": 4400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Issue 1 framed by the district judge, was in these terms :\n\n\"Did the defendants Hiralal and Bhaiyalal sign on Bhadon Sudi 11 Samvat 2006 in the capacity of manager and head of the family, on the khata of the plaintiffs after understanding the debit and credit accounts and accepting Rs."}}, {"text": "Badkulal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5127, "end_char": 5135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Issue 7 was in t'hese terms : \"Did the plaintiff Dipchand obtain the signature of defendants 1 and 2, in their bahi under the threat of instituting a suit and giving the assurance of the suit being not filed and leaving the interest which is incorrect and very much exaggerated, by saying that Badkulal shall he very angry with him ... \".", "canonical_name": "Badkulal"}}, {"text": "Bindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bindra for the appellants was unable to tell us\n\nwhat real plea was involved in the facts stated under th is issue."}}, {"text": "vVhen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7023, "end_char": 7028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vVhen asked whether on the date of signing the acknowledgment he looked into the books to see what amount was due from him, his answer was in the negative."}}, {"text": "Hiralal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7874, "end_char": 7881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants had written the accounts in their own books from which the true, bala.nce co11ld\n\nHiralal and Others\n\nV, Badkulal and Others.", "canonical_name": "Hiralalji"}}, {"text": "Badkulal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7897, "end_char": 7905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants had written the accounts in their own books from which the true, bala.nce co11ld\n\nHiralal and Others\n\nV, Badkulal and Others.", "canonical_name": "Badkulal"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7919, "end_char": 7926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nHiralal and Others\n\nBadkulal and Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Hiralalji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9711, "end_char": 9720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34,000 balance due to be received up to Bhadon Sudi 11 Samvat 2006 made by check and understanding of accounts with Hiralalji's books.\"", "canonical_name": "Hiralalji"}}, {"text": "muneem Puranfai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10690, "end_char": 10705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He deposed that \"This accounting was done by my muneem Puranfai and Ram Prasad, muneem of Hiralal. ..........."}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10710, "end_char": 10720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He deposed that \"This accounting was done by my muneem Puranfai and Ram Prasad, muneem of Hiralal. ...........", "canonical_name": "Ram Prasad"}}, {"text": "Kulai muneem", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12079, "end_char": 12091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nwas not present, that he signed afterwttrds, that Kulai muneem came with the bahi s:!.ying that Badkulal and Dipchand had quarrelled among themselves that there should also be the signature of Bhaiyalal, that Bhaiyalal questioned him as to why the witness had signed, that he replied that Dipchand had told him l!.fter pointing his hand towards God that he would take no action so long as he lived, so he did not check, nor any one explained him the accounts, that on this he asked Bhaiy1tlal to sign and on his asking he signed."}}, {"text": "Bhaiy1tlal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12511, "end_char": 12521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nwas not present, that he signed afterwttrds, that Kulai muneem came with the bahi s:!.ying that Badkulal and Dipchand had quarrelled among themselves that there should also be the signature of Bhaiyalal, that Bhaiyalal questioned him as to why the witness had signed, that he replied that Dipchand had told him l!.fter pointing his hand towards God that he would take no action so long as he lived, so he did not check, nor any one explained him the accounts, that on this he asked Bhaiy1tlal to sign and on his asking he signed.", "canonical_name": "Bhaiy1tlal"}}, {"text": "Kulai Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12938, "end_char": 12950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1 1he defendants tried to support their case by the statements of Kulai Prasad, muneem, and the other two muneems Ram Prasad aud Puraulal.", "canonical_name": "Kulai Prasad"}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad aud Puraulal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12986, "end_char": 13009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1 1he defendants tried to support their case by the statements of Kulai Prasad, muneem, and the other two muneems Ram Prasad aud Puraulal."}}, {"text": "Kulai Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13021, "end_char": 13033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as Kulai Prasad is concerned, he was in the plaintiffs' service and was dismissed by Badkulal, plaintiff, on 31st March, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Kulai Prasad"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13127, "end_char": 13143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as Kulai Prasad is concerned, he was in the plaintiffs' service and was dismissed by Badkulal, plaintiff, on 31st March, 1950."}}, {"text": "Ram Prasaa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13530, "end_char": 13540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Prasaa stated that he did not check the accounts of the plaintiffs from Bhadon Samvat 2006 and that Hiralal did not sign in bis presence.", "canonical_name": "Ram Prasad"}}, {"text": "Puranlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13894, "end_char": 13902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards Puranlal, be stated that after looking inlio the accounts and after mutual talk, Exhibit P-1\n\nwas written on Dip Chand's asking, that accounts might have been told by Dipchand on the basis of the statement which he had with him, that no ac-- counts were explained."}}, {"text": "Dip Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14003, "end_char": 14012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards Puranlal, be stated that after looking inlio the accounts and after mutual talk, Exhibit P-1\n\nwas written on Dip Chand's asking, that accounts might have been told by Dipchand on the basis of the statement which he had with him, that no ac-- counts were explained.", "canonical_name": "Dip Chand"}}, {"text": "Bodkulol", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16048, "end_char": 16056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Privy Council in\n\nHiralal and Other's\n\nBodkulol and Others."}}, {"text": "article 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16950, "end_char": 16960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16968, "end_char": 16982, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17403, "end_char": 17423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bindra drew our attention to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ghulam Murtuza v. Fasihunnissa('), wherein it was held that even if an acknowledgment implies a promise to pay it cannot be made the basis of suit and treated as giving rise to a fresh ca use of action."}}, {"text": "Govind Saran Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17861, "end_char": 17879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Govind Saran Singh."}}, {"text": "A. D. Mathur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17910, "end_char": 17922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : A. D. Mathur."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_767_772_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 767\n\nOHAIRM AN OF THE BANKURA\n\nMUNICIPALITY\n\nLALJI RAJA AND SONS. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nCalcutta High Court Rules, Part I, Chap . .11, R1!le 9-J,, risdiction of Single Judge-\"Order of fo1Jeiture of property\"-Forfeit1!re, meaning of- Order directing di, posal of 1inwholesome food under }1fonicipal laws- Whether forfeiture-Bengal Afonicipal Act,\n\n1932, SS. 428, 431, 432.\n\nAn order of a District Magistrate under ss. 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act (XV of 1932) for the disposal of an article of food which has been seized under s. 428 of the said Act is not an order of forfeiture of property within the meaning of the proviso to rule 9 of Chap. II of Part II of the Calcutta High Court Rules, and a Single Judge of the said High Court has jurisdiction to hear a reference from such an order.\n\nUnless the loss or deprivation of property is by way of penalty or punishment for a crime, offence or breach of engagement it would not amount to a \"forfeiture\" of property.\n\nCtUMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1952. Appeal from an Order dated 18th January, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Chunder J.) in Criminal Reference Case No. llO of 1951.\n\nN. 0. Talukdar antl A. D. Dutt for the appellant.\n\nAjit Kumar Dutta and S. N. Mukherjee for the respondents.\n\n1953. March 12. The Judgment of the Court was delivered hy\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal under arti cle 134(c) of the Constitution and raises the point whether a single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta could hear a reference from an order under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act XV of 1932. 'rhe jurisdiction of a single Judge of the High Court in criminal matters is defined in the proviso to\n\nMarch lfl.\n\n19/J3\n\nChairman. of the Bankura\n\nrule 9, Cb apter II, Part I of the. Rules of the High Court and the relevant portion of the proviso runs as under:-\n\nLalji Raja\n\nand Sons.\n\nBhaawati J.\n\n\"Provided that a single Judge may hear any Appeal, Reference, or Application for revision other than the following:-\n\n(1) One relating to an order of sentence of death, transportation, penal servitude, forfeiture of property or of imprisonment, not being an order of imprisonment in defanlt of payment of fine ......................... \"\n\nA single Judge therefore has no jurisdiction to deal with any reference or application for revision which relates to an order of forfeiture of property, and the question that arises in this appeal is wbenher the order passed by the learned District Magistrate, Bankura, under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, amounted to an order of forfeitu:e of property within the meaning of the above proviso.\n\n'fhe relevant facts may be shortly stated as follows.\n\nThe respondents are ; he proprietors of several oil mills in the town of Dankura within the Bankura Municipality. The Sanitary Inspector of the Municipality received on 6th Marnh, Hl50, information that the Manager of the Bree Gonranga Oil Mill, belonging to the respondents had dep\"osited about 300 ba.gs of rotten, decomposed, unwholesome mustard seeds in the courtyard of the Rice Mill of Bree Hanseswar Maji and about 600 bags of unwholesome mnstard seeds in the 1p.ill godown of the respondents for sale and for the preparation of oil therefrom for sale. On an application made by him in that behalf the 8ub- Divisional Officer, Bankura, duly issued a search warrant and the Sanitary Inspector on the same day found in possession of the respondents a huge q uantity of mustard seeds which were found to be highly unsound, unwholesome and unfit for human consumption. He seized the said seeds between the 6th March, 1950, and the 8th March, 1950, and after the completion of the seizure asked for written consent of the\n\nrespondents for destruction of t.he said mustard seeds which they refused. 'rhe Sanitary Inspector therefore kept all the bags thus seized, viz., 951! bags, in the mill .godowns of the respondents with their consent. .After sever:ol proceedings which it is not necessary to mention for the purpose of this appeal, the District Magistrate, Bankura, in M. P. No. 58 of 1950 under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act on the 14th Auguot, 1951, found that the stock of mustard seeds which was seized on the 6th March, 1950, was on that date and still was unfit for human consumption. J3ut in so far as no oil was coming out of the seeds and the seeds were capable of being used as manure or for cattle-food he would not direct their destruction but directed that they should be disposed of by the Commissioners of the Bankura Municipality as manure or as cattle-food ensuring before such disposal that the stocks in question had been rendered incapable of being used as human food.\n\nThe respondents.filed a petition under section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bankura, against the order of the District Magistrate, for a reference to the High Court.\n\nThe Additional Sessions Judge held that the seizure of the mustard seeds was illegal and that there was no evidence to show that the seeds in question were deposited in or brought to the places for the purpose of their sale or of preparation of oil for human consumption. He therefore made a reference under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the High Court for gnashing the proceedings.\n\nChunder J. accepted the reference, set aside the order of the District Magistrate and remanded , the case for retrial by some other Magistrate, as in the opinion of the learned Judge, the District Magistrate had decided the matter upon his own observations formed during the inspectidn of the mustard seeds and not on the material in the record. An application was made to a Bench of the High Court and leave was allowed on the point whether Chunder J. had jurisdiction sitting singly to bear th~ reference in view of the rule cited a]Jov~,\n\nChair11ia11 of the Bankura.\n\nM11nicipality\n\nv, J; alji Raja and Sons.\n\nBhag1oati J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\n1968 Sri N. C. Taluqdar for the appellants urged tha.t\n\nChair<nan of the order made by the District Magistrate, Bankura,\n\nth• Bankura under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932, was an order for forfeiture of property v.\n\nLalji Raja\n\nand Sons.\n\nBhagtoati J.\n\nwithin the meaning of the proviso to the rule and Chunder J. had no jurisdiction to deal with the reference and his order should be quashed.\n\nSection 431 provides :-\n\n\" ( l) Where any living thing, article of food, drug, ......... seized under section 428 is not destroyed by consent under sub-section (1) of section 429, or where an article of food so seized which is perishable is not dealt with under sub-section (2) of that section, it shall be taken before a Magistrate as soon as ma, y be after such seizure.\n\n(2) If it appears to the Magistrate that any such Ii ving thing is diseased or unsound or that any such food or drug is unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food or for medicine, as the case may he ............... he shall cause the same to be destroyed at the expense of the person .in whose possession it was at the time of its seizure, or to be otherwise disposed of by the Commissioners so as not to be capable of being used as human food or medicine ......... \"\n\nSection 432 provides : -\n\n\"When any authority directs in exercise of any powers conferred by this chapter, the destruction of any living thing, food or any drug, or the disposal of the same so as to prevent its being used as food or medicine, the same sh~)] thereupon be deemed to be the property of the Commissioners.\"\n\nThe word \"forfeiture\" is efined in Murray's Oxford Dictionary:-\" The fact of losing or becoming liable to deprivation of goods in consequence of a crime, 'offence, or breach of engagement\" ......... \"the penalty of the transgression\" or a \"punishment for an offence\". It was contended that in so far as section 432 provided for the vesting of the condemned food or drug in the Commissioners the owner of the property was divested or deprived of the proprietary\n\nrights therein and that the order made by the Magistrate under section 431 (2) was thus an order of forfeiture of the property.\n\nThis contention in our opinion is unsound. According to the dictionary meaning of the word \"forfeiture\" the loss or the deprivation of goods has got to be in consequence of a crime, offence or breach of engagement or has to be by way of penalty of the transgression or a punishment for an offence.\n\nUnless the loss or deprivation of the goods is by way of a penalty or punishment for a crime, offence or breach of engagement it would no& come within the definition of for .. feiture. What is provided under section 431(2) is the destruction of the food or drug which is unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food or medicine or the otherwise disposal of the same by the Commissioners so as not to be capable of being used as human food or medicine.\n\nThe vesting of such coqdemned food or drug iu the Commissioners which is provided by section 432 is with a view to facilitate the destruction or the otherwise disposal of such food or drug by the Commissioners and is in no way Ii fo1- f eiture of such food or drug by the Municipality.· The condemned food or drug by reason of its being found unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food or medicine cannot be dealt with by the owner.\n\nIt must be destroyed or otherwise disposed of so as to prevent its being used as human food or medicine.\n\nWhat the Municipal Commissioners are empowered to do therefore is what the owner himself would be expected to do and what is ordered to be done therefore cannot amount to a forfeiture of the property.\n\nThe order is not a punishment for a crime but is a measure to ensure that the condemned food er drug is not used as human food or medicine.\n\nThat this is the t.rue position is clear from the provisions of Chapter XXIV of the Act which provides for penalties. Sections 501 to 504 prescribe pnalties for specific offences and section 500 prescribes generally penalties for the several offences therein mentioned.\n\nSection 431 however does not figure therein.\n\nChairman of ths Bankura Municipality\n\nLalji Raja and Sons.\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nChairnian of the R1inkura\n\nllfumcipality\n\nV, Lalji Raja\n\nand Sons.\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nForfeiture of property is thus not one of the penalties or punishments for any of the offences mentioned n the Bengal Municipal Act.\n\nIn the relevant provision in the rule of the High Court an order of sentence of death, transportation, penal servitude, forfeiture of property or of imprisonmeut are grouped together. 'rhese orders are purely orders by way 'of penalty or punishm.ent for the commissiou of crimes or offences and the forfeiture of property mentioned there is no other than the one which is entailed as a consequence of the commission of a crime or offence.\n\nIn order that such forfeiture of property would bar the jurisdiction of the single Judge it has to be a forfeiture of property which is provided by way of penalty or punishment for the commission of a crime or offence.\n\nIn spite of his labours Shri N. C. Taluqdar hs.s not been able to point out to us any provision of the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932, which constitutes what is con temp lated under section 431(2), a penalty or punishment for the commission of a crime or offence. The offence that the respondent could be charged with i~ deened in section 421 of the Act and the punishment for that offence provided in section 500 is fine and not forfeiture.\n\nvVe are therefore of the opinion that the order of the District Magistrate, Bankura, under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, dated 14th August, 1951, was not an order of forfeiture of property within the meaning of the proviso to rule 9, Chapter II, Part I, of the Rules of the High Court, and Chunder J. had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference.\n\nThe result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : Sukumar Ghose.\n\nAgent for respondent: R. R. Biswas. ·\n\n~--", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "767\n\nOHAIRM AN OF THE BANKURA\n\nMUNICIPALITY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA MUNICIPALITY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LALJI RAJA AND SONS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LALJI RAJA AND SONS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Whether forfeiture-Bengal Afonicipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 351, "end_char": 391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SS. 428, 431, 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400, "end_char": 417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether forfeiture-Bengal Afonicipal Act,\n\n1932", "statute": "Whether forfeiture-Bengal Afonicipal Act,\n\n1932"}}, {"text": "ss. 431 and 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 460, "end_char": 475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether forfeiture-Bengal Afonicipal Act,\n\n1932", "statute": "Whether forfeiture-Bengal Afonicipal Act,\n\n1932"}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 584, "end_char": 590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether forfeiture-Bengal Afonicipal Act,\n\n1932", "statute": "Whether forfeiture-Bengal Afonicipal Act,\n\n1932"}}, {"text": "II of Part II of the Calcutta High Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 702, "end_char": 748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. D. Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1260, "end_char": 1270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Talukdar antl A. D. Dutt for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ajit Kumar Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1291, "end_char": 1307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ajit Kumar Dutta and S. N. Mukherjee for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1312, "end_char": 1327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ajit Kumar Dutta and S. N. Mukherjee for the respondents."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1533, "end_char": 1569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered hy\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal under arti cle 134(c) of the Constitution and raises the point whether a single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta could hear a reference from an order under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act XV of 1932. '"}}, {"text": "sections 431 and 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1613, "end_char": 1633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of Part II of the Calcutta High Court Rules", "statute": "II of Part II of the Calcutta High Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Municipal Act XV of 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1648, "end_char": 1672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lalji Raja", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1940, "end_char": 1950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rules of the High Court and the relevant portion of the proviso runs as under:-\n\nLalji Raja\n\nand Sons.", "canonical_name": "LALJI RAJA AND SONS"}}, {"text": "Bhaawati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1963, "end_char": 1971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhaawati J.\n\n\"Provided that a single Judge may hear any Appeal, Reference, or Application for revision other than the following:-\n\n(1) One relating to an order of sentence of death, transportation, penal servitude, forfeiture of property or of imprisonment, not being an order of imprisonment in defanlt of payment of fine ......................... \"\n\nA single Judge therefore has no jurisdiction to deal with any reference or application for revision which relates to an order of forfeiture of property, and the question that arises in this appeal is wbenher the order passed by the learned District Magistrate, Bankura, under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, amounted to an order of forfeitu:e of property within the meaning of the above proviso.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Bankura", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2555, "end_char": 2583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhaawati J.\n\n\"Provided that a single Judge may hear any Appeal, Reference, or Application for revision other than the following:-\n\n(1) One relating to an order of sentence of death, transportation, penal servitude, forfeiture of property or of imprisonment, not being an order of imprisonment in defanlt of payment of fine ......................... \"\n\nA single Judge therefore has no jurisdiction to deal with any reference or application for revision which relates to an order of forfeiture of property, and the question that arises in this appeal is wbenher the order passed by the learned District Magistrate, Bankura, under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, amounted to an order of forfeitu:e of property within the meaning of the above proviso."}}, {"text": "sections 431 and 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2591, "end_char": 2611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Act XV of 1932", "statute": "Municipal Act XV of 1932"}}, {"text": "Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2619, "end_char": 2645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dankura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2864, "end_char": 2871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents are ; he proprietors of several oil mills in the town of Dankura within the Bankura Municipality."}}, {"text": "Bankura Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2883, "end_char": 2903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents are ; he proprietors of several oil mills in the town of Dankura within the Bankura Municipality."}}, {"text": "Bree Gonranga Oil Mill", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sanitary Inspector of the Municipality received on 6th Marnh, Hl50, information that the Manager of the Bree Gonranga Oil Mill, belonging to the respondents had dep\"osited about 300 ba.gs of rotten, decomposed, unwholesome mustard seeds in the courtyard of the Rice Mill of Bree Hanseswar Maji and about 600 bags of unwholesome mnstard seeds in the 1p.ill godown of the respondents for sale and for the preparation of oil therefrom for sale."}}, {"text": "Bree Hanseswar Maji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sanitary Inspector of the Municipality received on 6th Marnh, Hl50, information that the Manager of the Bree Gonranga Oil Mill, belonging to the respondents had dep\"osited about 300 ba.gs of rotten, decomposed, unwholesome mustard seeds in the courtyard of the Rice Mill of Bree Hanseswar Maji and about 600 bags of unwholesome mnstard seeds in the 1p.ill godown of the respondents for sale and for the preparation of oil therefrom for sale."}}, {"text": "Bankura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3425, "end_char": 3432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application made by him in that behalf the 8ub- Divisional Officer, Bankura, duly issued a search warrant and the Sanitary Inspector on the same day found in possession of the respondents a huge q uantity of mustard seeds which were found to be highly unsound, unwholesome and unfit for human consumption."}}, {"text": "6th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3700, "end_char": 3715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He seized the said seeds between the 6th March, 1950, and the 8th March, 1950, and after the completion of the seizure asked for written consent of the\n\nrespondents for destruction of t.he said mustard seeds which they refused. '"}}, {"text": "8th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He seized the said seeds between the 6th March, 1950, and the 8th March, 1950, and after the completion of the seizure asked for written consent of the\n\nrespondents for destruction of t.he said mustard seeds which they refused. '"}}, {"text": "sections 431 and 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4194, "end_char": 4214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th Auguot, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4250, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58 of 1950 under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act on the 14th Auguot, 1951, found that the stock of mustard seeds which was seized on the 6th March, 1950, was on that date and still was unfit for human consumption."}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4846, "end_char": 4857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Bankura", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4900, "end_char": 4934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents.filed a petition under section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bankura, against the order of the District Magistrate, for a reference to the High Court."}}, {"text": "section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chunder", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5418, "end_char": 5425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chunder J. accepted the reference, set aside the order of the District Magistrate and remanded , the case for retrial by some other Magistrate, as in the opinion of the learned Judge, the District Magistrate had decided the matter upon his own observations formed during the inspectidn of the mustard seeds and not on the material in the record."}}, {"text": "N. C. Taluqdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6084, "end_char": 6098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhag1oati J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\n1968 Sri N. C. Taluqdar for the appellants urged tha.t\n\nChair<nan of the order made by the District Magistrate, Bankura,\n\nth• Bankura under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932, was an order for forfeiture of property v.\n\nLalji Raja\n\nand Sons.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Taluqdar"}}, {"text": "sections 431 and 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6215, "end_char": 6235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6243, "end_char": 6282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lalji Raja", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6328, "end_char": 6338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhag1oati J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\n1968 Sri N. C. Taluqdar for the appellants urged tha.t\n\nChair<nan of the order made by the District Magistrate, Bankura,\n\nth• Bankura under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932, was an order for forfeiture of property v.\n\nLalji Raja\n\nand Sons.", "canonical_name": "LALJI RAJA AND SONS"}}, {"text": "Bhagtoati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6351, "end_char": 6360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagtoati J.\n\nwithin the meaning of the proviso to the rule and Chunder J. had no jurisdiction to deal with the reference and his order should be quashed.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "Section 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6507, "end_char": 6518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6609, "end_char": 6620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "section 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6674, "end_char": 6685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Municipality Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7352, "end_char": 7363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Murray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7708, "end_char": 7714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The word \"forfeiture\" is efined in Murray's Oxford Dictionary:-\" The fact of losing or becoming liable to deprivation of goods in consequence of a crime, 'offence, or breach of engagement\" ......... \"the penalty of the transgression\" or a \"punishment for an offence\"."}}, {"text": "section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7976, "end_char": 7987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8198, "end_char": 8209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 431(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8771, "end_char": 8785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9101, "end_char": 9112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter XXIV of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9965, "end_char": 9988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 501 to 504", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10019, "end_char": 10038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXIV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XXIV of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10084, "end_char": 10095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXIV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XXIV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10172, "end_char": 10183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXIV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XXIV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10278, "end_char": 10286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati J.\n\nChairnian of the R1inkura\n\nllfumcipality\n\nV, Lalji Raja\n\nand Sons.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "V, Lalji Raja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10333, "end_char": 10346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati J.\n\nChairnian of the R1inkura\n\nllfumcipality\n\nV, Lalji Raja\n\nand Sons."}}, {"text": "N. C. Taluqdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11225, "end_char": 11239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of his labours Shri N. C. Taluqdar hs.s not been able to point out to us any provision of the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932, which constitutes what is con temp lated under section 431(2), a penalty or punishment for the commission of a crime or offence.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Taluqdar"}}, {"text": "Beugal Municipal Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11299, "end_char": 11325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 431(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11374, "end_char": 11388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11523, "end_char": 11534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11594, "end_char": 11605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "sections 431 and 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11726, "end_char": 11746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Beugal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11754, "end_char": 11780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "14th August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11788, "end_char": 11805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vVe are therefore of the opinion that the order of the District Magistrate, Bankura, under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, dated 14th August, 1951, was not an order of forfeiture of property within the meaning of the proviso to rule 9, Chapter II, Part I, of the Rules of the High Court, and Chunder J. had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12123, "end_char": 12136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : Sukumar Ghose."}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12161, "end_char": 12173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondent: R. R. Biswas. ·"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_773_779_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 773\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nPANDURANG VINAYAR CHAPHALKAR\n\nAND OTHERS. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN andBHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nBombay Bnilding (Control on Erection) Act, 1948, s. 15-Bornbay General Clauses Act, 1904, s. 25-Repeal of Ordinance and reenactment as Act-Notifications issued under Ordinance whether continue in force-Construction of Act-Stat,.tory fictions.\n\nThe Bombay Building (Control on !Crection) Ordinance of 1948 applied to certain areas mentioned in the Schedule to the Ordinance, and in exercise of the powers vested in it by the Ordinance the Government extended its provisions to certain other areas including Ratnagiri in respect of buildings intended to be used for cinemas and other places of entertainment, by a notifica~ tion of the 15th January, 1948. This Ordinance was repealed by the Bombay Building (Control on Erection) Act of 1948 the provisions of which were similar to those of tbe earlier Ordinance.\n\nSection 15(1) of the Act repealed that Ordinance and declared that \"the provisions of ss. 7 and 25, Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, shall apply to the repeal as if that Ordinance were an enactment.\"\n\nHeld, reversing the judgment of the Bombay High Court, that on a true construction of s. 15(1) of the abovesaid Act and s. 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, the notification issued on the 15th January, 1948, under the Ordinance continued in force under t_he Act of 1948 and that by it the provisions of the Act stood extended to other areas in the State including Ratnagiri to the extent indicated in the notification.\n\nEx parte Walton: In re Levy (17 Cb. D. 746) and East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Cotmcil ([1952] A.G. 109) referred to.\n\nCRUIINAL APPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1951.\n\nAppeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court of India on the 14th May, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th August, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Vyas JJ.) in Criminal Appeal No. 319of1950 arising ou-t of the Judgment and Order dated the 6th Januiuy, 1950, of the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate F.C., Ratnagiri City, in Criminal Case No. 77 of 1949.\n\nl~J.53\n\nltfarch 13.\n\nThe State of\n\nBo1?Jbay\n\nPandurang\n\nVina.yak Ghaphalkar and Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n774 8UPREME COURT REPoRts [1953]\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General fol' India (.G. N.\n\nJoshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the appella, nt.\n\nK. R. Chaudhury for the respondent.\n\n1953. March 13. Tha Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHA.JAN J.-The respondents were charged with having committed an offence punishable under section 9(2) read with section 4 of the Bomba, y Building (Control on Erection) Act, 1948, for commencing the work of erection of a cinema theatre without obtaining the necessary permission from the controller of buildings, Bombay.\n\nThe sub-divisional magistrate, Ratnagiri, held that the Act not having been validly extended to Ratnagiri, no permission of the controller of buildings was necessuy for the construction.\n\nHe accordingly acquitted them.\n\nOn appeal by the State Government, the order of acquittal was maintained by the High Court.\n\nThis appeal is before us by special leave from the concur!ent orders of acquittal.\n\nSpecial leave was granted on the Attorney-General for India undertaking on behalf of the State Government of Bombay that whatever the decision of the court might be, no proceedings will be taken against the respondents in respect of the subject-matter under appeal.\n\nAt the hearing of the appeal it was made plain by the learned Attorney-General that no adverse consequences will flow to the respondents or to their building being completed, by the acquittal order being pronounced as bad, and that the State Government will not in any way interfere with the respondents when they take steps to complete the building, the construction of which was commenced without the permission of the controller.\n\nThe State Government merely wants to have the question of law decided as a test case because the decision of the High Court, if left unchallenged, would have far-reaching effects.\n\nThe facts giving rise -to the prosecution of the res.pondents, shortly stated, are these: There was in force in the State of Bombay an Ordinance, Bombay\n\nBuiling (Control on Erection) Ordinance, 1948. It was applicable to certain areas specified in the schedule. The district of Ratnagiri was not one of the areas therein specified. Sub-section ( 4) of section 1 of the Ordinance empowered the provincial government by notification in the official gazette to extend to any other area specified in such notification its provisions.\n\nIt further empowered the provincial government to direct that it shall apply only in respect of buildings intended to be used for such purpose as may be specified in the notification. On 15th January, 1948, the Government of Bombay issued the following notification :--\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section\n\n(4) of section 1 of the Bombay Building (Control on Erection) Ordinance, 1948 (Ordinance No. I of 1948), the Government of Bombay is pleased to direct that the said ordinance shall also extend to all areas in the province of Bombay other than the areas specified in the schedule to the said Act and that it shall apply to said areas only in respect of buildings intended to be used for the purpose of cinemas, theatres and other places of amusement or entertai)lment.\"\n\nThe consequence of this notification was that in the district of Ratnagiri no cinema building could be commenced without the permission of the controller after that date.\n\nOrdinance I of 1948 was repealed by Act XXXI of 1948, \"The Bombay Building (Control on Erection) Act, 1948\". It was made applicable to areas specified in the schedule.\n\nSub-section (3) of section 1 authoried the provincial government by notification in the official gazette to direct that it shall also extend to anyother areas specified therein. It further authorized the provincial government to direct that it shall apply only in respect of buildings intended to be used for such purposes as may be specified in the notification. B.y section 15(1) of the Act it was provided that-\n\n\" The Bombay Building (Control on Erection) Ordinance, 1948, is hereby repealed andit is hereby\n\nThe State of\n\nBoniba11\n\nI'andivrang\n\nVinayak Chaphalkar and Other11.\n\n}, fahajan J.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nPandurang\n\nVinayak Chaphalkar and Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n776 SUPREM:in COURT R]jPORTS (1953j\n\ndeclared that the provisions of sections 7 and 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, shall apply to the repeal as if that Ordinance were an enactment.\"\n\nThe respondents started constructing a. cinema at Ratnagiri on 15th August,.1948, after the commQncement of Act XXXI of 1948 without obtaining the permission of the controller of buildings as required by the Act under the. impression that the A.ct had application only to areas specified in the schedule and the district of Ratnagiri not having been specified in the schedule, the provisions of the Act had no application to that area.\n\nAs above stated, they were prosecuted for committing an offence .under section 9(2) read with section 4 with the results abovementioned.\n\nThe order of acquittal was based on the ground that although the notification extended the scope of the ordinance to areas other than those which were mentioned specifically in the schedule thereto, it did not extend to those aieas the provisions of the Act in spite of the application of the provisions of section 25 of the Bombay Gene.ral Clauses Act. In our judgment, the construction placed by the High Court on the language of section 15 is erroneous and full effect has not been given to its provisions or to the provisions of section 25 o! the Bombay General Clauses Act.\n\nWe think on a true construction of section 15 of the Act and section 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, the notification issued on 15th January, 1948, under the ordinance continued in force under Act XXXI of 1948 and that by it the provisions of the Act stood extended to other areas in the State to the extent indicated in the notification. Section 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, provides-\n\n\" where any enactment is, :ifte1 the commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted by a Bombay Act, with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, bye-law or form made or issued under the repealed enactment shall, so far as it is nob incl>nsistent with the provisions re-enacted,\n\ncontinue in. force, and be deemed to have been made or issued nuder the provisions so re-enacted unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, bye-law or form made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted.\"\n\nIt cannot be contended that the notification was inconsistent with the provisions of Act XXXI\n\nof 1948.\n\nIt is clearly in accordance with its scheme and purpose. The High CourG did not combat the proposition that in view of the provisions of section 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act the notification continued in force after the coming into force of the Act. It, however, held that even if the notification was taken as having been issued under Act :{CXXI of 1948, the notification merely extended the ordinance to these areas and not the Act. In the opinion of the High Court, the word \"Act\" instead of \" Ordinance\" could not be read in the words of the notification by the force of section 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act and the notification literally construed, only extended the ordinance to those areas.\n\nIt was considered that if the intention. was to extend the Act to these areas, such an intention could only be carried out by enacting in Act XXXI of 1948 a proviso like the one enacted in the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1945, or by use of language similar to the one used in section 9 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. The proviso in the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order is in these terms:-\n\n\" Provided further any reference in any order issued under the Defence of India Rules or in any notification issued thereunder to any provision of the\n\nCotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1943, shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as reference to the corresponding provision of this\n\nOrder.\"\n\nWe do not find it possible to support this line of reasoning. It appears to us that the attention of the learned Judges was not pointedly drawn to the concluding words of section 15 (1) of the Act. It is specifically provided therein tha, t the provisions of\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nPandurang Vinayalc Chaphalkar and Others. ·\n\nMahajan J.\n\n)958\n\nThe State of Botnbay v.\n\nPa.ndnrana\n\nVtnayak Ohaphalkar and Others.\n\nl.1a.hajan J.\n\nsections 7 and 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act shall apply to the repeal as if the ordinance were an enactment. The ordinance by use of those words was given the status of an enactment and therefore the word \"ordinance\" occurring in the notification has to be read accordingly aud as extending the Act to those areas, and unless that is done, full effect cannot be given to the concluding words used in section 15(1) of the Act. The conch:ding words of section 15(1) of the Act achieve the purpose that was achieved in the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order by the \"proviso.\" By reason of the deeming provisions of section 15, the language used in the notification extending the ordinance to those are:i, s as a necessary consequence has the effect of extending the operation of the Act to those areas. When a statute enacts that something shall he deemed to have been done, which_ in fact and truth was not done, the court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. [Vide Lord Justice James in Ex parte Walton: In re Levy(')). If the purpose of the statutory fiction mentioned in section 15 is kept in view, then it follows that the purpose of that fiction would be completely defeated if the notification was construed in the literal manner in which It has been construed by the High Court. In East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council( 2), Lord Asquith while dealing with the provisions of the Town and County Planning Act, 1947, made reference to the same principle and observed as follows :-\n\n\" If yon are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, yon must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it ....... The statute says that yon must imagine a certain state of. affairs; it does not\n\n(r) 17 C4. D, 746, at p. 756,\n\n(2) (1952) A.C. 109,\n\nsay that having done so, you must cause or permi~ your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.\"\n\nThe corollary thus of declaring the provisions of section 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act applicable to the repeal of the ordinance and of deeming that ordinance an enactment is that wherever the word \"ordinance\" occurs in the notification, that word has to be read as an enactment.\n\nFor the reasons given above we are satisfied that the High Court. was in error in holding that the notification only extended the provisions of the ordinance to Ratnagiri district and not the provisions of Act XXXI of 1948 to that area. It may, however, be observed that the manner ail.opted by the legislature in keeping alive the notifications issued under the ordinance by use of somewhat involved language iu matters where the rights of the citi\"ens regarding the construction of buildings were being affected was not yery happy. It has certainly led three judges to think that the intention of the legislature was not brought out by the language. People who are not lawyers ma.y well be misled into thinking that the notifica.tion issued under the ordinance has terminated with its repeal and not having been re-issued under the Act, the provisions of which again in clear language provide that it only extends to areas specified in the schedule and which gives power to extend it, that those areas are excluded from the scope of the Act. It would have been much simpler if the legislature made its intention clear by use of simple and unambiguous language.\n\nBecause of the undertaking given by the learned Attorney-General not to proceed any further in this matter, it is not necessary to set aside the acquittal order of the respondents, \\Vhich will remain as it stands.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAcquittal not set aside.\n\nAgent for the appellant: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nAgent for the respondents: Ganpat Rai,\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nPand1trang\n\nVtnayak Gh'lphalkar and Others,\n\nMahajan J.", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "773\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PANDURANG VINAYAR CHAPHALKAR\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PANDURANG VINAYAR CHAPHALKAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bornbay General Clauses Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226, "end_char": 231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bornbay General Clauses Act, 1904", "statute": "Bornbay General Clauses Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "15th January, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Crection) Ordinance of 1948 applied to certain areas mentioned in the Schedule to the Ordinance, and in exercise of the powers vested in it by the Ordinance the Government extended its provisions to certain other areas including Ratnagiri in respect of buildings intended to be used for cinemas and other places of entertainment, by a notifica~ tion of the 15th January, 1948."}}, {"text": "Section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 948, "end_char": 961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Repeal of Ordinance and reenactment as Act-Notifications issued under Ordinance whether continue in force-Construction of Act", "statute": "Repeal of Ordinance and reenactment as Act-Notifications issued under Ordinance whether continue in force-Construction of Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 7 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1034, "end_char": 1046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Repeal of Ordinance and reenactment as Act-Notifications issued under Ordinance whether continue in force-Construction of Act", "statute": "Repeal of Ordinance and reenactment as Act-Notifications issued under Ordinance whether continue in force-Construction of Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1048, "end_char": 1080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, reversing the judgment of the Bombay High Court, that on a true construction of s. 15(1) of the abovesaid Act and s. 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, the notification issued on the 15th January, 1948, under the Ordinance continued in force under t_he Act of 1948 and that by it the provisions of the Act stood extended to other areas in the State including Ratnagiri to the extent indicated in the notification."}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1236, "end_char": 1244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "statute": "Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1270, "end_char": 1275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "statute": "Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1283, "end_char": 1315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ratnagiri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1524, "end_char": 1533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, reversing the judgment of the Bombay High Court, that on a true construction of s. 15(1) of the abovesaid Act and s. 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, the notification issued on the 15th January, 1948, under the Ordinance continued in force under t_he Act of 1948 and that by it the provisions of the Act stood extended to other areas in the State including Ratnagiri to the extent indicated in the notification."}}, {"text": "Bavdekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1966, "end_char": 1974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court of India on the 14th May, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th August, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Vyas JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Vyas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 1983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court of India on the 14th May, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th August, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Vyas JJ.)"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBo1?Jbay\n\nPandurang", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2217, "end_char": 2246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nBo1?Jbay\n\nPandurang\n\nVina.yak Ghaphalkar and Others."}}, {"text": "Vina.yak Ghaphalkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2248, "end_char": 2267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nBo1?Jbay\n\nPandurang\n\nVina.yak Ghaphalkar and Others."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2281, "end_char": 2288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\n774 8UPREME COURT REPoRts [1953]\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General fol' India (.G. N.\n\nJoshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the appella, nt.", "canonical_name": "MAHA.JAN"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2327, "end_char": 2341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\n774 8UPREME COURT REPoRts [1953]\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General fol' India (.G. N.\n\nJoshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the appella, nt."}}, {"text": ".G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2372, "end_char": 2385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\n774 8UPREME COURT REPoRts [1953]\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General fol' India (.G. N.\n\nJoshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the appella, nt."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2390, "end_char": 2401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\n774 8UPREME COURT REPoRts [1953]\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General fol' India (.G. N.\n\nJoshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the appella, nt."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhury for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHA.JAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2532, "end_char": 2540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tha Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHA.JAN J.-The respondents were charged with having committed an offence punishable under section 9(2) read with section 4 of the Bomba, y Building (Control on Erection) Act, 1948, for commencing the work of erection of a cinema theatre without obtaining the necessary permission from the controller of buildings, Bombay.", "canonical_name": "MAHA.JAN"}}, {"text": "section 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2623, "end_char": 2635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2646, "end_char": 2655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3307, "end_char": 3312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special leave was granted on the Attorney-General for India undertaking on behalf of the State Government of Bombay that whatever the decision of the court might be, no proceedings will be taken against the respondents in respect of the subject-matter under appeal."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3362, "end_char": 3368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special leave was granted on the Attorney-General for India undertaking on behalf of the State Government of Bombay that whatever the decision of the court might be, no proceedings will be taken against the respondents in respect of the subject-matter under appeal."}}, {"text": "was in force in the State of Bombay an Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4231, "end_char": 4279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was in force in the State of Bombay an Ordinance", "statute": "There was in force in the State of Bombay an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4878, "end_char": 4898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15th January, 1948, the Government of Bombay issued the following notification :--\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section\n\n(4) of section 1 of the Bombay Building (Control on Erection) Ordinance, 1948 (Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4998, "end_char": 5007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was in force in the State of Bombay an Ordinance", "statute": "There was in force in the State of Bombay an Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5821, "end_char": 5830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6170, "end_char": 6183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBoniba11", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6319, "end_char": 6337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.y section 15(1) of the Act it was provided that-\n\n\" The Bombay Building (Control on Erection) Ordinance, 1948, is hereby repealed andit is hereby\n\nThe State of\n\nBoniba11\n\nI'andivrang\n\nVinayak Chaphalkar and Other11."}}, {"text": "fahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "}, fahajan J.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nPandurang\n\nVinayak Chaphalkar and Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHA.JAN"}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6548, "end_char": 6565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6573, "end_char": 6605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7183, "end_char": 7195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "statute": "the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7206, "end_char": 7215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "statute": "the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7557, "end_char": 7567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "statute": "the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7682, "end_char": 7692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7783, "end_char": 7793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7808, "end_char": 7827, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7865, "end_char": 7875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7891, "end_char": 7901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7916, "end_char": 7935, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8175, "end_char": 8185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8193, "end_char": 8225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9104, "end_char": 9114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "statute": "the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9129, "end_char": 9148, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9550, "end_char": 9560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9575, "end_char": 9594, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9969, "end_char": 9978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9986, "end_char": 10018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Provided further any reference in any order issued under the Defence of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10100, "end_char": 10183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10586, "end_char": 10596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further any reference in any order issued under the Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Provided further any reference in any order issued under the Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10846, "end_char": 10863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further any reference in any order issued under the Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Provided further any reference in any order issued under the Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10878, "end_char": 10897, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11254, "end_char": 11267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11304, "end_char": 11317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11469, "end_char": 11479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "James", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12025, "end_char": 12030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Lord Justice James in Ex parte Walton: In re Levy('))."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12120, "end_char": 12130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lord Asquith while dealing with the provisions of the Town and County Planning Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12396, "end_char": 12484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13174, "end_char": 13184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lord Asquith while dealing with the provisions of the Town and County Planning Act, 1947", "statute": "Lord Asquith while dealing with the provisions of the Town and County Planning Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13199, "end_char": 13218, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ratnagiri district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13574, "end_char": 13592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was in error in holding that the notification only extended the provisions of the ordinance to Ratnagiri district and not the provisions of Act XXXI of 1948 to that area."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14860, "end_char": 14878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14908, "end_char": 14918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: Ganpat Rai,\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nPand1trang\n\nVtnayak Gh'lphalkar and Others,\n\nMahajan J."}}, {"text": "Vtnayak Gh'lphalkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14957, "end_char": 14976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: Ganpat Rai,\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nPand1trang\n\nVtnayak Gh'lphalkar and Others,\n\nMahajan J."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_780_789_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "March 16,\n\n780 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS (1953)\n\nATHERTON WEST & CO. T, TD.\n\nSUTI MILL MAZDOOR UNION AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CtHND MiUHJAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nU. P. lndl!strial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 3, 8-U. P. Government Notification No. 781 (L}!XVIII of March 10, 1948, els. 4, 7, 28-Dismissal of 1.uoikrnen with permission of Regional Gonciliati011 0.(/icer-Jl!risdiction of Board to hear the dispute-TVhether dispute ceases to be an industrial dispnte-Award of Board-Abse10ce of one member dl!ring /waring- Validity of award.,\n\nUnder bhe provisions of clauses 4 and 7 (3) of Notification No. 781 (L)/XVIII issued by the United Provinces Government on\n\nfarch 10, 1948, the absence of ol)e of the members of the Regional Conciliation Board on the last date of hearing and his nonparticipation iri the making and signing of the award woulcl not render the award void or inoperative.\n\nThe dismissal of workmen and their non-employment would not cease to be an industrial dispute merely because the Regional Conciliation Officer had given written permission to the employer to dismiss them under clause 23 of the T:.P. Government Notification of farch 10, 1948. Such permission does not Yalidate the <lismissal but only removes the ban on the right of the employer, bis agent or manager to dismiss the \\\\'orkmen concerned during the pendency of proceedings relating to an industrial dispute.\n\nCIVIL ArrELLA1'E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1953.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the decision dated 16th August, 1951, of he Labour Appellate 'l'ribunal of India, Calcutta, in Appeal No. 43 of 1951 (Cal.).\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Sri Nrirain Andley, with him) for the appellant.\n\n0. P. Vnr1na for the respondent.\n\n1953.\n\nMarch 16. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAG\\l'A1'I J.-This is an appeal by special leave from a decision of the [Jabour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, confirming an award made by the Regional Conciliation Board (Textiles & Hosiery), Kanpur, in an industrial dispute between the appellants and the respondents, ·\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPREME OOLiRT REPOR'rs 781\n\nThe' respondents 2. 3 and 4 were employees of the 1953 appellants, respondent 2 was employed in the - 1 ' l d h' l d 3 d 4 Athsrton West <l) c enca ca re w 1 e respon ents , an were em- 0 Ltd ployed as wrapping boy and piecer respectively and \".. their service conditions were governed by the stand- Si.ti Mill ing orders of the Employers' Association of Northern l1fozdoor Union India, Kanpur, of which association the appellants and Othm. were members.\n\nBhay11)ati J. There was a theft in the canteen within the mill premises between the night of January 6 and 7, 1950, and some money belonging to the appellants invested iu the canteen account was stolen from the safe.\n\nA report of the theft was made to the police authorities and an investigation was made by the police as well as the appellants in the matter with no result.\n\nThe management of the appellants thereafter took action against one J. P. Gurjar, who was in charge of the canteen in connection with the losses of money from the account of the canteen and after the completion of the enquiries terminated his services.\n\nAn industrial dispute in respect of the non-employment of the said .J. P. Gurjar arose between the parties which dispute was at the material time taken in appeal before the Industrial Court (Textiles & Hosiery), Kanpur.\n\nDuring the pendency of those proceedings, some time in August, 1950, the respondent 4 made a confession in regard to the said theft implicating the respondents 2 and 3 also therein.\n\nOn the 29th August, 1950, the management of the appellants presented to the respondents 2, 3 and 4 c]large-sheets in respect of the said theft and suspended them on the 30th August, 1950, from their senice. They also made an application on the 2nd September, 1950, to the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur, asking for permission to dismiss the respondents 2, 3 and 4.\n\n'rhe Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur, instituted an enquiry, heard the respondents 2, 3 and 4, considered the evidence which was led before him by the appellants as well as the respondents 2, 3 and 4 and made an order on the 12th October, 1950, according to the appellantA permission for the dismisrnl of the\n\n782 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS [i953J\n\n1953 respondents 2, 3 and 4.\n\nThe respondel'lts 2, 3 and 4\n\nAth t-w t , were accordingly dismissed from _their employ bv the er on es u. • .. co. Ltd. appell:a.nts with effect from the 13th October, 1950.\n\nv. .\n\nAn industrial dispute thereupon arose between the 8a\"1' vfu, u appellants and respondents 2, 3 and 4 in respect of the Maz oor nion • d d 4 d d a dOth•,.,. non-employmentot respon ents2,3au an respon - n ent l, a registered trade union, of which the respond-\n\nBhagwoti J. en ts 2, 3 and 4 were . members, ultimately-moved the_ Regional Conciliation Board ('1 1extiles and Hosiery), Kanpur, ou the 1st November, 1950, challenging the propriety and bona fides of the appellants in terminating the services of respondents 2, 3 and 4.\n\nThe appellants filed their written statement on the 25th November, 1950, contending inter alia that the dismissal was fully justified, regular and proper, having been made in accordance with the permission accorded by the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer. 'fhe only issue which was canvassed before the Regional Conciliation Board was whether any or all of the three workmen named in the application dated the 1st November, 1950, hits/have been wrongfully dismissed and if so, to what relief is he/they entitled.\n\nThe Board consisted of three members, Shri R. P.\n\nMaheshwari, CJiairman, and Shri B. B. Singh and Shri J. K. Bhagat, Members.\n\nShri J. K. Bhagat was not present on the last date of the hearing and the award was therefore signed on the 20th April, 1951, by Shri R. P. Maheshwari and Shri B. B. Singh.\n\nUnder the terms of the award the Board held that the dismissal was wron.ful and that the respondents 2, 3 and 4 were entitled to reinstatement as also to the full wages, including dearness allowance from the date of their suspension to the date they were taken back on duty.\n\nThe appellants preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate 'l'ribunal of India, Calcutta.\n\nThe appeal was heard on the 16th August, 1951, and the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the appellants. The appellants obtained special leave from this Court and filed the present appeal.\n\nTwo conte:etions were urged by Shri C. K. DaphwoB tary who appeared for the appellants before us-(1) - h . h d d d · Athe..ton West .t t at t e a.war was vo1 an moperat1ve as it was Co. Ltd. made by only two members of the Board, the third, v. member, Shri J. K. Bhagat not having been present Snti Mill at the last hearing and not having signed the same Mazdoor Union\n\nand (2) that the Additional Regional Conciliation and Others.\n\nOfficer having given the written permission for dis- BhagwatiJ. missal of repondents 2, 3 and 4 no industrial dispute could arise by reason of the non-employment of respondents 2, 3 and 4 and the Regional Conciliation Board had therefore no jurisdiction to entertain the application made before it by respondent 1 on behalf of the respondents 2, 3 and 4 and the award of the Regional Conciliation Board ordering the reinstatement of respondents 2, 3 and 4 was therefore without jurisdiction, void and inoperative and the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error in confirming the same.\n\nIn support of his first contention Shri C. K. Daphtary relied upon clause 4 and clause 7, sub-clause (3) of the G. N. No. 781 (L)/XVIII, dated 10th March, 1948, issued by the United Provinces Government regarding the constitution of Regional Conciliation Boards and Industrial Courts for the settlement of industrial disputes within the State.\n\nClause 4-\" No business may be transacted at any meeting of any Board unless all the three members are present 'I.\n\nClause 7 (3)-\" Where no amicable settlement can be reached on one or more issues the Board, if all the members thereof agree or if they do not so agree, the majority of the members agreeing or if no two members agree, the Chairman alone, shall record an award and the reasons for such award, on the issues on which the parties were unable to reach an amicable settlement.\"\n\nShri C. K. Daphtuy therefore urged that Shri J. K. Bhagat not having been present at the last meeting of the Board and not having signed the\n\n19sa award the award could not be lawfully made by the -- Chairman and the other member who were present\n\nAtherto•~est & and who signed the award and the award was therefore 0\\. . void and inoperative.\n\nShri c._ P.\n\nVarma who\n\nsuti Mill represented the respondent 1 before us however drew Mazdoo,. Unioii our attention to the Government Order No. 388(11)/ and Others.\n\nXVIII/37 (LL) /50 dated 2nd March, 1051, which amended the abol'e clauses 4 and 7(3).\n\nBhagwati J. , Clause 4 as amended provides:- \" (1) Notice of every meeting of the Board shall be given to the members by the ChairmBn in advance.\n\n(2) If apart from the Chairman either or both the other members fail to attend any meeting of the Board of which notice has been given to them, the Chairman may transact the business of the Board without the presence of the absent member or members; and no such business or proceedings of the Board shall be held invalid merely by reason of the fact that either one or both of the members were not present at the meeting.\"\n\nClause 7 (3) as amended provides: - \"Where no amicable settlement can be reached on one or more issues, if all the members present agree the Board or if they do not so agree the majority of the members agreeing or if no two rnembero present agree or if only the Chairman is present, he alone, shall record an award and the reasons for such award on the issues on which the parties were unable to reach an amicable settlement.\" ' 'fhese amendments in the 'clauses 4 and 7 (3) are enough in onr opinion to repel the contention of Shri C. K. Daphtary that the absence of Shri J. K.\n\nBhagat from the last meeting and also his non-participation in the making and signing of the award rendered the award void and inoperatiYe. 'l'he Board was empowered under the amended clauses 4 and 7(3) to act in the absence of Shri J. R. Bhagat and the award 11s it was made and signed by the two remaining members, viz., Sbri R. P. Maheshwari and Shri B. B. Singh, was lawful and binding on the partie~.\n\nIn support of his second contention Shri C. K. 1968 Daphtary relied upon clauses 23 and 24 of the Govern-A'h -m\n\nN 'fi d • eiton '\"st <! ment ot1 cat10n ated the 10th March, 1948, above 00• Ltd. referred to. v.\n\nClause 23 :-\" Sa, ve with the written permission of \" Sduti Mum th R '\n\n] C ']' 0\"\" h\n\nA . maz oor nion e eg10na onm iat1on 111cer or t e ss1Stant and Others.\n\nRegional Conciliation Officer concerned irrespective of the fact whether an enquiry is pending before a Bhagwati J.\n\nRegio-nal Conciliation Hoard or the Provincial Conciliation 13oara or an appeal has been filed before the ..\n\nIndustrial Court, no employer, his agent or manager, shall discharge or dismiss any workmen during the continuance of an enquiry or appeal and pending the\n\nissue of the orders of the State Government upon the findings of the said Court ......... \"\n\nClause 24 :-\"(1) Except as hereinbefore provided every order made or direction issued under the provisions of this Order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned by any party thereto in any proceeding ......... \"\n\nShri C. K. Daphtary contended that the order made by the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer on the 12th October, 1950, giving the appellants permission to dismiss respondents 2, 3 and 4 was final and conclusive in regard to the appellants' right to dismiss them from their employ and their dismissal accordingly by the appellants could not be the foundation of any industrial dispute which could be referred to the Regional Conciliation Board at the instance of respondent 1.\n\nHe further contended that if no industrial dispute could thus arise the Regional Conciliation Board had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and the award made by the Board was therefore without jurisdiction, void and inoperative and could not also be con firmed by the Tabour Appellate Tribunal.\n\nWe are unable to accept this contention.\n\nThe Government Notification dated 10th March, 1948, was issued by the Governor of the United Provinces\n\nin e)l:ercise of the powers conferred by cla, uses (b), (c),\n\n(d) and (g) of section 3 and section 8 of the -w & United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It Athorton est provided for the constitution by the Provincial Co. Ltd. b v.\n\nGovernment of such num er of Conciliation Boards\n\nsuti Mill as might be deemed necessary for the settlement of M•zdoor Union industrial disputes consisting of three members of\n\n.,.a Others. which one was to he the Conciliation Officer for the\n\nB' -t. J area; one was to be representative of the employers ,, agwa • • b h . f k and one was to e t e representative o wor men, the Conciliation Officer for the area being the .Chairman of the Board. '1 1he order provided for the mode in which industrial disputes may be referred to the Board for enquiry and the manner in which the enquiry was to be conduc, ed. It also provided for the constitution by the Provincial Government of such number of Industrial Courts as it might be necessary consisting of a President assisted by such equal number of assessors as the .President might determine representing employers and employees.\n\nProvision was made for appeals to such Industrial Courts from the awards of the Board and also for the hearing of the said appeals.\n\nAfter making further provision for the procedure to be adopted before the Boards as well a.s the Industrial Courts, the Order by clause 23. above mentioned imposed a ban ou the discli.arge or dismissal of any workman by the employer, his agent or manager during the pe':l.- dency of an enquir1' before the Regional Conciliation Board or the Provincial Conciliation Board or of an . appeal before the Industrial Court except with the written permission of the Regional Conciliation Officer or the Assistant Regional Conciliation Officer concerned and by clause 24 made every order or direction issued under the provisions of the said Government Order final and conclusive except as thereinbefore provided.\n\nIt is clear that clause 23 imposed a ban on the discharge or dismissal of any workman pending the enquiry of an industrial dispute before the Board or an appeal before the Industrial Court and the employer, his agent or manager could only discharge or dismiss\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'fS 787\n\nthe workman with the written permission of the 1968 Regional Conciliation Officer or the Assistant Regio- 41 1- 11_ ~\n\n1 C 1 .\n\nOffi d E . f h. /<Cr on est na onc1 1at10n cer concerne . ven 1 sue 00• Ltd. written permission was forthcoming the employer, his v. agent or manager might or might not discharge or Suti Mill dismiss the workman and the only effect of such Mazdoor Union written permission would be to remove the ban and Others. against the discharge or dismissal of the workman Bhagwati J. during the pendency of those proceedings.\n\nThe Regional Conciliation Officer or the Assistant Hegional Conciliation Officer concerned would institute an enquiry and come to the conclusion whether there was a prima facie case made out for the discharge or dismiss:i.l of the workman and the employer, his agent or manager was not actuated by any improper motives or did not resort to any unfair practice or victimisation in the matter of the proposed discharge or dismiss9'1 of the workman.\n\nBut he was not entrusted, as the Board or the Industrial Court would be, with the duty of coming to the conclusion whether the discharge or dismissal of the workman during the pendency of the proceedings was within the rights of the employer, his agent or manager.\n\nThe enquiry to be conducted by the Regional Conciliation Offier or the Assistant Regional Conciliation Officer concerned was not an enquiry into an industrial dispute as to the non-employment of the workman who was sought to be discharged or dismissed, which industrial dispute would only arise after an employer, his agent or manager discharged or dismissed the workman in accordance with the written permission obtained from the officer concerned. l'his was the only scope of the enquiry before the Regional Conciliation Officer or the Assistant Regional Conciliation Officer concerned and the effect of the written permission was not to validate the discharge or dismissal but merely to remove the ban on the powers of the employer, his agent or manager to discharge or dismiss the workman during the pendency of the proceedings.\n\nOnce such written permission wa, s granted by him, tha, t\n\n10•\n\n1953 order made or direction issued by him w.as to be final - , and conclusive and was not to be questioned by any Atherton West d' 'h l ff f\n\n00. Ltd. party thereto Ill any procee mgs. 1 e on y e ect o v. clause 24(1) was to prevent any party to the pending\n\nSuti Mill proceedings from challenging the written permission Mazdoor Union thus granted by the officer concerned.\n\nSuch written and Others. permission could not be made the subject-matter of\n\nBhaawati J. any appeal at the instance of either party and both the parties would be bound by the order made or direction issued by the officer concerned so far as it gave or refused the permission to the employer, his agent or man11ger in the matter of the proposed discharge or dismissal of the workman.\n\nThis was the only scope of the provisions of clauses 23 and 24 (1) above mentioned.\n\nOnce the written permission was granted by the officer concerned, the ban against the discharge or dismissal of the workman would be removed and the employer, his agent or manager could in the exercise of his discretion discharge or dismiss the workman but in that event an industrial dispute within the meaning of its definition contained in section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would arise and the workmen who bad btlen discharged or dismissed would be entitled to have that industrial dispute referred to the Region:1l Conciliation Board for enquiry into the same.\n\nThat right 9f the workman to raise an industrial dispute could not be taken away in the manner suggested by\n\nShri C. K. Daphtary by having resort to the provisions of clauses 23 and 24(1) aforesaid. That right \\1:as given to the workman by the terms of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, XXVIII of 1947, and woulii remain unaffected by any of the provisions hereinbefore referred to.\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that this contention of Sbri C. K. Daphtary also fails.\n\n\\Ve may before concluding advert to one circumstance and that is that even though the Labour\n\nApp111late Tribunal rightly confined its jurisdicti•m to\n\ndetermining substantial questions of law involved in 1958 the appeal, it nevertheless observed that even on the Atl t-w t , f . ier on es °' :octs the conclus10ns of the Board were perfectly\n\n00. Ltd. justified and there was no substance in the appeal on v. merits as well.\n\nThe appellants were not heard at all suti Mill on merits and it was hardly legitimate for the Labour M•zdoor Union Appellate Tribunal sito motu to consider the merits of •nd Others. the appeal and arrive at a finding in regard to the Bhagwati J. same. If at all the Labour Appellate Tribunal had any jurisdiction in regard to the merits it was incum- •. beut upon it to have heard the appellants in regard to the merits before arriving at a conclusion in regard to the same.\n\nThe resuH is that this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed .\n\n• Agent for the appellant : S. S. Shukla ..\n\n'rROJAN & CO. LTD. v.\n\nRM. N. N. NAGAPPA CHETTIAR. [MEHR CHAND MAHA.TAN and DAS JJ.]\n\nContract-Damages-Sale of shares-Sale induced by fra11d- Jleas11re of damages-Di(ference between price paid and market price on date of sale-Fluctuations of market and sudden closure of Stock Exchange, effect of-Interest on damaues-Practice-Gonflict between pleadings and proof-Decree on alternative claim not set itp\n\nin plaint-Legality.\n\nWhere a person is induced to l)Urchase shares at a certain price by fraud the measure of damages which he is entitled to re cover from the seller is the difference between the price which he paid for the shares and the real price of the shares on the date on which the shares were purchased.\n\nOrdinarily the m\"rket rate of the shares on the elate when the fraud was practised would represent their real price in tbe absence of any other circumstance.\n\nIf, however, the market was vitiated or was in a state of !lux or", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "1953)\n\nATHERTON WEST & CO. T,", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ATHERTON WEST & CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUTI MILL MAZDOOR UNION AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUTI MILL MAZDOOR UNION AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "clause 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1087, "end_char": 1096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "farch 10, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1137, "end_char": 1151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dismissal of workmen and their non-employment would not cease to be an industrial dispute merely because the Regional Conciliation Officer had given written permission to the employer to dismiss them under clause 23 of the T:.P. Government Notification of farch 10, 1948."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1602, "end_char": 1613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Sri Nrirain Andley, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Nrirain Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1649, "end_char": 1663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Sri Nrirain Andley, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Vnr1na", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1698, "end_char": 1707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Vnr1na for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Jabour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1864, "end_char": 1908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAG\\l'A1'I J.-This is an appeal by special leave from a decision of the [Jabour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, confirming an award made by the Regional Conciliation Board (Textiles & Hosiery), Kanpur, in an industrial dispute between the appellants and the respondents, ·\n\ns.c."}}, {"text": "Regional Conciliation Board (Textiles & Hosiery), Kanpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1942, "end_char": 1998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAG\\l'A1'I J.-This is an appeal by special leave from a decision of the [Jabour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, confirming an award made by the Regional Conciliation Board (Textiles & Hosiery), Kanpur, in an industrial dispute between the appellants and the respondents, ·\n\ns.c."}}, {"text": "January 6 and 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2658, "end_char": 2679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhay11)ati J. There was a theft in the canteen within the mill premises between the night of January 6 and 7, 1950, and some money belonging to the appellants invested iu the canteen account was stolen from the safe."}}, {"text": "J. P. Gurjar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3009, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The management of the appellants thereafter took action against one J. P. Gurjar, who was in charge of the canteen in connection with the losses of money from the account of the canteen and after the completion of the enquiries terminated his services.", "canonical_name": ".J. P. Gurjar"}}, {"text": ".J. P. Gurjar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3262, "end_char": 3275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An industrial dispute in respect of the non-employment of the said .J. P. Gurjar arose between the parties which dispute was at the material time taken in appeal before the Industrial Court (Textiles & Hosiery), Kanpur.", "canonical_name": ".J. P. Gurjar"}}, {"text": "Industrial Court (Textiles & Hosiery), Kanpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3368, "end_char": 3413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An industrial dispute in respect of the non-employment of the said .J. P. Gurjar arose between the parties which dispute was at the material time taken in appeal before the Industrial Court (Textiles & Hosiery), Kanpur."}}, {"text": "29th August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3606, "end_char": 3623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th August, 1950, the management of the appellants presented to the respondents 2, 3 and 4 c]large-sheets in respect of the said theft and suspended them on the 30th August, 1950, from their senice."}}, {"text": "30th August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3768, "end_char": 3785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th August, 1950, the management of the appellants presented to the respondents 2, 3 and 4 c]large-sheets in respect of the said theft and suspended them on the 30th August, 1950, from their senice."}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3843, "end_char": 3862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also made an application on the 2nd September, 1950, to the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur, asking for permission to dismiss the respondents 2, 3 and 4."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3913, "end_char": 3919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also made an application on the 2nd September, 1950, to the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur, asking for permission to dismiss the respondents 2, 3 and 4."}}, {"text": "12th October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4225, "end_char": 4243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'rhe Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur, instituted an enquiry, heard the respondents 2, 3 and 4, considered the evidence which was led before him by the appellants as well as the respondents 2, 3 and 4 and made an order on the 12th October, 1950, according to the appellantA permission for the dismisrnl of the\n\n1953 respondents 2, 3 and 4."}}, {"text": "Bhagwoti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "non-employmentot respon ents2,3au an respon - n ent l, a registered trade union, of which the respond-\n\nBhagwoti J. en ts 2, 3 and 4 were .", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "25th November, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5141, "end_char": 5160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants filed their written statement on the 25th November, 1950, contending inter alia that the dismissal was fully justified, regular and proper, having been made in accordance with the permission accorded by the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer. '"}}, {"text": "1st November, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5507, "end_char": 5525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe only issue which was canvassed before the Regional Conciliation Board was whether any or all of the three workmen named in the application dated the 1st November, 1950, hits/have been wrongfully dismissed and if so, to what relief is he/they entitled."}}, {"text": "R. P.\n\nMaheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5654, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board consisted of three members, Shri R. P.\n\nMaheshwari, CJiairman, and Shri B. B. Singh and Shri J. K. Bhagat, Members.", "canonical_name": "R. P.\n\nMaheshwari"}}, {"text": "CJiairman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5673, "end_char": 5682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board consisted of three members, Shri R. P.\n\nMaheshwari, CJiairman, and Shri B. B. Singh and Shri J. K. Bhagat, Members."}}, {"text": "B. B. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5693, "end_char": 5704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board consisted of three members, Shri R. P.\n\nMaheshwari, CJiairman, and Shri B. B. Singh and Shri J. K. Bhagat, Members."}}, {"text": "J. K. Bhagat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5714, "end_char": 5726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board consisted of three members, Shri R. P.\n\nMaheshwari, CJiairman, and Shri B. B. Singh and Shri J. K. Bhagat, Members.", "canonical_name": "J. K.\n\nBhagat"}}, {"text": "20th April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5846, "end_char": 5862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri J. K. Bhagat was not present on the last date of the hearing and the award was therefore signed on the 20th April, 1951, by Shri R. P. Maheshwari and Shri B. B. Singh."}}, {"text": "R. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5872, "end_char": 5888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri J. K. Bhagat was not present on the last date of the hearing and the award was therefore signed on the 20th April, 1951, by Shri R. P. Maheshwari and Shri B. B. Singh.", "canonical_name": "R. P.\n\nMaheshwari"}}, {"text": "l'ribunal of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6248, "end_char": 6266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate 'l'ribunal of India, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "16th August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6307, "end_char": 6324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard on the 16th August, 1951, and the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. K. DaphwoB tary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6521, "end_char": 6539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two conte:etions were urged by Shri C. K. DaphwoB tary who appeared for the appellants before us-(1) - h .", "canonical_name": "C. K. DaphwoB tary"}}, {"text": "J. K. Bhagat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6742, "end_char": 6754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h d d d · Athe..ton West .t t at t e a.war was vo1 an moperat1ve as it was Co. Ltd. made by only two members of the Board, the third, v. member, Shri J. K. Bhagat not having been present Snti Mill at the last hearing and not having signed the same Mazdoor Union\n\nand (2) that the Additional Regional Conciliation and Others.", "canonical_name": "J. K.\n\nBhagat"}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7543, "end_char": 7557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his first contention Shri C. K. Daphtary relied upon clause 4 and clause 7, sub-clause (3) of the G. N. No.", "canonical_name": "C. K. DaphwoB tary"}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7570, "end_char": 7578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7583, "end_char": 7591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7646, "end_char": 7662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "781 (L)/XVIII, dated 10th March, 1948, issued by the United Provinces Government regarding the constitution of Regional Conciliation Boards and Industrial Courts for the settlement of industrial disputes within the State."}}, {"text": "United Provinces Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7678, "end_char": 7705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "781 (L)/XVIII, dated 10th March, 1948, issued by the United Provinces Government regarding the constitution of Regional Conciliation Boards and Industrial Courts for the settlement of industrial disputes within the State."}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7848, "end_char": 7856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7963, "end_char": 7971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtuy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8342, "end_char": 8355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri C. K. Daphtuy therefore urged that Shri J. K. Bhagat not having been present at the last meeting of the Board and not having signed the\n\n19sa award the award could not be lawfully made by the -- Chairman and the other member who were present\n\nAtherto•~est & and who signed the award and the award was therefore 0\\. .", "canonical_name": "C. K. DaphwoB tary"}}, {"text": "c._ P.\n\nVarma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8687, "end_char": 8700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri c._ P.\n\nVarma who\n\nsuti Mill represented the respondent 1 before us however drew Mazdoo,."}}, {"text": "Mazdoo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8768, "end_char": 8774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri c._ P.\n\nVarma who\n\nsuti Mill represented the respondent 1 before us however drew Mazdoo,."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8935, "end_char": 8943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati J. , Clause 4 as amended provides:- \" (1) Notice of every meeting of the Board shall be given to the members by the ChairmBn in advance.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8949, "end_char": 8957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9506, "end_char": 9514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J. K.\n\nBhagat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10079, "end_char": 10092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhese amendments in the 'clauses 4 and 7 (3) are enough in onr opinion to repel the contention of Shri C. K. Daphtary that the absence of Shri J. K.\n\nBhagat from the last meeting and also his non-participation in the making and signing of the award rendered the award void and inoperatiYe. '", "canonical_name": "J. K.\n\nBhagat"}}, {"text": "J. R. Bhagat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10319, "end_char": 10331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he Board was empowered under the amended clauses 4 and 7(3) to act in the absence of Shri J. R. Bhagat and the award 11s it was made and signed by the two remaining members, viz.,", "canonical_name": "J. K.\n\nBhagat"}}, {"text": "Clause 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10705, "end_char": 10714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss1S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10843, "end_char": 10847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11341, "end_char": 11350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tabour Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12326, "end_char": 12351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further contended that if no industrial dispute could thus arise the Regional Conciliation Board had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and the award made by the Board was therefore without jurisdiction, void and inoperative and could not also be con firmed by the Tabour Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12577, "end_char": 12586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12591, "end_char": 12600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12613, "end_char": 12659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "clause 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13881, "end_char": 13890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14305, "end_char": 14314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14475, "end_char": 14484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17118, "end_char": 17130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhaawati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17365, "end_char": 17373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "permission could not be made the subject-matter of\n\nBhaawati J. any appeal at the instance of either party and both the parties would be bound by the order made or direction issued by the officer concerned so far as it gave or refused the permission to the employer, his agent or man11ger in the matter of the proposed discharge or dismissal of the workman.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18100, "end_char": 18112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18120, "end_char": 18149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18597, "end_char": 18626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18641, "end_char": 18664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19874, "end_char": 19886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• Agent for the appellant : S. S. Shukla ..\n\n'rROJAN & CO."}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.TAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19943, "end_char": 19962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.TAN and DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.TAN"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_789_809_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 789\n\ndetermining substantial questions of law involved in 1958 the appeal, it nevertheless observed that even on the Atl t-w t , f . ier on es °' :octs the conclus10ns of the Board were perfectly\n\n00. Ltd. justified and there was no substance in the appeal on v. merits as well.\n\nThe appellants were not heard at all suti Mill on merits and it was hardly legitimate for the Labour M•zdoor Union Appellate Tribunal sito motu to consider the merits of •nd Others. the appeal and arrive at a finding in regard to the Bhagwati J. same. If at all the Labour Appellate Tribunal had any jurisdiction in regard to the merits it was incum- •. beut upon it to have heard the appellants in regard to the merits before arriving at a conclusion in regard to the same.\n\nThe resuH is that this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed .\n\n• Agent for the appellant : S. S. Shukla ..\n\n'rROJAN & CO. LTD. v.\n\nRM. N. N. NAGAPPA CHETTIAR. [MEHR CHAND MAHA.TAN and DAS JJ.]\n\nContract-Damages-Sale of shares-Sale induced by fra11d- Jleas11re of damages-Di(ference between price paid and market price on date of sale-Fluctuations of market and sudden closure of Stock Exchange, effect of-Interest on damaues-Practice-Gonflict between pleadings and proof-Decree on alternative claim not set itp\n\nin plaint-Legality.\n\nWhere a person is induced to l)Urchase shares at a certain price by fraud the measure of damages which he is entitled to re cover from the seller is the difference between the price which he paid for the shares and the real price of the shares on the date on which the shares were purchased.\n\nOrdinarily the m\"rket rate of the shares on the elate when the fraud was practised would represent their real price in tbe absence of any other circumstance.\n\nIf, however, the market was vitiated or was in a state of !lux or\n\nTrojan tf; Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nV, Rm.N.N.\n\nNagrtppa Chettiar.\n\n790 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS [1953]\n\np•nic in consequence of the very fact tha.t wa~ fraudulently concealed, then the real value of the share~ has to be determined on a consideration of a variety of circumstances, disclosed by the evidence led by the parties.\n\nA firm of sharebrokers sold 3,000 shares to the plaintiff who was a constituent of the firm, on the 5th AJ(ril, 1937, at Rs. 77 and Rs. 77-4as. per sb'\"e without disclosing to the plaintiff the fact that the shares were owned by one of the partners of the firm and also the fact that they had received telephonic information on that day from a member of the Stock Exchange that there was going to be a sharp decline in the price of the shares. On the 6th April the Stock Exchange Association passed a resolution for closing the Exchange on the 8th and 9th April.\n\nThe plaintiff had to sell 2,000 shares through the defendants on the 20th April at Rs. 47 to Rs. 42 per share, and 1,000 shares on the 22nd April at Rs. 42- Sas.\n\nThe High Court awarded f.he difference between the price paid by the plaintiff and the prices fetched on resale as damages.\n\nOn appeal, Held, that the prices received at the resale on the 20th and 22nd April coul 0d not represent the true value of the shares on the 5th April.\n\nThe real question for determination was what the market value would have been on the 5th April of these shares if all the buyers and sellers knew that the Stock Exchange was to be closed on the 8th and 9th April.\n\nHeld also that the plaintiff was entitled to get interest on the amount awarded as damages from the 5th April till the date of suit on the principle that where money is obtained or retained by fraud a court of equity will order it to be returned with interest.\n\nJohnson v. Rex {[1904] A.O. 817) referred to.\n\nIt is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and that it is the case pleaded that has to be found.\n\nWhere the plaintiff based his claim for a certain sum of money on the ground that the defer:dants had sold certain shares belonging to him '>vithout his instructions, but he was not able to prove that the sale was not authorised by him: Held, reversing the deci,, ion of the High Court, that ohe plaintiff could not be given a decree for the SU)Il claimed on the ground of failure of consideration, as he had not set up any such alternative claim in the plaint or even at a later stage when he sought to amend the plaint.\n\nOrvIL APPELLATE JunISDICTION: Orvil Appeal No. 139 of 1952.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 17th March, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar JJ.) in 0.8.A. No. 34 of 1947, arising out of\n\nthe Judgment' and Decree dated the 18th April, 1'947,\n\nof the said High Court (Clark J.) in the exercise of tbe Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High\n\nCourt in C. S. No. 208 of 1940.\n\nV. Rangachari (K. Mangachary, with him) for the appellant.\n\nK. Krishnaswami Iyengar (K. Pa:rasuram, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953.\n\nMarch 20. l'he Judgment of the Court was delivered. by .\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The dispute in this appeal is between a constituent and a firm of stock-brokers. Some time before April, 1936, the plaintiff, then a young man, came into possession of property worth about 2 lakhs of rupees on a partition between him and bis brothers.\n\nIn the hope of getting rich by obtaining quick dividends by speculating on the stock-exchange he, through tbe defendant firm and certain other stockholders, entered into a series .of speculative transactions and it seems he did not fare badly in the beginning. But subsequent events tell a different tale.\n\nIn 1937, two iron and steel companies in North India, viz., Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., and the Bengal Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., merged into one concern and a new issue of shares was made. 'rhe scheme was that for every five shares which a person held in the Indian Iron Co. Ltd. on 22nd April, 1937, one fully paid up share would be given to him at a price of Rs. 25. 'rhe market price at the time this scheme was announced was about Rs. 55 per share. A wave of speculation followed this announcement and there was a boom iu the market.\n\nPrices of Indian Iron shares were going up to unreal heights. To stabilize the situation thus created by heavy speculation, three members of the Committee of the Calcutta Stock\n\nExchange presented a petition to the Committee on 5th April, 1937, to close the Calcutta. Stock Exchange\n\nTrojan & Co.\n\nLtd. v, R1n. N.N.\n\nNagap11a Chettiar.\n\nwoa for a while.\n\nOn the same evening plaintiff's stockbroker Annamalai Chettiar, who was carrying on Trojan rJ; Co. business in firm name •rroJau & Co., had elephonic Ltd. v conversation with one Ramdev Chokani, a member oi Rm. N. N. the Calcutta Stock Exchange, on this subject and from Nagappa this conversation he gathered that a sharp fall in the Ch•ttiar. prices of Indian Irons was likely.\n\nAt that time\n\nMahajan J.\n\nAnnamalai Chettiar had on bis hands some 5,000 of these shares. Shortly after this conversation and after business hours the same night, between the hours of 7-30 and 8-30, Annamalai Chettiar rang up the plaintiff and suggested to him that it would be a good thing for him to buy these shares.\n\nThe youthful plaintiff in his anxiety to get rich quickly accepted the suggestion and purchased these shares, some at Rs. 77 and others at Rs. 77-4-0.\n\nAnother firm of brokers, Ramlal & Co., had also in their hands another 4,000 of these shares. They too found in the plaintiff a ready buyer. They also contacted him on the phone after Annamalai had done so, and sold him 4,000 shares that they held.\n\nOut of the lot which the plaintiff purchased from the defendants he sold 1,300 shares to Ramanathan Chetti at cost price.\n\nOu the 6th April tbQ Committee of the Calcutta Stock Exchange Association passed a resolution closing the Siock Exchange on the 8th and 9th April.\n\nFrom the 6th April onwards the market sagged and the prices came down, at first gradually and then literally at a ruu. The result of it was that the plaintiff had to sell at a very heavy loss.\n\nThe defendants made demands on the plaintiff for the price of those shares.\n\nBetween 5th April and 20th April, 19.37, he made payments to defendants of various amounts totalling Hs. 60,000.\n\nA lot of 700 shares was sold by the plaintiff to Pilani & Co. and on 19th April, 1937, be instructed the deiendants for sale of the remaining 3,000 shares at the best price obtainable. 'fhe defend1wts sold 2,000 shares on 20th April, 1937, for prices ranging between Rs. 47-4-0 to\n\nRs. 44-12-0 per share.\n\nThe remaining 1,000 shares were sold by him through Messrs. Hamlal & Co. at Rs. 42-8-0 per share on 22nd April, 1937. The result of it was that on 22nd May, 1937, when the :i.ccounts between the plaintiff and the defendants were. settled it was found that plaintiff was heavily indebted to them in the sum of Hs. 51,712-7-0 and the credit balance of Hs. 64,000 that he had with the defendants at the end of March, 1907, had been wiped off.\n\nFor the amount found due he passed a promissory note in favour of defendants, Exhibit P-33. After giving credit for payments received on the promissory note the defendants filed a suit against him (O.S. 150 of\n\n1937) on the Original Side of the Madras High Court and obtained an ex parte interim order for attachment before judgment and attached plaintiff's movable and immovable properties at Madras, and also at Kottaiyur in Hamnad district.\n\nOwing to the attachment proceedings the firm of Ramlal & Co. filed a petition for adjudication of the plaintiff as an insolvent. On 22nd\n\nSeptember, 1937, Trojan & Co. also filed a petition for the same relief. An order adjudicating the plaintiff an insolvent was made by the High Court on 5th October, 1937, on the petition of Hamlal & Co.\n\nIn the course of the insolvency proceedings defendants tendered proof of their claim ou the promissory note, Exhibit P-33.\n\nThe Official Assignee having acquired knowledge about the telephonic conversation that had passed between Annamalai Chettiar and\n\nHamdev Chokani on the evening of the 5th April, 1937, came to the conclusion that the. insolvent had been a victim of a fraud perpetrated by the defendants and dismissed their claim. Defendants-firm was guilty of fraud both in respect of the failure to disclose the fact that the Indian Iron shares or most of them belonged to one of its partners, Annamalai Chettiar, and also on account of the failure ou its part to disclose its knowledge of the likelihood of a slump in the market because of the notice given by its members ~Q close the Stock Exchange.\n\nTrojan & Go. ltd. v.\n\nRm.N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar.\n\nMahajan. J.\n\n794 SUPREME OOUR'r REPORTS [19531\n\nTro}an,, f; Co.\n\nOn an application made to the High Court against the order of the Official Assignee it was set aside by Mockett J. and he directed that the claim of the defendants be disposed of on a court motion, the claim being heard as if it were a suit. In pursuance of this direction Trojan and Co. on 2Uth September, 1938, filed an application in the High Court, No. 313 of 1938.\n\nI'he Official Assignee representing the estate of the plaintiff denied its liability on the promissory note on the ground of fraud. On 15th March, 1940, Somayya J. dismissed the claim of the defendants.\n\nHe held the defendants-firm guilty of fraud in both respects. From this there was an appeal which was dismissed on 12th August, 1942.\n\nThe defendants applied for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council but leave was refused.\n\nDefendants then applied to the Privy Council for special leave and that application was also dismissed some time in October, 1943.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm. N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nOn the 28th September, 1940, when the appea.l from the decision of Somayya J. was still pending, the Official Assignee as representing the estate of the plaintiff filed the suit out of which this appeal arises against Trojan & Co. for an account of the transactions between himself as principal a, nd the defendants as agents and claiming damages for loss sustained by him and for various other reliefs.\n\nThe suit embraced in particular claims in respect of four transactions. The first related to the 5,000 Indian Iron shares. 'fhe second referred to a trans:;, ction of As.sociated Cements. On 22nd March, 1937, the plaintiff bad sold through the defendants 50 shares in Associated Cements at Hs. 180-8-0 per share. On 30th March, 1937, he h:1d similarly sold a further 200 shares in Associated Cement> at Rs. 183 per share.\n\nThe plaintiff did not have on hand even a single share in Associated Cements. It became necessary for him therefore to \"cover the sales\". On 21st July, 1937, defendants purchased on plaintiff's account 100 shares at Rs. 161-12-0 per share.\n\nOn 1st September, 1937, they purchased a further 150 shares a, t\n\n' ' '\n\nRs. 151 a sha, re.\n\nThe difference between the prices at which these shares had been sold and bought amounted to Rs. 6, 762 8-0 and for this amount the defendants gave the plaintiff credit by adjusting it towards the promissory note account. In respect of this transaction the case of the Official Assignee was that the purchase which had been made by the defendants was not only unauthorized, but contrary to instructions and was not valid and binding on' the plaintiff as it had been made after the commencement of the insolvency. No claim was made in the alternative that if this contention failed, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount credited towards the promissory note on the ground of failure of consideration. The third transaction related to 300 shares in Tatas, and the fourth one was in respect of shares in Ayer Mani Rubber Co. The last claim was abandoned at the trial and the claim on the third transaction was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and the correctness of the order of the trial judge was not canvassed in the appeal before the High Court. The amount decreed as regards these 300 shares was in the sum of Rs. 1,050.\n\nThe defendants denied liability for the entire claim and pleaded that they were not guilty of any fraud and that in any case the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any damage, as he could have easily sold away all his shares soon after his purchase without incurring any loss, and that he retained them in order to make profit.\n\nThe suit was first heard by Bell J. who decreed the claim of the plaintiff on 9th March, 1943. The defendants appealed. The appellate court set aside the decision of Bell J. and remanded the suit for fresh disposal on 25th August, 1944. Meantime, that is to say, on 21st February, 1944, the adjudication of the plaintiff was annulled and on his applieation he was brought on the record in the place of the Official\n\nAssignee and he continued the suit. Clark J. who tried the suit after remand gave a decree in f; tvour of\n\nlO~\n\nTrajan .t Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm.N.N.\n\nNagappa\n\nOhttiar.\n\nMahajan J,'\n\nTrojan £t Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm.N.N.\n\nNagappa Ohettiar.\n\nMahajan J,\n\nthe plaintiff for the sum of Rs. 61,787:9-0 with interest at the court rate of six per cent. per annum from 1st September, 1937, until payment or realization with costs.\n\nAgainst this decree the defendants preferred an appeal. The appellate Bench modified the decree of Clark J., and reduced the amount of the decree by a sum of Rs. 9,100. 'Each party was made to pay proportionate costs throughout. Leave to app'eal to this court against the decree was granted and the appeal is now before us under the certificate so granted.\n\nAs above stated, the claim in respect of Ayer-Mani Rubber shares was abandoned at the trial and the claim on the third transaction relating to 300 shares in 'l'atas was decreed for the sum of Rs. 1,050 and the correctness of this order was not canvassed in the appeal before the High Court. The two claims discnsse\\l in that court were in respect of the transaction of 5,000 Indian Iron shares and in respect of the transaction made in Associated Cements.\n\nThe dispute before us so far as the Indian Iron shares are concerned has narrowed down to the question of quantum of damages in respect of 3,000 out of the 5,000 shares that were transferred by the defendants to the plaintiff on the nigbt of the 5th April, 1937, 1,300 out of these shares having been sold at cost price by the plaintiff the day after the purchase, and 700 having been sold to Pilani & Co., and regarding which the plaintiff's claim was rejected in the High Court and plaintiff preferred no further appeal.\n\n'fhe finding of Somayya J., that the defendants firm was guilty of fraud both in respect of the failure to disclose the fact that the Indian Iron shares or most of them belonged to one of its partners, Annamalai Chettiar, and also on account of its failure to disclose its knowledge of the probable slump in the market by reason of the notice given by three members of the Stock Exchange to temporarily close it, was not contested before Clark J., and it was conceded that that finding had become final. The main question canvassed at this trial wa, s whether the plaintiff\n\nhad suffered. any damage as a consequence of this fraud and if so, how were the damages to be measured.\n\nIn the plaint plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to be recompensed for all loss and dama, ge which he had suffered. A sum of Rs. 45,042-9-0 was credi'ted in his account in respect of the sale of 3,000 shares made on 20th and 22nd April, 1937. He claimed the whole of this amount as damages on this count; in other words, according to the plaintiff, the damage suffered by him was to be measured according to the difference between the purchase price of the shares and the price for which they were ultimately sold.\n\nThe shares were bought on 5th April at Hs. 77 and Rs. 77-4-0 and sold at prices ranging between Rs. 42-8-0 and Rs. 47-4-0 on the 20th and 22nd April, 1937. This method of measuring damages was successfully challenged by the defendants before the trial judge.\n\nClark J., in spite of holding that the measure of damages in a case like this could not be as suggested by the plain tiff, estimated the damage suffered by him at the difference between the rate at which the plaintiff purchased the shares and the rate\n\nat which he actually sold them, on the ground that the price at which he sold them was more than the\n\nfair value of these shares realizable on the 5th April, 1937, between bona fide purchasers and sellers having knowledge of the real state of affairs.\n\nBefore the appeal Bench of the High Court it was contended that the trial judge was ill errot in bis assessment of the real value of these shares on 5th April, 193 7, and that in any case they could not be valued at four different rates. It was urged that damages had been over-estimated.\n\nThis contention was negatived and it was held that in the circumstances of this case it could not be said that the plainbiff acted unreasonably in holding on to the shares for the time that he did and that the defendants had by their own double dealings placed the plaintiff in a difficult position.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant reiterated before us the contentions raised by him in the High\n\nTrojan Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm. N.N.\n\nN•g•ppa GhettU.r.\n\nM•haj•n J.\n\nl958\n\nTro;'an i:t Co-.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nBm.N.N.\n\nNogappa Chettiar.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nCourt and urged that the true measure of damages in actions like this is the difference between the price paid and the real value of the shares at the time of the tnnsaction, and that any loss caused to the plaintiff by his retaining the shares after that date could not be decreed. It was strenuously contended that had the plaintiff sold the remaining shares like the 1,300 he sold, be would not have suffered any damage whatsoever, as the market price of these shares on the 6th and 7th was not below the cost price. It was said that the loss that the pla.intiff suffered was merely due to the circumstance that he retained the shares for a fortnight, and was not as a consequence of the fraud.\n\nLastly, it was contended that even if it could be held that the market on the 6th and 7th was affeuted by the very fact concealed from the plaintiff, its effect disappeared by tbe 10th April, when the fact became fully known and damage should have been assessed on the differenc~ between the market price of these shares which ruled at Rs. 62 per share on 10th April, 1937, and their cost price ..\n\nNow the rule is well settled that damages due either for breach of contr:i.ct or for tort are damages which, so far as money can compensate, will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act.\n\nDifficulty however arises in measuring the amount of this money compensation. A general principle cannot be laid down for measuring it, and every case must to some extent depend upon its own circumstance. It is, however, clear that in the absence of any special circumstances the measure of damages cannot be the amount of the loss ultimately sustained by the representee.\n\nIt can only be the difference between the price which he paid and the price which he would have received if he had resold them in the market forthwith after the purcb.ase provided of cburse that there was a fair market then. '£he question to be decided in such a. case is what could the plaintiff have obtained if he hi; d resold forohwith that; which he had been induced to purchase by the fraud\n\n. .\n\nof the defend11nts.\n\nIn other words, the mode of 1958 dealing with damages in such a case is to see what it Trojan ct Go.\" would have cost him to get out of the situation, i.e ..\n\nLtd. how much worse off was his estate owing to the barv. gain in which he entered into.\n\nThe law on this sub- Rm. N N. ject has been very appositely stated in McConnel v.\n\nNagappa Wright(') by Lord Collins in these terms:- Oh.ttiar. \"As to the principle upon which damages are Mahajan 1. assessed in this case, there is no doubt about it now.\n\nIt bas been laid down by several judges, and particularly by Cotton L.J. in Peek v. Derry('), but the common sense and principle of the thing is this. It is not an action for breach of contract, and, therefore, no damages in respect of prospective gains which the person contracting was entitled by his contract to expect to come in, but it is an action of tort-it is an action for a wrong done whereby the plaintiff was tricked out of certain money in his pocket ; and therefore, prima facie, the highest limit of his damages is the whole extent of bis loss, and that loss is measured by the money which was in bis pocket and is now in the pocket of the company. That is the ultimate, final, highest standard of his loss.\n\nBut, in so far as be has got an equivalent for that money, that loss is .diminished; and I think, in assessing the damages, prima f acie the assets as represented are taken to be an equivalent and no more for the money which was paid. So far as the assets are an equivalent, he is not damaged; so far as they fall short of being an equivalent, in that proportion he is damaged.\"\n\nThe sole point for determination therefore in the case is whether the shares handed over to the plaintiff were an equivalent for the money paid or whether they fell short of being the equivalent and if so, to what extent. Ordinarily the market rate of the shares on the date when the fraud was practised would represent their real price in the absence of any other circumstance. If, however, the market was vitiated or was in a state of flux or panic in consequence of the very fact that was fraudulently concealed,\n\n(z) 37 Ch. D. 541 •\n\nthen the real value of the shares has to be determined on a consideration of a variety of Trojan & 00• circumstances disclosed by the evidence led by the Ltd.\n\nB1n. N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar.\n\nMahajan J,\n\nparties.\n\nThus though ordinarily the market rate on the earliest date when the real facts became known may be taken as the real value of the shares, nevertheless, if there is no market or thereis no satisfactory evidence of a market rate for some time which may safely be taken as the real value, then if the representee sold the shares, although not bound to do so, and if the resale has taken place within a reasonable time and on reasonable terms and has not been unnecessarily delayed, then the price fetched at the re sale may well be taken into consideration in determining retrospectively the true market value of the shares on the crucial date. If there is no market at all or if the market rate cannot, for reasons re £erred to above, be taken as the real or fair value of the thing and the rep resentee has not sold the things, then in ascertaining the real or fair value of the thing on the date when deceit was practised subsequent events may be taken into account, provided such subsequent events a.re not attributable to extraneous circumstances which supervened on account of the retaining of tha thing. '£hese, we apprehend, are the well settled rules for ascertaining the loss and damage suffered by a party in such circumstances.\n\nIf damages had been measured on the rules above stated by the courts below, this court would have then respected the concurrent finding on this point as the question of assessment of damages primarily is a question of fa.ct and the concurrent findings of the courts below on such points except in very exceptional circumstances a.re nob reviewed by this court. We however find that in spite of the circumstance that the courts below correctly enunciated the rule of measuring damages in such cases, they estimated them on the difference between the cost price and the price realized at the sale on the 20th and 22nd at four different rates. These four rates could obviously not represent the true value of the shares on the 5th.\n\nMoreover the finding that the true value of these shares was lower than what was actually realized on their resale on the 20th and 22nd is not based on any evidence whatsoever.\n\nSuch a finding could only be arrived at on the basis of evidence on the record and by reference to that evidence, and this has not been done.\n\nThe High Court did not make an attempt to find out to what extent the value of the shares fell short of being an equivalent for the money taken from the plaintiff. Withollt determining this crucial issue we think it was not right to estimate the damage on the vague finding that the true value of the shares was lower than the value which they fetched at the resale on the 20th and 22nd. In this situation, we have no alternative but to arrive at our owu finding on this question in spite of the concurrent finding and we have to find as to what could be said to have been the true value of these shares on the relevant date.\n\nIn other words, the question for our determination is what the market value would have been on 5th April of these shares if all byers and sellers had information that the market was to be closed on 8th and 9th April to enablfl settlement of outsta.nding transactions to be effected, and had appreciated the effect of that decision. In the words of Buckley J. in Broome v. Speak('), it is indeed a difficult question to answer but that difficulty is no ground for refusing to answer it as has been done by the court below.\n\nIn order to determine the real price of these 3,000 shares sold to plaintiff by concealment of certain facts, the first question that needs decision is whether the market for these shares, the rate prevailing wherein would prima faoie be a true index of their value, had been affected by the very fact concealed of which the plaintiff complains. In this case from the proved facts it is clear that the market rate of these shares was seriously affected by reason of the impending decision of the Stock Exchange for closing it to stop the wave of speculation that had taken the frenzy of the market by reason of the merger of the two steel\n\n(I) (1903J I Ch. S86.\n\nTrojan. 4 Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm. N.N.\n\nNagappa Ohettiar.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n802 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1953]\n\nTrojan <t Go. companies doing business in northern India. The market reports for the week ending March 19, show that the Indian Irons were standing at or around Rs. 55. By Saturday the 3rd April after the announcement of the terms of the merger by reason of the keen speculation the shares were being dealt at around Rs. 73.\n\nOn Monday the 5th April the price was Rs. 77.\n\nOn Tuesday the 6th, the day when the decision was taken to close the market for two days, these shares touched Rs: 79 but by the close of business fell back to Rs. 72, a sudden drop of Rs. 7. On vVednesday the 7th April in the Calcutta market they closed at Rs. 58. a drop of Rs. 14 in a day.\n\nThese sudden rises and falls in the market during the course of these two days are sufficient indication of the fact that the drop was due to the decision of the Stock Exchange to close the Exchange for two days.\n\nThere is no evidence that any other factor was then disturbing the market rate of these shares.\n\nThe share market report of the defendants themselves issued on 10th April, 1987, amply bears out this fact.' In this report it was stated as follows:-\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm.N.N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar.\n\nMahajan J,\n\n\"The outstanding feature of the Indi&n markets during the week under review was the sudden landslide in Indian lron and Steel shares, which proved infectious to the other sections of the market. The week opened with a cheerful bullish sentiment and Indian Iron and Steels touched Hs. 80. At this dizzy height, the markets lost their equilibrium and frenzied selling resulted in a sensational decline of about 25 poi-nts. 1.\n\nThe heavy liquidation was due to a predominance of weak holders that bad come into the market at a !ate stage. Further; selling was accent1.ated by the decision of Calcutta Stock Exchange to close the Calcutta market on the 8th and 9th April to enable brokers to make deliveries and'effect settlements for transactions in Indian Iron and Steel shares. Rea vy volume of business has been outstanding between brokers on account of the delay in getting certificates.\n\nProspect of immediate delivery of share certificates scared off weak holders and prices declined on bea vy liquidation.\"\n\nIt is clear therefore that the decision of the Calcutta Stock Exchange to close the Calcutta market on 8th and 9th affected the market prices considerably.\n\nThe Calcutta market on the 7th dropped from 72 to 58 as already stated. The decision of the Calcutta Stock Exchange was published in the Hindu of Madras on the evening of the 7th.\n\nFrom the statement of account, Exhibit P-41, filed by Trojan & Co. on 7th, about half a dozen transactions in these shares took place through them.\n\nMost of the transactions, it appears, were by small holders of 100 scrips or so, who unloaded their shares between 71 to 60 per share.\n\nOn the 8th three transactions took place at Rs. 62.\n\nNo transaction took place between 8th and 14th. There were two transactions on the 14th at Rs. 56, and there was a transaction on the 15th at Rs. 57-8-0. On the 20th Trojan and Co. sold 2,000 of the plaintiff's shares at rates varying between Rs. 44-12-0 and Rs. 47-4-0.\n\nAccording to the statement of account of another broker, Ramlal & Co., there were about 16 transactions in these shares on the 7th. Most of them were sold in lots of 100 or 200 and the sale price of these shares ranged from Rs. 7 4 to 64.\n\nOn the 8th there were a few transactions, the rates varying between Rs. 57 to Rs. 66.\n\nThere was a transaction on the 9th at Rs. 60. There were two or three transactions on the 10th also near about this rate.\n\nNo transaction after the 10th made by this company has been exhibited on the record.\n\nExhibit P-23 is another weekly share market report of 'l'rojan & Co. issued on 17th April, 1937. It states as follows:-\n\n\"In the first place, Indian Irons are very cheap around Rs. 46.\n\nThe company is doing extremely well and the stage is set for a steady rise to Rs. 70 ............. ..\n\nIndian Iron and Steels fluctuated between Rs. 55 to Rs. 60 and closed at Rs. 47. 'fhe recent hectic speculation has brought its own nemesis.'.'\n\nThis report proves that there was really no market as it appears from the evidence on the record in\n\nTrojan ct Go.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm. N. N.\n\nNagappa\n\nOkettiar.\n\nMahajan I.\n\n19$3\n\nTrojan tf Co.\n\nLtd,\n\nRm, N. N.\n\nNagappa Ohettiar.\n\nMaha}an J.\n\n804 SUPREME COURT .REPOR'l. 18 [1953)\n\nMadras between the 8th and 17th which\"was a Saturday, aud on the 17th the prices seemed to be settling down at Rs. 46.\n\nOn the 19th the plaintiff gave to the defendants au order to sell his 3,000 shares and it was said \"Please retain this order till executed\".\n\nThe defendants were only able to dispose of 2,000 of these shares on tbe 20th at prices varying between Rs. 44-12-0 to Rs. 47-4-0.\n\nTbe remaiuiug 1,000 shares the plaintiff was able to sell through Ramlal and Co. at Rs. 42-8-0 on 22nd April, 1937. It is quite possible and probable t.hat had the plaintiff placed an order before the 19th, say on the 16th or 17th, with the defendants or with Ramlal & Co., he might have been able to sell these 1,000 shares also at about the same price as he was able to dispose of his 2,000 shares.\n\nNo member of the defendants-firm gave eviden6e in the case.\n\nPlaintiff went into the witness box and stated that had he known what the defendants knew, he would not have purchased the shares.\n\nThe information was withheld from him that these shares were likely to go down.\n\nHe said that be was told by the defendants to sell the shares but no purchasers were available and in spite of bis keenness to liquidate them he was not able to do so before tha 20th and 22nd, that he approached Trojan & Co., the defendants-firm for selling them but they were not able to sell more than 2,000 shares.\n\nConsidering the whole of thiB material, we are satisfied that the market rate prevailing on the 5th, 6th and 7th bad been affected by reason of the decision of the Calcutta Stock Exchange to keep the market closed on tbe 8th and 9th and the market did not set.tie down till about the 17th or 18th and the prices then ruling can in the circumstances of this case be said to be their true market price. In our judgment, Rs. 46 per share was the real price of these shares when they were put in the plaintiff's pocket and he got Rs. 46 for each share in lieu of what he paid for either at Rs. 77 or at Rs. 77-4-0.\n\nHe is entitled to commission also which he would have to pay on the sale of these shares. 'rhe difference between these\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COtJRT REPORTS 805\n\ntwo rates is the damage that he has suffered and he is entitled _to it.\n\nFor the reasons given above we modify the order passed by Clark J., and by the appellate Bench of the High Court to the extent indicated above and we estimate the plaintiff's damage at; Rs. 93,000 ou account of the 3,000 shares at the rate of Rs. 31 per share. ' 'l'he second question canvassed before the High Court and also before us was in respect of the Associated Cement shares. As above stated, the plaintiff's account was credited in the sum of Rs. 6,762-8-0 on account of the purchase of these shares.\n\nPlaintiff had pleaded that the transaction was not authorised by him and that it had been made in contravention of his instructions.\n\nHe had claimed compensation on the ground of breach of instructions; he did not in the alternative claim on the ground of failure of consideration the amount credited by the defendants in the promissory note account a.nd which credit disappeared by reason of the failure of tbe suit on the promissory note. At the hearing of the case before Bell J. the contention that the purchase was unauthorized was abandone, d by counsel and the same position was adopted before Clark J. During crossexamination of the plaintiff it was elicited that he either instructed the defendants to purchase the shares or at any rate ratified the purchase which the defendants had made on his behalf. It was argued before th.e appellate Bench of the High Court that having pleaded one thing and having led evidence in support of that thing but later on having been forced to admit in the witness box that the true state of things was different the plaintiff had disentitled himself to relief as regards these shares and be could not be granted the relief that he had not asked for.\n\nThe High Court negatived this contention on the ground that though a claim for damages in respect of a particular transaction may fail, that circumstance was no bar to the making of a direction that the defendants should pay the plain tiff the money actually due in respect of that particular transaction. It also he)d\n\n1~$8\n\nTrojan ct Go~\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm.N.N.\n\nNagappa Chdttia.1'.\n\nMahaja,. J.\n\nl943\n\nTrojan &- Oo.\n\nLtd.\n\nRm.N.N.\n\nN•gappa Chettiar.\n\nMaka.fa.ii J.\n\n806 8tJPREM:E COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nthat the plaintiff's claim in respect of this item of Rs. 6,762-8-0 was within limitation.\n\nWe. are unable to uphold the view taken by the High Court on this point. It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grouµds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found.\n\nWithout an amendment of the plaint the court was not entitled to grant the relief not askeCI for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case. The aliegations on which the plaintiff claimed relief in respect of these shares are clear and emphatic. 'rhere was no suggestion made in the plaint or even when its amendment was sought at one stage that the\n\npla.intiff in the alternative was entitled to this amount on the ground of failure of consideration.\n\nThat being so, we see no valid grounds for entertaining the plaintiff's claim as based on failure of consideration on the case pleaded by him. In disagreement with the courts below we hold that the plaintiff was wrongly granted a decree for the sum of Rs. 6,762-8-0 in respect of the Associated Cement shares in this suit.\n\nAc.counts settled could only be reopened on proper allegations.\n\nThe next point canvassed in the courts below was in respect of the claim of the plaintiff regarding interest on the ameunt found due to the plaintiff from 5th April, 1937, fio the date of the suit. It was contended that no interest could be allowed.on damages because to do so would amount to awarding damages on damages which is opposed to precedent a.nd principle.\n\nClark J., however, awarded interest by placing reliance on certain English decisions which enunciate the rule that an agent who receives or deals with the money of bis principal improperly and in breach of his duty or who refused to pay it over on demand is liable to pay interest from the time when he so receives or deals with the same or from the time of the demand.\n\nWe think it is well settled th&t interest is allowed hy a court of equity in the ca.se of money obtained or retained by frioud.\n\n1958 stated in article 423 of Volume I of Halsbury, the a.gent must also pay interest in all cases of fraud and on all bribes and secret profits received by him during his agency. Their Lordshi'ps of the Privy Council\n\nTrojan tt Co.\n\nin Johnson v. Rex(') observed as follows: -\n\n\"In order to guard against any possible misappre hension of their Lordships' views they desire to say th.at in their opinion there can be no doubt whatever, that money obtained by fraud and retained by fraud can be recovered with interest, whether the proceedings be taken in a court of equity, or a court of law, or in a court, which has jurisdiction both equitable and legal.\"\n\n'rhe appeal court affirmed the view of Clark J. on this point.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant contended that the decisions relied upon concerned cases where the agent had retained some money of his principal in his hands but that in the present case the claim was merely for damages.\n\nThis contention is fallacious.\n\nBy reason of the transaction brought about by fraudulent concealment plaintiff pa.id to the defendants a sum of Rs. 60,000 in ca.sh which he would not have parted with otherwise and he also lost the money which stood at his credit with the defend- _ ants. It is thus clear that the agents had a large sum of the plaintiff with them which they would not have acquired but by reason of the fraud that they practised on him. In this view of the case we see no force ia the contention of the learned counsel and we repel it.\n\nThe only other point that was argued before us was in respect of future interest. It was not denied that plaintiff was entitled to future interest as allowed to him at the rate of 6% on the amount found due. It was however argued that the plaintiff should not have been allowed interest for the period of oue year and six months during which the decrne stood satisfied.\n\nThe facts are that on 9th March, 1943, a decree for Rs. 51,805-1-0 carrying interest at six per cent. wa.s\n\nLtd.\n\nRm./'V.N.\n\nNagapp4 Chsttiar.\n\nMahajan. J.\n\nTrojaa d Oo.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm.N. N.\n\nNaga1JPtJ Chettia.r. -.\n\nM•h•.i•n J,\n\npassed in favour of the plaintiff. On the 11th May, 1943, an amount of Rs. 71,000 due under this decree was paid by the defendants to the Official Assignee. 'l' his amount was returned by the Officia 1 Assignee to the defendants on 12th September, 1944, after that\n\ndecree had been set aside.\n\nMeanwhile the plaintiff's adjudication had been annulled and he had been brought on the record ou 16th March, 1944. It was contended that during the period when the money remained with the Official Assignee who was the pla.intiff no future interest was payable as the decree stood satisfied during that period. 'l'he High Court rejected this contention on the ground that when this money was paid into court, it was coupled with a prayer that it should not be paid out to the creditors of the insolvent's estate pending disposal of the appeal, and therefore as the money was not distributable amongst the insolvent's creditors, interest for this period had been rightly allowed. In our opinion, this view cannot be sustained.\n\nSo far as the defendants judgment-debtors are concerned they had done their part and pa.id the money to the decreeholder and had thus satisfied the decree. It was open to the Official Assignee, the decree-holder, not to take the money on the condition on which it was given to him and if he had not taken the money from the defendants he could then justly have claimed future interest on this amount, but having taken the money and kept it, it could not be said that during this period anything was due to the plaintiff from the defendants. The defendants certainly had paid the decretal amount and whether the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest was able to use it or not was a circumstance wholly immaterial in considering whether future interest should or should not be allowed. In our judgment, the plaintiff was not entitled to future interest at the rate allowed for one year and six months period, beginning from 9th March, 1943, and ending with 12th l:!eptember, 1944.\n\nThe appeal is therefore allowed to the extent indicated above.\n\nI'he decree of the High Court will be\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'r REPOR1'8 809\n\n19~8 modified and plaintiff will be entitled to damages in the sum of Rs. 93,000 on the 3,000 Indian Iron shares.\n\nThe decree given to the plaintiff in respect of Rs. 6, 762-8-0 is set aside over and above the decree for Rs. 9,100 in his favour set aside by the High Court.\n\nIn the calculation of future interest tbe plaintiff will not be allowed interest from 9th March, 1943, to 12th September, 1944. In the result tbe decree given to the plaintiff in the sum of Rs. 61, 787 is reduced to Rs. 42,17 5.\n\nHe will get interest at six per cent. per annum from 5th April, 1937, until pttyment or realization except for a period of one year and six months.\n\nPlaintiff will get proportionate costs throughout.\n\nTrojan ct Co.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent: M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nMUSH'rAK HUSSEIN\n\nv. 'rHE S'fATE OF BOMBAY. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BOSE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]\n\nCriminal trial-Charge to jury-Mis-direction-Powers of appellate Court-Power of appellate Court to go into the whole ease to determine whether there has been failure of justice-Practice- Appellate Court-Summary 1ejection of appeal-D1'ty to state reasons in arguahle cases.\n\nIn his charge to the jury the Judge told them that the oase before them was a jig saw puzzle with some missing links and directed them to use their ingenuity to piece them together by finding out the probabilities and seeing whether they could successfully solve the puzzle. Held, this was misdirection in that it invited the jury to exercise its ingenuity by having resort, if necessary, to speculative reasoning.\n\nWhere a jury has been mis-directed and bas based its verdict on assumptions and conjectures the Supreme Court may order a retrial or remit the case to the High Court with a direction that it should consider the merits of the case in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court and eay whether there has been a\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm.N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nl9~3\n\nMarch BO.", "total_entities": 100, "entities": [{"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 905, "end_char": 917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• Agent for the appellant : S. S. Shukla ..\n\n'rROJAN & CO."}}, {"text": "rROJAN & CO. LTD.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 923, "end_char": 940, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TROJAN & CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RM. N. N. NAGAPPA CHETTIAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 945, "end_char": 971, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RM. N. N. NAGAPPA CHETTIAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 998, "end_char": 1005, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Horwill", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4564, "end_char": 4571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 17th March, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4576, "end_char": 4593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 17th March, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Clark", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4720, "end_char": 4725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34 of 1947, arising out of\n\nthe Judgment' and Decree dated the 18th April, 1'947,\n\nof the said High Court (Clark J.) in the exercise of tbe Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High\n\nCourt in C. S. No."}}, {"text": "V. Rangachari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4836, "end_char": 4849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Rangachari (K. Mangachary, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Mangachary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Rangachari (K. Mangachary, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Krishnaswami Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4896, "end_char": 4919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Krishnaswami Iyengar (K. Pa:rasuram, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. Pa:rasuram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4921, "end_char": 4934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Krishnaswami Iyengar (K. Pa:rasuram, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5032, "end_char": 5039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-The dispute in this appeal is between a constituent and a firm of stock-brokers.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "North India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5644, "end_char": 5655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1937, two iron and steel companies in North India, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5663, "end_char": 5691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., and the Bengal Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., merged into one concern and a new issue of shares was made. '"}}, {"text": "Bengal Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5701, "end_char": 5729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., and the Bengal Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., merged into one concern and a new issue of shares was made. '"}}, {"text": "Indian Iron Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5861, "end_char": 5881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhe scheme was that for every five shares which a person held in the Indian Iron Co. Ltd. on 22nd April, 1937, one fully paid up share would be given to him at a price of Rs."}}, {"text": "22nd April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5885, "end_char": 5901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhe scheme was that for every five shares which a person held in the Indian Iron Co. Ltd. on 22nd April, 1937, one fully paid up share would be given to him at a price of Rs."}}, {"text": "5th April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6369, "end_char": 6384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To stabilize the situation thus created by heavy speculation, three members of the Committee of the Calcutta Stock\n\nExchange presented a petition to the Committee on 5th April, 1937, to close the Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Annamalai Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6540, "end_char": 6558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same evening plaintiff's stockbroker Annamalai Chettiar, who was carrying on Trojan rJ; Co. business in firm name •rroJau & Co., had elephonic Ltd. v conversation with one Ramdev Chokani, a member oi Rm.", "canonical_name": "Annamalai Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Ramdev Chokani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6675, "end_char": 6689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same evening plaintiff's stockbroker Annamalai Chettiar, who was carrying on Trojan rJ; Co. business in firm name •rroJau & Co., had elephonic Ltd. v conversation with one Ramdev Chokani, a member oi Rm.", "canonical_name": "Ramdev Chokani"}}, {"text": "Nagappa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6767, "end_char": 6774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. the Calcutta Stock Exchange, on this subject and from Nagappa this conversation he gathered that a sharp fall in the Ch•ttiar."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6890, "end_char": 6897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time\n\nMahajan J.\n\nAnnamalai Chettiar had on bis hands some 5,000 of these shares.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Annamalai Chettiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6902, "end_char": 6920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time\n\nMahajan J.\n\nAnnamalai Chettiar had on bis hands some 5,000 of these shares.", "canonical_name": "Annamalai Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Annamalai Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7075, "end_char": 7093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly after this conversation and after business hours the same night, between the hours of 7-30 and 8-30, Annamalai Chettiar rang up the plaintiff and suggested to him that it would be a good thing for him to buy these shares.", "canonical_name": "Annamalai Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Ramlal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7374, "end_char": 7386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another firm of brokers, Ramlal & Co., had also in their hands another 4,000 of these shares."}}, {"text": "Annamalai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also contacted him on the phone after Annamalai had done so, and sold him 4,000 shares that they held.", "canonical_name": "Annamalai Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Ramanathan Chetti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7688, "end_char": 7705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the lot which the plaintiff purchased from the defendants he sold 1,300 shares to Ramanathan Chetti at cost price."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Stock Exchange Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7760, "end_char": 7795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ou the 6th April tbQ Committee of the Calcutta Stock Exchange Association passed a resolution closing the Siock Exchange on the 8th and 9th April."}}, {"text": "8th and 9th April", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7850, "end_char": 7867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ou the 6th April tbQ Committee of the Calcutta Stock Exchange Association passed a resolution closing the Siock Exchange on the 8th and 9th April."}}, {"text": "5th April and 20th April, 19.37", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8149, "end_char": 8180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between 5th April and 20th April, 19.37, he made payments to defendants of various amounts totalling Hs."}}, {"text": "Pilani & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8304, "end_char": 8316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A lot of 700 shares was sold by the plaintiff to Pilani & Co. and on 19th April, 1937, be instructed the deiendants for sale of the remaining 3,000 shares at the best price obtainable. '"}}, {"text": "19th April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8324, "end_char": 8340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A lot of 700 shares was sold by the plaintiff to Pilani & Co. and on 19th April, 1937, be instructed the deiendants for sale of the remaining 3,000 shares at the best price obtainable. '"}}, {"text": "20th April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8477, "end_char": 8493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe defend1wts sold 2,000 shares on 20th April, 1937, for prices ranging between Rs."}}, {"text": "Hamlal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8621, "end_char": 8633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining 1,000 shares were sold by him through Messrs. Hamlal & Co. at Rs."}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8708, "end_char": 8722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of it was that on 22nd May, 1937, when the :i.ccounts between the plaintiff and the defendants were."}}, {"text": "S. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9202, "end_char": 9208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9247, "end_char": 9264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After giving credit for payments received on the promissory note the defendants filed a suit against him (O.S. 150 of\n\n1937) on the Original Side of the Madras High Court and obtained an ex parte interim order for attachment before judgment and attached plaintiff's movable and immovable properties at Madras, and also at Kottaiyur in Hamnad district."}}, {"text": "Kottaiyur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9416, "end_char": 9425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After giving credit for payments received on the promissory note the defendants filed a suit against him (O.S. 150 of\n\n1937) on the Original Side of the Madras High Court and obtained an ex parte interim order for attachment before judgment and attached plaintiff's movable and immovable properties at Madras, and also at Kottaiyur in Hamnad district."}}, {"text": "Hamnad district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9429, "end_char": 9444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After giving credit for payments received on the promissory note the defendants filed a suit against him (O.S. 150 of\n\n1937) on the Original Side of the Madras High Court and obtained an ex parte interim order for attachment before judgment and attached plaintiff's movable and immovable properties at Madras, and also at Kottaiyur in Hamnad district."}}, {"text": "22nd\n\nSeptember, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9579, "end_char": 9600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd\n\nSeptember, 1937, Trojan & Co. also filed a petition for the same relief."}}, {"text": "Trojan & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9602, "end_char": 9614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd\n\nSeptember, 1937, Trojan & Co. also filed a petition for the same relief."}}, {"text": "Hamdev Chokani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10043, "end_char": 10057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Official Assignee having acquired knowledge about the telephonic conversation that had passed between Annamalai Chettiar and\n\nHamdev Chokani on the evening of the 5th April, 1937, came to the conclusion that the.", "canonical_name": "Ramdev Chokani"}}, {"text": "Mockett", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10820, "end_char": 10827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\n794 SUPREME OOUR'r REPORTS [19531\n\nTro}an,, f; Co.\n\nOn an application made to the High Court against the order of the Official Assignee it was set aside by Mockett J. and he directed that the claim of the defendants be disposed of on a court motion, the claim being heard as if it were a suit."}}, {"text": "High Court, No. 313 of 1938", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11057, "end_char": 11084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of this direction Trojan and Co. on 2Uth September, 1938, filed an application in the High Court, No."}}, {"text": "15th March, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11222, "end_char": 11238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15th March, 1940, Somayya J. dismissed the claim of the defendants."}}, {"text": "Somayya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11240, "end_char": 11247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15th March, 1940, Somayya J. dismissed the claim of the defendants."}}, {"text": "12th August, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11406, "end_char": 11423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From this there was an appeal which was dismissed on 12th August, 1942."}}, {"text": "22nd March, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12298, "end_char": 12314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd March, 1937, the plaintiff bad sold through the defendants 50 shares in Associated Cements at Hs."}}, {"text": "Associated Cements", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12375, "end_char": 12393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd March, 1937, the plaintiff bad sold through the defendants 50 shares in Associated Cements at Hs."}}, {"text": "30th March, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12423, "end_char": 12439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30th March, 1937, he h:1d similarly sold a further 200 shares in Associated Cement> at Rs."}}, {"text": "Associated Cement", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12488, "end_char": 12505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30th March, 1937, he h:1d similarly sold a further 200 shares in Associated Cement> at Rs."}}, {"text": "21st July, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12671, "end_char": 12686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st July, 1937, defendants purchased on plaintiff's account 100 shares at Rs."}}, {"text": "1st September, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12774, "end_char": 12793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st September, 1937, they purchased a further 150 shares a, t\n\n' ' '\n\nRs."}}, {"text": "Ayer Mani Rubber Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13676, "end_char": 13696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third transaction related to 300 shares in Tatas, and the fourth one was in respect of shares in Ayer Mani Rubber Co. The last claim was abandoned at the trial and the claim on the third transaction was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and the correctness of the order of the trial judge was not canvassed in the appeal before the High Court."}}, {"text": "Bell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14359, "end_char": 14363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was first heard by Bell J. who decreed the claim of the plaintiff on 9th March, 1943."}}, {"text": "9th March, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14409, "end_char": 14424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was first heard by Bell J. who decreed the claim of the plaintiff on 9th March, 1943."}}, {"text": "25th August, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14549, "end_char": 14566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellate court set aside the decision of Bell J. and remanded the suit for fresh disposal on 25th August, 1944."}}, {"text": "21st February, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14597, "end_char": 14616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meantime, that is to say, on 21st February, 1944, the adjudication of the plaintiff was annulled and on his applieation he was brought on the record in the place of the Official\n\nAssignee and he continued the suit."}}, {"text": "N.N.\n\nNagappa\n\nOhttiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14886, "end_char": 14908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N.\n\nNagappa\n\nOhttiar.", "canonical_name": "N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Nagappa Ohettiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14957, "end_char": 14973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N.\n\nNagappa Ohettiar.", "canonical_name": "Nagappa Ohettiar"}}, {"text": "Ayer-Mani Rubber shares", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15558, "end_char": 15581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As above stated, the claim in respect of Ayer-Mani Rubber shares was abandoned at the trial and the claim on the third transaction relating to 300 shares in 'l'atas was decreed for the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "20th and 22nd April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17398, "end_char": 17423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45,042-9-0 was credi'ted in his account in respect of the sale of 3,000 shares made on 20th and 22nd April, 1937."}}, {"text": "5th April, 193", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18613, "end_char": 18627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the appeal Bench of the High Court it was contended that the trial judge was ill errot in bis assessment of the real value of these shares on 5th April, 193 7, and that in any case they could not be valued at four different rates."}}, {"text": "High\n\nTrojan Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm. N.N.\n\nN•g•ppa GhettU.r.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19151, "end_char": 19205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the appellant reiterated before us the contentions raised by him in the High\n\nTrojan Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm."}}, {"text": "Nogappa Chettiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19261, "end_char": 19277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N.\n\nNogappa Chettiar.", "canonical_name": "Nagappa Ohettiar"}}, {"text": "10th April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20347, "end_char": 20363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "62 per share on 10th April, 1937, and their cost price ..\n\nNow the rule is well settled that damages due either for breach of contr:i.ct or for tort are damages which, so far as money can compensate, will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act."}}, {"text": "Collins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21817, "end_char": 21824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N N. ject has been very appositely stated in McConnel v.\n\nNagappa Wright(') by Lord Collins in these terms:- Oh.ttiar. \""}}, {"text": "Cotton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22024, "end_char": 22030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It bas been laid down by several judges, and particularly by Cotton L.J. in Peek v. Derry('), but the common sense and principle of the thing is this."}}, {"text": "N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23770, "end_char": 23793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar.", "canonical_name": "N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar"}}, {"text": "20th and 22nd at", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25659, "end_char": 25675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We however find that in spite of the circumstance that the courts below correctly enunciated the rule of measuring damages in such cases, they estimated them on the difference between the cost price and the price realized at the sale on the 20th and 22nd at four different rates."}}, {"text": "20th and 22nd is", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25909, "end_char": 25925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover the finding that the true value of these shares was lower than what was actually realized on their resale on the 20th and 22nd is not based on any evidence whatsoever."}}, {"text": "20th and 22nd", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26481, "end_char": 26494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Withollt determining this crucial issue we think it was not right to estimate the damage on the vague finding that the true value of the shares was lower than the value which they fetched at the resale on the 20th and 22nd."}}, {"text": "Buckley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27083, "end_char": 27090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Buckley J. in Broome v. Speak('), it is indeed a difficult question to answer but that difficulty is no ground for refusing to answer it as has been done by the court below."}}, {"text": "S86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27915, "end_char": 27918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28073, "end_char": 28078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "companies doing business in northern India."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28622, "end_char": 28630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On vVednesday the 7th April in the Calcutta market they closed at Rs."}}, {"text": "10th April, 1987", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29063, "end_char": 29079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The share market report of the defendants themselves issued on 10th April, 1987, amply bears out this fact.'"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Stock Exchange", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29790, "end_char": 29813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further; selling was accent1.ated by the decision of Calcutta Stock Exchange to close the Calcutta market on the 8th and 9th April to enable brokers to make deliveries and'effect settlements for transactions in Indian Iron and Steel shares."}}, {"text": "8th and 9th affected the", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30316, "end_char": 30340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear therefore that the decision of the Calcutta Stock Exchange to close the Calcutta market on 8th and 9th affected the market prices considerably."}}, {"text": "20th Trojan and Co.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31050, "end_char": 31069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th Trojan and Co. sold 2,000 of the plaintiff's shares at rates varying between Rs."}}, {"text": "17th April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31776, "end_char": 31792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit P-23 is another weekly share market report of 'l'rojan & Co. issued on 17th April, 1937."}}, {"text": "Trojan tf Co.\n\nLtd,\n\nRm, N. N.\n\nNagappa Ohettiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32305, "end_char": 32353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan I.\n\n19$3\n\nTrojan tf Co.\n\nLtd,\n\nRm, N. N.\n\nNagappa Ohettiar."}}, {"text": "Maha}an", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32356, "end_char": 32363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maha}an J.\n\n804 SUPREME COURT .REPOR'l.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Ramlal and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32867, "end_char": 32881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbe remaiuiug 1,000 shares the plaintiff was able to sell through Ramlal and Co. at Rs."}}, {"text": "16th or 17th,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33019, "end_char": 33032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is quite possible and probable t.hat had the plaintiff placed an order before the 19th, say on the 16th or 17th, with the defendants or with Ramlal & Co., he might have been able to sell these 1,000 shares also at about the same price as he was able to dispose of his 2,000 shares."}}, {"text": "N.N.\n\nNagappa Chdttia.1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36697, "end_char": 36720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N.\n\nNagappa Chdttia.1'.", "canonical_name": "N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Mahaja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36724, "end_char": 36730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahaja,.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "article 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38946, "end_char": 38957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trojaa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40965, "end_char": 40971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nTrojaa d Oo."}}, {"text": "12th September, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41268, "end_char": 41288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l' his amount was returned by the Officia 1 Assignee to the defendants on 12th September, 1944, after that\n\ndecree had been set aside."}}, {"text": "16th March, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41428, "end_char": 41444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile the plaintiff's adjudication had been annulled and he had been brought on the record ou 16th March, 1944."}}, {"text": "12th l:!eptember, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43015, "end_char": 43037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our judgment, the plaintiff was not entitled to future interest at the rate allowed for one year and six months period, beginning from 9th March, 1943, and ending with 12th l:!eptember, 1944."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 43951, "end_char": 43961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 43990, "end_char": 44005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "MUSH'rAK HUSSEIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44008, "end_char": 44024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUSH'rAK HUSSEIN\n\nv. 'rHE S'fATE OF BOMBAY. ["}}, {"text": "S'fATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44034, "end_char": 44050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUSH'rAK HUSSEIN\n\nv. 'rHE S'fATE OF BOMBAY. ["}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44053, "end_char": 44071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BOSE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44073, "end_char": 44084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BOSE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHA DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44090, "end_char": 44104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BOSE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44896, "end_char": 44909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a jury has been mis-directed and bas based its verdict on assumptions and conjectures the Supreme Court may order a retrial or remit the case to the High Court with a direction that it should consider the merits of the case in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court and eay whether there has been a\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_809_824_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'r REPOR1'8 809\n\n19~8 modified and plaintiff will be entitled to damages in the sum of Rs. 93,000 on the 3,000 Indian Iron shares.\n\nThe decree given to the plaintiff in respect of Rs. 6, 762-8-0 is set aside over and above the decree for Rs. 9,100 in his favour set aside by the High Court.\n\nIn the calculation of future interest tbe plaintiff will not be allowed interest from 9th March, 1943, to 12th September, 1944. In the result tbe decree given to the plaintiff in the sum of Rs. 61, 787 is reduced to Rs. 42,17 5.\n\nHe will get interest at six per cent. per annum from 5th April, 1937, until pttyment or realization except for a period of one year and six months.\n\nPlaintiff will get proportionate costs throughout.\n\nTrojan ct Co.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent: M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nMUSH'rAK HUSSEIN\n\nv. 'rHE S'fATE OF BOMBAY. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BOSE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]\n\nCriminal trial-Charge to jury-Mis-direction-Powers of appellate Court-Power of appellate Court to go into the whole ease to determine whether there has been failure of justice-Practice- Appellate Court-Summary 1ejection of appeal-D1'ty to state reasons in arguahle cases.\n\nIn his charge to the jury the Judge told them that the oase before them was a jig saw puzzle with some missing links and directed them to use their ingenuity to piece them together by finding out the probabilities and seeing whether they could successfully solve the puzzle. Held, this was misdirection in that it invited the jury to exercise its ingenuity by having resort, if necessary, to speculative reasoning.\n\nWhere a jury has been mis-directed and bas based its verdict on assumptions and conjectures the Supreme Court may order a retrial or remit the case to the High Court with a direction that it should consider the merits of the case in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court and eay whether there has been a\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm.N. N.\n\nNagappa Chettiar.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nl9~3\n\nMarch BO.\n\n1968 failure of justice as a result of the mis-directions, or it may examine the merits of the case and decide for itself whether there MushtakHumin has been a failure of justice in the case.\n\n v.\n\nIn deciding whether there has in fact been a failure of justice Th• Stat• of in consequence of a mis-direction, the Court is entitled to take the Bombay. whole case into consideration.\n\nAbdul Rahman v. Empel'or (A.LR. 1946 Lah. 82) referred to.\n\nThough in cases which prima Jacie raise no arguable issue the High Court may dismiss an appeal summarily.without giving any reasons, it is desirable that in arguable cases the High Court should in its summary rejection order give some indication of the views of the High Court on the points raised.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 1952. Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 14th February. 1952, from the Order dated the 17th September, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Chainani JJ.) in Criminal Appeal No. 1026 of 1951 arising out of Judgment and Order dated the 28th July, 1951, of the Court of the Third Additional Sessions Judge of Poona in Sessions Case No. 78 of 1951.\n\nA. S. R. Chari and J. B. Dadachanji for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953. March 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The appellant on 28th July, 1951, was convicted on a charge under section 366, Indian Penal Code, for having kidnapped. at Poona a minor girl Shilavati in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourne and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years after a trial before the third additional Sessions Judge of that place sitting with a jury of five.\n\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty by a majority of three to two.\n\nThe Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the verdict was not perverse. He therefore accepted it.\n\nThe appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court\n\nbut this, was summarily dismissed.\n\nThis appeal is be- 1953 fore us by special leave.\n\nM ht kH us a ussein The prosecution case was that on the 12th Decemv. ber, 1949, the appellant who was a music teacher The State of went to the house of S, hilavat[ and on the pretext Bombay. that there was a girl waiting in his house and that he llfahajan J. wanted to compare the voice of Shilavati with the voice of the girl took her to his house, and with the\n\nassistance of one Iqbal Putlabai (accused~) kidnapped her.\n\nShilavati was traced in Bombay after four months in the house of one Babu Konde. Thereafter she was medically examined and it was found that she was pregnant.\n\nTo prove the case against the appellant the prosecution examined in all sixteen witnesses. Ont of these four were eye-witnesses, viz., Pra.hlad, Jamunabai, Namdeo and Shilavati.\n\nYamunabai, the mother of Shilavati, stated that on 12th December when she returned home in the evening she learnt from her sister-in-law Jamunabai and others that the appellant had taken Shilavati on the pretext that he wanted to compare her voice with that of one Prabba who was waiting in bis house and thereafter Sbilavati had not come back, that on getting this information she along with her brothers and sister-in-law went to the house of the appellant and questioned him as to why Shilavati was not sent back, whereupon tbs appellant replied that be bad sent her by bus.\n\nAs Sbilav&ti did not return home, she went to the police and lodged a complaint. Ananda, uncle of the girl, deposed to the same effect.\n\nPrahlad, brother of Shilavati, a boy of school-going age, deposed that be saw Sbilavati going\n\nwitbtbe appellant while he was playing outside the school. N amdeo, who is a bricklayer, stated that on the 12th December while he was returning after completing his work at about 3-30 p. m. be saw Shilavati going with the appellant.\n\nOn medical examination it was found that Shilavati was a girl of 15 or 16 years of age and that she was pregnant.\n\nShilavati was examined as P. IV. 10 and she llepose'd\n\nJ05\n\n1958 that the accused came to her house at about 3-30\n\nh -:-H . p.m. aud told her that there was a singing party at Jfug tan; usssin . . v.\n\nKirkee and that she should. accompany him there,\n\nThe state of that she went with him on the promise that the Bombay. appellant would seud her back before her mother returned home, that while at the appellant's house she .l!ahajan J. was asked to smell cer.tain scents and she felt giddy and could not speak and when she came to senses in the morning she found herself in Bombay in a hut at Sion.\n\nShe further said tha-t on enquiry from one Kassam she was told that the appellant had left her there.\n\nOn th.e 12th December at about 11-40 p. m.\n\nYamunaba.i went to Padamji Gate police station and lodged a complaint there. In the comp la int it was stated that Shilavati ha.d quarrelled with one Shanta.- bai and had left the house and since then she had not returned. The police ware asked to find out her whereabouts.\n\nOn the 13t.h she sent a complaint to the Pollce Iuspector, A Division, Poona. Therein she made the allegation that the appellant used to come to her huse for coaching Shilavati in harmonium, that she learnt that he had sent a chit to her daughter in her absence and had called her to his house and that on enquiries about Shilavati's whereabouts he had given evasive answers. The police head-constable who was on duty on receipt of this complaint examined Yamunabai. He read out the application to her and recorded her statement which reads thue :-\n\n\"My daughter Shilavati age about 13/14 has left my house at 4 p. m. I made search for my daughter at the house of my paternal aunt, but I could not find her there.\n\nM. H. Gyani (appel!ant) used to come to my house for coaching up my daughter in singing. I do not know whether he has taken away my daughter nor have I seen him taking her away. I have mentioned his name in my application through mistake.\n\nMy daughter has gone out of my house to some other place.\n\nA search should therefore be made for her . .. .... I again state that. my daughter left tb!; l house\n\nS.d.R.\n\nSUPREME ootJR'r REPORTS 813\n\nafter quarreU.iug with my mother Harnahai. This is woa given in writing.\"\n\nMushta.k Hussetn In July, 1950, Yamunabai sent an application to v. the Collector of Poona. In this application she id Th• Stat• 01 that she had appointed the appellant as a. music , Bombay. master for her daughter, that on Monday the 12th Mahajan J.\n\nDecember, 1949, at about 6 p. m. the appellant and his friend Badsha had induced and kidnapped her to au unknown plac~. She asserted therein that she was sure that nobody but both M. H. Gyani and Badsha had kidnapped her daughter.\n\nIn the witness box Yamuna Bai, as already stated, gave a different story and Shilavati herself did not fully support the version of her mother.\n\nOn the 14th Marnh, 1950, a letter, Exhibit 4-G, was sent by Shilavati to her mother.\n\nThe relevant part of this letter is in these terms:-\n\n\"Since last so many days, I have left the house and I have not sent any letter to you and you must also be worrying as to where I have gone. I am at\n\nBombay and qu\\te well too. Do not worry a.bout me, I had gone to the river at Bamburda, and there some one forced me and brought me to Bombay and. he was prepared to ma.rry with me. He was an ordinary and old fellow.\n\nJ did not like it and he was going to convert me to Mahomedanism.\n\nI felt very sorry for this and I was very much sad.\n\nHe beat me twice or thrice. Te whom shall I express my sorrow?\n\nBut there was a boy staying there whom I told all the facts and told him to save me anyhow.\n\nHe promised to save me.\n\nThere were two days remaining for my marriage.\n\nTill then, he arranged for my stay and also for dinner, and one day before the marriage, previous night be took me out from that place.\n\nThere were many police complaints against him, and be, at the cost of his life, saved me.\n\nI married him in order to return his obligations.\n\nNow I am very happy.\n\nI am not in need of anything now. He is au ordiu:try boy.\n\nHe works in a press, and be is a worker.\n\nHe is from us and his name is Baburao Ronde and next\n\n814 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS [i953j\n\n19os time we will send a photograph of botb of us.\n\nDo ' - not worry about me. I am very happy. N amaskar to .1-lu•htak liussein l d l d . d v al el er y persons an ash1rwa as to youngsters.\n\nThe stte of N amaskar to grandmother Harnabai. Convey namas-\n\nBombay. kars to Anand mama, Vithal mama, Ram mama,\n\nShankar, Prah lad, Laxman, Hirabai, J amnabai, Mahajan J. Yamunabai, J a1bai, and to master.\"\n\nShilavati is admittedly a talented Harijan girl who used to take part in dramatic peformances and used to give public peformances in music and dancing on some remuneration. The letter written by her from Bombay speaks for itself and it 'vas on receipt of this letter and further corespondence to which it is not necessary to refer tl:at the police got clue of her whereabouts and ware able to restore her tG her mother Yamunabai.\n\nThe statute law in India in certain circumstances permits an appeal against a jury's verdict and authorizes the appellate court to substitue its own verdict on its own consideration of the evidence. It has conferred on the appellate court extensive powers of overruling or .modifying the verdict of a jury in the interests of due administration of justice confident that the appellate judges who have not themselves seen and heard the witnesses, will not exercise lightly the responsible power entrusted to them. Section 423 in sub-section (2), Criminal Procedure Code, snates as follows:-\n\n\"Nothing herein contained shall authorize the court to alter or re.-erse the verd\\ct of a jury unless it is of opinion that such verdict is erroneous owing to a misdirection by the judge or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him.\"\n\nSection 537 in sub clause (d) provides that no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appea.I on a.ccount of any misdirection in any charge to the jury\n\nunless such error, omission, irregularity or misdirec- 1963 ti on has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. Unless - . h f · bl' h d h h M\"sh!akHumin t ere ore it 1s esta 1s e m a case t at t ere has v. been a serious misdirection by the judge in charging The stot• of the jury which has occasioned a failure of justice and Bombay. has misled the jury in giving its verdict, the verdict of the jury cannot be set aside.\n\nThe learned counsel Jfahajan 1• for the appellant contended that the judge in his charge to the jury misdirected it in several important particulars and violated the rules of criminal jurisprudence and of evidence in a number of ways. It was said that he failed to warn the jury that it would he unsafe for it to act on the stateme'Ilt of Shilavati without her statement being corroborated by other evidence in material particulars.\n\nThe judge, according to the learned counsel, should have told the jury that though in law it was open to them if in the circumstances of this case they thought fit te do, to act on the uncorroborated trestimony of Shilavati but that ordinarily it was not safe to do so without that statement being corroborated in material particulars. This omission on the part of the judge, it was urged, amounted in law to a grave misdirection and the jury in all likelihood without such a warning arrived at its verdict on the basis of the uncQrrobora ted evidence of the girl. That part of the charge in which reference was made by the judge to Shilavati's evidence wherein she had said that she was told by Kassam Khan that the appellant had left her there was criticized on the ground that the jury had been direted to act on inadmissible evidence.· 'l'hen it was contended that it was a serious misdirection to direct the jury that it had to solve the jigsaw puzzle that had arisen in the case by using their own ingenuity and by piecing together the various pieces of the puzzle.\n\nThe last misdirection relied upon concerned the following part of the charge:-\n\n\"After weighing the probabilities of the case, the evidence on record, as prudent men if you come to the conclusion that the story given by the prosecution does not appear to be probable and that the\n\nSUP.REME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nwsh accused must not have committed the offence, then in th at -- case you have to return a verdict of not guilty.\" Jltishta.k H us.f.ei.n.\n\nIn our judgment, it is not necessary to pronounce The State af on all the points urged by the learned counsel, because\n\nliloonbay. we are of the opinion that the judge clearly mis-\n\nMahajan J. directed the jury when he askeg it to solve the problem that had arisen 'by exercising its ingenuity and by resorting, if necessary, to speculative reasoning.\n\nIn other words, the judge gave the jury a carte blanche to come to its conclusion on the basis of its own conjectures, if necessary. Not only that. He told the jury to bold the accused not guilty in case it found it improbable that he must not have committed the offence.\n\nThese propositions placed before the jury are repugnant to all notions of criminal jurisprudence and they must necessarily have affected its mind in arriving at the conclusion. This is how the cha.rge on this point reads:- , \" So you will find, gentlemen, that there are as inany as six versions before this court and therefore you have to consider all these versions and probabilities of the case, to find out whether the improved version now before the court is a correct one. I would like also to bring to your notice the letter writ- . ten at the instance of Shil11vati from Bombay.\n\nThat letter is Exhibit 4-G.\n\nSbilavati in her examination before the court does not admit that this letter was written at her instance. However, she has admitted before the police that this letter was written at her instance, and this was brought out in her cross-examination. In bhis letter she had stated that she had gone on that day to Bamburda river and there she was forcibly kidnapped by sGme man who was a.bout to marry her.\n\nThat man was an old man and she did not approve that marriage.\n\nFortunately, this Konde came to her rescue and took her to. Bombay and married her. 'l'hat is her statement.\n\nNow, gentlemen,, this is a jigsaw puzzle kept before you.\n\nIn jigsaw puzzles aU the pieces are lapt before us and we have to use our ingenuity and piece them together. Some\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'fS 817\n\nlinks are missing in this case.\n\nHowever, as rightly sub-\n\n19M mitted by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor,· in - . h Z t . h th b b 'l 'i. ,!' h Mushtak Hussein sue cases you iave o weig e pro a i i .ies OJ t e case v. and there/ ore you have to find out from the material be- Th• St.t• of fore us whether you can solve this jigsaw puzzle.\n\nNow Bombay. these points are before you that there was a quarrel with Shantabai.\n\nThe chit was alleged to have been MahajanJ. sent by accused No. 1, and then the girl went to Bamburda river and there she was kidnapped by somebody.\n\nNow, gentlemen, yon have to consider whether it is or it is not possible that the girl Shilavati might have received some chit probably from the accused No. l. 'fhis chit was seen by Shantahai who exposed to Harnabai the grandmother of bhe\n\ngirl.\n\nThe witness Harnabai is an old woman and probably she was put out and she might have taken her to task, and she might have even gone to the length of stating that she should go out of the house.\n\nHere is a young girl having hot blood, and it is or is it not probable that the girl in desperation had gone to Bambnrda, and she mentions the river, and gentlemen, you can find that there is a confluence of the rivers Mula and Mutha ; why did she go to the river ? Whether it is probable that she wanted to commit suicide. Yon will find, gentlemen, that near that confluence there is a mosque and in the evidence it has come out that the girl was found at the but at Sion with an old Mahommedan named Kassam Khan and bis keep.\n\nYou have to consider whether it is probable that this Kassam Khan and bis keep induced the girl to go with them to Bombay and whether Kassam Khan wanted to marry her there.\n\nYou have to find out whether it is probable that this chivalrous man Konde re'cued her from the old man Kassam Khan who was about to marry her and got himself married to the girl. 'rhe fact remains that the girl was found with Konde in Bombay ultimately. It is in evidence of the girl herself that she found herself in a hut at Sion and Kassam Khan and his keep were keeping a watch over her ........................ So, gentlemen, you will ha1e to find out all the probabilities @f the oase and\n\n1953 see whether you can successfully solve this pitzzle kept ,, 7 -k H . before us by the prosecution.\" ruU.! ita usssin v.\n\nHad the charge to the jury stopped with the sen- The State of ience, \"So you will find, gentlemeu, that there are as\n\nBombay. many as six versious before this, court and therefore you have to consider all these versions and probabili- Mahafan J. ties of the case, to find out whether the improved version now before the court is a correct one\", n6 exception could possibly have been taken to it.\n\nWhen the learned judge, however, proceeded to direct the jury to piece together the various pieces of the jigsaw puzzle by use of their ingenuity be clearly misdirected them inasmuch as he told them that they could in solving the problem draw upon their own imagination and exercise their ingenuity in the matter without reference to the evidence th:i.t had been placed by the prosecution on the record.\n\nNot only that, the learned judge himself indulged in speculation and placed a number of conjectures before the jury for its consideration. The learned judge surmised that the girl might well have gone to the river for committing suicide and asked the jury to consider this surmise as well. It was further surmised that a chit from the accused was received by Shilavati and that Shantabai saw that chit, and disclosed it to Harnabai, the grandmother, who in all likelihood took her to task and told her to get out of the house and thereupon the hotblooded Shilavati went to the river to commit suicide. There is no evidence whatsoever on the record about the actual receipt of that chit, of Shantabai seeing it and exposing this fact to Harnabai and of Harnabai threatening Sbilavati. All these considerations mentioned to the jury were the results of the judge's fertile imagination and were bound to mislead it into the belief that they could indulge in like conjectures and surmises in their effort to solve the puzzle. 'l'he direction to tbe jury that it was to solve the jigsaw puzzle by use of its ingenuity does not find place in an isolated passage of the charge, bot runs through it .. While winding up the learned judge again reiterateq it and sid ;-\n\n\"As I ha.ve already told you, you have to piece 1958 tfiogdether all the pieces of the jigsaw puz?.le and try to Musht•k-; u,,, in\n\nn out what story appears to you to be probable; v. whether the girl was drugged at all, or whether as Th• state of stated by her in her letter she went to a river at Bombay.\n\nBambnrda and there she met this Kassam Khan and his keep and along with them she went to Bombay of Maha, ian 1• her own accord.\"\n\nIn the concluding part of the charge the learued judge said:-\n\n\"After weighing the probabilities of the case, evidence on record, as prudent men if you come to the conclusion that the story given by the prosecution does not appear to be probable and that the accused must not have co1nmitted the offence, then in that base you have to return a verdict of not guilty.\"\n\nIt is not possible to say that these words were likely to give a correct lead to the jury in reaching its concl11sion.\n\nAll that the jury should have been told was that after weighing the probitbilities of the case and the eYidence on the record, as prudent men they should answer \"whether the prosecution had made out the charge against the accused.\" We are satisfied that as a result of these misdirections the jury in all likelihood gave a divided verdict of guilty by three to two not on evidence but on the basis of assumptions and conjectures.\n\nIn this situation, the question for consideration is what proeednre should be followed by this court for undoing the mischief that has happened and which would be most conducive to the ends of justice.\n\nThe simplest course open to us is to order a retrial of the appellant. It is also open to us to remit the case to the High Court with a direction that it should consider the merits of the case in the light of our decision and say whether there has been a failure of justice as a result of these misdirections. Lastly, it is open to 11s to examine the merits of the case a.nd\n\nlDO\n\n1958 decide for ourselves whether there has beeu a failure - of justice in the case and an innocent man has been Mu•hlak Huasein . t d v. con vic , e .\n\nTh• State of\n\nBo1nbay.\n\nMahajan J,\n\nIt is now well settled that in deciding whether there has been in fact a failure of justice in consequence of a misdirection the court is entitled to t'.tke the whole case into consideration. [Vide Abdul Rahim\n\nv. Emperor(1)]. The words \"in fact\" in section537(d), Criminal Procedure Code, emphasize the view that the court is entitled to go iuto the evidence itself in order to determine whether there has been a failure of justice. In the peculiar circumstances of this case we have chosen to adopt the third course, because at this moment of time it is most conducive to the ends of justice. It seems plain to us that on the material on this record no reasonable body of persons could possibly have arrived at the conclusion ; hat the appellant kidnapped Shilavati as alleged by the prosecution. We have taken upon ourselves the responsibility of deciding this case without the valuable opinion of the High Court because we feel satisfied that any other course would cause unnecessary harassment to the appellant.\n\nWith great respect we are however constrained to\n\nobserve that it was not right for the High Court to have dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant to that court summarily, as it certainly raised some arguable points which required consideration though we have not thought it fit to deal with all of them.\n\nIn cases which prima facie raise no argun:ble issue that course is, of course, justified, but this court would appreciate it if in arguable cases the ummary rejection order gives some indication of the views of the High Court on the points raised.\n\nWithout the opinion of the High Court on such points in special leave petitions under article 136 of the Constitution this Court sometimes feels embarrassed if it has to deal with those matters without the benefit of that opinion.\n\n(r) A.LR. 1046 P.C. 8>,\n\nThe learne'd Solicitor-General contended that this ma was not a fit case where the court was justified in go- M ht-;;:; . ing behind the verdict of the jury and in deciding the u• av. u\"\"\"\n\ncase in accordance with its own view of the evidence.\n\nThe Bt•t• of It was argued that the charge to the jury had to be Bombay. taken as a whole, that though some slight exception might be taken to certain passages in the charge the M•h•i•• J. learned judge had placed the case of both sides fairly before the jury and that not only did the learned judge place fairly the case of both sides before the jury, he indicated his opinion on the evidence strongly against the prosecution and that being so, the accused could not be allowed to say bat the charge which was strongly in bis favour and against the prosecution was defective iu law.\n\nIt was said that it was open to the jury to accept the statement of the mother of the girl as well as the statement of the girl in spite of the different conflicting versions mentioned in the charge and that the jury having done so, the matter stood concluded.\n\nAs already observed, charge to the jury canuot be said to be a fair charge if it tells the jury to approach the decision of the matter from a wrong angle, a.nd directs it to reach its decision by exercise of its own ingenuity and by having recourse to conjectures and speculative reasoning.\n\nThis ccmtention of the learned Solicitor- General therefore cannot be seriously considered.\n\nThat the verdict of the jury was erroneous in that it could not be the verdict of any body of reasonable men in the circumstances of this case is fully established by the facts and circumstances on the record.\n\nWhat Yamunabai deposed in court has been set out in the earlier part of this judgment. Her case now is that when she returned home on the 12th December, 1949, at about 6-30 p.m., she found that Shilavati was not in the house, she made enquiries from Jamna and Hira, she was told that accused 1 came and told them that there was a girl in his house and her voice was to qe compared with SbilaYati's voic.e and took her\n\n822 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S [l 953 J\n\ni9M away on that pretext. Prahlad, P. W. 4,\" deposed that - .. when his mother returned home at 6 p.m. he told her MushtakHusmn h Sh'] t' h db b h' . h v. t at 1 ava 1 a een .seen y nn mt e company\n\nTh• stat• of of accused l. Jamnaba1, P.W. 5, stated that the .c-\n\nBombay. cused came to the house at 3 p.m. and on the pretext that one girl had come to his honse for singing he Mahlij•n J. took Shilrtvati and that when Yamunabai returned she informed her of what had happened.\n\nAnanda, P.\\V. 6, repeated the sam@ story.\n\nThis story stands completely demolished by the different complaints that Yamunabai made to the police. 'l'here i.q no satisfactory explanation whatsoever why when she made her first report to the police at 11-40 p.m. she did not tell the police that she had been told by her son, by Jamuna and by Namdev that the girl had been taken away by the appellant and that be had told them that she had been sent back in a bus.\n\nNot only this, after she had sent a written complaint on the 13th December to the Police Inspector, Poona, suspecting the appellant of having kidnapped her daughter, she made a statement to the head-constable, withdrawing that allegation in most unambignons terms and stated that the girl had left the house after quarrelling with Harnabai. In the first report to the police she had said that the girl had left after quarrelling with one Shantabai.\n\nThese statements made by her could not be said to be the result of mere figments of her brain.\n\nShe must have made them on some basis. They give the lie direct to her present version. \\Vhen later on she sent an application to the Collector accusing the appellant and Badsha of having kidnapped her daughter .she asserted that they had taken her away to an unknown place at o p. m., though the occurrence in the earlier complaints was alleged to have taken place at about 3-30 p. m. The Jetter of 1'1th March, 1950, written at the instance of Shilavati to Yamunabai falsifies all the Yersions given by her and clearly suggests that the girl left the house of her own accord.\n\nIh this letter she sent her regards to the appellant. If he bad kidnapped her, that expression of respect would\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPORTS 823\n\nnot have found place in that letter at all.\n\nAnother 1153 version was mentioned in the evidence as to how the -;: occurrence took place. It was stated that the girl Jlu•hta vussoin received a chit from the appellant and on the basis The stat• of of this chit a quarrel ensued and the girl left the Bombay. house.\n\nUn this state of the record it is quite evident that the version now given by Yarnunabai to court Mahaja,. •1• or by Shilavati after she had come under the influ- • ence of her mother cannot be accepted.\n\nIt seems that the appellant because he was a music master and had been giving lessons to the girl a few months before her disappearance has been convicted on a charge under section 366, Indian Penal Code, not on the basis of evidence but on the basis of surmises and conjectures. 'l'he learned Solicitor- General referred us to the statement of the bricklayer and of the boy Prahlad.\n\nA mere reading of their statements shows that these are not true and have been procured to fill in gaps in the prosecution case.\n\nHarnabai was not produced as a witness in the case and the learned judge in his charge to the jury was ri'ght when he observed that a number of links were missing in the prosecution case and they could only be filled in on the basis of conjectures.\n\nBoth Yamunabai and l'rahlad studiously avoided stating that the girl took part in dramas or that she danced in public places.\n\nT'hey bried to make out that Shilavati was an unsophisticated girl having no knowledge of the world and that she never danced in public places or she never acted in public dramas.\n\nThere is ample material on the record consisting of her photos in the advertisements as well as in the statements made to the police which establishes that she acted in various dramas for which she was paid at the rate of Rs. 5 for each performance and that she gave dance performances and she was intending to make singing and dancing as\n\nher profession. 'l'he very fact that the brother and the mother were at pains to create a false impression on the court by deposing falsely was itself sufficient to show that no reliance coulcl be placed on theii;\n\nma testimony.\n\nWe are therefore firmly o.f the opinion -- . that there has been a grave failure of jmtice in this M1l8htakHu'36'n d h JI h b v case an t e appe ant, an mnocent man, as een\n\nTh• siate of convicted of a serious offonce on a verdict of the jury\n\nBomba~. arrived at in all likelihood on the basis of conjectures a.nd th:i.t that verdict was the consequence of the Mahajan J, misdirection given to the jury by the judge.\n\nFor the reasons given above we allow this appeal, set aside the verdict of the jury, and acquit the appellant of the offence with which he was charged.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: V. P. K. Nambiyar.\n\nAgent for the res poll.dent: G. H. Rajadhyakshet.", "total_entities": 101, "entities": [{"text": "9th March, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 398, "end_char": 413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the calculation of future interest tbe plaintiff will not be allowed interest from 9th March, 1943, to 12th September, 1944."}}, {"text": "12th September, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 418, "end_char": 438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the calculation of future interest tbe plaintiff will not be allowed interest from 9th March, 1943, to 12th September, 1944."}}, {"text": "5th April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 595, "end_char": 610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "per annum from 5th April, 1937, until pttyment or realization except for a period of one year and six months."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 808, "end_char": 818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 847, "end_char": 862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "MUSH'rAK HUSSEIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 865, "end_char": 881, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUSH'rAK HUSSEIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "rHE S'fATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 907, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 910, "end_char": 928, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 930, "end_char": 941, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1753, "end_char": 1766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a jury has been mis-directed and bas based its verdict on assumptions and conjectures the Supreme Court may order a retrial or remit the case to the High Court with a direction that it should consider the merits of the case in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court and eay whether there has been a\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRm."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2009, "end_char": 2016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nl9~3\n\nMarch BO.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ."}}, {"text": "MushtakHumin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2174, "end_char": 2186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1968 failure of justice as a result of the mis-directions, or it may examine the merits of the case and decide for itself whether there MushtakHumin has been a failure of justice in the case."}}, {"text": "Bavdekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3019, "end_char": 3027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1952, from the Order dated the 17th September, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Chainani JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Chainani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3032, "end_char": 3040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1952, from the Order dated the 17th September, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Chainani JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Third Additional Sessions Judge of Poona", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3163, "end_char": 3203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1026 of 1951 arising out of Judgment and Order dated the 28th July, 1951, of the Court of the Third Additional Sessions Judge of Poona in Sessions Case No."}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3238, "end_char": 3252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and J. B. Dadachanji for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3257, "end_char": 3273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and J. B. Dadachanji for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3294, "end_char": 3308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3340, "end_char": 3354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3447, "end_char": 3454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The appellant on 28th July, 1951, was convicted on a charge under section 366, Indian Penal Code, for having kidnapped.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ."}}, {"text": "section 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3524, "end_char": 3535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3537, "end_char": 3554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shilavati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3600, "end_char": 3609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at Poona a minor girl Shilavati in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourne and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years after a trial before the third additional Sessions Judge of that place sitting with a jury of five.", "canonical_name": "S, hilavat"}}, {"text": "12th Decemv. ber, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4213, "end_char": 4235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M ht kH us a ussein The prosecution case was that on the 12th Decemv."}}, {"text": "S, hilavat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4309, "end_char": 4319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ber, 1949, the appellant who was a music teacher The State of went to the house of S, hilavat[ and on the pretext Bombay.", "canonical_name": "S, hilavat"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4340, "end_char": 4346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ber, 1949, the appellant who was a music teacher The State of went to the house of S, hilavat[ and on the pretext Bombay."}}, {"text": "llfahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4403, "end_char": 4412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that there was a girl waiting in his house and that he llfahajan J. wanted to compare the voice of Shilavati with the voice of the girl took her to his house, and with the\n\nassistance of one Iqbal Putlabai (accused~) kidnapped her."}}, {"text": "Iqbal Putlabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4539, "end_char": 4553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that there was a girl waiting in his house and that he llfahajan J. wanted to compare the voice of Shilavati with the voice of the girl took her to his house, and with the\n\nassistance of one Iqbal Putlabai (accused~) kidnapped her."}}, {"text": "Babu Konde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4650, "end_char": 4660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shilavati was traced in Bombay after four months in the house of one Babu Konde."}}, {"text": "Pra.hlad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4876, "end_char": 4884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pra.hlad, Jamunabai, Namdeo and Shilavati."}}, {"text": "Jamunabai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4886, "end_char": 4895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pra.hlad, Jamunabai, Namdeo and Shilavati."}}, {"text": "Namdeo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4897, "end_char": 4903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pra.hlad, Jamunabai, Namdeo and Shilavati."}}, {"text": "Shilavati", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4908, "end_char": 4917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pra.hlad, Jamunabai, Namdeo and Shilavati."}}, {"text": "Yamunabai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4920, "end_char": 4929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yamunabai, the mother of Shilavati, stated that on 12th December when she returned home in the evening she learnt from her sister-in-law Jamunabai and others that the appellant had taken Shilavati on the pretext that he wanted to compare her voice with that of one Prabba who was waiting in bis house and thereafter Sbilavati had not come back, that on getting this information she along with her brothers and sister-in-law went to the house of the appellant and questioned him as to why Shilavati was not sent back, whereupon tbs appellant replied that be bad sent her by bus."}}, {"text": "Jamunabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5057, "end_char": 5066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yamunabai, the mother of Shilavati, stated that on 12th December when she returned home in the evening she learnt from her sister-in-law Jamunabai and others that the appellant had taken Shilavati on the pretext that he wanted to compare her voice with that of one Prabba who was waiting in bis house and thereafter Sbilavati had not come back, that on getting this information she along with her brothers and sister-in-law went to the house of the appellant and questioned him as to why Shilavati was not sent back, whereupon tbs appellant replied that be bad sent her by bus.", "canonical_name": "Yamunaba.i"}}, {"text": "Prabba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5185, "end_char": 5191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yamunabai, the mother of Shilavati, stated that on 12th December when she returned home in the evening she learnt from her sister-in-law Jamunabai and others that the appellant had taken Shilavati on the pretext that he wanted to compare her voice with that of one Prabba who was waiting in bis house and thereafter Sbilavati had not come back, that on getting this information she along with her brothers and sister-in-law went to the house of the appellant and questioned him as to why Shilavati was not sent back, whereupon tbs appellant replied that be bad sent her by bus."}}, {"text": "Sbilavati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5236, "end_char": 5245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yamunabai, the mother of Shilavati, stated that on 12th December when she returned home in the evening she learnt from her sister-in-law Jamunabai and others that the appellant had taken Shilavati on the pretext that he wanted to compare her voice with that of one Prabba who was waiting in bis house and thereafter Sbilavati had not come back, that on getting this information she along with her brothers and sister-in-law went to the house of the appellant and questioned him as to why Shilavati was not sent back, whereupon tbs appellant replied that be bad sent her by bus.", "canonical_name": "S, hilavat"}}, {"text": "Sbilav&ti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5502, "end_char": 5511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Sbilav&ti did not return home, she went to the police and lodged a complaint.", "canonical_name": "S, hilavat"}}, {"text": "Ananda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5580, "end_char": 5586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ananda, uncle of the girl, deposed to the same effect.", "canonical_name": "Anand mama"}}, {"text": "Prahlad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5636, "end_char": 5643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prahlad, brother of Shilavati, a boy of school-going age, deposed that be saw Sbilavati going\n\nwitbtbe appellant while he was playing outside the school."}}, {"text": "N amdeo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5790, "end_char": 5797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N amdeo, who is a bricklayer, stated that on the 12th December while he was returning after completing his work at about 3-30 p. m. be saw Shilavati going with the appellant."}}, {"text": "Shilavati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6007, "end_char": 6016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On medical examination it was found that Shilavati was a girl of 15 or 16 years of age and that she was pregnant.", "canonical_name": "S, hilavat"}}, {"text": "Sion", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6673, "end_char": 6677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant would seud her back before her mother returned home, that while at the appellant's house she .l!ahajan J. was asked to smell cer.tain scents and she felt giddy and could not speak and when she came to senses in the morning she found herself in Bombay in a hut at Sion."}}, {"text": "Kassam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6723, "end_char": 6729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She further said tha-t on enquiry from one Kassam she was told that the appellant had left her there.", "canonical_name": "Kassam Khan"}}, {"text": "Yamunaba.i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6827, "end_char": 6837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On th.e 12th December at about 11-40 p. m.\n\nYamunaba.i went to Padamji Gate police station and lodged a complaint there.", "canonical_name": "Yamunaba.i"}}, {"text": "Shanta.- bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6977, "end_char": 6989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the comp la int it was stated that Shilavati ha.d quarrelled with one Shanta.- bai and had left the house and since then she had not returned.", "canonical_name": "Shanta.- bai"}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7173, "end_char": 7178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13t.h she sent a complaint to the Pollce Iuspector, A Division, Poona."}}, {"text": "Yamunabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7558, "end_char": 7567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police head-constable who was on duty on receipt of this complaint examined Yamunabai.", "canonical_name": "Yamunaba.i"}}, {"text": "M. H. Gyani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7817, "end_char": 7828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. H. Gyani (appel!ant) used to come to my house for coaching up my daughter in singing.", "canonical_name": "M. H. Gyani"}}, {"text": "Harnahai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8289, "end_char": 8297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nSUPREME ootJR'r REPORTS 813\n\nafter quarreU.iug with my mother Harnahai.", "canonical_name": "Harnahai"}}, {"text": "Mushta.k Hussetn", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8331, "end_char": 8347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mushta.k Hussetn In July, 1950, Yamunabai sent an application to v. the Collector of Poona.", "canonical_name": "MUSH'rAK HUSSEIN"}}, {"text": "Collector of Poona", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8403, "end_char": 8421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mushta.k Hussetn In July, 1950, Yamunabai sent an application to v. the Collector of Poona."}}, {"text": "Badsha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8645, "end_char": 8651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "master for her daughter, that on Monday the 12th Mahajan J.\n\nDecember, 1949, at about 6 p. m. the appellant and his friend Badsha had induced and kidnapped her to au unknown plac~. She asserted therein that she was sure that nobody but both M. H. Gyani and Badsha had kidnapped her daughter."}}, {"text": "M. H. Gyani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8763, "end_char": 8774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "master for her daughter, that on Monday the 12th Mahajan J.\n\nDecember, 1949, at about 6 p. m. the appellant and his friend Badsha had induced and kidnapped her to au unknown plac~. She asserted therein that she was sure that nobody but both M. H. Gyani and Badsha had kidnapped her daughter.", "canonical_name": "M. H. Gyani"}}, {"text": "Yamuna Bai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8834, "end_char": 8844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the witness box Yamuna Bai, as already stated, gave a different story and Shilavati herself did not fully support the version of her mother."}}, {"text": "14th Marnh, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8967, "end_char": 8983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 14th Marnh, 1950, a letter, Exhibit 4-G, was sent by Shilavati to her mother."}}, {"text": "Bamburda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9328, "end_char": 9336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Do not worry a.bout me, I had gone to the river at Bamburda, and there some one forced me and brought me to Bombay and."}}, {"text": "Baburao Ronde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10250, "end_char": 10263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is from us and his name is Baburao Ronde and next\n\n814 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS [i953j\n\n19os time we will send a photograph of botb of us."}}, {"text": "Anand mama", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "kars to Anand mama, Vithal mama, Ram mama,\n\nShankar, Prah lad, Laxman, Hirabai, J amnabai, Mahajan J. Yamunabai, J a1bai, and to master.\"", "canonical_name": "Anand mama"}}, {"text": "Vithal mama", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10591, "end_char": 10602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "kars to Anand mama, Vithal mama, Ram mama,\n\nShankar, Prah lad, Laxman, Hirabai, J amnabai, Mahajan J. Yamunabai, J a1bai, and to master.\""}}, {"text": "Shankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10615, "end_char": 10622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "kars to Anand mama, Vithal mama, Ram mama,\n\nShankar, Prah lad, Laxman, Hirabai, J amnabai, Mahajan J. Yamunabai, J a1bai, and to master.\""}}, {"text": "Laxman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10634, "end_char": 10640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "kars to Anand mama, Vithal mama, Ram mama,\n\nShankar, Prah lad, Laxman, Hirabai, J amnabai, Mahajan J. Yamunabai, J a1bai, and to master.\""}}, {"text": "Hirabai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10642, "end_char": 10649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "kars to Anand mama, Vithal mama, Ram mama,\n\nShankar, Prah lad, Laxman, Hirabai, J amnabai, Mahajan J. Yamunabai, J a1bai, and to master.\""}}, {"text": "Mahajan J. Yamunabai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10662, "end_char": 10682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "kars to Anand mama, Vithal mama, Ram mama,\n\nShankar, Prah lad, Laxman, Hirabai, J amnabai, Mahajan J. Yamunabai, J a1bai, and to master.\""}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11160, "end_char": 11165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statute law in India in certain circumstances permits an appeal against a jury's verdict and authorizes the appellate court to substitue its own verdict on its own consideration of the evidence."}}, {"text": "Section 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11654, "end_char": 11665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11686, "end_char": 11709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12002, "end_char": 12013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Jfahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12663, "end_char": 12671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel Jfahajan 1• for the appellant contended that the judge in his charge to the jury misdirected it in several important particulars and violated the rules of criminal jurisprudence and of evidence in a number of ways."}}, {"text": "Kassam Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13773, "end_char": 13784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That part of the charge in which reference was made by the judge to Shilavati's evidence wherein she had said that she was told by Kassam Khan that the appellant had left her there was criticized on the ground that the jury had been direted to act on inadmissible evidence.· '", "canonical_name": "Kassam Khan"}}, {"text": "Shil11vati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15792, "end_char": 15802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ten at the instance of Shil11vati from Bombay.", "canonical_name": "S, hilavat"}}, {"text": "Sbilavati", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15846, "end_char": 15855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That letter is Exhibit 4-G.\n\nSbilavati in her examination before the court does not admit that this letter was written at her instance."}}, {"text": "Shantabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17053, "end_char": 17062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "these points are before you that there was a quarrel with Shantabai.", "canonical_name": "Shanta.- bai"}}, {"text": "MahajanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17099, "end_char": 17108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The chit was alleged to have been MahajanJ. sent by accused No.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ."}}, {"text": "Shantahai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17398, "end_char": 17407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. 'fhis chit was seen by Shantahai who exposed to Harnabai the grandmother of bhe\n\ngirl.", "canonical_name": "Shanta.- bai"}}, {"text": "Harnabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17423, "end_char": 17431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. 'fhis chit was seen by Shantahai who exposed to Harnabai the grandmother of bhe\n\ngirl.", "canonical_name": "Harnahai"}}, {"text": "Harnabai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17475, "end_char": 17483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness Harnabai is an old woman and probably she was put out and she might have taken her to task, and she might have even gone to the length of stating that she should go out of the house."}}, {"text": "Bambnrda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17771, "end_char": 17779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here is a young girl having hot blood, and it is or is it not probable that the girl in desperation had gone to Bambnrda, and she mentions the river, and gentlemen, you can find that there is a confluence of the rivers Mula and Mutha ; why did she go to the river ?"}}, {"text": "Konde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18431, "end_char": 18436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "You have to find out whether it is probable that this chivalrous man Konde re'cued her from the old man Kassam Khan who was about to marry her and got himself married to the girl. '"}}, {"text": "Maha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21454, "end_char": 21458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bambnrda and there she met this Kassam Khan and his keep and along with them she went to Bombay of Maha, ian 1• her own accord.\""}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23443, "end_char": 23466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24845, "end_char": 24856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26842, "end_char": 26861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Her case now is that when she returned home on the 12th December, 1949, at about 6-30 p.m., she found that Shilavati was not in the house, she made enquiries from Jamna and Hira, she was told that accused 1 came and told them that there was a girl in his house and her voice was to qe compared with SbilaYati's voic.e and took her\n\n822 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S [l 953 J\n\ni9M away on that pretext."}}, {"text": "Jamna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26954, "end_char": 26959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Her case now is that when she returned home on the 12th December, 1949, at about 6-30 p.m., she found that Shilavati was not in the house, she made enquiries from Jamna and Hira, she was told that accused 1 came and told them that there was a girl in his house and her voice was to qe compared with SbilaYati's voic.e and took her\n\n822 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S [l 953 J\n\ni9M away on that pretext.", "canonical_name": "Yamunaba.i"}}, {"text": "Hira", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26964, "end_char": 26968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Her case now is that when she returned home on the 12th December, 1949, at about 6-30 p.m., she found that Shilavati was not in the house, she made enquiries from Jamna and Hira, she was told that accused 1 came and told them that there was a girl in his house and her voice was to qe compared with SbilaYati's voic.e and took her\n\n822 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S [l 953 J\n\ni9M away on that pretext."}}, {"text": "SbilaYati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27090, "end_char": 27099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Her case now is that when she returned home on the 12th December, 1949, at about 6-30 p.m., she found that Shilavati was not in the house, she made enquiries from Jamna and Hira, she was told that accused 1 came and told them that there was a girl in his house and her voice was to qe compared with SbilaYati's voic.e and took her\n\n822 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S [l 953 J\n\ni9M away on that pretext.", "canonical_name": "S, hilavat"}}, {"text": "Jamnaba1", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27387, "end_char": 27395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h v. t at 1 ava 1 a een .seen y nn mt e company\n\nTh• stat• of of accused l. Jamnaba1, P.W. 5, stated that the .c-\n\nBombay."}}, {"text": "Shilrtvati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27555, "end_char": 27565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cused came to the house at 3 p.m. and on the pretext that one girl had come to his honse for singing he Mahlij•n J. took Shilrtvati and that when Yamunabai returned she informed her of what had happened.", "canonical_name": "S, hilavat"}}, {"text": "Ananda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27639, "end_char": 27645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ananda, P.\\V. 6, repeated the sam@ story."}}, {"text": "Jamuna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27965, "end_char": 27971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'here i.q no satisfactory explanation whatsoever why when she made her first report to the police at 11-40 p.m. she did not tell the police that she had been told by her son, by Jamuna and by Namdev that the girl had been taken away by the appellant and that be had told them that she had been sent back in a bus.", "canonical_name": "Yamunaba.i"}}, {"text": "Namdev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27979, "end_char": 27985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'here i.q no satisfactory explanation whatsoever why when she made her first report to the police at 11-40 p.m. she did not tell the police that she had been told by her son, by Jamuna and by Namdev that the girl had been taken away by the appellant and that be had told them that she had been sent back in a bus."}}, {"text": "1'1th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29048, "end_char": 29065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Vhen later on she sent an application to the Collector accusing the appellant and Badsha of having kidnapped her daughter .she asserted that they had taken her away to an unknown place at o p. m., though the occurrence in the earlier complaints was alleged to have taken place at about 3-30 p. m. The Jetter of 1'1th March, 1950, written at the instance of Shilavati to Yamunabai falsifies all the Yersions given by her and clearly suggests that the girl left the house of her own accord."}}, {"text": "Jlu•hta vussoin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29540, "end_char": 29555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated that the girl Jlu•hta vussoin received a chit from the appellant and on the basis The stat• of of this chit a quarrel ensued and the girl left the Bombay."}}, {"text": "Yarnunabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29767, "end_char": 29777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Un this state of the record it is quite evident that the version now given by Yarnunabai to court Mahaja,."}}, {"text": "Mahaja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29787, "end_char": 29793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Un this state of the record it is quite evident that the version now given by Yarnunabai to court Mahaja,.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ."}}, {"text": "section 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30067, "end_char": 30078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30080, "end_char": 30097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prahlad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30269, "end_char": 30276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he learned Solicitor- General referred us to the statement of the bricklayer and of the boy Prahlad."}}, {"text": "l'rahlad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30678, "end_char": 30686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Yamunabai and l'rahlad studiously avoided stating that the girl took part in dramas or that she danced in public places."}}, {"text": "V. P. K. Nambiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32150, "end_char": 32167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: V. P. K. Nambiyar."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyakshet", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32199, "end_char": 32218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the res poll.dent: G. H. Rajadhyakshet."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_825_836_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE REKRARIA COTTON MILLS LTD. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VrVIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]\n\nEssential Supplies Act (XXIV of 1946), ss. 7, 9--Notification requiring manufacturers to submit tru, e and accurate information-- \"Delivery\", meaning of-Possession of del credere (JJJent-Whether\n\npossession uf seller-Delivery to such (JJJent, effect of-Penal statutes -Liberal constrnction.\n\nA Government Notification issued under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, required every manufacturer to submit \"true and accurate information relating to his undertakings'' and a note on the printed form stated that \"by 'delivered' or 'delivery' is meant physical deli very of cloth in bales and pieces but not cloth which, though paid for, is still in the physical possession of the seller.\"\n\nThe appellant Mills were manufacture\"s of cloth and D.K. & Co. were their sole del credere selling agents who guaranteed payment to the appellant of the price of all sales made and, on the other side, guaranteed delivery <<l.J;.b.e purchasers with whom they dealt direct. One D.:11. informed1'!1o \\fills as the agent of an up-country quota-holder that be had been authorised by the latter to take delivery of 13 bales and on this account paid Rs. 14,000 to D.K. & Co.\n\nD.K. & Co. wrote to the Mills that they bad received payment.\n\nThe ;\\fills despatched the goods to D.M. but meanwhile the quotaholder had changed his agent and D.M. refused to take delivery.\n\nThe Mills credited the money which had been received from D.M. to D.K. & Co. and advised D. K. & Co. to keep the goods in a certain godown till the question of delivery was settled. In a return submitted under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, these 13 bales ivere shown as \"delivered\" to D. K. & Co.\n\nThe appellants were prosecuted and convicted on the ground that physical deli very was not given to D.K. & Co. and ohe return was not therefore true and accurate : Held, that, as the goods had left the Mill premises, the price had been paid and the property in them bad passed and as they were in a godown under the control of D. K. & Co., D. K. & Co. were in the circumstances, the persons to whom the goods were actually delivered and the conviction was illegal.\n\nA del creclere agent is an agent of the seller only np to a -point.\n\nBeyond that he is either a principal or an agent of the buyer.\n\nIn a penal statute it is the duty of the Court to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a broad an<l liberal sense.\n\nMarch 30\n\n826 i'il~PREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nCRBHNAI,\n\nAPPELLATE\n\n, JURISDICTION: Criminal\n\nTh r /.,'e J.:a ri'r1 Gofton .11il!s Ltd.\n\nAppeal No. 61 of 1952. ' Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 10th September, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the .5th March, 1951, of the High Court of .Judicature a.t Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Bhagwati J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 1950 arising out of the Judgment and OrrlPr dated the 29th May, 1950, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Second Court, Mazagaon, Bombay, in Cases Nos. 630/P and li35 /P of 1949.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay.\n\n111. P. Amin (R . .!. Kolah, with him) for appellants Nos. l, 2 and 4 ...\n\nA. K. Jluthuswmni for appellant No. 3.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. ]V[ ehta, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953. March 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ,, BosE J.-The appellants have been convicted under sections 7 and 9 of the Essential Supplies Act (No.\n\nXXIV of 1946) on two counts. The first appellant is a registered joint stock company, the Seksaria Mills Ltd. It was fined Rs. 10,000 on each of the two counts, that is to say, a total fine of Rs. 20,000, and this was upheld in appeal. The second appellant is the Director of the Mills. He was sentenced to two months' rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 2,00,000 on each count. In appeal the sentence of imprisonment was set aside and the fine reduced to Rs. 10,000 on each count.\n\nThe third appellant is the General Manager of the Mills.\n\nHe was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 2,000 on each count. This has been upheld. The fourth appellant is the Sales Manager of the Mills. He was sentenced to four months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 on each count. In appeal the sentence of imprisonment was upheld but the fine was reduced to Rs. 10,000 on each count. The substantive sentences are to run concurrently.\n\n1953 A Goverqment of India Notification dated 2nd February, 1946, required every manufacturer to b 't \"t d f t' 1 t' t h' The !:iekMria su m1 . rue, an accurate ill orma :10!1 re a mg o is Cotton Mill, Ltd. undertakmgs ' to the Textile Commrns10ner C.S.T. Secv. tion at Bombay. In compliance with this Order the The State of first appellant submitted a return, signed by the third Bontbay. appellant, on 10th March, 1947. This return is Exhibit A-1. It showed that 13 bales of cloth (20 half bales and 3 full bales) were delivered to Messrs. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company of Bombay during the month of February, 1947, on behalf of the quotaholder Shroe Kishan & Company. Another return of the same date (Exhibit A-2), also relating to the month of February, 1947, showed that 6 bales were delivered to the same Dwarkadas Khetan & Company on behalf of another quota-holder Beharilal Hairathi.\n\nA note on the back of each printed form states --\n\n\" By ' delivered ' or ' delivery ' is meant physical delivery of cloth in bales or in pieces but not cloth which though paid for is still in the physical possession of the seller.\"\n\nThe offence charged is that this information is not true and accurate. The case for tho prosecution is that the bales remained in the physical possession of the first appellant at all material times and were not physically delivered to Messrs. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company.\n\nBefore us the learned i'.lolicitor-General added that even if there was physical delivery to Dwarkadas Khetan that did not comply with the requirements of the form because the form requires information regarding physical delivery to the quota-holder or his agent and as Dwarkadas Khetan was not the agent of the quota-holder, the .statement is inaccurate and misleading.\n\nThe learned Presidency Magistrate who tried the case, and also the High Court on appeal, hold that the proRecution have established their cas0 and so have convicted and upheld the convietions respectively.\n\nBoscJ.\n\n1963 The business procedure of the first. appellant is explained by Dwarkadas Khetan. His firm, Dwark11- The S eksaria d JTh\n\n& C h fi ]] ' 0 ,,.11 Ltd as '- etan ompany, are t e rst a ppe ant s ottonJ.ui 11 \" , v. sole sellmg agents.\n\nThey are del credere agents\n\n1'hc Stntcof and guarantee payment to the first appellant of all\n\nBombay. saks made and, on the other side, guarantee delivery\n\nBoseJ. to the purchisers with whou1 they deal direct.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to understand that because of various orders and rules made under the Essential Supplies Act the first appellant could only sell to specified quota-holders and only up to the limits of their quotas. The two quota-holders which concern us are Shree Kishan & Company and Beharilal Bairathi.\n\nThe first appellant's selling procedure is this.\n\nWhen goods are ready for sale, it sends Dwarkadas Khetan & Company in duplicate a, \" ready sale note \". These notes contain particulars about the bales and the persons to whom they are to be delivered. Upon receipt of this Dwarkadas & Company contact the quotaholders or their agents.\n\nThe next step is for the quota-holder to pay Dwarkadas & Company the price of the goods specified in the \"ready sale note\". Upon receipt of the money, one of the two notes is handed over to the quota-holder or his agent and he is given a receipt for the money paid. At the same time Dwarkada.s & Company send the first appellant an \"advice slip \" telling it that the money has been received and asking it to prepare a delivery order. The first appella.nt then debits Dwarkadas & Company with the price and not the purchaser. For payment it looks to Dwarkadas & Company.\n\nUpon receipt of this advice slip the first appellant's office prepares tho delivery order and delivers the goods to the party concerned. The person receiving the goods then signs the deli very order in token of receipt and the signed order is sent to Dwaikadas & Company who, after making the necessary entries in their books, return the order to the Mills office.\n\nIt will be seen that the first appellant has no direct dealings with the purchaser. It acts through Dwarkadas & Company in every case.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREiE CODHT REPOHTS\n\n1953 It will now b, e necessary to trace the history of the two consignments relating to the 13 bales and the 6 bales separately. We will deal with the 13 bales first.\n\nThe 8eksariu ('otton .1..ltills Ltd.\n\nThe quota-holder in respect of the 13 bales was Shree Kishan & Company. This firm was an up-country firm and so it was necessary for it to appoint a local agent in Bombay for making payments and receiving delivery. There was some confusion about the agent so appointed ; at first one Dharsi Moolji was appointed and then P. C. Vora. The letter informing the first appellant that Dharsi Moolji bad been appointed is not on record but we were told at the Bar that it is not disputed that the letter is dated 7th February, 194 7. In any case, Dharsi Moolji wrote to the first appellant on 20th February, 1947, saying that he had been authorised to take delivery of the January quota on behalf of Messrs. Shree Kishan & Company and on 21st February, 1947, he paid Dwarkadas Khetan & Company a sum of Rs. 14,000 for this quota. A receipt and an entry in Dwarkadas' books evidence the payment.\n\nThe same day Dwarkadas Khetan wrote to the first appellant telling it that his firm had received payment in advance from Shree Kishan & ('ompany and that the 13 bales should be sent to \"our godown \", Whether the \"our \" refers to Dwarkadas' godown or to a godown jointly shared between Dwarkadas and the first appellant is not clear. The learned High Court Judges hold that the godown belonged to the first appellant, but that, in our opinion, is not very material for reasons we shall give later.\n\nOn receipt of this \"advice slip\" the first appellant prepared what it has called a \" ready sale note \" on the same day, 21st February, 1947, authorising the purchaser to take delivery within a week. Dharsi Moolji was named as the Commission Agent. (The man now entered is Prataprai Chunilal, that is, P. C. Vora,\n\nbut the original name was Dharsi l\\foolji. The change was made for reasons which will presently appear).\n\nThe State of\n\nBoil/bay.\n\nBo8eJ.\n\n830 SVPitEM.E COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19JJ In pursuance of all this, the first appellant despatched the 13 bales on 28th February, 1947, and sent them The Seharia t Dh u l\" B t th h\"l th t Cotton Mills Ltd. o ars1 lvJ.OO JI. u m e meanw 1 e o er even s v. had taken place.\n\nOne P. C. Vora wrote to the first The State of appellant on 17th February, 1947, and said that he\n\nBombay. had been authorised to take possession of these 13 bales.\n\nBose J, \\Vhat had happened in the meanwhile was that the quota-holder Shree Kishan & Company had changed its local agent. Accordingly, when the goods reached Dharsi l\\ioolji he refused to take delivery. The selling agent Dwarkadas th\\)reupon telephoned the first appellant. He explained that he h.ad actually received the money for the bales from Dharsi l\\ioolji a, nd had not received anything from P. C. Vora and so could not deliver the goods to the latter and equally could not accept money from P. C. Vora until the matter had been straightened out with Dharsi Moolji. The first appellant thereupon told Dwarkadas to keep the goods in the Dady Seth godown. On the same day, apparently before all this occmred, the first appellant credited Dwarkadas Khetan with the monev he had received from Dharsi Moolji on accomt of the 13 bales, less Dwarkadas' commission. In other words, this adjustment in the accounts was the equivalent of payment for the 13 bales by Dwarkadas Khetan to the first appellant on account of the purchaser Shree Kislmn & Company. It will be remembered that Dwarkadas Khetan & Company were the sole soiling agents and they alone were responsible to the l\\fills for orders which were placed through them.\n\nThe muddle between Dharsi .iVIoolji and P. C. Vora was cleared up between 3rd l\\farch, 1947, and 14th March, 1947.\n\nOn 3rd March, 1947, Dwarkadas Khetan returned the Rs. 14-,000 which Dharsi Moolji had paid and on 14th l\\farch, 1947, alccpted the money from P. C. Yorn. The alteration in the \"ready sale note\" of 21st February, 1947, was presumably made because of these facts.\n\nFour davs later, Dwarkadas Khetan delivered the goods to P. C. Vora. (There was no need to make any alterations in the first\n\n1953 appellant's account books because Dwarkadas was responsible for the price whatever happened between him and Dharsi and alw because in any event the Go~~:, s:i~;;; rd. goods were sold to Shree Kishan: the only query at that v. time was who was his agent to accept delivery for him). 'l'he State of The return with which we are concerned was made on 10th March, 1947. It will be seen from the above that the position at that date was as follows: ( l) the selling agent had informed the first appellant that he had effected a sale, (2) the selling agent had paid the first appellant for the goods, (3) specific bales had been set aside and appropriated to the sale and consequently the property in the goods had passed,\n\n(4) the goods had actually left the Mills' premises, and (5) they were in the Dady Seth godown under the control of Dwarkadas Khetan.\n\nvVe say the goods were under the control of Dwarkadas Khetan for three reasons~ ( 1) as shown above, the property in the goods had passed and so the first\n\napplant no longer had title to them, (2) Dwarkadas says that until he received the money for them from\n\nP. C. Vora he would have refused to deliver them, (3) being a del credere agent he would have been within his rights (a) to refuse delivery to anybody till he was paid and (li) to deliver them despite anything the first appellant might say once he received his money; also because Dwarkadas' Mehtaji says-\n\n\"If the goods are not accepted by the merchants or their agents, the same arc sent to ns and we keep them in the godown.\"\n\nBearing these facts in mind, we will now examine the offending document. It is a printed form.\n\nThe heading is- -\n\n\"Manufacturer's Returns showing details of delivery to quota-holders or others of civil cloth.\"\n\nThen there is a note as follows :\n\n\"IMPORTANT :-This form should be completed in accordance with the instructions printed overleaf ................. giving full details relating to the previo11& month.\"\n\nBambay.\n\n]Jose J.\n\n1.9.;., Under that is the following-\n\nThe Seksarin \"~11 stocks pledged/hypothcated.b:;: mar:ufactu- Cotton Mills Ltd. rers with banks or others shall be mcluded m this state-\n\n\"· ment.\"\n\nThe State f The only column in the printed form which could be Bombay. related to this is column 3 headed\" Full name and ad-\n\nBo\" J. dress of person to whom delivered.\" On the back there i\\re the following instructions:-\n\n\" II. The word ' others ' in the heading of the form includes artificers who are privileged to purehase cloth under General Permission No. TCS 42 /1, dated 10th August, 1944, and any person to whom deliveries are made under any other General or Special Permission or Order of the Textile Commissioner. The name of artificers or any other persons shall be mentioned in column 3 and B, gainst their names, number and date of General or 8pecial Permission shall be mentioned in column 2. - III. By 'delivered' or 'delivery' is meilnt physical delivery of cloth in bales or in pieces but not cloth which, though paid for, is still in the physical possession of the seller. \"\n\nThe form was filled in as follows : In the column headed \"Full name and address of quota-holder\" the name of Shree Kishan & Company is entered. In the column headed \" Full name and address of person to whom delivered \" the name of Dwarkadils Khetan & Company is entered. The question we have to decide is whether these two entries are inaccurate.\n\nDealing first with the learned Solicitor-General's argument regarding the construction of the words used in the form, we are of opinion that it cannot be accepted. The second clause of the portion marked \"Important\" towards the head of the form states that all stocks pledged or hypothecated with banks or others must also be included, and Instruction No. II on the back directs that the names of \"any other person\" must be entered in column 3 and that the number and date of the General or Special Permission must be set out in column 2. Whether this means that goods\n\n1953 cannot be pledged without permission or that only goods allotted to quota-holders can be pledged we do t k b h . . . l h h The Scksaria no n.ow, ut w atever 1t means, it is c ear t at t eoottonMills Ltd. entry m column 3 is not intended to be confined to v. quota-holders or their agents but means what it says, The State of namely the person to whom physical delivery of the Bombay. goods has been made whoever he may be.\n\nBo8e .!.\n\nThe only question therefore is whether there was physical delivery to Dwarkadas Khetan. In one sense, there can be no doubt about that. The goods left the Mills' premises, the property in them had passed and when Dharsi Moolji refused to receive them they were handed over to Dwarkadas Khetan and not taken back to the Mills.\n\nDwarkadas Khetan asked the Mills what he should do with them, and in the end he placed them in the Dady Seth godown. In any ordinary understanding of the term it would be clear that the goods had been phy:1ictdly delivered to Dwarkadas Khetan. But the learned High Court Judges do not appear to have concerned themselves with the question of actual physical possession because they say:-\n\n\"It would not be true to say, and the record amply bears it out, that this godown belonged to Dwarkadas Khetan.\n\nEven if Dwarkadas Khetan had control over the godown, the control was exercised on behalf of and as the agent of the Mills.\"\n\nTherefore, the test of the sort of possession which they had in mind was not the control over the goods.\n\nBut that has always been regarded as one of the tests of physical or de facto possession.\n\nLancelot Hall distinguishing between possession in law and possession in fact says that \"possession in the popular sense denotes a state of fact of exclusive physical\n\ncontrol\".\n\nSee his treatise on Possessory Liens in English Law, page 2. See also Pollock and Wright in their Essay on Possession in the Common Law, page 119. Drawing the same distinction they sy that \"physical possession\" may be generally described by stating that\n\nJO~\n\nSUPHENIE COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nJ9.jS \"when a person is in such a relation to a thing\n\nTl -;:;- . that, so far as rogardB the thing, he can assume, exer- \" \"\"\"\"\"a l I r I d 00110,, Mills Ltd. cise or resume rnanua cont!'o OJ 1, t al p.easure, an so\n\nv. far as regards other persons, the thing is under the prone State r tection of his personal presence, or in or on a house or Bombay. land occitpied by him, or in some receptacle belonging to him and under his control.\" Bosf J.\n\nThis would seem exactly to meet the case of Dwarkadas Khetan.\n\nPossession is an ambiguous term. The law books divide its concept into two broad categories, (i) physical possession or possession in fact and (2) legal possession which need not coincide with possession in fact.\n\nThe offending form with which we are concerned draws the same broad line. But even on the factual side of the border niceties creep in and so the possession of a servant is called custody rather than possession.\n\nBut what of an agent? If a man lives abroad over a period of years and leaves his house and furniture in charge of an agent who has the keys of the house and immediate access to and physical control over the furniture, it would be difficult to say that the agent was not in physical possession. It is true the legal possession would continue to reside in the owner but the actual physical possession would surely be that of the agent.\n\nAnd so with a del credere agent, because such a person is the agent of the seller only up to a point. Beyond that he is either a principal or an agent of the buyer.\n\nThis distinction was discussed by one of us in the Xagpur High Comt in Kalyandi K uwa1; ji v. Tirlcaram Sheolal(1) and was accepted by the Madras High Court in Kandula Radhakrishna Rao v. The Province of M a.dras(').\n\nBut we need not go into all this.\n\nHere is an Order which is to affect the business of hundreds of persons, many of whom are small petty merchants and traders, the sort of men who would not have lawyers constantly at their elbow ;· and even if they did, the more learned their advisers were in the law the more puzzled\n\n(1) A.LR. 1938 Nag. 254.\n\n(2) (1952) I Al.L.J, 494.\n\n~ I\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSl'.PREME COURT REPORTS 835\n\nthey would pe as to what advice to give, for it is not 1953. till one is learned in the law that wbtleties of thought . and bewilderment arise at the meaning of plain English The Seksaria d h. h d\" f Jl' GottonMillsLtd. wor s w 1c any or mary man o average mte 1gence, not versed in the law, would have no difficulty in The s~te of understanding. In a penal statute of this kind it is our Bomhay. duty to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they will not become Bose J. traps for honest, unlei1rned (in the law) and unwary men. lf there is honest and snbstantial compliance with an array of puzzling directions, that should be enough even if on some hypercritical view of the law other ingenious meanings can be devised. In our opinion, Dwarkadas Khetan could, in the circumstances given above, be described, without any straining of language, as the person to whom the goods were actually delivered. It follows the conviction on this count cannot stand.\n\nWe would like to add that in any event, even if ultra technical notions regarding the concept of possession were to be incorporated into the case, it would be wrong to say that there had been anything beyond a technical and unintentional breach of the law.\n\nThe facts are truly and accurately given according to the popular and natural meaning of the words used; nothing was hidden. The goods did reach the quotaholder in the end, or rather his proper agent, and we cannot see what anyone could stand to gain in an unauthorised way over the very natural mistake which occurred owing to what seems to have been a time-lag in the consequences of a change of agency. So, even if there was a technical breach of the law, it was not one which called for the severe strictures which are to be found in the trial court's judgment and certainly not for the savage sentences which the learned Magistrate imposed. In the High Court also we feel a nominal fine would have met the ends of justice even on the view the learned , Judges took of the law.\n\nThe charge on the second count relating to the 6 bales is a similar one and the fauts follow the same pattern. They have been detailed in the High C:ourfs\n\n836 SUPREME COURT HEi'ORTS [i953]\n\n1953 judgment, so it is not necessary to do m9re than out-\n\n'l'I s k . line them here.\n\nThe quota-holder here is Beharilal 0ou:: .:ii~:'l:d. Bairathi. In this case also, Dharsi Moolji paid Dwarkav. das Khetan for the goods and the Mills sent the bales\n\n'I!lw•Stato of to Dharsi Moolji for delivery in the same truck as the Bombay. 13 bales.\n\nDharsi Moolji refused to accept these bales\n\nBose J.\n\nApril 10\n\nalso, so they were deposited in the Dady Seth godown along with the other thirteen. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company has been entered as the person to whom delivery was made. For the reasons given above, we hold that this was a true and accurate return.\n\nThe appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence in each of the four cases is set aside. The fines, if paid, will be refunded.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for appellants Nos. 1, 2 & 4: Rajirider Narain.\n\nAgent for appellant No. 3: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nBASIR-UL-HUQ AND O'fHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL.\n\nNUR-UL-HUDA v.\n\nTHE STATE OF 'WEST BENGAL.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Gode, 1898, ss. 190, 195-Indian Penal Gode, 1860, ss. 182, 297, 500-Report to police all'9ing X had killed his 11iother-Trespass ivith police on cremation ground-Report fo11nd false-Oornplaint by X for trespass and defrin.ation-Maintainability-Jurisdiction to take counizance of ofjence-Whether barred by s. 195, Criminal Procedure Gode.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "THE REKRARIA COTTON MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE SEKSARIA COTTON MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VrVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VrVIAN BosE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Essential Supplies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Supplies Act", "statute": "Essential Supplies Act"}}, {"text": "Government Notification issued under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 441, "end_char": 510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D.K. & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 885, "end_char": 895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Mills were manufacture\"s of cloth and D.K. & Co. were their sole del credere selling agents who guaranteed payment to the appellant of the price of all sales made and, on the other side, guaranteed delivery <<l.J;.b.e purchasers with whom they dealt direct."}}, {"text": "D.M.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1401, "end_char": 1405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ;\\fills despatched the goods to D.M. but meanwhile the quotaholder had changed his agent and D.M. refused to take delivery."}}, {"text": "D. K. & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1583, "end_char": 1594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mills credited the money which had been received from D.M. to D.K. & Co. and advised D. K. & Co. to keep the goods in a certain godown till the question of delivery was settled."}}, {"text": "return submitted under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1681, "end_char": 1736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chagla C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2859, "end_char": 2870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 10th September, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the .5th March, 1951, of the High Court of .Judicature a.t Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Bhagwati J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2875, "end_char": 2883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 10th September, 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated the .5th March, 1951, of the High Court of .Judicature a.t Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Bhagwati J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3109, "end_char": 3125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nBombay."}}, {"text": "P. Amin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3133, "end_char": 3140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Amin (R . .!."}}, {"text": "R . .!. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3142, "end_char": 3155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Amin (R . .!."}}, {"text": "A. K. Jluthuswmni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3203, "end_char": 3220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l, 2 and 4 ...\n\nA. K. Jluthuswmni for appellant No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3243, "end_char": 3257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. ]V[ ehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "A. ]V[ ehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3294, "end_char": 3305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. ]V[ ehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seksaria Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3592, "end_char": 3611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first appellant is a registered joint stock company, the Seksaria Mills Ltd. It was fined Rs."}}, {"text": "2nd February, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4482, "end_char": 4500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1953 A Goverqment of India Notification dated 2nd February, 1946, required every manufacturer to b 't \"t d f t' 1 t' t h' The !:"}}, {"text": "Cotton Mill, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4625, "end_char": 4642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rue, an accurate ill orma :10!1 re a mg o is Cotton Mill, Ltd. undertakmgs ' to the Textile Commrns10ner C.S.T. Secv."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4706, "end_char": 4712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion at Bombay."}}, {"text": "10th March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4840, "end_char": 4856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant, on 10th March, 1947."}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas Khetan & Company of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4978, "end_char": 5014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It showed that 13 bales of cloth (20 half bales and 3 full bales) were delivered to Messrs. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company of Bombay during the month of February, 1947, on behalf of the quotaholder Shroe Kishan & Company."}}, {"text": "Shroe Kishan & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5080, "end_char": 5102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It showed that 13 bales of cloth (20 half bales and 3 full bales) were delivered to Messrs. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company of Bombay during the month of February, 1947, on behalf of the quotaholder Shroe Kishan & Company."}}, {"text": "Beharilal Hairathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5305, "end_char": 5323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another return of the same date (Exhibit A-2), also relating to the month of February, 1947, showed that 6 bales were delivered to the same Dwarkadas Khetan & Company on behalf of another quota-holder Beharilal Hairathi.", "canonical_name": "Beharilal Hairathi"}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas Khetan & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5803, "end_char": 5829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case for tho prosecution is that the bales remained in the physical possession of the first appellant at all material times and were not physically delivered to Messrs. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company."}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5925, "end_char": 5941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before us the learned i'.lolicitor-General added that even if there was physical delivery to Dwarkadas Khetan that did not comply with the requirements of the form because the form requires information regarding physical delivery to the quota-holder or his agent and as Dwarkadas Khetan was not the agent of the quota-holder, the .statement is inaccurate and misleading.", "canonical_name": "Dwarkav. das Khetan"}}, {"text": "Shree Kishan & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7139, "end_char": 7161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two quota-holders which concern us are Shree Kishan & Company and Beharilal Bairathi."}}, {"text": "Beharilal Bairathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7166, "end_char": 7184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two quota-holders which concern us are Shree Kishan & Company and Beharilal Bairathi.", "canonical_name": "Beharilal Hairathi"}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7460, "end_char": 7479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon receipt of this Dwarkadas & Company contact the quotaholders or their agents."}}, {"text": "Dwarkada.s & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7806, "end_char": 7826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the same time Dwarkada.s & Company send the first appellant an \"advice slip \" telling it that the money has been received and asking it to prepare a delivery order."}}, {"text": "Dwaikadas & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8345, "end_char": 8364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The person receiving the goods then signs the deli very order in token of receipt and the signed order is sent to Dwaikadas & Company who, after making the necessary entries in their books, return the order to the Mills office."}}, {"text": "8eksariu ('otton .1..ltills Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8800, "end_char": 8832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 8eksariu ('otton .1..ltills Ltd.\n\nThe quota-holder in respect of the 13 bales was Shree Kishan & Company."}}, {"text": "Dharsi Moolji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9118, "end_char": 9131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was some confusion about the agent so appointed ; at first one Dharsi Moolji was appointed and then P. C. Vora.", "canonical_name": "Dharsi l\\foolji"}}, {"text": "P. C. Vora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9155, "end_char": 9165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was some confusion about the agent so appointed ; at first one Dharsi Moolji was appointed and then P. C. Vora.", "canonical_name": "P. C. Vora"}}, {"text": "20th February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9420, "end_char": 9439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any case, Dharsi Moolji wrote to the first appellant on 20th February, 1947, saying that he had been authorised to take delivery of the January quota on behalf of Messrs. Shree Kishan & Company and on 21st February, 1947, he paid Dwarkadas Khetan & Company a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "21st February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9565, "end_char": 9584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any case, Dharsi Moolji wrote to the first appellant on 20th February, 1947, saying that he had been authorised to take delivery of the January quota on behalf of Messrs. Shree Kishan & Company and on 21st February, 1947, he paid Dwarkadas Khetan & Company a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9683, "end_char": 9692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A receipt and an entry in Dwarkadas' books evidence the payment.", "canonical_name": "Dwarkav. das Khetan"}}, {"text": "Shree Kishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9844, "end_char": 9856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same day Dwarkadas Khetan wrote to the first appellant telling it that his firm had received payment in advance from Shree Kishan & ('ompany and that the 13 bales should be sent to \"our godown \", Whether the \"our \" refers to Dwarkadas' godown or to a godown jointly shared between Dwarkadas and the first appellant is not clear."}}, {"text": "Prataprai Chunilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10493, "end_char": 10511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The man now entered is Prataprai Chunilal, that is, P. C. Vora,\n\nbut the original name was Dharsi l\\foolji."}}, {"text": "Dharsi l\\foolji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10561, "end_char": 10576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The man now entered is Prataprai Chunilal, that is, P. C. Vora,\n\nbut the original name was Dharsi l\\foolji.", "canonical_name": "Dharsi l\\foolji"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBoil", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10645, "end_char": 10659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nBoil/bay."}}, {"text": "17th February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11006, "end_char": 11025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One P. C. Vora wrote to the first The State of appellant on 17th February, 1947, and said that he\n\nBombay."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11112, "end_char": 11116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J, \\Vhat had happened in the meanwhile was that the quota-holder Shree Kishan & Company had changed its local agent."}}, {"text": "Dharsi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11270, "end_char": 11276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, when the goods reached Dharsi l\\ioolji he refused to take delivery."}}, {"text": "Shree Kislmn & Company", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12144, "end_char": 12166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, this adjustment in the accounts was the equivalent of payment for the 13 bales by Dwarkadas Khetan to the first appellant on account of the purchaser Shree Kislmn & Company."}}, {"text": "Dharsi .iVIoolji and", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12361, "end_char": 12381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The muddle between Dharsi .iVIoolji and P. C. Vora was cleared up between 3rd l\\farch, 1947, and 14th March, 1947."}}, {"text": "3rd l\\farch, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12416, "end_char": 12433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The muddle between Dharsi .iVIoolji and P. C. Vora was cleared up between 3rd l\\farch, 1947, and 14th March, 1947."}}, {"text": "14th March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12439, "end_char": 12455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The muddle between Dharsi .iVIoolji and P. C. Vora was cleared up between 3rd l\\farch, 1947, and 14th March, 1947."}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12461, "end_char": 12476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 3rd March, 1947, Dwarkadas Khetan returned the Rs."}}, {"text": "14th l\\farch, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12556, "end_char": 12574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14-,000 which Dharsi Moolji had paid and on 14th l\\farch, 1947, alccpted the money from P. C. Yorn."}}, {"text": "P. C. Yorn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12600, "end_char": 12610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14-,000 which Dharsi Moolji had paid and on 14th l\\farch, 1947, alccpted the money from P. C. Yorn.", "canonical_name": "P. C. Vora"}}, {"text": "Dharsi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12960, "end_char": 12966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no need to make any alterations in the first\n\n1953 appellant's account books because Dwarkadas was responsible for the price whatever happened between him and Dharsi and alw because in any event the Go~~:, s:i~;;; rd."}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas' Mehtaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14246, "end_char": 14264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vVe say the goods were under the control of Dwarkadas Khetan for three reasons~ ( 1) as shown above, the property in the goods had passed and so the first\n\napplant no longer had title to them, (2) Dwarkadas says that until he received the money for them from\n\nP. C. Vora he would have refused to deliver them, (3) being a del credere agent he would have been within his rights (a) to refuse delivery to anybody till he was paid and (li) to deliver them despite anything the first appellant might say once he received his money; also because Dwarkadas' Mehtaji says-\n\n\"If the goods are not accepted by the merchants or their agents, the same arc sent to ns and we keep them in the godown.\"", "canonical_name": "Dwarkav. das Khetan"}}, {"text": "Jose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14821, "end_char": 14825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "]Jose J.\n\n1.9.;.,"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15021, "end_char": 15026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State f The only column in the printed form which could be Bombay."}}, {"text": "Dwarkadils Khetan & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16142, "end_char": 16169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the column headed \" Full name and address of person to whom delivered \" the name of Dwarkadils Khetan & Company is entered."}}, {"text": "Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18669, "end_char": 18676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See also Pollock and Wright in their Essay on Possession in the Common Law, page 119."}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18681, "end_char": 18687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See also Pollock and Wright in their Essay on Possession in the Common Law, page 119."}}, {"text": "Bosf", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19329, "end_char": 19333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bosf J.\n\nThis would seem exactly to meet the case of Dwarkadas Khetan."}}, {"text": "Xagpur High Comt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20481, "end_char": 20497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This distinction was discussed by one of us in the Xagpur High Comt in Kalyandi K uwa1; ji v. Tirlcaram Sheolal(1) and was accepted by the Madras High Court in Kandula Radhakrishna Rao v. The Province of M a.dras(')."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20569, "end_char": 20586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This distinction was discussed by one of us in the Xagpur High Comt in Kalyandi K uwa1; ji v. Tirlcaram Sheolal(1) and was accepted by the Madras High Court in Kandula Radhakrishna Rao v. The Province of M a.dras(')."}}, {"text": "Dwarkav. das Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23478, "end_char": 23497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case also, Dharsi Moolji paid Dwarkav.", "canonical_name": "Dwarkav. das Khetan"}}, {"text": "Rajirider Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24127, "end_char": 24143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, 2 & 4: Rajirider Narain."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24173, "end_char": 24183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24212, "end_char": 24230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "BASIR-UL-HUQ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24233, "end_char": 24245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BASIR-UL-HUQ AND O'fHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL."}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24263, "end_char": 24283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BASIR-UL-HUQ AND O'fHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF 'WEST BENGAL"}}, {"text": "NUR-UL-HUDA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24286, "end_char": 24297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NUR-UL-HUDA v.\n\nTHE STATE OF 'WEST BENGAL."}}, {"text": "STATE OF 'WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24306, "end_char": 24327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NUR-UL-HUDA v.\n\nTHE STATE OF 'WEST BENGAL.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF 'WEST BENGAL"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24351, "end_char": 24362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "VrVIAN BosE"}}, {"text": "ss. 190, 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24420, "end_char": 24432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 182, 297, 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24458, "end_char": 24475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24713, "end_char": 24719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_836_848_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "836 SUPREME COURT HEi'ORTS [i953]\n\n1953 judgment, so it is not necessary to do m9re than out-\n\n'l'I s k . line them here.\n\nThe quota-holder here is Beharilal 0ou:: .:ii~:'l:d. Bairathi. In this case also, Dharsi Moolji paid Dwarkav. das Khetan for the goods and the Mills sent the bales\n\n'I!lw•Stato of to Dharsi Moolji for delivery in the same truck as the Bombay. 13 bales.\n\nDharsi Moolji refused to accept these bales\n\nBose J.\n\nApril 10\n\nalso, so they were deposited in the Dady Seth godown along with the other thirteen. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company has been entered as the person to whom delivery was made. For the reasons given above, we hold that this was a true and accurate return.\n\nThe appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence in each of the four cases is set aside. The fines, if paid, will be refunded.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for appellants Nos. 1, 2 & 4: Rajirider Narain.\n\nAgent for appellant No. 3: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.\n\nBASIR-UL-HUQ AND O'fHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL.\n\nNUR-UL-HUDA v.\n\nTHE STATE OF 'WEST BENGAL.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Gode, 1898, ss. 190, 195-Indian Penal Gode, 1860, ss. 182, 297, 500-Report to police all'9ing X had killed his 11iother-Trespass ivith police on cremation ground-Report fo11nd false-Oornplaint by X for trespass and defrin.ation-Maintainability-Jurisdiction to take counizance of ofjence-Whether barred by s. 195, Criminal Procedure Gode.\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S 837\n\n1953 The accused fo<lged information at a police station that X had ]Jeaten and throttled his mother to death and when the funeral pyre was in flames he entered the cremation ground \\Vith the Busir-uJ.Huq police. The dead body \\Vas examined and the complaint was fonnrl and Others to be false.\n\nOn the complaint of X, the accused was charged with v. offences under section 297, Indian Penal Code (trespass to wound The State of religious feelings) and section 500, Indian Penal Code (defamation).\n\nWest Bengal It was contended that, as the complaint disclosed offences under sections 182 and 211, Indian Penal Code, the Court could not take cognizance of the case except on a complaint by the proper authority under section 195, Crimin.I Procedure Code:\n\nlield, (i) that the facts which constituted the offence under section 297 were distinct from those which constituted an offence under section 182, as the act of trespass was alleged to have been committed after the making of the false report, so section 195 was no bar to the trial of the charge under section 297.\n\n(ii) As regards the charge under section 500, where the allegations made in a false report disclose two distinct offences, one against a public servant and the other against a pri vale individual, the latter is not debarred by the provisions of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, from seeking redress for the offence committed against him.\n\nSatish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De (24 C.W.N. 982); Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown [1939] E'.C.R. 139 referred to.\n\nSection 195 cannot however be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, on the ground that the latter offence is a minor one of the same character, or by describing the offence as one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in section 195, Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JumsmcrroN: Criminal Appeals Nos. 26 and 27 of 1952. Appeals under Article i34 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the Order dated 4th February, 1952, of the Calcutta High Court\n\n(CIIAKRAVARTTI and SINHA JJ.) in Criminal Revision Nos. 102 and 103 of 1952.\n\nS.C. Das Gupta and A.K. Dutt for the appellants.\n\nB. Sen for the respondent.\n\nArun Kwmar Datta for the complainant.\n\n1953.\n\nApril 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IliAHAJA::-1 J.\n\n-------- --. -------- -- ---- -- -\n\nillIAJAN J.-These two appeals aris{l.in the following ' circumstances: One Mokshadamoyec Dassi, Bair-ul-lluiz\n\nandO!hm mother ofDhirendra Nath Bera, died some time in the v. -eveniiig of the 3rd September, 1049. At the moment TheStateoL __ ofher death Dhircndra Nath \\rns not present at the West Benal - house. On his return at about 8-30 p.m. he along .\n\nwith some other persons took the dead body to the Mahaja-nJ. cremation grourid. It appears that Nurul Huda, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 27 of 1952, had lodged information at the police station to the effect that Dhirendra Nath had beaten and throttled his mother to death. \\Vhen the funeral pyre was .in flames, Nurul Huda along with the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 1952 and accompanied by the sub-inspector of police arrived at the cremation ground.\n\nThe appellants pointed out the dead body and told the sub-inspector that ' the complainant had killed his mother by throttling her and that there were marks of injury on the body which they could show to the subinspector if he caused the body to be brought down from the pyre. At their suggestion the fire was extinguished and the dead body was taken down from the pyre in spite of the protests from the complainant. On an examination of the dead body it was found that there were no marks of injury on it and the appellants were unable to point out any such marks. The body was however sent for post-mortem examination which was held on 5th September, 1049, but no injury was found on the person of the deceased. The sub-inspector after investigation reached the conclusion that a false complaint had been made against Dhirendra Nath,\n\nOn the 24th September, 1049, Dhirendra Nath filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Uluberia in the district of Howrah against the appellants in both the cases and one Sanwaral Huq. It was alleged in the complaint that the - information given by Numl Huda to the police was false, that Nurul Huda and the other appellants had - - made imputations mala fide out of enmity against him with the intention of harming his reputation and that to wound his religious feelings they had trespassed on\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSl'PREME COl'RT REPORTS 839\n\nthe cremation ground and mused the <len, d body to be biken nut hy making false impubtions.\n\nThe appellants were tried befOTe Shri R. Ray Choudhury, :Vfagistrate 1st class, 1Tluberia, on charges under sections 297 and 500, Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe charges framed against them were in these terms :---\n\n\"( 1) That you on or about the 17th day of Bhn, dra, 1:356 B.S. at Pamhila, P. S. Shyampur, with the intention of wounding the religious feelings of P. W. 1,\n\nDhirendra Xt1th Bera, the comp]n, inant, committed trespass upou the cremation ground where the funeral rites of the mother of the complainant were being performed and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 297, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance ;\n\n(2) That you on or abqut the 1 ith day of Bhaclra, 1356 B. S. at Panshila, P. S. Shyampur, defamed P. vV. 1, Dhirendrn Nath Bera, the complainant, by making imputation to the effect that he had killed his mother intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 500, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.\"\n\n'None of these charges relates to the falsity of the report made to the police or contains facts or allegations which disclose an offence under section 182, Indian Penal Code. The charge under section 297, Indian Penal Code, was a distinct one and concerned an act of the accused committed after the giving of the report. The charge under section 500 related to defamatory and libellous allegations contained in the report itself.\n\nIt was e011tended on behalf of the defence that 1\\urul Huda had lodged information with the police under a bona fide beliefcrcated in his mind on the statement of one Asiram Bibi and that none of the accused persons had entered the cremation ground as alleged by the complainant,\n\nBuir-ulHuq\n\nond- Others\n\nTh1-; State of lVest Bengal.\n\nAlahajffnJ.\n\n840 'suPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 The magistrate held the charges proved against all the appellants and convicted each of them under sec- Basir-ul-Huq and Others tions 297 and 500, Indian Penal Code. Each of the\n\nv. appellants was awarded three months' rigorous im-\n\nThe State of prisonment on the charge under section 297 and each West Bengal of them was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 100 on the\n\nMahajan .r. charge under section 500.\n\nThe appellants went up in appeal to the Sessions Judge of Howrah who by his order dated 31st July, 1950, set aside the convictions and sentences and acquitted them. He held that on the facts stated in the complaint the only offence that could be said to have been committed by the appellants was one under section 182 or section 211, Indian Penal Code, and that a court was not competent to take cognizance of those offences except on a complaint by a proper authority under the provisions of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nAgainst the acquittal order an application in revision wa.s preferred to the High Court. This petition came up for hearing before a Bench of the High Court (K. C. Das Gupta and P. N. Mookerjee JJ.).\n\nThe learned judges reached the conclusion that on the facts alleged in the petition of complaint distinct offences under sections 182, 297 and 500, Indian Penal Code, had been disclosed. They however referred for the decision of the Full Bench the following question:-\n\n\"If the facts alleged in a petition of complaint, or in an information received by the magistrate, on which a magistrate can ordinarily take cognizance of an offence under section 190, Criminal Procedure Code, disclose an offence of which cognizance cannot be taken by the magistrate because of the special provisions of section 195, or 196, or 196-A, or 197, or 199, Criminal Procedure Code, is the magistrate also de).iarred because of this from taking cognizance of other offences disclosed by the facts alleged, which are not in ny way affected by the provisions of section 195, or 196, or 196-A or 197 or 199, Criminal Procedure Code.\"\n\nThe Full Bench answered the question referred in the negative. In respect of the conviction under\n\nsection 297, Ipdian Penal Code, the learned Judges said that there was nothing in sections 195 to 199, Criminal Procedure Code, which could in any way bar the prosecution of the appellants under that section, as it could in no way be said that it arose out of the facts which would constitute an offence under section 182, or section 211, Indian Penal Code.\n\nOn the other hand, it arose from an entirely different set of facts, namely, the trespass by the opposite parties in the burial ground and the removal of the corpse from the lighted funeral pyre.\n\nWith regard to the offence under section 500, it was observed that though the prosecution for defamation was based on the false information given to a public officer, that circumstance, however, was no bar for the prosecution of the appellants under that section.\n\nIn the result the application in revision was allowed, the order of acquittal was set asidr and the sessions judge was directed to re-hear the appeal on the merits.\n\nAfter remand the appeal was heard on the merits and was dismissed.\n\nThe convictions and sentences passed by the magistrate were confirmed. Against the order of the sessions judge the appellants went up in revision to the High Court but these applications were summarily dismissed. The appellants thereupon applied to the High Court for a certificate under article 134\n\n(1) (c) of the Constitution for leave to appeal to this Court. In the application the order of the Full Bench dated 22nd June, 1951, was challenged. This application was opposed on behalf of the complainant on the ground that the interim order of the Full Bench not having been appealed against could not be challenged at that stage. Thus two substantial questions were argued in the leave application, namely,\n\n1. whether it was open to the accused to question the correctness of the Full Bench decision, it not having been appealed from when it was passed, and,\n\n2. whether the point decided by the Full Bench in itself was of sufficient importance to justify the granting of a certificate under article 134(1 )( c). 109\n\nBasi\"'Ul-Huq\n\nand Othe1's\n\nThe State of TV est Bengal,\n\nMahajanJ~\n\n195.J\n\nRa8i1-ul.Huq\n\nand OtllerR\n\nThe State of JV est Benaal.\n\nMa.hajanJ,\n\nAs the judgment of the Full Bench di4 not terminate the proceedings but merely directed the appeal to be reheard, it was held that the petitioners could not appeal from it at that time and it was open to them to raise the point at this stage.\n\nThe second question was considered of sufficient importance to justify the grant of leave and leave was accordingly granted.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminrory objection in order to canvass the first question mentioned above, while the learned counsel for the appellants canvassed the question of the correctness of the decision of the Full Bench on its merits.\n\nHe contended that the magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint under section 500 and section 297, Indian Penal Code, as the facts disclosed constituted an offence under section 182 which offence could not be tried except on a complaint by a public servant.\n\nSection 195, Criminal Procedure Code, on which the qnestion raised is grounded, provides, inter alia, that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 172 to 188, Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the pnblic servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing oft he pnblic servant concerned no prosecution for an offence under section 182 can be taken cognizance of. It does not further provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence other distinct offences are eommitted, the magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respe';; t cf those offences as well.\n\nThe allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may corrntitute an offence against the authority of the public servant or public justice, and on the other hand, they may also constitnte the offence of defamation or some other distinct offence.\n\nThe section does not per se bar the cognizance by the magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report has been made.\n\nIt was however argued that if on the same facts an\n\nS.C.lt.\n\nSCPREME COURT REPORTS 843\n\noffence of whi.ch no cognizance can be taken under the provisions of section HJ.5 is disclosed and the same facts disclose another offence as well which is outside the purview of the section and prosecution for that other offence is taken cognizance of without the requirements of section 195 having been fulfilled, then the provisions of that section would become nugatory and if such a course was permitted those provisions will stand defeated. It was further said that it is not permissible for the prosecution to ignore the provisimrn of this section\n\nby describing the offence as being punishable under some other section of the Penal Code.\n\nIn our judgment, tlw contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is without any substance so far as the present case is concerned. The charge for the offence under section 297, Indian Penal Code, could in no circumstance, as pointed out by the High Court, be described as falling within the purview of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. The act of trespass was alleged to have been eommitted subsequent to the making of the false report and all the ingredients of the offence that have been held to have been established on tlrn evidence concern the conduct of the appellants during the post-report period.\n\nIn these circumstances, no serious contention could be raised that the provisions of section 195 would stand defeated by the magistrate having taken cognizance of the offence under that section.\n\nAs regards the charge under section .500, Indian Penal Code, it seems fairly clear both on principle and authority that where the allegations made in >1 false report disclose two distinct offences, one against the public servant and the other against a private individual, that other is not debarred by the provisions of section 195 from seeking redress for the offence committed against him.\n\nSection 499, Indian Penal Code, which mentions the ingredients of the offence of defamation gives within defined limits immunity to persons making depositions in court, but it is now well settled that that immunity is a qualified one and is not absolute as it is in English law.\n\nUnder section 198,\n\nBaR£r-ul-Hur;\n\nand Othe1s\n\nv. 'l'!te State of H' t?.st Bengal.\n\n}dahajan J.\n\nBusir-ul-Huq and Otherfl\n\nThe State of lV est Bengal.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n844 SUPREME cou:R'r HEPORTS [1953]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code, a complaint in, respect of an offence under section 499, Indian Penal Code, can onlv be initiated at the instance of the person defamed, i!1 like manner as cognizance for an offence under section 182 cannot be taken except at the complaint of the public servant concerned. In view of these provisions there does not seem in principle any warrant for the proposition that a complaint under section 499 in such a situation cannot be taken cognizance of unless two persons join in making it, i.e., it can only be considered if both the public servant and the person defamed join in making it, otherwise the person defamed is without any redress.\n\nThe statute has prescribed distinct procedure for the making of the complaints under these two provisions of the Indian Penal Code and when the prescribed procedure has been followed, the court is bound to take cognizance of the offenoo complained of.\n\nThe decided cases fully support this view and our attention has not been drawn to any case which ha.s taken a contrary view as regards offences under section 500, Indian Penal Code.\n\nIn 8atis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De (1), five judges of the Calcutta High Court considered this question and held that where the maker of a single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, one under section 211, Indian Penal Code, which is an offence against public justice, and the other an offence under section 499, wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the court concerned, as the Criminal Procedure Code has not provided for sanction of court for taking cognizance of that offence. It was said that the two offences being fundamentally distinct in nature, could be separately taken cognizance of. Tha.t they are distinct in character is patent from the fact that tho former is made non-compoundable, while the latter remains compoundable; in one for the the initiation of the proceedings the legislature requires the sanction of the court under section 195,\n\n(I) (1920) 24 C.W.;,./, 982,\n\n•..\n\n8.C.H.\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS 845\n\nCriminal Proce, dure Code, while in the other, l'ognizance can be taken of the offence on the complaint of the person defamed. It could not be denied that the accused could be tried of charges under sections 182 and 500, Indian Penal Code, separately on the same facts pro1-ided the public servant as well as the person defamed made complaints. If that is so, there is no reason why one cannot be tried independently of the other so long as the requirements of each are satisfied.\n\nHarries C. J. while delivering the Full Bench decision in question examined all the earlier cases of the Calcutta High Court and observed that where upon the facts the commission of several offences is disclosed some of which require sanction and others do not, it is open to the complainant to proced in respect of those only which do not require sanction; because to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding very materially to the provisions of sections 195 to 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nSections 195 to 199 deal with the requisites for the prosecution of certain specified offences and the provisions of those sections must be limited to prosecutions for the offences actually indicated. If it was the intention of the legislature to make sanctions or complaints in a certain form necessary for the prosecution of all offences disclosed by facts which would give rise to any of the offences specifically indicated in these sections, the legislature could have said so but it did not.\n\nR, ecently this matter was canvassed before a Full Bench of the Madras High Court and it was held that in such cases it was open to the party defamed to take proceedings under section 499, Indian Penal Code, without the court filing a complaint in accordance with the provisions laid down in section 195. There the question was whether the alleged defamer who had given false evidence in a court could be prosecuted under section 499, Indian Penal Code, without a complaint by the court before whom he gave evidence and the question was answered in the affirmative after an exhaustive review of the decided cases of the difl:erent High Courts in India. It was said that if the offence of\n\nRusir-ul-Huq\n\nnnd Othe1s\n\nv. 'l'he State of Tr est Bengal.\n\nil1ahajan J,\n\n.ha.jit-ul-Huq\n\na.nd Otlu; rs\n\nv. '1.'he State of\n\nTV est Bengal.\n\nM aha)<1 n .] •\n\n84(i SUPREME COGRi1 REPORtS I i953J\n\ng1vmg false evidence in a judicial proceeding and defamation do not belong to the same genus but aro distinct and separate in their characteristics and ingredients, it was difficult to perceive any serious inhibition bv the Criminal Procedure Code for initiation and trial of one of these offences independently of mitcrim resort to fulfilling the conditions necessary tn rnnunence a prosecution for the other. These observations have apt application to tho present case. The ingredients of the offence under section 182 cannot be said to be the ingredients for the offence under section 500. Nor can it be said that the offence relating to giving false information relntes to the same group of offences as that of defamation.\n\nThough, in our judgment, section l!J5 docs not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not i' whether the facts disclose prim.arily and essentially an offence for whieh a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required. In other words, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging n person with an offence to which that section does not :1pply and then convieting him of an oftence to which it docs, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being 0110 punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in tl'uth and substance the offence falis in the category of sections mentioned in section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of seetion 195 prosecution foi:,\n\nsuch an offence cannot lie taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.\n\nBefore concluding, reference may also be made to the decision of the Federal Court in Hori Ram Singh v.\n\nThe Grown('). The appellant in that case was charged\n\n(1) (1939] F.C.R. 159.\n\nwith offences. under sections 409 and 4 77-A, Indian Penal Code. The offence un<ler section 477-A could not be taken cognizance of withff1t the previous consent of the Governor under section 2iO(l) of the Constitution Act, while the consent of the Governor was not required for the institution of the proceedings under section 409, Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe charge was that the accused dishonestly misapptopriated or converted to his own certain medicines entrusted to him in his official capa- C'ity as a sub-assistant surgeon in the Punjab Provincial Subordinate Medical Service. He was further charged that being a public servant, he wilfully and with intent to defraud omitted to record certain entries in a stock book of medicines belonging to the hospital where he was employe<l and in his possession. The proceedings under section 477-A were quashed by the Federal Court for want of jurisdiction, the consent of the Governor not having been obtained, but the case was sent back to the sessions judge for hearing on the merits as regards the charge under section 409, Indian Penal Code, and the order of acquittal passed by the sessions judge under that charge was set aside. Two distinct offences having been committed in the same transaction, one an offence of misappropriation under section409 and the other an offence under section 477-A which required the sanction of the Governor, the circumstance that cognizance could not be taken of the latter offence without such consent was not considered a bar to the trial of the appellant with respect to the offence under section 409.\n\nLeave to appeal under artide 134 ( 1 ) ( c) of the Constitution was limited to the question of law referred to the }tu]] Bench in this case, and it was distinctly said in the order disposing of the leave petition that leave would not have been granted had the scope of the appeal been limited to the merits of the case. It was observed that having regard to the findings recorded by the fina, I court of fact, as also the evidence in the case the elements of both the offl•nces had been fullv established. The learned counsel for the appellants attempted to argue that on the facts found no\n\n.1953\n\nBn&ir-ul-Huq\n\n(//Id Othe1s\n\nThe State of TVest Bengal.\n\nJfahajan J.\n\n19.53\n\nBn.sir-ul-Huq\n\nand Others\n\nThe State of lV eNt Ben.gal.\n\n. 11'1ohajan J.\n\n19.53\n\nApril 14.\n\noffence under section 297 could be said to have been made out. This point, in our opinion, \"is not open at this stage, it having been held that all the ingredients of the offence had been established on the record.\n\nEven otherwise there is no substance in the contention because the prosecution evidence is sufficient to hold the offence proved against all the appellants .\n\nFor the reasons given above we hold that there is no substance in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Sukumar Ghose.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. K. Bose.\n\nAgent for the complainant: 8. C. Bannerjee.\n\nLAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS\n\nR. RAMIER.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nHindu law-Will--Beqiwst to wife for her lifetime and to daitghter absolutely after wife's lifetime-Estate taken by wife-\n\nTVhether ordinary life estate or Hindn widow's estate-Danghter's estate-Whether vested-Death of daitghter be/ore widow, effect of\n\n-Constrnction of Hindn will-Gnidina principles.\n\nA Hindu Brahmin governed by the l'IIitakshara law made a \\vill in \\vhich he gave the following directions: \"After my life. time, you, the aforesaid Rauganayaki Ammal, my wife, shall till your lifetime enjoy the aforesaid entire properties ... After your lifetime, Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alie.nation such as gift, exchange and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations. As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to 0, wife of iny late son, H, my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases and obtain a release deed.\" After the death of the testatol' his \\vife entered into possession of his properties bnt Lefore the r1eath of his wifo, his daughter and all her children died: Held, (i) that on a proper constrndion of the will in the light of surrounding circumstances, the testator had conferred on bis\n\nI I", "total_entities": 186, "entities": [{"text": "Dharsi Moolji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 205, "end_char": 218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case also, Dharsi Moolji paid Dwarkav."}}, {"text": "Dwarkav. das Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 224, "end_char": 243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case also, Dharsi Moolji paid Dwarkav."}}, {"text": "Bose J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 422, "end_char": 429, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas Khetan & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 525, "end_char": 551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dwarkadas Khetan & Company has been entered as the person to whom delivery was made."}}, {"text": "Rajirider Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 873, "end_char": 889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, 2 & 4: Rajirider Narain."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 919, "end_char": 929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 958, "end_char": 976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1005, "end_char": 1029, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1077, "end_char": 1095, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 190, 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1166, "end_char": 1178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 182, 297, 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1204, "end_char": 1221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1459, "end_char": 1465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 837", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1523, "end_char": 1528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1895, "end_char": 1906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1908, "end_char": 1925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1982, "end_char": 1993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1995, "end_char": 2012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 182 and 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2105, "end_char": 2125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2127, "end_char": 2144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2246, "end_char": 2257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2347, "end_char": 2358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2419, "end_char": 2430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2531, "end_char": 2542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2587, "end_char": 2598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2634, "end_char": 2645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2846, "end_char": 2857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2859, "end_char": 2882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3066, "end_char": 3077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3402, "end_char": 3419, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3510, "end_char": 3521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3523, "end_char": 3546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3662, "end_char": 3683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIIAKRAVARTTI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3754, "end_char": 3767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals under Article i34 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the Order dated 4th February, 1952, of the Calcutta High Court\n\n(CIIAKRAVARTTI and SINHA JJ.)"}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals under Article i34 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the Order dated 4th February, 1952, of the Calcutta High Court\n\n(CIIAKRAVARTTI and SINHA JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S.C. Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Das Gupta and A.K. Dutt for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A.K. Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3850, "end_char": 3859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Das Gupta and A.K. Dutt for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3881, "end_char": 3887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Arun Kwmar Datta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3909, "end_char": 3925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arun Kwmar Datta for the complainant."}}, {"text": "illIAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4061, "end_char": 4069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "illIAJAN J.-These two appeals aris{l.in the following ' circumstances: One Mokshadamoyec Dassi, Bair-ul-lluiz\n\nandO!hm mother ofDhirendra Nath Bera, died some time in the v. -eveniiig of the 3rd September, 1049."}}, {"text": "Dhircndra Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4313, "end_char": 4327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the moment TheStateoL  ofher death Dhircndra Nath \\rns not present at the West Benal - house.", "canonical_name": "Dhircndra Nath"}}, {"text": "Nurul Huda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4513, "end_char": 4523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Nurul Huda, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Nurul Huda"}}, {"text": "Dhirendra Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27 of 1952, had lodged information at the police station to the effect that Dhirendra Nath had beaten and throttled his mother to death.", "canonical_name": "Dhircndra Nath"}}, {"text": "5th September, 1049", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The body was however sent for post-mortem examination which was held on 5th September, 1049, but no injury was found on the person of the deceased."}}, {"text": "24th September, 1049", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5734, "end_char": 5754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-inspector after investigation reached the conclusion that a false complaint had been made against Dhirendra Nath,\n\nOn the 24th September, 1049, Dhirendra Nath filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Uluberia in the district of Howrah against the appellants in both the cases and one Sanwaral Huq."}}, {"text": "Uluberia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5847, "end_char": 5855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-inspector after investigation reached the conclusion that a false complaint had been made against Dhirendra Nath,\n\nOn the 24th September, 1049, Dhirendra Nath filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Uluberia in the district of Howrah against the appellants in both the cases and one Sanwaral Huq."}}, {"text": "Howrah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5875, "end_char": 5881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-inspector after investigation reached the conclusion that a false complaint had been made against Dhirendra Nath,\n\nOn the 24th September, 1049, Dhirendra Nath filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Uluberia in the district of Howrah against the appellants in both the cases and one Sanwaral Huq."}}, {"text": "Sanwaral Huq", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5931, "end_char": 5943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-inspector after investigation reached the conclusion that a false complaint had been made against Dhirendra Nath,\n\nOn the 24th September, 1049, Dhirendra Nath filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Uluberia in the district of Howrah against the appellants in both the cases and one Sanwaral Huq."}}, {"text": "Numl Huda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6009, "end_char": 6018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged in the complaint that the - information given by Numl Huda to the police was false, that Nurul Huda and the other appellants had - - made imputations mala fide out of enmity against him with the intention of harming his reputation and that to wound his religious feelings they had trespassed on\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSl'PREME COl'RT REPORTS 839\n\nthe cremation ground and mused the <len, d body to be biken nut hy making false impubtions."}}, {"text": "Nurul Huda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6049, "end_char": 6059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged in the complaint that the - information given by Numl Huda to the police was false, that Nurul Huda and the other appellants had - - made imputations mala fide out of enmity against him with the intention of harming his reputation and that to wound his religious feelings they had trespassed on\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSl'PREME COl'RT REPORTS 839\n\nthe cremation ground and mused the <len, d body to be biken nut hy making false impubtions.", "canonical_name": "Nurul Huda"}}, {"text": "R. Ray Choudhury", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6424, "end_char": 6440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were tried befOTe Shri R. Ray Choudhury, :Vfagistrate 1st class, 1Tluberia, on charges under sections 297 and 500, Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "sections 297 and 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6494, "end_char": 6514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6516, "end_char": 6533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "P. S. Shyampur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6670, "end_char": 6684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charges framed against them were in these terms :---\n\n\"( 1) That you on or about the 17th day of Bhn, dra, 1:356 B.S. at Pamhila, P. S. Shyampur, with the intention of wounding the religious feelings of P. W. 1,\n\nDhirendra Xt1th Bera, the comp]n, inant, committed trespass upou the cremation ground where the funeral rites of the mother of the complainant were being performed and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 297, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance ;\n\n(2) That you on or abqut the 1 ith day of Bhaclra, 1356 B. S. at Panshila, P. S. Shyampur, defamed P. vV. 1, Dhirendrn Nath Bera, the complainant, by making imputation to the effect that he had killed his mother intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 500, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.\""}}, {"text": "Dhirendra Xt1th Bera", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6753, "end_char": 6773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charges framed against them were in these terms :---\n\n\"( 1) That you on or about the 17th day of Bhn, dra, 1:356 B.S. at Pamhila, P. S. Shyampur, with the intention of wounding the religious feelings of P. W. 1,\n\nDhirendra Xt1th Bera, the comp]n, inant, committed trespass upou the cremation ground where the funeral rites of the mother of the complainant were being performed and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 297, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance ;\n\n(2) That you on or abqut the 1 ith day of Bhaclra, 1356 B. S. at Panshila, P. S. Shyampur, defamed P. vV. 1, Dhirendrn Nath Bera, the complainant, by making imputation to the effect that he had killed his mother intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 500, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.\""}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6967, "end_char": 6978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6980, "end_char": 6997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Panshila", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7092, "end_char": 7100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charges framed against them were in these terms :---\n\n\"( 1) That you on or about the 17th day of Bhn, dra, 1:356 B.S. at Pamhila, P. S. Shyampur, with the intention of wounding the religious feelings of P. W. 1,\n\nDhirendra Xt1th Bera, the comp]n, inant, committed trespass upou the cremation ground where the funeral rites of the mother of the complainant were being performed and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 297, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance ;\n\n(2) That you on or abqut the 1 ith day of Bhaclra, 1356 B. S. at Panshila, P. S. Shyampur, defamed P. vV. 1, Dhirendrn Nath Bera, the complainant, by making imputation to the effect that he had killed his mother intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm the reputation of the complainant and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 500, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.\""}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7413, "end_char": 7424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7426, "end_char": 7443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7617, "end_char": 7628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7630, "end_char": 7647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7666, "end_char": 7677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7679, "end_char": 7696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7812, "end_char": 7823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Asiram Bibi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8072, "end_char": 8083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was e011tended on behalf of the defence that 1\\urul Huda had lodged information with the police under a bona fide beliefcrcated in his mind on the statement of one Asiram Bibi and that none of the accused persons had entered the cremation ground as alleged by the complainant,\n\nBuir-ulHuq\n\nond- Others\n\nTh1-; State of lVest Bengal."}}, {"text": "State of lVest Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8217, "end_char": 8238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was e011tended on behalf of the defence that 1\\urul Huda had lodged information with the police under a bona fide beliefcrcated in his mind on the statement of one Asiram Bibi and that none of the accused persons had entered the cremation ground as alleged by the complainant,\n\nBuir-ulHuq\n\nond- Others\n\nTh1-; State of lVest Bengal.", "canonical_name": "State of H' t?.st Bengal"}}, {"text": "Basir-ul-Huq and Others", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8398, "end_char": 8421, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BASIR-UL-HUQ AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8441, "end_char": 8458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8571, "end_char": 8582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8680, "end_char": 8691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Howrah", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8734, "end_char": 8758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants went up in appeal to the Sessions Judge of Howrah who by his order dated 31st July, 1950, set aside the convictions and sentences and acquitted them."}}, {"text": "31st July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8782, "end_char": 8797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants went up in appeal to the Sessions Judge of Howrah who by his order dated 31st July, 1950, set aside the convictions and sentences and acquitted them."}}, {"text": "section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9000, "end_char": 9011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9015, "end_char": 9026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9028, "end_char": 9045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9187, "end_char": 9198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9200, "end_char": 9223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. C. Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9383, "end_char": 9398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition came up for hearing before a Bench of the High Court (K. C. Das Gupta and P. N. Mookerjee JJ.)."}}, {"text": "P. N. Mookerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9403, "end_char": 9418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition came up for hearing before a Bench of the High Court (K. C. Das Gupta and P. N. Mookerjee JJ.)."}}, {"text": "sections 182, 297 and 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9547, "end_char": 9572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9574, "end_char": 9591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9868, "end_char": 9879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9881, "end_char": 9904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10017, "end_char": 10028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10064, "end_char": 10087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10266, "end_char": 10277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10311, "end_char": 10334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10437, "end_char": 10448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Ipdian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10450, "end_char": 10467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 195 to 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10519, "end_char": 10538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ipdian Penal Code", "statute": "Ipdian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10540, "end_char": 10563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10747, "end_char": 10758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10763, "end_char": 10774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10776, "end_char": 10793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11026, "end_char": 11037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11780, "end_char": 11791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "22nd June, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11909, "end_char": 11924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the application the order of the Full Bench dated 22nd June, 1951, was challenged."}}, {"text": "article 134(1 )( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12491, "end_char": 12510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of TV est Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12548, "end_char": 12570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "109\n\nBasi\"'Ul-Huq\n\nand Othe1's\n\nThe State of TV est Bengal,\n\nMahajanJ~\n\n195.J\n\nRa8i1-ul.", "canonical_name": "State of H' t?.st Bengal"}}, {"text": "State of JV est Benaal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12622, "end_char": 12644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Huq\n\nand OtllerR\n\nThe State of JV est Benaal.", "canonical_name": "State of H' t?.st Bengal"}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13388, "end_char": 13399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13404, "end_char": 13415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13417, "end_char": 13434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13488, "end_char": 13499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13577, "end_char": 13588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13590, "end_char": 13613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 172 to 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13746, "end_char": 13765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13767, "end_char": 13784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14040, "end_char": 14051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15126, "end_char": 15137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15479, "end_char": 15489, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15672, "end_char": 15683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15685, "end_char": 15702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15810, "end_char": 15821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15823, "end_char": 15846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16204, "end_char": 16215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16357, "end_char": 16374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16636, "end_char": 16647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16709, "end_char": 16720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16722, "end_char": 16739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16995, "end_char": 17006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "State of H' t?.st Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17046, "end_char": 17070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 198,\n\nBaR£r-ul-Hur;\n\nand Othe1s\n\nv. 'l'!te State of H' t?.st Bengal.", "canonical_name": "State of H' t?.st Bengal"}}, {"text": "dahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17074, "end_char": 17081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "}dahajan J.\n\nBusir-ul-Huq and Otherfl\n\nThe State of lV est Bengal.", "canonical_name": "dahajan"}}, {"text": "State of lV est Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17116, "end_char": 17138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "}dahajan J.\n\nBusir-ul-Huq and Otherfl\n\nThe State of lV est Bengal.", "canonical_name": "State of H' t?.st Bengal"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17141, "end_char": 17148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\n844 SUPREME cou:R'r HEPORTS [1953]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code, a complaint in, respect of an offence under section 499, Indian Penal Code, can onlv be initiated at the instance of the person defamed, i!1 like manner as cognizance for an offence under section 182 cannot be taken except at the complaint of the public servant concerned.", "canonical_name": "dahajan"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17189, "end_char": 17212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17258, "end_char": 17269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17271, "end_char": 17288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17402, "end_char": 17413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17603, "end_char": 17614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17971, "end_char": 17988, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18261, "end_char": 18272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18274, "end_char": 18291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18363, "end_char": 18382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 8atis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De (1), five judges of the Calcutta High Court considered this question and held that where the maker of a single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, one under section 211, Indian Penal Code, which is an offence against public justice, and the other an offence under section 499, wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the court concerned, as the Criminal Procedure Code has not provided for sanction of court for taking cognizance of that offence."}}, {"text": "section 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18506, "end_char": 18517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18519, "end_char": 18536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18613, "end_char": 18624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19258, "end_char": 19269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "8.C.H.\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS 845\n\nCriminal Proce", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19307, "end_char": 19356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tha.t they are distinct in character is patent from the fact that tho former is made non-compoundable, while the latter remains compoundable; in one for the the initiation of the proceedings the legislature requires the sanction of the court under section 195,\n\n(I) (1920) 24 C.W.;,./, 982,\n\n•..\n\n8.C.H.\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS 845\n\nCriminal Proce, dure Code, while in the other, l'ognizance can be taken of the offence on the complaint of the person defamed."}}, {"text": "sections 182 and 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19541, "end_char": 19561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19563, "end_char": 19580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19824, "end_char": 19831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harries C. J. while delivering the Full Bench decision in question examined all the earlier cases of the Calcutta High Court and observed that where upon the facts the commission of several offences is disclosed some of which require sanction and others do not, it is open to the complainant to proced in respect of those only which do not require sanction; because to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding very materially to the provisions of sections 195 to 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "sections 195 to 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20284, "end_char": 20303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20311, "end_char": 20337, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 195 to 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20340, "end_char": 20359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20902, "end_char": 20919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R, ecently this matter was canvassed before a Full Bench of the Madras High Court and it was held that in such cases it was open to the party defamed to take proceedings under section 499, Indian Penal Code, without the court filing a complaint in accordance with the provisions laid down in section 195."}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21014, "end_char": 21025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21027, "end_char": 21044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21130, "end_char": 21141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21260, "end_char": 21271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21273, "end_char": 21290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Tr est Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21562, "end_char": 21584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that if the offence of\n\nRusir-ul-Huq\n\nnnd Othe1s\n\nv. 'l'he State of Tr est Bengal.", "canonical_name": "State of H' t?.st Bengal"}}, {"text": "il1ahajan J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21587, "end_char": 21598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "il1ahajan J,\n\n.ha.jit-ul-Huq\n\na.nd Otlu; rs\n\nv. '1.'he State of\n\nTV est Bengal."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nTV est Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21642, "end_char": 21665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "il1ahajan J,\n\n.ha.jit-ul-Huq\n\na.nd Otlu; rs\n\nv. '1.'he State of\n\nTV est Bengal.", "canonical_name": "State of H' t?.st Bengal"}}, {"text": "section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22231, "end_char": 22242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22302, "end_char": 22313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23342, "end_char": 23359, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23451, "end_char": 23462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23464, "end_char": 23487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1939] F.C.R. 159", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23898, "end_char": 23915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 409 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23939, "end_char": 23957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23964, "end_char": 23981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24002, "end_char": 24013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24101, "end_char": 24110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24237, "end_char": 24248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24250, "end_char": 24267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Punjab Provincial Subordinate Medical Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24451, "end_char": 24496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge was that the accused dishonestly misapptopriated or converted to his own certain medicines entrusted to him in his official capa- C'ity as a sub-assistant surgeon in the Punjab Provincial Subordinate Medical Service."}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24746, "end_char": 24757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24977, "end_char": 24988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24990, "end_char": 25007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25250, "end_char": 25261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25493, "end_char": 25504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "State of TVest Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26138, "end_char": 26159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the appellants attempted to argue that on the facts found no\n\n.1953\n\nBn&ir-ul-Huq\n\n(//Id Othe1s\n\nThe State of TVest Bengal.", "canonical_name": "State of H' t?.st Bengal"}}, {"text": "Jfahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26162, "end_char": 26170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jfahajan J.\n\n19.53\n\nBn.sir-ul-Huq\n\nand Others\n\nThe State of lV eNt Ben.gal."}}, {"text": "State of lV eNt Ben.gal.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26213, "end_char": 26237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jfahajan J.\n\n19.53\n\nBn.sir-ul-Huq\n\nand Others\n\nThe State of lV eNt Ben.gal.", "canonical_name": "State of H' t?.st Bengal"}}, {"text": "11'1ohajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26241, "end_char": 26251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11'1ohajan J.\n\n19.53\n\nApril 14."}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26288, "end_char": 26299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26812, "end_char": 26825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Sukumar Ghose."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26854, "end_char": 26864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. K. Bose."}}, {"text": "C. Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26897, "end_char": 26909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Bannerjee."}}, {"text": "LAKSHMANA NADAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26912, "end_char": 26927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS\n\nR. RAMIER."}}, {"text": "R. RAMIER", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26940, "end_char": 26949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS\n\nR. RAMIER."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26976, "end_char": 26985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Rauganayaki Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27442, "end_char": 27459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "time, you, the aforesaid Rauganayaki Ammal, my wife, shall till your lifetime enjoy the aforesaid entire properties ... After your lifetime, Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alie.nation such as gift, exchange and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations.", "canonical_name": "Rauganayaki Ammal"}}, {"text": "Ramalakshmi Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27558, "end_char": 27575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "time, you, the aforesaid Rauganayaki Ammal, my wife, shall till your lifetime enjoy the aforesaid entire properties ... After your lifetime, Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alie.nation such as gift, exchange and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations."}}, {"text": "Ranganayaki Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27836, "end_char": 27853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to 0, wife of iny late son, H, my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases and obtain a release deed.\"", "canonical_name": "Rauganayaki Ammal"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_848_864_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "19.53\n\nBn.sir-ul-Huq\n\nand Others\n\nThe State of lV eNt Ben.gal.\n\n. 11'1ohajan J.\n\n19.53\n\nApril 14.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\noffence under section 297 could be said to have been made out. This point, in our opinion, \"is not open at this stage, it having been held that all the ingredients of the offence had been established on the record.\n\nEven otherwise there is no substance in the contention because the prosecution evidence is sufficient to hold the offence proved against all the appellants .\n\nFor the reasons given above we hold that there is no substance in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Sukumar Ghose.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. K. Bose.\n\nAgent for the complainant: 8. C. Bannerjee.\n\nLAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS\n\nR. RAMIER.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nHindu law-Will--Beqiwst to wife for her lifetime and to daitghter absolutely after wife's lifetime-Estate taken by wife-\n\nTVhether ordinary life estate or Hindn widow's estate-Danghter's estate-Whether vested-Death of daitghter be/ore widow, effect of\n\n-Constrnction of Hindn will-Gnidina principles.\n\nA Hindu Brahmin governed by the l'IIitakshara law made a \\vill in \\vhich he gave the following directions: \"After my life. time, you, the aforesaid Rauganayaki Ammal, my wife, shall till your lifetime enjoy the aforesaid entire properties ... After your lifetime, Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alie.nation such as gift, exchange and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations. As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to 0, wife of iny late son, H, my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases and obtain a release deed.\" After the death of the testatol' his \\vife entered into possession of his properties bnt Lefore the r1eath of his wifo, his daughter and all her children died: Held, (i) that on a proper constrndion of the will in the light of surrounding circumstances, the testator had conferred on bis\n\nI I\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSl:PREME COURT REPORTS 849\n\nv-iife only an or<linary life estate, and alien'.ttions made by her would not endnrebeyond her lifeti1ne :\n\n(ii) that tlie testator's <laughter obtained under the will a vested interest in the properties after the lifetime of the widovt, to which her husband succeeded on her death.\n\nThe rule of const!uction by analogy is a dangerous one to follow in construing 'i\\rills differently \\\\rorded 1 and executed in different surroundings.\n\nRam Bahadur v. Jaoer Nath Prasad (3 Pat. L .. J. 199), Pavani Subbamma v. Ammala Rama Naida ([!937] l :II.L.J. 2GS), Natlrn Rain j\\fohajan v. Ganqa, Bai ([1938] 2 M.L.J. 562), Vasantn Rao Ammennarnrna v. Venkata Kodanda Rao ([1940] I )'f.L,, T.188), Jlaharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundarmn Iyer (I.L.R. 48 :Vlad. 1), Maha-med Shni11, sool '\" Shewakram (2 I.A. 7), Rotna Chetty v. Nara.11anr; swami Chetty (26 :11.L .. J. 616), Mst. Bhaowati Devi v. Chowdry Bholona.t/1 Thttkur (2 !..\\. 256) and L•zllu v. Jagmohan (LL.R. 22 Born. 409) re£errecl to.\n\nJnclgment oft.he }fadras High Court affirmed.\n\nC1vrL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDIC1'ION; Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1952. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 27th February, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rao and Ayyar , JJ.) in Appeal No. 635 of 194G arising out of judgment and decree dated the 13th August, 1946, of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tinnevelly in Original Suit No. 50 of 1945.\n\nK. S. Krishnaswarny Iyengar (S. Rarnachandra Iyer, with him) for the appell::mts.\n\nK. Ra; jah Iyer (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953. April 14.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nlAHAJAN J.-One Lakshminarayana Iyer, a Hindu Brahmin, who owned considerable properties in the Tirunclveli district, died on 13th December, 1924, leaving him surviving a widow Ranganayaki, and a married daughter Ramalakshmi.\n\nRamalakshmi had married the plaintiff and had a number of children from him. They were all alive in December, 1924, when Lakshminarayana died, Before his death he .\n\nJlU\n\n195, J\n\nLakshntana.\n\nNadar and\n\nOlh61's\n\nR. Ramier\n\nLakshmana Nadar on.d\n\nOtl1erB ,._\n\nR. Rrunh~\n\nJfahaja11 J.\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPORTS [1953]\n\nexecuted a will on 16th November, HJ24, the construction of which is in controversy in this appeal.\n\nBy this will he gave the following directions:-\n\n\"After my lifetime, you, the aforesaid Ranganayaki Ammal, my wife, shall till your lifetime, enjoy the aforesaid entire properties, the outstandings due to me, the debts payable by me, and the chit amounts payable by me.\n\nAfter your lifetime Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and wife of Rama Ayyar Avergal of Melagaram village, and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, and sale from son to gfamlson and so on for generations.\n\nAs regards the payment of maintenance to be made to Chinnammal alias Lakshmi Ammal, wife of my late son Hariharamayyan, my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases, and obtain a release deed\".\n\nRanganayaki entered into possession of the properties on the death of her husband.\n\nOn 21st February, 1928, she settled the maintmmnce ulaim of Lakshmi Ammal and obtained a deed of release from her by paying her a sum of Rs. 3,350 in cash and by executing in her favour an agreement stipulating to pay her a sum of lb. 240 per annum.\n\nRamalak8hrni died on 25th April, 1938 during the lifetime of the widow.\n\nNone of her children smvived her.\n\nOn the 24th July, 1943, the widow describing hernelf as an absolute owner of the properties of her husband sold one of the items of the property to the 2nd defendant for Rs. 500.\n\nOn the 18th September, 1945, the suit out.of which this appeal arises was instituted hy the plaintiff, the husband and the sole heir of Ramalakshmi, for a declaration that the said sale would not be binding on him beyond the lifetime of the widow. A prayer was made that the widow be restrained from alienating the other properties in her possession. On the 19th September, 1945, an ad interim injunction was isshed by the High Court restraining the widow from alienating the properties in her possession and forming part of her husband's estate, In\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS\n\nS51\n\nspite of this i11junetion, on the 27th September, 1945, she executed two deeds of settlement in favour of the other defendants comprising a number of prnperties.\n\nThe plaintiff was allowed to amend his plaint and include therein a prayer for ,,, declarntion in respect of the invalidity of these alienations as well. It was averred in the plaint that Ramalakshrni obtained a ,-csted interest in the suit properties under the will of her father and plaintiff was thus entitled to maintain the suit.\n\nThe defendants pleaded that the pfaintiff had no title to maintain the suit, tlmt the widow was entitled\n\nunder the will to an absolute estate or at le8, st to an estate analogous to and not less than a widow's est:i, te, that the estate given to Rarnalakshmi 11.ndcr the will was but a contingent one and she having predeceased the widow, no interest in the suit properties devolved on the plaintiff.\n\nThe main issue in the suit was whether the widow took under the wilJ >tn 1ilJRolute estate or an estate like the Hindu widow's csbtP and whether the daughter's interest therein was in the nature of a eontingent remainder, or whether she got in the properties a vested interest.\n\nThe subordinate judge held that the widow took under the will a limited life interest, and not an atmolute estate or even a widow's estate under Hindu law, and that the daughter got thereunder 11, vested interest in the properties to which the plaintiff succeeded on her death. In view of this finding ho granted the plaintiff a declaratory decree to the effect that the first defendant had only an estate for life in t.lie suit properties and that the alienations made by her would not enure beyond her lifetime.\n\nThe question as to the Ya!idity of the alienations was left undetermined. The unsucPessful defendants preferred an appeal against this decree to the High Court of Judicature at Madras.\n\nDuring the pendency of the appeal the widow died on 14th February, 1948.\n\nThe High Court by its judgnwnt under appeal affirmed the decision of the trial\n\njudge 11ml maintained his view on the eonstruction of the will. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was\n\nLaf(sh1na.na\n\n1Vadar anrf.\n\nOther,~\n\nR. Rainier\n\nLahshniana\n\n:::..iadar and\n\nOthers\n\nv. .\n\nR. lrr.unier\n\n.ilf ahajan J.\n\n852 SUPREME COtR'.t REPORTS [1953]\n\ngranted and the appeal was admitted, on the 27th November, 1951.\n\nThe substantial question to decide in the appeal is whether the estate granted by the testator to his widow was a full woman's estate under Hindu law or merely a limited life estate in the English sense of that expression. It was not contested before us that a Hindu can by will create a life estate, or successive life estates, or any other estate for a limited term, provided the do nee or the persons taking under it are ca pable of taking under a deed or will. The decision of the appeal thus turns upon the question whether the testator's intention was to give to his widow an ordinary life estate or an estate analogous to that of a Hindu widow. At one time it was a moot point whether a Hindu widow's estate could be created by will, it being an estate created by law, but it is now settled that a Hindu can confer by means of a will on his widow the same estate which, she would get by inheritance. The widow in such a case takes as a dernisee and not as an heir. The court's primary duty in such cases is to ascertain from the language employed by the testator \"what were his intentions\", keeping in view the surrounding circumstances, his ordinary notions as a Hindu in respect to devolution of his property, his family relationships etc. ; in other words, to ascertain his wishes by putting itself, so to say, in his armchair.\n\nConsidering the will in the light of these principles, it seems to us that Lakshrninarayana Iyer intended by his will to direct that his entire properties should be enjoyed by his widow during her lifetime but her interest in those properties should come to an end on her death, that all these properties in their entirety should thereafter be enjoyed as absolute owners by his daughter and her heirs with powers of alienation, gift, exchange and sale from generation to generation. He wished to make his daughter a fresh stock of descent so that her issue, male or female, may have the benefit of his property. They were the real pe1'sons whom he earmarked with certainty as the ultimate recipients of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nS\"GPREME COl'RT REPORTS 853\n\nhis bounty. In express terms he conferred on his daughter powers of alienation by way of gift, exchange, sale, but in sharp contrast to this, on his widow he conferred no such powers.\n\nThe direction to her was that she should enjoy the entire properties including the outstandings etc. and these shall thereafter pass to her daughters. Though no restraint in express terms was put on her powers of alienation in case of necessity, even that limited power was not given to her in express terms. If the testator had before his mind's eye his daughter and her heirs as the ultimate beneficiarios of his bounty, that intention could only be achieved by giving to the widow a limited estate, because by conferring a full Hindu widow's estate on her the daughter will, only have a mere speti successionis under the Hindu law which may or may not mature and under the will her interest would only be a contingent one in what was left undisposed of by the widow.\n\nIt is significant that the testator did not say in the will that the daughter will enjoy only the properties left undisposed of by the widow.\n\nThe extent of the grant, so far as the properties mentioned in the schedule are\n\nconcerned, to the daughter and the widow is the same.\n\nJust as the widow was directed to enjoy the entire properties mentioned in the schedule during her lifetime in like manner the daughter and her heirs were it!so directed to enjoy the same properties with absolute rights from generation to generation.\n\nThey could not Pnjoy the same prope1ties in the manner directed if the widow had a full Hindu widow's estate and had thl' power for any purpose to dispose nf them and did so. lf that was the intention, the testator would cleal'ly\n\nhave said that the daughter would only take the pro- . perties remaining after the death of the widow.\n\nThe widow cannot be held to have been given afull Hindu widow's estate under the will unless it can be said that under its terms she was given the power of alienation for necessary purposes, whether in express terms or by necessary implication. As above pointed out, admittedly power of alienation in express terms was not conferred on her.\n\nIt was argued\n\nLnkshtnana\n\nJ>ladar and\n\nOthers\n\nH. Ramier\n\n1U a.hajan J.\n\nLr:iksh1nana.\n\n!:'..ndar anrl\n\nOther~\n\nv, R. rlamier\n\nJfah.itjau J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1953:\n\nthat such a power was implicit within the acts she was authorized to do, that is t\"o say, when she was directed to pay the debts and settle the maintenance of Ramalakshmi it was implicit within these directions that for these purposes, if necessity a.rose, she could alienate the properties. This suggestion in the surrounding circumstances attending the execution of this will cannot be sustained.\n\nTho properties disposed of by the will nnd mentioned in the schedule were considerable in extent nnd it seems that they fetched sufficient income to enable the widow to fulfil the obligations under the will.\n\nIndeed we find that within four years of the denth of the testator the widow was able to pay a lump sum of I{s. 3,350 in cash to the daughter-in-law without alienating any part of the immovable properties and presumably by this time she had discharged all the debts. It is not shown that she alienated a single item of immovable property till the year 1945, a period of over 21 yearn after the death of her husband, excepting one, which she rdienated in the year 1937 to raioc a sum of Rs. 1,000 in order to buy some land.\n\nUy this transaction she substituted one property by another. .For the purpose of her maintenance, for payment of debts etc., and for settling the claim of the daughter-in-law she does not appear to have felt any necessity to make any alienation of any part of the estate mentioned in the schedule and the testator in all likelihood knew that she could fulfil these obligations without having recourse to alienations and hence he did not give her any power to do so. In this situation the inference that the testator must lmve of necessity intended to confer on the widow power of alienation for those limited purposes ca.nnot he raised. In onr opinion, even if that suggestion is accepted that for the limited purposes meutioned in the will the widow could alienate, this power would fall far short of he powers that a Hindu widow enjoys under Hindu law.\n\nUnder that law she has the power to alienate the estate for tho benefit of the soul of the husband, for pilgrimage and for the benefit of the estate and for\n\n__ ..\n\nS.C.H.\n\nSVPREME COFRT REPOitTS 855\n\nother authori.zed purposes. It cannot be said that a Hfodu widow can only alienate her husband's estate for payment of debts, to meet maintenance charges and for her own maintenance.\n\nShe represents the estate in all respects and enjoys very wide power except that she cannot alienate except for necessity and her necessities have to be judged on a variety of considerations.\n\nWe therefore hold that the estate conferred on Ranganayaki A mrnal was more like the limited estate in the English sense of the term than like a full Hindu widow's estate in spite of tho directions above-mentioned.\n\nShe had complete control over the income of the property during her lifetime hut she had no power to deal with the corpus of the estate and it had to he kept intact for the enjoyment of the daughter. Though the daughter was not entitled to immediate possession of the property it was indicated with certainty that she should get the entire estate at the proper time and she thus got, an interest in it on the testator's death. She was given a present right of future enjoyment in the property. According to Jarman (Jarman on Wills), the law leans in favour of vesting of estates and the property disposed of belongs to the object of the gift when the will takes effect and we think the daughter got under this will a vested interest in the testator's properties on his death.\n\nIt was Btrenuously argued by .Mr. K. S. Krishnaswami lyengar that Lakshminarayana Iyer was a Brahmin gentleman presumably versed in the sastras, living in a village in the southernmost part of the Madras State, that his idea of a restricted estate was more likely tu be one analogous to a Hindu woman's estate than a life estate as understood in English law wherein the estate is measured by use and not by duration, and that if this will was construed in the light of the notions of Lakshminarayana Iyer it should be held that the widow got under it a Hindu widow's estate and the dnughter got under it a contingent remainder in the nature of 8JJes and on her death tliere was nothillg which\n\ncould devolve on the plaintiff and he thus had no loc, us\n\nt(l, ndi to question the alienations made by the widow,\n\nLakshrnana..\n\n.1..Vadar and\n\nOthers\n\nJi.. Raniier\n\n.1..li ahajan J.\n\nSBPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nLa.ksh1na na Nadar and\n\nOthrrs\n\nThe learned counsel in support of his CO\\ltention drew our attention to a number of decisions of different High Courts and contended that the words of this will should be construed in the manner as more or less similar words were construed by the courts in the wills dealt with in those decisions.\n\nThis rule of construction by analogy is a dangerous one to follow in construing wills different.Iv worded and executod in different surroundings. [V.ide Sasiman v. Shib Narain (1)].\n\nHowever,\n\nv. n. Ramier\n\nMahajan J.\n\nout of respect for learned counsel on both sides who adopted the same method of approach we proceed to examine some of the important cases referred to by them.\n\nMr. Krishnaswami Iyengar sought to derive the greatest support for his contention from the decision in Ram Bahadur v. Jager Nath Pmsad ('). The will there recited that if a daughter or son was born to the testator during his lifetime, such son or daughter would be the owner of all his properties but if there was no son or daughter, his niece S. would get a\n\nheque, t of a lakh of rupees, and the rest of the movable and immovable properties would remain in possession of his wife until her death, and after her these would remain in possession of his niece.\n\nThe remainder was disposed of in the following words: -\n\n\"If on the death of my wife and my niece there be living a son and a daughter born of the womb of my said brother's daughter, then two-thirds of the movable property will belong to the son and one-third to the daughter. But as regards the immovable property none shall have the lest right of alienation.\n\nThey will of course be entitled to enjoy the balance left after payment of rent\".\n\nThis 'ill was construed as conveying an absolute estate to the son and the daughter of the nieue. It was remarked that in spite of an express restriction against alienation, the estate taken by S. (the niece) was an estate such as a woman ordinarily acquires by inheritance under tho Hindu law which she holds in a completely representative Pha.racter but is unable to\n\n(1) 49 !. A. 25.\n\n(2) 3 Pat. LJ. 199.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 857\n\nalienate excep~ in case of legal necessity and that such a construction was in accordance with the ordinary notions that a Hindu has in regard to devolution of his property.\n\nThe provisions contained in this will bear no analogy to those we have to construe. The restraint against alienation was repugnant to both a life estate and a widow's estate and was not, therefore, taken into account. But there were other indications in that will showing that a widow's estate had been given. The fact that the gift over was a contingent bequest was by itself taken as a sure indication that the preceding bequest was that of a widow's estate. There is no such indication in the will before us.\n\nReliance was next placed on the decision in Pavani Subbamma v. Ammala Rama Naidu (1).\n\nUnder the will there dealt with, the widow S, was to enjoy the prnperties and after her lifetime the properties were to be taken in the ratio of three to five by the son's daughter and the daughter's son 1:espectively. A suit was instituted by the son's daughter for the recovery of possession of her share in one item of property forming part of the estate which had been sold by S.\n\nThe question for decision in that case was whether S. was at all entitled to sell anything more than her life interest even for purposes of meeting a necessity binding upon the estate. Varadachari J. held that since in the will the gift over to the grand-children was of the entire properties, and not a mere gift by way of defeasance, it had to be held that it indicated that the prior gift in favour of the widow was only of a limited interest.\n\nThis doeision therefore goes against the contention of the learned counsel but he placed reliance on the observations made in the judgment when the learned Judge proceeded to say \" In deference to the view taken in 111ahara; ia of Kolhapur v. Sundararn Iyer('), it may be possible to create an interest analogous to a woman's estate in Hindu law notwithstanding the addition of a gift over and that the estate taken by S. need not necessarily be only a life estate in the English law\n\n(1) (1937) l ll.L.j. 268,\n\nJJJ\n\n(2) (1925) l.Ll<. 48 lfad. I.\n\nLaksh1nana\n\nNadar and\n\nOthera\n\nR .. Rainier\n\n.Ji ahajan J.\n\nLakshmana\n\nNadar and\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ramier\n\n,\"\\fahajan J,\n\nSVPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nsense of the term.\" We do not understand how such passing observations can be helpful in' deciding the present case. Assuming that it is possible to create a Hindu woman's estate notwithstanding the addition of a gift over, the question nevertheless whether that had been done in a given case must depend on the terms of the particular instrument under consideration.\n\nThe following remarks in the Privy Council decision in Nathu Ram ilfahajan v. Gangabai(') were next cited:-\n\nAs the will gave her the right to 'enjoy' the income of the estate during her lifetime, it was evidently contemplated that she should, as provided by the Hindu law in the case of a widow, be in possession of the estate.\"\n\nSuch casual observation made in respect of a will couched in entirely different terms cannot afford much assiHtance in the decision of the case.\n\nIn Va.santharao Ammannamma v. Venkata Kodanda Rao Pantulii('), the next case cited, a Hindu testator who was a retired subordinate judge provided by his will as follows :-\n\n\"Out of the afore;; tated ancestral lands, the oneninth share to which I am entitled shall be enjoyed after my death by my wife till her death, and after her death it shall pass to S. son of my second elder brother deceased. My self-acquired properties shall on my death he enjoyed by my wife till her death and after her death they shall pass to my daughter. Thereafter they shall pass to my grandson through my daughter\".\n\nThe will was construed as giving the self-acquired properties ultimately to the grandsons, and the estate of the daughter was likened to an estate which she would take under the law of inheritance, that is a limited estate analogous to a widow's estate. At page 193 of the report it was observed as follows:·-\n\n\"The question therefore arises, did he intend to confer only a life estate or a daughter's estate ? It seems\n\n(I) (1938) Z M.L.J. 562. lz) (1940) l M.L.J. 188.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSL'PREME COl'RT REPOR'l'S 859\n\nto us that he meant to give a daughter's estate rather than a life estate. lie omits the words 'rforing her life' with reference to the disposition in fuvour of the dau{Jhter.\n\nThe words 'pass to my daughter' would rather indicate that in the ordinary comse of devolution the estate should pass to her, that is, the daughter and then to the grandsons. The words used in favour of the grandsons seem to indicate that the estate conferred on the daughter was not a life estate because there is no direct gift in favour of the grandsons, but on the other hand, what he says is that through his daughter the estate shall pass to his grandsons.\n\nEither he must have intended that the daughter should convey the property either by will or inter vivas to the grandsons or Rhe having taken the estate, through her it should pass to the grandsons in the ordinary course of devolution. If it was the daughter's estate that was intended to be conferred, there can be no question that the estate taken by the grandsons is not a ve1ited interest\".\n\nThis line of reasoning which appealed to the learned judges is not of much help to us here as the language in this will is quite different. If the same line of reasoning is adopted here, the decision of the case would go against the client of Mr. K. S. K. Iyengar because in the will in this case the widow's estate is delimited by the words \" till yom lifetime.\"\n\nReliance was next placed on 21Iaharaja of Kolhapur\n\nv. Sundaram Iyer('). That was a case of a government grant on the special terms set out therein and the question arose as to the nature of the grant. There it was said that \"the widows of Sivaji Haja got the gift of a life estate very much resembling the ordinary estate of a Hindu widow and with all the incidents of a widow's estate except the liability to be divested, but nevertheless a life estate rather than an estate of inheritance.\" These remarks do not throw much light on the point before us.\n\nThe last decision referred to was the decision of the Privy Council in Jlfohomed Shumsool v. 8he1rnkram (').\n\nThere a Hindu inhabitant of Bihar by a document of\n\n(I) (1925) l.L.R. 48 }lad. 1.\n\n(2) (1874-75) 'I.A. 7\n\nLaksh1nana\n\n1'..tadar an.a\n\nOtheh\n\nH. lfa1nier\n\nMahajan J.\n\nLakshmana Nadarand\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ranier\n\nMahajanJ.\n\n860 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1953]\n\na testamentary character declared his daughter who had two daughters, as his heir, and after'her, her two daughters together with their children were declared heirs and malik. One daughter of the daughter predeceased the testator without issue and the other daughter died after the death of the testator leaving an only son, the respondent in that case. In a suit by the respondent against his grandmother the daughter of the testator for a declaratory order preserving unmolested his future right and title to the said lands, it was held that the daughter took an estate subject to her daughters succeeding her. In this judgment the following obser_vations were emphasized as relevant to this enqmry :-\n\n\" It has been contended that these latter expressions qualify the generality of the former expressions, and that the will, taken as a whole, must be construed as intimating the intention of the testator that 2\\'Ist. Rani Dhun Kaur should not take an absolute estate, but that she should be succeeded in her estate by her two daughters. In other words, that she should take an estate very much like the ordinary estate of a Hindu widow.\n\nIn construing the will of a Hindu it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with respect to the devolution of property. It may be assumed that a Hindu generally desires that an estate, especially an ancestral estate, shall be retained in his family; and it may be assumed that a Hindu knows that, as a general rule, at all events, women do not take absolute estates of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate.\"\n\nThese observations are unexceptionable but it may also be pointed out that it is open to a Hindu to confer a limited life estate on his widow or even a larger estate than a widow takes as an heir and that in every ease he may not confer upon her by will a Hindu widow's estate which she would otherwise get by inheritance. Generally speaking, there will be no point in making a will if what is to be given to a widow is what she would get on intestacy and cases do arise\n\ns.c.:R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 861\n\nwhere a Hindu wishes to give to his widow a more restricted estate than she would get on intestacy or a much larger estate than that. The question in every case cannot be determined merely on the theory that every Hindu thinks only about a Hindu widow's estate and no more. \\Vhat is given must be gathered from the language of the will in the light of the surrounding circumstances.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondent followed the line adopted by Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar. He also on the analogy of other wills and the decisions given on their terms wanted a decision on the construction of this will in his favour.\n\nIn the first instance, he placed reliancP on a decision of the Madras High Court in Ratna Chetty v. , Narayanaswami Chetty( 1).\n\nThere the testator made a will in favour of his wife providing, inter alia, \"all my properties shall after my death be in possession of my wife herself and she herself should be heir to everything and Mutha Arunachala Chctty\n\n(nephew) and my wife should live together amicably as of one family. If the two could not agree and live together amicably, my wife would pay Rs. 4,000 and separate him and then my wife would enjoy all the remaining properties with absolute rights. If both of them would live together amicably, :\\fothu Arnnachala Chetty himself would enjoy the properties which remain after the death of the widow.\" It was held upon the construct.ion of the will that the nephew, who lived amicably with the widow till his death, had a vested interest at testator's death which could not be defeated by a testamentary disposition by the widow in favour of a stranger. This decision only decides that case and is not very relevant in this enquiry.\n\nReference was also made to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in M st. Bhagwati Devi\n\nv. Chowdry Bholonath Thalcur('). This was a case of a gift inter vivos. The gift to Mst. Chunderbutti, his wife, was in these terms :-\n\n(I) I 1914) 20 M.L.J. 616.\n\n12) (1874-75) 21.A 256.\n\n19~3\n\nLa!shmna\n\nNadar and\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ra1nier\n\nlfahajan J,\n\nLaksh1naru\n\nNadar and\n\nOthers\n\nll. Rainier\n\nilfahaja.n J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n\" the remaining ' milkiut ' and • minhai ' estEctes, together with the amount of ready rrionoy, articles, slaves, and all household furniture I have placed in the possession of Mst. Chunderbutti Thakurain, my wife, to be enjoyed during her lifetime, in order that she may hold possession of all the properties and milkiut possessed by me, the declarant, during her lifetime, and by the payment of government revenue, appropriate the profits derived therefrom, but that she should not by any means transfer the milkiut estates and the slaves; that after the death of my aforesaid wife the milkiut and household furniture shall devolve on Girdhari Thakur, my karta (adopted son).\"\n\nThe subordinate judge held that Chunderbutti got an estate for life with the power t, o appropriate profits and Girdhari -got a vested remainder on her death.\n\nThe High Court took a different view and held that Chunderbutti took the estate in her character as a Hindu widow. The Privv Council on this will held as follows :--- \" \" Their Lordships do not feel justified, upon mere conjecture of what might probably have been intended, in so interpreting it as materially to change the nature of the estate taken by Chunderlmtti. If she took the estate only of a Hindu widow, one consequence, no doubt, would be that she would be unable to alienate the profits, or that. at all events, whatever she purchased out of them would be an increment to her husband's estate, and the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover possession of all such property, real and personal. But, on the other hand, she would have certain rights as a Hindu widow; for example, she would have the right under certain circumstances, if the estate were insufficient to defray the funeral expenses or her maintenance, to alienate it altogether.\n\nShe certainly would have the power of selling her own estate; and it would further follow that Girdhari would not be possessed in any sense of a vested remainder, but merely of a contingent one. It would also follow that she would completely represent the estate, and under certain circumstances the statute\n\nS.C.l~.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nof limitations might run against the heirs to the estate, whoever they inight be.\n\nTheir Lordships see no sufficient reason for importing into this document words which would carry with them all these consequences, and they agree with the subordinate judge in construing it ttccording to its plain meaning.\"\n\nThese observations have to a certain extent relevance to the present case but on the facts this case is aho distinguishable. This will was couched in different; language than the will in the present case. There was a clear prohibition, forbidding the widow to make any transfers of the milkiut estates and the slaves.\n\nReference was also made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Lallu v. Jagmohan('). The will there ran as follows:-\n\n\"When I die, my wife named Suraj is owner of that property. And my wife has powers to do in the same way as I have absolute powers to do when I am present, and in case of my wife's death, my daughter Mahalaxmi is owner of the said property after that.\"\n\nIt was held that Suraj took only a life estate under the will, with remainder over to Mahalaxmi after her death and the bequest to Mahalaxmi was not contingent on her surviving Suraj, but that she took a vested remainder which upon her death passed to her heirs.\n\nAfter considering the rival contentions of the parties, we are of the opinion that no sufficient grounds have been made out for disturbing the unanimous opinion of the two courts below on the construction of this will. Both the learned counsel eventually conceded that the language used in the will was conistent with the testator's intention of conferring a life estate in the English sense as well as with the intention of conferring a Hindu widow's estate. It was, however, urged by Mr. Rajah Iyer that as no express or implied power of alienation for purposes of all legal necessities was conferred on the widow, that circumstance\n\n(r) (1898) I.LR. 22 Born. 409.\n\nLaksh1nana\n\n}.tadar and\n\nOthers v.\n\nIt. Ramier\n\nMahajan J •.\n\nLakshniana.\n\nNadarand\n\nOthers\n\nv, R. Ratn-ier\n\nMahajan J,\n\nSUPREME COGRT REPORTS [1953]\n\nnegatived the view that the testator intended to confer upon his widow a Hindu widow's estate' as she wo,.ild get in case of intestacy.\n\nHe also emphasized that the words of the gift over to the daughter as supporting his construction which was further reinforced by the words of the will limiting the widow's estate \"till your lifetime \" and of the omission from therein of words such as malik etc., while describing the widow's estate.\n\nMr. Krislrnaswami Iyengar, on the other hand, 0011tended that the absence of any words in the will 1eRtricting her powers of alienatio~1 and putting a restraint on them, suggested a contrary intE'ntion and that the daughter's estate was described as coming into being itfter the estate of the widow and was not conferred on her simultaneously with the widow, and this connoted according to the' notions of Hindus a full Hindu widow's estate. In our judgment, there is force in the contention of Mr. Rajah Iyer for reasons already stated nnd in the result, therefore, we dismiss this appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: JYI. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\nAgent for the respondent : Ganpat Rai.", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 667, "end_char": 680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Sukumar Ghose."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 709, "end_char": 719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. K. Bose."}}, {"text": "C. Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 752, "end_char": 764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Bannerjee."}}, {"text": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 767, "end_char": 793, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. RAMIER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 795, "end_char": 804, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. RAMIER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 808, "end_char": 826, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 831, "end_char": 844, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rauganayaki Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1297, "end_char": 1314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "time, you, the aforesaid Rauganayaki Ammal, my wife, shall till your lifetime enjoy the aforesaid entire properties ... After your lifetime, Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alie.nation such as gift, exchange and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations.", "canonical_name": "Ranganayaki A mrnal"}}, {"text": "Ramalakshmi Ammal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1413, "end_char": 1430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "time, you, the aforesaid Rauganayaki Ammal, my wife, shall till your lifetime enjoy the aforesaid entire properties ... After your lifetime, Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alie.nation such as gift, exchange and sale from son to grandson and so on for generations.", "canonical_name": "Ramalakshmi Ammal"}}, {"text": "Ranganayaki Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1691, "end_char": 1708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to 0, wife of iny late son, H, my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases and obtain a release deed.\"", "canonical_name": "Ranganayaki A mrnal"}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3299, "end_char": 3302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 27th February, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rao and Ayyar , JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3307, "end_char": 3312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 27th February, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rao and Ayyar , JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswarny Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3496, "end_char": 3523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswarny Iyengar (S. Rarnachandra Iyer, with him) for the appell::mts.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Krishnaswarny Iyengar"}}, {"text": "S. Rarnachandra Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswarny Iyengar (S. Rarnachandra Iyer, with him) for the appell::mts."}}, {"text": "K. Ra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3579, "end_char": 3584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Ra; jah Iyer (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3596, "end_char": 3613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Ra; jah Iyer (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Lakshminarayana Iyer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nlAHAJAN J.-One Lakshminarayana Iyer, a Hindu Brahmin, who owned considerable properties in the Tirunclveli district, died on 13th December, 1924, leaving him surviving a widow Ranganayaki, and a married daughter Ramalakshmi.", "canonical_name": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Ramalakshmi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3919, "end_char": 3930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nlAHAJAN J.-One Lakshminarayana Iyer, a Hindu Brahmin, who owned considerable properties in the Tirunclveli district, died on 13th December, 1924, leaving him surviving a widow Ranganayaki, and a married daughter Ramalakshmi.", "canonical_name": "Ramalakshmi Ammal"}}, {"text": "Ramalakshmi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3933, "end_char": 3944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramalakshmi had married the plaintiff and had a number of children from him.", "canonical_name": "Ramalakshmi Ammal"}}, {"text": "Lakshminarayana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4054, "end_char": 4069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were all alive in December, 1924, when Lakshminarayana died, Before his death he .", "canonical_name": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Lakshmana Nadar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4156, "end_char": 4171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nadar and\n\nOlh61's\n\nR. Ramier\n\nLakshmana Nadar on.d\n\nOtl1erB ,._", "canonical_name": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "R. Rrunh~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4191, "end_char": 4200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Rrunh~\n\nJfahaja11 J.\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPORTS [1953]\n\nexecuted a will on 16th November, HJ24, the construction of which is in controversy in this appeal."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COUHT REPORTS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4216, "end_char": 4237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Rrunh~\n\nJfahaja11 J.\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPORTS [1953]\n\nexecuted a will on 16th November, HJ24, the construction of which is in controversy in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Rama Ayyar Avergal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4682, "end_char": 4700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After your lifetime Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and wife of Rama Ayyar Avergal of Melagaram village, and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, and sale from son to gfamlson and so on for generations."}}, {"text": "Melagaram village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4704, "end_char": 4721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After your lifetime Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and wife of Rama Ayyar Avergal of Melagaram village, and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, and sale from son to gfamlson and so on for generations."}}, {"text": "gfamlson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4845, "end_char": 4853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After your lifetime Ramalakshmi Ammal, our daughter and wife of Rama Ayyar Avergal of Melagaram village, and her heirs shall enjoy them with absolute rights and powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, and sale from son to gfamlson and so on for generations."}}, {"text": "Chinnammal alias Lakshmi Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to Chinnammal alias Lakshmi Ammal, wife of my late son Hariharamayyan, my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases, and obtain a release deed\"."}}, {"text": "Hariharamayyan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4986, "end_char": 5000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the payment of maintenance to be made to Chinnammal alias Lakshmi Ammal, wife of my late son Hariharamayyan, my wife Ranganayaki Ammal shall pay the same as she pleases, and obtain a release deed\"."}}, {"text": "Ranganayaki", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5092, "end_char": 5103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ranganayaki entered into possession of the properties on the death of her husband.", "canonical_name": "Ranganayaki A mrnal"}}, {"text": "21st February, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st February, 1928, she settled the maintmmnce ulaim of Lakshmi Ammal and obtained a deed of release from her by paying her a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5236, "end_char": 5249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st February, 1928, she settled the maintmmnce ulaim of Lakshmi Ammal and obtained a deed of release from her by paying her a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ramalak8hrni", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5427, "end_char": 5439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramalak8hrni died on 25th April, 1938 during the lifetime of the widow.", "canonical_name": "Ramalakshmi Ammal"}}, {"text": "25th April, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5448, "end_char": 5464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramalak8hrni died on 25th April, 1938 during the lifetime of the widow."}}, {"text": "18th September, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th September, 1945, the suit out.of which this appeal arises was instituted hy the plaintiff, the husband and the sole heir of Ramalakshmi, for a declaration that the said sale would not be binding on him beyond the lifetime of the widow."}}, {"text": "19th September, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6073, "end_char": 6093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 19th September, 1945, an ad interim injunction was isshed by the High Court restraining the widow from alienating the properties in her possession and forming part of her husband's estate, In\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS\n\nS51\n\nspite of this i11junetion, on the 27th September, 1945, she executed two deeds of settlement in favour of the other defendants comprising a number of prnperties."}}, {"text": "S51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6297, "end_char": 6300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramalakshrni", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6653, "end_char": 6665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was averred in the plaint that Ramalakshrni obtained a ,-csted interest in the suit properties under the will of her father and plaintiff was thus entitled to maintain the suit.", "canonical_name": "Ramalakshmi Ammal"}}, {"text": "Rarnalakshmi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants pleaded that the pfaintiff had no title to maintain the suit, tlmt the widow was entitled\n\nunder the will to an absolute estate or at le8, st to an estate analogous to and not less than a widow's est:i, te, that the estate given to Rarnalakshmi 11.ndcr the will was but a contingent one and she having predeceased the widow, no interest in the suit properties devolved on the plaintiff.", "canonical_name": "Ramalakshmi Ammal"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8147, "end_char": 8181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The unsucPessful defendants preferred an appeal against this decree to the High Court of Judicature at Madras."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8425, "end_char": 8438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was\n\nLaf(sh1na.na\n\n1Vadar anrf."}}, {"text": "R. lrr.unier", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8535, "end_char": 8547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. lrr.unier\n\n.ilf ahajan J.\n\n852 SUPREME COtR'.t REPORTS [1953]\n\ngranted and the appeal was admitted, on the 27th November, 1951."}}, {"text": "Lakshrninarayana Iyer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10081, "end_char": 10102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Considering the will in the light of these principles, it seems to us that Lakshrninarayana Iyer intended by his will to direct that his entire properties should be enjoyed by his widow during her lifetime but her interest in those properties should come to an end on her death, that all these properties in their entirety should thereafter be enjoyed as absolute owners by his daughter and her heirs with powers of alienation, gift, exchange and sale from generation to generation.", "canonical_name": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "S\"GPREME COl'RT REPORTS 853", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10718, "end_char": 10745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were the real pe1'sons whom he earmarked with certainty as the ultimate recipients of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nS\"GPREME COl'RT REPORTS 853\n\nhis bounty."}}, {"text": "Lnkshtnana", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12926, "end_char": 12936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued\n\nLnkshtnana\n\nJ>ladar and\n\nOthers\n\nH. Ramier\n\n1U a.hajan J.\n\nLr:iksh1nana."}}, {"text": "H. Ramier", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12959, "end_char": 12968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued\n\nLnkshtnana\n\nJ>ladar and\n\nOthers\n\nH. Ramier\n\n1U a.hajan J.\n\nLr:iksh1nana."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13802, "end_char": 13806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ranganayaki A mrnal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15698, "end_char": 15717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We therefore hold that the estate conferred on Ranganayaki A mrnal was more like the limited estate in the English sense of the term than like a full Hindu widow's estate in spite of tho directions above-mentioned.", "canonical_name": "Ranganayaki A mrnal"}}, {"text": "Jarman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16374, "end_char": 16380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Jarman (Jarman on Wills), the law leans in favour of vesting of estates and the property disposed of belongs to the object of the gift when the will takes effect and we think the daughter got under this will a vested interest in the testator's properties on his death."}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16678, "end_char": 16696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami lyengar that Lakshminarayana Iyer was a Brahmin gentleman presumably versed in the sastras, living in a village in the southernmost part of the Madras State, that his idea of a restricted estate was more likely tu be one analogous to a Hindu woman's estate than a life estate as understood in English law wherein the estate is measured by use and not by duration, and that if this will was construed in the light of the notions of Lakshminarayana Iyer it should be held that the widow got under it a Hindu widow's estate and the dnughter got under it a contingent remainder in the nature of 8JJes and on her death tliere was nothillg which\n\ncould devolve on the plaintiff and he thus had no loc, us\n\nt(l, ndi to question the alienations made by the widow,\n\nLakshrnana..\n\n.1..Vadar and\n\nOthers\n\nJi.. Raniier\n\n.1..li ahajan J.\n\nSBPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nLa.ksh1na na Nadar and\n\nOthrrs\n\nThe learned counsel in support of his CO\\ltention drew our attention to a number of decisions of different High Courts and contended that the words of this will should be construed in the manner as more or less similar words were construed by the courts in the wills dealt with in those decisions.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Krishnaswarny Iyengar"}}, {"text": "Lakshminarayana Iyer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16710, "end_char": 16730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami lyengar that Lakshminarayana Iyer was a Brahmin gentleman presumably versed in the sastras, living in a village in the southernmost part of the Madras State, that his idea of a restricted estate was more likely tu be one analogous to a Hindu woman's estate than a life estate as understood in English law wherein the estate is measured by use and not by duration, and that if this will was construed in the light of the notions of Lakshminarayana Iyer it should be held that the widow got under it a Hindu widow's estate and the dnughter got under it a contingent remainder in the nature of 8JJes and on her death tliere was nothillg which\n\ncould devolve on the plaintiff and he thus had no loc, us\n\nt(l, ndi to question the alienations made by the widow,\n\nLakshrnana..\n\n.1..Vadar and\n\nOthers\n\nJi.. Raniier\n\n.1..li ahajan J.\n\nSBPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nLa.ksh1na na Nadar and\n\nOthrrs\n\nThe learned counsel in support of his CO\\ltention drew our attention to a number of decisions of different High Courts and contended that the words of this will should be construed in the manner as more or less similar words were construed by the courts in the wills dealt with in those decisions.", "canonical_name": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Madras State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16841, "end_char": 16853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami lyengar that Lakshminarayana Iyer was a Brahmin gentleman presumably versed in the sastras, living in a village in the southernmost part of the Madras State, that his idea of a restricted estate was more likely tu be one analogous to a Hindu woman's estate than a life estate as understood in English law wherein the estate is measured by use and not by duration, and that if this will was construed in the light of the notions of Lakshminarayana Iyer it should be held that the widow got under it a Hindu widow's estate and the dnughter got under it a contingent remainder in the nature of 8JJes and on her death tliere was nothillg which\n\ncould devolve on the plaintiff and he thus had no loc, us\n\nt(l, ndi to question the alienations made by the widow,\n\nLakshrnana..\n\n.1..Vadar and\n\nOthers\n\nJi.. Raniier\n\n.1..li ahajan J.\n\nSBPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nLa.ksh1na na Nadar and\n\nOthrrs\n\nThe learned counsel in support of his CO\\ltention drew our attention to a number of decisions of different High Courts and contended that the words of this will should be construed in the manner as more or less similar words were construed by the courts in the wills dealt with in those decisions."}}, {"text": "Vadar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17472, "end_char": 17477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami lyengar that Lakshminarayana Iyer was a Brahmin gentleman presumably versed in the sastras, living in a village in the southernmost part of the Madras State, that his idea of a restricted estate was more likely tu be one analogous to a Hindu woman's estate than a life estate as understood in English law wherein the estate is measured by use and not by duration, and that if this will was construed in the light of the notions of Lakshminarayana Iyer it should be held that the widow got under it a Hindu widow's estate and the dnughter got under it a contingent remainder in the nature of 8JJes and on her death tliere was nothillg which\n\ncould devolve on the plaintiff and he thus had no loc, us\n\nt(l, ndi to question the alienations made by the widow,\n\nLakshrnana..\n\n.1..Vadar and\n\nOthers\n\nJi.. Raniier\n\n.1..li ahajan J.\n\nSBPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nLa.ksh1na na Nadar and\n\nOthrrs\n\nThe learned counsel in support of his CO\\ltention drew our attention to a number of decisions of different High Courts and contended that the words of this will should be construed in the manner as more or less similar words were construed by the courts in the wills dealt with in those decisions."}}, {"text": "Raniier", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17496, "end_char": 17503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami lyengar that Lakshminarayana Iyer was a Brahmin gentleman presumably versed in the sastras, living in a village in the southernmost part of the Madras State, that his idea of a restricted estate was more likely tu be one analogous to a Hindu woman's estate than a life estate as understood in English law wherein the estate is measured by use and not by duration, and that if this will was construed in the light of the notions of Lakshminarayana Iyer it should be held that the widow got under it a Hindu widow's estate and the dnughter got under it a contingent remainder in the nature of 8JJes and on her death tliere was nothillg which\n\ncould devolve on the plaintiff and he thus had no loc, us\n\nt(l, ndi to question the alienations made by the widow,\n\nLakshrnana..\n\n.1..Vadar and\n\nOthers\n\nJi.. Raniier\n\n.1..li ahajan J.\n\nSBPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nLa.ksh1na na Nadar and\n\nOthrrs\n\nThe learned counsel in support of his CO\\ltention drew our attention to a number of decisions of different High Courts and contended that the words of this will should be construed in the manner as more or less similar words were construed by the courts in the wills dealt with in those decisions."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18091, "end_char": 18098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However,\n\nv. n. Ramier\n\nMahajan J.\n\nout of respect for learned counsel on both sides who adopted the same method of approach we proceed to examine some of the important cases referred to by them.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswami Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18268, "end_char": 18288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar sought to derive the greatest support for his contention from the decision in Ram Bahadur v. Jager Nath Pmsad (').", "canonical_name": "Krislrnaswami Iyengar"}}, {"text": "S.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19464, "end_char": 19466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was remarked that in spite of an express restriction against alienation, the estate taken by S. (the niece) was an estate such as a woman ordinarily acquires by inheritance under tho Hindu law which she holds in a completely representative Pha.racter but is unable to\n\n(1) 49 !."}}, {"text": "Varadachari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21059, "end_char": 21070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Varadachari J. held that since in the will the gift over to the grand-children was of the entire properties, and not a mere gift by way of defeasance, it had to be held that it indicated that the prior gift in favour of the widow was only of a limited interest."}}, {"text": "111ahara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21537, "end_char": 21545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This doeision therefore goes against the contention of the learned counsel but he placed reliance on the observations made in the judgment when the learned Judge proceeded to say \" In deference to the view taken in 111ahara; ia of Kolhapur v. Sundararn Iyer('), it may be possible to create an interest analogous to a woman's estate in Hindu law notwithstanding the addition of a gift over and that the estate taken by S. need not necessarily be only a life estate in the English law\n\n(1) (1937) l ll."}}, {"text": "R. Ramier", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21960, "end_char": 21969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nLaksh1nana\n\nNadar and\n\nOthera\n\nR .. Rainier\n\n.Ji ahajan J.\n\nLakshmana\n\nNadar and\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ramier\n\n,\"\\fahajan J,\n\nSVPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nsense of the term.\"", "canonical_name": "R. RAMIER"}}, {"text": "\\fahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21973, "end_char": 21981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nLaksh1nana\n\nNadar and\n\nOthera\n\nR .. Rainier\n\n.Ji ahajan J.\n\nLakshmana\n\nNadar and\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ramier\n\n,\"\\fahajan J,\n\nSVPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nsense of the term.\""}}, {"text": "S 859", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23964, "end_char": 23969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. K. Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25254, "end_char": 25270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the same line of reasoning is adopted here, the decision of the case would go against the client of Mr. K. S. K. Iyengar because in the will in this case the widow's estate is delimited by the words \" till yom lifetime.\""}}, {"text": "Sivaji Haja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25612, "end_char": 25623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There it was said that \"the widows of Sivaji Haja got the gift of a life estate very much resembling the ordinary estate of a Hindu widow and with all the incidents of a widow's estate except the liability to be divested, but nevertheless a life estate rather than an estate of inheritance.\""}}, {"text": "Lakshmana Nadarand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26205, "end_char": 26223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) (1874-75) 'I.A. 7\n\nLaksh1nana\n\n1'..tadar an.a\n\nOtheh\n\nH. lfa1nier\n\nMahajan J.\n\nLakshmana Nadarand\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ranier\n\nMahajanJ.\n\n860 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1953]\n\na testamentary character declared his daughter who had two daughters, as his heir, and after'her, her two daughters together with their children were declared heirs and malik.", "canonical_name": "LAKSHMANA NADAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "R. Ranier", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26233, "end_char": 26242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) (1874-75) 'I.A. 7\n\nLaksh1nana\n\n1'..tadar an.a\n\nOtheh\n\nH. lfa1nier\n\nMahajan J.\n\nLakshmana Nadarand\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ranier\n\nMahajanJ.\n\n860 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1953]\n\na testamentary character declared his daughter who had two daughters, as his heir, and after'her, her two daughters together with their children were declared heirs and malik.", "canonical_name": "R. RAMIER"}}, {"text": "MahajanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26244, "end_char": 26253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) (1874-75) 'I.A. 7\n\nLaksh1nana\n\n1'..tadar an.a\n\nOtheh\n\nH. lfa1nier\n\nMahajan J.\n\nLakshmana Nadarand\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ranier\n\nMahajanJ.\n\n860 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1953]\n\na testamentary character declared his daughter who had two daughters, as his heir, and after'her, her two daughters together with their children were declared heirs and malik.", "canonical_name": "MahajanJ."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28882, "end_char": 28894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the respondent followed the line adopted by Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar.", "canonical_name": "Krislrnaswami Iyengar"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29111, "end_char": 29128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first instance, he placed reliancP on a decision of the Madras High Court in Ratna Chetty v. , Narayanaswami Chetty( 1)."}}, {"text": "Mutha Arunachala Chctty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29378, "end_char": 29401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There the testator made a will in favour of his wife providing, inter alia, \"all my properties shall after my death be in possession of my wife herself and she herself should be heir to everything and Mutha Arunachala Chctty\n\n(nephew) and my wife should live together amicably as of one family."}}, {"text": "\\fothu Arnnachala Chetty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29699, "end_char": 29723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If both of them would live together amicably, :\\fothu Arnnachala Chetty himself would enjoy the properties which remain after the death of the widow.\""}}, {"text": "Chunderbutti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30328, "end_char": 30340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chunderbutti, his wife, was in these terms :-\n\n(I) I 1914) 20 M.L.J. 616.", "canonical_name": "Chunderbutti Thakurain"}}, {"text": "La!shmna\n\nNadar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30434, "end_char": 30449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19~3\n\nLa!shmna\n\nNadar and\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ra1nier\n\nlfahajan J,\n\nLaksh1naru\n\nNadar and\n\nOthers\n\nll."}}, {"text": "R. Ra1nier\n\nlfahajan J", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30463, "end_char": 30485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19~3\n\nLa!shmna\n\nNadar and\n\nOthers\n\nR. Ra1nier\n\nlfahajan J,\n\nLaksh1naru\n\nNadar and\n\nOthers\n\nll."}}, {"text": "Chunderbutti Thakurain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30759, "end_char": 30781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chunderbutti Thakurain, my wife, to be enjoyed during her lifetime, in order that she may hold possession of all the properties and milkiut possessed by me, the declarant, during her lifetime, and by the payment of government revenue, appropriate the profits derived therefrom, but that she should not by any means transfer the milkiut estates and the slaves; that after the death of my aforesaid wife the milkiut and household furniture shall devolve on Girdhari Thakur, my karta (adopted son).\"", "canonical_name": "Chunderbutti Thakurain"}}, {"text": "Girdhari Thakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31214, "end_char": 31229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chunderbutti Thakurain, my wife, to be enjoyed during her lifetime, in order that she may hold possession of all the properties and milkiut possessed by me, the declarant, during her lifetime, and by the payment of government revenue, appropriate the profits derived therefrom, but that she should not by any means transfer the milkiut estates and the slaves; that after the death of my aforesaid wife the milkiut and household furniture shall devolve on Girdhari Thakur, my karta (adopted son).\"", "canonical_name": "Girdhari Thakur"}}, {"text": "Girdhari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31369, "end_char": 31377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The subordinate judge held that Chunderbutti got an estate for life with the power t, o appropriate profits and Girdhari -got a vested remainder on her death.", "canonical_name": "Girdhari Thakur"}}, {"text": "Chunderlmtti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31771, "end_char": 31783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Privv Council on this will held as follows :--- \" \" Their Lordships do not feel justified, upon mere conjecture of what might probably have been intended, in so interpreting it as materially to change the nature of the estate taken by Chunderlmtti.", "canonical_name": "Chunderbutti Thakurain"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33387, "end_char": 33404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was also made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Lallu v. Jagmohan(')."}}, {"text": "Suraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33490, "end_char": 33495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will there ran as follows:-\n\n\"When I die, my wife named Suraj is owner of that property."}}, {"text": "Mahalaxmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33663, "end_char": 33672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And my wife has powers to do in the same way as I have absolute powers to do when I am present, and in case of my wife's death, my daughter Mahalaxmi is owner of the said property after that.\""}}, {"text": "Rajah Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34471, "end_char": 34481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, urged by Mr. Rajah Iyer that as no express or implied power of alienation for purposes of all legal necessities was conferred on the widow, that circumstance\n\n(r) (1898) I.LR."}}, {"text": "Laksh1nana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34649, "end_char": 34659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laksh1nana\n\n}.tadar and\n\nOthers v.\n\nIt."}}, {"text": "Krislrnaswami Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35243, "end_char": 35264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Krislrnaswami Iyengar, on the other hand, 0011tended that the absence of any words in the will 1eRtricting her powers of alienatio~1 and putting a restraint on them, suggested a contrary intE'ntion and that the daughter's estate was described as coming into being itfter the estate of the widow and was not conferred on her simultaneously with the widow, and this connoted according to the' notions of Hindus a full Hindu widow's estate.", "canonical_name": "Krislrnaswami Iyengar"}}, {"text": "JYI. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35886, "end_char": 35905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: JYI."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35935, "end_char": 35945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : Ganpat Rai."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_865_877_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM\n\nKESHAB PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER.\n\nGAMIRI KHARI CHAIDUAR FISHERMEN\n\nSOCIETY LTD. v.\n\nKESHAB PRASAD SINGH.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VrvrAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]\n\nAssam Land and Revenue Regulation (I of 1886), s. 16, Rules 190, 190A, 191-Settlement of fisheries---Direct settleme11t under r. 190A ofter a1wtion by Deputy Commissioner and on his recommendation--Whether settlement of Deputy Commissioner under Rules, or execntive act of State-Appeal to Hic1h Court-Maintaina.bility.\n\nThe Government of Assam, desiring to settle a fishery direct under'\" 190-A of the rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (I of 1886), directed the Deputy Commissioner concerned to put the fishery to auction and submit the bid list to Government with his recommendation for direct settle~ ment.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner accordingly auctioned the fishery and submitted the bid list with a recommendation in the first respondent's favour.\n\nGovernment sanctioned the settlement of the fishery wi_th the first respondent and the latter was informed of the acceptance of the bid and directed to make the deposits.\n\nGovernment received two more petitions on the same day for\n\nreconsideration of the orders passed and three weeks later Government reviewed its order and settled the fishery with another person.\n\nThe first respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court under r. 190 which provided that all orders of a Deputy Commissioner passed under these rules were appealable to tee High Court : Held, the words \" except with the previous sanction of the Provincial Government\" in r. 190-A do not permit the Provincial Government when it so wishes to lift the sa)es completely out of the statutory protection afforded by the Regulation and proceed to dispose of them by executive action.\n\nSuch a construction would maker. 190-A run counter to s. 16 of the Regulation which requires these sales to be made under and in accordance \\Vith the Rules.\n\nThe departure contemplated by r. 190-A was a departure within the Rules.\n\nAs the Deputy Commissioner was the only\n\nJJ2\n\n19.)3\n\nApril 1-1.\n\n'1 1he State of\n\nA_Hsr1111\n\nKeshab P'/'nsad\n\nS{ngh and\n\n866 Sl'PREiVIE COUI-tT REPORTS [1953]\n\nauthority competent to settle these fisheries, subject to sanction, the act of cancellation and the act of resettlemnt were his a.cts, however inucb he ma.y Jiaye actetl nuder the direction and orders of the Government, and the High Court ha<l jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under '\" 190.\n\n, Judgment of the High Court of Assam affirmed.\n\nAnothe,..\n\nCTVrL APPELLA'r~1 .TmUSDICTI0\"1: Civil Appeals Nos. 176 and 176-A of 1952.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 20th February, 1952, and 23rd May, 1952, respectively, from the J udgrnent and Order dated tho 6th December, 1951, of the High Court of , Judicature in Assam at Gauhati in its Revenue Appellate Jurisdiction (Deka J.) in Revenue Appeal No. 65 (M) of 1951.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Nuruddin Ahmed, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 176.\n\nB. B. Tawakley (K. 73. Asthana, with him) for the respondent in Civil Appeal ::'{o. 176.\n\nR. K. Ohmldhury (Jcii Gopal Ghosh and R. N. Tikku, with him) for respondent No. 2. in Civil Appeal No. 176 and appellant in Civil Appeal No. 176-A .\n\n. 1953. April 14. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.---This is a curious case in which the State Government of Assam having granted the first respondent a lease later cancelled its grant and regranted it to another party and now contends that it i& not bound by the Jaws and regulations which ordinarily govern such trnnsactions.\n\nAssam is blest with fisheries which arc under the control of and belong to the State Government.\n\nPeriodically the fishing rights arc leased out to licensees and the State derives considerable revenue from this source.\n\nSo valuable are these rights that as long ago as 1886 it was considered undesirable to leave such a lucrative source of revenue to the unfettered\n\n\" s.c.R.\n\n8UPHEME COURT REPORT8 867\n\ndiscretion and control of either the Provincial Government or a single individual however eminent. Accordingly, legislation was enacted and Regulation I of 1886 (The Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886) was passed into law.\n\nA Register of Fisheries had to be kept and the Deputy Commissioner was empowered, with the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner (later Provincial Government), to declare any collection of water to be a fishery.\n\nOnce a fishery was so dedared no person could acquire fishing rights in it except as provided by rules drawn up under section\n\n155. These rules, with alterations made from time to time, were still operative at all dates relevant and material to this case.\n\nPut shortlv, the effect of these rules at the dates mentioned hre was to require the fishing rights to be sold periodically by public auction in accordance with a particular procedure which was prescribed. These sales were called\" Settlements.\" Among the conditions of sale were the following :- ( l) The officer conducting the sale does not bind himself to accept the highest bid or any bid.\n\n(2) The purchaser shall immediately a.ft<'r the ticceptance of his bill furnish as security etc.\n\n(3) The annual sale of fisheries in a district should be reported to the Commissioner for sanction in Form No. 100.\n\nThe Form shows that each individual settlement had to be sanctioned. But tho rules in force at the dates relevant to this cttse permitted a departure in these words:-\n\n\" Ride 190-A.\n\nNo fishery shall be settled otherwise tha11 by sale as provided in the preceding instrnctions except with the previous sanction of the Provincial floyernment.\"\n\nThere is also the following rule: -- \" 191.\n\nFisheries should be settled to the best advanta(fc but, subject to this condition, the agency of middlmen tts lessees should be done away with as\n\n1:!5.J\n\nThe Swte of\n\nAssa1n\n\nv Keshab Prasad\n\nSingh and\n\n.1nother\n\nBo8e ,_1,\n\n'1.'he State of\n\nA.11sa1n\n\nv. [{eshab Prasad\n\nSinyh and\n\nAnothe, r\n\nBose J.!\n\n868 SUPREiE COURT ltEPORTS [Hl53]\n\nfar as possible. To effect this the fishery area should be broken up into blocks of such size that the actual fishers may be able to take the lease, which should be given, for preference, to the riparian land occupants or to the actual fishermen.\n\nThe endeavour of the District Officer should be to do away with the middlemen by finding out who the sub-lessees are and trying to come to terms with them.\"\n\nThe Rules also made provision for an appeal to the Revenue Tribunal (the High Court acted as such) in the following words :-\n\n\" 190. All orders of a Deputy Commissioner or Sub.\n\nDivisional Officer passed under these rules are appealable to the Revenue Tribunal.\"\n\nThe first respondent held previous leases of the fishery with which we are concerned for a number of years.\n\nThe last of these was to expire on 31st. March, 1951.\n\nShortly before its expiry there was agitation by way of petitions and memorials by some of the local fishermen asking in effect that rule 191 be given effect to though the applications do not actually mention the rule. These applications, six in number, range in date from 27th October, 1950, to 13th March, 1951. They were addressed to various officials ranging from the Chief Minister and the Revenue Minister to the Secretary to Government and the Parliamentary Secretary and the Deputy Commissioner. Government therefore had all the facts fully before it.\n\nIn view of these applications Government decided to settle the fishery direct and wrote the following letter to the Deputy Commissioner on 1st February, 1951:--\n\n\" Government desirn to settle the above mentioned fisherv direct under rule 190-A. I am therefore directed to \"request you to put the fishery to auction and then to submit the bid list to Government with your recommendation for direct settlement.\"\n\nBy that date Government had four of the six applications to which we have referred before it. In addition, it had the recommendation of the Sub-Deputy Collector\n\n8.C.lt. 8UPREME COUR'r REPOHTS 869\n\ndated 4th Jampry, 1951, in favour of these applications together with the Deputy Commissioner's endorsement letter dated 5th January, 1951, confirming the facts set out in the Sub-Deputy Collectors\n\nendorsement and in the applications. The first respondent also made an application to the Parliamentary Secretary on 13th March, 1951, before any final decision was reached.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner proceeded to auction the fishery on 24th February, 1951, and on 26th February, 1951, forwarded the bid lists to the Government with a recommendation in the first respondent's favour (his was the highest bid) in the following terms :- The present lessee is managing the fishery well and there is nothing against him.\"\n\nAfter this, and before the final sanction, Government received still another petition from some of the local fishermen asking for a settlement in their favour.\n\nThis ivas on 13th March, 1951. Therefore, by that date Government had six petitions from the local fishermen before it and one by the first respondent as well as the various recommendations made by the District officials. W\"ith all this material in its possession Government decided in favour of tho first respondent and on 17th March, 1951, wrote to the Deputy Commissioner, with a copy to tho Development Commissioner, as follows :-\n\n\"Government sanction settlement of the Chaiduar-Brahmapntra and Kharoibeel fishery under rule 190-A with the existing lessee Shri Keshab Prosad 8ingh at an annual revenue of Rs. 17,700 for a term of three years with effect from the 1st April, 1951, on the usual terms and conditions.\"\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner conveyed this sanction to the first respondent on 21st March, 1951, and called on him to make the necessary deposits.\n\nThe sanction is in the following terms :\n\n\"You are hereby informed that Government have allowed settlement of Chaiduar-Brahmaputra and Kharoibeel fishery with you at Rs. 17, 700 per year\n\n'1 1he State of\n\nAssa1n\n\nv. /(e1>hab Prasad\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nBoseJ.\n\n1953 for 3 years with effect from 1st April, 1951. You are\n\nThe State of therefore directed to deposit the 1 /4 purchase money amounting to Rs. 4,425 on 28th March, 19;'51, and the .4-ssa1n\n\nv. balance of .Rs. 13,27 5 in cash on 31st March, 1951, failing Keshab Pmsad which the settlement granted is liable to be cancelled.\"\n\nSingh and•\n\n~4noth1'1'\n\nBoseJ.\n\nAccording to all notimm of contract current in civilised countries that would hiwe constituted a binding engagement from which one of the parties to it\n\ncould not resile at will, and had the first respondent tried to hack out we have little doubt that the State Government of Assam would, and quite justifiably, have insisted on exacting its just clues.\n\nBut the State Government did not feel itself hampered by any such old fashioned notions regarding the sanctity of engagements. On the very day on which it passed its orders in the first respondent's favour, 17th Ma, rch, 1951, it received two more.petitions. They emanated from the same sources as before and said nothing new ; but they asked for a reconsideration of the orde.rs just passed.\n\nHad Government recalled its orders then and there, possibly no harm would have been done beyond exposing its vacillations to a limited official eircle. Hut it allowed five days to pass and then the Revenue Secretary wired the Deputy Commissioner not to recall the orders of Government, but to \"stay delivery of possession\" ponding what the Hevenue Secretary was pleased to call \"further orders of Government 011 the revision petitions\". But by then it was too late. The acceptance of the bid had already been communicated to the first respondent nnd by nll ordinary notions the contnwt was complete.\n\nThe State Govemment now says in effect, somewhat cynically, that it is not bound by the statutory rules and claims that that gives it the right to rec, ill its previous orders and regrant the fishery to some other person or body more to its liking, or rather in whom it has discovered fresh virtues hidden from its view in its earlier anxious and mature deliberations.\n\nActing on the telegraphic instructions received by him, the Deputy Commissioner conveyed the orders to the first respondent on 22nd March, 1951, and said:-\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:JIE COURT REPORTS Sil\n\n\"The undermentioned document is forwarded to Sri jut Kes!mb Prosad Singh ......... for information and necessary action.\n\nHe is further informed that he is not to deposit the I ;4th purchase money and additional securitv ......... till the decision of the revision petition mei{- tioned in the telegram\".\n\nThree weeks elapsed and then on 13th April, 1951, the State Oovemment solernnly \"reviewed\" its former order and said : -\n\n\"It is reported by the Deputy Commissioner that the Gamiri Kharai-Chaiduar. Fishermen Society, Ltd., is constituted by bona .fide fishermen.\n\nAccordingly, in view of the new circumstances brought forward by the above Society the review petition is allowed and the previous orders of Governrnent ......... dated the 17th March, 1951, is modified.\n\nThe Chaiduar Brahmaputra and Kharaibeel fishery is accordingly settled with the Gamiri Kliarai-\n\nChaiduar Fishermen Society Ltd ...... \"\n\nThe manager of this Fishermen's Society is one Maniram Das.\n\nHis name was put forward by 205 members who olaimod to be bona .fide Assamese fishermen in the petitions of 27th October, 1950, and 21st December, 1950, also by Maniram himself on behalf of this Society on 2nd January, 1951. Their claims were endorsed by the Sub-Deputy Collector on 4th January, 1951, and by the Deputy Commissioner on 5th January, 1951. The same claims were again made by Maniram Das on behalf of the Society on 23rd January, 1951.\n\nThe \"new circumstances\" said to have been discovered on review was the following statement made by the Deputy Commissioner on 3rd April, 1951 :-\n\n\" Gamiri Kharai-Chaiduar Society is formed by bonri fhle fishermen\".\n\nThe previous statement of the Sub-Deputy Collector made on 4th .Tanuary, 1951, was:-\n\n\"The applicants are all Kaibarta people in the district of Darrang whoHe sole business is to deal with\n\nThe State oj\n\nA3sa1n\n\nKeshab JJrasad\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nBose J,\n\nJ9/j3\n\n-The State of Assa1n v.\n\n S~PREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nfish ............ The applicants are Assamese people. In view of this and in view of the fact that these people have been recommended by respectable persons, I\n\nKeshnb Prasad suggest that Kharai-Chaiduar fishery\" (the one in question here) \" may be settled with them to encourage them to compete with the other fishermen Singh and\n\nAnother\n\nBose J. coming from outside Assam.\"\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner's endorsement on this (the same Deputy Commissioner) dated 5th January, 1951, runs:-\n\n\" The petitioner (Maniram Das) is an actual fisherman as will appear from the report of the Sub- Deputy Collector ...... As observed by the Sub-Deputy Collector ..... .it is a fact that the indigenous fishermen cannot compete with the upcountry people in open auction.\"\n\nTo characterise the later statement of the Deputy Commissioner dated 3rd April, 1951, as disclosure of a new circumstance betrays a cynical disregard for accuracy on a par only with the Assam Government's cynical disregard for its pledged word.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner was informed of the Government's revised decision on 13th April, 1951, and on 16th April, 1951, the fishery was settled with Maniram Das and, according to the first respondent, the settlement in his name was cancelled.\n\nThe first respondent's reaction to this was to file an appeal to the High Court under rule 190 and at the same time to apply for a mandamus under article 226 of the Constitution. The relief sought was worded as follows:- -\n\n\" The humble appellant, therefore, prays that your Lordships would be pleased to set aside the settlement of the fishery with the respondent and restore the settlement of the same with the humble\n\nappellant.\"\n\nThe High Court, not unsurprisingly on these facts. granted the prayer.\n\nIt acted under rule 190 as an appellate tribunitl and the only question for us to de- /' cide is whether it lrnd jurisdiction to do Ro, The\n\nThe appellant is 1953 mandamns petition is not before us. the State of Assam.\n\nThere is an ancient presumption under section 114,\n\nTh• State of\n\nAssani illustration (h), of the Evidence Act, dating from at v. least 1872, that official acts have been regularly per KMhab p,.asad formed. Strange as it may seem this applies to Govern- Singh anrl ments as well as to lesser bodies and officials, and Another. ancient though it is the rule is still in force. True, the presumption will have to be applied with caution in this case but however difficult the task it is our duty to try and find a ); wful origin for as many of the acts of the appellan~ Government as we can.\n\nNow, as we have seen, prescribed fisheries in Assam were lifted out of the realm of matters which could be disposed of at the executive discretion of either Governments or officials and were placed under statutory regulation and control by sections 16 and 155 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation of 1886; and we have already referred to the elaborate set of rules which were drawn up in pursuance of that Regulation. It follows that no fisherv can be \"settled\" except in accordance with those Ri'ilcs. .\n\nIt was not disputed that, apart from rule 190-A/ which we are now called upon to construe, the Deputy Commissioner alone could effect a \"settlement\" and, as we have shown, he was bound to follow a prescribed procedure; also that his \"settlement\" was subject to the sanction of the Commissioner.\n\nRule 190-A permits a departure but we do not con/ sider it n0cessary in this case to determine the exact extent of the departure permitted because the Deputy Commissioner was directed to put the fishery to auction and he did so. The only departure from the rules was that instead of sending the result of the auction to the Commissioner for Settlement it was sent to the State Government direct. ln our opinion, that was a permissible depal'ture but it was for all that a departure within the Rules.\n\nIn our judgment, the words \"except with the pre vious sanctiorr of thwProvincial Govornment\" are\n\nBoseJ.\n\n1953 important. vVo do not consider that tqis permits the Provincial Government when it so wishes to lift the Eales Th.r.State of l h d db Assam complete y out oft e statutory protection affor e y\n\nv. the Regulation and proceed to dispose of them by\n\nKeshnb Pmsnd executive action. Such a construction would make\n\ns; ngh and rule 190-A run counter to section 16 of the Regulation\n\nAnother. which requires these sales to be made in accordance with rules framed under section 155, and of course a rule-making authority cannot override the statute.\n\nAccordingly, the law requires the sale to be under and in accordance with the rules. It follows that the departure contemplated by rule 190-A is also a departure within the four corners of the rules read as a whole and is a part of the rules. It is true the departure need not conform to the \"preceding instructions \" contained in the earlier portion of the rules but the departure once sanctioned itself becomes part and parcel of the rules.\n\nThis is important because one of the statutory safeguards against arbitrary executiYe action i~ the appeal to the Revenue Tribuna~ which in this case is the High Court. We would be slow to hold that this safegnard can he circumvented by the simple expedient of lifting a sale out of the rules whenever Government finds that convenient.\n\nIt seems to us that if the intention was to authorise Government to lift the matter out of the rules altogether and to proceed in an executive capacity the word \" sanction \" would be out of place, for Govemment would hardly require its own previous san8tion to something which it is itself authorised to do.\n\nThe sanction must therefore refer to something which some other person or body is authorised to do, and in the context we feel that it can only mean sanction to the Deputy Commissioner to proceed in a manner which is not quite in accordance with the instructions contained in the rules.\n\nThe next question is, to what extent was a departure sanctioned ? This is to be found in the letter dated 1st February, 1951, addressed to the Deputy Commissioner ;- ·\n\ns.c.k. l:\\CPREME COCR'J' REPOR1'S 875\n\n\"Government desire to settle the above mentioned fishery direct under rnle 190-A.\n\nI am therefore directed to request you to put the fishery to auction and then to submit the bid list to Government with your recommendation for direct settlement \".\n\nThe State of Assam wishes to construe this to mean that the Government of Assam intended to flout the statute and disregard the Rules and proceed by exeeutive action. The words \" direct settlement \" do lend themselves to that construction but that would be an act which, in our opinion, would not be warranted by the law and, as we are bound to presume until the contrary is shown that the official acts of the Assam Government were regularly performed, we must, if we can, lean against a constrnction which would put that Government more in the wrong than we can help especially as it itself purported to act under rule 190-A.\n\nNow the only act which would be in consonance with rule 190-A and which would at the same time bo in conformity with the letter of the first Febmary would be for the Deputy Commissioner to sell by auction and then send the matter to Government direct for sanction instead of to the Commissioner.\n\nThat, in our opinion, would be a permissible departure and would make the action of Government legal and would bring the matter under rule 190-A. In the circumstances, we. are bound to constme this letter in that sense.\n\nNow what did the Deputy Commissioner do ? 80 far as the actual auction was concerned, he followed the Rules.\n\nHe held a regular auction anrl recorded the bids in the usual way.\n\nUp to that point ho not only complied with the letter of the 1st February but also with the regular mies. His only departure was to send his choice of a lessee to Government direct instead of to the Commissioner. This, acvording to us, was a permissible departure.\n\nLi pon receipt of the Deputy Commissioner's recommendation Government sanctioned the settlelllent with the first respondent and the Deputy Commissioner co1nmunicitted the sanction.\n\nThe State of Assa1n v.\n\nKeshab PrMad\n\nSingh and Another.\n\nBose J.\n\nL..\n\nThe State of\n\nAssani\n\n87G SUPHEME COGRi' RRPOHTS [1953]\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the State of Assam that this was not a settlement by the Deputy' Commissioner but by the State Govemment and that the Deputy Commissioner was only acting as its mouthpiece when\n\n[(eahal! Prasad he conveved the orders of Govr; rnment to the :5.rst\n\nSingh and Another.\n\nBPae J.\n\nrespondei{t. In our opinion, that is a mere playing with words. The su bstauce of the thing is there.\n\nIt would be illegal for Government to setHc the fishery direct by executive action because of the statute.\n\nIt would be proper for it to sanction tlw settlement under rule 190-A in the way it did. liovernment said it was acting under rule 190-A. H said it had \"sanctioned \" the settlement. \\Vhose act was it sanctioning?\n\nCertainly not its own, for one cannot sanction one's own act. Sanction can only be accorded to the act of another and the only other person concerned in this matter was the Deputy Commissioner. Accordingly, in spite of the efforts of Government to appear as a bold brave despot which knows no laws but its own, we are constrained to hold that it not only clothed itself with an aura of legality but that it actually acted within the confines of the laws by which it is bound.\n\nIt follows that the settlement was the act of the Deputy Commissioner and fell within the four corners of the rules. That vested the first respondent with a good and legal title to the lease.\n\nNext followed a similar series of acts cancelling the settlement \\Vith the first respondent and resettling the fishery with the rival body. As the Deputy Commissioner was the only authority competent to settle these fisheries, subject of course to sanction, we are bound to hold that the act of cancellation and the act of resettlement were his acts however much he may have acted under the direction and orders of a third party. That at once vested the High Court with jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against his actions under rule 190.\n\n\\Vhen we say the Deputy Commissioner acted under the direction and orders of the State Government, we refer to the actual act of \"settling\" and not to his choice of a lessee. If this auction had proceeded in the normal\n\nS, C.R.\n\n,. . .\n\nSliPREME uoun:r REPORTS 877\n\nThe .State of\n\nAssa1n v.\n\nway, the Deputy Commissioner would have directed the auction and would have made a selection and would then have sent his selection on to a higher authority, the Uommissioner, for sanction.\n\nHe would then have \"settled\" the fishery. In the present case, he carried out every one of those steps except that the higher authority here was the State Government which had substituted itself under rufo 190-A in place of the Commissioner.\n\nIt was the Deputy Commissioner who rn ade the initial choice. It was hi.s choice which was \" sanctioned \" and it was he who in realitv and in fact \" settled\" the fisherv with the first i:ospondent. The mere fact that the Stte Government in adrlition to \" sanctioning\" his act also told him to \" settle\" the fishery could not alter or divest him of his legal authority. This is not a case in which the Deputy Uommissioner having been vested with a\n\ndiscretion failed to exercise it and acted as the mouthpiece of another. His discretion was to select a bidder\n\nand he did that without any outside pressure.\n\nThereafter his authority was to \" settle \" the fishery with the selected bidder once his act was sanctioned and the mere fact 1hat he was directed by another to do that which he would have been bound to do under the law\n\nin any event cannot diYest the settlement of its legal and binding character.\n\nKeshab PrasC11J.\n\nOn the nwrits the High Court 1rns abundantly right.\n\nW c accordingly uphold its order and dismiss the appeal with costs pttyable to the first respondent.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 176-A of 1952.\n\nJ3osE , J. --For the reasons giveti in our judgment in Civil Appeal l\\o. 176 of 1952 pronounced to-day, we dismiss the appeal without costs.\n\nAppeals di:smissed.\n\nAgent for the appella.nt in Appeal No. 176: Naimit Lal.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 in Appeal Xo. 176 and respondent in Appeal No. 176-A: A. D. 1vlathur.\n\nAacnt for respondent No. 2 in Appeal No. 176 and\n\nappllant in Appeal No. 176-A: K. R. Krishnaswamy.\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother.\n\nBosl' .f.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE OF ASSAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ASSAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KESHAB PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KESHAB PRASAD SINGH AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 176, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VrvrAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 189, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 216, "end_char": 249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 263, "end_char": 268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation", "statute": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation"}}, {"text": "Deputy Commissioner and on his recommendation--Whether settlement of Deputy Commissioner under Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 367, "end_char": 467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1894, "end_char": 1899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nA_Hsr1111\n\nKeshab P'/'nsad\n\nS{ngh and\n\n866 Sl'PREiVIE COUI-tT REPORTS [1953]", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2144, "end_char": 2230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1 1he State of\n\nA_Hsr1111\n\nKeshab P'/'nsad\n\nS{ngh and\n\n866 Sl'PREiVIE COUI-tT REPORTS [1953]\n\nauthority competent to settle these fisheries, subject to sanction, the act of cancellation and the act of resettlemnt were his a.cts, however inucb he ma.y Jiaye actetl nuder the direction and orders of the Government, and the High Court ha<l jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under '\" 190."}}, {"text": "High Court of , Judicature in Assam at Gauhati", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2847, "end_char": 2893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by Special Leave granted by the Supreme Court on the 20th February, 1952, and 23rd May, 1952, respectively, from the J udgrnent and Order dated tho 6th December, 1951, of the High Court of , Judicature in Assam at Gauhati in its Revenue Appellate Jurisdiction (Deka J.) in Revenue Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2984, "end_char": 2995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Nuruddin Ahmed, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3026, "end_char": 3040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Nuruddin Ahmed, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B. B. Tawakley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3096, "end_char": 3110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Tawakley (K. 73."}}, {"text": "R. K. Ohmldhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Ohmldhury (Jcii Gopal Ghosh and R. N. Tikku, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Jcii Gopal Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3203, "end_char": 3219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Ohmldhury (Jcii Gopal Ghosh and R. N. Tikku, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Tikku", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3224, "end_char": 3235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Ohmldhury (Jcii Gopal Ghosh and R. N. Tikku, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3398, "end_char": 3402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.---This is a curious case in which the State Government of Assam having granted the first respondent a lease later cancelled its grant and regranted it to another party and now contends that it i& not bound by the Jaws and regulations which ordinarily govern such trnnsactions.", "canonical_name": "BosE"}}, {"text": "State Government of", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.---This is a curious case in which the State Government of Assam having granted the first respondent a lease later cancelled its grant and regranted it to another party and now contends that it i& not bound by the Jaws and regulations which ordinarily govern such trnnsactions."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3464, "end_char": 3469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.---This is a curious case in which the State Government of Assam having granted the first respondent a lease later cancelled its grant and regranted it to another party and now contends that it i& not bound by the Jaws and regulations which ordinarily govern such trnnsactions."}}, {"text": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section\n\n155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886", "statute": "The Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nA.11sa1n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6023, "end_char": 6041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fisheries should be settled to the best advanta(fc but, subject to this condition, the agency of middlmen tts lessees should be done away with as\n\n1:!5.J\n\nThe Swte of\n\nAssa1n\n\nv Keshab Prasad\n\nSingh and\n\n.1nother\n\nBo8e ,_1,\n\n'1.'he State of\n\nA.11sa1n\n\nv. [{eshab Prasad\n\nSinyh and\n\nAnothe, r\n\nBose J.!", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nA.11sa1n"}}, {"text": "eshab Prasad\n\nSinyh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fisheries should be settled to the best advanta(fc but, subject to this condition, the agency of middlmen tts lessees should be done away with as\n\n1:!5.J\n\nThe Swte of\n\nAssa1n\n\nv Keshab Prasad\n\nSingh and\n\n.1nother\n\nBo8e ,_1,\n\n'1.'he State of\n\nA.11sa1n\n\nv. [{eshab Prasad\n\nSinyh and\n\nAnothe, r\n\nBose J.!", "canonical_name": "Keshab JJrasad\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "27th October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7236, "end_char": 7254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These applications, six in number, range in date from 27th October, 1950, to 13th March, 1951."}}, {"text": "13th March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7259, "end_char": 7275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These applications, six in number, range in date from 27th October, 1950, to 13th March, 1951."}}, {"text": "1st February, 1951:--", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7663, "end_char": 7684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of these applications Government decided to settle the fishery direct and wrote the following letter to the Deputy Commissioner on 1st February, 1951:--\n\n\" Government desirn to settle the above mentioned fisherv direct under rule 190-A. I am therefore directed to \"request you to put the fishery to auction and then to submit the bid list to Government with your recommendation for direct settlement.\""}}, {"text": "24th February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8567, "end_char": 8586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner proceeded to auction the fishery on 24th February, 1951, and on 26th February, 1951, forwarded the bid lists to the Government with a recommendation in the first respondent's favour (his was the highest bid) in the following terms :- The present lessee is managing the fishery well and there is nothing against him.\""}}, {"text": "26th February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8595, "end_char": 8614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner proceeded to auction the fishery on 24th February, 1951, and on 26th February, 1951, forwarded the bid lists to the Government with a recommendation in the first respondent's favour (his was the highest bid) in the following terms :- The present lessee is managing the fishery well and there is nothing against him.\""}}, {"text": "17th March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9334, "end_char": 9350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W\"ith all this material in its possession Government decided in favour of tho first respondent and on 17th March, 1951, wrote to the Deputy Commissioner, with a copy to tho Development Commissioner, as follows :-\n\n\"Government sanction settlement of the Chaiduar-Brahmapntra and Kharoibeel fishery under rule 190-A with the existing lessee Shri Keshab Prosad 8ingh at an annual revenue of Rs."}}, {"text": "Keshab Prosad 8ingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9576, "end_char": 9595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W\"ith all this material in its possession Government decided in favour of tho first respondent and on 17th March, 1951, wrote to the Deputy Commissioner, with a copy to tho Development Commissioner, as follows :-\n\n\"Government sanction settlement of the Chaiduar-Brahmapntra and Kharoibeel fishery under rule 190-A with the existing lessee Shri Keshab Prosad 8ingh at an annual revenue of Rs."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9678, "end_char": 9693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17,700 for a term of three years with effect from the 1st April, 1951, on the usual terms and conditions.\""}}, {"text": "21st March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9806, "end_char": 9822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner conveyed this sanction to the first respondent on 21st March, 1951, and called on him to make the necessary deposits."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nAssa1n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10070, "end_char": 10086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17, 700 per year\n\n'1 1he State of\n\nAssa1n\n\nv. /(e1>hab Prasad\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nBoseJ.\n\n1953 for 3 years with effect from 1st April, 1951.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nA.11sa1n"}}, {"text": "hab Prasad\n\nSingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10096, "end_char": 10113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17, 700 per year\n\n'1 1he State of\n\nAssa1n\n\nv. /(e1>hab Prasad\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nBoseJ.\n\n1953 for 3 years with effect from 1st April, 1951."}}, {"text": "March, 19;'51", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10294, "end_char": 10307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,425 on 28th March, 19;'51, and the .4-ssa1n\n\nv. balance of .Rs."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10365, "end_char": 10381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13,27 5 in cash on 31st March, 1951, failing Keshab Pmsad which the settlement granted is liable to be cancelled.\""}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10462, "end_char": 10467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh and•\n\n~4noth1'1'\n\nBoseJ.\n\nAccording to all notimm of contract current in civilised countries that would hiwe constituted a binding engagement from which one of the parties to it\n\ncould not resile at will, and had the first respondent tried to hack out we have little doubt that the State Government of Assam would, and quite justifiably, have insisted on exacting its just clues.", "canonical_name": "Singh"}}, {"text": "22nd March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12341, "end_char": 12357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting on the telegraphic instructions received by him, the Deputy Commissioner conveyed the orders to the first respondent on 22nd March, 1951, and said:-\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:JIE COURT REPORTS Sil\n\n\"The undermentioned document is forwarded to Sri jut Kes!mb Prosad Singh ......... for information and necessary action."}}, {"text": "Kes!mb Prosad Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12461, "end_char": 12480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting on the telegraphic instructions received by him, the Deputy Commissioner conveyed the orders to the first respondent on 22nd March, 1951, and said:-\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:JIE COURT REPORTS Sil\n\n\"The undermentioned document is forwarded to Sri jut Kes!mb Prosad Singh ......... for information and necessary action."}}, {"text": "13th April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12746, "end_char": 12762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three weeks elapsed and then on 13th April, 1951, the State Oovemment solernnly \"reviewed\" its former order and said : -\n\n\"It is reported by the Deputy Commissioner that the Gamiri Kharai-Chaiduar."}}, {"text": "Gamiri Kharai-Chaiduar. Fishermen Society, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12888, "end_char": 12935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three weeks elapsed and then on 13th April, 1951, the State Oovemment solernnly \"reviewed\" its former order and said : -\n\n\"It is reported by the Deputy Commissioner that the Gamiri Kharai-Chaiduar."}}, {"text": "Maniram Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13368, "end_char": 13379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chaiduar Brahmaputra and Kharaibeel fishery is accordingly settled with the Gamiri Kliarai-\n\nChaiduar Fishermen Society Ltd ...... \"\n\nThe manager of this Fishermen's Society is one Maniram Das.", "canonical_name": "Maniram Das"}}, {"text": "Maniram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13543, "end_char": 13550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His name was put forward by 205 members who olaimod to be bona .fide Assamese fishermen in the petitions of 27th October, 1950, and 21st December, 1950, also by Maniram himself on behalf of this Society on 2nd January, 1951.", "canonical_name": "Maniram Das"}}, {"text": "4th January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13665, "end_char": 13682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their claims were endorsed by the Sub-Deputy Collector on 4th January, 1951, and by the Deputy Commissioner on 5th January, 1951."}}, {"text": "5th January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13718, "end_char": 13735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their claims were endorsed by the Sub-Deputy Collector on 4th January, 1951, and by the Deputy Commissioner on 5th January, 1951."}}, {"text": "23rd January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13812, "end_char": 13830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same claims were again made by Maniram Das on behalf of the Society on 23rd January, 1951."}}, {"text": "3rd April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13959, "end_char": 13974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The \"new circumstances\" said to have been discovered on review was the following statement made by the Deputy Commissioner on 3rd April, 1951 :-\n\n\" Gamiri Kharai-Chaiduar Society is formed by bonri fhle fishermen\"."}}, {"text": "Gamiri Kharai-Chaiduar Society", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13981, "end_char": 14011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The \"new circumstances\" said to have been discovered on review was the following statement made by the Deputy Commissioner on 3rd April, 1951 :-\n\n\" Gamiri Kharai-Chaiduar Society is formed by bonri fhle fishermen\"."}}, {"text": "4th .Tanuary, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14108, "end_char": 14126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The previous statement of the Sub-Deputy Collector made on 4th .Tanuary, 1951, was:-\n\n\"The applicants are all Kaibarta people in the district of Darrang whoHe sole business is to deal with\n\nThe State oj\n\nA3sa1n\n\nKeshab JJrasad\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nBose J,\n\nJ9/j3\nThe State of Assa1n v.\n\n S~PREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nfish ............ The applicants are Assamese people."}}, {"text": "Darrang", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14194, "end_char": 14201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The previous statement of the Sub-Deputy Collector made on 4th .Tanuary, 1951, was:-\n\n\"The applicants are all Kaibarta people in the district of Darrang whoHe sole business is to deal with\n\nThe State oj\n\nA3sa1n\n\nKeshab JJrasad\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nBose J,\n\nJ9/j3\nThe State of Assa1n v.\n\n S~PREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nfish ............ The applicants are Assamese people."}}, {"text": "Keshab JJrasad\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14261, "end_char": 14282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The previous statement of the Sub-Deputy Collector made on 4th .Tanuary, 1951, was:-\n\n\"The applicants are all Kaibarta people in the district of Darrang whoHe sole business is to deal with\n\nThe State oj\n\nA3sa1n\n\nKeshab JJrasad\n\nSingh and\n\nAnother\n\nBose J,\n\nJ9/j3\nThe State of Assa1n v.\n\n S~PREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nfish ............ The applicants are Assamese people.", "canonical_name": "Keshab JJrasad\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Keshnb Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14530, "end_char": 14543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of this and in view of the fact that these people have been recommended by respectable persons, I\n\nKeshnb Prasad suggest that Kharai-Chaiduar fishery\" (the one in question here) \" may be settled with them to encourage them to compete with the other fishermen Singh and\n\nAnother\n\nBose J. coming from outside Assam.\""}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14710, "end_char": 14714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of this and in view of the fact that these people have been recommended by respectable persons, I\n\nKeshnb Prasad suggest that Kharai-Chaiduar fishery\" (the one in question here) \" may be settled with them to encourage them to compete with the other fishermen Singh and\n\nAnother\n\nBose J. coming from outside Assam.\""}}, {"text": "Maniram Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14875, "end_char": 14886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner's endorsement on this (the same Deputy Commissioner) dated 5th January, 1951, runs:-\n\n\" The petitioner (Maniram Das) is an actual fisherman as will appear from the report of the Sub- Deputy Collector ...... As observed by the Sub-Deputy Collector ..... .it is a fact that the indigenous fishermen cannot compete with the upcountry people in open auction.\"", "canonical_name": "Maniram Das"}}, {"text": "Assam Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15314, "end_char": 15330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To characterise the later statement of the Deputy Commissioner dated 3rd April, 1951, as disclosure of a new circumstance betrays a cynical disregard for accuracy on a par only with the Assam Government's cynical disregard for its pledged word."}}, {"text": "16th April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15476, "end_char": 15492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner was informed of the Government's revised decision on 13th April, 1951, and on 16th April, 1951, the fishery was settled with Maniram Das and, according to the first respondent, the settlement in his name was cancelled."}}, {"text": "Maniram Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15523, "end_char": 15534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner was informed of the Government's revised decision on 13th April, 1951, and on 16th April, 1951, the fishery was settled with Maniram Das and, according to the first respondent, the settlement in his name was cancelled.", "canonical_name": "Maniram Das"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15764, "end_char": 15775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16382, "end_char": 16393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nAssani illustration (h)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16400, "end_char": 16433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is an ancient presumption under section 114,\n\nTh• State of\n\nAssani illustration (h), of the Evidence Act, dating from at v. least 1872, that official acts have been regularly per KMhab p,.asad formed."}}, {"text": "sections 16 and 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17175, "end_char": 17194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18699, "end_char": 18709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 155", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18814, "end_char": 18825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20379, "end_char": 20397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is to be found in the letter dated 1st February, 1951, addressed to the Deputy Commissioner ;- ·\n\ns.c.k."}}, {"text": "S 875", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20474, "end_char": 20479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Assam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20734, "end_char": 20748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Assam wishes to construe this to mean that the Government of Assam intended to flout the statute and disregard the Rules and proceed by exeeutive action."}}, {"text": "Government of Assam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20790, "end_char": 20809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Assam wishes to construe this to mean that the Government of Assam intended to flout the statute and disregard the Rules and proceed by exeeutive action."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22561, "end_char": 22565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nL..\n\nThe State of\n\nAssani\n\n87G SUPHEME COGRi' RRPOHTS [1953]\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the State of Assam that this was not a settlement by the Deputy' Commissioner but by the State Govemment and that the Deputy Commissioner was only acting as its mouthpiece when\n\n[(eahal!", "canonical_name": "BosE"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nAssani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22579, "end_char": 22595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nL..\n\nThe State of\n\nAssani\n\n87G SUPHEME COGRi' RRPOHTS [1953]\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the State of Assam that this was not a settlement by the Deputy' Commissioner but by the State Govemment and that the Deputy Commissioner was only acting as its mouthpiece when\n\n[(eahal!", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nA.11sa1n"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22907, "end_char": 22912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prasad he conveved the orders of Govr; rnment to the :5.rst\n\nSingh and Another.", "canonical_name": "Singh"}}, {"text": "BPae", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22927, "end_char": 22931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BPae J.\n\nrespondei{t."}}, {"text": "Keshab PrasC11J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26208, "end_char": 26224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Keshab PrasC11J.\n\nOn the nwrits the High Court 1rns abundantly right."}}, {"text": "Naimit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26621, "end_char": 26631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "176: Naimit Lal."}}, {"text": "A. D. 1vlathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26715, "end_char": 26729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "176-A: A. D. 1vlathur."}}, {"text": "K. R. Krishnaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26812, "end_char": 26830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "176-A: K. R. Krishnaswamy."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26833, "end_char": 26838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "Singh"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_878_893_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "L...\n\nApdl lo.\n\nSUPREME CO:CRT REPORTS [i953]\n\nKUMBHA MAvVJI\n\nUNION O:F INDIA-\n\n[iVIEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VrvIAN BosE and\n\nJAGANNADHA DAS JJ.]\n\nIndian Arbitration Act (II of 1940), ss. 14 (2), 31 (3) and (4) --Filing of award--Urnpire handin(I over award to parties--li'iling in Court by part11--Necessity of a11thorisa.tion of arbitrator or mnpi1'e--Award filed in two Courts--Exclnsive j11risdiction of Co11rt in which awa.rd was filed earlier-Filinu awctrrl after arbitration is coinpletc--Applicability of s. 31 ( 4)--\"In a reference\", meaninq of.\n\nThe mere filing of award in Court by a party to it without the authority of the arbitrator or umpire is not a su!licient OOlllpliance with the terllls of s. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, nor can it bo inferred from the mere handing over of the original award by the umpire to both the parties that he autlwrised thelll to file the same in Court on his behalf; that authority has to be specifically alleged and proved.\n\nThe phrase \"in a reference\" in s. 31, sub-s. (4), of the Indian Arbitration Act1 1940, is coml_)rehensive enough to cover an applic. ation first made after the arbitration is completed and a iinal award made, and the subsection vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Court in which an application for filing an •ward has been first made nuder s. 14 of the Act.\n\nThe respondent who was a party to an award filed itn application before the Subordinate Jndge of Gauhati under s. 14 ('2) of the Indian Arbitration Ad, on tho 10th August, 1949, praying that the umpire may be directed to file the award in Court and upon this notice \\Yas issued to the umpire to file the award in Court before 24th August, 1949.\n\nAs the original award had been handed over to the parties, the umpire sent by post on the 18th August, 1949, a copy of the award signed by him.\n\nThe Court directed the respondent to file the original award in Court and he did so on the 3rd September, 1949. :\\!eanwhile the appellant's solicitors sent to the Registrar of the Calcutta High Court Original Side, on the 17th August, 1949, the original award for being filed in Court and the award was filed on the 29th August: Held, that, as the umpire had, on the direction of the Subordinate Jndge of Gauhati sent a copy of the award signed by him to the Court on the 18th August, 1949, the earlier filing for the purposes of s. 31(3) of the Arbitration Act was in the Ganhati Court and not in the Calcutta High Court, though the original award was filed by the respondent in the Gauhati Court only after the appellant's solicitor had sent the award for filing to the\n\nCalcutta High Court.\n\nIn the circumstances the Gauhati Court 1953 alone had jurisaicition to proceed with the hearing of the dispute - under s. 31 of the Act.\n\nKumbhaMawji Judgment of the Calcutta High Court affirmed. v.\n\nUnion of lndia ..\n\nCIVIL APP.ELLATE .JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 133 and 131of1952.\n\nAppeals from the .Judgment and Decree dated the 23rd February, 1951, of the High Court of .Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Bannerjee .J.) in Appeal No. 11of1950 arising out of the Judgment and Decre 0\n\ndated the 16th day of December, 19i9, of the said High Court (Sinha J.) in its Ordinary Original Civil .Jurisdiction in Award Case No. 208 of 19i9.\n\nN. 0. Chatterjee (Amiya Kumrir Jfukhe1:jea, with him) for the appellant.\n\n0. K. Driphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Jindra Lal, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953. April 16. The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANXADHA DAS J.-On the 28th of January, 1948, the appellant, Khumba Mawji, entered into an agreement with the respondent, the Dominion of India (as it then was) to manufacture and supply, to the Bengal Assam Railway, stone boulders and ballast from Chutiapara quarry. The agreement was entered into at Calcutta, though the work was to be carried ont in Assam. It was a term of the agreement that if any differences arose between the parties, they were to be referred to the arbitration of two persons, one to be nominated by each side, and that if the arbitrators were not able to agree, the matter was to be decided by an umpire to be nominated by both the arbitrators. Differences having, in fact, arisen, the dispute was referred to two arbitrators and on their disagreement the matter went up to an umpire, one Mr. P. C. Chowdhury. The umpire made two awards on or about the 20th of .Julv, 1949, in favour of the appellant.\n\nBy one of then1 he directed a sum of Rs. 3,67,000 to be paid by the respondent to the\n\n1953 appellant on or before the 19th of Augu; t, 1949, with - .. interest thereafter at 6 per cent per annum in case of Kumbha Mawp default. J3y the other he directed a sum of Rs. 83,000\n\nUni'.oa ~India. to be similarly paid by the respondent to the ap:iellant. He is said to have made over each of the two\n\nJagannadha awards, in original, to each of the parties. On the\n\nDasJ. 10th of August, 1949, the respondent filed an application under section 14, sub-seCltion (2), of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, before the court of the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati in Assam praying that the umpire, Mr. Chowdhury, might be directed to file both the awards in court so that the petitioner might get an opportunity for filing objections thereto.\n\nOn this application notice was issued to the umpire to file the awards into that court before the 24th of August 1949.\n\nThe umpire sent a letter dated 18th August, 1949, to the Subordinate Judge, which is as follows with copies of the awards :-\n\n\"Dear Sir, With reference to your notice in money suit No. 63 of 1949 requiring me to submit the awards made by me in the above mentioned dispute on 20th July, 1949, I beg to submit that the two awards were made and signed by me in the presence of the parties and handed over to me on 20th July, 1949.\n\nAs directed by you 1 am sending herewith copies of the same signed by me.\n\nOn the back of each of these copies occurs the receipt of the parties to the awards.\"\n\nOn receipt thereof, the Subordinate , Judge made an order on 24th August, 1949, in the following terms :---\n\n\"Notice on the umpire served. Seen his report forwarding copies of the award of which the originals are said to have been made over to the parties. Applicant to file his copy on Brd Septem her, 1949\".\n\nOn the 3rd of September, 1949, the respondent filed the awards which were handed over to it bv the umpire, and the matter was being proceeded with by issue of further notices Mtd filing of objectiom in the court of the Suhordina, te .Tudge1 GauhiJ'ti, .\n\nMeanwhile on the 17th of August 1949, i.e., a week\n\n19S3 after the respDndent made its first application in the . -- ..\n\nG h t. t th ]] ' ]\" M KumbhaMawJ1 au a i cour , e appe ants so imtors, \" essrs. v Mukherjee and Biswas, sent a letter to the Registrar Unian af.India. of the High Court, Original Side, as follows :\n\n\"On behalf of our client Mr. Kumbha Mowjee we Jagannadha\n\nDa~ J. beg to enclose herewith two original Awards duly stamped and both dated 20th July, 1949, for the respective sums of Rs. 3,67 ,000 and Rs. 83,000 duly signed by the Umpire Mr. P. C. Chaudhury for filing.\n\nPlease therefore direct the office to file the said two Awards and to issue notices in respect thereof expeditiously.\"\n\nAfter some correspondence between the Deputy Registrar and the solicitors calling for some further papers, the Deputy Registrar informed the solicitors by his letter dated the 29th August, 1949, that the award had been filed and asked the solicitors to take out from the court and serve on the parties concerned the statutory notice fixing a date for judgment upon the said award by the Commercial Judge of the court.\n\nNotices were thereupon issued to both the parties in the following terms :\n\n\"To\n\n1. Kumbha Mawji.\n\n2. The Dominion of India represented by the Assam Railway.\n\nTake notice that the Award of the Umpire appointed in the matter of the above Arbitration Agreement had been .filed on the 29th day of August, 1949, and that the Court hearing the commercial causes will proceed to pronounce judgment on such award on 7th day of November, 1949.\n\nDated the 29th day of August, 1949.\" This notice was served on the respondent on the 2nd of September, 1949. Thus in respect of these awards, proceedings were initiated purporting to be under section 14 (2) of the Indian Arbitration Act simultaneously both in the court of the Subordinate Judge 114\n\n882 Sl'PR.EME COt'R.T REPORTS\n\n1953 of Gauhati in Assam as well as on the Original Side - of the High Court at Calcutta. • Ku1nbha-Mawj~· . , v.\n\nThe appellant m answer to the notice rnsued by the\n\nf; nionof India. Gauhati court on 3rd September, 1949, appeared before that court on 28th October, 1949, and obtained Jagannadhn adjournments from time to time until 10th December,\n\nDaoJ. 1949.\n\nOn that date the Gauhati court rejected his prayer for any further adjournment and fixed 20th .January, 1950, for an ex parte hearing.\n\nMeanwhile, the respondent after receiving the notice issued to him by the Calcutta High Court filed, on the 24th of November, 1949, an affidavit dated the 15th of November, 1949, stating his objections to the jurisdiction of the Calcutta Court and to the validity of the awards.\n\nOn the same date a counter affidavit thereto dated the 19th of November, 1949, was filed on behalf of the appellant. On these affidavits the matter was taken up for consideration by the Commercial , Judge of the Calcutta High Court on the 16th of December, 1949.\n\nThe learned Judge overruled J, he objections of the respondent, and passed judgment on the two awards. On appeal therefrom by the respomlent to the Division Bench, the learned Judges reversed the judgment of the single Judge. They held that there had been no proper application under section 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, before the High Court of Calcutta, anrl that consequently thnt Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.\n\nBefore the learned single Judge of the High Court the main objection taken and set out in paragraph 14 of the respondent's affirlavit dated the 15th of November 1949 was as follows:\n\n\"I submit further that inasmuch as the applic>ttion of the Dominion of India nuder section 14 (2) of the Indian Arbitration Act was made as aforesaid to the said Court a, t Ganhati before the award was filed in this Hon'ble Court by Kumbha Mawji, the Court at Gau ha ti alone has jurisdiction.\"\n\nUnder section 31 (1) of the Indian Arbitration Act an award may be filed in any court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. The\n\ns.c.1~.\n\nSUPREME UOCHT ItRPOH1'S 883\n\nreference in tqis case arose out of a contract which, as 1963 already statrd, wa.s entered into a.t Calcutta. and had -- to be performed in Assam.\n\nThus the Gauhati court KumbhaMawji as well as the Calcutta High Court admittedly had Union~ India. jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the reference. _ The point taken, however, on behalf of the respondent .f agannadha in their objections was that, having regard to section Da., .J. 31, sub-section (4) of the Aet 11nd to the fact tlmt an application under section 14, sub-section (2) for a direction to the umpire to file the award was made to the Gauhati court as early as the 10th August, that court was seized of the matter from that date, amt that therefore a11y application under section 14 on a later date to another court, though otherwise compe tent, was liarred u11der section 31, 'mh-section (4).\n\nThis was the main question that was Sl'riously pressed before the learned single Judge. But the learned , Judge was of the opinion that section 31 (4) related only to applications made during the pendency of a reference to arbitration and not to applications made subsequent to the m11king of 11n 11\\rnrd. He thought that in respect of applications for filing an award the exulusive\n\njurisdiction w11s determined with reference to the question as to which was the competent court in which the award was, in fact, first filed under section 14, sub-section (2) (as distinct from when the application for the filing of the award was first presented).\n\nIn this view, the learned Judge held on the facts th11t the 11ward must be taken to have been filed earlier in the Calcutta court and not in the Gauhati court. He accordingly held that the Calcutta High Court had exclusive jurisdiction lrnving regard to section 31 (3), and hence proceeded to judgment on the 11ward, the respondent not having filed any objections before him in time.\n\nOn appeal, the learned Judges considered it unnecessary for them to dispose of the case on either of tlw above grounds c:onsiclercd by the single .Judge, t<ncl held that on the facts it was quite c.lear that there had been no rlue filing of the aw11rd at 11ll in the Calcntta court under seetion 14 (2) inasmuch as t\\lc mrnrd3\n\n884 SUPitEME COUitT REPOH:I18 [1953]\n\n1953 which were claimed to have been duly , filed were, in\n\nK nb--;:-:\\1 .. fact, not filed by the umpire ; nor was it shown that \"' :. ' awp they were filed under his authority.\n\nOn this limited Union of India. ground they reversed the decision of the learned single Judge and vacated the judgment given in favour of Jaganoodha the appellant on the basis of the two awards.\n\nHence Das J. these two appeals to us.\n\nOn the facts stated above three questions i1risc for consideration:\n\n(1) Whether the appellant had the authority of the umpire to file the awards on his behalf into court in terms of section 14 (2) of the Arbitratiou Act ;\n\n(2) Whether in view of sub-section (3) of section 31 of the Act it can be said that the awards were filed in the CvJcutta High Court earlier than in the Gauhati court ; and\n\n(3) Whether the scope of sect.ion 31, sub-section (4) of the Act is limited to applications under the Act during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings only.\n\nAs regards the first question, section 14, sub-section (2) provides that,\n\n\"the arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions or documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in court, and the court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.\"\n\nThis section clearly implies that where the award or a signed copy thereof is in faut filed into court by a party he should have the authority of the umpire for doing so.\n\nThis is, at any rate, the assumption on which the question has beeli dealt with in the High Court, and it has not been contended before us that the filing of the award into court by a party himself\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPliE:ME COURT l~EPORTS 885\n\nthough without the authority of the umpire to do o 1953 on his behalf, is sufficient compliance with the terms K b-;-;,1 . . . of this section. The learned Judges of the High Court um '~. awi• were of the opinion that the authority of the umpire Union of India. empowering the appellant to file the original awards into court on his behalf has not been made out on the Jagannadha evidence in the case. The argument stressed before us Das 1 is that in para 7 of the affidavit dated the 19th of November, 1949, filed on behalf of the appellant in the High Court on the 24th of November, 1949, it is stated that\" On or about the 21st July, 1949, the said Umpire made over the said original award to this deponent for filing.\" lt is urged that this is an averment of the requisite authority from the umpire, and it is pointed out that this assertion has not been contradicted on the other side by any reply affidavit. It is contended therefore that the filing was valid. The learned Judges in coming to the contrary conclusion relied on two facts, namely, that the umpire in his letter to the Gauhati court dated 18th August, 1949, when sending copies of the awards in compliance with the notice issued to him by that court merely stated that he handed over the awards to both the parties, but did not say that he authorised any of them to file the same into court on his behalf. The learned Judges were also of the opinion that the umpire as a person of commonsense could not be supposed to have authorised both the parties to file the awards into court on his behalf. We are inclined to agree with this reasoning. vVhere, as in this case, the originals are said to have been handed over to both the parties, it cannot be assumed that the mere handing over of the awards to the parties necessarily implies the authority of the umpire to file the same into court on his behalf. That authority has to be specifically alleged and proved. In the present case the statement in the affidavit relied on by learned counsel before us is no more than an assertion that the umpire handed over the original awards to the appellant for filing, but there is no allegation that they were so handed over to him for filing on behalf of the umpire.\n\n886 SUPREME COURT ltEPORTR [1953]\n\nl953 The umpire may not have been aware that the awards\n\nK bl ,, .. should be filed into court onlv bv himself or under his tun inJ~-1.UU'J'l h .t • v. aut on .y.\n\nUnion of lnrfla.\n\n.J aga.nna.dhrJ\n\nDasJ.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant urged that the question of the authorisation of the umpire for the filing of the award by the appell1111t was one that was not raised at all as an objection before the learned single Judge of the High Court, and that such an objection should not have been taken notice of for the first time on appeal. It is no doubt true that neither the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent nor the judgment of the learned single Judge gives any indication of this question having been raised in the first court. Indeed, the learned .Judges on appeal recognise it when they say towards the concluding portion of their judgment as follows:\n\n\"It does not appear that the point on which the appeal succeeds was argued in the court below. But it is a point of law and no ojection was taken before iis by the respondent to the appellant taking the point before us \".\n\nThough it is somewhat difficult to see how the qnos tion raised can be said to be a pme question of law, it is quite clear from the above extract that no objection was taken by the respondent to the point being raised.\n\nIt has not been suggested before us that this statement in the judgment was in .111y way erroneous. Appellant's counsel argued that if the learned Judges on appeal felt inclined to dispose of the case on this point alone, they should have called upon the umpire to dari(y whether or not the appellant had his authority, or given an opportunity for production of his affidavit in support of the autho1; ity.\n\nLearned counsel presses that an opportunity should now be allowed. It does not appear, however that it is either necessary or desirable at this stage and after this lapse of time to allow this matter to go back for that purpose.\n\nBecause, apart from the question of mere want of proof of authority, it is clear that in a case of this kind and on the facts above stated, it was\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSlJP8EME COURT REPORTS 887\n\nincumbent on. the appellant to allege categorically 19.53 that, in terms of sub-section (2) of section 4, he had - th 't h 't f h Th ]] Kumbha Mawji e reqrns1 e aut on y o t e umpll'e. , at a egat10n iR wanting not only in the affidavit dated the 19th of Union~ India.\n\nNovember, 1949, but what is more important is that when the awards were filed into court on the 17th of Jagannndha August, 1949, by the solicitors on behalf of the appel- DaaJ. !ant with a letter which might be treated as the initial application to the court, there is not a word to suggest that the awards were being filed nuder th•.' authority of the umpire. The letter contained only a\n\nbald statement that the two original awards duly signed by the umpire were enclosed therewith for filing, with a request to direct the office to file the two awards and to issue notices in respect thereof expeditiously.\n\nIn those circumstances, there has been cleurly no sufficient compliunce with the terms of section 14, sub-section (2) of the Act to constitute the filing of the awards by the appellant's solicitors the filing thereof by the umpire.\n\nAs regurds the second question, numely, as to whether with reference to the terms of section 31, subsection (3) the awards should be held to have been filed earlier in tho Calcutta court •or in the Gauhati court, the view taken by the learned Comrnerciul .Judge was that the filing in the Calcutta court must\n\nlie taken to have been earlier.\n\nFor the purpose of the consideration of this question it may be assumed that that filing was under the uuthority of the umpire.\n\nThe learned Judge wus of the opinion that the filing of the awards in the Gauhati court must be tuken to have been made on the 3rd September \\Vhcn in pursuuncc of the prior order of the Subordinate Judge duted 24th August, 1949, the present respondent filed into court the origi1ml uwards with him.\n\nIn coming to this conclusion the learned Judge ignored the fact that on 18th August, 1949, the umpire in response to the notice previously issued to him forwarded to the court signed copies of the awn, rds and that the same were in that court on or brfore 24th August, 1949. This seems, in terms, to\n\nl.,\n\n1953 be sufficient compliance with the proviions of section\n\nK bh M .. 14, sub-section (2) which only requires that on the um. ; aw; i directions of the court the original award or the copy\n\nUnion of India. thereof should be caused by the umpire to be filed into it. The learned Judge stated that he was not aware Jagannadha whether the copies sent to the Subordinate Judge were\n\nDas J. signed copies or not. The learned Judge failed unfortu- 1iately to notice that the umpire himself in his letter dated 18th August, 1949, stated clearly as follows:\n\n\"As directed by you I am sending herewith copies of the same (a wards) signed by m.e\".\n\nThe learned Judge was also inclined to think that the mere forwarding of the awards does not amount to the filing of them. Here again, the learned Judge has overlooked that under section 14, sub-section (2) the actual filing by the umpire is not essential, but that it is sufficient if the umpire C11; uses the awards to be filed.\n\nIt is not suggested that sending by post in compliance with the notice is not such \"causing\",\n\nIt appears to us therefore clear that the filing of the awards in the Gauhati court must be taken to be on the 24th of August, 1949. So far as the Calcutta comt is concerned, though no doubt the awards were put into that court by the appellant's solicitors on the 17th August, 1949, it appears clearly from the notice issued by the Registrar dated the 30th of August, 1949, that the awards were treated as filed only on the 29th day of August, 1949. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the respondent's affidavit filed in the Calcutta court on 24th of November, 1949, contain categorica.l assertions that so far as the Gauhati court is concerned, the copies of the 11wards were filed by the umpire on the 24th of August, 1949, while as regards the Calcutta High Court the awards were filed on the 29th of August, l!l49.\n\nThes0 assertions have not been contradicted on behalf of the appellant in the counter-PAfidavit filed on the same day. From these facts, it is clear that the earlier ti.lino for the purposes of section 31(3) is in the Gauhati eomt\n\nand not in the Calcutta court as held bv the learned single Judge under an wroneous imprcssi\"on as to the fa, cts, We may as well mention a, t this stage that\n\n. \"\n\nit was not . suggested before us that for legal 1953 purposes the filing of the awards in the Calcutta High K bl\\f ..\n\nCourt (on the assumption of existence of authority in \"'\" :: awJ• the appellant for such filing on behalf of the umpire) Union of India. is not the 29th of August, 1949, but only the 10th of August when the letter was sent by the solicitors to Jagannadha the Registrar enclosing the awards. \\Ve mention this Das J. because it appears from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that some such point was raised there, but before us the contrary was assumed.\n\nWe are accordingly of the opinion that even if the authority of the umpire for the filing of the award into court on his behalf by the appellant is to be taken for granted, it was in the Gauhati court that the awards must be taken to have been filed earlier.\n\nOn this ground, therefore, we are inclined to hold that the Gauhati court alone has jurisdiction under section 31 (3) of the Act.\n\nThe third question which remains for consideration is whether sub-section ( 4) of section 31 of the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 applies only where the first application under the Act was made during the course of pendency of a reference to arbitration or also to a case like the present one where such first application is made after the completion of the arbitration and on the making of an award. As already stated, the learned Judges on appeal did not deal with this question.\n\nThe trial Judge, however, considered the matter, and held that the above provision related only to an application made during the pendency of a reference to arbitration. In the view of the learned Judge,\n\n\"In order to attract sub-section (4) an application must have been made during the pendency of the reference, and if such an application had been made, all other applications arising out of that reference (whether made in the reference or not) must be made in that court\".\n\nApparently, the learned Judge construed the phrase \"in a reference\" in section31, sub-section (4), as meaning \"in the course of a reference\", and that is ;1]so the\n\n\"' .\n\n1953 contention before us of the counsel for the appellant, -- which requires closer examination.\n\nKu1nbhaMawji , . \"· Section 31 of the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 is Union of India. in the following terms:\n\n\"(l) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an Jagannadha j b fil l 1 h · Da. J. aware may e ec in any Court avmg JUrIS diction in the mattel' to wbich the reference relates.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court.\n\n(3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the Court where the a ward has been, or may be, filed, and to no other Court.\n\n(4) Notwithstanding :1nything contained else where in this Act or in any other Jaw for the time being in force, where in any reference an application under the Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court\".\n\nSub-section ( l) relates to the question as to where a completed award has to be filed, and prescribes the local jurisdiction for that purpose. Sub-section (2) deals with the ambit of the exercise of that jurisdiction, and declares it to be exclusive by saying that \"all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or arbitration agreement between the parties , to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed and by 110 other Court\". Sub-section (B) is intended to provide\n\n. ~\n\nthat all applieations regarding the conduct of arbitra- 1963 tion proceedings or otherwise arising out of such pro- - d. b d 1 Kumbha Mawji cee mgs are to e ma e on y m one court, and lays on the concerned party the obligation to do so. Then comes Union ; j Indict. sub-section (4), the object of which apparently is to go - further than sub-section (3), that is, not merely casting Jagannadha on the party concerned an obligation to file all applica- Das J. tions in one court but vesting exclusive jurisdiction for such applications in the court in which the first application has been already made. Thus it will be seen on a comprehensive view of section 31 that while the first sub-section determines the jurisdiction of the court in which an award can be filed, sub-sections (2), (B) and ( 4) are intended to make that jurisdiction effoctive in three different ways, (I) by vesting in one court the authority to deal with all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement, (2) by casting on the persons concerned the obligation to file all applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings in one court, and (3) by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the court in which the first application relating to the matter is filed.\n\nThe context, therefore, of subsection (4) would seem to indicate that the sub-section was not meant to be confined to applications made during the pendency of an arbitration. The necessity for clothing a single court with effective and exclusive jurisdiction, and to bring about by the combined operation of these three provisions the avoidance of conflict and scramble is equally essential whether the question arises during the pendency of thn arbitration or after the arbitration is completed or before the arbitration is commenced. There is no conceivable reason why the Legislature should have intended to confine the operation of sub-section (4) only to applications made during the pend ency of an arbitration, if as is contended, the phrase \"in any reference \" is to be taken as meaning \" in the course of a reference \".\n\nIt may be noticed that the Arbitration Act deals with arbitrations of three different categories: (I) arbitration\n\n892 SUPI'tEM:E COUl'tT REPOR1 1S [195:!]\n\n1963 without intervention of the court, dealt with in\n\nK ;,:~ .. sections 3 to 19 comprising Chapter II; (2) ar\"bitration \"'\" a aw;• with the intervention of a court where there is no suit v.\n\nUnion of India. pending provided in section 20 which is a separate - Chapter III; and (3) arbitration in suits dealt with in Jagannadha sections 21 to 25 comprising Chapter IV. The i'iris-\n\nDas J. diction as regards the latter two classes of arbitrations in respect of certain matters is provided in the very provisions relating to those two classes of arbitrations, that is, section 20, sub-section (1) and section 21.\n\nSub-section (1) of section 31 appears to refer only to the first class. It may, therefore, have been, plausibly, suggested that sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) refer only to this class. But no such position was taken up before us. Indeed, having regard to the wide language employed in these sub-sections it has been assumed that sub-sections (2) and (3) cover all three classes in all their stages. If so, is there any sufficient reason to think that sub-section (4) was meant to have a very restricted operation ? On the view of this sub-section suggested for the appellant, not only would an application made after the award was pronounced be excluded from sub-section (4) but also an application made before the commencement of the arbitration, i.e., for the filing of an agreement of reference and for a direction thereupon. It must be remembered that section 31 is one of the group of sections headed \" General \" which by virtue of section 26 are applicable to all arbitrations. Unless therefore the wording in sub-section ( 4) of section 31 is so compelling as to confine the scope thereof to applications during the pendency of an arbitration, such a limited construction must be rejected.\n\nAs already stated, the entire basis of the limited construction is the meaning of the phrase \" in any reference\" used in sub-section (4) as meaning \"in the course of any reference \". But such a connotation thereof is not in any ordinary sense compelling. The preposition \" in\" is used in various contexts and is capable of conveying various shades of meaning. In the Oxford English Dictionary one of the shades of meaning of this preposition is\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'rs 893\n\n\" Expressing reference or relation to something; in 19o3 reference or regard to; in the case of, in the matter, K ·- .. ffi · f umbha Maw3i a arr, or provmce o . v.\n\nUsed especially with the sphere or department in Union of India. relation or reference to which an attribute or quality is predicated \".\n\nJaga1madha In the context of section 31, sub-section (4), it is reasonable to think that the phrase \"in any reference\" means \" in the matter of a reference \". The word\n\n\"reference\" having been defined in the Act as \"reference to arbitration\", the phrase \"in a reference\" would mean \"in the matter of a reference to arbitration\".\n\nThe phrase \"in a reference\" is, therefore, comprehensive enough to cover also an application first made after the arbitration is completed and a final awiud is made, and in our opinion that is the correct construction thereof in the context.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that section 31 ( 4) would vest exclusive jurisdiction in the court in which an application for the filing of ai1 award has been first made under section 14 of the Act.\n\nIt is undisputed that the application by the respondent Union of India was made before the Gauhati court on the 10th August, 1949, and the earliest move by the appellant before the Calcutta court was on the 17th August, 1949.\n\nOn these facts and on the view of the interpretation of section 31, sub-section (4), which\n\nwe are inclined to take, it is clear that the Gauhati court only has the jurisdiction and not the Calcutta High Court as regards the present dispute.\n\nIn the result, the two appeals must I.Jc dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : S1tku1nar Ghose.\n\nAgent for the respondent: 0. 11. Rajadhyakslw.\n\nDasJ.", "total_entities": 125, "entities": [{"text": "UNION O:F INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION O:F INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "iVIEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VrvIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Arbitration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Arbitration Act", "statute": "Indian Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 507, "end_char": 512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Arbitration Act", "statute": "Indian Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 704, "end_char": 709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Arbitration Act", "statute": "Indian Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 717, "end_char": 745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1010, "end_char": 1015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1319, "end_char": 1324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1449, "end_char": 1454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2359, "end_char": 2367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganhati Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2402, "end_char": 2415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\!eanwhile the appellant's solicitors sent to the Registrar of the Calcutta High Court Original Side, on the 17th August, 1949, the original award for being filed in Court and the award was filed on the 29th August: Held, that, as the umpire had, on the direction of the Subordinate Jndge of Gauhati sent a copy of the award signed by him to the Court on the 18th August, 1949, the earlier filing for the purposes of s. 31(3) of the Arbitration Act was in the Ganhati Court and not in the Calcutta High Court, though the original award was filed by the respondent in the Gauhati Court only after the appellant's solicitor had sent the award for filing to the\n\nCalcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2431, "end_char": 2450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\!eanwhile the appellant's solicitors sent to the Registrar of the Calcutta High Court Original Side, on the 17th August, 1949, the original award for being filed in Court and the award was filed on the 29th August: Held, that, as the umpire had, on the direction of the Subordinate Jndge of Gauhati sent a copy of the award signed by him to the Court on the 18th August, 1949, the earlier filing for the purposes of s. 31(3) of the Arbitration Act was in the Ganhati Court and not in the Calcutta High Court, though the original award was filed by the respondent in the Gauhati Court only after the appellant's solicitor had sent the award for filing to the\n\nCalcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Gauhati Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2513, "end_char": 2526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\!eanwhile the appellant's solicitors sent to the Registrar of the Calcutta High Court Original Side, on the 17th August, 1949, the original award for being filed in Court and the award was filed on the 29th August: Held, that, as the umpire had, on the direction of the Subordinate Jndge of Gauhati sent a copy of the award signed by him to the Court on the 18th August, 1949, the earlier filing for the purposes of s. 31(3) of the Arbitration Act was in the Ganhati Court and not in the Calcutta High Court, though the original award was filed by the respondent in the Gauhati Court only after the appellant's solicitor had sent the award for filing to the\n\nCalcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Gauhati Court 1953", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2649, "end_char": 2667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances the Gauhati Court 1953 alone had jurisaicition to proceed with the hearing of the dispute - under s. 31 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2743, "end_char": 2748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KumbhaMawji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2762, "end_char": 2773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KumbhaMawji Judgment of the Calcutta High Court affirmed.", "canonical_name": "Kumbha Mowjee"}}, {"text": "Union of lndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2824, "end_char": 2838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nUnion of lndia ..\n\nCIVIL APP.ELLATE .JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "UNION O:F INDIA"}}, {"text": "Harries C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3030, "end_char": 3042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the .Judgment and Decree dated the 23rd February, 1951, of the High Court of .Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Bannerjee .J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bannerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3047, "end_char": 3056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the .Judgment and Decree dated the 23rd February, 1951, of the High Court of .Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Bannerjee .J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3188, "end_char": 3193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11of1950 arising out of the Judgment and Decre 0\n\ndated the 16th day of December, 19i9, of the said High Court (Sinha J.) in its Ordinary Original Civil .Jurisdiction in Award Case No."}}, {"text": "Amiya Kumrir Jfukhe1", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3293, "end_char": 3313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee (Amiya Kumrir Jfukhe1:jea, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Driphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3352, "end_char": 3364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Driphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Jindra Lal, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3395, "end_char": 3407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Driphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Jindra Lal, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3412, "end_char": 3422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Driphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and Jindra Lal, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "JAGANXADHA DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3516, "end_char": 3530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANXADHA DAS J.-On the 28th of January, 1948, the appellant, Khumba Mawji, entered into an agreement with the respondent, the Dominion of India (as it then was) to manufacture and supply, to the Bengal Assam Railway, stone boulders and ballast from Chutiapara quarry.", "canonical_name": "JAGANXADHA DAS"}}, {"text": "28th of January, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3541, "end_char": 3562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANXADHA DAS J.-On the 28th of January, 1948, the appellant, Khumba Mawji, entered into an agreement with the respondent, the Dominion of India (as it then was) to manufacture and supply, to the Bengal Assam Railway, stone boulders and ballast from Chutiapara quarry."}}, {"text": "Khumba Mawji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3579, "end_char": 3591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANXADHA DAS J.-On the 28th of January, 1948, the appellant, Khumba Mawji, entered into an agreement with the respondent, the Dominion of India (as it then was) to manufacture and supply, to the Bengal Assam Railway, stone boulders and ballast from Chutiapara quarry.", "canonical_name": "Kumbha Mowjee"}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3644, "end_char": 3661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANXADHA DAS J.-On the 28th of January, 1948, the appellant, Khumba Mawji, entered into an agreement with the respondent, the Dominion of India (as it then was) to manufacture and supply, to the Bengal Assam Railway, stone boulders and ballast from Chutiapara quarry."}}, {"text": "Chutiapara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANXADHA DAS J.-On the 28th of January, 1948, the appellant, Khumba Mawji, entered into an agreement with the respondent, the Dominion of India (as it then was) to manufacture and supply, to the Bengal Assam Railway, stone boulders and ballast from Chutiapara quarry."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3820, "end_char": 3828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreement was entered into at Calcutta, though the work was to be carried ont in Assam."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3871, "end_char": 3876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreement was entered into at Calcutta, though the work was to be carried ont in Assam."}}, {"text": "P. C. Chowdhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4337, "end_char": 4352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Differences having, in fact, arisen, the dispute was referred to two arbitrators and on their disagreement the matter went up to an umpire, one Mr. P. C. Chowdhury.", "canonical_name": "P. C. Chowdhury"}}, {"text": "19th of Augu; t, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4566, "end_char": 4587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,67,000 to be paid by the respondent to the\n\n1953 appellant on or before the 19th of Augu; t, 1949, with - .. interest thereafter at 6 per cent per annum in case of Kumbha Mawp default."}}, {"text": "Kumbha Mawp", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,67,000 to be paid by the respondent to the\n\n1953 appellant on or before the 19th of Augu; t, 1949, with - .. interest thereafter at 6 per cent per annum in case of Kumbha Mawp default.", "canonical_name": "Kumbha Mowjee"}}, {"text": "10th of August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4912, "end_char": 4932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the\n\nDasJ. 10th of August, 1949, the respondent filed an application under section 14, sub-seCltion (2), of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, before the court of the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati in Assam praying that the umpire, Mr. Chowdhury, might be directed to file both the awards in court so that the petitioner might get an opportunity for filing objections thereto."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5013, "end_char": 5041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Gauhati", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5067, "end_char": 5095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the\n\nDasJ. 10th of August, 1949, the respondent filed an application under section 14, sub-seCltion (2), of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, before the court of the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati in Assam praying that the umpire, Mr. Chowdhury, might be directed to file both the awards in court so that the petitioner might get an opportunity for filing objections thereto."}}, {"text": "Chowdhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the\n\nDasJ. 10th of August, 1949, the respondent filed an application under section 14, sub-seCltion (2), of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, before the court of the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati in Assam praying that the umpire, Mr. Chowdhury, might be directed to file both the awards in court so that the petitioner might get an opportunity for filing objections thereto."}}, {"text": "24th of August 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5374, "end_char": 5393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this application notice was issued to the umpire to file the awards into that court before the 24th of August 1949."}}, {"text": "18th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5427, "end_char": 5444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The umpire sent a letter dated 18th August, 1949, to the Subordinate Judge, which is as follows with copies of the awards :-\n\n\"Dear Sir, With reference to your notice in money suit No."}}, {"text": "20th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5671, "end_char": 5686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "63 of 1949 requiring me to submit the awards made by me in the above mentioned dispute on 20th July, 1949, I beg to submit that the two awards were made and signed by me in the presence of the parties and handed over to me on 20th July, 1949."}}, {"text": "24th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt thereof, the Subordinate , Judge made an order on 24th August, 1949, in the following terms :---\n\n\"Notice on the umpire served."}}, {"text": "Brd Septem her, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6274, "end_char": 6294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Applicant to file his copy on Brd Septem her, 1949\"."}}, {"text": "3rd of September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6305, "end_char": 6327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 3rd of September, 1949, the respondent filed the awards which were handed over to it bv the umpire, and the matter was being proceeded with by issue of further notices Mtd filing of objectiom in the court of the Suhordina, te .Tudge1 GauhiJ'ti, ."}}, {"text": "17th of August 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile on the 17th of August 1949, i.e., a week\n\n19S3 after the respDndent made its first application in the . -- .."}}, {"text": "M KumbhaMawJ1", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6694, "end_char": 6707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G h t. t th ]] ' ]\" M KumbhaMawJ1 au a i cour , e appe ants so imtors, \" essrs."}}, {"text": "Kumbha Mowjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6902, "end_char": 6915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the High Court, Original Side, as follows :\n\n\"On behalf of our client Mr. Kumbha Mowjee we Jagannadha\n\nDa~ J. beg to enclose herewith two original Awards duly stamped and both dated 20th July, 1949, for the respective sums of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Kumbha Mowjee"}}, {"text": "P. C. Chaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "83,000 duly signed by the Umpire Mr. P. C. Chaudhury for filing.", "canonical_name": "P. C. Chowdhury"}}, {"text": "29th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7438, "end_char": 7455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some correspondence between the Deputy Registrar and the solicitors calling for some further papers, the Deputy Registrar informed the solicitors by his letter dated the 29th August, 1949, that the award had been filed and asked the solicitors to take out from the court and serve on the parties concerned the statutory notice fixing a date for judgment upon the said award by the Commercial Judge of the court."}}, {"text": "Kumbha Mawji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7765, "end_char": 7777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumbha Mawji.", "canonical_name": "Kumbha Mowjee"}}, {"text": "2nd of September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8203, "end_char": 8225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This notice was served on the respondent on the 2nd of September, 1949."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8310, "end_char": 8320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ku1nbha-Mawj~", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8541, "end_char": 8554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ku1nbha-Mawj~· . ,", "canonical_name": "Ku1nbha-Mawj~"}}, {"text": "3rd September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8650, "end_char": 8669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gauhati court on 3rd September, 1949, appeared before that court on 28th October, 1949, and obtained Jagannadhn adjournments from time to time until 10th December,\n\nDaoJ. 1949."}}, {"text": "28th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gauhati court on 3rd September, 1949, appeared before that court on 28th October, 1949, and obtained Jagannadhn adjournments from time to time until 10th December,\n\nDaoJ. 1949."}}, {"text": "20th .January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8900, "end_char": 8919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that date the Gauhati court rejected his prayer for any further adjournment and fixed 20th .January, 1950, for an ex parte hearing."}}, {"text": "19th of November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9282, "end_char": 9304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same date a counter affidavit thereto dated the 19th of November, 1949, was filed on behalf of the appellant."}}, {"text": "16th of December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9466, "end_char": 9488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these affidavits the matter was taken up for consideration by the Commercial , Judge of the Calcutta High Court on the 16th of December, 1949."}}, {"text": "section 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9775, "end_char": 9788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9831, "end_char": 9853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They held that there had been no proper application under section 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, before the High Court of Calcutta, anrl that consequently thnt Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter."}}, {"text": "15th of November 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10079, "end_char": 10100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the learned single Judge of the High Court the main objection taken and set out in paragraph 14 of the respondent's affirlavit dated the 15th of November 1949 was as follows:\n\n\"I submit further that inasmuch as the applic>ttion of the Dominion of India nuder section 14 (2) of the Indian Arbitration Act was made as aforesaid to the said Court a, t Ganhati before the award was filed in this Hon'ble Court by Kumbha Mawji, the Court at Gau ha ti alone has jurisdiction.\""}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10177, "end_char": 10194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the learned single Judge of the High Court the main objection taken and set out in paragraph 14 of the respondent's affirlavit dated the 15th of November 1949 was as follows:\n\n\"I submit further that inasmuch as the applic>ttion of the Dominion of India nuder section 14 (2) of the Indian Arbitration Act was made as aforesaid to the said Court a, t Ganhati before the award was filed in this Hon'ble Court by Kumbha Mawji, the Court at Gau ha ti alone has jurisdiction.\""}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10201, "end_char": 10211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10420, "end_char": 10430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 883", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10602, "end_char": 10607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gauhati court KumbhaMawji", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10766, "end_char": 10791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus the Gauhati court KumbhaMawji as well as the Calcutta High Court admittedly had Union~ India."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11118, "end_char": 11128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gauhati court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11210, "end_char": 11223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".J. 31, sub-section (4) of the Aet 11nd to the fact tlmt an application under section 14, sub-section (2) for a direction to the umpire to file the award was made to the Gauhati court as early as the 10th August, that court was seized of the matter from that date, amt that therefore a11y application under section 14 on a later date to another court, though otherwise compe tent, was liarred u11der section 31, 'mh-section (4)."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11347, "end_char": 11357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11440, "end_char": 11450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11606, "end_char": 11616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12001, "end_char": 12011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12234, "end_char": 12248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view, the learned Judge held on the facts th11t the 11ward must be taken to have been filed earlier in the Calcutta court and not in the Gauhati court."}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12373, "end_char": 12383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcntta court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12771, "end_char": 12785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the learned Judges considered it unnecessary for them to dispose of the case on either of tlw above grounds c:onsiclercd by the single .Judge, t<ncl held that on the facts it was quite c.lear that there had been no rlue filing of the aw11rd at 11ll in the Calcntta court under seetion 14 (2) inasmuch as t\\lc mrnrd3\n\n884 SUPitEME COUitT REPOH:I18 [1953]\n\n1953 which were claimed to have been duly , filed were, in\n\nK nb--;:-:\\1 .. fact, not filed by the umpire ; nor was it shown that \"' :. '"}}, {"text": "Jaganoodha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13188, "end_char": 13198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ground they reversed the decision of the learned single Judge and vacated the judgment given in favour of Jaganoodha the appellant on the basis of the two awards."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13252, "end_char": 13255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence Das J. these two appeals to us."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13468, "end_char": 13478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13551, "end_char": 13561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CvJcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13622, "end_char": 13641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the facts stated above three questions i1risc for consideration:\n\n(1) Whether the appellant had the authority of the umpire to file the awards on his behalf into court in terms of section 14 (2) of the Arbitratiou Act ;\n\n(2) Whether in view of sub-section (3) of section 31 of the Act it can be said that the awards were filed in the CvJcutta High Court earlier than in the Gauhati court ; and\n\n(3) Whether the scope of sect.ion 31, sub-section (4) of the Act is limited to applications under the Act during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings only."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13878, "end_char": 13888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15115, "end_char": 15129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the High Court um '~. awi• were of the opinion that the authority of the umpire Union of India."}}, {"text": "24th of November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15436, "end_char": 15458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument stressed before us Das 1 is that in para 7 of the affidavit dated the 19th of November, 1949, filed on behalf of the appellant in the High Court on the 24th of November, 1949, it is stated that\" On or about the 21st July, 1949, the said Umpire made over the said original award to this deponent for filing.\""}}, {"text": "21st July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15495, "end_char": 15510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument stressed before us Das 1 is that in para 7 of the affidavit dated the 19th of November, 1949, filed on behalf of the appellant in the High Court on the 24th of November, 1949, it is stated that\" On or about the 21st July, 1949, the said Umpire made over the said original award to this deponent for filing.\""}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19365, "end_char": 19374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th of Jagannndha August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19636, "end_char": 19667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November, 1949, but what is more important is that when the awards were filed into court on the 17th of Jagannndha August, 1949, by the solicitors on behalf of the appel- DaaJ. !"}}, {"text": "DaaJ. !", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19711, "end_char": 19718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November, 1949, but what is more important is that when the awards were filed into court on the 17th of Jagannndha August, 1949, by the solicitors on behalf of the appel- DaaJ. !"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20241, "end_char": 20251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20469, "end_char": 20479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagannadha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21776, "end_char": 21786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge stated that he was not aware Jagannadha whether the copies sent to the Subordinate Judge were\n\nDas J. signed copies or not.", "canonical_name": "JAGANXADHA DAS"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22281, "end_char": 22291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th of August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22640, "end_char": 22660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not suggested that sending by post in compliance with the notice is not such \"causing\",\n\nIt appears to us therefore clear that the filing of the awards in the Gauhati court must be taken to be on the 24th of August, 1949."}}, {"text": "17th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22793, "end_char": 22810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the Calcutta comt is concerned, though no doubt the awards were put into that court by the appellant's solicitors on the 17th August, 1949, it appears clearly from the notice issued by the Registrar dated the 30th of August, 1949, that the awards were treated as filed only on the 29th day of August, 1949."}}, {"text": "30th of August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22881, "end_char": 22901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the Calcutta comt is concerned, though no doubt the awards were put into that court by the appellant's solicitors on the 17th August, 1949, it appears clearly from the notice issued by the Registrar dated the 30th of August, 1949, that the awards were treated as filed only on the 29th day of August, 1949."}}, {"text": "29th day of August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22953, "end_char": 22977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the Calcutta comt is concerned, though no doubt the awards were put into that court by the appellant's solicitors on the 17th August, 1949, it appears clearly from the notice issued by the Registrar dated the 30th of August, 1949, that the awards were treated as filed only on the 29th day of August, 1949."}}, {"text": "29th of August, l!l49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23312, "end_char": 23333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the respondent's affidavit filed in the Calcutta court on 24th of November, 1949, contain categorica.l assertions that so far as the Gauhati court is concerned, the copies of the 11wards were filed by the umpire on the 24th of August, 1949, while as regards the Calcutta High Court the awards were filed on the 29th of August, l!l49."}}, {"text": "section 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23530, "end_char": 23543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "29th of August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24000, "end_char": 24020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is not the 29th of August, 1949, but only the 10th of August when the letter was sent by the solicitors to Jagannadha the Registrar enclosing the awards."}}, {"text": "10th of August", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24035, "end_char": 24049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is not the 29th of August, 1949, but only the 10th of August when the letter was sent by the solicitors to Jagannadha the Registrar enclosing the awards."}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24696, "end_char": 24706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24806, "end_char": 24816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ku1nbhaMawji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25957, "end_char": 25969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ku1nbhaMawji , . \"·", "canonical_name": "Ku1nbha-Mawj~"}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25977, "end_char": 25987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28557, "end_char": 28567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3 to 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30293, "end_char": 30309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30421, "end_char": 30435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1963 without intervention of the court, dealt with in\n\nK ;,:~ .. sections 3 to 19 comprising Chapter II; (2) ar\"bitration \"'\" a aw;• with the intervention of a court where there is no suit v.\n\nUnion of India.", "canonical_name": "UNION O:F INDIA"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30457, "end_char": 30467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 21 to 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30557, "end_char": 30574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30797, "end_char": 30807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30829, "end_char": 30839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30861, "end_char": 30871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31697, "end_char": 31707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31778, "end_char": 31788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31877, "end_char": 31887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaga1madha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32825, "end_char": 32835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaga1madha In the context of section 31, sub-section (4), it is reasonable to think that the phrase \"in any reference\" means \" in the matter of a reference \".", "canonical_name": "JAGANXADHA DAS"}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32854, "end_char": 32864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33437, "end_char": 33447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33578, "end_char": 33588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33714, "end_char": 33731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is undisputed that the application by the respondent Union of India was made before the Gauhati court on the 10th August, 1949, and the earliest move by the appellant before the Calcutta court was on the 17th August, 1949."}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33885, "end_char": 33895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34182, "end_char": 34184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajadhyakslw", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34233, "end_char": 34245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajadhyakslw."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_894_905_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "May 18.\n\n894 SUPREME COUR'f REPOR'l'S [1953)\n\nUHERUVU NAGESWARASWAMI\n\nRAJAH VADREVU VISW'ASUNDARA RAO\n\nAND OTHERS ME!fR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MuKHERJEA, GnuLAill\n\nHASAN AND BHAGWATI JJ.\n\nHindu law-Debts-Father's power to alienC<te sons' interest for antecedent debts-Whether 'property' and passes to Receiver on insolvency of father-Sale by Receiver, whether vests sons' interest in purchaser-Provincial InsoZ.Vency Act, 1920, as amended in 1948, s. 28A--Retrospective operation-Nadras Agricultnrists' Relief Act, 1938, ss. 7, 8-Pnrchaser of eq•dty of redcmption- Right tv claim relief.\n\nUnder the provisions of s. 28A of the Provincial Insolvency Aot, 1920, as amended by the Provincial Insolvency (Amendment) Act of 1948, which bas been expressly made retrospective, when a Hindu father governed by the :\\Iitakshara law is adjndged a bankrupt, his power to alienate the interest of bis sons in the joint family properties for che satis(action of his antecedent debts not contracted for illeg•l or immornl purposes, passes to the Receiver as his \"property\" within the meaning of the Act.\n\nConsequently, where a Hindu father who has mortgaged the joint family property for an antecedent debt which is not illegal or immoral becomes insolvent ancl the receiver sells the property, the interest of his sons in the property also vests in the purchaser, even in the case of a sale held before the Amendment Act of 1948 came into force, and the sons cannot redee1n the property.\n\nSat Narain v. Sri Xishen (63 LA. 384), Rama Sastruln v.\n\nBalltkrislma Rao (I. L. l'.. 1943 )fad. 83) and Viswanath v.\n\nOfficial Receiver (I.L.R. 16 Pat. 60) referred to.•\n\nThough the liability of a person who has purchase<l an er1uity of redemption after 22nd )farch, 1938, to 11ay the mortgage debt arises only on the date of his purchase, ii the debt itself existed on the 22nd ;\\Jarch, 1938, and if it was payable by an agriculturist on that date, the purchaser can clahn the benefits conferred by s. 7 of the Madras Agricultural Relief Act, 1938, if he himself \\vas an agriculturist on the date of his application.\n\nPerianna v. Sellappa (LL.IL 1939 )lad. 218) referred to.\n\nCrvrL APPELLA~'E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 76 of 1950.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Madras dated 18th April 1945, in\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COVRT REPORTS 895\n\nOheruvu Appeals Nos. 56 and 192of1941 reversing in part the decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam in Original Suit No. 29 of 1937.\n\nN ageswa\"'aswanii B. Somayya (C. J11allikaijnna Row, with him) v. th ]] t Raja V adtevu 10r e ap1)e an . 1,. a • • iswasun (f?'t~ K. Rajah Aiyar (R. Ga1111p((, thy Aiya.r, with him) HaoandOrhm for Respondent No. 1.\n\nRespondent No. 10 appeared in pernon .\n\n1953. May 18. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUKHER.JEA J.- -The appellant before us is the sixth defendant in a suit, commenced by the plaintiff-respondent in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Masulipatam (being Original Suit No. 29 of 1937) for recovery of a sum of Rs. 99,653 annas odd by enforcement of a simple mortgage bond. The mortgage bond is dated 28th September, 1930, and it was executed by defendant No. 1 for himself and as guardian of his two minor sons-- -defendants 2 and 3-all of whom constituted together a joint Hindu family at that time. The plaintiff mortgagee happens to be the son-in-law of defendant No. 1 and at the time of the execution of the mortgage the first defendant was indebted to a large number of persons including the mortgagee himself, and being hard pressed by his creditors requested the plaintiff to lend him a sum of Rs. 1,25,000 on the hypothecation of the properties in suit, to enable him to tide over his difficulties and discharge his debts.\n\nThe total consideration of Rs. 1,25,000 as stated in the deed is made up of the following items :- ( l) Rs. 13,065, which was the amount due on a promissory note executed in favour of the plaintiff by the first defendant on the 17th January, 1928.\n\n(2) Rs. 13,285 due under another promissory note dated 18th August, 1930 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the wife of the plaintiff and later on transferred by her to the plaintiff on 28th September, 30.\n\nMukherjea .T.\n\n(3) Rs. 25,000 paid by the plaintiff by endorsing in favour of defenda, nt No. 1 a cheque for that amount\n\nSLTPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n w.13 drawn in his name hy the Co-operative Central Bank,\n\nGhcmi>u Ramchandrapuram on the Central Urban Bank, Madras.\n\nNageswaraswami\n\n(4) Rs. 937-8-0, the amount paid in cash by plainv. tiff to defendant No. 1 for purchasing stamps for the ll\"ia Vad1evu mortgage document. 1 r iswasunda.r{l RnoandOth\"s\n\n(5) Rs. 72,712-8-0, the amount of future advances which the plaintiff promised to make from time to time MukherJeaJ. to defendant No. 1 according to his convenience.\n\nThe money lent was to carry interest at 7!% simple per annum and the clue date of payment of the principal money was 30th September, 1933. The interest would, however, have to be paid annually on the 30th of September every year, in default of which the whole of the principal and interest in arrears would become repayable immediately with interest at 9% compound per annum with yearly rests. It was expresly stated in the mortgage deed that if the mortgagee was unable to advance tho entire amount of Rs. 1,25,000, the terms set out above would apply to the amount actually advanced. It appears that after the execution of the mortgage bond a sum of Rs. 3,000 only was paid by the mortgagee to defenda.nt No. 1 on 5th of November, 1930. In the plaint, which was filed by the plaintiff on the 15th Septem her, 1937, the total claim was laid at Rs. 99,653 annas odd, out of which Rs. 55,287 annas odd constituted the principal money as stated above and the rest was claimed as interest calculated at the rate of 9% per annum compound with yearly rests ..\n\nBesides the original mortgagors, who were defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in the suit, there were three other persons imp leaded as parties defendants. Defendant No. 4 was the Receiver in insolvency in whom the entire estate of the defendant No. 1 vested bv reason of his being adjudged a bankrupt by an order\" of the District Judge of Kistna dated the 18th January, 1932 in Insolvency Proceeding No. 20 of 1931, started at the instance of another creditor of the first defendant.\n\nDefendant No. 5 was a lessee in respect of the mortgaged properties under defendant No. 4, while the sixth defendant was the purchaser of all the mortgaged\n\nproperties from the Receiver in insolvency. The 1963 Receiver, it seems, had put up all the suit pro- . ] · h CheriJ-VU perties to sac subject to the mortgage on 19t Na9Mwaraswami April, 1937, and they were knocked down to defendv. ant No. 6 for the price of Rs. 1,340. A registered deed Raja Vadrevu of sale was executed by the Receiver in favour of the Viswaaundma purchaser on 20th January, 1939.\n\nRaa and Oehm The defendants 1 to 3 did neither appear nor contest Mukherj'a J. the suit. Defendant No. 4 appeared in person but disclaimed any interest in the suit properties. The defendant No. 5 contended that he was a lessee under defendant No. 4 for one year only and was not a necessary party to the snit at all. The suit was really contested by defendant No. 6, the purchaser at the Receiver's sale. The defence taken by defendant No. 6 in his written statement was substantially of a two-fold character. It was pleaded in the first place that the bond in suit was a collusive docnmen t not supported by any consideration and was executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of his own son-in-law, with a view to shield his properties from the reach of his\n\ncroditorn. The other contention put forward was that the interest claimed was penal and usurious.\n\nAfter the passing of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act in March, 1938, this defendant filed an additional written statement, with the permission of the court, in which he raised the plea that as an agriculturist he was entitled to the reliefs provided in that Act and that the mortgage debt should be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of the same.\n\nThe trial Judge by his judgment dated the 29th July, 1940, decreed the suit in part. It was held that the mortgage bond was not a collusive document executed with the intention of defrauding the creditors of the mortgagor; it was a genuine transaction and was supported by consideration. On the other point, the court held that defendant No. 6 was an agriculturist and was entitled to claim the reliefs under Madras Act IV of 1938. After deducting all outstanding interest which stood discharged under section 8( 1) of the\n\n1953 Agriculturists' Belief Act, the principal money due to the\n\nOh creditor on that date was found by the trial court to be\n\nNnge8i:a\"'::::vami Bs. 42,870 annas odd. This figure was arrived at by\n\nv. taking only the original amounts actually advanced on llnjn l'adrevu the two promissory notes mentioned above and further, Fiswasuudara deducting from them, the payments made by the 11\"0 aad Others debtor towards the satisfaction of the pr.incipals in each.\n\nl'>Tuk~~0,0 .J. Thus a preliminary decree was made in favour of the plaintiff entitling him to recover a sum ofBs. 42,870-4-0 together with interest at 6±% per annum from 1st October, 1937, to 1st November, 1940, the date fixed for payment under the preliminary decree. ln default, the whole amount was to carry interest at 6% per annum. It may be mentioned here that the Subordinate .Judge in deciding issue No. 3 held expressly that the provision relating to payment of compound interest at an enhanced rate in default of payment of the stipulated interest on the due dates was in the nature of a penalty and should be relieved against; but as the court scaled down the inLeresL under Madras Act IV of 19:38, it became unnecessal'v to consider in what manner this relief should be grinted under section 74 of the Indian Contract Act.\n\nAgainst this decision, two appeals were taken to the High Court of Madras, one by the plaintiff and the other by defendant No. 6.\n\nThe plaintiff in his appeal (being Appeal No. 56 of 1941) assailed that part of the judgment of the Subordinate Judge which gave the defendant No. 6 relief under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act; while the appeal of the sixth defendant (being Appeal No. 192 of 1941) attacked the very foundation of the mortgage decree on the ground that the mortgage being a collusive and fraudulent transaction, the plaintiff's suit should have been dismissed in toto.\n\nThe defendants 2 and 3, although they remained ex parte during the trial in the first court, filed, in forrna pauperi8, a memorandum of cross-objection challenging the decree of the Subordinate Judge on the ground that as their interest in the mortgaged properties did not pass to the defendant No. 6 by virtue of the Beceiver's sale, their right of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COtJR.T R.EPORTS 899\n\n1953 redemption remained intact and ought to have been declared by the trial Judge.\n\nUheruvu Both these appeals as well as the cross-objection Nageswa, aswami were heard together by a Division Bench of the High R . vv.J_ . aJa awrevu Court and they were disposed of by one and the same Viswasundara judgment dated the 18th of April, 1945.\n\nRao and Others\n\nThe High Comt affirmed the finding of the trial Judge that the bond in suit was supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 55,287-8-0 as alleged in the plaint and that it was a valid and bona fide transaction.\n\nThe learned Judges held, differing from the trial court, that the defendant No. 6 was not entitled to claim any relief under the provisionR of the ?lfadras Agriculturists' Relief Act, and that in any event the court below was not right in reducing the amount of the principal money from Rs. li5,287-8-0 to Rs. 42,870, there being no renewal of a prior debt so far as defendant No. 6 was concerned.\n\nThe court agreed in holding that the provisian relating to payment of enhanced interest in case of default amounted to a penalty and reduced the rate of interest from 9% compound to 7§·% compound with yearly rests. Lastly, the High Court allowed the cross-objection of defendants 2 and 3, being of opinion that their interest in the mortgaged properties could not vest in the Receiver on the insolvency of their father and that the defendant No. 6 could not acquire the same by virtue of his purchase from the Receiver.\n\nThe defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were, tht>refore, allowed the right to redeem the mortgaged properties along with defendant No. (j.\n\nThe result was that the plaintiff was given a decre0 for a sum of Rs. 55,287-8-0 with interest at 7t% compound wit, h yearly rests up to the date of redemption ancl suhsequent interest was allowed at the rate of 6% per annum. Interest was to be calculated from 28th Septern ber, 1930, on Rs. 52,287-8·0 and from 5th November, 1930, on the amount of Rs. 3,000. Against this decree, the defendant No. 6 obtained leave to appeal to the Privy Council and because of the abolition of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, the appeal has come before us.\n\nM ukherjea J,\n\n1953 Mr. Somayya, who appeared in support of the appeal, did not press before us the contention raised on behalf\n\nNag~~:~:,\"wami of his client in the comts below that the mortgage was\n\n v. a fraudulent transaction or was void for want of consi-\n\nT?aja l'adrevu deration. He assailed the propriety of the judgment of riswa8nndarn the High Court substantially on three points. His first Rao and Othm contention is, that the decision of the High Court allow-\n\nMukherjea J. ing a right of redemption to defendants 2 and 3 ca1mot stand in view of the amendment introduced by the Provincial Insolvency Amendment Act, 1948, which has been expressly made retrospective. The second point taken by the learned counsel is that the defendant o. 6 should have been given relief under the MadmsAgriculturists' Relief Act and the debt should have been scaled down in accordance with the provisions thereof. It is said that the defendant No. 6 was an agriculturist himself and even if he was not, the relief under Madras Act IV of 1938 was still available to him by reason of the original mortgagors being agriculturists. The third and the last point urged is that in any event.having regard to the finding arrived at by the High Court that the stipulation to pay compound interest at an enhanced rate was a penalty, adequate relief should have been granted against it and no compound interest should have been allowed a.t a.II.\n\nThe first point raised by the learned counsel, in our opinion, is well-founded and must succeed. There was some difference of judicial opinion a.s to whether the powers of a. father under the Mita.ksha.ra. law to alienate the joint family property including the interest of his sons in the same for discharge of an antecedent debt not contracted for illegal or immoral purposes vests in the Receiver on the adjudication of the fa.th er a.s a.n insolvent .. Under the Presidencv Towns Insolvency Act, this power was held to vest in the Official Assignee under section 52(2) of the Act( 1).\n\nAs regards cases governed by Provincial Insolvency Act, it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court tha. t the father's power to dispose of his son's interest in the joint family property for satisfaction of his untainted\n\n{I) Sat Narain v. Sri KiBhen, (1936) 63 I.A. 384.\n\nS.U.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT 1-tEPORTS 901\n\ndebts was not \"property \" within the meaning of\n\n].'J53 sertion 28 (2) (d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act('); 0 while a contrary view was taken y a Full Bench of the Nages'.~;,~:;, ami Patna High Court (2). The conflict has now been set at v. rest by the enactment of section 28A in the Provincial Tlaja Vadrevu Insolvency Amendment Act of 1948 which came into l'ismasundam force on the 12th April, 1948. The new section reads as Rao and Others follows:- ·· \"The property of the iusolvent shall comprise and shall always be deemed to have comprised also the capacity to exercise and to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in or over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the insolvent for his own benefit at the commencement of his insolvency or before his discharge.\"\n\nThe language of the section indicates that its operation has been expressly made retrospective.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the power of the defendant No. 1 to alienate the interest of his sons, the defendants\n\nMukherjeaJ.\n\n2 and 3, in the mortgaged properties for satisfaction of his antecedent debts, did pass to the Receiver as \"property\" within the meaning of the Provincial Insolvency Act and consequently on a sale by the Receiver the interest of defendants 2 and 3 did vest in the sixth defendant, and he alone must be held competent to • exercise the right of redemption.\n\nThe second point urged by 1\\fr. Somayya raises the question as to whether the appellant could claim relief under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act. The High Court decided this point against the appellant firstly on the ground that the appellant was not a debtor at the date of the commencement of the Act, he having acquired no interest in the equity of redemption at that time.\n\nThe other reason given is that the defendant No. 6 was not an agriculturist within the meaning of the Agriculturists' Relief Act and although he was possessed of r1gricultural lands and hence priina facie came within the definition of an \" agriculturist \" as given in section 2 (ii) of\n\n(1) l?ama.8atrulu v, Bala.fJrishna /{ao, I.L.R. [1943] i\\Iad. 83.\n\n(2) Viawanathv. Official l?eceivcr, I.L.R. (1936) r6 Pat. 60 (F . .B.J.\n\n1953 the Act, he was excluded from the de{inition by the operation of proviso (D) attached to the sub-section.\n\nOheruvu Nageswaraswami So far as the first ground is concerned, section 7 of v. the Agriculturists' Relief Act expressly lays down that Raja Vadreva \"all debts payable by an agriculturist at the com-\n\nViswasundara mencement of this Act, shall be scaled down in accord.\n\nRM and Othern ance with the provisions of this chapter\".\n\nThe\n\nMukherjea .J. essential pre-requisite to the application of the provisions of the chapter, therefore is the existence of a debt payable by an agriculturist on the date when the Act commenced, that is to say, on the 22nd March,\n\n1938. The learned Judges of the High Court wtwe certainly right in saying that the sixth defendant was not a debtor on that date, as he did not become the owner of the equity of redemption till the 20th of January, 1939, when the deed of sale was executed in his favour by the Receiver in insolvency. But this by itself is not sufficient to disentitle the appellant to the privileges of the Agricu tt.urists' Relief Act. It is not necessary that the applicant for relief himself should be liable for the debt on the date that the Act came into force.\n\nThe right to claim relief as is well settled by decisions(') of the i\\fadras High Court is not contined to the person who originally contracted the debt, but is available to his legal representatives m1d assigns as well; nor is it necessary that tho applicant should be personally .liable for the debt. The liability cf a. purchaser of the equity of redemption to pay the mortgage debt uucloubtedly arises on the date of his purchase; but the debt itself which has its origin in the mortgage bond did ex:ir; t from before his purchase, and if it was payable by an agriculturist at the relevant date, the purchaser could certainly claim the privileges of the Act if he himself was au ngrieulturist nt the date of his application. The material question, therefore, is whether the mortgage debt was payable by an agriculturist on 22nd March, 1938 ? Tbe appellant argues thi1t it was payable by the mortgagors and they were certainly agriculturists. vVe do not think that there is warrant for any such assumption on\n\n(1) Vide Perianna v. Sellappa, I.L.R. [1939] l\\.Iad. 2~8.\n\nthe materials as they exist on the record. The only 1953 issue before the trial .Judge was, as to whether Ch defendant No. 6 was an agriculturist. There was Nag'\"w::::aini neither any question raised nor any evidence adduced \"· as to whether defendants Nos. 1 to ;3 were agricultnr- Raja V<1drevu ists as well.\n\nIn fact, this aspect of the case was not Viswasundara adverted to by the trial Judge at all.\n\nBefore the Rao and Others High Court it was argued on behalf of defendant No. 6 h f h 1 h f f\n\n;\\fnlcherjea J. t at even i e was not an agricu turist imsel , yet i the defendants Z and 3 were given relief as agriculturists, that would enure for his benefit as well and accordingly he invited the court to go into the question and hold that the original mortgagors were agricul - turists. This the learned Judges refused to do and dismissed this part of the claim of defendant No. 6 with these remarks :\n\n\"In the present ease,· the mortgagors have not claimed such a benefit, nor have they adduced any evidence to show that they are agriculturists. We therefore cannot accede to the request of the sixth defendant that the right of the mortgagors to relief should be investigated merely with the object of giving an accidental relief to the non-agriculturist purchaser.\"\n\nAs the point was not investigated at all, it is not possible for us to hold that the debt was payable by an agriculturist on the relevant date. It may be that the mortgaged properties were agricultural lands but it is not known whether the mortgagors did possess other estates which might bring them within the purview of any of the provisos attached to the definition.\n\nIn these circumsta.nces, the appellant must be deemed to have failed to show that there was in existence a debt payable by an agriculturist on 22nd March, 1938.\n\nThe High Court has held further that the defendant No. 6 was not an agriculturist because he was the purchaser of certain villages at a court sale in respect of which Peishkush exceeding Rs. 500 was payable.\n\nConsequently, he became \"land-holder of an estate\" under the Madras Estates Land Act and could not claim to be an agriculturist as laid down in the proviso (D) to section 2 (ii) of the Act. Mr. Somayya\n\n1953 lays stress upon the fact that this purch1tse on the part of his client was mere! v as a benamidar for defendant Clteruvu ,, Nage .. wamBwamiNo. 5 as has been held by both the coyrts below and v. consequently the proviso did not affect him at all.\n\nRaja Vadr\"\"u This is a deba.t.able point upon which the judicial Yiswaaundam opinion of the Madras High Court itself does not Pao and Oth\"\" seem to be quite uniform. A distinetion can certa.inly\n\n;.lfukherjen .!. be drawn between the rights of a person in his own individual or personal capacity and those which he exercises on behalf of another. On the other hand, if we look to the definition of\" land-holder\" as given in section 3 ( 5) of the Madras Estates Land Act, it may be argued that a benamidar of an estate, who is entitled to collect rents and is at least the titular owner of the estate could come within the description.\n\nHaving regard to the view taken by us that section 7 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act is not applicable on the facts of the present case, this question does not really become material and it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion upon it. For the identical reason section 8 ( 1) of the Act cannot also be invoked in favour of the appellant. It may further be mentioned thtLt Mr. Somayya in course of his arguments made it plain that he would not press for relief under the Agriculturists' Relief Act if the high rate of interest allowed by the High Court was substantially reduced.\n\nThis takes us to the third point and we think that the stipulation as to payment of compound interes~ in case of default, being held to be a penalty by both the courts below, the High Court should not have allowed interest at the rate of 7 i % compound with yearly rests.\n\nThe High Court seems to have been misled by a statement occurring in the judgment of the trial Judge that the original rate of interest was 7}% compound with yearly rests. This is not true and as a matter of fact, the original agreement was to pay interest at 7i% simple. We consider it proper that the mortgage money payable to the plaintiff should carry interest at the rate of7!% simple up to the expiry of the period of .redemption which we fix at six months from this date,\n\nThe result, therefore, is that we allow the appeal in 1963 part and modffy the judgment of the High Court. A 0 preliminary decree should be drawn up in favour of Nag\"~::~::, aini the plaintiff against defendant No. 6 alone for a sum v. of Rs. 55,287 annas odd which will carry interest at Raja Vadmu 7!% simple per annum. Interest will be calculated Viswa•undara on Rs. 52,287 on and from the date of the mortgage, Rao and Others while on the balance of Rs. 3,000 interest will run MukherjeaJ. from 5th November, 1930. We make no order as to costs of this court or of the High Court. The plaintiff will have his costs of the trial court.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Al. 8. K. Aiyangar.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : Ganpat Rai.\n\nBOPPANNA VENKATESWARALOO AND OTHERS 1962\n\nV • N ovembcr24\n\nSUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL JAIL,\n\nHYDERABAD STATE.\n\nUNION OF INDIA-Intervener. [MEIIB CHAND MAHAJAN, S.R. DAS and BHAGWATIJJ.]\n\nP1eventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act (XLI of 1952), s. 11-A-Act passed on 22nd August, 1952-Brought into force on 30th Sevteinber, 1952-Detention exviring on 30th September, 1952 -Order on 22nd September, 1959, extending detention uvto 31st December, 1952 -Validity of order of extension-General Clauses Act (X of 1897), s. 22-Act LXI of 1952, s. 11-A (2), apvlicability of.\n\nThe petitioner was served with an oriler of detention on the 20th October, 1951, and, after a reference to the Advisory Board, the Govemment confirmed the detention and specified 31st March, 1952, as the date up to which the detention was to continue.\n\nOn the 20th l\\farcb, 1952, the detention was extended till the 30th September, 1952, and on the 22nd September, 1952, the detention was again extended up to the 31st December, 1952. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Government had no power on 22nd September, 1952, to extend the detention.beyond the 1st October, 1952, as the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act of 1952, even though it had received the assent of the", "total_entities": 91, "entities": [{"text": "May 18.\n\n894", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 18."}}, {"text": "UHERUVU NAGESWARASWAMI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHERUVU NAGESWARASWAMI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAJAH VADREVU VISW'ASUNDARA RAO\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJAH VADREVU VISWASUNDARA RAO AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MukherjeaJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 179, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Vency Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 404, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 441, "end_char": 447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vency Act, 1920", "statute": "Vency Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 496, "end_char": 512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 514, "end_char": 522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Relief Act, 1938", "statute": "Relief Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 28A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 606, "end_char": 612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Relief Act, 1938", "statute": "Relief Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1970, "end_char": 1974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Agricultural Relief Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1982, "end_char": 2018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CrvrL APPELLA~'E JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2147, "end_char": 2176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CrvrL APPELLA~'E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2251, "end_char": 2271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Madras dated 18th April 1945, in\n\ns.c."}}, {"text": "N ageswa\"'aswanii B. Somayya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2488, "end_char": 2516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N ageswa\"'aswanii B. Somayya (C. J11allikaijnna Row, with him) v. th ]] t Raja V adtevu 10r e ap1)e an ."}}, {"text": "Raja V adtevu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2562, "end_char": 2575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N ageswa\"'aswanii B. Somayya (C. J11allikaijnna Row, with him) v. th ]] t Raja V adtevu 10r e ap1)e an .", "canonical_name": "Raja V adtevu"}}, {"text": "K. Rajah Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2618, "end_char": 2632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a • • iswasun (f?'t~ K. Rajah Aiyar (R. 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"source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in favour of the wife of the plaintiff and later on transferred by her to the plaintiff on 28th September, 30."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4214, "end_char": 4223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea .T.\n\n(3) Rs.", "canonical_name": "MukherjeaJ."}}, {"text": "30th September, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4956, "end_char": 4976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The money lent was to carry interest at 7!% simple per annum and the clue date of payment of the principal money was 30th September, 1933."}}, {"text": "5th of November, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5555, "end_char": 5576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 on 5th of November, 1930."}}, {"text": "15th Septem her, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5633, "end_char": 5654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the plaint, which was filed by the plaintiff on the 15th Septem her, 1937, the total claim was laid at Rs."}}, {"text": "District Judge of Kistna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6204, "end_char": 6228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 vested bv reason of his being adjudged a bankrupt by an order\" of the District Judge of Kistna dated the 18th January, 1932 in Insolvency Proceeding No."}}, {"text": "18th January, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6239, "end_char": 6257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 vested bv reason of his being adjudged a bankrupt by an order\" of the District Judge of Kistna dated the 18th January, 1932 in Insolvency Proceeding No."}}, {"text": "Raja Vadrevu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6813, "end_char": 6825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A registered deed Raja Vadrevu of sale was executed by the Receiver in favour of the Viswaaundma purchaser on 20th January, 1939.", "canonical_name": "Raja V adtevu"}}, {"text": "Viswaaundma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6880, "end_char": 6891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A registered deed Raja Vadrevu of sale was executed by the Receiver in favour of the Viswaaundma purchaser on 20th January, 1939."}}, {"text": "20th January, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6905, "end_char": 6923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A registered deed Raja Vadrevu of sale was executed by the Receiver in favour of the Viswaaundma purchaser on 20th January, 1939."}}, {"text": "Raa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6926, "end_char": 6929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raa and Oehm The defendants 1 to 3 did neither appear nor contest Mukherj'a J. the suit."}}, {"text": "Oehm", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6934, "end_char": 6938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raa and Oehm The defendants 1 to 3 did neither appear nor contest Mukherj'a J. the suit."}}, {"text": "Mukherj'a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6992, "end_char": 7001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raa and Oehm The defendants 1 to 3 did neither appear nor contest Mukherj'a J. the suit.", "canonical_name": "MukherjeaJ."}}, {"text": "29th July, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8188, "end_char": 8203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Judge by his judgment dated the 29th July, 1940, decreed the suit in part."}}, {"text": "Madras Act IV of 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8555, "end_char": 8576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8648, "end_char": 8661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act IV of 1938", "statute": "Madras Act IV of 1938"}}, {"text": "1st October, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9301, "end_char": 9318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42,870-4-0 together with interest at 6±% per annum from 1st October, 1937, to 1st November, 1940, the date fixed for payment under the preliminary decree."}}, {"text": "1st November, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9323, "end_char": 9341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42,870-4-0 together with interest at 6±% per annum from 1st October, 1937, to 1st November, 1940, the date fixed for payment under the preliminary decree."}}, {"text": "LeresL under Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9804, "end_char": 9827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9927, "end_char": 9937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "LeresL under Madras Act", "statute": "LeresL under Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9945, "end_char": 9964, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Uheruvu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11032, "end_char": 11039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uheruvu Both these appeals as well as the cross-objection Nageswa, aswami were heard together by a Division Bench of the High R ."}}, {"text": "Nageswa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11090, "end_char": 11097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uheruvu Both these appeals as well as the cross-objection Nageswa, aswami were heard together by a Division Bench of the High R ."}}, {"text": "18th of April, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11265, "end_char": 11284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aJa awrevu Court and they were disposed of by one and the same Viswasundara judgment dated the 18th of April, 1945."}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11287, "end_char": 11290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao and Others\n\nThe High Comt affirmed the finding of the trial Judge that the bond in suit was supported by consideration to the extent of Rs."}}, {"text": "28th Septern ber, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12829, "end_char": 12851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Interest was to be calculated from 28th Septern ber, 1930, on Rs."}}, {"text": "5th November, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12880, "end_char": 12898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52,287-8·0 and from 5th November, 1930, on the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "M ukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13118, "end_char": 13128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M ukherjea J,\n\n1953 Mr. Somayya, who appeared in support of the appeal, did not press before us the contention raised on behalf\n\nNag~~:~:,\"wami of his client in the comts below that the mortgage was\n\n v. a fraudulent transaction or was void for want of consi-\n\nT?aja l'adrevu deration.", "canonical_name": "MukherjeaJ."}}, {"text": "Somayya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13142, "end_char": 13149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M ukherjea J,\n\n1953 Mr. Somayya, who appeared in support of the appeal, did not press before us the contention raised on behalf\n\nNag~~:~:,\"wami of his client in the comts below that the mortgage was\n\n v. a fraudulent transaction or was void for want of consi-\n\nT?aja l'adrevu deration.", "canonical_name": "Somayya"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13590, "end_char": 13599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His first Rao and Othm contention is, that the decision of the High Court allow-\n\nMukherjea J. ing a right of redemption to defendants 2 and 3 ca1mot stand in view of the amendment introduced by the Provincial Insolvency Amendment Act, 1948, which has been expressly made retrospective.", "canonical_name": "MukherjeaJ."}}, {"text": "Provincial Insolvency Amendment Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13707, "end_char": 13748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act IV of 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14131, "end_char": 14152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 52(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15106, "end_char": 15119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act IV of 1938", "statute": "Madras Act IV of 1938"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15228, "end_char": 15245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards cases governed by Provincial Insolvency Act, it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court tha."}}, {"text": "S.U.R.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15420, "end_char": 15426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.U.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT 1-tEPORTS 901\n\ndebts was not \"property \" within the meaning of\n\n].'J53 sertion 28 (2) (d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act('); 0 while a contrary view was taken y a Full Bench of the Nages'.~;,~:;, ami Patna High Court (2)."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15644, "end_char": 15660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.U.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT 1-tEPORTS 901\n\ndebts was not \"property \" within the meaning of\n\n].'J53 sertion 28 (2) (d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act('); 0 while a contrary view was taken y a Full Bench of the Nages'.~;,~:;, ami Patna High Court (2)."}}, {"text": "section 28A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15727, "end_char": 15738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15846, "end_char": 15862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conflict has now been set at v. rest by the enactment of section 28A in the Provincial Tlaja Vadrevu Insolvency Amendment Act of 1948 which came into l'ismasundam force on the 12th April, 1948."}}, {"text": "MukherjeaJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16476, "end_char": 16487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to alienate the interest of his sons, the defendants\n\nMukherjeaJ.\n\n2 and 3, in the mortgaged properties for satisfaction of his antecedent debts, did pass to the Receiver as \"property\" within the meaning of the Provincial Insolvency Act and consequently on a sale by the Receiver the interest of defendants 2 and 3 did vest in the sixth defendant, and he alone must be held competent to • exercise the right of redemption.", "canonical_name": "MukherjeaJ."}}, {"text": "Somayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16878, "end_char": 16885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Somayya raises the question as to whether the appellant could claim relief under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17498, "end_char": 17507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viawanathv", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17588, "end_char": 17598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Viawanathv."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17833, "end_char": 17842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Vadreva", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17905, "end_char": 17917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oheruvu Nageswaraswami So far as the first ground is concerned, section 7 of v. the Agriculturists' Relief Act expressly lays down that Raja Vadreva \"all debts payable by an agriculturist at the com-\n\nViswasundara mencement of this Act, shall be scaled down in accord.", "canonical_name": "Raja V adtevu"}}, {"text": "20th of January, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18528, "end_char": 18549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the High Court wtwe certainly right in saying that the sixth defendant was not a debtor on that date, as he did not become the owner of the equity of redemption till the 20th of January, 1939, when the deed of sale was executed in his favour by the Receiver in insolvency."}}, {"text": "22nd March, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19709, "end_char": 19725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material question, therefore, is whether the mortgage debt was payable by an agriculturist on 22nd March, 1938 ?"}}, {"text": "\\fnlcherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20456, "end_char": 20467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 h f h 1 h f f\n\n;\\fnlcherjea J. t at even i e was not an agricu turist imsel , yet i the defendants Z and 3 were given relief as agriculturists, that would enure for his benefit as well and accordingly he invited the court to go into the question and hold that the original mortgagors were agricul - turists."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22136, "end_char": 22145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Somayya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22167, "end_char": 22174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Somayya\n\n1953 lays stress upon the fact that this purch1tse on the part of his client was mere!", "canonical_name": "Somayya"}}, {"text": "Clteruvu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22294, "end_char": 22302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v as a benamidar for defendant Clteruvu ,, Nage .. wamBwamiNo."}}, {"text": "Raja Vadr\"\"u", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22430, "end_char": 22442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Vadr\"\"u This is a deba.t.able point upon which the judicial Yiswaaundam opinion of the Madras High Court itself does not Pao and Oth\"\" seem to be quite uniform.", "canonical_name": "Raja V adtevu"}}, {"text": ".lfukherjen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22627, "end_char": 22638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A distinetion can certa.inly\n\n;.lfukherjen .!."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22854, "end_char": 22863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23109, "end_char": 23118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23345, "end_char": 23354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24832, "end_char": 24835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52,287 on and from the date of the mortgage, Rao and Others while on the balance of Rs."}}, {"text": "K. Aiyangar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25113, "end_char": 25124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25156, "end_char": 25166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "BOPPANNA VENKATESWARALOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25169, "end_char": 25193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOPPANNA VENKATESWARALOO AND OTHERS 1962\n\nV • N ovembcr24\n\nSUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL JAIL,\n\nHYDERABAD STATE."}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25277, "end_char": 25291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA-Intervener. ["}}, {"text": "MEIIB CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25305, "end_char": 25324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEIIB CHAND MAHAJAN, S.R. DAS and BHAGWATIJJ.]"}}, {"text": "S.R. DAS", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25326, "end_char": 25334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEIIB CHAND MAHAJAN, S.R. DAS and BHAGWATIJJ.]"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATIJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25339, "end_char": 25349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEIIB CHAND MAHAJAN, S.R. DAS and BHAGWATIJJ.]", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25412, "end_char": 25417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Validity of order of extension-General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25617, "end_char": 25667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25681, "end_char": 25686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Validity of order of extension-General Clauses Act", "statute": "Validity of order of extension-General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25704, "end_char": 25709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Validity of order of extension-General Clauses Act", "statute": "Validity of order of extension-General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "20th l\\farcb, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25996, "end_char": 26014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th l\\farcb, 1952, the detention was extended till the 30th September, 1952, and on the 22nd September, 1952, the detention was again extended up to the 31st December, 1952."}}, {"text": "22nd September, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26085, "end_char": 26105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th l\\farcb, 1952, the detention was extended till the 30th September, 1952, and on the 22nd September, 1952, the detention was again extended up to the 31st December, 1952."}}, {"text": "1st October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26309, "end_char": 26326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Government had no power on 22nd September, 1952, to extend the detention.beyond the 1st October, 1952, as the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act of 1952, even though it had received the assent of the"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_913_930_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 913\n\nmentioned in ihe section and could not mean a date 1952 antecedent to 30t, h September, 1952.\n\nB oppamna For the reasons given above, in our judgment, the Venkatcswaraloo detention of the petitioner in this petition and of those and Other• in the other petitions mentioned above, after the 30th v.\n\nSeptember, 1952, became illegal and we therefore Superintendnt, d. t h t th t't' th' · d . .\n\nCentral Jail, rrec t a e pe 1 10ners m is pet1t10n an m pet1- Hyderabad State tions Nos. 350, 356, 362 and 366 of 1952 be released - forthwith. They are in detention by reason of the MaJwjan J. extension order made on the 22nd September extending their detention up to 31st December, 1952. On that date the State Government had no jurisdiction to make that order under the law in force as it stood on that date. 30th September, 1952, had been specified as the date up to which their detention was to last by a subsisting and perfectly valid order and their detention order beyond that date is illegal and cannot be justified on the provisions of section 11-A (2) or on the provisions of section 11 ( 1) of the original Act.\n\nPetitions allowed.\n\nAgent for the respondents and intervener : G. H.\n\nRajadhyaksha.\n\nTHAKURAIN RAJ RANI AND OTHERS\n\nTHAKUR DWARKA NATH SINGH\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, s.R.DAS andBHAGWAnJJ, J\n\nWill--Agreement by cousiJ> of testator to make monthly poymm•t to testator in consideration of giving hirn and his sons the remainder after life-esta.te to wid, ow--Grant of letters of administration- Question of animus testanfr-Whether res-judicata-Payments,\n\n11..vhether condition precedent or ?nere consideration-Death of cousin before widoiir--Efi'ect of.\n\nOn the 7bh .T anuary, 1904, G, a cousin of S, executed au agreement in favour of S, the material portion of which ran as follows: ''Whereas my cousin S has proposed to make a bequest of his taluka in favour of his wife and after her death in my favour and\n\nJan. 23,\n\nSUPREME CO~RT REPORTS [19.53]\n\n1003 that of my sons ...... therefore by way of consicJ.eration for this concession and favour, I, tho executant, out of my O\\Vn free will ThnkurahJ. Raj do hereby execute this agreement in favour of my cousin aforesaid\n\nEani that in the month in which the said cousin may execute the said and Of/\"\"' will in my favour.and that ol my sons and lays the same along v. with an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapnr 'fhnl,:ur Dwarka district, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue, I Nath Singh shall from the 1st date of the month following that month conand Othera. tinne to pay the said cousin the sum of Rs. 50 in cash every month during his life so long as the said will remains in force ......\n\nIf I fail to perform the said contract the said cousin has power to have the same performed by me th1ougb the Court.\" This agree ment was registered on the 11th January. On the 18th January, S submitted a draft will for sanction and the will as amended and sanctioned was executed on the 28th .July, 1904. 'rhis will provided as follows: \"after my death my wife for her lifetime shall l'emain in possession of my entire estate ...... without the po, ver of any sort to transfer the said properties and rights, that on the death of the said wife all the aforesaid property and rights shall devolve on my cousin G with a,11 proprietary powers ancl that on the death of G, the said entire property and rights shall deYolve on X, Y, Z, sons of G, in the following shares .... \" The will also provided for maintenance for the daughter, sister, aunt and mother of S.\n\nOn tho application of G's sons (G having died) letters of administration with the will annexed were granted to them by the Chief Court of Oudh and this decision was affirmed by the Privy Conncil on appeal in 1937. 'rhe heirs of S thereupon instituted a suit against the sons of G for a declaration that the will was inoperative and ineffectual and that G's sons had in any case no right to the properties of S, as S had no animns testandi and G had also failed to pay Rs. 50 to S as agreed:\n\nHeld, (i) that the deed of agreement and the will formed parts of one transaction and formed one contract, consideration for the will being the agl'eement, and consideration for the agreement being the will;\n\n(ii) as the Privy Council had decided that the will was the last will and testament of S and granted letters of administration, the question of ani1nu.s testandi was res jndicata;\n\n(iii) with regtml Lo tbe plea that the monthly payment of Hs. 50 was a condition precedent to the validity of the will and that by reason of the non-fulfilment of this condition the will had become inoperative, such a plea \\Vas also barred by res judicata as the Privy Council had granted letters of administration; and even on the n1erits the plea was untenable as the wife and other relations of the testator had also certain rights under the will which did not depend on the monthly payment by G;\n\n (iv) the question whethel' the payment of Hs. 50 wae a cou-\n\n<liion precedent to the vesting of the legacy in G or G's sons was\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT l{J~PORTS 915\n\nnot, however, rs j?ldiMta and it was open to tbe plaintiff to raise 196& such a plea; (v} on a proper interpretation of the terms of the agreen1ent, Thakurain Raj the payment of Rs .. 50 per month was not a condition precedent to Rani h fhl 'Gb andOthers t e vestmg o t e egacy m , ut merely a consideration, and the plaintiffs' remedy was to enforce the agreement if it was not v. duly performed; Thakur Dwarkti\n\n( Nath Singh\n\nvi) that as G obtained a vested remainder uuder the will, and Others. his interest did not [all into the residue on his death before the widow, but vested in his sons; and as the bequest to G did not lapse there was no question of anJ· resulting trust or of any intestacy with respect to the remainder, and G's sons were entitled to the estate under the will.\n\nCIVIL APPELLA'l'F.\n\nJuRISDW'.rlO)!: Civil Appeal No. 153 of 1951.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated 2nd January, 1946, of the Chief Court of Avadh in First Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1940 arising out of the Decree dated 6th Xovember, 1939, of the Court of Civil Judge in Regular Suit No. 36 of 1937.\n\nDr. Bakshi Tele Chand (Onlcwr Nath Sn:vastal!a, with him) for the appellants.\n\nAchhru Rarn (Bishan Singh, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1953. Jammry 23. The Judgment of the Court waH delivered by\n\nBHAGWA'L'I J.- -This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed by the late Chief Court of Ondh, ttffirming the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge of Sitapur, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit.\n\nOne, Thakur Shankar Bux Singh, proprietor of the Estate known as Rampur Kelau, situated in District Sitapur (Oudh) was heavily indebted and the estate had been in the possession of Deputy Commissioner of Sitapur as receiver from 1892 up to 11th July, 1901.\n\nThereafter he was declared a disqualified proprietor under the provisions of Section 8 (D) (1) of thn C.P.\n\nCourt of Wards Act (r.P. Act Ill of 1899) and the Court of Wards took possession of the estate on the 1st August, 1901.\n\nCnder Section 34 of the Aet he was\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 not competent to dispose his property by will without the consent in writing of the Court of \\Vards, though 1.'hakurain Raj\n\nllani prior to the 1st August, 1901, he had made four succesand Others sive wills, the last being dated 19th June, Hl01, under v. which he gave his estate absolutely to his wife.\n\nh~/, nr Dwarka the 30th November, 1901, he made a will giving a life\n\nAath Singh interest to his wife and the remainder over to his cousin and Others.\n\nGanga Bux Singh after providing for certain legacies by\n\nBhagwati J. way of maintenance in favour of his three daughters, his father's sister and his mother. The Court of Wards withheld its consent to this will which thus fell through.\n\nOn the 7th January, 1904, Ganga Bux Singh executed in his favour a registered deed of agreement agreeing to pay him Rs. 50 per month during his lifetime with effect from the month in which he would execute a will in.favour of Ganga Bux Singh and his sons and submit the same for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue.\n\nA draft of the will was accordingly prepared by him on the 18th January, 1904, under which he gave a life interest to his wife and the residue of the property to Ganga Bux Singh and after him to his sons after providing legacies for maintenance in favour of his daughters, father's sister and mother. The Board of Revenue intimated on the 25th May, 1904, that it would not withhold its consent to a will similar to that contained in the draft but altered in the light of the proposals contained in the further letter dated 27th April, 1904. He thereupon duly made and published a will on the 28th July, 1904, in accordance with the suggestions contained in the Board's letter dated 25th May, 1904, cancelling iill the previous wills executed by him. It appears that he handed over tho original of this will to Ganga Bux Singh Lut did not give any intimation of the execution thereof to the authorities and the authorities could only come to know of the same when Ganga Bux Singh gave the original will to the Special Manager on or about the 19th December, 1905.\n\nHe appears to have changed his mind thereafter and having embraced Christianity intended to marry a Christian woman and submitted to the Court of Wards on the 8th June, 1906, the draft of a new will which he\n\nintended to excute in favour of his UhriRtian wife. 1963 The Board withheld its consent to that new will and 7,1 -. R . intimated on the 13th July, 1906, its refusal and also wk~:~:;• aJ communicated thereby the withholding of its consent and Others to the will already executed by him on the 28th July, v.\n\n1904. A further attempt by him on the 21st Novem- 1'huku,- Dwarku ber, 1906, to obtain the consent of the Court of Wards Nath Singh to another draft will was also unsuccessful and the will and Others. datedthe 28th July, 1904, was the only last will a.nd BltagwatiJ. testament executed by him and got registered after consent obtained from the Court of \\Vards.\n\nShankar Bux Singh died thereafter on the 28th July, 1922, and he being a Christian at the time of his death succrnssion to his property was governed by the Indian Succession Act.\n\nHis wife got l /3rd of the estate and the remaining 2 /3rds were divided in equal shares between his surviving daughter and the son of a pre-deceased daughter of his. Mutation was effected in the records of rights and the name of the widow was shown there as the owner of the estate in his place and stead. The Court of Wards relinquished charge of the estate sometime in November, 1925.\n\nThe widow executed on the 16th August, 1927, a deed of gift conveying the bulk of the estate to her daughter and the son of the pre-deceased daughter. She also executed another deed of gift in the same year conveying the rest of the properties and on the 8th September, 1928, Ganga Bux Singh filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur for a declaration that under the aforesaid will she had only a life interest in tht.' property and the transfers made by her were void.\n\nThis suit was contested by her and one of the defences tRken was that Ganga Bux Singh could not maintain' the suit without first obtaining letters of administration with the will annexed. This defence was upheld and the suit wr.s dismissed on the 14th July, rnao.\n\nGanga Bux Singh having died in the meanwhile on the 19th October, 1929, his sons applied for letters of administration with the will annexed on the 25th September, 1930, on the original side of the Chief Court of Oudh.\n\nThis application w&s opposed by the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1963 widow and other heirs of Shankar Bux. Singh inter alia on the ground that the will had been executed without Thakurain Raj Rani the sanction of the Court of Wards. Mr. Justice Kisch\n\nand Others delivered an elaborate judgment, negatived a.JI the v. objections and granted letters of administration with Thakur Dwarka the will annexed to the sons of Ganga Bux Singh on\n\nNath Smgk the Hith November, l93l.\n\nAn appeal filed by the and Others. widow and heirs of Shankar Bux Singh against that\n\nBhagwati J. decision was allowed bv the Bench of the Chief Court of Oudh at Lucknow oi1 the 8th September, 1933, and the orders passed by the lower court granting letters of administration with the will annexed were set aside.\n\nThe sons of Ganga Bux Singh took an appeal to the Privy Council and their Lordships of the Privy Council on the 7th May, 1987, reversed the decree of the Appeal Court and rrn; tored the decrne passed by Mr. Justice Kisch. Their Lordships however observed that the only effect of their decision was that letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed must be granted as prayed but that would not in any way lJl'eiudice anv proceediiws a\"ainst anv of the benefi- J b b v ciaries which may be open to the respondents or any of them.\n\nOn the 9th tleptem ber, 1987, the widow, the claughter and the son of the pre-deceased daughter of Shankar Bux Singh, the plaintiffs, filed the suit out of which this appeal arises, against the three 8ons of Ganga Bux Singh, the defendants, for a declaration that the will dated the 28th July,\n\n1904, wa.s inoperative and ineffectual and that in any case the defendants had no iight, title or interest in the properties in suit, that plaintiff 1 was entitled to hold the property in suit under the will of Shankar\n\nBux Singh dated 19th June, 1901, or that the plaintiffs 1 to 3 were entitled to the same as heirs-at-law of Shankar Bux Singh deceased under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, and for further and other reliefs. In the plaint they alleged that the will was inoperative as Shankar Bux 8ingh had no animus testandi and that it was void and inoperative in respect of the testamentary disposition in favour of Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh am\\ his sons because Ganga Bux Singh 195.1 failed to perform his part of the contract as regards the f, hi JI\n\n'J. 1hakurai'n Raj payment o mont y a owance and the defendants Rani therefore could not take advantage of or claim any \"\"d Others ben!!fit under that testamentary disposition and further v. the payment of the said allowance being a condition Tha; ur Dmka\n\nprecedent and the condition not having been fulfilled J>.ath Singh h d. 't' I t' Th d f' d 3 and Others. t e 1spos1 rnn 1ecame mopera 1ve. . e e en ant filed a written stat; ement on the 7th February, 1938, Bhagwati J. eontesting the plaintiff's claim. He contended that the plea as to the validity or effeet of the will was barred hy res j11dicata by virtue of the judgmt>n t of the Privy Council ch1ted 7th May, 1937.\n\nHe denied that the will was executed in consideration of the agreement.\n\nHe also denied that there was any contingent or conditional contract or any trace of the alleged condition in the whole of the correspondence between Shankar Bux Singh and the Board of Revenue.\n\nThe learned Civil .Judge, Sitapm, after considering the cvidenee, oral as well as documentary, led before him held that the will as well as the agreement formed one contract, that Ganga Bux Singh had failed to perform his promise or his part of the contract, that the only point which was agitated before their Lordships of the Privy Council was as regards the consent of the\n\nCourt of 'Vards and that therefore even though the plaintiffs were precluded from disputing the genuineness of the will they were not precluded from seeking a declaration to the effect that the defendants were not entitled to any benefit under the will, and that the decision therefore did not operate as res judicata so far as issues in the present case were concerned.\n\nHe however held that the contract clearly provided a remedy for breach on the part of either party, that Shankar Bux Singh did not in fact cancel the will and could not he said to have treated it as inoperative, that Ganga Bux Singh acquired a vested interest in the estate on the death of the testator and that on his death that interest devolved on his sons amongst whom were the defendants in the suit and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief as claimed, T)le\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Chief Qourt of Oudh.\n\nThe Chief Court of Oudh negatived the contention that Tl1akurai11 Raj h d ·\n\nJ d h Rani Shankar Bux Singh a no animu8 testan<ii an t at\n\nand Others it was a will in form only and not in substance, holdv. ing that it was barred by res judicata by reason of the\n\nThakur Dwarh1 decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council. It\n\nXa; h Singh also negatived the contention that the bequest in and Other.1, .r f B s I d' . 1 b iavour o Ganga ux mg 1 was a con 1t10na equest\n\nBhagwati .r. or that Ganga Bux Singh having failed to fulfil his obligation to pay the gujara his original chamcter as a legatee changed into that of a trustee and he must hold the beneficial interest for the testator or his heirs.\n\nThe appeal was therefore dismissed with costs. The plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and the necessary certificate was grante<l hy the Chief Court of Oudh on the 8th August, 1947.\n\nIt is necessary at the outset to set out the deed of agreement and the will executed by Ganga Bux Singh and Shankar Bux Singh respectively on dates the 7th January, 1904, and the 28thJuly, 1904. The deed of agreement dated the 7th .January, 1904, ra.n as under:-\n\n\"vVhereas, my cousin Thakur Shankar Bakhsh Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur Kalan, has proposed to make a bequest of his taluka, immovables, movables, rights etc. in favour of his wife and after her death in my favour and that of my sons Dwarka Nath Singh, Ajodhiya Nath Singh and Tirbhuwan Nath Singh, therefore by way of consideration for this concession and favour, I, the executant, out of my own free will do hereby execute this agreement in favour of my cousin aforesaid that in the month in which the said cousin might execute the said will in my favour and that of my sons and lays the same along with an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur district, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue, I shall from the 1st date of the month following that month, continue to pay to my said cousin Rs. 50 in cash every month during his life, so long as the said will remains in force and under this contract I make my person liable and hypothecate the same by virtue\n\nof this agreement. If I, the; executant, fail to perform 1963 the said contract the said cousin has power to have Th k-. R . the same performed by me, the executant, through\n\n\" ';;~7 •J Court. If the will mentioned above executed by the and Other• said cousin, be not sanctioned by the Members of the v.\n\nBoard of Revenue or if under any circumstance, the Thakur D~\"\"ka said cousin may himself revoke the said will, then from Nath Singh and Others. the time of revocation or refusal by the Board of Revenue the said cousin shall not be entitled to receive Bhagwati J. the aforesaid monthly amount of Rs. 50 and whatever money the said cousin might have received from me, the executant, up to the said refusal or revocation the said cousin shall necessarilv be bound to refund that money to me, the executaii.t.\"\n\nThe will dated the 28th July, 1904, was executed by Shankar Bux Singh in the terms following:--\n\n\"I am Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John son of Thakur Anant Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur and Grantee of Piprawan, district Sitapur. Out of my own free will, inclination and accord and consent I make a will that after my death my wife for her lifetime shall remain in possession of my entire Ilaqa (estate) as well as the movable and immovable property, left by me, together with the rights etc., relating to the said properties, without the power of any sort to transfer the said properties and rights, that on the death of the said wife all the aforesaid property and the rights shall devolve on my real cousin, Ganga Bakhsh with all the proprietary powers, and that on the death of Ganga Bakhsh the said entire property and the rights shall devolve on Dwaraka Nath, Ajodhia Nath and Tirbhuwan Nath, sons of Ganga Bakhsh, like Ganga Bakhsh himself, in the following shares: Dwaraka Nath annas 6, Ajodhia Nath annas 5, Tirbhuwan Nath annas 5: and that the persons mentioned below shall continue to get the maintenance allowance (Guzara) according to the amounts and conditions noted below:-·-\n\nMusammat Permeshuri, my eldest daughter, married at Allahabad to the son of Rai Anant Ram, generation\n\n19;3 after generation, (limited) to male issue,. Rs. 100 per month; Thakurain Raj\n\nflani Musammat Chandrani, my younger sister, married and Othm to Rai Raghubir Bakhsh, son ofRai Kunwar Bahadur,\n\nRais of Shahabad, district Hardoi, generation after Thakur Dwarka generation (limited) to male issue, Rs. 60 per month;\n\nNo.th Singh\n\nand Others, Mussamat 1-toop Rani, my real paternal aunt (father's sister), wife of Munshi Chedi Prasad deceased,\n\nBhagwati J. Rais of Qasba Mahona, district Lucknow, generation after generation, (limited) to male issue, Rs. 45 per month; Musammat Sohni, my mother for her life, Rs. 70 per month. * * * * Be it also known that my estate (Ilaqa) is under the Superintendence of the Court of Wards rmd the Hon'ble Members of the Board of Revenue have granted me power to execute the will so I do hereby execute this my last will cancelling all the previous wills executed by me.\" • It is clear from the terms of the deed of agreement that Ganga Bux Singh agreed to pay Rs. 50 in cash every month during the lifetime of Shankar Bux Singh in consideration of Shankar Bux Singh having proposed to make a bequest of the remainder in favour of Ganga Bux Singh and his sons and that it was after the deed of agreement was got registered by Ganga Bux Singh on the 11th .January, 1904, that the draft of the will was submitted on the 18th January by Shankar Bnx Singh to the Court of vVards.\n\nIt was this draft of the will amended as it was by the letter dated 27th April, 1904, that was engrossed in the will which was ultimately executed on the 28th July, 1904, after the letter of sanction obtained from the Board on 25th May, 1904.\n\nThe learned Civil Judge under the circumstanr:i>s uame rightly to the conclusion that the <leed of agreement and the will formed part of the same transaction, that the consideration for the will was the deed of agreement and the consideration for the agreement was the will and that the wiU\n\nI •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREiE COCR'r ilEPORTS 923\n\nas well as the agreement formed one contract. This 1v53 finding was not challenged beforn the Chief Court of T' k-. R . 0\n\n.._., . rta ura1n a; udh and could not be challenged before us.\n\nThere Rani was also a further finding of fact which was recorded and Other, by the learned Civil Judge and it was that Ganga Bux v.\n\nSingh failed <tnd neglected to make any payment to 1'hakur JJ_warka Shankar Bux Singh in terms of the deed of agreement Na%'0 8Z\"u\" even though Shankar Bux Singh executed the will and \"\" t \"' laid the same along with the application before the Bhagwati J.\n\nDeputy Commissioner, Sitapur, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue and that Ganga Bux Singh thus failed to perform his part of the contract.\n\nThis finding also was not challenged before the Chief Court of Oudh and could not be challenged before us.\n\nThe question therefore which falls to be considered by us is what is the effect of the failure on the part of Ganga Bux Singh to make the payments to Shankar Bux Singh in terms of the deed of agreement. It was urged by Dr. Tckchand, who appeared for the plaintiffs before us that by reason of such non-payment and the breach of contract on the part ofG; onga Bux Singh the will became ineffective and inoperative, that the payment of Rs. 50 per month during the lifetime of Shankar Bux Singh was a condition precedent to the vesting of the legacy in favour of Ganga Bux Singh and that condition not having been fulfilled the legacy did not vest in Ganga Bux Singh and that on a true construction of the terms of the will Ganga Bux Singh acquired no vested interest in the remainder. He also urged that the scope of the Privy Council judgment was misunderstood by the Chief Court of Oudh and that both the questions as regards anhn1ls testandi and the payment of Rs. 50 per month being a condition precedent though they were bareed by res judicata in regard to the due execution of the will were still open to him as affecting the right of Ganga Bux Singh to the legacy which was provided for him by Shankar Bux Singh under the will.\n\nIn regard to the hist contention urged by Dr. Tekchand both the courts below were of the opinion that the question of animus testandi was barred by res\n\n924 SUPREME COURT Rl!JPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 , judicata.\n\nIt was held by their Lordships of , . R . the Privy Council that the will in 'dispute was 7 hakurain \"J not revoked and that it was the last will and Rani and Others testament of Shankar Bux Singh. That decision necesv. sarily meant that the testator when he appended Thakur Dwarka his signature to the will was in a sound and disposing Nath Singh state of mind, was a free agent and duly executed the and Others. will in accordance with the law. The decision was\n\nBhaywati J. conclusive as regards the testamentary capacity, due execution and the representative title of the person to whom the letters of administration with the will annexed were granted. It was not open therefore to the plaintiffs to contend that the will which was executed by Shankar Bux Singh was a will merely in form and not in substance. The question of animus testandi . was therefore barred by res _judicata. In regard however to the question whether the bequest in favour of Ganga Bux Singh could t.ake effect by reason of default in payment the decision of the Privy Council did not constitute res _judicata and it was open to . the plaint' iffs to urge that contention.\n\nBoth the courts below therefore allowed the plaintiffs to agitate that question tl-.ough they came to a conclusion adverse to the plaintiffs.\n\nWe are of the opinion that there was no bar of res _judicata and the courts below were right in allowing the plaintiffs to agitate that question.\n\nThe payment of Rs. 50 per month to Shankar Bux Singh during his lifetime might be a condition precedent to the whole will coming into operation or might be a condition precedent to the vesting of the legacy in favour of Ganga Bux Singh. If the plaintiffs urged the former position that plea would certainly be barred by res _judicata. No court would grant a probate or letters of administration with the will annexed in regard to a will w':i.ich has ceased to be operative and was a mere scrap of paper. The plaintiffs could not therefore be heard to say that by reason of the non-fulfilment of the condition precedent the whole will had become inoperative, for that would run counter to th.e decision of th(} Privy Council. Even on merits such a position would be untenable for the simple reason that besides\n\n I\n\nI •\n\nGanga Bux Singh there was the widow, who was given I91iJ a life interest and there were the three daughters, the \" h ' d h h Thakurain Raj 1at er s sister an t e mother w o were given legacies by Rani way of maintenance and they were certainly not guilty and Others of non-fulfilment of any condition precedent. The will v. would certainly therefore stand so far as they were con- Thakur Dwarka cernedand the whole effect of the non-fulfilment of the Nath Singh condition precedent qua Ganga Bux Singh would be and Others. to prevent the vesting of the legacy in his favour.\n\nBlmgwati J.\n\nThe latter position therefore would be available to the plaintiffs and they could contend that by reason of the non-fulfilment of the condition precedent by Ganga Bux Singh the legacy provided in his favour did not vest in him.\n\nIf the payment of Rs. 50 per month therefore constituted a condition precedent the plaintiffs were on firm ground and that position coulrl not and was not contested before us by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants. It therefore remains to be considered whether the payment of Rs. 50 per month to Shankar Bux Singh during his lifetime\n\nco11Rtituted a condition precedent to the vesting of the legacy in favour of Ganga Bux Singh.\n\nThere is no doubt, as held by the learned Civil Judge, that the consideration for the will was the deed of agreement and the consideration for the agreement was the will and that the will as well as the agreement formed one contract. But for Ganga Bux Singh having executed the deed of agreement Shankar Bux Singh • would not have forwarded the draft will to the Court of Wards for its sanction and he would also not have executed the will on the 28th July, 1904. The contract was an overall contract under which both the parties had to perform their respective obligations. The obligation on the part of Ganga Bux Singh was to execute the deed of agreement, agreeing to pay the moneys to\n\nShankar Bux Singh in accordance with the terms thereof.\n\nThe obligation on the part of Shankar Bux Singh was to execute the will and submit it to the Court of Wards for its sanction. Both these obligations were fulfilled by the parties and the two documents were supported by consideration and became Linding\n\n!:126 SUPREME COURT REPOR'h:l [1953]\n\n195J on beth the the parties. The non-perfonnanoe of the agreement to pay by Ganga Bux Singh\"constituted at '11hakurai-n Raj '-' '-' Rani best a failure to fulfil his obligation and Shankar Bux\n\nand Others Singh became entitled to pursue his rights and remev. dies against Gangti Bnx Singh by reason of the breach Thakur Dwarka of contract by him.\n\nNath Singh h . . lt was urged bv Dr. Tekchand t at the cons1derat10n and Others.\n\nJ here constituted tt condition precedent and that the\n\nBlwgwati J. non-pa, yment of Rs. 50 per month by Ganga Bux Singh constituted non-fulfilment of condition precedent.\n\nHe relied upon the observations of Chief Justice \\Vills in Acherley v. Vernon, 125 English Reports llOG at page llOS (Willes 153 at page 156):\n\n\"I know of no words that either in a, will or deed neoessmily make a condition precedent, but the smno words will either make a condition precedent or subsequent according to the nnture of the thing and the intent of the parties. If therefore a man devise one thing in lieu and c01rnideration of another, or agree to do anything or pay a sum of money in consideration of anything to be done, in these cases that which is the consideration is looked upon as a condition precedent.\n\nSo is the case of Peters v. Opie, 1 Ventr. 177, and 1 :Saund. 350. If a man agree to pay a sum of money to another pro lubore suo in pulling down a house, the pulling down of tho house is a condition precedent. So is the case of Thorpe and Thorpe, 1 Salk. 171, where a man agreed to pay a sum of money to another he releasing the equity of redemption in certain lands. And so is tb.e case of 'l'wmer v. Ooodwin, adjudged by Lord \"Macclesfield and the rest of the Judges of B. R. upon great consideration, P. 13 Anne, in which case Goodwin wa.s to pay Tu111er 1500!. he assigning a judgment.\n\nIn all which mises it was holden that the party vd10 was to receive the money was not entitled to demand it until he had performed that which was the consideration of the payment, and which was considered in all these cases to be in the nature of a condition precedent. * * *\n\nSo likewis.e if it plainly appear to be the intent of 1953 the testator that the devisee shall not have the bene- 7,1 - fit of the devise unless he perform a certain act enJ'oiniakumin Ilaj Rani ed him by the devisor, this is a condition precedent ; and Others and the devisee shall have no benefit of the devise v. until he perform it, even though the condition be never Thakur Dwarka so umensonable if it be not illegal or impossible; for Naih Singh d d \" and Others, CUJUB est ure eJUB eBt iBponere.\n\nThese observations were particularly relied upon by Bhagwati J, Dr. Tekchand in support of his contention that the payment of .Rs. 50 per month to Shankar Bux Singh during his lifetime constituted a condition precedent. to the vesting of the legacy in favour of Ganga Bux Singh.\n\nWhile recognising the force of these observations we are constrained to observe that the terms of the deed of agreement negative any such contention. The agreement itself provided what was to happen if payment was not made in accordance with the terms thereof. If Ganga Bux Singh failed t, o perform the contract Shankar Bux Singh was to have the power to have the same performed by Ganga Bux Singh through Court. This consequence could not be contemplated if the payment constituted a condition precedent and the non-fulfilment of the condition precedent was to have the effect of rendering the agreement inoperative. In that event the agreement itself would become inoperative and no rights nuder the agreement would survive to Shankar Bux Singh.\n\nThe right which was therefore given to Shankar Bux\n\nSingh to have the agreement performed by Ganga Bux Singh contemplated the existence and the continued existence of the agreement so as to enable Shankar Bux Singh to hold Ganga Bux Singh to its performance.\n\nThe continued existence of the contract was in contemplation of the parties and so far as Ganga Bux\n\nSingh is cmwPrned it was at no stage contemplated that he could forego the performanee of the obligation on his part to pay Rs. 50 per month to Shankar Bux Singh during his lifetime so long as the will stood 1111revolrnd,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)\n\n19.53 It is significant to observe on the otl; ter hand that\n\nTl ku--: R . two events were contemplated so far as Shankar Bux\n\nw ;:~7 OJ Singh himself was concerned.\n\nThe one was the withand Others holding of the consent of the Court of Wards and the\n\nv. other was the revocation of the will by Shankar Bux\n\nThakur D':'arka Singh himself. The sum of Rs. 50 per month was agreed Nath Smgh to be paid bv Ganga Bux Singh to him from the aad Others. h h \"sh k B s. h d th u mont w en an ar ux mg execute e w1\n\nBhagwati J. and laid it before the Court of Wards for its sanction. The Court of \\Vards might withhold its consent to the will and in that event whatever payments were made during the interval by Ganga Bux Singh to Shankar Bux Singh had to be refunded by the latter. Even though the Court of Wards might sanction the will Shankar Bux Singh might later on revoke the will and the consequence of such revocation was also provided in that Shankar Bux Singh was to refund to Ganga Bux Singh the amounts which he had paid up to the time of revocation to Shankar Bux Singh in accordance with the terms of the agreement. It has to be observed moreover that all these constituted independent obligations on the part of both the pacties. The obligation on th.e part of Ganga Bux Singh was so long as the will stood unrevoked to pay to Shankar Bux Singh Rs. 50 per month during his lifetime and the obligation on the part of Shankar Bux Singh was to obtain the consent of the Court of Wards and to leave the will unrevoked during his lifetime.\n\nThese obligations were independent of each other and the consequences of the non-performance of these obligations on the part of each of the parties were expressly provided in the agreement itself. It could not therefore be contended that the payment of Rs. 50 per month to Shankar Bux Singh during his lifetime constituted a condition precedent to the vesting of the legacy in his favour. That was merely a consideration provided by Ganga Bux Singh for the execution of the will by Shankar Bux Singh in his favour and if Ganga Bux Singh committed a breach of the agreement the only result was that Shankar Bux Singh would become \\)ntitled to recover the amount due on such default\n\n4 - •\n\nfrom Ganga Bux Singh by having recourse to a court of law.\n\nThe contract would continue to subsist, the\n\nThakttrain Raj parties being relegated to their rights and remedies Rani thereunder as contemplated by the parties. and Others\n\nhln spitefoRf th~ 0 non-paymehnt bSyhGakngaBBuxSS!nghh ?f ThakurvDwarka t e sum o . ~· l> per mont to an ar ux mg m Nath 8 ; ngh accordance with the terms of the agreement at no time and Others. did Shankar Bux Singh revoke the will nor did he pursue Ganga Bux Singh in a court of law for the re- Bhagwati J, covery of the amounts in respect of which Ganga Bux Singh was in default. He left the will unrevoked and on his death the will became effective as his last will and testament and operated to vest in Ganga Bux Singh an interes1i in the remainder as therein provided.\n\nThere is nothing in the will itself which in terms makes the bequest conditional on regular payment of the amount under the agreement.\n\nThe argument which was advanced by Dr. Tekchand based on section 81 of the Indian Trusts Act could not avail him for the simple reason that the intention of Shankar Bux Singh had to be gathered as on the date of the execution of the will and not at any subsequent time thereafter. That intention was clearly to effect a testamentary disposition of the remainder in favour of Oanga Bux Singh. It was certainly farthest from the thought of Shanlrnr Bux Singh not to dispose of the beneficial interest in the remainder in favour of Ganga Bux Ringh with the result that there could neither be a secret trust nor a trust of imperfect obligation created in favour of the heirs at law of the testator Shankar\n\nBux Singh.\n\nThe argument of Dr. Tekchand that the remainder did not vest in Ganga Bux Singh but fell into residue by reason of his having pre-deceased the widow of Shanlrnr Bux Singh is equally of no avail.\n\nThe legacy in favour of Ganga Bux Singh was a legacy of the remainder of the estate whih vested in Ganga Bux 8ingh but was deferred in possession till after the extinction of the life interest created in favour of the plaintiff l. Ruch vested interest could devolve upon the dofondants, the heirs and legal representatives of\n\n. 120\n\nSCPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19.13 Ganga Bux Singh on the death of th() latter and the\n\n7'hakurain llaj defendants were therefore as the heirs and legal repreflani sentatives of Ganga Bux Singh since deceased rightly and Other., entitled to the same. As the bequest was not v. conditional and did not lapse there onld be no ques- Thakur Dwarka t' f lt' t t f ' t h N h ,.. h ion o any resu mg rus or o any rntes acy wit at ui.11rf • • and Others. respect to the remamder.\n\nThe result therefore is that the appeal fails and must Bhagwat-i J. be dismissed \\Vith costs.\n\nJa; n, 28.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: R11; iinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondents: 0. P. Lal.\n\nBEJOY GOPAL MUKHERJI v.\n\nPRATUL CHANDRA GROSE.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nBHAGWA1'I JJ.]\n\nLandlord and tenant-Permanent tenancy-Evidence-Inference froin po.<!session froni generation to generation, transfers, erection of structu, res and other ci1:cnmsttinces-J1Iere increase of rent, effect of.\n\nPermanency of tenure does not necessarily imply both fixity of rent and fixity of occupation and the fact of enhancement of rent Joes not necessarily n1ilitate n, gainst the tenancy being a permanent one.\n\nWhen, therefore, in a previous suit the only <iuestion was whether the jama could be increasen and the jama was increased : Held, that this decision did not operate as res judicata on the tJ.U8sLio11 of permanency of the tenure in a snbsoquent suit for ejectment.\n\nShankar Rao v. Sambhu Wallad (1940) 45 C.W.N. 57; Jogen dra Krishna Banerji v. Szibashini Dassi (1940) 45 C.W.N. 590, Probhas Chandra Mallick v. Debe-ndra Nath Das (1939) 43 C.W.N. 828, relied on.\n\n'Thiere possession for generations at a uniforin rent, or construe tion of permanent structures hy itself may not be conclusive proof of a permanent right but the cumulative effect of such facto coupled with other facts may lead to the inference of • permanent\n\nI I", "total_entities": 116, "entities": [{"text": "30t, h September, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mentioned in ihe section and could not mean a date 1952 antecedent to 30t, h September, 1952."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 490, "end_char": 499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Central Jail, rrec t a e pe 1 10ners m is pet1t10n an m pet1- Hyderabad State tions Nos."}}, {"text": "31st December, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 697, "end_char": 716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are in detention by reason of the MaJwjan J. extension order made on the 22nd September extending their detention up to 31st December, 1952."}}, {"text": "30th September, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 840, "end_char": 860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30th September, 1952, had been specified as the date up to which their detention was to last by a subsisting and perfectly valid order and their detention order beyond that date is illegal and cannot be justified on the provisions of section 11-A (2) or on the provisions of section 11 ( 1) of the original Act."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1074, "end_char": 1084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1115, "end_char": 1125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. H.\n\nRajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1216, "end_char": 1235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents and intervener : G. H.\n\nRajadhyaksha."}}, {"text": "THAKURAIN RAJ RANI AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1238, "end_char": 1267, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAKURAIN RAJ RANI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THAKUR DWARKA NATH SINGH\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1269, "end_char": 1305, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAKUR DWARKA NATH SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1309, "end_char": 1327, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s.R.DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1336, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R. DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ThnkurahJ. Raj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2152, "end_char": 2166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7bh .T anuary, 1904, G, a cousin of S, executed au agreement in favour of S, the material portion of which ran as follows: ''Whereas my cousin S has proposed to make a bequest of his taluka in favour of his wife and after her death in my favour and\n\nJan. 23,\n\nSUPREME CO~RT REPORTS [19.53]\n\n1003 that of my sons ...... therefore by way of consicJ.eration for this concession and favour, I, tho executant, out of my O\\Vn free will ThnkurahJ. Raj do hereby execute this agreement in favour of my cousin aforesaid\n\nEani that in the month in which the said cousin may execute the said and Of/\"\"' will in my favour.and that ol my sons and lays the same along v. with an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapnr 'fhnl,:ur Dwarka district, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue, I Nath Singh shall from the 1st date of the month following that month conand Othera."}}, {"text": "I Nath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2519, "end_char": 2531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7bh .T anuary, 1904, G, a cousin of S, executed au agreement in favour of S, the material portion of which ran as follows: ''Whereas my cousin S has proposed to make a bequest of his taluka in favour of his wife and after her death in my favour and\n\nJan. 23,\n\nSUPREME CO~RT REPORTS [19.53]\n\n1003 that of my sons ...... therefore by way of consicJ.eration for this concession and favour, I, tho executant, out of my O\\Vn free will ThnkurahJ. Raj do hereby execute this agreement in favour of my cousin aforesaid\n\nEani that in the month in which the said cousin may execute the said and Of/\"\"' will in my favour.and that ol my sons and lays the same along v. with an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapnr 'fhnl,:ur Dwarka district, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue, I Nath Singh shall from the 1st date of the month following that month conand Othera."}}, {"text": "28th .July, 1904", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3026, "end_char": 3042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th January, S submitted a draft will for sanction and the will as amended and sanctioned was executed on the 28th .July, 1904. '"}}, {"text": "Chief Court of Oudh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3723, "end_char": 3742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhis will provided as follows: \"after my death my wife for her lifetime shall l'emain in possession of my entire estate ...... without the po, ver of any sort to transfer the said properties and rights, that on the death of the said wife all the aforesaid property and rights shall devolve on my cousin G with a,11 proprietary powers ancl that on the death of G, the said entire property and rights shall deYolve on X, Y, Z, sons of G, in the following shares .... \" The will also provided for maintenance for the daughter, sister, aunt and mother of S.\n\nOn tho application of G's sons (G having died) letters of administration with the will annexed were granted to them by the Chief Court of Oudh and this decision was affirmed by the Privy Conncil on appeal in 1937. '"}}, {"text": "Thakur Dwarkti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50 wae a cou-\n\n<liion precedent to the vesting of the legacy in G or G's sons was\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT l{J~PORTS 915\n\nnot, however, rs j?ldiMta and it was open to tbe plaintiff to raise 196& such a plea; (v} on a proper interpretation of the terms of the agreen1ent, Thakurain Raj the payment of Rs .. 50 per month was not a condition precedent to Rani h fhl 'Gb andOthers t e vestmg o t e egacy m , ut merely a consideration, and the plaintiffs' remedy was to enforce the agreement if it was not v. duly performed; Thakur Dwarkti\n\n( Nath Singh\n\nvi) that as G obtained a vested remainder uuder the will, and Others.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Dwarkti"}}, {"text": "Nath Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5566, "end_char": 5576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50 wae a cou-\n\n<liion precedent to the vesting of the legacy in G or G's sons was\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT l{J~PORTS 915\n\nnot, however, rs j?ldiMta and it was open to tbe plaintiff to raise 196& such a plea; (v} on a proper interpretation of the terms of the agreen1ent, Thakurain Raj the payment of Rs .. 50 per month was not a condition precedent to Rani h fhl 'Gb andOthers t e vestmg o t e egacy m , ut merely a consideration, and the plaintiffs' remedy was to enforce the agreement if it was not v. duly performed; Thakur Dwarkti\n\n( Nath Singh\n\nvi) that as G obtained a vested remainder uuder the will, and Others.", "canonical_name": "Nath Singh"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLA'l'F.\n\nJuRISDW'.rlO)", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5939, "end_char": 5972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLA'l'F.\n\nJuRISDW'.rlO)!:"}}, {"text": "Bakshi Tele Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6248, "end_char": 6265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Bakshi Tele Chand (Onlcwr Nath Sn:vastal!a, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Achhru Rarn", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6323, "end_char": 6334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Rarn (Bishan Singh, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Bishan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6336, "end_char": 6348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Rarn (Bishan Singh, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "BHAGWA'L'I", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6443, "end_char": 6453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court waH delivered by\n\nBHAGWA'L'I J.- -This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed by the late Chief Court of Ondh, ttffirming the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge of Sitapur, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA'L'I"}}, {"text": "Civil Judge of Sitapur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6595, "end_char": 6617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court waH delivered by\n\nBHAGWA'L'I J.- -This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed by the late Chief Court of Ondh, ttffirming the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge of Sitapur, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit."}}, {"text": "Thakur Shankar Bux Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6658, "end_char": 6682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One, Thakur Shankar Bux Singh, proprietor of the Estate known as Rampur Kelau, situated in District Sitapur (Oudh) was heavily indebted and the estate had been in the possession of Deputy Commissioner of Sitapur as receiver from 1892 up to 11th July, 1901.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John"}}, {"text": "11th July, 1901", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6893, "end_char": 6908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One, Thakur Shankar Bux Singh, proprietor of the Estate known as Rampur Kelau, situated in District Sitapur (Oudh) was heavily indebted and the estate had been in the possession of Deputy Commissioner of Sitapur as receiver from 1892 up to 11th July, 1901."}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 6997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court of Wards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7019, "end_char": 7037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st August, 1901", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7121, "end_char": 7137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter he was declared a disqualified proprietor under the provisions of Section 8 (D) (1) of thn C.P.\n\nCourt of Wards Act (r.P. Act Ill of 1899) and the Court of Wards took possession of the estate on the 1st August, 1901."}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7146, "end_char": 7156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court of Wards Act", "statute": "Court of Wards Act"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7176, "end_char": 7210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cnder Section 34 of the Aet he was\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 not competent to dispose his property by will without the consent in writing of the Court of \\Vards, though 1.'hakurain Raj\n\nllani prior to the 1st August, 1901, he had made four succesand Others sive wills, the last being dated 19th June, Hl01, under v. which he gave his estate absolutely to his wife."}}, {"text": "1.'hakurain Raj\n\nllani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7319, "end_char": 7341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cnder Section 34 of the Aet he was\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 not competent to dispose his property by will without the consent in writing of the Court of \\Vards, though 1.'hakurain Raj\n\nllani prior to the 1st August, 1901, he had made four succesand Others sive wills, the last being dated 19th June, Hl01, under v. which he gave his estate absolutely to his wife."}}, {"text": "30th November, 1901", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h~/, nr Dwarka the 30th November, 1901, he made a will giving a life\n\nAath Singh interest to his wife and the remainder over to his cousin and Others."}}, {"text": "Aath Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7586, "end_char": 7596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h~/, nr Dwarka the 30th November, 1901, he made a will giving a life\n\nAath Singh interest to his wife and the remainder over to his cousin and Others.", "canonical_name": "Nath Singh"}}, {"text": "Ganga Bux Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7668, "end_char": 7683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganga Bux Singh after providing for certain legacies by\n\nBhagwati J. way of maintenance in favour of his three daughters, his father's sister and his mother.", "canonical_name": "Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7725, "end_char": 7733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganga Bux Singh after providing for certain legacies by\n\nBhagwati J. way of maintenance in favour of his three daughters, his father's sister and his mother.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA'L'I"}}, {"text": "7th January, 1904", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7912, "end_char": 7929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th January, 1904, Ganga Bux Singh executed in his favour a registered deed of agreement agreeing to pay him Rs."}}, {"text": "18th January, 1904", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8293, "end_char": 8311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A draft of the will was accordingly prepared by him on the 18th January, 1904, under which he gave a life interest to his wife and the residue of the property to Ganga Bux Singh and after him to his sons after providing legacies for maintenance in favour of his daughters, father's sister and mother."}}, {"text": "25th May, 1904", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8573, "end_char": 8587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board of Revenue intimated on the 25th May, 1904, that it would not withhold its consent to a will similar to that contained in the draft but altered in the light of the proposals contained in the further letter dated 27th April, 1904."}}, {"text": "27th April, 1904", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8757, "end_char": 8773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board of Revenue intimated on the 25th May, 1904, that it would not withhold its consent to a will similar to that contained in the draft but altered in the light of the proposals contained in the further letter dated 27th April, 1904."}}, {"text": "28th July, 1904", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8826, "end_char": 8841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He thereupon duly made and published a will on the 28th July, 1904, in accordance with the suggestions contained in the Board's letter dated 25th May, 1904, cancelling iill the previous wills executed by him."}}, {"text": "Ganga Bux Singh Lut", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9044, "end_char": 9063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that he handed over tho original of this will to Ganga Bux Singh Lut did not give any intimation of the execution thereof to the authorities and the authorities could only come to know of the same when Ganga Bux Singh gave the original will to the Special Manager on or about the 19th December, 1905.", "canonical_name": "Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh"}}, {"text": "19th December, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9275, "end_char": 9294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that he handed over tho original of this will to Ganga Bux Singh Lut did not give any intimation of the execution thereof to the authorities and the authorities could only come to know of the same when Ganga Bux Singh gave the original will to the Special Manager on or about the 19th December, 1905."}}, {"text": "13th July, 1906", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9643, "end_char": 9658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "intimated on the 13th July, 1906, its refusal and also wk~:~:;• aJ communicated thereby the withholding of its consent and Others to the will already executed by him on the 28th July, v.\n\n1904."}}, {"text": "Wards Nath Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9929, "end_char": 9945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A further attempt by him on the 21st Novem- 1'huku,- Dwarku ber, 1906, to obtain the consent of the Court of Wards Nath Singh to another draft will was also unsuccessful and the will and Others."}}, {"text": "Shankar Bux Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10176, "end_char": 10193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shankar Bux Singh died thereafter on the 28th July, 1922, and he being a Christian at the time of his death succrnssion to his property was governed by the Indian Succession Act.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Bux. Singh"}}, {"text": "28th July, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10217, "end_char": 10232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shankar Bux Singh died thereafter on the 28th July, 1922, and he being a Christian at the time of his death succrnssion to his property was governed by the Indian Succession Act."}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10332, "end_char": 10353, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "16th August, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10771, "end_char": 10788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The widow executed on the 16th August, 1927, a deed of gift conveying the bulk of the estate to her daughter and the son of the pre-deceased daughter."}}, {"text": "8th September, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11000, "end_char": 11019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She also executed another deed of gift in the same year conveying the rest of the properties and on the 8th September, 1928, Ganga Bux Singh filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur for a declaration that under the aforesaid will she had only a life interest in tht.'"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Sitapur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11070, "end_char": 11098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She also executed another deed of gift in the same year conveying the rest of the properties and on the 8th September, 1928, Ganga Bux Singh filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur for a declaration that under the aforesaid will she had only a life interest in tht.'"}}, {"text": "14th July, rnao", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11483, "end_char": 11498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This defence was upheld and the suit wr.s dismissed on the 14th July, rnao."}}, {"text": "19th October, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11553, "end_char": 11571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganga Bux Singh having died in the meanwhile on the 19th October, 1929, his sons applied for letters of administration with the will annexed on the 25th September, 1930, on the original side of the Chief Court of Oudh."}}, {"text": "Shankar Bux. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11818, "end_char": 11836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application w&s opposed by the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1963 widow and other heirs of Shankar Bux.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Bux. Singh"}}, {"text": "Thakurain Raj Rani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11902, "end_char": 11920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh inter alia on the ground that the will had been executed without Thakurain Raj Rani the sanction of the Court of Wards.", "canonical_name": "THAKURAIN RAJ RANI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Kisch", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11969, "end_char": 11974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Kisch\n\nand Others delivered an elaborate judgment, negatived a.JI the v. objections and granted letters of administration with Thakur Dwarka the will annexed to the sons of Ganga Bux Singh on\n\nNath Smgk the Hith November, l93l."}}, {"text": "Thakur Dwarka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12096, "end_char": 12109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Kisch\n\nand Others delivered an elaborate judgment, negatived a.JI the v. objections and granted letters of administration with Thakur Dwarka the will annexed to the sons of Ganga Bux Singh on\n\nNath Smgk the Hith November, l93l.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Dwarkti"}}, {"text": "7th May, 1987", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12624, "end_char": 12637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sons of Ganga Bux Singh took an appeal to the Privy Council and their Lordships of the Privy Council on the 7th May, 1987, reversed the decree of the Appeal Court and rrn; tored the decrne passed by Mr. Justice Kisch."}}, {"text": "9th tleptem ber, 1987", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13061, "end_char": 13082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th tleptem ber, 1987, the widow, the claughter and the son of the pre-deceased daughter of Shankar Bux Singh, the plaintiffs, filed the suit out of which this appeal arises, against the three 8ons of Ganga Bux Singh, the defendants, for a declaration that the will dated the 28th July,\n\n1904, wa.s inoperative and ineffectual and that in any case the defendants had no iight, title or interest in the properties in suit, that plaintiff 1 was entitled to hold the property in suit under the will of Shankar\n\nBux Singh dated 19th June, 1901, or that the plaintiffs 1 to 3 were entitled to the same as heirs-at-law of Shankar Bux Singh deceased under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, and for further and other reliefs."}}, {"text": "Ganga Bux Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13262, "end_char": 13277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th tleptem ber, 1987, the widow, the claughter and the son of the pre-deceased daughter of Shankar Bux Singh, the plaintiffs, filed the suit out of which this appeal arises, against the three 8ons of Ganga Bux Singh, the defendants, for a declaration that the will dated the 28th July,\n\n1904, wa.s inoperative and ineffectual and that in any case the defendants had no iight, title or interest in the properties in suit, that plaintiff 1 was entitled to hold the property in suit under the will of Shankar\n\nBux Singh dated 19th June, 1901, or that the plaintiffs 1 to 3 were entitled to the same as heirs-at-law of Shankar Bux Singh deceased under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, and for further and other reliefs.", "canonical_name": "Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh"}}, {"text": "Shankar\n\nBux Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13560, "end_char": 13578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th tleptem ber, 1987, the widow, the claughter and the son of the pre-deceased daughter of Shankar Bux Singh, the plaintiffs, filed the suit out of which this appeal arises, against the three 8ons of Ganga Bux Singh, the defendants, for a declaration that the will dated the 28th July,\n\n1904, wa.s inoperative and ineffectual and that in any case the defendants had no iight, title or interest in the properties in suit, that plaintiff 1 was entitled to hold the property in suit under the will of Shankar\n\nBux Singh dated 19th June, 1901, or that the plaintiffs 1 to 3 were entitled to the same as heirs-at-law of Shankar Bux Singh deceased under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, and for further and other reliefs.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Bux. Singh"}}, {"text": "Shankar Bux Singh deceased under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13677, "end_char": 13753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shankar Bux 8ingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13850, "end_char": 13867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the plaint they alleged that the will was inoperative as Shankar Bux 8ingh had no animus testandi and that it was void and inoperative in respect of the testamentary disposition in favour of Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh am\\ his sons because Ganga Bux Singh 195.1 failed to perform his part of the contract as regards the f, hi JI\n\n'J. 1hakurai'n Raj payment o mont y a owance and the defendants Rani therefore could not take advantage of or claim any \"\"d Others ben!!fit under that testamentary disposition and further v. the payment of the said allowance being a condition Tha; ur Dmka\n\nprecedent and the condition not having been fulfilled J>.ath Singh h d. 't' I t' Th d f' d 3 and Others.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Bux. Singh"}}, {"text": "Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13984, "end_char": 14006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the plaint they alleged that the will was inoperative as Shankar Bux 8ingh had no animus testandi and that it was void and inoperative in respect of the testamentary disposition in favour of Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh am\\ his sons because Ganga Bux Singh 195.1 failed to perform his part of the contract as regards the f, hi JI\n\n'J. 1hakurai'n Raj payment o mont y a owance and the defendants Rani therefore could not take advantage of or claim any \"\"d Others ben!!fit under that testamentary disposition and further v. the payment of the said allowance being a condition Tha; ur Dmka\n\nprecedent and the condition not having been fulfilled J>.ath Singh h d. 't' I t' Th d f' d 3 and Others.", "canonical_name": "Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh"}}, {"text": "Civil .Judge, Sitapm", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15076, "end_char": 15096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Civil .Judge, Sitapm, after considering the cvidenee, oral as well as documentary, led before him held that the will as well as the agreement formed one contract, that Ganga Bux Singh had failed to perform his promise or his part of the contract, that the only point which was agitated before their Lordships of the Privy Council was as regards the consent of the\n\nCourt of 'Vards and that therefore even though the plaintiffs were precluded from disputing the genuineness of the will they were not precluded from seeking a declaration to the effect that the defendants were not entitled to any benefit under the will, and that the decision therefore did not operate as res judicata so far as issues in the present case were concerned."}}, {"text": "Bux Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16882, "end_char": 16891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or that Ganga Bux Singh having failed to fulfil his obligation to pay the gujara his original chamcter as a legatee changed into that of a trustee and he must hold the beneficial interest for the testator or his heirs."}}, {"text": "8th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17276, "end_char": 17292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and the necessary certificate was grante<l hy the Chief Court of Oudh on the 8th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "7th .January, 1904", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17522, "end_char": 17540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deed of agreement dated the 7th .January, 1904, ra.n as under:-\n\n\"vVhereas, my cousin Thakur Shankar Bakhsh Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur Kalan, has proposed to make a bequest of his taluka, immovables, movables, rights etc."}}, {"text": "vVhereas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17560, "end_char": 17568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deed of agreement dated the 7th .January, 1904, ra.n as under:-\n\n\"vVhereas, my cousin Thakur Shankar Bakhsh Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur Kalan, has proposed to make a bequest of his taluka, immovables, movables, rights etc."}}, {"text": "Thakur Shankar Bakhsh Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17580, "end_char": 17607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deed of agreement dated the 7th .January, 1904, ra.n as under:-\n\n\"vVhereas, my cousin Thakur Shankar Bakhsh Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur Kalan, has proposed to make a bequest of his taluka, immovables, movables, rights etc.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John"}}, {"text": "Dwarka Nath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17790, "end_char": 17807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in favour of his wife and after her death in my favour and that of my sons Dwarka Nath Singh, Ajodhiya Nath Singh and Tirbhuwan Nath Singh, therefore by way of consideration for this concession and favour, I, the executant, out of my own free will do hereby execute this agreement in favour of my cousin aforesaid that in the month in which the said cousin might execute the said will in my favour and that of my sons and lays the same along with an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur district, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue, I shall from the 1st date of the month following that month, continue to pay to my said cousin Rs."}}, {"text": "Ajodhiya Nath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17809, "end_char": 17828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in favour of his wife and after her death in my favour and that of my sons Dwarka Nath Singh, Ajodhiya Nath Singh and Tirbhuwan Nath Singh, therefore by way of consideration for this concession and favour, I, the executant, out of my own free will do hereby execute this agreement in favour of my cousin aforesaid that in the month in which the said cousin might execute the said will in my favour and that of my sons and lays the same along with an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur district, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue, I shall from the 1st date of the month following that month, continue to pay to my said cousin Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ajodhiya Nath Singh"}}, {"text": "Tirbhuwan Nath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17833, "end_char": 17853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in favour of his wife and after her death in my favour and that of my sons Dwarka Nath Singh, Ajodhiya Nath Singh and Tirbhuwan Nath Singh, therefore by way of consideration for this concession and favour, I, the executant, out of my own free will do hereby execute this agreement in favour of my cousin aforesaid that in the month in which the said cousin might execute the said will in my favour and that of my sons and lays the same along with an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur district, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue, I shall from the 1st date of the month following that month, continue to pay to my said cousin Rs.", "canonical_name": "Tirbhuwan Nath Singh"}}, {"text": "Sitapur district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18209, "end_char": 18225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in favour of his wife and after her death in my favour and that of my sons Dwarka Nath Singh, Ajodhiya Nath Singh and Tirbhuwan Nath Singh, therefore by way of consideration for this concession and favour, I, the executant, out of my own free will do hereby execute this agreement in favour of my cousin aforesaid that in the month in which the said cousin might execute the said will in my favour and that of my sons and lays the same along with an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur district, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue, I shall from the 1st date of the month following that month, continue to pay to my said cousin Rs."}}, {"text": "Shankar Bux Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19410, "end_char": 19427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will dated the 28th July, 1904, was executed by Shankar Bux Singh in the terms following:--\n\n\"I am Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John son of Thakur Anant Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur and Grantee of Piprawan, district Sitapur.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Bux. Singh"}}, {"text": "Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19461, "end_char": 19495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will dated the 28th July, 1904, was executed by Shankar Bux Singh in the terms following:--\n\n\"I am Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John son of Thakur Anant Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur and Grantee of Piprawan, district Sitapur.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John"}}, {"text": "Thakur Anant Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19503, "end_char": 19521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will dated the 28th July, 1904, was executed by Shankar Bux Singh in the terms following:--\n\n\"I am Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John son of Thakur Anant Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur and Grantee of Piprawan, district Sitapur."}}, {"text": "Rampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19535, "end_char": 19541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will dated the 28th July, 1904, was executed by Shankar Bux Singh in the terms following:--\n\n\"I am Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John son of Thakur Anant Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur and Grantee of Piprawan, district Sitapur."}}, {"text": "Piprawan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19557, "end_char": 19565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will dated the 28th July, 1904, was executed by Shankar Bux Singh in the terms following:--\n\n\"I am Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John son of Thakur Anant Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur and Grantee of Piprawan, district Sitapur."}}, {"text": "Sitapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19576, "end_char": 19583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The will dated the 28th July, 1904, was executed by Shankar Bux Singh in the terms following:--\n\n\"I am Thakur Shankar Baksh alias S. John son of Thakur Anant Singh, Taluqdar of Rampur and Grantee of Piprawan, district Sitapur."}}, {"text": "Ganga Bakhsh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20066, "end_char": 20078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "relating to the said properties, without the power of any sort to transfer the said properties and rights, that on the death of the said wife all the aforesaid property and the rights shall devolve on my real cousin, Ganga Bakhsh with all the proprietary powers, and that on the death of Ganga Bakhsh the said entire property and the rights shall devolve on Dwaraka Nath, Ajodhia Nath and Tirbhuwan Nath, sons of Ganga Bakhsh, like Ganga Bakhsh himself, in the following shares: Dwaraka Nath annas 6, Ajodhia Nath annas 5, Tirbhuwan Nath annas 5: and that the persons mentioned below shall continue to get the maintenance allowance (Guzara) according to the amounts and conditions noted below:-·-\n\nMusammat Permeshuri, my eldest daughter, married at Allahabad to the son of Rai Anant Ram, generation\n\n19;3 after generation, (limited) to male issue,."}}, {"text": "Dwaraka Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20207, "end_char": 20219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "relating to the said properties, without the power of any sort to transfer the said properties and rights, that on the death of the said wife all the aforesaid property and the rights shall devolve on my real cousin, Ganga Bakhsh with all the proprietary powers, and that on the death of Ganga Bakhsh the said entire property and the rights shall devolve on Dwaraka Nath, Ajodhia Nath and Tirbhuwan Nath, sons of Ganga Bakhsh, like Ganga Bakhsh himself, in the following shares: Dwaraka Nath annas 6, Ajodhia Nath annas 5, Tirbhuwan Nath annas 5: and that the persons mentioned below shall continue to get the maintenance allowance (Guzara) according to the amounts and conditions noted below:-·-\n\nMusammat Permeshuri, my eldest daughter, married at Allahabad to the son of Rai Anant Ram, generation\n\n19;3 after generation, (limited) to male issue,."}}, {"text": "Ajodhia Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20221, "end_char": 20233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "relating to the said properties, without the power of any sort to transfer the said properties and rights, that on the death of the said wife all the aforesaid property and the rights shall devolve on my real cousin, Ganga Bakhsh with all the proprietary powers, and that on the death of Ganga Bakhsh the said entire property and the rights shall devolve on Dwaraka Nath, Ajodhia Nath and Tirbhuwan Nath, sons of Ganga Bakhsh, like Ganga Bakhsh himself, in the following shares: Dwaraka Nath annas 6, Ajodhia Nath annas 5, Tirbhuwan Nath annas 5: and that the persons mentioned below shall continue to get the maintenance allowance (Guzara) according to the amounts and conditions noted below:-·-\n\nMusammat Permeshuri, my eldest daughter, married at Allahabad to the son of Rai Anant Ram, generation\n\n19;3 after generation, (limited) to male issue,.", "canonical_name": "Ajodhiya Nath Singh"}}, {"text": "Tirbhuwan Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20238, "end_char": 20252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "relating to the said properties, without the power of any sort to transfer the said properties and rights, that on the death of the said wife all the aforesaid property and the rights shall devolve on my real cousin, Ganga Bakhsh with all the proprietary powers, and that on the death of Ganga Bakhsh the said entire property and the rights shall devolve on Dwaraka Nath, Ajodhia Nath and Tirbhuwan Nath, sons of Ganga Bakhsh, like Ganga Bakhsh himself, in the following shares: Dwaraka Nath annas 6, Ajodhia Nath annas 5, Tirbhuwan Nath annas 5: and that the persons mentioned below shall continue to get the maintenance allowance (Guzara) according to the amounts and conditions noted below:-·-\n\nMusammat Permeshuri, my eldest daughter, married at Allahabad to the son of Rai Anant Ram, generation\n\n19;3 after generation, (limited) to male issue,.", "canonical_name": "Tirbhuwan Nath Singh"}}, {"text": "Musammat Permeshuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20547, "end_char": 20566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "relating to the said properties, without the power of any sort to transfer the said properties and rights, that on the death of the said wife all the aforesaid property and the rights shall devolve on my real cousin, Ganga Bakhsh with all the proprietary powers, and that on the death of Ganga Bakhsh the said entire property and the rights shall devolve on Dwaraka Nath, Ajodhia Nath and Tirbhuwan Nath, sons of Ganga Bakhsh, like Ganga Bakhsh himself, in the following shares: Dwaraka Nath annas 6, Ajodhia Nath annas 5, Tirbhuwan Nath annas 5: and that the persons mentioned below shall continue to get the maintenance allowance (Guzara) according to the amounts and conditions noted below:-·-\n\nMusammat Permeshuri, my eldest daughter, married at Allahabad to the son of Rai Anant Ram, generation\n\n19;3 after generation, (limited) to male issue,."}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21137, "end_char": 21144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "60 per month;\n\nNo.th Singh\n\nand Others, Mussamat 1-toop Rani, my real paternal aunt (father's sister), wife of Munshi Chedi Prasad deceased,\n\nBhagwati J. Rais of Qasba Mahona, district Lucknow, generation after generation, (limited) to male issue, Rs."}}, {"text": "Musammat Sohni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21218, "end_char": 21232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45 per month; Musammat Sohni, my mother for her life, Rs."}}, {"text": "11th .January, 1904", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21934, "end_char": 21953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50 in cash every month during the lifetime of Shankar Bux Singh in consideration of Shankar Bux Singh having proposed to make a bequest of the remainder in favour of Ganga Bux Singh and his sons and that it was after the deed of agreement was got registered by Ganga Bux Singh on the 11th .January, 1904, that the draft of the will was submitted on the 18th January by Shankar Bnx Singh to the Court of vVards."}}, {"text": "Shankar Bnx Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22019, "end_char": 22036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50 in cash every month during the lifetime of Shankar Bux Singh in consideration of Shankar Bux Singh having proposed to make a bequest of the remainder in favour of Ganga Bux Singh and his sons and that it was after the deed of agreement was got registered by Ganga Bux Singh on the 11th .January, 1904, that the draft of the will was submitted on the 18th January by Shankar Bnx Singh to the Court of vVards.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Bux. Singh"}}, {"text": "Rani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22834, "end_char": 22838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There Rani was also a further finding of fact which was recorded and Other, by the learned Civil Judge and it was that Ganga Bux v.\n\nSingh failed <tnd neglected to make any payment to 1'hakur JJ_warka Shankar Bux Singh in terms of the deed of agreement Na%'0 8Z\"u\" even though Shankar Bux Singh executed the will and \"\" t \"' laid the same along with the application before the Bhagwati J.\n\nDeputy Commissioner, Sitapur, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue and that Ganga Bux Singh thus failed to perform his part of the contract."}}, {"text": "1'hakur JJ_warka Shankar Bux Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23012, "end_char": 23046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There Rani was also a further finding of fact which was recorded and Other, by the learned Civil Judge and it was that Ganga Bux v.\n\nSingh failed <tnd neglected to make any payment to 1'hakur JJ_warka Shankar Bux Singh in terms of the deed of agreement Na%'0 8Z\"u\" even though Shankar Bux Singh executed the will and \"\" t \"' laid the same along with the application before the Bhagwati J.\n\nDeputy Commissioner, Sitapur, for sanction of the Members of the Board of Revenue and that Ganga Bux Singh thus failed to perform his part of the contract."}}, {"text": "Tckchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23706, "end_char": 23714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged by Dr. Tckchand, who appeared for the plaintiffs before us that by reason of such non-payment and the breach of contract on the part ofG; onga Bux Singh the will became ineffective and inoperative, that the payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Tekchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24763, "end_char": 24771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to the hist contention urged by Dr. Tekchand both the courts below were of the opinion that the question of animus testandi was barred by res\n\n924 SUPREME COURT Rl!JPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 , judicata."}}, {"text": "Bhaywati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25389, "end_char": 25397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision was\n\nBhaywati J. conclusive as regards the testamentary capacity, due execution and the representative title of the person to whom the letters of administration with the will annexed were granted.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA'L'I"}}, {"text": "Blmgwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27762, "end_char": 27770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Blmgwati J.\n\nThe latter position therefore would be available to the plaintiffs and they could contend that by reason of the non-fulfilment of the condition precedent by Ganga Bux Singh the legacy provided in his favour did not vest in him."}}, {"text": "Ganga Bux Singh\"constituted at '11hakurai-n Raj '-' '-' Rani best a failure to fulfil his obligation and Shankar Bux", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29562, "end_char": 29678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The non-perfonnanoe of the agreement to pay by Ganga Bux Singh\"constituted at '11hakurai-n Raj '-' '-' Rani best a failure to fulfil his obligation and Shankar Bux\n\nand Others Singh became entitled to pursue his rights and remev."}}, {"text": "Gangti Bnx Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29758, "end_char": 29774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dies against Gangti Bnx Singh by reason of the breach Thakur Dwarka of contract by him."}}, {"text": "Nath Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29834, "end_char": 29844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nath Singh h . .", "canonical_name": "Nath Singh"}}, {"text": "\\Vills", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30138, "end_char": 30144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He relied upon the observations of Chief Justice \\Vills in Acherley v. Vernon, 125 English Reports llOG at page llOS (Willes 153 at page 156):\n\n\"I know of no words that either in a, will or deed neoessmily make a condition precedent, but the smno words will either make a condition precedent or subsequent according to the nnture of the thing and the intent of the parties."}}, {"text": "Thorpe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30943, "end_char": 30949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So is the case of Thorpe and Thorpe, 1 Salk."}}, {"text": "Macclesfield", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31144, "end_char": 31156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And so is tb.e case of 'l'wmer v. Ooodwin, adjudged by Lord \"Macclesfield and the rest of the Judges of B. R. upon great consideration, P. 13 Anne, in which case Goodwin wa.s to pay Tu111er 1500!."}}, {"text": "Goodwin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31245, "end_char": 31252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And so is tb.e case of 'l'wmer v. Ooodwin, adjudged by Lord \"Macclesfield and the rest of the Judges of B. R. upon great consideration, P. 13 Anne, in which case Goodwin wa.s to pay Tu111er 1500!."}}, {"text": "Naih Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32024, "end_char": 32034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "*\n\nSo likewis.e if it plainly appear to be the intent of 1953 the testator that the devisee shall not have the bene- 7,1 - fit of the devise unless he perform a certain act enJ'oiniakumin Ilaj Rani ed him by the devisor, this is a condition precedent ; and Others and the devisee shall have no benefit of the devise v. until he perform it, even though the condition be never Thakur Dwarka so umensonable if it be not illegal or impossible; for Naih Singh d d \" and Others, CUJUB est ure eJUB eBt iBponere."}}, {"text": "Shankar Bux\n\nSingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33156, "end_char": 33174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The right which was therefore given to Shankar Bux\n\nSingh to have the agreement performed by Ganga Bux Singh contemplated the existence and the continued existence of the agreement so as to enable Shankar Bux Singh to hold Ganga Bux Singh to its performance.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Bux. Singh"}}, {"text": "Shankar Bux\n\nThakur D':'arka Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34026, "end_char": 34060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The one was the withand Others holding of the consent of the Court of Wards and the\n\nv. other was the revocation of the will by Shankar Bux\n\nThakur D':'arka Singh himself."}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36964, "end_char": 36974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Trusts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36982, "end_char": 36999, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Oanga Bux Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37282, "end_char": 37297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That intention was clearly to effect a testamentary disposition of the remainder in favour of Oanga Bux Singh.", "canonical_name": "Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh"}}, {"text": "Shanlrnr Bux Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37345, "end_char": 37363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was certainly farthest from the thought of Shanlrnr Bux Singh not to dispose of the beneficial interest in the remainder in favour of Ganga Bux Ringh with the result that there could neither be a secret trust nor a trust of imperfect obligation created in favour of the heirs at law of the testator Shankar\n\nBux Singh.", "canonical_name": "Shankar Bux. Singh"}}, {"text": "Ganga Bux Ringh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37436, "end_char": 37451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was certainly farthest from the thought of Shanlrnr Bux Singh not to dispose of the beneficial interest in the remainder in favour of Ganga Bux Ringh with the result that there could neither be a secret trust nor a trust of imperfect obligation created in favour of the heirs at law of the testator Shankar\n\nBux Singh.", "canonical_name": "Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh"}}, {"text": "Ganga Bux Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38188, "end_char": 38203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "120\n\nSCPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19.13 Ganga Bux Singh on the death of th() latter and the\n\n7'hakurain llaj defendants were therefore as the heirs and legal repreflani sentatives of Ganga Bux Singh since deceased rightly and Other.,", "canonical_name": "Ganga\n\n,_ •\n\nBux Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhagwat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38681, "end_char": 38688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result therefore is that the appeal fails and must Bhagwat-i J. be dismissed \\Vith costs.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA'L'I"}}, {"text": "iinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38783, "end_char": 38796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: R11; iinder Narain."}}, {"text": ". P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38827, "end_char": 38835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: 0."}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38887, "end_char": 38906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nBHAGWA1'I JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38908, "end_char": 38917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nBHAGWA1'I JJ.]", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "BHAGWA1'I", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38923, "end_char": 38932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nBHAGWA1'I JJ.]", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA'L'I"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_930_939_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "SCPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19.13 Ganga Bux Singh on the death of th() latter and the\n\n7'hakurain llaj defendants were therefore as the heirs and legal repreflani sentatives of Ganga Bux Singh since deceased rightly and Other., entitled to the same. As the bequest was not v. conditional and did not lapse there onld be no ques- Thakur Dwarka t' f lt' t t f ' t h N h ,.. h ion o any resu mg rus or o any rntes acy wit at ui.11rf • • and Others. respect to the remamder.\n\nThe result therefore is that the appeal fails and must Bhagwat-i J. be dismissed \\Vith costs.\n\nJa; n, 28.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: R11; iinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondents: 0. P. Lal.\n\nBEJOY GOPAL MUKHERJI v.\n\nPRATUL CHANDRA GROSE.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nBHAGWA1'I JJ.]\n\nLandlord and tenant-Permanent tenancy-Evidence-Inference froin po.<!session froni generation to generation, transfers, erection of structu, res and other ci1:cnmsttinces-J1Iere increase of rent, effect of.\n\nPermanency of tenure does not necessarily imply both fixity of rent and fixity of occupation and the fact of enhancement of rent Joes not necessarily n1ilitate n, gainst the tenancy being a permanent one.\n\nWhen, therefore, in a previous suit the only <iuestion was whether the jama could be increasen and the jama was increased : Held, that this decision did not operate as res judicata on the tJ.U8sLio11 of permanency of the tenure in a snbsoquent suit for ejectment.\n\nShankar Rao v. Sambhu Wallad (1940) 45 C.W.N. 57; Jogen dra Krishna Banerji v. Szibashini Dassi (1940) 45 C.W.N. 590, Probhas Chandra Mallick v. Debe-ndra Nath Das (1939) 43 C.W.N. 828, relied on.\n\n'Thiere possession for generations at a uniforin rent, or construe tion of permanent structures hy itself may not be conclusive proof of a permanent right but the cumulative effect of such facto coupled with other facts may lead to the inference of • permanent\n\nI I\n\nI . .. .\n\nS.C.]{.\n\nSl1PRE.Y1E COURT REPORTS 931\n\n1953 tenancy. Where \\twas not known how the earliest known tenant acquired the tenancy or \\Yhat the nature of the tenancy was, the tenancy had passed from one person to another by inheritance or Bejoy Gopal by will or by transfer inter vivas, in the deeds of transfer the Mukherji transferee was given the right to enjoy from generation to genera,~ v. tion for ever, pucka structures and tanks had been constructed, Pratul Chandra\n\nGhost. and though there was an enhancement of rent in 1860, the rent had not been increased since then : Held, that all these circumstances put together irresistibli led to the conclusion of a permanency of the tenure.\n\nProbhas Chandra 1lfallik v. Debendra Nath Das (1939) 43\n\n0. W .N. 828 referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRrnDICTION: Civil Appeal No. ri:~ of 1952.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 20th January, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature tit Calcutta (Das and Gupta J, J.) in Appeal from Original Decree No. 141 of 1940 arising out of , Judgment and Decree dated the 8th May, 1940, of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, lst Court of Zillah Howrah in Title Suit No. 38 of 1948.\n\nN. 0. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha., with him) for tlw appellant.\n\nPanchanan Ghose (Syama Chamn Mitter and A./{.\n\nDutt, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953. January 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs J. - This is an appeal by the plaintiff in an ejectment suit. His case was that defendant No. 1 Pratul Chandra Ghose was >1 Ticca tern111t of premises Nos. 2 and 3, Watkin's Lane, Howrnh, comprising an area of 1 Bigha 19 Cottahs of land 011 a rent of Rs. 78 per annum under the landlords Kumar Sarat Kumar Roy and Bibhuti Bhusan Cluitterjee, pro Jonna\n\ndefendants Nos. 2 and 3, that the plaintiff took a l\\Iourashi l\\Iokarari len, sc from these landlords on the 23rd September, 19:37, and thereby hecame the immediate landlord of the said defendant and that the teuancy was determined by a notice to quit dated the 7th October, 1937. The trial Court, amongst other\n\n932 SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS [1953j\n\nthings, found as a fact that the tenancY. of the defendant Pratul Chandra Ghose was permanent, heritable Bejoy Chandra and transferable and was not liable to be determined Mukherji v. by notice. The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the\n\nPratul Ohandm High Court but the High Court dismissed that appeal\n\nGhose. holding, amongst other things, that the finding of the\n\nDasJ. trial Court as to the na\\ure of the tenancy was correct.\n\nThe plaintiff has now come up on appeal before us after getting a certificate from the High Court that it is a fit case for appeal to this Court.\n\nHelying on the decision of the Privy Council in Dhanna 1vlal v. 1floti Sayar(') Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant contends that the present appeal is not concluded by the concurrent findinµ of the Courts below that the tenancy was permanent because that question was one of the proper inference in law to be deduced from the facts as found by the Court.s below.\n\nThe learned counsel has, therefore, taken us through the evidence mostly documentary, as to the nature of the tenancy. The earliest document referred to is Exhibit P /ll, being a conveyance executed in 1226 B. S.=1819-1820 by Sheikh Manik and another in favour of Mrs. Cynthia Mills Junior. How the vendors had acquired their title is not known.\n\nBy that deed of sale the vendors, for a money consideration, conveyed their interest in the lands described as J amai lands to the purchaser who, on payment of rent of Rs. 4-8-0 per kist, was to \"go on possessing and enjoying the same with great felicity down to your sons and grandsons etc., in succession by constncting houses and structures.\" Mrs. Cynthia Mills died some time before October, 1855, and her son John Henry Mills who had succeeded her sold the premises to one Mrs. Sabina Love by a, conveyance Exhibit P/10 dated the 29th October, 1855. It appears from that deed that by that time a tank with masonry steps had been excavated on the lands which were described as a plot of rentpaying garden land. The consideration for the sale\n\n(I) (1927)L.R. 51I.\\.178.\n\nI '\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSCPREME COURT REPOH.TS 938\n\nwas Rs. 1,00.D.\n\nThe following provisions of the sale\n\nI953 deed are of importance :- Bej<>y Gopal \"From this date being entitled to make gift and Mukherji sale of the said property, you do bring into your own v. possession the said lands etc., and on paying a1mually Pmtut Chandra to thP Maliks Zemindars Rs. 4-8-0 (Rupees four and Glwse. annas eight) in Sice<ts coins as rent and on getting Das J. your name mutated in place of mine and obtaining Dakhilas in your own name, you do go on possessing and enjoying the same with great felicity down to your sons and grandsons etc., in succession.\"\n\nBy a conveyance Exhibit P i9, dated the 10th October, 1856, Mrs. Sabina Love transferred the premises to one [<'rancis Horatio Dobsou.\n\nThe premises were there described as \"garden land held under Mourashi Patta\" which Patta has since been held to be a spnrious document in a subsequent litigation.\n\nIt appears from this document that Mrs. Cynthia Mills had ex ca vtited a tank and eonstructed a pucca ghat and laid out a garden and that on her death her son and heir John Henry Mills came into possession of the land and that he had sold the premises to }frs. Sabina Love and that after her purchase Mrs. Sabina Love had enclosed the said lands and had manufactured bricks with the earth of the land she purchased. The consideration for this conveyance was Rs. 1,200. It provided as follows :--\n\n\" From to-day you become the ow1wr of the said bnds with pmwrs of making gift and sale. On keeping the said lands together with the tank with all interests therein in your possession and under your control, and on paying according to the previous Pat ta the )fokarari <1nnual rent nf R.,. +-8-0 in Sicea coins into the Sherista of the Zemindar and on having the previous name • struck off from the landlord's Sherista mid getting your own name Tecorcled therein, you do go on enjoying and possessing the same with great felicity down to your sons, gmndsons etc., in succession.\"\n\nOn 10th Jeshta 1260 B.b. corresponding to 23rd }fay, 1859, a notice under sections 9 and 10 of Regulation V of 1812 was issued by the then Zemindars Rl}ni\n\nBe.joy Gopal Mukherji\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS [1953]\n\nLalanmoni and Raja Purna Chandra Roy. It was addressed to \"Mrs. Cynthia Mills Junior, Sarbarahkar Mr. Dobson, of Salkhia.\" It ran as follows: -\n\nv. \"This is to inform you that you are in possession of Pratul Chandra l Bigha 19 Cottas oflands of different kinds as per the\n\nGhose. b d . . b 1 d d . th M l o-· _ oun aries given e ow as recor e m . e a . epart- Das J. ment in the said village for which according to your own statement you are paying a yearly rental of Rs. 4-12-6. But you have taken no settlement in respect thereof from our estate (sarkar). .Now on fixing the annual Jama of the said lands according to the prevailing rate as per Jamabandi at Rs. 137-8-0 a year, fifteen days' notice is given to you under the provisions of sections !land 10 of Regulation V of 1812 and you are hereby informed that within the said period you should appear before our Zamindary G'utchery and accept a Pottah after submitting a Kabuliyat according to the practice in respect of the land and J arna.\n\nIn default, nJter the expiry of the said period action will be taken according to law, and thereafter no plea shall be entertained.\"\n\nThe requisition not having been complied with, tho landlords evidently filed a suit being Suit .No. 590 of 1859.\n\nThe pleadings in this suit are not on the record.\n\nOn 21st September, 1860, the Principal Sudder Amin delivered his judgment, Exhibit 24. It appears from that judgment that the following two issues had been framed:-\n\n\" 1. vVhether the plaintiffs have served notice on the other party for assessment of J l1ma ?\n\n2. whether a Jama can be assessed in respect of the disputed lands; if so at what rate?\"\n\nThe Principal Sudder Amin overruling the objection of the defendants held that the landlords had full power to assess the rent and accordingly he fixed the rent at Rs. 2 per Cotta which worked out at Rs. 78 in respect of the entire iand. There was an appeal from that decision which, however, was dismissed bv the judgment Exhibit Z (2) delivered on the 18th J\\farch,\n\n1862. The J\\fournshi Patta relied upon was rejected as\n\nl •\n\nS.C.R\n\nSCPREME COURT REPORTS 935\n\nit was not registered and appoared, on examination, to have been ne\"'ly written and filed.\n\nThereafter the landlord filed a suit for rent of the disputed lands against Dobson and Exhibits Z and Z (1) are the certified copies of the judgment and order passed thereon.\n\nOn the 29th May, 1866, Dobson executed two mortgages (Exhibits P /6 and P 17) in favour of De Rozario and John Dominic Freitas for Rs. 4,000 and Rs, 2,000 respectively.\n\nTho two re-conveyances dated 29th February, 1874, and 12th March, 1874, are also on tho record. On 6th March, 1874, Dobson sold the premisPs to Henry Charles Mann by a deed which is Exhibit\n\nP /5.\n\nThe consideration for the sale was Rs. 9,500.\n\nIt appears from this deed that by that time there were two brick-built dwelling houses on the property which came to be numbered as Nos. 2 and 3, Watkin's Lane. On 11th September, 188:3, Henry Charles Mann sold the premises to George .Jones for Rs. 10,000 : vi de Exhibit P /4.\n\nIn both those sale deeds the transferee is granted a heritable right for ever. In the assessment books of the Howrah Municipality (Exhibits 22 series) thR interest of George Jones is described as Mourashi.\n\nIn the landlord's Sherista the nature of the tenancy is not stated and Dobson continues to be the recorded tenant (Exhibit D series).\n\nThere was, however, no eolumn in the rent receipts to indicate the status of the tenant. It appearK that on the death of George .Jones the estate came into the hands of the Administrator-General of Bengal representing the estate of George .Jones.\n\nIn the rent receipts of Dighapatia Raj the rent is said to he \"received from , Jones- -Administrator-General of Bengal.\" In May,\n\n1931, the plaintiff and the Administrator-General of Bcnga.l entered into an agreement for sale of premises Xo. 2, vVatkin's Lane, being a portion of the premises in question, fol' a sum of Rs. 10,001 and Rs. 1,001 was paid by the plaintiff as and by way of earnest money.\n\nThe landlords having declined to subdivide the groupd\n\nrent between the two portions of the premises, namely, Xos. 2 and 3, vVatkin's Lane, and a portion of the Premises No. 2, vVatkin's Lane, having fallen down the\n\nBejoy Gopal\n\nMukherji\n\nPratul Chandra\n\nGhose.\n\nDas J.\n\n036 S\"GPREME COFRT Rl~PORTS [1953]\n\n1953 agreement for sale appears to have fallm} t.hrough. On\n\nBe, ioy Gopal the 4th , June, 1932, the plaintiff suggested that a lease\n\nMukhe1ji for 20 years should be gra.nted which was refused by v. the Administrator-General, Bengal. Then there was Pratul Chandra some negotiation between the plaintiff and the\n\nOhos<.\n\nAdministrator-General of Bengal for the sale of both DasJ. the premises, Nos. 2 and 3, Watkin's Lane, to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 12,500. The pla; ntiff on 9th April, 1 !J33, sent a draft deed of sale (Exhibit 15) for the approval of the Administrator-General of Bengal deseribing the premises as a Mokarari Mourashi homestead.\n\nOn 21st April, 1933, Dighapatia Raj Estate wrote to the Administrator-General of Bengal saying that the tenancy waft a Ticca one. On 6th June, 1933, the Administrator-General of Bengal declined to approve the draft as drawn. After some further proposal by the plaintiff for a long lease he declined to purchase the property on the ground that the Administrator-General of Bengal had not a good marketable title. Nothing having come out of the negotiations between the plaintiff and the Administrator-General of Bengal the latter in September, 1936, invited offers for sale of the lands (Exhibit B). The defendant No. 1 made the highest offer of Rs. 12,251 and this was accepted by the Administrator-General in preference to the offer made by the plaintiff for Rs. 11,251. The Administrator-General accordingly executed a conveyance in favour of the defendant Pratnl Chandra Ghose (Exhibit P. X) who thereupon became the tenant of the premises. Having failed to obtain title to the premises from the Administrator-General of Bengal the plaintiff approached the landlords a.nd on 22nd September, 1937, obtained a Mokarari Monrashi Patta in respect of the disputed land on payment of a Selami of Rs. 3,205 and at an annual rent of Rs. 78 only.\n\nThe defendant Pratul Chandra Ghose filed rent suits against the plaintiff in respect of the nnderlea, se held by.the latter under the Administmtor-General of Bengal and obtained rent decrees. The plaintiff, however, on the strength of hi5 new title deeived from the superior landlords under the M:ourashi Patta served\n\nnotice on thedefendant Pratul Chandra Ghose on the l953 7th October, 1937, requiein0ct him to vacate the premises BeJoy Gopal on the last day of the month of Chaitra 1944 B. S.\n\nMukherji The defendant Pratul Chandra Ghose, not having v, vacated the premises, the plaintiff filed the suit out of Pratul Chandra which the present appeal has arisen.\n\nGhose.\n\nShri N. C. Chatterjee contends that in view of the DasJ. decision in the suit of 1859 it was not open to the defendant Pratul Chandra Ghose to contend that his tenancy was a heritable permanent tenancy. This point was neither pleaded nor raised in the trial Court but was put forward for the first time before the High Court. The pleadings of the 1859 suit are not on the record but the substance of the written statement appears from the judgment Exhibit 24 passed in that case. The issues framed in that case have already been set out. There was no issue regarding the character of tho tenancy, namely, whether it was permanent and heritable or otherwise.\n\nThe only question there was whether rent could be assPssed under the Regulation. There is nothing in that Regulation suggesting that rent could be assessed only if the tenancy was a ticca tenancy or that rent could not be assessed if the tenancy was a permanent one.\n\nThe question of permanency of the tenancy was not, therefore, directly or substantially in issue. \\Ve find ourselves in agreement with the High Court that the permanency of tenure does not necessarily imply both fixity of rent and fixity of occupation. The fact of enhancement of rent in 1859 may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration hut it does not necessarily militate against the tenancy being a permanent one, as held by the Privy Council in the case of an i1gricultural tenancy in Shankarrao v. Sambhu Wallad('), The principle of that decision was applied also to non-agricultural tenancies in JogendraKrishnaBanerji v. Sm. Subashini Dassi('). In Probhas Chandra 111allik v. Debendra Nath Das(') also the same view was taken. We, therefore, hold that the plea of res judicata cannot be sustained.\n\n(r) (1940) 45 C.Vi/.N. 57\n\n(2) (1940) C.'\\\\'.\\I\". 590.\n\n(3) (r939) 43 cwx: 828,\n\nShri N. C. Chatterjee then contends, r, elying on the decisions in Rasamoy Purkatt v. Srinath il1oyra (1), Bejoy Gopnl\n\nMukherji Digbijoy Roy v. Shaikh Aya Rahman ('), Satyendra\n\nNath v. Charu Sankar (3) and Kamal Kumar Datta\n\nPratul Chandra v. Nanda Lal Dule (') that the tenancy in this case\n\nGh0\"· cannot be regarded as a permanent one. The decisions\n\nDaaJ. in those cases have to be read in the light of the facts of those particular cases. The mere fact of rent having been received from a certain person may not, as held in Rasamoy Purkatt v. Srinath.!Yloyra (supra) and Digbjoy Roy v. Shaikh Aya Rahman (supra), amount. to a recognition of that person as a tenant. Mere possession for generations at a uniform rent or construction of permanent structure by itself may not be conclusive proof of a permanent right as held in Kamal Kumar Dutt v. Nanda Lal Dule (supra) but the cumulative effect of such fact coupled with several other facts may lead to the inference of a permanent tenancy as indicated even in the case of Satyendra Nath v. Charu Sankar (supra) on which Shri N. C. Chatterjee relies.\n\nWhat, then, are the salient facts before us ? It is not known how the earliest known tenant Shaik Manik acquired the tenancy or what the nature of that tenancy was. The tenancy has passed from one person to another by inheritance or by will or by transfers inter vivas. In the deeds of transfer the transferee has been given the right to enjoy the property from generation to generation for ever. A tank has been excavated and a pucca ghat built on the land. Bricks have been manufactured with the earth taken from the land and the premises have been enclosed within pucca walls. Pucca buildings have been erected and mortgage~ have heen executed for substantial amounts.\n\nAlthough there was an enhancement of rent in 1860 that rent has continued to he paid ever since then.\n\nPortion of the premis~, namely, No. 2, Watkin'sLane, has been used as a factory by the plaintiffs and on the other portion, namely, No. 3, Watkin's Lane, residential buildings were erected which indicate that the lease was for residential purposes.\n\nAs already\n\n(1) 7 C.W.N. 132\n\n(2) 17 C.W.N. r56,\n\n(3) 40 C.W.N. 854.\n\n(4) (r929) l.L.R. 56 Cal. 738.\n\nindicated thei; e have been many transfers and devolutions and the landlords have accepted rent from the transferees or the successors.\n\nThe names of :Nirs. Cynthia Mills and Dobson and Jones were mutated in the Zamindar's Sherista. Although in the rent receipts Dobson continued to be shown as the recorded tenant, eventually Jones's name appears on the rent receipts as tenant. In spite of the increase in land value and the letting value the landlords through whom the plaintiff derives his title did not at any time make any attempt to eject the tenant or to get any further enhancement of rent since 1860. All these circumstances put together are explicable only on the hypothesis of permanency of the tenure and they irresistibly lead to the conclusion, as held by the lower Courts, that the tenancy in question was heritable and a permanent one.\n\nThe decision of Mukherjea, J., in the case of Probhas Chandra JY!allick v. Debendra Nath Das (supra) is definitely in point. In this Yiew of the matter we hold that the Courts below were right in dismissing the plaintiff'.s claim for ejectment.\n\nIn the result this appeal must fail and we dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. K. Ghose.\n\nAgent for the respondent : Sukiimar Ghose.\n\nSARASW' ATHI AMMAL v.\n\nJAGADAMBAL AND ANOTHER. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nHind11 la•v-S11ccession-Dancing girls of Sonth India- Whether dasi dauqhter excludes niarried dau, ghters-Uu.ston1,-Na tu re of evidence necessary to prove custo1n-- Hindu, law--Rulc preferring 1naidens to 11ia1-ried daughters, whether avplies to JJrostitute daughters.\n\nThe evidence on record did not establish the custom which bad been pleaded, namely that among the community of. do.sis\n\nBejoy Gopal\n\nMukherji\n\nPratul Oha.ndrct\n\nGhose.\n\nDasJ.\n\nFeb. 27.", "total_entities": 68, "entities": [{"text": "Ganga Bux Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SCPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19.13 Ganga Bux Singh on the death of th() latter and the\n\n7'hakurain llaj defendants were therefore as the heirs and legal repreflani sentatives of Ganga Bux Singh since deceased rightly and Other.,"}}, {"text": "iinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 631, "end_char": 644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: R11; iinder Narain."}}, {"text": ". P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 675, "end_char": 683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: 0."}}, {"text": "BEJOY GOPAL MUKHERJI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 686, "end_char": 706, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BEJOY GOPAL MUKHERJI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRATUL CHANDRA GROSE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 711, "end_char": 731, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRATUL CHANDRA GROSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 756, "end_char": 765, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R. DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bejoy Gopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2174, "end_char": 2185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where \\twas not known how the earliest known tenant acquired the tenancy or \\Yhat the nature of the tenancy was, the tenancy had passed from one person to another by inheritance or Bejoy Gopal by will or by transfer inter vivas, in the deeds of transfer the Mukherji transferee was given the right to enjoy from generation to genera,~ v. tion for ever, pucka structures and tanks had been constructed, Pratul Chandra\n\nGhost.", "canonical_name": "BEJOY GOPAL MUKHERJI"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2715, "end_char": 2730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JuRrnDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature tit Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2850, "end_char": 2887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 20th January, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature tit Calcutta (Das and Gupta J, J.) in Appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "N. 0. Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3116, "end_char": 3132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. 0.", "canonical_name": "N. 0. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "A. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3134, "end_char": 3145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha.,"}}, {"text": "Panchanan Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3178, "end_char": 3193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchanan Ghose (Syama Chamn Mitter and A./{."}}, {"text": "Syama Chamn Mitter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3195, "end_char": 3213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchanan Ghose (Syama Chamn Mitter and A./{."}}, {"text": "Pratul Chandra Ghose", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3424, "end_char": 3444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Pratul Chandra Ghose was >1 Ticca tern111t of premises Nos.", "canonical_name": "PRATUL CHANDRA GROSE"}}, {"text": "Kumar Sarat Kumar Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3616, "end_char": 3637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78 per annum under the landlords Kumar Sarat Kumar Roy and Bibhuti Bhusan Cluitterjee, pro Jonna\n\ndefendants Nos."}}, {"text": "Bibhuti Bhusan Cluitterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3642, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78 per annum under the landlords Kumar Sarat Kumar Roy and Bibhuti Bhusan Cluitterjee, pro Jonna\n\ndefendants Nos."}}, {"text": "Pratul Ohandm High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the\n\nPratul Ohandm High Court but the High Court dismissed that appeal\n\nGhose."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4692, "end_char": 4708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Helying on the decision of the Privy Council in Dhanna 1vlal v. 1floti Sayar(') Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant contends that the present appeal is not concluded by the concurrent findinµ of the Courts below that the tenancy was permanent because that question was one of the proper inference in law to be deduced from the facts as found by the Court.s below.", "canonical_name": "N. 0. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Manik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earliest document referred to is Exhibit P /ll, being a conveyance executed in 1226 B. S.=1819-1820 by Sheikh Manik and another in favour of Mrs. Cynthia Mills Junior."}}, {"text": "Cynthia Mills Junior", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5274, "end_char": 5294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earliest document referred to is Exhibit P /ll, being a conveyance executed in 1226 B. S.=1819-1820 by Sheikh Manik and another in favour of Mrs. Cynthia Mills Junior.", "canonical_name": "Cynthia Mills Junior"}}, {"text": "Cynthia Mills", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Cynthia Mills died some time before October, 1855, and her son John Henry Mills who had succeeded her sold the premises to one Mrs. Sabina Love by a, conveyance Exhibit P/10 dated the 29th October, 1855.", "canonical_name": "Cynthia Mills Junior"}}, {"text": "John Henry Mills", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5766, "end_char": 5782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Cynthia Mills died some time before October, 1855, and her son John Henry Mills who had succeeded her sold the premises to one Mrs. Sabina Love by a, conveyance Exhibit P/10 dated the 29th October, 1855."}}, {"text": "Sabina Love", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5835, "end_char": 5846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Cynthia Mills died some time before October, 1855, and her son John Henry Mills who had succeeded her sold the premises to one Mrs. Sabina Love by a, conveyance Exhibit P/10 dated the 29th October, 1855."}}, {"text": "29th October, 1855", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Cynthia Mills died some time before October, 1855, and her son John Henry Mills who had succeeded her sold the premises to one Mrs. Sabina Love by a, conveyance Exhibit P/10 dated the 29th October, 1855."}}, {"text": "10th October, 1856", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6804, "end_char": 6822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a conveyance Exhibit P i9, dated the 10th October, 1856, Mrs. Sabina Love transferred the premises to one [<'rancis Horatio Dobsou."}}, {"text": "Horatio Dobsou", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6883, "end_char": 6897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a conveyance Exhibit P i9, dated the 10th October, 1856, Mrs. Sabina Love transferred the premises to one [<'rancis Horatio Dobsou."}}, {"text": "10th Jeshta 1260 B.b", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8144, "end_char": 8164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10th Jeshta 1260 B.b."}}, {"text": "23rd }fay, 1859", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8183, "end_char": 8198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "corresponding to 23rd }fay, 1859, a notice under sections 9 and 10 of Regulation V of 1812 was issued by the then Zemindars Rl}ni\n\nBe.joy Gopal Mukherji\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS [1953]\n\nLalanmoni and Raja Purna Chandra Roy."}}, {"text": "sections 9 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Purna Chandra Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8364, "end_char": 8386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "corresponding to 23rd }fay, 1859, a notice under sections 9 and 10 of Regulation V of 1812 was issued by the then Zemindars Rl}ni\n\nBe.joy Gopal Mukherji\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS [1953]\n\nLalanmoni and Raja Purna Chandra Roy."}}, {"text": "Dobson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8452, "end_char": 8458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was addressed to \"Mrs. Cynthia Mills Junior, Sarbarahkar Mr. Dobson, of Salkhia.\""}}, {"text": "Salkhia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8463, "end_char": 8470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was addressed to \"Mrs. Cynthia Mills Junior, Sarbarahkar Mr. Dobson, of Salkhia.\""}}, {"text": "Jamabandi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8997, "end_char": 9006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Now on fixing the annual Jama of the said lands according to the prevailing rate as per Jamabandi at Rs."}}, {"text": "21st September, 1860", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9651, "end_char": 9671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st September, 1860, the Principal Sudder Amin delivered his judgment, Exhibit 24."}}, {"text": "Sudder Amin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9687, "end_char": 9698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st September, 1860, the Principal Sudder Amin delivered his judgment, Exhibit 24."}}, {"text": "18th J\\farch,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10353, "end_char": 10366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was an appeal from that decision which, however, was dismissed bv the judgment Exhibit Z (2) delivered on the 18th J\\farch,\n\n1862."}}, {"text": "J\\fournshi Patta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10378, "end_char": 10394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J\\fournshi Patta relied upon was rejected as\n\nl •\n\nS.C.R\n\nSCPREME COURT REPORTS 935\n\nit was not registered and appoared, on examination, to have been ne\"'ly written and filed."}}, {"text": "29th May, 1866", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10738, "end_char": 10752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th May, 1866, Dobson executed two mortgages (Exhibits P /6 and P 17) in favour of De Rozario and John Dominic Freitas for Rs."}}, {"text": "De Rozario", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10822, "end_char": 10832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th May, 1866, Dobson executed two mortgages (Exhibits P /6 and P 17) in favour of De Rozario and John Dominic Freitas for Rs."}}, {"text": "John Dominic Freitas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10837, "end_char": 10857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 29th May, 1866, Dobson executed two mortgages (Exhibits P /6 and P 17) in favour of De Rozario and John Dominic Freitas for Rs."}}, {"text": "29th February, 1874", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10930, "end_char": 10949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho two re-conveyances dated 29th February, 1874, and 12th March, 1874, are also on tho record."}}, {"text": "12th March, 1874", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10955, "end_char": 10971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho two re-conveyances dated 29th February, 1874, and 12th March, 1874, are also on tho record."}}, {"text": "6th March, 1874", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11000, "end_char": 11015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th March, 1874, Dobson sold the premisPs to Henry Charles Mann by a deed which is Exhibit\n\nP /5."}}, {"text": "Henry Charles Mann", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11045, "end_char": 11063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th March, 1874, Dobson sold the premisPs to Henry Charles Mann by a deed which is Exhibit\n\nP /5."}}, {"text": "11th September, 188:3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11310, "end_char": 11331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th September, 188:3, Henry Charles Mann sold the premises to George .Jones for Rs."}}, {"text": "George .Jones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11373, "end_char": 11386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th September, 188:3, Henry Charles Mann sold the premises to George .Jones for Rs.", "canonical_name": "George .Jones"}}, {"text": "Howrah Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11535, "end_char": 11554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the assessment books of the Howrah Municipality (Exhibits 22 series) thR interest of George Jones is described as Mourashi."}}, {"text": "George Jones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11592, "end_char": 11604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the assessment books of the Howrah Municipality (Exhibits 22 series) thR interest of George Jones is described as Mourashi.", "canonical_name": "George .Jones"}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11965, "end_char": 11971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appearK that on the death of George .Jones the estate came into the hands of the Administrator-General of Bengal representing the estate of George .Jones."}}, {"text": "Dighapatia Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12039, "end_char": 12053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the rent receipts of Dighapatia Raj the rent is said to he \"received from , Jones- -Administrator-General of Bengal.\"", "canonical_name": "Dighapatia Raj Estate"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12683, "end_char": 12686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\n036 S\"GPREME COFRT Rl~PORTS [1953]\n\n1953 agreement for sale appears to have fallm} t.hrough."}}, {"text": "Pratul Chandra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12977, "end_char": 12991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then there was Pratul Chandra some negotiation between the plaintiff and the\n\nOhos<.", "canonical_name": "PRATUL CHANDRA GROSE"}}, {"text": "21st April, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13386, "end_char": 13402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st April, 1933, Dighapatia Raj Estate wrote to the Administrator-General of Bengal saying that the tenancy waft a Ticca one."}}, {"text": "Dighapatia Raj Estate", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13404, "end_char": 13425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st April, 1933, Dighapatia Raj Estate wrote to the Administrator-General of Bengal saying that the tenancy waft a Ticca one.", "canonical_name": "Dighapatia Raj Estate"}}, {"text": "6th June, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13516, "end_char": 13530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th June, 1933, the Administrator-General of Bengal declined to approve the draft as drawn."}}, {"text": "Administrator-General of Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13730, "end_char": 13761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some further proposal by the plaintiff for a long lease he declined to purchase the property on the ground that the Administrator-General of Bengal had not a good marketable title."}}, {"text": "Pratnl Chandra Ghose", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14242, "end_char": 14262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Administrator-General accordingly executed a conveyance in favour of the defendant Pratnl Chandra Ghose (Exhibit P. X) who thereupon became the tenant of the premises.", "canonical_name": "PRATUL CHANDRA GROSE"}}, {"text": "22nd September, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14461, "end_char": 14481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having failed to obtain title to the premises from the Administrator-General of Bengal the plaintiff approached the landlords a.nd on 22nd September, 1937, obtained a Mokarari Monrashi Patta in respect of the disputed land on payment of a Selami of Rs."}}, {"text": "ourashi Patta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14922, "end_char": 14935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, however, on the strength of hi5 new title deeived from the superior landlords under the M:ourashi Patta served\n\nnotice on thedefendant Pratul Chandra Ghose on the l953 7th October, 1937, requiein0ct him to vacate the premises BeJoy Gopal on the last day of the month of Chaitra 1944 B. S.\n\nMukherji The defendant Pratul Chandra Ghose, not having v, vacated the premises, the plaintiff filed the suit out of Pratul Chandra which the present appeal has arisen."}}, {"text": "Shaik Manik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18322, "end_char": 18333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not known how the earliest known tenant Shaik Manik acquired the tenancy or what the nature of that tenancy was."}}, {"text": "Jones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19544, "end_char": 19549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cynthia Mills and Dobson and Jones were mutated in the Zamindar's Sherista."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20228, "end_char": 20237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of Mukherjea, J., in the case of Probhas Chandra JY!allick v. Debendra Nath Das (supra) is definitely in point."}}, {"text": "P. K. Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20569, "end_char": 20580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: P. K. Ghose."}}, {"text": "Sukiimar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20610, "end_char": 20624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : Sukiimar Ghose."}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20675, "end_char": 20693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20698, "end_char": 20707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20726, "end_char": 20729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bejoy Gopal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21105, "end_char": 21116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "do.sis\n\nBejoy Gopal\n\nMukherji\n\nPratul Oha.ndrct\n\nGhose.", "canonical_name": "BEJOY GOPAL MUKHERJI"}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_939_949_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 939\n\nindicated thei; e have been many transfers and devolutions and the landlords have accepted rent from the transferees or the successors.\n\nThe names of :Nirs. Cynthia Mills and Dobson and Jones were mutated in the Zamindar's Sherista. Although in the rent receipts Dobson continued to be shown as the recorded tenant, eventually Jones's name appears on the rent receipts as tenant. In spite of the increase in land value and the letting value the landlords through whom the plaintiff derives his title did not at any time make any attempt to eject the tenant or to get any further enhancement of rent since 1860. All these circumstances put together are explicable only on the hypothesis of permanency of the tenure and they irresistibly lead to the conclusion, as held by the lower Courts, that the tenancy in question was heritable and a permanent one.\n\nThe decision of Mukherjea, J., in the case of Probhas Chandra JY!allick v. Debendra Nath Das (supra) is definitely in point. In this Yiew of the matter we hold that the Courts below were right in dismissing the plaintiff'.s claim for ejectment.\n\nIn the result this appeal must fail and we dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. K. Ghose.\n\nAgent for the respondent : Sukiimar Ghose.\n\nSARASW' ATHI AMMAL v.\n\nJAGADAMBAL AND ANOTHER. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nHind11 la•v-S11ccession-Dancing girls of Sonth India- Whether dasi dauqhter excludes niarried dau, ghters-Uu.ston1,-Na tu re of evidence necessary to prove custo1n-- Hindu, law--Rulc preferring 1naidens to 11ia1-ried daughters, whether avplies to JJrostitute daughters.\n\nThe evidence on record did not establish the custom which bad been pleaded, namely that among the community of. do.sis\n\nBejoy Gopal\n\nMukherji\n\nPratul Oha.ndrct\n\nGhose.\n\nDasJ.\n\nFeb. 27.\n\n Baraswathi Ani1nal v.\n\nJ agada1nbal and Another.\n\n(dancing girls) in South India a dasi daughter succeeded to her mother in preference to the married daughters; nd in the absence of such custom, succession to a dasi must be governed by the rule of propinquity of Hindu law as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and dasi daughters and married daughters \\Vonld succeed to their mother's property in equal shares.\n\nA rule that degraded relations are preferential heirs to undegro .. ded ones cannot be evolved merely on logical grounds; the existence of such a rule can only be justified on the basis of established custom.\n\nCustom cannot be extended by analogy. It must be established inductively, not deductively, and it cannot be established by a priori methods. It cannot be a matter of mere theory but must always be a matter of fact and one custom cannot be deduced from another.\n\nShanmngathammal v. Gomathi Ammal (6 Nl.L.J. 861), distinguished. N'uasanna v. Gang\" (I.L.H. 13 Mad. 133), Snbbaratna\n\nMudali v. Balokrishna Naidu (33 1I.L.J. 207), Subbaraya Pillai\n\nv. Rmnaswami Pillai (I.L.R. 23 llfacl. 171), Balamndaram v.\n\nKarnakshi Arnrnal (71 11.L.J. 785), and Abdtil Hnsein Khan v. Sama Dero (I.hl\\. 45 Cal. 450: P .C.) referred to.\n\nThe rule of Hindu law by which a maiden is a preferential heir to her married sisters does not apply to daughters who are admittedly married to an idol and lead a life of prostitution.\n\nTara v. Krishna (I.L.R. 31 Born. 495) referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 105 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 16th September, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Snbba Rao and Chandra ReddiJJ.) in Appeal No. 162 of 1946 arising out of Judgment and Decree dated the 30th November 1945 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore in Original Suit No. 34of1945.\n\nS. Ramachandra Iyer, for the appellant. 'l'. R. Srinivasan, for the respondents.\n\n1953, February 27. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by - MAHA.JAN J. - One Thangathammal who was a dasi (dancing girl) lived in the Tanjoro district in Madras State and died possessed of some properties.\n\nShe left her surviving three daughters, Saraswathi, Jagadambal and Meenambal. Jagadambal filed the suit out of which\n\n• •\n\n,.. ., ..\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSLTPREME COURT REPORTS 941\n\nthis appeal aries against her sisters for partition of the movable and immovable properties set out in the pbint and for allotment of a thin! share to her therein. 8he alleged that her mothor was maried to one Thyagaraja Pillai, that the properties in suit were the stridhanam properties of her mother who died intestate on 26th July, 1943, and that according to the law or custom of the community to which the parties belonged she and her sistcrn were entitled to share equally the propertil's of her mother.\n\nSaraswathi Ammal, the 1st defendant contested the snit. She pleaded that her mother was not a married womnn but n dnsi who followed her hereditttry occupa, tion and w<1s att<1ched to Shri Saranatha Perurnal temple at 'riruchurai in the Tanjore district, that of\n\nthe three daughters the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant married and lived with their husbands, while she (1st defendant) was duly initiated as a dasi in the said temple and remained unmarried and that according to the h1w and custom of the community, the mother's property devolved solely on her to the exclusion of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant.\n\nThe 2nd defendant supported the 1st defendant's case. The material issue in the suit was issue No. 1 which was in these terms:-\n\n\" Who is the proper heir of Thangathammal. whether according to custom as set up by the plaintiff, all the daughters arc heirs, or according to the custom put forward by tbc 1st defendnnt, the unmarried daughters alone are entitled to inherit.\"\n\nThe Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit holding that Thaugathammal was a dasi and not a mttrried woman, that according to the custom of the dasi community in South India, a dasi daughter is regarded as a nearer heir to the mother than a married daughter and that the 1st defendant was entitled to remain in\n\npossession of the suit properties. Agninst this decision an appeal was taken to the High Court. The High Court reversed the decrne of the 8nbordinate , Judge and held that the custom pleaded by the lst defendant\n\nSaraswathi Ammal v.\n\nJ a.yadambal and Another,\n\nMahajan:J.\n\nJ9fjJ\n\nSaraswat}u\"\n\nAnunal\n\nJ agadau1bal a, nd Another.\n\n942 SUPREME COtJRT REPORTS [1953]\n\nwas not proved and that the rule of propinquity of Hindu law as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience, governed the succession and the married and dasi daughters were equally entitled to the inheritance.\n\nIt was further held that a dasi daughter was not in the status of <1 maiden or unmarried daughter for purposes of succession to stridhanam property. Leave to appe1tl to the Supreme Court was granted under article 1:33 of the Constitution.\n\nAfter hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, we feel no hesitation in concurring with the decision of the High Court. It was contended that the High Comt was in error in holding that the custom set up by the defendant was not proved. To prove the custom that a dasrdaughter was a preferential heir and excluded her married sisters reliance was placed on the evidence of some mem hers of the communitv and reference was also made to certain instances. Th~ same kind of evidence was led by the plaintiff in support of her case.\n\nThe evidence of both the parties on the the issue of custom is of an unsatisfactory and inconclusive character and from it no inference can be drawn of the existence of a uniform, certain ancl ancient custom prevailing in the community on this point.\n\nOut of the defendant's witnesses, the first witness, Rajagopal Pillai, deposed that his wife was the daughter of dasi Kamakshi who had six daughters of w horn three were married and three were dasis, that on Kamakshi's death, her dasi daughters alone would take the inheritance and that his wife, would be excluded. This statement does not hurt him in any way as his wife will not be bound by what he might state.\n\nHis bald assertion about the custom in the community is not of much value. He does not disclose any source of his information. In cross-examination he admitted that he did not know a single specific instance where such a custom was enforced. The second witness the point is the first defendant. She stated th1tt one Tulasi's sister Mangalam got no share in her mother Ammani's properties. In cross-examination it was adiuitted that Mangalam died about forty years ago,\n\n.... , .\n\n., .\n\n, ,\n\ni.e., some tim~ before the defendant was born.\n\nShe could therefore have no personal knowledge about Ammani's instance. No written record of that inheritance is forthcoming.\n\nMangalam's son Govindaswami Pillai appeared as D. W. 3.\n\nHe deposed that Mangalam's mother Ammani had divided her properties between her dasi daughters in her lifetime.\n\nThe instance therefore is not an instance concerning succession and cannot be treated as relevant in this enquiry. The 1st defendant further deposed to an instance in Srirangam when succession opened out on the death of dasi Chellappa. It was said that her property was taken by her dasi daughter Visalakshi to the exclusion of her married daughters Marakatham and Rukmini and that the assets were worth a lakh of rupees. One would have expected some written documents about that sucession if it took place in the manner deposed to. In the absence of any evidence from the descendants of Chellappa and in the absence of any documentary evidence regarding that succession it is difficult to place any reliance on this so-called instance.\n\nDefendant No. 1 stated that her knowledge of it was only from hearsay, and the requirements of section 32 of the Evidence Act not being fulfilled, her evidence on this point cannot be treated as admissible. The third witness, about whom reference has alreacly been made, apart from deposing as to l\\fangalam's instance also deposed about the instance of dasi l\\foenakshi.\n\nHer daughter Jeevaratnam is married to the witness. He said that Meenakshi's dasi daughters inherited her property and that his wife was exeluded. The only property alleged to belong to Meenakshi was a house, the value of which is not known. The succession is said to have occurred over twenty years ago. None of the daughters of Meemikshi have been examined as witnesses in the case, to enable the court to find out the details about it and merely on the statement of this witness the instance cannot be held proved. The fourth witness for the defendant is her non-contesting sister.\n\nShe said nothing on the on the question of custom. She, however, statecl\n\nSaratJWathi\n\nArnmat\n\nJagadambal and Another.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nSaraswathi\n\nA1nn1al\n\nJ agada-111 bal and Another.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nSUPREME COUH.T BEPORTS [19fi3]\n\nthat she was not entitled to a share. in the assets of her mother. \\Vhen asked why sho was making that statement, she said that she was saying so because her husband and some elders (whose names were not disclosed) had told her so.\n\nEvidence of this character on the question of custom cannot be seriouslr considered.\n\nVenugopal Pillai is the fifth witness for the defendant. He is the husband of the second defendant.\n\nHis evidence regarding the instance ef Chellappa is purely hearsay. He deposed that he had learnt that a dasi's married daughter is not entitled to claim a share as she is not her heir in the presence of a dasi daughter and therfore he told his wife not to claim a share.\n\nHe did not disclose the source of his information. Jan.aid Ammal, the sixth witness, is a dasi.\n\nShe deposed that she has five daughters of whom two are married, one is a dasi and the other two are young girls and that according to their caste custom her properties on her death would devolve on her dasi daughters and that the married daughters must remain content with the presents given at their marriage. In cross-examination she admitted that she was deposing about the caste custom not from any specific instance in which the custom was observed hut at the request of the defendant, and that she had heard of this custom from her elders whose names she did not disclose. She further admitted that she had an uncle living but she did not even ask him about the custom. The witness, it appears, knows nothing about the custom and is giving evidence in order to oblige the defendant.\n\nThe next witnesB who gave evidence on the issue is D. W. 8, Kanrnlathammal, a dasi. Her mother was also a dasi. She deposed that her mother's properties were divided between her and her other dasi sister and Amba, her third sister, who was married, was not given a share.\n\nIn cross-examination she admitted that Amba never asked for a share.\n\nNeither was Amba produced, nor any written municipal records showing that the witness actually inherited the property of her mother to the exclusion of Amba.\n\nIt is difficult to hold this incident proved mnrely on the\n\n' •\n\n~ !\n\n. •\n\nvague testimony of this witness.\n\nPappathi Ammal, the next witness in the case, is also a dasi. She deposed that her father's mother's property devolved on her two dasi daughters on her death and that there was no married daughter in existence. This evidence is of a neutral character and is not of much use on the question of custom pleaded in the case. Apart from asserting that in this community dasi's property devolves on her death only on the dasi daughters to the exclusion of married daughters, she cited the instance of Chellappa, a dasi of Srirangam. It was elicited in cross examination that Chellappa left a house and landed properties.\n\nNo explanation is forthcoming why documentary evidence of revenue records about this instance has been withheld.\n\nOral evidences as to instances which can be proved by documentary evidence cannot safely be relied upon to establish custom, when no satisfactory explanation for withholding the Lest kind of evidence is given. The last witness in the case is Rajamani Ammal, another dasi who does service in Sri Ranganathaswami temple. She also referred to the instance of Chellappa. She said that her jewels which were worth Rs. 1,000 would pass on her death to her dasi daughter. She went to the length of saying that if a dasi leaves an only child who is a married woman, even then her properties will pass to a next heir such as a cousin and not a married daughter. This is all the evidence led by the defendant to prove custom. On this meagre and unsatisfactory material we cannot hold th11t the custom pleaded is proved. The opinion evidence is not of a convincing character and evidence as to specific instances in support of the custom is really nil.\n\nOur attention was also drawn to a decision of the lVIadras High Court in Shanmugathammal v. Gomathi Ammal(') In that case the plaintiff, a member of the dasi community, claimed to succeed to her deceased maternal aunt and pleaded that the three surviving sisters of the deceased who were impleded as defendants were not entitled to inherit because one of them\n\n(r) 67 'l.L.J. 861,\n\nScwaBwathi\n\nAnimal\n\nJagadamho.l and AnotheJ'\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nSaraRwa.th.i\n\nA1nmal\n\nJagndanibal r11vl A nothe1,\n\nMahajan J.\n\nhad been adopted by another dancing, girl and the other two had become married.\n\nThe issue raised in the case was whether the custom set up by the plaintiff that among dancing women married women are excluded by a woman who continues to be a dasi is true, valid and enforceable.\n\nCertain dasis gave evidence in support of the custom.\n\nNo evidence whatever was given to the contrary and the custom pleaded was held proved in the circumstances of that case. Emphasis was laid on the circumstance that there was no evidence whatsoever against the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 who denied the existence of the custom in their written statements did not venture to deny it on oath in the witness box. The dasi community concerned in that case was a small one consisting originally of twenty houses of which only seven.or eight were then in existence and in that situation it was said that the custom might well be one that was well recognized and so much a part of the consciousness of the community, that any dispute like the present dispute amongst so small a body of women would be an extremely rare occurrence and therefore impossible of proof and that the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to search the presidency for witnesses to speak to some similar dispute in other places. In our opinion, that decision does not furnish a good judicial instance in respect of the custom pleaded in the present case.\n\nThere is no evidence that the customs of that small community of dasis are applicable to the community of dasis in the present case which form a considerable community in this district. Moreover, the case was decided on the peculiar circumstances of that case on very meagre materials and did not lay down any general custom of dasis on this point.\n\nIt is unnecessary to examine the plaintiff's evidence in detail. Suffice it to say that it is more than sufficient to rebut the evidence led by the defendant and it neutralizes its effect, if any. In the absence of proof of existence of a custom governing succession the decision of the case has to rest on the rules of justice, equity and good conscience because admittedl; v no\n\n:.\n\nclear text of .Hindu law applies to such a case. The High Court thought that the just rule to apply was one of propinquity to the case, according to which the married and dasi daughters would take the mother's property in equal shares.\n\nNo exception can he taken to this finding givPn by the High Court. :N\" o other rule was suggested to us leading to a contrary result.\n\nIt was argued that the dasis have a distinct status in Hindu society mid that a rule has b1wn evolved by judicial decisions under which the state of degradation hy itself furnishes a rule of preference in a competition between dasi daughters and married daughters.\n\nThe juidicial decisions referred to concern the community of prostitutes and the rule evolved concerning them has been abrogated by later decisions. It was contended that though the said rule had been abrogated and was no longer applicable to that community concerning which it was evolved, it should by analogy be applied to cases of succession to dasis.\n\nN arasanna\n\nv. Gangu(') was the first case cited. There, an adopted niece of a prostitute dancing girl was preferred to a brother remaining in caste. It was said that the legal relation between a prostitute dancing girl and her undegraded relations remaining in caste becomes severed and thev are therefore not entitled to inherit the estate. In\" Subbaratna Mudali v. Balakrishnaswami Naidu('), the next case cited, the facts were that a deceased woman Palani inherited the property in dispute from her mother N agu, who inherited it from her mother Mottai who again inherited it from her father Arunachalam. Arunachalam had two brothers Ramaswami and Mathurbutham and the question in that case was whether Mathurbutham's daughter Seethai or Ramaswami's daughter's son Marudamuthu Mudali was the heir of Palani. The learned judges held that Mathurbutham's daughter was preferential heir to Ramaswami's daughter's son.\n\nIt was pointed out that the rule of preference based on degradation was no longer good law. It was, however~\n\n(r) I.LR. 13 ~[ad. IJ3.\n\n(2) 33 ~LL.J. 207,\n\n• 19.53\n\nSaraswathi\n\nA1n11u1.l\n\n\\'.\n\nJ(/gadarn.bal and Another.\n\nt.lf.ahajfln .J,\n\n• 1953\n\nSa1a.swa, lhi\n\nAnnna.l\n\nJagadarnbal and Another.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nSUPREME COGRT REPORTS [1953]\n\nadded that in cases of dancing girls the law remained as it was before.\n\nOur attention was also drawn to certain observations in Subbaraya Pillai v. Ramaswami Pillai(') at page 177, and to the Q..eoision in Balasundarani v. Ka.makshi Ammal('). In the former case the learned Judges rejected t.he broad proposition that degradation of a woman in consequence of her unchastity entails in the eye of the law cessation of the tie of kindred between her and the members of her natural family and also between her and the members of her husband's family.\n\nWe think that decision on this point is sound in law.\n\nDegradation of a woman does not and cannot sever the ties of blood and succession is more often than not determined by ties of blood than by the moral charli'cter of the heir.\n\nIn Balasundaram v. Kamakshi Ammal(') it was held that thc1 property acquired by the mother had been acquired by her as a married woman and notwithstanding her lapse into unchastity, it devolved on her daughters clothed with the ordinary character of property acquired by a Hindu female, that is to say, the daughters took a life estate in it.\n\nThe learned counsel attempted to persuade us to hold the custom pleaded proved by the assistance of decisions given in analogous cases and by applying the Jll'inciples of the rules said to have been enunciated in some of them. Those cases were decided on their own facts and in some of them a rule was enunciated that degraded people are a class by themselves and their degraded relations are preferential heirs to the undegraded ones.\n\nAs already said, \"we cannot subscribe to the view that any such rrile can be evolved merely on logical grounds. Its existence can only be justified on the basis of established custom. No trustworthy evi. dence has been led in this case to establish that the daughters of a dasi by marriage lose their right of in heritance and form a separate community. The correct approach to a case where it party seeks to prove a custom is the one pointed out by their Lordships of the\n\n\\I) J.L.R. 23 Mad. 17r. .\n\n(2) ?1 i\\1.L.J. 785.\n\nPrivy Council in Abdul Hussein Khan v. Soma Dero(' ).\n\nIt was there 'said that it is incumbent on a party setting up a custom to allege and prove the custom on which he relies and it is not any theory of custom or deductions from other customs which can be made a rule of decision but only any custom applicable to the parties concerned that can be the rule of decision in a particular case. It is well settled that custom cannot be extended by analogy. It must be estabished inductively, not deductively and it cannot be , established by a priori methods.\n\nTheory and custom are antitheses, custom cannot be a matter of mere theory but must always be a matter of fact and one custom cannot be deduced from another. A community living in one particular district may have evolved a particular custom but from that it does not follow that the community living in another district is necessarily follow. ing the same custom.\n\nThe last point taken by the learned counsel was that under Hindu law the 1st defendant as a maiden was entitled to preference over her married sisters. Defendant No. 1 was admittedly married to the idol and she has been on her own showing living a life of prostitution. The text of the Mitakshara dealing with the case of a virgin can. not be applied to her case. [Vide Tara v. Krishna(')].\n\nIt is inconceivable that when the sages laid down the principle of preference concerning unmarried daughters they would have intended to include a prostitute with in the ambit of that text.\n\nFor the reasons given above we see no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for appellant: S. Subramaniam, Agent for respondent No. 1 : M. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\n(r) l.L.R. 45 Cal. 450 (P.C.)\n\n(%) I.L.R 3I Bom. '\\95.\n\nSaraswathi\n\nAmmal v.\n\nJagadamhal and Another.\n\nMahajan J,", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "Cynthia Mills", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cynthia Mills and Dobson and Jones were mutated in the Zamindar's Sherista."}}, {"text": "Dobson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 210, "end_char": 216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cynthia Mills and Dobson and Jones were mutated in the Zamindar's Sherista."}}, {"text": "Jones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 221, "end_char": 226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cynthia Mills and Dobson and Jones were mutated in the Zamindar's Sherista."}}, {"text": "in the case of Probhas Chandra JY!allick v. Debendra Nath Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 920, "end_char": 981, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. K. Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1246, "end_char": 1257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: P. K. Ghose."}}, {"text": "Sukiimar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1287, "end_char": 1301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : Sukiimar Ghose."}}, {"text": "SARASW' ATHI AMMAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1304, "end_char": 1322, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SARASW' ATHI AMMAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGADAMBAL AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1327, "end_char": 1349, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGADAMBAL AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1352, "end_char": 1370, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1403, "end_char": 1406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bejoy Gopal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1782, "end_char": 1793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "do.sis\n\nBejoy Gopal\n\nMukherji\n\nPratul Oha.ndrct\n\nGhose."}}, {"text": "Pratul Oha.ndrct", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1805, "end_char": 1821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "do.sis\n\nBejoy Gopal\n\nMukherji\n\nPratul Oha.ndrct\n\nGhose."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3476, "end_char": 3510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 16th September, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Snbba Rao and Chandra ReddiJJ.)"}}, {"text": "Snbba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3512, "end_char": 3521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 16th September, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Snbba Rao and Chandra ReddiJJ.)"}}, {"text": "Chandra ReddiJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3526, "end_char": 3541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 16th September, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Snbba Rao and Chandra ReddiJJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. Ramachandra Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3715, "end_char": 3734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Ramachandra Iyer, for the appellant. '"}}, {"text": "R. Srinivasan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3760, "end_char": 3773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Srinivasan, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MAHA.JAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3861, "end_char": 3869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by - MAHA.JAN J. - One Thangathammal who was a dasi (dancing girl) lived in the Tanjoro district in Madras State and died possessed of some properties.", "canonical_name": "MAHA.JAN"}}, {"text": "Thangathammal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3879, "end_char": 3892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by - MAHA.JAN J. - One Thangathammal who was a dasi (dancing girl) lived in the Tanjoro district in Madras State and died possessed of some properties.", "canonical_name": "Thangathammal"}}, {"text": "Madras State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3956, "end_char": 3968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by - MAHA.JAN J. - One Thangathammal who was a dasi (dancing girl) lived in the Tanjoro district in Madras State and died possessed of some properties."}}, {"text": "Saraswathi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4049, "end_char": 4059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She left her surviving three daughters, Saraswathi, Jagadambal and Meenambal.", "canonical_name": "SARASW' ATHI AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Jagadambal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4061, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She left her surviving three daughters, Saraswathi, Jagadambal and Meenambal."}}, {"text": "Meenambal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4076, "end_char": 4085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She left her surviving three daughters, Saraswathi, Jagadambal and Meenambal."}}, {"text": "Thyagaraja Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8he alleged that her mothor was maried to one Thyagaraja Pillai, that the properties in suit were the stridhanam properties of her mother who died intestate on 26th July, 1943, and that according to the law or custom of the community to which the parties belonged she and her sistcrn were entitled to share equally the propertil's of her mother."}}, {"text": "26th July, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4503, "end_char": 4518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8he alleged that her mothor was maried to one Thyagaraja Pillai, that the properties in suit were the stridhanam properties of her mother who died intestate on 26th July, 1943, and that according to the law or custom of the community to which the parties belonged she and her sistcrn were entitled to share equally the propertil's of her mother."}}, {"text": "Saraswathi Ammal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4690, "end_char": 4706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saraswathi Ammal, the 1st defendant contested the snit.", "canonical_name": "SARASW' ATHI AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Saranatha Perurnal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4878, "end_char": 4896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She pleaded that her mother was not a married womnn but n dnsi who followed her hereditttry occupa, tion and w<1s att<1ched to Shri Saranatha Perurnal temple at 'riruchurai in the Tanjore district, that of\n\nthe three daughters the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant married and lived with their husbands, while she (1st defendant) was duly initiated as a dasi in the said temple and remained unmarried and that according to the h1w and custom of the community, the mother's property devolved solely on her to the exclusion of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant."}}, {"text": "Tanjore district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4926, "end_char": 4942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She pleaded that her mother was not a married womnn but n dnsi who followed her hereditttry occupa, tion and w<1s att<1ched to Shri Saranatha Perurnal temple at 'riruchurai in the Tanjore district, that of\n\nthe three daughters the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant married and lived with their husbands, while she (1st defendant) was duly initiated as a dasi in the said temple and remained unmarried and that according to the h1w and custom of the community, the mother's property devolved solely on her to the exclusion of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant."}}, {"text": "Thangathammal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5464, "end_char": 5477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 which was in these terms:-\n\n\" Who is the proper heir of Thangathammal.", "canonical_name": "Thangathammal"}}, {"text": "Thaugathammal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit holding that Thaugathammal was a dasi and not a mttrried woman, that according to the custom of the dasi community in South India, a dasi daughter is regarded as a nearer heir to the mother than a married daughter and that the 1st defendant was entitled to remain in\n\npossession of the suit properties.", "canonical_name": "Thangathammal"}}, {"text": "South India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5841, "end_char": 5852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit holding that Thaugathammal was a dasi and not a mttrried woman, that according to the custom of the dasi community in South India, a dasi daughter is regarded as a nearer heir to the mother than a married daughter and that the 1st defendant was entitled to remain in\n\npossession of the suit properties."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6742, "end_char": 6755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Leave to appe1tl to the Supreme Court was granted under article 1:33 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6774, "end_char": 6783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajagopal Pillai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7649, "end_char": 7665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the defendant's witnesses, the first witness, Rajagopal Pillai, deposed that his wife was the daughter of dasi Kamakshi who had six daughters of w horn three were married and three were dasis, that on Kamakshi's death, her dasi daughters alone would take the inheritance and that his wife, would be excluded."}}, {"text": "Kamakshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7714, "end_char": 7722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the defendant's witnesses, the first witness, Rajagopal Pillai, deposed that his wife was the daughter of dasi Kamakshi who had six daughters of w horn three were married and three were dasis, that on Kamakshi's death, her dasi daughters alone would take the inheritance and that his wife, would be excluded."}}, {"text": "Tulasi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8327, "end_char": 8333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She stated th1tt one Tulasi's sister Mangalam got no share in her mother Ammani's properties."}}, {"text": "Mangalam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8343, "end_char": 8351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She stated th1tt one Tulasi's sister Mangalam got no share in her mother Ammani's properties."}}, {"text": "Ammani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8379, "end_char": 8385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She stated th1tt one Tulasi's sister Mangalam got no share in her mother Ammani's properties."}}, {"text": "Govindaswami Pillai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8692, "end_char": 8711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mangalam's son Govindaswami Pillai appeared as D. W. 3."}}, {"text": "Srirangam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9014, "end_char": 9023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 1st defendant further deposed to an instance in Srirangam when succession opened out on the death of dasi Chellappa."}}, {"text": "Chellappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9072, "end_char": 9081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 1st defendant further deposed to an instance in Srirangam when succession opened out on the death of dasi Chellappa."}}, {"text": "Visalakshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9144, "end_char": 9154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that her property was taken by her dasi daughter Visalakshi to the exclusion of her married daughters Marakatham and Rukmini and that the assets were worth a lakh of rupees."}}, {"text": "Marakatham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9197, "end_char": 9207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that her property was taken by her dasi daughter Visalakshi to the exclusion of her married daughters Marakatham and Rukmini and that the assets were worth a lakh of rupees."}}, {"text": "Rukmini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9212, "end_char": 9219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that her property was taken by her dasi daughter Visalakshi to the exclusion of her married daughters Marakatham and Rukmini and that the assets were worth a lakh of rupees."}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9680, "end_char": 9690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "l\\fangalam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9882, "end_char": 9892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third witness, about whom reference has alreacly been made, apart from deposing as to l\\fangalam's instance also deposed about the instance of dasi l\\foenakshi."}}, {"text": "l\\foenakshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third witness, about whom reference has alreacly been made, apart from deposing as to l\\fangalam's instance also deposed about the instance of dasi l\\foenakshi."}}, {"text": "Jeevaratnam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9971, "end_char": 9982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Her daughter Jeevaratnam is married to the witness."}}, {"text": "Meenakshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10023, "end_char": 10032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He said that Meenakshi's dasi daughters inherited her property and that his wife was exeluded."}}, {"text": "Meemikshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10288, "end_char": 10297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "None of the daughters of Meemikshi have been examined as witnesses in the case, to enable the court to find out the details about it and merely on the statement of this witness the instance cannot be held proved."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10664, "end_char": 10671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nSaraswathi\n\nA1nn1al\n\nJ agada-111 bal and Another.", "canonical_name": "MAHA.JAN"}}, {"text": "Saraswathi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10676, "end_char": 10686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nSaraswathi\n\nA1nn1al\n\nJ agada-111 bal and Another.", "canonical_name": "SARASW' ATHI AMMAL"}}, {"text": "Venugopal Pillai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11090, "end_char": 11106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venugopal Pillai is the fifth witness for the defendant."}}, {"text": "Jan.aid Ammal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11515, "end_char": 11528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jan.aid Ammal, the sixth witness, is a dasi."}}, {"text": "Kanrnlathammal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12412, "end_char": 12426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next witnesB who gave evidence on the issue is D. W. 8, Kanrnlathammal, a dasi."}}, {"text": "Amba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12560, "end_char": 12564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She deposed that her mother's properties were divided between her and her other dasi sister and Amba, her third sister, who was married, was not given a share."}}, {"text": "Pappathi Ammal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12963, "end_char": 12977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pappathi Ammal, the next witness in the case, is also a dasi."}}, {"text": "Srirangam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13479, "end_char": 13488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from asserting that in this community dasi's property devolves on her death only on the dasi daughters to the exclusion of married daughters, she cited the instance of Chellappa, a dasi of Srirangam."}}, {"text": "Rajamani Ammal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13935, "end_char": 13949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last witness in the case is Rajamani Ammal, another dasi who does service in Sri Ranganathaswami temple."}}, {"text": "lVIadras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14686, "end_char": 14705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was also drawn to a decision of the lVIadras High Court in Shanmugathammal v. Gomathi Ammal(') In that case the plaintiff, a member of the dasi community, claimed to succeed to her deceased maternal aunt and pleaded that the three surviving sisters of the deceased who were impleded as defendants were not entitled to inherit because one of them\n\n(r) 67 'l.L.J. 861,\n\nScwaBwathi\n\nAnimal\n\nJagadamho.l and AnotheJ'\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nSaraRwa.th.i\n\nA1nmal\n\nJagndanibal r11vl A nothe1,\n\nMahajan J.\n\nhad been adopted by another dancing, girl and the other two had become married."}}, {"text": "Palani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18739, "end_char": 18745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\" Subbaratna Mudali v. Balakrishnaswami Naidu('), the next case cited, the facts were that a deceased woman Palani inherited the property in dispute from her mother N agu, who inherited it from her mother Mottai who again inherited it from her father Arunachalam."}}, {"text": "N agu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18796, "end_char": 18801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\" Subbaratna Mudali v. Balakrishnaswami Naidu('), the next case cited, the facts were that a deceased woman Palani inherited the property in dispute from her mother N agu, who inherited it from her mother Mottai who again inherited it from her father Arunachalam."}}, {"text": "Mottai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18836, "end_char": 18842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\" Subbaratna Mudali v. Balakrishnaswami Naidu('), the next case cited, the facts were that a deceased woman Palani inherited the property in dispute from her mother N agu, who inherited it from her mother Mottai who again inherited it from her father Arunachalam."}}, {"text": "Arunachalam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18882, "end_char": 18893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\" Subbaratna Mudali v. Balakrishnaswami Naidu('), the next case cited, the facts were that a deceased woman Palani inherited the property in dispute from her mother N agu, who inherited it from her mother Mottai who again inherited it from her father Arunachalam."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18924, "end_char": 18933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arunachalam had two brothers Ramaswami and Mathurbutham and the question in that case was whether Mathurbutham's daughter Seethai or Ramaswami's daughter's son Marudamuthu Mudali was the heir of Palani."}}, {"text": "Mathurbutham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18938, "end_char": 18950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arunachalam had two brothers Ramaswami and Mathurbutham and the question in that case was whether Mathurbutham's daughter Seethai or Ramaswami's daughter's son Marudamuthu Mudali was the heir of Palani."}}, {"text": "Seethai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19017, "end_char": 19024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arunachalam had two brothers Ramaswami and Mathurbutham and the question in that case was whether Mathurbutham's daughter Seethai or Ramaswami's daughter's son Marudamuthu Mudali was the heir of Palani."}}, {"text": "Marudamuthu Mudali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19055, "end_char": 19073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arunachalam had two brothers Ramaswami and Mathurbutham and the question in that case was whether Mathurbutham's daughter Seethai or Ramaswami's daughter's son Marudamuthu Mudali was the heir of Palani."}}, {"text": "S. Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23267, "end_char": 23281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for appellant: S. Subramaniam, Agent for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23312, "end_char": 23329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : M. S. K. Aiyangar."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_950_972_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "195::\n\nJ anuar, Y .10.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nKESHAV MILLS LTD.'\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY\n\n[Mmm CHAND MAHA.JAN, S. R. DA~, VrnAN BosE and\n\nBHAGWATI JJ.)\n\nIndian Income-ta.•r Act (XI o/1922), ss. 4 (1) (a) and (c), 18-\n\nJ\\-ron-resident-Accoznts in 11icrcantile systern-Sale of goods in British Inrli<t throuah agents-Assessability of profits derived front wch sale-Provision of law apvlicable to such cases-Inc01ne-tax outhori.ties, whether bound to compute incorne according to mercantile .•11stein-Avvlicablit?1 of s.13 to non-1esidents.\n\nA non-resident company manufactured textile goods at Poutside British India and sold the goods ex-mills. A firm, R & Co., guaranteed the sale-price of goods sold ex-mills by the company to purchasers at Ahmedabad within British India.\n\nAs the company maintained its accounts according to the mercantile system, the company debited R & Co., with the price of goods sold and credited the sales account with the amount of \\be bills. R & Co., collected the amounts of the bills from the purchasers on behalf of the company and c1edited the snms realised in the company's\n\n\"°count with banks at Ahmedabad and also disbursed them to creditors of the company in British India. These payments were credited by the company to R & Co. During tbe relevant accounting year the company thus received Rs. 12,68,480.\n\nThe company also received Rs. 4,40,878 from sales to purchasers in British India. The amount of the sales bills for which hundis were drawn on \\lie purchasers in favour of banks were debited by the company to the accounts of the respective merchants and credited to the\n\nales account and the sums roceivec1 by the ba.nks fro1n the purchasers against delivery of tho rail, vay receipts \\Vere credited by the company to the accounts of the respective purchasers. In either case there \\Vas no change in the relationship of vendor and purchaser bet\\veen the company and the purchasers by reason of the entries made in the company's hooks.\n\nThe question as reframed by the High Conrt was whether these two sums were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessees to merchants in British India and whether they were received in British India and could be included in the assessable income of tho company in British India: Held, per llfelw Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das and Bhagwati J J., (Vivian Bose J. dissenting) that tbe two amounts in question were sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the company to merchants in British India; that they were neither received by the company nor could be deemed to have been received by it w!ien the entries were µiacje in the books of account at P but \\iad\n\n196J merely accrued ot arisen to it there; that they were first received by R & Co. and by the banks through whom the railway receipts were negotiated on behalf of the company in British India; <tnd Kesliav Mills that they were therefore liable to t<tx under s. 4(1) (a) of the Lt4, Indian Income.tax Act as having been t•eceived in 13ritish India on v. its behalf.\n\nOonunissioner of Though it is true that in the case of residents, if the assessee employs the mercantile system regularly it is obligatory on the income-tax authorities to compute the income according to that system, it is doubtful whether that position would be available to a non-resident who maintains his books of account outside British India according to the mercantile system.\n\nSection 13 would only he relevant where the total profits of the assessee have to be computed and in that event the assessee would he entitled to claim that they should be computed according to the system of accounts maintained by him ; it would not be relevant v.'hen stray iten1s of income are sought to he assessed in the taxable territories as received in the taxable territories by a non-resident.\n\nBvse J.-In the case of accounts kept in the mercantile system, the profit or loss at the end of the accounting year is based not on a difference between \\Vhat \\Vas actually received and what was actually paid out, but on the difference between the right to receive and the liability to pay. 'I1he taxation in such cases is not on income, profits or gains which \\Vere received but on profits which \"accrued or arose\" to the assessee in the accounting yea.r.\n\nThis view excludes s. 4(1) (a) and this means that a resident is taxed in such cases under s. 4(l)(b) and a non-resident under s. 4(1) (c).\n\nApplying s. 4(1) (c) to the present case, in the case of the Rs. 4 lakbs odd the profits accrued or arose in British India where the right to take delivery of the goods accrued and where the price was actually paid, but what is really taxable under s. 4 (1) (c) is not the Rs. 4 lakhs odd, but the figures entered in the accounting year as the p\\\"ice of the various transactions which the Rs. 4 lakhs represented. Similarly, in the case of Rs. 12 lakhs odd, it is the figure entered in the books in the accounting year relating to the transactions which is taxable.\n\nBy the Fnll Conrt.-The expression \"deewed to be received\" in s. 4 (1) (a) means deemed by the provisions of the Act to be received.\n\nSubramaniyan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Incometax (2 I.T.C. 365), Ahmed Din Alladitta v. Commissioner of Income-tax, P1mjab (2 I.T.R. 369), Kanwal Naya\" Hamir Singh v. Commissioner of Jn. come-ta.r, Ajmer-iYierwara (6 I.T.R. 675), Commissioner of Tncomc tax v. Singari Bai (13 I.T.R. 224) distinguished.\n\nB. ill. Kamdar, In re (1946 I.T.R .. 14), Pondicherry Railway Co.\n\nv. Commissioner of Incometax (58 I.A. 239) and Commissioner of\n\nJncom.e.eax,\n\nBotnbay.\n\nKeshav Mills Ltd;\n\nIncome-tax v. Mathias (66 I.A. 23), Comrnissioner1Jf Income-tax v.\n\nKameswar Singh (1933 I.T.R. 94), Commissionei of Income-tax v.\n\nChu11ilal Mehta (1938 I.T.R. 521) referred to.\n\nCtVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Commissioner rNo. 151 of 1951.\n\nIncome-tax, Appeal from a Judgment and Order dated 14/15th Bornbay.\n\nSeptember, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Income-tax Reference No. 2 of 1949.\n\nR. J. Kolah and N. A. Palkiwalla for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P.A.\n\nMehta, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1953. January 30. The judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan J., Das J. and Bhagwati .J. was delivered by Bhagwati J. Bose J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 66 ( 1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, whereby the High Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal that two amounts of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 were the sale proceeds of goods sold by the appellant to merchants in British India, were received in British India and were liable to income-tax in British India.\n\nThe appellant is a company registered in the Baroda State, as it then was, prior to its merger with India. It manufactmes textile goods in Petlad in the Baroda State and after the goods are manufactured they are sold by the company ex-mills. The company employs Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. as guaranteed brokers. That firm guarantees the sale price of goods sold by the company ex-mills to the purchasers from Ahmedabad and receives commission as consideration for the guarantee and the work which it does for the company. The company is a non-resident and its accounts are maintained according to the mercantile system.\n\n195.J In the assessment year 1942-43 (the previous year being the calendar year 1941) the total sales of the d b h d Ke8hav Mills goo s y t e company amounte to Rs. 29,68,808. In making the assessment on the company for that assess-\n\nL~~· . ment year the following three amounts were considered Commissioner of for the purpose of determining the company's liability Income-wx, to British Indian tax.\n\nBombay.\n\n(a) Sale proceeds recovered through Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co.\n\n(b) Sale proceeds through British Indian banks and shroffs re ceived by means of drafts or hundies drawn by the company (Railway receipts handed over to British Indian merchants by the banks on payment).\n\nRs. 12,68,480\n\nRs. 4,40,878\n\n( c) Sale proceeds received by cheques on British Indian banks and hundies on British Indian shroffs and merchants, and collected by the banks and shroffs Rs. 6,71,735\n\nTotal Rs. 23,81,093\n\nAs regards item(a)the company debited the account of the firm of Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. with Rs. 13,41,744 which represented sales made by the company to merchants ofAhmedabad whose payments were guaranteed by that firm, and credited the sales account with the amount of the bills. }fossrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. collected the amounts of the bills from the merchants at Ahmedabad and credited the sums recovered in the company's accounts with banks and/ or shroffs at Ahmedabad and also made disbursements under instructions of the company to the creditors of the company in British India. All these payments were credited by the company to the account of Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. and during the relevant accounting year the company thus\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n19!iJ received Rs. 12,68,480 agai115t the total debits of Rs. 13,41,744.\n\nKeshav Mills Ltd.\n\nAs regards item (b) the eompany received Rs . . v: 4,40,878 by drawing hundies or drafts for the amounts Oointni8Bioner of of its sales bills (including the forwarding charges and\n\nIncome.tax h f 't fj th n t h ) Bombay. ' t e cost o trans1 _rom e m1 premises o t e station on the merchants m favour of recognised banks and\n\nBhaywati J. shroffs in British India, by sending the same to those banks or shroffs with the railway receipts duly endorsed in favour of the merchants and by instructing the banks or shroffs to recover the amounts including the costs of transmitting the same to them. The amounts of these sales bills were debited by the company to the accounts of the respective merchants and credited to the sales a.ecount and the sums recovered by the banks or shroffs from the merchants in British India against the delivery of the relative railway receipts were on receipt of the same by the company credited to the accounts of the respective merchants in their books of account.\n\nAs regards item (c), the company received Bs. 6,71,735 from the merchants by cheques and hundies drawn on banks and shroffs in British India in favour of the company.\n\nThese cheques and hundies were negotiated by the company in Petlad and sent back for credit to its accounts with those banks and shroffs. The said cheques and hundies were cashed in British India and the sale proceeds remitted by the banks and shroffs to the company. The amounts of the sales bills were debited to the accounts of the merchants in the books of the coml)any when the goods were invoiced to the merchants and these accounts were credited with the moneys thus received by the company from the merchants.\n\n'l'he Income-tax Officer brought to tax the profits derived by the company represented by the said three items in the assessment year on the basis that the sale proceeds having been received in British India the profits were received in British India. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal held that profits\n\nJ •\n\nfrom items (a) and ( c) were exempt from British Indian 19,;3 tax while thos!l represented by item (b) were rightly Kesha• Mills taxed. The Department filed an appeal to the Appel- Ltd. late Tribunal against the decision of the Appellate v.\n\nAssistant Commissioner in regard to items (a) and (c) Commissioner of and the company filed an appeal in respect of item (b ).\n\nIncmne-tax, The Appellate Tribunal held in regard to item (a) that Bombay. the merchants in British India were not absolved either in law or in-fact from their responsibility to pay to the company its dues by virtue of the debit entries in the accom1t of Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. and in regard to item (b) that the payment of the amounts dne was a condition precedent to the delivery of goods by the banks in British India on behalf of the company. The Tribunal therefore held that profits arising from items (a) and (b) were rightly subjected to tax.\n\nAs regards item (c) the Tribunal held that Rs. 6,71,735 \"were received by the assessee company directly from the merchants in British India by chequesandhundies drawn on banks and shroffs in British India in favour of the company but were negotiated in Petlad and sent for credit to the company's account. The amounts were received at Petlad and once they were received there, they could not be held to have been received again in British India \".\n\nThe Department asked the Tribunal to refer to the High Court the question of law arising on item ( c) and the company asked the Tribunal to refer to the High Court the question of law arising on items (a) and (b) and the Tribunal therefore referred the following question of law to the High Court:--\n\n\" Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sums of Rs. 12,68,480, Rs. 4,40,878 and Rs. 6,71,735, or any of them, which, represents receipts by the assessee company of its sale proceeds in British India, include any portion of its income in British India ? \"\n\nThe High Court held that Rs. 12,68,480 were received in British India and included the profits and gains of the business of the assessee company. It held t, hat Rs. 4,40,878 also were received in British India\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n1os.1 and the company was liable in respect of that amount.\n\nK<BhavMills In regard to the item of Rs. 6,71,735, the High Court\n\nfound that the facts stated by,· the Tribunal were not Ltd. v. sufficient to enable it to reach a decision and therefore\n\nOommissione1 of directed that the Tribunal should submit a suppleb1em11e-1ax, mentary statement of case setting out the several B 01•1bay. aspects set out in the judgment. 'l'he High Court\n\nBhagwati .J. reframed the question in regard to the two items of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 in the manner following:-\n\n(1) whether the sums of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessee to merchants in British India or were debts due by the said merchants?\n\n(2) Whether if they were sale proceeds, they were received in British India ? and answered them by stating that they were sale proceeds and they were received in British India.\n\nThere was also a third question which was comprised in the reference and that question was framed as under:- Whether the profits of the assessee's business are included in the sums of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 ?\n\nThis question was also answered by stating that they were included in these two sums. The company obtained leave from the High Court to appeal against the decision in regard to the two sums of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 and hence this appeal.\n\nIt is common ground that the company is a nonresident and its accounts have been regularly kept according to the mercantile system. Its balance sheets were also prepared on that basis. The company was assessed to tax in British India on the basis that these two sums of money were received in British India by or on behalf of the company. In regard to the item of Rs. 12,68,480, even though the amounts of the sales bills were in the first instance debited by the company in its books to the account of Messrs. Ja, gmohandas Ramanlal & Co, the sale proceeds in accordance with\n\nJ •\n\nS.C.R. i'lUPREllfE COl'RT REPORTS 957\n\nthe terms of the sales hills were pitid by the respective 1953 merchants to -Yiessrs. J agmohandas Ramanlal & Co. in Keshav Mills British India and were either credited bv Messrs.\n\nLtd . • Tagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. in the compny's acv .. counts with banks or shroffs in British India or were Oommisswner of\n\nl. b d b h . d . h h . .\n\nIncom,,-taz, c JS urse y t em m accor ance wit t e mstruct10ns Bombay. of the company in British India. In regard to the item of Rs. 4,10,878 even though the amounts of the Bhagv•ati J. sales bills were debited in the first instance by the company to the accounts of the respective merchants in the books of account at Petlad the relative railway receipts were sent by the company to banks or shroffs in British India together with drafts or hundies in connection with the same with instructions that deliverv of the railway receipts should he given to the respective merchants against payment and the amounts of the s<tles bills were thus paid by the respective merclrnn ts to the banks or shroffs in British India and were tmtrnmitted under the instructions of the company by the banks and shroffs in British India to the company at Petlad. Prima facie therefore the amounts of the sales bills in both the citses whether they were paid to )fo,:irn .. fagmohandas Ranmnlal & Co. or to the banks or Rhroffs through \\1hom the railway receipts were negotiated were paid by the mercha1its in British India and were received by Messrs .. Tagrnohandas Ramanlal & Co. and the banks or shroffs on behalf of the company in British Indin.\n\nThe receipt of these itmounts thus fe!l within section 4 (1) (a) of the Act and the - profits or gains of this business thus were received in British India by or on behitlf of the company.\n\nThe company however sought exemption from liability to tax on the grounds (a) that the accounts of the company were kept on the mercantile or book profit basis under which the accrual of profit as shown in the account was the criterion of taxability and section 4(1)\n\n(a) had no application at all; (h) that it was obligatory on the authorities under section 13 of the Act to accept that systPm of maintaining accounts except under the proviso to that section and that the method of computation there was made the very basis of 124\n\n958 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19.13 chargeability and section 10 read with section 13 operated to save these amounts from chargeability and Keshan Mills d ' d\n\n(c) that the amounts having been treate as receive Ltd. v... when credit entries were made in the books of account,\n\nOommiBaioner ~I and chargeability having crystallised on the date when\n\nIncome-tax, the income accrued or was treated as received, there 8 1:!.nbay. was no further scope for a charge when the amounts were su bsequentl.Y actually received and the subse- Bhagwati J, quent handling of the amounts by the company and the receipt thereof in British Indir1 were of no consequence.\n\nThe mercantile system of accounting or what is otherwise known as the double entry system is opposed to the cr1sh system of book keeping under which fl record is kept of actual cash receipts and actual cash payments, entries being made only when money is\n\nactlrnlly collected or disbursed. That system brings into credit what is due, immediately it becomes legally due and before it is actually received and it brings into debit expenditure the amount for which a legal liability has been incurred before it is actually disbursed. The profits or gains of the business which 'are thus credited are not realised but having been earned are treated as received though in fact there is nothing more than an accrual or arising of the profits at that stitge.\n\nThey are book profits.\n\nReceipt being not the sole test of chargeability and profits and gains that have accrued or arisen or are deemed to have accrued or arisen being also liable to be charged for income-tax, the assessability of these profits which are thus credited in the books of account arises not because they are received but because they have accrued or arisen.\n\nMr. Kolah appearing for the company drew our attention to the following cases:~ Subramaniyan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Incometax('), Ahmed Din Allad-itta v. Commissioner. of In come-tax, Punjab('), Kanical Nayan Hnmir Singh v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Ajmei<Merwara(') and\n\n(r) (1927) i l.T, C. 365.\n\n(2) (1934] 2 l, T.R. 369,\n\n(3) (1938] 6 I.T.R. 675.\n\n.... .\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPRE~IE UOU1-t1' REPORTS 959\n\nCornmissioner of 1 ncome-tax v. Shrimati Singari 1963 Bai(').\n\nKeshav Mills The assessees there were all residents in British India Ltd. and maintained their books of account according to v. the mercantile system. Except in the case of Commis- Commi••ioner of sioner of Income-tax v. Singari Bai(') where the assess- Income-tax, ment was in respect of the total ineome or profits, Bombay. stray items of income treated as received in British Bhagwati J.\n\nIndia were sought to be charged for tax and they were all assessed for tax not on the basis of actual receipts in British India but on the basis of their having accrued or arisen in British India. The cases were decided with reference to the law as it stood before the amendment in 1939 which under seution4(1) rendered liable to tax all income, profits or gains from whatever source derived, accruing or arising or received in British India or deemed under the provisions of the Act to accrue, arise or to be reciYed in British India.\n\nThe question that arose for the determination of the courts was whether under the mercantile system, profits which were credited in the books could be taxed even though they had in fact not been received and the conclusion reached by the courts was that these profits credited in the books of account were earned and could be charged as having accrued or arisen within British India even though they were in fact not received. In none of these cases were the courts concerned with a non-resident claiming to have received profits or gains outside British India under the mercantile system of accounting and claiming exemption from liability to tax under section 4 (1) (a) in respect of profits actually received in British India.\n\nIt follows from the above that the mercantile system of accounting treats profits or gains as arising or accruing at the date of the transaction notwithstanding the fact that they are not received or deemed to be received and umler that system, book -profits are assessed as liable to tax. lf an assessee therefore regularly adopts the mercantile system of accounting he would be liable to tax on the profits thus credited by\n\n(1) [1945) 13 I.f, R. 224.\n\n960 SUPREME COURT Rjf>ORTS ll953]\n\n1953 him in his books of account subject to all deductions for bad debts as provided in section 10' (2) (xi). Sec- Keshav M ill8 tion 4 (1) (a) has nothing to do with this basis of tax- Ltd. l j v. ation. Section 13 which is an integra part oft te com-\n\nOommissioner ofputation of the total income of the assessee and is\n\nIncome-ta.•, compulsory on the income-tax authorities as well when Bombay. computing the total income (vide section 2 (15) ) does\n\nBhagwati J. not lay down ri, ny exemption from liability. It only sets up a mode of computation of the income which is liable to assessment and imposes upon the income-tax authorities an obligation to accept the mode of accounting regularly adopted by the assessee except in the cases where the proviso to that section comes into operation. The profits earned and credited in the books of account being thus taken tts the basis of computation, the system of accounting postulates the existence of debts in so far as moneys remain due and payable by the parties to whom they have been debited and when it is realised that these debts are not recoverable the assessee gets a deduction fdr the bad debts under section 10 (2) (xi).\n\nThis however does not mean that the transaction ltS it has been recorded in the books of account under the mercantile system of accounting or the double entry system is metamorphosed or the relationship between the parties assumes a different character. What was in its inception a transaction of sale and purchase is not converted into another transaction as between creditor and debtor.\n\nThe relationship as between vendor and purchaser still subsists and there dues not come into existence a new relationship as between creditor and debtor with all its necessary consequences. The transaction as it has been recorded in the books of account has got to be worked out to its fullest extent. _;\\forely because the goods have been supplied and the price thereof has been debited to the purchaser the rights and obligations of the vendor and purchaser inter se arc not in any manner affected. The vendor is bound tu fulfil all his obligations under the contract and continues to be liable for all the consequences of his default including rejection of his goods by the purchaser or a claim for d1images\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORirs 96i\n\n1953 for breach of wal'l'anty by him. The purchaser is\n\nequallv entitlec'l to reJ ect the 0aoods or to claim the .J Keshav M il'1s damages as on breach of warranty by the vendor and Ltd. all these rights and obligations have got to be worked v. out in spite of the fact that the entries are made in Oonunis•ion\" of the books of account by the vendor in ;1ccordance with Incorne-tax, the mercantile system of accounting adopted by him.\n\nBombay.\n\nThe vendor could not say tha.t he is under no further Bhagwati J. obligation to the purchaser and that the purchaser must pay the price of the goods debitPd to him as a debt arising out of the book entry.\n\nThe count in any action filed by the vendor against the purchaser would be a count for the price of goods sold <ind delivered and would not be a count on an assumpsit for recovery of a debt due by the debtor to him.\n\nIt is clear that under these circumstances there is no receipt of the moneys !Lt all, either actual or constructive, in cash or in kind, by actual payment or by adjustment or settlement of accounts. There is also no scope for the <irgurnent, that even though these sums ma v not be said to be either actuallv or constructively reeived they should be \"deemed to be received\". The expression \"deemed to be received\" only meam; deemed by the provisions of the Act to be received. The phrase statutory receipt might be conveniently employed to cover income which is \"deemed to be received'', and instances of such statutorv receipts are to be found in the provisions of the Ac:t,\"e.g., section 18 (4), seetion 58 (E), section 58 (J) (3), section 7(2), section 16(1) (c) and sections 19 (2) (vii) and\n\nHJ(2). (See the observations of Beaumont ('.J. in Commissioner of lncorne-ta; c, Bombay v. New India Assw1- ance Co. Ltd.(1 ).\n\nAn amount cannot be \"deemed to be received\" merely by the volition or sweet will of an indiYidual. In all the cases which we have mentioned above the profits earned which >rnre credited in the books of account according lo the mercantile system of accounting were at best \"treated as having been received\" which is neither \"received\" nor \"deemed to be received\" and therefore not within the purview of section.4(1) (a).\n\n(1) [1938] 6 I.T.R. 603 at p. 614.\n\n962 SUPRE.VIE COUR'i; nEPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 If then profits which have Leen thus credited cannot be said to be received nor deemed to have been receiv- KP, shav A!ifls ed when the entries were made in the books of account, Ltd.\n\nv. the contention urged before us by Mr. Kolah that\n\nGoin1ni . .aioner of there could not be a second receipt of the amount in\n\nIncome-la.>:, British lndia does not survive. [t is true that the llombay. words used in section 4(1) (a) rnlate to the first receipt after the accrual of the income. Once it is received bv BhugwatiJ. \" the party entitled to it, in respect of any subsequent dealing with the said amount it cannot be said to be \"received\" as income on that occasion. [Per Kania J, in B. ; JI. Kamdar (1)J.\n\nThe \"receipt\" of income refers to the first occasion when the recipient gets the money under his own control. Once an amount is received as income, any remittance or transmission of the amount to another place does not result in \"receipt\", within the meaning of this clause, at the other place. 'l'his was definitely established by the Privy Council in Pond-icherry Rail1cay Co. v. Commis8-ioner of lncome- 'J'ax (') :i, ml in Commissioner of Income-tax v. J.Vlathias (3). If, therefore, the income, profits or gains have been once received by the assessee even though outside British India they do not become chargeable by reason of the moneys having been brought in British India, because what is chargeable is the first receipt of the moneys and not a subsequent dealing by the assessee with the said amount.\n\nIn that event they are brought by the assessee as his own moneys which he has already received and had control over and they cease to enjoy the character of income, profits or gains.\n\nThis ratio however does not apply to the facts of the present case before us.\n\nThe moneys were neither received by the company nor could be deemed to have been received by it when the entries were made in the books of account at Petlad. They had merely accrued or arisen to it and so far as the receipt thereof is concerned they were first received in British India when \\hey were received by Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal\n\n(r) [r946] r4 l.T.R. 14 at p. 39,\n\n(z) [1931] 58 l.A. z39.\n\n(3) [1939] 66 I.A. z~.\n\n, , .\n\n1953 & Co. or by the various banks or shroffs in British India through 'whom the railway receipts were negoti- - Keshav i.ll1'll8 ated. The first receipt of the moneys was therefore Ltd. when they were paid as such by the merchants to v.\n\nMessrs. J agmohandas Ramanlal & Co. or to the various GommiBBioner of banks or shroffs as above.\n\nW'hatever paid by the Incometox, merchants to these several parties were the sale pro- Bombay. ceeds of the goods which had been sold and delivered BhaguatiJ. by the company to them and they were received within the meaning of section 4 (1) (a) of the Act by these several parties on behalf of tho company in British India at the time when these payments were made by the merchants to them.\n\nMr. Kolah pressed into service the argument based on section 13 of the Act that the mercantilo svstem of accounting regularly adopted by the assessec \\vas obliga.tory on the income-tax authorities for computation of his income. l'Vhile agreeing generally with that submission in case of residents, we doubt whether that position would be available to a non-resident, who maintains his books of account outside British India according to the mercantile system. The section would only be relevant where the total profits of the assessee have to be computed, in which event he would be entitled to claim that they should be computed according to the syHtem of accounts maintained hy him. But the section would hardly be relevant where stra.y items of income are caught iu taxable territories as received in taxable territories by a non-resident. The entries in the present ease were put in merely to prove that the sale proceeds were received outside British India where the entries were made. That contention however could not be sustained, as section 4 (1) (a) is concerned with cases of actual receipt and not with cases of paper receipts.\n\nHaving regard to the observations. made above we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was right in holding that the two sums of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 wBre the sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the appellant to merchants in British India, that they were received by Messrs,\n\n964- SUPREME COt'RT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 J agmohanclas Itamanlal & Co. and by the banks and\n\nKe&hav Mills shroffa through whom the railway receipts were nego\n\nL tiatecl, on behalf of the appellant in British lnclia, that td. v. they were liable to tax under section4(1) (a) of the Gommi . ., ioner of Act as having been received in British India on its be\n\nIncome-tax, half, that there is nothing either in the facts and circum-\n\nBombay. stances of 1ohe ease or in law why they should be exflhagwatiJ. empted from such liability, that the a.nswers given to the questions which were ultimately considered by the High Comt were correct, and the appellant was rightly held liable for the tax on these two amounts subject to all just deductions and allowances.\n\nThe appeal therefol'e fails and must stand dismissed with costs.\n\nBo.SE, J.-I respectfully disagree.\n\nSection 3 of the Indian Incomet8x Act provides that the \"total income\" is to be charged in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nWe have therefore to see what \"total income\" means.\n\n\"Total income\" is defined in section 2(15). It means (not\" inclmles\" but means) the total amount of income, profits and gains \"referred to in sub-section (I) of section 4 computed in the manner laid down in this Act.\" Then-fore, the computation of all income referred to in section 4( 1) has to be \"in the manner laid down in the Act \".\n\nSection 4 (apart from the provisos and explanations) is divided into three clauses, (a), (b) and (c).\n\nClause\n\n(b) deals with residents and (c) with non-resident5. As\n\n(a) is general, it is legitimate to infer that it refers to both. Therefore, the words \"received\" and \"deemed to be received \" must be constrned in tho same sense in both cases except of course where it is otherwise provided in the Act, for sub-section (1) is made subject to the provisions of the Act.\n\n'N' ow the words \"deemed to be received\" can be exduded from consideration at once because I agree that they are confined, and are intended to he confined to what I may call the deeming sections in the Act., that is to say, to cases where the deeming must be clone\n\n' . '\n\nunder the express provisions of the Act. That leaves 1953 us with the wdrd \"received\" (I am of courne only deal- Keshav Mills ing with section 4(1) (a) which deals with \"receipts\" Ltd. and not with section 4( 1) ( c) which refers to \"accruals\" v. and \"arisals\" and to that which is deemed to \"accrue\" Commissioner of or ''arise\").\n\nNow this, in my opinion, is to be contrasted with the words \"accrue\" and \"arise\" which are used in clauses (b) and (c).\n\nThough there may be overlapping in some cases, I do not think the three are intended to mean the same thing. The Privy Council thought in Commissioner of Income-ta.r v. 1Jiathia8( 1) that there is some variation in meaning between them and in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Chun-ilal B. Mehta(') they drew attention to the antithesis between \"accruing and arising in\" and \"received in'', though they also said in the earlier case that there is not a complete disjunction between them and that they are not three mutually exclusive qualifications (page 56); that is, that there may be some overlapping in cert:i, in cases.\n\nNext, we turn to section 6 which divides the various sources of income under various heads for the purposes of computation and chargeability and states that each head shall be \"chargeable\" \"in the manner hereinafter :i, ppearing\". It is to be observed that the word \"shall\" has been user! and not\" may\" thereby implying that there is no option in the matter.\n\nSo far as business is concerned, the he:i, d is No. (iv) \"Profits and gains of business etc.\"'\n\nThat carries us on to sections 10 and 13 which P.rescribe the method of computation. Here again, the language is imperative and in the case of a business the method of computation has to be in accordance with the method of auuounting regularly employed by the assessee: s00 Commissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nKameshwar Singh(·).\n\nNow in the present case, the method of accounting was the mercantile system. The essential difference\n\n(r) [1939] 7 J.T.R. 48 at 56.\n\n(3) [1933] I I.T.R. 94 at IOO and IOI,\n\n(2) [1938] 6 I.T.R. 521 at 527. 125\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nBonibay.\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19!i3 between this and the cash basis system is that in the latter actual receipts and disbursements'are taken into J(e.<; hav Mi'.ll8 account. In the former, sums which are due to the Ltd. v. business are entered on the credit side immediately Commissioner oJthey are legally due and before they are actually\n\nIncome-tax, received and expenditures are entered the moment a Bombay. legal liability to pay arises and before the actual clis-\n\nBose J. bursements.\n\nThe profit or loss at the encl of the accounting year is therefore based, not on a difference between hat was actually received and what was actually paid out, but on the difference between the right to receive and the liability to pay. I find it impossible in such a case to say that the taxation is on income, or profits and gains which were \"received\".\n\nIt can only be on profits which ''accrued\" or \"arose\" to the assessee in the accounting year: see the Privy Council in Feroz Shah v. Commissioner of Income-tax(').\n\nThat, in my opinion, excludes section 4(1) (a) ttnd that in turn means that in such a case a resident is taxed under section 4(1) (b) and r1 non-resident under section 4( 1) ( c ) .\n\n.N'ow, this to my mind is of vital importance. The primary object of the Income-tax Act is to tax and not merely to ascertain rm income. The computation of the income is subsidiary and is only for the purposes of ascertaining the quantum of the tax : see Goimnissioner of Income-tax v. Karne8hwar Singh('). Therefore, if the legislature chooses to lay down different methods of computation and say that the taxation shall be on the amount so computed, it is essential that these methods be adhered to. In some cases this may be to the advantage of the assessee and in others it may operate to his disadvantage. But that is immaterial.\n\nThe importance lies in this. All that can be taxed in a given year are the profits and gains which are received or which arise or accrue in the \" previous\n\nyear\", and if the Act directs that the profits are to bfil computed in a given case on \"accruals\" or \"arisnls\" and not on actual receipts it is essential that that b@\n\n(1) [1933) l I.T.H. 219 at 224 and 225.\n\n(2) [1933] l l.T.R. 94 at IOO.\n\n' ••\n\nj ••\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE~IE COlJRT RE1)0RTS 967\n\ndone ; and it follows from that that the tax in such a 1953 case can only be on the accruals or arisals and not on Kesha11 Mills the actual receipts, for clearly you cannot tax on that\n\nLU. which you are forbidden to compute in a case where v. the tax can only be levied on \\\\httt is computable Gommiseioner ~I under the Act.\n\nIncome-ta.•.\n\nIt is important to draw the distinction for this rea- Bambav. son. The rate of tax varies from year to year, there- Bo•e J. fore if the book profits which are dirPcted to be taxed in a given year are, say, Rs. 10,000 and the actual receipts only Rs. 100, it makes a lot of difference which figure is taken; nor does it even itself out in the long run, for if the rate of taxation inereases in th(' following year and the state of the \\rnsiness is just the reverse, namely that the book profits ?, re only Rs. 100 whereas the actual receipts arising from the previous year's transiwtions are Its. 10,000, it will make a\n\nconsidern hie difference to the asses see in the aggregate of tax payable over the years, whether he pays on the basis of book profits or actual receipts in the two years.\n\nI am not able to draw tt di:; tinction between a resident and a non-resident in thrso matters. I can find no ground for holding that in the case of a resident the mercantile system must he adopted for computing the profits if that is the system of accounting regularly employed but that that need not be done in the case of a non-resident. If the assessee had been a resident company, the taxation would, in my opinion, have been under section 4(1) (b) on profits and gains which had accrued or arisen and not under section 4\n\n(1) (a) on profits which had been received. The same principle must, in my opinion, be applied in the case of a non-resident and therefo1e section 4 ( 1) ( c) is attracted, provided the profits and gains ha Ye actually accrued or arisen in the taxable ten-itorics or they can, because of section 42, he deemed to haYc accrued or arisen there. If section 4 (I) ( c) is not attracted, then the tax cannot be levied.\n\nNow, applying section 4 (I) (c), the question is where do the profits and gains arise or accrue in a casP\n\n968 SUPREME cotrRT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 like the present ? This is not free from. difficulty and Keshav Mills various views have been, and can be, taken. But as Ltd. these expressions have not been defined and as they v. are not words of art, I think they should be construed\n\nCommiSBioner 0! in their ordinary meaning which businessmen would\n\nIncom•tax, ordinarily and easily understand in a business transac-\n\nBombay. tion. When goods are solcl it is to my mind evident\n\n80., .J. that the profit or the loss on any particular transaction arises out of the sale, for until there is a sale there can be no profit.\n\nThe profit may 1{ot be wholly attributable to the sale but that is <tnother\n\nmatter.\n\nIt is to my mind unquestionable that they arise, in part, at any rate, out of th0 sale.\n\nTherefore, ifthe goods are sold in the taxable territories, then, to my mind, the profits, or a portion of them, arise there. As the Privy Council pointed out in Commissioner of J ncome-la.J; v. Chimil1il 13. 1VI ehta(' ), in determining where the profits arise the place of the formation of the contract is not the sole criterion, other matters, as for example acts done under the contract are also material.\n\nI am not here attempting to go behind the clecision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the place of sale is not necessarily the place of the receipt of the profits. I am construing the word \"arise \" and not \"receive\".\n\nThat brings me to the next question, where were the goods in the present case sold? That is a mixed question of fact and law and must vary in each case and must, in my opinion, be answered in a commonsense way and not necessarily in the artificial manner laid down by the Sale of Goods Act to determine where and when the property passes. What are the facts here ? In the case of the Rs. 4 lakhs odd, the control over the corpus of thP goods was retained by the assessee right up to the moment the price was paid; and the price was paid not outside British India but to his nominees in this country, namely, to the assessee's banlrn in .British India. These banks retained the documents of title and had the right to refuse\n\n(!) [1938] 6 J.T.R. SZI at 533\n\n). •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'f REPORTS 969\n\ndelivery until , the money was actually handed over.\n\n195J Therefore, the right to get iiossession of the baoods and Keshav M?°lls to take deliverv accrued or arose in British Indit1 • Ltd, where the money was actually paid, and that to my v. mind must be taken to be the place where the profits Commissioner of accrued and arose for income-tax purposes, not be- Income.tax, cause the money was received there, for we are not Bombay. concemed with actm1l receipts, but because the right s • ., J. which accrued at the date of the transaction was to receive the money in British India and hand over the goods there on the receipt of the money.\n\nAs I haye said, the substance of the transaction must be viewed and that cannot be made to depend upon the method of book-keeping. Even if there are no books the profits on such a transaction would accrue in the place where the money is to be paid and the goods are to be handed oveT.\n\nI eannot see how that can alter by reason of the method of accounting employed. Accordingly, I agree that the method of accounting >1dopted by the assessee cannot affect the substance of the transactions between the parties or affect their nature. The rights and liabilities of the parties inter se cannot be made to depend on the way in which one of them chooses to keep its books. But that is not the case when we come to the question of taxation for income-tax purposes.\n\nThere the method of accounting is vital. But even there the substance of the transaction must be viewed, for the substance cannot alter by a mere method of accounting. It is evident that if the assessee had been n>sident in British India and these transactions had\n\nueen omitted from the books, the sums which ought to have been entered would be taxable as items which had escaped assessment even if there had been no actual receipts in that or in any following year.\n\nTherefore, it is not the entry in the books which attracts the taxation but the profits on the transaction itself, and when the mercantile system is used the profits arise when the right to receive them accrues and not when t.hc entry is made. 1f tho sys-tern is properly employed the e11try is made as soon as the\n\nriht to receive the price arises and so for all practical\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 purposes that is the date ordinarily referred to, lmt a man cannot manipulate the amount' of his tax by Ke8hav Mill~· h h l choosing to enter or not to enter items w ic oug it to\n\nL~. be entered on a particular date, as and when he\n\n'Oo1nmissloner of}Jleases.\n\nlnemne-lax,\n\nBo-mhay.\n\nBose J,\n\nNow, the Rs. 4 lakhs odd represent actual receipts but that is not what is taxable when the computation is based on the mercantile system. What should be taxed, or rather taken into account for the purposes of taxation, are the figures entered in the accounting year as the sale price of the various transactions which the Rs. 4 lakhs represent. The profits which ttrise out of these transactions do not, on my view, escape tax because the profits accrue or arise in the taxable territories.\n\nBut the figure on which the tax is to be computed is not the 4 lakhs odd which represent the actual receipts but another figure which unfortunately we have not been given. I am of course assuming that the figures were duly entered in the books at the proper time in accordance with the mercantile system of accounting. If they were not, then the Income-tax authorities have power to tax income which, for one reason or another, has escaped assessment.\n\nTurning to the Rs. 12 lakhs.\n\nWe know that the figure entered in the books relating to these transactions was Iis. 13,41,744. I am not clear whether that was entered in the accounting year with which we are concerned, though I gathered that that was the case.\n\nThe actual receipts, which followed later, amounted to only Rs. 12,68,480. In my opinion, if anything is computable for the purposes of tax, it is the former figure (assuming all the entries arc in the accounting year) and not the latter. But in order to determine whether the profits on these transactions :ire taxable at all, we must examine the transactions.\n\nIn these cases the sales were to merchants reident in Ahmedabad. But according to the assessee's affidavit,\n\n\" In respect of buyers from Ahmedabad, the applicant Mills have no account of such buyers.\n\nThe\n\nprice is debited to the account of the said Jagmohandas 195t Raml:11 and company and credited to the sales Keshav Mill• account in the books of the applicant:\" Lid. and later, Jagmohandas v. \"discharges its debts by making payments to the Commissioner of applicants from time to time towards the balance 1n;, ome-1\"\"'• in their said account in the books of the applicant omhay.\n\nMills. The said amounts arc paid by the said firm by Bose J. paying the same to the credit of the applicant Mills with British Indian banks or shroffs.\"\n\nNow, it is evident from this that Jagmohandas & Company do not merely guarantee payment by tho Ahmedabad buyers but actually make the payments, or the equivalent of payments, to the assessee company. So little do the buyers matter that their transactions are not even reflected in the accounts.\n\nAll we have is Jagmohandas. It does not, in my opinion,' matter whether the actual buyers remained primarily and legally responsible to the assessee or not.\n\nThe fact remains that in practice Jagrnohandas & Company actually met the obligations of the buyers and discharged their liabilities to the assessee. It is equally clear that Jagmohandas & Company must have recouped themselves in some way from the buyers.\n\nThe question is how. If tho whole of the transactions occurred outside British India and the buyers or their agents went to Petlad and received the goods there and pa.id Jagmohandas & Company outside British India, thf'n I am clear that the profits and gains did not accrue or arise in British India, simply because the goods were ultimately brought there. But if Jagmohancbs & Company or their agents were paid in British 1ndia, the profits and gains, in my opinion, arose there in the same way as in the 4 lakhs c>Lse. If Jagmohandas & Company were the actual agents of the assessee as were the banks in the other case, and the payments were made in the taxable territories, then the accrual and arising was direct. If, however, they were not the agents in the strict sense of the term, then I am of opinion that section 42 would be attracted because at the very least there would be a \"business connection\",\n\n1953 provided of course the payments were made in the taxable territories.\n\nKeshav Mills Ltd.\n\nNow, here again, I am looking to what was actually v. done in order to determine what the rights were, for Commi,, ioner of it is evident that what was done was done in pursuance\n\nIncomctax, of some agreement, express or implied, between the Bombay. h h 1 d h h parties w ic . agreement regu ate t eir rig ts, and Bose J, those rights in turn determine the place where the profits accrued or arose, or must, because of section 42, be deemed to have accrued or arisen.\n\nIn my view, the question referred by the Incometax Appellate Tribunal in its statement of the case does not reflect the trnc position because it concentrates on the actual receipts. If the cash basis system of accounting was germane here, then I would agree that the Rs. 4,40,878 was part of the assessee's income in British India, and so also in the other case, provided the payments were made in British India.\n\nBut it is misleading to enquire what wou 1d have happened in circumstances which are not material in this case because of the mercantile system of accounting which was employed.\n\nAs regards the High Court. The learned Judges reframed the question and answered it without sending the case back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for a further statement of the case.\n\nThat was not Htrictly proper.\n\nHut, in my opinion, the reframed questions suffer from the same defect.\n\nIn my opinion, the case should be sent back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for a reframing of the questions along the lines I hnYe indicated and for a further statement of the case.\n\nAppeal di8missed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "KESHAV MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KESHAV MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VrnAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 170, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Bhagwati J. Bose", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 210, "end_char": 215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 535, "end_char": 539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 621, "end_char": 634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A non-resident company manufactured textile goods at Poutside British India and sold the goods ex-mills."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 762, "end_char": 771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A firm, R & Co., guaranteed the sale-price of goods sold ex-mills by the company to purchasers at Ahmedabad within British India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1222, "end_char": 1227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R & Co., collected the amounts of the bills from the purchasers on behalf of the company and c1edited the snms realised in the company's\n\n\"°count with banks at Ahmedabad and also disbursed them to creditors of the company in British India."}}, {"text": "llfelw Chand Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2290, "end_char": 2310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question as reframed by the High Conrt was whether these two sums were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessees to merchants in British India and whether they were received in British India and could be included in the assessable income of tho company in British India: Held, per llfelw Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das and Bhagwati J J., (Vivian Bose J. dissenting) that tbe two amounts in question were sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the company to merchants in British India; that they were neither received by the company nor could be deemed to have been received by it w!ien the entries were µiacje in the books of account at P but \\iad\n\n196J merely accrued ot arisen to it there; that they were first received by R & Co. and by the banks through whom the railway receipts were negotiated on behalf of the company in British India; <tnd Kesliav Mills that they were therefore liable to t<tx under s. 4(1) (a) of the Lt4, Indian Income.tax Act as having been t•eceived in 13ritish India on v. its behalf."}}, {"text": "S. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2312, "end_char": 2321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question as reframed by the High Conrt was whether these two sums were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessees to merchants in British India and whether they were received in British India and could be included in the assessable income of tho company in British India: Held, per llfelw Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das and Bhagwati J J., (Vivian Bose J. dissenting) that tbe two amounts in question were sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the company to merchants in British India; that they were neither received by the company nor could be deemed to have been received by it w!ien the entries were µiacje in the books of account at P but \\iad\n\n196J merely accrued ot arisen to it there; that they were first received by R & Co. and by the banks through whom the railway receipts were negotiated on behalf of the company in British India; <tnd Kesliav Mills that they were therefore liable to t<tx under s. 4(1) (a) of the Lt4, Indian Income.tax Act as having been t•eceived in 13ritish India on v. its behalf."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2326, "end_char": 2334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question as reframed by the High Conrt was whether these two sums were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessees to merchants in British India and whether they were received in British India and could be included in the assessable income of tho company in British India: Held, per llfelw Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das and Bhagwati J J., (Vivian Bose J. dissenting) that tbe two amounts in question were sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the company to merchants in British India; that they were neither received by the company nor could be deemed to have been received by it w!ien the entries were µiacje in the books of account at P but \\iad\n\n196J merely accrued ot arisen to it there; that they were first received by R & Co. and by the banks through whom the railway receipts were negotiated on behalf of the company in British India; <tnd Kesliav Mills that they were therefore liable to t<tx under s. 4(1) (a) of the Lt4, Indian Income.tax Act as having been t•eceived in 13ritish India on v. its behalf.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati J. Bose"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2342, "end_char": 2353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question as reframed by the High Conrt was whether these two sums were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessees to merchants in British India and whether they were received in British India and could be included in the assessable income of tho company in British India: Held, per llfelw Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das and Bhagwati J J., (Vivian Bose J. dissenting) that tbe two amounts in question were sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the company to merchants in British India; that they were neither received by the company nor could be deemed to have been received by it w!ien the entries were µiacje in the books of account at P but \\iad\n\n196J merely accrued ot arisen to it there; that they were first received by R & Co. and by the banks through whom the railway receipts were negotiated on behalf of the company in British India; <tnd Kesliav Mills that they were therefore liable to t<tx under s. 4(1) (a) of the Lt4, Indian Income.tax Act as having been t•eceived in 13ritish India on v. its behalf."}}, {"text": "tnd Kesliav Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question as reframed by the High Conrt was whether these two sums were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessees to merchants in British India and whether they were received in British India and could be included in the assessable income of tho company in British India: Held, per llfelw Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das and Bhagwati J J., (Vivian Bose J. dissenting) that tbe two amounts in question were sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the company to merchants in British India; that they were neither received by the company nor could be deemed to have been received by it w!ien the entries were µiacje in the books of account at P but \\iad\n\n196J merely accrued ot arisen to it there; that they were first received by R & Co. and by the banks through whom the railway receipts were negotiated on behalf of the company in British India; <tnd Kesliav Mills that they were therefore liable to t<tx under s. 4(1) (a) of the Lt4, Indian Income.tax Act as having been t•eceived in 13ritish India on v. its behalf."}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3415, "end_char": 3425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bvse", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3819, "end_char": 3823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bvse J.-In the case of accounts kept in the mercantile system, the profit or loss at the end of the accounting year is based not on a difference between \\Vhat \\Vas actually received and what was actually paid out, but on the difference between the right to receive and the liability to pay. '"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4368, "end_char": 4378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4404, "end_char": 4411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4427, "end_char": 4434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5046, "end_char": 5050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5984, "end_char": 5995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "September, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Income-tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6000, "end_char": 6009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "September, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Income-tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "R. J. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6054, "end_char": 6065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah and N. A. Palkiwalla for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkiwalla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6070, "end_char": 6086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah and N. A. Palkiwalla for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6107, "end_char": 6121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P.A.\n\nMehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P.A.\n\nMehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6152, "end_char": 6163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P.A.\n\nMehta, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mehr Chand Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6230, "end_char": 6248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan J., Das J. and Bhagwati .J. was delivered by Bhagwati J. Bose J. delivered a separate judgment.", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6253, "end_char": 6256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan J., Das J. and Bhagwati .J. was delivered by Bhagwati J. Bose J. delivered a separate judgment."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati J. Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6294, "end_char": 6310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan J., Das J. and Bhagwati .J. was delivered by Bhagwati J. Bose J. delivered a separate judgment.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati J. Bose"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6411, "end_char": 6445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 66 ( 1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, whereby the High Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal that two amounts of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6506, "end_char": 6516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6529, "end_char": 6556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Baroda State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6888, "end_char": 6900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a company registered in the Baroda State, as it then was, prior to its merger with India."}}, {"text": "Petlad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6982, "end_char": 6988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It manufactmes textile goods in Petlad in the Baroda State and after the goods are manufactured they are sold by the company ex-mills."}}, {"text": "Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company employs Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. as guaranteed brokers."}}, {"text": "ofAhmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8554, "end_char": 8565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13,41,744 which represented sales made by the company to merchants ofAhmedabad whose payments were guaranteed by that firm, and credited the sales account with the amount of the bills. }"}}, {"text": "Keshav Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9231, "end_char": 9248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Keshav Mills Ltd.\n\nAs regards item (b) the eompany received Rs . ."}}, {"text": "Bhaywati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9575, "end_char": 9583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t e cost o trans1 _rom e m1 premises o t e station on the merchants m favour of recognised banks and\n\nBhaywati J. shroffs in British India, by sending the same to those banks or shroffs with the railway receipts duly endorsed in favour of the merchants and by instructing the banks or shroffs to recover the amounts including the costs of transmitting the same to them.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati J. Bose"}}, {"text": "Keshav Mills British India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15568, "end_char": 15594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J agmohandas Ramanlal & Co. in Keshav Mills British India and were either credited bv Messrs.\n\nLtd . •"}}, {"text": "Petlad. Prima", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16621, "end_char": 16634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,10,878 even though the amounts of the Bhagv•ati J. sales bills were debited in the first instance by the company to the accounts of the respective merchants in the books of account at Petlad the relative railway receipts were sent by the company to banks or shroffs in British India together with drafts or hundies in connection with the same with instructions that deliverv of the railway receipts should he given to the respective merchants against payment and the amounts of the s<tles bills were thus paid by the respective merclrnn ts to the banks or shroffs in British India and were tmtrnmitted under the instructions of the company by the banks and shroffs in British India to the company at Petlad."}}, {"text": "fagmohandas Ranmnlal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16739, "end_char": 16765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prima facie therefore the amounts of the sales bills in both the citses whether they were paid to )fo,:irn .. fagmohandas Ranmnlal & Co. or to the banks or Rhroffs through \\1hom the railway receipts were negotiated were paid by the mercha1its in British India and were received by Messrs .. Tagrnohandas Ramanlal & Co. and the banks or shroffs on behalf of the company in British Indin."}}, {"text": "Tagrnohandas Ramanlal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16920, "end_char": 16947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prima facie therefore the amounts of the sales bills in both the citses whether they were paid to )fo,:irn .. fagmohandas Ranmnlal & Co. or to the banks or Rhroffs through \\1hom the railway receipts were negotiated were paid by the mercha1its in British India and were received by Messrs .. Tagrnohandas Ramanlal & Co. and the banks or shroffs on behalf of the company in British Indin."}}, {"text": "British Indin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17001, "end_char": 17014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prima facie therefore the amounts of the sales bills in both the citses whether they were paid to )fo,:irn .. fagmohandas Ranmnlal & Co. or to the banks or Rhroffs through \\1hom the railway receipts were negotiated were paid by the mercha1its in British India and were received by Messrs .. Tagrnohandas Ramanlal & Co. and the banks or shroffs on behalf of the company in British Indin."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17064, "end_char": 17073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17461, "end_char": 17473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17558, "end_char": 17568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17799, "end_char": 17809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17820, "end_char": 17830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keshan Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17885, "end_char": 17897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company however sought exemption from liability to tax on the grounds (a) that the accounts of the company were kept on the mercantile or book profit basis under which the accrual of profit as shown in the account was the criterion of taxability and section 4(1)\n\n(a) had no application at all; (h) that it was obligatory on the authorities under section 13 of the Act to accept that systPm of maintaining accounts except under the proviso to that section and that the method of computation there was made the very basis of 124\n\n958 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS [1953]\n\n19.13 chargeability and section 10 read with section 13 operated to save these amounts from chargeability and Keshan Mills d ' d\n\n(c) that the amounts having been treate as receive Ltd. v... when credit entries were made in the books of account,\n\nOommiBaioner ~I and chargeability having crystallised on the date when\n\nIncome-tax, the income accrued or was treated as received, there 8 1:!.nbay."}}, {"text": "Kolah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19529, "end_char": 19534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kolah appearing for the company drew our attention to the following cases:~ Subramaniyan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Incometax('), Ahmed Din Allad-itta v. Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Keshav Mills", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19995, "end_char": 20007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Keshav Mills The assessees there were all residents in British India Ltd. and maintained their books of account according to v. the mercantile system.", "canonical_name": "KESHAV MILLS LTD"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20313, "end_char": 20319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Except in the case of Commis- Commi••ioner of sioner of Income-tax v. Singari Bai(') where the assess- Income-tax, ment was in respect of the total ineome or profits, Bombay."}}, {"text": "British India or deemed under the provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20815, "end_char": 20870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21578, "end_char": 21587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "British India or deemed under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "British India or deemed under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22233, "end_char": 22243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22350, "end_char": 22360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22575, "end_char": 22584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23305, "end_char": 23315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26015, "end_char": 26025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26047, "end_char": 26057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26067, "end_char": 26079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26081, "end_char": 26094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26103, "end_char": 26114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beaumont", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26162, "end_char": 26170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See the observations of Beaumont ('.J. in Commissioner of lncorne-ta; c, Bombay v. New India Assw1- ance Co. Ltd.(1 )."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27160, "end_char": 27172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27426, "end_char": 27431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Kania J, in B. ; JI."}}, {"text": ". Kamdar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27445, "end_char": 27453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Kania J, in B. ; JI."}}, {"text": "Jagmohandas Ramanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28859, "end_char": 28879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had merely accrued or arisen to it and so far as the receipt thereof is concerned they were first received in British India when \\hey were received by Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal\n\n(r) [r946] r4 l.T.R. 14 at p. 39,\n\n(z) [1931] 58 l.A. z39.", "canonical_name": "Jagmohandas Ramanlal"}}, {"text": "J agmohandas Ramanlal & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29219, "end_char": 29246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first receipt of the moneys was therefore Ltd. when they were paid as such by the merchants to v.\n\nMessrs. J agmohandas Ramanlal & Co. or to the various GommiBBioner of banks or shroffs as above."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29536, "end_char": 29545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29754, "end_char": 29764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30743, "end_char": 30752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32011, "end_char": 32020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32228, "end_char": 32241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32360, "end_char": 32369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32473, "end_char": 32486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32537, "end_char": 32546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33417, "end_char": 33429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33480, "end_char": 33493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34374, "end_char": 34383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 10 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34835, "end_char": 34853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s00", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35083, "end_char": 35086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35844, "end_char": 35848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "legal liability to pay arises and before the actual clis-\n\nBose J. bursements."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36417, "end_char": 36429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36504, "end_char": 36516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36547, "end_char": 36560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36643, "end_char": 36657, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39223, "end_char": 39235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39303, "end_char": 39312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39453, "end_char": 39462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39602, "end_char": 39612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39660, "end_char": 39669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39743, "end_char": 39752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Keshav Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39933, "end_char": 39945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "difficulty and Keshav Mills various views have been, and can be, taken."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41096, "end_char": 41109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am not here attempting to go behind the clecision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the place of sale is not necessarily the place of the receipt of the profits."}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41533, "end_char": 41550, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Keshav Mill•", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46520, "end_char": 46532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nprice is debited to the account of the said Jagmohandas 195t Raml:11 and company and credited to the sales Keshav Mill• account in the books of the applicant:\" Lid."}}, {"text": "Jagmohandas & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46980, "end_char": 47001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it is evident from this that Jagmohandas & Company do not merely guarantee payment by tho Ahmedabad buyers but actually make the payments, or the equivalent of payments, to the assessee company."}}, {"text": "Jagmohandas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47257, "end_char": 47268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All we have is Jagmohandas.", "canonical_name": "Jagmohandas Ramanlal"}}, {"text": "Jagrnohandas & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47434, "end_char": 47456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact remains that in practice Jagrnohandas & Company actually met the obligations of the buyers and discharged their liabilities to the assessee."}}, {"text": "Jagmohancbs & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48021, "end_char": 48042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But if Jagmohancbs & Company or their agents were paid in British 1ndia, the profits and gains, in my opinion, arose there in the same way as in the 4 lakhs c>Lse."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48472, "end_char": 48482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49083, "end_char": 49093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Incometax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49174, "end_char": 49202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my view, the question referred by the Incometax Appellate Tribunal in its statement of the case does not reflect the trnc position because it concentrates on the actual receipts."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50070, "end_char": 50099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion, the case should be sent back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for a reframing of the questions along the lines I hnYe indicated and for a further statement of the case."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50253, "end_char": 50268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50298, "end_char": 50316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_973_986_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "' ,; .\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 973 .\n\nMAGGA AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), ss. 284, 285, 539-Assessois-Trial with three assessors-Absence of one assessor during trial-Substitution of new person-Legality of trial-Re-appearance of absent assessor-Continuing trial with four assessors- Va, lidity of trial.\n\nSection 285 of the Criminal Procedure Code permits a trial commenced with the aid of three assessors to be continued and completed with the aid of less than three if during the course of the trial any assessor is prevented by sufficient cause from attending. It does not, however, authorise the substitution of an assessor for an absent one nor an addition to the number of assessors during the course of the trial.\n\nA, B and 0 were summoned to sit as assessors for a murder trial and as C did not appear, D who was i11 tl1e list of assessors and who was present in court though not su111moned, was asked to sit as an assessor, and the trial commenced \\\\'ith three assessors A, B and D.\n\nA absented himself during the course of the trial and the judge asked E to sit in place of A and proceeded with the trial for some days with B, D and E. Later on A appeared and the trial continued till the end with the four assessors A, B, D and E: Held, (i) that the mere fact that D who had not been summoned was allowed to sit as an assessor when the trial commenced did not vitiate the trial as it was a mere irregularity and did not cause any failure of justice; King Emperor v. Ramsidh Rai (39 Cr. L.J. 725) approved.\n\nBalak Singh v. Emperor (A.LR. 1918 Pat. 420) explained.\n\n(ii) though sub-sectiou (1) of s. 285 imposes a duty on \\be judge to find ont whether there was sufficient cause for the absence of an assessor and to consider \\.Vbether it is not possible to enforce his attendance, it should be presumed that he has done so when be proceeds with the trial in his absence and a mere omission to record reasons for proceeding with the trial without the absent assessor would not by itself vitiate the trial ; {iii) a sessions judge, however, has no jurisdiction to substitute another person for any assessor \\Vho absents himself rlnring the trial or to reinstate the absent assessor \\Vhen be re-appears and continue the trial with four asses3ors \\vhen the trial commenced with three assessors, an(\\ the trial in question was there~ lore illegal.\n\nFeb.16.\n\nnnd Another\n\n'J'he Sfa.fe of\n\nRajnsthnn.\n\nS-CPRE:\\IE COURT REPORTS [1053]\n\nKing Emperor v. Tirwnal Reddi (I.L.R. 24 Mad. 523) distin guished.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Ap. peal No. 103of1952. Appeal under article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 27th October, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Rajasthan at Jodhpur (Wanchoo C.J. and Bapna .T.) in D.B. Criminal Murder Reference No. 2 of .1952, arising out of the .Judgment and Order dated the lst July, 1952, of the Court of the Sessions Judge, Pali, in Criminal Original Case No. 2 of 1951.\n\nH. J. Urnrigar for the appellants.\n\nPorus A. 111 ehta for the respondent.\n\n1953. February 16.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal under article 1:34(1) ( c) of the Constitution of India, by Magga and Bhagga, who have been convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code, for the triple murders of Ganesh, Gheesa and Hardas.\n\nThe case relates to an incident which took place on the night between the 3rd and 4th April, 1951. Gheesa and Ganesh, deceased, Ratna, Govind, another Ganesh who is a witness in the case, and Hardas had gone to \"Imaratia \" a well in village Gadwara on that night to keep watch over the crops there. Gheesa slept in one shed near the well, while Hardas slept in another shed some distance away, and Ratna slept in a third shed near the entrance gate. Ganesh, deceased, Ganesh (P., V.), and Govind slept on the threshing floor further away from the well. Some time after midnight Ratna woke up on hearing the cries of Gheesa. It is alleged that he then saw the two accused beating Gheesa, accused Magga having in his hand a farsi and accused Bhagga having a katari and an axe. Hardas, who woke up on hearing the cries, rushed to the aid of Gheesa and thereupon the two accused.. Magga and Bhagga, fell upon him and attacked him with farsi and axe. Ratna,\n\n,'\\.\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COlHtT REPORTS 975\n\nran away and hid himself near the well. On an alarm being raised, one Krishna who was working on a nearby well came and witnessed the attack on Hardas. The accused, after finishing Gheesa and Hardas went to the threshing floor where Ganesh, deceased, was sleeping.\n\nThere Magga asked Bhagga to hit Ganesh with the axe and Bhagga immediately hit Ganesh with the axe and he fell down. Thereafter Magga hit Ganesh two or three times with the farsi on the legs and Bhagga cut the neck of Ganesh with the katari. Govind (P.W.) entreated on behalf of Ganesh but he was threatened and was told that if he did not keep quiet he would also be killed. Without injuring Govind and Ganesh (P.Ws.) the accused then left the place.\n\nInformation of the incident was carried to the village by Ratna and a report of it was made to the police at 11-30 a.rn. on 4th April, 1951. In the report it was stated that \" Bhagga and Magga are standing at their house with swords and are saying that they would kill more persons. Village people are surrounding them outside the house''. The sub-inspector of police, when he arrived at the village, found the house of the accused surrounded by the village people. The door of the house was dosed from inside and the accused were standing on the chabutra inside. Magga had a farsi in his hand and Bhagga had an unsheathed sword.\n\nThe sub-inspector got the door opened, arrested the accused, and took possession of the farsi and the sword. He also recovered the axe and a katari which were bloodstained. The clothes of the accused were also taken possession of after the arrest and they appeared to have bloodstai1rn on them.\n\nThe acuused pleaded not guilty. They admitted their partnership in cultivation at \"Imaratia \" well with the deceased but denied that any quarr<!l took place between them and tbe otber partners about the cutting of the crop. They also denied that the~· had gone to the well armed with various weapons aml had committed the murder ofGheesa, Hardas and Ganesh.\n\nThe sessions judge on the evidence led by the prosecution fo!t satisfied that the prosecution case was\n\nMagga and Another v.\n\nTheStaU of Rajasthan.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nMuggrt\n\nluul, Another v. 'l.'lw State of\n\nRajasthan.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n976 SUPREME COURi' kEPOR'.i's [1953]\n\nproved beyond all reasonable doubt. It ; was held that the murder was brutal and advantage had been taken of the persons who were sleeping to kill them. In the result the appellants were convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to death.\n\nThe sentence of death passed on them by the sessions judge was confirmed by the High Court after examining the evidence afresh. In the High Court a contention was raised that the whole trial was vitiated inasmuch as it had not been conducted in accordance with procedure prescribed by law. This contention was negatived on the ground that the irregularities committed in the course of the trial were such as were cured by the provisions of section 537, Criminal Procedure Code. As the objection raised concerned the validity of the trial the case was certified as a fit one for appeal to this Court.\n\nThe facts which concern the validity of the trial, shortly stated, are these : The trial began on 22nd March, 1952. Three assessors had been summoned for that date. Of these two were present while the third did not come. Thereupon one person who was present in the court premises and whose name was in the list of assessors but who had not been summoned in the manner prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure was chosen as an assessor. The trial then began with the three assessors so chosen, viz., Jethmal, Balkrishna and Asharam. On the 6th June, 1952, Jethmal, one of the assessors absented himself and for some reason, which is not clear from the record, one Chimniram was asked to sit in place of Jethmal as an assessor with the result that on the 6th June, 1952, there were three assessors, viz., Balkrishna and Asharam, who had been sitting from the beginning of the trial, and Chimniram who was introduced for the first time that day. On the 23rd .June also Chimniram, Balkrishna and Asharam sat as assessors. On 27th June, however, Jethmal re-appeared and was allowed to sit and since that date four assessors sat throughout, viz., Jethmal, Chimniram, Balkrishna and Asharam. Eventually all these four assessors gave their opinion on the first\n\n' ...\n\n) .. '\n\nJuly, 1952, wqen the trial came to an end. It was contended that the trial was bad as it took place in defiance of the provisions of sections 284 and 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that such an illegality could not qe cured by the provisions of section 537 of the Code.\n\nIn order to judge of the validity of this objection it is necessary to set out the provisions of the Code relevant to this matter. Section 284 provides that, \"When the trial is to be held with the aid of assessors, not less than three and, if possible, four shall be chosen from the persons summoned to act as such\". The section as it originally stood required that \" two or more shall be chosen as the Judge thinks fit\", so that there had to be a minimum of two assessors. In the year 1923, that provision was amended so as to make a minimum of three assessors an essential requisite for a trial to be held with the aid of assessors. A trial commenced with less than three assessors is not authorised by the provisions of this section as it now stands. Therefore, unless a case comes within the provisions of the next following section 285, a trial held in defiance of the provisions of section 284 would not be legal. Section 285, however, has no application to cases where a trial is commenced with less than three assessors. [Vide Balak Singh v. Emperar (1); Sipattar Singh\n\nv. King-Emperor(')]. Section 285 provides:- . \"( 1) If in the course of a trial with the aid of assessors, at any time before the finding, any assessor is from any sufficient cause, prevented from attending throughout the trial, or absents himself, and it is not practicable to enforce his attendance, the trial shall proceed with the aid of the other assessor or assessors.\n\n(2) If all the assessors are prevented from attending or absent themselves, the proceedings shall be stayed and a new trial shall be held with the aid of fresh assessors.\"\n\nIn cases contemplated by this section a trial commenced with the aid of three assessors can be\n\n(1) A.I.I{. 191.S Fat. 420.\n\n(2) A.I.IL 19,2 All. qo.\n\nMagga und Another v. 'l.'he State of Rajasthan.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n1liagga and Arwthe-r\n\nThe State of flajasthan.\n\nJ.liahaja.n .J.\n\n978 SUPREME coURii REPORTS [1953j\n\ncontinued and finished with the aid of.less than three assessors. This section, howeve-r, does neither authorize the substitution of an assessor for an absent assessor, nor does it authorise an addition of rt11 assessor to the number of assessors during the c:ourse of the trial.\n\nThe effect of the provisions of sections 284 and 285 is that a trial cannot be va, lidly commenced with less than three assessors chosen in the manner prescribed by the Code, but once validly commenced it can be continued in certain cases to a finish if some, though not all, of the persons originally appointed, attend throughout the trial. lf all of them do not attend, then a fresh trial has to be held. An addition in the number of the assessors or a change or substitution in their personnel during the course of the trial is not warranted by the Code; on the other hand, it is implicitly prohibited.\n\nThe procedure prescribed by section 285(1) is not of a permissive nature. It has to be followed if the conditiorn; prescribed are fulfilled, and like section 285(2) it is nf a mandatory character. No scope is loft in these provisions for the exercise of the discretion of the judge for wpplementing these provisiorn and for holding a trial in a manner different from the one prescribed aml for conducting it witfi the aid of some assessors originally appointed, itml also with the aid of some others recruited during the trial.\n\nSection 309 provides that when a trial is concluded, the court may sum up the evidence for the prosecution and defence and shall then require each of the assessors to state his opinion orally and shall record such opinions. Sub-clause (2) of this section enacts that the judge shall then give judgment, but in doing so shall not be bound to conform to the opinions of the assessors.\n\nSections 326 and 327 enact the method and manner of summoning assessors and jurors. Section 537 provides as follows:-\n\n''Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Chapter XX VII or on appeal or revision Oil account-\n\n.. '\n\n) ,.\n\n(a) of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, sutiunonH, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proeeediugs before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this ('ode, or ...\n\n( c) of the omission to revise any list of jurors or assessors in accordance with section 324, or\n\n(cl) of any misdirection in any charge to a jury, uJ1less such error, omission, irregularity or misclirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.\"\n\nThe first objection that was taken in the High Court to the validity of the trial was that Asharam who had not been summoned as an assessor could not be appointed as such and hence it should be held that the trial commenced with a minimum of two assessors in defiance of the provisions of section 284.\n\nWhat happened was this: On the date fixed for the trial there was a deficiency in the number of persons who had been summoned and who appeared to act as assessors, the court then sent for Asharam whose name was in the list of assessors and ordered him to sit as an assessor. The High Court took the view, and we think rightly, tha.t the circumstance that the formality of issuing a summons was not gone through was a mere irregularity which was curable under section 537 of the Code, as there was no failure of justice caused on account of that irregularity and that the trial on that account could not be held to be bad. This view is in accord with the decision of the Calcutta High Court in King-Emperor v. Rainsidh Rai(') with which we agree.\n\nWe are constrained, however, to observe that the High Court did not fully appreciate the decision of the Patna High Court in Balak Singh v. Jtm.peror('), when it said that that decision held a trial bad where a person was ehosen as an assessor who had uut been summoned. In that case during the examination of the Jirst witness only one qualified assessor was present in court and capable of acting as such, the judge ordered another pernon who happened to be present in court hut was not in the official list of assessors to act as an\n\n(r) 39 Crl. L.J. 725. (2) A.I.R. r9r8 Pat. 420,\n\n19.!3\n\nMagga and Another\n\nv, 'PM State of\n\nRaja, sth.nn,\n\nMahajan J.\n\n.2llagga and Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nRaja8than.\n\nA-lahaja, n J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\nassessor, and it was held that as the tri:i, l commenced with only one assessor and not with two duly qualified assessors the trial was abortive and contrary to law.\n\nNo exception could therefore be taken to the rule stated in this decision.\n\nThe second objection against the validity of the trial taken before the High Court was founded on section 285.\n\nIt was contended that when one of the assessors appointed absented himself the court was bound, under section 285, to ascertain before proceeding further with the trial whether the absence of the assessor was due to sufficient cause and whether it was practicable to enforce his attendance and that the judge in this case failed to observe this condition which alone entitled him to continue the trial with the remaining assessors and that the defect was fatal to the validity of the trial. The High Court held that though there was non-compliance with the provisions of section 285 in the case, this irregularity was cured by section 537 as it had not in fact caused failure of justice. We agree with the High Court in this conclusion. It is no doubt true that the section enjoins on the judge a duty to find whether there is a sufficient cause for the non-attendance of an assessor and whether it is not practicable to enforce his attendance, and ordinarily the proceedings must represent on their face whether this duty has been performed, but we think that such an omission on his part does not necessarily vitiate the trial.\n\nWe are further of the opinion that when a judge proceeds with a trial in the absence of one or two of the assessors with the aid of the remaining assessor or assessors, it may be presumed that he has done so because he was satisfied that it was not practicable to enforce the attendance of the absent assessor or assessors and that there was sufficient cause for his or their non-attendance.\n\nIf, however, there is evidence to a contrary effect, the matter may be different. Failure to record an order indicating the reasons for proceeding with the trial with the aid of the remaining assessors can at best be an irregularity or an omission which must be held to\n\n' . '\n\n' _, .\n\nbe such as to come within the reach of section 537 unless it has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. It could not be seriously argued that such an omission can lead to such a result.\n\nFinally the learned counsel contended, also relying on section 285, that the sessions judge had no jurisdiction or power to substitute an assessor or to reinstate the absent assessor, or to add to the number of assessors.\n\nWhen the point was raised before the High Court, it fully realized that there was no provision in law which permitted such substitution of an absent assessor by another assessor or the subsequent reinstatement of an absent assessor as had been done in this case.\n\nIt, however, felt that the irregularity was of the same nature as non-compliance with the provisions of section 285, and as such was cured by section 537 of the Code. In regard to the addition of an assessor during the trial it said :-\n\n\"We have not been able to find any reported case where an assessor harl been added in the middle of the trial as has been done by the learned judge. That is perhaps due to the fact that no judge ever did Buch an obviously silly thing, but considering that the trial, in any case, continued with the aid of two assessors who were there throughout, there was, in our opinion, substantial compliance with the mode of trial provided in the Code and the irregularity committed by the addition of Chimniram in June, 1952, is curable under section 537 as it did not occasion any failure of justice.\n\nThe sessions judge was still the court of competent jurisdi0tion to try the case and all that he did was to add unnecessarilv one more assessor to advise him when he had no businss to do so. We can ignore his presence altogether and as the irregularity has not caused failure of justice, the trial will not be vitiated\".\n\nIn our judgment, the High Court was in error in this view.\n\nThe sessions judge during the progress of the trial not only made a change in the personnel of the assessors originally appointed and also added to their number, ln1t )le actually took the opinions 127\n\nMa, ga and Another\n\nThe State of Rajasthan,\n\nMa, hajan J.\n\nMagga and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nRajasthan..\n\n}, f aha;\"an J.\n\nof all the four assessors as required by the provisions of section 309 of the Code, and acted in accordance with those opinions in convicting the two appellants. It is plain that a unanimous verdict of four assessors is bound to weigh much more with a judge than the opinion of two persons. \\Ve have not been able to understand how the High Court could ignore the presence of assessors altogether who had given their opinions and which opinions had been accepted by the judge. The opinion of an assessor is exercised in the judicial function imposed upon him by law, and the judge is bound to take it into consideration and he cannot dispense with it.\n\nThe judge considered this trial as if he had commenced it with the aid of four assessors, and taking into consideration their opinion, he convicted the appellants.\n\nIt is difficult to assess the value which the judge gave to the opinions of the assessors at the time of arriving at his finding and the High Court was in error in thinking that it did no harm and caused no prejudice. We ca1mot subscribe to the view of the High Court that the trial should be taken as having been conducted with the aid of the two assessors as sanctioned bv section 285, Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThat is not what actually happened. It is difficult to convert a trial held partly with the aid of three assessors and partly with the r1id of fom assessors into one held with the aid of two assessors only. At no stage was the trial held with the aid of two assessors only.\n\nThe third substituted assessor attended a part of the trial and the added fourth assessor also attended a part of it. None of these two were present throughout. Thus the trial when it concluded was a different trial from the one which was commenced under the provisions of section 284, Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nTo a situation like this we think section .537 cannot be called in aid.\n\nSuch a trial is not known to the Code and it seems implicitly prohibited by the provisions of sections 284 and 285.\n\nWhat happened in this case cannot be described as a mere error, omission or irregularity in the course of the trial. It is much more serious. H\n\n' ...\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPHEME UOUR'i' REPOR, TS 983\n\namounts to holding a trial in violation of the provisions of the Uode and goes to the root of the matter and the illegality is of a <·.haracter that it vitiates the whole proceedings.\n\nAs observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Subramania Iyer v. King-Emperor('), disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial cannot be regarded as a mere irregularity.\n\nIn Abdu.Z Rahman v. King-Emperor{'), the distinction between cases which fall within the rule of section 537 and those which are outside it was pointed out by Lord Phillimore. There it was said that tlw distinction between Subramania, Iyer'8 ca .. e (1) and that case in which there was an irregularity in <>omplying with the provisions of section 360 of tht' Cmk lnlS fairly obvious.\n\nIn Subramania lyer's case (1) the pnwedure adopted was one which the Code positiYely prohibits and it . was possible that it might have worked actual injustice to the accused but that the error in not reading the statements of witnesses to them was of a different character, and such an omission was not fatal.\n\nIn Pululcurti Kotayya v. 1\\. ing-Emperor(\") their Lordships again examined this qm'stion. That wtts a cas¥ where there had been a breach of th0 provisions of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, and it was held that in the peculiar eircumstances of that case it had not prejudiced the accused and the ca, se therefor\" fell under section 537 and that the trial was vaJid notwithstanding the breach of section 162.\n\nSir John Beaumont in delivering the decision of the Board made the following observations which bring out the distinction between the two sets of cases : --\n\n\"There are, no doubt, authorities in India which lend some support to !\\!fr. Pritt's contention, and reference may be made to 7'irlcha v. Nanak('), il1\n\nwhich the court expressed th':' view that sedion 537, Criminal Procedure Code, applied only to errors of procedure arising out of mere inadvertence, and not to cases of disregard of, or disobedience to, mo, ndatory provisions of the Code, and to In re Jlarlura 11111tlw\n\n(1) (1901) z8 I.A. z57.\n\n(2) (1927) 54 I.A. 96.\n\n(3) (1947) 74 I.A. 65,\n\n(4) (19n) !.LR. 49 All. 475\n\nMagga (tttd Another\n\nThe State of Rajasthan.\n\nMahajan , J,\n\nMagga and Another\n\nThe. State of\n\nRa.ja$lhan.\n\n}Jaha}an J,\n\nVannian(' ), in which the view was expressed that any failure to examine tbe accused under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, was fatal to the validity of the trial, and could not be cured under section 537.\n\nIn their Lordships' opinion, this argument is based on too narrow a view of the operation of section 537.\n\nWhen a trial is conducted in a mrmner different from that prescribed by the Gode [as in Subramania Iyer's case(')], the trial is bad, and no question of curing an ii-regularity arises: but if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity occurs in the course of snCJl conduct, the irregularity can be cured under section 537, and none the less so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always he the case, a breach of one or more of the very com prehensi vc provisions of the Code.\n\nThe distinction drawn in many of the cases in India between an illegality find an irregularity is one of degree rather than of kind. This view finds support in the decision of their Lordships' Boflrd in Abdul Rahman v. ]( ing-Emperor( 3 ), where failure to comply with section 3GO, Criminal Procedure Code, was held to be cured by sections 535 and 5Bi. The present case falls under section 537, and their Lordships hold the trial valid notwithstanding the breach of section 162.\"\n\nIn our judgment, the trial conducted in the present case was conducted in fl nrnnner different from that prescribed by the Code and is bad and no question here flrises of curing flny irregularity. The Code does not authorize a trial commenced with the flid of three named assessors to be conducted and completed with the aid of four assessors. The substitution of one assessor by another and an addition to the number of assessors appointed at the commencement of the trial is not sfluctioned by section 285, Criminal Procedure Code, nor is it authorized by section 284. On the other hand, the language of section 285( 1) read with the provisions of section 285(2) implicitly bans the holding of such a tria.I. It is uot possible to say with any degree\n\n(1) (1922) I.LR. 45 l\\lad. 820. (%) (1901) is I.A. ~7\n\n(3) (1927) 54 I.A. 96.\n\nof certainty to what extent the opinion of the outgoing and the incoming assessors who did not attend the whole of the trial influenced the decision in the case ;\n\nbut as such a trial is unknown to law, it has to be presumed that it was illegal.\n\nMr. Mehta for the State Govemment contended thttt under section 309(2) the opinion of assessors is not binding on the sessions judge and their presence or absence does not affect the constitution of the court and that as at this trial at least two of the assessors originally appointed sat throughout the trial it should be held that the trial was substantially a trial conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The learned counsel did not go to the length of urging that a trial without the aid of any assessorn whatever was a good trial under the Code. Such a contention, if raised, would have to be negatived in view of the clear\n\nprovisions of section 284 and of sub-section (2) of section 285.\n\nThe appointment of at least three assessors is essential for the validity of a trial of this character at its commencement, and once validly commenced, in certain events, it can be validly concluded if at least one of them remains present throughout, while others drop out ; but a trial conducted in the manner in which it was done in this case is wholly outside the contemplation of the Code and it is not possible to hold that it was concluded according to the provisions of the Code. The provision in the Code that the opinion of the assessor is not binding on the sessions judge cannot lend support to the contention that the sessions\n\njndgr is entitled to ignore their very existence.\n\nAs already pointed out, though he may not be bound to accept their opinions, he is certainly bound to take them into consideration. The weight to be attached to such opinions may well vary with the number of assessors.\n\n:\\:Ir. Mehta to support his contention placed reliimce on tho majority decision of the Madras High Court in King-Emperor v. Tirumul Reddi (1).\n\nIn that case the trial continued for about seven weeks.\n\nDuring that\n\n(l) (l901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 523.\n\nMagga n.ndAnotMr\n\nThe State of\n\nRajasthf1n.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nillagga and Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\n.Rajasthan.\n\nMahjan .J.\n\n986 SUPREME COlTRT REPORTS [1953]\n\nperiod one of the assessors was permitted tci absent himself during two whole days, and five half days respectively, at first, so that he might visit his mother on her death-bed, and subsequently, to perform the daily obsequies rendered necessary by her decease.\n\nHe then resumed his seat as an asessor and continued so to act until the termination of the trial. all the depositions recorded in his aJ1sence having ben read by him on his return.\n\nAt the conclusion of the trial the sessions judge invited the opinion of each assessor, and recorded it. The opinion of each was that all the accused were guilty and the judge concurring in that opinion, convicted the accused.\n\nOn appeal it was contended that the judge had acted contrary to law in allowing the assessor who had been absent to resume his seat as an assessor and in inviting and taking into consideration his opinion in deciding the case. It was held by the majority of the court that the finding and the sentence appealed aga.inst had been passed by a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 537 of the Code and that the defect in the trial did not affect its validity and was cured by that section as the irregularity\n\n0 had not in fact occasioned a failure of justice. llfr. Justice Davies\n\ntook a different view. This decision was clearly given on the peculiar fact8 and circum8tances of that case and is no authority in support of the view contended for by Mr. Mehta.\n\nFor the reasons given above we are constrained to hold that the trial of the appellants conducted in the manner above stated was bad and the <tppellants have to he retried in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code.\n\nIn the result we allow this appeal, quash the conviction and sentence passed on the appellants, and direct their retri!tl by the sessions judge in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code.\n\nAppeal allowed Retrial ordered.\n\nAgent for the respondent: G. H. 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"label": "COURT", "start_char": 14666, "end_char": 14685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view is in accord with the decision of the Calcutta High Court in King-Emperor v. Rainsidh Rai(') with which we agree."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14848, "end_char": 14864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are constrained, however, to observe that the High Court did not fully appreciate the decision of the Patna High Court in Balak Singh v. Jtm.peror('), when it said that that decision held a trial bad where a person was ehosen as an assessor who had uut been summoned."}}, {"text": "Magga", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15336, "end_char": 15341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "420,\n\n19.!3\n\nMagga and Another\n\nv, 'PM State of\n\nRaja, sth.nn,\n\nMahajan J.\n\n.2llagga and Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nRaja8than.", "canonical_name": "Magga"}}, {"text": ".2llagga", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15399, "end_char": 15407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "420,\n\n19.!3\n\nMagga and Another\n\nv, 'PM State of\n\nRaja, sth.nn,\n\nMahajan J.\n\n.2llagga and Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nRaja8than."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nRaja8than", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15428, "end_char": 15447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "420,\n\n19.!3\n\nMagga and Another\n\nv, 'PM State of\n\nRaja, sth.nn,\n\nMahajan J.\n\n.2llagga and Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nRaja8than.", "canonical_name": "State of flajasthan"}}, {"text": "section 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15837, "end_char": 15848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15953, "end_char": 15964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16422, "end_char": 16433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16478, "end_char": 16489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17700, "end_char": 17711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17905, "end_char": 17916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18441, "end_char": 18452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18479, "end_char": 18490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19107, "end_char": 19118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19776, "end_char": 19794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sessions judge during the progress of the trial not only made a change in the personnel of the assessors originally appointed and also added to their number, ln1t )le actually took the opinions 127\n\nMa, ga and Another\n\nThe State of Rajasthan,\n\nMa, hajan J.\n\nMagga and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nRajasthan..\n\n}, f aha;\"an J.\n\nof all the four assessors as required by the provisions of section 309 of the Code, and acted in accordance with those opinions in convicting the two appellants."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nRajasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19834, "end_char": 19853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sessions judge during the progress of the trial not only made a change in the personnel of the assessors originally appointed and also added to their number, ln1t )le actually took the opinions 127\n\nMa, ga and Another\n\nThe State of Rajasthan,\n\nMa, hajan J.\n\nMagga and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nRajasthan..\n\n}, f aha;\"an J.\n\nof all the four assessors as required by the provisions of section 309 of the Code, and acted in accordance with those opinions in convicting the two appellants.", "canonical_name": "State of flajasthan"}}, {"text": "section 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19933, "end_char": 19944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21067, "end_char": 21078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21080, "end_char": 21103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 284", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21654, "end_char": 21665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21667, "end_char": 21690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 284 and 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21860, "end_char": 21880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22550, "end_char": 22561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Phillimore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22617, "end_char": 22627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Z Rahman v. King-Emperor{'), the distinction between cases which fall within the rule of section 537 and those which are outside it was pointed out by Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "Subramania", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22676, "end_char": 22686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There it was said that tlw distinction between Subramania, Iyer'8 ca .. e (1) and that case in which there was an irregularity in <>omplying with the provisions of section 360 of tht' Cmk lnlS fairly obvious.", "canonical_name": "Subramania lyer"}}, {"text": "section 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22793, "end_char": 22804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subramania lyer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22842, "end_char": 22857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Subramania lyer's case (1) the pnwedure adopted was one which the Code positiYely prohibits and it .", "canonical_name": "Subramania lyer"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23309, "end_char": 23320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23322, "end_char": 23345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23481, "end_char": 23492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23552, "end_char": 23563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "John Beaumont", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23570, "end_char": 23583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir John Beaumont in delivering the decision of the Board made the following observations which bring out the distinction between the two sets of cases : --\n\n\"There are, no doubt, authorities in India which lend some support to !"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23761, "end_char": 23766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir John Beaumont in delivering the decision of the Board made the following observations which bring out the distinction between the two sets of cases : --\n\n\"There are, no doubt, authorities in India which lend some support to !"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23931, "end_char": 23954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24275, "end_char": 24293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "475\n\nMagga (tttd Another\n\nThe State of Rajasthan.", "canonical_name": "State of flajasthan"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nRa.ja$lhan.\n\n}Jaha}an J", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24334, "end_char": 24367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of\n\nRa.ja$lhan."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24461, "end_char": 24472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24474, "end_char": 24497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24568, "end_char": 24579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24675, "end_char": 24686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Subramania Iyer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24777, "end_char": 24792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When a trial is conducted in a mrmner different from that prescribed by the Gode [as in Subramania Iyer's case(')], the trial is bad, and no question of curing an ii-regularity arises: but if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity occurs in the course of snCJl conduct, the irregularity can be cured under section 537, and none the less so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always he the case, a breach of one or more of the very com prehensi vc provisions of the Code.", "canonical_name": "Subramania lyer"}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25053, "end_char": 25064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 3G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25503, "end_char": 25513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25516, "end_char": 25539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 535 and 5B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25565, "end_char": 25584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25616, "end_char": 25627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25700, "end_char": 25711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26211, "end_char": 26222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26224, "end_char": 26247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 284", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26273, "end_char": 26284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 285( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26321, "end_char": 26336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 285(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26365, "end_char": 26379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26799, "end_char": 26804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mehta for the State Govemment contended thttt under section 309(2) the opinion of assessors is not binding on the sessions judge and their presence or absence does not affect the constitution of the court and that as at this trial at least two of the assessors originally appointed sat throughout the trial it should be held that the trial was substantially a trial conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code."}}, {"text": "section 309(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26851, "end_char": 26865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 284", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27458, "end_char": 27469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27496, "end_char": 27507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28508, "end_char": 28525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mehta to support his contention placed reliimce on tho majority decision of the Madras High Court in King-Emperor v. Tirumul Reddi (1)."}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29891, "end_char": 29902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Davies", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30092, "end_char": 30098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Davies\n\ntook a different view."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30771, "end_char": 30789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}]}
{"document_id": "1953_1_987_1000_EN", "year": 1953, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nS\"CPRElVIE COURT REPORTS 987\n\nHOOSEIN KASAM DADA (INDIA) LTD. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND\n\nOTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS , JJ.]\n\nAppeal-Right to appeal-Whether vested right-When 1ight vests-Change of law after initiation of proceedings in lower Court\n\n-Law governing appeal-Law making deposit of a1nount of appeal a condition for admission of appeal - Whether matter of mere prncedure -Ce1!trnl Provinces andBerar S•tleB Ta.v Act, 1947, s. 22 (1) -Centred Provinces Sales Tax Act (Second A11wndment) Act, 1950.\n\nThe right of appeal is a matter of substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure, and this right becomes vesterl in a party when the proceedings are first initiated in, and before a decision is given by, the inferior Court and such a right cannot be taken away except by express enttctment or necessary intendment.\n\nSection 22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, provided that no appeal against an order of assessment should be entertained by the prescribed authority unless it was satisfied that such amount of tax as the appellant might admit to be d11e from him, had bean paid.\n\nThis Act was amended on the 25th November, 1949, and s. 22(1) as amended provided that no appeal should be admitted by the said authority unless such appeal was accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax in respect of which the appeal had been preferred.\n\nOn the 28th of November, 1947, the appellant submitted a return to the Sales Tax Officor, \\vho, fincl.ing that the turnover exceeded 2 lacs, sub~ mitted the case to the Assistant Co1n1uissioner for disposal and the latter made an assessment on the 8th April, 1950. The appellant praiel'l'ad an appeal on the 10th ;\\fay, 1950, without depositing the a1nount oI ta.x in respect o{ \\Vhich he ha<l apperLled.\n\nThe Board of Havetme was of opinion that s. 22(1) as amended applied t; o the case as the assessment was made, and the appeal was preferred, after the amendment came into force, and rejected the appeal.\n\nHeld, (i) that the appellant had a vested right to appeal when the proceedings v.'ere initiated, i.e., in 1947, and his right to ap peal was governed by the law as it existed on that date; (ii) that the amendment of 1950 cannot be regarded as a mere alteration in procedure or an alteration regulating the exercise of the right of appeal, but whittled down the right itself, and it Jmd no ratrospocthe effect as tlrn Amendment Act of 1950 did not oxpressly or by necessary intendn1ent give it retrospective effect, a.µd th~\n\nFebruary 23.\n\nSUPREME COURT Rl~PORTS [1953]\n\n1963 appeal could not therefore he rejected for non-payment of the tax - in respect of which the appeal was preferred. • H oo8ein Kasarn\n\nDada (India) Colonial Sngar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving [1905] A.O. 369, N,1nabin Aba v. Sheku bin Andu (I.hR. 32 Born. 337), Delhi Cloth ( v. and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tam Commissioner, Delhi 54 The State of I.A. 421), Kirpa Singh v. Rasaldar Ajaipal fingh (A.LR. 1?28 Madhya Pradesh Lah. 627), Sardar Ali v. Dalim7tddzn (I.L.R. 06 Cal. 512) applied.\n\nand Othors, Badruddin Abdnl Rahim v. Sitaram Vinayak Apte (I.L.R. 52 Born. 753) disapproved.\n\nIn re Vasudeva Sainiar (A.I.R. 1929 1fad. 381), Rain Sinqha\n\nv. Sankar Doyal (I.L.R. 50 All. 965). Radhakisnn v. Sri Dhar (A.LR. 1950 N\"ag. 17), Gordhan Das v. Governor-General in Conncil (A.LR. 1950 Pnnj. 103) and Nagendm ?Vath Bose v. ~Ionmohan (1930, 34 C.W.N. 1009) referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLA't'E\n\n, JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 182 of 1952.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2nd August, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur in Miscellaneous Petition No. 187 of 1950 under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.\n\nN. 0. Chatteijee (R. 111. Hajamavi8, with him) for the appellant.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer for the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\n1953. Februarv 23.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by \"\n\nDAS J. On the 28th November, 1947, the appellant Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) submited to the Sales Tax Officer, Akola, a Sales Tax return in Form IV for the first quarter. Notice in Form XI calling upon the assessee to produce evidence in support of the said return having been issued by the Sales Tax Officer, the assessee produced his accouni books.\n\nNot being satisfied by the inspection of the account books as to the correctness of the return and being of opinion that the taxable turnover exceeded mpees two lacs the Sales Tax Officer submitted the case to the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Ammvati, for assessment,\n\n. -,\n\n. ..\n\nOn the 25th January, 1949, the Assistant Commis- 1953 sioner issued a fresh notice in Form XI under sec- H -. - ' 1 d fi d h 1 h oosem Ka, am t10n 1 an xe t e case for d1sposa on the 5t Dada (India) February, 1949.\n\nAfter various adjournments and Ltd. proceedings to which it is not necessary to refer, the v. hearing commenced on the 9th June, 1949, when an The State of agent of the assessee appeared with books of account Madhya Pradesh of the Akola Branch. Eventually after various further and Others. proceedings the Assistant Commissioner on the 8th Das J.\n\nApril, 1950, assessed the assessee, to the best of his judgment, in the sum of Rs. 58,657-14-0 and a copy of the order in Form XIV was sent to the assessee.\n\nBeing aggrieved by the order of assessment the assessee on the 10th May, 1950, preferred an appeal to the Sales Tax Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, under section 22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).\n\nThe appeal not having been accompanied by any proof of the payment of the tax in respect of which the appeal had been preferred, the authorities, after giving the assessee several adjournments, declined to admit the appeal.\n\nThe assessee moved the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, by a revision application against the order of the Sales Tax Commissioner contending that his appeal was not governed by the proviso to section 22( 1) of the Act as amended on the 25th November, 1949, by the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act (Act LVII of\n\n1949) but was governed by the proviso to section 22(1) of the Act as it stood when the assessment proceed. ings were started, i.e., before the said amendment. The Board of Revenue took the view that as the order of assessment was made after the amendment of the section and the a ppea.! was filed thereafter such appeal must be governed by the provisions of law as it existed at the time the appeal was actually filed and that the law as it existed before the filing of the appeal could not apply to the case. The assessee thereupon moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying, amongst other things, for a writ of mandamus or an appropriate\n\n1953 order directing the Sales Tax Commissioner to admit\n\n-:--K and hear the appeal without demanding payment of oosein n.oam h f h\n\nA Dada (India) t e amount o sales tax assessed by t e ss1stant Ltd.\n\nCommissioner of Sales Tax. The High Court dismissed v. the application on the 2nd August, 1951. The assessee The State of applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Madhya Prod\"•\"- Court which was also dismissed by the High Court on\n\nand Other•. the 14th March, 1952. The assessee thereupon applied\n\nDas J, to this Court for special leave to appeal on the 12th May, 1952.\n\nThis Court granted special leave. to appeal, but such leave was, by the order granting such leave, limited to the question of the effect of the amendment to section 22 of the Act on the petitioner's appeal to the Sales Tax Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh. This Court took the view that the other questions sought to be raised by the assessee would have to be decided by the Sales Tax Commissioner in case the appeal succeeded. The appeal has now come up for final disposal before us and in this appeal we are concerned only with the limited question of the effect of the amendment to section 22 of the Act.\n\nSection 22( 1) of the Act was originally expressed rn the following terms :-\n\n\"22. (1) Any dealer aggrieved by an order under this Act may, in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority against the order:\n\nProvided that no appeal against an order of assessment, with 01 without penalty, shall be entertained by the said authoritv unless it is satisfied that such amount of tax or penalty' or both as the appellant may admit to be due from him, has been paid.\"\n\nThe relevant portion of section 22 as amended runs as fo!Jows :-\n\n\"22. (1) Any dealer aggrieved by an order under this Act may, in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority against the order : Provided thn, t no appeal against an order of assessment, with or without penalty shall he admitted by the said authority unless such appefll is accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax, with\n\n. . '\n\n' ,. •\n\ns.c.ii.\n\nSUPREME couki' REPOHTS 99i\n\npenalty, if any, in respect of which the appeal has been 1.953 preferred.\"\n\nIt 1 f' h 1 [ 1 Huu,.in Kasum is c ear rom t c anguagc irne( m t ie tnov1so to 1., 1 (I 4 . J • • . ,111( a n u1. sect10n 22 ( 1) as it stood prior to the amendment that LtJ. an aggrieved assessee had only to pay such amount of v. tax as he might admit to be due from him, whereas ~'he State uf under the proviso to section 22( I) as amended the Madhya Pradnh appeal has to be accompanied by satisfactory proof of and_Vers. payment of the tax in respect of which the appeal had DaaJ. been preferred. The contention of the present assessce is that as the amendment has not been made retrospective its right of appeal under the original section 22(1) remains imaffected and that accordingly as it does not admit anything to be due it was not liable to deposit any sum along with its appeal and the Commissioner was bound to admit its appeal and had no jurisdiction or power to reject it on the ground that it had not been accompanied by any proof of payment of the tax assessed against the appellant as required under the amended proviso and the Board of l'tevenue and the High Court were in error in not directing the Commissioner to admit the appeal.\n\nThat the amendment has placed a substantial restriction on the assessee's right of appeal cannot be disputed, for the amended section requires the payment of the entire assessed amount as a condition precedent to the admission of its appeal.\n\nThe question is whether the imposition of such a restriction by amendment of the section can affect the asscssee's right of appeal from a decision in proceedings which commenced prior to such amendment and which right of appeal was free from such r<:striction under the section as it stood at the time of tho commencement of the proceedings.\n\nThe question was answered in the negative by the Judicial Committee in Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Irving(').\n\nIn that case the Collector of Customs acting under an Act called the Excise Tariff Act, 1902, required the appellants to pay£ 20,100 excise duty on 6,700 tons of sugar.\n\nThe appellants disputed the claim.\n\nSo they deposited\n\n( <) L.R. [1905] A.C. 369.\n\n992 SUPREME COURT ItEPOR'f8 [1953]\n\nJ95J the money with the Collector and then brought the action by issuing a writ on the 25th Ocober, 1902. A Jloo8ein J(asa1n\n\n' J Dada 1 India) special case having been stated for the opinion of t ie\n\nfol.\n\nSupreme Court, that Court on the 4th September, 1903, v. gave judgment for the Collector. In the meantime the The State uf Judiciary Act, 1903, was passed and received Royal Madhya Prade .• h assent on the 25th August, 1903, that is to say about\n\naad Others. 10 days before the judgment was delivered. By sec-\n\nDasJ. tion 39(2) of that Act the right of appeal from the Supreme Court to the Privy Council given by the Order in Council of 1860 was taken away and the only appeal therefrom was directed to lie to the High Court of Australia. The appellants having with the leave of the Supreme Court filed an appeal to the Privy Council the respondents filed a petition taking the preliminary point that no appeal lay to the Privy Council and praying that the appeal be dismissed. In dismissing that application Lord Macnaghten who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council said: --\n\n\"As regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversv.\n\nOn the one hand, it was not disputed that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only, the petition is well founded.\n\nOn the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed. The Judicary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment.\n\nAnd therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure?\n\nIt seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in >t pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure.\n\nIn principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference\n\n. . ,\n\n. ...\n\ns.c.R. st:PREME COUH, T HEPO.RTS 993\n\nwith existing rights contrary to the well-known general 1953 principle that statuteR are not to be held to act - 1 I 1 · h lluu1u, in /[asa1n retrospective y un css a c car mtent10n to t at effect I> d (I 1. J · c d '' a a 1u ta 1s rnan11este .\n\nLtd.\n\nTho principle of the above decision was applied by \"· Jenkins C.J. in Nana bin Aba v. Sheku bin Andu (1 ) l'he State 01\n\n-1 b th p C 'l If J'J l' Cl h d i•fodhya Pradesh anu -y e nvy ou11c1 1tse m e tii ot an d 0 1 General ,~1 ills Co. Ltd. v. I nconie-tax Commissioner, \"\"\n\n1 '\"'' Delhi('). A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court adopt- Da., J. ed it in Kirpa Singh v. Rasaldar Ajaipal Singh(').\n\nIt was there regarded as settled that the right of appeal was not a mere matter of procedure but was a vested right which inhered in a party from the commencement of the action in the Court of first instance and such right could not be taken away except by an express provision or by necessary implication.\n\nIn Sardar Ali v. Dalimuddin ('), the suit out of which the appeal arose was filed in the Munsiff's Court at Alipore on the 7th October, 1920.\n\nThe suit having been dismissed on the 17th July, 1924, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of the District Judge but the appPal was dismissed.\n\nThe plaintiffs then preferred a second appeal to the High Court on the 4th October,\n\n1926. That second appeal was heard by a Single Judge and was dismissed on the 4th April, 1928. In the meantime Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was amended on the 14th January 1928 so as to provide that no further appeal should lie from the decision of a Single Judge sitting in second appeal unle§.s the Judge certified that the case was a fit one for appeal. In this case the learned Judge who dismissed the second appeal on the 4th April, 1928, declined to give any certificate of fitness. The plaintiffs on the 30th April, 1928, filed an appeal on the strength of dause 15 of the Letters Patent as it stood before the amendment. The contention of the appellants was that the amended clause could not be applied to that appeal, iOr to do so would be to apply it retrospectively and to impair and indeed to defeat a substantive right which was in existence\n\n(I) (1908) I.LR 32 Born. 337.\n\n13) A.l.R. 1928 Lah. 627.\n\n(2) (1927) L.R. 5+ LA. 421; LL.R. 9 Lah. 284. (4) (1929) LL.R 56 Cal. 512,\n\n19;3 prior to the date of the amendment. The appellants\n\n-:-K claimed that on the 7th October, 1920,- when the snit uosein cuutin . . . .\n\nDada (forNaJ was filed they had vested m them by the ex1stmg law\n\nLtd. a substantive right to a Letters Patent appeal from\n\nv. the decision of a Single Judge and that an intention\n\n7'hc Stat' a.f to interfere with it, to clog it with a new condition or\n\nMad!tyuo 1h'mde.•h to impair or im1>eril it could not be ]lrcsumed unless it\n\nand l crs. ·. b was clearly mamfested y express words or necessary Dae J. inteudment. In giving effect to the contentions of the appellants Rankin C.J. observed at p. 518 :-\n\n\"Now, the reasoning of the J ndicial Committee in The Colonial Sugar Rfining Company's case is a co•,- clusive authority to show that rights of appeal are not matters of procedure, <ind that the right to enter the superior comt is for the present pnrpose deemed to arise to a litigant before auy decision has been given by the inferior court. If the latter proposition be accepted, I can see no intermediate point at which to resist the conclusion that the right arises at the date of the suit.\"\n\nIt was held that the ne1Y clause could not be given retrospective e.ffect and accordingly the date of presentation of the second appeal to the High Court was not the date which determined the applicability of the amended clause of the Letters Patent and that the date of the institution of the suit was the determining factor.\n\nAs against the last mentioned decision of the Calcutta High Court.Sri Oanapttthy Aiyar, ttppearing for the respondent, refers us to the decision of a Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Badruddin Abdiil Rahim v. Si'.ttiram Vinnyak Apte (1), where it was held that the amendment of clause 15 of the Letters Patent operated retrospectively. That case followed an mirlicr decision of the same High Court in Framji Bomanfi v. llonnasji Bai; jorji (').\n\nThe decision in the old case proceeded upon two grounds, namely, (1) that the question was one of procedure and (2) that sec-\n\n(1) (19i8 1 J.L H.. 52 Born. 753; A.LR. {1928) Boin. 371.\n\n(2) (1866) Born. H.C. (O.C.J.) 49.\n\n' .... •\n\ntion 2 of the New Letters Patent of 1865 gave retros. l953\n\npectve operation to te Leters Patent by making it Hoosein Ka.•am applicable to all pendmg suits.\n\nIn so far as the first Dada 1 India) ground is concerned it clearly runs counter to the de- Ltd. cision of the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Rev . . fining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (supra) and must be taken as The State 0! overruled as Fawcett .J. himself acknowledged at Madhyz'\n\n0 0 P7 md\"h 756 A d h d d . . , l' mu t \"\"' page • . s regar s t e secon groun 1t 1s mapp 1cable to the case before us and it is not necessary to Das J. express any opinion as to the soundness and validity of that ground. It may be mentioned here that in Shaikh Hasan Abdul Karim v. King Emperor(') another Bench of the same High Court expressly dissented from the decision in Badruddin Abdul Rahirn v.\n\nSitararn Vinayak Apte (supra). The principle laid down in the Colonial Sugar Rfining Co.'s case (supra.) was followed by a Special Bench of Madras in In re Vasudeva Samiar ('). A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal (3 ) fell into line and held that the earlier decision on this point of that Court in Zamin Ali Khan v. Genda (') stood overruled by the Privy Council decision in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co.'s case.\n\nA Full Bench of Nagpur High Court in Radhakisan v. Shridar (') has also taken the same view.\n\nThe Punjab- High Court has also adopted the same line in Gordhan Das v. The Governor General in Council('').\n\nThe case of Nagr-ndra Nath Bose v. 1l1on 21Iohan Singha Roy (7) is indeed very much to the point. In that case the plaintiffs instituted a suit for rent valued at Rs. 1,306/15 and obtained a decree. In execution of that decree the defaulting tenure was sold on the 20th November, 1928, for Bs. 1,600.\n\nOn the 19th December, 1928, an application was made, under Order XXI, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the present petitioner, who was one of the judgment-debtors,\n\n{I) J.L.H_ (TCJ45) BonL 17.\n\n(2) A LR. ('929) Mad 38r; 56 :11.L.J 369.\n\n(3) (r928) I.L.R. 50 AIL 965; A.I.H. (r928) AIL 437.\n\n(4) (r904) 1.L.H. 26 All. 375.\n\n(5) A.LR. (r950) i'>ag. rn-\n\n(6) A.LR, (r952) Punjab ro3 (l'.B.).\n\n17) (r930) 34 C.W.N. roog,\n\n1953 for setting aside the sale. That application having\n\n-:--K been dismissed for default of his appearance the petioosein aeain . f' d 1 t ti D' t . t J d f Dada 1 India) tioner pre crre an appea o ie . 1s ric u ge o Ltd.\n\nHoogly who refused to admit the appeal on the ground\n\nv. that the amount recoverable in execution of the decree The State of had not been deposited as required by the proviso to sec-\n\nMadh!fa Prade., h tion 174, clause ( e), of the Bengal Tenancy Act as amendmul Others. ed by anamending Act in 1928.\n\nThe contention of the\n\nDas J. petitioner was that the amended provision which came into force on the 21st February, 1929, could not affect the right of appeal from a decision on an application made on the 19th December, 1928, for setting aside the sale. ]\\fitter J. said at page\n\n1011 :-\n\n\"We thiI!k the contention of the petitioner is wellfounded and must prevail. That a right of appeal is a substantive right cannot now be seriously disputed. It is not a mere matter of procedure. Prior to the amendment of 1928 there was an appeal against an order refusing to set aside a sale (for that is the effect also where the application to set aside the sale is dismissed for default) under the provisions of Order 43, rule (1), of the Code of Civil Procedure. That right was unhampered by any restriction of the kind now imposed by section 174(5), Proviso. The Court was bound to admit the appeal whether appellant deposited the amount recoverable in execution of the decree or not.\n\nBy requiring such deposit as a condition precedent to the admission of the appeal, a new restriction has been put on the right of appeal, the admission of which is now hedged in with a condition. There can be no doubt that the right of appeal has been affected by the new provision and in the a.bsence of an express enactment this amendment cannot apply to proceedings pending at the date when the new amendment came into force.\n\nIt is true that the appeal was filed after the Act came into force, but that circumstance is immaterial-for tho date to be looked into for this purpose is the date of the original proceeding which eventually culminated in the appeal.\"\n\n, ... '\n\nThe above decisions quite firmly establish and our 1953 decisions in J/mardan Reddy v. The State (1) and in H G t R .\n\nA . . al Ch\n\n. L , f C L d (') oo.sein asani anpa ai v. garw arnuer OJ ommerce t .\n\nDada (India) uphold the principle that a right of appeal is not Ltd. merely a matter of procedure. It is matter of substanv. tive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an Th< State 0! inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested Madhy~ :radesh in a party when proceedings are first initiated in, and and\n\n1 era, before a decision is given by, the inferior court. In Das J. the language of Jenkins C .• J. in Nana bin Aba v.\n\nShaik bin Andu (supra) to disturb an existing right of appeal is not a mere alteration in procedurn. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An [intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication.\n\n$ri Ganapathy Aiyar urges that the language of section 22( 1) as amended clearly makes the section retrospective. The new proviso, it is pointed out, peremptorily requires the authority not to admit the appeal unless it be accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax in respect of which the appeal is preferred and this duty the authority must discharge at the time the appeal is actually preferred before him.\n\nThe argument is that after the amendment the authority has no option in the matter and he has no jurisdiction to admit any appeal unless the assessed tax be deposited. It follows, therefore, by necessary implication, according to the learned Advocate, that the amended provision applies to an appeal from an assessment order made before the date of amendment as well as to an appeal from an order made after that date. A similar argument was urged before the Calcutta Special Bench in Sardar Ali v.\n\nDalirnuddin (supra), namely, that after the amendment the court had no authority to entertain an appeal without a certificate from the Single Judge.\n\n(r) [1950] S.C.R. 94r.\n\n(2) (r952) S.C.J, 564. na\n\nSUPR.EME COVRT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1963 Rankin C.J. repelled this argument with the remark\n\nHoos;; n Ka.sam at page 520: --\n\nDada (Indh•J \"Unless the contrary can be shown, the provision Ltd. which takes away jurisdiction is itself subject to the\n\nv. implied saving of the litigants' right.\" The State of .___,\n\nModhya Pmdesh In our view the above observation is apposite and\n\nand Others. applies to the case before us. The trne implication of ·· the above observation as of the decisions in the other Das .J. h cases referred to above is that t e pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of snpporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old hw must govern the exercise and enforcement ofthr1t right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right. The argument that the authority has no option or jurisdiction to admit the appeal unless it be accompanied by the deposit of the assessed tax as required by the amended proviso to section 22 ( 1) of the Act overlooks the fact of existence of the old law for the purpose of supporting the pre-existing right and really amounts to begging the question.\n\nThe new proviso is wholly inapplicable in such a situation and the jurisdiction of the authority has to be exercised under the old law which so continues to exist. The argument of Sri Ganapathy Iyer on this point, therefore, cannot be accepted.\n\nThe learned Advocate urges that the requirment as to the deposit of t.he amount of the assessed costs does not affect the right of appeal itself which still remains intact, but only introduces a new matter of procedure.\n\nHe contends that this case is quite different from the case of Sardar Ali v. Dalmuddin (8upra ), for in this case it is entirely in the power of the appellant to deposit the ta; K if }le chooses to do so whereas it was not\n\nwithin the power of the appellant in that case to 1953 secure a certifioote from the learned Single .Judge who Hoose'ln Ka.sani disposed of the second appeiil.\n\nIn the first place the Dada r fodia) onerous condition may in a given case prevent the Ltd. exercise of the right of appeal, for the assessee may not v. be in a position to find the necessiiry money in time.\n\nThe State of Further this argument cannot prevail in view of the Madhya Pradesh decision of the Calcnttii High Court in N agendra Nath and Others, Bose v. Mon }lfohtln Singha (suprrt) . .:'iio cogent argu- DasJ. ment hits been adduced before us to show that that decision is not correct. There can be no doubt that the new requirement \"touches\" the substnntive right of appeal vested in the appellant. Nor can it be overlooked that such a requirement is calculated to interfere with or fetter, if not to impair or imperil, the substantive right. The right that the amended seotion gives is certainly less than the right which was available before. A proYision which is calculated to deprive the appellant of tho unfettered right of appeal cannot be regarded as a mere alteration in procedurP. Indeed the new requirement cannot be said merely to regulate the exercise of the appellant's pre-existing right but in truth whittles down the right itself and cannot be regarded as a mere rule of procedure.\n\nFinally, Sri Gana pa thy Iyer faintly urges that until actual assessment there can be no '!is' and, therefore, no right of appeal can accrue before that event. There are two answers to this plea.\n\nWhenever there is a proposition by one party and an opposition to that proposition by another a 'lis' arises. It may be conceded, though not deciding it, that when the assessee files his return a '!is' may not immediately arise, for under section 11 ( 1) the authority may accept the return as correct and complete. But if the authority is not satisfied as to the correctness of the return iind calls for evidence, surely a controversy arises involving a proposition by the assessee and an opposition by the State.\n\nThe circumstance that the authority who raises the dispute is himself the judge can makP no difference, for the authority raises the dispute in the interest of the State and in so acting only represents the State, lt\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1953 will appear from the dates given above that in this case\n\n-:---·~, the '!is' in the sense explained above arose before the oose1n 1.}.asa1n f d f ] .\n\nTj, • Daria (lndia) date o amen ment o tie section. l' urther, even 1f Ltd. the '!is' is to be taken as arising only on the date of v. assessment, there was a possibility of such a ']is' arising 7'he State 01 as soon as proceedings started with the filing of the\n\nModh%'~ :\" 0d\"hreturn or, at any rate, when the authority called for an ' \"\"· evidence and strted the hearing and the right of ap-\n\nDM J. peal must be taken to have been in existence even at those dates. For the purposes of the accrual of the right of appeal the critical and relevant date is the date of initiation of the proceedings and not the decision itself.\n\nFor all the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the appellant's appeal should not have been rejected on the ground that it was not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the assessed tax.\n\nAs the appellant did not admit that any amount was due by it, it was under the section as it stood previously entitled to file its appeal without depositing any sum of money. We, therefore, allow this appeal and direct that the appeal be admitted by the Commissioner and be decided in accordance with law. The appellant is entitled to the costs of this appeal and we order accordingly.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for appellant: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.", "total_entities": 93, "entities": [{"text": "987\n\nHOOSEIN KASAM DADA (INDIA) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "987\n\nHOOSEIN KASAM DADA (INDIA) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND\n\nOTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS , JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 466, "end_char": 471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Centred Provinces Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 477, "end_char": 508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 866, "end_char": 879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Centred Provinces Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Centred Provinces Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1183, "end_char": 1202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was amended on the 25th November, 1949, and s. 22(1) as amended provided that no appeal should be admitted by the said authority unless such appeal was accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax in respect of which the appeal had been preferred."}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1208, "end_char": 1216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "28th of November, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1435, "end_char": 1457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th of November, 1947, the appellant submitted a return to the Sales Tax Officor, \\vho, fincl.ing that the turnover exceeded 2 lacs, sub~ mitted the case to the Assistant Co1n1uissioner for disposal and the latter made an assessment on the 8th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "10th ;\\fay, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant praiel'l'ad an appeal on the 10th ;\\fay, 1950, without depositing the a1nount oI ta.x in respect o{ \\Vhich he ha<l apperLled."}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1875, "end_char": 1883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Jmd no ratrospocthe effect as tlrn Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2420, "end_char": 2468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT Rl~PORTS [1953]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2577, "end_char": 2606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT Rl~PORTS [1953]\n\n1963 appeal could not therefore he rejected for non-payment of the tax - in respect of which the appeal was preferred. •"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLA't'E\n\n, JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3488, "end_char": 3521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLA't'E\n\n, JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3637, "end_char": 3671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 2nd August, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur in Miscellaneous Petition No."}}, {"text": "arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3720, "end_char": 3737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chatteijee", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3766, "end_char": 3776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatteijee (R. 111."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer for the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "28th November, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3959, "end_char": 3978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by \"\n\nDAS J. On the 28th November, 1947, the appellant Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) submited to the Sales Tax Officer, Akola, a Sales Tax return in Form IV for the first quarter."}}, {"text": "Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3994, "end_char": 4025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by \"\n\nDAS J. On the 28th November, 1947, the appellant Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) submited to the Sales Tax Officer, Akola, a Sales Tax return in Form IV for the first quarter.", "canonical_name": "987\n\nHOOSEIN KASAM DADA (INDIA) LTD"}}, {"text": "25th January, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4641, "end_char": 4659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th January, 1949, the Assistant Commis- 1953 sioner issued a fresh notice in Form XI under sec- H -. - '"}}, {"text": "10th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5419, "end_char": 5433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being aggrieved by the order of assessment the assessee on the 10th May, 1950, preferred an appeal to the Sales Tax Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, under section 22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5462, "end_char": 5500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being aggrieved by the order of assessment the assessee on the 10th May, 1950, preferred an appeal to the Sales Tax Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, under section 22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5508, "end_char": 5521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5865, "end_char": 5897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee moved the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, by a revision application against the order of the Sales Tax Commissioner contending that his appeal was not governed by the proviso to section 22( 1) of the Act as amended on the 25th November, 1949, by the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act (Act LVII of\n\n1949) but was governed by the proviso to section 22(1) of the Act as it stood when the assessment proceed."}}, {"text": "section 22( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6035, "end_char": 6049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6223, "end_char": 6236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6725, "end_char": 6753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee thereupon moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying, amongst other things, for a writ of mandamus or an appropriate\n\n1953 order directing the Sales Tax Commissioner to admit\n:--K and hear the appeal without demanding payment of oosein n.oam h f h\n\nA Dada (India) t e amount o sales tax assessed by t e ss1stant Ltd.\n\nCommissioner of Sales Tax."}}, {"text": "articles 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 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"end_char": 7720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to appeal, but such leave was, by the order granting such leave, limited to the question of the effect of the amendment to section 22 of the Act on the petitioner's appeal to the Sales Tax Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8050, "end_char": 8060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8074, "end_char": 8088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8574, "end_char": 8584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9417, "end_char": 9431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9736, "end_char": 9749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "that case the Collector of Customs acting under an Act called the Excise Tariff Act, 1902", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10962, "end_char": 11051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "meantime the The State uf Judiciary Act, 1903", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11552, "end_char": 11597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11824, "end_char": 11837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By sec-\n\nDasJ. tion 39(2) of that Act the right of appeal from the Supreme Court to the Privy Council given by the Order in Council of 1860 was taken away and the only appeal therefrom was directed to lie to the High Court of Australia."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12269, "end_char": 12279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dismissing that application Lord Macnaghten who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council said: --\n\n\"As regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversv."}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12776, "end_char": 12780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed."}}, {"text": "His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12988, "end_char": 13081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13892, "end_char": 13899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd.\n\nTho principle of the above decision was applied by \"· Jenkins C.J. in Nana bin Aba v. Sheku bin Andu (1 ) l'he State 01\n1 b th p C 'l If J'J l' Cl h d i•fodhya Pradesh anu -y e nvy ou11c1 1tse m e tii ot an d 0 1 General ,~1 ills Co. Ltd. v. I nconie-tax Commissioner, \"\"\n\n1 '\"'' Delhi(')."}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14150, "end_char": 14167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court adopt- Da.,"}}, {"text": "Munsiff's Court at Alipore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14632, "end_char": 14658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sardar Ali v. Dalimuddin ('), the suit out of which the appeal arose was filed in the Munsiff's Court at Alipore on the 7th October, 1920."}}, {"text": "7th October, 1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14666, "end_char": 14683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sardar Ali v. Dalimuddin ('), the suit out of which the appeal arose was filed in the Munsiff's Court at Alipore on the 7th October, 1920."}}, {"text": "4th October,\n\n1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14902, "end_char": 14920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs then preferred a second appeal to the High Court on the 4th October,\n\n1926."}}, {"text": "4th April, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14994, "end_char": 15009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That second appeal was heard by a Single Judge and was dismissed on the 4th April, 1928."}}, {"text": "Clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15027, "end_char": 15036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th January 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15078, "end_char": 15095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was amended on the 14th January 1928 so as to provide that no further appeal should lie from the decision of a Single Judge sitting in second appeal unle§.s the Judge certified that the case was a fit one for appeal."}}, {"text": "30th April, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15430, "end_char": 15446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs on the 30th April, 1928, filed an appeal on the strength of dause 15 of the Letters Patent as it stood before the amendment."}}, {"text": "Rankin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16520, "end_char": 16526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In giving effect to the contentions of the appellants Rankin C.J. observed at p. 518 :-\n\n\"Now, the reasoning of the J ndicial Committee in The Colonial Sugar Rfining Company's case is a co•,- clusive authority to show that rights of appeal are not matters of procedure, <ind that the right to enter the superior comt is for the present pnrpose deemed to arise to a litigant before auy decision has been given by the inferior court."}}, {"text": "Colonial Sugar Rfining Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16609, "end_char": 16639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In giving effect to the contentions of the appellants Rankin C.J. observed at p. 518 :-\n\n\"Now, the reasoning of the J ndicial Committee in The Colonial Sugar Rfining Company's case is a co•,- clusive authority to show that rights of appeal are not matters of procedure, <ind that the right to enter the superior comt is for the present pnrpose deemed to arise to a litigant before auy decision has been given by the inferior court."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17426, "end_char": 17445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As against the last mentioned decision of the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Oanapttthy Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17450, "end_char": 17466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Oanapttthy Aiyar, ttppearing for the respondent, refers us to the decision of a Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Badruddin Abdiil Rahim v. Si'.ttiram Vinnyak Apte (1), where it was held that the amendment of clause 15 of the Letters Patent operated retrospectively."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17543, "end_char": 17560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Oanapttthy Aiyar, ttppearing for the respondent, refers us to the decision of a Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Badruddin Abdiil Rahim v. Si'.ttiram Vinnyak Apte (1), where it was held that the amendment of clause 15 of the Letters Patent operated retrospectively."}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17671, "end_char": 17680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fawcett", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18461, "end_char": 18468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "overruled as Fawcett .J. himself acknowledged at Madhyz'\n\n0 0 P7 md\"h 756 A d h d d . . ,"}}, {"text": "Madhyz", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18497, "end_char": 18503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "overruled as Fawcett .J. himself acknowledged at Madhyz'\n\n0 0 P7 md\"h 756 A d h d d . . ,"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18652, "end_char": 18655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s regar s t e secon groun 1t 1s mapp 1cable to the case before us and it is not necessary to Das J. express any opinion as to the soundness and validity of that ground."}}, {"text": "Colonial Sugar Rfining Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18972, "end_char": 18998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle laid down in the Colonial Sugar Rfining Co.'s case (supra.)"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19050, "end_char": 19056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was followed by a Special Bench of Madras in In re Vasudeva Samiar (')."}}, {"text": "Vasudeva Samiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19066, "end_char": 19081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was followed by a Special Bench of Madras in In re Vasudeva Samiar (')."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19107, "end_char": 19127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal (3 ) fell into line and held that the earlier decision on this point of that Court in Zamin Ali Khan v. Genda (') stood overruled by the Privy Council decision in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co.'s case."}}, {"text": "Colonial Sugar Refining Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19326, "end_char": 19353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal (3 ) fell into line and held that the earlier decision on this point of that Court in Zamin Ali Khan v. Genda (') stood overruled by the Privy Council decision in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co.'s case."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19379, "end_char": 19396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of Nagpur High Court in Radhakisan v. Shridar (') has also taken the same view."}}, {"text": "Punjab- High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19461, "end_char": 19479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab- High Court has also adopted the same line in Gordhan Das v. The Governor General in Council('')."}}, {"text": "20th November, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19832, "end_char": 19851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of that decree the defaulting tenure was sold on the 20th November, 1928, for Bs."}}, {"text": "19th December, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19876, "end_char": 19895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 19th December, 1928, an application was made, under Order XXI, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the present petitioner, who was one of the judgment-debtors,\n\n{I) J.L.H_ (TCJ45) BonL 17."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19950, "end_char": 19977, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of had not been deposited as required by the proviso to sec-\n\nMadh!fa Prade., h tion 174, clause ( e), of the Bengal Tenancy Act as amendmul Others. ed by anamending Act in 1928.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20638, "end_char": 20822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1s ric u ge o Ltd.\n\nHoogly who refused to admit the appeal on the ground\n\nv. that the amount recoverable in execution of the decree The State of had not been deposited as required by the proviso to sec-\n\nMadh!fa Prade.,"}}, {"text": "21st February, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20925, "end_char": 20944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the\n\nDas J. petitioner was that the amended provision which came into force on the 21st February, 1929, could not affect the right of appeal from a decision on an application made on the 19th December, 1928, for setting aside the sale. ]"}}, {"text": "\\fitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21079, "end_char": 21086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\fitter J. said at page\n\n1011 :-\n\n\"We thiI!k the contention of the petitioner is wellfounded and must prevail."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21551, "end_char": 21578, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 174(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21652, "end_char": 21666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganapathy Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23511, "end_char": 23526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "$ri Ganapathy Aiyar urges that the language of section 22( 1) as amended clearly makes the section retrospective.", "canonical_name": "Gana pa thy Iyer"}}, {"text": "section 22( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23554, "end_char": 23568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Special Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24396, "end_char": 24418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar argument was urged before the Calcutta Special Bench in Sardar Ali v.\n\nDalirnuddin (supra), namely, that after the amendment the court had no authority to entertain an appeal without a certificate from the Single Judge."}}, {"text": "Dada", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24759, "end_char": 24763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "na\n\nSUPR.EME COVRT REPORTS [1953]\n\n1963 Rankin C.J. repelled this argument with the remark\n\nHoos;; n Ka.sam at page 520: --\n\nDada (Indh•J \"Unless the contrary can be shown, the provision Ltd. which takes away jurisdiction is itself subject to the\n\nv. implied saving of the litigants' right.\""}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25996, "end_char": 26006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26352, "end_char": 26366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument of Sri Ganapathy Iyer on this point, therefore, cannot be accepted.", "canonical_name": "Gana pa thy Iyer"}}, {"text": "Hoose'ln Ka.sani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26970, "end_char": 26986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He contends that this case is quite different from the case of Sardar Ali v. Dalmuddin (8upra ), for in this case it is entirely in the power of the appellant to deposit the ta; K if }le chooses to do so whereas it was not\n\nwithin the power of the appellant in that case to 1953 secure a certifioote from the learned Single .Judge who Hoose'ln Ka.sani disposed of the second appeiil."}}, {"text": "State of Further", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27233, "end_char": 27249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Further this argument cannot prevail in view of the Madhya Pradesh decision of the Calcnttii High Court in N agendra Nath and Others, Bose v. Mon }lfohtln Singha (suprrt) ."}}, {"text": "Calcnttii High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27325, "end_char": 27345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Further this argument cannot prevail in view of the Madhya Pradesh decision of the Calcnttii High Court in N agendra Nath and Others, Bose v. Mon }lfohtln Singha (suprrt) ."}}, {"text": "Gana pa thy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28244, "end_char": 28260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, Sri Gana pa thy Iyer faintly urges that until actual assessment there can be no '!", "canonical_name": "Gana pa thy Iyer"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28667, "end_char": 28677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30615, "end_char": 30630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for appellant: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "G. H. Rajadhyaksha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30655, "end_char": 30673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha."}}]}