{"document_id": "1952_1_572_582_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Amjad Khan v.\n\nThe State.\n\nBoil /,\n\nFeb. 27.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\non the doors were not the isolated acts of a few scattered individuals. It was the mob that was doing it .and in the High Court's words,\n\n\"The very fact that in the town of Katni two shots should have struck four Sindhis and none else shows that the rival community was on the move in that area.\"\n\nIn our opinion, the appellant did not use than was necessary. Indeed, the firing, acting as a deterrent, spurred them on ransacked and looted the place.\n\nmore force far from and they\n\nWe have confined our attention to the right of private defence of the person though in this case the question about the defence of property happens to be bound up with it.\n\nThe appeal is allowed. The convictions and sentences are set aside and the appellant will be released.\n\nAgent for the appellant: 0. P. Verma.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nMOHAMMAD YASIN\n\nTHE TOWN AREA COMMITTEE,\n\nJALALABAD AND ANOTHER.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEE, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. )\n\nConstitution of India. 1950, Arts. 19(l)(g), 32-U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, ss. 293(1), 298(2) (g)(d)-Municipal byc-laws- Bye-law imposing fee for carrying on wholesale trade in vegetables and fruits within municipal area-Validity-Restraint on fundamental right to carry on trade-Licence and tqx, difference.\n\nThere is a difference between a tax like the income-tax and a licence fee for carrying on an occupation, trade or business.\n\nA licence fee on a business not only takes away the property of the licensee but also operates as a restriction on his fundamental\n\n. '\n\nf '\n\n...\n\nright to carry on his business.· Therefore if the imposition of a 19'2: licence fee is without authority of law it can be challenged by way of an application under Art., 32.\n\nMohammal\n\nYasin Under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution a citizen has the right v. to carry on any occupation, trade or business and the only The Town Area restriction on this unfettered right is the authority of the State Committtl!, to make a law relating to the carrying on of such occupation, /alalabad trade or business as mentioned in cl. ( 6) of that article as mendand AntlJer, ed by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. If therefore a licence fee imposed for carrying on an occupation, trade or business cannot be justified on the basis of any valid law, no question of its reasonableness can arise, for an illegal impost must at all times be an unreasonable restriction and will necessarily infringe the right of the citizen to carry on his occupation, trade or business under Art. 19( 1) (g), and such infringement can properly be made the subject matter of a challenge under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nBye-law No. 1 of the Bye-laws of the Town Area Committee of Jalalabad (in the United Provinces) provided that no person shall sell or purchase any vegetables or fruit within the prescribed limits of the Town Area Committee by wholesale or auction, without paying the fees fixed by these bye-laws to the licensee appointed by the Town Magistrate.\n\nBye-law No. 4(b) provided that any person can sell in wholesale at any place in the town area provided he pays the prescribed fees to the licensee.\n\nA person who had been carrying on the business of wholesale dealer in vegetables and fruits in his own shop at Jalalabad for a period e>f seven years applied for protection under Art. 32 contending tl\\.at these bye-laws infringed his fundamental right to carry on his trade guaranteed by Art. 19( I) (g) and were therefore void.\n\nHeld, thats. 293(1) and s. 298(2) (J) (d) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, as amended at the time they were extended to the town areas in the United Provinces did not empower the Town Area Committee to make any bye-law authorising it to charge any fees otherwise than. for the use and occupation of any property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town Area Committee including any public street.\n\nThe bye-laws in question which imposed a charge on the wholesale dealer in the shape of the prescribed fee, irrespective of any use or occupation by him of immovable property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town Are; t Committee inch; ding any public street, are obviously ultra vires the powers of the Committee and, therefore, the bye-laws cannot be said to constitute a valid law which alone may, under Art. 19( 6) of the Constitution, impose ai restriction on the right , conferred by Art. 19(1) (g). In the absence of any valid law authorising it, such illegal imposition must undoubtedly operate as an illegal restraint and must\n\nifringe the unfettered right of the wholesale dealer to carry oIJ& ., .\n\nMohammad\n\nhis occupation, trade or hu!; iness which is guaranteed to him by Art. 19 (1) (g) of our Constitution.\n\nYasin Kairana case [1950] S.C.R. 566 and Ramji Lal v. !ncome-ta1t v.\n\nOfficer, Mohindargarh [ 1951] S.C.R. 127 distinguished.\n\nThe Town Ar<a ..\n\nCommittee\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petition No. 132 of 1951. /a/a/abad' Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ •nd Anoth<r, in the nature of mandamus. The material facts are\n\nDas/. set out in the judgment.\n\nNuruddin Ahmad for the petitioner.\n\nK. N. Aggarwal for .the respondents.\n\n1952. February 27; The Judgment of the Court - was delivered by\n\nDAs J.-This i& an application under article 32 of the Constitution made by Mohammad Yasin for the protection of his fundamental right of carrying on his business which, according to him, is being infringed by the respondent.\n\nThe case sought to be made out in the petition may be shortly stated as follows:- The petitioner is a whole11ale dealer in fresh vegetables and fruits at 1alalabad in the district of Muzaffarnagar in the State of Uttar Pradesh and claims to have been carrying on such business for the last 7 years or so at his shop situated in the town of\n\nJalalabad. The vegetable and fruit growers used to bring their goods to the town and get them auctioned through any of , the vegetable dealers of their choice ' who used to charge one anna in the rupee as and by way of commission.\n\nThe respondent Committee which is a Town Area Committee has framed certain bye-laws under which all right and power to levy oc collect commission on sale or purchase of vegetables and fruits within the limits of the town vt in the respondent Committee or any other agency appointed by the Committee and no one except the respondent Committee is authorised to deal in wholesale vegetables and fruits and collect the commission thereof in any place and in any event. The respondent committee has by auction given the contract for sale of\n\n, ..\n\nvegetables and fruits and for collecting the commis- -sion for the current year to the respondent Bishambcr who, it is alleged, has never dealt in vegetables and fruits. The respondent Committee has not set up any market nor has it framed any bye-laws for issue of licences to the vegetable and fruit merchants. The bye-laws also provide for prosecution for the breach of\n\nany of the provisions of these bye-laws.\n\nAlthough, in ierms, there is no absolute prohibition against carrying on business as wholesale dealer in vegetables and fruits, the result of the bye-laws requiring the wholesale dealers to pay the prescribed fee of one anna in the rupee to the contractor who holds the monopoly is, in effect, to bring about a total prohibition of the business of the wholesale dealers in vegetables and 'fruits. The petitioner contends that by granting a monopoly of the right to do wholesale business in vegetables and friuts to the respondent Bishambcr the . .respondent Committee has in effect totally prevented the petitioner from carrying on his business and has 'thereby infringed his fundamental right under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.\n\nIn the alternative, .the petitioner contends that the respondent Committee has no legal authority to impose a tax of the kind it has sought to do, that the imposition of a tax calculated at one anna in the rupee is in the nature .of a sale-tax and cannot be regarded as a licence fee . and such unauthorised impost constitutes an illegal res-\n\n.traint on his fundamental right under article 19 (1) (g).\n\nThe notice of motion has been served Oil the rea- pondent Committee as welll as on respondent Bish- .amber.\n\nThe respondents have entered appearance and filed an affidavit in opposition to the present :application affirmed by their agent on record.\n\nParagraph 4 of that affidavit is as follows:-\n\n\"4. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the petition arc wrong and misleading and do not convey the correct l<lea. If the bye-laws are read from beginning to end, <the correct position is that the Town Aiea. Committee !has lawfully impooed certain taxes on the purchase\n\nMohammad\n\nYasin\n\nThe Town Are11\n\nCommittee,\n\n/11Wabatl 11nd Another.\n\nDas /.\n\nMohammad\n\nYaSin\n\nThe Town Area Committee, falalabad and Another.\n\nDas J.\n\nand sale of fruits and vegetables within the ambit of the Town Area; and instead of collecting the aforesaid taxes departmentally the Committee finds it more convenient and less expensive to auction the 'right to collect the taxes' and give the contract to the highest bidder or whomsoever it thinks fit and proper. There is absolutely no restriction on anybody who wants to purchase or anybody who wants to ell; only he must pay the prescribed tax to the Town Area Committee through the Contractor.\n\nThe market is open, and writ large throughout the territory of the Town Area Committee and anybody can purchase from anybody and anybody can sell to anybody, without any control or intervention by the Contractor, whose position is simply that of a taxcollector on behalf of the Town Area Committee. Instead of getting the pay, he gets the profits, if any, and runs the risk of incurring losses if his gross realisations are less than what he paid. This is clearly the position, and it is submitted, there is nothing wrong with it legally and no interference of the petitioner's rights.'\"\n\nThe petitioner has to his petition annexed copies of a set of bye-laws dated June 24, 1942, and a copy of a resolution of the respondent Committee dated March 16, 1950, recommending the addition of several bye-laws to the previous bye-laws. At the hearing . of the petition before us it was agreed by and between counsel on both sides that the petition has to be disposed of on the basis of the bye-laws of 1942 only and learned counsel for the respondent Committee has. produced the original bye-laws of 1942 before us ..\n\nBye-law 1 only provides that no person shall sell or- . purchase any vegetable or fruit within the prescribed\n\nlimits of the Town Area Committee, Jalalabad, by wholesale or auction, without paying the fee fixed under , the51e lie-Laws to the li, censee appointed by the Town Magistrate. Bye-law 4 (b) expressly provides that any person can sell in wholesale at any place in the Town Area provided he pays the prescribed fees. to the licensee. It is, therefore, clear that these bye-- laws do not, in terms, prohibit anybody from dealing~ . in veget!ables and fruits as alleged by the petitioner:\n\n. \\\n\n...\n\nand in this respect they materially differ from the bye-laws which this Court had to consider in the Kairana case(1) which consequently does not govern this case.\n\nLearned counsel, however, contends-and we think with considerable force and cogency-that although, in form, there is no prohibition against carrying on any wholesale business by anybody, in effect and in substance the bye-laws have brought about a total stoppage of the wholesale dealers' business in a commercial sense.\n\nThe wholesale dealers, who will have to pay the prescribed fee , to the contractor appointed by auction, will necessarily have to charge the growers of vegetables and fruits something over and above the prescribed fee so as to keep a margin of profit for themselves but in such circumstances no grower of vegetables and fruits will have his produce sold to or auctioned by the wholesale dealers at a higher rate of commission but all of them will flock to the contractor who will only charge them the prescribed commission. On the other hand, if the wholesale dealers charge the growers of vegetables and fruits only the commission prescribed by the bye-laws they will have to make over the whole of it to the contractor without keeping any profit themselves. In other words, the wholesale dealers will be converted into mere tax collectors for the contractor or the rpondent Committee without any remuneration from either of them.\n\nIn effect, therefore, the bye-laws, it is said, have brought about a total prohibition of the business of the wholesale dealers in a commercial sense and from a p_ractical point of view. We are not of opinion that this contention is unsound or untenable.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner, however, does not leave the matter there. He goes further and urges that the respondent Comm~tee has no legaL authority to impose this fee of one anna in the rupee on the value of goods sold or auctioned and that such imposition is in the nature of a sale tax rather than a licence fee.\n\n(') {1950] S.C.R. 566.\n\nMohammad Yasin v.\n\nThe Town Ared\n\nCommittee, /alalabad and Another.\n\nDas/.\n\nMohammad\n\nYasin\n\nv. 0'1.'he Town Area\n\nCommittee,\n\nfalalabad end Another.\n\nDas./.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent in reply takes a preliminary objection to this line of argument. He points out that as the levying of a tax without authority of law is specifically prohibited under article 265 of the Constitution, article 31(1) must be construed as referring to deprivation of property otherwise than by levying of a tax and that levying of a tax in contravention of article 265 does not amount to a breach of a fundamental right. He contends, on the authority of 'the decision of this Court in Ramjilal v. Income-tax\n\nOfficer, Mohindargarh('), that while an illegal imposition of tax may be challenged in a properly constituted suit, it cannot be questioned by an application under article 32. This argument overlooks the difference between a tax like the income-tax and a licence tee for carrying on a business. A licence fee on a business not only takes away the property of the licensee but also operates as a restriction on his right to carry on his business, for without payment of such fee the business cannot be carried on at all. This aspect of the matter was not Ta\\ised or oonsidered in the case relied on by the learned counsel, and that case, , therefore, has no application to .the facts of this case.\n\nUnder article 19(1) (g) the citizen has the right to carry on any occupation, trade or business which right under that clause is apparently to be unfettered. The only restriction to this unfettered right is the authority of the State to make a law relating to the carrying on of such occupation, trade or business as mentioned in clause ( 6) of that\n\narticle :as amended by the Consttuon (Fi.t\\st Amendment) Act, 1951. If therefore, the licence fee cannot be justified on the basis of any valid law no question of its reasonableness can arise, for an illegal impost must at all times be an unreasonable restriction and will necessarily infringe the right of the citizen to carry on his occupation, trade or business under article 19\n\n(1) (g) and such infringement can properly be made the subject-matter of a challenge under article 32 of the Constitution.\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 127\n\n. .,\n\nLearned counsd for the respondents then refers. us 1952\n\nMohammaa:\n\nYasin\n\nto the U.P. Town Areas Act (No. II of 1914) which governs the respondent Committee.\n\nSection 14 of this Act requires the Committee to annually determine and report to the District Magtrate the amount required to be raised in any town area for the purposes\n\nThe Town Are1i\n\nCommittee, /alalabad of this Act and provides that the amount so determined shall be raised by the imposition of a taX to be assessed on the occupiers of houses or lands within the limits of the town area according either to their\n\ngeneral circumstances or to the annual rental value of the houses or lands so occupied by them as the Committee may determine. There were, at the time when the bye-laws of the respondent Committee were framed, five provisps to this section none of which authorised the imposition of any tax on any business and, therefore, they have no bearing on the question now under consideration. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, draws our attention to section 38 of the Act which authorises the Provincial Government by notification in the Official Gazette to extend to all or any or any part of any town area any enactment for the time being in force in any municipality in.\n\nthe United Provinces and to declare its extension to. be ubject to such restria11ions and modifications, if any, as it thinks fit. Then he proceeds to draw oiir attention to Notification No. 397/XI-871-E, dated the 6th February, 1929, whereby in supersession of all\n\nprevious notifica, tions, the Provincial Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 38(1) of the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914, extended the provisions of sections 293(1) and 298(2) (J) (d) of the\n\nUnited Provinces Municipalities Act (II of 1916) to, all the town area in the United Provinces. in the modified form set forth therein. The original bye-laws produced by learned counsel purport, however, to,\n\nhave been framed by the respondent Committee under\n\nsections 298 (2) (F) (a) and 294 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act (II of 1916). We have not been referred to any notification whereby: section 2941\n\nond Another •.\n\nDas/.\n\nMohammad Yasin v.\n\nThe Town At-ea\n\nCommittee,\n\n/alalabad , and Another.\n\n])as].\n\nof the United Provinces Municipalities Act was extended to the respondent Committee. It appears, however, that the bye-laws of the respondent Committee were revised in September 1942 and were then said to have en made under section 298 (2) (J) (d). It will have, therefore, to be seen whether these bye-laws come within the purview of section 298 (2) (J) ( d) as modified in their application to the respondent Committee.\n\nIt_}:\\'ill be noticed that under section 298 (2) (J) ( d) as modified as aforesaid the respondent Committee is authorised only to make bye-laws fixing any charges or fees or any scale of charges or fees to be paid under section 293(1) and prescribing the .times at which such charges -0r fees shall be payable and designating the persons authorised to receive payment thereof. Section 293 ( 1 ), as modified, authorises the respondent Committee to charge fees to be fixed by bye-laws or by public auction or by agreement for the use or occupation ( etherwise than under a lease) of any immovable property vested in, or entrusted to the management -0f the T-0wn Area Committee, including any public street or place of which it allows the use or occupation whether by allowing a projection thereon or otherwise. Bye-law 1 of the respondent Committee to which a reference has already been made forbids a person from 1using any land within the limits of the town area for the sale or purchase of fruits and vegetables without -paying the prescribed fee.\n\nBye-law 4 (b), however, allows any person to sell in wholesale at any place in the town area, provided he pay~ the prescribed fees to the licensee. Th'8C bye-laws do not purport to fix a fee for the use or occupation of any immovable pr<> perty vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town Area Committee including any public street -0r place of which it allows the use or occupation whether by allowing a projection thereon or otherwise . . Sections 293(1) and 298(2) (J) (d) of the United Province ~Ml!lnicipalities Act, 1916, as amended at the time they .were extended to the town areas in the United Provinces do not empower the Town Area Committet .t::> make any bye-law authorising it to\n\n' --\n\n'charge any fees otherwise than for the use or occupation of any property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town Area Committee including .any public street. Therefore, the bye-laws prima facie go much beyond the powers conferred on the respondent Committee by the sections mentioned above and the petitioner complains agairu, t the enforcement of these bye-laws against him as he carries on business in his own shop and not in or on any immoveable property vested in the Town Area Committee or entrusted to their management. Learned counsel for the respondent Committee, however, urges that the growers of vegetables and fruits come on foot or in carts or on horses along the public street and stand outside the petitioner's shop and for such use of the public street the respondent Committee is well within its powers to charge the fees. From the way the case was formulated by the learned counsel, it is quite clear that if anybody uses the public street it is the growers of vegetables and fruits who come to the petitioner's shop to get their produce auctioned by the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be charged with fees for use of the public street by those persons.\n\nIn our opinion, the bye-laws which imp~ a charge on the wholesale dealer in the shape of the prescribed fee, irrespective of any use or oc.cupation by him of immoveable property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town Area Committee including\n\nany; public street, are obviously ultra vires the powers of the respondent Committee and, therefore, the bye-\n\nIaws cannot be said to constitute a valid law which alone may, under article 19(16) of the Constitution,\n\nime a restriction on the right conferred by article 19(1) (g). In the absence of any valid law authorising it, such illegal imposition must undoubtedly operate as an illegal restraint and must infringe the unfettered right of the wholesale dealer to carry on his occupation, trade or business which is guaranteed to him by article 19(1) (g) of our Constitution.\n\nA{ohammad\n\nYasin\n\nThe Town Arca\n\nCommittee,\n\nJalalabad and Another.\n\nDas/.\n\nMollammtul\n\nYasin\n\nThe To\"\"' Area\n\nCommittee.\n\n/altdtlbail\n\nv .. 1.\n\nIn this view of the matter the petitioner is entitled, to a suitable order for protection of his fundamental right. The prayer in the petition, however, has been, expressed in language much too wide and cannot be granted in that form. The proper order would be to direct the respondent Committee not to prohibit the petitioner from carrying on the business of a wholesale dealer in vegetables and fruits within the limits of the Jalalabad Town Area Committee until proper and valid bye-laws are framed and tl1ereafter except in accordance with a licence to be obtained by the petitioner under the b)ie-laws to be so framed. The . respondent Committee will pay tlie costs of thj.g application to the petitioner.\n\nAgent for the petitioner: Nan nit Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. C. Aggarwal-\n\n~ '\n\nGIPN-S3--6 S.C. India/71-12-10-72-700.", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "Katni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 249, "end_char": 254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was the mob that was doing it .and in the High Court's words,\n\n\"The very fact that in the town of Katni two shots should have struck four Sindhis and none else shows that the rival community was on the move in that area.\""}}, {"text": ". P. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 861, "end_char": 871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: 0."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 900, "end_char": 911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "MOHAMMAD YASIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 914, "end_char": 928, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD YASIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE TOWN AREA COMMITTEE,\n\nJALALABAD AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 930, "end_char": 977, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE TOWN AREA COMMITTEE, JALALABAD AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 981, "end_char": 1002, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. 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CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1072, "end_char": 1093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(l)(g), 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1101, "end_char": 1119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 293(1), 298(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1152, "end_char": 1170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Mohammal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1833, "end_char": 1841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohammal\n\nYasin Under Art.", "canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD YASIN"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1855, "end_char": 1868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Art. 19( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2629, "end_char": 2640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2729, "end_char": 2736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jalalabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3366, "end_char": 3375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A person who had been carrying on the business of wholesale dealer in vegetables and fruits in his own shop at Jalalabad for a period e>f seven years applied for protection under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3434, "end_char": 3441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3543, "end_char": 3554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 298(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3609, "end_char": 3618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3640, "end_char": 3664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19( 6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4423, "end_char": 4434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1916", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1916"}}, {"text": "Mohammad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4726, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohammad\n\nhis occupation, trade or hu!;", "canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD YASIN"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4802, "end_char": 4809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5072, "end_char": 5079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5207, "end_char": 5221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nuruddin Ahmad for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. N. Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5243, "end_char": 5257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Aggarwal for .the respondents."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5382, "end_char": 5392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mohammad Yasin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 27; The Judgment of the Court - was delivered by\n\nDAs J.-This i& an application under article 32 of the Constitution made by Mohammad Yasin for the protection of his fundamental right of carrying on his business which, according to him, is being infringed by the respondent.", "canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD YASIN"}}, {"text": "Muzaffarnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case sought to be made out in the petition may be shortly stated as follows:- The petitioner is a whole11ale dealer in fresh vegetables and fruits at 1alalabad in the district of Muzaffarnagar in the State of Uttar Pradesh and claims to have been carrying on such business for the last 7 years or so at his shop situated in the town of\n\nJalalabad."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5785, "end_char": 5798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case sought to be made out in the petition may be shortly stated as follows:- The petitioner is a whole11ale dealer in fresh vegetables and fruits at 1alalabad in the district of Muzaffarnagar in the State of Uttar Pradesh and claims to have been carrying on such business for the last 7 years or so at his shop situated in the town of\n\nJalalabad."}}, {"text": "Bishambcr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6786, "end_char": 6795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent committee has by auction given the contract for sale of\n\n, ..\n\nvegetables and fruits and for collecting the commis- -sion for the current year to the respondent Bishambcr who, it is alleged, has never dealt in vegetables and fruits."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7803, "end_char": 7816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8226, "end_char": 8236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 24, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10126, "end_char": 10139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner has to his petition annexed copies of a set of bye-laws dated June 24, 1942, and a copy of a resolution of the respondent Committee dated March 16, 1950, recommending the addition of several bye-laws to the previous bye-laws."}}, {"text": "March 16, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10202, "end_char": 10216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner has to his petition annexed copies of a set of bye-laws dated June 24, 1942, and a copy of a resolution of the respondent Committee dated March 16, 1950, recommending the addition of several bye-laws to the previous bye-laws."}}, {"text": "Kairana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11281, "end_char": 11288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nand in this respect they materially differ from the bye-laws which this Court had to consider in the Kairana case(1) which consequently does not govern this case."}}, {"text": "article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13563, "end_char": 13574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13596, "end_char": 13609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13749, "end_char": 13760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14065, "end_char": 14075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14605, "end_char": 14618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15321, "end_char": 15331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15424, "end_char": 15434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mohammaa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15543, "end_char": 15551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "us 1952\n\nMohammaa:\n\nYasin\n\nto the U.P. Town Areas Act (No.", "canonical_name": "MOHAMMAD YASIN"}}, {"text": "Yasin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15554, "end_char": 15559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "us 1952\n\nMohammaa:\n\nYasin\n\nto the U.P. Town Areas Act (No."}}, {"text": "Town Areas Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15573, "end_char": 15587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15646, "end_char": 15656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Areas Act", "statute": "Town Areas Act"}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16520, "end_char": 16530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Areas Act", "statute": "Town Areas Act"}}, {"text": "6th February, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16960, "end_char": 16978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "397/XI-871-E, dated the 6th February, 1929, whereby in supersession of all\n\nprevious notifica, tions, the Provincial Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 38(1) of the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914, extended the provisions of sections 293(1) and 298(2) (J) (d) of the\n\nUnited Provinces Municipalities Act (II of 1916) to, all the town area in the United Provinces."}}, {"text": "section 38(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17104, "end_char": 17117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17126, "end_char": 17163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 293(1) and 298(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17192, "end_char": 17218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914", "statute": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "sections 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17496, "end_char": 17508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914", "statute": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "section 2941", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17641, "end_char": 17653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914", "statute": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "section 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17983, "end_char": 17994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914", "statute": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "section 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18094, "end_char": 18105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914", "statute": "the\n\nUnited Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "section 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18215, "end_char": 18226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 293(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18402, "end_char": 18416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 293", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18559, "end_char": 18570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 293(1) and 298(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19683, "end_char": 19709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United Province", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19725, "end_char": 19740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sections 293(1) and 298(2) (J) (d) of the United Province ~Ml!lnicipalities Act, 1916, as amended at the time they .were extended to the town areas in the United Provinces do not empower the Town Area Committet .t::> make any bye-law authorising it to\n\n' --\n\n'charge any fees otherwise than for the use or occupation of any property vested in or entrusted to the management of the Town Area Committee including .any public street."}}, {"text": "article 19(16)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21572, "end_char": 21586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21653, "end_char": 21666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21932, "end_char": 21945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jalalabad Town Area Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22546, "end_char": 22575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proper order would be to direct the respondent Committee not to prohibit the petitioner from carrying on the business of a wholesale dealer in vegetables and fruits within the limits of the Jalalabad Town Area Committee until proper and valid bye-laws are framed and tl1ereafter except in accordance with a licence to be obtained by the petitioner under the b)ie-laws to be so framed."}}, {"text": "Nan nit Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22855, "end_char": 22866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner: Nan nit Lal."}}, {"text": "P. C. Aggarwal-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22895, "end_char": 22910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. C. Aggarwal-\n\n~ '\n\nGIPN-S3--6 S.C. India/71-12-10-72-700."}}, {"text": "S3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22922, "end_char": 22924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12-10-72-700", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22942, "end_char": 22954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. C. Aggarwal-\n\n~ '\n\nGIPN-S3--6 S.C. India/71-12-10-72-700."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_583_597_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "_ ..\n\n( -.\n\nS.C.E,.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nVEERAPPA PILLAI\n\n\"· RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 226--0rder of Traffic Board grant ing permit to run motor buses to particular person-Application to High Court by rival claimant under Art. 226 for quashing the order and for a direction to grant permits to him-Maintainabilityjurisdiction of High Court to interfere-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -Grant of permit-Whether depends on ownership of bus-Discretion of Traffic Board.\n\nThe writs referred to in Art. 226 are intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without judisdiction , or in excess of it:, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record and such act, omission or error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.\n\nThe Motor Vehicles Act contains a complete and precise schr\"me for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities, and the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities; it is not a matter of right.\n\nWhere, in a dispute between two rival claimants for running through a particular route five buses, which each of them alleged he had purchased from a third person, the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, after calling for a report from the Regional Transport Officer and considering several circumstances that had a material bearing on the case, restored the permanent permits which had been granted to one of the claimants, but on an application by the other claimant under Art. 226 of the Constitution td the High Court of Madras for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, the Central Road Traffic Board and the State of Madras and for a: writ of mandamus to the respondents to transfer, is:ue or grant\n\nMflt'Ch 17.\n\n1952 permanent permits to the petitioner', the High Court set aside . . the order of the Central Traffic Board, relying mainly on the Veerapp• .Pillai fact that the petitioner's title to. the five buses had been cstav. blished and directed the Regional Traffic Authority to grant to Raman & Raman the petitioner permits in respect of the five buses : Ltd. & Others.\n\nHeld, that under the Motor Vehicles Act, the issue of -- a permit for a bus was not dependent on the ownership of the Chantfrasekhara bus but on other considerations also, and as the Central Traffic\n\nAiyar ].\n\nBoard had issued an order granting permits to one of the claimants after considering all circumstances the High Court acted erroneously in interfering with the Order 0£ Traffic Board on an application under Art. 226 ; and in any event the order of the High Court issuing a direction to the Regional Transport Authority to grant permits to the other party was clearly in excess of its powers and jurisdiction.\n\nThe Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation.\n\nNo one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport autho~ rities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have .to be taken into account.\n\nCML\n\nAPPELLATE JuRismCTION Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1951. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 13th of April, 1951, of . the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and Somasundaram J.) in C.M.P. No. 122/15 of 1950.\n\nM. C. Setalvad (C. R. Pattabhi Raman, with him) for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary (M. Natesan, with him) for the respondent No. 1.\n\nV. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras\n\n(R. '.\n\nGanapathi Iyer, with him) for respondent No. 4.\n\n1952. March 17. . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR J.-This appeal arises as the result of special leave to appeal granted by this Court on the 1st of May, 1951, against an order of the Madras High Court dated 13th April, 1951, quash- . iµg i::ertain proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, and the Central Traffic Board, Madras, dated 19th January, 1950, and 3rd March,\n\n. -\n\n- •\n\ny • -.\n\n1950, respectively, and an order of the first respondent (the State of Madras) dated 7th November, 1950, and directing the issue to Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd. (Petitioners before the High Court) of permits for the five buses in respect of which a joint application had been made originally by them and one T. D. Balasubramania Pillai.\n\nThe present appellant, G. Veerappa Pillai, was the fourth respondent in the High Court. The present first respondents (Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd.) were the petitioners before the High Court. Present respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were respectively respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 before the High Court.\n\nThe dispute is between the appellant and Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., who were competing bus pro- -prietors in the Tanjore District; and it is over the issues of five permanent permits for buses Nos. M.D.O. 81, M.D.O. 230, M.D.O. 6, M.D.O. 7 and M.D.O. 759 on the route between Kumbakonam and Karaikal. It has been a long-drawn game with many moves, counter-moves, advances and checkmates, both sides displaying unusual assiduity and skill in their manoeuvres for position.\n\nBut it is unnecessary to set out in great detail all the steps taken, as they have been narrated in the order of High Court and many of them are of insignificant relevance for disposal of this appeal. I shall state here only what is material.\n\nThe 'C' permits for the five buses stood originally in the name of Balasubramania Pillai. The buses were agreed to be purchased from him by Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., and there was a joint application by the transferor and transferee on 10th March, 1944, for transfer of the ownership and of the 'C' permits in the name of the purchasers. Two days later, Veerappa Pillai, proprietor of the Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, who is the appellant before us, applied for temporary permits to ply two of his own vehicles over the same route, stating that the vehicles of the two agencies which held the permits were mostly out of action.\n\nIt was a fact that out of the five buses sold.\n\nV eerappa Pillai v.\n\nRaman & Rama\"\n\nLtd. & Others.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nV eerappa Pillai\n\nRaman & Raman Ltd. & 0 thers.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar ].\n\nby Balasubramania Pillai, only two were then running; the other three were under repairs. The permanent .permits for the sold buses were suspended by order of the Secretary dated 28th March,\n\n1944. Temporary permits for buses M.D.0. 920, 894, 918, M.S.C. 7632 and 7482 had been issued to Veerappa Pillai during the same month.\n\nNow we come to another chapter in the story. Balasubramania Pillai resiled from the joint application and repudiated it as having been got from him by fraud. The Secretary, Road Traffic Board, thereupon refused to transfer the ownership on the 19th March, 1944, and this order was confirmed by the Board on 29th May, 1944.\n\nBalasubramania Pillai and Veerappa Pillai made a joint application on 10th April, 1944, for transfer of the buses and the original permits in favour of Veerappa Pillai who had on the same date agreed to purchase the vehicles. The Secretary granted this application on the same date. Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., took the matter before the Central Road Traffic Board and they made an order on 16th August, 1944, upholding the issue of temporary permits to V eerappa Pillai for his buses M.D.O. 920, 894, 918, M.S.C. 7632 and 7482, but setting aside the transfer of registry of the original buses and the transfer of the permits relating to the same.\n\nOn an application by Veerappa Pillai to review its order dated 16th August, 1944, the Central Road Traffic Board allowed on 27th November, 1944, only the transfer of the ownership of the buses but not a transfer of the permits.\n\nYet another move in the game was this. Veerappa Pillai filed a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam, on 3rd October, 1944, for recovery of possession of the original five buses from Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., on the strength of his purchase from Balasubramania Pillai.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge appointed Veerappa. Pillai as Receiver on 17th March, 1945, and the five disputed buses were delivered to him on 26th April, 1945.\n\nTwo of the buses M.D.O. 6 and 7 were repaired by him and put on the route under his temporary permits. The suit was decreed in\n\n. -\n\n...\n\n' \\\n\nhis favour on 2nd May, 1946.\n\nLater, he repaired the other three buses M.D.O. 759, 230 and 81 and began to run them on the same route under the temporary permits he held.\n\nVeerappa Pillai was discharged from receivership on 18th September, 1946.\n\nOn the strength of the Sub-Court decree, Veerappa Pillai again applied for a permanent transfer of the permits, and on 22nd July, 1946, the Central Road Traffic Board transferred the petition to the Regional Transport Authority with an intimation that it saw no objection to the issue of regular permits to Veerappa Pillai for the disputed buses or to their transfer in his name, provided there were valid permits in existence.\n\nThis view appears to have been modified later and on 2nd September, 1946, the Regional Transport Officer directed the issue of temporary permits to the buses for the period from 3rd September, 1946, to 31st October, 1946, subject to the condition that the issue of the permits did not affect the rights of either party in the matter under dispute. Thereupon, the Government was moved by V eerappa Pillai and also by Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., but the Government declined to interfere and the result was an order on 30th June, 1947, by the Regional Transport Authoritv to the following effect :- ·\n\n\"Since the subject-matter 1s on appeal before the High Court, the matter will lie over pending the decision of the High Court.\n\nThe temporary permits are continued as i~ being done.\"\n\nA fresh petition by Veerappa Pillai to the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, was unsuccessful, but a further appeal to the Government of Madras ended in his favour in an order dated 29th March, 1949.\n\nThe order is in these terms :-\n\n\"Shri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, Tanjore district, have been permitted by the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to run their buses M.D.O. 6, 7, 81, 230 and 759 on the Kumbakonam-Karaikal route on temporary permits from 1944 pending\n\nVeerappa Pillai\n\nRaman & Ramar>\n\nLtd. & Othtrs.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nVeerappa Pillai v.\n\nRaman & Raman Ltd. & Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nthe High Court's decision on the question of permanent ownership of the buses.\n\nGovernment consider it undesirable to keep these buses running on temporary permits for a long and indefinite period.\n\nFurther Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service have secured the decision of the Sub-Court, Kumbakonam, in their favour about the permanent ownership of the buses.\n\nIn the circumstances the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, is directed to grant permanent permits for the buses of Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, referred to above in lieu of the existing temporary permits.\"\n\nOn the basis of this Government order, permanent permits were issued in favour of Veerappa Pillai on 18th April, 1949.\n\nGetting to know of this last order, Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., approached the Government of Madras with a petition praying for clarlfication of the order by making it expressly subject to the decision of the High Court regarding the title to the said five buses and that in the event of the High Court deciding the appeal in favour of Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd. \"the above said five permanent permits will be taken away from Veerappa Pillai and given to them.\" The Minister of Transport, who dealt with the matter, stated on the petition \"that was my intention also.\"\n\nThe High Court reversed the decree of the Sub-Court on 2nd September, 1949, and came to the conclusion that the title of Messs. Raman and Raman Ltd., to the five buses prevailed over that of Veerappa Pillai.\n\nOn 19th September, 1949, they applied to the Government . for cancellation of the five permits issued to Veerappa Pillai and for grant of the same to them.\n\nThe Government declined to interfere as the Regional Transport Authority was the comptent authority, vide order dated 16th November, 1949.\n\nIn their application to the Regional Transport Authority dated 28th November, 1949, Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd .• asked for withdrawal of the permits. In the meantime, that is -on 14th October, 1949, Veerappa Pillai applied for renewal of his permanent permits held for his own\n\n. -\n\n....\n\n- .\n\nbuses Nos. M.D.O. 1357, 20, 1366, 1110, 1077, M.D.O. 1368 and M.S.C. 7632, which had been substituted for the .disputed buses as they had become unroadworthy and useless. The application for renewal has under section 58, sub-clause (2), of the Act to be treated as a fresh application for new permits. Tlus procedure was followed and on 22nd October, 1949, a notification was issued inviting objections against the renewal and giving 30th November, 1949, as the date of hearing.\n\nNo objections were received and the Secretary renewed the permits for two years from 1st January, 1950.\n\nThis order was dated 3rd January, 1950.\n\nThe Regional Transport Authority dealing with the application of Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., dated 28th November, 1949, resolved on 19th January, 1950, that the permanent permits issued to Veerappa Pillai should be cancelled, that the route should be declared vacant in respect of the five buses and fresh applications should be invited and dealt with on the merits. The order further stated that \"in the meanwhi:le Sri G. V eerappa Pillai and Raman and Raman will be given temporary permits for running two and three buses respectively on the route.\n\nThe permanent permits will be cancelled with immediate effect. Raman and Raman should put in the buses as quickly as possible.\n\nTill then Sri Veerappa Pillai will be given temporary permits so as not to dislocate public traffic.\"\n\nBoth the parties were dissatisfied with this order and preferred appeals to the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, which dismissed the appeal of Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., and restored the permanent permits of Veerappa Pillai by order dated the 3rd March, 1950.\n\nMessrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., moved the Government, but it declined to interfere by G.O., dated 7th November, 1950.\n\nThereupon, Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., moved the High Court on 4th December, 1950, under article 226 of the Constitution in Civil Mi:Scellaneous Petition No. 12215 of 1950 for a writ of certiorari for quashing the orders and the proceedings of the\n\nV eerappa Pillai v.\n\nRaman & Raman\n\nLtd. & Othel's.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\n11.iyar ;.\n\nV eerappa Pillai\n\nRaman & RamatJ\n\nLtd. & Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nRegional Transport Authority, the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, and the State of Madras dated 19th January, 1950, 3rd March, 1950, and 7th November, 1950, respectively, and for the sue of a writ of mandamus or other such appropriate directions to the first respondent to transfer, issue or grant \"the five pucca permits in respect of the route Kumbakonam to Karaikkal to the petitioner herein\" (Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd.) It is on this petition that the order challenged in this appeal was made by the High Court.\n\nThe High Court took the view that throughout all the stages prior to the High Court's decree, the parties, the transport authorities vested with the power to issue permits, and the Government also proceeded upon the footing that the transfer of the perm!ts was dependent on the title to the buses and that Veerappa Pillai obtained the temporary and permanent permits only in his capacity as transferee and not in his individual right. To quote the learned Chief Justice :- \"the conduct of the parties, the attitude of the transport authorities including the Government are all explicable only on the assumption that the rights of parties were consequent on the ownership of the five vehicles in question.\n\nThe fourth respondent having obtained the benefit of temporary and permanent permits as a transferee from Balasubramania Pillai all this ti1me cannot be heard now to say after the decision of this Court which has negatived his claim and upheld the claim of the applicant that the applicant should not enjoy the fruits of his success.\" He further points out that the procedure laid down by the Motor Vehicles Act and the rule• for grant of fresh permits was not followed and that long before the application for renewal was allowed, the Regional Transport Authority had been informed of the decision of the High Court. The order of the Central Road Traffic Board was in his opinion most unsatisfactory, as it was based on a quibbling distinction between \"withdrawal\" and \"cancellation\" of the permits. In his view, the orders complained against deprived Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., of the fruits of the\n\n. -\n\n-- .\n\ndecree obtained by them at the hands of the High Court after much expenditure of time and money.\n\nAn examination of the relevant sections of the Motor Vehicles Act does not support the view that the issue of a permit for a bus-which falls within the definition of a \"stage carriage\"-is necessarily dependent on the ownership of vehicle.\n\nAll that is required for obtaining a permit is possession of the bus.\n\nAs ownership is not a condition precedent for the grant of permits and as a person can get a permit provided he is in possession of a vehicle which satisfies the requirements of the statute or the rules framed thereunder, we have to hold that the partiesi and the authorities were labouring under a misconception if they entertained a contrary view.\n\nBut the assumption on which they proceeded may perhaps be explained, if not justified, on the ground that it was supposed that the question of ownership of vehicles had an important or material bearing on the question as to which of them had a preferential claim for the permits.\n\nIt may well be it was one of the factors to be taken into account and it seems to us that this was apparently the reason why the question of issue of permanent permits was postponed from time to time till we come to the order of the Government dated 29th March, 1949, on petitions presented by both the contestants.\n\nIf ina.tters, had stood as they were till the Government had made this order, something could have been said in favour of Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., in the event of their ultimate success rn the High Court as regards the title to the five buses. But the said order altered the situation. In the order, the direction for the grant of permanent permits is not rested solely on the decision of the Sub-Court in favour of Veerappa Pillai but another reason was also given, namely, that Government considered it undesirable to keep the buses running on temporary permits for a long and indefinite period.\n\nIn giving this reason, they were stating a policy.\n\nVeerappa Pillai v.\n\nRaman & Ramafl\"\n\nLtd. & Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nV ecrappa Pillai\n\nv. Raman& Raman • Ltd. & Others.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar ].\n\nAs observed already, the High Court by their judgment dated 2nd September, 1949, reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed Veerappa Pillai'& suit for possession of the buses based on his\n\ntitle~ If it were the law that the question of possession based on ownership was decisive as regards the grant of permits, and if no other circumstances were available to be taken into account when the question of the issue of permanent permits again came up for consideration, it would have been easy to hold that Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., had at least a preferential claim.\n\nBut unfortunately for them, both these reqms1tes are not satisfied. It has been pointed out already that nowhere do we find in the Act anything to indicate that the issue of permits depends on ownership. Other circumstances which had a material bearing as to which of them was entitled to the permits had come into existence since the date of the original . joint application and were taken :lnto account by the transport authorities and by the Government. The order of 19th January, 1950, of the Regional Transport Authority sought to render rough and ready justice between the parties by the adoption of what may be called a middle course.\n\nThe terms of the order have already been set out.\n\nBefore disposing of the appeals ()f both the parties, the Central Traffic Board appears to have called for a report from the Regional Transport Officer. In this report, attention was drawn to the fact that all the five buses had been replaced by new vehicles and that the registration certificates had been cancelled as a result of the replacement. After Balasubramania Pillai, it was Veerappa Pillai who was running the buses continuously on this route for nearly 5 years and he also obtained the privilege of securing the permanent permits. The Central Traffic Board's order of 3rd March, 1950, restoring the permanent permits of Veerappa Pillai was based on the fact that Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd. asked for withdrawal of the permits and not th_eir cancellation and that no opportunity had been given to Veerappa Pillai to show cause why his permits should not be cancelled~ and\n\n. -\n\nf •\n\n~·.\n\nthe procedure followed. prescribed for cancellation was\n\nnot\n\nWhen the Government was moved by Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., under section 64 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, they had before them a petition for withdrawal of the permanent permits issued to Vei:rappa Pillai and for transfer or grant of five 'pucca permits' relating to the five buses. The Government granted stay of the appellate order of the Central Road Traffic Board pending disposal of the revision petition and called for a report from the subordinate transport authorities.\n\nTwo important facts were brought to the notice of the Government in the report. Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd. did not file any objections to the renewal of the permits sought by Veerappa Piillai. What is more important, they had no permits from the Fr.ench authorities enabling them to run any buses on the portion of the route which lay in French territory. It was further pointed out that there was no subsisting joint application to support the request for transfer and that the original permits in the 'name of Balasubramanian had ceased to exist after 31st December,\n\n1944. The Government had also before them two petitions dated 8th March, 1950, and 25th October, 1950, from Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., and two petitions dated 29th March, 1950, and 8th June, 1950, from Veerappa Pillai. It is on the bm.s of all these materials that the Government declined to interfere with the decision of the Central Road Traffic Board.\n\nIt IS contended for the appellant that m this state of affairs the High Court acting under Article 226 of the Constitution had no right to interfere with the orders of the transport authorities.\n\nIt is unnecessary for the disposal of this appeal to consider and decide on the exact scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.\n\nWhether the writs it can issue must be analogous to the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari specified therein and the power is subject to all the limitations, or restrictions\n\nV urappa Pillai v.\n\nRaman & Raman\n\n.Ltd .. & Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar/.\n\nVeerappa Pillai\n\nRaman & Raman Ltd. (Jr Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar f.\n\nimposed on the exercise of this jurisdiction, or whether the High Court is at liberty to issue any suitable directions or orders or writs untramelled by any conditions, whenever the interests of justice so requie, is a large and somewhat difficult problem which does not arise for solution now. Mr. Setalvad appearing for the appellant urged two narrower grounds as sufficient for his purposes.\n\nFirstly, he urged that however wide the jurisdiction of the High Court might be under Article 226, it could never exercise its powers under the article in such a manner as to convert itself into a court of appeal sitting in judgment over every tribunal or authority in the State discharging administrative or quasi-judicial functions.\n\nSecondly, he maintained that the Motor Vehicles Act with the rules framed thereunder dealing with the grant of permits is a self-contained code and that in re_wect of the rights and liabilities created by such a statute the manner of enforcement must be sought within the statute itself.. It was further urged by him that in any event, the High Court could not substitute its own view or discretion for the view taken or discretion exercised by the specified authorities, even if it was erroneous or unsound.\n\nSuch writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice.\n\nHowever extensive the juridiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper vilow to be tafoen or the order to be made.\n\nMr. Daphtary, who appeared for the respondent, said nothing to controvert this position. His argument\n\nv •\n\n. -\n\n• -\n\n• •\n\nwas that if all along the authorities and the Government had proceeded upon a particular footing and dealt with the rights of the parties on that basis, it was not open to them afterwards to change front and give the go-by altogether to the conception of the rights of parties entertained by them till then. According to him, there was manifest injustice to his client in allowing them to do so and this was the reason whkh impelled the High Court to make the order which is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal.\n\nThe Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. The Regional Transport Authority and the Provincial Tranport Authority are entrusted under section 42 with this power. They may be described as administrative bodies exercising quasijudicial functions in the matter of the grant or permits.\n\nUnder rule 3 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Regional Transport Authority is called the Road Traffic Board and the Provincial Transport Authority is called the Central Road Traffic Board.\n\nThese bodies or authorities are constituted by the Provincial Government. The matters which are to be taken foto account in granting or refusing a stage carriage permit are specified in section 47.\n\nBy delegation under rule 134A, the Secretary of the Road Traffic Board may exercise certain powers as regards the grant or refusal of stage carriage permits and under rule 136 there is an appeal to the Board from these orders.\n\nSimilar Powers of delegation are vested in the Secretary to the Central Board and an appeal lies to the Central Board under rule 148(1). From an origiinal order of the Road Traffic Board there is an appeal to the Central Board and from the original orders of the Central Board to the Government, vide rules 147 and 148. An amendment introduced by the Madras Act XX of 1948\n\nV eerappa Pillai v.\n\nRaman & Raman Ltd. & Others.\n\nChandrasek_hara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nVeerappa Pillai\n\nand found as section 64A in the Act vests a power of revision in the Provincial Government.\n\nBesides this specific provision, there is a general provision in section 43A that the Provincial Government may issue such orders and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary to the Provincial Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority in resv.\n\nRaman & Raman Ltd. & Othm.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar /. pect of any matter relating to road transport; and such transport authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions. There is, therefore, a regular hierarchy of administrative bodies established to deal with the regulation of transport by means of motor vehicles.\n\nThus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and i~ is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right.\n\nWe are accordingly of opinion that this was not a case for interference with the discretion that was exercised by the Trans port Authorities paying regard to all the facts and the surrounding circumstances.\n\nFurther, it will be noticed that the High Court here did not content itself with merely quashing the proceedings, it went further and directed the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, \"to grant to the petitioner permits in respect of the five buses in respect of which a joint application was made originally by the petitioner and Balasubramania Pi1llai and that in case the above buses have been condemned, the petitioner shall be at liberty to provide substitutes within such time as may be prescribed by the authorities.\" Such a diirection was clearly in excess of its powers and jurisdiction.\n\n..... -\n\n> •\n\nFor the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court set aside. Each party will bear their own costs of these proceedings throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : S. Subrahmanyam.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 4 : P. A. Mehta.\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS v.\n\nV. G. ROW\n\nUNION OF INDIA & STATE I OF TRA VAN CORE-COCHIN. J lnterveners\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\n- MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAlYAR JJ.)\n\nIndian Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of 1908) as amended by Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, ss. 15 (2) (b), 16-Law empowering State to declare associations illegal by notification-No provision for judicial inquiry or for service of notification on association or office-bearers-Validity of law-Unreasonable restriction on right to form associations-Constitution of India, art. 19 (1) (c), (4).\n\nSection 15 (2) (b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, .is amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, included within the definition of an \"unlawful association\"· an association \"which has been declared by the State by notification in the Official Gazette to be unlawful on the ground (to be specified in the notification) that such association ( i) constitutes a danger to the public peace, or (ii) has interfered or interferes with the maintenance of public order or has such interference for its object, or (iii) has interfered or interferes with the administration of the law, or has such interference for its object.\" Section 16 of the Act as amended provided that a notification under s. 15 (2) (b) shall (i) specify the ground on which it is issued and such other particulars, if any, as may have bearing on the 2-7 S. C. India/71\n\nVeci:appa Pillai.\n\nRaman & Raman\n\nLtd. & Otlzerr.\n\nChandrasek ham\n\nAiyar /.\n\nMarch 31", "total_entities": 141, "entities": [{"text": "VEERAPPA PILLAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 186, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212, "end_char": 220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352, "end_char": 360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maintainabilityjurisdiction of High Court to interfere-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 428, "end_char": 507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 616, "end_char": 624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Maintainabilityjurisdiction of High Court to interfere-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Maintainabilityjurisdiction of High Court to interfere-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1323, "end_char": 1341, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Road Traffic Board, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1870, "end_char": 1904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where, in a dispute between two rival claimants for running through a particular route five buses, which each of them alleged he had purchased from a third person, the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, after calling for a report from the Regional Transport Officer and considering several circumstances that had a material bearing on the case, restored the permanent permits which had been granted to one of the claimants, but on an application by the other claimant under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2177, "end_char": 2185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2213, "end_char": 2233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution td the High Court of Madras for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, the Central Road Traffic Board and the State of Madras and for a: writ of mandamus to the respondents to transfer, is:ue or grant\n\nMflt'Ch 17."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2355, "end_char": 2370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution td the High Court of Madras for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, the Central Road Traffic Board and the State of Madras and for a: writ of mandamus to the respondents to transfer, is:ue or grant\n\nMflt'Ch 17."}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2743, "end_char": 2748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "blished and directed the Regional Traffic Authority to grant to Raman & Raman the petitioner permits in respect of the five buses : Ltd. & Others.", "canonical_name": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2848, "end_char": 2866, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3244, "end_char": 3252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3451, "end_char": 3469, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "13th of April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3968, "end_char": 3987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 13th of April, 1951, of ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3998, "end_char": 4032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and Somasundaram J.) in C.M.P. No."}}, {"text": "Rajamannar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4034, "end_char": 4044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and Somasundaram J.) in C.M.P. No."}}, {"text": "Somasundaram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4055, "end_char": 4067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and Somasundaram J.) in C.M.P. No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4103, "end_char": 4117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad (C. R. Pattabhi Raman, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Pattabhi Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4122, "end_char": 4139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad (C. R. Pattabhi Raman, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4171, "end_char": 4185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (M. Natesan, with him) for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. Natesan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4187, "end_char": 4197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (M. Natesan, with him) for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. K. T. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4236, "end_char": 4250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras\n\n(R. '."}}, {"text": "R. '.\n\nGanapathi Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4281, "end_char": 4302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras\n\n(R. '."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4399, "end_char": 4419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR J.-This appeal arises as the result of special leave to appeal granted by this Court on the 1st of May, 1951, against an order of the Madras High Court dated 13th April, 1951, quash- .", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar/."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4838, "end_char": 4853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950, respectively, and an order of the first respondent (the State of Madras) dated 7th November, 1950, and directing the issue to Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd. (Petitioners before the High Court) of permits for the five buses in respect of which a joint application had been made originally by them and one T. D. Balasubramania Pillai."}}, {"text": "Raman and Raman Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4916, "end_char": 4936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950, respectively, and an order of the first respondent (the State of Madras) dated 7th November, 1950, and directing the issue to Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd. (Petitioners before the High Court) of permits for the five buses in respect of which a joint application had been made originally by them and one T. D. Balasubramania Pillai.", "canonical_name": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS"}}, {"text": "T. D. Balasubramania Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5084, "end_char": 5111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950, respectively, and an order of the first respondent (the State of Madras) dated 7th November, 1950, and directing the issue to Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd. (Petitioners before the High Court) of permits for the five buses in respect of which a joint application had been made originally by them and one T. D. Balasubramania Pillai."}}, {"text": "G. Veerappa Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5137, "end_char": 5155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present appellant, G. Veerappa Pillai, was the fourth respondent in the High Court.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "Raman and Raman Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5241, "end_char": 5261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present first respondents (Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd.) were the petitioners before the High Court.", "canonical_name": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5463, "end_char": 5468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute is between the appellant and Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., who were competing bus pro- -prietors in the Tanjore District; and it is over the issues of five permanent permits for buses Nos.", "canonical_name": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Raman Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5473, "end_char": 5483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute is between the appellant and Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., who were competing bus pro- -prietors in the Tanjore District; and it is over the issues of five permanent permits for buses Nos."}}, {"text": "Tanjore District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5530, "end_char": 5546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute is between the appellant and Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., who were competing bus pro- -prietors in the Tanjore District; and it is over the issues of five permanent permits for buses Nos."}}, {"text": "Kumbakonam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5693, "end_char": 5703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.D.O. 81, M.D.O. 230, M.D.O. 6, M.D.O. 7 and M.D.O. 759 on the route between Kumbakonam and Karaikal."}}, {"text": "Karaikal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5708, "end_char": 5716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.D.O. 81, M.D.O. 230, M.D.O. 6, M.D.O. 7 and M.D.O. 759 on the route between Kumbakonam and Karaikal."}}, {"text": "Balasubramania Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6201, "end_char": 6222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 'C' permits for the five buses stood originally in the name of Balasubramania Pillai.", "canonical_name": "Balasubramania Pi1llai"}}, {"text": "Raman and Raman Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6283, "end_char": 6303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The buses were agreed to be purchased from him by Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., and there was a joint application by the transferor and transferee on 10th March, 1944, for transfer of the ownership and of the 'C' permits in the name of the purchasers."}}, {"text": "10th March, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6375, "end_char": 6391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The buses were agreed to be purchased from him by Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., and there was a joint application by the transferor and transferee on 10th March, 1944, for transfer of the ownership and of the 'C' permits in the name of the purchasers."}}, {"text": "Veerappa Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6493, "end_char": 6508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two days later, Veerappa Pillai, proprietor of the Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, who is the appellant before us, applied for temporary permits to ply two of his own vehicles over the same route, stating that the vehicles of the two agencies which held the permits were mostly out of action.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6528, "end_char": 6555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two days later, Veerappa Pillai, proprietor of the Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, who is the appellant before us, applied for temporary permits to ply two of his own vehicles over the same route, stating that the vehicles of the two agencies which held the permits were mostly out of action."}}, {"text": "V eerappa Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6894, "end_char": 6910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nV eerappa Pillai\n\nRaman & Raman Ltd. & 0 thers.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6943, "end_char": 6963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar ].", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar/."}}, {"text": "19th March, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7540, "end_char": 7556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secretary, Road Traffic Board, thereupon refused to transfer the ownership on the 19th March, 1944, and this order was confirmed by the Board on 29th May, 1944."}}, {"text": "29th May, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7603, "end_char": 7617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secretary, Road Traffic Board, thereupon refused to transfer the ownership on the 19th March, 1944, and this order was confirmed by the Board on 29th May, 1944."}}, {"text": "10th April, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Balasubramania Pillai and Veerappa Pillai made a joint application on 10th April, 1944, for transfer of the buses and the original permits in favour of Veerappa Pillai who had on the same date agreed to purchase the vehicles."}}, {"text": "Central Road Traffic Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7960, "end_char": 7986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., took the matter before the Central Road Traffic Board and they made an order on 16th August, 1944, upholding the issue of temporary permits to V eerappa Pillai for his buses M.D.O. 920, 894, 918, M.S.C. 7632 and 7482, but setting aside the transfer of registry of the original buses and the transfer of the permits relating to the same."}}, {"text": "16th August, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8013, "end_char": 8030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., took the matter before the Central Road Traffic Board and they made an order on 16th August, 1944, upholding the issue of temporary permits to V eerappa Pillai for his buses M.D.O. 920, 894, 918, M.S.C. 7632 and 7482, but setting aside the transfer of registry of the original buses and the transfer of the permits relating to the same."}}, {"text": "V eerappa Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., took the matter before the Central Road Traffic Board and they made an order on 16th August, 1944, upholding the issue of temporary permits to V eerappa Pillai for his buses M.D.O. 920, 894, 918, M.S.C. 7632 and 7482, but setting aside the transfer of registry of the original buses and the transfer of the permits relating to the same.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "27th November, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8395, "end_char": 8414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application by Veerappa Pillai to review its order dated 16th August, 1944, the Central Road Traffic Board allowed on 27th November, 1944, only the transfer of the ownership of the buses but not a transfer of the permits."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8588, "end_char": 8617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veerappa Pillai filed a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam, on 3rd October, 1944, for recovery of possession of the original five buses from Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., on the strength of his purchase from Balasubramania Pillai."}}, {"text": "3rd October, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8622, "end_char": 8639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veerappa Pillai filed a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam, on 3rd October, 1944, for recovery of possession of the original five buses from Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., on the strength of his purchase from Balasubramania Pillai."}}, {"text": "Veerappa. Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8824, "end_char": 8840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Subordinate Judge appointed Veerappa.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "17th March, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8856, "end_char": 8872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pillai as Receiver on 17th March, 1945, and the five disputed buses were delivered to him on 26th April, 1945."}}, {"text": "26th April, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8927, "end_char": 8943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pillai as Receiver on 17th March, 1945, and the five disputed buses were delivered to him on 26th April, 1945."}}, {"text": "2nd May, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9103, "end_char": 9116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\n' \\\n\nhis favour on 2nd May, 1946."}}, {"text": "18th September, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9313, "end_char": 9333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veerappa Pillai was discharged from receivership on 18th September, 1946."}}, {"text": "22nd July, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9455, "end_char": 9470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the strength of the Sub-Court decree, Veerappa Pillai again applied for a permanent transfer of the permits, and on 22nd July, 1946, the Central Road Traffic Board transferred the petition to the Regional Transport Authority with an intimation that it saw no objection to the issue of regular permits to Veerappa Pillai for the disputed buses or to their transfer in his name, provided there were valid permits in existence."}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9818, "end_char": 9837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view appears to have been modified later and on 2nd September, 1946, the Regional Transport Officer directed the issue of temporary permits to the buses for the period from 3rd September, 1946, to 31st October, 1946, subject to the condition that the issue of the permits did not affect the rights of either party in the matter under dispute."}}, {"text": "3rd September, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9943, "end_char": 9962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view appears to have been modified later and on 2nd September, 1946, the Regional Transport Officer directed the issue of temporary permits to the buses for the period from 3rd September, 1946, to 31st October, 1946, subject to the condition that the issue of the permits did not affect the rights of either party in the matter under dispute."}}, {"text": "31st October, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9967, "end_char": 9985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view appears to have been modified later and on 2nd September, 1946, the Regional Transport Officer directed the issue of temporary permits to the buses for the period from 3rd September, 1946, to 31st October, 1946, subject to the condition that the issue of the permits did not affect the rights of either party in the matter under dispute."}}, {"text": "30th June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10283, "end_char": 10298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the Government was moved by V eerappa Pillai and also by Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., but the Government declined to interfere and the result was an order on 30th June, 1947, by the Regional Transport Authoritv to the following effect :- ·\n\n\"Since the subject-matter 1s on appeal before the High Court, the matter will lie over pending the decision of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10621, "end_char": 10627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A fresh petition by Veerappa Pillai to the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, was unsuccessful, but a further appeal to the Government of Madras ended in his favour in an order dated 29th March, 1949."}}, {"text": "29th March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10734, "end_char": 10750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A fresh petition by Veerappa Pillai to the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, was unsuccessful, but a further appeal to the Government of Madras ended in his favour in an order dated 29th March, 1949."}}, {"text": "Sathi Vilas Bus Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10791, "end_char": 10814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order is in these terms :-\n\n\"Shri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, Tanjore district, have been permitted by the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to run their buses M.D.O. 6, 7, 81, 230 and 759 on the Kumbakonam-Karaikal route on temporary permits from 1944 pending\n\nVeerappa Pillai\n\nRaman & Ramar>\n\nLtd. & Othtrs."}}, {"text": "Sathi Vilas Bus Service", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11390, "end_char": 11413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service have secured the decision of the Sub-Court, Kumbakonam, in their favour about the permanent ownership of the buses."}}, {"text": "Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11556, "end_char": 11593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, is directed to grant permanent permits for the buses of Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, referred to above in lieu of the existing temporary permits.\""}}, {"text": "Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11651, "end_char": 11687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, is directed to grant permanent permits for the buses of Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, referred to above in lieu of the existing temporary permits.\""}}, {"text": "18th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11853, "end_char": 11869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of this Government order, permanent permits were issued in favour of Veerappa Pillai on 18th April, 1949."}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11954, "end_char": 11974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Getting to know of this last order, Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., approached the Government of Madras with a petition praying for clarlfication of the order by making it expressly subject to the decision of the High Court regarding the title to the said five buses and that in the event of the High Court deciding the appeal in favour of Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd. \"the above said five permanent permits will be taken away from Veerappa Pillai and given to them.\""}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12503, "end_char": 12522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court reversed the decree of the Sub-Court on 2nd September, 1949, and came to the conclusion that the title of Messs."}}, {"text": "19th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12660, "end_char": 12680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 19th September, 1949, they applied to the Government ."}}, {"text": "16th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12932, "end_char": 12951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government declined to interfere as the Regional Transport Authority was the comptent authority, vide order dated 16th November, 1949."}}, {"text": "28th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13017, "end_char": 13036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In their application to the Regional Transport Authority dated 28th November, 1949, Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd .• asked for withdrawal of the permits."}}, {"text": "Raman and Raman Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13046, "end_char": 13065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In their application to the Regional Transport Authority dated 28th November, 1949, Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd .• asked for withdrawal of the permits."}}, {"text": "14th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13135, "end_char": 13153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, that is -on 14th October, 1949, Veerappa Pillai applied for renewal of his permanent permits held for his own\n\n. -"}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13459, "end_char": 13469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13587, "end_char": 13605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tlus procedure was followed and on 22nd October, 1949, a notification was issued inviting objections against the renewal and giving 30th November, 1949, as the date of hearing."}}, {"text": "1st January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13815, "end_char": 13832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No objections were received and the Secretary renewed the permits for two years from 1st January, 1950."}}, {"text": "3rd January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13856, "end_char": 13873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was dated 3rd January, 1950."}}, {"text": "19th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14010, "end_char": 14028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regional Transport Authority dealing with the application of Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., dated 28th November, 1949, resolved on 19th January, 1950, that the permanent permits issued to Veerappa Pillai should be cancelled, that the route should be declared vacant in respect of the five buses and fresh applications should be invited and dealt with on the merits."}}, {"text": "G. V eerappa Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14298, "end_char": 14317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order further stated that \"in the meanwhi:le Sri G. V eerappa Pillai and Raman and Raman will be given temporary permits for running two and three buses respectively on the route.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "Raman Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14826, "end_char": 14836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the parties were dissatisfied with this order and preferred appeals to the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, which dismissed the appeal of Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., and restored the permanent permits of Veerappa Pillai by order dated the 3rd March, 1950.", "canonical_name": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS"}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14911, "end_char": 14926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the parties were dissatisfied with this order and preferred appeals to the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, which dismissed the appeal of Messrs.\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd., and restored the permanent permits of Veerappa Pillai by order dated the 3rd March, 1950."}}, {"text": "7th November, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15025, "end_char": 15043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., moved the Government, but it declined to interfere by G.O., dated 7th November, 1950."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15138, "end_char": 15149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "11.iyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15367, "end_char": 15374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\n11.iyar ;."}}, {"text": "V eerappa Pillai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15379, "end_char": 15395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V eerappa Pillai\n\nRaman & RamatJ\n\nLtd. & Others.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "Karaikkal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15818, "end_char": 15827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nRegional Transport Authority, the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, and the State of Madras dated 19th January, 1950, 3rd March, 1950, and 7th November, 1950, respectively, and for the sue of a writ of mandamus or other such appropriate directions to the first respondent to transfer, issue or grant \"the five pucca permits in respect of the route Kumbakonam to Karaikkal to the petitioner herein\" (Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd.) It is on this petition that the order challenged in this appeal was made by the High Court."}}, {"text": "further points out that the procedure laid down by the Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17022, "end_char": 17095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17745, "end_char": 17763, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Veerappa Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19614, "end_char": 19629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veerappa Pillai v.\n\nRaman & Ramafl\"\n\nLtd. & Others.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "Raman & Ramafl\"\n\nLtd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19634, "end_char": 19655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veerappa Pillai v.\n\nRaman & Ramafl\"\n\nLtd. & Others.", "canonical_name": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Central Traffic Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21109, "end_char": 21130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before disposing of the appeals ()f both the parties, the Central Traffic Board appears to have called for a report from the Regional Transport Officer."}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22083, "end_char": 22093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22105, "end_char": 22123, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Vei:rappa Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22207, "end_char": 22223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "prescribed for cancellation was\n\nnot\n\nWhen the Government was moved by Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd., under section 64 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, they had before them a petition for withdrawal of the permanent permits issued to Vei:rappa Pillai and for transfer or grant of five 'pucca permits' relating to the five buses.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "Veerappa Piillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22675, "end_char": 22691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd. did not file any objections to the renewal of the permits sought by Veerappa Piillai.", "canonical_name": "G. V eerappa Pillai"}}, {"text": "Balasubramanian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23012, "end_char": 23027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further pointed out that there was no subsisting joint application to support the request for transfer and that the original permits in the 'name of Balasubramanian had ceased to exist after 31st December,\n\n1944.", "canonical_name": "Balasubramania Pi1llai"}}, {"text": "31st December,\n\n1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23054, "end_char": 23074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further pointed out that there was no subsisting joint application to support the request for transfer and that the original permits in the 'name of Balasubramanian had ceased to exist after 31st December,\n\n1944."}}, {"text": "8th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23132, "end_char": 23147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government had also before them two petitions dated 8th March, 1950, and 25th October, 1950, from Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., and two petitions dated 29th March, 1950, and 8th June, 1950, from Veerappa Pillai."}}, {"text": "25th October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23153, "end_char": 23171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government had also before them two petitions dated 8th March, 1950, and 25th October, 1950, from Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., and two petitions dated 29th March, 1950, and 8th June, 1950, from Veerappa Pillai."}}, {"text": "29th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23231, "end_char": 23247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government had also before them two petitions dated 8th March, 1950, and 25th October, 1950, from Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., and two petitions dated 29th March, 1950, and 8th June, 1950, from Veerappa Pillai."}}, {"text": "8th June, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23253, "end_char": 23267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government had also before them two petitions dated 8th March, 1950, and 25th October, 1950, from Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd., and two petitions dated 29th March, 1950, and 8th June, 1950, from Veerappa Pillai."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23519, "end_char": 23530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23771, "end_char": 23782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar/.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24054, "end_char": 24076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar/.\n\nVeerappa Pillai\n\nRaman & Raman Ltd. (Jr Others.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar/."}}, {"text": "Raman & Raman Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24095, "end_char": 24113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar/.\n\nVeerappa Pillai\n\nRaman & Raman Ltd. (Jr Others.", "canonical_name": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. and OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24451, "end_char": 24459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setalvad appearing for the appellant urged two narrower grounds as sufficient for his purposes."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24634, "end_char": 24645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24917, "end_char": 24935, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25427, "end_char": 25438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26166, "end_char": 26174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Daphtary, who appeared for the respondent, said nothing to controvert this position."}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26813, "end_char": 26831, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27301, "end_char": 27311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27834, "end_char": 27844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Act XX of 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28426, "end_char": 28447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28557, "end_char": 28568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XX of 1948", "statute": "Madras Act XX of 1948"}}, {"text": "section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28702, "end_char": 28713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XX of 1948", "statute": "Madras Act XX of 1948"}}, {"text": "Balasubramania Pi1llai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30347, "end_char": 30369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, it will be noticed that the High Court here did not content itself with merely quashing the proceedings, it went further and directed the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, \"to grant to the petitioner permits in respect of the five buses in respect of which a joint application was made originally by the petitioner and Balasubramania Pi1llai and that in case the above buses have been condemned, the petitioner shall be at liberty to provide substitutes within such time as may be prescribed by the authorities.\"", "canonical_name": "Balasubramania Pi1llai"}}, {"text": "S. Subrahmanyam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30836, "end_char": 30851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : S. Subrahmanyam."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30883, "end_char": 30898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30930, "end_char": 30941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31064, "end_char": 31083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J lnterveners\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAlYAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31107, "end_char": 31121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J lnterveners\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAlYAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar/."}}, {"text": "AlYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31123, "end_char": 31128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J lnterveners\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAlYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31135, "end_char": 31168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31247, "end_char": 31253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act", "statute": "Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31504, "end_char": 31525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31527, "end_char": 31534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31550, "end_char": 31560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31576, "end_char": 31615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32207, "end_char": 32217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908", "statute": "the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32275, "end_char": 32280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908", "statute": "the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Chandrasek ham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32474, "end_char": 32488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasek ham\n\nAiyar /.\n\nMarch 31", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar/."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_597_611_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "> •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 597\n\nFor the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court set aside. Each party will bear their own costs of these proceedings throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : S. Subrahmanyam.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 4 : P. A. Mehta.\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS v.\n\nV. G. ROW\n\nUNION OF INDIA & STATE I OF TRA VAN CORE-COCHIN. J lnterveners\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\n- MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAlYAR JJ.)\n\nIndian Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of 1908) as amended by Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, ss. 15 (2) (b), 16-Law empowering State to declare associations illegal by notification-No provision for judicial inquiry or for service of notification on association or office-bearers-Validity of law-Unreasonable restriction on right to form associations-Constitution of India, art. 19 (1) (c), (4).\n\nSection 15 (2) (b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, .is amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, included within the definition of an \"unlawful association\"· an association \"which has been declared by the State by notification in the Official Gazette to be unlawful on the ground (to be specified in the notification) that such association ( i) constitutes a danger to the public peace, or (ii) has interfered or interferes with the maintenance of public order or has such interference for its object, or (iii) has interfered or interferes with the administration of the law, or has such interference for its object.\" Section 16 of the Act as amended provided that a notification under s. 15 (2) (b) shall (i) specify the ground on which it is issued and such other particulars, if any, as may have bearing on the 2-7 S. C. India/71\n\nVeci:appa Pillai.\n\nRaman & Raman\n\nLtd. & Otlzerr.\n\nChandrasek ham\n\nAiyar /.\n\nMarch 31\n\nS111te of Madras\n\nv • • V. G. Row.\n\nnecessity therefor and (ii) fix a reasonable period .for any office. bearer or member of the association or any other person interested to make a representation to the State Government in respect of the issue of the notification. Under s. 16A the Government was required after the expiry of the time fixed in the notification for making representation to place the matter before an Advisory Board and to cancel the notification if the Board finds that there was no sufficient cause for the issue of such noti6.cation.\n\nThere was however no provision for adequate communicatiori of the notification to the association and its members or office bearers.\n\nIt was conceded that the test under s. 15(2)(b) as amended was, as it was under s. 16 as it stood before the amendment, a subjective one and the factual existence or otherwise of the grounds was not a justiciable issue and the question was whether s. 15(2)(b) was unconstitutional and void : Held, (for reasons stated below) that s. 15(2)(b) in; psed restrictions on the fundamental right to form assoc1at.J.ons guaranteed by art. 19 (I) ( c ), which were not reasonable within the meaning of art. 19( 4) and was therefore unconstitutional and void. The fundamental right to form associations or unions guaranteed by art. 19 (!) ( c) of the Constitution has such a wide and varied scope for its exercise, and its curtailment is fraught with such potential reactions in the religious, political and economic fields, that. the vesting of the authority in the executive Government to impose restrictions on such right, without allowing the grounds of such imposition, both in their factual and legal aspects to be duly tested in a judicial inquiry, is a strong element which should be taken into account in judging the reasonableness of restrictions imposed on the fundamental right under art. 19(l)(c). The absence of a provision for adequate communication of the Government's notification under s. 15(2)(b) by personal service or service by affixture to the association and its members and office-bearers was also a serious defect.\n\nThe formula of subjective satisfaction of the Government or of its officers with an advisory Board to review the materials on which the Government seeks to override a basic freedom gu~.ran teed to the citizen, may be viewed as reasonable only in very exceptional circumstances and within the narrowest limits.\n\nIn considering the reasonableness of laws imposing restric tions on fundamental right, both the substantive and procedural aspects of the impunged la\\V should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness and the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impunged and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.\n\nThe nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underly ing purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time should all\n\n. -\n\n-enter into the judicial verdict.\n\nIn evaluating such elusive 1952 factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the Stare of Madras social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges particiv. -pating in the decision should play an important part, and the V. G. Row. limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v. The State ([1950] S.C.R. 88) and Dr. Khare\n\nv. The State of Punjab ([1950] S.C.R. 519) distinguished.\n\nC. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India,\n\n(S.\n\nGovind Swaminathan and R.\n\nGanapathi Iyer , with [\" him) for the appellant (State of Madras).\n\nC. R. Pattabhi Raman for the respondent.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the Union of India.\n\nSubrahmanya Iyer, Advoerate-General of Travancore-Cochin (M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him) for the State of Travancore-Cochin.\n\n1952. March 31. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-This is an appeal from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras adjudging section 15 (2) (b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (Act No. XIV of 1908) as amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) as unconstitutional and void, and quashing Government Order No. 1517, Public (General) Department, dated 10th March, 1950, whereby the State Government declared a Society called the People's Education Society an unlawful association.\n\nThe respondent, who was the general secretary of the Society, which was registered under the Societies' Registration Act, 1860, applied to the High Court on\n\nState Uf Madras\n\n\"· V. G. Row.\n\nPfltanjali &stri C. {.\n\n10th April, 1950, under article 226 of the Constitution complaining that the impugned Act and the Order\n\ndated 10th March, 1950, purporting to be issued thereunder infringed the fundamental right conferred on him by article 19 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution to form associations or unions and .seeking . appropriate reliefs.\n\nThe High Court, by a full bench of three Judges (Rajamannar C.\n\nJ ., Satyanarayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri JJ.) allowed the application on 14th September,\n\n1950, and granted a certificate under article 132. The State of Madras has brought this appeal.\n\nThe Government Order referred to above runs as follows:-\n\n\"WHEREAS in the opinion of the State Government, rhe Association known as the People's Education Society, Madras, has for its object interference with the administration of the law and the maintenance of law and order, and constitutes a danger to the public peace;\n\nNOW, therefore, His Excellency the Governor of Madras, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908\n\n(Central Act XIV of 1908) hereby declares the said association to be an unlawful association within the meaning of the said Act.\"\n\nNo copy of. this order was served on the respondent or any other office-bearer of the society but it was notified in the official Gazette as required by the impugned Act.\n\nThe declared objects of the Society as set out in the affidavit of the respondent are :\n\n(a) to encourage, promote, diffuse and popularise useful knowledge in all sciences and more specially social science ;\n\n(b) to encourage, promote, diffuse and popularise political education among people ; ( c) to encourage, promote and popularise the study and understanding of all social and political problems and bring about social and political reforms ; and\n\n\"\"\"\n\n. -\n\n_,..\n\n- .\n\n> -\n\n- ( d) to promote, encourage and popularise art, literature and drama.\n\nIt was however, stated in a counter-affidavit £led on behalf of the appellant by the Deputy Secretary to Government, Public Department, that, according to inforniation received by the Government, the Society was actively helpip.g the Communist Party in Madras which had been declared unlawful in August 1949 by utilising its funds through \"its Secretary for carrying on propaganda on behalf of the Party, and that the declared objects of the Society were intended to camouflage its real activities.\n\nAs the Madras Amendment Act (No. XI of 1950) was passed on the 12th August, 1950, during the pendency of the petition, which was taken up for hearing on the 21st August, 1950, the issues involved had to be determined in the light of the original Act as amended. In order to appreciate the issues it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions. Before amendment by the Madras Act; the material provisions were as follows:-\n\n\"15. In this Part-\n\n(1) \"association\" means any combrnation or body of persons whether the same be known by any distinctive name or not ; and\n\n(2) \"unlawful association\" means an association-\n\n(a) which encourages or aids persons to commit acts of violence or intimidation or of which the members habitually commit such acts, or\n\n(b) which has been declared to be unlawful by the Provincial Government under the .powers hereby conferred.\n\n16. If the Provincial Government is of opinion that any association interferes or has for its object interference with the administration of the law or with the maintenance of law and order, or that it constitutes a danger to the public peace, the Provincial Government may by notification in the offidal Gazette declare such association to be unlawful.\"\n\n- The amending Act substituted for clause (b) in Section 15(2) the following clause :- •\n\n1'952\n\nState: of Madras\n\n.v • . v. G. Row.\n\nPatrmjali Sa; tri C. /.\n\nStale If/ Madras\n\nV. G. Row.\n\nPatania/i StlSll'i C. /.\n\n\"(b) which has been declared by the State Government by notification in the official Gazette to be unlawful on the ground (to be specified in the notification) that such association-\n\n(i) constitutes a danger to the public peace, or\n\n(ii) has interfered or interferes with the maintenance of public order or has such interference for its object, or\n\n(iii) has interfered or interferes with the administration of the law, or has such interference for its object\".\n\nFor the old section 16, sections 16 and 16A were substituted as follows :\n\n\"16. (1) A notification issued under clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 15 in respect of any association shall- ( a) specify the ground on which it is - issued, the reasons for its issue, and such other particulars, if any, as may have a bearing on the necessity therefor ; and\n\n(b) fix a reasonable period for any office-bearer or member of the association or any other person interested to make a representation to the State Government in respect of the issue of the notification.\n\n(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the State Government to disclose any facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose.\"\n\nUnder section 16A the Government is required, after the expiry of the time-fixed in the notification for making representations, to place before an Advisory Board constituted by it a copy of the notification and of the representations, if any, received before such expiry, and the Board is to consider the materials placed before it, after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the State Government or from any office-bearer or member of the association concerned or any other person, and submit its report to the Government.\n\nIf it is found by the Board that there is no sufficient cause for the issue of the notification in respect of the association\"\n\n... ..\n\n. -\n\n. -\n\n- .\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 603 ' concerned, the Government is required to cancel the notification.\n\nThere is no amendment of section 17 which prescribes penalties by way of imprisonment or fine or both for membership or management of an unlawful association and for taking part in meetings of such association or making, receiving or soliciting contributions for purposes thereof.\n\nSection 17 A, which confers power on the Government to notify and take possession of places used for the purposes of an unlawful association, was amended by the addition of subclauses 2(a) and 2(b) providing for a remedy, where such power was exercised, by way of application, within thirty days of the notification in the official Gazette, to the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court or the District Judge according as the place notified is situated in the Presidency Town or outside, for \"a declaration that the place has not been used for the purposes of any unlawful association\". If such declaration is made, the Government is to cancel the notification in respect of the place. Section 17B empowers the officer taking possession of a notified place to forfeit movable property found therein if, in his opinion, such property \"is, or may be used for the purposes of the unlawful association\" after following the procedure indicated.\n\nSection 17E similarly empowers the Government to forfeit funds of an unlawful association \"if it is satisfied after such enquiry as it may think fit that such funds are being used or intended to be used for the purposes of an unlawful association\".\n\nThe procedure to be followed in such cases is also prescribed.\n\nBy section\n\n17F jurisdiction of civil courts, save as expressly provided, is barred in respect of proceedings taken under sections 17 A to 17E.\n\nBy section 6 of the amending Act notifications already issued and not cancelled before the amendment are to have effect as if they had been issued under section 15 (2) (b) as, amended, and it is provided in such cases a supplementary notification should also be issued as required in section 16 (1) (a) and (b) as amended and thereafter the procedure provided by\n\nState of M11dr111\n\nV. G. Row.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of Madras v.\n\nV. G .. Row.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. J.\n\n604 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nI the new. section 16-A should be followed. It was under this provision that the validity of the notification issued on the 10th March, 1950, under old section 16 fell to be cons, ideted in the light of the provisions of the amended Act when the petition came up for hear-. ing in the High Court on 21st August, 1950.\n\nIt will be seen that while old section 16 expressly conferred on the Provincial Government power to declare associations unlawful if, in its opinion, there existed cert.ain pecified grounds in relation to them, those grolinds are now incorporated in section 15(2) (b) as amended, and the reference to the \"opinion\" of the Government is . dropped.\n\nThis led to some .discussion befor.e' us as io whether or not the grounds referred to in section 15(2) (b)' as amended are justidable issues.\n\nIf the factual existence of those grounds could be made the subject of inquiry in a court of law, the . restrictions sought to be imposed on. the right of association would not be open to . exception, but then the Government would. 'apparently have no use for section 15\n\n(2) (b).\n\nFor, it was strenuously contended on its behalf by the Attorney-General that the incorporation of these grounds in a definition clause, which made a declaration by Government the test of unlawfulness, rendered the insertion of ,, the .words ''.in. its opinion\". unnecessary and, indeed, inappropriate and that ' ' the omission of those words could not lead to any inference that the grounds on which the declaration was to be based were intended to be any more justiciable than under the old section 16 ; more especially as the \"opinion\" or the .\"satisfaction\" of the Government or of its oflicer:s is still the. determining factor in notifying a place under section 17 A(l) and in forfi:iting the movables found therein under section 17B(l) or the funds of an unlawful association under section\n\n17E (1). The provision for an inquiry as to the existence or otherwise ' of such grounds before an Advisory Board and for: cancellation of the notilicatidn in case the Board found there was no sufficient cause for declaring the assoeiation as unlawful also pointed; it was\n\nurged to . the same conclusion.. The contention is not\n\n- .\n\n>:>-\n\nwithout force, and the position wa:s not contested for ?952! the respondent. It may, accordingly, be taken that State,'of.M'{llras. the test under section 15(2) (b) is as it was under the .l'. old section 16, a subjective one, and the factual exist- .V. G. Raw. ence or otherwist of the grounds is not a justiciable issue.\n\n. It is on this basis, then, that the question has to be determined as to whether section 15 (2) (b) as amended falls within the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative abridgement of the fundamental right conferred on the citizen by article 19(1)(c). Those limits are defined in clause ( 4) of the same article.\n\n\" ( 4) Nothing in sub-clause ( c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it iinposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.\"\n\nIt wasi not disputed that the restrictions in question were imposed \"in the interests of public order\". But, are they \"reasonable\" restrictions within the meaning or article 19 ( 4) ?\n\nBefore proceeding to consider this question, we think it right to point out, what is sometimes overlooked, that our Constitution contains express provisions for judicial review of legislation as to its conformity with the Constitution, unlike as in America where the Supreme Court has assumed extensive powers of reviewing legislative acts under cover of the widely interpreted \"due process\" clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.\n\nIf, then, the courts in this country face up to such important and none too easy task, it is not out of any desire to tilt at legislative authority in a crusader's spirit, but in discharge of a duty plainly laid upon them by the Constitution.• This is especially true as regards the \"fundamental rights\", as to which this Court has been assigned the' role of a sentinel on the qui vive. While the Court naturally . attaches great weight to the legislative judg- ment, it cannot desert its own.·, ducy: : to' : determine\n\nPatanjali. .!/alt.ri C. /.\n\nState of Mlldr111\n\nV. G. Row.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. f.\n\n.finally the constitutionality of an impugned statute.\n\nWe have ventured on these obvious remarks because it appears to have been suggested in some quarters that the courts in the new set up are out to seek clashes with legislatures in the country.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court unanimously held that the restrictions under section 15 (2) (b) were not reasonable on the ground of (1), the inadequacy of the publication of the notification, (2) the omission to fix a time-limit for the Government sending the papers to the Advisory Board or for the latter to make its report, no safeguards being provided against the Government enforcing the penalties in the meantime, and (3) the denial to the aggrieved person of the right to appear either in person or Ly pleader before the Advisory Board to make good his representation.\n\nIn addition to these grounds one of the learned Judges (Satyanarayana Rao J.) held that the impugned Act offended against article 14 of the Constitution in that there was no reasonable basis for the differentiation in treatment between the two classes of unlawful associations mentioned in section 15(2) (a) and (b ) •.\n\nThe oher learned Judges did not, however, agree with this vi, ew.\n\nViswanatha Sastri J. further held that the provisions for forfeiture of property contained in the impugned Act were void as they had no reasonable relation to the maintenance of public order. The other two Judges expressed no opinion on this point. While agreeimg with the cpnclusion of the learned Judges that section 15 (2) (b) is unconstitutional and void, we are of opinion that the decision can be rested on a broader and more fundamental ground.\n\nThis Court had occasion in Dr. Khare's case (1 ) tO define the scope of the judicial review under clause\n\n(5) of article 19 where the phrase \"imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right\" also. occurs, and four out of the five Judges participating in the decision expressed the view (the other Judge leaving the question open) that both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive\n\n( 1) [1950] S.C.R. 519.\n\n' .\n\nlaw should be .f.Xamined from the point of view of rearonableness ; that is to say, the Court should consider not only factors such as the duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances under which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorised. It is important in this; context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, whereever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.\n\nThe nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter mto the judicial verdict.\n\nIn evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.\n\nGiving due weight to all the considerations indicated above, we have come to the conclusion that section 15 (2) (b) cannot be upheld as falling within the limits of authorised restrictions on the right conferred by article 19 (1) (c).\n\nThe right to form associations or unions has such wide and varied scope for its exercise, and its curtailment is fraught with such potential reactions in the religious, political and economic fileds, that the vesting of authority m the executive government to impose restrictions on such right, without allowing the grounds of such imposition, both in their factual and legal as, pects, to be\n\nState of MadraJ\n\nV. G. Row.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of Mat/ros' ·:\n\n'°Y• V. G. Rql/!.\n\nPatanjali .Sastri C. /.\n\nduly tested in a judicial inquiry, is a strong element' which, in our opinion, must be taken into account in. judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed. by section 15 (2) (b) on the exercise of the fundamental right under article 19 ( 1) ( c) ; for, no summary and what is bound to be a largely one-sided review by an Ach•L, ory Board, even where its verdict is binding on the executive government, can be a substitute for a judicial enquiry.\n\nThe formula of subjective satisfaction of the Government or of its officers, with an Advisory Board thrown in to review the materials on which the Government seeks to override a basic free-· dom guaranteed to the citizen, may be viewed as reasonable only in very exceptional circumstances and, within the narrowest limits, and cannot receive judicial approval as a general pattern of reasonable restrictions on fundamental rights. In the case of preventive• detention, no doubt, this Court upheld in Gopalan' s case(') deprivation of personal liberty by such means,- but that was because the Constitution itself sanctions laws providing for preventive detention, as to which no question of reasonableness could arise in view of the language of article 21.\n\nAs pointed out by Kania C. J .\" at page 121, quoting Lord Finlay in Rex v. Halliday('); \"the court was the least appropriate tlribunal 'to investigate into circumstances: of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based\".\n\nThe Attorney-General placed strong reliance on the decision in Dr. Khare' s cas~(') where the subjective satisfaction of the Government regarding the necessity for the externment of a person, coupled with a reference of the matter to an Advisory Board whose opinion, however, had no binding force, was considered by a majority to be \"reasonable\" procedure for reStricting the right to move freely conferred by article 19 ( 1) (b). The Attorney-General claimed that the reasoning of that decision applied a fortiori to the present case, as the impugned Act provided that the Advisory Board's report was binding on the Government. We cannot agree.\n\nWe consider that. that case\n\n( 1 ) [19501 S.C.R. 88. (2 ) [1917] A:c. 260, 269,\n\n: . ( 8 ) [1950] S.C.R. 519. . . .\n\n. -\n\n...\n\nis distinguishable in several essential particulars. For 19~2 one thing. externment of individuals, like preventive 8 >f M detention; is largely precautionary and based on sus- '\"'\"°v. adra• picion. In fact, section A (1), of the EastPunjab v.0:11owc Public Safety Act, which was the subject of.considera~ tion in Dr; Kha re's case('), authorised both preventive Palanjali detention and. externmenL for. the same purpose and\n\n80\"'' 0 • J. on the same ground namely, \"with a view to prevent. ing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public -0rder it. is necessary; etc.\".· Besides, both involve an element of emergency requiring prompt steps to be taken. to prevent apprehended danger to public tranquillity;:· and , authority has.to be vested in the Government and its. officers to take appropriate action on. theii: own res\" ponsibility. . These features. are; , however, absent in the grounds on which the Government is. authorised, under section 15 (2) (b), to declare associations unlaw • ful. These grounds; taken by themselves, are factual and not anticipatory or based on suspicion. An association is allowed to . be declared unlawful because it \"constitutes\" a danger or \"has interfered or .interferes\" with the maintenance .of public.order or \"has such interference fore its object\",. etc.· ... The factual existence of .-these grounds is :amenable to objective d_etermination by the court;: quite as: much as the grounds mentioned in clause {a) of sub-section (2) of section 15; as to which the Attorney-Generalconceded that it . would be . .incumbent : f on, the Government to establish, as, a fact, that the association, which it a!leged, to •be unlawful, \"encouraged\" or .'.'aided\"· persons to commit acts of violence,· etc;: \\Ve :are unable to discover any.reasonableness in the claim. of the Government in seeking,.by its mere , declaration, to shut.out judicial enquiry into the underlying facts under clause (b). Secondly, the East Punjab Public .\n\nSafety Act.was a temporary enactmentwhich, was to be in force only for a year, and any order made there-' under wasJo. expire at. the. termination ofthe Act. \\Vhat. may be_ regarded as a. reasonable restriction\n\n(1) [1950) S.C.R. si9. :\n\nState of Madras v.\n\nV. G. Row.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nimposed under such a statute will not necessarily be considered reasonable under the impugned Act, as the latter is a permanent measure, and any declaration made thereunder would continue in operation for an indefinite period until the Government should think fit to cancel it. Thirdly, while, no doubt, the Advisory Board procedure under the impugned Act provides a better safeguard than the one under the East Punjab Public Safety Act, under which the report of such body is not binding on the Government, the impugned Act suffers from a far more serious defect in the absence of any provision for adequate communication of the Government's notification under section 15(2)(b) to the association and its members or office-bearers.\n\nThe Government has to fix a reasonable period in the notification for the aggrieved person to make a representation to the Government. But, as stated already, no personal service on any office-bearer or member of the association concerned or service by aflixture at the office, if any, of such association is prescribed. Nor is any other mode of proclamation of the notification at the place where such association arries on its activities provided for.\n\nPublication in the official Gazette, whose publicity value is by no means great, may not reach the members of the association declared unlawful, and if the time fixed expired before they knew of such declaration, their right of making a representation, which is the only opportunity of presenting their case, would be lost. Yet, the consequences to the members which the notification involves are most serious, for, their very member.iliip thereafter is made an offence under section 17.\n\nThere was some discussion at the bar as to whether want of knowledge of the notification would be a valid defence in a prosecution under that section.\n\nBut it is not necessary to enter upon that question, as the very risk of prosecution involved in declaring an association unlawful with penal consequences, without providing for adequate communication of such declaration to the\n\nassociation and its members or office-bearers, may well be considered sufficient to rendc; r the imposition of\n\n. -\n\n.. '\n\nrestrictions by such means unreasonable.\n\nIn this respect an externment order stands on a different footing, as provision is made for personal or other adequate mode of service on the individual concerned, who is thus assured of an opportunity of putting forward his case. For all these reasons the decision in Dr. Khare' s case(1) is distinguishable and cannot rule the present case as claimed by the learned Attorney- General. Indeed, as we have observed earlier, decision dealing with the validity of restrictions imposed on one of the rights conferred by article 19 (1) cannot have much value as a precedent for adjudging the validity of the restrictions imposed on another right, even when the constitutional criterion is the same, namely, reasonableness, as the conclusion must depend on the cumulative effect of the varying facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nHaving given the case our best and most anxious consideration, we have arrived at the conclusion, in agreement with the learned Judges of the High Court, that, having regard to the peculiar features to which reference has been made, section 15 (2) (b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause ( 4) of article 19 and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void.\n\nThe appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P.A. Mehta. ' Agent for the respondent : S. Subrahmanyan.\n\nAgent for the Union of India and the State of Travancore-Cochin : P. A. Mehta.\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 519.\n\nState of Madras\n\nV. G. Row.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.", "total_entities": 121, "entities": [{"text": "S. Subrahmanyam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 248, "end_char": 263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : S. Subrahmanyam.", "canonical_name": "S. Subrahmanyam"}}, {"text": "Agent for respondent No. 1 : M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 266, "end_char": 310, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 342, "end_char": 353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 : P. A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "P. A. 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Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5940, "end_char": 5951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India,\n\n(S.\n\nGovind Swaminathan and R.\n\nGanapathi Iyer , with [\" him) for the appellant (State of Madras)."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nGovind Swaminathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5983, "end_char": 6005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India,\n\n(S.\n\nGovind Swaminathan and R.\n\nGanapathi Iyer , with [\" him) for the appellant (State of Madras)."}}, {"text": "R.\n\nGanapathi Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6010, "end_char": 6028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India,\n\n(S.\n\nGovind Swaminathan and R.\n\nGanapathi Iyer , with [\" him) for the appellant (State of Madras)."}}, {"text": "C. R. Pattabhi Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6082, "end_char": 6102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. R. Pattabhi Raman for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6124, "end_char": 6138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6169, "end_char": 6181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Subrahmanya Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6218, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subrahmanya Iyer, Advoerate-General of Travancore-Cochin (M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him) for the State of Travancore-Cochin."}}, {"text": "M. R. Krishna Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6276, "end_char": 6296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subrahmanya Iyer, Advoerate-General of Travancore-Cochin (M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him) for the State of Travancore-Cochin."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6405, "end_char": 6421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-This is an appeal from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras adjudging section 15 (2) (b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (Act No.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali .Sastri"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6467, "end_char": 6501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-This is an appeal from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras adjudging section 15 (2) (b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (Act No."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6512, "end_char": 6522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6538, "end_char": 6577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Registration Act, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7053, "end_char": 7075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7187, "end_char": 7198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Registration Act, 1860", "statute": "Registration Act, 1860"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7379, "end_char": 7389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Registration Act, 1860", "statute": "Registration Act, 1860"}}, {"text": "Rajamannar C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7537, "end_char": 7550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, by a full bench of three Judges (Rajamannar C.\n\nJ .,"}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7557, "end_char": 7574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satyanarayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7579, "end_char": 7596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satyanarayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri JJ.)"}}, {"text": "14th September,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7629, "end_char": 7650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "allowed the application on 14th September,\n\n1950, and granted a certificate under article 132."}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7684, "end_char": 7695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Registration Act, 1860", "statute": "Registration Act, 1860"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7701, "end_char": 7716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madras has brought this appeal."}}, {"text": "People's Education Society, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7879, "end_char": 7913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government Order referred to above runs as follows:-\n\n\"WHEREAS in the opinion of the State Government, rhe Association known as the People's Education Society, Madras, has for its object interference with the administration of the law and the maintenance of law and order, and constitutes a danger to the public peace;\n\nNOW, therefore, His Excellency the Governor of Madras, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908\n\n(Central Act XIV of 1908) hereby declares the said association to be an unlawful association within the meaning of the said Act.\""}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8161, "end_char": 8171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8179, "end_char": 8218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Act XIV of 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8221, "end_char": 8244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12th August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9637, "end_char": 9654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XI of 1950) was passed on the 12th August, 1950, during the pendency of the petition, which was taken up for hearing on the 21st August, 1950, the issues involved had to be determined in the light of the original Act as amended."}}, {"text": "21st August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9731, "end_char": 9748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XI of 1950) was passed on the 12th August, 1950, during the pendency of the petition, which was taken up for hearing on the 21st August, 1950, the issues involved had to be determined in the light of the original Act as amended."}}, {"text": "Before amendment by the Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9923, "end_char": 9957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10846, "end_char": 10859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before amendment by the Madras Act", "statute": "Before amendment by the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11488, "end_char": 11498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 16 and 16A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11500, "end_char": 11519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11620, "end_char": 11630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12202, "end_char": 12213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13031, "end_char": 13041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13288, "end_char": 13298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13972, "end_char": 13983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14227, "end_char": 14238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n17F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14544, "end_char": 14556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14663, "end_char": 14674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14689, "end_char": 14698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14839, "end_char": 14849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14970, "end_char": 14980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pataniali Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15081, "end_char": 15097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of Madras v.\n\nV. G .. Row.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali .Sastri"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15209, "end_char": 15219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15350, "end_char": 15360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15548, "end_char": 15558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15767, "end_char": 15780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15954, "end_char": 15967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16268, "end_char": 16278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16782, "end_char": 16792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16949, "end_char": 16959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17017, "end_char": 17031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n17E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17078, "end_char": 17090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17575, "end_char": 17588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17625, "end_char": 17635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17834, "end_char": 17844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17997, "end_char": 18013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18555, "end_char": 18565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18823, "end_char": 18830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before proceeding to consider this question, we think it right to point out, what is sometimes overlooked, that our Constitution contains express provisions for judicial review of legislation as to its conformity with the Constitution, unlike as in America where the Supreme Court has assumed extensive powers of reviewing legislative acts under cover of the widely interpreted \"due process\" clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18841, "end_char": 18854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before proceeding to consider this question, we think it right to point out, what is sometimes overlooked, that our Constitution contains express provisions for judicial review of legislation as to its conformity with the Constitution, unlike as in America where the Supreme Court has assumed extensive powers of reviewing legislative acts under cover of the widely interpreted \"due process\" clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19950, "end_char": 19960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20573, "end_char": 20583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 15(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20741, "end_char": 20754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21150, "end_char": 21160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21323, "end_char": 21328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court had occasion in Dr. Khare's case (1 ) tO define the scope of the judicial review under clause\n\n(5) of article 19 where the phrase \"imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right\" also."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21405, "end_char": 21415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23393, "end_char": 23403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23511, "end_char": 23521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of MadraJ", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23926, "end_char": 23941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The right to form associations or unions has such wide and varied scope for its exercise, and its curtailment is fraught with such potential reactions in the religious, political and economic fileds, that the vesting of authority m the executive government to impose restrictions on such right, without allowing the grounds of such imposition, both in their factual and legal as, pects, to be\n\nState of MadraJ\n\nV. G. Row."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23955, "end_char": 23971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali .Sastri"}}, {"text": "State of Mat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23979, "end_char": 23991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of Mat/ros' ·:\n\n'°Y• V. G. Rql/!.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS"}}, {"text": "Patanjali .Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24020, "end_char": 24037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali .Sastri C. /.\n\nduly tested in a judicial inquiry, is a strong element' which, in our opinion, must be taken into account in.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali .Sastri"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24214, "end_char": 24224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24280, "end_char": 24290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25002, "end_char": 25009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of preventive• detention, no doubt, this Court upheld in Gopalan' s case(') deprivation of personal liberty by such means,- but that was because the Constitution itself sanctions laws providing for preventive detention, as to which no question of reasonableness could arise in view of the language of article 21."}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25246, "end_char": 25256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25277, "end_char": 25282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Kania C. J .\""}}, {"text": "Finlay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25317, "end_char": 25323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at page 121, quoting Lord Finlay in Rex v. Halliday('); \"the court was the least appropriate tlribunal 'to investigate into circumstances: of suspicion on which such anticipatory action must be largely based\"."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25912, "end_char": 25922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Public Safety Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26527, "end_char": 26544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27265, "end_char": 27275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Public Safety Act", "statute": "Public Safety Act"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27801, "end_char": 27811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Public", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28268, "end_char": 28286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, the East Punjab Public ."}}, {"text": "section 15(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29246, "end_char": 29262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30249, "end_char": 30259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31325, "end_char": 31335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31869, "end_char": 31879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31895, "end_char": 31927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32062, "end_char": 32072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908", "statute": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32224, "end_char": 32234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P.A. Mehta. '", "canonical_name": "P. A. Mehta"}}, {"text": "S. Subrahmanyan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32265, "end_char": 32280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : S. Subrahmanyan.", "canonical_name": "S. Subrahmanyam"}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-Cochin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32320, "end_char": 32346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Union of India and the State of Travancore-Cochin : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32387, "end_char": 32402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madras\n\nV. G. Row.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_612_644_EN", "year": 1952, "text": ". Maret.. 27.\n\n\n:SUPREME. COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nDATTATREYA MORESHWAR PANGARKAR\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]\n\nPreventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), s. 11 (1)-Confirmatioo of detention order after report of Advisory Board-Period of ft<rther detention not specified-Order not expressed to be in the name of Governor-Validity of detention-Executive decisions-Mode of er{lression-Constitution of India, Art. 166 (1) and (2)-Whether directory or mandatory.\n\nSection 11, sub-s. (I), of the Preventive Detention Act, 195(), provided that \"in any case where the Advisory Board has reJX>rt~ ed that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate government may confirm the deten~ tion order and continue the detention for such period as it thinks fit\".\n\nThe case of the petitioner who was arrested under the Act was referred to the Advisory Board and on receiving a report from the Board that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner the Government decided to confirm the order of detention and this decision was communicated to the District Magistrate. by a confidential letter signed by the Assistant Secretary to the Government for the Secretary to the Government. The material portion of the letter ran thus:- 11Thc Government is accordingly pleased to confirm the detention order against the detenue.\n\nPlease inform the detenue accordingly and report compliance.\" In an application for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that his detention was illegal: (i) because the Government had at the time of confirming the order omitted to specify the\" period during which, the detention should continue; (ii) because the ordCr of confirmation was not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor as required by Art. 166 (1) of the Constitution:\n\nHeld, per PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI\n\nC.J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR _JJ.\n\n(MAHAJAN J. dissenting)-that thet Omission to state the period 9f further dete, ntion while confirming the detention order under s. 11(1) .of the Preventive Detention Act could not render the detention illegal because, per\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. J. and DAs J.n a proper construction of s. 11 (!), a specification of the period of continuation of the detention is not necessary, however desirable it may be; per MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR0 JJ.-though s. 11 (!) docs contemplate that a period should be inentioned during\n\n. -\n\n> '\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSt1Pl{EME COURT REPORTS 613\n\nwhich the further detention of the detenue is to Continue, mere omission to do so would not make the order a nullity and justify release of the detenue.\n\nHeld also, per PATANJALI SAsTRl C. J., MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR.A A1YAR, JJ ., that though the Preventive Detention Act contemplates and requires the taking of an executive decision for confirming a detention order tinder s. 11(1), omission to make and authenticate that executive decision in the form mentioned in Art. 166 will not make the decision itself illegal for the provisions in that article are merely directory and not mandatory.\n\nPer MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR JJ.-Section 11(1) c; if the Preventive Detention Act does contemplate a formal order of confirmation and Art. 166(1) of the Constitution would apply to the case ; clauses ( 1) and (2) of the said article must however be read together.\n\nWhile cl. ( 1) relates to the mode of expression of an executive order or instrument, cl. (2) lays down the way in which such order is to be authenticated, and when both these forms are complied with, an order or instrument would be immune from challenge in a court of law on the ground that it has not been made or executed by the Governor of the State.\n\nEven if cl. ( 1) is taken to be in independent provision uµconnected with cl. (2) and having no relation to the purpose indicated therein, cl. ( 1) is directory and not imperative in its character.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-Section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act contemplates that when the report of the Advisory Board reaches the Government it has to come to a decision and pass an order in accordance with that decision against the detenue to the effect that in view of the report of the Advisory Board the detention order is continued for a certain period and failure to fix the period of further detention would make the detention illegal.\n\nA. K. Gopalan v. The State ([1950] S. C.R. 88}, Makhan Singh Tarsikha v. The State of Punjab ([1952] S.C.R. 368), S. Krishnan v.\n\nThe State of Madras ([1951] S.C.R. 621), Chakar Singh v. The State of Punjab (Petition No. 584 of 1951) and /. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Others v. King Emperor ([1947] F.C.R. 14 l) referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JuRrsmCTION.\n\nPetition (No. 683 of 1951) under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nThe facts are set out in detail in the judgment.\n\nBawa Shiv Charan Singh (amicus curiae) for the petitioner.\n\nM. C. Setdvad, Attorney-General for lhdia (/tndra Lal, with him) for the respondents. 3-7 S. C. India/71\n\nDattatrtytl Moreshwar ·\n\nPangorlc.ar\n\n. v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay aml Others,\n\n1952.\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangark_ar\n\n.-v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay 11nd Other\"1.\n\nDa1 ].\n\n1952.\n\nMarch 27. The Court delivered judgment as follows :- DAs J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas cr>rpus and for the immediate release of the petitioner who is alleged to have been kept in illegal detention in Baroda Central Prison.\n\n On February 15, 1951, the petitioner was arrested under an order made on February 13, 1951, by the then District Magistrate, Surat, in exercise of powers conferred on him by the Preventive Detention Act,\n\n1950. A copy of the said order was served on the petitioner at the time of his arrest. On the same date grounds of detention were served on the petitioner as required by section 7 of the Act.\n\nIt was specifically mentioned in the grounds that it was not in the public interest to disclose further facts.\n\nThe petitioner moved the High Court of Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution complaining that his detention was illegal and praying that he should be forthwith released.\n\nIn that application one of the points urged was that the grounds in support of the detention were false, vague and fantastic and that the detention order was made fu bad faith.\n\nTwo affidavits were filed on behalf of the State in support of the detention order. That application was, on April 17, 1951, dismissed by the Bombay High Court.\n\nIn the meantime, the case of the petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board which on April 5, 1951, made a report stating that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. According to the affidavit of Venilal T ribhovandas Dehejia, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department, filed in answer to the present application, this report of the Advisory Board was placed before the Government and, on April 13, 1951, the Government decided to confirm the order of detention. This decision was, on April 28, 1951, communicated to the District Magistrate, Surat, in a confidential letter in the terms following :-\n\n. -\n\n- '\n\nConfidential letter No. B.D. II/1042-D (11) Home Department (Political) Bombay Castle, 28th April, 1951.\n\nTo The District Magistrate, Surat.\n\nSubject :-Preventive Detention Act, 195~\n\nReview of detention orders issued under the- Reference your letter No. Pol. 1187 JP, dated the 23rd February, 1951, on the subject noted above.\n\n2. In accordance with section 9 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, the case of detenue Shri Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar was placed before the Advisory Board which has reported that there is sufficient cause for his detention, Government is accordingly pleased to confirm the detention order issued against the detenu. Please inform the detenu accordingly and report compliance.\n\n3. The case papers of the detenu are returned herewith.\n\nSd/- G. K. Kharkar, for Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department.\n\nIt also appears from the aforesaid affidavit that Sri G. K. Kharkar who signed the letter for the Secretary\n\nto the Government of Bombay, Home Department, was at the time an Assistant Secretary and, as such, was, under rule 12 of the Rules of Business made by the Government of Bombay under article 166 of the.\n\nConstitution, authorised to sign orders and instruments of the Government of Bombay.\n\nThe petitioner has now moved this Court under article 32 of the Constitution complaining that he is being unlawfully detained.\n\nThe only question is whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty in accordance with procedure established by law.\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar v. 'The State of Bombay and Oth\"s.\n\nDattatreya Mbreshwar\n\nPangarkar\n\nThe State uf\n\nBombay tmd Others.\n\n_Das /.\n\nli16\n\nis said to be detained by rhg State In exercise of powers conferred on it by the Preventive Detention Att, 1950; as . amended in 1951. The State must, accordingly, satisfy us that the procedure established by law has been sictiy followed.\n\nAlthough a supplementary petition has been filed in this Court complaining that the grounds supplied to him are false, vague, lacking in particulars and insufficient to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation against the order of detention, it has not; however, been pressed before us by learned counsel appearing as aniictls curiae in support af the application.\n\nAt the hearing before us, learned counsel has confined his arguments to challenging the validity of detention of the petitioner on two grounds, namely, (1) that the State Gdvernment has •failed to cdmply with the requirements of section 11(1) tJf the amended Act ih that at the time of confirming the detention order it oniitted to specify the period thitihg which the detention would contihik, and (Z) that the order of confirmation is not in proper legal form, in that it is riot expressed to be made in the name of the Governor as required by article 166(1) of the Constitution.\n\nGround No. 1. The validity of this ground of attack depends ori :i j:iroper understanding of section 11 ( 1) of the Prevehtive Detention Act, Which, as amended, runs as follows :~\n\n\" ( 1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue t.he detention for such period as it thiks fit\".\n\nThe argument is that the sub-section contemplates a decision containing two things, namely, (1) a confirmatiol). of the detention order and (2) a direction fot\n\n\"'--\n\n. -\n\nthe continuantion of the detention.\n\nI do riot think this arglimer\\t is sound, for if the intention were that both the thing. should be included in an order then the sub-section would have been worded _ differently.\n\nIt -+:-' would have ended by saying that \"the appropriate\n\nI..\n\n-' -\n\nGoverpment !llay make an order cpnfirming the dei~J}.· tion order and continuiqg the detention for suc;:h period as it thinks fit\". Grammatically section lJ (1) confers two powers, namely (1) the appropriat~ Government rnay confirm the detention order and (2) the appropriate Government may continue the deten•\n\ntion for such period as it thinks fit. The confirmation of the detention order certainly contemplates the taking of .an executive decision, but the detenu being l).lready in custody and the detention order being coil~ firmed his detention continues automatically anq; therefore, no further executive dcision is called for to continue the detention. It follow~ that it is not nece~ sary to include a direction for the continuation of the detention iI). the decision confirming the detention order.\n\nIt is next suggested that the words \"such -period\" in the sub-section dearly imply that it is necessary to specify the period during which the detention would continue, for if the intention of Parliament were otherwise, the section would have stopped after the words ''may continue his detention\". It is urged that if, as hdd by this Court in Petition No. 308 of 1951 (Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab), it is illegal, after the amendment of the Act, to mention any period of detention in the initial order of deten~ tion made under section 3 of the Act and if no period of detention need be mentioned at the time of confirmation under secti9n 11 (1) then the approprite Government will; after confirmation, lose sight of the case and the detenu will be detained indefinitely.\n\nIt is suggested that if two constructions are possibie, the ooe that advances the interests ot the subject should be adopted.\n\nI do not think that two constructions are possible at all or that the suggested construction will be of any advantage to the detenue for reasons w)licl}. I proceed to state briefly,\n\nThere can be no two opinions that detention withi;>ut t, rial is odious at all times and that it is desirable, fherdfore, in oases of preventive <letention that a definite period of detention should, if possible, . ~\n\nDauatreya Mgreshw11r\n\nPnqgarkt1r\n\nv. 'f lze State of Bombay. atJd Othm.\n\nPas/.\n\nl95i\n\nDattatreya.\n\nMoreshwar.\n\nP<ingark._ar\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others. -·- Da> J.\n\nspecified.\n\nBut whether the Act, on a true construction of it, requires such a specification of period is an entirely different question and to answer that question regard must be had to the actual language used in the Act. If the intention of Parliament were that the period during which the detention would be continued must be specified then the sub-section 11 (1) would have empowered the appropriate authority to continue the detention for such \"period as it thinks fit to specify\" instead of\n\n~'as it thinks fit\". Further, the notion that nonspecification of the period will continue the detention for an indefinite period need not oppress us unduly because .the Act itself being of a limited duration such detention must nece.sisarily come to an end on the expiry of the Act. In A. K. Gopa!.an's case('), Kania C. J. at page 126 said :-\n\n\"It was argued that section 11 of the impugned Act was invalid as it permitted the continuance of the detention for such period as the Central Government or the State Government thought fit.\n\nThis may mean anindefinite period. In my opinion, this argument has no substance because the Act has to be read as a whole; The whole life of the Act is for a year and therefore the argument that the detention may be for an indefinite period is unsound.\"\n\nTo the like effect were the following observations of Mahajan J. at page 232 :-\n\n.. \"Section 11 of the Act was also impugneJ on the ground that it offended against the Constitution inasmuch as it provided for preventive detention for , an indefinite period.\n\nThis section in my opinion has to be read in the background of the provision in subclause (3) .of section 1 of the Act which says that the Act will cease to have effect on .1st April, 1951\".\n\nThese observations were made on section 11 of the Act as it stood before the amendment of the Act.\n\n. -\n\nThat section has been substantially, if not verbatim, -+- • reproduced in section 11 (1) of the amended Act and\n\n(I) [1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\n.. '\n\n• -\n\naccordingly the above observations will apply to the present section 11 (1) with equal force and cogency.\n\nIndeed in S.\n\nKrishnan v. The State of Madras(1) Sastri J., as he then was expressed himself as follows in connection with the present section 11 (1) :-\n\n\"The objection to the validity of section 11 (1) can be disposed of in a few words. The argument is that the discretionary power given to the appropriate Government under that sub-section to continue the detention \"for such period as it thinks fit\" authorises preventive detention for an indefinite period, which is contrary to the provisions of tide 22 (4). But, if as already observed, the new Act is to be in force only up to 1st. April, 1952, and no detention under the Act can continue thereafter, the discretionary power could be exercised only subject to that over-all limit.\"\n\nTwo points clearly emerge out of these observations as I comprehend them.\n\nThe very argument as to the invalidity of the section could not be raised at all except on the basis that the section, by itself and on a true interpretation of it, permitted an indefinite detention. Iii the second place, this argument was met by the Court, not by saying that that was not the correct meaning of the section and that on the contrary the words \"such period\" necessitated the fixation of a definite period of detention but, by saying that the life of the Act being limited, the duration of detention permitted by the section was in any event co-terminous with the life of the Act and could not go beyond it. This answer of the Court makes it clear that the Court fully recognised that the section, by itself and on its true iriterpremtioo., stanctioned an indefinift1e d!etention oot held that that contingency had been averted by the fact that the Act itself was of a limited duration.\n\nIt is said that the section should be . construed irrespective of whether it occurs in a temporary statute or a permanent one, and it is urged that if the statute were a permanent one the section, on the aforesaid interpretation, would have permitted an indefinite detention.\n\nThe answer is given by Mahajan J. in the (1. [1951] S.C.R. 621 at P. 629. .\n\nE>attatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar\n\n\\· v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay and 0 thers.\n\nDas/.\n\nDqttatrey4 Mortshwar\n\nPangarkar\n\n. v.\n\nThe Stai. of and OtAttt.\n\nBombay\n\nDas/.\n\n62Q StJJ'REME COURT REPORTS [!952]\n\nfollowing passage in his judgment in S. Krishnan v. 'The State of Madras (supra) at page 639 with which I concurred :-\n\n\"It may be pointed out that Parliament may well have thought that it was unnecessary to fix any maximum period of detention in the new statute which was of a temporary nature an.cl whose own tenure of life was limited to one year. Such temporary statutes\n\nease to have any effect after they expiJ'.e, they autoroatically come to an end at the expiry of the. period for which they have been enacted and nothing further\n\npm be don; under diem. The dereptjon of the petitioners therefore is bound to c0me to an end automatii:al\\y with the life of the statute and in these cirumstancs Parliament may . well have thought that it would be .wholly unnecessary to legislate ; ind provide a maximum period of detention for those detained under this law.''\n\nFor all I know, such drastic and extensive power to i:ontiriue the detention as long as it may think fit may not be given by Parliament to the executive Government in a permanent statute.\n\nBut if it does think fit to do so, it will not be for the Court to question the knowledge, wisdom or patriotism of the Legislature and to permit its dislike for the policy of the law to prevail over the plain meaning of the language used by the Legislature. Apart from this consideration, there is a period specified in the sub-section itself, for as. soon as the appropriate Government will cease\n\n'tO think fit to continue the detention it will revoke the detention order under section i3 and the period of detention will automatically come to an end. Again, . if the idea of indefinite detention were so repugnant as to induce us to construe sub-section 11(1} by reading inti:> it the . requirement that the period of detention must be specified at the time the , order of detention is confirmed; it will lead us to a situatio11 which cannot -be maintained In view of a decision of this Court.\n\nThe section, ir will be noticed, does not authorise the '.apprapriate Government to \"continue the detention for such period as it thinks fit from tirn~ to time.\"\n\n. -\n\n- '\n\nTherefore, the power conferred on the appropriate Government by this sub-section will be exhausted by its single exercise and it will not be possible to extend the period of detention any longer. This view of the matter will, however, run counter to our decision in Petition No. 584 of 1951, Chakar Singh v. The State of Punjab, where it has been held that there is nothing in section 11 ( 1) to prevent the appropriate Government from directing the detention of a person to continue further so long as the period fixed bv the previous order has not expired and the person has not been released.\n\nAccording to this decision the appropriate Government may direct the detention to continue even after the expiry of the period fixed by the order confirming the detention order or any subsequent order provided such directions are :given before the expiry of the period fixed by the immediately preceding order.\n\nFrom what source does the appropriate Government derive its power to direct the further continuation of the detention after having, in the order of confirmation, once specified the period of petention ? Section B of the Act gives power to the .appropriate Government to revoke or amend a detention order which must mean the initial order of detention under section 3 of the Act but not an order made under section 11 (1) confirming a detention order or fixing a period of detention.\n\nTherefore, the authority to extend the period of detention previously fixed which, in view of our decision, must be held to exist, will have to be derived from the very words \"may continue such detention for such period as it thinks fit\". It follows, therefore, that the specification of the period of detention . does not destroy or abridge the wide over-all power of the appropriate Government to direct the continuation of the detention as long as it thinks fit.\n\nIf the specification of the period of detention is not at all sacrosanct and the appropriate Govern- , ment may nevertheless continue the detention as long\n\nas it thinks fit to do so, why is the specification of a .period to be regarded aJ> vitally or at all necessary ?\n\nSP far as the detenu. i~ concem~; . his detention will\n\nl952\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarka1 v.\n\nT /le State pf\n\nBombay and Others.\n\nDas f.\n\nDattatreya Mot:eshwar\n\nPangarkar v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nnot be any more definite and less irksome if it is open to the appropriate Government to continue the detention by an indefinite number of orders made from time to time until the expiry of the Act itself by affiux of time in the case of a temporary statute or by its repeal in the case of a permanent Act. It is said that if we insist on a specification of a definite period when the confirmatory order is made and thereafter each time the period of detention is extended then the appropriate Government will have to apply its mind to the case of the detenu before it will make an order for further continuation of the detention, but that if we say that no. time need be specified, the appropriate Government will lose sight of the case and the detenu will be detained indefiniltely. I do not see why we should impute such dereliction of duty to the appropriate Government ;. but even if we do so and insist on the specification of the period. of detention we shall perhaps be driving the appropriate Gqvernmen.t to fix the longest permissible period of detention ending with the expiry of the Act itself and then to lose sight of the case of the detenu •.\n\nThat, I apprehend, will do no good to the detenu. Section 13 gives ample power to the appropriate Government to revoke the detention order at any time and it iS expected that it will apply its mind to each case and revoke the detention order and release the detenu as soon as it is satisfied that his detention is no longer necessary.\n\nIn any event, the considerations of, hardship urged upon us may make it desirable that a period of detention should be fixed but this cannot alter the plain meaning of the language of the section. The Court is not concerned wi.th any question of policy.\n\nIt has to ascertain the intention of the Legislature from. the language used in the Act.\n\nIn my judgment, on a pr<>-- per construction of section 11 ( 1), a specification of the period of continuation of the detention is not necessary, however, desirable one may consider it to be .\n\n. -\n\n. . Ground No. 2 : On this head the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner . is. that no valid order of -.!<'- confirmation has been made in proper legal form at all and that a confidential communication from the-\n\n- '\n\nHome Department to the District Magistrate cannot be regarded as an order under section 11(1) of the Act.\n\nLearned Attorney-General urges that section 11(1) of the Act contemplates only the . taking of an executive decision, namely, the confirmation of the detention order and contends that the sub-section does not contemplate the making of a formal order. He draws our attention to section 3 of the Act which expressly refers to an order of detention and points out .that section 11\n\n(1) does not refer to any order of confirmation. Reference may, however, be made to section 13 which authorises the appropriate Government to revoke or modify the order of detention. In this section also there is no reference to any order of revocation or modification but nevertheless revocation or modification must imply an executive decision.\n\nUnder section 11(1), as under section 13, the appropriate Government has to apply its mind and come to a decision.\n\nWhether we call it an order or merely an executive action makes no difference in the legal incidents of the decision.\n\nSection 11(1) plainly requires an executive decision as to whether the detention order should or should not be confirmed. The continuation of the detention as a physical fact automatically follows as a consequence of the decision to confirm the detention order and, for reasons stated above, does not require any further executive decision to continue the detention..\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the Preventive Detention Act contemplates and requires the taking of an executive decision either for confirming the detention order under section 11 ( 1) or for revoking or modifying. the detention order under section 13. But the Act is silent as to the form in which the executive decision, whether it is described as an order or an executive action, is to be taken. No particular form is prescribed by the Act at all and the requirements of the Act will be fully satisfied if it can be shown that the executive decision has in fact been taken. It is at this stage that learned counsel for the petitioner passes on to article 166 of the Constitution and contends that all executive action of the Government of a State must be\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar\n\nThe State ol\n\nBomhay and Dthers.\n\nDas/.\n\n195l\n\nDatta tr.era Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay and Others.\n\nDai/.\n\n§24\n\nSTJPREM~ COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nexpressed and authenticated in .the manner therein provided. The learned Attorney-General poil)ts out that there is a distinction between the taking of an\n\nexective decision and giving formal expression to the dec1S1on so taken.\n\nUsually executive decision is taken on the office files by way of notings or endorsements . made by the appropriate Minister or 9fficer. If every executive decision has to be given a formal expression the wh61e governmental machinery, he contends, will be brought to a standstill. I agree that every executive decision need not be formally expressed and this is particularly so when one superior officer directs his subordinate to act or forbear from acting in a particular way, but when the executive decision affects an outsider or is required . to be officially notified or to be communicated it should normally be expressed in the form mentioned in article 166(1), i.e., in the na!IlC of the Governor., Learned Attorney-General then fails back upon the plea that an omission to make and authenticate an executive decision in the form mentioned in article 166 does not make the decision itself illegal, for the provisions of that article, like their counterpart in the Government of India Act, are merely\n\ndiretory and not mandatory as held in /; K. Gas Plant'.\n\nManufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd. and Others v. The King-Emperor('). In my opinion, this contention of the learned Attorney-General must pre,., ail.\n\nIt is well settled that generally speaking the provis'ions of a sJ:a; tute creating public .duties are directory and those conferring priYate rights are imperative. When the provisions of .a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who hav.e no control over those entrusted with the .duty and at the same time would not promote the main object .of the legislature, it has been the practice of th~ Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect ,, f them not affecting the validity of the\n\nacts done.\n\nThe considerations which weighed twith {1) [19l7] F.C.R. 141 (1449).\n\n. ..:\n\n. .\n\ntheir L.Ordships of the Federal Court in the case referred to above in the matter of interpretation of section 40 (1) of the 9th Schedule to the Government of India\n\nAct, 1935, appear to me to apply with equal cogency to article 166 of the Constitution.\n\nThe fact that the old provisions have been split up into two clauses in artide 166 does, not appear to me to make any difference in the meaning of the article. Strict compliance with the re.qilireinents of article 166 gives an immunity to the order in that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor.\n\nIf, therefore, the requirements of that article are not complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be claimed by the State. This, however, does not vitiate the order itself. The position, t!herefore, is that while the Preventive Detention Act requires an executive decision, call it an order . or an executive action, for the\n\nconfirmation of an order of detention under section 11 (1) that Act does not itself prribe any particular form of expression of that executive decision. Article 166 directs all executive action to be expressed and authenticated in the manner therein laid down but an omission to comply with those. provisions does not render the executive action a nullity.\n\nTherefore, all that the procedure established by law requires is that the appropriate Government must take a decision as to whether the detention order . should be confirmed or not undt::r section 11 (1). That such a decision has been in fact taken by the appropriate Government is amply proved on the record. Therefore, there has been, in the circumstances of this case, no breach of the procedure establitsed by law and the present detention of the petitioner cannot be called in question.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, in my opinion, this applica, tion must fail.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-I just delived by my learned nothing to add.\n\nMUKHERJEA J.-In my should be dismissed and I\n\nagree with the judgment brother Das and I have\n\nopinion this application. deem it proper to state\n\n19$2 --·- Dattatuyti MlJreshwar\n\nPangatkar\n\nThi! State of Bombay afld Others,\n\nDas/.\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar\n\nThe State of Bombay .and Others.\n\nMuf<herjea /.\n\n' succinctly my own views on the questions that have been raised in the case.\n\nThe validity of the detention of the petitioner has been challenged before us on a two-fold ground. The first ground urged is that it was imperative on the part of the appropriate Government, when it confirmed the order of detention under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act, to sepcify the period during which the detention was to continue; and an omission to state the period vitiates the order.\n\nThe other contention raised is that the order of confirmation not being expressed to be made in the name of the Governor, as is required under article 166 (1) of the Constitution, is void and inoperative.\n\nSo far as the first ground is concerned, it would be necessary to advert to the language of section 11 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act which runs as follows :-\n\n\"11. Action upon the report of Advisory Board.- ( 1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit.\"\n\nIt is to be noted that section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act under which the initial order of deten- . tion is made i~ worded differently in this respect and it ' merely empowers the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, to make an order, under the circumstances specified in the section, directing that a person be detained ; and nothing is said about the period for which such detention should be directed. It is now settled by a pronouncement(1) of .this court that not only it is not neces.sary for the detaining authority to mention the period of detention when passing the original order under section 3 ( 1) of\n\n. -\n\nr the Preventive Detention AcJ, but that the order would be . bad and illegal if any period is specified, as it might\n\n_,.A: (!) Vide Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab, Petition No 308 of 1951.\n\n-..\n\nprejudice the case of the detenu when it goes up for consideration before the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board again has got to express its opinion only on the point as to whether there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned. It is neither called upon nor is it competent to say anything regarding the period for which such person should be detained. Once\n\nthe Advisory Board expresses its view that there is sufficient cause for detention at the date when it makes its report, what action to be taken subsequently is left entirely to the appropriate Government and it can under section 11(1) of the Act \"confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit.\" In my opinion, the words \"for such period as it thinks fit\" presuppose and imply that after receipt of the report of the Advisory Board the detaining authority has to make up its mind as to whether the original order of detention should be confirmed and if .so, for what further period the detention is to continue.\n\nObviously that is the proper stage for making an order or decision of this description as the investigation with regard to a particular detenu such as is contemplated by the Preventive Detention Act is then at an end and the appropriate Government is in full posses,5ion of all .the materials regarding him. It could not have been in the contemplation of the legislature that the matter should be left indefinate and undetermined even then. This, in my opinion, is the reason for the difference in the language of section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act as compared with that of section 3 (1) of the Act. I do not think that once the appropriate Government in making the order under section 11(1) specifies the period during which the detention of the person concerned is to continue, it becomes functus officio and is incapable of extending the detention for a further period at a subsequent time if it considers necessary.\n\nIn my opinion, section 13 of the Act gives very wide powers to the detaining authority in this respect and it can revoke or modify any detention order at any time it chooses and the power of modification would\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nDattdtftyii MMtsht/J/Jf\n\nPangatkal'\n\n.v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay Rnd Othel's.\n\ncertainly include a power of extension. of the pericld of detention, provided such power exercised before the period originally fixed has expired and provided the extended period does not exceed the over-all limit which is co-extensive with the life or duration of the Act itself.\n\nThis is quite in accordartce with the view taken by this court in Chakar Singh v. The State of Punjab(').\n\nThe question now is whether the om1ss10n to state the period of further detention while confirming the detention order under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act makes the detention illegal ? The point is not free from doubt, but having regard to the fact that the new Preventive Detention Act iii a temporary statute which was to be in force only up to the 1st of April, 1952, and has only been recently extended to a further period of six months, and no detention under the Act can continue after the date of expiry of the Act, I am inclined to hold that non-specification of the further period in an order under section 11(1) of the Act does not make the order of detention a nullity.\n\nIf no period is mentioned, the order might be taken to imply that it would continue up to the date of the expiration of the Act itself when all detentions made under it would automatically come to an end. Of course, the appropriate Government is always at liberty to terminate the order of detention earlier, if it considers proper, in exercise of its general powers under section 13 of the Act.\n\nI am not much impressed by the argument that the non-mentioning of the period in the order of confirmation is . likdy to cause serious prejudice to the interests of the detenu. It may be that if a period is mentioned, the attention of the Government is likely to he drawn to the case near about the time when the period is due to expire and the facts of the case may be reviewed by the appropriate authority at that . time before it decides to extend the detention any further ; but it seems to me to be clear from the provision of section 13 that the Act contemplates review of individual cases by the (\\)Petition No. 584of1951.\n\n. .,-\n\n) .;\n\n> '. -+\n\nappropriate Government from time to time , irrespective of any period being mentioned in the order of detention. It can legitimately be expected that the detaining authority would discharge the duties which are imposed upon it, but even if it does not, there is nothing in the law which prevents it from fixing the period of detention up to the date of expiry of the Act itself which is by no means a long one, and in that case the Court would obviousfr be powerless to give any relief to the detenu. It is perfectly true that an order for detention for an indefinite period is repugnant to all notions of democracy and individual liberty, but the indefiniteness in the case of an order made under section 11 (I) of the Preventive Detention Act is in a way cured by the fact that there is a limit set to the duration of the Act itself, which automatically prescribes a limit of time beyond which the order cannot operate. In my opinion, section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act does contemplate that a period should be mentioned during which the further detention of the detenu is to continue and the Government should see that no om1ss10n occurs in this respect, but I am unable to hold that this omission alone would make the order a nullity which will justify us in .releasing the detenu.\n\nThe other question for consideration is, whether the order is invalid by reason of the fact that it has not been expressed in the manner laid down in article 166 of the Constitution. Article 166 runs as follows:-\n\n\"166 (1). All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.\n\n(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor.\n\n4-7SCI/71\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay and Others.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nD.uatrey11 Moresnu,.,\n\nP=gark\"\" ...\n\nThe State ot\n\nBombo1 1md Others.\n\nM~/.\n\n(3) The Governor shall make rules for the more con- venient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion.\"\n\nln the case before us the order confirming the detention purports to be signed by Mr. G. K. Kharkar, for the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department.\n\nThe affidavit filed in this case by V. T. Dehejia .shows that Mr. Kharkar was then the Assistant Secretary to the Home Department and was authorised under the rules framed under article 166\n\n(3) of the Constitution by the Governor of Bombay to sign orders and instruments for the Government of Bombay.\n\nT:he order admittedly is not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor and i£ article 166\n\n(1) of the Constitution applies to this case, it certainly does not fulfil the requirement of that provision. To get round this difficulty the learned Attorney-General has put forward a two-fold argument. He has argued in the first place that article 166 ( 1) of the Constitution applies to a case where the executive action has got to be expressed in the shape of a formal order ; and it is only such order that requires authentication in the manner laid down in clause (2) of the article.\n\nSection 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, it is said, does not neces.sitate the passing of a formal order at all.\n\nIt is enough i£ the detaining authority decides by any form of executive action that the original .order of detention should be confirmed. The other argument put forward is that the provisions of clauses ( 1) and (2) of article 166 are directory and not mandatory in the sense that even if a particular order is not expressed or authenticated in the way mentioned in these prm1isions, it would not be an ineffective or invalid order , provided it is proved to have been made by the proper authority to whom that particular business has been allocated :by the rules framed under clause (3) cl .article 166. The only result of such omission may be that the order would not enjoy an\n\n. -\n\nimmunity from challenge on the ground specified in clause (2) of the article.\n\nSo far as the first point is concerned, it seems to me to be quite correct to hold that article 166(1) of the Constitution is confined to cases where the executive action requires to be expressed in the shape of a formal order or notification or any other instrument.\n\nI cannot, however, agree with the learned Attorney- General that section 11 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act does not contemplate the passing of a formal order. It is true that section 11(1) does not speak of an order of confirmation but when there is an initial order of detention made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, it could normally be confirmed only by passing another order.\n\nThis would be clear from the provision of section 13 of the Act which empowers the detaining authority to revoke or modify a detention order any time it chooses.\n\nNeither revocation nor modification is possible without any order being made to that .effect and yet section 13 like section 11 (I) does not speak of an order at all.\n\nThe first contention of the Attorney-General therefore cannot succeed.\n\nThe other contention raised by the learned Attorney- General involves consideration of the question as to whether the provision of article 166 (1) of the Constitution is imperative in the sense that non-compliance with it would nullify or invalidate an executive action.\n\nThe clause does not undoubtedly lay down how an executive action of the Government of a State is, to be performed; it only prescribes the mode in which such act is to be expressed.\n\nThe manner of expression is ordinarily a matter of form, but whether a rigid compliance with a form is essential to the validity of an act or not depends upon the intention of the legislature.\n\nVarious tests have been formulated in various judicial decisions for the purpose of determining whether a mandatory enactment shall he considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is unnecessary for our present\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar v.\n\nT /le State of Bombay and Others.\n\nMuk, herjea /,\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangark_ar\n\n\"· The State of\n\nBombay and Others.\n\nMukheriea /.\n\npup.ose to discuss these matters in detail.\n\nIn my opm10n, article 166 of the Constitution which purports to lay down the procedure for regulating business transacted by the Government of a State should be read as a whole. Under clause (3) the Governor is to make rules for the more convenient transaction of such business and for allocation of the same among the Ministers in so far as it does not relate to matters in regard to w hi th the Governor is required to act in his discretion. It is in accordance with these rules that business has to be transacted.\n\nBut whatever executive action is to be taken by way of an order or instrument, it shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor in whom the executive power of the State is vested and it shall further be authenticated in the manner specified in the rules framed by the Governor.\n\nClauses (1) and (2) of article 166 in my opinion are to be read together. Clause (1) cannot be taken separately as an independent mandatory provision detached from the provision of clause (2).\n\nWhile clause ( 1) relates to the mode of expression of an executive order or instrument, clause (2) lays down the way in which such order is to be authenticated ; and when both these forms are complied with, an order or instrument would be immune from challenge in a court of law on the ground that it has not been made or executed by the Governor of the State. This is the purpose which underlies these provisions and I agree with the learned Attorney-General that non-compliance with the provisions of either of the clauses would lead to this result that the order in question would lose the protection which it would otherwise enjoy, had the proper mode for expression and authentication been adopted.\n\nIt could be challenged in any court of law even on the ground that it was not made by the .Governor of the State and in case of such challenge the onus would be upon the State authorities to show . affirmatively that the order was in fact made by the .Governor in accordance with the rules framed under .article 166 of the Constitution.. This view receives support from a pronouncement of the Federal Court\n\nin /. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Company Limited and Others v. King-Emperor(1), where a somewhat analogous provision contained in section 49(1) of Schedule IX of the Government of India Act came up for consideratipn and the provision was held !to be directory and not imperative.\n\n. Even if clause (1) of article 166 is taken to be an independent provision unconnected with clause (2) and having no relation to the purpose which is indicated therein, I would still be of opinion that it is directory and not imperative in its character.\n\nIt prescribes a formality for the doing of a public act. As has been said by Maxwell(2), \"where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted ._with the duty without promoting the essential aims of\n\n the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally . understood as mere instructions for the guidance an\"d government of those on whom: the duty is imposed, or in other words as directory only.\" In the present case the order under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act purports to be an order of the Government of Bombay and is signed by the officer who was com- . petent to sign according to the rules framed by the Governor under article 166 of the Constitution, and in these circumstances I am unable to hold that the order is a nullity even though it has not been expressed to be made in the name of the Governor.\n\nThe result is that both the grounds fail and the petition is dismissed.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-1 concur in the order just now pronounced by my learned brother . Mukherjea J. and I have nothing useful to add.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The legality of the detention of the petitioners in all the above-mentioned petitions ts challenged on two grounds: (1) That the order of\n\n....._-t\n\n(1) [1947] F.C.R. 142. . . (2). Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, pp. 379-80.\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar.\n\nPangarkar\n\n. v. rhe State of Bombay and Others ..\n\nMukheriea /;\n\nDattatreya Uori!shwar\n\nPangarktlr\n\n. v.\n\nT n• Stai. of\n\nBombay and Others.\n\nMahaian f.\n\ncontinuance of .the detention made under section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended, does not specify the period of detention. (2) That it is not expressed \"in the name of the Governor\" as required by article 166 ( 1) of the Constitution.\n\nThe petitioners were informed through the District Magistrate that government had confirmed the detention orders but they were not told for what period their detentions were to continue.\n\nNo order expressed in the manner contemplated by article 166(1) was served on them.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the requirements of the Preventive Detention Act should be strictly complied with, that it was one of the requirements of section 11 of the Act that the government should at the time of confirming the detention order specify the period of the continuante of such detention and that non-compliance in this particular vitiated the tontinuance order.\n\nIt was further urged th:it unless the order was expressed in the manner required under article 166(1) of the Constitution and served on the person concerned it had no force.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General ontested both these contentions. He argued that it was not incumbent on government to make any formal order under section\n\n1.1 and all that the section contemplates is an executive action indicating an intention of the government to confirm the detention order and continue the detention after receipt of the report of the Advisory Board, that there was nothing in the language of the section which obliged the government to specify the period of such detention and that any omission to mention the period would not make the continuation of the detention illegal. It was also argued that the action of the government under section 11 need not necessarily be expressed as required in article 166( 1) that these provisions were merely directory :ind not mandatory hd had been substantially complied with.\n\nFor a proper appraisal of these tOntentions it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions elf the\n\nConstitution and of the Preventive Detention Act.\n\nArticles 22 (4) and (5) of the Constitution are in these terms:-\n\n\" ( 4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for longer period than three months unless- ( a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention ........... .\n\n(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order.\"\n\nSections 3, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the Preventive Detention Act provide as follows :-\n\n\"3. The Central Government or rhe State Government may--(a) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to ............ it is necessary so to do, make an order directi'ng that such person be detained.\n\n\"9. In every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within six weeks from the date specified in subsection (2) place before an Advisory Board constituted by it under section 8 the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in Ca.<lje where the order has been made by an officer, also the report made by such officer under sub-section (3) of section 3.\"\n\n\"10. (1) the Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information, as it may deem necessary, from the appropriate Government at from the person concerned, and if in any particular cise it considers it essential, after hearing him in person, $Ubmit its\n\nDtmatreyo MMeshtvttr\n\nPtmttJrlf.•\n\nTiie Stt1te of\n\nBomh'lty and Otkers.\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar ..\n\nPangarkar\n\nThe State of\"\n\nBombay and Others. \"\n\nMahajan/;,\n\nreport to the appropriate Government within ten week_s from the date specified in sub-section (2) of section 9.\n\n(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned.\"\n\n\"11. (1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit.\n\n(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith.\"\n\n\"13. ( 1) Without prejudice to the prov1s1ons of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897), a detention order may at any time be. revoked or modified, ............ .\n\n(2) The revocation of. a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order under section 3 against the same person.\"\n\nThe answer to the first question depends on the construction to be placed upon the words \"such period as it thinks fit\" occurring in section 11 of the Act.\n\nThe words have to be given their plain meaning irrespective of the circumstances that they occur in a temporary statute and have to be construed in the same manner if they occurred in a permanent statute.\n\nIt has been held by this Court in Mak_kan Singh Tarsikha v. State of Punjab, Petition No. 308 of 1951, that fixing of the period of detention in the initial order of detention under section 3 is contrary to the scheme of the Act inasmuch as such a construction tends to prejudice the case of the detenu when placed before the Advisory Board. It was emphasized that before a person is deprived of his personal. liberty, the procedure established by law must be strictly followed\n\n, <\n\nand must not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person affected.\n\nThe language employed in section 11 of the Act is different from the language of section 3 and to my mind, this difference indicates a contrary intention. The words \"such period as it thinks fit\" have the meaning that government has to specify and fix the period of such detention. If these words were construed in the manner suggested by the learned Attorney-General, it will lead to the result that the Preventive Detention Act would authorise detention of a person without specification of the period of such detention at any moment of time, subject of course to the over-all limit fixed for the life of the Act itself, and that the government would not be obliged to apply its mind to the question of duration at all.\n\nSuch a conclusion, to my mind, has to be avoided unless the language employed conclusively points to it.\n\nllnder the Constitution, the detention of a person under any law providing for preventive detention cannot be for a period of more than three months ,. unless the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. The Constitution itself has specified the maximum limit of the initial detention and detention for a period longer than three months can only be made on the basiSi of the report of the Advisory Board.\n\nThe words \"longer period than three months\" to my mind do not indicate that the period can be of indefinite duration, as it could be under the unique Regulation III of 1818.\n\nOn the other hand, they indicate a specified period, though longer than three months.\n\nThe Constitution visualizes, in my opinion, a period of detention initially for three months, which may subsequently be extended for a further period of time; but it rules out the idea of detention without a fixed duration, i.e., with a beginning but without an end.\n\nAny notion of an indefinite period of detention is wholly foreign to a democratic constitution like ours.\n\nAs pointed out by me in Gopalan's case(1), the law of\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nDattatreya Morcshwar\n\nPangarkar v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay and Others.\n\nMahajllfJ /.\n\npreventive detention during peace tirnes is an evil of necessity as it deprives a person of his personal liberty without a trial and even without a personal hearing and that being so, the safeguards provided against unregulated executive action have to be construed as widely as possible for the benefit of a person\n\ndetained. The Word& \"such period\" [imply that there has to be a beginning and an end of that period; in other words, it has to be for a certain duration the\n\nextent depending on the pleasure of the government.\n\nThough the government is entitled to fix the period of detention at its choice, it is bound to make a decision about it. If this was not the ttue import and meaning of the language employed in the section and the intention was that the government need not specify the duration of the detention, the section, in my view would have been drafted differently. There was no necessity to use the words \"for such period as it thinks fit,. therein at all. The intention would have been well expressed if the section was worded a:s follows :- ·\n\n\"The appropriate Government may confirm the detention order\".\n\nIt was on these lines that rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules was drafted and the saine was the scheme of Regulation III of 1818.\n\nThe warrant to the jailer in the regulation directed him to reecive the person into custody and to deal with him in conformity with the orders of the Governor-General. The same phraseology could. have been employed in section 11.\n\nIt has been held by this Court in Chakkar Singh v.\n\nThe State of Ptmjab (Petition No. 584 of 1951), that the power of the detaining authority under section 11 is not exhausted once it specifies the period of detention but that it can, before the expiration of the period initially fixed, direcjt the detention of a person to continue for a further period. I took this view for the simple reason that it was in accord with the provisions of the General Clauses Act which provide that the authority which has the power to make a certain order ot to give a certain directidn has also the power before it becomes ff!nctus officio to revise and fecdnsider that\n\n$.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COUR.T REPORTS 639\n\norder or to atriend or to alter it. That decision does\n\nnot by implications suggest that it was not obligatory on government to specify the period of detention under section 11.\n\nOn the other hand, it presupposes that sl.lch a period should be fixed but the Government can change its mind if it considers necessary.\n\nThe conclusion that the section authorizes detention for an indefinite period was negatived by the late Chief Justice :ind by me in Gopalan's case(1).\n\nThe learned Chief Justice in that case in dealing wLth section 11 made the following observaitions :-\n\n\"It was argued that section 11 of the impugned Act was invalid as it permitted the continuance of the detention for such period as the central Government or the State Government thought fit. This may mean an indefinite period.\n\nIn my opinion this argument has no substance because the Act has 1to be read as a whole. The whole life of the Act is for a year and therefore the argument that the detention may be for an iridefiriite period is unsound.\"\n\nIn the same case I said as follows :- \"Section 11 of the Aat was also impugned on the ground that it offened against the Constitution inasmuch as it provided for preventive detention for an indefinite period.\n\nThis section in my opinion has to be read in clie background of the provision in sub.\n\nclause (3) of section 1 of the Act which says that the Act will ease to have effect on 1st April, 1951.\"\n\nIn S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras(2), the question of the validity of section 11 was again examined.\n\nThe court took the view that the section was good. Bose J. dissenting held that the sectit>n was bad as it provided for an indefinite period of detention.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J., as he then was, and with whom the learned\n\nChief Justice agreed as to the validity of the section observed as follows :-\n\n\"The objection to the validity of section 11 (1) can be disposed of in a few words. The argument is that th~ discretionary p<ilwer given to the appropriate\n\n(1) {1950] S.C; R. 88.\n\n(2) (1951] s, c.R. 621.\n\nDattatreya M tireslttt1ar\n\nPdngarklir\n\nT !te State of\n\nBombay imd Otltt:f'I.\n\nM11haitin /.\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar..\n\nPangarl{ar\n\nThe State. of\n\nBombay and Others\"\n\nMahajan 1.\n\nGovernment under that sub-section to continue the detention 'for such period as it thinks fit' authorises preventive detention for an indefinite period, which is contrary to the provisions of article 22( 4). But, if as already observed, the new Act is to be in force only up to 1st April, 1952, and no detention under the Act can continue thereafter, the discretionary power could be exercised only subject to that over-all limit.\"\n\nIn the same case while upholding the validity of section 11, I made the following observations :- \"It may be pointed out that Parliament rooy well have thought that it was unnecessary to fix any . maximum period of detention in the new statute which was . of a temporary nature and whose own tenure of life was limited to one year.\n\nSuch temporary statutes cease to have any effect after they expire, they aut0:- matically come to an end at the expiry of the period for which they have been enacted and nothing further can be . done under them. The detention of the petitioners therefore is bound to come to an end automatically with the life of the statute and in these circumstances Parliament may well have thought that it would be wholly unnecessary to legislate and provide a maximum period of detention for those detained under this law.\"\n\nThe point for decision that case was whether it was necessary while enacting the Preventive Detention Act to fix a maximum period for the detention of a person as contemplated by article 22 (7) of the Constitution, and whether for want of such fixation the statute was void.\n\nThat contention was negatived. The point that arises for determination in the present case, however, is whether the Government when making an .order under section 11 of the Act has got to specify a period for the continuance of the detention. The question as to the meaning of the words \"such period as it thinks fit\" was neither argued nor decided in either of the cases mentioned above.\n\nThe result of the above decisions to my mind is this : that section 11 <loo not provide for an indefinite priod of detention and is not bad on that ground, though Bose J. took a contrary\n\n...\n\nview. The section in view of these decisions should read thus:-\n\n\"In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit, (but not beyond the period of the life of the Act itself).\"\n\nWithin the period of the life of the Act the Government can fix any period for the duration of the detention. The words \"such period as it thinks fit'', in my opinion, oblige the Government to fix a period of the detention of the person concerned within the over-all limit of the period of the life of the Act. The government must make up its mind and decide in each individual case after the receipt of -the report of the Advisory Board whether a particular detenu has to be kept in detention for the whole of the over-all period, or for any period shorter than that.\n\nIt cannot be presumed that every case requires detention for the maximum period. That decision is however subject to review and alteration before the time originally determined runs out.\n\nThe contention that the Government need make no order at all under section 11 and that it can indicate its intention by some other method seems to me to be unsound. This result was sought to be spelt out of the phraseology of sections 3 and 11 of the Act. Section 3 provides for the making of an order of detention, while section 11 does not use that phraseology.\n\nIn my opinion, however, tthis difference in the phraseology of the two sections doe.Si not in any way support the contention raised. The making of an order is implicit in the language of the section itself. Confirmation of an order already passed can only be by making an order. The section in another part provides for the revocation of an order. Revocation of an order again can only be made by passing an order of revocation and cannot be done by any other process. Section 13 provides not only for\n\nDattatrcya Morcshwar Pangarkar v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nDal!~!reya M, oreshrpty\"\n\nPangarkr\n\nThe Sta.te pf\n\nBomba JI ani! O.thers.\n\nMahajan /.\n\n642 SUPREME COURT l, lEPORTS [1952]\n\nrevocation of an order but for modification of the order of detention. It is obvious that the modification . of an order JS only possible by passing a fresh order and not in any other manner. No particular significance can attach to the omission of the words \"make an order\" in section 11.\n\nThe word \"order\" has numerous meanings but the meaning relevan.t in the present context\n\nis \"decision\".\n\nIt also means \"an au; thorij1<ative direction or mandate\".\n\nIt cannot be contended that Government can confirm or continue the detention without taking a decision or issuing a direction. Such a decision or direction is tantamount to an order. I am therefore clearly of the view that it is the intention of the law that when the report of the Advisory Board reaches the Government, it has to come to a decision and pass an order in accordance with that decision against the detenu to the effect that in view of the report of the Advisory Board the detention order LS continued for a certain period.\n\nReliance was placed by the learned Attorney-General in support of his contention on two decisions of the High Courts in India. In Prahlad Krishna v. The State of Bombay('), it was held that it was not necessary to mention the period during which the detenu will be further detained after the State Government had confirmed the detention order. This conclusion was reached on the following reasoning :-\n\n\"The words of the section are exactly similar in effect to the words of a contract between two parties ill which one said to the other that the latter should keep a cycle lent by the former for such period as he thought fit. There would be no necessity in such a case £9r the person w whom the cycle was lent to say how long he would keep the cycle ...... If the legislature had intended that the appropriate Government should make an order after receiving a report of the Advisory Committee as to how long the dtenu should be ,!letained, it -would hae said not that the detenu's detention should continue as )ong as the appropriate Government thoug)lt fit,. but 'pass an order for the (I) A.LR. 1952 Bom. I.\n\n....\n\ndetention of the person concerned for such further period as it deemed fit'.\"\n\nThe analogy of the cycle contract, in my opinion, is neither happy nor apposite, in the construction of section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act.\n\nFurther I am not able to see how the draft suggested by the High Court would have more appropriately brought out the intention of the legislature 1than the words of the section as it now stands.\n\nThe addition of the word \"further\" does not necessarily indicate that the Government is bound to specify a period if the original words \"such period\" do not so indicate.\n\nIn Ram Adhar Misra v. The State(1), it was held that an order of detention which does not specify the period of detention cannot be regarded as illegal.\n\nReliance was placed on the observations of the late Chief Justice and myself in Gopalan's case(2), and cited earlier in this judgment. These observations do not support the conclusion reached by the High Court, as already observed.\n\nThe decision is not supported on any other independent reasoning.\n\nThe nearest analogy to the language employed in section 11 is found in the provisions of Part IV of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to prevention of offences. In sections 106 to 110 of this Part the language employed is \"a person can be called upon to execute a bond for his good behaviour etc. for such period not exceeding one year or three years as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.\" It is not possible to argue that the magistrate can call upon a person to execute a bond without fixing a period for which that bond is to be good, and that in the absence of such de.termination it has to be presumed that the bond has to be executed for the maximum period mentioned in the section. In my opinion, failure to fix the period for which the bond is to be operati<ve would make the order ineffective and any default on the part of the person called upon to give the bond would not be punishable.\n\nThe discretion given to Government by\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1951 All. 18.\n\n(2) [1950] S. C.R. 88.\n\nJ95Z\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.\n\nMahajan ].\n\nthe phrase \"as it thinks fit\" is limited by the duty imposed on it by the provisions of the section.\n\nThe next question that falls to be determined and which is of some difficulty, is whether failure to fix the period makes the detention illegal. After considerable thought I have reached . the conclusion that the nondetermination by Government of the period of the continuance of the detention operates prejudicially against the detenus and makes the detention illegal. It is possible and even probable that had the Government on receipt of the report of the Advisory Board applied its mind and come to a decision on the point, it might well have fixed the duration of the detention at a point of time that would have expired by now, though it is also likely that it might not have expired by now. In such a situation when the matter is in doubt it is not right to hold that the detention of the petitioners at the present moment is lawful. The onus of establishing affirmatively that the detention of these petitioners is lawful at the present moment rests on the detaining authofiy and in the circumstances it has to be held that this onus remains undischarged.\n\nThe subsequent conduct of the Government in resisting these petitions is not relevant in this enquiry in the absence of an order as presi::ribed by the statute. If the Government finds that the detention of the petitioners is necessary up to 31st March, 1952, it can gjve effect to that intention in these cases by issuing a fresh order of detention.\n\nThe result therefore is that, dissenting from the decision of the majority of the court, I hold that the peti~ •. tioners are not detained according to procedure estab- _,(/. lished by law and are entitled to their release.\n\nI 't' therefore direct that they be released forthwith.\n\nIn this view of the case I do not feel called upon to decide the second point raised in these cases.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nAgent for the respondents: P. A~ MehM.", "total_entities": 228, "entities": [{"text": "DATTATREYA MORESHWAR PANGARKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DATTATREYA MORESHWAR PANGARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 168, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 173, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 203, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 206, "end_char": 230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 245, "end_char": 250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 473, "end_char": 494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 496, "end_char": 504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 550, "end_char": 560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1926, "end_char": 1934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1971, "end_char": 1980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "166 (1) of the Constitution:\n\nHeld, per PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI\n\nC.J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR _JJ.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1982, "end_char": 1988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "166 (1) of the Constitution:\n\nHeld, per PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI\n\nC.J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR _JJ.", "canonical_name": "SASTRI"}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1997, "end_char": 2006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "166 (1) of the Constitution:\n\nHeld, per PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI\n\nC.J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR _JJ.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2033, "end_char": 2038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "166 (1) of the Constitution:\n\nHeld, per PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI\n\nC.J.,\n\nMUKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR _JJ."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2046, "end_char": 2053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(MAHAJAN J. dissenting)-that thet Omission to state the period 9f further dete, ntion while confirming the detention order under s. 11(1) .of the Preventive Detention Act could not render the detention illegal because, per\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. J. and DAs J.n a proper construction of s. 11 (!),", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "s. 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2174, "end_char": 2182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2269, "end_char": 2285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(MAHAJAN J. dissenting)-that thet Omission to state the period 9f further dete, ntion while confirming the detention order under s. 11(1) .of the Preventive Detention Act could not render the detention illegal because, per\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. J. and DAs J.n a proper construction of s. 11 (!),", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2329, "end_char": 2334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR0", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2468, "end_char": 2489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a specification of the period of continuation of the detention is not necessary, however desirable it may be; per MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR0 JJ.-though s. 11 (!)", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR0"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2501, "end_char": 2506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also, per PATANJALI SAsTRl C. J., MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR.A A1YAR, JJ .,", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHAR.A A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2831, "end_char": 2852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also, per PATANJALI SAsTRl C. 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C. Setdvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setdvad, Attorney-General for lhdia (/tndra Lal, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Dattatrtytl Moreshwar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5185, "end_char": 5206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3-7 S. C. India/71\n\nDattatrtytl Moreshwar ·\n\nPangorlc.ar\n\n.", "canonical_name": "DATTATREYA MORESHWAR PANGARKAR"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay aml Others,\n\n1952", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5233, "end_char": 5267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay aml Others,\n\n1952.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay aml Others,\n\n1952"}}, {"text": "Dattatreya Moreshwar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5270, "end_char": 5290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangark_ar\n\n.-v.", "canonical_name": "DATTATREYA MORESHWAR PANGARKAR"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5314, "end_char": 5330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nBombay 11nd Other\"1.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay aml Others,\n\n1952"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5450, "end_char": 5460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6042, "end_char": 6051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act,\n\n1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act,\n\n1950"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner moved the High Court of Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution complaining that his detention was illegal and praying that he should be forthwith released."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6229, "end_char": 6240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act,\n\n1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act,\n\n1950"}}, {"text": "April 17, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6642, "end_char": 6656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was, on April 17, 1951, dismissed by the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6675, "end_char": 6692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was, on April 17, 1951, dismissed by the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6785, "end_char": 6798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, the case of the petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board which on April 5, 1951, made a report stating that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Venilal T ribhovandas Dehejia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6936, "end_char": 6965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the affidavit of Venilal T ribhovandas Dehejia, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, 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J. at page 126 said :-\n\n\"It was argued that section 11 of the impugned Act was invalid as it permitted the continuance of the detention for such period as the Central Government or the State Government thought fit."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14281, "end_char": 14291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14396, "end_char": 14414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A. K. Gopa!.an's case('), Kania C. J. at page 126 said :-\n\n\"It was argued that section 11 of the impugned Act was invalid as it permitted the continuance of the detention for such period as the Central Government or the State Government thought fit."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14763, "end_char": 14770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the like effect were the following observations of Mahajan J. at page 232 :-\n\n.. \"Section 11 of the Act was also impugneJ on the ground that it offended against the Constitution inasmuch as it provided for preventive detention for , an indefinite period.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14794, "end_char": 14804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15066, "end_char": 15075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".1st April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15140, "end_char": 15156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This section in my opinion has to be read in the background of the provision in subclause (3) .of section 1 of the Act which says that the Act will cease to have effect on .1st April, 1951\"."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15192, "end_char": 15202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15339, "end_char": 15349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15473, "end_char": 15483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15568, "end_char": 15574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed in S.\n\nKrishnan v. The State of Madras(1) Sastri J., as he then was expressed himself as follows in connection with the present section 11 (1) :-\n\n\"The objection to the validity of section 11 (1) can be disposed of in a few words.", "canonical_name": "SASTRI"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15654, "end_char": 15664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15707, "end_char": 15717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st. April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16102, "end_char": 16118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, if as already observed, the new Act is to be in force only up to 1st."}}, {"text": "E>attatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17590, "end_char": 17622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E>attatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar\n\n\\· v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay and 0 thers."}}, {"text": "Pangarkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17695, "end_char": 17704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pangarkar\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Pangarkar"}}, {"text": "Stai. of and OtAttt.\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17716, "end_char": 17744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe Stai."}}, {"text": "Section B of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21029, "end_char": 21049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21183, "end_char": 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application.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "Dattatuyti MlJreshwar\n\nPangatkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31200, "end_char": 31232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "deem it proper to state\n\n19$2 --·- Dattatuyti MlJreshwar\n\nPangatkar\n\nThi!"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31676, "end_char": 31686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31990, "end_char": 32001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32145, "end_char": 32155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32568, "end_char": 32580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33178, "end_char": 33187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34013, "end_char": 34026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34984, "end_char": 34994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35056, "end_char": 35065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35160, "end_char": 35173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35418, "end_char": 35428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dattatreya Moreshwar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35614, "end_char": 35634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion, section 13 of the Act gives very wide powers to the detaining authority in this respect and it can revoke or modify any detention order at any time it chooses and the power of modification would\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar\n\nPangarkar\n\nThe State of Bombay and Others.", "canonical_name": "DATTATREYA MORESHWAR PANGARKAR"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay Rnd Othel", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35740, "end_char": 35766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nBombay Rnd Othel's.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay aml Others,\n\n1952"}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36285, "end_char": 36298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36438, "end_char": 36462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st of April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36527, "end_char": 36545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point is not free from doubt, but having regard to the fact that the new Preventive Detention Act iii a temporary statute which was to be in force only up to the 1st of April, 1952, and has only been recently extended to a further period of six months, and no detention under the Act can continue after the date of expiry of the Act, I am inclined to hold that non-specification of the further period in an order under section 11(1) of the Act does not make the order of detention a nullity."}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36784, "end_char": 36797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37231, "end_char": 37241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37787, "end_char": 37797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38606, "end_char": 38616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38845, "end_char": 38858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39356, "end_char": 39367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39389, "end_char": 39400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "G. K. Kharkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40477, "end_char": 40490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln the case before us the order confirming the detention purports to be signed by Mr. G. K. Kharkar, for the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department.", "canonical_name": "G. K. Kharkar"}}, {"text": "V. T. Dehejia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40593, "end_char": 40606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit filed in this case by V. T. Dehejia .shows that Mr. Kharkar was then the Assistant Secretary to the Home Department and was authorised under the rules framed under article 166\n\n(3) of the Constitution by the Governor of Bombay to sign orders and instruments for the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Kharkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40623, "end_char": 40630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit filed in this case by V. T. Dehejia .shows that Mr. Kharkar was then the Assistant Secretary to the Home Department and was authorised under the rules framed under article 166\n\n(3) of the Constitution by the Governor of Bombay to sign orders and instruments for the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40735, "end_char": 40746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40791, "end_char": 40797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The affidavit filed in this case by V. T. Dehejia .shows that Mr. Kharkar was then the Assistant Secretary to the Home Department and was authorised under the rules framed under article 166\n\n(3) of the Constitution by the Governor of Bombay to sign orders and instruments for the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40945, "end_char": 40956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41201, "end_char": 41212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41450, "end_char": 41463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41790, "end_char": 41801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42163, "end_char": 42174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 166(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42423, "end_char": 42437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42669, "end_char": 42679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42785, "end_char": 42798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42901, "end_char": 42910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43049, "end_char": 43059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43271, "end_char": 43281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43287, "end_char": 43297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43541, "end_char": 43552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44547, "end_char": 44558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45366, "end_char": 45377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46547, "end_char": 46558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 49(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46781, "end_char": 46794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46798, "end_char": 46840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46956, "end_char": 46967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act", "statute": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47819, "end_char": 47829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act", "statute": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48029, "end_char": 48040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48289, "end_char": 48309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-1 concur in the order just now pronounced by my learned brother .", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR0"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48379, "end_char": 48388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J. and I have nothing useful to add.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "[1947] F.C.R. 142", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 48591, "end_char": 48608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48619, "end_char": 48626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, pp."}}, {"text": "Stai. of\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48805, "end_char": 48821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nT n• Stai.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay aml Others,\n\n1952"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48888, "end_char": 48898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48906, "end_char": 48936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49066, "end_char": 49077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 166(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49342, "end_char": 49356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49551, "end_char": 49561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 166(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49865, "end_char": 49879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section\n\n1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50096, "end_char": 50106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50605, "end_char": 50615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 166( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50665, "end_char": 50680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50941, "end_char": 50952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sections 3, 9, 10, 11 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51752, "end_char": 51780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52327, "end_char": 52336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52578, "end_char": 52587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\"\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53023, "end_char": 53040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dattatreya Moreshwar ..\n\nPangarkar\n\nThe State of\"\n\nBombay and Others. \"", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay aml Others,\n\n1952"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53169, "end_char": 53178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53970, "end_char": 53980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53988, "end_char": 54013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54201, "end_char": 54210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54371, "end_char": 54381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54783, "end_char": 54792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55185, "end_char": 55195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55241, "end_char": 55250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57122, "end_char": 57129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by me in Gopalan's case(1), the law of\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58820, "end_char": 58830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58981, "end_char": 58991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59277, "end_char": 59296, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59692, "end_char": 59702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60050, "end_char": 60060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60118, "end_char": 60128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60588, "end_char": 60598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60860, "end_char": 60869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60933, "end_char": 60948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "clause (3) of section 1 of the Act which says that the Act will ease to have effect on 1st April, 1951.\""}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61026, "end_char": 61036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61109, "end_char": 61113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J. dissenting held that the sectit>n was bad as it provided for an indefinite period of detention."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61214, "end_char": 61230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri J., as he then was, and with whom the learned\n\nChief Justice agreed as to the validity of the section observed as follows :-\n\n\"The objection to the validity of section 11 (1) can be disposed of in a few words.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61391, "end_char": 61401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dattatreya M", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61563, "end_char": 61575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dattatreya M tireslttt1ar\n\nPdngarklir\n\nT !", "canonical_name": "DATTATREYA MORESHWAR PANGARKAR"}}, {"text": "State. of\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61695, "end_char": 61712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "te State of\n\nBombay imd Otltt:f'I.\n\nM11haitin /.\n\nDattatreya Moreshwar..\n\nPangarl{ar\n\nThe State.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay aml Others,\n\n1952"}}, {"text": "article 22( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61930, "end_char": 61944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1st April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62016, "end_char": 62031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, if as already observed, the new Act is to be in force only up to 1st April, 1952, and no detention under the Act can continue thereafter, the discretionary power could be exercised only subject to that over-all limit.\""}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62220, "end_char": 62230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63196, "end_char": 63206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63448, "end_char": 63458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63743, "end_char": 63753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65099, "end_char": 65109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65258, "end_char": 65275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65288, "end_char": 65297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65354, "end_char": 65364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65866, "end_char": 65876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66381, "end_char": 66391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 67218, "end_char": 67223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed by the learned Attorney-General in support of his contention on two decisions of the High Courts in India."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68400, "end_char": 68410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69314, "end_char": 69324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part IV of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69355, "end_char": 69374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 106 to 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69436, "end_char": 69455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IV of the Code", "statute": "Part IV of the Code"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71833, "end_char": 71849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Government finds that the detention of the petitioners is necessary up to 31st March, 1952, it can gjve effect to that intention in these cases by issuing a fresh order of detention."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_645_654_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 645\n\n• >\n\nJOSHI GIRJADHARJI AND ANOTHER\n\nLACHMANJI PANTH AND OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.]\n\nU. P. Debt Redemption Act (XIII of 1940), ss. 2 (9), 21- \"Loan\". \"Suit to which Act applies\", meanings of-Decree on\n\nmortgage--Person who is not agriculturist when advance is made- W hether eatitled t-0 relief.\n\nA mortgage was executed by several persons on the 28th July, 1931. The term of the mortgage, namely six years, expired in July 1937, the mortgagees instituted a suit in May 1938 and a decree was passed in March 1939.\n\nAn application for relief under the U. P. Debt Redemption Act (XIII of 1940) was made on 11th April, 1942, and this application was resisted on the ground that S, one of the mortgagors, had been assessed to income-tax and was therefore not an agriculturist, and the suit was not consequently \"a suit to which the Act applied.\" The evidenoe showed that S was earning a month! y salary of Rs. 90 and that from February 1932 he had been assessed to income-tax till the year 1936.\n\nThe High Court held, relying on the Full Bench ruling in Ketki Kunwar v. Ram Saroop (I.L.R. 1943 All. 35), that under sec. 21 of the Act the mortgage money could be recovered only from the mortgaged property and not personally and that the proviso to sec. 2 (9) of the Act. had therefore no application and the question whether S was an agriculturist on the date of the mortgage was immaterial. As S was admittedly an agriculturist on the date of the suit, the High Court held that the judgment debtors were entitled to relief under the Act\" On appeal\n\nHeld, that, assuming that the proviso to sec. 2 (9) applied and that in order to be a \"loan\" within the meaning of the Act it must be shown that the advance was made to one who at the date of the advance was an agriculturist, S was not an agriculturist on the 28th July, 1931, as the Indian Finance (Supplementary and Extending) Act of 1931 which reduced the taxable minimum from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 1,000 was passed only in November 1931 and income-tax was first deducted from his salary only in February, 1932.\n\nQuaere : Whether the Full Bench decision in Ketki Kunwar\n\nv. Ram Saroop (I.L.R. 1943 All. 35) is correct.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 64 of 1951. On Appeal from the Judgment and\n\n5-7 SCI/71\n\n195Z\n\nApril 25\n\n/oshi Girjadharji\n\nand Another v. l..achmanji Panth\n\nand Others.\n\nDecree dated the 16th April, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Malik C. J. and Prasad J.) in First Appeal No. 358 of 1943 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd February, 1943, of the Court of the Additional Civil Judge, Benares, in Original Suit No. 33 of 193.8.\n\nGopi Nath Kunzru (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the appellants.\n\nKrishna Shankar for the respondents.'\n\n1952. April 25. delivered by The judgment of the Court was\n\nDAs J.-This appeal arises out of an application by five out of ten judgment-debtors made under section 8 of the U. P. Debt Redemption Act (No. XIII of 1940) for ascertaining the amount due by them in accordance with the provisioqs of sections 9 and 10 of that Act and for amerid!rig the decree passed on March 31, J939, by the' 'Additional Civil Judge, Banaras, in O.S. No. 33 of 1938. The facts material for the purposes of this ap.P.eal may now be briefly stated.\n\nBy a mortgage deed e11~Gute9, . Qn. Ju.ne 22, 1922, Madho Ram Sita Ram, Jai Ram and Lakshman, all sons of Pandit Raja Ram Pant Sess, mortgaged certain immovable properties in favour of Damodarji, son of Kamta Nathji, owner of the Kothi Joshi Shivanath Vishwanath for the due repayment of the sum of Rs. 8,000 advanced on that date by a cheque together with interest thereon at 12 annas per cent. per mensem with quarterly rests.\n\nOn July 28, 1931, the 'y said mortgagors and their sons executed a mortgage over the same properties irt favour of Kothi Kamta Nathji Vishwanathji for the due repayment of Rs. 3,000 with interest thereon at twelve annas per cent. per mensem with quarterly rests.\n\nIt is recited in the deed that the sum of Rs. 8,000 was advanced\n\non this date by a cheque anc; l that the amount was r ·· utilised in paying up the amount due under the earlier\n\nmortgage deed to Damodarji proprietor of Kathi Shivanath Vishwanath.\n\nIn 1935 the\n\nU. P.\n\nAgriculturists' Relief Act (No. XXVII of 1934) came into force. On May 19, 1938, Girjadharji, son of Damodarji, and Murlidharji, minor son of Gangadharji who was another son of Damodarji, filed suit No. 33 of 1938 in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge Benaras, against the mortgagors and their sons for the recovery of Rs. 9,477-2-0 due as principal and interest up to date of suit and for further interest under the mortgage deed of July 28, 1931.\n\nIt appears from the judgment of the High Court under appeal that in their written statement the mortgagors claimed the benefit of the U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (No. XXVII of 1934).\n\nThe plaintiffs contended that the mortgagors were members; of a joint Hindu family and as Sita Ram one of the mortgagors was assessed to income-tax the mortgagors were not agriculturists as defined in section 2(2) of that Act and, therefore, could not claim the benefit conferred on the agriculturists by that Act.\n\nThe trial Court, by its judgment dated March 31, 1939, . hel(l that though Sita Ram was assessed to incomer;{!>;. for . the year 1931-32, the amount of such incometax did not exceed the amount of cess payable on the land held by him and consequently the second proviso to section 2 (2) did not apply to him and he was, therefore, an agriculturist and as the other mortgagors . '\"'.ere also agriculturists all of them were entitled to the\n\nbenefits under the Act. Accordingly, after scaling . down the interest, a sum of Rs. 9,497-14-1 was declared to be due for principal, interest and costs up to March 31, 1939, and a preliminary mortgage decree for sale was passed in that suit .\n\n. I11 'I940 the U.P. Debt Redemption Act (No. XIII o1 1940) came into force.\n\nOn April 11, 1942, five of the judgment -debtors made an application under section 8 of this Act before the Additional Civil Judge, Banaras, who passed the decree. In the petition it was stated that the debt was actually advanced in 1922, that the petitioners were agriculturists within\n\n/oshi Girjadharii and Another v.\n\nLachmanji Panth\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\n/oshi Giriadharii\n\nand Another\n\nLachman; i Panth\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nthe meaning of Act XIII of 1940, that the decreeholders can only get interest at the reduced rate of Rs. 4-8-0 per cent. per annum from 1922, and that after adjustment of accounts nothing will be found outstanding against the petitioners. The prayer was that an account of the money-lending business be made from the beginning of 1922 and the decree in suit No. 33 of 1938 be modified by reducing the amount due thereunder.\n\nThe decree-holders filed a petition of objection asserting, inter alia, that the petitioners were by no means agriculturists, that they and the respondents Nos. 3 to 7 were members of a joint Hindu family at the time of the execution of the mortgage deed of July 28, 1931, that Sita Ram used to pay income-tax at the date of the mortgage in suit and paid even at the time of the application, that all the members of the petitioners' family were not agriculturists within the meaning of the Act and were, therefore, not entitled to the benefits thereof, that the debt advanced under the mortgage deed of July 28, 1931, was not a \"loan\" as defined in the Act and, therefore, the Act did not apply. It will be noticed that although the judgment-debtors-applicants specifically prayed for the accounts being taken from 1922, when the loan was said to have been actually advanced, the decree-holders, in their petition of objection, did not contest that position.\n\nAt the hearing of the application before the Additional Civil Judge, the learned pleader for the decree-holders admitted that with the exception of Sita Ram the remammg judgment-debtors were agriculturists under Act No. XIII of 1940 but that as\n\nSita Ram was a party to the mortgage in suit they were not entitled to the benefit of the Act.\n\nTwo witnesses, namely Suraj Mani Tripathi and Sita Ram, were examined on ' behalf of the judgment-debtors applicants. Sita Ram stated that since 1907 he had been a teacher in Harish Chandra Intermediate College of Banaras, that in 1930 his salary was Rs. 90 per month, that since February 1932 to 1936 he paid income-tax and that after that he paid no income-tax.\n\n-.,-··\n\n' ,\n\n- '\n\n...\n\n• '\n\n....\n\nHis evidence was corroborated by Suraj Mani Tripathi who was the Accountant of the College from 1930 to 1942.\n\nReferring to the College Acquittance Roll Suraj Mani Tripathi deposed that the pay of Sita Ram was Rs. 90 per month throughout 1930, that in 1930 no income-tax was levied, that in 1931 also his salary was Rs. 90 per month and that no income-tax was deducted in 1931 too, that the first deduction of income-tax from his salary was made in February 1932.\n\nNo rebutting evidence was adduced by the decree-holders on the hearing of the application under section 8 of the Act of 1940.\n\nThe income-tax assessment form filed during the trial of the mortgage suit and marked as exhibits is dated February 9, 1933, and shows that on that date Sita Ram was assessed at Rs. 1-14-0 as income-tax on Rs. 180 for the year 1931-32.\n\nBy his judgment delivered on February 22, 1943, the Additional Civil Judge found that Sita Ram was not assessed to income-tax either at the date of the application under section 8 or at the date of the mortgage of 1931 and, therefore held that the applicants were agriculturists and that the case related to a loan as defined in Act XIII of 1940. He then went on to discuss the question whether the account should be reopened from June 2, 1922, when the earlier mortgage was executed or from July 28, 1931, when the mortgage in suit was executed. The decree-holders who did not adduce: any evidence on the hearing of the application evidently relied on the , evidence adduced in suit No. 33 of 1938.\n\nAfter discussing that evidence the learned Judge came to the conclusion that so far as the judgment-debtors were concerned the mortgagees in the two mortgages were one and the same.\n\nHe adversely commented on the non-production of the books of account by the decree-holders.\n\nRe-opening the accounts from Jl!ne 2, 1922, the learned Judge concluded that the whole of the principal and interest payable according to the Act had been fully discharged and that nothing remained due by the judgmentdebtors under the decree in suit No. 33 of 1938.\n\nfoshi Girjadharji\n\nand Another\n\nLachmanji Pantli\n\nand Others.\n\nDas f.\n\n/oshi Giriadharji\n\nand Another v.\n\nLachmanii Panth\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\naccordingly declared that the decree stood discharged in full and directed a note to that effect to be made in the Register of Suits.\n\nThe decree-holders having appealed to the High Court, a Division Bench (B. Mallik, C. J. and Bind Basni Prasad J.) by its judgment delivered on April 16, 1948, held that the question whether Sita Ram was or was not an agriculturist on July 28, 1931, was not material as it was not denied that all the judgment, debtors were agriculturists on the date of suit.\n\nReference was made by the learned Judges to section 21 and it was stated that by reason of that section the mortgage amount could be recovered only from the mortgaged property and not personally from the mortgagors and accordingly the proviso to the definition of \"loan\" in section 2 (9) of the Act had no application and it was, therefore, not necessary to show that the borrowers were agriculturists at the date when the advance was made and that as the judgment-debtors were admittedly agriculturists at the date of the suit, the case was fullv covered bv the Full Bench decision of that High Court in Ketki Kunwar v. Ram Saroop('). The High Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal on this point alone. The question whether the account should be reopened from 1922 or from 1931 was not raised by the decree-holders at all. The decree-holders have now come up on appeal before us on a certificate granted by the High Court under section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\n' Sri G. N. Kunzru appearing in support of this appeal has strongly questioned the correctness of the (Full Bench decision relied on by the High Court and the interpretation put by the High Court on section 21 and section: 2(9) of the Act. As we think this appeal can be decided on a simpler ground we do not consider it necessary, on this occasion, to express any opinion on either of these questions which are by no means free from doubt.\n\n( 1 ) I.L.R. (1943] All. 35; A.LR. 1942 All. 390; (1942) A.L.J. 578.\n\n- '\n\n...\n\n1952 The present application ha.<! been made under section 8 of the U. P. Debt Redemption Act, 1940, sub- Joshi Giriadhar; i section (1) of which, omitting the proviso, runs as and Another follows:- v. \"Notwithstanding the prov1sions of any decree or of any law for the time being in force, an agriculturist or a workman liable to pay nhe amount due under a decree to which thi~ Act applies passed before the commencement of this Act, may apply to the Civil Court which passed the decree or to which the execution of .the decree has been transferred, for the amendment of the decree by reductron according to the provisions of this Act of the amount due under it, and on receipt of such application the Court shall, after notice to the opposite party, calculate the amount due from the applicant in accordance with the provisi1ons of sections 9 and 10 and shall amend the decree accordingly.\"\n\nIt is clear from the wording of the sub-section that there are three pre-requisites for exercise of the right conferred by it, namely, (1) that the application must be by an agriculturist and (2) that that agri'culturist must be liable to pay the amount due under a decree to which this Act applies and (3) that that decree was passed before the commencement of this Act.\n\nThat the judgment-debtors applicants were agriculturists at the date when suit No. 33 of 1938 was filed and also in 1942 when the application under section 8 was made is conceded by Sri G. N. Kunzru.\n\nThe decree in that suit was passed on March 31, 1939, which was well before the commencement of the Act. The only question that remains is whether the amount was due under a decree to which the Act applies. Under section 2(6) of the Act the phrase \"decree to which this Act applies\" means a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act in a suit to which this Act applies. Section 2(17) defines the phrase \"suit to which this Act applies\" as meaning any suit or . proceeding relating to a loan. The question then, . arises : was the decree under which the judgment-debtors applicants are liable passed in a suit\n\nLachmanji Pantk\n\n• and Others.\n\n•[ sva\n\n1952 relating to a loan ? Loan is thus defined in secfoshi Girjadhar; i tion Z(9) :\n\nand Another \"'Loan' means an advance in cash or kind made v. before the first day of June, 1940, recoverable from Lachmanji Panth 1 k f h and Oth<Ts. an agricu turist or a wor man or rom any sue person and other pesrons jointly or from the property Das ]. of an agriculturist or workm:fn and includes any transaction which in substance amounts to such advance, but does not include an advance the liability for the repayment of which has, by a contract with the borrower or his heir or successor or by sale in execution of a decree been transferred to another person or an advance by the Central or Provincial Government to make advances or by a co-operative\n\nsociety or by a schedule bank :\n\nProvided that an advance recoverable from an agriculturist or from an agriculturist and other persons jointly shall not be deemed to be a loan for the purposes of this Act unless such advance was made to an agriculturist or to an agriculturist and other persons jointly.\" , , ... . ... .iii\n\nIn order to be a \"loan\" the advance must be recoverable from an agriculturist.\n\nThe word \"recoverable\" seems, prima facie, to indicate that the crucial point of time is when the advance becomes recoverable, i.e., when the amount advanced becomes or falls due.\n\nUnder the mortgage of 1931 the date of redemption was 6 years from the date of execution, i.e., in July 1937. Sri Kunzru concedes that Sita Ram was not assessed to income-tax since 1936.\n\nAssuming, but without deciding, that the proviso to section 2 (9) applies and that in order to be a \"loan\" it must be shown that the advance was made to one who, at the date of the advance, was an agriculturist as defined in section 2(3) of the Act the question has yet to be answered, namely, had Sita Ram ceased to be an agriculturist by reason of clause (b) of the proviso to section 2(3), . that is to say, by reason of his being assessed to i.pcome-tax on July 28, 1931.\n\nAccording to the evidence of suraj Mani Tripathi and Sita Ram\n\nincome-tax was first deducted at the source in the month of February 1932 by the College authorities and the actual assessment was made on February 9, 1933.\n\nTherefore, Sita Ram was not assessed to incometax on July 28, 1931.\n\nIt is not disputed that the taxable minimum was reduced from Rs. 2,000 per annum to Rs. 1,000 per annum by the Indian Finance (Supplementary & Extending) Act, 1931, which was enacted on November 26, 1931.\n\nTherefore, at the date of the. advance, i.e., on July 28, 1931, Sita Ram whose , salary was below Rs. 2,000 per annum was not only not actually assessed to income-tax but was not even liable to such assessment.\n\nThe evidence of Suraj Mani Tripathi shows that the first deduction of incometax out. of the salary was in the month of February 1932 and the income-tax assessment form for 1931-32 (Ex. S) shows that tax was assessed on Rs. 180 which was evidently salary for February and March 1932 being the last two months of the assessment year.\n\nThe position, therefore, is that Sita Ram was not assessed to income-tax at the date of the advance in 1931 or on the due date under the deed, i.e., in July 1937, or on the date of s1Uit in 1938 or on the date of the application under section 8 in 1942. It consequently follows that he was an agriculturist on all these dates.\n\nThe other judgment-debtors were admittedly agriculturist.\n\nTherefore, the application under section 8 was made by persons who were all agriculturists and who were liable to pay under a decree to which the Act applies, i.e., under a decree passed in a suit relating to a loan as defined by section 2 (9).\n\nThe Courts below, therefore, were right in their conclusion that the judgment-debtors applicar.ts were entitled to the benefit of the Act.\n\nSri G. N. Kunzru finally submitted that in any case the accounts could not be taken from 1922, for the mortgagees under the two mortgages were different. We have already pointed out that this point was not specifically taken in the decree-holders' petition of objection.\n\nThe trial Court held as a fact that so far as the judgment-debtors were concerned the\n\nfoslzi Girjadharii and Another\n\nLachman; i Panth\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nJoshi Girjadharji and Another v.\n\nLachmanji Panth\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nMay 26.\n\nmortgagees were the same in both the mortgages ..\n\nAlthough in the petition of appeal to the High Court it was alleged that the mortgagees were different and the accounts could not be reopened from 1922, that ground was not specifically urged before the High Court.\n\nThe determination of that question must necessarily involve an investigation into facts.\n\nWe do not think, in the absence of a plea in this behalf in the decree-holders' petition of objection and also in view of their failure and neglect to raise this question before the High Court, it will be right for this final court of appeal, at this stage and in the circumstances of this case, to permit the appellants to raise this question of fact.\n\nThe result, therefore, 1s that this appeal must stand dismissed with costs. :-\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : C. P. Lall.\n\nAgent for the respondents : N atmit Lall.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nSHAILABALA DEVI\n\n[PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.J., MEHER\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE, JJ.]\n\nIndian Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXlll of 1931), s. 4 (I} (a)-Constitution of India Arts. 19(1) and 19(2)-Restrictions imposed by s. 4(l)(a) on freedom of speech and expression-Whether fall within Art. 19 (2)-Validity of s. 4 (!)-Speeches of political demagogues-Construction-Burden of prosecution .\n\n. Section 4 (!) (a) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXIII of 1931) is not unconstitutional as the restrictions imposed on freedom of speech and expression by the said sec tion are solely directed against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it and are within the ambit of Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nRomesh Thapar's case ( [1950]", "total_entities": 102, "entities": [{"text": "JOSHI GIRJADHARJI AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JOSHI GIRJADHARJI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LACHMANJI PANTH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LACHMANJI PANTH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Debt Redemption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Redemption Act", "statute": "Debt Redemption Act"}}, {"text": "Debt Redemption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 638, "end_char": 657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "11th April, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 685, "end_char": 701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application for relief under the U. 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Debt Redemption Act (XIII of 1940) was made on 11th April, 1942, and this application was resisted on the ground that S, one of the mortgagors, had been assessed to income-tax and was therefore not an agriculturist, and the suit was not consequently \"a suit to which the Act applied.\""}}, {"text": "sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1192, "end_char": 1199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Redemption Act", "statute": "Debt Redemption Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1325, "end_char": 1331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Redemption Act", "statute": "Debt Redemption Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1668, "end_char": 1674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "/oshi Girjadharji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2367, "end_char": 2384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Appeal from the Judgment and\n\n5-7 SCI/71\n\n195Z\n\nApril 25\n\n/oshi Girjadharji\n\nand Another v. l..achmanji Panth\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "JOSHI GIRJADHARJI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "achmanji Panth", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2404, "end_char": 2418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Appeal from the Judgment and\n\n5-7 SCI/71\n\n195Z\n\nApril 25\n\n/oshi Girjadharji\n\nand Another v. l..achmanji Panth\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "LACHMANJI PANTH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Malik C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2514, "end_char": 2522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Decree dated the 16th April, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Malik C. 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Asthana, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Krishna Shankar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2795, "end_char": 2810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Shankar for the respondents.'"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2989, "end_char": 2998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Debt Redemption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3012, "end_char": 3031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 9 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3128, "end_char": 3145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Redemption Act", "statute": "Debt Redemption Act"}}, {"text": "31, J939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3204, "end_char": 3212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XIII of 1940) for ascertaining the amount due by them in accordance with the provisioqs of sections 9 and 10 of that Act and for amerid!rig the decree passed on March 31, J939, by the' 'Additional Civil Judge, Banaras, in O.S. No."}}, {"text": "Madho Ram Sita Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3413, "end_char": 3431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ju.ne 22, 1922, Madho Ram Sita Ram, Jai Ram and Lakshman, all sons of Pandit Raja Ram Pant Sess, mortgaged certain immovable properties in favour of Damodarji, son of Kamta Nathji, owner of the Kothi Joshi Shivanath Vishwanath for the due repayment of the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Jai Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3433, "end_char": 3440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ju.ne 22, 1922, Madho Ram Sita Ram, Jai Ram and Lakshman, all sons of Pandit Raja Ram Pant Sess, mortgaged certain immovable properties in favour of Damodarji, son of Kamta Nathji, owner of the Kothi Joshi Shivanath Vishwanath for the due repayment of the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Lakshman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3445, "end_char": 3453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ju.ne 22, 1922, Madho Ram Sita Ram, Jai Ram and Lakshman, all sons of Pandit Raja Ram Pant Sess, mortgaged certain immovable properties in favour of Damodarji, son of Kamta Nathji, owner of the Kothi Joshi Shivanath Vishwanath for the due repayment of the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Pandit Raja Ram Pant Sess", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3467, "end_char": 3492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ju.ne 22, 1922, Madho Ram Sita Ram, Jai Ram and Lakshman, all sons of Pandit Raja Ram Pant Sess, mortgaged certain immovable properties in favour of Damodarji, son of Kamta Nathji, owner of the Kothi Joshi Shivanath Vishwanath for the due repayment of the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Damodarji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3546, "end_char": 3555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ju.ne 22, 1922, Madho Ram Sita Ram, Jai Ram and Lakshman, all sons of Pandit Raja Ram Pant Sess, mortgaged certain immovable properties in favour of Damodarji, son of Kamta Nathji, owner of the Kothi Joshi Shivanath Vishwanath for the due repayment of the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kamta Nathji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3564, "end_char": 3576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ju.ne 22, 1922, Madho Ram Sita Ram, Jai Ram and Lakshman, all sons of Pandit Raja Ram Pant Sess, mortgaged certain immovable properties in favour of Damodarji, son of Kamta Nathji, owner of the Kothi Joshi Shivanath Vishwanath for the due repayment of the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kothi Joshi Shivanath Vishwanath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3591, "end_char": 3623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ju.ne 22, 1922, Madho Ram Sita Ram, Jai Ram and Lakshman, all sons of Pandit Raja Ram Pant Sess, mortgaged certain immovable properties in favour of Damodarji, son of Kamta Nathji, owner of the Kothi Joshi Shivanath Vishwanath for the due repayment of the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "July 28, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3794, "end_char": 3807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 28, 1931, the 'y said mortgagors and their sons executed a mortgage over the same properties irt favour of Kothi Kamta Nathji Vishwanathji for the due repayment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kothi Kamta Nathji Vishwanathji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3906, "end_char": 3937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 28, 1931, the 'y said mortgagors and their sons executed a mortgage over the same properties irt favour of Kothi Kamta Nathji Vishwanathji for the due repayment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kathi Shivanath Vishwanath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4275, "end_char": 4301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,000 was advanced\n\non this date by a cheque anc; l that the amount was r ·· utilised in paying up the amount due under the earlier\n\nmortgage deed to Damodarji proprietor of Kathi Shivanath Vishwanath."}}, {"text": "May 19, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4391, "end_char": 4403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 19, 1938, Girjadharji, son of Damodarji, and Murlidharji, minor son of Gangadharji who was another son of Damodarji, filed suit No."}}, {"text": "Girjadharji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4405, "end_char": 4416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 19, 1938, Girjadharji, son of Damodarji, and Murlidharji, minor son of Gangadharji who was another son of Damodarji, filed suit No."}}, {"text": "Murlidharji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4440, "end_char": 4451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 19, 1938, Girjadharji, son of Damodarji, and Murlidharji, minor son of Gangadharji who was another son of Damodarji, filed suit No."}}, {"text": "Gangadharji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4466, "end_char": 4477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 19, 1938, Girjadharji, son of Damodarji, and Murlidharji, minor son of Gangadharji who was another son of Damodarji, filed suit No."}}, {"text": "Sita Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5058, "end_char": 5066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs contended that the mortgagors were members; of a joint Hindu family and as Sita Ram one of the mortgagors was assessed to income-tax the mortgagors were not agriculturists as defined in section 2(2) of that Act and, therefore, could not claim the benefit conferred on the agriculturists by that Act."}}, {"text": "section 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5323, "end_char": 5337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Court, by its judgment dated March 31, 1939, ."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5556, "end_char": 5565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Debt Redemption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5989, "end_char": 6008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 11, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6049, "end_char": 6063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 11, 1942, five of the judgment -debtors made an application under section 8 of this Act before the Additional Civil Judge, Banaras, who passed the decree."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6121, "end_char": 6130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Redemption Act", "statute": "Debt Redemption Act"}}, {"text": "Additional Civil Judge, Banaras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6154, "end_char": 6185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 11, 1942, five of the judgment -debtors made an application under section 8 of this Act before the Additional Civil Judge, Banaras, who passed the decree."}}, {"text": "Sita Ram the remammg judgment-debtors were agriculturists under Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8008, "end_char": 8075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sita Ram was a party to the mortgage in suit they were not entitled to the benefit of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8106, "end_char": 8199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Suraj Mani Tripathi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8224, "end_char": 8243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two witnesses, namely Suraj Mani Tripathi and Sita Ram, were examined on ' behalf of the judgment-debtors applicants."}}, {"text": "Sita Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8248, "end_char": 8256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two witnesses, namely Suraj Mani Tripathi and Sita Ram, were examined on ' behalf of the judgment-debtors applicants."}}, {"text": "Suraj Mani Tripathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8634, "end_char": 8653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".,-··\n\n' ,\n'\n\n...\n\n• '\n\n....\n\nHis evidence was corroborated by Suraj Mani Tripathi who was the Accountant of the College from 1930 to 1942.", "canonical_name": "Suraj Mani Tripathi"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9162, "end_char": 9171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sita Ram was a party to the mortgage in suit they were not entitled to the benefit of the Act", "statute": "Sita Ram was a party to the mortgage in suit they were not entitled to the benefit of the Act"}}, {"text": "February 9, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9300, "end_char": 9316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The income-tax assessment form filed during the trial of the mortgage suit and marked as exhibits is dated February 9, 1933, and shows that on that date Sita Ram was assessed at Rs."}}, {"text": "February 22, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9459, "end_char": 9476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment delivered on February 22, 1943, the Additional Civil Judge found that Sita Ram was not assessed to income-tax either at the date of the application under section 8 or at the date of the mortgage of 1931 and, therefore held that the applicants were agriculturists and that the case related to a loan as defined in Act XIII of 1940."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9600, "end_char": 9609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 2, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9861, "end_char": 9873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then went on to discuss the question whether the account should be reopened from June 2, 1922, when the earlier mortgage was executed or from July 28, 1931, when the mortgage in suit was executed."}}, {"text": "foshi Girjadharji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10674, "end_char": 10691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "foshi Girjadharji\n\nand Another\n\nLachmanji Pantli\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "JOSHI GIRJADHARJI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Lachmanji Pantli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10706, "end_char": 10722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "foshi Girjadharji\n\nand Another\n\nLachmanji Pantli\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "LACHMANJI PANTH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Lachmanii Panth", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10780, "end_char": 10795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das f.\n\n/oshi Giriadharji\n\nand Another v.\n\nLachmanii Panth\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "LACHMANJI PANTH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "B. Mallik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11024, "end_char": 11033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree-holders having appealed to the High Court, a Division Bench (B. Mallik, C. J. and Bind Basni Prasad J.) by its judgment delivered on April 16, 1948, held that the question whether Sita Ram was or was not an agriculturist on July 28, 1931, was not material as it was not denied that all the judgment, debtors were agriculturists on the date of suit."}}, {"text": "Bind Basni Prasad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11045, "end_char": 11062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree-holders having appealed to the High Court, a Division Bench (B. Mallik, C. J. and Bind Basni Prasad J.) by its judgment delivered on April 16, 1948, held that the question whether Sita Ram was or was not an agriculturist on July 28, 1931, was not material as it was not denied that all the judgment, debtors were agriculturists on the date of suit."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11357, "end_char": 11367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11587, "end_char": 11596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12243, "end_char": 12254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12258, "end_char": 12285, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "G. N. Kunzru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12294, "end_char": 12306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Sri G. N. Kunzru appearing in support of this appeal has strongly questioned the correctness of the (Full Bench decision relied on by the High Court and the interpretation put by the High Court on section 21 and section: 2(9) of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12487, "end_char": 12497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12861, "end_char": 12870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Debt Redemption Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12884, "end_char": 12909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 9 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13644, "end_char": 13661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Redemption Act, 1940", "statute": "Debt Redemption Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14225, "end_char": 14234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14491, "end_char": 14503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(17)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14665, "end_char": 14678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lachmanji Pantk", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14905, "end_char": 14920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "arises : was the decree under which the judgment-debtors applicants are liable passed in a suit\n\nLachmanji Pantk\n\n• and Others.", "canonical_name": "LACHMANJI PANTH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Kunzru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16390, "end_char": 16396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Kunzru concedes that Sita Ram was not assessed to income-tax since 1936."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16516, "end_char": 16525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16689, "end_char": 16701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16843, "end_char": 16855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "suraj Mani Tripathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16970, "end_char": 16989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the evidence of suraj Mani Tripathi and Sita Ram\n\nincome-tax was first deducted at the source in the month of February 1932 by the College authorities and the actual assessment was made on February 9, 1933.", "canonical_name": "Suraj Mani Tripathi"}}, {"text": "November 26, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17417, "end_char": 17434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 per annum by the Indian Finance (Supplementary & Extending) Act, 1931, which was enacted on November 26, 1931."}}, {"text": "s1U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18163, "end_char": 18166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18217, "end_char": 18226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18402, "end_char": 18411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18599, "end_char": 18608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "foslzi Girjadharii", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19114, "end_char": 19132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Court held as a fact that so far as the judgment-debtors were concerned the\n\nfoslzi Girjadharii and Another\n\nLachman; i Panth\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "JOSHI GIRJADHARJI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Joshi Girjadharji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19184, "end_char": 19201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das/.\n\nJoshi Girjadharji and Another v.\n\nLachmanji Panth\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "JOSHI GIRJADHARJI AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Lachmanji Panth", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19218, "end_char": 19233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das/.\n\nJoshi Girjadharji and Another v.\n\nLachmanji Panth\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "LACHMANJI PANTH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "C. P. Lall", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20101, "end_char": 20111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : C. P. Lall."}}, {"text": "N atmit Lall", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20142, "end_char": 20154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : N atmit Lall."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR\n\nSHAILABALA DEVI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20161, "end_char": 20192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nSHAILABALA DEVI\n\n[PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.J., MEHER\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20195, "end_char": 20217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nSHAILABALA DEVI\n\n[PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.J., MEHER\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE, JJ.]", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "CHAND\n\nMAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20226, "end_char": 20240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nSHAILABALA DEVI\n\n[PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.J., MEHER\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20261, "end_char": 20265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nSHAILABALA DEVI\n\n[PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.J., MEHER\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20326, "end_char": 20330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20339, "end_char": 20360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1) and 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20361, "end_char": 20382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20407, "end_char": 20417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20474, "end_char": 20481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20498, "end_char": 20502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20580, "end_char": 20589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20890, "end_char": 20897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Romesh Thapar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20924, "end_char": 20937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Romesh Thapar's case ( [1950]"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_654_674_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Joshi Girjadharji and Another v.\n\nLachmanji Panth\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nMay 26.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1952]\n\nmortgagees were the same in both the mortgages ..\n\nAlthough in the petition of appeal to the High Court it was alleged that the mortgagees were different and the accounts could not be reopened from 1922, that ground was not specifically urged before the High Court.\n\nThe determination of that question must necessarily involve an investigation into facts.\n\nWe do not think, in the absence of a plea in this behalf in the decree-holders' petition of objection and also in view of their failure and neglect to raise this question before the High Court, it will be right for this final court of appeal, at this stage and in the circumstances of this case, to permit the appellants to raise this question of fact.\n\nThe result, therefore, 1s that this appeal must stand dismissed with costs. :-\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : C. P. Lall.\n\nAgent for the respondents : N atmit Lall.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nSHAILABALA DEVI\n\n[PATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.J., MEHER\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE, JJ.]\n\nIndian Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXlll of 1931), s. 4 (I} (a)-Constitution of India Arts. 19(1) and 19(2)-Restrictions imposed by s. 4(l)(a) on freedom of speech and expression-Whether fall within Art. 19 (2)-Validity of s. 4 (!)-Speeches of political demagogues-Construction-Burden of prosecution .\n\n. Section 4 (!) (a) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXIII of 1931) is not unconstitutional as the restrictions imposed on freedom of speech and expression by the said sec tion are solely directed against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it and are within the ambit of Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nRomesh Thapar's case ( [1950]\n\nS.C.R. 594]) and Brij Bhushan's case ( [1950] S.C.R. 605) do not 1952 lay down any wide proposition that restrictions of the nature imposed by s. 4 (1) (a) are outside the scope of Art 19 (2) as 'fhe fate of they are conceived generally in the interests of public order. At B1har any rate, the amendment made to Art. 19 (2) by the Constitu- . v. . tion (First Amendment) Act which is retrospective in operation Shatlabala Devi~ makes the matter clear.\n\nIn order to determine whether a particular document falls within the ambit of s. 4 ( 1) the writing has to be considered as a whole in a. fair, free and liberal spirit, not dwelling too much on isolated passages or upon a strong word here and there, and an endeavour should be made to gather the general effect which the whole composition would have on the minds of the public.\n\nExpressions which are the stock in trade of political demagogues and have no tendency to excite anybody, and exaggerations in languages, cannot lead to that result.\n\nRhetoric of this kind might in conceivable circumstances inflame passions, as for example, if addressed to an excited mob, but if such circumstances exist it is for the Government to establish the fact.\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Case No. 273 of 1951.\n\nAppeal under Arts. 132(1) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 13th October, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Shearer, Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ.) in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 220 of 1949.\n\nS. K.. Mitra (K. Dayal, with him), for the appellant.\n\nBasant Chandra Ghosh and Arun Chandra Mitra for .,... the respondent.\n\n1952. May 26. The Court delivered judgment as follows:-\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This appeal has been preferred by the State of Bihar against the judgment of a Special Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna allowing the application of the respondent under section 23 of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, XXIII of 1931.\n\nIt appears that the petition was argued by both the sides as it was one made under article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe respondent was the keeper at all relevant times of the Bharati Press at Purulia. A pamphlet under\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nShailabala Devi.\n\nMahajan T.\n\nthe heading \"Sangram\" was printed at the said press and is alleged to have been circulated in the town of Purulia in the district of Manbhum.\n\nThe Government of Bihar considered that the pamphlet contained objectionable matter of the nature described under section 4(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act and required the press to furnish security in the sum of Rs. 2,000, under section 3(3) of the Act by the 19th September, 1949.\n\nOn the 26th September, 1949, the respondent applied to the High Court under section 23 for setting aside the above order.\n\nThis application was allowed by the majority of the Judges constituting the Bench. Shearer J. was of the view that the application should be dismissed.\n\nSeveral objections were raised to the validity of the order passed by the Bihar Government but it is unnecessary to mention all of them. The two points which were seriously pressed before the High Court were that the leaflet did not contain any words or signs or visible representation of the nature described in section 4 ( 1) of the Act, and that the provisions of section 4 (1) of the Act were inconsistent with article 19 ( 1) of the Constitution and as such void under article 13.\n\nThe High Court reached the conclusion that the pamphlet did come within the mischief of the Act. . Sarjoo Prosad J., with whom Ramaswami J. concurred, on a construction of the decisions of this Court in Ramesh Thapar v. The State of Madras('), and Brij .Bhushan v. The State of Delhi(2), found, though with some reluctance, that section 4 ( 1) (a) of the Act was repugnant to the Constitution and therefore void.\n\nMr. Justice Shearer, however, held that the pamphlet was a seditious libel and that there was nothing in the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above which compelled the court to hold the provisions of section 4 (1) (a) of the Act to be void.\n\nIn my opinion, Shearer J. was right in the view that there is nothing in the two decisions of this Court which bears directly or indirectly on the point at issue in the present case and that both Sarjoo Prasad\n\n(!) [1950] S.C.R. 594.\n\n(2) [1950] S.C.R. 605.\n\n\"\"'\n\nT.ie State of\n\nBilt11r\n\nand Ramaswami JJ. were in error in holding that these decisions were conclusive on the question of the invalidity of clauses (a) and (b) of section 4(1) of the Act.\n\nTowards the concluding part of his judgment Sarjoo Prosaj J. observed as follows:- Sluil11bala Devi. \"I am compelled to observe that from the above discussions of the Supreme Court judgments, it follows logically that if a person were to go on inciting murder or other cognisable offences either through the press or by word of mouth, he would be free to do so with impunity inasmuch as he would claim the privilege of exercising his fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression.\n\nAny legislation which seeks or would seek to curb this right of the person concerned would not be saved under article 19 (2) of the Constitution and would have to be declared void. This would be so, because such speech or expression on the part of the individual would fall neither under libel nor slander nor defamation nor contempt of court nor any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of or tends to overthrow the State. I cannot with equanimity contemplate such an anomalous situation but the conclusion appears to be unavoidable on the authority of the Supreme Court judgments with which we are bound.\n\nI, therefore, wish that my decision on the point would sooner than ever come to be tested by the Supreme Court itself and the position re-examined in the light of the anomalous situation pointed out above. It seems to me that the words used in the Constitution Act should be assigned a wide and liberal connotation even though they occur in a clause which provides an exception to the fundamental right vouchsafed under article 19( 1) (a) of the Constitution Act.\"\n\nThese observations-I speak with great respectdisclose a complete lack of understanding of the precise scope of the two decisions of this Court referred to above. Section 3(3) of the Act under which the notice was issued in the present case enacts as follows :\n\n\"Whenever it appears to the Provincial Government that any printing press is used for the purpose\n\nAlllhaian J.\n\n1952 of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or The State o1 other document containing any words, signs or visible Bihar representation of the nature described in section 4, v. sub-section (1), the Provincial Government may, by Shailabala 'FJeui: notice in writing to the keeper of the press .... order\n\nMahaian f.' the keeper to deposit with the Magistrate security ... \"\n\nClause (a) of section 4 ( 1) deals with words or signs or visible representations which incite to or encourage, or tend to incite to or encourage the commission of any offence of murder or any cognizable offence involving violence.\n\nIt is plain that speeches or expressions on the part of an individual which incite to or encourage the commission of violent crimes, such as murder, cannot but be matters which would undermine the security of the State and come within the ambit of a law sanctioned by article 19(2) of the Constitution.\n\nI cannot help observing that the decisions of this Court in Ramesh Thapar's case('), and in Brij Bhushan's case(') have been more than once misapplied and misunderstood and have been construed as laying down the wide proposition that restrictions of the nature imposed by section 4(1) (a) of the Indian Press\n\n(Emergency Powers) Act or of similar character are outside the scope of article 19(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as they are conceived generally in the interests of public order.\n\nSarjoo Pro sad J. also seems to have fallen into the same error.\n\nThe question that arose in Ramesh Thapar's case(') was whether the impugned Act (Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, XXIII of 1949) in so far as it purported by section 9 (1-A) to authorise the Provincial Government \"for the purpose of securing the public safety and the maintenance of public order, to prohibit or regulate the entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in tJhe Province of Madras or any part thereof any document or class of documents\" was a law relating to any matter which undermined the security of or tended to overthrow the State, and it was observed that whatever ends the impugned Act. may have been intended to subserve and whatever\n\n(!) [1950] S.C.R. 594.\n\n(2) [1950] S.C.R. 605.\n\n.\"--\n\n~ . __ .,\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\naims its framers may have had in view, it:SJ application and scope could not, in the absence of delimiting words in the statute itself, be restricted to those eggravated forms of preiudicial activity which are calculated to endanger the security of the State, nor was there any guarantee that those authorized to exercise the powers under the Act would in using them discriminate between those who act prejudically to the security of the\n\nState and those who do not. Section 4(1)(a) of the impugned Act, however, is restricted to aggravated forms of prejudicial activity.\n\nIt deals specifically with incitement to violent crimes and does not deal with acts that generally concern them.selves with the maintenance of public order. That being so, the decision in Ramesh Thapar's case(1) given on the constitutionality of section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act has no relevancy for deciding the constitutional.ity of the provisions of section 4(1) (a) of the Indian Press: (Emergency Powers) Act.\n\nTowards the concluding portion in Ramesh Thapar's Judgment(1)\n\nit was observed as follows :-\n\nShailabala Devi.\n\n- .\n\n\"We are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed \" solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of article 19, although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of pub~ lie order. It follows that section 9(1-A) which authorizes imposition of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public ordet falls outside the scope of authorized restrictions\n\n1 under clause (2), and is therefore void and unconstitutional.\"\n\nThe restrictions imposed by section 4(1) (a) of the\n\n- Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act on freedom of speech and expression are solely directed against the undermining of the security of the State or the over- ~· throw of it and are within the ambit of article 19(2)\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 594.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nShailabala Devi.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nof the Constitution.\n\nThe deduction that a person would be free to incite to murder or other cognizable offence through the press with impunity drawn from our decision in Romesh Thapar's case(') could easily have been avoided as it was avoided by Shearer J. who in very emphatic terms said as follows :-\n\n\"I have read and re-read the judgments of the Supreme Court, and I can find nothing in them myself which bear directly on the point at issue, and leads me to think that, in their opinion, a restriction of this kind is no longer permissible.\" Be that as it may, the matter is now concluded by the language of the amended article 19(2) made by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act which is retrospective in operation, and the decision of the High Court on this point cannot be sustained.\n\nMr. Basant Chander Ghosh contended that the amendment made in article 19(2) of the Constitution with retrospective operation was repugnant to article 20 of the Constitution inasmuch as it declared a certain act an offence which was not an offence at the time when the act was committed. This contention is untenable. The respondent is alleged to have violated the provisions of section 4(1)(a) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act which was a law in force in the year 1949 when the offending pamphlet was published. She has not been convicted of any offence so far and is not being again convicted for the same by reason of the amendment in article 19(2).\n\nArticle 2(} has no application whatever to the present case.\n\nArticle 19(2) empowers a legislature to make laws imposing reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights conferred under article 19(1) of the Constitution.\n\nIt does not declare any acts which were not offences. before as offences with retrospective effect.\n\nMoreover, in the year 1949 the respondent was not possessed of any fundamental rights which could be said to have been contravened by the amendment.\n\nThough, as I have said above, the High Court 1s m error in the finding that the provisions of section 4(1)(a)\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 594.\n\nJ.,. • ._. -,\n\n' -\n\n~. -·\n\n_,,\n\n.. -\n\n.. , '\n\nof the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act are repugnant to the Constitution, its judgment has to be maintained as it is also in error in holding that the pamphlet in question fell within the mischief of section 4(1) (a) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act.\n\nThe document is written in high-flown Bengali language and contairu; a good deal of demagogic claptrap with some pretence to poetic flourish.\n\nIt enunciates certain abstract propositions in somewhat involved language and it cannot be followed except with considerable effort.\n\nThe High Court held that the document offended against the provisions of section 4 ( 1) (a) inasmuch as certain parts of it contemplate a bloody and violent revolution and that the central theme that runs through the whole gamut of the offending pamphlet is that author is anxious to bring about a bloody revolution and change completely the present order of things by causing a total annihilation of the persons and the policies of those who according to him are in the opposite camp.\n\nParticular reference was. made to the following passages in the writing which in the opinion of the learned Judges support that conclusion.\n\nThe first of these passages is in these words:-\n\n\"Oh thou foolish oppressor, you want to cause abject terror in me with your red eyes and full throated voice-do that, I am not afraid ...... My protest is against parochial national politics.\"\n\nAnother passage reads thus :-\n\n\"Death is my secret love ; poison i s my drink ; the flames of fire are my sweet breeze; the wailing of a hundred breaved childless mothers is just a tune in my flute ; the weeping of widows at their widowhood is just a rhythm of my song.\"\n\nThe next passage referred to is in these terms :-\n\n\"I am the cremation ground.\n\nI am the bloodthirsty goddess Kali who lives and moves about in the cremation ground. Plague or famine is my great joy ...... I am thirsty, I want blood, I want revolution,\n\n6-7 S.C.l./71\n\nT lu State •l\n\nBihar v.\n\nShailabala Devi.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nSkailabala Devi.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nI want faith in the struggle. Tear, tear the chain of wrongs; Break thou the proud head of the oppressor.\"\n\nReference was also made to a passage in which the writer desires that his cries should be heard by people far and near, that his call should be hearkened far far away. across the hills, the jungles, across the rivers and rivulets and all those who hear should come forward to join .the ranks in destroying the oppressor and in which he claims that he is the messenger of death, . that his revolutionary song signals the door of each of the listeners and signals to them to come out if they have life, if they have health, if they have courage to come and dash to pieces those who commit oppression on the mother, and he says that with the blood of those followers kt the revolution grow.\n\nIt winds up with an invocation to the readers in these terms :-\n\n\"If you are true, if you ai:e the gift of God, if you\n\nre not a bastard, then come forward with a fearless heart to struggle against the oppressors' improper conduct, oppression and injustice. We should no.t tolerate wrongful oppression. Oh, thou the people with the burning pain of thine heart burn the heart of the oppressive, high-handed oppressor.\n\nLet all wrongs, all high-handedness, all oppressions, all tyrannies be burnt in the flame.\"\n\nIt seems to me that the learned Judge~ of the High Court took this writing too seriously. It did not &serve that consideration. It is some kind of patch-up work, with no consistency or cohesion between its different parts. Portions of it are unmeaning nonsense and in other parts it .talks of revolution in the abstract.\n\nThere is no appeal to anybody in particular or for any known or specific cause. No mention is made of any specific kind of oppression or injustice that is intended to be remedied. The desire is to change the face of the earth by ending a!J oppression, tyranny and injustice. There is no evidence whatsoever for connecting this pamphlet with any agitation or movement at the time it was written in tl1at locality.\n\nI have read the writing several times anc\\ I tl ink that Mr. Ghosh is\n\n• ' . -\n\n- __.\n\n• )\n\nright wll; n 4e s; iys tha, t the: paµiphkt contains merely li~ empty slogans, carrying no particular 111eaning except '[he Siqte. of some amount of figurative expression or language \\Jor- Bihar rowed at ranqom from various authors with a touch v. of poetic flourish about it.\n\nWritings of this c:; haracter Shaila, bCifa 1)evi. at the present moment an\\} in he present back- Ajaai4~ /. ground of our country neither excite nor have he\n\ntendency to excite any person from among the clss which is likely to reaCl a pamphlet of this naf:1Ire, They wjll necessarily be equated, people.\n\nSuch writings leave their reac:lers cold and nobody takes them seriously.\n\nPeople lal.:Jgh and scoff at such stuff as they have become too famili<1r with it and such writings have lost all sting.\n\nAny non descript person who prom_ises tq chaJ1ge the ord<; r of things by bloody\n\nrevolution and assumes the role of a new Messiah is\n\nerely the' li!4ghingcstock of hi& readers and creats an a, dverse impressio!l against hiµiself, rather than succeeq in stirring up any excitement in the minds of the readers.\n\nRhetoric of this kinq might in conceivable cin; ui; ns.van1=es inflame passions as, for example, if :i.ddressed tq an: excited mob, but if such exceptional circumstan:ces exist it was for the State Govemment to establish the fact. In the absence of y s4ch pnmf we must assume that the pamphlet would be rea~ by educateci persons in the quietness of\n\nheir hotµes or in other places where the atmosphere\n\ni~ normal.. wo4ld therefore hold, in the words of my bg)tlier Bose in 8hagwati Charan Shukla v. Government of C~ P. & J3.erar(1), that though the pamphlet in question uses extravagant language and there is in it the usual crude emotional appeal which is the stock-in-trade of the demagogue as well as a blundering and ineffective attempt to ape the poets, that is all, and there is nothing n:mre in it. The time is long past when writings qf tpis kind can in normal circumstances excite people t() cotn1Uit crimes of violence or murder or tend to ex\\:ite ;µiypody to commit acts of violence. Again, the lap.uage employed is full of mysticism and (D I.L.R~ 1946 Nag. 865. 86\n\n7-7 S.C.T.171\n\n1952 - The State of Bihar v.\n\nS/Jailabala Devi.\n\nMahajan f,\n\ncannot be easily understood and it creates no impression of any kind on any person.\n\nIn order to determine whether a particular document falls within the ambit of any of the clauses of section 4 ( 1), the writing has to be considered as a whole and in a fair and free and liberal spirit, not dwelling too much upon isolated passages or upon a strong word here and there, and an endeavour should be made to gather the general effect which the whole composition would have on the mind of the public. Expressions which are the stock-in-trade of political demagogues and have no tendency to excite anybody, and exaggerations in language cannot lead to that result.\n\nThe learned Government Advocate placed reliance on the decision of Harries C. J. in Badri Narain v. Chief Secretary, Bihar Government(').\n\nThe learned Chief Justice therein held that in order to show that certain words fall under section 4(1)(a) it is not necessary to show that the words tend to incite or to encourage the commission of a particular offence or offences and that it is sufficient if they tend to incite to or to encourage the commission of cognizable offences of violence in general. In that case, a poem entitled \"Labourers, the mainstay of the world\" began by emphasising that labourers are the mainstay of the present world and then proceeded to describe their unfortunate and pitiful lot.\n\nIn a subsequent portion the author stated that though speechless today, when organized, the labourers will be as powerful as millions and this portion of the poem ended with these words :\n\n\"Why are you helplessly tolerating the exploitation of your masters.\"\n\nThe remaining line.s, were as follows :-\n\n\"Labourers, raise now the cry of revolution. The heavens will tremble, the Universe will shake and the flames of revolution will burst forth from land and water. You who have been the object of exploitation, now dance the fearful dance of destruction on this earth ; truly, labourers, only total destruction , will\n\n(2) A.LR. 1941 Pat. 132.\n\n' )\n\n- .\n\n' '\n\ncreate -a new world order. and that will bring happiness to the whole world.\"\n\nIt is quite clear that here an appeal was made to labourers inciting and encouraging them to commit acts of violence. The words used certainly tended to achieve that result.\n\nThey were no empty slogans or abstract propositions.\n\nIt had one consistent and coherent purpose, i.e., to excite labourers and to bring them into action. Any observation made about this writing can have no apt application for the determination of the present case.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice in the concluding part of the judgment very pertinently pointed out that a commonsense interpretation must be given to the document complained of, the question to be answered always being, what impression will the documents or words give to a man of ordinary commonsense. My answer to this query in the pres, ent case is that the document read at first sight is not intelligible unless it is explained to that man of ordinary commonsense by a learned person and hence it can by itself create no impression of any kind on such a person. After the writing is explained to such a man, he will merely laugh at it and throw it in the waste paper basket without taking it seriously. He will refuse to believe that a person of this kind can create a new world order by appealing to a bloody revolution.\n\nAs I pointed out in my judgment in Harkrishan Singh v. Emperor(1), the use of such words as appear in this document creates no impression on the mind of any reasonable reader.\n\nThat case dealt with clause (d) of section 4(1), but: the principle underlying it also applies to the construction of writings which are alleged to fall under section 4(1)(a). I do not mean to suggest or to lay down as a general proposition that some of .the words used in the pamphlet in question in the context of any other writing would not fall within the mischief of section 4(1)(a). Certain parts of the pamphlet, if read as isolated passages, may have the tendency to excite people to commit (I) A.LR. 1946 Lah. 22.\n\nThe State f\n\nBihar\n\nv.\n\nShailabala Devi.\n\nMahajan f.\n\n195~\n\nThe $we of Bi bar\n\nShail~a/a l)evi.\n\nSQP~EME COURT REPORTS [1%2]\n\ncrimllll of violnc, but that is not the effect if the pamphlet is read in its entirety.\n\nThe result is th?t I would dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances would make no order as to costs.\n\nThe State Government has succeeded in its contention that section 4(1) (a) of the Act is constitutional and that ws the real ground on which it came to this Q:!urt.\n\n)?P,.T,\\NJAL!\n\nSAsTR! <;::. J.=l ; igree with \\he judgment rnst deli'v\"ecl gy µiy \\earnei:\\ brother Mahajan J, ancl jiav~ not44lg to add.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-I . concur in the jud11ment delivered by my learned brother Mahajan J. and I wpulcl like to say a few words, regarding the publication itself which led to the demand of security by th~ Government under th~ provision of the Indian Press (Emergency) Act.\n\nTl}, point thi!t fNWrs qmsideration is, whether the wqrds contained in th, impugned publication are of th~ natur~ c!esgribed jµ section 4(1) (a) of the Act; qr in other wprds whether they incite to or encourage or tend to incite to or to encourage the commission of any pffence of murder or any cognizable offence involving violence.\n\nIt is well settled that to arrive at a decision on this point, the writing is to be looked at as ; i whole: without laying stress on isolated passages or particular expresions used here and there, and that the court should take into consideration what effect the writing is likely to produce on . the m'ind; of the readers for whom the pµbljcation is intended. Account shoqld alsl) be taken of the place, circumstances and occasion of the publication, as a clear appreciation of the background in which the words are used is of very great assistance in enabling the court to view them in t)ipir proper perspective. ·\n\nTh~ )eaRet in question 1s entitled \"Sangam\" or\n\n,_ -\n\n'\\ • '\n\n5trµggle. It is written in high-flown Bengali prose v with ll!rge mixture of poetic expressions borrowed at random from the writings of some welloknown\n\npoets of Bengal.\n\nThe object of the writing as far as could be gathered from the document is tq give a poetic or idealistic picture of what is meant and eonnotated by \"struggle\" or revolution. The aim and end of \"struggle\", as stated in the leaflet, is to wipe out ''oppression\", injustice or wrong\" which is \"pervading all over the world from the past to the future\"; and it is only after all wrongs, injustice and oppression have\n\nperiilied that a new world could be built up.\n\nThis seems to be the main or central theme of the composition, clothed, though it is, under much incoherent talk and seemingly meaningless utterances.\n\nThere is no indication throughout the writings as to what kind of oppression, injustice or wrong the author had in mind. Far from referring , to grievances of any specific character, the writer does not even hint at such general causes of discontent as political inequality, economic exploitation or class warfare which are the subject-matter of agitation in many parts of the world. The leaflet does not give indication also of any unpopular measure or act of injustice affecting the minds of the people in the particular area where it was published and within which it was intended to be circulated. In or.e part of the document the following words are found to occur :\n\n\"If mother be true, let no disgrace spread in the name of the mother. If mother tongue be equal to mother, then the said language is your most revered goddess. Do not allow disgrace to spread in her name\".\n\nIt is not the case of the Government and there is no statement or affidavit to that effect, that the passages here have any reference to the language controversy which agitated and probably is still agitating this particular district. In another part of the document the expression \"narrow parochial politics\" has been used, but here again the Government has not made any attempt to explain, what .this expression could, in the particular context, mean or refer to. As no acts of injustice or oppression are actually mentioned in the document, it: is difficult to say who the \"oppressors\" a.re, whose \"proud heads\" the author asks his\n\nLast.\n\n1'/it Stou of\n\nBiltu\n\n•• S/J11illlbolt1 Dni.\n\nThe State 'of\n\nBihar\n\n.v.\n\nShailabala Devi.\n\nreaders to break. It is quite clear that the \"oppressor\" mentioned here is neither the Government nor the party in power, nor has it any relation to any particular class or persons or a sect or community which might be harassing others and trampling upon their rights. Ii may be, that to attract the operation of section 4(1)(a) of the Indian Press Act, the incitement to murder or violence need not be specifically directed against particular individuals or class of persons ; but when the whole talk is about injustice or operation in the abstract, which is stated by the author to be in existence from , the beginning of time and when in hyperbolic language a hope is expressed of establishing a better and a cleaner world through struggle, sweet and blood, the words used may not improperly be looked upon as an effusion of poetic fancy which, having no relation to actual facts can have very little potency for doing mischief. I will now proceed to examine the contents of the pamphlet in derail. ·\n\nThe writer begins in an affected poetic vein and describes, in language, to which it is difficult to attach any rational meaning, what \"struggle\" or revolution is. The \"struggle\" which is personified in the article introduces itself in the following manner :\n\n\"I am not wealth, nor popular strength, not the people nor fame ; ... I am not joy nor a brag, nor the timid look of the beloved's eyes .... I am not mother's affection, nor sister's love\".\n\nIf these words convey any sense, they can only mean that the struggle or revolution which the writer wants to depict is something different from what we ordinarily associate with our social life and happiness ; it is a negation of all natural human feelings and senti- .ments. The next paragraph says in equal enigmatical language what \"Sangram\" or \"struggle\" actually is. \"I\n\nam old antiquated history\" thus the article proceeds ; \"I am time eternal, I am the future, the present and the past, in my heart is written the story of the past, the problems of the present and the voice of the\n\nfuture\".\n\nI do not know whether this is a poetic way of depicting the entire life process which is said to lie through struggle and guide our evolution in this planet.\n\nStruggle, according to the author, is coeval with time and eternity.\n\nIn the next paragraph the writer passes on to say with many repetitions of the word \"wrong\" that \"it\n\nis wrong which is pervading all over from the past to the future\", and it is this wrong that is to be righted by the struggle. The struggle here is likened for reasons best known to the author to a piece of torn grass in the middle stream of a turbulent river, and to a grain of dust thrown in the face of a cyclone. \"It is dishonour, unhappiness, endless pain .. \" It is again likened sue- . cessively to the frown of the beloved, to famine, storm and evil days. The call is sent to everybody to come on \"where the sky is cracking and the endless rough and thorny path is shrouded in darkness\" and assist in building up a new world.\n\nMany of the expressions used here are taken verbatim from the writings of some well-known Bengalee authors, though they sound nothing but a rigmarole in the present context.\n\nThe next paragraph begins with the word \"revolution\".\n\nStruggle is revolution and through struggle and revolution the world is to be built anew. It is then said that \"death is my darling and death is the only truth in this world\". If one has to die, there is no sense in dying of illness. Let a man choose an honourable death by standing against oppressors.\n\nQuite abruptly the author brings in the name of Sri Subhas\n\nChandra Bose in the midst of this talk and asks his readers to listen \"far far away across the hills, across the jungle, across the rivers and rivulets the call of Subhas Chandra Bose, the greatest revolutionary leader of the world\". The people are asked not to stop until the objective is attained. A.gain it is said \"I am struggle, I am revolution .... I am a Hindu, I am a Mussalman, I am a Christian, I am a Jew, I am a Keduin, I am severed from all religions by the fruits of my action in previous births\".\n\nWithout the least attention to any sequence of thought, immediately\n\n'The State of Bihar v.\n\nShailabala Devi,\n\nMukherjea /.\n\n\"f he State of\n\nBihar\n\nShailabala Devi.\n\nMukherj•a /.\n\nafrer this, the imaginary pppressor is addressed by the author as follows :\n\n\"Oh you foolish oppressor you want to terrify with your red eyes, I fear not.\"\n\nThe author, or rather the personified \"struggle\" which purports to speak, then repeats the well-known words of poet Tagore and says 'that he does not seek salvation through renunciation ; he wants that salvation which lies in joy amidst innumerable dangers and dijliculties. The idea of finding joy in all that is hated, avoided and dreaded in this world is elaborated in the passages that follow. \"Death\" it is said \"is my secret love, poison is my drink, the flames of fire are y sweet breeze, the cry of childless mothers a tune m my flute and the weeping of widows a rythm of my song\".\n\nIn this vein the author goes on conjuring up all the uncanny and weird things in the world and associating them with struggle. \"I am not joy, I am the remnant of the dying cfies ......... I am the bloodthirsty goddess Kali who lives and moves about in the cremation ground. I want blood .......... Break the proud head of the oppressor.\n\nI bathe in flames ............ Thunder is my kiss of affection .......... I do not understand myself.\n\nI do not know myself.\n\nI do not recognise myself, still I want revolution, still I want struggle\". T!ie learned Judges of the High Court laid very great stress on these passages which in their opinion constitute a direct incitement to bloody revolution ; and that is also the line of argument adopted l:Jy Mr. Mitter who appeared before us on behalf of the State. It has been argued by Mr. Ghosh appearing for the respondent that the \"struggle\" which the author has depicted and which he aims at is a non-violent struggle and the blood that is to be shed is the blood of those who are called l!pon to resist oppression and miustice.\n\nOn the other hand, it is argued on behalf of the State that the passages quoted above can only mean th:i.t it is a bloody and violent revolution which could carry men to their desired end. In my opinion, neither of these contentions furnish to us the proper I)lethod ~£ approach to the question which requires\n\n,._\n\nS.CJL\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\ndecision in the present case. We would have to look at the article as a whole find focus our attention on what can be regarded to be its central theme or purpose.\n\nAs has been said already, what the writer wants is to draw an ideal picture of \"struggle\" o:r revolution quite unconnected with any particular place, or any particular political or social environment.\n\nInjustice or oppression exists, according to the author, from the very dawn of time and so also does struggle or revolution.\n\nIt is an integral part of the world process and is a sort of irrational or blind impulse.\n\nThis is expressed by saying \"I do not understand myself, I do not recognise myself, still I want revolution\". In painting death or war, the artist would naturally choose some uncanny associations.\n\nThe .trappings of revolution, as the author paints it, are all the fearful and hideous things in this world. It is linked up with thunder and storm, fire and devastation, cataclysm, famine, danger, destruction and death.\n\nIt is immaterial so far as this ideal picture is concerned whether the blood that is spoken of is the blood of the oppressor or of the oppressed, and whether the struggle is violent or pacific. The goddess Kali in the Hindu mythology is the goddess of destruction and death, but she is the benign goddess also whose protecting hands ward off all oppressions, danger and calamity. That is the reason why revolution or struggle is assimilated to this goddess.\n\nIt cannot be denied that in painting this picture of \"struggle\" or revolution the author has used very strong words ; but they would not be unnatural if it is only an ideal picture that the author really desired to paint. If however, it can be shown that under the cloud of these general enigmatical words something concrete and tangible lies hidden, that the \"oppression\" and \"oppressor\" are not imaginary abstractions but are real things not unknown to the people to whom the article is addressed' and there is in fact a grievance agitating the popular mind, no matter whether it is well or ill founded, against which the author desires to inflame public opinion; then even though he uses veiled or covert language, there\n\nTire Statt! •f\n\nBihllr\n\nSkm'lahala Detli.\n\nM111(/1erjea f,\n\n:1952\n\n.The State of Bihar v.\n\nShailabala Devi.\n\n. Muk.herjea J. ., .\n\ncan be no doubt that the article would come within the purview of section 4( 1) (a) of the Indian Press Act.\n\nBut the difficulty is that the Government has not made any attempt to establish any of these facts.\n\nWithout knowing the attendant circumstances and the actual background of the publication, it is not possible for us to ascertain the real intention that lies behind the writing ; and absolutely no materials have been placed before us by the Government which might enable us to find out what in reality was the substance behind this camouflage of words, if camouflage it actually is.\n\nThe rest of the article proceeds in the same hyperbolic and enigmatical style. There is repetition atl nauseam of the same stock phrases and expressions.\n\nIt goes on to say \"I am the messenger of death. I am untouchable, I am vague, I am queer, I am nightmare,\n\nI am robber, I am enemy, I am unknown, I am not Falgoon with its sweet smelling flowers ; I am eternal separation, I am restlessness\".\n\nI am extremely doubtful whether expressions like these would not, to an ordinary reader, appear to be anything better than 'the ravings of a mad man. I will cull a few more expressions which occur subsequently and which fortify this impression.\n\n\"I see struggle on my darling's struggle in the honey of flowers ... I am Deepak Ragini ... I am misfortune. distress, I am jealousy, I am evil days.\"\n\nface, I see storm, I am the I am cry of\n\nThe concluding portion of the article follows: reads as\n\n\"Let me speak the last word : If you are true, if you are gift of God, if you are not a bastard ... then come forward with a fearless heart, struggle against the oppressor's improper conduct, oppression and injustice. We shall not tolerate wrongful oppression.\n\nOh, the people, with the pain of your heart-burn, the heart of the oppressive high-handed oppressor, let all wrongs, all high-handedness, all oppressions, all tyrannies be burnt in the flame.\"\n\n' -\n\n....\n\nThere was a good deal of discussion before us as to whether these passages hint at a violent or a nonviolent struggle. It may be capable of either interpretation, but as I have said already, that by itself would not afford a decisive solution of the question before us.\n\nIt is also not much material .to consider whether the author wants that \"jealousy and malice\" which he has referred to at the end of the article, are to develop and spread or they are to be transformed into innocuous and sweet smelling flowers.\n\nThis is certainly a matter upon which difference of opinion is possible. After all, we are to see what impression the article read as a whole would produce upon ordinary people. An ordinary reader is not expected to seek the assistance of an interpreter. in trying to find out the true meaning of the words used.\n\nAs has been said already, many of the expressions used here have been taken verbatim from the writings of certain noted Bengalee authors.\n\nThey are stock phrases current in Bengal and amongst the Bengali speaking community elsewhere.\n\nIf it strikes the reader that what the author wanted was to pass himself off as a noted writer by sheer plagiarism, then whatever else may be said about the article, it certainly does not come within the purview of section 4(1) (a) of the Press Act. Taking the article as it is, it is nothing but a tissue of high sounding and meaningless words and whether the author wanted to imitate some of the well-known poets of Bengal in attempting to give a poetic description of \"struggle\" or revolution or wanted to give himself the pose of a liberator of mankind, out to wipe out the last vestiges of oppression and injustice from the face of the earth, no rational person would take him seriously and would look upon this composition as the vapourings of a deranged brain.\n\nIf, on the other hand, the whole thing is a cleaver ruse resorted to with the object of inflaming the popular mind against certain persons or authorities, and although. only general and vague words are used, the words have their meaning and significance to those\n\n. 1~52\n\n.. The Stateof\n\n' Bihar .. v.\n\nShailabala Devi.\n\n. . Mu.k.hr:riea /.\n\nTlie State of\n\nBihtJr\n\nShailaba/a De11i.\n\nMa1 26.\n\nwho are acquainted with the actual situation, it was incumbent upon the Government to clear up these matters and present before us the background and the context without which no meaning could be attributed to this species of empty verbiage.\n\nAs Government did not discharge the duty that lay upon them, I am clearly of opinion that no security order could be passed against the respondent under the provision of section 4(l)(a) of the Press Emergency Act.\n\nDAs J.-During the course of the arguments I entertained some doubt as to the innocence of the meaning and implication of the pamphlet in question, but, in the light of the judgments of my learned brothers Mahajan. J. and Mukherjea J., which I have had the advantage of perusing since, I do not fee) that I would be justified in dissenting from the construction they have put upon the language used in the pamphlet.\n\nI accordingly concur in their conclusion.\n\nBosE J.-1 agree with my brothers Mahajan and Mukherjea.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nti.\n\nPURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ.]\n\nPreventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), s. 3-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 166--0rder of deteotion-Form of order-Order stating that Government is satisfied-Not stating exf\"essl'f that it is issued in the name of the Governor'-Valid£ty-Proof by other evidence-Valt1e of Secretary's evidence-Form of verification.\n\nThe tnatetial , portio~ of an order of detention made under s, 3 of. the: Ptevo11ti.e Detention Act, 1950, ran as fol!bws:\n\n, -.\n\n- .. .", "total_entities": 133, "entities": [{"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. P. Lall", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 947, "end_char": 957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : C. P. Lall."}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1003, "end_char": 1021, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAILABALA DEVI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1023, "end_char": 1038, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Shailabala 'FJeui", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1052, "end_char": 1063, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1079, "end_char": 1086, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mahajan T.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1088, "end_char": 1097, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BosE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1107, "end_char": 1116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1172, "end_char": 1176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1185, "end_char": 1206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1) and 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1207, "end_char": 1228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1253, "end_char": 1263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1320, "end_char": 1327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1344, "end_char": 1348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1426, "end_char": 1435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Romesh Thapar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1770, "end_char": 1783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Romesh Thapar's case ( [1950]\n\nS.C.R. 594]) and Brij Bhushan's case ( [1950] S.C.R. 605) do not 1952 lay down any wide proposition that restrictions of the nature imposed by s. 4 (1) (a) are outside the scope of Art 19 (2) as 'fhe fate of they are conceived generally in the interests of public order.", "canonical_name": "Romesh Thapar"}}, {"text": "Brij Bhushan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1818, "end_char": 1830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Romesh Thapar's case ( [1950]\n\nS.C.R. 594]) and Brij Bhushan's case ( [1950] S.C.R. 605) do not 1952 lay down any wide proposition that restrictions of the nature imposed by s. 4 (1) (a) are outside the scope of Art 19 (2) as 'fhe fate of they are conceived generally in the interests of public order."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1982, "end_char": 1988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2113, "end_char": 2120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shatlabala Devi~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2212, "end_char": 2228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion (First Amendment) Act which is retrospective in operation Shatlabala Devi~ makes the matter clear.", "canonical_name": "Shailabala 'FJeui"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2332, "end_char": 2336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 132(1) and 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3064, "end_char": 3090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3098, "end_char": 3119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3181, "end_char": 3214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 13th October, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Shearer, Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Shearer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3216, "end_char": 3223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 13th October, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Shearer, Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3225, "end_char": 3234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 13th October, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Shearer, Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prosad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3239, "end_char": 3252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 13th October, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Shearer, Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prosad"}}, {"text": "S. K.. Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3307, "end_char": 3319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K.. Mitra (K. Dayal, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3321, "end_char": 3329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K.. Mitra (K. Dayal, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Basant Chandra Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3362, "end_char": 3382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basant Chandra Ghosh and Arun Chandra Mitra for .,...", "canonical_name": "Basant Chandra Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Arun Chandra Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3387, "end_char": 3405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basant Chandra Ghosh and Arun Chandra Mitra for .,..."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3490, "end_char": 3497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court delivered judgment as follows:-\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This appeal has been preferred by the State of Bihar against the judgment of a Special Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna allowing the application of the respondent under section 23 of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, XXIII of 1931.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan T."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3539, "end_char": 3553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court delivered judgment as follows:-\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This appeal has been preferred by the State of Bihar against the judgment of a Special Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna allowing the application of the respondent under section 23 of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, XXIII of 1931."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3684, "end_char": 3694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3838, "end_char": 3849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3979, "end_char": 3994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A pamphlet under\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nShailabala Devi."}}, {"text": "Shailabala Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3996, "end_char": 4011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A pamphlet under\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nShailabala Devi.", "canonical_name": "Shailabala 'FJeui"}}, {"text": "Mahajan T.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4014, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan T.\n\nthe heading \"Sangram\" was printed at the said press and is alleged to have been circulated in the town of Purulia in the district of Manbhum.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan T."}}, {"text": "Purulia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4132, "end_char": 4139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan T.\n\nthe heading \"Sangram\" was printed at the said press and is alleged to have been circulated in the town of Purulia in the district of Manbhum."}}, {"text": "Manbhum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4159, "end_char": 4166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan T.\n\nthe heading \"Sangram\" was printed at the said press and is alleged to have been circulated in the town of Purulia in the district of Manbhum."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4173, "end_char": 4192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Bihar considered that the pamphlet contained objectionable matter of the nature described under section 4(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act and required the press to furnish security in the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4283, "end_char": 4295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4413, "end_char": 4425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4444, "end_char": 4464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000, under section 3(3) of the Act by the 19th September, 1949."}}, {"text": "26th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th September, 1949, the respondent applied to the High Court under section 23 for setting aside the above order."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Several objections were raised to the validity of the order passed by the Bihar Government but it is unnecessary to mention all of them."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5056, "end_char": 5065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5110, "end_char": 5119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5158, "end_char": 5168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5559, "end_char": 5568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Shearer, however, held that the pamphlet was a seditious libel and that there was nothing in the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above which compelled the court to hold the provisions of section 4 (1) (a) of the Act to be void."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5858, "end_char": 5867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBilt11r", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6169, "end_char": 6186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"\"'\n\nT.ie State of\n\nBilt11r\n\nand Ramaswami JJ.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBilt11r"}}, {"text": "and Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6188, "end_char": 6201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"\"'\n\nT.ie State of\n\nBilt11r\n\nand Ramaswami JJ."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6328, "end_char": 6340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prosaj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6398, "end_char": 6411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Towards the concluding part of his judgment Sarjoo Prosaj J. observed as follows:- Sluil11bala Devi. \"", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prosad"}}, {"text": "Sluil11bala Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6437, "end_char": 6453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Towards the concluding part of his judgment Sarjoo Prosaj J. observed as follows:- Sluil11bala Devi. \""}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6954, "end_char": 6964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7917, "end_char": 7931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8125, "end_char": 8137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Alllhaian", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8323, "end_char": 8332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3(3) of the Act under which the notice was issued in the present case enacts as follows :\n\n\"Whenever it appears to the Provincial Government that any printing press is used for the purpose\n\nAlllhaian J.\n\n1952 of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or The State o1 other document containing any words, signs or visible Bihar representation of the nature described in section 4, v. sub-section (1), the Provincial Government may, by Shailabala 'FJeui: notice in writing to the keeper of the press .... order\n\nMahaian f.' the keeper to deposit with the Magistrate security ... \"\n\nClause (a) of section 4 ( 1) deals with words or signs or visible representations which incite to or encourage, or tend to incite to or encourage the commission of any offence of murder or any cognizable offence involving violence."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8506, "end_char": 8515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shailabala 'FJeui", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8571, "end_char": 8588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3(3) of the Act under which the notice was issued in the present case enacts as follows :\n\n\"Whenever it appears to the Provincial Government that any printing press is used for the purpose\n\nAlllhaian J.\n\n1952 of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or The State o1 other document containing any words, signs or visible Bihar representation of the nature described in section 4, v. sub-section (1), the Provincial Government may, by Shailabala 'FJeui: notice in writing to the keeper of the press .... order\n\nMahaian f.' the keeper to deposit with the Magistrate security ... \"\n\nClause (a) of section 4 ( 1) deals with words or signs or visible representations which incite to or encourage, or tend to incite to or encourage the commission of any offence of murder or any cognizable offence involving violence.", "canonical_name": "Shailabala 'FJeui"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8731, "end_char": 8740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9218, "end_char": 9231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ramesh Thapar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9314, "end_char": 9327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I cannot help observing that the decisions of this Court in Ramesh Thapar's case('), and in Brij Bhushan's case(') have been more than once misapplied and misunderstood and have been construed as laying down the wide proposition that restrictions of the nature imposed by section 4(1) (a) of the Indian Press\n\n(Emergency Powers) Act or of similar character are outside the scope of article 19(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as they are conceived generally in the interests of public order.", "canonical_name": "Romesh Thapar"}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9526, "end_char": 9538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9636, "end_char": 9649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Pro", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9746, "end_char": 9756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Pro sad J. also seems to have fallen into the same error.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prosad"}}, {"text": "Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9893, "end_char": 9931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9977, "end_char": 9986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act", "statute": "Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11040, "end_char": 11055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11392, "end_char": 11401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11528, "end_char": 11540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11962, "end_char": 11972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 9(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12111, "end_char": 12125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12399, "end_char": 12411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12627, "end_char": 12640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13355, "end_char": 13368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Basant Chander Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13528, "end_char": 13548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Basant Chander Ghosh contended that the amendment made in article 19(2) of the Constitution with retrospective operation was repugnant to article 20 of the Constitution inasmuch as it declared a certain act an offence which was not an offence at the time when the act was committed.", "canonical_name": "Basant Chandra Ghosh"}}, {"text": "article 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13586, "end_char": 13599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13666, "end_char": 13676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13902, "end_char": 13917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14171, "end_char": 14184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14374, "end_char": 14387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14755, "end_char": 14770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15046, "end_char": 15058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15458, "end_char": 15467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16638, "end_char": 16642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am the bloodthirsty goddess Kali who lives and moves about in the cremation ground."}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16802, "end_char": 16807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Plague or famine is my great joy ...... I am thirsty, I want blood, I want revolution,\n\n6-7 S.C.l./71\n\nT lu State •l\n\nBihar v.\n\nShailabala Devi."}}, {"text": "Shailabala Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16822, "end_char": 16837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Plague or famine is my great joy ...... I am thirsty, I want blood, I want revolution,\n\n6-7 S.C.l./71\n\nT lu State •l\n\nBihar v.\n\nShailabala Devi.", "canonical_name": "Shailabala 'FJeui"}}, {"text": "Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19010, "end_char": 19015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have read the writing several times anc\\ I tl ink that Mr. Ghosh is\n\n• ' . -"}}, {"text": "s4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20384, "end_char": 20386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21472, "end_char": 21481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22016, "end_char": 22023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Government Advocate placed reliance on the decision of Harries C. J. in Badri Narain v. Chief Secretary, Bihar Government(')."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22179, "end_char": 22194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24875, "end_char": 24887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24999, "end_char": 25014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25212, "end_char": 25227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State f\n\nBihar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25368, "end_char": 25382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State f\n\nBihar\n\nv.\n\nShailabala Devi.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBilt11r"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25406, "end_char": 25413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan f.\n\n195~\n\nThe $we of Bi bar\n\nShail~a/a l)evi.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan T."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25742, "end_char": 25754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25950, "end_char": 25957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.=l ; igree with \\he judgment rnst deli'v\"ecl gy µiy \\earnei:\\ brother Mahajan J, ancl jiav~ not44lg to add.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan T."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26384, "end_char": 26396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27309, "end_char": 27315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is written in high-flown Bengali prose v with ll!rge mixture of poetic expressions borrowed at random from the writings of some welloknown\n\npoets of Bengal."}}, {"text": "State 'of\n\nBihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29629, "end_char": 29645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State 'of\n\nBihar\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBilt11r"}}, {"text": "section 4(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29983, "end_char": 29998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subhas\n\nChandra Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33279, "end_char": 33299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Quite abruptly the author brings in the name of Sri Subhas\n\nChandra Bose in the midst of this talk and asks his readers to listen \"far far away across the hills, across the jungle, across the rivers and rivulets the call of Subhas Chandra Bose, the greatest revolutionary leader of the world\".", "canonical_name": "Subhas\n\nChandra Bose"}}, {"text": "Subhas Chandra Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33451, "end_char": 33470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Quite abruptly the author brings in the name of Sri Subhas\n\nChandra Bose in the midst of this talk and asks his readers to listen \"far far away across the hills, across the jungle, across the rivers and rivulets the call of Subhas Chandra Bose, the greatest revolutionary leader of the world\".", "canonical_name": "Subhas\n\nChandra Bose"}}, {"text": "Tagore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34253, "end_char": 34259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The author, or rather the personified \"struggle\" which purports to speak, then repeats the well-known words of poet Tagore and says 'that he does not seek salvation through renunciation ; he wants that salvation which lies in joy amidst innumerable dangers and dijliculties."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35479, "end_char": 35485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T!ie learned Judges of the High Court laid very great stress on these passages which in their opinion constitute a direct incitement to bloody revolution ; and that is also the line of argument adopted l:Jy Mr. Mitter who appeared before us on behalf of the State."}}, {"text": "section 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38533, "end_char": 38546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deepak Ragini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39780, "end_char": 39793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"I see struggle on my darling's struggle in the honey of flowers ... I am Deepak Ragini ... I am misfortune."}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41704, "end_char": 41716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43064, "end_char": 43079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43330, "end_char": 43339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. and Mukherjea J., which I have had the advantage of perusing since, I do not fee) that I would be justified in dissenting from the construction they have put upon the language used in the pamphlet.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43601, "end_char": 43608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BosE J.-1 agree with my brothers Mahajan and Mukherjea.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan T."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43613, "end_char": 43622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BosE J.-1 agree with my brothers Mahajan and Mukherjea.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 43671, "end_char": 43683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 43712, "end_char": 43728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43735, "end_char": 43750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nti."}}, {"text": "PURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43757, "end_char": 43777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43780, "end_char": 43796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43804, "end_char": 43823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43855, "end_char": 43879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43894, "end_char": 43898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43899, "end_char": 43920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43928, "end_char": 43936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44257, "end_char": 44276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_674_682_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Tlie State of\n\nBihtJr\n\nShailaba/a De11i.\n\nMa1 26.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nwho are acquainted with the actual situation, it was incumbent upon the Government to clear up these matters and present before us the background and the context without which no meaning could be attributed to this species of empty verbiage.\n\nAs Government did not discharge the duty that lay upon them, I am clearly of opinion that no security order could be passed against the respondent under the provision of section 4(l)(a) of the Press Emergency Act.\n\nDAs J.-During the course of the arguments I entertained some doubt as to the innocence of the meaning and implication of the pamphlet in question, but, in the light of the judgments of my learned brothers Mahajan. J. and Mukherjea J., which I have had the advantage of perusing since, I do not fee) that I would be justified in dissenting from the construction they have put upon the language used in the pamphlet.\n\nI accordingly concur in their conclusion.\n\nBosE J.-1 agree with my brothers Mahajan and Mukherjea.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nti.\n\nPURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ.]\n\nPreventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), s. 3-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 166--0rder of deteotion-Form of order-Order stating that Government is satisfied-Not stating exf\"essl'f that it is issued in the name of the Governor'-Valid£ty-Proof by other evidence-Valt1e of Secretary's evidence-Form of verification.\n\nThe tnatetial , portio~ of an order of detention made under s, 3 of. the: Ptevo11ti.e Detention Act, 1950, ran as fol!bws:\n\n, -.\n\n- .. .\n\n- .... ,\n\n' l\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Bombay is satisfied with respect to the person known as J. N. . ..... that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the min tenance of public order it is necessary to make the followmg order : Now, therefore,. ....... the Government of Bombay is pleased to direct that the said J. N. be detained.\n\nBy order of the Governor of Bombay\n\n(Sd.) V. T. D.\n\nSecretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department\".\n\nThe High Court of Bombay held that the order was defective as it was not \"expressed to be in the name of the Governor\" within the meaning of Art. 166 (1) and was not accordingly protected by Art. 166 (2) :\n\nHeld, that the order was not defective merely because it stated that the Government of Bombay was satisfied and that the Government of Bombay was pleased to direct that J. N. be detained, and, though the addition of the words \"and in his name\" to the words \"By order of the Governor of Bombay\" would have placed the matter beyond controversy, the order was really one expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor of Bombay within Art. 166.\n\nHeld further, that, assuming that the order was defective it was open to the State Government to prove by other means that such an order has been validly made.\n\nIt is not absolutely necessary in evety case to call the Minister in charge ; if the Secretary or any other person has the requisite means of knowledge and his affidavit is believed, that will ht: enough.\n\nVerification should invariably be modelled .on the lines of\n\n0. XIX, r. 3, of the Civil Procedure Code, whether the Code applied in terms or not, and when the matter deposed to is not based on personal knowledge the sources of information must be clearly disclosed.\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Case No. 30 of 1950.\n\nAppeal under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 24th October, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Vyas JJ.) m Criminal Application No. 1003 of 1950.\n\nC. Setalvad (Attorney-General for India) and C. K. Daphtary (Solicitor-General for India) with G. N.\n\nJoshi for the apellant.\n\nRespondent ex parte.\n\nThi: Stat1: uf\n\nBombay\n\nPurushottam Jog Naik.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nPurushottam fog Naik.\n\nBose/.\n\n1952.\n\nMay 26.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by BoSE J.-This is an appeal from an order of the Bombay High Court directing the release of the respondent who had been detained under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General states at the outset that Government does not want to re-arrest the respondent but merely desires to test the High Court's decision on certain points which will have far-reaching effects on preventive detentions in the State of Bombay. Following the precedent of their Lordships of the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Vimlabat Deshpande(') we proceed to decide the appeal but direct that the respondent shall not in any event be re-arrested in respect of the matters to which the appeal relates.\n\nThe respondent was originally arrested under an order of the District Magistrate, Belgaum, dated the 26th February, 1950, though he was then beyond the jurisdiction of that authority. On the 11th of July, 1950, the Bombay High Court held that a detention of that kind was invalid. The decision was given in the case of In re Ghate(2). This necessitated a review of 57 cases, among them the respondent's. Orders were passed in all those cases on the 17th of July,\n\n1950. About 52 of the detenus were released and in the remaining cases fresh orders of detention were passed by the Government of Bombay.\n\nIn the respondent's case the order was in these .terms:\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Bombay is satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Purushottam Jog Naik of Ulga Village, Taluka Karwar, District Kanara, that with a view to preventing him from acting iri a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is ncessary to make the following order: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Preventive\n\n(1) I.L.R. 1946 Nag. 651 at 655.\n\n(2) (1950) 52 Born. L.R. 711..\n\n.. _ ._../,,\n\nS.C.R.1\n\nDetention Act, 1950 (No. IV of 1950), the Government of Bombay is pleased to direct that the said Shri Purushottam Jog Naik be detained.\n\nBy order of the Governor of Bombay,\n\nSd/-V. T. Dehejia, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department.\n\nDated at Bombay Castle, this 17th day of July, 1950.\" He was served with the grounds of detention on the 26th of July, 1950, and with a fuller set on the 9th of August. The original grounds were as follows :\n\n\"In furtherance of your campaign for non-payment of rent, you were instigating the people in the Belgaum District to commit acts of violence against landlords.\n\nIn all probability, you will continue to do so.\" The second set gave the following additional particulars :\n\n\"The people in Belgaum District, whom you were instigating to commit acts of violence against landlords in furtherance of your campaign for non-payment of rent, were the tenants in Hadalge and round about villages in the Khanapur Taluka of Belgaum District, and the said instigation was carried on by you for some months till your arrest in April, 1949.\"\n\nOn the 24th of August, 1950, the respondent applied to the Bombay High Court under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code for an order of release. He succeeded, and the appeal is against that order.\n\nThe first ground on which the learned High Court Judges proceeded was that the detention order of the 17th July was defective as it was not expressed in proper legal form. The basis of their reasoning is this.\n\nArdcle 166(1) of the Constitution requires that- \"All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.\"\n\nIt will be seen that the order of detention states m the preamble.\n\nThe Statr:of\n\nBombay\n\nPurushottam Jog Naik.\n\n.Bose/.\n\nT ht Staie of\n\nBombay\n\nPurushottam\n\nfog Nail(.\n\nBose/.\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Bombay is satisfied ... \" and the operative part of the otder runs~\n\n\"Now, therefore. . . . . . . . the Government of Bombay is pleased to direct etc.\"\n\nIt does not say that the Governor of Bombay is pleased to direct.\n\nThe learned Judges held that this is not an order expressed to be made in the name of the Governor and accordingly is not protected by clause (2) of article 166. They conceded that the State could prove by other tneans that a valid order had been passed by the proper authority, but they held that the writing, (Record No. 3), which purports to embody the order, cannot be used to prove that a valid order was made because the formula set out in article 166(1) was not employed. We are unable to agree.\n\nNow we do not wish to encourage laxity of expression, nor do we mean to suggest that ingenious experiments regarding the permissible limits of departure from the language of a Statute or of the Constitution will be worthwhile, but when all is said and done we lnust look to the substance of article 166 and of the Order.\n\nThe short answer in this case is that the order under consideration is \"expressed\" to be made in the name of the Governor because it says \"By order of the Governor,\" One of the meanings of \"expressed\" 1s to make known the opinions or the feelings of a particular person and when a Secretary to Government apprehends a man and tells him in the order that this is being done under the orders of the Governor, he is in substance saying that he is acting in the name of the Governor and, on his behalf, is making known to the detenu the opinion and feelings and orders of the Governor.\n\nIn our opinion, the Constitution does not require a magic incantation which can only be expressed in a set formula of words. What we have to see is whether the substance of the requirements is there.\n\nIt has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and therefore had to conform to its tertns.\n\nSection 3 of the Act provides that the State Government may if satisfied,\n\n. ~\n\n.•·\n\n\"make an order directing that such person be detained.\"\n\nIt is true that under section 3[ ( 43a) (a)) of the General Clauses Act the words \"the State Government\" mean the Governor, but if that be so, then the expression must be given the same meaning in the order which merely reproduces the language of section 3, not indeed because the General .Clauses Act applie$ t() the order (it does not) but because the order is reproducing the language of the Act and must therefore be taken to have the same meaning as in the Act itself, particularly as the order concludes with the words,\n\n\"By qrder of the Governor of Bombay.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act enables certain authorities specified by it to rµake orders of detention. These include, not only State Governments but also the Central Government, any District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate and certain Commissioners of Police.\n\nThe list does not include the Governor of a State. Now, though the term \"State Government\" appearing in an enactment means the Governor of the State, there is no provision of law which equates the term Governor with the State Government of which he happens to be the head. On the contrary, the Constitution invests him with certain functions and powers which are separate from those of his Government. It was therefore appropriate that the order in this case should have set out that the Government of Bombay was satisfied and not some other authority not contemplated by the Act and that that Government directed the detention.\n\nIt was also proper that the 6rder should have been executed under the orders of the Governor autihenticated, under the rules, by the signature of the Secretary. It is true that addition of the words \"and in his name\" to the words \"By order of the Governor of Bombay\" would have\n\n0 placed the matter beyond controversy but we are unable to see how an order which purports to be an order\n\nT lie S1ate ti/\n\nBombay\n\nP1m11iattam\n\nfog Naik_.\n\nBose /.\n\n: 1952 -- The Staie'of\n\n\"Bombay\n\n. 'v. .Purushottam\n\n'/og Naik.\n\nBose/.\n\nof the Governor of Bombay can fail to be otherwise than in his name. If A signs his name to a communication that communication goes out in his name.\n\nEqually, if he employs an agent to sign on his behalf and the agent states that he is signing under the orders of A, the document still goes forth in the name of A.\n\nIn our opinion, the High Court was wrong on this point.\n\nThe next step in the High Court's reasoning was this. The learned Judges held that the writing produced as the order did not prove itself because of the defect we have just considered but that nevertheless it was open to the State Government to prove by other means that such an order had been validly made. The learned Judges therefore called upon Government to make an affidavit setting out the facts.\n\nAn affidavit was made by the Home Secretary but the learned Judges were not satisfied and asked for a further affidavit. The Home Secretary thereupon made a second one but the learned Judges were still not satisfied and considered that the Minister in charge should have made an affidavit himself.\n\nWe do not intend to discuss this matter because once an order of this kind is unable to prove itself and has to be proved by other means it becomes impos- . sible to lay down any rule regarding either the quantum of evidence necessary to satisfy the Court which is called upon to decide 'the question or the nature of the evidence required. This is a question of fact which must be different in each case.\n\nOf course, sitting as a court of appeal, it would have been necessary for us to decide this had we reached a differ- . ent conclusion on the first point and had the State\n\nGovernment desired the re-arrest of the respondent.\n\nBut' as we are only asked to deal with general principles, all we need say as regards this is that it is not necessary in every case to call the Minister in charge.\n\nIf the Secretary, or any other person, has the requisite means of knowledge and his affidavit is believed, that will be enough.\n\n, I\n\nWe wish, however, to observe that the verification of the affidavits produced here 1s defective. The body of the affidavit discloses that certain matters were known to the Secretary who made the affidavit personally. The verification however states that everything was true to the best of his information and belief.\n\nWe point this out as slipshod verifications of this type might well in a given case lead to a rejection of the affidavit. Verifications should invariably be modelled on the lines of Order XIX, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, whether the Code applies in terms or not. And when the matter deposed to 1s not based on personal knowledge the sources of information should be dearly disclosed.\n\nWe draw attention to the remarks of Jenkins C. J. and Woodroffe J. in Padmabati Dasi\n\nv. Rasik Lal Dhar(1) and endorse the learned Judges' observations.\n\nIn fairness to the Home Secretary we deem it right to say that his veracity was neither doubted nor impugned by the High Court, but only his means of knowledge. He was speaking of the \"satisfaction\" of the Minister and the High Court was not satisfied regarding his knowledge of the state of the Minister's mind.\n\nThe learned Judges considered that the Minister himself would have been a more satisfactory source of information, but as we say, this 1s not a question of law. As a matter of abstract law, of course, the state of man's mind can be proved by evidence other than that of the man himself, and if the Home Secretary has the requisite means of knowledge, for example, if the Minister had told him that he was satisfied or he had indicated satisfaction by his conduct and acts, and the Home Secretary's affidavit was regarded as sufficient in the particular case, then that would constitute legally sufficient proof.\n\nBut whether that would be enough in any given case, or whether the \"best evidence rule\" should be applied in , trictness in that particular case, must necessarily depend upon its facts. In the present case, there was the element that 57 cases were dealt with in the course of 6 days\n\n(1) (1910) I.L.R. 37 Cal. 259.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nPurushottam Jog Naik.\n\nBose /.\n\nThe Stote of\n\nBombay\n\nPuNlshottam\n\nfog Naik_.\n\nBose /.\n\nand orders passed in all on one day. But we do not intend to enter into the merits. All we desire to ay is that if the learned Judges of the High Court mtended to lay down as a proposition of law that an affidavit from the Minister in charge of the department is indispensable in all such cases, then they went too far.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contended that the Minister in charge could not be asked to divulge these matters because of article 163(3) of the Constitution. We do not decide this question and leave it open.\n\nAnother point which was argued related to the privilege which the Home Secretary claimed on behal.f of the State Government under article 22 ( 6) of the Constitution. Government disclosed certain facts in the ground~ furnished to the detenu and claimed privilege regarding the rest of the facts in its possession.\n\nIn our opinion, the grounds supplied were sufficiently specific and they could form a proper basis for the \"satisfaction\" of the Government.\n\nAs regards the rest, Government has claimed privilege in the affidavit of the Home Secretary on the ground of public interest. This raises further questions which we do not intend to examine as the respondent is not to be re-arrested.\n\nThe order of release was, in our opinion, wrong, but in view of Government's undertaking not to re-arrest the respondent, we direct that he be not re-arrested in respect of the matters to which .this appeal relates.\n\nOrder. of High Court set aside.\n\nAgent for the appelant: P.A. Mehta.\n\nGIPN-S3-7 S. C. lndia/71-25-1-73-700\n\n' •", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "State of\n\nBihtJr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 21, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tlie State of\n\nBihtJr\n\nShailaba/a De11i."}}, {"text": "section 4(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 494, "end_char": 509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DAs J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 539, "end_char": 545, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "in the light of the judgments of my learned brothers Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 691, "end_char": 751, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Mukherjea J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 760, "end_char": 772, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BosE J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 998, "end_char": 1005, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BosE J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1101, "end_char": 1113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1142, "end_char": 1158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1187, "end_char": 1207, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1210, "end_char": 1226, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1285, "end_char": 1309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1324, "end_char": 1328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1358, "end_char": 1366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1687, "end_char": 1706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".... ,\n\n' l\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Bombay is satisfied with respect to the person known as J. N. . ....."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2135, "end_char": 2141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order of the Governor of Bombay\n\n(Sd.)"}}, {"text": "V. T. D.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2149, "end_char": 2157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. T. D.\n\nSecretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department\"."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2221, "end_char": 2241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay held that the order was defective as it was not \"expressed to be in the name of the Governor\" within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2358, "end_char": 2366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2408, "end_char": 2416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "J. N.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2593, "end_char": 2598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "166 (2) :\n\nHeld, that the order was not defective merely because it stated that the Government of Bombay was satisfied and that the Government of Bombay was pleased to direct that J. N. be detained, and, though the addition of the words \"and in his name\" to the words \"By order of the Governor of Bombay\" would have placed the matter beyond controversy, the order was really one expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor of Bombay within Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2859, "end_char": 2867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3564, "end_char": 3575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3583, "end_char": 3604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 24th October, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Vyas JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bavdekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3702, "end_char": 3710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 24th October, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Vyas JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Vyas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3715, "end_char": 3719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 24th October, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Vyas JJ.)"}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad (Attorney-General for India) and C. K. Daphtary (Solicitor-General for India) with G. N.\n\nJoshi for the apellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3812, "end_char": 3826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad (Attorney-General for India) and C. K. Daphtary (Solicitor-General for India) with G. N.\n\nJoshi for the apellant."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3862, "end_char": 3874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad (Attorney-General for India) and C. K. Daphtary (Solicitor-General for India) with G. N.\n\nJoshi for the apellant."}}, {"text": "Purushottam Jog Naik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi: Stat1: uf\n\nBombay\n\nPurushottam Jog Naik.", "canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK"}}, {"text": "BoSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4077, "end_char": 4081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by BoSE J.-This is an appeal from an order of the Bombay High Court directing the release of the respondent who had been detained under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950.", "canonical_name": "BosE J."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4210, "end_char": 4219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4890, "end_char": 4909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was originally arrested under an order of the District Magistrate, Belgaum, dated the 26th February, 1950, though he was then beyond the jurisdiction of that authority."}}, {"text": "11th of July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4980, "end_char": 4998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th of July, 1950, the Bombay High Court held that a detention of that kind was invalid."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5004, "end_char": 5021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th of July, 1950, the Bombay High Court held that a detention of that kind was invalid."}}, {"text": "17th of July,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orders were passed in all those cases on the 17th of July,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Purushottam Jog Naik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5537, "end_char": 5557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the respondent's case the order was in these .terms:\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Bombay is satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Purushottam Jog Naik of Ulga Village, Taluka Karwar, District Kanara, that with a view to preventing him from acting iri a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is ncessary to make the following order: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Preventive\n\n(1) I.L.R. 1946 Nag.", "canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM JOG NAIK"}}, {"text": "Kanara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5599, "end_char": 5605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the respondent's case the order was in these .terms:\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Bombay is satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Purushottam Jog Naik of Ulga Village, Taluka Karwar, District Kanara, that with a view to preventing him from acting iri a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is ncessary to make the following order: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Preventive\n\n(1) I.L.R. 1946 Nag."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5833, "end_char": 5842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5951, "end_char": 5970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "T. Dehejia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6133, "end_char": 6143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order of the Governor of Bombay,\n\nSd/-V. T. Dehejia, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department."}}, {"text": "Belgaum District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6508, "end_char": 6524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The original grounds were as follows :\n\n\"In furtherance of your campaign for non-payment of rent, you were instigating the people in the Belgaum District to commit acts of violence against landlords."}}, {"text": "Hadalge", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6862, "end_char": 6869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second set gave the following additional particulars :\n\n\"The people in Belgaum District, whom you were instigating to commit acts of violence against landlords in furtherance of your campaign for non-payment of rent, were the tenants in Hadalge and round about villages in the Khanapur Taluka of Belgaum District, and the said instigation was carried on by you for some months till your arrest in April, 1949.\""}}, {"text": "24th of August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7044, "end_char": 7064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th of August, 1950, the respondent applied to the Bombay High Court under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code for an order of release."}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7120, "end_char": 7131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7805, "end_char": 7825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/.\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Bombay is satisfied ... \" and the operative part of the otder runs~\n\n\"Now, therefore. . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8188, "end_char": 8199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 166(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8834, "end_char": 8845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9652, "end_char": 9738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9785, "end_char": 9794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "It has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9949, "end_char": 9958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "It has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9979, "end_char": 9998, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10174, "end_char": 10183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "It has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10517, "end_char": 10526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "It has to be remembered that this order was made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10688, "end_char": 10706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These include, not only State Governments but also the Central Government, any District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate and certain Commissioners of Police."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11822, "end_char": 11824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Purushottam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11914, "end_char": 11926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. .Purushottam\n\n'/og Naik."}}, {"text": "Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14704, "end_char": 14711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We draw attention to the remarks of Jenkins C. J. and Woodroffe J. in Padmabati Dasi\n\nv. Rasik Lal Dhar(1) and endorse the learned Judges' observations."}}, {"text": "Woodroffe", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14722, "end_char": 14731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We draw attention to the remarks of Jenkins C. J. and Woodroffe J. in Padmabati Dasi\n\nv. Rasik Lal Dhar(1) and endorse the learned Judges' observations."}}, {"text": "article 163(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16620, "end_char": 16634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16837, "end_char": 16847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17674, "end_char": 17684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appelant: P.A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "S3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17692, "end_char": 17694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_683_696_EN", "year": 1952, "text": ". '\n\n~~> .. {\" '\n\n::- __ ;,::._--::: . ..\n\n..... f'.\n\nii~:\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSHAMARAO V. PARULEKAR\n\nTHE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA,\n\nBOMBAY AND TWO OTHERS\n\nPetition No. 86 of 1952.\n\nD. M. PANGARKAR v.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER\n\nPetition No. 147 of 1952.\n\nMRS.GODAVARIPARULEKAR\n\nTHE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA,\n\nBOMBAY AND TWO OTHERS\n\nPetition No. 157 of 1952.\n\nGANESH LAXMAN PATIL FOR TUKARAM HARI\n\nWAZEKAR\n\nTHE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, KOLABA\n\nAND TWO OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF HYDERABAD-INTERVENER\n\nPetition No. 155 of 1952.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nPreventive Detention Act (IV of 1950)-Amendment Acts of .1951 and 1952-Detention order under Act of 1950 as amended in 1951 -Extension of duration of Act by Amending Act of 1952 until 1st October, 1952-Whether extends period of detention-Amendment Act-Rule of construction-\"Principal Act,\" meaning of- Validity of s. 3 of Amending Act of 1952-Legality of detention after 1st April, 1952-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 22 (4) and (7).\n\nMay 26.\n\nShamarao V. Parulek_at\n\nv. 2\"he District\n\nMagistrate ..\n\nThana, and Others.\n\n1\\i1 or<lcr directing the detention of the petitioner was n1ade on the 15th of Nove1nber, 1951, under the Preventive Detention Act of J 950 as a1nen<led by the A111ending Act of 1951, \\Vhich pfolonged the duration of the Act of 1950 up to the 1st April, 1952. 'The Preventive Detention (An1en<lment) Act of 1952 extended the duration of the Act of 1950 for a further period of six 1nonths, that is to say, until the 1st October, 1952.\n\nSection 3 of the Act of 1952 provided further that detention orders con finned under the principal Act and in -force itnn1ediately before the conunencement of the Act of 1952, sh~1ll, 1,-vhere the period of detention is not specified in the order, re1nain in force \"for so long as the principal Act (which was defined as the Act of 1950) \\\\'as in force.\" It \\Vas contended on behalf of the petitioner that his <letention after 1st 1\\pril, 1952, \\Vi.ls illegal.\n\n1-Ield, (i) \\Vhen a subsequent Act an1cnds an earlier one in such a \\Vay as to incorporate itself or a part of itself into the earlier, then the earlier 1\\ct 1nust thereafter be read and construed (except where that \\vould lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered \\vords had been written into the earlier Act \\Vith pen and ink and the old words scored out so that there is no need to refer to the atneuding Act at all.\n\nAfter the passing of the Act of 1952 the expressions \"the Act of 1950'\" and \"the principal Act\" incant the 1\\ct of 1950 as a111ended by the Act of 1952, and the effect of s. 3 of the Act of I 952 was that the detention of the petitioner \\Vould re1nain in force until the 1st October, 1952, without prejudice to the po\\ver of the Govern n1ent to 1nodify or revoke it;\n\n(ii) section 3 did not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution as there \\Vas a rational classificatien of the cases of detention orders in the section, and the period of detention was left in every case to the discretion of the State;\n\n(iii) the words \"any person in sub-cl. (b) of cl. 7 of Art. 22 of the Constitution do not contemplate that individual attention should be paid to each case; on the contrary, the words used in the said sub-clause empower the Parlian1ent to pres cribe the maxin1um for a class taken as a \\vholc as it has done in s. 3, ands. 3 does not therefore offend cl. (4) or cl. (7) of Art. 22;\n\n(iv) the power of the Parliament to fix a maxi1nu!P period does not exhaust itself once it has exercised 'that power but can be exercised again in respect of the same detention;\n\n( v) section 3 1s not repugnnt to the Constitution on the ground that it does not fix a time limit, for it specifies the\n\nperiod as until the expiry of the Act; nor on the ground that it ...,.-1 introduces the idea of potentially indefinite detention by periodical amendments; for the Parliament has the power to do that.\n\nORIGINAL JumsorcnoN : Petitions (Nos. 86, 147, 157 and 155 of 1952) under article 32 of the Const'itution for writs in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nPetitioners in person in petitions Nos. 86, 147 and 157 of 1952.\n\nRajani Patel for the petitioner in petition No. 155.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attomey-General for India, ( G. N. /oshi, with him) for the respondents.\n\nGanapathi Iyer for the intervener (State of Hyderabad).\n\n1952.\n\nMay 26.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J.-This petition and three others, namely petitions Nos. 147, 155 and 157 of 1952, raise issues regarding the vires and applicability to these cases of section 3 of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952.\n\nThis judgment is confined to those points and will govern these cases only in so far as they raise those points.\n\nThe remaining points wliich do not touch these issues will be dealt with by another Bench.\n\nThe only exception is a point raised in petition No. 155 of 1952 with which the other petitions are not concerned. \\Ve will deal with that separately.\n\nThe present petition (No. 86 of 1952) was argued very ably and with commendable conCiseness by the petitioner in person.\n\nThe fact that he has not been able to persuade us to his view is not due to any defect in his presentation of the case.\n\nThe petitioner was arrested on the 15th of NoYembcr, 1951, and an order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was served on him the same .day, and he was given the grounds of detention on the following day, the 16th. His case was placed before an Advisory Board and on the 8th of February, 1952, the Bombay Government \"confirmed and continued\"\n\nthe detention under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950.\n\nThis Act, as it originally stood, was due to expire <>n the 1st of April, 1951, but in that year an amending\n\nShamarao V. Parttlekar\n\nThe Dfrtrict\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose /.\n\nShamarao V. Parulekar v.\n\nThe District Magistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose f.\n\nAct was passed which, among other things.. prolonged its life to the 1st of April, 1952. The order of detention in ths case was passed under tl1e Act of 1950 as amended by the Act of 1951. According to past decisions of this Court, the detention would have expired on the 1st of April, 1952, when the Act of 1950 as amended in 1951 would itself have expired.\n\nBut a fresh Act was passed in 1952 (Act XXXIV of 1952), the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952.\n\nThe effect of this Act was to prolong the life of the Act of 1950 for a further six months, namely till the 1st of October, 1952.\n\nThe question is whether that Act also prolonged the deten6on and whether it had the vires to do so.\n\nIt was contended that the mere prolongation of the life of an Act does not, by reason of that alone, prolong the life of a detention which was due to expire when the Act under which it was made expired. Therefore, as the Act under which the present detention was made was due to expire on the 1st of April, 1952, the mere prolongation of its life by the amending Act did not affect a prolongation of the detention.\n\nAccordingly, the petitioner should have been released on the 1st of April, 1952, and as tl1ere is no fresh order of detention he is entitled to immediate release.\n\nWe need not express any opinion on that point because there is present in the amending Act something more than a mere prolongation of tl1e life of the old one. There is section 3 which is in these terms :\n\n\"Validity and duration of dete11tio11 in certain cases.- Every detention order confirmed under section 11 of the principal Act and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall have effect as if it had been confirmed under the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act; and accordingly, where the period of detention is either not specified in such detention order or specified (by whatever form of words) to be for the duration or un.til the -d expiry of the principal Act or until the 31st day of March. 1952, such detention order shall continue te>\n\n. 1952 remain in force for so long as the principal Act is in force, but without prejudice to the power of the appropriate Government. to revoke or modify it at any tirrie. \"_ - ---- --·\n\nShamaraQ V .. Paroleka'I'\n\nv, It will be noticed that the concluding part of this section states that the detention order shall remain in force \"for so long as the principal Act is in force.\" Section 2 of the amending Act defines the \"principal\n\nAct\" to mean the Act of 1950. Therefore, it was argued, as the Act of 1950 was due to expire on 'the 1st of April, 1952; the. present detention also came to an end on that date and so, in the absence of a.fresh order of detention, the petitioner's detention after that· date was illegal. .This argument; though ingenious, -\n\nThe District\n\n..;.lJagistrate.\n\nis fallacious. - The construction of an Act which has been amended is now governed by technical rules and we. must first be clear regarding the proper canons of construction.\n\nThe rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to . a _repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered word~ had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. This is the rule in England: see Craies on Statute Law, 5th edition, page 207; it is the law in America: see Crawford on Statutory Construction, page 1 IO; and it is the law . which the Privy Council applied to India in Keshoram Poddar v. Nundo Lal l.1allick('). Bearing this in mind it will be seen that the Act of 1950 remains the Act of 1950 all the way through even with its subsequent amendments. Therefore, the moment the Act of 1952 was passed andsection 2 came into operation, the Act of 1950 meant the Act of 1950 as amended by section 2, that is to say, the Act of 1950 now due to expire on the 1st of October; 1952; · · ·\n\n(1) (1927) 54 I:A• 152 at 155\n\nTna, and Otha-a.\n\nBo, eJ.\n\nShamarao V. Parulek.ar\n\nThe District\n\n'Magistrate,\n\nThana, 1md Others.\n\nBose /.\n\nTurning now to section 3, whose vires is questioned, and examining it clause by clause we first get these words:\n\n\"Every detention order confirmed under seetion II of the principal Act and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act.\"\n\nAccording to the rule of construction just examined, the words \"'principal Act\" means the Act of 1950 as amended by the Acts of 1951 and of 1952, that is to say, the Act of 1950 due to expire on the 1st of October, 1952.\n\nIncidentally, in the particular centext it could not mean the Act of 1950 as it stood in 1950 because no order confirmed under it as it then stood could have been alive \"at the commencement of this Act\", namely .on the 15th of March, 1952.\n\nThe section continues-\n\n\"shall have effect as if it had been cunfirmcd under the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act.\"\n\nThe underlined words \"as amended by this Act\"' were relied on to show that wherever the words \"the principal Act\" were referred to they meant the unamended original Act of 1950, otherwise these words would have been unnecessary.\n\nIn our opinion, they were unnecessary in the sense that their absence would not have made any difference to the interpretation though it would have made the section barder to follow and understand.\n\nWe say that for this reason.\n\nWithout the underlined words the section paraphrased would read-\n\n\"Every detention order confirmed under the original Act shall have effect as if confirmed under its . ' ,, prov1s10ns.\n\nIf this were to be read literally it would lead to an absurdity, for if the order is actually confirmed under the original unamended Act it would be pointless to introduce a fiction and say that the order shall be deemed to be confirmed under that Act as unamended.\n\nBut even apart from a strictly technical construction, the language of the section is accurate because, as we\n\n,.._ -\n\nhave said, the rule is that an amended Act must be :ead as if the words of amendment had been written into the Act except where that would lead to an 111consistency, and this woul<l be one of those cases unless the words are construed in a sensible and commonsense way.\n\nThe draughtsman therefore had either to leave the words as they were, with an apparent inconsistency, or make his meaning clear by adding the words he did.\n\nBut we do not think the addit1on made any difference to the result.\n\nWe now turn to the second half of section 3, that is to say, to the words following the semi-colon.\n\nIt is important to note here that this part is conequential on the first and merely explains the effect of the first\n\nhalf.\n\nIt is also relc\\'ant to note that it deals with four different kinds of orders, different, that is to say, in the form of the words used though in the end they all come to the same thing. It deals with the following kinds of order :-\n\n(1) an order in which the period of detention is not specified at all; in that event the detention would end at midnight on the night of the 31st of March, 1952.\n\nIt is clear that in this context the words \"the principal Act\" cam1ot mean the Act expiring on the 1st of October, 1952, because it envisages an order made before the Act of 1952 was in being and so on the date of its making the order could only refer to the Act then in being;\n\n(2) an order in which the period is stated to be \"fo1 the duration of the principal Act\", that is to ay, till the 31st of March, 1952 ;\n\n(3) an order in which the period is specified to be until the expiry of the principal Act, which again brings us back to the 31st of March, 1952, as the last day of detention;\n\n(4) an order in which the period is specified to be till the 31st of March, 1952. In all these four cases the section says that the detention order shall \"continue to remain in force, for so long as the principal Act is iFl force'', that is to say, till the 1st October, 1952.\n\nShamarao V. Parulekar v.\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose f.\n\nShamarao V. Parulekar v.\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate, Thana, Qnd Others.\n\nBose/.\n\nThat follows from the first part of the section because that is the meaning which the law directs shall be placed on these words unless the context otherwise directs and the context does not direct otherwise here.\n\nThis part of the section is only explanatory.\n\nBut we wish to found deeper than this.\n\nIt is the duty of Courts to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show was obviously intended the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently.\n\nIndeed, the law goes so far as to require the Courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided.\n\nSec the speech of Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson(') quoted with approval by the Privy Council in Narayana Swami v. Emperor('); also Salmon v. Duncombe(\"). The rule is also set out in the text books = See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 9th edition, page 236, and Craies on Statute Law, 5th. edition, pages 89 to 93. The meaning of section 3 is quite plain ancl only desperate hair splitting can reduce it to an absurdity. Courts should not be astute to defeat the provisions of an Act whose meaning is, on the face of it, reasonably plain.\n\nOf course, this does not mean that an Act, or any part of it, can be recast. It must be possible to spell the meaning contended for out of the words actually used. We hold that there is no difficulty of construction.\n\nIt was next argued that in any event the extended detention became a fresh detention (because of the Act of 1952) from the date the Act came into force, and reliance was placed upon the judgments of two of us, Mahajan and Das JJ. in S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras('). It is enough to say that that was not the\n\n(') [1857] 6 H.L.C. 61 at 106. (') 1l App. Cas. 627 at 634.\n\n(') A.I.R.1939 P. C.47. (') [1951] S.C.R.621 at635and640.\n\n\\.-----\n\n......\n\ndecision of the Court in that case, and further, that the\n\ntwo Judges who held it was a fresh detention nevertheless considered that a fresh order with its concomitant fresh grounds and a fresh reference to the Advisory Board were not required; therefore, either way the petitioner must fail.\n\nReference was made to the equality clause in article 14 of tlte Constitution but that argument is easily met because the classification which section 3 makes is reasonable.\n\nIn one class it places all those whose cases have already been considered by the Advisory Board and in the other those whose cases have yet to go before it; also the law is fair, or at any rate as fair as detention laws can be, despite this distinction because power is left to the appropriate Government to revoke or modify these orders, or any of them, at any time.\n\nSubstantially therefore there is no _differentiation.\n\nArticle 14 was considered at length in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar(1), and according to the law laid down there, the Court must be satisfied on two points before it can strike at a law on the ground of unlawful discrimination. It must be satisfied (1) that the law in fact discriminates and (2) that such discrimination is not permissible on the prindple --- of a rational classification made for the purposes of the legislation.\n\nThe argument here was that section 3 discriminated against those detenus whose cases had been referred to the Advisory Board and whose detention was confirmed, on the strength of its report, under section 11 ( 1) before the amending Act of 1952 was passed. The reason given was that these detentions are automatically extended up to the 1st of October, 1952, by section 3 without further reference to an Advisory Board, whereas in other cases, that is to say, in the case of those who were detained before the amending Act but whose cases had not been referred at the date it came into force, and in the case of those detained after the\n\n(t) [1952] S.C.R. 284.\n\nShamarao V. Parvlek.ar\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate, Thana, and Others.\n\nBose /.\n\nShamarao V. Parulekar • v.\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose /.\n\namending Act, the Advisory Board is called into play an,\\ individual attention is given to each case with the result that many of those detentions might not be for as long as six months. They might, for example. be only for one month or two .. It was urged that this was discrimination of a kind which cannot be supported by any principle of permissible classification because classification into the above categories has llC\\ reasonable relation to the objects of tl1e legislation, such as security ' of the State, maintenance of public order and so forth.\n\nWe are unable to accept this line of reasoning. To say that section 3 automatically extends the detention of persons in the petitioner's position to the 1st of October, 1952, and stops iliere, is only to make a partial statement of the effect of section 3 because the extension is subject to the power of the appropriate Government to revoke or modify it at any time.\n\nIn other words, the automatic continuation of the detention till the 1st of October is not absolute and irrevocable but is made dependent on the power of the appropriate Government to revoke or modify it at its discretion under section 13 of the Act. The State may or may not continue the detention for the whole of thc extended period.\n\nIn both classes of cases the duration of the detention within the overall limit of the life of the Act is left to the discretion of the State. The only difference is that in the one class of cases the discretion is exercised after the period has been extended by the amending Act, in the other the appropriate Govtrnment fixes the period itself in its discretion and can again at its discretion revoke or modify '1t.\n\nIn both cases, the substance of ilie law is that tl1e period of detention is left to the discretion of the State, and so tbere is no substantial discrimination.\n\nIt was argued that however fair this may look t>n paper, in pract1ice that will be grave discrimination because, as a matter of fact, tl1e State will not apply its mind in ilie majority of cases like the petitioner's That is an argument we cannot accept and no material was placed before us to justify such a conclusion.\n\n~· '\n\nWe turn now to the next point. It was contended that section 3 offends the Constitution because article 22 ( 4) and (7) do not envisage the direct intervention of Parliament in a whole batch of cases.\n\nThe protectiem guaranteed is that there shall be individual attention and consideration to each separate case by some duly specified and constituted authority.\n\nIn our opinion, this is not accurate.\n\nArticle 22 ( 4) guarantees that there shall be no preventive detention for more than ili.ree months unless the law authorising it makes provision for an Advisory Board and the Board after considering each individual case separately reports . that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detentim1.\n\nTo that extent there must be individual consideration of ead1 case, but once the report is made and is unfavourable to the detenu, then the detention can be for a longer period\n\nprovided it does not exceed \"the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under subclause (b) of clause (7) .\" Sub-clause (b) of clause (7) emp0wcrs Parliament to prescribe \"the maximum period for which any person may in any class or ....... . of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention.\" Parliament is accordingly empowered to specify a class. It has done so. The class is all persons whose cases have already been considered by an Advisory Board.\n\nIt is empowered to prescribe a maximum period.\n\nThat also it has done.\n\nThe extended detention (that is to say, for more than three months) can then be \"under any law providing for preventive detention.\" A law made by Parliament falls within these words. Parliament is equally authar'ised to say who shall determine the period of detention, and as there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent it, it can itself exercise the authority it is empowered to delegate to others.\n\nStress was laid on the words \"any person\" in sub. clause (b) of clause (7) and it was contended that this contemplates individual attention in each case.\n\nBut\n\nShamarao V. Parulek_11r\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose/.\n\nShamarao V. Parulekar v.\n\nThe District Magistrate, Thana, and Others.\n\nBose /.\n\nif that is so, then it means that Parliament must itself direct the maximum period for each separate person falling. within the class individually. The words are, we th111k, reasonably plain and we hold that Parliament can prescribe the maximum for a class taken as a whole as it has done in section 3.\n\nIt was next argued that once the power given under clause (7) to fix a maximum period has been exercised '-· the power exhausts itself and cannot be exercised again in respect of the same detention. In our opinion, no such limitation is imposed upon Parliament by the Constitution.\n\nThen it was said that secuon 3 stands on a footing different from section 12 of the amending Act of 1951 as it introduces the idea of potentially indefinite detention and accordingly is repugnant to the Constitution, and in any event is a fraud upon it. In so far as this means that section 3 fixes no time limit, the contention is unsound because the section specifies the exact period of the qetention, namely till the expiry of the Act of 1950, that is to say, till the 1st of October, 1952.\n\nIn so far as it means that Parliament is enabled to continue detention indefinitely by the expedient of periodic amendments in the Act of 1950, the answer is that Parliament has the power.\n\nThis was precisely the power exercised In the amending Act of 1951 and upheld by this Court in S. Krishnan v.\n\nThe State of Madras('). The present Act is no different from that in this respect.\n\nSo far, we have dealt with the facts in petition No. 86 of 1952.\n\nThe facts in the other three petitions naturally differ in their details but they all conform to the same general pattern so far as the points d!s cussed above are concerned, so there is no need to discuss them individually. \\Ve hold that section 3 of the amending Act of 1952 is intra vires and that the detentions are not bad on any of the grounds discu5'- ed above. The rest of the points raised in each individual case are left open except for one point which\n\nf1) [1951] S.C.R. 621.\n\n. - -..,.-\n\nanses m petition No. 155 of 1952. That point 1s as follows.\n\nThe first ground of detention given to the petitioner in this case reads :\n\n\"Being the President of Jamat of Agris you have used your position as such to increase your influence over the residents of Uran Peta, have created a band of obedient and trusted associates, have inflicted heavy fines on villagers in Uran Peta who have disregarded your wishes and have imposed on them boycott or excommunication in cases of their refusal to pay the\n\nfines.\"\n\nIt was argued that at the very outset these allegations import noth'ing more than an exercise of functions such as the infliction of fines and excommuni- <:ation which the petitioner as head of the caste had authority to do. They do not touch any of the matters covered by section 3 (1) (a) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, under which the petitioner is detained.\n\nFor example, they do not touch the security of the\n\nState or the maintenance of public order or any of the other matters specified in section 3. They are therefore irrelevant to the detention, and as it is impossible to say how far these irrelevant matters influenced the detention, the petitioner is entitled to release. Reliance was placed upon certain observations of the Federal Court in Rex v. Basudev(1).\n\nWe think 'it unnecessary to examine this point because we do not think the ground is irrelevant nor do we agree that it means what the petitioner says.\n\nIn our opinion, the grounds of detention must be regarded as a whole and when that is done the relevance of the first ground becomes plain.\n\nThe gravemen of the charge against the petitioner is that he aimed at setting up a parallel government in the Uran Peta area and that in order to achieve that end he did various acts such as intimidating the workers in the salt pans with threats of murder, and his own workers with threats of death, unless they carried out his\n\n(1) [ 1949] F.C.R. 657 at 661.\n\nShamarao V. Parulekar\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose /.\n\nEvacce Evuee\n\nThe District\n\nMllgistrttte,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose /.\n\nMay 26.\n\norders; and among the lesser instances given to illustrate the exercise of parallel governmental authority are the ones set out in the first ground, namely the mfliction of fines with the sanction of excommunication and boycott to ensure their payment and due obedience to his orders. This point has no force and is decided against the petitioner.\n\nIt will not be open to him to re-agitate this afresh when his case is reheard on the remaining issues.\n\nAll the four cases will now be set down for hearing on the remaining points which arise in them. As they do not involve constitutional issues they need not go before a Constitution Bench.\n\nAgent for the petitioner m Petition No. 155 : M.SK.\n\nSastri for P. G. Goklzale.\n\nAgent for the respondents and Intervener : P. A.\n\nMehta.\n\nEBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER\n\nCUSTODIAN GENERAL OF\n\nEVACUEE PROPERTY.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nBomba)' Evacuees (Admi11istratio11 of Property) Act, 1949- 0rdinance No. XXVII of 1949, ss. 7, 24-0rder refusing to declare\n\nperson evacuee-Whether appea/able-lnformant, whether \"person aggrieved\"-Right to appeal-CoHrts with limited juristliction-- Pau1er to decide facts upon which iurisdiction depends-Powers of an appellate court-Grant of writ of certiorari-Guiding principles.\n\nA writ of certiorari cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong.\n\nIt must be shown before such writ is issued that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principle~ of natural justice.\n\nWant of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter, so that the inferior court might not have authority to enter on the inquiry or upon some part of", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "SHAMARAO V. PARULEKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Shamarao V. Parulek_11r", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA,\n\nBOMBAY AND TWO OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 168, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA, BOMBAY AND TWO OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 541, "end_char": 562, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 564, "end_char": 582, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 584, "end_char": 593, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 595, "end_char": 598, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 603, "end_char": 618, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 621, "end_char": 645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Extension of duration of Act by Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 746, "end_char": 790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 935, "end_char": 939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Extension of duration of Act by Amending Act", "statute": "Extension of duration of Act by Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1008, "end_char": 1029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1031, "end_char": 1043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1580, "end_char": 1589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2660, "end_char": 2664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2760, "end_char": 2777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the passing of the Act of 1952 the expressions \"the Act of 1950'\" and \"the principal Act\" incant the 1\\ct of 1950 as a111ended by the Act of 1952, and the effect of s. 3 of the Act of I 952 was that the detention of the petitioner \\Vould re1nain in force until the 1st October, 1952, without prejudice to the po\\ver of the Govern n1ent to 1nodify or revoke it;\n\n(ii) section 3 did not contravene Art."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2862, "end_char": 2871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2891, "end_char": 2898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3138, "end_char": 3143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3403, "end_char": 3407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3465, "end_char": 3472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3497, "end_char": 3507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22;\n\n(iv) the power of the Parliament to fix a maxi1nu!P period does not exhaust itself once it has exercised 'that power but can be exercised again in respect of the same detention;\n\n( v) section 3 1s not repugnnt to the Constitution on the ground that it does not fix a time limit, for it specifies the\n\nperiod as until the expiry of the Act; nor on the ground that it ...,.-1 introduces the idea of potentially indefinite detention by periodical amendments; for the Parliament has the power to do that."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3659, "end_char": 3668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4051, "end_char": 4061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajani Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4192, "end_char": 4204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajani Patel for the petitioner in petition No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4246, "end_char": 4260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attomey-General for India, ( G. N. /oshi, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "G. N. /oshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4291, "end_char": 4302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attomey-General for India, ( G. N. /oshi, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Ganapathi Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4336, "end_char": 4350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganapathi Iyer for the intervener (State of Hyderabad)."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4609, "end_char": 4618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th of NoYembcr, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5307, "end_char": 5329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was arrested on the 15th of NoYembcr, 1951, and an order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was served on him the same .day, and he was given the grounds of detention on the following day, the 16th."}}, {"text": "8th of February, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5563, "end_char": 5584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His case was placed before an Advisory Board and on the 8th of February, 1952, the Bombay Government \"confirmed and continued\"\n\nthe detention under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950."}}, {"text": "Bombay Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5590, "end_char": 5607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His case was placed before an Advisory Board and on the 8th of February, 1952, the Bombay Government \"confirmed and continued\"\n\nthe detention under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5655, "end_char": 5665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamarao V. Parttlekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5822, "end_char": 5844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act, as it originally stood, was due to expire <>n the 1st of April, 1951, but in that year an amending\n\nShamarao V. Parttlekar\n\nThe Dfrtrict\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.", "canonical_name": "Shamarao V. Parulek_11r"}}, {"text": "Dfrtrict\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5850, "end_char": 5897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act, as it originally stood, was due to expire <>n the 1st of April, 1951, but in that year an amending\n\nShamarao V. Parttlekar\n\nThe Dfrtrict\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5932, "end_char": 5978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose /.\n\nShamarao V. Parulekar v.\n\nThe District Magistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.", "canonical_name": "District Magistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "1st of April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6255, "end_char": 6273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to past decisions of this Court, the detention would have expired on the 1st of April, 1952, when the Act of 1950 as amended in 1951 would itself have expired."}}, {"text": "1st of October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect of this Act was to prolong the life of the Act of 1950 for a further six months, namely till the 1st of October, 1952."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7429, "end_char": 7438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7561, "end_char": 7571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st day of March.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7983, "end_char": 8001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is section 3 which is in these terms :\n\n\"Validity and duration of dete11tio11 in certain cases.- Every detention order confirmed under section 11 of the principal Act and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall have effect as if it had been confirmed under the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act; and accordingly, where the period of detention is either not specified in such detention order or specified (by whatever form of words) to be for the duration or un.til the -d expiry of the principal Act or until the 31st day of March."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8429, "end_char": 8438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9494, "end_char": 9501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is the rule in England: see Craies on Statute Law, 5th edition, page 207; it is the law in America: see Crawford on Statutory Construction, page 1 IO; and it is the law ."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9685, "end_char": 9690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which the Privy Council applied to India in Keshoram Poddar v. Nundo Lal l.1allick(')."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9928, "end_char": 9937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10011, "end_char": 10020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamarao V. Parulek.ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10166, "end_char": 10188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the moment the Act of 1952 was passed andsection 2 came into operation, the Act of 1950 meant the Act of 1950 as amended by section 2, that is to say, the Act of 1950 now due to expire on the 1st of October; 1952; · · ·\n\n(1) (1927) 54 I:A• 152 at 155\n\nTna, and Otha-a.\n\nBo, eJ.\n\nShamarao V. Parulek.ar\n\nThe District\n\n'Magistrate,\n\nThana, 1md Others.", "canonical_name": "Shamarao V. Parulek_11r"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10262, "end_char": 10271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th of March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10937, "end_char": 10956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Incidentally, in the particular centext it could not mean the Act of 1950 as it stood in 1950 because no order confirmed under it as it then stood could have been alive \"at the commencement of this Act\", namely .on the 15th of March, 1952."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12660, "end_char": 12669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st of March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13228, "end_char": 13247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It deals with the following kinds of order :-\n\n(1) an order in which the period of detention is not specified at all; in that event the detention would end at midnight on the night of the 31st of March, 1952."}}, {"text": "Wensleydale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15253, "end_char": 15264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sec the speech of Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson(') quoted with approval by the Privy Council in Narayana Swami v. Emperor('); also Salmon v. Duncombe(\")."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15577, "end_char": 15586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16215, "end_char": 16222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next argued that in any event the extended detention became a fresh detention (because of the Act of 1952) from the date the Act came into force, and reliance was placed upon the judgments of two of us, Mahajan and Das JJ."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16227, "end_char": 16230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next argued that in any event the extended detention became a fresh detention (because of the Act of 1952) from the date the Act came into force, and reliance was placed upon the judgments of two of us, Mahajan and Das JJ.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16796, "end_char": 16806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16893, "end_char": 16902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17349, "end_char": 17359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17824, "end_char": 17833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17994, "end_char": 18004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18159, "end_char": 18168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamarao V. Parvlek.ar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18459, "end_char": 18481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shamarao V. Parvlek.ar\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate, Thana, and Others.", "canonical_name": "Shamarao V. Parulek_11r"}}, {"text": "District\n\nMagistrate, Thana, and Others.\n\nBose", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18487, "end_char": 18533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shamarao V. Parvlek.ar\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate, Thana, and Others.", "canonical_name": "District Magistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose /.\n\namending Act", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18570, "end_char": 18634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose /.\n\nShamarao V. Parulekar • v.\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19241, "end_char": 19250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19427, "end_char": 19436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st of October", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19619, "end_char": 19633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the automatic continuation of the detention till the 1st of October is not absolute and irrevocable but is made dependent on the power of the appropriate Government to revoke or modify it at its discretion under section 13 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19778, "end_char": 19788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20849, "end_char": 20858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20892, "end_char": 20902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21198, "end_char": 21208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shamarao V. Parulek_11r", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22814, "end_char": 22837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But\n\nShamarao V. Parulek_11r\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.", "canonical_name": "Shamarao V. Parulek_11r"}}, {"text": "District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22843, "end_char": 22871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But\n\nShamarao V. Parulek_11r\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.", "canonical_name": "District Magistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Thana, and Others.\n\nBose", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22924, "end_char": 22969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/.\n\nShamarao V. Parulekar v.\n\nThe District Magistrate, Thana, and Others.", "canonical_name": "District Magistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23266, "end_char": 23275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23627, "end_char": 23637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23844, "end_char": 23853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24747, "end_char": 24756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uran Peta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25270, "end_char": 25279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first ground of detention given to the petitioner in this case reads :\n\n\"Being the President of Jamat of Agris you have used your position as such to increase your influence over the residents of Uran Peta, have created a band of obedient and trusted associates, have inflicted heavy fines on villagers in Uran Peta who have disregarded your wishes and have imposed on them boycott or excommunication in cases of their refusal to pay the\n\nfines.\""}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25795, "end_char": 25804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25820, "end_char": 25850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26027, "end_char": 26036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "1949] F.C.R. 657", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26934, "end_char": 26950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shamarao V. Parulekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26960, "end_char": 26981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shamarao V. Parulekar\n\nThe District\n\nMagistrate,\n\nThana, and Others.", "canonical_name": "Shamarao V. Parulek_11r"}}, {"text": "M.SK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27808, "end_char": 27812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "155 : M.SK."}}, {"text": "P. A.\n\nMehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27886, "end_char": 27898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents and Intervener : P. A.\n\nMehta."}}, {"text": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27901, "end_char": 27918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER\n\nCUSTODIAN GENERAL OF\n\nEVACUEE PROPERTY."}}, {"text": "CUSTODIAN GENERAL OF\n\nEVACUEE PROPERTY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27932, "end_char": 27970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER\n\nCUSTODIAN GENERAL OF\n\nEVACUEE PROPERTY."}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28143, "end_char": 28152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_696_709_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Evacce Evuee\n\nThe District\n\nMllgistrttte,\n\nThana, and Others.\n\nBose /.\n\nMay 26.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952}\n\norders; and among the lesser instances given to illustrate the exercise of parallel governmental authority are the ones set out in the first ground, namely the mfliction of fines with the sanction of excommunication and boycott to ensure their payment and due obedience to his orders. This point has no force and is decided against the petitioner.\n\nIt will not be open to him to re-agitate this afresh when his case is reheard on the remaining issues.\n\nAll the four cases will now be set down for hearing on the remaining points which arise in them. As they do not involve constitutional issues they need not go before a Constitution Bench.\n\nAgent for the petitioner m Petition No. 155 : M.SK.\n\nSastri for P. G. Goklzale.\n\nAgent for the respondents and Intervener : P. A.\n\nMehta.\n\nEBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER\n\nCUSTODIAN GENERAL OF\n\nEVACUEE PROPERTY.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nBomba)' Evacuees (Admi11istratio11 of Property) Act, 1949- 0rdinance No. XXVII of 1949, ss. 7, 24-0rder refusing to declare\n\nperson evacuee-Whether appea/able-lnformant, whether \"person aggrieved\"-Right to appeal-CoHrts with limited juristliction-- Pau1er to decide facts upon which iurisdiction depends-Powers of an appellate court-Grant of writ of certiorari-Guiding principles.\n\nA writ of certiorari cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong.\n\nIt must be shown before such writ is issued that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principle~ of natural justice.\n\nWant of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter, so that the inferior court might not have authority to enter on the inquiry or upon some part of\n\n. ,~\n\nit.\n\nIt may also arise from the absence of some essential preli minary or upon the existence of some particular facts collateral 1 to. the actual matter which the court has to try and which are conditions precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by it.\n\nBut once it is held that the court has jurisdiction but while exercising it, it made a mistake, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right inasmuch as a court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as wrongly.\n\nWhen an inferior court or tribunal which has the power of deciding facts is established by the legislatur, e, it may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is sho\\Vn to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things but not otherwise.\n\nThere, it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction.\n\nBut the legislature may entrust the court or tribunal itself with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists and on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more.\n\nIn the second case the rule that a tribunal cannot give itself jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist does not apply.\n\nOrdinarily, a curt of appeal has not only jurisdiction to determine the soundness of the decision of the inferior court as a court of error, but by the very nature of things it has also jurisdiction to determine any points raised before it in the nature of prelimenary issues by the parties. Such jurisdiction is inherent in its very constitution as a court of appeal.\n\nWhether an appeal is competent, whether a party has locus standi to prefer it, whether the appeal in substance is from one or another order and whether it has been preferred in proper form and within the time prescrribed, are all matters for the decision of the appellate court so constituted.\n\nAn order by an Additional Custodian in a proceeding under Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 refusing to declare a person an evacuee and his property evacuee property is an order under s. 7 of the Ordinance and is appealable under s. 24.\n\nA person claiming to be interested in an enquiry as to whether a person is an evacuee and his property evacuee property, who has filed a written statement and adduced evidence, is a \"person aggrieved\" by an order that the latter is not an\n\nvacuee and has a locus standi to prefer an appeal from the order.\n\nCML\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1952.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for the Punjab at\n\n2-8 S.C. India/71\n\n1952 - Ebrahim Aboobak_ar and Another\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee Property •\n\nEvacuee Aboobakar end Aneiher\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee\n\nProperty.\n\nMRhajan }.\n\nSimla dated 24th May, 1951, in Civil Writ No. 15 of 1951.\n\nM. L. Manekshatv (P. N. Bhagwati, with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setaluad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N. foshi, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1952. May 26. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.- This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature of the State of Punjab dated the 24th May, 1951, dismissing the petition filed by the appellants for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the respondent ..\n\nAboobaker Abdul Rahman_, the father. of the appellants, was possessed of considerable movable as well as immovable properties including a cinema theatre, known as the Imperial Cinema, situate at Bombay.\n\nSoon after the partition of India, he went to Pakistan and was in Karachi in the month of September, 1947, where he purchased certain properties in that month.\n\nOn informatjon supplied by one Tek Chand Dolwani to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property, the Additional Custodian started proceedings under the Bombay Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1949, against Aboobaker in or about the month of July, 1949.\n\nDuring the pendency of the said proceed .. ings, the Government ·-of India Ordinance XXVII of 1949 came into force.\n\nThereupon, on the 16th December, 1949, the Additional Custodian issued a notice to the said Aboobaker under section 7 of the Ordinanc{ and a further notice on the 11th January, 1950, to shov. cause why his property should not be declared to be evac_uee property. Pursuant to the said notices an enquiry was held by the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property who after recording the statement of the said Aboobaker and examining some other evidence produced by the said Tekchand Dolwani and\n\ntakinointo consideration the written starement filed \" by him, adjudicated on the 8th February, 1950, that\n\nthe said Aboobaker was not an evacuee. He, however, issued another notice to Aboobaker on the same day calling upon Htm to show cause why he should not be declared an intending evacuee under section 19 of the said Ordinance.\n\nOn the 9th February, 1950, he adjudicated him as an intending evacuee.\n\nOn the 31st March, 1950, Tekchand Dolwani being the informant and interested in the adjudication of the said Aboobaker as an evacuee, filed an appeal against the order of the 9th February to the respondent (The Custodian General of India) praying for an order declanng the said Aboobaker an evacuee and that he being the first informant should be allotted the said cinema.\n\nOn the 18th April, 1950, the Ordinance was replaced by Act XXXI of 1950.\n\nThe appeal was heard by the respondent in New Delhi on the 13th May, 1950.\n\nAt the hearing it was urged on behalf of Aboobaker that he having been declared an intending evacuee and he having accepted that order, no appeal lay therefrom and that the said Tekchand Dolwani was not a person aggrieved by any order passed by the Additional Custodian and therefore had no locus standi to appeal under the provisions of section 24 of Ordinance XXVII of 1949.\n\nThe hearing of the appeal was concluded on the 13th May, 1950, and it is alleged in the written. statement of the respondent that the order was dictated by him on the same day after the conclusion of the hearing and was also signed by him and it bore that date.\n\nAboobakcr suddenly died on the 14th May, 1950, which was a Sunday and the respondent pronounced the order written on the 13th to the counsel of Aboobaker on the\n\n15th May, 1950. By this order the respondent held that the appeal purpodng to be from the order passed by the Additional Custodian on the 9th February, 1950, declaring the said Aboobaker an intending evacuee in effect and in substance was directed against the Qrder made on the 8th February in the proceedings started under section 7 of the Ordinance declining to declare the said Aboobaker's , property as evacuee property.\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar and Another v.\n\nCustodian General o/\n\nEvacuee Property.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar and Another\n\nCustodia11 General of Evacuee Property.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nHe further held that the said Tekchand Dolwani was interested in the appeal and had locus standi to prefer it.\n\nHaving overruled the preliminary objections raised by the appellants, the hearing of the appeal was adjourned and further inquiry was directed to be\n\nmade in the matter. Notices of the adjourned hearing of the appeal were given from time to time to the two appellants. On the 30th February, 1951, they were informed that the appeal would be heard on the 7th March, 1951.\n\nThe two appellants allege that they are some of the heirs entitled to the estate of the said Aboobaker. Two of his sons migrated to Pakistan and one of the appellants is his third son and the other appellant is his only daughter.\n\nBeing aggrieved by the order of the respondent dated the 13th May, 1950, the appellants filed a petition in the High Court of the State of Punjab at Simla on the 26th February, 1951, under article 226 of the Constitution, praying for a writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside that order and for a writ of prohibition or mandamus directing the said respondent io forbear from proceeding with the heating of the said appeal on the 7th March, 1951, or on any other date or dates.\n\nThe appellants raised the following contentions in the petition :\n\n1. That the appeal preferred by Tekchand Dolwani before the respondent was in terms an appeal against tl1e order of the 9th February, 1950, and not an appeal against the conclusion reached on the 8th February, 1950, and inasmuch as the said order was made against Aboobaker and not in his favour, Tekchand had no right of appeal against the same and the respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain it or make any order therein.\n\n2. That Tekchand was not a person aggrieved by the order dated the 8th February, 1950, within the meaning of section 24 of the Ordinance and was not entitled to appeal against the said order and inasmuch as no appeal lay at his instance, the respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain it or make any order therein.\n\n\\ •..\n\n' 7\n\n_.,\n\n3. That after the death of Aboobaker on the 14th May, 1950, the respondent ceased to have jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of the appeal or make any order therein.\n\nThe High Court held that the order of the respondent pronounced on the 15th May, 1950, was not a nullity and_ the appeal preferred by Tekchand was in effect and in substance an appeal from the order passed by the Additional Custodian on the 8th February, 1950, and that Tekchand was a preson aggrieved within the meaning of section 24 of the Ordinance. It accordingly dismissed the petition with costs but on the 27th June, 1950, granted him leave to apr.eal to this Court under article 133 of the Constitution.\n\nOn the 30th July, 1951, during the pendency of the appeal in this Court, the respondent finally pronounced orders on the appeal of Tekchand and held that Aboobaker was an evacuee and his property was declared evacuee property.\n\nA petition under article 226 for quashing this order is pending in the High Court of the State of Bombay.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants canvassed the following points before us :\n\n1. That the appeal to the respondent was against the order of the 9th and not against the order of the 8th, and as no appeal lay against the order of the Sith the respondent had no jurisdiction to hear it.\n\n2. That assuming that the appeal was preferred against the order of the 8th, that order was not an appcalable order inasmuch as section 24 allows an appeal agaimt an order declaring properties evacuee properties and not against any conclusion that a certain person is or is not an evacuee, and thus no appeal was competent at all which could he heard by the respondent.\n\n3. That Tekchand was not a person aggrieved within the - meaning of section 24 of the Ordinance and had no locus standi to prefer the appeal and the respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain it at his instance.\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar and Another v.\n\nCustodian General of\n\nEvacuee Property.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar ind Another\n\nCustodian General oj\n\nEvacuee Property,\n\nMahajan /,\n\n4. That the order pronounced on the 15th after the death of Aboobaker was a uullity.\n\nIt is mentioned in the judgment of the High Court that Shri M. L. Manekshah conceded that the death of Aboobaker docs not in any way affect the validity of the order pronounced by the Custodian General on the 15th May, 1950.\n\nThe learned counsel adopted practically the same attitude before us in view of the affidavit of the respondent in which it was affirmed that the order in question was dictated on the 13th May, 1950, and -was signed 011 the same date.\n\nThe High Court on the principle of Order XXII, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure, held that an order written but not pronounced could be pronounced even after the death of the party affected.\n\n' In these circumstances the last contention of the learned counsel docs not require any further consideration and is rejected.\n\nThe larger question that has been raised in the petition pending before the High Court of the State oi Bombay that the properties of Aboobaker could not be declared evacuee properties after his death as they had devolved on his heirs was not raised in these proceedings and we have not been invited to decide it.\n\nThat being so, the question is lefo open.\n\nThe remaining three questions canvassed before us, unless they are of such a nature as would make the decision of the respondent dated the 13th May, 1950, a nullity, cannot be the subject-matter of a writ of certiorari. It is plain that such a writ cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong. Indeed, it must be shown before such a writ is - issued that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subjectmatter, so that the inferior court might not have authority to enter on the inquiry or upon some part of it.\n\nIt may also arise from the absence of some essential preliminary or upon the existence of some\n\n\" '\n\n. /\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME q)URT REPORTS 703\n\nparticular facts collateral to the actual matter which\n\nthe court has to try and which are conditions prrce .. dent to the assumption of jurisdiction . by it. But once it is held that the court has jurisdiction but while exercisiing 'jr, it made a mistake, rhe '.Vronged party\n\ncan only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right inasmuch . as a court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as wrongly. The three ques- •ions agitated before us do not seem to be questions which bear upon the jurisdiction of the court of appeal, 0r its authority to entertain them.\n\nIt was contended that no court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision 011 a point collateral to the merits of the case upon v1hich tbe limit of its jurisdiction depends and that the questions involved in the appeal before the respondent were collateral to the merits of the case. As pointed out by Lord Esher, M. R., in Reg. v. Commissioner of fncome T ax(1), the formula enunciated above is quite plain but its application is often misleading. The learned Master of the Rolls classified the cases under two categories thus :\n\n\"'Vhen an inferior court or tribunal or body which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body.\n\nIt may in effect say that, if a certain statr. of facts exists and is shown to sucb. tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have iurl.sdiction to do such things bur not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusive] 1 to drcide whether that •tate of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be ques. ti1:med, and it will be held that they have acted without iurisdiction.\n\nBut there is anotl!r:r state of things which may exist. The legislature may entrust tl1e tribunal or body wit!t i.I jurisdiction which include-! the jurisdiction to determine wliethcl' the preliminary state of facts exists.\n\nas well as the jurisdiction, and on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more.\n\nWhen\n\n(1) 21 Q.B.D. 313.\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar and Another\n\ny, Custodian General of\n\nEvacuee Property,\n\nVfahairm f.\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar 11nd Another\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee Property.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nthe legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is erroneo11s application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jnrisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given iuhsdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal froni such exercise of their jurisdiction.\" The tribunal constituted to hear appeals under section 24 has been constituted in these terms :\n\n\"Any person aggrieved by an order made under section 7, section 16, section 19 or section 38 may prefer an appeal in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed- ( a) to the Custodian, where the origiml order has been passed by a Deputy or As,,; stant Custodian;\n\n(b) to the Custo(fon-Genernl, where the original order has been passed by the Custodian, an Additional Custodian or an Authorized Deputy Custodian.\"\n\nLike all courts of appeal exercising general jurisdiction in civil cases, the respondent has been constituted an appellate court in words of the widest amplitude and the legislature has not limited his jurisdiction by providing that such exercise will depend on the existence of any particular state of facts.\n\nOrdinarily, a court of appeal has not only jurisdidion to determine the soundness of the decision of the inferior court as a court of error, but by the very nature of things it has also jurisdiction to determine any points raised before it in the nature of preliminary issues by the parties.\n\nSuch jurisdiction is inherent in its very constitution as a court of appeal. Whether an appeal is competent, whether a party has /oms standi to prefer it, whether the appeal in substance is from one or another order\n\nand whether it has been preferred in proper form and within the time prescribed, are all matters for the decision of the appellate court so constituted. Such a tribunal falls within class 2 of the classification of the Master of the Rolls. In these circumstances it seems to us that the order of the High Court of Punjab that a writ of certiorari could not issue to the respond~ ent quashing the order of the 13th May, 1950, was right.\n\nWe are further of the opinion that none of the contentions raised has any merit whatsoever.\n\nFor a proper appraisal of the contention that Tekchand Dolwani is not a \"person aggrieved\" within the meaning of those words 'in section 24 of the Ordinance, it is necessary to refer to the rules made under the Ordinance. It is provided in rule 5 (5).. that ay person or persons claiming to be interested in the enquiry or in the property being declared as evacuee property, may file a written statement in reply to the written statement filed by the persons interested in the property claiming that the property should not be declared evacuee property; the Custodian shall then either on the same day or on any subsequent day to which the hearing may be adjourned, proceed to hear the evidence, if any, which the party appearing to show cause may produce and also evidence which the\n\npart)' claiming to be interested as mentioned above may adduce.\n\nIn the proceedings before the Additional Custodian, Tekchand Dolwani filed a reply to the written statement of Aboobaker and adduced evidence: in suoport of the stand taken by h 11m that the property of Aboobaker was evacuee property.\n\nFurther Tekchand Dolwani was the first informant who brought to the notice of the Custodian concerned that the property of Aboobaker was evacuee property and in view of the order of the Ministry of Rehabilitation he was, as a first informant, entitled to first consideration in the allotment of this property, the Additional Custodian was bound to hear him on the truth ahd validity of the information given by him.\n\nWhen a person is given a right to raise a contest in a certain matter and his contention is negatived, then\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar and A.notht:f\n\nv ..\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee Property.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar and AnotAer\n\nCustodian General of\n\nEvacuee Property.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nto say that he is not a person aggrieved by the order does not seem to us to be at all .right or proper. He is certainly aggrieved by the order disallowing his contention.\n\nSection 24 allows a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by an order made under section 7.\n\nThe conclusion reached. by the Additional Custodian on the 8th February, 1950, that Aboobaker was not an evacuee amounted to an order under section 7 and Tekchand therefore was a person aggi:ieved by that order.\n\nSection 43 bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Custodian. In clause 1 (a) it provides as follows :-\n\n\"no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property is or is not evacuee property or whether an evacuee has or has not any right or interest in any evacuee property.\" It is clear therefore that the Additional Custodian has to find and adjudicate on the question whether a certain property is or is not evacuee property and whether a certain person is or is not an evacuee and such an adjudication falls within the ambit of section 7 of the Ordinance.\n\nLord Esher M. R. in In re Lamb, Ex parte Board of Trade(') observed as follows :-\n\n\"The meaning of the term 'person aggrieved' was explained by this Court in Ex paru Official Receiver(').\n\nIt was there determined that any person who makes an application to a Court for a decision, or any person who is brought before a Court to subnlit to a decision, is, if the decision goes against l:im,_ thereby a 'person aggrieved' by that <lecision.\"\n\nLord Justice Kay in the same judgment made the following observations :-\n\n\"The preliminary objection to the appeal is twofold : (1) It is said that the Board of Trade are not 'persons aggrieved'.\n\nThey are persons whom the court was bound to hear, if they wished to be heard,. on the validity of this objection, and the decision bas\n\n( 1 ) [1894] 2 Q.B.D. 805.\n\n(')° 19 Q.B.D. 174.\n\n\\,..._II\n\n,..,\n\n--- ·-·-' ---~ ' j ,.,,\n\nS.C.R. cSUPREME, COURT.:REPORTS <707.\n\nbeen against them .. How it can be said that they are\n\n_ I9.5:Z not 'persons aggrieved', by the . decision, passes my Ebrahim understanding. \\Vhen two persons are in the position Aboobakar of litigants before the High Court, and the decision of .and Another , the Court goes against one of them, how it can be said v. that .he is not a 'person aggrieved' by the decision, Ouatoaian I cannot understand: I am clearly of opinion that the 0;;:::,.:1 Board were 'persons aggrieved' by this decision. Then .. Property.\n\n(2) it is said that the decision is not an 'order'. When --. __ - _the High . Court makes_ a declaration . of right, and Mahajan J. further orders the costs of the application to. be paid (which is the common form. here used), and that_ is dr_aw_n .up an.d sealed with_ the seal of the Court, an_d, I suppose plac_e.d on record, as all orders of the High .Court are, it seems t? me thatitis.clearly an order of the Court.'.' , 0 , In our opinion, Tekchand Dolwani is a person aggrieved within the rule stated in the decision mentioned above and the respondent rightly held that he\n\nhad locus standi to prefer the appeal.\n\nThe next point urged was that the appeal had been . preferred against the order of the 9th February and not against the order of. the 8th and that the respon-. dent had no jurisdiction to hear it. 'Whether the appeal in substance had been preferred against the order of the 8th or the order of the 9th was a matter which was certainly within the competence of the respondent to decide and does not involve any question of jurisdiction whatsoever. Be that as it may, we have examined .the memorandum of appeal presented by Tekchand Dolwani to the respondent and it appears to_ .. us that the High Court was right when it held that the-. . appeal was in effect and in substance an appeal from the order passed by the Additional Custodian oil the 8th February. The relief claimed in appeal concerns the order of the. 8th and the grounds of appeal only relate to this matter. The only defect poillted out was in the description of the order attacked in appeal. .. It is well settled that such errors of description cannot be a!lowed to prejudice the riht of a party. The two\n\n----F-·\n\nI ( f ' l,~\n\n. 19.51 orders of the 8th and 9th made on consecutive days, . though under different provisions of , the Ordinance,\n\n, J,,~\"/:.~:, were interlinked and the latter order was merely conseand Another 'quential on the conclusionreached on the 8th and the v. •description in the memorandum of appeal that the aus:odia,. appeal was against the order of the 9th cannot be a;:::,,7 , considered as really an error of a kin.d of which serious\n\n-notice <; ould be taken. - Pr<YP.,.~J.\n\nThe last point raised before us was not taken in the\n\n-.lIhd}anJ. - High Court .and.therefore we have not the benefit of that court's decision on the point~ It was contended -that no appeal lay against the order of the Additional\n\nCustodian dated the 8th February declining to declare Aboobaker. an evacuee, that the only order that the\n\nCustodian is entitled to pass undersectiori 7isanorder declaring any property to be evacuee property and that it is this order and this order alone which is appealable under section 24. ,- In our opinion, this _ contention is withouf force. Section 24 confers a right of appeal against all orders made under section 7 and _ does not specify the nature of the orders made appealable. In an enquiry under section 7 the first point for adjudication is whether a certain person falls within _ the definition of the word \"evacuee\" given in the Ordinance._ .If he comes within the ambit of the definition, then any property held by him becomes evacuee property. The civil court is barred from entertaining or adjudicating upon the questions whether the property is or is not evacuee property, or - whether an evacuee has any right or interest in any evacuee property.\n\nThe decision of the Custodian -whether in the affirmative or in the negative amounts . to an adjudication under section 7 and is as such appealable.\n\nIt was contended that when the Custodian reached the conclusion that a certain person is not an evacuee, then he is not entitled to make any order whatsoever -but has just to file the proceedings. This contention is unsound. \\Vhen a certain person claiming to be interested in getting a property declared evacuee propery is allowed to put in a written st; iteµient ; ind le; iq\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar Mid Another\n\nCustodian General of\n\nEvacuee Property.\n\nMahajan /.\n\norders of the 8th and <Jth made on consecutive days, though under different provisions of the Ordinance were interlinked and the latter order was merely conse'. quential on the conclusion reached on the 8th and the description in the memorandum of appeal that the appeal was against the order of the qth cannot be considered as rea)ly an error of a kind ot which serious notice could be taken.\n\nThe last point raised before us was not taken in the High Court and therefore we have not the benefit of that court's decision on the point.\n\nIt was contended that no appeal lay against the order of the Additional Custodian dated the 8th February declining to declare Aboobaker an evacuee, that the only order that the Custodian is entitled to pass under section 7 is an order declaring any property to he , evacuee property and that it is this order and this order alone which is appealahle under section 24.\n\nIn our opinion, this contention is witliout force. Section 24 confers a right of appeal against all orders made under section 7 and does not specify the nature of the orders made appealahle. In an enquiry under section 7 the first point for adjudication is whether a certain person falls within the definition of the word \"evacuee\" given jn the Ordinance.\n\nIf he comes within the ambit of the definition, then any property held by him becomes evacuee property.\n\nThe civil court 1s barred from entertaining or adjudicating upon the questions whether the property is or is not evacuee property, or whether an evacuee has any right or interest in any evacuee property.\n\nThe decision of the Custodian whether in the affirmative or 'in the negative amounts to an adjudication under section 7 and is as such appealahle.\n\nIt was contended that when the Custodian reached the conclusion that a certain person is not an evacuee, then he i> not entitled to make any order whatsoever but has just to file the proceedings.\n\nThis contention is unsound. When a certain person claiming to be interested In getting a property declared evacuee prol'' perty is allowed to put in a written statement and lead\n\n...... ~\n\n. ,..\n\nevidence, then the decision of the court whether favourable or unfavourable to him has to take the form of an adjudication and necessarily amounts to an order.\n\nReference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Federal Court in Rayarappan Nayanar v. Madhavi Amma(1) on an analogous provision of the Code of Civil Procedure contained in Orders XL, Rule 1, and XLIII, Rule 1 (s). Order XLIII, Rule 1 (s) makes any order made under Order. XL, Rule 1, appealable, while Order XL, Rule 1, only empowers the court to appoint a receiver. It was held that the order removing a receiver was appealable under Order XLIII, Rule I; inasmuch as such an order fell within the ambit of Order XL, Rule 1, and the power of appointing a receiver included the power of removing or dismissing him. The present case stands on a higher footing. The power of granting a certain relief includes obviously the power of refusing that relief.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the otder made by the Additional Custodian refusing to declare Aboobaker an evacuee and his property evacuee property was an order made under section 7 of the Ordinance and was therefore appealable under section 24 .\n\nThe result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs,\n\nAppeai dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : Rajindar Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta.\n\n( 1) [1949] F.C.R. 667.\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar and Another v.\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee Property.\n\nMakaian f.", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 806, "end_char": 812, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. A.\n\nMehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 877, "end_char": 889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents and Intervener : P. A.\n\nMehta.", "canonical_name": "P. A.\n\nMehta"}}, {"text": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 892, "end_char": 921, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CUSTODIAN GENERAL OF\n\nEVACUEE PROPERTY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 923, "end_char": 961, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CUSTODIAN GENERAL OF EVACUEE PROPERTY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 988, "end_char": 1006, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1009, "end_char": 1018, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1020, "end_char": 1023, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1134, "end_char": 1143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4243, "end_char": 4247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4289, "end_char": 4294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature for the Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4705, "end_char": 4744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for the Punjab at\n\n2-8 S.C. India/71\n\n1952 - Ebrahim Aboobak_ar and Another\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee Property •\n\nEvacuee Aboobakar end Aneiher\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee\n\nProperty."}}, {"text": "Ebrahim Aboobak_ar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for the Punjab at\n\n2-8 S.C. India/71\n\n1952 - Ebrahim Aboobak_ar and Another\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee Property •\n\nEvacuee Aboobakar end Aneiher\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee\n\nProperty.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "L. Manekshatv", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4994, "end_char": 5007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. L. Manekshatv (P. N. Bhagwati, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. N. Bhagwati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. L. Manekshatv (P. N. Bhagwati, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setaluad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5055, "end_char": 5069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setaluad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N. foshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N. foshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5100, "end_char": 5111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setaluad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N. foshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5202, "end_char": 5209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.- This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature of the State of Punjab dated the 24th May, 1951, dismissing the petition filed by the appellants for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the respondent ..\n\nAboobaker Abdul Rahman_, the father.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature of the State of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5257, "end_char": 5304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.- This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature of the State of Punjab dated the 24th May, 1951, dismissing the petition filed by the appellants for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the respondent ..\n\nAboobaker Abdul Rahman_, the father."}}, {"text": "Aboobaker Abdul Rahman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.- This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature of the State of Punjab dated the 24th May, 1951, dismissing the petition filed by the appellants for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the respondent ..\n\nAboobaker Abdul Rahman_, the father."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the partition of India, he went to Pakistan and was in Karachi in the month of September, 1947, where he purchased certain properties in that month."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5706, "end_char": 5714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the partition of India, he went to Pakistan and was in Karachi in the month of September, 1947, where he purchased certain properties in that month."}}, {"text": "Karachi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5726, "end_char": 5733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the partition of India, he went to Pakistan and was in Karachi in the month of September, 1947, where he purchased certain properties in that month."}}, {"text": "Tek Chand Dolwani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5852, "end_char": 5869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On informatjon supplied by one Tek Chand Dolwani to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property, the Additional Custodian started proceedings under the Bombay Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1949, against Aboobaker in or about the month of July, 1949.", "canonical_name": "Tek Chand Dolwani"}}, {"text": "Aboobaker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6038, "end_char": 6047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On informatjon supplied by one Tek Chand Dolwani to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property, the Additional Custodian started proceedings under the Bombay Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, 1949, against Aboobaker in or about the month of July, 1949.", "canonical_name": "Aboobaker"}}, {"text": "16th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6221, "end_char": 6240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, on the 16th December, 1949, the Additional Custodian issued a notice to the said Aboobaker under section 7 of the Ordinanc{ and a further notice on the 11th January, 1950, to shov."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6311, "end_char": 6320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, on the 16th December, 1949, the Additional Custodian issued a notice to the said Aboobaker under section 7 of the Ordinanc{ and a further notice on the 11th January, 1950, to shov."}}, {"text": "Tekchand Dolwani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6674, "end_char": 6690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the said notices an enquiry was held by the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property who after recording the statement of the said Aboobaker and examining some other evidence produced by the said Tekchand Dolwani and\n\ntakinointo consideration the written starement filed \" by him, adjudicated on the 8th February, 1950, that\n\nthe said Aboobaker was not an evacuee.", "canonical_name": "Tek Chand Dolwani"}}, {"text": "8th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6778, "end_char": 6796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the said notices an enquiry was held by the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property who after recording the statement of the said Aboobaker and examining some other evidence produced by the said Tekchand Dolwani and\n\ntakinointo consideration the written starement filed \" by him, adjudicated on the 8th February, 1950, that\n\nthe said Aboobaker was not an evacuee."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6995, "end_char": 7005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7037, "end_char": 7055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th February, 1950, he adjudicated him as an intending evacuee."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7109, "end_char": 7125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 31st March, 1950, Tekchand Dolwani being the informant and interested in the adjudication of the said Aboobaker as an evacuee, filed an appeal against the order of the 9th February to the respondent (The Custodian General of India) praying for an order declanng the said Aboobaker an evacuee and that he being the first informant should be allotted the said cinema."}}, {"text": "18th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7483, "end_char": 7499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th April, 1950, the Ordinance was replaced by Act XXXI of 1950."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7592, "end_char": 7601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard by the respondent in New Delhi on the 13th May, 1950."}}, {"text": "13th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7609, "end_char": 7623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard by the respondent in New Delhi on the 13th May, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7964, "end_char": 7974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aboobakcr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8267, "end_char": 8276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aboobakcr suddenly died on the 14th May, 1950, which was a Sunday and the respondent pronounced the order written on the 13th to the counsel of Aboobaker on the\n\n15th May, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Aboobaker"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8753, "end_char": 8762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ebrahim Aboobakar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8855, "end_char": 8872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ebrahim Aboobakar and Another v.\n\nCustodian General o/\n\nEvacuee Property.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "30th February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9414, "end_char": 9433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th February, 1951, they were informed that the appeal would be heard on the 7th March, 1951."}}, {"text": "7th March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9492, "end_char": 9507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th February, 1951, they were informed that the appeal would be heard on the 7th March, 1951."}}, {"text": "High Court of the State of Punjab at Simla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9853, "end_char": 9895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being aggrieved by the order of the respondent dated the 13th May, 1950, the appellants filed a petition in the High Court of the State of Punjab at Simla on the 26th February, 1951, under article 226 of the Constitution, praying for a writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside that order and for a writ of prohibition or mandamus directing the said respondent io forbear from proceeding with the heating of the said appeal on the 7th March, 1951, or on any other date or dates."}}, {"text": "26th February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9903, "end_char": 9922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being aggrieved by the order of the respondent dated the 13th May, 1950, the appellants filed a petition in the High Court of the State of Punjab at Simla on the 26th February, 1951, under article 226 of the Constitution, praying for a writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside that order and for a writ of prohibition or mandamus directing the said respondent io forbear from proceeding with the heating of the said appeal on the 7th March, 1951, or on any other date or dates."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9930, "end_char": 9941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tekchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10328, "end_char": 10336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the appeal preferred by Tekchand Dolwani before the respondent was in terms an appeal against tl1e order of the 9th February, 1950, and not an appeal against the conclusion reached on the 8th February, 1950, and inasmuch as the said order was made against Aboobaker and not in his favour, Tekchand had no right of appeal against the same and the respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain it or make any order therein.", "canonical_name": "Tek Chand Dolwani"}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10834, "end_char": 10844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11303, "end_char": 11317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the order of the respondent pronounced on the 15th May, 1950, was not a nullity and_ the appeal preferred by Tekchand was in effect and in substance an appeal from the order passed by the Additional Custodian on the 8th February, 1950, and that Tekchand was a preson aggrieved within the meaning of section 24 of the Ordinance."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11556, "end_char": 11566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th June, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11645, "end_char": 11660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It accordingly dismissed the petition with costs but on the 27th June, 1950, granted him leave to apr.eal to this Court under article 133 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11711, "end_char": 11722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11752, "end_char": 11767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th July, 1951, during the pendency of the appeal in this Court, the respondent finally pronounced orders on the appeal of Tekchand and held that Aboobaker was an evacuee and his property was declared evacuee property."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11990, "end_char": 12001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of the State of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12044, "end_char": 12077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A petition under article 226 for quashing this order is pending in the High Court of the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12498, "end_char": 12508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12809, "end_char": 12819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ebrahim Aboobakar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13042, "end_char": 13059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar ind Another\n\nCustodian General oj\n\nEvacuee Property,\n\nMahajan /,\n\n4.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "M. L. Manekshah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13272, "end_char": 13287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is mentioned in the judgment of the High Court that Shri M. L. Manekshah conceded that the death of Aboobaker docs not in any way affect the validity of the order pronounced by the Custodian General on the 15th May, 1950."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13728, "end_char": 13751, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of the State oi Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14069, "end_char": 14102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The larger question that has been raised in the petition pending before the High Court of the State oi Bombay that the properties of Aboobaker could not be declared evacuee properties after his death as they had devolved on his heirs was not raised in these proceedings and we have not been invited to decide it."}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16160, "end_char": 16165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Lord Esher, M. R., in Reg.", "canonical_name": "Esher"}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18397, "end_char": 18407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18492, "end_char": 18501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18503, "end_char": 18513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18515, "end_char": 18525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18529, "end_char": 18539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19992, "end_char": 20012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances it seems to us that the order of the High Court of Punjab that a writ of certiorari could not issue to the respond~ ent quashing the order of the 13th May, 1950, was right."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20351, "end_char": 20361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tekchand Dolwani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21316, "end_char": 21332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further Tekchand Dolwani was the first informant who brought to the notice of the Custodian concerned that the property of Aboobaker was evacuee property and in view of the order of the Ministry of Rehabilitation he was, as a first informant, entitled to first consideration in the allotment of this property, the Additional Custodian was bound to hear him on the truth ahd validity of the information given by him."}}, {"text": "Ebrahim Aboobakar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21834, "end_char": 21851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When a person is given a right to raise a contest in a certain matter and his contention is negatived, then\n\nEbrahim Aboobakar and A.notht:f\n\nv ..\n\nCustodian General of Evacuee Property.", "canonical_name": "EBRAHIM ABOOBAKAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22182, "end_char": 22192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22265, "end_char": 22274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22417, "end_char": 22426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22490, "end_char": 22500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22609, "end_char": 22617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23126, "end_char": 23135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23160, "end_char": 23165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Esher M. R. in In re Lamb, Ex parte Board of Trade(') observed as follows :-\n\n\"The meaning of the term 'person aggrieved' was explained by this Court in Ex paru Official Receiver(').", "canonical_name": "Esher"}}, {"text": "Kay", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23609, "end_char": 23612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Justice Kay in the same judgment made the following observations :-\n\n\"The preliminary objection to the appeal is twofold : (1) It is said that the Board of Trade are not 'persons aggrieved'."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24695, "end_char": 24702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of right, and Mahajan J. further orders the costs of the application to.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27278, "end_char": 27288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27345, "end_char": 27355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27412, "end_char": 27421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27507, "end_char": 27516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28079, "end_char": 28088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29330, "end_char": 29339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29473, "end_char": 29483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29537, "end_char": 29547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29604, "end_char": 29613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29697, "end_char": 29706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30263, "end_char": 30272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31003, "end_char": 31030, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31794, "end_char": 31803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31856, "end_char": 31866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajindar Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31983, "end_char": 31998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : Rajindar Narain."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32029, "end_char": 32040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "P. A.\n\nMehta"}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 667", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32048, "end_char": 32065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_710_737_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "MRy 20\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nLACHMANDAS KEW ALRAM AHUJA\n\nAND ANOTHER\n\nfl.\n\n[1952]\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY. [PATANJALI SAsTRI C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.]\n\nConstt.tution of India, .tlrts. 13, 14-Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, s. 12-Provision empowering Government to refer 'cases' for trial by Special Judge-Validity-Discriminatior> -Proceedings commenced before 26th January, 195(), before Special\n\nfudge-Procedure discriminatory-Continuation of trial under special procedure-Validity of trial-Applicability of Constitution to pe\"nding trials.\n\nfield, pe1 :MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR/.\n\nArYAll, JJ. (PATANJAL! SASTR! C. J. dissenting).-Section 12 of the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947; in so far, at any rate~ as it authorises the Govern1nent to direct particular \"cases\" to be tried by a Special Judge appointed under the Act does not purport to proceed on any classification and therefore contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution and is void under Art. 13 on the pr!aciples laid down in the cases of State of Bengal v., Anwa1 Ali Sarkar ([1952] S.C.R. 284) and Kathi Raning Raf{)at v. Th, State of Saurashtra ([1952) S.C.R. 435).\n\n'fhe appellants who were accused of having con11nitted xnurder and other serious offences were directed by the Governn1ent of Bombay by an order made on the 6th August, 1949, to be tried under the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act by a Special JuJgc appointed under the Act, charges were fra1ned against then1 on the 13th January, 1950, and they \\Vere convicted in March,\n\n1950. On appeal it was contended before the High Court that the trial and conviction \\Vere illegal as the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act was void under Art. 13 read \\Vith r\\rt. 14 of the Constitution which came into force on the 26th ]:Jnuary, 1950, but the 1-Iigh Court held that as the procee<lings:\n\na.gaint the accused had commenced before the Constitution, the provisions of Arts. 13 and 14 did not apply and the conviction\n\n\\Vas not illegal.\n\nHeld, by a ma1or1ty, that although substantive rights and liabilities acquired or accrued before the date of the Constitution remain enforceable, it caqnot be held that after that date, thoscrights or liabilities must be enforced under the particular pro- 1-' cedure that \\vas in force before that date, although it has since that date been repealed or come into conflict with the fundamental • right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the\n\nConstitution, as there is no vested right in procedure. The fact of reference of \"cases\" to the Special Judge before the Con- 1titution came into force has no reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act, the discrimination therefore continued after the Constitution came into force and\n\nuth continuation of the application of the discriminatory procedure to the cases of the appellants after the date of the Constitution constituted a b.-each of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14, and the appellants were therefore entitled to be tried under the ordinary procedure after the date of the Constitution.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI\n\nC. ]. (contra).-Granting that s. 12 of the Bombay Act must, in view of the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar' s case, be held to be discriminatory and void in so far as it empowers the State Government to refer individual cases to :i Special Judge for trial, the trial of the appellants which had validly started before the Special Judge who had ben empower ed to try the case cannot be vitiated by the Constitution subsequently coming into force.\n\nThe provisions of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights have no retrospective operation and do not affect a criminal prosecution commenced before the Constitution came into force.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the Special Judges validly created and exercised before tl1e Constitution and their competence to try the cases referred to them cannot be affected by the special pro-. ccdure becoming discriminatory.\n\nThe correct view is that Art. 14 does lnot affect pencJling trials even in matters of procedure.\n\nMoreover the appellants against whom proceedings had been commenced before the Special Judge, were not in the same situation as others and there was nothing discriminatory in a law which permits them to be tried under the special procedure which was applicable to them when the proceedings were started against them.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE Jumsn1cT10N: Cases Nos. 20 and 21 of 1950.\n\nAppeals under Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated the 19th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay (Dixit and Shah, JJ.) in Confirmation Case No. 4 of 1950 and Criminal Appeals Nos. 190 and 199 of 1950, arising out of judgment dated the 13th March, 1950, of the Court of the Special Judge at Ahmedabad in Special Cases Nos. 2 and 3 of 1949.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee and Ram Lal Anand (Hardyal Hardy and S. L. Chibber, with them) for the appellants.\n\nLachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another v.\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nLachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Anl!ther\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India Joshi, with him) for the respondent.\n\n[1952]\n\n(G. N.\n\nA. A. Peerbhoy and J. B.\n\nDadachanji for the Intervener.\n\n1952.\n\nMay 20.\n\nThe judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ. was delivered by Das J. Patanjali Sastri C.J. delivered a separate dissenting judgment.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-I regret I am unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother Das J. whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading.\n\nThe appellants were convicted and sentenced to death and varying terms of imprisonment by the Special Judge, Ahmedabad, on charges of murder and other offences under the Indian Penal Code,. the Arms Act and the Bombay Police Act.\n\nThe Special Judge was appointed by a notification ..issued under the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) and on August 6, 1949, the State Government, in exercise of the powers ' conferred by section 12 of the impugned Act, directed the Special Judge to try the case of the appellants who were implicated in what was known as the Central Bank Robbery Case.\n\nCharges were framed on January 13, 1950, without any preliminary enquiry and committal by a Magistrate which had been dispensed with by the impugned Act, and seventeen witnesses for the prosecution were examined before January 26, 1950, when the Constitution came into force.\n\nThe proceedings continued, and after the examination of sixty witnesses in all, ended in the conviction of the appellants on March 13, 1950.\n\nSeparate appeals were preferred by the present appellants to the High Court which, however, confirmed the conviction and sentence in each case.\n\nAn objection that the trial was illegal as the imug; ied Act was void under article 13 ( 1) of the Const1tut10n; read with article 14, was overruled on the ground that\n\n. .\n\n' ...\n\nthose provisions had no retrospective operation and did not affect proceedings already started \"in the Court of the Special Judge.\n\nThe learned Judges followed the decision of a Special Bench of their own Court in In re Keshav Madhav Menon(1), which has since been\n\naffirmed by this Court in (1951] S.C.R. 228.\n\nIt is urged on behalf of the appellants that the decision relied on by the High Court is distinguishable and that the present case is governed by the decision of this Court in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar(2) to the effect that section 5 of the Bengal Act (which is in identical terms with section 12 of the impugned Act) is discriminatory and void in so far, at any rate, as it empowers the State Government to direct \"cases\" to be tried by a Special Court under a special\n\nprocedure.\n\nAcoorldingly, 1t was claimed that the Special Judge had no jurisdidion to try the appellants applying the special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act.\n\nGranting, however, that section 12 of the impugned Act must, in view of the decisio.n in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case(2), be held to be disi; riminatory and void in so far as it empowers the State Government to refer individual cases to a Special Judge for trial, it does not seem to me to follow that the trial of the appellants, which had validly started before the Special Judge who had been duly empowered to try the case, is vitiated by reason of the Constitution subsequently coming into force. It is to be noted that the West Bengal case(2 ) was argued on the basis that article 14 of the Constitution was applicable to the proceedings from their inception, although the notification directing the trial of some of the persons accused in that case was issued on the day before the commencement of the Constitution. The position here is different.\n\nThe appellant's case was sent to the Special Judge for trial by notiiication dated 6th August, 1949, and the Judge took cognisance of it, framed the charges and proceeded with the trial to a considerable extent before the commencement of the Constitution on 26th\n\n(1) [1950] 52 Born. L.R. 540.\n\n( 2) {1952] S.C.R. 284. 3-8 S.C.India/71\n\nLachmandas\n\nKi:walram\n\nAhuja tmd A notlli:r\n\nT ht: State of Bombay.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. f.\n\nLachmandas\n\nKewalram\n\nAhuia and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay.\n\nPataniali Sas1ri C. J, .\n\nJanuary, 1950.\n\nThere could be no question, therefore, of the appellants' fundamental right under article 14 being infringed up to that point, as it has been held by this court in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case(') that the provisions of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights have no retrospective operation and do not affect a criminal prosecution commenced before the Constitution came into force.\n\nOn and after 26th January, 1950, the appellants, no doubt, had the right to the equal protection of the law; but, as has been repeatedly pointed out, that right only meant that the State, including the executive and the legislature, should apply the same law, substantive and procedural, to all persons alike in the same situation without discrimination.\n\nIt is said that after the commencement of the Constitution persons who commit the same offences with which the appellants stood charged would, according to Anwar Ali Sark_ar's case(\") not be liable to be tried by the Special Judge under the special procedure and, if so, the trial of the appellants, too, could not be continued by the Special Judge under uch procedure after 26th January, 1950, because such of the departures from the normal procedure of trial under the Criminal Procedure Code as were applied to the appellants during the rest of their trial; being disadvantageous to them in some respects, involved discrimination against them. It is, therefore, daimed that the continued application of such discriminatory procedure after the Constitution came into force rendered the trial and the resulting conviction illegal.\n\nI am unable to agree.\n\nIn the first place, as already pointed out, equal protection of the laws postulates persons in the same situation and in the same circumstances claiming that the same law should be applied to them. - Can it be said that the appellants, whose trial by the Special Judge had been lawfully commenced and was pending at the commencement of the Constitution, were in the same situation with persons who committed the same offences after the Constitution came into\n\n{') [1951] S.C.R. 228.\n\n( 2 ) [1952] S.C.R. 284.\n\nforce ? It seems to me that the situation and circumstances are different in the two cases and no compla'int of discriminatory treatment by reason only of the trial having been continued under the special procedure can be sustained, even assuming that the ordinary procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code became applicable to the appellants on and after 26th January, 1950.\n\nSuch assumption, however, seems to be open to question. Section 1, sub-section (2), of the Criminal Procedure Code enacts that \"Nothing herein contained shall affect ........ any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force ...... \" The jurisdiction conferred on the Special Judge by the impugned Act, which, as pointed out already, was perfectly valid and fully operative down to the 26th January, 1950, thus remained unaffected and application to the appellants of the ordinary procedure prescribed by the Code was excluded.\n\nIt cannot, therefore, be said that on the 26th January, 1950, the appellants were in a position to claim that they were entitled to be tried under the ordinary procedure like those who committed the same offences after that date or who, having committed them before such date, had not been directed to be tried by the Special Judge. It was said that section 1 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code pre-supposes a valid law conferring a special jurisdiction or prescribing a special form of procedure and, inasmuch as such parts of the special procedure as could still be applied to trials continued after the commencement of the Constitution are void under article 13 (1) read with article 14, section 1 (2) of the Code could not stand in the way of the appellants being tried under the ordinary procedure. This argument seems to me to beg the question. It assumes that the special procedure is discriminatory and void to the extent to which it could have been applied to the trial of the appellants after 26th January, 1950.\n\nBut the assumption would not be valid unless the appellants could be tried\n\nLachmandu\n\nKewalram Ahuja and Another.\n\nThe Stat11 of Bombay.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nh7. 1952\n\nLachmandas Kewalram\n\nAhuia and Another\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nPatanjali .Sastri C. /.\n\nunder the normal procedure after 26th January, 1950, in which case alone they would say \"Why not try us lUlder the Code; why discriminate ?\" But, having regard to section 1(2) of the Code, the normal procedure would become applicable only if the special procedure is excluded as being discriminatory and void.\n\nThe argument thus proceeds in a circle.\n\nAgain, it is diflicult to see on what principle the jurisdiction of the Special Judge, validly created and exercised over the appellants' case; could cease to continue on and after 26th January, 1950. According to the appellants' contention, the special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act became discriminatory and void after 26th January, 1950, and, therefore, inapplicable to what remained of their trial.\n\nBut, could this circumstance affect the competence of the Special Judge to try their case of which he had validly taken cognisance? In Keshoram Poddar v. Nundo Lal Mullick(') the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the cessation of the jurisdiction of a Rent Control Tribunal after 31st March, 1924, over properties beyond a certain rental value did not affect its power to deal with a case after such cessation if the case was within its jurisdictioo when it was filed and related to a period prior to such cessation. Their Lordships observed : ''The application of the Act is when the parties begin to move under it This was done in the present case before March 1924. The rest is merely the working out of the application\".\n\nThe position here seems to me to be closely analogous. The Special Judge was competent to try the appellants' case when the trial commenced before 26th January, 1950, and the impugned Act was validly applied to the case.\n\nThe rest was merely working out the application of the impugned Act.\n\nI find it difficult to see why the competency of the Special Judge to try the case should cease after 26th January, 1950, any more than that of the Rent Contrd!. Tribunal to deal with a pending matter after 31st March, 1924, when its jurisdiction was restricted. ·\n\n(') [1927] 54 I.A. 152.\n\nIf, then, the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to continue the trial of the appellants remained unaffected by the advent of the Constitution, it would be impracticable for the Judge to switch the pending trials to a different procedure from 26th January, 1950, so as to give effect to the equal protection claims of under-trial prisoners.\n\nThe impugned Act, for instance, enacts that \"NotwithstancJjng anything contained in the Code the trial of offences before a Special Judge shall not be by jury or with the aid of assessors\"\n\n(s. 20).\n\nThe trials having been held so far without a jury or assessors as the case may be, it would obviously be impossible in such cases to continue them after 26th January, 1950, with a jury or with the aid of assessors, where such trials are required to be so conducted under the ordinary procedure.\n\nAgain, the impugned Act provides that no case shall be transferred from any Special Judge, a necessary consequence of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Judge and the special mode of proceeding prescribed for him. If a right of transfer under section 526 of the Code were to be recognised as accruing after 26th January, 1950, to persons undergoing trial before the Special Judge, the scheme of trial by Special Courts may well break down. The alternative courses open to the Court would, therefore, seem to he either to hold that article 13 (1), read with article 14, does not affett pending trials even in respect of procedural matters as it has been held not to affect such trials in respect of substantive rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case(1), or to go back on that decision and give those provisions of the Constitution retrospective effect.\n\nI am clearly of opinion that the principle of the above-said decision must rule the present case. That principle has been stated thus: \"Article 13 (1) cannot be read as obliterating the entire operation of the inconsistnt laws, or to wipe them out altogether from the statute-book, for, to do so will be to give them retrospective effect which, we have said, they do not possess.\n\nSuch laws exist for all past transactions and for enforcing a/.l\n\n. (1) (1951 J S.C.R. 228.\n\n~. ,\n\nLachmand11s\n\nKewalram\n\nAhuja and Another v.\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nLachmamlas\n\nKewal ram\n\nAhuia uzd Another v.\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nrights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution\". (Italics mine).\n\nIndeed, the last few words are apt to cover the present case, though, as a party. to that decision, I am sensible that we did not have in mind a case precisely like the one now before us.\n\nBut, it is well to remember that over-fine distinctions sometimes lead to unsuspected traps.\n\nIn the foregoing discussion I have assumed that such departures from the normal procedure as were still applicable to what remained of the appellants' trial after the 26th January, 1950, were so materially prejudicial to them as to amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nI am, however, by no means satisfied that that is the position. One of these deviations relates to the recording of evidence. The Special Judge is empowered to record only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness examined, whereas the Criminal Procedure Code requires the evidence to be recorded in full. Another relates to the summoning of witnesses for the defence, the Special Judge being given a discretion to refuse to summon a witness \"if satisfied after examination of the accused that the evidence of such witness wijl not be\n\nmaterial\" (s. 13), while under section ?57 (1) of the Code the Magistrate has the discretion to refuse to summon witnesses if he considers that the application for the issue of process for compelling the attendance of any witness is made \"for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice\". And lastly, the impugned Act provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to transfer any case from any Special Judge (section 18 (3) ), whereas transfers under section 526 of the Code are allowed on certain specified grounds. The more important departures from the procedure under the Code such as dispensation of preliminary enquiry and committal and the elimination of jury and assessors had already been applied, and validly applied, to the trial of the appellants before the Constitution came into force, and there can be no question of such departures vitiating the trial.\n\nI am unable to regard the\n\nprocedural variations in the recording of evidence and the summoning of witnesses as so serious as to amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of article 14. Even if the appellants were to be tried under the normal procedure of the Code after 26th January, 1950, the omission to record the evidence in full and the refusal to summon a witness in the circumstances mentioned in section 13 may well be regarded as mere irregularities curable under section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As regards transfer, it does not, as already pointed out, fit in with the scheme of trial before a Special Judge, and, unless any system of trials by Special Courts is to be condemned as violative of article 14--the decision of this Court in Kathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra(1) shows that it can be validly instituted in appropriate circumstances-a prohibition of transfer cannot be regarded as falling with'in the inhibition of article 14.\n\nI have emphasised elsewhere, and I do so again, that in applying the dangerously wide and vague language of the equality clause to the concrete facts of life, a doctrinaire approach should be avoided.\n\nIn all the circumstances of this case, I do not feel impelled to set aside the trial and conviction of the appellants and I accordingly dismiss the appeals.\n\nDAs J.-These two appeals are from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court (Dixit and Shah JJ.) dated May 19, 1950, dismissing the appeals preferred by the appellants against the order made by Shri M. S. Patil on March 13, 1950, as the Special Judge appointed under the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947, whereby he convicted and sentenced them to death and to different terms of imprisonment under the different charges.\n\nThe prosecution case is shortly as follows : On the morning of May 26, 1949, between the hours of 10-30 a.m. and 11 a.m. in the city of Ahmedabad the two appellants with another companion, after injuring, by gunshot, the driver and a peon of the Central\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 435.\n\nLachmandas\n\nKewalram\n\nAhuja 11nd Another v.\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C, /.\n\nr\" 19'2\n\nLachmandas\n\nKewalram Ahuja and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay.\n\nDai /.\n\nBank of India Ltd., forcibly removed moto~ van No.\n\nBY 4388 belonging to the bank in which 11 large sum of money was being carried from its head office at Gandhi Road to its branch office at Maskati. After abandoning the motor van at a distance of threefourths of a mile, the three gunmen forcibly took possession of the bicycles of some persons who were riding the same and continued their escape.\n\nIn course of their flight, they fired and injured several people.\n\nEventually, however, the two appellants were arrested by the Police but their companion made good his escape. . The driver and the peon of the bank who had been injured succumbed to their injuries, one dying on the spot and the other in the hospital on the next day.\n\nAfter investigation, the Ahmedabad Police, on July 19, 1949, submitted to the City Magistrate, Ahmedabad, two charge sheets Nos. 183 and 183-A against the two appellants and the then unknown absconder in respect of several offences cmnmi_tted in course of the transaction that took place on May 26, 1949. The charge sheet No. 183 was in respect of offences under sections 394, 397, 302, 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, section 19 ( e) of the Arms Act, and sect; on 68 (1) of the Bombay District Police Act. The charge sheet No. 183-A was in respect of offences punishable under sections 307, _392 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, section 19( e) of the Arms Act and section 68(1) of the Bombay District Police Act. In each of these charge sheets there was appended a note to the effect that the District Superintendent of Police, Ahrnedabad City, had requested the District Magistrate, Ahmedabad, to move the Government of Bombay for the constitution of a Special Court to hear the cases and that the said charge sheets might be transferred to the Special Court as and when one was so constituted. In view of this note the City Magistrate did not hold any enquiry but only remanded the appellants.\n\nBy a Notification dated August 6, 1949, the Government of Bombay exercising its powers under section 10 of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947,\n\n. .J\n\nconstituted a Special Court of criniinal jurisdiction for the Ahmedabad District and under section 11 of that Act appointed Shri M. S. Patil, District and Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, as a Special Judge to preside over the Special Court.\n\nBy another Notification made on the same date, the Government of Bombay in exercise of powers conferred by section 12 of the Act directed the Special Judge to try two particular cases, namely, the Postal Van dacoity case in which there were 9 accused and the Central Bank robbery with murder case in wliich the two :appellants before us were the accused under the two charge sheets.\n\nIn view of the above Notification the City Magistrate, Ahmedabad, transferred the two cases against the appellants to the Court of the Special Judge and they came to be numbered as cases Nos. 2 and 3 respectively of ~949.\n\nOn December 31, 1949, the Government of Bombay directed that the trial of the appellants should be held by the Special Judge in the Ahmedabad Central Prison.\n\nThere was no order of committal by any Committing Magistrate nor was there any preliminary enquiry by the Special Judge .\n\nOn January 13, 1950, the Special Judge consolidated the two cases against the appellants with a view to holding a joint trial. On the same day he framed five several charges, namely, four under different sections of the India Penal Code and one under section 19 ( e) of the Indian Arms Act and section 68 (1) of the Bombay District Police Act. On January 19, 1950, the first prosecution witness was examined and up to January 25, 1950, seventeen prosecution witnesses were examined. The Constitution came into operation on January 26,\n\n1950. Tlie hearing proceeded thereafter and the deposition of the last witness was recorded on February 9, 1950. Altogether sixty-two witnesses were examined. The two appellants were examined under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on February 10, 1950. One handwriting expert was examined as a Court witness on February 13, 1950, and argumets for the prosecution commenced on the following day.\n\nAfter the conclusion of the\n\nLzchmandas\n\nKewalram Ahuia and Another\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nDllS /.\n\n' '\n\nLflchmandas\n\nKewal ram Ahuia 11nd Another\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nDas/.\n\narguments for the defence on February 23, 1950, the Special Judge delivered his judgment on March 13, 1950.\n\nAccording to his findings both the appellants had committed eleven different offences punishable under several penal provisions of law as specified by him and he convicted both the appellants of the said eleven offences and sentenced both of them to death under section 302/34, Indian Penal Code, and to transportation for life under section 307 /34, Indian Penal Code, and to various terms of imprisonment under various other sections of the Indian Penal Code, Arms Act and Bombay District Police Act.\n\nThe capital sentences were, of course, subject to the confirmation by the High Court.\n\nBoth the appellants appealed to the Bombay High Court.\n\nThe appeals along with the reference for the confirmation of the sentences of death were heard together by Dixit and Shah JJ. who by their judgments dated May 19, 1950, dismissed the appeals and confirmed the sentences of death. The appellants applied to the High Court for certificates under articles 132 (1) and 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution to enable them to appeal to this Court. The High Court (Bhagwati and Dixit JJ.), however, granted the appellants a certificate only under article 132 (1) but declined to issue any under article 134 (1) (c). The appellants thereupon filed the present appeals pursuant to the certificate under article 132 (1). A petition was filed before us under article 132 (3) for leave to urge, as an additional ground, that the trial was vitiated by reason of misjoinder of charges. No such ground was actually advanced before the High Court and as this Court did not think fit to permit the appellants to raise a new point at this stage it disallowed that petition.\n\nAccordingly these appeals must be limited to attacking the judgment of the High Court on the ground that a substantial question. of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution has been wrongly decided.\n\nThe only substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution urged before us is that\n\nthe Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, or, at any rate, that part of section 12 of that Act which authorises the State government to direct specific \"cases\" to be tried by a Special Judge appointed under that Act, offends against the equal protection of law guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution and is as such void under article 13 on the principle laid down J by this Court in the cases of The State of West Bengal\n\nv. Anwar Ali Sarkar(1) and Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra(2 ). In order to appreciate the pont in issue, it is necessary to consider in some detail the provisions of the impugned Act.\n\nThe Act came into force on March 23, 1947. It was then intituled as \"An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to public safety, maintenance of public -Jrder and the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the Province of Bombay\".\n\nThe preamble recited the expediency of consolidating and amending the law relating to those several matters.\n\nBy section 2 (3) the Act was to remain in force for a period of three years. The Act was amended by Bombay Act I of 1950 and amongst other things, the words \"security of the State, maintenance of public order and maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community in the State of Bombay\" were substituted for the words \"public safety, maintenance of public order and the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the Province of Bombay\" occurring in the long title and preamble of the Act.\n\nThe word \"six\" was substituted for the word \"three\" in section 2 (3). The remaining sections of the Act are grouped under several heads.\n\nThus sections 3 (Al) to 5B are grouped under the heading \"Restrictions of movements etc.\".\n\nA contravention of an order made under some of these sections is made an offence punishable as mentioned therein.\n\nThe subject of \"collective fines\" is dealt with under that heading in section 6. \"Control of camps etc. and uniforms\" are covered by sections 7 and 8, each of which makes a contravention\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 284.\n\n(2) [1952] S.C.R. 435.\n\nLachmandas\n\nKewalram Ahuja and Another\n\nv. The State of Bombay.\n\nDas/.\n\nLachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another v.\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nDas f.\n\nof any order made under it an offence. Section 9 prescribes whipping as a punishment for certain offences under certain Acts in addition to any other punishment to which the offender may be liable under those Acts.\n\nSection 9 A is set down under the heading \"Control of Publications etc.\" and section 9B under the heading \"Control of Commodities etc.\".\n\nEach of those sections makes a contravention of any order made thereunder an offence punishable as provi.ded therein.\n\nSections 10 to 20 which are collected under the heading \"Special Courts\" are material for the purposes of the point in issue before us and will have to be carefully noted. The rest of the sections are set out under the headings \"Miscellaneous\" and \"Amendments to Acts\".\n\nTurning to the group of sections under the heading \"Special Courts\", it will be noticed that section 10, like section 3 of the West Bengal (Special Courts) Act, 1950, and section 9 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance, 1948, authorises the government by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification.\n\nSection 11 which corresponds to section 4 of the West Bengal Act and section 10 of the Saurashtra Ordinance empowers the government to appoint as a Special Judge to preside over a Special Coun any person possessing the requisite qualifications mentioned therein. Section 12 is expressed in precisely the same terms in which section 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Act and section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance are expressed, namely :\n\n\"A Sp.ecial Judge shall try such offences or class of offences or such cases or class of cases as the Provincial Government may, by general or special order in writing direct.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that the offences mentioned in the above section are not limited to offences created by . this Act only but also cover offences under any other law, e.g., the Indian Penal Code, Section 13 runs thus: I\n\n\"13. (1) A Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to his Court for trial.\n\n(2) A Special Judge shall ordinarily record a memorandum only of the substance of the evidence of each witness examined, may refuse to summon any witness if satisfied after examination of the accused that the evidence of such witness will not be material and shall not be bound to adjourn any trial for any purpose unless such adjournment is,\" in his opinion, necessary in the interests of justice. ( 3) In matters not coming within the scope of sub.sections (1) and (2), the provisions of the Code, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provis'ions of sections. 10 to 20, shall apply to the proceedings of a Special Judge; and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session.\"\n\nUnder section 14 of the Special Judge may in his discretion direct the evidence of a person who is not in a position to attend the Court to be recorded on com-\n\n~ mission.\n\nEnhanced punishments are provided for certain offences by section 15 as follows :\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Penal Code, whoever commits an offence of attempt to murder may, in lieu of any punishment to which he is liable under the said Indian Penal Code, be punishable with death; and whoever commits an offence of voluntarily causing hurt by stabbing may, in lieu of any punishment to which he is liable under > the said Indian Penal Code, be punishable with death or transportation for life.\"\n\nSection 16 authorises the Special Judge to pass any sentence authorised by law and section 17 prescribes a special rule of procedure for recovery of fines. Section 18 gives a right of appeal to a person convicted on a trial held by a Special\n\n'~ Judge within a period of fifteen days from the date of sentence and also empowers the High Court tD call for the records of the proceedings of any\n\nLachmandas\n\nKewalram Ahuia and Another\n\nThe St11te of Bombay.\n\nDas f.\n\nLachmandas Kewalram Ahuia .and Another\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nDas/.\n\ncase tried by a Special Judge and in respect of such case exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by sections 423, 426 and 428 of the Code.\n\nSub-section (3) of section 18 runs thus :\n\n\"No Court shall have jurisdiction to transfer any case from any Special Judge or to make any order under section 491 af the Code in respect of any person triable by a Special Judge or, save as herein otherwise provided, have jurisdiction of any kind in respect of proceedings of any Special Judge.\"\n\nThus the right to apply for transfer of the case and the right to apply for revision are denied to an accused who is tried by a Special Judge. Ordinary law is, by section 19 made applicable in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of sections 10 to 20. Section 20 provides as follows :- \"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, the trial of offences before a Special Judge shall not be by jury or with the aid of assessors.\"\n\nThus, besides providing for enhanced punishment and whipping the Act eliminates the committal proceedings [section 13 (1) ], permits the Special Judge to record only a memorandum of the evidence, confers on him a larger power to refuse to summon a defence witness, than what is conferred on a Court by section 257 ( 1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also deprives the accused of his right to apply for a transfer or for revision.\n\nThat these departures from the ordinary law cause prejudice to person subjected to the procedure prescribed by the Act cannot for a moment be denied.\n\nThis Court has, by its decisions in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar\n\n(supra) and in Kathi Raning Rawal v. The State of Saurashtra (supra), recognised that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive Ia:w but also by a law of procedure and that the procedure prescribed by the corresponding provisioI)s in the West Bengal Special Courts Act and the Saurashtra Ordinance which introduced similar departures from the ordinary law of procedure constituted a discrimination\n\n......\n\nagainst persons tried by the Special Judge according to procedure prescribed by those pieces of legislation and finally that, in any event, section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Act and section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance, both of which corresponded to section 12 of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, in so far as they authorised the government to direct specific and particular \"cases\" to be tried by the Special fuoge, was unconstitutional and void. In view of the departures from the ordinary law brought about by the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, which are noted above it, cannot but be held, on a parity of reasoning, that at any rate section 12 of the Act, in so far as it authorises the Government to direct particular \"cases\" to be tried by a Special Judge, is also unconstitutional.\n\nLearned Attorney-General appearing for the State of Bombay does not controvert the legal position as d'iscussed above but he points out that the offences were committed in May, 1949, that the Special CoUrt was constituted and the Special Judge was appointed in August, 1949, and these \"cases\" were directed to be tried by the Special Judge in August, 1949, that the Special Judge actually framed charges against the appellants on January 13, 1950, and that the depositions of seventeen witnesses had been taken before the Constitution came into force and when the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, was valid 'in its entirety. He contends, on the authority of the decision of this Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay(1), that the Constitution has no retroactive operation and that it does not affect the rights acquired or the liabilities incurred under laws which, before the advnt of the Constitution, were valid, and, quoting from the judgment of the majority of the Bench in that case, that \"such laws exist for all 'past transactions and for enforcing all rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution\", he urges that the legal proceedings commenced before the Constitution came into\n\n( 1)\n\n[ 1951 J S.C.R. 221. ' 1 ; ; v,\n\nLachmandas Kewalram Ahuia and Anoth~\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nDas/.\n\nLachmandas\n\nKewalram\n\nAhuia and Another\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nDas f.\n\noperation are in no way affected by it and may well be proceeded with.\n\nIn Keshavan Madhava Menon's case, the appellant was the Secretary of People's Publishing House, Ltd., of Bombay.\n\nIn September, 1949, he was alleged to have published a pamphlet which, according to the Bombay Government authorities, was a \"news sheet\" within the meaning of section 2 ( 6) of the Indian Press\n\n(Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. On December 9, 1949, he was arrested and a prosecution was started against him in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay for having published the pamphlet without the authority required by section 15 (1) of the Act and for having thereby committed an offence punishable under section 18 of that Act. During the pendency of the proceedings the Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950. On March 3, 1950, the petitioner filed a written statement submitting, inter alia that the definition of \"news sheet\" as given in section 2 ( 6) of that Act, and sections 15 and 18 thereof were inconsistent with article 19 (1) (a) and, as such, void under article 13 of the Constitution.\n\nThis was followed up by a petition -filed in the High Court on March 7, 1950, under article 228 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Bombay High Court considered it unnecessary to deal with the question whether sections 15 and 18 were inconsistent with article 19 ( 1) (a) but held that, assuming that they were inconsistent, the proceedings commenced under section 18 before the commencement of the Constitution could nevertheless be proceeded with. The High Court took the view that the word \"void\" was used in artide 13(1) in the sense of \"repealed\" and that consequently it attracted section 6 of the General Clauses Act which by article '367 was made applicable for the interpretation of the Constitution. The High Court. having dismissed the application the appellant came up on appeal before this Court after having obtained a certificate granted by the High Court under article 132 (1) of the Constitution.\n\nThe majority of this Court held that the Constitution\n\nbad no retrospective effoct but was wholly prospective\n\n.. ~\n\n,_,\n\nin its operation and as the existing laws, in so far as they were inconsistent with the fundamental rights, were rendered void only to the extent of their inconsistency, they were not void for all purposes but were void only to the extent they came into conflict with the fundamental rights. In other words, the majority of this Court held that while on and after the commencement of the Constitution no existing law could, by reason of article 13 (1), be permitted to stand in the way of the exercise of any of the fundamental rights, that article could not be read as wiping out the incensistent law altogether from the statute book and as obliterating its entire operation on past transactions, for to do so would be to give it retrospective effect which it did not possess. Such law, it was held, existed for all past transactiom and for enforcement of rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution. To the same effect were the observations of Mahajan J. who delivered a separate but concurrent judgment, namely that a provision that with effect from a particular date an existing law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy had no retrospective operation and could not affect pending prosecurions or actions taken under such law, and there was in such a situation no necessity for introducing a saving clause and that it did not need the said of a legislative provi--\n\nsioa of the nature contained in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act.\n\nAccording to him, not bc.ing retrospective in its operation, the Constitution could not, therefore, in any way affect prosecutions started for punishing offences that were complete under the law in force at the time they were committed. It will be noticed that in that case the prosecution was started according to the ordinary law of procedure.\n\nThe only question there was whether a criminal proceeding instituted for a contravention of the provisions of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act which amounted to a completed offence before the date of the Constitution could be continued after the Constitution came into force where no change in procedure was involved. The result of that decision is that although\n\n+-S s, c. India/71\n\nLllchmandM\n\nKewalram\n\nAhuja .,,, Anotlur\n\nTlie Stale of\n\nBomb•y.\n\nDM /.\n\nLachmandas Kewalram\n\nAhuja •nd Another v.\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nDas/.\n\nthe acts which before the Constitution constituted an offence under that Act would not, if done after the date of the Constitution, amount to an offence, nevertheless as the Constitution had no retrospective operation it did not obliterate the offence completed before the date of the Constitution and the offender could, therefore, be proceeded against after the Constitution came into force. It was in this sense that it was stated in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case that the law existed for the past transactions and for enforcing all rights acquired or liabilities incurred before the date of the Constitution.\n\nIf the law did not exist, the offence created by it would ipso facto disappear and no question of punishing the non-existing offence could arise.\n\nThe observations made in that case related to thi: substantive rights acquired or liabilities incurred under the Act before the Constitution came into force.\n\nUnder what procedure the rights and liabilities would be enforced did not come up for consideration in that case, as the procedure adopted throughout was the same, namely, the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. ·\n\nThe law of procedure regulates legal proceedings generally from its inception up to its termination and usually connotes a continuous process.\n\nThe Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, by sections 10 to 20 under the heading \"Special Courts\" prescribes 2 special procedure for the trial by the Special Judge of \"such ofl:ences or class of offences or cases or class of cases as the government may by general or special order in writing direct\". The offences or cases so directed to be tried by the Special Judge need not be, or relate to, the special offences created by the Act itself but may be or relate to, any offence under any law, e.g., Indian Penal Code, Arms Act and the Bombay District Police Act. It has been seen that the. special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act constitutes a departure from the ordinary law of procedure and is, in some important respects, detrimental to the interest of the persons subjected to it and as such is discriminatory.\n\nThe\n\ndiscrimination does not end with the taking of cognizance of the case by the Special Judge without the case being committed to him but continues even in subsequent stages of the proceedings in that the person subjected to it cannot, even at those subsequent stages, have the benefit of having the evidence for or against him recorded in extenso, may not get summons for all witnesses he wishes to examine in defence only on the ground that the Special Judge does not consider that such evidence will be material and cannot exercise his right to apply to a superior Court for transfer of the case even though the Special Judge has exhibited gross bias against him or to apply for revision of any order made by the Special Judge. As the Act was valid in its entirety before the date of the Constitution, that part of the proceeding before the Special Judge, which, upto that date, had been regulated by this special procedure cannot be questioned, however discriminatory it may have been, but if the discriminatory procedure is continued after the date of the Constitution, surely the accused person may legitimately ask : \"Why am I today being treated differently from other persons accused of similar offences in respect of procedure? It is stated in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn., p. 232 :-\n\n\"No person has a vested right in any course of procedure.\n\nHe has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being\n\nby, or for the Court in which he sues, and, if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode.\"\n\nIf in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, no person has a vested right in procedure it must follow as a corollary that nobody has a vested liability in matters of procedure in the absence of any special provision to the contrary.\n\nIf this is the posil-) tion when the law of procedure is altered by statute, why £hould the position be different when the Act prescribing the discriminatory procedure becomes\n\nLachmantlu\n\nKewalram\n\nAhuia and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay.\n\nDas /.\n\nLttchmandas\n\nKew air am\n\nAhuja •nd Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBomlxzy.\n\nDas f.\n\n\".oid by reason of its repugnancy to the equal protect10n clause of tbe Constitution.\n\nAlthough the substantive rights and liabilities acquired or accrued before tbe date of tbe Constitution remain enforceable, as held in Keslzava11 Madhava Menon's case, nobody can claim, after that date, that those rights or liabilities must be enforced under that particular procedure although it bas, since that date, come 'into conflict with tbe fundamental right of equal protection of laws guaranteed by article 14.\n\nIt is said, in reply, that in this case there 1s, rn law, no discrimination which can be said to be within the m'ischief sought to be prevented by artide 14. TI1e appellants are persons whose \"cases\" had been properly sent for trial to the Special Court before the Constitution came into force and, therefore, they cannot complain if the procedure prescribed by the Act is continued to be applied to their \"cases\" although such procedure cannot be applied to \"cases\" which had not been referred to the Special Court up to that date, for the appellants cannot claim to be similarly situated with persons whose \"cases\" had not been directed to be tried by the Special Court before the date of the Constitution or who committed similar offences after that date.\n\nIn the circumstances, the continued application of the procedure laid down in the impug ned Act to the \"cases\" of the appellants cannot, it is contended, amount to discrimination in the eye of the law and is, therefore, not within the inhibition of the equal protlection clause of the Constitutibn.\n\nArticle 14 being thus out of the way, the procedure laid down in the impugned Act continues to be valid in law as regards tbe persons whose \"cases\" had been subjected to it before the advent of the Constitution and so far as those persons are concerned there has been no change in the procedure and, therefore, their \"cases\" must continue to be regulated by that procedure.\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument as sound. It is now well established that while article 14 forbids claS< legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In\n\norder, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,\n\n(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distingu'ishes persons or things that are grouped together from others who are left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.\n\nWhat is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the -object of the Act. To take an example : Under section 11 of the Contract Act persons who have not attained majority cannot enter into a contract.\n\nThe two categories are adults and minors.\n\nThe basis of classification is the age. That basis obviously has a relation to the capacity to enter into a contract.\n\nTherefore, the section satisfies both the requirements <lf a permissible classification. In the present case, although the first part of section 12 of the Bombay Act, like section 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Act or section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance, may indicate and imply a process of classification, the section, in so far as it authorises the government to direct particular \"cases\" to be tried by the Special Court, does not purport to proceed upon the basis of any classificati()n at all.\n\nFurther, the supposed basis of the alleged classification, namely the fact of reference to the Special Court before the Constitution came into effect, has no reasonable relation . to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act. The avowed objects of the Act recited in the preamble are the expediency of consolidating an<l amending the law relating to the -security of the State, maintenance of public order and maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community in the State of Bombay.\n\nIf the consideration of the security of the State or the maintenance of public order requires the application of the special procedure there is no obvious reason why it should be applied to \"cases\" already referred and not to cases not yet referred at the date of the Constitution. The same consideration applies equally to both categories of cases. It is, therefore, clear that there is no nexus\n\nL\"chmandtU\n\nKewalram\n\nAhujll and A11ot!zer\n\n\"' The State of Bombay.\n\nDas/.\n\nLachmandas ·\n\nKcwalram\n\nAhuja •nd Another v.\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nDas/.\n\nwhich connects the basis on which the supposed classification is founded with the objects of the Act, for the object of the Act is wide enough to cover both categories of \"cases\". 1:herefore, it is not a permissible\n\nclssification. Indeed, it is an instance of fanciful classification which has no rational basis at all.\n\nWe sec no particular reason why the special procedure should be applied to the appellants' \"cases\" any more than it should be applied to \"cases\" not referred to the Special Court up to the 26th Januory, 1950.\n\nNo special or peculiar circumstances have been shown to exist which may make the appellants' \"cases\" specially suited to this special procedure. In the absence of a rational basis of classification, as explained above, there can be no justification, after the advent of the Constitution, for depriving the appellants of the right to move the Court for transfer or for revision or to obtain process for the attendance of defence witnesses or of having the evidence of the witnesses recorded as in an ordinary trial which is available to other persons accused of similar offences and prosecuted according to the ordinary procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Lt is, therefore, clear that in this case the discrimination continuetl after the Constitution came into force and such contmuation of the application of the discriminatory procedure to their cases i1ftcr the date of the Constitution constituted a breach of their fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 and being inconsistent with the provisions of that article the special procedure became void under article 13 and as there is no vested right or liability in matters of procedure the appellants are entitled to be tried according to the ordinary procedure after the date of the Constituion.\n\nTheir complaint is not for something that had happened before 26th January, 1950, but is for unconstitutional discrimination shown against them since that date.\n\nTheir grievance, their cause of action as it were, 1s post-constitution and.. therefore, must be scrutinised and examined in the light of their constitutional rights.\n\nSo viewed, there can be no doubt or\n\nquestion that they have been discriminated against after the date of the Constitution in the matter of procedure. It has already been held in the West Bengal and the Saurashtra cases that discrimination can lie in procedure just as much as in a substantive law.\n\nTherefore, the continuation of the trial after that date according to the discriminatory procedure resulting in their conviction and sentence cannot be supported.\n\nIndeed in a sense the Special Judge's jurisdiction came to an end, for he was enjoined to proceed only according to the special procedure and that procedure having become void as stated above, he could. not proceed at all as a Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Keshoram Poddar v.\n\nNundo Lal Mallick(1)°.\n\nThe Calclltta Rent Act, 1920, enabled the landlord or tenant of premises in Calcutta to obtain from the Controller of Rents a certification of the standard reµt of the premises and also gave a right to apply to the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal for revision of the order of the Controller.\n\nThe Act was originally to be in force for a pericxl of three years which was subsequently extended until the end of March, 1924, and finally tl1e figure 1927 was substituted for 1924 with a proviso \"that after 31st March, 1924, tl1is Act shall cease to apply to any premises the rent of which exceeded Rs. 250 a month\". The appellant was let into possession on 1st June, 1920, but the rent payable was not then fixed ..\n\nHe remained in possession until March, 1923, and the question raised by the case was what rent ought to be paid for that period of occupation. Disputes having arisen, the appellant applied to the Controller and on 23rd October, 1922, the Controller fixed the rent at Rs. 4,500 per month.\n\nOn 25th November, 1922, the appellant appealed to the President of the Improvement Tribunal to revise that decision. The revision application could not be taken up by the President until long after 31st March, 1924, and when it was eventually\n\n(1) I.LR. 54 Cal. 508; 54 I.A. 152.\n\nLachmandas\n\nKewalram\n\nAhuia and Another\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nDas/ .\n\n- . ·~·-..-~=--------. \" '\n\n_19sz posted before him on 3rd August, 1924, he held that he Lachmarnld. had no jurisdktiori to determine the_- 1!1atter, for the\n\nKtwalram Act, ha_d ceased to_ apply to _the_ premises. _. It_ will be Ahuja observed that the. application to the President was\n\nand'Anoth~ made' long before 31st l\\Iarch~ 1924, .and that the v. -'j:ieriod for\\vhich the rent had to be: determined was\n\nz::::;:.j between June;, 1920; and _l\\farch;' 192J.· The: Privy\n\nCouncil held that _ the 'application _ of the :.Act - Da•J.\n\nWas \\vhen the parties began to move tinder it and. that wa.S done before March; 1924; and that the' President accordingly had judsdictiim fo decide it. 'That ; decision apiiears to_ u~ to have rio applicatfon-to the .\n\nfacts of the: present. case, for the problem before us does not relate to a period anterior to the Constitution when. the Act'. was good and the Special Judge had - authority to apply the special procedure, -_-The point for: decision now is whether the .continuation of tlie\n\nprocedure prescribed by the Act after-the Constitution came _into force operates tothe prejudfre c; if the appellants •and, as' such; offends against their newly acquired fundamental right of equal protection of law 'guaranteed by article_ 14. ~-The Constitution has no\n\nretrospective operation to invalidate that part of the proceedings that has already-. been gone -through but the Constitution does not permit the special procedure to stand inthe way of the exercise or enjoyment of pos_t-constitutional rights and must, therefore.-'strike do'wn the discriminatory procedure if it is sought to be adopted after the_ Constitution came into operation; To' that' situation, the! decision of the Privy Council '.referred to above can have no application.--.·!.<.'.'. .. ·· .. . , '.For.' reasons' stated. above; .the conviction 'of the appellants on trial held bf the Specfal Judge after the 'date of' the Constitution according to the special pro. ; ce_dure prescribed by the impugned Act -and __ the sentences passed on them cannot be supported and these appeals must, therefore, be -allowed -and the convic- ' tions and\" sentences' must be 'set aside. The appel- ' fants. are' entitled; after -tlie Constitution! not to be . discriminated against in matters of procedure' and are. -\n\nntitled to be tried according to law. \\Ve, therefore, -\n\n...\n\ndirect that they be tried for the offences alleged to have been committed by them according to law and in the meantime they be retained in custody as undertrial prisoners.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : Naunit Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the intervener : Rajindcr Narain .\n\nGURBACHAN SINGH\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JI.]\n\nCity of Bombay Police Act, 1902, s. 27 (!)-Constitution of India, Arts. 19 (1) (d), 19 (5)-Provisions relating to externment whether infringe fundamental right to freedom of movement-Validity-Externment 01der fixing place outside State of Bombay for residence-Legality.\n\nSection 27 (I) of the City of Bombay Police Act: 1902, docs not contravene the provisions of Art. 19 of the Constitution inasmuch as it was enacted in the interest of the general public and, having regard to the class of cases to which this sub-section .applies and the menace which an extemment order passed under it is intended to avert, the restrictions that it imposes on the fundamental right of free movement of a citizen which is guaranteed by Art. 19 (!) (d) of the Constitution arc reasonable and come within the purview of Art. 19 (5).\n\nThe determination of the question whether the restrictions imposed by a legislative enactment upon the fundamental rights of a citizen enumerated in Art. 19 (1) ( d) of the Constitution are reasonable or not within the meaning of clause (5) of the article :depends as much on the procedural part of the law as upon its\n\nsubstantial part, and the Court has got to look in each case to the circumstances under which and the manner in which the J'Cstrictions have been imposed.\n\nThere are two kinds of externment orders contemplated by '&Uh-section (I) of s. 27 of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902; one, where the externmant is directed from Greater :Bombay, and the other where the extcrncc is to remove him.self\n\nM11y 7.", "total_entities": 281, "entities": [{"text": "LACHMANDAS KEW ALRAM AHUJA\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LACHMANDAS KEW ALRAM AHUJA\n\nAND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 194, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 236, "end_char": 275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 277, "end_char": 282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 704, "end_char": 714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Special Judge appointed under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 866, "end_char": 903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 980, "end_char": 987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Judge appointed under the Act", "statute": "Special Judge appointed under the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1026, "end_char": 1033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Judge appointed under the Act", "statute": "Special Judge appointed under the Act"}}, {"text": "13th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1526, "end_char": 1544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'fhe appellants who were accused of having con11nitted xnurder and other serious offences were directed by the Governn1ent of Bombay by an order made on the 6th August, 1949, to be tried under the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act by a Special JuJgc appointed under the Act, charges were fra1ned against then1 on the 13th January, 1950, and they \\Vere convicted in March,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Vere illegal as the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1668, "end_char": 1721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1737, "end_char": 1744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vere illegal as the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act", "statute": "Vere illegal as the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act"}}, {"text": "Arts. 13 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1965, "end_char": 1980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vere illegal as the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act", "statute": "Vere illegal as the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2992, "end_char": 2999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3122, "end_char": 3138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nC. ]. (", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3170, "end_char": 3175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3227, "end_char": 3243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contra).-Granting that s. 12 of the Bombay Act must, in view of the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar' s case, be held to be discriminatory and void in so far as it empowers the State Government to refer individual cases to :i Special Judge for trial, the trial of the appellants which had validly started before the Special Judge who had ben empower ed to try the case cannot be vitiated by the Constitution subsequently coming into force.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali Sark_ar"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4022, "end_char": 4029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4510, "end_char": 4531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "19th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4570, "end_char": 4584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132 (1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated the 19th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay (Dixit and Shah, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132 (1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated the 19th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay (Dixit and Shah, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4629, "end_char": 4634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132 (1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated the 19th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay (Dixit and Shah, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132 (1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated the 19th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay (Dixit and Shah, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "13th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4766, "end_char": 4782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "190 and 199 of 1950, arising out of judgment dated the 13th March, 1950, of the Court of the Special Judge at Ahmedabad in Special Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4871, "end_char": 4887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Ram Lal Anand (Hardyal Hardy and S. L. Chibber, with them) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal Anand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4892, "end_char": 4905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Ram Lal Anand (Hardyal Hardy and S. L. Chibber, with them) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Hardyal Hardy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4907, "end_char": 4920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Ram Lal Anand (Hardyal Hardy and S. L. Chibber, with them) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. L. Chibber", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4925, "end_char": 4938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Ram Lal Anand (Hardyal Hardy and S. L. Chibber, with them) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4972, "end_char": 4997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another v.\n\nThe State of Bombay.", "canonical_name": "LACHMANDAS KEW ALRAM AHUJA\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5018, "end_char": 5033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another v.\n\nThe State of Bombay.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBomlxzy"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5098, "end_char": 5114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India Joshi, with him) for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5122, "end_char": 5136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India Joshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nA. A. Peerbhoy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5212, "end_char": 5233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1952]\n\n(G. N.\n\nA. A. Peerbhoy and J. B.\n\nDadachanji for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "J. B.\n\nDadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1952]\n\n(G. N.\n\nA. A. Peerbhoy and J. B.\n\nDadachanji for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "Mehr Chand Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5309, "end_char": 5327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.", "canonical_name": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5329, "end_char": 5338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5340, "end_char": 5343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5348, "end_char": 5368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ."}}, {"text": "Das J. Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5391, "end_char": 5414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Das J. Patanjali Sastri C.J. delivered a separate dissenting judgment."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5463, "end_char": 5479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-I regret I am unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother Das J. whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "Special Judge, Ahmedabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5725, "end_char": 5749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were convicted and sentenced to death and varying terms of imprisonment by the Special Judge, Ahmedabad, on charges of murder and other offences under the Indian Penal Code,."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5801, "end_char": 5818, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5825, "end_char": 5833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5849, "end_char": 5859, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5931, "end_char": 5965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 6, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6020, "end_char": 6034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Judge was appointed by a notification ..issued under the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) and on August 6, 1949, the State Government, in exercise of the powers ' conferred by section 12 of the impugned Act, directed the Special Judge to try the case of the appellants who were implicated in what was known as the Central Bank Robbery Case."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6099, "end_char": 6109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "January 13, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6288, "end_char": 6304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charges were framed on January 13, 1950, without any preliminary enquiry and committal by a Magistrate which had been dispensed with by the impugned Act, and seventeen witnesses for the prosecution were examined before January 26, 1950, when the Constitution came into force."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6484, "end_char": 6500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charges were framed on January 13, 1950, without any preliminary enquiry and committal by a Magistrate which had been dispensed with by the impugned Act, and seventeen witnesses for the prosecution were examined before January 26, 1950, when the Constitution came into force."}}, {"text": "March 13, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6667, "end_char": 6681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings continued, and after the examination of sixty witnesses in all, ended in the conviction of the appellants on March 13, 1950."}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6905, "end_char": 6915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6952, "end_char": 6962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Security Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Keshav Madhav Menon(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7230, "end_char": 7251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges followed the decision of a Special Bench of their own Court in In re Keshav Madhav Menon(1), which has since been\n\naffirmed by this Court in (1951] S.C.R. 228."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7565, "end_char": 7574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7627, "end_char": 7637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8005, "end_char": 8015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8504, "end_char": 8515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to be noted that the West Bengal case(2 ) was argued on the basis that article 14 of the Constitution was applicable to the proceedings from their inception, although the notification directing the trial of some of the persons accused in that case was issued on the day before the commencement of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8554, "end_char": 8564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9306, "end_char": 9322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. f.\n\nLachmandas\n\nKewalram\n\nAhuia and Another\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBomlxzy"}}, {"text": "Pataniali Sas1ri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9325, "end_char": 9341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pataniali Sas1ri C. J, ."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9449, "end_char": 9459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Keshavan Madhava Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9531, "end_char": 9553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There could be no question, therefore, of the appellants' fundamental right under article 14 being infringed up to that point, as it has been held by this court in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case(') that the provisions of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights have no retrospective operation and do not affect a criminal prosecution commenced before the Constitution came into force."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9773, "end_char": 9791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On and after 26th January, 1950, the appellants, no doubt, had the right to the equal protection of the law; but, as has been repeatedly pointed out, that right only meant that the State, including the executive and the legislature, should apply the same law, substantive and procedural, to all persons alike in the same situation without discrimination."}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali Sark_ar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10272, "end_char": 10289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that after the commencement of the Constitution persons who commit the same offences with which the appellants stood charged would, according to Anwar Ali Sark_ar's case(\") not be liable to be tried by the Special Judge under the special procedure and, if so, the trial of the appellants, too, could not be continued by the Special Judge under uch procedure after 26th January, 1950, because such of the departures from the normal procedure of trial under the Criminal Procedure Code as were applied to the appellants during the rest of their trial; being disadvantageous to them in some respects, involved discrimination against them.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali Sark_ar"}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11917, "end_char": 11926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12823, "end_char": 12832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13127, "end_char": 13137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13152, "end_char": 13162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13164, "end_char": 13173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lachmandu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13573, "end_char": 13582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the assumption would not be valid unless the appellants could be tried\n\nLachmandu\n\nKewalram Ahuja and Another."}}, {"text": "Kewalram Ahuja", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13584, "end_char": 13598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the assumption would not be valid unless the appellants could be tried\n\nLachmandu\n\nKewalram Ahuja and Another.", "canonical_name": "Kewal ram Ahuia"}}, {"text": "Stat11 of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13617, "end_char": 13633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stat11 of Bombay.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBomlxzy"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri C.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13636, "end_char": 13655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nh7.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI C.J."}}, {"text": "Lachmandas Kewalram\n\nAhuia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13670, "end_char": 13696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1952\n\nLachmandas Kewalram\n\nAhuia and Another\n\nThe State of Bombay.", "canonical_name": "LACHMANDAS KEW ALRAM AHUJA\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13920, "end_char": 13932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st March, 1924", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14820, "end_char": 14836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Keshoram Poddar v. 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"label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33325, "end_char": 33335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance, 1948", "statute": "the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34228, "end_char": 34238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34453, "end_char": 34463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34479, "end_char": 34538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34656, "end_char": 34673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34842, "end_char": 34859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34916, "end_char": 34926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34999, "end_char": 35009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35072, "end_char": 35082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Kewalram Ahuia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35322, "end_char": 35336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 18 gives a right of appeal to a person convicted on a trial held by a Special\n\n'~ Judge within a period of fifteen days from the date of sentence and also empowers the High Court tD call for the records of the proceedings of any\n\nLachmandas\n\nKewalram Ahuia and Another\n\nThe St11te of Bombay.", "canonical_name": "Kewal ram Ahuia"}}, {"text": "sections 423, 426 and 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35569, "end_char": 35594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35628, "end_char": 35638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35757, "end_char": 35768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36115, "end_char": 36125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 10 to 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36201, "end_char": 36218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36220, "end_char": 36230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36508, "end_char": 36518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 257", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36703, "end_char": 36714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36727, "end_char": 36753, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37158, "end_char": 37168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37638, "end_char": 37647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37679, "end_char": 37689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37749, "end_char": 37759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38154, "end_char": 38164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In view of the departures from the ordinary law brought about by the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "In view of the departures from the ordinary law brought about by the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Constitution came into force and when the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38829, "end_char": 38910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39582, "end_char": 39607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ; ; v,\n\nLachmandas Kewalram Ahuia and Anoth~\n\nThe 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"start_char": 40337, "end_char": 40347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40424, "end_char": 40434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40491, "end_char": 40512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 3, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40553, "end_char": 40566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 3, 1950, the petitioner filed a written statement submitting, inter alia that the definition of \"news sheet\" as given in section 2 ( 6) of that Act, and sections 15 and 18 thereof were inconsistent with article 19 (1) (a) and, as such, void under article 13 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40680, "end_char": 40689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40712, "end_char": 40730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40762, "end_char": 40772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40806, "end_char": 40816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40902, "end_char": 40915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed up by a petition -filed in the High Court on March 7, 1950, under article 228 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40923, "end_char": 40934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41039, "end_char": 41057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41081, "end_char": 41091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41186, "end_char": 41196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41416, "end_char": 41425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41433, "end_char": 41452, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41706, "end_char": 41717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42303, "end_char": 42313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42835, "end_char": 42842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect were the observations of Mahajan J. who delivered a separate but concurrent judgment, namely that a provision that with effect from a particular date an existing law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy had no retrospective operation and could not affect pending prosecurions or actions taken under such law, and there was in such a situation no necessity for introducing a saving clause and that it did not need the said of a legislative provi--\n\nsioa of the nature contained in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act."}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43329, "end_char": 43348, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45358, "end_char": 45384, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45537, "end_char": 45576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 10 to 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45581, "end_char": 45598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947", "statute": "The Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46036, "end_char": 46053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Arms Act and the Bombay District Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46055, "end_char": 46098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47618, "end_char": 47625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is stated in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47886, "end_char": 47896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being\n\nby, or for the Court in which he sues, and, if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode.\""}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBomlxzy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48548, "end_char": 48565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das /.\n\nLttchmandas\n\nKew air am\n\nAhuja •nd Another v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBomlxzy.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBomlxzy"}}, {"text": "Keslzava11 Madhava Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48798, "end_char": 48822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the substantive rights and liabilities acquired or accrued before tbe date of tbe Constitution remain enforceable, as held in Keslzava11 Madhava Menon's case, nobody can claim, after that date, that those rights or liabilities must be enforced under that particular procedure although it bas, since that date, come 'into conflict with tbe fundamental right of equal protection of laws guaranteed by article 14."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49071, "end_char": 49081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50144, "end_char": 50154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50605, "end_char": 50615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51262, "end_char": 51272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51662, "end_char": 51672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51697, "end_char": 51706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51738, "end_char": 51748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th Januory, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53585, "end_char": 53603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We sec no particular reason why the special procedure should be applied to the appellants' \"cases\" any more than it should be applied to \"cases\" not referred to the Special Court up to the 26th Januory, 1950."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54252, "end_char": 54278, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54576, "end_char": 54586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54686, "end_char": 54696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 55411, "end_char": 55421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has already been held in the West Bengal and the Saurashtra cases that discrimination can lie in procedure just as much as in a substantive law."}}, {"text": "Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55899, "end_char": 55958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calclltta Rent Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56085, "end_char": 56109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56157, "end_char": 56165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calclltta Rent Act, 1920, enabled the landlord or tenant of premises in Calcutta to obtain from the Controller of Rents a certification of the standard reµt of the premises and also gave a right to apply to the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal for revision of the order of the Controller."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Improvement Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 56313, "end_char": 56342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calclltta Rent Act, 1920, enabled the landlord or tenant of premises in Calcutta to obtain from the Controller of Rents a certification of the standard reµt of the premises and also gave a right to apply to the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal for revision of the order of the Controller."}}, {"text": "1st June, 1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56750, "end_char": 56764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was let into possession on 1st June, 1920, but the rent payable was not then fixed ..\n\nHe remained in possession until March, 1923, and the question raised by the case was what rent ought to be paid for that period of occupation."}}, {"text": "23rd October, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57024, "end_char": 57042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disputes having arisen, the appellant applied to the Controller and on 23rd October, 1922, the Controller fixed the rent at Rs."}}, {"text": "25th November, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57102, "end_char": 57121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th November, 1922, the appellant appealed to the President of the Improvement Tribunal to revise that decision."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 60049, "end_char": 60059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 60088, "end_char": 60099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Rajindcr Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 60129, "end_char": 60144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the intervener : Rajindcr Narain ."}}, {"text": "GURBACHAN SINGH", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 60148, "end_char": 60163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GURBACHAN SINGH\n\nti."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60174, "end_char": 60189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JI.]", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBomlxzy"}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60227, "end_char": 60246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JI.]", "canonical_name": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60259, "end_char": 60262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JI.]", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60267, "end_char": 60287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JI.]", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ."}}, {"text": "City of Bombay Police Act, 1902", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60294, "end_char": 60325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60327, "end_char": 60332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "City of Bombay Police Act, 1902", "statute": "City of Bombay Police Act, 1902"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60337, "end_char": 60358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60360, "end_char": 60368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60565, "end_char": 60575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60602, "end_char": 60612, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60658, "end_char": 60665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61016, "end_char": 61023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61098, "end_char": 61105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61261, "end_char": 61268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61665, "end_char": 61670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "City of Bombay Police Act, 1902", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61678, "end_char": 61709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_737_744_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "...\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 737\n\ndirect that they be tried for the offences alleged to have been committed by them according to law and in the meantime they be retained in custody as undertrial prisoners.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : Naunit Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the intervener : Rajindcr Narain .\n\nGURBACHAN SINGH\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JI.]\n\nCity of Bombay Police Act, 1902, s. 27 (!)-Constitution of India, Arts. 19 (1) (d), 19 (5)-Provisions relating to externment whether infringe fundamental right to freedom of movement-Validity-Externment 01der fixing place outside State of Bombay for residence-Legality.\n\nSection 27 (I) of the City of Bombay Police Act: 1902, docs not contravene the provisions of Art. 19 of the Constitution inasmuch as it was enacted in the interest of the general public and, having regard to the class of cases to which this sub-section .applies and the menace which an extemment order passed under it is intended to avert, the restrictions that it imposes on the fundamental right of free movement of a citizen which is guaranteed by Art. 19 (!) (d) of the Constitution arc reasonable and come within the purview of Art. 19 (5).\n\nThe determination of the question whether the restrictions imposed by a legislative enactment upon the fundamental rights of a citizen enumerated in Art. 19 (1) ( d) of the Constitution are reasonable or not within the meaning of clause (5) of the article :depends as much on the procedural part of the law as upon its\n\nsubstantial part, and the Court has got to look in each case to the circumstances under which and the manner in which the J'Cstrictions have been imposed.\n\nThere are two kinds of externment orders contemplated by '&Uh-section (I) of s. 27 of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902; one, where the externmant is directed from Greater :Bombay, and the other where the extcrncc is to remove him.self\n\nM11y 7.\n\n1952 from• the State of Bombay.\n\nIn the first class of cases, the ex- -- . terntnent order has to specify the place , vhere the externee is to- GurbachRR Singh re111ove himself and it muSt also indicate the route by which he v. has to reach that place.\n\nOn the other hand, where the extern- The State of inent is fron1 the State of Bombay, the externee can remain any- Bombay where he likes outside the State and no place of residence can or •nd Another need be mentioned.\n\n\\Vhere an externment order made under s. 27(1) of the City of Bo1nbay Police Act direc-::Cd a person \\Vho resided in the City of Bo1nbay to remove himself £1 Dm Greater Bombay and to go to his native place at Amritsar, and on his representation that he did not like to go to Amritsar and might be allowed to stay at Kalyan, v,.rhich was outside Greater Bombay, he was per1nitted to do so: Held, that in view of the subsequent request of the externee which was acceded to by the Commis~ sioner of Police, the externment order coul<l be construed as an order of externment fro1n Greater Bon1bay to Kalyan and it \\vas. therefore a valid order of extern1nent.\n\nORIGINAL JuR1so1cnoN : Petition No. 76 of 1952.\n\nApplication un<ler Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indb for a writ in the nature of mandamus.\n\nH. f. U mrigar for the petitioner.\n\nG. N. Joshi for the respondent. 1952.\n\nMay 7.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution, presented by one Gurubachan Singh, praying for a writ, in the nature of mandamt<s\n\nrestraining the respondents as well as their subordinates an; l successors from enforcing an externment order served on the pd1tioner under section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act (1902).\n\nThe petitioner is an Indian citizen and is said to be: residing with his father at a place called \"Gogri Niwas'', Vincent Road, Dadar, his father having a business in electrical gocxls in the city of Bombay.\n\nOn the 23rd July, 1951, the petitioner was serve<l with .a1~ order purporting to have been made by the Corrim1ss1onr of Police, Bombay, under section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, directing him to remove himself from Greater Bombay and go to his native place at\n\n,,._.\n\nAmritsar in East Punjab. It was mentioned in the order that the petitioner was to comply with its directions within two days from the date it was made, and that he was to proceed to Amritsar by rail. On July 25, 1951, the petitioner made an application to the Commissioner of Police and prayed for an extention of the time within which he was to remove himself from Greater Bombay, and on this application the Commis- ,' sioner of Police gave him time .till the 30th of July next.\n\nOn 30th July, 1951, the petitioner himself wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police stating that he did not desire to go to Amritsar and prayed that he might be allowed to stay at Kalyan which is outside Greater Bombay but withm the State of Bombay and that he might be given a Railway ticket from Dadar to that place.\n\nIt appears that acting on this letter the police took the petitioner to Kalyan on the evening of 30th July, 1951, and left him there.\n\nAfter that, the petitioner commenced proceedings in the Bombay High Court first in its original s'1de under the Letters Patent and then in the Appellate Criminal Bench of the Court under articles 226 and 228 of the Constitution, complaining of the externment order mentioned above and praying for a writ of certiorari to have it quashed.\n\nBotfl these applications were dismissed and the petitioner has now come up to this court under article 32 of the Constitution on the allegation that his fundamental rights under clauses (d) and (e) of article 19 (1) of the Constitution have been infringed by the externment order.\n\nMr. Umrigar appearing in support of the pct1t1on\n\n:;, i has argued before us, in the first place that the order of externment is altogether void as it is not in confonuity with the provisions of section 27 ( 1) of the City of Bombay Police Act.\n\nHis second contention is\n\nf . that the provisions of section 27 (1) of the City of Bombav Police Act being in conflict with the funclamentai' rights enunciated in clauses ( <l) and ( e) of\n\n.,_ J article 19 (I) of the Constitution are void under article 13 (I) of the Constitution.\n\nThe last contention\n\nGurbachan Singh v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and A. n other\n\nGurbachan Sin;:h\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay and Another\n\nMuftherjea /.\n\nurged, though somewhat faintly, is hat the provmon of section 27 (1) mentioned above is discriminatory in its character and offends against art; icle 14 of the Constitution.\n\n.---,\n\nAs regards the first point, it is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the order of externment, as Was passed by the Commissioner of Police on 23-7-1951, is not in strict conformity with the provision of section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act. \\.\n\nThe order directed the petitioner to remove himself out of Greater Bombay but at the same time mentioned Amritsar as the place where he was to go. Section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act provides as follows :-\n\n\"Whenever it shall appear to the Commissioner of Police,\n\n(a) that the movements or acts of any person in the Greater Bombay are causing or calculated to cause alarm, <!anger or harm to person or property, or that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence, or an offence punishable under Chapters XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or in the abetment of any such offence, and when in the opinion of the Commissioner witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safetv of their person or property;\n\n(b) ... The Commissioner of Police may, by an order jn writing duly served on him ... direct such person ... to remove himself outside the State or to such place within the State and by such route and within such time as the Comn:rissioner of Police shall prescribe and not to enter the State or as the case may be the Greater Bombay.\"\n\nIt seems clear from this provision that there are two kinds of externment orders contemplated by the subsection; one, where externment is directed from the Greater Bombay and the other where the externee is to remove himself from the State of Bombay. In the\n\n\\ _,\n\nI ,,,\n\nfirst class of cases the order has got to specify the place where the externee is to remove himself to and it must also indicate the route by which he has to\n\nre:ich that place. On the other hand, when the externment is from the State of Bombay, the externee can remain anywhere he likes outside the State and no place of residence can or need be mentioned. ·\n\nIn the case before us the externment order started by directing the petitioner to remove himself only out of Greater Bombay.\n\nIt was 'incumbent in such a case for the authorities to specify the place where the externce was to stay.\n\nActually a place, namely Amritsar, was specified in the order, but as it is not within the State of Bombay, it was manifestly beyond the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Police to name such place at all. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner, not without some force, that the omission to specify a place within the State where the petitioner was to stay vitiates the order. On the other hand the order read as a whole 'might indicate that the intention of the Commissioner of Police was to extern the petitioner outside the State of Bombay and this is apparent from the fact that he was directed to proceed to Amritsar which ii situated in another State. It is no doubt true that the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, had no authority to fix any place outside the State as the place of residence of the externee and that direction was ineffective; but that direction certainly has a bearing on the question of the construction of\n\nthe order, for it indicates that the real intention of the order was to direct the externee to remove himself not only from Greater Bombay but from the State of Bombay itself.\n\nIf that was the intention, no place of residence need have - been indicated at all.\n\nWe need not, however, labour this aspect of the matter any further, for we are of the opinion that whatever irregularity there might have been in the original order, the subsequent conduct of the petitioner which had the sanction and approval of the Commissioner of Police removed the defect, if any.\n\nAs has been stated already, on the 30th July, 1951,\n\nGurhachan Sintf,\n\nThe State of Bombay •nd Another.\n\nGurbachan Singh\n\nT Ii• Stille of Bom/fay anti Another.\n\nMukheri•• f.\n\nthe petitioner himself by a letter written to the Commissioner of Police sought his permission to stay at Kalyan which is within the State of Bombay. Hio\n\nrequest was acceded to and the Police actually took him to Kalyan on the evening of the 30th. We think that, in these circumstances, the order made on the 23rd July, 1951, might be construed to be an order of ' externment from Greater Bombay and though there \"-. was a mistake regarding the place where the externee was to remove himself to, the mistake was rectified by the petitioner choosing Kalyan as the place of residence and that choice being accepted and given effect to by the Police Department.\n\nWe do not think that in these circumstances there is really any substance in the first point raised by Mr. Umrigar. -\"\"'\n\nThe second point urged by the learned counsel raises the question as to whether section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act has imposed restrictions upon the fundamental right, of a citizen which is guaranteed under article 19 (1) (d) of the Constitution and being in conflict with this fundamental right is void and inoperative under article 13 ( 1) of the Constitution.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the provisions of section 27 (1) of the Bombay Act was made in the interest of the general public and to protect them aga!nst dangerous and bad characters whose presence in a particular locality may jeopardize the peace and safety of the citizens.\n\nThe question, therefore, is whether the restrictions that this law imposes upon the rights of free movement of a citizen, come within the purview of clause (5) of article 19 of the Constitution; or .., in other words whether the restrictions are reasonable?\n\nIt is perfectly true that the determination of the question as to whether the restrictions imposed by a legislative enactment upon the fundamental rights of a citizen enunciated lh . article 19 ( 1) ( d) of the Conslitution are reasonable or not within the meaning of clause (5) of the article would depend as much upon the procedural part of the law as upon its substantive part; and the court has got to look in each case to the circumstances under which and the manner in\n\n.• -·\n\n. ,\n\nwhich the restrictions have been imposed. The maximum duration of the externment order made under 1952\n\nsection 27 (I) of the Bombay Act is a period of two 'f:!U!S ut1tpt1qJn!) years and the Commissioner of Police can always permit the externee to enter the prohi8ited area even before the expiration of that period.\n\nHaving regard . ,\\ /o ; lttJtS \"'If .L\n\niftJqWOfl\n\nto the class of cases to which this sub-section applies and Another. and the menace which an externment order passed •/ t1; if~1f>tnn under it is intended to avert, it is difficult to say that this provision is unreasonable.\n\nThe Commissioner of Police can in a proper case cancel the externment order any moment he likes, if, in his opinion, the return of the externee to the area from which he was removed ceases to be attended with any danger to the community.\n\nAs regards the procedure to be followed in such cases, section 27 ( 4) of the Act lays down that before an order of externment is passed against any person, the Commissioner of Pofice or any officer authorized by him shall inform such person, in writing, of the general nature of the material allegations against him and give him a reasonable opportunity of explaining these allegations.\n\nHe is permitted to appear through an Advocate, or an Attorney and can file a written statement and examine witnesses for the purpose of clearing his character.\n\nThe only point. which Mr. Umrigar attempts to make in regard to the reasonableness of this procedure is that the suspected person is not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses who deposed against him and on whose evidence the proceedings were started.\n\nIn our opinion this by itself would not make the procedure unreasonable having regard to the avowed intention of the legislature in making the enactment. The law is certainly an extraordinary one and has been made only to meet\n\nthose exceptional' cases where no witnesses for fear of violence to their person or property are willing to depose publicly against certain bad characters whose presence in certain areas constitutes a menance to the safety of the public residing therein.\n\nTnis object would be wholly defeated if a right to confront or cross-examme these witnesses was given to the\n\nGurbttchan Sinzh\n\nThe State of\n\nBomboy and Another.\n\nMuk_herjea ].\n\nMay 26.\n\nsuspect. The power to initiate proceedings under the Act has been vested in a very high and responsible officer and he is expected to act with caution and impartia!'ity while discharging his duties under the Act.\n\nThis contention of Mr. Umrigar must, therefore, fail.\n\nThe last point made by Mr. Umrigar d0es not seem to us to be tenable.\n\nIt is true that a procedure '-. • different from what is laid down under the ordinary law has been provided _for a particular class of persons against whom proceedings could be taken under sec- '-... tion 27(1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, but the discrimination if any is based upon a reasonable classi- . fication which is within the competency of the legislature to make. Having regard to the objective which . • the legislation has in view and the policy underlyiag it, a departure from the ordinary procedure can certainly' 'be justified as the best means of giving effect to the object of the legislature.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the petition and it shall stand dismissed.\n\nPetition dismissed. _4\n\nAgent for the petitioner: P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta.\n\nD. K. NABHIRAJIAH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAH, AJAN, MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948- Va/idity-F,, ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Constitutiou of India, Arts. 31 (2), 19 (!) (!)-Order of allotment efore\n\nConstit\"tion came into for'l'e-Possession taken thereafter-Validity of proceedings-Writ for quashing orders-Maintainability.\n\nA house belonging to the petitioner in the Bangalore City -' 0 -< l'cll vacant on the !st September, 1949, and on the 13th September, 1949, an order was passed by the Rent Co\"troller", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 258, "end_char": 268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 297, "end_char": 308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Rajindcr Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 338, "end_char": 353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the intervener : Rajindcr Narain ."}}, {"text": "GURBACHAN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 372, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Gurubachan Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 379, "end_char": 410, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 413, "end_char": 434, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 436, "end_char": 455, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 457, "end_char": 466, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 468, "end_char": 471, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "City of Bombay Police Act, 1902", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "City of Bombay Police Act, 1902", "statute": "City of Bombay Police Act, 1902"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 546, "end_char": 567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 569, "end_char": 577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 742, "end_char": 748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 (1) (d), 19 (5)-Provisions relating to externment whether infringe fundamental right to freedom of movement-Validity-Externment 01der fixing place outside State of Bombay for residence-Legality."}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 774, "end_char": 784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 811, "end_char": 821, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 867, "end_char": 874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1225, "end_char": 1232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1307, "end_char": 1314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1470, "end_char": 1477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1874, "end_char": 1879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "City of Bombay Police Act, 1902", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1887, "end_char": 1918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "GurbachRR Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2189, "end_char": 2204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "terntnent order has to specify the place , vhere the externee is to- GurbachRR Singh re111ove himself and it muSt also indicate the route by which he v. has to reach that place.", "canonical_name": "Gurubachan Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 27(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2557, "end_char": 2565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902", "statute": "the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2589, "end_char": 2599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2728, "end_char": 2736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Vhere an externment order made under s. 27(1) of the City of Bo1nbay Police Act direc-::Cd a person \\Vho resided in the City of Bo1nbay to remove himself £1 Dm Greater Bombay and to go to his native place at Amritsar, and on his representation that he did not like to go to Amritsar and might be allowed to stay at Kalyan, v,.rhich was outside Greater Bombay, he was per1nitted to do so: Held, that in view of the subsequent request of the externee which was acceded to by the Commis~ sioner of Police, the externment order coul<l be construed as an order of externment fro1n Greater Bon1bay to Kalyan and it \\vas."}}, {"text": "Kalyan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2835, "end_char": 2841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Vhere an externment order made under s. 27(1) of the City of Bo1nbay Police Act direc-::Cd a person \\Vho resided in the City of Bo1nbay to remove himself £1 Dm Greater Bombay and to go to his native place at Amritsar, and on his representation that he did not like to go to Amritsar and might be allowed to stay at Kalyan, v,.rhich was outside Greater Bombay, he was per1nitted to do so: Held, that in view of the subsequent request of the externee which was acceded to by the Commis~ sioner of Police, the externment order coul<l be construed as an order of externment fro1n Greater Bon1bay to Kalyan and it \\vas."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3244, "end_char": 3251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "G. N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3355, "end_char": 3366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Joshi for the respondent."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3488, "end_char": 3498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gurubachan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3537, "end_char": 3553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution, presented by one Gurubachan Singh, praying for a writ, in the nature of mandamt<s\n\nrestraining the respondents as well as their subordinates an; l successors from enforcing an externment order served on the pd1tioner under section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act (1902).", "canonical_name": "Gurubachan Singh"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3743, "end_char": 3753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3790, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "23rd July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4016, "end_char": 4031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd July, 1951, the petitioner was serve<l with .a1~ order purporting to have been made by the Corrim1ss1onr of Police, Bombay, under section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, directing him to remove himself from Greater Bombay and go to his native place at\n\n,,._.\n\nAmritsar in East Punjab."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4151, "end_char": 4161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4198, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "East Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4302, "end_char": 4313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd July, 1951, the petitioner was serve<l with .a1~ order purporting to have been made by the Corrim1ss1onr of Police, Bombay, under section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, directing him to remove himself from Greater Bombay and go to his native place at\n\n,,._.\n\nAmritsar in East Punjab."}}, {"text": "July 25, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4493, "end_char": 4506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 25, 1951, the petitioner made an application to the Commissioner of Police and prayed for an extention of the time within which he was to remove himself from Greater Bombay, and on this application the Commis- ,' sioner of Police gave him time .till the 30th of July next."}}, {"text": "30th of July next", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4752, "end_char": 4769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 25, 1951, the petitioner made an application to the Commissioner of Police and prayed for an extention of the time within which he was to remove himself from Greater Bombay, and on this application the Commis- ,' sioner of Police gave him time .till the 30th of July next."}}, {"text": "30th July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30th July, 1951, the petitioner himself wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police stating that he did not desire to go to Amritsar and prayed that he might be allowed to stay at Kalyan which is outside Greater Bombay but withm the State of Bombay and that he might be given a Railway ticket from Dadar to that place."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30th July, 1951, the petitioner himself wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police stating that he did not desire to go to Amritsar and prayed that he might be allowed to stay at Kalyan which is outside Greater Bombay but withm the State of Bombay and that he might be given a Railway ticket from Dadar to that place."}}, {"text": "Dadar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5074, "end_char": 5079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30th July, 1951, the petitioner himself wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police stating that he did not desire to go to Amritsar and prayed that he might be allowed to stay at Kalyan which is outside Greater Bombay but withm the State of Bombay and that he might be given a Railway ticket from Dadar to that place."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5287, "end_char": 5304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After that, the petitioner commenced proceedings in the Bombay High Court first in its original s'1de under the Letters Patent and then in the Appellate Criminal Bench of the Court under articles 226 and 228 of the Constitution, complaining of the externment order mentioned above and praying for a writ of certiorari to have it quashed."}}, {"text": "articles 226 and 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5418, "end_char": 5438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5771, "end_char": 5781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5856, "end_char": 5863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Umrigar appearing in support of the pct1t1on\n\n:;, i has argued before us, in the first place that the order of externment is altogether void as it is not in confonuity with the provisions of section 27 ( 1) of the City of Bombay Police Act."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6047, "end_char": 6057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6085, "end_char": 6095, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6151, "end_char": 6161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6188, "end_char": 6198, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6294, "end_char": 6304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6344, "end_char": 6354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last contention\n\nGurbachan Singh v.\n\nThe State of Bombay and A. n other\n\nGurbachan Sin;:h\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay and Another\n\nMuftherjea /.\n\nurged, though somewhat faintly, is hat the provmon of section 27 (1) mentioned above is discriminatory in its character and offends against art; icle 14 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6579, "end_char": 6589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23-7-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".---,\n\nAs regards the first point, it is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the order of externment, as Was passed by the Commissioner of Police on 23-7-1951, is not in strict conformity with the provision of section 27 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act. \\."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6921, "end_char": 6931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6958, "end_char": 6968, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7121, "end_char": 7131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7168, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7610, "end_char": 7646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gurhachan Sintf", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10668, "end_char": 10683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been stated already, on the 30th July, 1951,\n\nGurhachan Sintf,\n\nThe State of Bombay •nd Another."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10690, "end_char": 10705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been stated already, on the 30th July, 1951,\n\nGurhachan Sintf,\n\nThe State of Bombay •nd Another.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBombay"}}, {"text": "Gurbachan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10720, "end_char": 10735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurbachan Singh\n\nT Ii• Stille of Bom/fay anti Another.", "canonical_name": "Gurubachan Singh"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11653, "end_char": 11663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11690, "end_char": 11700, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11793, "end_char": 11803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11912, "end_char": 11922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11995, "end_char": 12005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12389, "end_char": 12399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12668, "end_char": 12678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13077, "end_char": 13087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13862, "end_char": 13872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurbttchan Sinzh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15204, "end_char": 15220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tnis object would be wholly defeated if a right to confront or cross-examme these witnesses was given to the\n\nGurbttchan Sinzh\n\nThe State of\n\nBomboy and Another.", "canonical_name": "Gurubachan Singh"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBomboy", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15226, "end_char": 15242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tnis object would be wholly defeated if a right to confront or cross-examme these witnesses was given to the\n\nGurbttchan Sinzh\n\nThe State of\n\nBomboy and Another."}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15854, "end_char": 15864, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16385, "end_char": 16401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4\n\nAgent for the petitioner: P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16525, "end_char": 16540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAH, AJAN, MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948- Va/idity-F,, ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Constitutiou of India, Arts.", "canonical_name": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "AJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16542, "end_char": 16546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAH, AJAN, MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948- Va/idity-F,, ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Constitutiou of India, Arts."}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16548, "end_char": 16557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAH, AJAN, MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948- Va/idity-F,, ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Constitutiou of India, Arts.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16559, "end_char": 16562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAH, AJAN, MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948- Va/idity-F,, ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Constitutiou of India, Arts.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16567, "end_char": 16587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAH, AJAN, MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948- Va/idity-F,, ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Constitutiou of India, Arts.", "canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Arts. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16733, "end_char": 16741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_744_756_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Gurbttchan Sinzh\n\nThe State of\n\nBomboy and Another.\n\nMuk_herjea ].\n\nMay 26.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nsuspect. The power to initiate proceedings under the Act has been vested in a very high and responsible officer and he is expected to act with caution and impartia!'ity while discharging his duties under the Act.\n\nThis contention of Mr. Umrigar must, therefore, fail.\n\nThe last point made by Mr. Umrigar d0es not seem to us to be tenable.\n\nIt is true that a procedure '-. • different from what is laid down under the ordinary law has been provided _for a particular class of persons against whom proceedings could be taken under sec- '-... tion 27(1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, but the discrimination if any is based upon a reasonable classi- . fication which is within the competency of the legislature to make. Having regard to the objective which . • the legislation has in view and the policy underlyiag it, a departure from the ordinary procedure can certainly' 'be justified as the best means of giving effect to the object of the legislature.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the petition and it shall stand dismissed.\n\nPetition dismissed. _4\n\nAgent for the petitioner: P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta.\n\nD. K. NABHIRAJIAH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHER CHAND MAH, AJAN, MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948- Va/idity-F,, ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Constitutiou of India, Arts. 31 (2), 19 (!) (!)-Order of allotment efore\n\nConstit\"tion came into for'l'e-Possession taken thereafter-Validity of proceedings-Writ for quashing orders-Maintainability.\n\nA house belonging to the petitioner in the Bangalore City -' 0 -< l'cll vacant on the !st September, 1949, and on the 13th September, 1949, an order was passed by the Rent Co\"troller\n\n-.. ,\n\nunder the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948, allotting the house to another person and directing the petitioner to deliver possession to the latter. The petitioner protested and took various steps to get the order vacated but he was unsuccessful and forcible possession wu taken from him under an order made on the 11th April, 1950.\n\nHe applied to the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the order allotting the house and the subsequent orders made to enforce that order, on the ground, inter alia, that these orders contravened the provisions_ of Arts. 31\n\n(2) and 19\n\n(1) (£) of the Constitution:\n\nHeld, (i) that as the order of allotment was made before the Constitution came into force and at a time when the Control Order provided, validly, that a house could be taken for the occupation of a private individual, the order could not be impugned on the ground that it contravened Art. 31(2) or 19(1) (f) of the Constitution; (ii) the fact that possession was actually taken on! y in pursuance of an order made on the 11th April, 1950, was immaterial as the petitioner's right to possession was lost earlier; (iii) Art. 31 (2) was inapplicable for another reason also, namely, that there was no acquisition of the house by the State, as taking of possession can only be from a person who is entitled to possession and the landlord lost this right to possession by reason of the Controller's order.\n\nHeld also, that the power conferred by cl. (bb) of sub-cl. {2) >-· of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules (under which the Control Order was made) was not confined to cases where the house was available for letting or subletting in the sense that the landlord did not require the house for his own use or had not let it to another himself.\n\nORIGINAL JurusDICTION : Petition No. 297 of 1951.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights by quashing the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and House _.,.\n\nRent Controller, Bangalore, allotitjing \\the' petitfoner's house to the 3rd respondent and for taking forcible possession of the same.\n\nS. K. Venkataranga Iyengar for the petitioner.\n\nA. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the respondent No. 1.\n\nK. Ramaseshayya Chowdhury for the respondent No. 2.\n\n1952. May 26. The Judgment of the Court w; u delivered by\n\n5-8 S.C. India/71\n\nD. K.\n\nN ab!tirajiak\n\nTke State of Mysore •11d Others.\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhirajiah v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMysore and Others.\n\nChandrasek._hara Aiyar /.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYER J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution for quashing the orders of the Deputy ., Commission.er and House Rent Controller, Bangalore, (2nd respondent) allotting house No. 291, Fifth Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore City, for the use of Sri Aswathanarayana Rao (3rd respondent) and taking forcible possession of the same.\n\nThe State of Mysore has been impleaded as the first respondent.\n\nThe facts are these.\n\nThe petitioner D. K. Nabhirajiah is a merchant and is the owner of the premises aforesaid. After lengthy litigation, the previous tenant of the premises vacated it on 1st September, 1949. On 2nd September, 1949, the petitioner notified the vacancy to the 2nd respondent as required by law but added that he wanted the premises for his own use to set up one of his grown-up sons in a business in clectr'ical goods.\n\nThe third respondent Aswathanarayana Rao however wanted the house for a children's school which he was running under the name of Bala Mandir and so he not only applied to the Reht Controller for allotting to him that house but also moved the Minister for Law and Labour for the same purpose.\n\nThe second respondent made an order on 13th September, 1949, in the following terms :\n\n\"With reference to your vacancy report in respect of the above place you are informed under clause 3\n\n(2) of the Mysore House Rem and Accommodation Control Order, 1948 that the building is required for the occupation of Balamandira Home for the children and for residential use of the Director. You are therefore directed under clause 3 ( 4) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948 to hand over possession of the above house to the said Sri Aswathanarayana Rao, Director, Balarnandira.\" By a.n order dated 20th September, 1949, made on an application by. the petitioner dated 16th September, 1949, the Deputy Commissioner refused to reconsider the allotment and required the petitioner to give effect to the same at once and deliver possession to the allottee.\n\n....\n\n. .\n\n,.... .\n\nThe petitioner preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Labour who is the House Rent Control Appellate Authority and obtained a stay, but the appeal was eventually dismissed and the said order vacated on 28th December, 1949. He filed a Revision Petition No. 97 of 1949-50 before the Government of Mysore but without success and the Government declined to interfere by their order dated 14th March,\n\n1950.\n\nHe then resorted to the High Court of Mysore by means of a petition under section 45 of the Mysore Specific Relief Act. This again' was dismissed on the ground that the party who seeks to obtain an order under the said section cannot do so on the allegation that the statute which enjoins the doing or forbearing of the act is itself illegal or ultra vires. Applications moved under article 226 of the Constitution in the course of the same proceedings also failed.\n\nThis was on 5th January, 1951.\n\nSome intermediate steps may now be set out. The third respondent complained that he had not been given possession.\n\nOn this complaint, the second respondent passed an order on the 20th March, 1950, to the following effect :-\n\n\"Sri Aswathanarayana Rao, the allottee of the :i.bove house, has reported that you have not handed over possession of the house to him. You are required to show cause immediately why you should not be prosecuted for failure to obey the order.\n\nPlease note that if the house is not handed over to the allottee, 2ction will be taken under clause 3 ( 6) to take forcible possession of the house through police.\"\n\nThe petitioner lodged a protest against this order pointing out that the House Rent Accommodation Control Order did not vest the Controller with jurisdiction to allot the house, but on 23rd March, 1950,\n\nhe received the following reply :-\n\n\"Your letters under reference have been examined carefully. It is not correct to say that allotment of a house to any party (private) is illegal. Clause 3 of\n\nD. K.\n\nNabhirajiah v.\n\nThe State of Mysore and Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhiraji'ah\n\nThe Stat• of\n\nMysor•· and Oth.,,.s.\n\nChandmsekharu Aiyar /.\n\n7•f8\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] the Mysore House Rent Control Order, 1948, is amended to include any person also. I do not find any other reason except that you are evading to give possession to the allottee.\n\nYou are hereby finally warned that if possession is not given to the allottee action will be taken to prosecute you and take forcible possession of the house.\"\n\nOn 11th April, 1950, the second respondent made the following order :-\n\n\"Whereas premises No. 291, Fifth Main Road, Gandhi Nagar was allotted to Sri Aswathanarayana Rao of Balamandira.\n\nThe owner's appeal before the Labour Commissioner and Government having been rejected, the owner filed a petition before the High Court of Mysore who passed an interim order and which was vacated by the order referred to above. A subsequent appeal before the Labour Commissioner has also been rejected and stay vacated in Endorsement in H.R.C. 1/1949-50 dated 10th April, 1950.\n\nI therefore direct the owner Sri D. K. Nabhirajiah to hand over possession of the said house to Sri Aswathanarayana Rao at once, failing which, I authorise the Superintendent of Police, Bangalore City or any other officer empowered by him in his behalf to take possession of the house and hand over to the allottee, Sn Aswathanarayana Rao.\"\n\nAs this order was not obeyed by the petitioner, forcible possession was taken of the house with police help and the third respondent was given possession.\n\nThe petitioner seeks to quash the above-mentioned orders of the second respondent dated 20th September, 1949, 20th March, 1950, 23rd March, 1950, and 11th April, 1950.\n\nThe prayer in the petition is thus worded:-\n\n\"for quashing the orders of the second respondent No. 522-Acc. (b )-49 dated 20th September, 1949, confirmed by Appellate Authority 'in H.R.C. Appeal No. 117 of 1949-1950 dated 28th December, 1949, and by the Government of Mysore in H.R.C. Revision Petition No. 97 of 1949-1950 dated 14th March,\n\n• 4.\n\n' ,_\n\n1950, and also the subsequent orders of the second respondent No. 562 Acc. (b )-50 dated 20th March, 1950, 23rd March, 1950, and 11th April, 1950, respecti:vely a.Hotting and taking over forcible possession of the property No. 291, Fifth Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore City, for the use of a private individual, the thlrd respondent, and for costs.\"\n\nThe contention of the petitioner is a threefold one, namely:-\n\n(1) The order allotting the premises to the third respondent contravenes the provisions of article 31, sub-clause (2) and article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution.\n\n~. ·\n\n(2) The order is discriminatory and offends article 14 of the Constitution,.\n\n(3) Under the Defence of India Rub under which the Accommodation Control Order was made, the :1llotment can only be of houses available for letting.\n\nIt will be convenient here to set out the relevant legislative provision's.\n\nThe Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948, (hereinafter referred to for the sake of convenience as the Control Order) was made in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules as applied to Mysore, and it came into force with effect from 1st July, 1948.\n\nClause 3 of the Control Order provides, subject to two exceptions, for notice being given by the landlord to the Controller within seven days after a house becomes vacant. Subclause (2), as it originally stood, was in the following terms:-\n\n\"(2) If within ten days of the receipt by the Controller of a notice under sub-clause (1), the Controller does not intimate the landlord in writing that the house is required for the purposes of the Government of Mysore, or of the Central Government, or of the Government of an Indian Province or State, or of any local authority or public body, or of any educational or other public institution for the occupation of any\n\nD. K.\n\nNabhirajiah v.\n\nTise State of Mysore .ntl Othet'S.\n\nChandra\n\nsekhara Aiyar /.\n\nD. K.\n\nNabhirajiah v.\n\nThe Stat• of\n\nMys01e and Otiiers.\n\nChand:•asekhaia Aiyar /.\n\nofficer of any such government authority, body or institution, the landlord shall be at liberty to let the house to any tenant, or if the Controller, on application made by the landlord permits the landlord to do so, to occupy the house himself.\"\n\nBy a notification dated 4th May, 1949, the words : \"or for the occupation of any individual\" were added after the words \"body or institution\" in the said sub-section.\n\nThe sub-clause as amended runs thus :\n\n\"(2) If within ten days of the receipt by the Controller of a notice under sub-clause (1), the Controller does not intimate the landlord in writing that the house is required for the purposes of the Government of Mysore, or of the Central Government, or of tlie Government of an Indian Province or State, or of any local authority or public body, or of any educational or other public institution, or for the occupation of any officer of any such Government authority, body or institution or for the occupation of any individual, the landlord shall be at liberty to let the house to any tenant, or if the Controller on application made by the landlord, permits the landlord to do o, to occupy the house himself.\"\n\nSub-clause (3) says :-\n\n\"The landlord shall not let the house to a tenant or occupy it himself, before the expiry of the period of tea days specified in sub-clause (2), unless he has received intimation that the house is not required for the purposes referred to in that sub-clause or the permission referred to therein, earlier.\"\n\nTo this sub-clause, a proviso was added by a notification to the following effect :\n\n\"Provided that the Controller, before requiring the house for any of the purposes stated above, shall take into consideration such l:epresentati; on, if any, as may. be made by the owner regarding his bona fide requirements for personal occupation.\"\n\nThen comes sub-clause ( 4) which reads as follows :-\n\n\"( 4) If the house is required for any of the purposes or for the occupatin by any of the officers\n\n....\n\n-; ..,-\n\n...\n\nspecified in .sub-clause (2) the landlord shall deliver possession of the house to the Government authority, body or institution concerned and such Government authority or body or institution shall be deemed to be the tenant of the landlord, with retrospective effect from the date on which the Controller received notice under sub-clause (1), the terms of the tenancy being such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant: Provided that the rent payable shall not exceed the fair rent which may be payable for the house under the provisions-of this Order.\"\n\nThe Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order of 1948 was repealed by the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act XXX of 1951.\n\nBut what is relevant and material for disposal of this petition is the earl'ier Control Order as all the proceedings now in question were taken under it.\n\nIf the allotment had been made under the Control Order prior to the date of its amendment on 4th May, 1949, the petitioner would have had a good case to urge. Sub-clause (2) as it then stood spoke of the house being required for certain specified purposes or for any educational or other public institution, or for the occupation of an officer of any Government authority, body or institution ; and the house could not liave been required for the occupation of a private individual. But the amendment has enlarged the scope of the power of the Controller by providing that the requirement may also be for the occupation of any ind 11vidual. The answer to the first contention based on article 31 (2) or article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution is a short one. The Constitution came into force on the 26th January, 1950, after the impugned orders were made and at a time when there was nothing like a chapter of Fundamental Rights.\n\nThe argument that the requisition in the present case was not for any public purpose and the restriction on the respondent to hold property must be in the interest of the general public presupposes that the Constitution governs the case. This\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhirajiall\n\nThe State of Mysore attd 0 then.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\n19~2\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhirajiah v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMy_sore Qnd Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nassumption, however, is not well-founded. The order of allotment was made before the Constitution came into force and at a time when the Control Order provided, validly, that a house could be taken for the occupation of a private 'individual.\n\nDuring the period of 10 days specified in sub-clause (2), the landlord could not let the house or occupy it himself, and on allotment he was bound to deliver up possession to the allottee. His rights as landlord were thus at an end so far as possession was concerned.\n\nWhether retrospective effect could be given to article 13 ( l) of the Constitution arose for decision in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay(').\n\nDealing with the argument that the said article rendered void ab initio and for all purposes an earlier law which was inconsistent with fundamental rights, it was laid down by this Court in that case \"that such laws existed for all past transactions and for enforcing all rights and tiabilities accrued before the date of the\n\nConstitution.\" (Per Das J., at page 234).\n\nMr. Justice Mahajan observed at pages 249 and 250 :-\n\n\"It is admitted that after the 26th January, 1950, there has been no infringement of the appellant's right of freedom of speech or expression. In September, 1949, he did not enjoy either complete freedom of speech or full freedom of expression.\n\nIt is in relation to the freedom guaranteed in article 19 ( l) of the Constitution to the citizen that the provisions of article 13 (1) come into play. The article does not declare any law void independently of the existence of the freedom guaranteed by Part III. A citizen must be possessed of a fundamental right before he can ask the court to declare a law which is inconsistent with it void; but if a citizen is not possessed of the right, he cannot claim this relief.\"\n\nThese remarks have application here.\n\n\\- •\n\nThe learned Advocate for the petitioner sought to '>-• get over this difficulty by pointing out that the\n\n( 1)\n\n[1951] S.C:R. 228.\n\ndispossess 1ion took place on 11-4-1950.\n\nThis, however, is no answer. The dispossession was a mere consequence which followed under clause 3, sub-clause ( 6), of the Control Order.\n\nThe right to possession was lost earlier and the landlord merely held on to the property.\n\nArticle 31 (2) does not apply for another reason.\n\nThere was no acquisition by the State of the house.\n\nThe taking of possession can only be from a person who is entitled to possession. The petitioner landlord lost his right to possession by reason of the Controller's order.\n\nAs soon as the allotment Is made, the allottee becomes a tenant and the owner becomes the landlord by reason of sub-clause ( 4) of the Control Order and the learned Advocate-General of the Mysore State contended that a statutory tenancy was thereby created. It is no doubt true that it is provided by sub-clause ( 4) that the terms of the tenancy may be such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, and there is no provision, as found in the later Act, as to what is to happen in the event of there being no agreement. If it is correct that a tenancy is brought into existence by the operation of the statute, it is possible that in case the terms are not the subject of any agreement between the landlord and the tenant, the ordinary law of landlord and tenant will apply in the absence of any provision for the fixation of terms by the Controller. But the point does not arise for decision in this case and nothing further need be said about it.\n\nThe applicability of sub-clause ( 4) of the Control Order was sought to be avoided in another manner.\n\nIt was pointed out that sub-clause (2) referred in Its first part \"to the purposes of the Government of Mysore\" etc., and in its later part \"for the occupation of any officer or any such Government authority, body or corporation, or for the occupation of an individual\", but that when we come to sub-clause ( 4) the two categaries are kept distinct or separate and in referring to the second category the Control Order\n\nD. K.\n\nNabhirajiah v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMysore and Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /,\n\nD. K.\n\nNabhirajiah v.\n\nThe State of Mysore and Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nspeaks only of the requirement of the house for the occupation by any of the officers and nothing is said about the occupation of any individual.\n\nThe amending Act did not introduce the words \"or for the occupation of any individual\" into sub-clause ( 4). Therefore, it was urged that the whole basis of the Advocate-General's contention about a statutory tenancy being created fell to the ground. At first sight, there seems to be something in the point.\n\nBut if sub-clause\n\n(2) is read as a whole, having in view the object sought to be achieved by the legislation, it is fairly clear that there is no such necessary antithesis between the two categories or clauses and that the words \"for the purposes\" can be so read as to include \"occupation\" also.\n\nThe omission of the words. \"for the purposes\" in the latter part of sub-clause (2) was perhaps to avoid inartistic phraseology. \"For the occupation\" certainly reads better than \"for the purposes of the occupation\".\n\nGround No. 2 regarding discrimination was not pressed.\n\nThen, we come to ground No. 3. Clause (bb ). of sub-clause (2) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules is in these terms :-\n\n\" (bb) for regulating the letting and sub-letting of any accommodation or class of accommodation, whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished or unfurnished and whether with or without board, and in particular,-\n\n( i) for controlling the rents for such accommodation (either generally or when let to specified persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances) ; ( (ii) for preventing the eviction of tenants and sub-tenants from such_ accommodation in specified circumstances and) ;\n\n(iii) for requiring such accommodation l'<> be let either generally, or to specified persons or classes of persons, or in specified circumstances; ...... \"\n\n...\n\n~-'\n\n... -\n\n.. '\n\n\\. .\n\nIt was urged that the power conferred under this sub-clause applied only to those cases where the house was available for letting or sub-letting and not to cases where a house was not so available, in other words, if the landlord of any premises said that they were required for his own occupation, the Government had no power to requisition the same. Emphasis was laid on the word \"regulating\".\n\nThis, however, is an obviously unsound interpretation to be placed upon the words.\n\nThey mean that the Government might provide for and regulate the letting and sub-letting etc., and that such is the scope is clear from the words in sub-clause (2) \"may by order provide\".\n\nThe argument for the petitioner, if accepted, would render the powers entirely nugatory, as it would then be open to every landlord to say that the premises are required for self-occupation, or even that he has already let it out to another and that therefore it is not available for being let.\n\nThere was no requisition of property in this case under section 75 (A) of the Defence of India Rules.\n\nThe Control Order was promulgated under rule 81 (2)\n\n(bb) which provides for the regulation of letting and sub-letting houses. It is rather the exercise of a police power of regulation in public interest than anything done in the exercise of a power of eminent domain, in which case alone questions relating to compensation and public purpose will arise.\n\nIn the course of the arguments, it was suggested that the amendment notification of 4th May, 1949, introducing the words \"or for the occupation of any individual\" was invalid because the regulation of letting and sub-letting under clause (bb) could only be for the Defence of British India or for the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, and that the taking of property for the occupation of a private individual was outside the scope of the power. Apart from the fact that no such ground has been taken in the petition, it has also to be noted that\n\n195!\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhirajiilh\n\nThe State of\n\nUysore attd Others.\n\nChattdrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nD. X..\n\nN abhirajiah v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMysore \"1Jd Others.\n\nChondr•·\n\nsek_horo Aiyor /.\n\nthe Control Order purports to have been made not only under clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules, hut also under the Supplies, SefV!Ccs and Miscellaneous Provisions (Temporary Powers) Act of 1947. We have not got this Act before us and it was not even referred to in the course of the arguments.\n\nHence, no decision is called for on this point.\n\nThe petition fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.\n\nPetition ditmiued.\n\nAgent for the petitioner: K. R. Kri1hnaswamy.\n\nAgent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta.\n\nUJAGAR SINGH\n\nII.\n\nTHE STATE OF THE PUNJAB\n\nand\n\nJAGJIT SINGH\n\nII.\n\nTHE STATE OF THE PUNJAB\n\n[SAtYID FAZL ALI, PATANJ ALI SAsTR1, Mu1rnEi.JEA,\n\nDAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAi., JJ. J\n\nPreventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), SJ. 3, 12-Detention order-Non-specification of period of detention-Ground supplied vague and same as in earlier order-Particulars supplied after\n\n'1months-Legality of deteiJtion-Duty to supply particulars lls soon as may he'-Form of detention order-Order signed by Home Secretary-Validity.\n\nNon-specification of any dfinitc period in a detcntioa order made under s. 3 of the PrcventiVc Detention Act, IV of 1950, is not a material omission rendering the order invalid in view of the provisions contained in clauses (4) (a) and (7) (a) of Ar~ 22 of the Constitution and •· 12 of the Act.\n\nAn order of detention which expressly states that the Go•ernor of the State concerned was satisfied of the neCCMity of\n\n'_,.\n\n. .", "total_entities": 97, "entities": [{"text": "Gurbttchan Sinzh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurbttchan Sinzh\n\nThe State of\n\nBomboy and Another."}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 344, "end_char": 351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention of Mr. Umrigar must, therefore, fail."}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 690, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1211, "end_char": 1227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4\n\nAgent for the petitioner: P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1258, "end_char": 1269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "D. K. NABHIRAJIAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1289, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. K.\n\nN abhirajiall", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1294, "end_char": 1324, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1328, "end_char": 1349, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1374, "end_char": 1383, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1385, "end_char": 1388, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1393, "end_char": 1416, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1559, "end_char": 1567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "11th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2264, "end_char": 2280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner protested and took various steps to get the order vacated but he was unsuccessful and forcible possession wu taken from him under an order made on the 11th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2301, "end_char": 2314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He applied to the Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2321, "end_char": 2328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2522, "end_char": 2530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3092, "end_char": 3099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3785, "end_char": 3792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3800, "end_char": 3821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4062, "end_char": 4088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "A. R. Somanatha Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4110, "end_char": 4130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4161, "end_char": 4178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore, (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. Ramaseshayya Chowdhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4217, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Ramaseshayya Chowdhury for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4348, "end_char": 4353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court w; u delivered by\n\n5-8 S.C. India/71\n\nD. K.\n\nN ab!tirajiak\n\nTke State of Mysore •11d Others.", "canonical_name": "D. K."}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4374, "end_char": 4389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court w; u delivered by\n\n5-8 S.C. India/71\n\nD. K.\n\nN ab!tirajiak\n\nTke State of Mysore •11d Others.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nMy_sore Qnd Others."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4432, "end_char": 4448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. K.\n\nN abhirajiah v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMysore and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nMy_sore Qnd Others."}}, {"text": "Chandrasek._hara Aiyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasek._hara Aiyar /.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYER J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution for quashing the orders of the Deputy .,", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasek._hara Aiyar /.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYER J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution for quashing the orders of the Deputy .,", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4542, "end_char": 4552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bangalore City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4739, "end_char": 4753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "291, Fifth Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore City, for the use of Sri Aswathanarayana Rao (3rd respondent) and taking forcible possession of the same."}}, {"text": "Aswathanarayana Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4774, "end_char": 4793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "291, Fifth Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore City, for the use of Sri Aswathanarayana Rao (3rd respondent) and taking forcible possession of the same.", "canonical_name": "Aswathanarayana Rao"}}, {"text": "D. K. Nabhirajiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4958, "end_char": 4975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner D. K. Nabhirajiah is a merchant and is the owner of the premises aforesaid.", "canonical_name": "D. K.\n\nN abhirajiall"}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2nd September, 1949, the petitioner notified the vacancy to the 2nd respondent as required by law but added that he wanted the premises for his own use to set up one of his grown-up sons in a business in clectr'ical goods."}}, {"text": "Aswathanarayana Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5379, "end_char": 5398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third respondent Aswathanarayana Rao however wanted the house for a children's school which he was running under the name of Bala Mandir and so he not only applied to the Reht Controller for allotting to him that house but also moved the Minister for Law and Labour for the same purpose.", "canonical_name": "Aswathanarayana Rao"}}, {"text": "13th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5690, "end_char": 5710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second respondent made an order on 13th September, 1949, in the following terms :\n\n\"With reference to your vacancy report in respect of the above place you are informed under clause 3\n\n(2) of the Mysore House Rem and Accommodation Control Order, 1948 that the building is required for the occupation of Balamandira Home for the children and for residential use of the Director."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5830, "end_char": 5838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6066, "end_char": 6074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aswathanarayana Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "You are therefore directed under clause 3 ( 4) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948 to hand over possession of the above house to the said Sri Aswathanarayana Rao, Director, Balarnandira.\"", "canonical_name": "Aswathanarayana Rao"}}, {"text": "Balarnandira", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6233, "end_char": 6245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "You are therefore directed under clause 3 ( 4) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948 to hand over possession of the above house to the said Sri Aswathanarayana Rao, Director, Balarnandira.\""}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Labour", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6585, "end_char": 6607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Labour who is the House Rent Control Appellate Authority and obtained a stay, but the appeal was eventually dismissed and the said order vacated on 28th December, 1949."}}, {"text": "28th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6749, "end_char": 6768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Labour who is the House Rent Control Appellate Authority and obtained a stay, but the appeal was eventually dismissed and the said order vacated on 28th December, 1949."}}, {"text": "14th March,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6931, "end_char": 6948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "97 of 1949-50 before the Government of Mysore but without success and the Government declined to interfere by their order dated 14th March,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6975, "end_char": 6995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then resorted to the High Court of Mysore by means of a petition under section 45 of the Mysore Specific Relief Act."}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7025, "end_char": 7035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7050, "end_char": 7069, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7334, "end_char": 7345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "5th January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7430, "end_char": 7447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was on 5th January, 1951."}}, {"text": "20th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7630, "end_char": 7646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this complaint, the second respondent passed an order on the 20th March, 1950, to the following effect :-\n\n\"Sri Aswathanarayana Rao, the allottee of the :i.bove house, has reported that you have not handed over possession of the house to him."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8013, "end_char": 8021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23rd March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8271, "end_char": 8287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner lodged a protest against this order pointing out that the House Rent Accommodation Control Order did not vest the Controller with jurisdiction to allot the house, but on 23rd March, 1950,\n\nhe received the following reply :-\n\n\"Your letters under reference have been examined carefully."}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8472, "end_char": 8480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8541, "end_char": 8561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhiraji'ah\n\nThe Stat• of\n\nMysor•· and Oth.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ"}}, {"text": "Chandmsekharu Aiyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8625, "end_char": 8644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandmsekharu Aiyar /.\n\n7•f8\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] the Mysore House Rent Control Order, 1948, is amended to include any person also."}}, {"text": "Balamandira", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9195, "end_char": 9206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "291, Fifth Main Road, Gandhi Nagar was allotted to Sri Aswathanarayana Rao of Balamandira."}}, {"text": "10th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9569, "end_char": 9585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A subsequent appeal before the Labour Commissioner has also been rejected and stay vacated in Endorsement in H.R.C. 1/1949-50 dated 10th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "D. K. Nabhirajiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9621, "end_char": 9638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I therefore direct the owner Sri D. K. Nabhirajiah to hand over possession of the said house to Sri Aswathanarayana Rao at once, failing which, I authorise the Superintendent of Police, Bangalore City or any other officer empowered by him in his behalf to take possession of the house and hand over to the allottee, Sn Aswathanarayana Rao.\"", "canonical_name": "D. K.\n\nN abhirajiall"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11118, "end_char": 11128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11149, "end_char": 11159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11240, "end_char": 11250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11505, "end_char": 11511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948, (hereinafter referred to for the sake of convenience as the Control Order) was made in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules as applied to Mysore, and it came into force with effect from 1st July, 1948."}}, {"text": "1st July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11816, "end_char": 11830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948, (hereinafter referred to for the sake of convenience as the Control Order) was made in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules as applied to Mysore, and it came into force with effect from 1st July, 1948."}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11833, "end_char": 11841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12287, "end_char": 12293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subclause (2), as it originally stood, was in the following terms:-\n\n\"(2) If within ten days of the receipt by the Controller of a notice under sub-clause (1), the Controller does not intimate the landlord in writing that the house is required for the purposes of the Government of Mysore, or of the Central Government, or of the Government of an Indian Province or State, or of any local authority or public body, or of any educational or other public institution for the occupation of any\n\nD. K.\n\nNabhirajiah v.\n\nTise State of Mysore .ntl Othet'S.\n\nChandra\n\nsekhara Aiyar /.\n\nD. K.\n\nNabhirajiah v.\n\nThe Stat• of\n\nMys01e and Otiiers."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12305, "end_char": 12323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subclause (2), as it originally stood, was in the following terms:-\n\n\"(2) If within ten days of the receipt by the Controller of a notice under sub-clause (1), the Controller does not intimate the landlord in writing that the house is required for the purposes of the Government of Mysore, or of the Central Government, or of the Government of an Indian Province or State, or of any local authority or public body, or of any educational or other public institution for the occupation of any\n\nD. K.\n\nNabhirajiah v.\n\nTise State of Mysore .ntl Othet'S.\n\nChandra\n\nsekhara Aiyar /.\n\nD. K.\n\nNabhirajiah v.\n\nThe Stat• of\n\nMys01e and Otiiers."}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13321, "end_char": 13341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sub-clause as amended runs thus :\n\n\"(2) If within ten days of the receipt by the Controller of a notice under sub-clause (1), the Controller does not intimate the landlord in writing that the house is required for the purposes of the Government of Mysore, or of the Central Government, or of tlie Government of an Indian Province or State, or of any local authority or public body, or of any educational or other public institution, or for the occupation of any officer of any such Government authority, body or institution or for the occupation of any individual, the landlord shall be at liberty to let the house to any tenant, or if the Controller on application made by the landlord, permits the landlord to do o, to occupy the house himself.\""}}, {"text": "Control Act XXX of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15370, "end_char": 15393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "4th May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15644, "end_char": 15657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the allotment had been made under the Control Order prior to the date of its amendment on 4th May, 1949, the petitioner would have had a good case to urge."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16236, "end_char": 16246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act XXX of 1951", "statute": "Control Act XXX of 1951"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16254, "end_char": 16264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act XXX of 1951", "statute": "Control Act XXX of 1951"}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16349, "end_char": 16367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution came into force on the 26th January, 1950, after the impugned orders were made and at a time when there was nothing like a chapter of Fundamental Rights."}}, {"text": "D. K.\n\nN abhirajiall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16725, "end_char": 16745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhirajiall\n\nThe State of Mysore attd 0 then.", "canonical_name": "D. K.\n\nN abhirajiall"}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16751, "end_char": 16766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhirajiall\n\nThe State of Mysore attd 0 then."}}, {"text": "D. K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16812, "end_char": 16817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\n19~2\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhirajiah v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMy_sore Qnd Others.", "canonical_name": "D. K."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMy_sore Qnd Others.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16840, "end_char": 16869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\n19~2\n\nD. K.\n\nN abhirajiah v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMy_sore Qnd Others.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nMy_sore Qnd Others."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16871, "end_char": 16891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nassumption, however, is not well-founded.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17456, "end_char": 17466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17912, "end_char": 17915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Das J., at page 234).", "canonical_name": "DAS"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17947, "end_char": 17954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Mahajan observed at pages 249 and 250 :-\n\n\"It is admitted that after the 26th January, 1950, there has been no infringement of the appellant's right of freedom of speech or expression."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18282, "end_char": 18292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18356, "end_char": 18366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "11-4-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18916, "end_char": 18925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dispossess 1ion took place on 11-4-1950."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19019, "end_char": 19027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19160, "end_char": 19170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23961, "end_char": 23971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nUysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25025, "end_char": 25041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. K.\n\nN abhirajiilh\n\nThe State of\n\nUysore attd Others.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nMy_sore Qnd Others."}}, {"text": "sek_horo Aiyor", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25152, "end_char": 25166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chondr•·\n\nsek_horo Aiyor /.\n\nthe Control Order purports to have been made not only under clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules, hut also under the Supplies, SefV!Ccs and Miscellaneous Provisions (Temporary Powers) Act of 1947."}}, {"text": "K. R. Kri1hnaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25663, "end_char": 25681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioner: K. R. Kri1hnaswamy."}}, {"text": "UJAGAR SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25726, "end_char": 25738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UJAGAR SINGH\n\nII."}}, {"text": "STATE OF THE PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25749, "end_char": 25768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB\n\nand\n\nJAGJIT SINGH\n\nII."}}, {"text": "JAGJIT SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25775, "end_char": 25787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB\n\nand\n\nJAGJIT SINGH\n\nII."}}, {"text": "SAtYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25820, "end_char": 25835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB\n\n[SAtYID FAZL ALI, PATANJ ALI SAsTR1, Mu1rnEi."}}, {"text": "PATANJ ALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25837, "end_char": 25854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB\n\n[SAtYID FAZL ALI, PATANJ ALI SAsTR1, Mu1rnEi."}}, {"text": "Mu1rnEi.JEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25856, "end_char": 25867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB\n\n[SAtYID FAZL ALI, PATANJ ALI SAsTR1, Mu1rnEi."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25878, "end_char": 25898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JEA,\n\nDAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAi.,", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25908, "end_char": 25932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26310, "end_char": 26314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_765_774_EN", "year": 1952, "text": ") -·\n\n) .\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 765\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRr J.-I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.\n\nDAs J.-In view of the ma=ority decision in Case No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Acharya), I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother.\n\nOrder accordingly.\n\nPetition No. 194 of 1950 Agent for the petitioner : R. R. Biswas.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the intervener : P. A. Mehta.\n\nPetition No. 167 of 1950 Agent for the petition: R. S. Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA v.\n\nHIRA DEVI AND ANOTHER.\n\n[MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and BosE, JJ.] Civil Procedure code, 1908, s. 60 (k)-Provident Funds Act (XIX of 1925), ss. 2 (a), 3 (1)-Compulsory deposit in Provident Fund-Exemption from attachment-Appointment of receiver- Legality.\n\nA receiver cannot be appointed in execution of a decree in respect of a compulsory deposit in a Provident Fund due to the judgment debtor.\n\nWhatever doubts may have existed under the earlier Act of 1897, the definition of \"compulsory deposit\" in s. 2 (a) of the Provident Funds Act (XIX of 1925) clearly includes deposits remaining to the credit of the subscriber or depositor after he has retired from service.\n\nArrears of salary and allowances stand upon a different footing and are not exempt from being proceeded against in execution.\n\nCML\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1951.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 17th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Sinha J.) in Appeal No. 41 of 1950 arising out of the Order of\n\nUjagar Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nMay 21.\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another. -·- Chandra- . sekhara Aiyar /.\n\nBanerjee J. dated 19th December, 1949, in Suit No. 1132 of 1948.\n\nC. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n(B. Sen, with him) for the appellant.\n\nNaziruddin Ahmad (Numddin Ahmad, with him) for respondent No. I.\n\nS. N. Mukherjee for respondent No. 2. 1952.\n\nMay 21.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYER J.-This Court granted special leave to appeal m this dse on the Government agreel11g to pay the costs of the respondents in respect of the appeal in any event. - The decree-holder was a lady named Hira Devi.\n\nThe judgment debtor was one Ram Grahit Singh, who retired on 31st January, 1947, as a Head Clerk m the Dead Letter Office, . Calcutta. A money decree was obtained against him on 30th July, 1948.\n\nOn !st February, 1949, a receiver was appointed for collecting the moneys standing to the credit of the judgment-debtor in a Provident Fund with the Postal authorities.\n\nThe Union of India intervened with an application dated 20th September, 1949, for setting aside the order appointing the receiver.\n\nMr.\n\nJustice Banerjee dismissed the application of the Union of India, holding that a receiver could be appointed for collecting the fund. On appeal, Trevor Harries C. J. and Sinha J. upheld his view.\n\nFrom the facts stated in the petition filed by the Union of India before the High Court, it apears that a sum of Rs. 1,394-13-1 represents arrears of pay and allowances due to the judgment-debtor and a sum of Rs. l,563, is the compulsory deposit in his P10vident Fund account.\n\nDifferent c011s1derations will apply to the two sums, though in the lower court the parties seem to have proceeded on the footing that the entire sum was a \"compulsory deposit\" within the meaning of the Provident Funds Act, 1925.\n\nThe main question to be decided is whether a receiver can be appointed in execution in respect of Provident Fund money due to the judgment-debtor.\n\n' .._.\n\n. '\n\n• . .\n\n' •\n\n) -\n\n\\ .\n\n., ..\n\nCompulsory deposit and other , sums in or derived from any fund to which the Provident Funds Act XIX of 1925 applies are exempt from attachment and sale under section 60 (k), Civil Procedure Code.\n\n\" Compulsory deposit \" is thus defined in section 2(a) of the Provident Funds Act XIX of 1925:-\n\n\"Compulsory deposit means a subscription to, or deposit in a Provident Fund which under the rules of the Fund, is not, until the happening of some specified contingency repayable on demand otherwise than for the purpose of the payment of premia in respect of a policy of life insurance (or the payment of subscriptions or premia in respect of a family pension fund), and includes any contribution and any interest or increment which has accrued under the rules of the fund on any such subscription, deposit, contribution, and also any such subscription, deposit, contribution, interest or increment remaining to the credit of the subscriber or depositor after the happening of any such conti:hgency.\"\n\nSuch a deposit cannot be assigned or charged and is not liable to any attachment.\n\nSection 3 (1) of the said Act provides :-\n\n3. (1) \"A compulso1ry deposit in any Government or Railway Provident Fund shall not in any way be capable of being assigned or charged and shall not be liable tO attachment under any decree or order of any CivH, Revenue or Criminal Court . in respect of any debt or liability incurred by the subscriber or depositor, and neither the Official Assignee nor any receiver appointx:d under the P110vincial Insolvency Act, 1920 shall be entitled to, or have any claim on any such compulsory deposit.\"\n\nIt is obvious that the prohibition against the assignment or the attachment of such compulsory deposits is based on grounds of public policy.\n\nWhere the interdiCtion is absolute, to allow a judgment creditor to get at the fund indirectly by means of the appointment of a receiver would be to circumvent the statute. That such a frustration of the very object Qf\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar ].\n\nthe legislation should not be permitted was laid down by the Court of Appeal as early as 1886 in the case of Lucas v. Harris('), where the question arose with reference to a pension payable to two officers of Her Majesty's Indian Army. Section 141 of the Army Act, 1881 provided :\n\n\"Every assignment of, and every charge on, and every agreement to assign or charge any ...... pension payable to any officer or soldier of Her Majesty's forces, or any pension payable to any such officer ...... or to any person in respect of any military service, shall except so far as the same is made in pursuance of a royal warrant for the benefit of the family of the person entitled thereto, or as may be authorised by any Act for the time being in force, be void.\"\n\nIn that case, the appointment of a receiver to collect the pension was in question. Lindley, L.J., observed :-\n\n\"In considering whether a receiver of a retired officer's pension ought to be appointed, not only the language but the object of section 141 of the Army Act, 1881 must be looked to; and the object of the section would, in my opinion, be defeated, and not advanced, if a receiver were appointed.\"\n\nLord Jusdce Lopes reiterated the same thing in these words :-\n\n\"It is beyond dispute that the object of the legislature was to secure for officers who had served their country, a prv 'ision which would keep them from want and would enable them to retain a respectable social position.\n\nI do not see how this object could be effected unless those pensions were made absolutely inalienable, preventing not only the person himself assigning his interest in the pension, but also preventing the pension being seized or attached under a garnishee order, or by an execution or other process of law.\n\nUnless protection is given to this extent the object which the legislature had in view is frustrated, and a strange anomaly would exist.\n\nA person with a\n\n( 1) 18 Q.B.D. 127.\n\n<. .... _\n\n. 1.\n\nl -\n\n) '\n\npension would not bt able to utilise his pension to pay a debt beforehand, but immediately his creditor had obtaineci judgment might be deprived of his pension by attachment, equitable execution, or some other legal process. It is impossible . to suppose that the legislature could have intended such an anomaly.\"\n\nSection 51 of the Civil Procedure Code no doubt recognises five modes of execution of a decree and one of them is the appointment of a receiver.\n\nInstead of executing the decree by attachment and sale, the Court may appoint a receiver but this can only be in a case where a receiver can be appointed.\n\nThe Provident Fund money is exempt from attachment and is inalienable.\n\nNormally, no execution can lie against such a sum.\n\nThe learned Judges in the Court below rested their view on the authority of the decision of the Privy Counc'il in Rajindra Narain Singh v. Sundara Bibi(1).\n\nThis decision has caused all the defficulty and has created a current of thought that even though the property may not itself be liable to attachment, a receiver can be appointed to take possession of the same and to apply the income or proceeds in a particular manner including the payment of the debts of the judgment-debtor.\n\nIt is necessary, therefore, to examine the facts of the case carefully and find out whether the proposition sought to be deduced from it can be justified as a principle of general application apart from the particular circumstances. The original decision of the Allahabad High Court from which the appeal was taken before the Judicial Committee is reported in Sundar Bibi v. Raj Indranarai:n Singh(2).\n\nIn a suit between , two brothers there was a compromise. to the effect that the judgment-debtor shall possess and enjoy the immoveable properties mentioned in the list and estimated to yield a net profit of Rs. 8,000 a year without power of transfer during the lifetime of his brother, Lal Bahadur Singh, he undertaking to pay certain public exactions and other dues\n\n(1) (1925) 52 I.A. 262.\n\n(2) (1921) 43 All. 617.\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another.\n\nChandrasek hara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nTlte Union of\n\nIndia\n\nHjra Devi oad Another.\n\nChandrasek_hara\n\nAiyar ].\n\nto his brother, Lal Bahadur Singh, amounting in all to Rs. 7,870-11-6, in four equal instalments per annum, each oo be paid a month before the Government revenue, falls due. The arrangement was stated to be \"in lieu of his maintenance\". When the judgment debtor's interest in the properties was sought to be attached and sold, he raised the objection that they were exempt from attachment and sale by reason of clause (n) of Section 60 of the Code which speaks of \"a right to future maintenance\". The High Court held that the words employed in sub-clause (n) contemplated a bare right of maintenance and nothing more-a right enforceable by law and payable in the future-and that inasmuch as in the case before them the properties had been assigned to the judgmentdebtor in lieu of his maintenance, it was not such a right which alone was exempt from attachment and sale. They thought that it was a fit case for the appointment of a receiver and remitted the execution petition to the subordinate judge for the appointment of a receiver after determining the allowance payable to the judgment-debtor for his maintenance.\n\nWith this conclusion of the High Court the Judicial Committee concurred. But they also expressed the view that they did not agree with the High Court on the subject of the actual legal position of the right of maintenance conferred upon the judgmentdebtor. Taking the prayer of the judgment creditor to be that the right of maintenance be proceeded against, their Lordships observed that the right was in point of law not attachable and not saleable. If it was an assignment of properties for maintenance, the amount of which was not fixed, it was open to the judgment-creditor to get a re.ceiver appointed subject to the condition that whatever may remain after making provision for the maintenance of the judgmentdebtm should be made available for the satisfaction of the decree debt. The right to maintenance could not be attached or sold.\n\nIn so far as the decree-holder sought oo attach this right and deprive the judgmentdebtor of his maintenance, he was not entitled to do\n\n\\. ---\n\n. -4\n\n' --\n\nso, but where his application for the appointment of a receiver was more comprehensive and sought to get at any remaining income after satisfying the maintenance claim, the appointment of a receiver for the purpose was justified.\n\nThe decision of the Privy Council does not appear to lay down anything beyond this. In our opinion, it is not an authority for the general proposir tion that even though there is statutory prohibition against attachment and alienation of a particular species of property, it can be reached by another mode of execution, viz., the appointment of a receiver.\n\nOn the other hand, it was pointed out in the case of Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad v.\n\nKarnani Industrial Bank Limited (1) that as the Nawab had a disposing power over the rents and profits assigned to him for the maintenance of his title and dignity without any power of alienation of the properties, no question of public policy arose and tl1at a receiver of the rents and profits was rightly appointed. This line of reasoning indicates clearly that in cases where there is no disposing power and the statute imposes an absolute bar on alienation or attachment on grounds of public policy, execution should not be levied.\n\nUnderstood as mentioned above, Rajindra Narain Singh's case creates no difficulty.\n\nWe shall now refer to the decision that followed or distinguish - ed the same. In The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Bai Somi and Another(2), the maintenance of Rs. 96 per annum was made urider a compromise decree a charge on the house which was to belong to the defendant. The court-fee due to Government was sought to be recovered by attachment of the house.\n\nThe right to attach was negatived; the house could not be attached as it belonged to the defendant; and the plaintiff's right to maintenance could not be attached under section 60, clause (1). In cleating with a prayer made by the Government for the first time in the High Court for an order appointing a receiver of the plaintiff's maintenance, Beaumont C. J. and\n\n(1) (1931) 58 I.A. 215. (') (1933) 57 Bom. 507.\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nanother learned Judge held that even this could not be done. The Chief Justice said \"If these exempted payments can be reached in execution by the appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution, the protection afforded by the section is to a great extent lost\".\n\nThey steered clear of Rajindra Narain Singh's case by stating that there was in the judgment of the Board no clear expression of opinion and there was doubt whether the allowance then in question was maintenance or not. The Madras High Court in The Secrt:· tary of State for India in Council v. Sarvepalli Venkata Lakshmamma (') has dealt with a question similar to the one in The Secretary of State for India in Council\n\nv. Bai Somi and Another (') but it merely referred to the ruling in Rajindra Narain Singh's case without dealing with the facts or the reasoning. It throws no light.\n\nThe case in Janakinath v. Pramatha Nath(\") was a decision by a single Judge and stands on the same footing as the Madras case. There is nothing else on this subject in the judgment than the short observation, \"the Provident Funds Act does not in my opinion prohibit the appointment of a receiver of the sum lying to the credit of the deceased in the Provident Fund.\" Possibly the view was taken that on the death of the employee and in the absence of any dependent or nominee becoming entitled to the fund under the rules, it became money payable to the heirs of the deceased and lost its original nature of being a compulsory deposit.\n\nThe case of Dominion of India, representing E. I. Ry. Administration and another v.\n\nAshutosh Das and Others'(4 ) refers no doubt to Rajin-· dra Narain Singh's case but does not discuss it in any detail.\n\nRoxburgh J. merely states \"surely it is an improper use of that equitable remedy to employ it ID avoid a very definite bar created by statute law to achieving the very object for which the receiver i• appointed\".\n\nThe decision in Ramprasad v. Motiram(') related to the attachment and sale in execution of a\n\n( 1) (1926) 49 Bad. 567.\n\n( 2) (1933) 57 Born. 507.\n\n( 3) (1940) 44 C.W.N. 266.\n\n(4) (1950) 54 C.W.N. 254.\n\n( 5) (1946) 25 Pat. 705\n\n' '\n\n. J\n\n. 't\n\n...\n\nmoney decree of the interest of a khoposhdar in a khorposh grant which was heritable and transferable.\n\nIt affords us no assistance.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondents relied on three decisions of the Privy Council as lending him support.\n\nOne is Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad's case(1) already referred to.\n\nVibhudapriya T hirtha Swamiar v.\n\nLaksh.mindra Thirtha Swamiar(2) and Niladri Sahu v. Mahant Chaturbhuj Das and Others(3) are the other two cases and they relate to maths and alienations by way of mortgage of endowed properties by the respective mahants for alleged necessity of the institutions.\n\nThey bear no analogy to the present case. The mahants had a beneficial interest in the properties after being provided with maintenance. A receiver could be appointed in respect of such beneficial interest so that the decrees obtained may be satisfied.\n\nWith great respect to the learned Judges of the Court below, we are of the opinion that execution cannot be sought against the Provident Fund money by way of appointment of a receiver.\n\nThis conclusion does not, however, apply to the arrears of salary and allowance due to the judgmentdebtor as they stand upon a different legal footing.\n\nSalary is not attachable to the extent provided in Section 60, clause (1), Civil Procedure Code, but there is no such exemption as regards arrears of salary.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General conceded that this portion of the amount can be proceeded against in execution.\n\nThe Provident Fund amount was not paid to the subscriber after the date of his retirement 'in January 1947.\n\nThis, however, does not make it any . the less a compulsory deposit within the meaning of the Act. Whatever doubt may have existed under the earlier Act of 1897 the decisions cited for the respondent, Miller v. B. B. & C. I. Railway(4 ) and Raj\n\n(1) (1931) 58 I.A. 215.\n\n(8) (1926) 53 I.A. 253.\n\n( 2) (1927) 54 I.A. 228, ( 4) (1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 454.\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nThe Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nKumar Mukharjee v. W. G. Godfrey(') are under that Act, the meaning has now been made clear by the definition in section 2 of the present Act; any deposit\n\n\"remaining to the credit of the subscriber or depositor after the happening of any such contingency\" is also a compulsory deposit; .and the contingency may be I retirement from service.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the lower court dated 1st February, 1949, appointing a receiver is set aside as regards the Provident Fund amount of Rs. 1,563 lying to the credit of the judgment-debtor. Under the condition granting special leave, the Government will pay the 1st respondent's costs of this appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the respondent No. 1 : Naunit Lal. Agent for the respondent No. 2 : P. K. Chatterjee.\n\n(') A.LR. 1922 Cal. 196.\n\nGIPN-S4-8 s.c.India/71-18-12-72-700,\n\n',/ ·.\n\nI \"!\n\n' .J •\n\n.r r\n\nIf-\\ 1,\n\nI ' '", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 385, "end_char": 397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "194 of 1950 Agent for the petitioner : R. R. Biswas."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 426, "end_char": 437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "R. S. Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 530, "end_char": 542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167 of 1950 Agent for the petition: R. S. Narula."}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 586, "end_char": 604, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HIRA DEVI AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 609, "end_char": 630, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HIRA DEVI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 634, "end_char": 653, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BosE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 689, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 719, "end_char": 724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 729, "end_char": 748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 764, "end_char": 769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Provident Funds Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Provident Funds Act"}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1142, "end_char": 1161, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Harries C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1601, "end_char": 1613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 17th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Sinha J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1618, "end_char": 1623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 17th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Sinha J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPunjab", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41 of 1950 arising out of the Order of\n\nUjagar Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab."}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1832, "end_char": 1840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sekhara Aiyar /.\n\nBanerjee J. dated 19th December, 1949, in Suit No."}}, {"text": "C. Setalvad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1898, "end_char": 1909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n(B. Sen, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1940, "end_char": 1946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India\n\n(B. Sen, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Naziruddin Ahmad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1978, "end_char": 1994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naziruddin Ahmad (Numddin Ahmad, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Numddin Ahmad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1996, "end_char": 2009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naziruddin Ahmad (Numddin Ahmad, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2044, "end_char": 2059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nS. N. Mukherjee for respondent No."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2142, "end_char": 2163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYER J.-This Court granted special leave to appeal m this dse on the Government agreel11g to pay the costs of the respondents in respect of the appeal in any event. -", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYER"}}, {"text": "Hira Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2361, "end_char": 2370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree-holder was a lady named Hira Devi.", "canonical_name": "Hira Devi"}}, {"text": "Ram Grahit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2401, "end_char": 2417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment debtor was one Ram Grahit Singh, who retired on 31st January, 1947, as a Head Clerk m the Dead Letter Office, ."}}, {"text": "31st January, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2434, "end_char": 2452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment debtor was one Ram Grahit Singh, who retired on 31st January, 1947, as a Head Clerk m the Dead Letter Office, ."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2498, "end_char": 2506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Calcutta."}}, {"text": "30th July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2551, "end_char": 2566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A money decree was obtained against him on 30th July, 1948."}}, {"text": "st February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2573, "end_char": 2590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st February, 1949, a receiver was appointed for collecting the moneys standing to the credit of the judgment-debtor in a Provident Fund with the Postal authorities."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2743, "end_char": 2757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India intervened with an application dated 20th September, 1949, for setting aside the order appointing the receiver."}}, {"text": "20th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2795, "end_char": 2815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India intervened with an application dated 20th September, 1949, for setting aside the order appointing the receiver."}}, {"text": "Trevor Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3021, "end_char": 3035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, Trevor Harries C. J. and Sinha J. upheld his view."}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3554, "end_char": 3579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Funds Act XIX of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3859, "end_char": 3880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3931, "end_char": 3941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Funds Act XIX of 1925", "statute": "Funds Act XIX of 1925"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3947, "end_char": 3967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4012, "end_char": 4024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Funds Act XIX of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4042, "end_char": 4063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4852, "end_char": 4861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Funds Act XIX of 1925", "statute": "Funds Act XIX of 1925"}}, {"text": "Insolvency Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5296, "end_char": 5316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6134, "end_char": 6145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Insolvency Act, 1920", "statute": "Insolvency Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "Army Act, 1881", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6153, "end_char": 6167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6737, "end_char": 6744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lindley, L.J., observed :-\n\n\"In considering whether a receiver of a retired officer's pension ought to be appointed, not only the language but the object of section 141 of the Army Act, 1881 must be looked to; and the object of the section would, in my opinion, be defeated, and not advanced, if a receiver were appointed.\""}}, {"text": "section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6894, "end_char": 6905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Army Act, 1881", "statute": "the Army Act, 1881"}}, {"text": "Army Act, 1881", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6913, "end_char": 6927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jusdce Lopes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7067, "end_char": 7079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Jusdce Lopes reiterated the same thing in these words :-\n\n\"It is beyond dispute that the object of the legislature was to secure for officers who had served their country, a prv 'ision which would keep them from want and would enable them to retain a respectable social position."}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8174, "end_char": 8184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9348, "end_char": 9368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The original decision of the Allahabad High Court from which the appeal was taken before the Judicial Committee is reported in Sundar Bibi v. Raj Indranarai:n Singh(2)."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9911, "end_char": 9925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another."}}, {"text": "Hira Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9930, "end_char": 9939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India v.\n\nHira Devi and Another.", "canonical_name": "Hira Devi"}}, {"text": "Chandrasek hara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9954, "end_char": 9969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasek hara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nTlte Union of\n\nIndia\n\nHjra Devi oad Another.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYER"}}, {"text": "Hjra Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10003, "end_char": 10012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasek hara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nTlte Union of\n\nIndia\n\nHjra Devi oad Another.", "canonical_name": "Hira Devi"}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10479, "end_char": 10489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajindra Narain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13420, "end_char": 13441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Understood as mentioned above, Rajindra Narain Singh's case creates no difficulty."}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14016, "end_char": 14026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beaumont", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14193, "end_char": 14201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In cleating with a prayer made by the Government for the first time in the High Court for an order appointing a receiver of the plaintiff's maintenance, Beaumont C. J. and\n\n(1) (1931) 58 I.A. 215. (') ("}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14902, "end_char": 14919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Court in The Secrt:· tary of State for India in Council v. Sarvepalli Venkata Lakshmamma (') has dealt with a question similar to the one in The Secretary of State for India in Council\n\nv. Bai Somi and Another (') but it merely referred to the ruling in Rajindra Narain Singh's case without dealing with the facts or the reasoning."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15381, "end_char": 15387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case in Janakinath v. Pramatha Nath(\") was a decision by a single Judge and stands on the same footing as the Madras case."}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15481, "end_char": 15500, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Roxburgh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16109, "end_char": 16117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roxburgh J. merely states \"surely it is an improper use of that equitable remedy to employ it ID avoid a very definite bar created by statute law to achieving the very object for which the receiver i• appointed\"."}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17827, "end_char": 17837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17851, "end_char": 17871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18763, "end_char": 18772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "1st February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19069, "end_char": 19087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the lower court dated 1st February, 1949, appointing a receiver is set aside as regards the Provident Fund amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19420, "end_char": 19430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19465, "end_char": 19481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 : P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "S4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19515, "end_char": 19517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_775_782_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nMAHABIR GOPE AND OTHERS\n\nHARBANS NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR\n\nand VIVIAN BosE JJ.l\n\nBihar Tenancy Act, 1937, ss. 5(2), 20, 21-Zuripeslzgi lease-- Lease .by mortgagee for a term of 3 years-Lease continuing in possession for over 30 years-Whether acquires occupancy rights-- Construction of lease-Mortgagee's power to lease-Limitations-- Transfer of Property Act, (IV of 1882), s. 76 (a) and (e).\n\nAs a general rule a person cannot transfer or otherwise confer a better title on another than he himself has and a mortgagee cannot therefore create an interest in mortgaged property which will enure beyond the termination of his interest as mortgagee. Further, a mortgagee cannot during the subsistence of the mortgage act in a manner detrimental to the mortgagor's interestJ;, such as by giving a lease which may enable the tenant to acquire permanent occupancy rights in the land, thereby defeating the mortgagor's right to khas possession.\n\nA permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period is an exception to the general rule, but to fall within this exception the settlement of the tenant by the mortgagee must have been a bona fide one.\n\nThe exception will not apply in a case where the terms of the mortgage prohibit the mortgagee from making any settlement of tenants on the land either expressly or by necessary implication.\n\nWhere a zuripeshgi ijara deed contained the following clause ; \"It is desired that the ijaradars should enter into possession and occupation of the share let out in ijara (being the klzudkasht land under his own cultivation), cultivate them, pay 2 as. as reserved rent year after year to us, the executants, and appropriate the produce thereof year after year on account of his having the ijara interest\" and the kabuliat executed by the tenant to whom the lands were leased by the mortgage for a period of 3 years referred to the ijara deed and contained an express provision that he (the tenant) would give up possession of the tika land on the expiry of the lease without urging any claim on the score that the lands were his kasht lands : Held, confirming the decision of the High Courr, that the settlement\n\n<.was not a bona fide one and the successors of the tenant (the defendants) did not acquire permanent rights of occupancy in\n\nApril 14. ·\n\nMakabir Gope\n\nand Others\n\nHM!Jans Narain Singh and Others.\n\nthe demised lands under the Bihar Tenancy Act even though the lands had been in the ocr:upation of the tenant and his successors for over 30 years after the expiry of the lease.\n\nHeld further, that the defendants could not acquire occupancy rights under sections 20 and 21 of the Bihar Tenancy Act as the mortgagee was neither a \"proprietor\" nor a \"tenure holder .. or \"under-tenure-holder\" 3.nd the tenant and his successors were not, therefore, \"settled raiyats\" within the meaning of section 5, cl. (2), of the said Act.\n\nManjhil-Lal Biswanath Shah Dea v. Shaikh Mohiuddin (1.L.R. 24 Cal. 272), Babu Bairo Nath Ray v. Shanke Pahan (I.L.R. 8 Pat. 31) and Binda Lal Pakrashi and Others v. Kalu Pramanik and Others (I.L.R. 20 Cal. 708) distinguished.\n\nCrvrL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRrsorsCTION Civil Appeal\n\nNo. 143 of 1951.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment aod decree dated 23rd March, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Reuben and Jamuar JJ.) in appeal from Original Decree No. 206 of 1946 arising out of a decree dated 31st January, 1946, of the Subordinate Judge at Patna in Title Suit No. 55/4 of 1943-45.\n\nSaiyid Murtaza Faz/ Ali for the appellants.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha, with him) for the respondents Nos. 1 to 9.\n\nB. K. Saran for the respondents Nos. 11 to 16.\n\n1952. April 14. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR J.-This is an appeal by the defendaots from a decree of the Patna High Court reversing a decree of 'the Subordinate Judge's Court at Patna, and decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for possession against the defendant first party who may be called for the sake of convenience as 'the Gopes'.\n\nThe lands were k hudk has ht lands, partly belonging to the plaintiffs first party and partly belonging to Mussammet Aoaro Kuer, fn;>m whom the plaintiffs second and \"third parties trace title. The ancestors of plaintiffs first party gave on 28-9-1899 an ijara with possession to one Lakhandeo Singh an ancestor of the defendant second party under Exhibit I (b) for a term\n\n.• >.\n\n-0f six years from 1307 Fasli to 1312 Fasli for Rs. 540.\n\nThe poshgi money was to be repaid in one lump sum at the end of Fasli 1312. If there was no redemption then the ijara was to continue in force till the money was repaid.\n\nM ussammat Anaro Kuer gave her share in ijara to the same Lakhandeo Singh orally on 10th June, 1905, for a period of three years for Rs. 542.\n\nLakhandeo Singh, who is represented now by the <lefendant second party, made a settlement of the land thus got by him (8.26 acres or 13 bighas in all) with one Ram Lal Gope an ancestor of the defendant first party for a period of three years from Fasli 1315 to Falsi 1318.\n\nThere was a patta in favour of the tenant and a Kabuliyat in favour of the landlord. This was in 1908.\n\nThe mortgage was redeemed in June 1942 by payment in proceedings under section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, When the plaintiffs4 went to take possession, they were resisted by the' Gopes (defendant first party), and after unsuccessful criminal proceedings, the plaintiffs filed the present suit.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge dismissed it, holding that the Gopes were raiyatJ having acquired permanent occupancy rights in the'. lands as the result of the settlement by the mortgagee, Lakhandeo Singh. On appeal the High Court set aside this decision and gave the plaintiffs a decree for possession on the finding that the defendants were not raiyats and had no permanent rights of occupancy. This court granted to the defendants special leave to appeal.\n\nThe suit was in the alternative for recovery of the value of the lands as compensation or damages from the defendant second party jn case it was found that the defendant first party could not be ejected.\n\nThe trial court decreed this alternative claim and awarded to the plaintiffs compensation at the rate of Rs. 200 per bigha.\n\nThe defendant second party carried the matter in appeal to the High Court and succeeded.\n\nBut we have nothing to do with this matter in the present appeal.\n\nAt the trial, the plaintiffs alleged and maintained that the lands were their zirat lands within the meaning\n\nMahabir Gope\n\nand Others\n\nH arhans Narain\n\nSingh and Others.\n\nChandrasek harp\n\nAiyr /.\n\nt9'i2 ·..;;:.;_,;_ Mahabir dope\n\nand Others\n\nv. llarbans \"l\\f arain Singh and Others. -·- Chatidrasekhara\n\nAiyat' /.\n\nof section 116 of the Bihar Tenancy Act and that the defendant first party could acquire no rights of occupancy in the same.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge found against this contention and held that they were khud kasht or bal(asht fands of the proprietor, in which rights of occupancy can be acquired.\n\nHe negatived the plea of the defendants that they were their ancestral raiyats lands; He also held that there was no collusion between the mortgagee Lakhandeo Singh and Ram Lal Gope in the matter of settlement of lands.\n\nIt is on the basis of these findings which were accepted by both the parties that the hearing of the appeal proceeded before the High Court.\n\nIt was held by the Privy Council in Bengal Indigo Company v. Roghobur Das('). that \"a zuripeshgi lease\n\n~ is not a mere contract for the cultivation of the land 'tat a rent, but is a security to the tenant for the money\n\n advanced\". They . observed, speaking of the leases before them, that \"the leases in question were not mere contracts for the cultivation of the land let; but that they were also intended to. constitute, and did constitute, a real and valid security to the tenant for the principal sums which he had advanced, and interest thereon.\n\nThe tenants' possession under them was, in part at least, not that of cultivators only, but that of creditors operating repayment of the debt due to them, by means pf their security.\" These words apply to the ijara deed before us; its dominant intention was to provide a security for the loan advanced and not to bring into existence any relationship of landlord and tenant. .\n\nThe general, rule is that a person cannot by transfer or otherwise confer a better title on another than he himself has..\n\nA mortgagee cannot, therefore, create an . interest in the mortgaged property which will enure beyond the termination of his interest as mortgagee.\n\nFurther, the mortgagee, who takes possession of the mortgaged property, must manage it as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it if it were his own; and he must not commit any act which is destructive\n\n(1) (1897) 24 Cal. 272.\n\n' '\n\n()t permanently injurious to the property; ; ee section 76, sub-clauses (a) & (e) of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nIt follows that he may grant leases not extending beyond the period of the mortgage; any leases granted by hini must come to an end at redemption.\n\nA mortgagee cannot during the subsistence of the mortgagee act in a manner detrimental to the mortgagor's interests such as by giYing a lease which may enable the tenant to acquire permanent or occupancy rights in the land thereby defeating the mortgagor's right to khas possession; it would be an act which would fall within the provisions of section 76, subdause ( e), . of the Transfer of Property Act. ·\n\nA permissible settlement by a m()rtgagee in posses~ sion with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by statut.e based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period . is a differerit matter altogether.\n\nIt is an exception to the general rule.\n\nThe tenant cannot be ejected. by the mortgagor even after the redemption of the mortgage. fie may become an occupancy raiyat in some cases and a non-occupancy raiyat in other cases.\n\nBut the settlement of the tenant by the mortgagee must have been a bona fide one. This exception will not apply in a case where the terms of the mortgage prohibit the mortgagee from making any settlement of tenants on the land either expressly or by necessary implication.\n\nWhere .all the zamindari rights are given to the mortgagee, it may be possible to infer on the proper construction of the document that he can settle lands with tenants in the ordinary course of management and the tenants might acquire certain rights in the land in their capacity as tenants. In the case of Manjhil-Lal Biswa Nath Shah Deo v. Sheikh Mohiuddin (1), there was a bona fide settlement of mortgaged rayati land by the mortgagee with tenants and it was held that the mortgagor was not entitled to evict them after redemption.\n\nThe earlier decision of Babu Bhairo Nath Ray\n\nv. Shanke Pahan(2), related to bakasht lands, and\n\n(1) (1927) 8 Pat. L.T. 92.\n\n(2) (1929) I.L.R. 8 Pat. 31.\n\n-·· .... ,.,-.-.1 ·r.\n\nMahabir Gopi\n\nana Otlteri\n\n'Ve ' \\ H arbans Narain\n\nSif!gh and Others:\n\nM4habir Gope\n\nanrl Others\n\nY. lfarbans !Varain\n\nSingh. and, Others.\n\nChandrasek.hara\n\nAiyar 1there was no provision in the zuripeshgi lease restricting the power of the mortgagee lessee as regards settlement of tenants.\n\nKhudkasht lands and bakasht lands are really in the nature of raiyati lands which come into the possession of the proprietor by surrender, abandonment or purchase.\n\nIn the present case, we have the following clause in the ijara deed: \"It is desired that the ijaradar should enter into possession and occupation of the share let out in ijara (being the Khudkasht land under his own cultivation), cultivate them, pay 2 annas as reserved rent year after year to us, the executants, and appropriate the produce thereof year after year on account of his having the ijaradari interest.\" This term disentitles the mortgagee from locating tenants on the land mortgaged.\n\nRam Lal Gape, the grandfather of the defendants first party, who executed the kabuliat in 1908 must have known of the title of Lakhandeo Singh the mortgagee and the terms under which he held the lands under the registered zuripeshgi ijara deed and this is most probably why the tenant not only took the lease for a period of 3 years, but expressly undertook to give up possession over the thika lands on .the expiry of the period of lease without urging any claim on the score that the lands were his old kasht lands. His kabuliat (Exhibit 11) in fact refers to Lakhandeo Singh' s ijaradari interest.\n\nIn view of these facts, .the learned Judges of the High Court stated that they were not prepared to hold that the settlement was a bona fide one or the mortgagee was within llis rights in settling these lands.\n\nStrong reliance was placed for the appellants on the Full Bench decision -Binad Lal Pukrashi and Others v.\n\nKalu Pramanik and OtMrs(') where it was held that a person inducted into possession of land as a raiyat even by a trespasser became a non-occupancy raiyat within the meaning of section 5, sub-section, 2 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and was protected from ejectrnent.\n\nBut this decision has been subsequently\n\n(1) (1893) I.L.R. 20 Cal. 708.\n\nexplained away in several cases as based on the propo--\n\nsition that the rights must have been bona fide acquired by them from one whom they bona fide believed to have the right to let them into possession of the land.\n\nSuch, however, is not the case here, in view of the recitals in the ijara deed in favour of Lakhandeo Singh and the kabuliat by Ram Lal Gope.\n\nSections 20 and 21 of the Bihar Tenancy Act were referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants in the course of his arguments and he pointed out that the land in this case was held continuously by his clients and their predecessors from 1908 to 1942, when they were sought to be ejected. For these sections to apply, we must be in a position to hold that the appellants were \"settled raiyats\". \"Raiyats\" 1s defined in sub-clause 2 of section 5 as meaning \"primarily a person who has acquired a right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself or by members of his family ...... \" Sub-clause 3 provides that a person shall not be deemed to be a raiyat unless he holds land either immediately under a proprietor or immediatelv under a tenure-holder.\n\nLakhandeo Singh was not' a \"proprietor\" by which term is meant a person owning, whether in trust or for his own benefit, an estate or part of an estate: he was only a mortgagee. Nor was he a tenure-holder or under-tenureholder, as he does not comply with the definition given in sub-clause (1) of section 5, namely, a person who had acquired from a proprietor or from another tienure-holder a right to hold land for the purpose of collecting rents, or for the purpose of bringing the land under cultivation by establishing tenants on it.\n\nSuch proof as there is in this case only goes to show that the lands were under the cultivation of the plaintiffs and that they were made over to the possession of the mortgagee so that he might cultivate them himself.\n\nHence, Ram Lal Gope could not claim that he was a settled raiyat of the village and that under the statute he secured occupancy rights in the lands which he took on lease from Lakhandeo Singh.\n\nMahabir Gope\n\nand Others\n\nv. llarbans lllarain\n\nSingh and Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nMahabir Gape\n\nand Others.\n\nHarbans Narain\n\nSingh and Others.\n\nChandrasek_hara\n\n Aiyar /.\n\nApril 2.\n\nLastly, it was urged that the ijara by Mst. Anaro Kuer was admittedly an oral transaction and there was no proof of any prohibition against the settlement with tenants so far as her share (3.97 acres) was concerned and that the rights of the parties as regards this area .would stand on a different footing from the rights in respect of the 4 acres and 29 cents belonging to the plaintiff first party.\n\nThis point was not taken in the courts below where the two ijaras given to Lakhandeo Singh were dealt with as if they were part and parcel of one and the same transaction, the rights and liabilities, whatever they were, being common to both. We cannot allow the poiilt to be taken now.\n\nThe result is that the High: Court's decree 1s. confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with: costs of the plaintiffs-respondents. There will be no order as; to costs of the other respondents.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: S. P. Varma.\n\nAgent for the respondents Nos. 1 to 9: M. M Sinha.\n\nAgent for the respondents Nos. 11 to 16 :.\n\nK_. L. Mehta.\n\nRAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR\n\nti.\n\nMAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n(Civil Appeals Nos. 68 to 92 of 1951).\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and V 1v1AN Bo SE JJ.]\n\nEquitable set-off-Suit by patnidar against zemindar for possession of land with mesne f\"ofits-Decree t\"n favour of patnidar- Claim by 'zemindar to set off against m.esne profits rent_, revenue and cesses which accl'ited after deUvCry of t:ossession-Maintainability.\n\n: Where a patnidar has obtained a decree against his zcmindar for' possessiori .of reSU1ned challkld?ri chakran lands with mesnc profits from the date on which the zemihdar wrongfully took.", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "MAHABIR GOPE AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHABIR GOPE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HARBANS NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARBANS NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Chandrasek_hara\n\n Aiyar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 5(2), 20, 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1937", "statute": "Bihar Tenancy Act, 1937"}}, {"text": "Limitations-- Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitations-- Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Limitations-- Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Makabir Gope", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2558, "end_char": 2570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Makabir Gope\n\nand Others\n\nHM!Jans Narain Singh and Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR GOPE AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "HM!Jans Narain Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2584, "end_char": 2604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Makabir Gope\n\nand Others\n\nHM!Jans Narain Singh and Others."}}, {"text": "sections 20 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2872, "end_char": 2890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3105, "end_char": 3114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reuben", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3552, "end_char": 3558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment aod decree dated 23rd March, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Reuben and Jamuar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Jamuar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3563, "end_char": 3569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment aod decree dated 23rd March, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Reuben and Jamuar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Murtaza Faz/ Ali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3749, "end_char": 3765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saiyid Murtaza Faz/ Ali for the appellants."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3787, "end_char": 3803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha, with him) for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "A. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3805, "end_char": 3816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Sinha, with him) for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. K. Saran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3862, "end_char": 3873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Saran for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3970, "end_char": 3990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR J.-This is an appeal by the defendaots from a decree of the Patna High Court reversing a decree of 'the Subordinate Judge's Court at Patna, and decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for possession against the defendant first party who may be called for the sake of convenience as 'the Gopes'.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasek_hara\n\n Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4051, "end_char": 4067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR J.-This is an appeal by the defendaots from a decree of the Patna High Court reversing a decree of 'the Subordinate Judge's Court at Patna, and decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for possession against the defendant first party who may be called for the sake of convenience as 'the Gopes'."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge's Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4095, "end_char": 4129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR J.-This is an appeal by the defendaots from a decree of the Patna High Court reversing a decree of 'the Subordinate Judge's Court at Patna, and decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for possession against the defendant first party who may be called for the sake of convenience as 'the Gopes'."}}, {"text": "Aoaro Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4395, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands were k hudk has ht lands, partly belonging to the plaintiffs first party and partly belonging to Mussammet Aoaro Kuer, fn;>m whom the plaintiffs second and \"third parties trace title."}}, {"text": "28-9-1899", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4520, "end_char": 4529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ancestors of plaintiffs first party gave on 28-9-1899 an ijara with possession to one Lakhandeo Singh an ancestor of the defendant second party under Exhibit I (b) for a term\n\n.• >."}}, {"text": "Lakhandeo Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4562, "end_char": 4577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ancestors of plaintiffs first party gave on 28-9-1899 an ijara with possession to one Lakhandeo Singh an ancestor of the defendant second party under Exhibit I (b) for a term\n\n.• >."}}, {"text": "Anaro Kuer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4899, "end_char": 4909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M ussammat Anaro Kuer gave her share in ijara to the same Lakhandeo Singh orally on 10th June, 1905, for a period of three years for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Anaro Kuer"}}, {"text": "10th June, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4972, "end_char": 4987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M ussammat Anaro Kuer gave her share in ijara to the same Lakhandeo Singh orally on 10th June, 1905, for a period of three years for Rs."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal Gope", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5191, "end_char": 5203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakhandeo Singh, who is represented now by the <lefendant second party, made a settlement of the land thus got by him (8.26 acres or 13 bighas in all) with one Ram Lal Gope an ancestor of the defendant first party for a period of three years from Fasli 1315 to Falsi 1318.", "canonical_name": "Ram Lal Gope"}}, {"text": "Fasli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakhandeo Singh, who is represented now by the <lefendant second party, made a settlement of the land thus got by him (8.26 acres or 13 bighas in all) with one Ram Lal Gope an ancestor of the defendant first party for a period of three years from Fasli 1315 to Falsi 1318."}}, {"text": "Falsi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakhandeo Singh, who is represented now by the <lefendant second party, made a settlement of the land thus got by him (8.26 acres or 13 bighas in all) with one Ram Lal Gope an ancestor of the defendant first party for a period of three years from Fasli 1315 to Falsi 1318."}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5480, "end_char": 5490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5498, "end_char": 5522, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gopes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5766, "end_char": 5771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Subordinate Judge dismissed it, holding that the Gopes were raiyatJ having acquired permanent occupancy rights in the'."}}, {"text": "llarbans", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6897, "end_char": 6905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir dope\n\nand Others\n\nv. llarbans \"l\\f arain Singh and Others. -·-"}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6970, "end_char": 6981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9118, "end_char": 9128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9159, "end_char": 9183, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9678, "end_char": 9688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9714, "end_char": 9738, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mahabir Gopi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11252, "end_char": 11264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "·· .... ,.,-.-.1 ·r.\n\nMahabir Gopi\n\nana Otlteri\n\n'Ve ' \\ H arbans Narain\n\nSif!gh and Others:\n\nM4habir Gope\n\nanrl Others\n\nY. lfarbans !", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR GOPE AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Chandrasek.hara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11393, "end_char": 11408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasek.hara\n\nAiyar 1there was no provision in the zuripeshgi lease restricting the power of the mortgagee lessee as regards settlement of tenants.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasek_hara\n\n Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Ram Lal Gape", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12208, "end_char": 12220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lal Gape, the grandfather of the defendants first party, who executed the kabuliat in 1908 must have known of the title of Lakhandeo Singh the mortgagee and the terms under which he held the lands under the registered zuripeshgi ijara deed and this is most probably why the tenant not only took the lease for a period of 3 years, but expressly undertook to give up possession over the thika lands on .the expiry of the period of lease without urging any claim on the score that the lands were his old kasht lands.", "canonical_name": "Ram Lal Gope"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13306, "end_char": 13315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 20 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13830, "end_char": 13848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14260, "end_char": 14268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14272, "end_char": 14281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14437, "end_char": 14445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14899, "end_char": 14908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahabir Gope", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15555, "end_char": 15567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Gope\n\nand Others\n\nv. llarbans lllarain\n\nSingh and Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR GOPE AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15622, "end_char": 15642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nMahabir Gape\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasek_hara\n\n Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Mahabir Gape", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15647, "end_char": 15659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nMahabir Gape\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR GOPE AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Harbans Narain\n\nSingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15674, "end_char": 15695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Narain\n\nSingh and Others.", "canonical_name": "HARBANS NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Chandrasek_hara\n\n Aiyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15709, "end_char": 15732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasek_hara\n\n Aiyar /.\n\nApril 2.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasek_hara\n\n Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Anaro Kuer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15791, "end_char": 15801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anaro Kuer was admittedly an oral transaction and there was no proof of any prohibition against the settlement with tenants so far as her share (3.97 acres) was concerned and that the rights of the parties as regards this area .would stand on a different footing from the rights in respect of the 4 acres and 29 cents belonging to the plaintiff first party.", "canonical_name": "Anaro Kuer"}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16674, "end_char": 16685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "M. M Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16727, "end_char": 16737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 9: M. M Sinha."}}, {"text": "K_. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16784, "end_char": 16796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K_."}}, {"text": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16799, "end_char": 16835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR\n\nti."}}, {"text": "MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16842, "end_char": 16863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n(Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16922, "end_char": 16935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and V 1v1AN Bo SE JJ.]"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_782_793_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Mahabir Gape\n\nand Others.\n\nHarbans Narain\n\nSingh and Others.\n\nChandrasek_hara\n\n Aiyar /.\n\nApril 2.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nLastly, it was urged that the ijara by Mst. Anaro Kuer was admittedly an oral transaction and there was no proof of any prohibition against the settlement with tenants so far as her share (3.97 acres) was concerned and that the rights of the parties as regards this area .would stand on a different footing from the rights in respect of the 4 acres and 29 cents belonging to the plaintiff first party.\n\nThis point was not taken in the courts below where the two ijaras given to Lakhandeo Singh were dealt with as if they were part and parcel of one and the same transaction, the rights and liabilities, whatever they were, being common to both. We cannot allow the poiilt to be taken now.\n\nThe result is that the High: Court's decree 1s. confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with: costs of the plaintiffs-respondents. There will be no order as; to costs of the other respondents.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: S. P. Varma.\n\nAgent for the respondents Nos. 1 to 9: M. M Sinha.\n\nAgent for the respondents Nos. 11 to 16 :.\n\nK_. L. Mehta.\n\nRAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR\n\nti.\n\nMAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n(Civil Appeals Nos. 68 to 92 of 1951).\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and V 1v1AN Bo SE JJ.]\n\nEquitable set-off-Suit by patnidar against zemindar for possession of land with mesne f\"ofits-Decree t\"n favour of patnidar- Claim by 'zemindar to set off against m.esne profits rent_, revenue and cesses which accl'ited after deUvCry of t:ossession-Maintainability.\n\n: Where a patnidar has obtained a decree against his zcmindar for' possessiori .of reSU1ned challkld?ri chakran lands with mesnc profits from the date on which the zemihdar wrongfully took.\n\n...\n\npossession of them, the zemindar is not entitled to deduct by -1952 way of equitable set-off from the amount of mesne profits pay- . ---- able by him under the decree, the amounts due to him on account Ra1a B_uP.endra\n\nof rent, revenue and cesses for a period subsequent to the date Narain Szngha of delivery_ of possession of the lands inasmuch _as the two cross Bahadur demands do not arise out of the same transaction. The transac- .-v. tion which led to the plaintiff's demand for mes_ne profits resulted • Maharaj from the defendant's wrongful act as trespasser, while the Bahadur Singh transaction which gave rise to the zemindar's demand arose out and Others. ofthe relationship of landlord and tenant and the obligations resulting therefrom.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n_ CrvrL\n\nAPPELLATE JrnusmcTION : Appeals from the judgments arid -decrees dated the 23rd February, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Akram and Blank JJ.) in Second Appeals Nos. 861 to 885 of 1939 from the judgments and decrees dated the 16th December, 1938, of the Court of the District Judge, Birbhum, in Title Appeals Nos. 23 'to 47 of 1938.\n\nSitaram Bannerjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and Amiya Kumar Mukherjea, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos. 68 to 74 of 1951.\n\nUrukramdas Chakravarthy (S. 'fl/. Mukherjee, with him) for the respondent No .. 1. in Civil Appeals Nos. 68 to 74 of 1951.\n\n- ·- Sitaram Bannerjee (Arun Kutnar Dutta and Amiya Kumar Mukherjea, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos. 75 to 92 of 1951.\n\nPanchanan Chose (Chandra Nath Mukherji, with him) for the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in Civil Appeals Nos. 75 to 92 of 1951.\n\n1952. April 2. The Judgment of the Court was\n\ndelivered by - -\n\nMAHAJAN J.-These appeals are directed against the judgment and decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, dated 23rd February, 1945, reversing the judgment and decrees passed by the District Judge -of Birbhum dated - 16th December, 1938. The\n\nprincipal questions for determination are the same m\n\nRaja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj IJahadur Singh and Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nall of them and can be conveniently disposed of by one judgment.\n\nIt is necessary to set out briefly the history of this half a century old litigation.\n\nThe seven suits out of which arise Appeals Nos. 68 to 74 were filed iH September, 1904, by Maharaja Bahadur Singh, in the court of the different Munsifs at Rampurhat, against Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, deceased, and others, for a declaration of his title to the lands mentioned in the different suits and for mesne profits from the year 1899. till recovery of possession.\n\nIt was alleged that the lands in the several suits were chowkidari chakran lands within the plaintiff's patnidari, granted to his predecessors in interest on 14th November, 1853, by the ancestors of the defendant, that as the lands were in the possession of village watchman on service tenures, they were excluded from assessment of land revenue and no rent was paid on them, that in the year 1899 under the provisions of sections 50 and 51 of Bengal Act VI of 1870 Government resumed the lands, terminated the service tenures and settled them with the zamindar, that in this situation the plaintiff as patnidar became entitled to their actual physical possession, that the zamindar wrongfully took physical possession of them and denied the right of the plaintiff and hence he was entitled to the reliefs claimed.\n\nThe suits were decreed on 17th August, 1905, and 19th August, 1905, by the two courts respectively and the decisions were affirmed on appeal by the District Judge. On special ppeal to the High Court, the suits were remanded for trial on the question of limitation, and after remand they were dismissed by the trial court and the Court of appeal as barred by limitation. On second appeal, it was held that the suits were within limitation and were then decreed for the second time. This decision was affirmed on appeal to His Majesty in Council.\n\nThe plaintiff actually obtained possession of the lands invol:ved in these suts in August, 1913. An application was made for ascertainment of mesne profits on\n\n' )•\n\n6th November, 1918.\n\nThis was resisted by the defendant and it was pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to interest on mesne profits, that the zamindar was entitled to receive the profits of the disputed lands and that deduction should be made out of the amount of the mesne profits on account of munafa and the amount of chowkidari dues as well as cesses due to him or paid by him. Five years later, on\n\n,;. 24th June, 1927, another set of objections was filed\n\n.....\n\nby the zamindar claiming deduction out of mesne profits 'by way of equitable set-off of the payments made by him subsequent to the date of delivery of possession as well as for the amount of munafa that became payable to him after that date.\n\nAfter a prolonged enquiry .the trial court on 18th December, 1937, decreed the plaintiff's claim for mesne profits after allowing the zamindar the deductions claimed by him up to the date of assessment of mesne profits but disallowed the amount claimed by way of equitable setoff for the subsequent period. The learned District Judge on appeal reversed this decision and allowed the defendant the amount claimed by him by way of equitable set-off, subject, however, to the condition that the dues of the defendant should be deducted from the dues of the plaintiff till the defcndant' s dues were wiped off. The relevant part of his judgment runs thus :-\n\n\"The broad fact is that they (plaintiffs) have been in possession of the lands since 1910 and have been in enjoyment of rent from the tenants from that date and according to law they are not entitled to possess the land unconditionally. Now that all the facts are before the court and the time has come for final adjustment of accounts between the parties the court should try to do substantial justice between the parties.\n\nIt is not sufficient answer to say that the plea of equitable set-off was not raised in the beginning. The circumstances in all these cases are peculiar and it could hardly be expected that such plea would have been taken in the very beginning. The course of litigation in these cases has not run along\n\nRaja 13hupendra\n\nNarain Singha\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singlt\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan I~\n\nRaja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nJ\\1ahajan f,\n\neasy and smooth channels : on the contrary its course has been extremely tortuous and disturbed frequmtly by conflicting decisions.\n\nNo one could have reasonably anticipated in the beginning that the litigation would be protracted in this extraordinary way.\n\nIt is the duty of the court to take notice of the subsequent events in order to do justice between the parties . ..... As we are dealing with the question of equitable set-off, no question of time-barred debts or unascertained sum can arise. . . . . . The plea of equitable setoff in respect of time-barred debts can be set up as a shield by way of defence nor can any question of payment of court-fees arise. There is, in my opinion, no substantial difference in the character of the respective parties during the entire period and it would be futile to make an attempt at distinction by over; subtle argument where there is really no difference in substance. There is considerable force in .the argument advanced on the side of tl1e appelltant, namely, tile appellant's claim to the equitable set-off is really in the. nature of cross-demand arising out of the same transaction and connected in its nature and cricumstances ..... ; From whatever standpoint the matter may be 'looked at I am of the opinion that the claim of the appellnt for equitable set-off for the subsequent period by way of deduction of the chowkidari revenue and cess .paid by him as well as on account of munafa should be allowed.\n\nThis amount will also carry interest at 6 per cent per annum up to date. The subsequent! period means the period since the date of delivery of possession up to 1927-28.\"\n\nAgainst the judgment and decrees of the District' Judge the plaintiff preferred appeals to the High Court at Calcutta.\n\nThe High Court by the judgment under appeal modified the decress of the District Judge and disallowed the claim for equitable set-off in its entirety for the subsequent period and restored the decree of the trial court. The zamindar filed applications for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council.\n\nThese applications were consolidated with similar applications filed in t11e second batch of suits. A certificate\n\n.~\n\nwas granted for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. By an order dated 9th June, 1947, all the appeals were admitted and it was directed that the proceedings be printed and transmitted to England.\n\nDuring the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court, Raja Bhupendra Narayan Singh died and the 11resent appellant was impleaded as his heir and representative. An application was also made in the High Court for permission to urge additional grounds not already taken. After the abolition of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council these appeals were transmitted to this Court.\n\nAn application under Order XIX, rule 4, of the Supreme Court Rules was presented at the hearing of the appeals that the appellant be allowed to urge the following additional grounds in support of the appeals, viz.:-\n\n(1) That the munafa (rent) should not be calculated on the basis of the principles laid down in Radhacharan v. Maharaja Raniit Singh(1).\n\n(2) That the said munafa should have been assessed on a fair share of the profits from the land.\n\nThe ~econd batch of appeals. (Nos. 75 to 92 of 1951) arises out of 18 suits instituted in the court of the Munsif of Rampurhat on 22nd December, 1909, by Ganpat Singh and Narpat Singh predecessors in interest of respondents 1 to 3 against the predecessors in interest of the appellant, late Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, and also some other persons who were tenants under him, for a declaration of the plaintiffs' title to the resumed chowkidari chakran lands and for khas possession of the same and for mesne profits~ The allegations in these suits were the same as in the first set of suits. The defence to the suits was also the same. The suits were decreed by the trial Judge on 30th September, 1910, in the following terms :-\n\n\"The plaintiffs' title is declared to the lands in suit and they will get khas possession of the same by ejecting the tenant defendants; on condition of paying\n\n(1) (1918)\n\n27 C.L.J. 532.\n\nRaja Bhupendra Narain Singh11\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nRaja Bhupi:ndra\n\nNarain Singha Bahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh and Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nto t.he defendant No. 1 an additional rent, to be determined on the principle that the original patni rent should bear the same ratio to the patni rent now payable bv the plaintiffs as the original H ustbood at the time of the creation of the patni should bear to the present increased Hustbood, or any other fair and equitable rent which may be determined at the time of assessing the mesne profits.\n\nThe plaintiffs will get W asilat from defendant No. I up to the date of delivery of possession of the land in suit to them. The amount will be determined in a separate enquiry.\"\n\nThe District Judge on appeal remanded the cases for determination of the conditions and terms under which the patnidar was to hold the lands under the zamindar and directed ascertainment of profits. The plaintiffs obtained delivery of possession of the lands in the meanwhile on 23rd November, 1910. Against the remand order appeals were preferred to the High Court and the 'High Court decreed the appeals in these terms:-\n\n\"W e set aside the portion of the decision of the District Judge which remands the cases to the original court to determine the conditions under which the patnidar is to hold the lands under the zarnindar.\n\nRest of the remand order will stand. That portion of the Munsif's decree, which imposes on the appell; mt, as a condition of obtaining khas possession, the payment of additional rent to the zamindar will be set aside.\" Against these decrees appeals were preferred to His Majesty in Council by special ilcave. The Privy Council set aside the decrees of the High Court and observed as follows:-\n\n\"Their Lordships, therefore, see no reason for interfering with the long series of authorities commencing as. far back as the . year 1900, which have established the right of the zamindar to have an additional rent fixed for such 'lands not can. their Lordships overlook the fact that in the cases already referred before this Board no exception was taken by the patnidar to the\n\n' ii\n\n• (\n\nfixing of such rents as a condition of being put into . \" possession.\n\nOn 8th December, 1922, the plaintiffs filed applications in these suits for ascertainment of mesne profits for the years 1906 to 1910. Objections were taken on behalf of the defendant on the 17th April, 1923, and it was contended that .the plaintiffs may be allowed mesne profits to the extent of the amount that would be found due after deduction of the amount of rent to which the defendant was entitled in respect of the lands in suit according lb the judgment of the munsif.\n\nOn the 28th May, 1927, another application was filed by the zamindar claiming deduction by way of equiitab'.le set-off of the amounts due to him for rent from 1910 onwards and on account of subsequent payment made by him towards revenue and cesses. After a prolonged enquiry the munsaf ultimately on the 18th December, 1937, decreed the plaintiff's claim for mesne profits after allowing deductions for the amounts claimed by the defendant up to the date of delivery of possession.\n\nHe held that the appellant was not entitled to get any amount by way of equitable set-off in respect of sums of money spent by him in payment of revenue and cesses or for the amount of munafa or profits for the period subsequent to the date of delivery of possession.\n\nThe District Judge on appeal! by his judgment dated the 16th December, 1938, allowed the claim of equitable set-off for the period subsequent to delivery of possession and directed that \"from the plaintiffs' dues, the dues of the defendant are to be deducted and if after these deductions any sum is due to the plaintiffs they will get a decree for that sum. If it is found on calculations in some cases that the dues of the defendant exceed the dues of the plaintiffs, in such cases the prayer of the plaintiffs for mesne profits must be dismissed.\" Against this decision special appeals were pref erred to the High Court and by the judgment under appeal the decision of the uial court was restored. Applications were then made for leave to appeals to His 1\\1.ajesty in. Council and 2-9 S.C. Indiaf71\n\nRaja BhupendriJ\n\nNargin Singhi!I\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nRaja BhuPendra\n\nN ar•io Sitizht1\n\nBllhadur\n\nMMharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMah•jan /.\n\nthose were allowed and a certificate was granted for preferring those appeals. Because of the abolition of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council those appeals are now before us for decision.\n\nThe points for decision in all these appeals are the following:-\n\n1. Whether the appellant is entitled to deduct by way of equitable set-off from the amount of mesne profits the amounts due to him on account of rent, revenue and cesses for the period subsequent to the dates of delivery of possession.\n\n2. Whether interest should be allowed on the amount of mesne profits found due, and if so, at what rate.\n\n3. Whether the rent due to the appellant from the patnidar on those lands should be calculated on the basis of annual assets of the land (as in Radhacharan\n\nv. Maharaia Ranji~ Singh(')), or on a fair and equitable basis.\n\nThe claim for set-off for the period. for which mesne profits were claimed has been allowed and is not in these appeals.\n\nAs regards the amounts due to the appellant by way of rent subsequent to .the date of transfer of possession, the claim is unconnected with the subjectmatter of the different suits.\n\nIt seems clear that a plea in the nature of equitable set-off is not available when the cross-demands do not arise out of the same ·. transaction. Mesne profits due to the plaintiff relate to the period during which the appellant was in wrongful possession of the lands and .the amounts claimed by the defendant relate to a period when he was no longer in possession and had ceased to be a trespasser. No mesne profits a.re claimaWe for that period. The right of the appellant to recover additional rents from the plaintiff arises out of a different ! cause of action and independently of the claim for I. mesne profits. If the patnidar after having entered into possession had defaulted in the payment of the\n\n(1) (1918) 27 C.L.J. 532. ' .• , , ; ':\n\n> -\n\n1952 additional rents due for any period, nothing stood in the way of the appellant from recovering them by appropriate legal proceedings.\n\nThe prolongation of the enquiry for ascertainment of the mesne profits cannot support a claim for equitable set-off for the period subsequent to the delivery of possession to the plaintiff.\n\nRaia Bhupendra Narain SingA11\n\nBahadur\n\nIt is obvious that no claim for equitable set-off against mesne profits during the pendency of the suits could be made for the sums deduction of which is now sought, as the amounts had not then accrued due and his right to them had not yet arisen. The learned District Judge was in error in holding that the appellant's claim for equitable set-off was in the nature of a cross-demand arising out of the same transaction and connected in its nature and circumstances.\n\nHe failed to appreciate that the transaction which led to plaintiff's demand rsulted tfrom the defendant's wrongful act as a trespasser, while the transaction giving rise to the appellant's demand arises out of the relationship of landlord and tenant and the obligations resulting therefrom.\n\nA wrongdoer who has wrongfully withheld moneys belonging to another cannot invoke any principles of equity in his favour and seek to deduct therefrom the amounts that during this period have fallen due to him. There is nothing improper or unjust in telling the wrongdoer to undo his wrong, and not to take advantage of it. Such a person cannot be helped on any principles of equity to recover amounts for the recovery of which he could have taken action in due course of law and which for some unexplained reason he failed to take and which claim may have by now become barred by limitation.\n\nIt was contended that it was only after the decree of the Privy Council that the appellant's rights to the additional rent was finally established and till then no legal steps could be taken to enforce this demand.\n\nThe contention is without force.\n\nThe appellant's right to additional rent had been established by the decree of the trial court in execution of which possession passed from him to the patnidar. 'fhe Privy\n\nMaharai Bahadur SingA\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n1952 .--- Raia Bhupendra\n\nNarain St'ngha ..\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nCouncil only affirmed this decision.\n\nThe patnidars under the decree were entitled to possession of the lands conditional on payment of the additional rent due for the period they had been out of possession.\n\nThat condition having been fulfilled (by adjustment of the appellant's claim against the mesne profits), the decree must be held to have been satisfied, thus completely settling the cross-demands. The landlord's demand for subsequent rents has to be enforced in the ordinary way in the civil court if any default has been committed in the payment of these rents. This claim cannot for ever remain linked with the demand for mesne profits for any anterior period. The result 1s that the decision of the High Court on this point is maintained.\n\nOn the question of future interest payable on the decretal amount, the learned District Judge observed as follows:-\n\n\"I may state, however, at this stage that if I were to rule out the fact that I am allowing the claim of the appellant for equitable set-off, I would have allowed interest to the plaintiffs at the uniform rate of 4 per cent. per annum throughout, i.e., from the beginning '•. of the W ashilat period up to date: As I am allowing the prayer for equitable set-off, I am of opinion, however, that interest at the usual rate at 6 per cent. per annum should be granted for the whole of this period.\"\n\nThe High Court disallowed equitable set-off but yet maintained this decision. When the claim for equitable set-off is being disallowed, there is no justification for allowing future interest at the rate of more than 1' four per cent. for such a long period, particularly in a case where the plaintiff himself has not been prompt in getting the amount of mesrie profits ascertained.\n\nThe plaintiff did not even ask for an enquiry into this question for a period of about twelve years. Taking .into consideration all the circurristances of the case we • , think that future interest .should not have been allow- . ed to the' plaintiff in the several suits at a higher rate ,.i.. ..\n\n. than four per cent: on the amount decreed in the vari-\n\n<$ suits by way 'of mesne :profits. ·\n\n--\n\nt ...\n\nThe appellant's last contention that the munafa\n\n(rent) should not be calculated on the principle laid down in Radhacharan v. Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1) but should have been assessed on a fair share of the profits of the land has no substance because the claim was not made in the grounds of appeal to the Privy Council and was not even mentioned in the additional grounds of appeal. It was for the first time made before us at the hearing and we see no valid grounds for entertaining it at this late stage. Moreover, it seems to us that the claim has no substance in the absence of any .evidence about the proportion the original patni rent bore to the r.evenue and cesses.\n\nFor the reasons given above all these appeals fail except to the extent that the decree of the High Court is modified in that the amounts decreed by way of mesne profits in the various suits will bear interest at the rate of four per cent. instead of six per cent. The parties will bear their own costs in all these appeals.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Civil Appeals No. 62 to 74 :lJ.ld 75 to 92 : P. K. Bose.\n\n'W Agent for respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeals Nos. 68\n\nto 74 : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 m Civil Appeals Nos. 75 to 92 : Sukumar Ghose.\n\nMUSAMMAT PHOOL KUER\n\nti.\n\nMUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHE.lt.\n\nPANDIT MADAN MOHAN\n\nMUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER .\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR.\n\nand VMAN BosE JJ.] Hindu law-Widow-Surrender 'to next reversioner and stranger-Validity-Compromise by widow-When binding O# reversioner.\n\n(1) (1918) 27 C.L.J. 532.\n\nRaja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nApril 24", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Anaro Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anaro Kuer was admittedly an oral transaction and there was no proof of any prohibition against the settlement with tenants so far as her share (3.97 acres) was concerned and that the rights of the parties as regards this area .would stand on a different footing from the rights in respect of the 4 acres and 29 cents belonging to the plaintiff first party."}}, {"text": "Lakhandeo Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 608, "end_char": 623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This point was not taken in the courts below where the two ijaras given to Lakhandeo Singh were dealt with as if they were part and parcel of one and the same transaction, the rights and liabilities, whatever they were, being common to both."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1057, "end_char": 1068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "M. M Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1110, "end_char": 1120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 9: M. M Sinha."}}, {"text": "K_. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1167, "end_char": 1179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K_."}}, {"text": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1182, "end_char": 1218, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1225, "end_char": 1257, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1300, "end_char": 1318, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Narain Szngha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2111, "end_char": 2124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "able by him under the decree, the amounts due to him on account Ra1a B_uP.endra\n\nof rent, revenue and cesses for a period subsequent to the date Narain Szngha of delivery of possession of the lands inasmuch as the two cross Bahadur demands do not arise out of the same transaction."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2579, "end_char": 2586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\n_ CrvrL\n\nAPPELLATE JrnusmcTION : Appeals from the judgments arid -decrees dated the 23rd February, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Akram and Blank JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "Akram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\n_ CrvrL\n\nAPPELLATE JrnusmcTION : Appeals from the judgments arid -decrees dated the 23rd February, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Akram and Blank JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Blank", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2751, "end_char": 2756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\n_ CrvrL\n\nAPPELLATE JrnusmcTION : Appeals from the judgments arid -decrees dated the 23rd February, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Akram and Blank JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Sitaram Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sitaram Bannerjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and Amiya Kumar Mukherjea, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Arun Kumar Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2972, "end_char": 2988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sitaram Bannerjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and Amiya Kumar Mukherjea, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Arun Kutnar Dutta"}}, {"text": "Amiya Kumar Mukherjea", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2993, "end_char": 3014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sitaram Bannerjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and Amiya Kumar Mukherjea, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Urukramdas Chakravarthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3085, "end_char": 3108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Urukramdas Chakravarthy (S. 'fl/. Mukherjee, with him) for the respondent No .. 1."}}, {"text": "Arun Kutnar Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3233, "end_char": 3250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "·- Sitaram Bannerjee (Arun Kutnar Dutta and Amiya Kumar Mukherjea, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Arun Kutnar Dutta"}}, {"text": "Panchanan Chose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3347, "end_char": 3362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchanan Chose (Chandra Nath Mukherji, with him) for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Chandra Nath Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3364, "end_char": 3385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchanan Chose (Chandra Nath Mukherji, with him) for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3534, "end_char": 3541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was\n\ndelivered by - -\n\nMAHAJAN J.-These appeals are directed against the judgment and decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, dated 23rd February, 1945, reversing the judgment and decrees passed by the District Judge -of Birbhum dated - 16th December, 1938.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "Raja Bhupendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3841, "end_char": 3855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nprincipal questions for determination are the same m\n\nRaja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj IJahadur Singh and Others.", "canonical_name": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR"}}, {"text": "Maharaj IJahadur Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3883, "end_char": 3905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nprincipal questions for determination are the same m\n\nRaja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj IJahadur Singh and Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Bahadur Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4175, "end_char": 4197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68 to 74 were filed iH September, 1904, by Maharaja Bahadur Singh, in the court of the different Munsifs at Rampurhat, against Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, deceased, and others, for a declaration of his title to the lands mentioned in the different suits and for mesne profits from the year 1899.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Rampurhat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4240, "end_char": 4249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68 to 74 were filed iH September, 1904, by Maharaja Bahadur Singh, in the court of the different Munsifs at Rampurhat, against Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, deceased, and others, for a declaration of his title to the lands mentioned in the different suits and for mesne profits from the year 1899."}}, {"text": "Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4259, "end_char": 4284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68 to 74 were filed iH September, 1904, by Maharaja Bahadur Singh, in the court of the different Munsifs at Rampurhat, against Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, deceased, and others, for a declaration of his title to the lands mentioned in the different suits and for mesne profits from the year 1899.", "canonical_name": "Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur"}}, {"text": "14th November, 1853", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4615, "end_char": 4634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the lands in the several suits were chowkidari chakran lands within the plaintiff's patnidari, granted to his predecessors in interest on 14th November, 1853, by the ancestors of the defendant, that as the lands were in the possession of village watchman on service tenures, they were excluded from assessment of land revenue and no rent was paid on them, that in the year 1899 under the provisions of sections 50 and 51 of Bengal Act VI of 1870 Government resumed the lands, terminated the service tenures and settled them with the zamindar, that in this situation the plaintiff as patnidar became entitled to their actual physical possession, that the zamindar wrongfully took physical possession of them and denied the right of the plaintiff and hence he was entitled to the reliefs claimed."}}, {"text": "sections 50 and 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4879, "end_char": 4897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Act VI of 1870", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4901, "end_char": 4922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17th August, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5299, "end_char": 5316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suits were decreed on 17th August, 1905, and 19th August, 1905, by the two courts respectively and the decisions were affirmed on appeal by the District Judge."}}, {"text": "19th August, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5322, "end_char": 5339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suits were decreed on 17th August, 1905, and 19th August, 1905, by the two courts respectively and the decisions were affirmed on appeal by the District Judge."}}, {"text": "24th June, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6401, "end_char": 6416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24th June, 1927, another set of objections was filed\n\n.....\n\nby the zamindar claiming deduction out of mesne profits 'by way of equitable set-off of the payments made by him subsequent to the date of delivery of possession as well as for the amount of munafa that became payable to him after that date."}}, {"text": "18th December, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6751, "end_char": 6770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a prolonged enquiry .the trial court on 18th December, 1937, decreed the plaintiff's claim for mesne profits after allowing the zamindar the deductions claimed by him up to the date of assessment of mesne profits but disallowed the amount claimed by way of equitable setoff for the subsequent period."}}, {"text": "Maharaj Bahadur Singlt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8133, "end_char": 8155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The course of litigation in these cases has not run along\n\nRaja 13hupendra\n\nNarain Singha\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singlt\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Maharaj Bahadur Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8224, "end_char": 8245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan I~\n\nRaja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10006, "end_char": 10028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the judgment and decrees of the District' Judge the plaintiff preferred appeals to the High Court at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "9th June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10527, "end_char": 10541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated 9th June, 1947, all the appeals were admitted and it was directed that the proceedings be printed and transmitted to England."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10644, "end_char": 10651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated 9th June, 1947, all the appeals were admitted and it was directed that the proceedings be printed and transmitted to England."}}, {"text": "Raja Bhupendra Narayan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10712, "end_char": 10740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court, Raja Bhupendra Narayan Singh died and the 11resent appellant was impleaded as his heir and representative.", "canonical_name": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11082, "end_char": 11095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application under Order XIX, rule 4, of the Supreme Court Rules was presented at the hearing of the appeals that the appellant be allowed to urge the following additional grounds in support of the appeals, viz.:-\n\n(1) That the munafa (rent) should not be calculated on the basis of the principles laid down in Radhacharan v. Maharaja Raniit Singh(1)."}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1909", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11618, "end_char": 11637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75 to 92 of 1951) arises out of 18 suits instituted in the court of the Munsif of Rampurhat on 22nd December, 1909, by Ganpat Singh and Narpat Singh predecessors in interest of respondents 1 to 3 against the predecessors in interest of the appellant, late Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, and also some other persons who were tenants under him, for a declaration of the plaintiffs' title to the resumed chowkidari chakran lands and for khas possession of the same and for mesne profits~ The allegations in these suits were the same as in the first set of suits."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11642, "end_char": 11654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75 to 92 of 1951) arises out of 18 suits instituted in the court of the Munsif of Rampurhat on 22nd December, 1909, by Ganpat Singh and Narpat Singh predecessors in interest of respondents 1 to 3 against the predecessors in interest of the appellant, late Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, and also some other persons who were tenants under him, for a declaration of the plaintiffs' title to the resumed chowkidari chakran lands and for khas possession of the same and for mesne profits~ The allegations in these suits were the same as in the first set of suits.", "canonical_name": "Ganpat Singh"}}, {"text": "Narpat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11659, "end_char": 11671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75 to 92 of 1951) arises out of 18 suits instituted in the court of the Munsif of Rampurhat on 22nd December, 1909, by Ganpat Singh and Narpat Singh predecessors in interest of respondents 1 to 3 against the predecessors in interest of the appellant, late Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, and also some other persons who were tenants under him, for a declaration of the plaintiffs' title to the resumed chowkidari chakran lands and for khas possession of the same and for mesne profits~ The allegations in these suits were the same as in the first set of suits.", "canonical_name": "Ganpat Singh"}}, {"text": "Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11779, "end_char": 11804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75 to 92 of 1951) arises out of 18 suits instituted in the court of the Munsif of Rampurhat on 22nd December, 1909, by Ganpat Singh and Narpat Singh predecessors in interest of respondents 1 to 3 against the predecessors in interest of the appellant, late Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, and also some other persons who were tenants under him, for a declaration of the plaintiffs' title to the resumed chowkidari chakran lands and for khas possession of the same and for mesne profits~ The allegations in these suits were the same as in the first set of suits.", "canonical_name": "Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur"}}, {"text": "30th September, 1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12168, "end_char": 12188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suits were decreed by the trial Judge on 30th September, 1910, in the following terms :-\n\n\"The plaintiffs' title is declared to the lands in suit and they will get khas possession of the same by ejecting the tenant defendants; on condition of paying\n\n(1) (1918)\n\n27 C.L.J. 532."}}, {"text": "Raja Bhupendra Narain Singh11", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12406, "end_char": 12435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Bhupendra Narain Singh11\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR"}}, {"text": "Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12437, "end_char": 12444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Bhupendra Narain Singh11\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Raja Bhupi:ndra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12485, "end_char": 12500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Bhupi:ndra\n\nNarain Singha Bahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh and Others.", "canonical_name": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12563, "end_char": 12570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nto t.he defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "23rd November, 1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13435, "end_char": 13454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs obtained delivery of possession of the lands in the meanwhile on 23rd November, 1910."}}, {"text": "8th December, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14646, "end_char": 14664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 8th December, 1922, the plaintiffs filed applications in these suits for ascertainment of mesne profits for the years 1906 to 1910."}}, {"text": "17th April, 1923", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14834, "end_char": 14850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Objections were taken on behalf of the defendant on the 17th April, 1923, and it was contended that .the plaintiffs may be allowed mesne profits to the extent of the amount that would be found due after deduction of the amount of rent to which the defendant was entitled in respect of the lands in suit according lb the judgment of the munsif."}}, {"text": "28th May, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15130, "end_char": 15144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th May, 1927, another application was filed by the zamindar claiming deduction by way of equiitab'.le set-off of the amounts due to him for rent from 1910 onwards and on account of subsequent payment made by him towards revenue and cesses."}}, {"text": "16th December, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15931, "end_char": 15950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by his judgment dated the 16th December, 1938, allowed the claim of equitable set-off for the period subsequent to delivery of possession and directed that \"from the plaintiffs' dues, the dues of the defendant are to be deducted and if after these deductions any sum is due to the plaintiffs they will get a decree for that sum."}}, {"text": "Raja BhupendriJ\n\nNargin Singhi!I", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16678, "end_char": 16710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Council and 2-9 S.C. Indiaf71\n\nRaja BhupendriJ\n\nNargin Singhi!I\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Mahajan f.\n\nRaja BhuPendra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16760, "end_char": 16786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan f.\n\nRaja BhuPendra\n\nN ar•io Sitizht1\n\nBllhadur\n\nMMharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "MMharaj Bahadur Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16816, "end_char": 16837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan f.\n\nRaja BhuPendra\n\nN ar•io Sitizht1\n\nBllhadur\n\nMMharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Raia Bhupendra Narain SingA11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19080, "end_char": 19109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raia Bhupendra Narain SingA11\n\nBahadur\n\nIt is obvious that no claim for equitable set-off against mesne profits during the pendency of the suits could be made for the sums deduction of which is now sought, as the amounts had not then accrued due and his right to them had not yet arisen.", "canonical_name": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR"}}, {"text": "Raia Bhupendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20955, "end_char": 20969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\n1952 .--- Raia Bhupendra\n\nNarain St'ngha ..\n\nBahadur v.\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR"}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24297, "end_char": 24307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "62 to 74 :lJ.ld 75 to 92 : P. K. Bose."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24374, "end_char": 24384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68\n\nto 74 : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24457, "end_char": 24470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75 to 92 : Sukumar Ghose."}}, {"text": "MUSAMMAT PHOOL KUER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24473, "end_char": 24492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUSAMMAT PHOOL KUER\n\nti.", "canonical_name": "MUSAMMAT PHOOL KUER"}}, {"text": "MUSAMMAT PEM KUER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24499, "end_char": 24516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHE.lt.", "canonical_name": "MUSAMMAT PHOOL KUER"}}, {"text": "PANDIT MADAN MOHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24533, "end_char": 24551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PANDIT MADAN MOHAN\n\nMUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER ."}}, {"text": "VMAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24634, "end_char": 24643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and VMAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Raja Bhupendra Narain Singha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24795, "end_char": 24823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_793_811_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "t ...\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 793\n\nThe appellant's last contention that the munafa\n\n(rent) should not be calculated on the principle laid down in Radhacharan v. Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1) but should have been assessed on a fair share of the profits of the land has no substance because the claim was not made in the grounds of appeal to the Privy Council and was not even mentioned in the additional grounds of appeal. It was for the first time made before us at the hearing and we see no valid grounds for entertaining it at this late stage. Moreover, it seems to us that the claim has no substance in the absence of any .evidence about the proportion the original patni rent bore to the r.evenue and cesses.\n\nFor the reasons given above all these appeals fail except to the extent that the decree of the High Court is modified in that the amounts decreed by way of mesne profits in the various suits will bear interest at the rate of four per cent. instead of six per cent. The parties will bear their own costs in all these appeals.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Civil Appeals No. 62 to 74 :lJ.ld 75 to 92 : P. K. Bose.\n\n'W Agent for respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeals Nos. 68\n\nto 74 : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 m Civil Appeals Nos. 75 to 92 : Sukumar Ghose.\n\nMUSAMMAT PHOOL KUER\n\nti.\n\nMUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHE.lt.\n\nPANDIT MADAN MOHAN\n\nMUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER .\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR.\n\nand VMAN BosE JJ.] Hindu law-Widow-Surrender 'to next reversioner and stranger-Validity-Compromise by widow-When binding O# reversioner.\n\n(1) (1918) 27 C.L.J. 532.\n\nRaja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nApril 24\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat Pem Kuer and Another.\n\nMahaian f.\n\nA relinquishment by a Hindu widow of her estate in favour of the next reversioner and a stranger in equal moieties is not a valid surrender under Hindu law.\n\nA valid surrender cannot be made in favour of anybody except the next heir of the husband.\n\nMummareddi Nagireddi v. Pitti Durairaia Naidu [19511 (S.C.R. 655) followed.\n\nIt is competent to a Hindu widow to enter into a compromise in the course of the suit bona fide in the interest of the estate and not for her personal advantage and a decree passed on such a compromise will be binding on the reversioner. The question whether a compromise is a bona fide settlement of a disputed right between the parties depends on tho substance of the transaction and in order that it may bind the estate it should be a prudent and reasonable act. [On the facts their Lordships held, agreeing with the High Court, that the compromise in the present case was neither prudent nor reasonable so far as it affected the interests of the estate and of the ultimate reversioners and that it was not, therefore, binding on the reversioners.]\n\nRamsumaran Prasad v. Shyam Kumari ( 49\n\nI. A. 342), Mohendra Nath Biswas v. Shamsunnessa Khatun (21 C.L.f. 157) and lmrit Kunwar v. Roop Narain Singh (6 C.L.R. 76) followed.\n\nMata Prasad v. Nageshar Sahai (52 I.A. 393) distinguished.\n\nC1VIL\n\nAPPELLATE Juruso1cnoN : Civil Appeals Nos. 29 and 30 of 1951.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated 26th October, 1943, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Verma and Yorke JJ.) in First Appeal No. 48 of 1938 arising out of the\n\n' f •\n\njudgment and decree dated 6th August, 1937, of the - Court of the Additional Civil Judge at Agra in Suit No. 30 of 1936.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and Kirpa Ram (K. B. Asthana, with them) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1951.\n\nK. N. Agarwal for the appellant in Civil Appeal • No. 30 of 1951.\n\nC. K. Daphtary (G. C. Mathur, with him) for the respondents in both the appeals.\n\n1952. April 24. The Judgment of the' Court wa~ delivered by MAHAJAN J.\n\n} • • ·,._ ..\n\n,, \"\"' \\ \\-\n\n' I ~\n\nMAHAJAN J.--The dispute in this appeal concerns the zemindari and house properties last owned by Shaha Chiranji Lal who died at a young age on the 14th May, 1913, leaving him surviving a widow, Mst. Khem Kuer, and his mother Mst. Mohan Kuer, besides a number of collaterals, indicated in the pedigree table below :-\n\nShah Pirthi Raj\n\nI I Mst. Tulsa Kuer=Shah Lal Chand=Mst. Mohan Kuer .1 Hira Lal Shah Jal Kisen I Mst. Ram Kuer =Kherpal\n\nI I- I I Ram Chand Lachman Kishen Lal\n\nPrasad =Mst. Umri\n\nI Ganga Prasad I J amna Prasad\n\n'1 Manohar Lal\n\nI I Shah Jwala Prasad\n\n(1) Khem Kuer\n\n(2) Phool Kuer\n\nI Dwarka Prasad\n\nShah Sj Kishen\n\nI Shah Madho Lal i----1\n\nSudarshan Lal Mad- I Mst. Prem Kuer i sudan Lal\n\nShah Chiranji Lal =Lekh Raj =Mst. Khem Kuer I\n\nLachrni Jarain\n\n~ ;:,.. lI °:\"\"'\n\nl~~ ~~ ::i... ::! 0 .... ~:;.::::!:0:~~1t0.\n\nS,~~\n\n~~VI ... \"' ~ N\n\n----\"--~ _.. ·---- .• I\n\n~ 8 c:: §\n\nMusammal Ph.ool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer tmd Another.\n\n' Mahaian /.\n\n.796\n\nSUPREME COURT.REPORTS [1952]\n\nMst. Khem Kuer, the young widow of Shah Chiranji Lal, was murdered on the 28th August, 1919, and Mst. Mohan Kuer, the mother, died on the 5th December, 1932. Mst. Prem Kuer, the respondent in the appeal, claiming herself to be the heir to Shah Chiranji Lal as his sister, brought the suit giving rise to this appeal in the court of the civil judge, Agra, against amongst others, Mst. Phool Kuer, the present appellant, for recovery of possession of the properties of Shah Chiranji Lal and mesne profits.\n\nMst. Prem Kuer joined her half-sister Mst. Ram Kuer and their sons as plaintiffs along with herself.\n\nIn the array of defendants were impleaded Mst. Phool Kuer and Mst. Khem Kuer, widows of Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal and his sons and a host of others. as transferees of the properties.\n\nThe main defence to the suit was that Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal were recognized to be the owners and heirs to the entire estate of Shah Chiranji Lal by Khem Kuer and Mohan Kuer in a family settlement arrived at between the parties in suit No. 120 of 1915, that by virtue of this family settlement the estate of the deceased was vested in them subject to the life estates of the two women and that the plaintiffs who came to be recognized as reversioners by the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, II of 1929, were not entitled to claim it. It was further pleaded tha~ on the death of Khem Kuer in 1919, Mohan Kuer surrendered the estate in favour of Jwala Prasad and Madho Lal and they took possession of it as owners and the plaintiffs who subsequently became statutory heirs in 1919 could not be allowed to question the surrender and reopen the succession which could not remain in abeyance.\n\nThe learned additional civil judge who tried the suit, dismissed it holding that the compromise of 1915 was a bona fide settlement of a bona fide dispute and was binding as a family settlement being for the benefit of the estate, that Mohan Kuer surrendered the estate validly in favour of Jwala Prasad and Madho\n\n. ..[·\n\nLal and they entered into possession of it after the death of Khem Kuer. Some of the transferees who had been impleaded as defendants compromised the suit with the plaintiffs and that part of the suit was decided according to the terms thereof between those parties.\n\nMst.\n\nPrem Kuer preferred an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad against the decree dismissing her suit. The High Court by its judgment dated the 26th October, 1943, allowed the appeal, reversed the findings of the learned additional civil judge on the above issues and decreed the plaintiffs' suit with costs. Some of the transferee-defendants compromised with the plaintiffs-appellant m the High Court and the appeal was decided in terms thereof in their favour.\n\nTwo main points which are in controversy in this appeal and require consideration, are:-\n\n1. Whether the compromise in suit No. 120 of 1915 amounts to a family settlement and binds the plaintiff-respondent, and,\n\n2. Whether the surrender by Mst.\n\nMohan Kuer was a valid surrender under Hindu law.\n\nIn order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties, it is: necessary to set out shortly in chronological order the history of the events which has resulted in this controversy.\n\nAs already stated, Shah Chiranji Lal died on the 14th May, 1913, leaving considerable movable and immovable property. At the time of his death, his widow Khem Kuer was about eleven years old and his mother Mohan Kuer was about 53 years old.\n\nThe two revers10ners, Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal, made an application for mutation of names of the estate in their favour claiming it on the basis of a will alleged to have been made by Shah Chiranji Lal on the 13th May, 1913, a day before his death. On the 10th of September, 1913, an application was made by Mohan Kuer for herself and as guardian of Khem Kuer , challenging the genuineness of the will . and claiming\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\n.v.\n\nMusammat Pem Kuer and Another.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer and Anothet'.\n\nMahaian J.\n\nthat the estate of the late Shah Chiran ji Lal should' be mutated in their names.\n\nNotice of this application was given to the two reversioners but they thought it prudent not to appear and to contest the contentions raised by the two ladies, with the result that the inheritance of the late Chiranjf Lal was mutated in the name of the widow as sole heir under the guardianship of Mohan Kuer by an order dated the 28th October, 1913. The reversioners. had also made applications in pending suits for getting themselves impleaded as legal representatives.\n\nMohan Kuer applied for the removal of their names and for substitution of the name of the widow and of herself in those cases.\n\nPending decision of these matters, on the 11th May, 1915, suit No. 120 of 1915 was filed by Jwala Prasad and Madho Lal on the basis of the alleged will of the 13th May, 1913. On the same day an application was made for the appointment of a receiver and' an interim order appointing a receiver was passed by the court. On the 18th May, 1915, Mohan Kuer for herself and as guardian of the minor widow made an application praying for the discharge of the receiver.\n\nBy an order dated the 23rd September, 1915, the receiver was discharged and it was held by the civil judge that the plaintiffs had no prima faci~ case and that the will propounded by them was a susp1c10us document. On the 18th December, 1915, suit No. 120' of 1915 was compromised between the parties. This compromise is in the following terms:-\n\n\"l. The plaintiffs relinquish their claim for possession over the estate of Shah Chiranji Lal.\n\n2. The defendants shall have all those rights to the estate of Shah Chiranji Lal, which she had as a Hindu widow according to law. After the death of .the two Musammats, the plaintiffs in equal shares and, after them, their heirs, who might have the right of survivorship one after the other, shall be the owners of the estate of Shah Chiranji Lal.\n\n3. The name of Mst. Mohan Kunwar defendant\n\nainst one half of the property in lieu of maintc:nance., shall continue.\n\n-.......\n\n' •.\n\n4. Mst. Mohan Kunwar and Mst. Khem Kunwar shall have power to do anything they might choose with the entire income from the movable and immovable property, cash, ornaments, amount of decrees and documents, household goods and other movables, which they might have in their possession. The plaintiffs or anyone else shall have no power to interfere or to ask for rendition of accounts.\n\n5. In case Mohan Kunwar defendant dies first, Mst. Khem Kunwar shall, as a Hindu widow, become the owner m possession of the entire property, of which Mst. Mohan Kuer might have been in possession in any way, subject to the provisions of condition No. 4. In case Mst. Khem Kuer defendant dies first, Mst. Mohan Kuer shall as a Hindu widow, become the owner in possession of the entire property of which Mst. Khem Kuer might have been in possession in any way, subject to the provisions of condition No. 4.\"\n\nIn accordance with the terms of this compromise suit No. 120 of 1915 was dismissed.\n\nIn the proceedings that were pending for substitution of names the court on the 22nd December, 1915, ordered that Khem Kuer and Mohan Kuer be impleaded as legal representatives of the late Shah Chiranji Lal.\n\nOn the 2nd September, 1918, Khem Kuer brought a suit against her mother-in-law Mohan Kuer for a declaration to the effect that she alone was the lawful heir of Chiranji Lal and was the owner of the property, mentioned in schedule A and that the defendant had no concern with i~. This suit was compromised between the parties on the 22nd April, 1919. Mohan Kuer agreed that Khem Kuer's suit be decreed.\n\nKhem Kuer undertook to look after Mohan Kuer in every way and if she desired to live separately from her, she agreed to pay her a sum of Rs. 3000 per annum by way of maintenance .\n\nKhem Kuer did not live long after her having become owner of the entire estate of her husband under the terms of this compromise. As stated already, she was murdered on the 28th August, 1919. The estate\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer and Another~\n\nMahajan /.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\n. v.\n\nMusammat\n\nPcm Kuer . and Another.\n\nMahian /.\n\nthus became vested in Mohan Kuer both according to Hindu law as well as in accordance with the terms of the compromise of the 18th December, 1915. It is alleged that either on the fourth or the thirteenth day after the death of Khem Kuer, Mohan Kuer when asked about the mutation of the estate, said that she had no concern with it and had relinquished it and had devoted herself to worship. On the 15th September, 1919, an application bearing the signature of Mohan Kuer . in Hindi was presented by her mukhtar Chaturbhuj in the court of the subordinate judge at Agra, praying that the sale certificate in suit No. 1919 (Shah /wala Prasad v. Rai Bahadur Shah Durga Prasad), be prepared in the names of Shah Jwala Prasad and\n\nShah Madho Lal, for they were the heirs in possession of the properties of Shah Chiranji Lal. This application (Exhibit N-31) contains the following recital:-\n\n\"Mst. Khem Kuer died on the 28th of August,\n\n1919. I do not wan~ to take any proceedings in my own name. Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal are the subsequent heirs and it is in their names that all the mutation proceedings etc. are being taken in the revenue court. They have been made the heirs in possession of the entire property and an application has been filed in their names in this court for preparation of the sale certificate. This petitioner has got no objection to the preparation of the sale certificate in their names, for they are the heirs and are in possession of the property.\"\n\nThe sale certificate was prepared accordingly. On the 16th September, 1919, Jwala Prasad and Madho Lal applied for mutation in respect of the lands relating to mauza Samra in the court of the tahsildar of Etmadpur. In column 5 of this application (Exhibit A-14) it was alleged that they were entitled to mutation by right of inheritance. Similar applications were made in respect of other villages also. (Vide Exhibit 128 etc.). Mutations were entered 'in all the villages ori the basis that both of them were heirs in equal shares to the property of the deceased, though according to Hindu law, Shah Jwala Prasad alone was the\n\n' ' •.\n\nnext heir. During the course of the mutation proceedings one Chintaman, general attorney of Shah Jwala Prasad was examined on the 11th October, 1919, and he stated that Mst. Khem Kuer died on the 28th August, 1919, that Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal were her heirs in equal shares, that Mohan Kuer was the mother-in-law of the deceased and she did not want her name to be recorded and had made relinquishment in favour of Shah Madho Lal and Shah Jwala Prasad in the civil court on the 15th September,\n\n1919. Chaturbhuj, general attorney of Mohan Kuer was examined in the same proceedings on the 27th October, 1919, and he stated that Mohan Kuer did not want her name to be recorded in place of the name of the deceased, that she had no objection to the entry of the names of Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal, that she had sent him for making that statement.\n\nHe admitted the relinquishment filed by Mohan Kuer in the civil court with respect to the property of Mst.\n\nKhem Kuer but he was not able to state when that relinquishment had taken place.\n\nThe tahsildar after recording these statements ordered the mutation of names in favour of the two reversioners (Exhibit\n\nM-2).\n\nOn the 22nd November, 1919, the two reversioners Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal, having entered into possession of the estate after the death of Khem Kuer made a gift of property of the value of about Rs. 50,000 in favour of the sisters of Shah Chiranji Lal by means of two deeds of gift. (Vide Exhibit M-16). These gift deeds contain the following recitals:-\n\n\"Shah Chiranji Lal deceased was the owner of Katariha estate in which besides other villages the villages specified below were also included, and as he had no issue after his death Mst. Khem Kuer became his heir as a Hindu widow of a joint family subject to Mitakshara school of law. On her death we the execut ...\n\nants who were entitled to become the absolute owners of the estate of Shah Chiranji Lal acording to Shas,. tras became the absolute owner of the entire property\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat Pem Kuer and A notlfer.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer \"'nd Another.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nof Shah Chiranji Lal by inheriting the estate from rum. We obtained possession over everythlng and mutation of names also were effected in our favour from the revenue court in respect of all villages.\n\nShah Chiranji Lal deceased had two sisters Mst.\n\nRam Kuer and Mst. Prem Kuer and he had a desire during his lifetime to give them some property but owing to sudden death he could not himself fulfil hls intention during hls lifetime. We the executants accept this fact as desired by him. Besides this the mother of Shah Chiranji Lal also desires the same thlng and it is our duty to fulfil the same, and to give property to the Musammats aforesaid is considered to be a pious and good act from the religious point of view. It is our duty also to respect their wishes and fulfil the same, so that the people of our caste and family might not think that after the death of Shah Chiranji Lal his wishes remained unfulfilled. Hence for the reasons set forth above and keeping in view the honour of the family and pious nature of the act we the executants while in a sound state of body and mind ........... . make a gift of the following villages in favour of the donees.\"\n\nThe donees subsequently made a number of transfers of the property gifted to them and in every respect the gift deeds were acted upon. Jwala Prasad, the presumptive reversioner, died in the year 1930.\n\nIn suit No. 49 of 1928 (same as No. 89 of 1929) one Pandit Rikh Ram had obtained a decree against Shah Madho Lal and his sons and they appealed against it to the High Court and also applied for postponement .of the preparation of the final decree. Stay was ordered on the applicants furnishing security in the sum of Rs. 20,000 for future interest, costs, etc.\n\nOn the 26th May, 1930, in compliance with the order of the High Court a security bond was executed by Shah Madho Lal and his sons as first party and by Mst. Mohan Kuer -as second party, containing the following recitals:-\n\n\"After the death of Mst. Khem Kuer Mst. Mohan Xuer was to become the owner of the property with\n\n' • _,_\n\n,..\n\nlimited interests as a Hindu mother, but she relin- .quished her inheritance and did not agree to accept any property. By means of a private arrangement, i.e., a family arrnagement, it was decided as between Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal that they should be the owners of the property aforesaid in equal shares. Documents in that connection were registered. Thus Shah Madho Lal executant No. 1 is the exclusive owner of the property given below which is being pledged and hypothecated under this security bond. Executant No. 4, •the second party, has, after hearing and understanding the contents of this security bond, joined in token of the veracity of the facts noted above so that in future she might not be able to take objection to t and so that she might have no objection of any sort to the security bond.\" (Execu- . tant No. 4 was Mst. Mohan Kuer).\n\nOn the 30th June, 1930, an affidavit bearing the thumb impression of Mst. Mohan Kuer was filed in the same proceedings containing the following statements:-\n\n\"I solemnly affirm and say that after the death of Mst. Khem Kuer I did not agree to accept property nor was I the heir and that I relinquished the entire property in favour of Shah Jwala Prasad who became the owner of the entire property which was in possession of Khem Kuer.\"\n\nThe Subordinate Judge expressed the view that the bond could not be held to have been executed by Mohan Kuer, she being a pardanashin lady.\n\nHe .. declined to accept the deed as sufficient and valid J security. On the 9th July, 1930, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissed the application for stay of proceedings.\n\nOn the 15th July, 1931, Mohan Kuer instituted suit No. 24 of 1931 in the court of the subordinate judge of Mathura against the widows of Shah Jwala Prasad, Shah Madho Lal and his sons and a number of trans- ..,._..., ferees who had taken the property from these two reversioners. In para 8 of the plaint it was alleged\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer and Another.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer and Another.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nthat the plaintiff was an old pardanashin woman, was simple and of week intellect and illiterate, that on account of the murder of Mst. Khem Kuer, she was very terror-stricken and Was full of sorrow and had no knowledge about her rights, that the third defendant and Jwala Prasad who wanted to get the property took undue advantage of the plaintiff's aforesaid condition and unlawfully entered into possession of the property left by Chiranji Lal deceased and caused the mutation of names in their favour. In para. 12 it was said that the defendants had got the , thumb impressions of the plaintiffs on certain documents without telling her the contents of those papers, simply by saying that a decree for a considerable amount had been passed against the property and it was going to be sold in auction and that a security bond must be furnished for saving the property. She prayed for a decree for possession of the property in dispute in her favour against the defendants. During the pendency of this suit Mohan Kuer died on the 5th December, and on her death an attempt was made by the present plaintiffs to get themselves impleaded as her legal representatives but on the 9th October 1934 it was held that the claim of Mst. Mohan Kuer was of a personal character and the suit therefore could not proceed owing to abatement. It was, however, noted that the legal representatives could file a separate suit, if so advised. It is in consequence of this order that the suit out of which this appeal arises was filed on the 30th April, 1936.\n\nIt was contended by the learned Attorney-General that the High Court on mere suspicions and unwarr:mted assumptions had found the main issues in the case aaginst the appellant and had erroneously held that the compromise in suit No. 120 of 1915 was not binding on the plaintiffs and that the surrender by Mohan Kuer was not valid surrender under Hindu law. After hearing the learned counsel at considerable length, we did not think it necessary to hear the respondent in reply, as in out opiru'on, the decision\n\nof the High Court on both the points was right.\n\nJ {. •\n\n'1. •\n\nOn the point of surrender, the learned Attorney- .General contended that the widow effaced herself and put both the reversioners in possession of the property half and half, and agreed to take Rs. 3,000 from them for her maintenance and that the fact of surrender was satisfactorily proved from the conduct of Mohan Kuer in allowing the estate to be mutated in the names\" of the reversioners and in allowing them to take possession of it, also by the different statements made by her and from the other documentary and oral evidence led in the case. Emphasis was laid on the statements contained in the application (Exhibit M-31), on the statement of her mukhtar Chaturbhuj, and on the recitals of the security bond and the affidavit, Exhibit P-30.\n\nWhether Mohan Kuer effaced herself and surrendered the property, or whether she merely abandoned it,. or whether she entered into an arrangement for the division of the estate between herself, tl1e two reversioners and the daughters and their sons, it is not possible to predicate with any amount of certainty.\n\nNo definite opinion can be offered on the question whether whatever she did, she did voluntarily after fully realizing the consequences of her act and whether as a pardanashin lady she had been properly advised on the matter or whether she merely acted on sentiment.\n\nConsiderable doubt is cast on the story of surrender set up by the defendants by the recitals in the two deeds of gift, dated 22nd November, 1919, extracted above. The donors did not base their title to the property either on the compromise of 1915 or on the surrender of Mohan Kuer of the year 1919 or on the will; on the other hand, they said that they had become owners of the property of Chiranji Lal by inheritance under Hindu law after the death of his widow. Both of them could not possibly iP.herit the property half and half under Hindu law. Moreover,. there is no clear or definite evidence of either the time when the arrangement was made or of the terms thereof. The evidence on these points is vague and 3-9 S, C, Indiaf71\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer and Anothe1\n\nMahajan J.\n\nMusa1nmat Phool Kuer\n\nMusa1nmat\n\nPem Kuer and A not her.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nunsatisfactory. It is completely wanting as arrangement under which Mohan Kuer entitled to receive Rs. 3,000 from them.\n\n[1952]\n\nto the became\n\nThe conduct of Mohan Kuer and the various statements by her no doubt do indicate that she cut off her connection with the bulk of the estate of Chiranji Lal after the death of the widow and received a sum of Rs. 3,000 from the reversioners and 1t IS also clear that at her instance the reversioners gave property of the value of Rs. 50,000 to her daughters, but in the absence of any satisfactory evidence as to the precise nature of this arrangement it is not possible to conclude that the widow after fully realizing as to what she was doing and after proper advice effaced herself.\n\nIn this connection the allegations made by her in the suit of 1931 cannot be altogether ruled out from consideration.\n\nAssuming however for the sake of argument that Mohan Kuer purported to relinquish her estate in favour of Jwala Prasad and Madho Lal, in our opinion, the relinquishment cannot in law operate as an extinction of her title in the estate. The principle underlying the doctrine of surrender is that it cannot possibly be made in favour of anybody except the next heir of the husband. Vesting of the estate in the next reversioner takes place under operation of law and it is not possible for the widow to say that she is withdrawing herself from the husband's estate in order that it may vest in somebody other than the next heir of the husband. It was held by this court in Mummareddi Nagi Reddi v.\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu(') that so far as the next heir is concerned, there cannot be a surrender of the totality of the interest which the widow had, if she actually directs that a portion of it should be held or enjoyed by somebody else other than the husban.rl's heirs and that the position is not materially altered if the . surrender is made in favour of the next heir witlt\n\nwhom a stranger is associated and the widow purports to relinquish the estate in order that it may vest in\n\n(t) [1951] S.C.R. 655.\n\nboth of them. Though in the written statements of the two sets of defendants different versions of the character of the arrangement were pleaded, the learned Attorney-General before us stated that the surrender by the widow was made both in favour of Jwala Prasad and Madho Lal in equal moieties. Madho Lal admittedly was not the next reversioner entitled to succeed to the estate.\n\nThus the surrender of the totality of the interest of the widow was not made in favour of the next heir.\n\nThat being so, it cannot operate as a valid surrender. If the surrender could be held a valid one, then obviously succession that had opened out in 1919 and vested in the next heirs could not be divested at the instance of the plaintiffs in the year 1932 on the death of Mohan Kuer, but in view of the invalidity of the surrender it has to be held that succession to Shah Chiranji Lal's estate opened in 1932 and the plaintiffs as next heirs were entitled to take it.\n\nThe next question for consideration is whether the compromise of 1915 entered into between Mohan Kuer as guardian of Khem Kuer, and the two reversioners who had claimed the estate on the basis of a will, was a bona fide family arrangement and thus binding on the ultimate reversioners, the plaintiffs.\n\nIt is well settled that when the estate of a deceased Hindu vests in a female heir, a decree fairly and properly obtained against her in regard to the estate is in the absence of fraud or collusion binding on the reversionary heir, but the decree against the female holder must have involved the decision of a question of title and not merely a question of the widow's possession during her life (vide Venayeck Anundrow\n\nv. Luxumeebaee('). This principle of res iudicata is not limited to decrees in suits contested and it is competent to a widow to enter into a compromise in the course of a suit bona fide in the interest of the estate, and not for her personal advantage, and a decree passed on such compromise is binding upon the reversioner. The question whether the transaction\n\n(I) (1861-1863) 9 M.I.A. 520.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer and Another.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer v.\n\nMusa1nmat\n\nPem Kuer and Another.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nSUPREME COTJRT REPORTS r 195? 1\n\nis a bona fide settlement of a disputed right between the parties depends on the substance of the transaction and in order that it may bind the estate it should be a prudent and reasonable act in the circumstances of the case. As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ramsumran Prasad v.\n\nShy am Kumari (1), the true doctrine is laid down in M ohendra Nath Biswas v. Shamsunnessa Khatun(2), decided in 1914, and it is that a compromise made bona fide for the benefit of the estate and not for the personal advantage of a limited owner will bind the reversioner quite as much as a decree against her after contest.\n\nThat being so, we proceed to inquire whether the compromise in the present case is one that can be supported on these principles. In agreement with the High Court we are of the opinion that it cannot be so supported. Mohan Kuer in entering into the compromise on behalf of the minor widow never applied her mind to the interests of the ultimate reversioners. She entered into it for her own personal benefit and for the personal benefit of the minor widow in complete indifference as to what was to happen to the estate after their respective deaths.\n\nUnder this compromise these two ladies got all the rights they had under Hindu law without sacrificing an iota of their property and then they agreed that after their death the plaintiffs in equal shares and after them their heirs shall be the owners of the estate of Chiranji Lal.\n\nIt did not matter in the least to the two ladies what was to happen to the estate after their deaths and they were quite willing to let this estate go to the plaintiffs in the suit though one of them was a remote reversioner. The compromise therefore was made in the interest of the actual parties to the suit in complete disregard of the interests of the ultimate reversioners. The widows undoubtedly acted with reasonableness and prudence so far as their personal interest was concerned but further than that they did not see. The claim of the two plaintiffs in\n\nSuit No. 120 of 1916 was adverse to the interest of the ;,.\n\n(1) (1922) 49 I.A. 342.\n\n(2) (1915) 21 C.L.J. 157.\n\n' I\n\nreversion as they were claiming as legatees under the will. The widows while entering into the compromise safeguarded their personal rights only and thus in entering into it they only represented themselves and not the estate or the reversioners and surrendered nothing out of their rights, and it cannot be said that in the true sense of the term it was a bona fide settlement of disputed rights where each party gave up something of its own rights to the other. The plaintiffs got an admission from the widows in regard to the future succession of the estate that after their deaths they would succeed though they were not heirs in accordance with Hindu law. By this admission the widows lost nothing whatsoever.\n\nThose who lost were the ultimate reversioners and their interest was not in the least either considered or safeguarded.\n\nIn these circumstances it seems to us that the compromise cannot be held to be a bona fide settlement or family arrangement of disputed rights and was entered into by Mohan Kuer for her personal advantage and of the advantage of Khem Kuer. The present case is analogous to the decision of the Privy Council in lmrit Konwur v. Roop Narain Singh(1). There in a dispute between a person claiming to be an adopted son of the previous owner and the widow and her daughters who would have title after her the widow gave up her daughters' rights in consideration of her receiving practically unimpaired what she could.\n\nTheir Lordships held that such a compromise could not stand, a:s indeed it was not a compromise at all.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General laid considerable emphasis on the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mata Prasad v. Nageshar Sahai(2 ). In that case the widow admitted the right of the reversioner under Act I of 1869 and agreed that succession will be governed by that Act.\n\nThe reversioner agreed to let her remain in possession and undertook that he would not alienate the property during that period. The widow in that case was not constituted a full owner under Hindu law and she did not get her full rights\n\n(1) {1880) 6 C.L.R. 76.\n\n(2) (1925) 52 I.A. 393.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer v.\n\nMusammat Pem Kuer and Another.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nMusammat Phool Kucr\n\nMusdmmat\n\nPem Kuer and Another.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nunder the compromise but as a matter of concession was allowed to remain in possession by the reversioner and as a matt<r of fact she sacrificed her rights to a considerable extent and did not act for her personal benefit at all except to the limited extent mentioned\n\nabove. In the circumstances of that case it was held that the compromise was a bona fide family settlement of disputed claims and was binding on the reversioners.\n\nIn the present case the devolution of rhe property after the death of Chiranji Lal . was agreed to be in accordance with Hindu law and that being so, the further devolution of the property after t11eir death was no concern of the widows. That was a matter of law. The ultimate reversioners were stabbed in the back by the widow and such a compromise cannot be held to be binding on them. A large number of cases were cited before us in which compromises under different circumstances had been held to be binding on the reversioners. We consider that it is wholly unnecessary to examine those cases because the circumstances in which those compromises were made were quite different from the circumstances of the present caie. Considering all the materials which were placed before us, we hold in agreement with the High Court that the compromise in the present case was neither prudent nor reasonable so far as it affected the interest~ of the estate and that of the ultimate reversioners and that being so.. is not binding on the plaintiffs. For the reasons given above this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 30 of 1951\n\nThis is an appeal by one of the transferees and arises out .of the same suit out of which arises appeal No. 29 of 1951. On the 13th June, 1928, Shah Madho Lal and his son Shah Madhusudan Lal executed a sale deed (Exhibit M-13) in favour of the appellant for the sum of Rs. 21,000. The transferee while adopting the defence taken by Madho Lal and by the heirs of Jwala Prasad, pleaded that he was protected by the provi• sions of . section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\n' -\n\nThe High Court held that in cases where a person who has allowed :mother to occupy the position of an ostensible owner has a limited estate, the rule of section 41 applies only during the lifetime of the limited owner and is not available to protect transferees against the claim of the reversioners.\n\nA number of ; rnthorities were cited m support of this proposition.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant was unable to displace this propositi.mr... It JS quite clear that the plea of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act could only be raised against Mohan Kuer or her legal representatives but is not available against the plaintiff, Mohan Kuer having acquired a limited life estate.\n\nThis contention is therefore rejected.\n\nThe learned counsel then contended that the plaintiff Pem Kuer had relinquished her rights m favour of her sons in 1933 and she had no locus 1tandi to maintain the suit or to appeal against the decision of the trial judge as the title to the estate had vested in her sons. The plaintiffs had alleged in para. 13 of the plaint that the relinquishment was inoperative and void. The defendants did not dispute that allegation and it is not open to them at this stage to take up the plea which they could h2:1e taken in the trial court or in tl1e appellate court. Even in the grounds of appeal to this court the point was not taken. If the point was taken at the proper stage the plaintiffs might well have proved that the relinquishment was no longer operative or they might have amended the plaint and put it in proper form.\n\nThe learned counsel adopted the arguments of the learned Attorney-General in the other appeal and for the reasons given therein . these points are decided against him. This appeal therefore also fails and JS dismissed with costs .\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 29 of .- 1951 : S. S. Shukla.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 30 of ....__..,... 1951 : P. C. Agarwal.\n\nAgent for the respondents in both : Rajinder Narain.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer v.\n\nMusammat Pem Kuer Rnd Another.\n\nMahajan /.", "total_entities": 104, "entities": [{"text": "Agent for the appellant in Civil Appeals No. 62 to 74 :lJ.ld 75 to 92 : P. K. Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1063, "end_char": 1145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1212, "end_char": 1222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68\n\nto 74 : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1295, "end_char": 1308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75 to 92 : Sukumar Ghose."}}, {"text": "MUSAMMAT PHOOL KUER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1311, "end_char": 1330, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1391, "end_char": 1420, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1425, "end_char": 1443, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1445, "end_char": 1465, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Raja Bhupendra Narain Singha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1633, "end_char": 1661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Maharaj Bahadur Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1672, "end_char": 1693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Bhupendra Narain Singha\n\nBahadur\n\nMaharaj Bahadur Singh\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Musammat Phool Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1730, "end_char": 1749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nApril 24\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat Pem Kuer and Another.", "canonical_name": "MUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Musammat Pem Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1751, "end_char": 1768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nApril 24\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat Pem Kuer and Another.", "canonical_name": "MUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3250, "end_char": 3287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the judgment and decree dated 26th October, 1943, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Verma and Yorke JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Verma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the judgment and decree dated 26th October, 1943, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Verma and Yorke JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Yorke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3299, "end_char": 3304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the judgment and decree dated 26th October, 1943, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Verma and Yorke JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3490, "end_char": 3504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and Kirpa Ram (K. B. Asthana, with them) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Kirpa Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3509, "end_char": 3518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and Kirpa Ram (K. B. Asthana, with them) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3520, "end_char": 3533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and Kirpa Ram (K. B. Asthana, with them) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. N. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3597, "end_char": 3610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Agarwal for the appellant in Civil Appeal • No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3664, "end_char": 3678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (G. C. Mathur, with him) for the respondents in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3680, "end_char": 3692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (G. C. Mathur, with him) for the respondents in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the' Court wa~ delivered by MAHAJAN J.\n\n} • • ·,._ ..", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Shaha Chiranji Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",, \"\"' \\ \\-\n\n' I ~\n\nMAHAJAN J.--The dispute in this appeal concerns the zemindari and house properties last owned by Shaha Chiranji Lal who died at a young age on the 14th May, 1913, leaving him surviving a widow, Mst.", "canonical_name": "Shaha Chiranji Lal"}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4384, "end_char": 4395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Umri\n\nI Ganga Prasad I J amna Prasad\n\n'1 Manohar Lal\n\nI I Shah Jwala Prasad\n\n(1) Khem Kuer\n\n(2) Phool Kuer\n\nI Dwarka Prasad\n\nShah Sj Kishen\n\nI Shah Madho Lal i----1\n\nSudarshan Lal Mad- I Mst."}}, {"text": "Phool Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4439, "end_char": 4449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Umri\n\nI Ganga Prasad I J amna Prasad\n\n'1 Manohar Lal\n\nI I Shah Jwala Prasad\n\n(1) Khem Kuer\n\n(2) Phool Kuer\n\nI Dwarka Prasad\n\nShah Sj Kishen\n\nI Shah Madho Lal i----1\n\nSudarshan Lal Mad- I Mst.", "canonical_name": "Phool Kuer"}}, {"text": "Sudarshan Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4509, "end_char": 4522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Umri\n\nI Ganga Prasad I J amna Prasad\n\n'1 Manohar Lal\n\nI I Shah Jwala Prasad\n\n(1) Khem Kuer\n\n(2) Phool Kuer\n\nI Dwarka Prasad\n\nShah Sj Kishen\n\nI Shah Madho Lal i----1\n\nSudarshan Lal Mad- I Mst."}}, {"text": "Lachrni Jarain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4605, "end_char": 4619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kuer I\n\nLachrni Jarain\n\n~ ;:,.. lI °:\"\"'\n\nl~~ ~~ ::i... ::!"}}, {"text": "Khem Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4853, "end_char": 4862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kuer, the young widow of Shah Chiranji Lal, was murdered on the 28th August, 1919, and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Khem Kunwar"}}, {"text": "Prem Kuer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Kuer, the respondent in the appeal, claiming herself to be the heir to Shah Chiranji Lal as his sister, brought the suit giving rise to this appeal in the court of the civil judge, Agra, against amongst others, Mst.", "canonical_name": "Prem Kuer"}}, {"text": "Shah Chiranji Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5087, "end_char": 5104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Kuer, the respondent in the appeal, claiming herself to be the heir to Shah Chiranji Lal as his sister, brought the suit giving rise to this appeal in the court of the civil judge, Agra, against amongst others, Mst.", "canonical_name": "Shaha Chiranji Lal"}}, {"text": "Phool Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5232, "end_char": 5242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Phool Kuer, the present appellant, for recovery of possession of the properties of Shah Chiranji Lal and mesne profits.", "canonical_name": "Phool Kuer"}}, {"text": "Prem Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5358, "end_char": 5367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Kuer joined her half-sister Mst.", "canonical_name": "Prem Kuer"}}, {"text": "Ram Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5396, "end_char": 5404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kuer and their sons as plaintiffs along with herself."}}, {"text": "Khem Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5522, "end_char": 5531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kuer, widows of Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal and his sons and a host of others.", "canonical_name": "Khem Kunwar"}}, {"text": "Shah Jwala Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5543, "end_char": 5560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kuer, widows of Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal and his sons and a host of others."}}, {"text": "Shah Madho Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5565, "end_char": 5579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kuer, widows of Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal and his sons and a host of others."}}, {"text": "Mohan Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5827, "end_char": 5837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main defence to the suit was that Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal were recognized to be the owners and heirs to the entire estate of Shah Chiranji Lal by Khem Kuer and Mohan Kuer in a family settlement arrived at between the parties in suit No.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Kunwar"}}, {"text": "Jwala Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further pleaded tha~ on the death of Khem Kuer in 1919, Mohan Kuer surrendered the estate in favour of Jwala Prasad and Madho Lal and they took possession of it as owners and the plaintiffs who subsequently became statutory heirs in 1919 could not be allowed to question the surrender and reopen the succession which could not remain in abeyance."}}, {"text": "Madho Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6334, "end_char": 6343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further pleaded tha~ on the death of Khem Kuer in 1919, Mohan Kuer surrendered the estate in favour of Jwala Prasad and Madho Lal and they took possession of it as owners and the plaintiffs who subsequently became statutory heirs in 1919 could not be allowed to question the surrender and reopen the succession which could not remain in abeyance.", "canonical_name": "Madho Lal"}}, {"text": "Madho", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6869, "end_char": 6874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned additional civil judge who tried the suit, dismissed it holding that the compromise of 1915 was a bona fide settlement of a bona fide dispute and was binding as a family settlement being for the benefit of the estate, that Mohan Kuer surrendered the estate validly in favour of Jwala Prasad and Madho\n\n. ..[·", "canonical_name": "Madho Lal"}}, {"text": "Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6884, "end_char": 6887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal and they entered into possession of it after the death of Khem Kuer."}}, {"text": "Prem Kuer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Kuer preferred an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad against the decree dismissing her suit.", "canonical_name": "Prem Kuer"}}, {"text": "26th October, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7314, "end_char": 7332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court by its judgment dated the 26th October, 1943, allowed the appeal, reversed the findings of the learned additional civil judge on the above issues and decreed the plaintiffs' suit with costs."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8143, "end_char": 8147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already stated, Shah Chiranji Lal died on the 14th May, 1913, leaving considerable movable and immovable property."}}, {"text": "Chiranji Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8148, "end_char": 8160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already stated, Shah Chiranji Lal died on the 14th May, 1913, leaving considerable movable and immovable property.", "canonical_name": "Chiranji Lal"}}, {"text": "14th May, 1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8173, "end_char": 8187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already stated, Shah Chiranji Lal died on the 14th May, 1913, leaving considerable movable and immovable property."}}, {"text": "13th May, 1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8587, "end_char": 8601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two revers10ners, Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal, made an application for mutation of names of the estate in their favour claiming it on the basis of a will alleged to have been made by Shah Chiranji Lal on the 13th May, 1913, a day before his death."}}, {"text": "10th of September, 1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8634, "end_char": 8657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th of September, 1913, an application was made by Mohan Kuer for herself and as guardian of Khem Kuer , challenging the genuineness of the will ."}}, {"text": "Musammat Phool Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8796, "end_char": 8815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and claiming\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "MUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mahaian", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8921, "end_char": 8928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahaian J.\n\nthat the estate of the late Shah Chiran ji Lal should' be mutated in their names.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Shah Chiran ji Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8961, "end_char": 8979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahaian J.\n\nthat the estate of the late Shah Chiran ji Lal should' be mutated in their names.", "canonical_name": "Shaha Chiranji Lal"}}, {"text": "Chiranjf Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notice of this application was given to the two reversioners but they thought it prudent not to appear and to contest the contentions raised by the two ladies, with the result that the inheritance of the late Chiranjf Lal was mutated in the name of the widow as sole heir under the guardianship of Mohan Kuer by an order dated the 28th October, 1913.", "canonical_name": "Chiranji Lal"}}, {"text": "28th October, 1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9347, "end_char": 9365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notice of this application was given to the two reversioners but they thought it prudent not to appear and to contest the contentions raised by the two ladies, with the result that the inheritance of the late Chiranjf Lal was mutated in the name of the widow as sole heir under the guardianship of Mohan Kuer by an order dated the 28th October, 1913."}}, {"text": "11th May, 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9659, "end_char": 9673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending decision of these matters, on the 11th May, 1915, suit No."}}, {"text": "18th May, 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9942, "end_char": 9956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th May, 1915, Mohan Kuer for herself and as guardian of the minor widow made an application praying for the discharge of the receiver."}}, {"text": "23rd September, 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10102, "end_char": 10122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated the 23rd September, 1915, the receiver was discharged and it was held by the civil judge that the plaintiffs had no prima faci~ case and that the will propounded by them was a susp1c10us document."}}, {"text": "18th December, 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10302, "end_char": 10321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th December, 1915, suit No."}}, {"text": "Mohan Kunwar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10893, "end_char": 10905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Kunwar defendant\n\nainst one half of the property in lieu of maintc:nance.,", "canonical_name": "Mohan Kunwar"}}, {"text": "Khem Kunwar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11037, "end_char": 11048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kunwar shall have power to do anything they might choose with the entire income from the movable and immovable property, cash, ornaments, amount of decrees and documents, household goods and other movables, which they might have in their possession.", "canonical_name": "Khem Kunwar"}}, {"text": "Khem Kunwar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11444, "end_char": 11455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kunwar shall, as a Hindu widow, become the owner m possession of the entire property, of which Mst.", "canonical_name": "Khem Kunwar"}}, {"text": "Khem Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11661, "end_char": 11670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kuer defendant dies first, Mst.", "canonical_name": "Khem Kunwar"}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12066, "end_char": 12085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the proceedings that were pending for substitution of names the court on the 22nd December, 1915, ordered that Khem Kuer and Mohan Kuer be impleaded as legal representatives of the late Shah Chiranji Lal."}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12202, "end_char": 12221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 2nd September, 1918, Khem Kuer brought a suit against her mother-in-law Mohan Kuer for a declaration to the effect that she alone was the lawful heir of Chiranji Lal and was the owner of the property, mentioned in schedule A and that the defendant had no concern with i~. This suit was compromised between the parties on the 22nd April, 1919."}}, {"text": "22nd April, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12527, "end_char": 12543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 2nd September, 1918, Khem Kuer brought a suit against her mother-in-law Mohan Kuer for a declaration to the effect that she alone was the lawful heir of Chiranji Lal and was the owner of the property, mentioned in schedule A and that the defendant had no concern with i~. This suit was compromised between the parties on the 22nd April, 1919."}}, {"text": "Musammat Phool Kuer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12983, "end_char": 13002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The estate\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer and Another~\n\nMahajan /.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\n.", "canonical_name": "MUSAMMAT PEM KUER AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Pcm Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13086, "end_char": 13094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nMusammat\n\nPcm Kuer .", "canonical_name": "Prem Kuer"}}, {"text": "Mahian", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13111, "end_char": 13117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahian /.\n\nthus became vested in Mohan Kuer both according to Hindu law as well as in accordance with the terms of the compromise of the 18th December, 1915.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "15th September, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13521, "end_char": 13541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 15th September, 1919, an application bearing the signature of Mohan Kuer ."}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13686, "end_char": 13690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Hindi was presented by her mukhtar Chaturbhuj in the court of the subordinate judge at Agra, praying that the sale certificate in suit No."}}, {"text": "28th of August,\n\n1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14036, "end_char": 14057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kuer died on the 28th of August,\n\n1919."}}, {"text": "16th September, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14662, "end_char": 14682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 16th September, 1919, Jwala Prasad and Madho Lal applied for mutation in respect of the lands relating to mauza Samra in the court of the tahsildar of Etmadpur."}}, {"text": "Etmadpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14813, "end_char": 14821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 16th September, 1919, Jwala Prasad and Madho Lal applied for mutation in respect of the lands relating to mauza Samra in the court of the tahsildar of Etmadpur."}}, {"text": "Chintaman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15306, "end_char": 15315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of the mutation proceedings one Chintaman, general attorney of Shah Jwala Prasad was examined on the 11th October, 1919, and he stated that Mst."}}, {"text": "11th October, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15375, "end_char": 15393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of the mutation proceedings one Chintaman, general attorney of Shah Jwala Prasad was examined on the 11th October, 1919, and he stated that Mst."}}, {"text": "28th August, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15441, "end_char": 15458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kuer died on the 28th August, 1919, that Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal were her heirs in equal shares, that Mohan Kuer was the mother-in-law of the deceased and she did not want her name to be recorded and had made relinquishment in favour of Shah Madho Lal and Shah Jwala Prasad in the civil court on the 15th September,\n\n1919."}}, {"text": "15th September,\n\n1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15737, "end_char": 15758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khem Kuer died on the 28th August, 1919, that Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal were her heirs in equal shares, that Mohan Kuer was the mother-in-law of the deceased and she did not want her name to be recorded and had made relinquishment in favour of Shah Madho Lal and Shah Jwala Prasad in the civil court on the 15th September,\n\n1919."}}, {"text": "Chaturbhuj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15760, "end_char": 15770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chaturbhuj, general attorney of Mohan Kuer was examined in the same proceedings on the 27th October, 1919, and he stated that Mohan Kuer did not want her name to be recorded in place of the name of the deceased, that she had no objection to the entry of the names of Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal, that she had sent him for making that statement."}}, {"text": "27th October, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15847, "end_char": 15865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chaturbhuj, general attorney of Mohan Kuer was examined in the same proceedings on the 27th October, 1919, and he stated that Mohan Kuer did not want her name to be recorded in place of the name of the deceased, that she had no objection to the entry of the names of Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal, that she had sent him for making that statement."}}, {"text": "22nd November, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16440, "end_char": 16459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 22nd November, 1919, the two reversioners Shah Jwala Prasad and Shah Madho Lal, having entered into possession of the estate after the death of Khem Kuer made a gift of property of the value of about Rs."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17400, "end_char": 17407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nof Shah Chiranji Lal by inheriting the estate from rum.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Shah Chiranji Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17614, "end_char": 17631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah Chiranji Lal deceased had two sisters Mst.", "canonical_name": "Shaha Chiranji Lal"}}, {"text": "Pandit Rikh Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18837, "end_char": 18852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "89 of 1929) one Pandit Rikh Ram had obtained a decree against Shah Madho Lal and his sons and they appealed against it to the High Court and also applied for postponement .of the preparation of the final decree."}}, {"text": "26th May, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19154, "end_char": 19168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th May, 1930, in compliance with the order of the High Court a security bond was executed by Shah Madho Lal and his sons as first party and by Mst."}}, {"text": "Mohan Xuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19410, "end_char": 19420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Xuer was to become the owner of the property with\n\n' • ,\n\n,..\n\nlimited interests as a Hindu mother, but she relin- .quished her inheritance and did not agree to accept any property.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Kunwar"}}, {"text": "30th June, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20354, "end_char": 20369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th June, 1930, an affidavit bearing the thumb impression of Mst."}}, {"text": "9th July, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21002, "end_char": 21016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th July, 1930, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissed the application for stay of proceedings."}}, {"text": "15th July, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21119, "end_char": 21134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 15th July, 1931, Mohan Kuer instituted suit No."}}, {"text": "Mathura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21219, "end_char": 21226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1931 in the court of the subordinate judge of Mathura against the widows of Shah Jwala Prasad, Shah Madho Lal and his sons and a number of trans- ..,._...,"}}, {"text": "Pem Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21463, "end_char": 21471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para 8 of the plaint it was alleged\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer and Another.", "canonical_name": "Prem Kuer"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21486, "end_char": 21493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan f.\n\nMusammat Phool Kuer\n\nMusammat\n\nPem Kuer and Another.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Mahaian", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21552, "end_char": 21559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahaian /.\n\nthat the plaintiff was an old pardanashin woman, was simple and of week intellect and illiterate, that on account of the murder of Mst.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "9th October 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22741, "end_char": 22757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of this suit Mohan Kuer died on the 5th December, and on her death an attempt was made by the present plaintiffs to get themselves impleaded as her legal representatives but on the 9th October 1934 it was held that the claim of Mst."}}, {"text": "30th April, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23088, "end_char": 23104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in consequence of this order that the suit out of which this appeal arises was filed on the 30th April, 1936."}}, {"text": "mukhtar Chaturbhuj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24338, "end_char": 24356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Emphasis was laid on the statements contained in the application (Exhibit M-31), on the statement of her mukhtar Chaturbhuj, and on the recitals of the security bond and the affidavit, Exhibit P-30."}}, {"text": "13th June, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36308, "end_char": 36323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th June, 1928, Shah Madho Lal and his son Shah Madhusudan Lal executed a sale deed (Exhibit M-13) in favour of the appellant for the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shah Madhusudan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36352, "end_char": 36371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th June, 1928, Shah Madho Lal and his son Shah Madhusudan Lal executed a sale deed (Exhibit M-13) in favour of the appellant for the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36612, "end_char": 36622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36630, "end_char": 36654, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36815, "end_char": 36825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37150, "end_char": 37160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37168, "end_char": 37192, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pem Kuer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37451, "end_char": 37459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel then contended that the plaintiff Pem Kuer had relinquished her rights m favour of her sons in 1933 and she had no locus 1tandi to maintain the suit or to appeal against the decision of the trial judge as the title to the estate had vested in her sons.", "canonical_name": "Prem Kuer"}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38533, "end_char": 38545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29 of .- 1951 : S. S. Shukla."}}, {"text": "P. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38618, "end_char": 38631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30 of ......,... 1951 : P. C. Agarwal."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38670, "end_char": 38685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents in both : Rajinder Narain."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_812_824_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "April 30.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nBHAGW AN SINGH\n\nfl.\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VIVIAN BoSE JJ.J\n\n(1952]\n\nEvidence Act (1 of 1872), secs. 145, 157-Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, secs. 208, 288, 537, 540-Criminal trial-Examination of Witness not examined before Comm:'tting Magistrate-Ugality-'- State1nents before Committing Magistrate-Admissibility-Statement not denied-Use as corroborative evidence-Certificate of magistrate that deposition was read over-Presumption of correctness-Practice of examining Committing Magistrate, impropriety of.\n\nThe Sessions Court has power to examine witnesses who were not examined before the Committing Magistrate because 0£ -sec. 540, Criminal Procedure Code, and if the witness is treated .as a prosecution witness and examined by the prosecuting coun- :Sel instead of by the court, that at best would be an irregularity .curable by sec. 537 of the Code.\n\nThe proper time to object to :Such a procedure would be at the trial itself.\n\nShel' Bahadur v. The Crown (I.LR. 15 Lah. 331) and Queen Empress v. G. W. Hayfield (I.L.R. 14 All. 212) distinguished S. S. Jhabwala v. Emperor (A.LR. 1933 All. 690) and Mussamat Niamat v. The c,.own. (I.L.R. 17 All. 176) approved. Emperor v.\n\nChanning Amold (B Cr. L.j. 877) referred to.\n\nResort to sec. 145 of the Evidence Act is necessary only if a witness denies that he made the former statement.\n\nIn that e'vent it would be necessary to prove that he did and if the former statement was r.educcd to \\Vriting, then sec, 145 requires that his attentian must be drawn to those parts which are to be\n\nsed for contradiction.\n\nBut that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement.\n\nIn such a case all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which ne furthor proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.\n\nThe former statement cannot be used as substantive evidence unless sec. 288, Criminal Procedure Codo, is called in ai& but , even without sec. 288 the court would be entitled to sar, basing on the evidence-in-chief which is the substantive CVl dence, that what the witness said to the police or the Committing Magistrate, is the true version, not because those statements form substantive evidence, but because they tally with the evidence-in-chief which is substantive.\n\nIf a . former statement can be brought in under sec. 157 of the Evidence Act, it can be transmuted into substantive evidence by the application of sec. 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nTara Singh v. The State [1951] S.C.R. 729 distinguished.\n\nIf the certificate of the Committing Magistrate endorsed on 1952 \"the deposition sheet states that the deposition was read out to -- the witness and the witness admitted it to be correct the court is BhagtUan Singh bound to accept this as correct under sec. 80 of the Evidence\n\nV'.\n\nAct until it is proved to be untrue.\n\nThe State of It is not necessary nor desirable to examine Magistrate to prove the truth of his certificate.\n\nKashmera Singh v. The State of Madhya (S.C.R.) 526 followed.\n\nth~ Committing\n\nPradesh [1952]\n\nEven if it be true that the deposition was not read over, that would only amount to a curable irregularity and in the absence of prejudice which must be disclosed in an affidavit which shows exactly where the record departs from what the witness actually :said, the objection cannot be sustained .\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION ; Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1952.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 4th June, 1951, of the High Court of judicature of Punjab at Simla (Bhandari and Soni JJ.) in Criminal Appeal No. 109 of 1951 arising out of Judgment and order dated 19th March 1951 of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Femzepore, in Sessions Trial No. 18 of 1951.\n\nT. R. Bhasin, for the appellant.\n\nGoprd Singh, for the respondent.\n\n1952. April 30. The Judgment of the Court was -Oelivered by\n\nBosE J.-This is a simple case at great length on behalf of number of technical objections :trial taken .\n\nthough it was the appellant to the validity\n\nargued and a of the\n\nThe appellant Bhagwan Singh has been convicted of the murder of one Buggar Singh and sentenced to death. He has also been convicted under section 19(f) of the Indian Arms: Act but we are not concerned with that here.\n\nThe prosecution story is that the appellant bore a grudge against the deceased because the deceased had fired at the appellant's brother some six or seven years before the present occurrence and was sent to jail for\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/.\n\nBhagwan Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPr1njab.\n\nBose].\n\nit. When he came out of jail the police thought it prudent to take proceedings against both sides under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This resulted in the appellant's two brothers and his cousms being bound down, as also the deceased.\n\nThis, it i~ said, constituted the motive for the present cnme.\n\nOn the date of the occurrence, the 7th of September 1950, the prosecution state that the appellant was\n\nsitting at the shop of Jit Singh, P.W. 2, when the deceased came there about 12-15 p.m. and borrowed Rs. 5 from Jit Singh who lent him the money and entered the transaction in his account book.\n\nWhen the deceased left the shop he was followed by the appellant who shot him at point blank range with a pistol only 4 or 5 karams from the shop.\n\nThis attracted the attention of a number of bystanders who immediately chased the appellant and apprehended him after a short run of about 30 karams. He was still carrying t.he pistol. It was taken away from him by Jagir Singh Patwari, P.W. 4.\n\nThe appellant was immediately taken to the local .police pbilt about 100 karams distant and the shopkeeper Jit Singh, P.W. 2, made the first information report at 12-37 p.m. within 15 minutes of the occurrence.\n\nThe motive is proved by Bhag Singh, P.W. 7, who has_ been believed af!d that part of the case was not challenged before us.\n\nThe occurrence was witnessed by a large number of persons of whom the prosecution examined only five. Two of them turned hostile in the Sessions Court and one gave evidence which has been regarded by the High Court as neutral.\n\nThe remaining two, Balbir Singh (P.W. 5) and Jaswant Singh (P.W. 6) have been believed. The only questions are (1) whether the conviction can be rested on their testimony and (2) whether certain irregularities in the trial vitiate it.\n\nNo attack was made on the testimony of Balbir Singh,. P.W. 5, except that the two eye-witnesses who\n\n-- -I\n\n\"\"'\n\nresiled in the Sessions Court contradict him. But it was argued that the evidence of Jaswant Singh P.W .. 6, is vitiated because he was not examined by the Committing Magistrate. It was said that that makes his evidlence in the Sessions Court inadmissible.\n\nThis raises a quesion which is largely academic in this case because the reason Jaswant Singh,\n\nP.W. 6, was not examined by the Committing Magistrate is that the witness had gone away and was not available and it would have been a needless, and indeed unjustifiable, holding up of the proceedings to wait till he could be found and summoned.\n\nIt is evident that the Sessions . Court has power to examine witnesses who were not examined before the Committing Magistrate because of section 540 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and if the witness is treated as a prosecution witness and examined by the prosecuting counsel instead of by the Co.urt itself that at best would be an irregularity curable by section 537. The proper time to object to such a procedure would be at the trial itself, and as the appellant was represented in the Sessions Court by two counsel it is too late to object to such a venial irregularity in this Court.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant took us elaborately through the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Criminal Prncedure Cod(l and stressed in particular section 208(1) but we need not enter into this because section 540 is a complete answer in this particular case. None 9f the cases cited goes so far as to say that no witness who was not produced in the committal proceedings can be examined at the trial and we would be unable to agree if they did.\n\nThe decision most in favour of the appellant's contention is Sher Bahadur v. The Crown(1) but that does no more than consider such an omission as a curable defect. Abdul Qadir J. said at pages 338 and 342 that it was conceded before them that section 540 could be called in aid in such a case, and at page 331}\n\nthe learned Judge dealt with the question of prejudice (I) (1934) I.L.R. 15 Lah. 331.\n\nBhagwan Singk\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/.\n\niBhagwan Singh\n\n. v.\n\nThe State of Puniab.\n\nBose f.\n\nand concluded at page 344 with the remark that the question is one of fact in each case and that in his opinion there was prejudice in that particular case .\n\nThe other learned Judge took the same view at pages 347 and 348 and said :-\n\n\"The Court can, of course, always use its discretion and allow the production of further evidence.\"\n\nIt is to be observed that the objection in that case was raised at a very early stage and before the sessions .trial had commenced ; also that the prosecution wished to examine no less than eight material witnesses (out of a total of sixteen) which they had deliberately withheld in the committal proceedings.\n\nWe make no remarks about the correctness of the observations which travel beyond the question of prejudice because that is unnecessary here. It is sufficient to say that the learned Judges conceded the power under section 540 and decided the case on the \"question of prejudice.\n\nThe question raised in Queen-Empress v.\n\nG. W.\n\nHayfield(') does not arise here because the Sessions Court did not refuse to examine Jaswant Singh, P. W. 6, and so the question whether the prosecution could demand his examination as a matter of right never arose. The fact remains that they were permitted to do so and the defence raised no objection.\n\nThe decision of the Allahabad High Court in S. H.\n\nJhabwala v. Emperor(') and the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mussammat Niamat v. The Crown (3) arc against the learned counsel's contention.\n\nThe decision of the Full Bench of the Lower Burma Chief Court in Emperor v. Channing Arnold(4 ) is. not in point because the Committing Magistrate there refused to examine witnesses which the prosecution wanted, and indeed insisted that he should examine, and what was worse he prevented the accused from completing the . cross-examination of tjie only prosecution witness which the Committing Magistrate thought fit to examine.\n\nWhatever else may be thought of\n\n(1) (1892) !.L.R. 14 All. 212.\n\n(3) (1936) l.L.R. 17 Lah. 176.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1933 All. 690. ( 4) (1912) 13 Cr. L.J. 877.\n\n... •\n\n1952 section 208 it is evident that the accused has the right to cross-examine, at any rate, . those of the witnesses who are examined by the Committing Magistrate on behalf of the prosecution and section 347 cannot be used as a cloak for a hasty committal before such cross-examination is complete.\n\nBhagwan Singlr\n\nIn our opinion, the cases cited do not justify the extreme position taken up by the learned counsel for the appellant and as section 540 is a complete answer in this case all we need consider is the question of prejudice.\n\nWe do not hold that the court is bound to examine a witness called under section 540 itself as a court witness and that it can never entrust the examination to the prosecuting counsel because even if that be the proper procedure no prejudice has been occasioned iin thi:s particular' case.\n\nThe :irregularity here on this score, if indeed it is one; is so trivial as to be innocuous.\n\nA more important question is, was the appellant taken by surprise and was prejudice occasioned because of that? We do not think so because Jaswant Singh was mentioned in the first information report, recorded within 15 minutes of the occurrence, as one of the eye-witnesses and he was again mentioned as an eye-witness in the calendar oif the committal proceedings.\n\nThe appellant was presumably supplied with the witnesses' statement to the police, or at any rate he had the right to demand a copy under section 162 and if he did not do so, it was presumably because neither he nor his two learned counsel wanted it. The first information report is a full one and sets out all the essentials of the prosecution case; therefore, with all that information in the possession of the appellant and his counsel it could be impossible for him to contend that he did n:ot know what this witness was to prove.\n\nHad the witness travelled beyond the statements embodied in t11e first information report, objection to the use of anything not contained in it would have been understandable, though to be effective such\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose /.\n\n!Bhagwan Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose /.\n\nobjection would ordinarily have to be raised at the trial, but as the witness does not do that, there can be no objection on the score of prejudice. It 1s to be observed that the Explanation to section 537 requires a court to take into consideration the fact whether any objection on the score of irregularity could have been raised at an earlier stage.\n\nNow the High Court bases its decision on the evidence of these eye-witnesses and on the fact that the . appellant was apprehended on the spot within a minute or two of the murder with the pistol still in .his possession, and had the learned Judges stopped there, there would have been no foundation for the very elaborate network of technicalities upon which the learned counsel for the appellant embarked. But Bhandari J. (Soni J. concurring) after saying that\n\n\"After a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case I entertain no doubt in my mind that Balbir Singh and Jaswant Singh P. Ws. have told nothing but the truth\"\n\nwent on to say-\n\n\"and that Jit Singh and Jagir Singh who made correct statements before the police and before the Committing Magistrate have given false evidence in the trial Court with the object of savmg the appellant from the gallows.\"\n\nIt was argued that the learned Judges have here used the evidence of these witnesses before the Committing Magistrate as substantive evidence despite the fact that it was legally inadmissible for that purpose because the formalities prescribed by section 288 were not observed.\n\nReliance was placed upon Tara Singh v. The State(').\n\nEven if that be so, it would make no difference because the evidence of 'Balbir Singh and Jaswant Singh, whom the learned Judges primarily believe, 1s sufficient to afford a basis for the conviction and the mere fact that extraneous matter not necessary for the conviction was also called in aid would not affect\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 729.\n\nthe result. Bun as a matter of fact the foundation for this attacki is based upon incorrect assumptions.\n\nWe will deal with Jit Singh, P. W. 2, first. He sup- .Ported the prosecution case in his examination-inchief but resiled when cross-examined.\n\nHe was therefore treated as hostile and the learned Public Prosecutor was permitted to cross-examme him. In cross-examination the witness's statement in the Committal Court was read out to him and he was asked whether he had made such a statement and he said: \"Yes.\" When that statement is read it is found to tilllY with his evidence in chief and with the depositions of Balbir Singh and Jaswant Singh and with the first information report. Now it was not necessary to use the former statement as substantive evidence at all and the fact that the learned High Court Judges placed this on a par with the statements to the police, including of course the first information report, indicates that they were not using the former statements as substantive evidence but merely as corroboration of what was said in chief.\n\nThe distinction is a subtle\n\n~:me and can perhaps be best explained in the followmg way.\n\nA witness is called and he says in chief, \"I saw the accused shoot\n\nX\".\n\nIn cross-examination he resiles and says \"I did not see it at all.\" He is then asked \"but didn't you tell A, B & C on the spot that you had. seen it?\" He replies \"yes, I did.\" We have, of set purpose, chosen as an il1utration a statement which was not reduced to writing and which was not made either to the police or to a magistrate.\n\nNow, the former statement could not be used as substantjve evidence. It would only be used as corroboration of the evidence in chief under section 157 of the Evidence Act or to shake the witness's credit or test his veracity under section 146. Section 145 is not called into play at all in such a case. Resort to section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that 11e made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did, and If the\n\nBhag111an Singh v.\n\nThe State of Ptinjab.\n\nBose/.\n\nBhagwan Singh ...\n\nThe State of\n\nPuniab.\n\nBou /.\n\nformer state1iient was reduced to writing, thefl section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to those parts which are to be used for contradiction .\n\nBut that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case all that is necesj_ary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.\n\nOf course, that statement cannot be used as substantive . evidence unless section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code is called in aid. But even without section 288 a Court would be entitled to say in such a case, basing on the evidence in chief, which is sub~. stantivf: evidence, that 111rhat the 'vitness said to tl1e police, or to the Committing Magistrate, is the true version, not because those statements .form substantive .\n\nevidenc.~ but because they tally with the evidence in chief which is substantive.\n\nThis is onliy one of the many ways in which a witness's testimony can be sifted and examined. Corroboration is as useful to test the truth of a story as any other method. In such a case, what the Court really does, though it may happen to put the matter the ot11er way round, is to say that in its opinion the substantive evidence given in chief is true because it is corroborated by an earlier statement and for that reason, namely because the version in 'chief is the true one the contradictory version given in cross-examination is wrong, not because of the contradiction embodied in the former statement but because of what was said in chief, a version which it is now safe to believe on account of the corroboration afforded by the earlier statement.\n\nIt is true the earlier statement could also have been used for contradicting the version given in crossexamination and in that event, if it . is in writing, the . limitations imposed by section 145 of the Evidence Act would have to be observed, but the prosecution is not bound to do that. It has a choice. It can, if it so chooses, build up the version given in chief in any Way it pleases and, having done that, use the version in chief to destroy the version in cross-examination.\n\nBut in the case before us there is no need to resort to these subtleties because here the depositions were brought on record and could be used as substantive evidence even if the formalities prescribed by section 145 of the Evidence Act were not observed for the very simple reason that there was no need in this cause to resort to section 145. As we have said, the prosecution had a choice here because of the two conflicting versions given in chief and in crossexamination. It was entitled to use the former statement either to contradict what was said in crossexamination or to corroborate what was said in chief. In either event, section 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code could be used, to make the former statement substantive evidence because what the sec~ tion says is \"subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act,\" and not subject to any particular section in it. Section 157 is as much a provision of the Indian Evidence Act as section 145 and if the former statement can be brought in under section 157 it can be transmuted into substantive evidence by the application of section 288.\n\nTara Singh v. The State(1) is to be distinguished because there, there were no two versions in the course of the same testimony. The witness in question was hostile from the start in the Sessions Court and the whole purpose of resorting to section 288 was to contradict what he said there and no question of corroboration arose. The prosecution had no choice there, as i~ was here, of using the former statement either to contradict or to corroborate.\n\nWe turn next to Jagir Singh, P. W. 4. In hi~ cas~ there was no choice. He was hostile from the start and in his1 case our observations in the ruling just referred to apply in full. But on an examination of his evidence we find that the formalities prescribed by section 145 were complied with.\n\nHis cross-examination, in contrast to Jit Singh' s where such a procedure was not necessary, shows that every circumstance intended to be. used as contradiction was. put to him point by point and passage by passage._ That was\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 729 at 743. 4-9 S.C. India/71\n\nI Bhagwan Singh\n\nv. rhe State of Puniab.\n\nBose/.\n\nlihogwan Singh\n\n-·· The State of\n\nPnnjab.\n\nBOGe ].\n\nconceded:, but it was argued that this was done without drawing the witness's attention to the parts of the writing which were to be used for the purposes of contradiction.\n\nWe are by no means satisfied that that is the case because at least one of the passages is reproduced in inverted commas and so must have been read out from the statement. But that apart. Immediately after the witness had been questioned about each separate fact point by point, the whole statement was read out to him and he admitted that he had made it in the Committing Court. Now this procedure may be open to objection when the previous statement is a long one and only one or two small passages in it are used for contradiction-that may, in a given case, confuse a witness and not be a fair method of affording him an opportunity to explain-but in the present case the previous statement is a short one and the witness was questioned about every material passage in it point by point.\n\nAccordingly, the procedure adopted here was in substantial compliance with what section 145 requires.\n\nThere can be no hard and fast rule.\n\nAll that is required is that the witness must be treated fairly arid be afforded a reasonable opportunity of explaining the contradictions after his attention has been drawn to them in a fair and reasonable manner. We are satisfied that that was done here. The matter is one of substance and not of mere form.\n\nJit Singh, l>.W. 2, said that the statement made by him in the commital proceedings was not read over to him and so did Jagir Singh, P.W. 4.\n\nIt was argued that in the absence of an enquiry that must be accepted as true, and if true, the evidence becomes inadmissible.\n\nNow the certificate of the Committing Magistrate endorsed on the deposition sheet states that the depcr sition V/a5 read out to the witness nd that the witness admitted it to be cbriett. The Coutt is bound to accept this as correct under section 80 of the Indian Evidence Act until it is proved to be untrue. The burden is on\n\n, < ' \"\n\nthe person seeking to displace the statutory presumption and if he . chooses to rely on the testimony of a witness which the Court is not prepared to believe the matter ends there. The duty of displacing the presumption lies on the person who questions it. The Court is of course bound to consider such evidence as is adduced\n\nbut .it is not bound to believe such evidence nor is there any duty whatever on the Court to conduct an enquiry on its own.\n\nThere is nothing in this point.\n\nBut we again wish to discountenance the suggestion that the Committing Magistrate should have been examined to prove the trurh of his certificate and we endorse the remarks we made in Kashmera Singh v. The State of Madhya Prvidesh(1) based on the decision of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor(2) regarding rhe undesirability of any such practice.\n\nBut even if the fact be true that the deposition was , not read over, th<!t would only amount to a curable\n\nirregularity and~ as the Privy Council observed in Abdul Rahman v. King Emperor(3 ), in the absence of prejudice which must be disclosed in an affidavit which shows exactly where the record departs from what the witness actually said, there is no point in the objection. The object of the reading over prescribed by section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to enable the witness to change his story but to ensure that the record faithfully and accurately embodies the gist of what the witness actually said. Therefore, before prejudice can be substantiated on this score, it must be disclosed by affidavit exactly where the maccuracy lies.\n\nThe next and last objection is on similar lines. Jit Singh, P. W. 2, and Jagir Singh, P. W. 4, said that their statements before the .Committing Magistrate were made under the threats and duress of the police.\n\nIt was argued that that should not have been rejected • without further enquiry, and a ruling in which a further enquiry was considered necessary was cited. Here\n\n~ (1) [1952] S.C.R. 526.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253 at 258.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 44 at 46-47.\n\nBhagtvan Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/.\n\nBliagwan Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/.\n\nagain, it is_ no part of a Court's duty to enter upon a roving enquiry in the middle of a trial on matters which are collateral to the main issue. The burden is. on the person making these allegations to substantiate them and if he chooses to rely on evidence which does not satify the Court he must suffer the same fate as every other person who is unable to discharge an onus which the law places upon him.\n\nIt was also argued that there was no proper compliance with the provisions of section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We are satisfied that there was substantial compliance in this case. The facts were simple and few and the crucial matters were brought to the attention of the appellant. In any event, the learned counsel was unable to tell us even at the argument stage exactly how his client was prejudiced and tell us what answers his client would have given to the questions which, according to counsel, ought to have been put to the appellant.\n\nWe pressed him several times to disclose that but he was unable to do so.\n\nAs we said at the outset, the case is a very simple one in which a man was caught red-handed with a pistol still in his hand and in which the first information report was recorded practically on the spot within 15 minutes of the occurrence. The murder was committed in day light and there was no dearth of eye-witnesses.\n\nTwo have been believed, and in the case of the other tWo, certain statements made by them in the Sessions Court resiling from statements previously recorded in the committal proceedings have been disbelieved.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed. We see no reason to interfere with the sentence of death.\n\nAppeal dismissed • .\n\nAge_nt for the appellant : Sanker Das.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P:· A. Mehta.\n\n' ... ' ~", "total_entities": 90, "entities": [{"text": "BHAGW AN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGW AN SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BoSE JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 679, "end_char": 687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 689, "end_char": 712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 888, "end_char": 896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1289, "end_char": 1297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1918, "end_char": 1926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1989, "end_char": 1997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2470, "end_char": 2478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2823, "end_char": 2830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of It", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2895, "end_char": 2906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of It is not necessary nor desirable to examine Magistrate to prove the truth of his certificate.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/."}}, {"text": "Bhandari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3588, "end_char": 3596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 4th June, 1951, of the High Court of judicature of Punjab at Simla (Bhandari and Soni JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Soni", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3601, "end_char": 3605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 4th June, 1951, of the High Court of judicature of Punjab at Simla (Bhandari and Soni JJ.)"}}, {"text": "T. 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borrowed Rs."}}, {"text": "Jit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5131, "end_char": 5140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 from Jit Singh who lent him the money and entered the transaction in his account book."}}, {"text": "Jagir Singh Patwari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5577, "end_char": 5596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was taken away from him by Jagir Singh Patwari, P.W. 4."}}, {"text": "Bhag Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5843, "end_char": 5853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The motive is proved by Bhag Singh, P.W. 7, who has_ been believed af!d that part of the case was not challenged before us."}}, {"text": "Balbir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6191, "end_char": 6203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining two, Balbir Singh (P.W. 5) and Jaswant Singh (P.W. 6) have been believed."}}, {"text": "Jaswant Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6217, "end_char": 6230, 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Puniab.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/."}}, {"text": "section 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9530, "end_char": 9541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9968, "end_char": 9988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Allahabad High Court in S. H.\n\nJhabwala v. Emperor(') and the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mussammat Niamat v. The Crown (3) arc against the learned counsel's contention."}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10048, "end_char": 10065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Allahabad High Court in S. H.\n\nJhabwala v. Emperor(') and the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mussammat Niamat v. The Crown (3) arc against the learned counsel's contention."}}, {"text": "section 208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10744, "end_char": 10755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 347", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10936, "end_char": 10947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Singlr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11040, "end_char": 11054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Singlr\n\nIn our opinion, the cases cited do not justify the extreme position taken up by the learned counsel for the appellant and as section 540 is a complete answer in this case all we need consider is the question of prejudice.", "canonical_name": "BHAGW AN SINGH"}}, {"text": "section 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11181, "end_char": 11192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11352, "end_char": 11363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12169, "end_char": 12180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12776, "end_char": 12799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/."}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13049, "end_char": 13060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balbir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13788, "end_char": 13800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Bhandari J. (Soni J. concurring) after saying that\n\n\"After a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case I entertain no doubt in my mind that Balbir Singh and Jaswant Singh P. Ws."}}, {"text": "Jagir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13901, "end_char": 13912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "have told nothing but the truth\"\n\nwent on to say-\n\n\"and that Jit Singh and Jagir Singh who made correct statements before the police and before the Committing Magistrate have given false evidence in the trial Court with the object of savmg the appellant from the gallows.\""}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14347, "end_char": 14358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaswant Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14523, "end_char": 14536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if that be so, it would make no difference because the evidence of 'Balbir Singh and Jaswant Singh, whom the learned Judges primarily believe, 1s sufficient to afford a basis for the conviction and the mere fact that extraneous matter not necessary for the conviction was also called in aid would not affect\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 729."}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16475, "end_char": 16486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16567, "end_char": 16578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16580, "end_char": 16591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16649, "end_char": 16660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16865, "end_char": 16878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/.\n\nBhagwan Singh ...\n\nThe State of\n\nPuniab.", "canonical_name": "BHAGW AN SINGH"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPuniab.\n\nBou", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16888, "end_char": 16910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/.\n\nBhagwan Singh ...\n\nThe State of\n\nPuniab.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/."}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16964, "end_char": 16975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17384, "end_char": 17395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17462, "end_char": 17473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18768, "end_char": 18779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19272, "end_char": 19283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19399, "end_char": 19410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19701, "end_char": 19712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19878, "end_char": 19897, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19949, "end_char": 19960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19991, "end_char": 20010, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20014, "end_char": 20025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20078, "end_char": 20089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20159, "end_char": 20170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20413, "end_char": 20424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20642, "end_char": 20653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We turn next to Jagir Singh, P. W. 4."}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20888, "end_char": 20899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lihogwan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21247, "end_char": 21261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/.\n\nlihogwan Singh\n·· The State of\n\nPnnjab."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPnnjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21271, "end_char": 21287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/.\n\nlihogwan Singh\n·· The State of\n\nPnnjab.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/."}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22345, "end_char": 22356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23224, "end_char": 23234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23242, "end_char": 23261, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 360", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24594, "end_char": 24605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24613, "end_char": 24639, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhagtvan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25400, "end_char": 25414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagtvan Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.", "canonical_name": "BHAGW AN SINGH"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25420, "end_char": 25445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagtvan Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nBose/."}}, {"text": "Bliagwan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25447, "end_char": 25461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/.\n\nBliagwan Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.", "canonical_name": "BHAGW AN SINGH"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25982, "end_char": 25993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanker Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27209, "end_char": 27219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Age_nt for the appellant : Sanker Das."}}, {"text": "A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27253, "end_char": 27261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : P:· A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_825_839_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "• '.· ' >\n\n., -·\n\n_,,\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 825\n\nTHAKUR GOKALCHAND\n\nti.\n\nPARVIN KUMAR!\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VMAN BosE JJ.]\n\nPunjab custom-Principles to be observed in dealing with .customary law stated-Essentials of valid custom.\n\nThe plaintiff, a Rajput belonging to Tehsil Garhshankar in the District of Hoshiarpur (Punjab), instituted a suit against the defendant for the recovery of the properties which belonged to .a deceased Gurkha woman R and which she had acquire~ by way .of gift from a stranger, alleging that he was the lawfully wedded husband of R and that according to custom which applied to the parties with regard to succession he was entitled to succeed to the move, able and immoveable properties of R in preference to the defendant who was his daughter by R.\n\nHeld, that even if it be .assumed that R was lawfully married to the plaintiff, the question to be decided would be whether succession to property which R had received as a gift from a stranger and which she .owned in her own right would be governed by the custom governing her husband's family and hot her own.\n\nSuch marriage as was .alleged to have been contracted by the plaintiff being evidently an act of rare occurrence, the rule of succession set up by the plaintiff cannot be said to derive its force from long usage and .the plaintiff was not, in any even~, entitled to succeed.\n\nTheir Lordships laid down the general principles which should be kept in view in dealing with questions of customary law as follows :\n\n(1) It should be recognised that many of the agricultural tribes in the Punjab are governed by a variety of customs, which depart from the ordinary rules of Hindu and Muhammadan law, :in regard to inheritance and other matters mentioned in section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872.\n\n(2) In spite of the above fact, there is no presumption that a particular person or class of persons is governed by custom, and a party who is alleged to be governed by customary law must . prove that he is so governed and must also prove the existence of the custom set up by him. (See Daya Ram v. Sohel Singh and Others, 110 P.R. (1906) 390 at 410; Abdul Hussein Khan\n\nv. Bibi So.na Dero, L.R. 45 I.A. 10).\n\n(3) A custom, in order to be binding, must derive its force from the fact that by long usage it has obtained the force of law, but the English rule that \"a custom, in order that it may be legal and binding, must have been used sci long that the memory .of man runneth not to the contrary\" should not be strictly\n\n~952\n\nMay 16.\n\nThakur Gokal Chand v.\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\napplied to Indian conditions. All that is necessary to prove is that the usage has been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariabjlity as to show that it has, by com111on consent, been submitted to as the established governing rule of a particular locality. (See Mt. Subhani v. Nawab, A.LR. 1941 P.C. 21 at 32). .\n\n( 4) A custom may be proved by general evidence ns to its. existence by n1embers of the tribe or family who would naturally be cognizant of its existence and its exercise without controversy., and such evidence n1ay be safely acted on when it is: supported by a public record of custom such as the Riwaj-i-am, or Manual of Custo!Jlary Law. (See Ahmad Khan v. Mt. Channi Bibi, A.LR. 1925 P.C. 267 at 271).\n\n(5) No statutory presumption attaches to the contents of at Ri\\vaj-i-atn or similar compilation, but being a public record prepared by a public officer in the discharge of his duties under Government rules, the statements to be found therein in support of custom are admissible to prove facts recited therein and' will generally be regarded as a strong piece of evidence of the custotn.\n\nThe entries in the llhvaj-i-am may however be proved' to be incorrect, and the quantum of evidence required for the purpose of rebutting them wilL vary with the circumstances of each case.\n\nThe presumption of correctness attaching to a Riwaj-i-am may be rebutted, if it is shown that it affects adversely the rights of females or any other class of persons who had no opportunity of appearing before the revenue authorities. (Sec Beg v. Allah Ditta, A.LR. 1916 P.C. 129 at 131; Saleh Mohammad\n\nv. Zawar Hussain, A.LR. 1944 P.C. 18 ; Mt. Subhani v. Nawab• A.LR. 1941 P.C. 21 at 25).\n\n{ 6} When the question of custom applicable to an agriculturist is raised, it is open to a party who denies the application of custom to show that the person who claims to be governed by it has completely and permanently drifted away from agriculture and agricultural associations and settled for good in urban life and adopted trade, service, etc., as his principal occupation anc; I\" means and source of livelihood, and does not follow other custo1ns applicable to agriculturists. (See Muhammad Hayat Khan\n\nv. Sandhe Khan and Others, 55 P.R. (1906) 270 at 274; Muzafjar Muhammad v. Imam Din, I.L.R. (1928) 9 Lah. 120, 125).\n\n(7) The opinions expressed by the compiler of a Riwaj.i.am or Settlement Officer as a result of his intimate knowledge and' investigation of the subjec~ are entitled to weight which will vary with the circu1nstances of each case. The only safe rule toe be laid down with regard to the weight to be attached to the· con1piler's re1narks is that if they represent his personal opinion or bias and detract from the record of. long standing custom, they will not be sufficient to displace the custom, but if they are the result of his inquiry a\"nd investigationas to the scope of. the~\n\n' -\n\n' _,\n\napplicability of tbe custom and any special sense in which tbe 1952 exponents of the custom expressed themselves in regard to it, such remarks should be given due weight. (See N\"rain Singh v. Thakur Gokal Mt. Basant Kaur, A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 419 at 421, 422; Mt. Chinto v.\n\nChand Thelur, A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 985; Khedam Hussain v.\n\nMohammad v.\n\nHussain, A.I.R. 1941 Lah. 73 at 79).\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\nCrvrL\n\nAPPELLATE JurusorcrroN : Civil Appeal No. 158 of 1951. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated 24th March, 1948, of the High Court of Punjab at Simila (Teja Singh and Khosla JJ.) in Regular First Appf'.al No. 133 of 1945 arising out of judgment and decree dated 25th November, 1944, of the\n\nCourt of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Kangra, at Dharmsala in Suit No. 86 of 1943.\n\nDaryadatta Chawla for the appellant.\n\nGurbachan Singh (Jindra Lal, with him), for the respondent.\n\n1952. May 16. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Punjab at Simla reversing the judgmeµt and decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge of Kangra in a suit instituted by the appellant for a declaration that he was the sole lawful heir of one Musammat Ram Piari, whom he alleged to be Pis wife, and as 1 such was entitled to the properties left by her, and for possession of those properties •.\n\nThe suit was instituted against 2 persons, namely,.\n\nParvin Kumari, who was alleged to be the daughter of the plaintiff by Ram Piari, and Shrimati Raj Kumari, who were respectively impleaded as defend-· ants Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nThe case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint was: that he was married to Ram Piari, the daughter of an employee of Raj Kumari (defendant No. 2) about 22\n\nyears before the institution of the suit, that after marriage she lived with him at Hoshiarpur and gave birth to a daughter, Parvin Kumari (defendant No. 1 ),. on the 4th March, 1929, and that Ram Piari died ia\n\nThakur Gokal\n\nChand\n\n.v.\n\nParvin KumOri.\n\nFaz/ Ali].\n\nApril, 1941, leaving both movable and immovable properties which she had acquired in her own name with the aid of his money and which had been taken possession of by Raj Kumari. He further alleged that he was a Rajput by caste belonging to tehsil Garhshankar in the district of Hoshiarpur, and was governed by custom in matters of uccession, and, according to that custom, he, as the husband of the deceased Ram Piari, was entitled to the movable and immovable properties left by her to the exclusion of Parvin Kumari, her daughter.\n\n. The suit was contested by both Parvin Kumari and Raj Kumari, and both of them denied that the appellant h)ad been mart1ied to Ram Piar~. Their case was that the properties in suit were acquired by Raj Kumari with her own money for Ram Piari, that the latter had made a will bequeathing them to her <laughter, Parvin Kumari, that the appellant was not governed by ctom, and that in any event the alleged custom could not apply to the personal and selfacquired property of Ram Piari. As regards 2 cars which were also included .in the list of properties daimed in the plaint, the case of Raj Kumari was that they belonged to her and that the deceased was only a benarnidar.\n\n' The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit with respect to all the properties excepting the 2 cars which were held to belong to Raj Kumari. The court held that Ram Piari was the legally married wife of the appellant, that he was governed by customary law applicablle . to Rajputs . of Hoshiarpur disttict i'n matters .of succession, and that according to that customary law he was the preferential heir to the estate of Ram Piari. J:'he court further held. that the will of Ram Piari was invalid as. she had no power under the\n\n.ustomary law to make a will.\n\nBoth the . defendants appealed to the High Court against the judgment of the trial court, and the appeal was ultimately allowed and the plaintiff's suit was .clismissed. The High Court held that though there\n\nwas evidence of long cohabitation of the plaintiff and Ram Piari giving ris, e to a presumption of marriage, yet that presumption had been completely rebutted .and the proper conclusion to be arrived at on the evidence on record was that the plaintiff had not been able to prove that Ram Piari was his lawfully wedded wife. As to custom, the findings of the High Court were as follows:-\n\n( 1) that the appellant belonged to an agricultural tribe of Hoshiarpur district and was therefore govern- ed by the custom prevailing among the Rajputs of that district;\n\n(2) that there was no local or general custom allowing the plaintiff to succeed in preference to the daughter to the property left by Ram Piari which had been given to her by a stranger, namely, Raj Kumari; .and\n\n(3) that the parties were governed by Hindu law ci:ider which Parvin Kumari being the daughter of Ram ' Piari was entitled to succeed to the properties left by the latter in preference to the plaintiff.\n\nAgainst the decision of the High Court, the plaintiff has now preferred this appear, after obtaining a .certificate from the High Court under sections 109 and,\n\n110 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe first question which arises in this appeal is whether the plaintiff has succeeded in proving that Ram Piari was his legally wedded wife. The plaintiff was admittedly employed as a copyist in the District Judge's court at Hoshiarpu.r and was living in that town. His case was. that he gained the acquaintance of Raj Kumari (defendant No. 2), a wealthy lady of Kangra district who owned a tea estate in tehsil Palampur and occasionally visited Hoshiarpur, and through her good offices was married to Ram Piari, who was the daughter of one Chandar Bir, an em- :ployee of Raj Kumari working in her tea estate. After marriage, ' Ram Pfari live~ w:iith -the plainitiff at Hoshiarpur as his lawfully wedded wife, and a daughter, .Parvin Kumari, (also called Usha Rani), was born to\n\nThakur Gok.al\n\nChand\n\n\".· Parvin, 11:.um, ari.\n\nFazl 4li /.\n\nThakur Gokal\n\nChand\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\nFaz/Ali].\n\nthem on the 4th March, 1929. Raj Kumari had great attachment towards Ram Piari and often used to pay visits to Hoshiarpnr to meet her. In the year 1934-35 (no date is mentioned in the plaint; but this year is mentioned in the plaintiff's evidence), Raj Kumari took Ram Piari from the plaintiff's house with belongings of every description on the pretext of taking her out for recreation. Ram Piari did not like going round with Raj Kumari and though she wanted to come back to the plaintiff s; he had not the courage to disobey Raj Kumari, and in fact Ram Piari and Raj Kumari inwardly hated one another during the last years of the former's life. In the year 1941, Ram Piari died at Mayo Hospital at Lahore, leaving the properties in dispute which had been acquired by her by good management with the plaintiff's own money.\n\nAs against this version of the paintiff, ithe case of Raj Kumari was that Ram Piari had peen enticed away by a motor driver sometime in 1921, that she returned to Holta estate after about 11 years with.\n\nParvin Kumari who was; then about 3 years old, and after her return both she and her daughter remained' with her (Raj Kumari) till Ram Piari died in 1941..\n\nRaj Kumari, being a widow, felt very lonely and so brought up Ram Piari as a companion and all the properties in dispute had been acquired by her with, her own money for the benefit of Ram Piari. Parvin Kumari had been educated and brought up at her ex-· pense, and it was entirely false that she and Ram Piari inwardly hated each other, the truth being that they liked and were attached to each other.\n\nThe evidence adduced by the plaintiff to prove that Ram Piari was his lawfully wedded wife consists partly of the evidence of a number of witnesses and partly of circums1tantial evidence. The direct evidence of marriage is furnished by Babu Ram, P. W. 7, Arrant Ram, P. W. 11, Babu, P. W. 12, and Asa Ram,.\n\nP. W. 13. Babu Ram claims to be the family priest and alleges to have officiated as priest at the time of the plaintiff's marriage. Anant Ram and Asa Ram are\n\njaswal Rajputs residing in village Bham, which 1s near the plai, ntiff's village, Ajnoha, and Babu is a barber.\n\nThese four persons have said that they accompanied the marriage party and that the marriage of the plaintiff with Ram piari was celebrated in their presence.\n\nThe evidence of the other witnesses and the circumstantial evidence upon which reliance has been placed by the plaintiff have been summarized by the learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment in these words:-\n\n\"P. W. 5 Mukhi Ram is a Municipal Commissioner at Hoshiarpur. P. W. 4 Doctor Shadi Lal is a leading Medical Practitioner of Hoshiarpur. P. W. 9 Lala Sham Lal and P. W. 10 Lala Har Narain have been co-employees with the plaintiff in the same office; though these persons (except P. W. 9) have no social relations with the plaintiff and his family, yet they have been seeing Ram Piari living with plaintiff as his wife. She was proclaimed as such by the plaintiff and both of them were treated as husband and wife by the people of the Mohalla and by the brotherhood in the village of plaintiff. Exhibits P-18 and P-19 show that defendant No. 2 has been addressing Ram Piari, care of plaintiff in 1932 and has heen receiving correspondence, care of the plaintiff which shows that she approved of the plaintiff's alliance with Ram Piari\n\n.... Paras Ram, a younger brother of Ram Piari~ lived in the house of Gokal Chand and it is in evidence that he used to address the plaintiff as jija-a common name for sister's husband. From 1930 to 1934 Paras Ram read in the D.A.V. High School at Hoshiarpur and Exhibits P. W. 6/1 to 6 are copies • of entries in the registers of the school regarding applications which were given by Gokal Chand, plaintiff, for admiss.ion of his ward Paras Ram, son of Chandar\n\nBir who was described as his sal.a (wife's brother).\n\nP. W. 6 Lala Bishan Das, teacher, ha~ filed these copies. His sister's, house was adjacent to the house of the plaintiff and he had occasions to see Ram Piari\n\nliving and being treated as wife by the plaintiff during those years.\"\n\nThakur Gokal\"\n\nChand\n\nv.\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\nFazl Ali f.\n\nThakur Gokal Chand v. 'f'arvin Kumari.\n\n]?azl Ali/.\n\nUpon the evidence to which ll\"eference has been )Ilade, the trial court came to the conclusion that Ram Piari was the legally married wife of the appellant.\n\nThe learned judges of the High Court however found the evidence of the 4 witness.es who claimed to have been present at the marriage of the plaintiff to be quite unconvincing, and they pointed out that the case of the plaintiff being that his marriage had been performed with great pomp and show, it was surprising that the evidence . relating to . it should be confined to 4 persons one of whom appeared to be a 'hired witness' and the other 3 were interested persons.\n\nAs io the evidence of the 4 pers, ons who claim to have been present at the plaintiff's marriage, we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High Court. The evidence of the other witnesses undoubtedly establishes the fact that for some years the plaintiff and Ram Piari lived together as husband and wife and were treated as such, that Paras Ram, brother of Ram Piari, addres.sed the plaintiff as jija (a common name for sister's husband), and that the plaintiff acted as Paras Ram's guardian when the latter. was admitted to D.A.V. School and was described as his brother-in-law in some of the entries in the school register. The learned Judges of the High Court considered that the evidence of .certain witneses who deposed to some of the facts on which the lower court relied, did not strictly comply with the requirements of section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, firstly because the witnesses had no special means of knowledge on the subject of relationship between the plaintiff and Ram Piari, and secondly because what section 50 made relevant was not mere opinion but opinion \"expressed by conduct\" of persons who as members of the family or otherwise, had special means; of knowledge. It seems to us that the question as to how far the evidence of those particular witnesses is relevant under section 50 is academic, because it is well-s.ettled that continuous cohabitation for a number of years may raise the presumption of marriage. In the present case, it seems clear that the plaintiff and Ram Piari\n\nlived and were treated as husband and :wife for a number of years, and, in the absence of any material pointing to the contrary conclusion a presumption might have been drawn that they were lawfully married. But the presumption which may be drawn from long cohabitation is rebuttable, and if there are circumstances which weaken or destroy that presumption, the court cannot ignore them. We -agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that in the present case, such circumstances are not wanting, and their cumulative effect warrants the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove the factum of his marriage with Ram Piari. In the .first place, the plaintiff has not examined any of his near relations such as his brother, or collaterals living in Ajnoha, or any co-villagers, whose presence at the marriage would have been far more probable than the presence of the witnesses examined by him. He has also not examined any of the witnesses residing in or round about Holta estate in spite of the fact that his own case is that the marriage was celebrated with great pomp and show. It was suggested in the courts below that since defendant No. 2 is an influential person, no local witnesses would be available to support the plaintiff's case, but the High Court has very fully dealt with this aspect and pointed out .firstly that Raj Kumari had had litigation with a number of persons belonging to Palampur and such persons would not be under her influence, and secondly that no good reason has been shown why Raj Kumari, who is alleged to have brought about the marriage between the plaintiff and Ram Piari, should take a completely hostile attitude towards him. Then again, neither the parents nor any of the relations of Ram Piari have been examined to support the plaintiff. - On the other hand, Ram\n\nPiari's own mother, Ganga, has deposed that the former was never married to the plaintiff, and the statement made by Ram Piari in her will, which is a very valuable piece of evidence, . is to the same effect. It is also incredible that in spite of the love which Ram Piari is said to have had for the plaintiff, she left him\n\n.1952\n\nThakur Gokal'\n\nChand\n\n•. v.\n\nParvin Kumari. ,\n\n, Faz/ Ali/.\n\n:Thakur Gokal Chand . v.\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\nFaz/ AU/.\n\nand went away to live with Raj Kumari, and that during the long period when Ram Piari was away, the .plaintiff should never have visited her or made enquiries -about her and hisi alleged daughter, Parvin Kumari. This is all the more strange, since it is stated hy the plaintiff that Ram Piari continued to love him and that she and Raj Kumari inwardly hated each other. Parvin Kumari says in her deposition .that she had never seen her father and -that when she\n\n•eached the age of discretion she found herself living at :Palampur. The conduct of the plaintiff -in showing such complete indifference to his wife and daughter as is disclosed in his evidence is most unnatural, and .no less unnatural is his conduct in instituting a suit to .deprive :her of properties which had come into her hands not by reason of anything done by him but as a result of the generosity shown towards her by a stranger. The plaintiff's case that the properties in dispute were acquired by 'Ram 'Piari iwlth the aid of his money is wholly untrue, and it has been rightly found by both the courts that they were acquired for her by Raj Kumari. The plaintiff's witnesses have tried to exaggerate his means to support his case, but the truth appears to be that he had hardly any means of his own beyond the somewhat meagre salary which he .us.ed to draw as a court typist.\n\nSeveral of the witnesses including and Advocate and Ram Piari's own mother have deposed that Ram Piari had eloped with a driver and had remained away from Holta .estate for a number of years. Even the Subordinate Judge has not rejected the story of elopement, and though there is no reliable evidence as to when and how she met the plaintiff, the possibility of her having lived with him for some years. even though they were not legally married, cannot be ruled out.\n\nThe plaintiff claims ta be a Rajput of high caste, and it appears ta us rather unusual that he should not marry in _his own tribe but should take in marriage a Gurkha girl who was born of very poor parents and belonged tci a place far away from where he himself lived.\n\n_,__\n\nThe fact that Paras Ram lived. with the plaintiff for .some time and addressed the latter as jija, and that the plaintiff d<!S!Cribed himself as guardian and brother-in-law of Paras Ram, is as consistent with the . defence version as with the plaintiff's. If Paras Ram's parents had been in affluent circumstances so as to be :able to maintain and educate him, , the case would have been different, but there is evidence to show that -Chandar Bir was very poor and both his wife and -daughter had to work as servants of Raj Kumari to .earn their living.\n\nIn our opinion, the conclusiGn arrived at by the High Court has not been shown by the plaintiff to be 'incorrect, and whatever the true facts may be, we are compelled to hold that in the present state of evidence rhe plaintiff has not s.ucceeded in establishing that am Piari was his legally wedded wife.\n\nIn the view we have taken, it is not necessary to deal with the question whether succession to the properties in dispute will be governed by customary law\n\n•Of by Hindu law, but since it was argued before us at very great length, we think that we might state the contentions of the parties and the difficulties which in our opinion arise in dealing with those contentions on the material before us. Before doing so, however, we wish to set out briefly certain general principles which we think should be kept in view in dealing with questions of customary law. They may be summarized as follows:-\n\n(1) It should be recognized that many of the agricultural tribes in the Punjab are governed by a -:variety of customs, which depart from the ordinary rules of Hindu and Muhammadan law, in regard to inheritance and other matters mentioned in seetion 5 •of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872.\n\n(2) In spite of the above fact, there is no presumption that a particular person or class of persons is governed by custom, and a party who is alleged to be governed by customary law must prove that he is so governed nd must also prove the existence of the\n\nThakur Gokal\n\nChand\n\nv ..\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nThakur Gktil\n\nChand\n\nv~ .\n\nParvin Kumar;.\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\ncustom s.et up by him. See Daya Ram v. Sahel Singh and' Others('), Abdul Hussein Khan. v. Bibi Sana Dero(2).\n\n(3) A custom, in order to be binding, must derive its force from the fact that by long usage it has obtained the force of law, but the English rule that \"a. custom, in order that it may be legal and binding,. must have been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary\" should not be strictly applied to Indian conditions. All that is. necessary to prove is that the usage has been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariability as. to show that it has, by common consent, been submitted to as the established governing rule of a particular locality. See Mt. Subhani v. Nawab(3).\n\n( 4) A custom may be proved by general evidence as to its exil;, tence by members of the tribe or family who woul:<l naturallyi be cogniiant Of ilts existence and its exercise without controversy, and such evidence may he safely acted on when it is supported by a public record of custom such as the Riwaj-i-am or Manual of Customary Law. See Ahmad Khan v.\n\nMt. Channi Bibi(').\n\n(5) No statutory presumption attache11 to the con. tents of a Riwaj-i-am or similar compilation, hut being a public record prepared by a public officer in the discharge of his duties under Government rules, the statements to be found therein in support of custom are admissible to prove facts recited therein and will generally be regarded as a strong piece of evidence of the custom. The entries in the Riwaj-i-am may however be proved to be incorrect, and the quantum of evidence required for the purpose of rebutting them will vary with the circumstances of each case. The presumption of correctness attaching to a Riwaj-i-am may be rebutted, if it is shown that it affects adversely the rights of females or any other class of persons who had no opportunity of appearing before the revenue authoritiei;. See Beg v. Allah Ditta('), Saleh.\n\n(1) llO P.R. (1906) 390 at 410. (4) A.I.R.1925 P.C. 267 at271. ·\n\n(2) L.R. 45 I.A. 10.\n\n(5) A.LR .. 1916 P.C. 129 at 131.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1941 P.C. 21 at 32. ·\n\nMohammad v. Zawar Hussain(1); Mt. Subhani v.\n\nNawab(2).\n\n( 6) When the question of custom applicable to an agriculturist is raised, it is open to a party who denies the application of custom to show that the person who claims to be governed by it has completely and permanently drifted away from agriculture and agricultural associations and settled for good in urban life and adopted trade, service, otc., as his principal occupation and means and source of livelihood, and does not follow other customs applicable to agriculturists.\n\nSee Muhammad Hayat Khan v. Sandhe Khan and Others(3), Muzaffar Muhammad v. Imam Din(4).\n\n(7) The opinions expressed by the compiler of a Riwaj-i-am or Settlement Officer a result of his intimate knowledge and investigation of the subject, are entitled to weight which will vary with the circumstances of each case. The only safe rule to be laid down with regard to the weight to be attached to the compiler's remarks is that if they represent his personal opinion or bias and detract from the record of long-standing custom, they wlll not be sufficient to displace the custom, but if they are the result of his inquiry and investigation as to the scope of the applicability of the custom and any special sense in which the exponents of the custom expressed themselves in regard to it, such remarks should be given due weight.\n\nSee Narain Singh v. Mt. Basant Kaur( 5 ), Mt .. Chinto v.\n\nThelur( 6 ); Khedam Hussain v. Mohammad Hussain(').\n\nBearing these principles in mind, the difficulty which appears to us to beset the case of the plaintiff may be briefly stated as follows :- The basis of the plaintiff's case is that the custom by which he claims to be governed is a \"zamindara custom\" and he is governed by it by reason of his belonging to a family of agriculturists. From the evidence, however, it appears that he had sold most, if not\n\n(1) A.LR. 1944 P.C. 18.\n\n(5) A.LR.1935 Lah. 419 at\n\n(2) A.LR. 1941 P.C. 21 at 25. 421, 422.\n\n(3) 55 P.R. (1906) 270 at 274. ( 6) A.LR. 1985 Lah. 985.\n\n(4) I.LR. (1928) 9 Lah. 120, 125. (7) A.LR. 1941 Lah. 73 at 79. 5-9 S.C. India/71\n\nThakur Gokal\n\nChand v.\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nThakur Gokal Chand v.\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\nall, of . his property in the village to which he belonged, that his ancestors were bankers or sahukars, that his father was a clerk of a lawyer practising in Hoshiarpur d(strict and that he himself was a clerk in the district Judge's court at Hoshiarpur and lived there, and there is hardly any evidence to show that any of his relations was dependent on agriculture or that he maintained connection with them.\n\nIn our opinion, the witnesses of the plaintiff have tried to grossly exaggerate his pecuniary means and have not given a correct picture on which the answer to the question as to whether he would still be governed by the old custom would depend. Again, though according to the answer to question 11 in the Riwaj-i-am of Hoshiarpur district, the general custom governing the Rajputs of that district would seem to be that a marriage within the tribe only is lawful, the plaintiff did not marry a Rajput of his district but is said to have married a Gurkha woman, about whose caste and character the evidence is conflicting, and whose family was admittedly not governed by the \"Riwaj-iam\" upon which the plaintiff relies. If both the husband and the wife are shown to belong to the same tribe and to be governed by the same custom, then the difficulty in deciding what would be the rule of succession on the death of the wife in regard to the wife's self-acquired property may not be very great.\n\nBut even if it be assumed that Ram Piari was lawfully married to the plaintiff, the serious question to be decided would be w he th er succession to tbe property which Ram Piari received as gift from a stranger and which she owned in her own right, would be governed by the custom governing her husband's family and not her own. Such marriage as is said to have been contracted by the plaintiff being evidently an event of rare occurrence, the rule of succession set up by him cannot be said to derive its force from long usage. As we have pointed out, a custom in order to be binding must derive its force from the fact that by long usage it has obt; i, ined the force of law; and if an occasion never arose to apply the rule of succession\n\ninvoked by the plaintiff, to the property held by a wife in her own right, the foundation on which custom grows would be wanting. When the matter is further probed, it appears that the plaintiff relies not only on custom but partly on custom and partly on the rule of Hindu la:w, namely, that the law which governs the husband will govern the wife , also.\n\nWhether the latter rule can be extended to a case like the present a question of some difficulty, on which, as at present advised, we would reserve our opinion.\n\nIn the circumstances, we prefer to leave the issue of custom undecided, and base our decision on the sole ground, which by itself is sufficient to conclude the appeal, that the plaintiff's marriage with Ram Piari has not been clearly established.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the e; ase and particularly since the appellant has appealed in f orma pauperis, we direct that the parties will bear their own costs in all the courts.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: S. D. Sekhri.\n\nAgent for the respondent: Naunit Lal.\n\nLACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nEvidence Act (1 of 1872), sec. 27-Statements of several accused leading to discoveries-Admissibility-Necessity of proof as to which statement was made first-Scope of sec. 27.\n\nThree persons K, M and S, who were accused of murder made statements to the police which disclosed that the dead bodies after being dismembered were thrown into a stream and the police party thereafter went with the three accused to the stream where each of them pointed out a place where different\n\nThakur Gokal\n\nChand v.\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\nFazl Ali f.\n\nMarch 21.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "825\n\nTHAKUR GOKALCHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THAKUR GOKALCHAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ti.\n\nPARVIN KUMAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PARVIN KUMARI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VMAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1585, "end_char": 1591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships laid down the general principles which should be kept in view in dealing with questions of customary law as follows :\n\n(1) It should be recognised that many of the agricultural tribes in the Punjab are governed by a variety of customs, which depart from the ordinary rules of Hindu and Muhammadan law, :in regard to inheritance and other matters mentioned in section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1753, "end_char": 1762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Laws Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1770, "end_char": 1791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 45 I.A. 10", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2185, "end_char": 2200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Teja Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6065, "end_char": 6075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated 24th March, 1948, of the High Court of Punjab at Simila (Teja Singh and Khosla JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Khosla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6080, "end_char": 6086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated 24th March, 1948, of the High Court of Punjab at Simila (Teja Singh and Khosla JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Daryadatta Chawla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6289, "end_char": 6306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daryadatta Chawla for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gurbachan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6327, "end_char": 6342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurbachan Singh (Jindra Lal, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6344, "end_char": 6354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurbachan Singh (Jindra Lal, with him), for the respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6446, "end_char": 6453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Punjab at Simla reversing the judgmeµt and decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge of Kangra in a suit instituted by the appellant for a declaration that he was the sole lawful heir of one Musammat Ram Piari, whom he alleged to be Pis wife, and as 1 such was entitled to the properties left by her, and for possession of those properties •.\n\nThe suit was instituted against 2 persons, namely,."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab at Simla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6514, "end_char": 6543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Punjab at Simla reversing the judgmeµt and decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge of Kangra in a suit instituted by the appellant for a declaration that he was the sole lawful heir of one Musammat Ram Piari, whom he alleged to be Pis wife, and as 1 such was entitled to the properties left by her, and for possession of those properties •.\n\nThe suit was instituted against 2 persons, namely,."}}, {"text": "Musammat Ram Piari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Punjab at Simla reversing the judgmeµt and decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge of Kangra in a suit instituted by the appellant for a declaration that he was the sole lawful heir of one Musammat Ram Piari, whom he alleged to be Pis wife, and as 1 such was entitled to the properties left by her, and for possession of those properties •.\n\nThe suit was instituted against 2 persons, namely,."}}, {"text": "Parvin Kumari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6922, "end_char": 6935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parvin Kumari, who was alleged to be the daughter of the plaintiff by Ram Piari, and Shrimati Raj Kumari, who were respectively impleaded as defend-· ants Nos.", "canonical_name": "Parvin Kumari"}}, {"text": "Ram Piari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6992, "end_char": 7001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parvin Kumari, who was alleged to be the daughter of the plaintiff by Ram Piari, and Shrimati Raj Kumari, who were respectively impleaded as defend-· ants Nos.", "canonical_name": "Ram ' Piari"}}, {"text": "Shrimati Raj Kumari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parvin Kumari, who was alleged to be the daughter of the plaintiff by Ram Piari, and Shrimati Raj Kumari, who were respectively impleaded as defend-· ants Nos."}}, {"text": "Hoshiarpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7336, "end_char": 7346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) about 22\n\nyears before the institution of the suit, that after marriage she lived with him at Hoshiarpur and gave birth to a daughter, Parvin Kumari (defendant No."}}, {"text": "4th March, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7419, "end_char": 7434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the 4th March, 1929, and that Ram Piari died ia\n\nThakur Gokal\n\nChand\n\n.v."}}, {"text": "Thakur Gokal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7464, "end_char": 7476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the 4th March, 1929, and that Ram Piari died ia\n\nThakur Gokal\n\nChand\n\n.v."}}, {"text": "Parvin KumOri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7490, "end_char": 7503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parvin KumOri.", "canonical_name": "Parvin Kumari"}}, {"text": "Raj Kumari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7684, "end_char": 7694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April, 1941, leaving both movable and immovable properties which she had acquired in her own name with the aid of his money and which had been taken possession of by Raj Kumari.", "canonical_name": "Raj Kumari"}}, {"text": "Parvin Kumari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8022, "end_char": 8035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further alleged that he was a Rajput by caste belonging to tehsil Garhshankar in the district of Hoshiarpur, and was governed by custom in matters of uccession, and, according to that custom, he, as the husband of the deceased Ram Piari, was entitled to the movable and immovable properties left by her to the exclusion of Parvin Kumari, her daughter.", "canonical_name": "Parvin Kumari"}}, {"text": "Ram Piar~.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8180, "end_char": 8190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was contested by both Parvin Kumari and Raj Kumari, and both of them denied that the appellant h)ad been mart1ied to Ram Piar~. Their case was that the properties in suit were acquired by Raj Kumari with her own money for Ram Piari, that the latter had made a will bequeathing them to her <laughter, Parvin Kumari, that the appellant was not governed by ctom, and that in any event the alleged custom could not apply to the personal and selfacquired property of Ram Piari.", "canonical_name": "Ram ' Piari"}}, {"text": "Ram ' Piari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10370, "end_char": 10381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As to custom, the findings of the High Court were as follows:-\n\n( 1) that the appellant belonged to an agricultural tribe of Hoshiarpur district and was therefore govern- ed by the custom prevailing among the Rajputs of that district;\n\n(2) that there was no local or general custom allowing the plaintiff to succeed in preference to the daughter to the property left by Ram Piari which had been given to her by a stranger, namely, Raj Kumari; .and\n\n(3) that the parties were governed by Hindu law ci:ider which Parvin Kumari being the daughter of Ram ' Piari was entitled to succeed to the properties left by the latter in preference to the plaintiff.", "canonical_name": "Ram ' Piari"}}, {"text": "sections 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10618, "end_char": 10630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10644, "end_char": 10671, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "District Judge's court at Hoshiarpu.r and", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10873, "end_char": 10914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff was admittedly employed as a copyist in the District Judge's court at Hoshiarpu.r and was living in that town."}}, {"text": "Raj Kumari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10989, "end_char": 10999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that he gained the acquaintance of Raj Kumari (defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Raj Kumari"}}, {"text": "Kangra district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11037, "end_char": 11052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2), a wealthy lady of Kangra district who owned a tea estate in tehsil Palampur and occasionally visited Hoshiarpur, and through her good offices was married to Ram Piari, who was the daughter of one Chandar Bir, an em- :ployee of Raj Kumari working in her tea estate."}}, {"text": "Palampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11086, "end_char": 11094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2), a wealthy lady of Kangra district who owned a tea estate in tehsil Palampur and occasionally visited Hoshiarpur, and through her good offices was married to Ram Piari, who was the daughter of one Chandar Bir, an em- :ployee of Raj Kumari working in her tea estate."}}, {"text": "Chandar Bir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11215, "end_char": 11226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2), a wealthy lady of Kangra district who owned a tea estate in tehsil Palampur and occasionally visited Hoshiarpur, and through her good offices was married to Ram Piari, who was the daughter of one Chandar Bir, an em- :ployee of Raj Kumari working in her tea estate.", "canonical_name": "-Chandar Bir"}}, {"text": "Ram Pfari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11302, "end_char": 11311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After marriage, ' Ram Pfari live~ w:iith -the plainitiff at Hoshiarpur as his lawfully wedded wife, and a daughter, .Parvin Kumari, (also called Usha Rani), was born to\n\nThakur Gok.al\n\nChand\n\n\".·", "canonical_name": "Ram ' Piari"}}, {"text": "Hoshiarpnr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11674, "end_char": 11684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Kumari had great attachment towards Ram Piari and often used to pay visits to Hoshiarpnr to meet her."}}, {"text": "Mayo Hospital at Lahore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12247, "end_char": 12270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1941, Ram Piari died at Mayo Hospital at Lahore, leaving the properties in dispute which had been acquired by her by good management with the plaintiff's own money."}}, {"text": "Raj Kumari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12707, "end_char": 12717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parvin Kumari who was; then about 3 years old, and after her return both she and her daughter remained' with her (Raj Kumari) till Ram Piari died in 1941..\n\nRaj Kumari, being a widow, felt very lonely and so brought up Ram Piari as a companion and all the properties in dispute had been acquired by her with, her own money for the benefit of Ram Piari.", "canonical_name": "Raj Kumari"}}, {"text": "Babu Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13390, "end_char": 13398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The direct evidence of marriage is furnished by Babu Ram, P. W. 7, Arrant Ram, P. W. 11, Babu, P. W. 12, and Asa Ram,."}}, {"text": "Arrant Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13409, "end_char": 13419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The direct evidence of marriage is furnished by Babu Ram, P. W. 7, Arrant Ram, P. W. 11, Babu, P. W. 12, and Asa Ram,."}}, {"text": "Asa Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13451, "end_char": 13458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The direct evidence of marriage is furnished by Babu Ram, P. W. 7, Arrant Ram, P. W. 11, Babu, P. W. 12, and Asa Ram,."}}, {"text": "Anant Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13594, "end_char": 13603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anant Ram and Asa Ram are\n\njaswal Rajputs residing in village Bham, which 1s near the plai, ntiff's village, Ajnoha, and Babu is a barber."}}, {"text": "Asa Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13608, "end_char": 13615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anant Ram and Asa Ram are\n\njaswal Rajputs residing in village Bham, which 1s near the plai, ntiff's village, Ajnoha, and Babu is a barber."}}, {"text": "Bham", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13656, "end_char": 13660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anant Ram and Asa Ram are\n\njaswal Rajputs residing in village Bham, which 1s near the plai, ntiff's village, Ajnoha, and Babu is a barber."}}, {"text": "Ajnoha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13703, "end_char": 13709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anant Ram and Asa Ram are\n\njaswal Rajputs residing in village Bham, which 1s near the plai, ntiff's village, Ajnoha, and Babu is a barber."}}, {"text": "Babu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13715, "end_char": 13719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anant Ram and Asa Ram are\n\njaswal Rajputs residing in village Bham, which 1s near the plai, ntiff's village, Ajnoha, and Babu is a barber."}}, {"text": "Ram piari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13848, "end_char": 13857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These four persons have said that they accompanied the marriage party and that the marriage of the plaintiff with Ram piari was celebrated in their presence.", "canonical_name": "Ram ' Piari"}}, {"text": "Mukhi Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14111, "end_char": 14120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of the other witnesses and the circumstantial evidence upon which reliance has been placed by the plaintiff have been summarized by the learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment in these words:-\n\n\"P. W. 5 Mukhi Ram is a Municipal Commissioner at Hoshiarpur."}}, {"text": "Shadi Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14179, "end_char": 14188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 4 Doctor Shadi Lal is a leading Medical Practitioner of Hoshiarpur."}}, {"text": "Lala Sham Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14246, "end_char": 14259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 9 Lala Sham Lal and P. W. 10 Lala Har Narain have been co-employees with the plaintiff in the same office; though these persons (except P. W. 9) have no social relations with the plaintiff and his family, yet they have been seeing Ram Piari living with plaintiff as his wife."}}, {"text": "Lala Har Narain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14273, "end_char": 14288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 9 Lala Sham Lal and P. W. 10 Lala Har Narain have been co-employees with the plaintiff in the same office; though these persons (except P. W. 9) have no social relations with the plaintiff and his family, yet they have been seeing Ram Piari living with plaintiff as his wife."}}, {"text": "Paras Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14941, "end_char": 14950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 has been addressing Ram Piari, care of plaintiff in 1932 and has heen receiving correspondence, care of the plaintiff which shows that she approved of the plaintiff's alliance with Ram Piari\n\n.... Paras Ram, a younger brother of Ram Piari~ lived in the house of Gokal Chand and it is in evidence that he used to address the plaintiff as jija-a common name for sister's husband."}}, {"text": "Ram Piari~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14973, "end_char": 14983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 has been addressing Ram Piari, care of plaintiff in 1932 and has heen receiving correspondence, care of the plaintiff which shows that she approved of the plaintiff's alliance with Ram Piari\n\n.... Paras Ram, a younger brother of Ram Piari~ lived in the house of Gokal Chand and it is in evidence that he used to address the plaintiff as jija-a common name for sister's husband.", "canonical_name": "Ram ' Piari"}}, {"text": "Gokal Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15006, "end_char": 15017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 has been addressing Ram Piari, care of plaintiff in 1932 and has heen receiving correspondence, care of the plaintiff which shows that she approved of the plaintiff's alliance with Ram Piari\n\n.... Paras Ram, a younger brother of Ram Piari~ lived in the house of Gokal Chand and it is in evidence that he used to address the plaintiff as jija-a common name for sister's husband."}}, {"text": "D.A.V. High School at Hoshiarpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15162, "end_char": 15194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From 1930 to 1934 Paras Ram read in the D.A.V. High School at Hoshiarpur and Exhibits P. W. 6/1 to 6 are copies • of entries in the registers of the school regarding applications which were given by Gokal Chand, plaintiff, for admiss.ion of his ward Paras Ram, son of Chandar\n\nBir who was described as his sal.a (wife's brother)."}}, {"text": "Lala Bishan Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15461, "end_char": 15476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 6 Lala Bishan Das, teacher, ha~ filed these copies."}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17266, "end_char": 17276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17284, "end_char": 17303, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17463, "end_char": 17473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17739, "end_char": 17749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palampur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19360, "end_char": 19368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 is an influential person, no local witnesses would be available to support the plaintiff's case, but the High Court has very fully dealt with this aspect and pointed out .firstly that Raj Kumari had had litigation with a number of persons belonging to Palampur and such persons would not be under her influence, and secondly that no good reason has been shown why Raj Kumari, who is alleged to have brought about the marriage between the plaintiff and Ram Piari, should take a completely hostile attitude towards him."}}, {"text": "Ram\n\nPiari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19762, "end_char": 19772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Ram\n\nPiari's own mother, Ganga, has deposed that the former was never married to the plaintiff, and the statement made by Ram Piari in her will, which is a very valuable piece of evidence, .", "canonical_name": "Ram ' Piari"}}, {"text": "Ganga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19787, "end_char": 19792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Ram\n\nPiari's own mother, Ganga, has deposed that the former was never married to the plaintiff, and the statement made by Ram Piari in her will, which is a very valuable piece of evidence, ."}}, {"text": "Holta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21721, "end_char": 21726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Several of the witnesses including and Advocate and Ram Piari's own mother have deposed that Ram Piari had eloped with a driver and had remained away from Holta .estate for a number of years."}}, {"text": "-Chandar Bir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22745, "end_char": 22757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Paras Ram's parents had been in affluent circumstances so as to be :able to maintain and educate him, , the case would have been different, but there is evidence to show that -Chandar Bir was very poor and both his wife and -daughter had to work as servants of Raj Kumari to .earn their living.", "canonical_name": "-Chandar Bir"}}, {"text": "am Piari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23133, "end_char": 23141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the conclusiGn arrived at by the High Court has not been shown by the plaintiff to be 'incorrect, and whatever the true facts may be, we are compelled to hold that in the present state of evidence rhe plaintiff has not s.ucceeded in establishing that am Piari was his legally wedded wife.", "canonical_name": "Ram ' Piari"}}, {"text": "Punjab Laws Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24029, "end_char": 24050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parvin Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24393, "end_char": 24405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parvin Kumar;.", "canonical_name": "Parvin Kumari"}}, {"text": "L.R. 45 I.A. 10", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26450, "end_char": 26465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hoshiarpur district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29487, "end_char": 29506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, though according to the answer to question 11 in the Riwaj-i-am of Hoshiarpur district, the general custom governing the Rajputs of that district would seem to be that a marriage within the tribe only is lawful, the plaintiff did not marry a Rajput of his district but is said to have married a Gurkha woman, about whose caste and character the evidence is conflicting, and whose family was admittedly not governed by the \"Riwaj-iam\" upon which the plaintiff relies."}}, {"text": "S. D. Sekhri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31945, "end_char": 31957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: S. D. Sekhri."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31986, "end_char": 31996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "LACHMAN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31999, "end_char": 32012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32056, "end_char": 32067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32100, "end_char": 32107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32240, "end_char": 32247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_839_848_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 839\n\ninvoked by the plaintiff, to the property held by a wife in her own right, the foundation on which custom grows would be wanting. When the matter is further probed, it appears that the plaintiff relies not only on custom but partly on custom and partly on the rule of Hindu la:w, namely, that the law which governs the husband will govern the wife , also.\n\nWhether the latter rule can be extended to a case like the present a question of some difficulty, on which, as at present advised, we would reserve our opinion.\n\nIn the circumstances, we prefer to leave the issue of custom undecided, and base our decision on the sole ground, which by itself is sufficient to conclude the appeal, that the plaintiff's marriage with Ram Piari has not been clearly established.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the e; ase and particularly since the appellant has appealed in f orma pauperis, we direct that the parties will bear their own costs in all the courts.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: S. D. Sekhri.\n\nAgent for the respondent: Naunit Lal.\n\nLACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nEvidence Act (1 of 1872), sec. 27-Statements of several accused leading to discoveries-Admissibility-Necessity of proof as to which statement was made first-Scope of sec. 27.\n\nThree persons K, M and S, who were accused of murder made statements to the police which disclosed that the dead bodies after being dismembered were thrown into a stream and the police party thereafter went with the three accused to the stream where each of them pointed out a place where different\n\nThakur Gokal\n\nChand v.\n\nParvin Kumari.\n\nFazl Ali f.\n\nMarch 21.\n\nLachma11 Singh\n\nand Others\n\nThe State.\n\nparts of the dead bodies were discovered. It was contended on behalf of the accused that it was only the information which was first given that was admissible under sec. 27 of the Evidence Act, that once a fact has been discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence~ it cannot be said to be rediscovered in consequence of information received from another accused person, and that in the absence of evidence to show which of the accused first gave the infer mation the discoveries alleged cannot be proved against any of the accused persons: Held, that, even assuming that this argu ment was correct, as it appeared from the evidence that S led the police to a particular spot on the stream and it was at his instance that some blood stained earth was recovered from a place outside the village and he had also pointed out the trunk of one of the dead bodies, and the High Court was satisfied that there was an \"initial pointing out\" by S, the case was covered by the rule and the evidence as to the discoveries was admissible.\n\n\\Vith regard to the rule applicable to cases where there is clear and unimpeachable evidence as to independent and authen tic statements of the nature referred to in sec. 27 of the Evidence Act having been made by several accused persons either simultaneously or otherwise, some of the decided cases have gone further than is warranted by the language of sec. 27 of the Evidence Act and may have to be reviewed on a future occasion.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 2i of 1950. Appeal from the judgment and order dated 29th J uni:, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Simla (Weston C.J. and Khosla J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 432 of 1949 arising out of a judgment dated 5th August, 1949, of the Court of the Addi- tional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, in Sessions Trial No. 7 <if 1949 and Case No. 8 of 1949.\n\nfai Gopal Sethi (R. L. Kohli, with him) for the appellants.\n\nGopal Singh for the State.\n\n1952, March 21. The Judgment of the Court delivered by\n\nwas\n\n: -. :; oo\n\nFAzL Au J.-The three appellants were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge at Amritsar and found guilty of having murdered two persons named Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh and sentenced to transportation for life. The High Court of Punjab upheld their\n\n;..- ·-\n\n' ===t >\n\nconviction and sentence and granted them a certificate under article 134( 1) ( c) of the Constitution that the case 1s a fit one for appeal to this Court. Hence this appeal.\n\nThe facts of the case may be briefly stated as follows. On the evening of 16th December, 1948, a little before sunset, Achhar Singh, one of the murdered persons, went to the house of one Inder Singh in village Dalam for getting paddy husked. Achhar Singh's brother, Darshan Singh, who was working as a driver at Amritsar, came to Dalam from Amritsar the same evening, and, on coming, to know from his father that Achhar Singh had gone to Inder Singh's house, he also went there. While the two brothers were returning home, they were attacked by the three appellants and two of their relatives in a lane adjoining Inder Singh's house. The five assailants, who were armed with deadly weapons, inflicted a number of injuries on the two victims, as a result of which they died then and there. After the murder, the appellants and their companions tied the two dead bodies in two kheses (wrappers) and took them to village Saleempura where two other persons, named Ajaib Singh and Banta Singh, joined them, and the dead bodies after being dismembered were thrown into a stream known as Sakinala at a place about five miles from village Dalam.\n\nBela Singh, father of the deceased persons, who was one of the persons who claiw; to have witnessed the occurrence, did not leave the village at night on account of fear, but he started about two hours before sunrise on the next morning and lodged the first information report at 10 A.M. at the nearest police station. A police officer arrived in village Dalam shortly afterwards, and after investigation a charge-sheet was submitted against seven persons including the present appellants.\n\nAt the trial, five of the accused were charged with offences under section 302 read with section 149 and under section 201 read with section 149 of the Indian\n\nPenal Code, and the remaining two accused were charged with the offence under section 201 read with section 149 of that Code. The learned Judge who tried\n\nLachman Sing/,\n\nand Others\n\nThe State.\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\nLzchman Singh and Others\n\nThe State,\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\nthe accused, convicted the appellants and two other persons under section 302 read with section 149 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to transportation for life and convicted Ajaib Singh under section 201 read with section 149 and sentenced him to three years' R.I. Banta Singh, accused, was acquitted.\n\nOn appeal the Punjab High Court upheld the conviction of th~ present appellants and acquitted the remaining three persons.\n\nBefore proceeding to discuss the evidence in the case, it is necessary to refer to what has been described as the motive for thy. murder.\n\nIt appears, that in June, 1947, Natha Singh, father of the third appellant, Swaran Singh, was murdered, and Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh, the two milrdered persons in the case before us, and their third brother, Sulakhan Singh, were charged with the murder of that person. As a result of the trial, Darshan Singh was acquitted and Achhar Singh was sentenced to 1! years' R.I., while Sulakhan Singh was sentenced to 7 years' R.I. The judgment of the Sessions Judge in that case was delivered shortly before the date of the present occurrence, and it is common ground that Achhar Singh had been released on bail by the appellate court and was at large at _that time. It is said that the appellants and their relatives felt aggrieved by the 'acquittal of Darshan Singh\n\nand by the light sentenced passed on Achhar Singh, and therefore committed this murder in a spirit of frmtration and revenge. It was conceded before us by the learned counsel for the appellants that the facts stated above constituted a strong motive for the murder, but he also contended that .they constituted an equally strong motive for the appellants being falsely implicated in case the murder was committed, as was suggested by him, in circumstances under which the murderers could not be seen or identified. It therefore becomes necessary to set out the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of the murder.\n\nThe evidence led by the prosecution may be divided under two main heads:-(1) Direct evidence, and (2) Circumstantial evidence.\n\nThe direct evidence consists\n\noif the testimony of four eye-witnesses, namely, Bela Singh, father of the deceased, who claims to have gone to the scene of occurrence on hearing an outcry and to have witnessed the murderous assault on his sons ; Inder Singh and his wife, Mst. Taro, to whom the murdered persons had gone for getting paddy husked and who lived in a house adjoining the lane where the murder took place ; and Gurcharan Singh, a resident of a different village, who states that he saw the occurrence when he was going towards village Dhadar on a cycle.\n\nThe circumstantial evidence in the case, on which the High Court has relied, may be briefly summarised as follows :- ( 1) The second appellant, Massa Singh, who was arrested on the 18th December, 1948, was wearing a pyjama stained with human blood.\n\n(2) The third appellant, Swaran Singh, who was arrested on the 18th December, 1948, took the police on the 19th December to his haveli which was locked, and, on opening it two khases (wrappers) which were stained with human blood were recovered. ·\n\n(3) Swaran Singh pointed out a spot on the way to Sakinala, where the two dead bodies were placed for a short time while they were being taken to Sakinala, and the police scrapped blood-stained earth from that spot. He also led the police to the bank of Sakinala and pointed out the trunk of the body of Darshan Singh which was lying in the nala.\n\n(4) Lachhman Singh, who was arrested on the 28th December, 1948, pointed out a dilapidated khola near Sakinala where 3 spears, one kirpan and a datar, all stained with human blood, were recovered.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge, who heard the evidence, seems to have been impressed by the evidence of the eye-witnesses, and he has summed up his conclusion in these words:-\n\n\"This evidence was so consistent, so reliable, and of such nature that in my opinion it is definitely established that the five accmed Lachhman Singh, Katha\n\nLachman Singh\n\nand Others\n\nTh r: Sta tr:.\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\nLachman Singh\n\nand Others\n\nThe State.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nSingh, Massa Singh, Charan Singh and Swaran Singh are proved to have actually murdered both Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh.\n\nThis fact is further proved from subsequent events as deposed by P.W. 8 Bahadur Singh and P.W. 9 Gian Singh and P. W. 11 Bhagwan Singh. These witnesses had witnessed the various recoveries in this case which were made at the instance of all the accused.\"\n\nThe learned Judges of the High 03urt, though they repelled most of the criticisms levelled against the witnesses, ultimately came to the conclusion that \"in all the circumstances (of the case) it would be proper not to rely upon the oral evidence implicating particular accused ' unJess there is some circumstantial evidence to support it\".\n\nHaving laid down this standard, they examined the circumstancial evidence against each of the accused persons and upheld the conv>iction of the three appellants on the ground that the circumstantial evidence, to which reference has been made, was sufficient corrobbration of the oral evidence.\n\nThe case of the appellants was argued at great length by Mr. Sethi, who appeared for them, and everything that could possibly be said in their favour was urged by him with great force and clarity. Proceedings, however, upon the principles laid down by this court, circumscribing the scope of a criminal appeal after the case has been sifted by the trial court, and the High Court, it seems to us that the question involved in the present appeal is a short and simple one. According to our reading of the judgment of the High Court, the learned Judges, who dealt with the case, did not condemn the oral evidence outright, but, as a matter of prudence and caution, they decided not to convict an accused person unless there were some circumstances to lend support to the evidence of the eye-witnesses with regard to him.\n\nIt is quite clear on reading the judgment that the corroboration which the learned judges required to satisfy themselves was not that kind of corroboration which one requires in the case of the evidence of an approver or an accomplice,\n\nbut corroboration by some circumstances which would lend assurance to the evidence before them and satisfy them that the particular accused persons were really concerned in the murder of the deceased.\n\nJudged by this standard, which it was open to them to prescribe, it seems to us that the case of each of -the appellants clearly fell within the rule which they had laid down\n\nfor their own guidance.\n\nThe comment of the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to the blood-stained pyjama which was recovered from Massa Singh was, firstly, that it was not possible to gather from the evidence the extent of the blood stains, and secondly that it would be highly improbabk that this accused person would be so reckless as to continue to wear a blood stained pyjama after having perpetrated the crime. This criticism has been considered by the courts below, and it does not appear to us to be of such a nature as to affect the conclusion arrived at by them.\n\nAs to the recovery of blood-stained weapons at the instance 'Of Lachhman Singh, it was urged that the entire evidence with regard to this recovery should be discarded, as the police investigation in the case was not a straightforward one but was conducted in such a way as to raise suspicion that the police were deliberately trying to create some evidence of recovery against each of the accused persons. It is sufficient to say that it is not the function of this court to reassess evi- <lence and an argument on a point of fact which did not prevail with the courts below cannot avail the appellants in this court. The comment against the 'discoveries made at \\the instance of Swaran Singh was that they are not admissible in evidence under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides-\n\n\"When any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information whether it amounts to a 'COnfession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.\"\n\nLachman Singn\n\nand Others\n\nThe State.\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\nLachman Singh and Others v.\n\nThe State.\n\nFaz/ Ali/.\n\nThe main facts which it is necessary to tate to understand the argument on this point may be summed up as follows:-\n\nAccording to the prosecution, all the three accused, namely, Katha Singh, Massa Singh and Swaran Singh, were interrogated by the police on the morning of the 19th December, 1948, and they made certain statements which were duly recorded by the police. In these statements, it was disclosed that the dead bodies were thrown in the Sakinala. Thereafter, the police party with the threeaccused went to Sakinala where each of them pointed out a place where different parts of the dead bodies were discovered.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants cited a number of rulings in which section 27 bas been construed to mean that it is only the information which is first given that is admissible . and once a fact bas been discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence, it cannot be said to be a re-discovered in consequence of information received from another accused person. It was urged before us that the prosecution was bound to adduce evidence to prove as to which of the three a£Cused gave the information first. The head constable,· who recorded the statements of the three accused has not stated which of them gave the information first to him, but Bahadur Singh, one of the witnesses who attested the recovery memos, was specifically asked in cross-examination about it and stated : \"I cannot say from whom information was got first\". In the circumstances, it was contended that since it cannot be ascertained which of the accused first gave the information, the alleged discoveries cannot he proved against any of the accused persons. It seems to us that if the evidence adduced by the prosecution is found to be open to suspicion and it appears that the police have deliberately attributed similar confessional statements relating to facts discovered to different accused persons,. in order to create evidence against all of them, the case undoubtedly demands a most cautious approach.\n\nBut as to what should be the rule when there is clear and unimpeachable evidence as to independent and authentic statements of the nature referred to in section 27 of the Evidence Act, having been made by several accused persons either simultaneously or otherwise, all that we wish to say is that as at present advised we are inclined to think that some of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have perhaps gone farther than is warranted by the language of section 27, and it may be that on a suitable occasion in future thooe cases may have to be reviewed. For the purpose of this appeal, however, it is sufficient to state that even if the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants, which apparently found favour with the High Court, is correct, the discoveries made at the instance of Swaran Singh cannot be ruled out of consideration.\n\nIt may be that several of the accused gave information to the police that the dead bodies could be recovered in the Sakinala, which is a stream running over several miles, but such an indefinite information could not lead to any discovery unless the accused followed it up by conducting the police to the actual spot where parts of the two bodies were recovered.\n\nFrom the evidence of the head constable as well as that of Bahadur Singh, it is quite clear that Swaran Singh led the police via Salimpura to a particular spot on Sakinala, and it was at his imtance that blood-stained earth was recovered from a place outside the village and he also pointed out the trunk of the body of Darshan Singh. The learned judges of the High Court were satisfied, as appears from their judgment, that his was \"the initial pointing out\" and tl1erefore the case was covered even by the rule which, according to the counsel for the appellants_, is the rule to be applied in the present case.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants poinred out that the doctor who performed the post-mortem examination of the corpses, found partially digested rice in the stomach of the two deceased persons, and he\n\n19\"2\n\nLachman Singh\n\nand Others\n\nThe States.\n\nFaz/ Ali/.\n\nLackman Singh\n\nand Ot'1er1\n\nTlie State,\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nurged that from this it would be inferred that the occurrence must have taken place sometime at night after the deceased persons had taken their evening meals together. This argument again raises a question of fact which the High Court has not omitted to consider.\n\nIt may however be stated that a reference to books on medical jurisprudence shows that there are many factors affecting one's digestion, and cases were cited before us in which rise was not fully digested even though considerable time had elapsed since the last meal was taken. There are also no data before us to show when the two deceased persons took their last meal, and what article of food, if any, was taken by them along with rice. The finding of the doctor therefore does not necessarily affect the prosecution case as to the time of occurrence.\n\nIt was also contended that there being no charge under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the conviction of the appellants under section 302 read with section 149 could not have been altered by the High Court to one under section 302 read wlth section 34, upon the acquittal of the remaining accused persons. The facts of the case are however such that the accused could have been charged alternative.. ly, either under section 302 read with section 149 or under section 302 read with section 34.\n\nThe point has therefore no force.\n\nIn our opinion, there is no ground for interfering with the judgment of the courts below, and we accordingly disrujss this appeal and uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellants. We however wish to endorse the opinion of the High Court that having regard to the gruesome nature of the crime, the sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge was inappropriate and his reasons for imposing the lighter penalty are wholly inadequate.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. N. Sachthey.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.", "total_entities": 93, "entities": [{"text": "Ram Piari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 757, "end_char": 766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances, we prefer to leave the issue of custom undecided, and base our decision on the sole ground, which by itself is sufficient to conclude the appeal, that the plaintiff's marriage with Ram Piari has not been clearly established."}}, {"text": "S. D. Sekhri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1076, "end_char": 1088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: S. D. Sekhri."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1117, "end_char": 1127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1130, "end_char": 1154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1156, "end_char": 1165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1187, "end_char": 1202, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1231, "end_char": 1238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1371, "end_char": 1378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lachma11 Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1745, "end_char": 1759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachma11 Singh\n\nand Others\n\nThe State.", "canonical_name": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1777, "end_char": 1782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachma11 Singh\n\nand Others\n\nThe State."}}, {"text": "sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1950, "end_char": 1957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3020, "end_char": 3027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3209, "end_char": 3216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Simla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3422, "end_char": 3455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order dated 29th J uni:, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Simla (Weston C.J. and Khosla J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Weston C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3457, "end_char": 3468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order dated 29th J uni:, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Simla (Weston C.J. and Khosla J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Khosla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3473, "end_char": 3479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order dated 29th J uni:, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Simla (Weston C.J. and Khosla J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "fai Gopal Sethi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3686, "end_char": 3701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fai Gopal Sethi (R. L. Kohli, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. L. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3703, "end_char": 3714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fai Gopal Sethi (R. L. Kohli, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3747, "end_char": 3758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh for the State."}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge at Amritsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3898, "end_char": 3935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "oo\n\nFAzL Au J.-The three appellants were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge at Amritsar and found guilty of having murdered two persons named Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh and sentenced to transportation for life."}}, {"text": "Darshan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3990, "end_char": 4003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "oo\n\nFAzL Au J.-The three appellants were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge at Amritsar and found guilty of having murdered two persons named Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh and sentenced to transportation for life."}}, {"text": "Achhar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4008, "end_char": 4020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "oo\n\nFAzL Au J.-The three appellants were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge at Amritsar and found guilty of having murdered two persons named Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh and sentenced to transportation for life."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4067, "end_char": 4087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Punjab upheld their\n\n;..- ·-\n\n' ===t >\n\nconviction and sentence and granted them a certificate under article 134( 1) ( c) of the Constitution that the case 1s a fit one for appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "article 134( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4182, "end_char": 4197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16th December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4370, "end_char": 4389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of 16th December, 1948, a little before sunset, Achhar Singh, one of the murdered persons, went to the house of one Inder Singh in village Dalam for getting paddy husked."}}, {"text": "Inder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4483, "end_char": 4494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of 16th December, 1948, a little before sunset, Achhar Singh, one of the murdered persons, went to the house of one Inder Singh in village Dalam for getting paddy husked."}}, {"text": "Dalam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of 16th December, 1948, a little before sunset, Achhar Singh, one of the murdered persons, went to the house of one Inder Singh in village Dalam for getting paddy husked."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhar Singh's brother, Darshan Singh, who was working as a driver at Amritsar, came to Dalam from Amritsar the same evening, and, on coming, to know from his father that Achhar Singh had gone to Inder Singh's house, he also went there."}}, {"text": "Saleempura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5214, "end_char": 5224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the murder, the appellants and their companions tied the two dead bodies in two kheses (wrappers) and took them to village Saleempura where two other persons, named Ajaib Singh and Banta Singh, joined them, and the dead bodies after being dismembered were thrown into a stream known as Sakinala at a place about five miles from village Dalam."}}, {"text": "Ajaib Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the murder, the appellants and their companions tied the two dead bodies in two kheses (wrappers) and took them to village Saleempura where two other persons, named Ajaib Singh and Banta Singh, joined them, and the dead bodies after being dismembered were thrown into a stream known as Sakinala at a place about five miles from village Dalam."}}, {"text": "Banta Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5272, "end_char": 5283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the murder, the appellants and their companions tied the two dead bodies in two kheses (wrappers) and took them to village Saleempura where two other persons, named Ajaib Singh and Banta Singh, joined them, and the dead bodies after being dismembered were thrown into a stream known as Sakinala at a place about five miles from village Dalam.", "canonical_name": "Banta Singh"}}, {"text": "Bela Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5435, "end_char": 5445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bela Singh, father of the deceased persons, who was one of the persons who claiw; to have witnessed the occurrence, did not leave the village at night on account of fear, but he started about two hours before sunrise on the next morning and lodged the first information report at 10 A.M. at the nearest police station."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5993, "end_char": 6004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6015, "end_char": 6026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6037, "end_char": 6048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6059, "end_char": 6070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6086, "end_char": 6096, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6164, "end_char": 6175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6186, "end_char": 6197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lachman Sing/", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6241, "end_char": 6254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge who tried\n\nLachman Sing/,\n\nand Others\n\nThe State.", "canonical_name": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6409, "end_char": 6420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6431, "end_char": 6442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6450, "end_char": 6460, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6539, "end_char": 6550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6664, "end_char": 6681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the Punjab High Court upheld the conviction of th~ present appellants and acquitted the remaining three persons."}}, {"text": "Natha Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6945, "end_char": 6956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears, that in June, 1947, Natha Singh, father of the third appellant, Swaran Singh, was murdered, and Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh, the two milrdered persons in the case before us, and their third brother, Sulakhan Singh, were charged with the murder of that person.", "canonical_name": "Banta Singh"}}, {"text": "Swaran Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6989, "end_char": 7001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears, that in June, 1947, Natha Singh, father of the third appellant, Swaran Singh, was murdered, and Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh, the two milrdered persons in the case before us, and their third brother, Sulakhan Singh, were charged with the murder of that person.", "canonical_name": "Swaran Singh"}}, {"text": "Sulakhan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears, that in June, 1947, Natha Singh, father of the third appellant, Swaran Singh, was murdered, and Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh, the two milrdered persons in the case before us, and their third brother, Sulakhan Singh, were charged with the murder of that person."}}, {"text": "Bela Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8513, "end_char": 8523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The direct evidence consists\n\noif the testimony of four eye-witnesses, namely, Bela Singh, father of the deceased, who claims to have gone to the scene of occurrence on hearing an outcry and to have witnessed the murderous assault on his sons ; Inder Singh and his wife, Mst."}}, {"text": "Taro", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8710, "end_char": 8714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taro, to whom the murdered persons had gone for getting paddy husked and who lived in a house adjoining the lane where the murder took place ; and Gurcharan Singh, a resident of a different village, who states that he saw the occurrence when he was going towards village Dhadar on a cycle."}}, {"text": "Gurcharan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8857, "end_char": 8872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taro, to whom the murdered persons had gone for getting paddy husked and who lived in a house adjoining the lane where the murder took place ; and Gurcharan Singh, a resident of a different village, who states that he saw the occurrence when he was going towards village Dhadar on a cycle."}}, {"text": "Dhadar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8981, "end_char": 8987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taro, to whom the murdered persons had gone for getting paddy husked and who lived in a house adjoining the lane where the murder took place ; and Gurcharan Singh, a resident of a different village, who states that he saw the occurrence when he was going towards village Dhadar on a cycle."}}, {"text": "Massa Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9145, "end_char": 9156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstantial evidence in the case, on which the High Court has relied, may be briefly summarised as follows :- ( 1) The second appellant, Massa Singh, who was arrested on the 18th December, 1948, was wearing a pyjama stained with human blood.", "canonical_name": "Massa Singh"}}, {"text": "18th December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9182, "end_char": 9201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstantial evidence in the case, on which the High Court has relied, may be briefly summarised as follows :- ( 1) The second appellant, Massa Singh, who was arrested on the 18th December, 1948, was wearing a pyjama stained with human blood."}}, {"text": "Swaran Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9504, "end_char": 9516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Swaran Singh pointed out a spot on the way to Sakinala, where the two dead bodies were placed for a short time while they were being taken to Sakinala, and the police scrapped blood-stained earth from that spot.", "canonical_name": "Swaran Singh"}}, {"text": "Sakinala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9550, "end_char": 9558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Swaran Singh pointed out a spot on the way to Sakinala, where the two dead bodies were placed for a short time while they were being taken to Sakinala, and the police scrapped blood-stained earth from that spot."}}, {"text": "Lachhman Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9852, "end_char": 9866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Lachhman Singh, who was arrested on the 28th December, 1948, pointed out a dilapidated khola near Sakinala where 3 spears, one kirpan and a datar, all stained with human blood, were recovered."}}, {"text": "28th December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9892, "end_char": 9911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Lachhman Singh, who was arrested on the 28th December, 1948, pointed out a dilapidated khola near Sakinala where 3 spears, one kirpan and a datar, all stained with human blood, were recovered."}}, {"text": "Lachhman Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10354, "end_char": 10368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sessions Judge, who heard the evidence, seems to have been impressed by the evidence of the eye-witnesses, and he has summed up his conclusion in these words:-\n\n\"This evidence was so consistent, so reliable, and of such nature that in my opinion it is definitely established that the five accmed Lachhman Singh, Katha\n\nLachman Singh\n\nand Others\n\nTh r: Sta tr:.", "canonical_name": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Katha\n\nLachman Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10370, "end_char": 10390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sessions Judge, who heard the evidence, seems to have been impressed by the evidence of the eye-witnesses, and he has summed up his conclusion in these words:-\n\n\"This evidence was so consistent, so reliable, and of such nature that in my opinion it is definitely established that the five accmed Lachhman Singh, Katha\n\nLachman Singh\n\nand Others\n\nTh r: Sta tr:."}}, {"text": "Lachman Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10432, "end_char": 10445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali/.\n\nLachman Singh\n\nand Others\n\nThe State.", "canonical_name": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10471, "end_char": 10479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nSingh, Massa Singh, Charan Singh and Swaran Singh are proved to have actually murdered both Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh."}}, {"text": "Massa Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10491, "end_char": 10502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nSingh, Massa Singh, Charan Singh and Swaran Singh are proved to have actually murdered both Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh.", "canonical_name": "Massa Singh"}}, {"text": "Charan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10504, "end_char": 10516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nSingh, Massa Singh, Charan Singh and Swaran Singh are proved to have actually murdered both Darshan Singh and Achhar Singh."}}, {"text": "Bahadur Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10681, "end_char": 10694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This fact is further proved from subsequent events as deposed by P.W. 8 Bahadur Singh and P.W. 9 Gian Singh and P. W. 11 Bhagwan Singh."}}, {"text": "Gian Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10706, "end_char": 10716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This fact is further proved from subsequent events as deposed by P.W. 8 Bahadur Singh and P.W. 9 Gian Singh and P. W. 11 Bhagwan Singh."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This fact is further proved from subsequent events as deposed by P.W. 8 Bahadur Singh and P.W. 9 Gian Singh and P. W. 11 Bhagwan Singh."}}, {"text": "Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11563, "end_char": 11568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the appellants was argued at great length by Mr. Sethi, who appeared for them, and everything that could possibly be said in their favour was urged by him with great force and clarity."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14268, "end_char": 14278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14286, "end_char": 14305, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lachman Singn", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14621, "end_char": 14634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lachman Singn\n\nand Others\n\nThe State.", "canonical_name": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Lachman Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14672, "end_char": 14685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali/.\n\nLachman Singh and Others v.\n\nThe State.", "canonical_name": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Katha Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14903, "end_char": 14914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali/.\n\nThe main facts which it is necessary to tate to understand the argument on this point may be summed up as follows:-\n\nAccording to the prosecution, all the three accused, namely, Katha Singh, Massa Singh and Swaran Singh, were interrogated by the police on the morning of the 19th December, 1948, and they made certain statements which were duly recorded by the police.", "canonical_name": "Banta Singh"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15422, "end_char": 15432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bahadur Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16035, "end_char": 16048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The head constable,· who recorded the statements of the three accused has not stated which of them gave the information first to him, but Bahadur Singh, one of the witnesses who attested the recovery memos, was specifically asked in cross-examination about it and stated : \"I cannot say from whom information was got first\"."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16929, "end_char": 16939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17260, "end_char": 17270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Salimpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18143, "end_char": 18152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the evidence of the head constable as well as that of Bahadur Singh, it is quite clear that Swaran Singh led the police via Salimpura to a particular spot on Sakinala, and it was at his imtance that blood-stained earth was recovered from a place outside the village and he also pointed out the trunk of the body of Darshan Singh."}}, {"text": "Lackman Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18893, "end_char": 18906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali/.\n\nLackman Singh\n\nand Ot'1er1\n\nTlie State,\n\nFazl Ali].", "canonical_name": "LACHMAN SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19823, "end_char": 19834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19845, "end_char": 19855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19863, "end_char": 19880, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19921, "end_char": 19932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19943, "end_char": 19954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20014, "end_char": 20025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20036, "end_char": 20046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20212, "end_char": 20223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20234, "end_char": 20245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20255, "end_char": 20266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20277, "end_char": 20287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20816, "end_char": 20830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. N. Sachthey."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20859, "end_char": 20870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_849_869_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nNAR HARi SASTRI AND OTHERS\n\nSHRI BADRINATH TEMPLE COMMITTEE.\n\n[SAIYAD FAZL ALI J., MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.]\n\nHindu law-Religious Endowments-Right to worship-Right of Pandas to accompany worshippers to temple-Bye-law of temple committee to prohibit taking of gifts within temple precincts -Validity-Badrinath Temple Act, 1939, ss. 3, 4.\n\nThe right of the Deoprayagi Pandas to enter the Badrinath Temple along with their Yajmans is not a precarious or permissive right depending for its existence on the arbitrary discretion of the temple authorities; it is a legal right in the true sense of the expression, but it can be exercised only subject to the restrictions which the temple committee may impose in good faith for maintenance of order and decorum within the temple and for ensuring proper performance of customary worship.\n\nThere is nothing in the Badrinath Temple Act, 1939, which vests in the temple committee or the idol, gifts made to Pandas within the precincts of the temple.\n\nBut bye-law (8) of the Puja Bye-laws framed by the temple committee which forbids the acceptance of gifts by any person within the precincts of the temple unless he comes within the category of persons specifically authorised by the committee to receive the same is a valid bye-law, which it was quite competent for the committee to enact under the terms of clauses ( m) and ( n) of sec. 25 of the Act and in view of this bye-law the Pandas are not entitled to a declaration by the Court that they have a right to take, within the precincts of the temple, whatever they receive as gifts at the time of worship.\n\nC1VIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 105 of 1951.\n\nOn appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 22nd November, 1946, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Verma C.J. and Mathur J.) in First Appeal :t)To. 310 of 1941 arising out of judgment and decree dated the 4th March, 1941, of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge of Pauri, Garhwal, in Original Suit No. 1 of 1934.\n\nK. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar (R. C. Ghatak and N. C. Sen, with him) for the appellants. _..,.\n\nS. K. Dar (D. D. Unival, with him) for the respondent.\n\nMay 9.\n\nNar Hari Sastri\n\nand Others\n\nv; Shri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee.\n\nM uk heriea /.\n\n1952. May 9. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-The sanctity which orthodox Hindu thought and ; Eeeling attribute to 1visiting of sacred places is nowhere better illustrated than in the vast concourse of pilgrims, who are attracted every year, from all parts of India, to the mountain shrines at Badrinath, situated, high up in the Himalayas, in the District of Garhwal.\n\nThe place to which the appellation od' 'Puri' is given, contains a number of temples but the principal temple is the one where the idol Badrinath along with some other subsidiary idols is in.tailed. This main temple is divided into three portions or apartments, and to the innermost portion which is considered to be the holiest and where the deities are located, no pilgrim is allowed access.\n\nThe pilgrims gather in the middle room; they have 'darshan' or look at the diety from this place and there also they make their offerings and perform other . rites of individual worship.\n\nThe last room is an outer apartment which is used as a sort of waiting place for the worshippers.\n\nOutside the temple and at a short distance from it, there is a hot spring known as Tapta Kundu where the worshippers take ceremonial bath before they enter into the temple and to the Tapta Kundu they come back again after the ceremonies are over.\n\nThe temple at Badrinath is an ancient institution and is admittedly a public place of worship for the Hindus.\n\nThe chief priest or ministrant of the temple is known by the name of 'Rawal' who originally looked after both the spiritual and temporal affairs of the idol subject to certain rights of supervision and control cxercisab'.le by the Tehri Durbar which, however, were not very clearly defined.\n\nIt appears that there was a scheme for the management of the temple framed by the Commissioner of Kumaun division, within whose jurisdiction Badrinath is situated, some time in the year 1899. Under this scheme, 'Rawal' was to be the sole\n\ntrustee of the Badrinath temple and its properties, and the entire management was entrusted to him subject to his keeping accounts, which he had to submit for approval by the Tehri Durbar, and making arrangements for the disposal and safe custody of cash receipts and other non-perishable valuables. This scheme apparently did not work well and led to constant friction between the 'Rawal' on the one hand and the Tehri Durbar on the other.\n\nThis unsatisfactory state of affairs led to public agitation and demand for reforms, and in 1939, the U.P. Legislature passed the Sri Badrinath Temple Act, the object of which was to remove the chief defects in the existing system of management. The Act restricts the 'Rawal' to his priestly duties and the secular management is placed in the hands of a small committee, the members of which are partly elected and partly nominated, powers being reserved to the Government to take steps against the committee itself, if it is found guilty of mismanagement. The Act preserves the traditional control of the Tehri Durbar.\n\n_ The appellants before us, who were the plaintiffs in the trial Court, claim to be Pandas associated with the Badrinath temple. The Pandas are Brahmans belonging to the priestly class and are found to exist in almost all important public places of worship in India. They are not temple pr'iests in the proper sense of the expression and have nothing to do with the regular worship of the idol which is carried on by the Shebayat, the High Priest or the manager as the case may be. Their chief duty consists in acting as guides or escorts of the pilgrims, and taking them to various places of worship acquainting them at the same time with detailed informations regarding the reputed sanctity of each.\n\nThey look after the comforts of the pilgrims and make arrangements for their boarding and lodging and also act as Tirtha Purohits, in which capacity they assist the pilgrims in the performance of various acts of individual worship as distinguished from the general worship which is conducted by or on behalf of the temple authorities.\n\nN ar H ari Sastri and Others\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nN ar H ari Sastri and Others\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMukheriea /.\n\nIt 1s admitted that there are several classes of Pandas in Badrinath and the Deoprayagi Pandas to which category the plaintiffs belong get normally the charge of all the pilgrims that come from the plains, whereas the Pandas of the 'Dimn' class act as attendants on all hill people. The people coming to Badrinath from the plains generally follow the pilgrim's route from Hardwar to Badrinath and in this route, at a distance of about 58 miles from Hardwar, stands the place known as Deoprayag where all the Deoprayagi Pandas reside.\n\nIt is in the light of these few introductory facts that we propose to follow the history of this litigation and deal with the points in controversy that it has given •- rise to.\n\nThe suit was commenced by the appellants iJn the Court of the Senior Civil Judge of Garhwal on 16th April, 1934, and the only defendant in the suit, as it was filed originally, was the 'Rawal' who was at that time in entire charge of the Badrinath Institution, both as Trustee and High Priest. The suit was a representative one and purported to be brought on behalf of all the Deoprayagi Pandas and permission of the Court under Order I, rule 8, of the Civil Procedure Code was duly taken. The allegations in the plaint in substance are that the plaintiffs who are a body of Brahman Purohits residing at Deoprayag and also at Badrinath have the right, by immemorial custom, to act as Pandas and 'Tirtha Purohits' of the pilgrims at Badrinath. t is said that in performance of their duties they meet the pilgrims at Hardwar and conduct them throughout the pilgrimage to different places of sanctity and finally to Badrinath itself. Besides looking to their creature comforts, they assit the pilgrims, while they stay at Badrin.ath, in having their ceremonial ablutions in the 'Tapta Kundu' and then conduct them into the precincts of the temple and assist them in having\n\n.. -\n\n'darshan' of the idols and making offerings to them.\n\nThe plaintiffs aver that because of the support that they lent to the transfer of the management of the temple from the 'Rawal' to the Tehri Durbar, the defendant 'Rawal' was displeased with them and in August 1933, wrongfully and without any just cause or excuse, obstructed and threatened to obstruct the plaintiffs from entering the precincts of the temple along with their Yajmans or clients and unlawfully restrained them from assisting the pilgrims in the usu:ll way at the time of 'darshan' and worship of the deities inside the temple. The reliefs. prayed for in the pliint after it was amended stand as follows:-\n\n( I) That a declaration be gran~ d .nat the plaintiffs are 1the Pandas of Badrinath .cmple and that they have a right to personally go into the precincts of the Badrinath temple at all times and on all occasions without obstruction when the said temple is open for doing 'darshan', worship etc.\n\n(2) That the plaintiffs have the right freely to go into the precincts of the said temple with their Yajmans or clients whenever it is open for assisting them in the matter of 'darshan' or worship of God Badrinarayan and other deities and in the matter of making offerings to them.\n\n(3) That the plaintiffs have the right to take within the precincts of the said temple whatever is put into their hands as gift by their clients at the time of worship etc.\n\n( 4) That a perpetual !IlJUnction be issued restraiBing the defendant 'Rawal' from interfering with the immemorial rights of the plaintiffs.\n\nThe defendant, in his written statement, admitted that the Pandas did sometimes accompany rich pilgrims as their guides and receive presents from them for the services they rendered. It was also admitted that the plaintiffs in their individual capacity as Hindus had the right to enter the temple of Badrinath for purposes of worship.\n\nIt was asserted, however,\n\n6-9 S.C. India/71\n\nNar Hari Sastri ·\n\nand Others\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMukheriea /.\n\nNar Hari Sastri\n\nand Others\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Commi'ttee.\n\nMuk_herjea /.\n\nthat it was neither necessary nor desirable that the plaintiffs should be allowed to accompany their Yajmans or clients into the temple, as the defendant h'imself made adequate arrangements for 'darshan' and worship by the pilgrims; and he, as the sole trustee and manager of the temple, had the right to regulate entry into . the temple so that over-crowding might be avoided and order maintained inside it. lt was further pleaded that the suit of the plaintiffs was barred by res judicata and the law of limitation.\n\nOn these pleadings, two issues of a preliminary nature were framed by the Civil Judge, one of them being, whether the plaintiffs' suit was barred by res judicata. This issue was decided against the plaintiff and the Civil Judge dismissed the suit on 18-9-1934 holding that the suit was barred by the rule of res judicata, as an earlier suit brought by five of the Deoprayagi Pandas and claiming identical reliefs against the 'Rawal' was dismissed by the Commissioner of the Kumaun Division in the year\n\n1896. Against this order of dismissa~, an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to the High Court of Allahabad and a Division Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated 23rd May, 1938, reversed the decision of the Civil Judge on this preliminary point and remanded the case for hearing of the suit on its merits.\n\nThe case then went back before the Civil Judge and while it was still pending, the .Sri Badrinath Temple Act was passed. A temple committee being formed in accordance with the provisions of this Act the said committee through its Secretary, was impleaded as Defendant No. 2 in the suit. The committee filed a fresh written sratement in which certain additional grounds were taken.\n\nIt was contended primarily that the suit as framed, was not maintainable by reason ·. of the provisions of : Sri Badrinath Temple Act of 1939, whic\\l abrogated all previous rights and customs and vested the ownership of the temple and its endowments in the temple committee.\n\nIt was asserted, further, that all gifts made within the precincts of the temple would vest in the temple\n\n....J.\n\ncommi.ittee under section 3(b) of the Act and that the 1952 committee had the absolute right to regulate entry of Nar Hari Sastri. persons inside the temple. and Others\n\nA number of issues were framed after this written statement was filed, and on hearing the evidence adduced by the parties, the Civil Judge disposed of the suit by his judgment dated 4th March, 1941.\n\nThe suit was decreed in part and the plaintiffs were 'given a declaration in their favour on one of the points in an attenuated and restricted form. Besides certain pleas in bar which were raised by the defendants in their written statements and in regard to which the trial judge's decision was in favour of the plaintiffs, the substantial controversy between the parties centred round the two following points :\n\n(1) Whether the Deoprayagi Pandas could accompany their Y ajmans or clients inside the temple and assst them in the 'd'.arsihan' and worship of the deities?\n\n(2) Whether the Pandas would have the right to accept within. the precincts of the temple whatever was paid by the pilgrims as gifts or presents to them and not to the temple?\n\nAs regards the first point, the learned Civil Judge reviewed the entire evidence relating to the practice of admitting the Pandas along with their Yajmans inside the temple, as it obtained from very early times down to the date of the institution of the suit. It appears that\n\nin 1892 certain rules were framed by the then 'Rawal' for regulation •of pilgrims in the Badrinath temple, and to these rules the Commisioner of Kumaun Division accorded bis sanction on 4th July, 1892. One of these rules, namely Rule (3), expressly laid down that \"at the time of 'darshan' by the pilgrims, no other persons and Pandas shall be allowed to go inside the temple along with the pilgrims\". On 22nd October, 1894, an application was filed before the Commissioner of Kumaun Division by some residents of Deoprayag complaining\n\nof unjust prohi; bition from entering the temple by the new manager and it was prayed that directions might\n\nShri Badrinath.\n\nTemple Committee.\n\nMukheriea f.\n\nNar Hari Sastri\n\nand Others\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nbe given to the said Manager to desist from encroaching upon the time-l1onoured rights of the Pandas. On 28th October, 1894, the Commissioner ordered that a copy of the petition might be sent to the Manager for report and in the body of the order he recorded his\n\nopinion that \"the duty of the Pandas consists normally in escorting the pilgrims to the temple precincts.\n\nTheir entering the temple can be permitted when they did so as pilgrims.\" The petiti:On was eventually rejected, and on 19th August, 1895, five Deoprayagi Pandas filed a suit in the Court of the Deputy Collector, Garhwal, who was invested with the powers of a Civil Court, praying for a declaration of their right to go inside the temple with their Yajmans which the 'Rawal' was not willing to allow unless he gave special permission. The trial cqurt allowed the plaintiffs' prayer but, on appeal, the judgment was reversed and the suit was dismissed. This order of dismissal was affirmed on Second Appeal by the Commissfoner of Kumaun Division who had the powers of a High Court in regard to this area, by his order dated 9th March,\n\n1896. This is the earli1er decision on the strength of which the plea of res judicata was taken by the defendant._. in the present suit. According to the learned\n\nC1vil Judge, after the.rules as mentioned above were framed in 1892 and the judgment of the Commis--\n\nsioner, Kumaun Division, in the Civil Suit was given in 1896, it was the 'Rawa:.1' who decided whether or not he would give permission to any particular Panda to go inside the temple as an escon of his Yajmans and practice was almost uniform on th.is point down to the year 1903. The same practice prevailed, according to the learned Judge, from 1903 to 1920. From 1921, however, the practice became lax to a great extent and from the evidence of respectable witnesses examined on . 'behalf of the plaintiffs, the learned Judge was of opinion that in many cases the Pandas were able to go inside the temple without any let ' or hindrance and without seeking any express. permission from the 'Rawal'~ A definite challenge to the rights of the Pandas occurred agin in. 1933 which led\n\n.. ..\n\n.\\.....\n\n.-~' -\n\nto the institution of the present suit.\n\nAfter reviewing this eviidence, the learned Civil Judge discussed the provisions of the Shri Badrinath Temple Act bearing on this point and summed up his conclusions as follows:-\n\n\"In my view under the scheme of the Shri Badrinath Act, the Pandas or pilgrims have no absofote right to go inside the temple, regardless of the conditions imposed by the Committee about entry into the temple, but ordinarily if the entry of the pilgrims or Pandas is in accordance with the rules or bye-laws framed by the Committee the pilgrims can always go inside accompanied by their Pandas, who are entitled as devout Hindus to go inside the temple, and perform worship there, and can assist their Yajmans also. In other words, there is no right of the plaintiffs which has to be recognised, and can be recognised, on the grounds of custom, usage, or otherwise, that they can without any let or hindrance and regardless of the conditions imposed by the Committee, enter the temple with the pilgrims whenever they like. Like other pilgrims, and persons who are all subject to the control of the conditions that may be imposed by the Committee, the Deoprayagi Pandas can also enter the temple, perform worship there, and even help their Yajmans wh01 happen to be inside the temple. To lay down an absolute prohibition against them would not be in accordance wth the provisions of Shri Badrinath Temple Act, and similarly to recognise. that they have an absolute right to enter the temple with the pilgrims, would also nullify a number of prov1s10ns in the Shri Badrinath Temple Act. Issue No. 2 rs decided accordingly in the negative, but subject to . recognition of the conditional right of the plaintiffs to accompany tlieir pilgrims and help them in the 'darshan', as mentioned above subject to the control of the Committee.\"\n\n. In spite of this finding, which is certainly not very definite the Court dismissed in toto - the plaintiffs' prayer No. 2 in the plaint, the reason given being tliat .\n\nNar Hari Sastri\n\nand Others ...\n\nShri Badrinath\n\nTemple\n\nCommitte~.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nN ar H ari Sastri and Others v.\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nno absolute right as was claimed by the plaintiffs was established on the footing of a custom or otherwise.\n\nAs regards the other point, the learned Judge was of opinion that although a Panda had no absolute right to go inside the temple along with his clients, yet if the committee or the temple authorities allowed him to do so, there was nothing in law or custom which could preven, t him from accepting a gift which any pilgrim might desire to make in his favour. The result was that the learned Judge gave the plaintiffs a declaration in the following terms :-\n\n\"The plaintiffs' suit is decreed for a declaration that they have a right to accept within the precincts of the temple whatever was put into their hands as gifts (Dan or Dakshina or Shankalp) by the pilgrims, for the benefit of the plaintiffs and not the temple, and to retain such gifts for their personal benefit. This right is however subject to the administrative control of the temple committee so far as the maintenance of order and decency and the enforcement of proper behaviour within the temple are concerned. The exercise of this right will further be restricted by any special or general ,, condit10ns imposed by the Committee of management under any bye-law' framedd by hit in a 1 ccordance with . the provisions of Shri Ba rinat Temp e Act or any other special law that may hereafter be applicable to the temple.\"\n\nThe rest of the plaintiffs' claim was di, smissed.\n\nAgainst this judgment, the plaintiffs took an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad. The defendants also ~- preferred cross-objections challenging the propriety of that part of the trial Court's decree which was in favour of the plaintiffs. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of. Varma\n\nC. J. and Mathur J. and, by their judgment dated 22nd November, 1946, the learned Judges dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal and allowed the cross objections filed by the defendants. Thus, the decision resulted in a total \"'-'\"\"- dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit. It is from this judgment that the present appeal has come before us.\n\n- Ji,\n\nIt was held by the High Court that the plaintiffs failed miserably to esta81ish that there was any immemorial usage in existence under which they were entitled to accompany the pilgrims, as of right, inside the precincts of the temple.\n\nIt was held also that even if any such usage existed, that must be deemed to have been abrogated by the provisions of Shri Badrinath Temple Act, and reference was made in this connection to section 25 (1) (m) of the Act, which empowers the temple committee tc; frame bye-laws not inconsistent with the provision~ of the: Act for the \"maintenance of order inside the temple and regulating the entry of persons therein.\"\n\nIt is to be noted that after the judgment of the trial court was delivered and the appeal came up for hearing before the High Court, the Badrinath Temple Committee passed a resolution which was approved of by the Governor of the U.P. State, and was to the following effect:-\n\n\"Subject to the provision of bye-laws and any direction given by the committee, the Pandas can accompany their Yajmans within the temple.\"\n\nThis resolution was communicated to the plaintiffs by the 2nd defendant by a letter dated 29th May, 1942, and undoubtedly after passing of this resolution, tht: grievance of the plaintiffs in regard to temple entry disappeared to a large extent. The H1gh Court however, refused to give the plaintiffs a declaration of their right in this respect even in a limited form as, jn its opinion, the plaintiffs could not claim such declaration as a matter of right. The view taken by the High Court seems to be that it is entirely for the committee to decide, whether the Pandas should be allowed to enter the temple at all, and if so, to what extent and under what conditions.\n\nOn the 1other question irdating to ', the right of the plaintiffs to accept gifts made in their favour by the pilgrims within the precincts of the temple, it was held by the High Court that under section 3(b) of the Shri Badrinath Temple Act, such gifts would become part of the endownment, and the donees would be\n\nNar Hari Sastri\n\nand Others v.\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\n1952 Nar Hari SOstri\n\nand Others\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Com111; ttcc;\n\nMuk_herjea /.\n\nincapable of laying any claim to the same. It was, further, held that bye-law (8) of the Puja Bye-laws , framed by the temple committee which prevents a person other. than those whose rights have been spec\\- fically recognised by the Committee, from receiving\n\nany gifts within the precincts of the temple, was quite a legitimate provision the making of which was within the rule-making authority of the committee of management. It was held, therefore, that in view of this rule, the plaintiffs' , claim, in regard to -receiving of gifts within the temple was not maintainable in law.\n\nMr. Iyengar, appearing in support of the appeal before us, has assailed the propriety of the High Court's decision on both these points.\n\nThe first point that requires consideration is whether the plaintiffs can, on the facts admitted and found in this case, claim a declaration of their right to accompany the Y ajmans or clients inside the Badrinath temple and assist them in having 'darshan' of the deities and in performing such ceremonies as individual worshippers may perform. Mr. Dar, who appears on behalf of the respondents, draws our attention to the fact that this right has practically been conceded by the temple cammitJtee in their resolution passed in March, 1942, referred to , already.\n\nThe learned counsel has very fairly stated to us that he would have no objection if the plaintiffs are given a declaration of their rights in this respect in some suitable form as might safeguard their interest, without in any way trenching upon the rights of temple committee and thereby obviate all disputes in the future.\n\nIt seems to us that the approach of the court below\n\no -~ ~SfPect; of the case has not been quite proper, and, to avoid any possible misconception, we would desire to state succinctly what the correct legal position is. Once it is admitted, as in fact has been admitted in the present case, that the temple is a public place of worship of the Hindus, the right of entrance into the temple for purposes of 'darshan' or worship is a right\n\n...\n\nwhich flows from the nature of the institution itself, and for the acquisition of such righ~, no custom or immemorial usage need be asserted or proved.\n\nAs the Panda as well as his client are both Hindu worshippers, there can be nothing wrong in the one's accompanying the other inside the temple and subject to what we will s.tate presently, the fact that the pilgrim, being a stranger to the spot, takes the assistance of the Panda in the matter of 'darshan' or worship of the deities or that the Panda gets remuneration from his client for the services he renders, does. not in any way affect the legal rights of either of them.\n\nIn law, it makes no difference whether one performs the act of worship himself or i, s aided or guided by another in the performance of them. If the Pandas daim any special right which is not enjoyed ordinarily by members of the Hindu public, they would undoubtedly have to establish such rights on the basis of custom, usage or otherwise.\n\nThis right of entry into a public temple is, however, not an unregulated or unrestricted right. It is open to the trustees of a public temple to regulate the time of public visits and fix certain hours of the day during which alone members of the public would be allowed access to the shrine. The public may also be denied access to certain particularly sacred parts of the temple, e.g., the inner sanctuary or as it is said the 'Holy of Holies' where the deity is actually located. Quite apart from these, it is always competent to the temple authorities to make and enforce rules to ensure good order and decency of worship and present overcrowding in a temple.\n\nGood conduct or orderly behaviour .is always an obligatory condition of admission into a temple(1), and this principle has been accepted by and recognised in the Shri Badrinath Temple Act, section 25 of which provides for framing of bye-laws by the temple committee inter alia for maintenance of order inside the temple and regulating the entry of persons within it(2).\n\n(') Vide Kalidas fivram v. Gor Pa1jaram, I.L.R. 15 Born. p. 309; Thackersay v. Harbhum, I.L.R. 8 Born. p. 432.\n\n(2) Vide Section 25 (1) (rn).\n\nN ar H ari Sastri\n\nand Others\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMukheriea f.\n\nN ar H ari Sastri and Others\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMuk,_herjea /.\n\nThe true position, therefore, is that the plaintiffs' right of entering the temple along with their Yajmans. is not a precarious or a permissive right depending for its existence upon the arbitrary discretion of the\n\ntemple authorities; it is a legal right in the true sense of the expression but it can be exercised subject to the restrictions which the temple committee may impose in good faith for maintenance of order and decorum within the temple and for\" ensuring proper performance of customary worship.\n\nIn our opinion, the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration in this form.\n\nWe now come to the other point which is the real bone of contention between the parties to this appeal,. and the question for consideration is whether the plaint-·\n\niffs are entitled to a declaration that they have a right to take, within the precincts of the temple, whatever is put into their hands as gifts by their clients at the time of workship. The trial court,. as pointed out above, gave the plaintiffs a qualified declaration on this point, though the High Court rejected this claim altogether. Mr.\n\nIyengar has vehemently assailed the propriety of the grounds upon which the decisioi; i of the High Court rests, whereas Mr. Dar has contended inter alia that the claim of the plaintiffs under this head is wholly untenable in view of the provision of bye-law (8) of the Puja Bye-laws framed by the temple committee. ·\n\nIt may be stated at the outset that as the gift, if any, which a pilgrim might choose to make within the temple precincts is entirely a voluntary act on his part and as he could not be compelled to make a gift either in favour of the Pandas or anybody else, there could, strictly speaking, be no legal right in the plaintiffs t0< receive any gift from his client which can be declared by a court of law.\n\nThe plaintiffs do accept the position that the pilgrims are not bound to give anything to the Pandas by way of Daks hiina or sacrificial fee at the conclusion of the ceremonies in the temple ; but what they say is this that if the pilgrims choose tO< make any gift to them, the temple committee could:\n\n---/\n\nnot, in law, prevent the latter from accepting the same and treat such gifts as part of the temple property. It is argued that bye-law (8) of the Puja Bye-laws is illegal and ultra vires and cannot take away the legal right of the donee to the gifted property under the ordinary law which has not been and cannot be affected in any way by the provisioµs of the Sri Badrinath Temple Act.\n\nA number of respectable witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiffs do say that when they went on pilgrimage to Badrinath they made gifts to their Pandas inside the temple at the close of the ceremony of darshan and worship. But the evidence taken, even at its face value, does not establish that the practice of making gifts to Pandas within the temple is a general one or that the pilgrims regard it as an indi&- pensable part of the ceremony of worship; many .of the witnesses plainily admit that they do not remember to have made any gifts at a11 within the temple precincts and others say that they paid dakshina or sacrifieial fees to all the Brahmans who were found inside the temple at that time and not exclusively to their Pandas. It is also stated that suphal or final blessing is obtained from the Pandas by the pilgrims . after making presents to them at the place called Tapta Kundu where the hot spring Lies which is outside the temple.\n\nMr. Iyengar has drawn our attention to certain texts from the Kedar Kanda of Skanda Purana which describe the glory of the deity Badrinath, to show that it is a religious duty enjoined by the Hindu scriptures that a worshipper who goes to Badrikasram should make gifts to Brahmans after the diarshan of the idol is obtained and offerings are made to it. An English rendering of the passages relied upon by the learned counsel would read thus:-\n\n\"After having bathed in the Ganges, in the Narada Hrada (Kund) and others (Hradas), one (worshipper) shall bathe in the Vahni Tirth (Tapta Kunda) after performing the obligatory duties and with his mind\n\nNar Hari Sastriand Others v.\n\nShri Badrinatk\n\nTemple Committee.\n\nMuk_herjea I~\n\nNar Hari Sastri and Others\n\nv. .Shri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nkept under control, he shall go into the temple of Badrinath with his mind concentrated on Shri Hari.\n\nHe shall make ofl'erings to the . best of his capacity and with utmost devotion.\n\nThen he shall look at the All Pervading N arayana from crown to foot, and HERE make gifts tp Brahmans to the best of his capacity.\n\nThereafter, he shall do\n\nPRADAKSHINA (go-round) with the utni.ost devotion.\n\nThen he shall come back to the Tirthas (Vahni Tirtha etc.) and make gifts according to his , means\"(').\n\nIt cannot and is not disputed that according to orthodox Hindu ideas, gift to Brahmans is considered as a meritorious act and there are texts, to some of which Mr. Iyengar drew our attention, which extol the merits of such gifts when made at a sacred place or within a temple or on the banks of a holy river. It may be as Mr. Iyengar suggests that the idea of making gifts within the temple had its origin in the religious texts to which the learned counsel drew our attention.\n\nBut, the point that requires consideration in the present case is a difl'erent and much narrower one. The question is whether under the powers of making bye-laws which are conferred by the Sri Badrinath Temple Act upon the managing committee, the latter could niake a rule as they have done, by which all persons other than those whose rights are specifically recognised are disabled from receiving gifts. within the precincts of the temple.\n\nIt is perfectly 'true that under the general law, nobody can be prevented froin accepting a gift which another person may be inclined to make in his favour, and it is immaterial in such cases at what i:Jlace the gift is actually made.\n\nOne has to enquire, therefore, on what grounds the committee can interdict the taking' of any gifts within the temple precincts. The High Court seems to be of opinion-and this view is sought to be supported on behalf of the respondents before us-that the Sri Badrinath Temple Act itself has in express\n\n(!) Skanda Purana, Kedar Khand, Badri Mahatma, Chapter VI, Verses 46-49.\n\n1952 terms abrogated the rights of the donee in regard to a gift made to him within the temple and as such gifts come within the definition of \"endowment\" as given in Na; n1Ja; j1l:::\"\n\nthe Act the temple committee gets a controlling hand over them and can make any regulations in relation thereto. Reliance lis placed in this connection upon section 3 (b) of the Sri Badrinath Temple Act which lays down that the expression \"endowment\" in relation\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee.\n\nMukheriea /. to the Act \"means all property moveable or immoveable belonging to or given or endowed for the maintenance or improvement of, or additions to, or worship in the temple, or for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith and includes the idols installed therein, the premises of the said temple and gifts of property made to anyone within the precincts of the temple.\" The definition is undoubtedly couched in very wide language but it is to be noted that under section 4 of the Act which deals with the vesting of property, a gift does not vest in the temple at all unless it is made for the benefit of the temple or for the convenience, comfort or benefit of the pilgrims.\n\nIt is conceded by Mr. Dar that a gift intended for the personal benefit of the Pandas cannot vest in the temple and this is a quite in accordance with the existing principles of Hindu law.\n\nHe contends, however, that such gifts could not vest in the donee, as well, in accordance with the definition of \"endowment\" given in section 3 (b) of the Sri Badrinath Temple Act.\n\nIn other words, according to the interpretation which he would like to plit upon section 3 (b) of the Act, such gifts should be regarded as totally void after the passing of the Act and consequently title to the thing given would still remain in the donor even after the gift is made. This does not seem to us to be a sound view to take. If a legislation wants to take away the propnetary right which a person acquires under the ordinary law, it must express its intention in clear and unambiguous terms. We are unable to spell a)ly such intention out of the language used in section 3(b) of the Sri\n\nNar Hari Sastri\n\nand Others\n\nShri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nBadrinath Temple Act. It may be that the wording of this sub-section is defective and that there is an apparent conflict between the provision of this sub-section and that of section 4 of the Act. It is an arguable point whether the expression \"gifts of property made to any one\" should not be construed to mean gifts made to any one for the benefit of the temple or for other purposes as are specified in section 4. But it is not necessary for our purpose to express any opinion on that point in the present case. All that we desire to say is tl.!at there is nothing in the Sri Badrinath Temple Act which lays down that a gift made to any person inside the temple and intended for the benefit of that person shall not belong to him.\n\nBut, even if the gifts made within the temple and 'intended for the benefit of the donee personally cannot vest in the temple under section 4 of the Sri Badrinath Temple Act, the question still remains whether the committee in exercise of their powers to make bye-laws, can frame a rule that no such gifts should be allowed to be made within the temple and whatever gifts the pilgrims might choose to make in favour of any person which is unconnected w'ith offerings to the deity must be made outside the temple precincts.\n\nSection 25 of the Act empowers the committee to make bye-laws not inconsistent with the Act or the rules made thereunder or any other law for a variety of purposes which are enumerated in the different clauses of the section; and clauses ( m) and ( n) run as follows :\n\n(m) The maintenance of order within the temple or inside the temple and regulating the entry of persons therein; and\n\n(n) The performance of duties prescribed in section 23.\n\nSection 23 lays down the duties of. the committee and sub-section (9) prescribes it to be duty of the committee to do all such things as may be incidental and conducive to the efficient management of the .._, temple and endowments and the convenience of the\n\npilgrims. In our opinion, bye-law\n\n(8) of the Puja Bye-laws referred to above, which forbids the acceptance of the gifts by any person within the temple, unless he comes within the category of person specifically authorised by the committee to receive the same, is a perfectly legitimate bye-law which it was quite competent for the committee to enact under the terms of clauses (m) and (n) of section 25 referred to above.\n\nIt will be remembered that the religious duty to make gifts within the temple or at sacred places which is enjoined on Hindu worshippers by the texts relied upon by Mr. Iyengar has no particular reference to the Pandas who accompany the worshipper. The injunction is to make gifts in favour of Brahmans generally and the Pandas, because they are Brahmans and happen to be available at the spot, naturally become recipients of such gifts.\n\nIt is a thing too well known to require mention that in many of the Hindu temples of renown in India, the pilgrims after their worship is finished, or even before that, are literally beseiged by an army of mendicants including many Sadhus or ascetics, the begging Brahmans who abound in all sacred places, and even people who are associated with various duties in the temple itself.\n\nThe presence of a large number of such persons who certainly do not come inside the temple as worshippers is positively detrimental to the maintenance of good order, decency and solemnity in the temple and not unoften it is a source of very great annoyance and discomfort to the pilgrims themselves.\n\nIt seems to us that one of the objects which the temple committee had in view in framing these byelaws was to prevent this religious mendicancy showing itself in an unseemly manner witftin the precincts of the temple itself. Bye-law 8 of the Puja Bye-laws referred to above, which prevents taking of a gift by any person within the temple, lays down, further, that the permanent employees of the temple shall not receive or solicit for any remuneration, reward or Dakshina in any form from the pilgrims. , This prohibition is not confined to the temple but extends also\n\nNar Hari Sastri and Others\n\nShri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee.\n\nMuk_herjea /.\n\nNar Hari Sastri\n\nand Others\n\nShri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee.\n\nMukherjca /.\n\nto places outside it. Then again, bye-law i5 specifically provides that no Sadhu or beggar shall beg or sit for begging for alms within the temple. We think, therefore, that for the purpose of preventing overcrowding within the temple and to ensure order, decency and worshipful behaviour on the part of those who enter into it, the committee was quite justified in framing this bye-law which lays down in substance that whatever gifts a pligrim might be desirous of making and which is unconnected with the offerings to the deity shall be made outside the temple precincts and not inside it. In our opinion, the Pandas do not stand to lose anything by reason of this regulation and their grievance is more or less a sentimental one.\n\nAs we have said already, the gift intended for the Pandas can under no circumstances vest in the temple, but a regulation of this character could certainly be deemed to be necessary as conducive to efficient management of the temple and endowments, the convenience of the pilgrims and the maintenance of order and decent behaviour within the temple precincts.\n\nWe do not see how such bye-law can be said to be, in any way, inconsisteno w1i.th the provisions of the Act.\n\nIt is certainly confined to the circumstances COiiltemplated by the Statute itself and is not repugnant to the general principles of Hindu law which we have referred to already. It does not, in our opinion, tiake away the proprietary right of any person which it recognised under ordinary law. Thus, although we cannot agree with the High Court of Allahabad regarding the interpretation that it has put upon sections 3 (b) and 4 of the Act, we think that bye-law 8 of the Puja Bye-laws is perfectly valid and is within the ambit of the powers conferred upon the committee by section 25 of the Act.\n\nThe appeal is thus allowed only in part. The ' plaintiffs shall have a declaration that they are entitled to. accompany their Yajmans inside the temple >-- subject tc any bye-law or rule made by the committee in proper.; exercise of their powers under section 25 of\n\nI !\n\n1952 the Sri Badrinath Temple Act. The other prayer of the plaintiffs is rejected.\n\nAs the appeal succeeds in part and as it raised questions of general importance with regard to which there were longstanding disputes between the parties, we ... think that the proper order should be to direct each party to bear his own costs in all the Courts.\n\nThe costs of the defendant shall come out of the temple funds.\n\nNar Hari Sastri and Others\n\nr '\n\nAppeal allowed zn part.\n\nAgent for the appellants : . C. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent : S. S. Sukla.\n\nGUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER\n\nGUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS\n\n[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN Bos.F. JJ.]\n\nHindu law-Illegitimate son of Sudra-Right to demand partition of separate pr'Jperty of father.\n\nUnder Hindu law, though an illegimate son of . a Sudm cannot enforce partition during his father's lifetime, he can enforce partition after his father's death if the father was sepante from hirs collaterals and has ~ft separate property and legitimate sons.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1950.\n\nAppeal from a judgment and decree dated the 9th April, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Mukherjee JJ.) in First Appeal No. 68 of 1944 arising out of judgment and decree dated the 23rd December, 1943, of the Court of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Gaya, in Suit No. 4 of 1941.\n\nGurbachan Singh (Manohar Lal Sachdev, with him) for the appellants.\n\nS. B. Jathar .for the legal representative of respondent No. 4. 7-9 S.C. India/71\n\nShri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee.\n\nMuberjea 7.\n\nMay 16.", "total_entities": 100, "entities": [{"text": "NAR HARi SASTRI AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAR HARi SASTRI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BADRINATH TEMPLE COMMITTEE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BADRINATH TEMPLE COMMITTEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYAD FAZL ALI J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 355, "end_char": 363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "is nothing in the Badrinath Temple Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 865, "end_char": 909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1401, "end_char": 1408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is nothing in the Badrinath Temple Act, 1939", "statute": "There is nothing in the Badrinath Temple Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Verma C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1810, "end_char": 1820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 22nd November, 1946, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Verma C.J. and Mathur J.) in First Appeal :t)To."}}, {"text": "Mathur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1825, "end_char": 1831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 22nd November, 1946, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Verma C.J. and Mathur J.) in First Appeal :t)To."}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2024, "end_char": 2050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar (R. C. Ghatak and N. C. Sen, with him) for the appellants. _..,."}}, {"text": "R. C. Ghatak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2052, "end_char": 2064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar (R. C. Ghatak and N. C. Sen, with him) for the appellants. _..,."}}, {"text": "N. C. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2069, "end_char": 2078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar (R. C. Ghatak and N. C. Sen, with him) for the appellants. _..,."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2117, "end_char": 2126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dar (D. D. Unival, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. D. Unival", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2128, "end_char": 2140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dar (D. D. Unival, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Nar Hari Sastri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2181, "end_char": 2196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nar Hari Sastri\n\nand Others\n\nv; Shri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee.", "canonical_name": "NAR HARi SASTRI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Badrinath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2218, "end_char": 2227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nar Hari Sastri\n\nand Others\n\nv; Shri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee.", "canonical_name": "Badrinath"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2548, "end_char": 2553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-The sanctity which orthodox Hindu thought and ; Eeeling attribute to 1visiting of sacred places is nowhere better illustrated than in the vast concourse of pilgrims, who are attracted every year, from all parts of India, to the mountain shrines at Badrinath, situated, high up in the Himalayas, in the District of Garhwal."}}, {"text": "Badrinath", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2582, "end_char": 2591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-The sanctity which orthodox Hindu thought and ; Eeeling attribute to 1visiting of sacred places is nowhere better illustrated than in the vast concourse of pilgrims, who are attracted every year, from all parts of India, to the mountain shrines at Badrinath, situated, high up in the Himalayas, in the District of Garhwal."}}, {"text": "Garhwal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2648, "end_char": 2655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-The sanctity which orthodox Hindu thought and ; Eeeling attribute to 1visiting of sacred places is nowhere better illustrated than in the vast concourse of pilgrims, who are attracted every year, from all parts of India, to the mountain shrines at Badrinath, situated, high up in the Himalayas, in the District of Garhwal."}}, {"text": "Badrinath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2794, "end_char": 2803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The place to which the appellation od' 'Puri' is given, contains a number of temples but the principal temple is the one where the idol Badrinath along with some other subsidiary idols is in.tailed.", "canonical_name": "Badrinath"}}, {"text": "Rawal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3769, "end_char": 3774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The chief priest or ministrant of the temple is known by the name of 'Rawal' who originally looked after both the spiritual and temporal affairs of the idol subject to certain rights of supervision and control cxercisab'.le by the Tehri Durbar which, however, were not very clearly defined.", "canonical_name": "Rawal"}}, {"text": "Rawal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4203, "end_char": 4208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under this scheme, 'Rawal' was to be the sole\n\ntrustee of the Badrinath temple and its properties, and the entire management was entrusted to him subject to his keeping accounts, which he had to submit for approval by the Tehri Durbar, and making arrangements for the disposal and safe custody of cash receipts and other non-perishable valuables.", "canonical_name": "Rawal"}}, {"text": "Durbar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4411, "end_char": 4417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under this scheme, 'Rawal' was to be the sole\n\ntrustee of the Badrinath temple and its properties, and the entire management was entrusted to him subject to his keeping accounts, which he had to submit for approval by the Tehri Durbar, and making arrangements for the disposal and safe custody of cash receipts and other non-perishable valuables."}}, {"text": "Legislature passed the Sri Badrinath Temple Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4779, "end_char": 4826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shebayat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5714, "end_char": 5722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are not temple pr'iests in the proper sense of the expression and have nothing to do with the regular worship of the idol which is carried on by the Shebayat, the High Priest or the manager as the case may be."}}, {"text": "N ar H ari Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N ar H ari Sastri and Others\n\nShri Badrinath Temple Committee."}}, {"text": "Hardwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The people coming to Badrinath from the plains generally follow the pilgrim's route from Hardwar to Badrinath and in this route, at a distance of about 58 miles from Hardwar, stands the place known as Deoprayag where all the Deoprayagi Pandas reside."}}, {"text": "Senior Civil Judge of Garhwal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7264, "end_char": 7293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was commenced by the appellants iJn the Court of the Senior Civil Judge of Garhwal on 16th April, 1934, and the only defendant in the suit, as it was filed originally, was the 'Rawal' who was at that time in entire charge of the Badrinath Institution, both as Trustee and High Priest."}}, {"text": "16th April, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7297, "end_char": 7313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was commenced by the appellants iJn the Court of the Senior Civil Judge of Garhwal on 16th April, 1934, and the only defendant in the suit, as it was filed originally, was the 'Rawal' who was at that time in entire charge of the Badrinath Institution, both as Trustee and High Priest."}}, {"text": "Badrinath Institution", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7440, "end_char": 7461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was commenced by the appellants iJn the Court of the Senior Civil Judge of Garhwal on 16th April, 1934, and the only defendant in the suit, as it was filed originally, was the 'Rawal' who was at that time in entire charge of the Badrinath Institution, both as Trustee and High Priest."}}, {"text": "Deoprayag", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7806, "end_char": 7815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations in the plaint in substance are that the plaintiffs who are a body of Brahman Purohits residing at Deoprayag and also at Badrinath have the right, by immemorial custom, to act as Pandas and 'Tirtha Purohits' of the pilgrims at Badrinath."}}, {"text": "Badrin.ath", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8221, "end_char": 8231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides looking to their creature comforts, they assit the pilgrims, while they stay at Badrin.ath, in having their ceremonial ablutions in the 'Tapta Kundu' and then conduct them into the precincts of the temple and assist them in having\n\n.. -\n\n'darshan' of the idols and making offerings to them."}}, {"text": "Rawal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8554, "end_char": 8559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs aver that because of the support that they lent to the transfer of the management of the temple from the 'Rawal' to the Tehri Durbar, the defendant 'Rawal' was displeased with them and in August 1933, wrongfully and without any just cause or excuse, obstructed and threatened to obstruct the plaintiffs from entering the precincts of the temple along with their Yajmans or clients and unlawfully restrained them from assisting the pilgrims in the usu:ll way at the time of 'darshan' and worship of the deities inside the temple.", "canonical_name": "Rawal"}}, {"text": "Tehri Durbar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8568, "end_char": 8580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs aver that because of the support that they lent to the transfer of the management of the temple from the 'Rawal' to the Tehri Durbar, the defendant 'Rawal' was displeased with them and in August 1933, wrongfully and without any just cause or excuse, obstructed and threatened to obstruct the plaintiffs from entering the precincts of the temple along with their Yajmans or clients and unlawfully restrained them from assisting the pilgrims in the usu:ll way at the time of 'darshan' and worship of the deities inside the temple."}}, {"text": "God Badrinarayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9552, "end_char": 9568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) That the plaintiffs have the right freely to go into the precincts of the said temple with their Yajmans or clients whenever it is open for assisting them in the matter of 'darshan' or worship of God Badrinarayan and other deities and in the matter of making offerings to them."}}, {"text": "18-9-1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11260, "end_char": 11269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This issue was decided against the plaintiff and the Civil Judge dismissed the suit on 18-9-1934 holding that the suit was barred by the rule of res judicata, as an earlier suit brought by five of the Deoprayagi Pandas and claiming identical reliefs against the 'Rawal' was dismissed by the Commissioner of the Kumaun Division in the year\n\n1896."}}, {"text": "Deoprayagi Pandas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11374, "end_char": 11391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This issue was decided against the plaintiff and the Civil Judge dismissed the suit on 18-9-1934 holding that the suit was barred by the rule of res judicata, as an earlier suit brought by five of the Deoprayagi Pandas and claiming identical reliefs against the 'Rawal' was dismissed by the Commissioner of the Kumaun Division in the year\n\n1896."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11597, "end_char": 11620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order of dismissa~, an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to the High Court of Allahabad and a Division Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated 23rd May, 1938, reversed the decision of the Civil Judge on this preliminary point and remanded the case for hearing of the suit on its merits."}}, {"text": "23rd May, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11683, "end_char": 11697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order of dismissa~, an appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to the High Court of Allahabad and a Division Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated 23rd May, 1938, reversed the decision of the Civil Judge on this preliminary point and remanded the case for hearing of the suit on its merits."}}, {"text": "Sri Badrinath Temple Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11912, "end_char": 11936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sri Badrinath Temple Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12319, "end_char": 12343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12619, "end_char": 12631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sri Badrinath Temple Act", "statute": "Sri Badrinath Temple Act"}}, {"text": "Nar Hari Sastri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12715, "end_char": 12730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was asserted, further, that all gifts made within the precincts of the temple would vest in the temple\n\n....J.\n\ncommi.ittee under section 3(b) of the Act and that the 1952 committee had the absolute right to regulate entry of Nar Hari Sastri.", "canonical_name": "NAR HARi SASTRI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "4th March, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12953, "end_char": 12968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others\n\nA number of issues were framed after this written statement was filed, and on hearing the evidence adduced by the parties, the Civil Judge disposed of the suit by his judgment dated 4th March, 1941."}}, {"text": "4th July, 1892", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14184, "end_char": 14198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that\n\nin 1892 certain rules were framed by the then 'Rawal' for regulation •of pilgrims in the Badrinath temple, and to these rules the Commisioner of Kumaun Division accorded bis sanction on 4th July, 1892."}}, {"text": "22nd October, 1894", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14403, "end_char": 14421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd October, 1894, an application was filed before the Commissioner of Kumaun Division by some residents of Deoprayag complaining\n\nof unjust prohi; bition from entering the temple by the new manager and it was prayed that directions might\n\nShri Badrinath."}}, {"text": "28th October, 1894", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14876, "end_char": 14894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 28th October, 1894, the Commissioner ordered that a copy of the petition might be sent to the Manager for report and in the body of the order he recorded his\n\nopinion that \"the duty of the Pandas consists normally in escorting the pilgrims to the temple precincts."}}, {"text": "19th August, 1895", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15262, "end_char": 15279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petiti:On was eventually rejected, and on 19th August, 1895, five Deoprayagi Pandas filed a suit in the Court of the Deputy Collector, Garhwal, who was invested with the powers of a Civil Court, praying for a declaration of their right to go inside the temple with their Yajmans which the 'Rawal' was not willing to allow unless he gave special permission."}}, {"text": "Court of the Deputy Collector, Garhwal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15324, "end_char": 15362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petiti:On was eventually rejected, and on 19th August, 1895, five Deoprayagi Pandas filed a suit in the Court of the Deputy Collector, Garhwal, who was invested with the powers of a Civil Court, praying for a declaration of their right to go inside the temple with their Yajmans which the 'Rawal' was not willing to allow unless he gave special permission."}}, {"text": "9th March,\n\n1896", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15865, "end_char": 15881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order of dismissal was affirmed on Second Appeal by the Commissfoner of Kumaun Division who had the powers of a High Court in regard to this area, by his order dated 9th March,\n\n1896."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge discussed the provisions of the Shri Badrinath Temple Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17034, "end_char": 17103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shri Ba rinat Temp e Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20433, "end_char": 20457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Varma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20882, "end_char": 20887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Varma\n\nC. J. and Mathur J. and, by their judgment dated 22nd November, 1946, the learned Judges dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal and allowed the cross objections filed by the defendants."}}, {"text": "22nd November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20938, "end_char": 20957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Varma\n\nC. J. and Mathur J. and, by their judgment dated 22nd November, 1946, the learned Judges dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal and allowed the cross objections filed by the defendants."}}, {"text": "Shri Badrinath Temple Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21583, "end_char": 21608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21655, "end_char": 21665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shri Badrinath Temple Act", "statute": "Shri Badrinath Temple Act"}}, {"text": "Badrinath Temple Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22022, "end_char": 22048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to be noted that after the judgment of the trial court was delivered and the appeal came up for hearing before the High Court, the Badrinath Temple Committee passed a resolution which was approved of by the Governor of the U.P. State, and was to the following effect:-\n\n\"Subject to the provision of bye-laws and any direction given by the committee, the Pandas can accompany their Yajmans within the temple.\""}}, {"text": "U.P. State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22114, "end_char": 22124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to be noted that after the judgment of the trial court was delivered and the appeal came up for hearing before the High Court, the Badrinath Temple Committee passed a resolution which was approved of by the Governor of the U.P. State, and was to the following effect:-\n\n\"Subject to the provision of bye-laws and any direction given by the committee, the Pandas can accompany their Yajmans within the temple.\""}}, {"text": "29th May, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22391, "end_char": 22405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This resolution was communicated to the plaintiffs by the 2nd defendant by a letter dated 29th May, 1942, and undoubtedly after passing of this resolution, tht: grievance of the plaintiffs in regard to temple entry disappeared to a large extent."}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23169, "end_char": 23181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24045, "end_char": 24052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Iyengar, appearing in support of the appeal before us, has assailed the propriety of the High Court's decision on both these points."}}, {"text": "Dar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24528, "end_char": 24531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Dar, who appears on behalf of the respondents, draws our attention to the fact that this right has practically been conceded by the temple cammitJtee in their resolution passed in March, 1942, referred to , already."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27342, "end_char": 27352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27645, "end_char": 27655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Skanda Purana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31378, "end_char": 31391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Iyengar has drawn our attention to certain texts from the Kedar Kanda of Skanda Purana which describe the glory of the deity Badrinath, to show that it is a religious duty enjoined by the Hindu scriptures that a worshipper who goes to Badrikasram should make gifts to Brahmans after the diarshan of the idol is obtained and offerings are made to it."}}, {"text": "Badrikasram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31540, "end_char": 31551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Iyengar has drawn our attention to certain texts from the Kedar Kanda of Skanda Purana which describe the glory of the deity Badrinath, to show that it is a religious duty enjoined by the Hindu scriptures that a worshipper who goes to Badrikasram should make gifts to Brahmans after the diarshan of the idol is obtained and offerings are made to it."}}, {"text": "Hari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32206, "end_char": 32210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea /.\n\nkept under control, he shall go into the temple of Badrinath with his mind concentrated on Shri Hari."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34487, "end_char": 34496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35120, "end_char": 35129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35658, "end_char": 35667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35787, "end_char": 35796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36282, "end_char": 36294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Badrinath Temple Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36385, "end_char": 36405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36560, "end_char": 36569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Badrinath Temple Act", "statute": "Badrinath Temple Act"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36791, "end_char": 36800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Badrinath Temple Act", "statute": "Badrinath Temple Act"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37252, "end_char": 37261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Badrinath Temple Act", "statute": "Badrinath Temple Act"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37644, "end_char": 37654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38076, "end_char": 38086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38089, "end_char": 38099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38742, "end_char": 38752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brahmans", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39067, "end_char": 39075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injunction is to make gifts in favour of Brahmans generally and the Pandas, because they are Brahmans and happen to be available at the spot, naturally become recipients of such gifts."}}, {"text": "Nar Hari Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40468, "end_char": 40483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This prohibition is not confined to the temple but extends also\n\nNar Hari Sastri and Others\n\nShri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee.", "canonical_name": "NAR HARi SASTRI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42238, "end_char": 42248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42405, "end_char": 42415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42681, "end_char": 42691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 43199, "end_char": 43208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "S. S. Sukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 43238, "end_char": 43249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : S. S. Sukla."}}, {"text": "GUR NARAIN DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43252, "end_char": 43266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER\n\nGUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS\n\n[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN Bos."}}, {"text": "GUR TAHAL DAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43280, "end_char": 43293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER\n\nGUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS\n\n[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN Bos."}}, {"text": "SAIYID F AZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43308, "end_char": 43323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER\n\nGUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS\n\n[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN Bos."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN Bos", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43328, "end_char": 43338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER\n\nGUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS\n\n[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN Bos."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43834, "end_char": 43867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment and decree dated the 9th April, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Mukherjee JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43869, "end_char": 43880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment and decree dated the 9th April, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Mukherjee JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Manohar Lal Sachdev"}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43885, "end_char": 43894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment and decree dated the 9th April, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Mukherjee JJ.)", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "23rd December, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43976, "end_char": 43995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68 of 1944 arising out of judgment and decree dated the 23rd December, 1943, of the Court of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Gaya, in Suit No."}}, {"text": "First Additional Subordinate Judge, Gaya", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44017, "end_char": 44057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "68 of 1944 arising out of judgment and decree dated the 23rd December, 1943, of the Court of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Gaya, in Suit No."}}, {"text": "Gurbachan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44083, "end_char": 44098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurbachan Singh (Manohar Lal Sachdev, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal Sachdev", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44100, "end_char": 44119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurbachan Singh (Manohar Lal Sachdev, with him) for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "Manohar Lal Sachdev"}}, {"text": "S. B. Jathar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44152, "end_char": 44164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Jathar .for the legal representative of respondent No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_869_877_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 869\n\n1952 the Sri Badrinath Temple Act. The other prayer of the plaintiffs is rejected.\n\nAs the appeal succeeds in part and as it raised questions of general importance with regard to which there were longstanding disputes between the parties, we ... think that the proper order should be to direct each party to bear his own costs in all the Courts.\n\nThe costs of the defendant shall come out of the temple funds.\n\nNar Hari Sastri and Others\n\nr '\n\nAppeal allowed zn part.\n\nAgent for the appellants : . C. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent : S. S. Sukla.\n\nGUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER\n\nGUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS\n\n[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN Bos.F. JJ.]\n\nHindu law-Illegitimate son of Sudra-Right to demand partition of separate pr'Jperty of father.\n\nUnder Hindu law, though an illegimate son of . a Sudm cannot enforce partition during his father's lifetime, he can enforce partition after his father's death if the father was sepante from hirs collaterals and has ~ft separate property and legitimate sons.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1950.\n\nAppeal from a judgment and decree dated the 9th April, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Mukherjee JJ.) in First Appeal No. 68 of 1944 arising out of judgment and decree dated the 23rd December, 1943, of the Court of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Gaya, in Suit No. 4 of 1941.\n\nGurbachan Singh (Manohar Lal Sachdev, with him) for the appellants.\n\nS. B. Jathar .for the legal representative of respondent No. 4. 7-9 S.C. India/71\n\nShri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee.\n\nMuberjea 7.\n\nMay 16.\n\nGur Narain Das\n\nand Another v.\n\nGur Taha/ Das\n\nQnd Others.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\n1952. May 16. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL ALI J .-This appeal arises out of a suit for partition which was dismissed by the trial court but was decreed by the High Court of Patna on appeal.\n\nThe material facts of the case are briefly as follows :-\n\nOne Rambilas Das had 2 sons, Budparkash Das and Nandkishore Das. Nandkishore Das had several sons, the plaintiffs, Gurtahl Das being one of his illegitimate sons. The present suit was brought by Gurtahl Das against 4 persons, namely, Gurnarayan Das and Jai Narayan Das, sons of Nandkishore Das, Shibtahl Das who was alleged to be one of the illegitimate sons of Nandkishore Das, and Mst. Rambholi Kuer, wife of Nanaksharan Das, one of the sons of Nandkishore Das.\n\nAnother person, Kuldip Das, who was the daughter's son of Nandkishore's brother, Budparkash Das, intervened in the suit after its institution and was impleaded as the fifth defendant. After the death of the second defendant, Jai Narayan Das, his wife, Surat Kuer, was brought on record.\n\nThe plaintilf's case was that Budparkash Das and Nandkishore Das formed a joint Hindu family, and that Budparkash Das died without any male issue in a state of jointness with llis brother, Nandkishore, with the result that the entire joint family property devolved on him. Subsequently, disputes arose regarding the management and enjoyment of the properties among the plaintiff and the defendants, which compelled the plaintiff to institute the present suit for partition. The plaintiff alleged that the parties were Sudras and belonged to the Nanak Shai sect of Fakirs, and that he and the third defendant, Shibtahl Das, were dasiputras of Nandkishore Das by a concubine, and J ai Narayan Das and Gurnarayan Das were also dasiputras of Nandkishore by another concubine.\n\nThe suit was contested mainly by the first defendant Gu.rnarayan Das and Mst. Surat Kuer,. on the following pleas :-firstly, that the suit was not maintainable as a suit for partition, because the plaintiff was never\n\nin possession of the properties of which he claimed partition, secondly that the family of the defendants were not Sudras but Dwijas and an illegitimate son could not sue for partition, thirdly that the defendants did not form a jont Hindu family with the plaintiff and Shibtahf Das, fourthly that Mst. Rambholi Kuer was not the widow of Nanaksharan Das, and fifthly that the plaintiff and Shibtahl Das were not sons of Nandkishore Das. The case of Mst. Rambholi Kuer was that the parties were Dwijas and not Sudras, and defendant No. 5, Kuldip Das, pleaded to the same effect and further alleged that Budparkash Das was separate from Nandkishore Das, that although they did not divide the properties by metes and bounds, they used to divide the produce half and half, and that he was in possession of his share of the properties as the daughter's son of Budparkash Das and they could not be made the subject of partition.\n\nShibtahl Das supported the claim of the plaintiff.\n\nThe trial court dismssed the suit, holding, among other things, (1) that the plaintiff not being in joint possession of any of the properties, the suit for partition was not maintainable, (2) that the parties were Sudras, (3) that Budparkash Das and Nandkishore Das were joint and not separate, ( 4)' that the plaintiff had no cause of action, and (5) that Shibtahl Das had not proved that he was the son of Nandkishore, Against the decision of the trial court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the High Court at Patna, and Kuldip Das filed a cross-objection contesting the finding that Budparkash was joint with hi:s brother, Nandlcishore.\n\nThe High Court reversed the deci§jon of the trial court and held (1) that the parli.es were Sudras and not Dwijas, (2} that Eudpark.ash died in a state of separation from his brother, Nandkishore, and (3) that no suit for declaration of title was necessary and the plainti'ff•s failure to• pay sufficient court-fee should not stand in the way of suitable relief being granted to \"\"· him. B0th the High C0urt and the tial court found that defendants Nos. 1 and1 Z, Gumarayan Das and\n\nGur Narain D11s\n\nand Anot.,, t!f\"\n\nG#f' Tahal Du\n\nand Othf'I.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nGur Narain Das and Another\n\n.v.\n\nGur Tahal Dti.f\n\nand Others,\n\n.Fazl Ali/.\n\nJai Narayan Das, were the legitimate 1; ons of Nandkishore Das. On the above findings, the High Court passed a preliminary decree directing that separate allotments of the properties should be made to the plaintiff and the defendants excepting Shibtahl Das.\n\nIt was contended before us on behal.f of the first appellant that the finding of the courts below that the parties were Sudras was not correct and should be set aside.\n\nThis contention must however fail, since we find no good reason for departing from the welle$iablished !practice of this court of not disturbing concurrent finding of the trial court and the first appellate court.\n\nIn the present case, the finding that the parties are Sudras is largely based on the oral evidence, and the learned Judges of the High Court in arriving at their conclusion have not overlooked 1he tests which have been laid down in a series of authoritative decisions for determining the question whether a person belongs to the regenerate community or to the Sudra community.\n\nThe next question which was very seriously debated before us was whether Budparkash Dai; and Nandkishore Das were joint or separate. On this question, the two courts below have expressed conflicting views, but on a careful consideration of the evidence before us, we are inclined to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court, who . after reviewing the entire evidence have come to the conclusion that Budparkash Das died in a state of separation from Nandkishore.\n\nIt will be material to quote here the fol:'.owing extract from the_ judgment of the trial judge in which he sums up the evidence on this. question :-\n\n\"From the oral evidence on the record,· this much is quite clear that Budparkash lived in a separate house and used to get crops. This defendant (defendant No. 5 Kuldip Das) has also filed Exhibii: B (2) chaukidari receipt for 1936 (Register No. 283) and Exhibit C 1 (copy of Assessment Register showing: No. 284 in the name of Budparkash) which may go to show that possibly Budparkash was paying separate . chowkidari tax. The defendant No. S has also filed some\n\n. 1952 letters marked A-1, A-5, A-4,\n\nA-6, A-10 and\n\nA-12, which not only show that this defendant is related to Gur Narain Das the defendants' family, but also that grains and . and Another . money were offered to him from time to time. But . v. none of these documents clearly show that there Gur Tahal Das . had been partition between Budparkash and Nand- , .and Others. kishme or that the defendant No. 5 ever came in possession over any property, as being the heir of Budparkash. Of course there is some oral evidence to support him. But I do not think, on considering and weighing the evidence that separation. of Budparkash from Nandkishore has been proved.\n\nThe learned pleader for the defendant No. 5 has urged that the circumstances considered in the light of the ruling reported in Behar Report, Vol. 4 (1937-38) Privy Council at p. 302, would support the defendant's case as there was defined . share of Budparkash and Nandkishore in the Khatyan (exts. Gl and\n\nG2).\n\nI am not prepared to agree with the learned pleader on thi:s point, as there is not a scrap of paper to show that Budparkash or even after him Kuldip Das separately appropriated the usufruct of any property, or ever Budparkash showed any intention of separation, I expect that if Budparkash had separated, at least ori his death the defendant No. 5 would have maintained an account book of his income from the properties in dispute, specially as he lived at a distant place. :He does not appear to have ever cared to look after the property or demand accounts from his alleged\n\nco-sharers.\"\n\nThis summary of the evidence shows firstly, that the two brothers lived in separate houses, secondly, that they paid separate chaukidari taxes, and thirdly, that Budparkash used to get grains and money from N andkishore from time to time. The trial judge has also observed that the khatyans, exhibits G 1 arid G 2 record the defined shares of the two brothers, but the printed record shows that exhibits G 1 and G 2 are mere rent-receipts.\n\nAs the khatyan was not printed, we sent for the original record and found that the entries in the khatyan, which are exhibits F 1 and\n\n. Fazl Ali/.\n\nGur Narain Das\n\nand Another.\n\nGur Taha! Oas\n\n•nd Others.\n\nFaz! Ali/.\n\nF 2, have been correctly not:cd in the judgment of the trial court.\n\nIt seems to us therefore that the findings which we have set out give greater support to the oral evidence adduced on behalf of defendant No. 5 than to the evidence adduced by the other parties, and that being so, we think that the finding of the High Court must be upheld.\n\nWe were greatly impressed by several letters of exhibit-A series, which have been found to be genuine by both the courts below.\n\nThe genuineness of the letters was attacked before us, but we find no good reason for reversing the find•\n\nings of the trial judge and the High Court.\n\nIn one of these letters exhibit A-10, Nandkishore Das wntmg to Kuldip on the 12th June, 1934, states that he was sending 25 maunds of rice, 7 maunds of khesari and rupees seventy-five and then adds: \"I have got with me all the accounts written, which will be explained when you will come and you will render a just account of your share when you come\", In an(1ther :letter, exhibit A-12, which was written by Nandkishore to Kuldip on the 15th October, 1936, the former states : \"I wrote to you several times to adjust account of your share, but you did not do so up till now. I write to you to come and examine the account of your share.\n\nI have not got money now. If you have got time, then come for a day and have the account adjusted and take what may be found due to you\".\n\nIt seems to us that if the parties were really joint in the legal sense of the term, there was no question of examining the accounts and adjusting them and there would have been no reference to the share of Kuldip in the produce or the money collected.\n\nThe prOiper conclusion to be arrived at is, as the witnesses for defendant No. 5 have stated, that though there was no partition by metes and bounds, the two brothers were divided in status and enjoyed the usufruct of the properties according to their respective shares Several witnesses were examined on behalf of defendant No. 5, who have stated from their personal knowledge that the two brothers lived in separate houses, were separate in mess and the produce\n\nwas divided between them half and half. It seems to us that the finding of the High Court as to the separation of the two brothers must be upheld.\n\nGur Narain Du\n\n1md Anotl11:r The third contention urged on behalf of the appel- T. 1 1 h . h th th l . 'ff Gur Tahal Da; ants re ates to t e questlon w e er e p amu and Others is entitled only to maintenance or to a share in the properties left by Nandkishore Das.\n\nThe rights of an Fal Ali /. illegitimate son of a Sudra are considered in Mitakshara, Ch. 1, S. 12, which is headed \"Rights of a son by a female slave, in the case of a Sudra's estate\".\n\nThis text was fully considered by the Privy Council in Vellaiyappa v. Natarajan(1) and the conclusions derived therefrom were summarized as follows:-\n\n\"Their Lordships are of opinion that the illegitimate son of a Sudra by a continuous concubine has the status of a son, and that he 1s a member of the family; that the share of inheritance given to him is not merely in lieu of maintenance, but in recognition of his status as a son; that where the father has left no separate property and no legitimate son, but was joint with his collaterals, the illegitimate son is not entitled to demand a partition of the joint family property in their hands, but is entitled as a member of the family to maintenance out of that property.\"\n\nThis statement of the law, with which we agree, may be supplemented by three other well-settled principles, these being firstly, that the illegitimate son does not acquire by birth any interest in his father's estate and he cannot therefore demand partition against his father during the latter's lifetime; secondly, that on his father's death, the illegitimate son succeeds as a copatcener to the separate estate of the father along with the legitimate son(s) with a right of survivorship and is entitled to enforce partition against the legitimate son(s) ; and thi:rdly, that on a partition between a legitimate and an illegitimate son, the illegitimate son takes only one-half of what he would have taken if he: was; a legitimate son.\n\n(I) A.LR. 1931 P.C. 294.\n\nGu, r Narai~ Dai\n\nand Another v •.\n\nGur Tahal Das ·\n\nand Others •.\n\nFazz'Ali /.\n\nIt seems to us that the second proposition enunciated . above follows from the following passage in the Mitakshara text:-\n\n\"But after the demise of the father, if there be sons of a wedded wife, kt these brothers allow the son of the female slave to participate for half a share.\"\n\nIf therefore the illegitimate son is a coparcener with the legitimate son of his father, it must necessarily follow that he is entitled to demand partition against the legitimate son.\n\nThere can be no doubt that though the illegitimate son cannot enforce partition during the father's lifetime and though he is not entitled to demand partition where the father has left no separate property and no legitimate son but was joint with his L, collaterals, he can enforce partition in a case like the present, where the father was . separate from his collaterals and has left separate property and legitimate sons ..\n\nThe last point put forward on behaif of the appellants was that the plaintiff not being in possession of the properties which are the subject of the suit, he cannot .maintain a suit for partition. This contention cannot prevail, because the plaintiff is undoubtedly a cosharer in the properties and unless exclusion and ouster .are pleaded an.cl proved, which is not the case here, is enti.tled to partition.\n\n. Thus, all the points urged on behalf of the appellants fail, but, in one respect, the decree of the High Court must be modified.\n\nTo appreciate this, reference will have to be made to the following statements made by defendant. No. 5 in paragraphs 8 and 11 of his\n\nwrfrten statement :\n\n \"8. That this defendant holds moiety share in jagir and bsht lands. Mahanth Budh Parkash Das was living separately in the northern house allotted to him and the southern portion was allotted to the thakhta of Nandkishore Das, : the . · sniafiest house divided into 2 havelis.\n\nI -'\n\n11. That this defendant has nothing to do with the eight annas interest in the properties given in schedule under than C and D relating to jagir and kasht lands, which rightfully belonged to Nandkishore . Das and has no concern with the properties noted in those schedules.\"\n\nParagraph 11 is rather ambiguously worded, but it was conceded before us by the counsel for defendant No. 5 that the latter had no claim to any interest in the properties set out in schedules other than schedules C and D.\n\nSuch being the purport of paragraphs 8 . and 11, the decree should provide that defendant -No. 5 will be entided only to a share in the properties\n\nset out in schedules C and D and will have no . share in the properties set out in the other schedules.\n\n Subject to this modification, the decree of the High Court is affirmed, and this appeal is dismissed. There ·:will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal. dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Naunit Lal.\n\nAgent for the legal representative of 4th respondent: _ R. N. Sachthey.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nti.\n\nVIRKUMAR GULABCHAND SHAH\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nEssential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XX/V of 1946), . ss. 2(a), 17(2)-Spices (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1946, els. 2, 3-Turmeric, whether \"foodstuff\"-Meaning of \"foodstuff\".\n\n~ The term \"foodstuff\" is ambiguous.\n\nIn one sense it has a narrow meaning and is limited to articles which are eaten as food for purposes of nutrition and nourishment and so would • excl?de condiments and spices such as yeast, salt, pepper, bakmg powder and turmeric. In a wider sense it includes every- . thing that goes into the preparation of food proper (as under- stood in the narrow sense) to make it more palatable and digestible.\n\nWhether the term is used in a particular statute in i its wider or narrower sense cannot be answered in the abstract\n\nGur Narain Das\n\nand Anothdv.\n\nGur Tahal Das\n\nand Others.\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\n1952.\n\nMay, 27.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 533, "end_char": 542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "S. S. Sukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 572, "end_char": 583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : S. S. Sukla."}}, {"text": "GUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 586, "end_char": 612, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 614, "end_char": 638, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Gurbachan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1417, "end_char": 1432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurbachan Singh (Manohar Lal Sachdev, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal Sachdev", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1434, "end_char": 1453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurbachan Singh (Manohar Lal Sachdev, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. B. Jathar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1486, "end_char": 1498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. B. Jathar .for the legal representative of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Badrinath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1574, "end_char": 1583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-9 S.C. India/71\n\nShri Badrinath\n\nTemple Committee."}}, {"text": "Gur Narain Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1626, "end_char": 1640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gur Narain Das\n\nand Another v.\n\nGur Taha/ Das\n\nQnd Others.", "canonical_name": "GUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Gur Taha/ Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1658, "end_char": 1671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gur Narain Das\n\nand Another v.\n\nGur Taha/ Das\n\nQnd Others.", "canonical_name": "GUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1686, "end_char": 1694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\n1952.", "canonical_name": "Faz! Ali/."}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1757, "end_char": 1765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL ALI J .-This appeal arises out of a suit for partition which was dismissed by the trial court but was decreed by the High Court of Patna on appeal.", "canonical_name": "Faz! Ali/."}}, {"text": "Rambilas Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1973, "end_char": 1985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts of the case are briefly as follows :-\n\nOne Rambilas Das had 2 sons, Budparkash Das and Nandkishore Das."}}, {"text": "Budparkash Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1998, "end_char": 2012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts of the case are briefly as follows :-\n\nOne Rambilas Das had 2 sons, Budparkash Das and Nandkishore Das.", "canonical_name": "Budparkash Das"}}, {"text": "Nandkishore Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2017, "end_char": 2032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material facts of the case are briefly as follows :-\n\nOne Rambilas Das had 2 sons, Budparkash Das and Nandkishore Das.", "canonical_name": "Nandkishore . Das"}}, {"text": "Nandkishore Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2034, "end_char": 2049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandkishore Das had several sons, the plaintiffs, Gurtahl Das being one of his illegitimate sons.", "canonical_name": "Nandkishore . Das"}}, {"text": "Gurtahl Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2084, "end_char": 2095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandkishore Das had several sons, the plaintiffs, Gurtahl Das being one of his illegitimate sons.", "canonical_name": "Gurtahl Das"}}, {"text": "Gurtahl Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2164, "end_char": 2175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was brought by Gurtahl Das against 4 persons, namely, Gurnarayan Das and Jai Narayan Das, sons of Nandkishore Das, Shibtahl Das who was alleged to be one of the illegitimate sons of Nandkishore Das, and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Gurtahl Das"}}, {"text": "Gurnarayan Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2203, "end_char": 2217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was brought by Gurtahl Das against 4 persons, namely, Gurnarayan Das and Jai Narayan Das, sons of Nandkishore Das, Shibtahl Das who was alleged to be one of the illegitimate sons of Nandkishore Das, and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Gu.rnarayan Das"}}, {"text": "Jai Narayan Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2222, "end_char": 2237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was brought by Gurtahl Das against 4 persons, namely, Gurnarayan Das and Jai Narayan Das, sons of Nandkishore Das, Shibtahl Das who was alleged to be one of the illegitimate sons of Nandkishore Das, and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Jai Narayan Das"}}, {"text": "Shibtahl Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2264, "end_char": 2276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was brought by Gurtahl Das against 4 persons, namely, Gurnarayan Das and Jai Narayan Das, sons of Nandkishore Das, Shibtahl Das who was alleged to be one of the illegitimate sons of Nandkishore Das, and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Shibtahl Das"}}, {"text": "Rambholi Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2357, "end_char": 2370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rambholi Kuer, wife of Nanaksharan Das, one of the sons of Nandkishore Das."}}, {"text": "Nanaksharan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2380, "end_char": 2395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rambholi Kuer, wife of Nanaksharan Das, one of the sons of Nandkishore Das."}}, {"text": "Kuldip Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2450, "end_char": 2460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another person, Kuldip Das, who was the daughter's son of Nandkishore's brother, Budparkash Das, intervened in the suit after its institution and was impleaded as the fifth defendant.", "canonical_name": "Kuldip Das"}}, {"text": "Nandkishore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2492, "end_char": 2503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another person, Kuldip Das, who was the daughter's son of Nandkishore's brother, Budparkash Das, intervened in the suit after its institution and was impleaded as the fifth defendant.", "canonical_name": "Nandkishore . Das"}}, {"text": "Jai Narayan Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2659, "end_char": 2674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of the second defendant, Jai Narayan Das, his wife, Surat Kuer, was brought on record.", "canonical_name": "Jai Narayan Das"}}, {"text": "Surat Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2686, "end_char": 2696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of the second defendant, Jai Narayan Das, his wife, Surat Kuer, was brought on record.", "canonical_name": "Surat Kuer"}}, {"text": "Shibtahl Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3331, "end_char": 3343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff alleged that the parties were Sudras and belonged to the Nanak Shai sect of Fakirs, and that he and the third defendant, Shibtahl Das, were dasiputras of Nandkishore Das by a concubine, and J ai Narayan Das and Gurnarayan Das were also dasiputras of Nandkishore by another concubine.", "canonical_name": "Shibtahl Das"}}, {"text": "J ai Narayan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3400, "end_char": 3416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff alleged that the parties were Sudras and belonged to the Nanak Shai sect of Fakirs, and that he and the third defendant, Shibtahl Das, were dasiputras of Nandkishore Das by a concubine, and J ai Narayan Das and Gurnarayan Das were also dasiputras of Nandkishore by another concubine."}}, {"text": "Gu.rnarayan Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3548, "end_char": 3563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was contested mainly by the first defendant Gu.rnarayan Das and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Gu.rnarayan Das"}}, {"text": "Surat Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3573, "end_char": 3583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surat Kuer,.", "canonical_name": "Surat Kuer"}}, {"text": "Shibtahf Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3983, "end_char": 3995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the following pleas :-firstly, that the suit was not maintainable as a suit for partition, because the plaintiff was never\n\nin possession of the properties of which he claimed partition, secondly that the family of the defendants were not Sudras but Dwijas and an illegitimate son could not sue for partition, thirdly that the defendants did not form a jont Hindu family with the plaintiff and Shibtahf Das, fourthly that Mst.", "canonical_name": "Shibtahl Das"}}, {"text": "Kuldip Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4251, "end_char": 4261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, Kuldip Das, pleaded to the same effect and further alleged that Budparkash Das was separate from Nandkishore Das, that although they did not divide the properties by metes and bounds, they used to divide the produce half and half, and that he was in possession of his share of the properties as the daughter's son of Budparkash Das and they could not be made the subject of partition.", "canonical_name": "Kuldip Das"}}, {"text": "Budparkash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4920, "end_char": 4930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court dismssed the suit, holding, among other things, (1) that the plaintiff not being in joint possession of any of the properties, the suit for partition was not maintainable, (2) that the parties were Sudras, (3) that Budparkash Das and Nandkishore Das were joint and not separate, ( 4)' that the plaintiff had no cause of action, and (5) that Shibtahl Das had not proved that he was the son of Nandkishore, Against the decision of the trial court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the High Court at Patna, and Kuldip Das filed a cross-objection contesting the finding that Budparkash was joint with hi:s brother, Nandlcishore.", "canonical_name": "Budparkash Das"}}, {"text": "High Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5192, "end_char": 5211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court dismssed the suit, holding, among other things, (1) that the plaintiff not being in joint possession of any of the properties, the suit for partition was not maintainable, (2) that the parties were Sudras, (3) that Budparkash Das and Nandkishore Das were joint and not separate, ( 4)' that the plaintiff had no cause of action, and (5) that Shibtahl Das had not proved that he was the son of Nandkishore, Against the decision of the trial court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the High Court at Patna, and Kuldip Das filed a cross-objection contesting the finding that Budparkash was joint with hi:s brother, Nandlcishore."}}, {"text": "Nandlcishore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5320, "end_char": 5332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court dismssed the suit, holding, among other things, (1) that the plaintiff not being in joint possession of any of the properties, the suit for partition was not maintainable, (2) that the parties were Sudras, (3) that Budparkash Das and Nandkishore Das were joint and not separate, ( 4)' that the plaintiff had no cause of action, and (5) that Shibtahl Das had not proved that he was the son of Nandkishore, Against the decision of the trial court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the High Court at Patna, and Kuldip Das filed a cross-objection contesting the finding that Budparkash was joint with hi:s brother, Nandlcishore.", "canonical_name": "Nandkishore . Das"}}, {"text": "Eudpark.ash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5459, "end_char": 5470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court reversed the deci§jon of the trial court and held (1) that the parli.es were Sudras and not Dwijas, (2} that Eudpark.ash died in a state of separation from his brother, Nandkishore, and (3) that no suit for declaration of title was necessary and the plainti'ff•s failure to• pay sufficient court-fee should not stand in the way of suitable relief being granted to \"\"· him.", "canonical_name": "Budparkash Das"}}, {"text": "Gumarayan Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and1 Z, Gumarayan Das and\n\nGur Narain D11s\n\nand Anot.,,"}}, {"text": "Gur Tahal Dti.f", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5927, "end_char": 5942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gur Tahal Dti.f\n\nand Others,\n\n.Fazl Ali/.\n\nJai Narayan Das, were the legitimate 1; ons of Nandkishore Das.", "canonical_name": "GUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Budparkash Dai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7064, "end_char": 7078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next question which was very seriously debated before us was whether Budparkash Dai; and Nandkishore Das were joint or separate.", "canonical_name": "Budparkash Das"}}, {"text": "Nandkishore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7448, "end_char": 7459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "after reviewing the entire evidence have come to the conclusion that Budparkash Das died in a state of separation from Nandkishore."}}, {"text": "Gur Narain Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8191, "end_char": 8205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1952 letters marked A-1, A-5, A-4,\n\nA-6, A-10 and\n\nA-12, which not only show that this defendant is related to Gur Narain Das the defendants' family, but also that grains and .", "canonical_name": "GUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Gur Tahal Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8373, "end_char": 8386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. none of these documents clearly show that there Gur Tahal Das .", "canonical_name": "GUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Nand-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8431, "end_char": 8436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had been partition between Budparkash and Nand- , .and Others."}}, {"text": "Behar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8871, "end_char": 8876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 has urged that the circumstances considered in the light of the ruling reported in Behar Report, Vol."}}, {"text": "Gur Taha! Oas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10269, "end_char": 10282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gur Taha!", "canonical_name": "GUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali/.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10297, "end_char": 10307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz!", "canonical_name": "Faz! Ali/."}}, {"text": "Kuldip", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10997, "end_char": 11003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In one of these letters exhibit A-10, Nandkishore Das wntmg to Kuldip on the 12th June, 1934, states that he was sending 25 maunds of rice, 7 maunds of khesari and rupees seventy-five and then adds: \"I have got with me all the accounts written, which will be explained when you will come and you will render a just account of your share when you come\", In an(1ther :letter, exhibit A-12, which was written by Nandkishore to Kuldip on the 15th October, 1936, the former states : \"I wrote to you several times to adjust account of your share, but you did not do so up till now.", "canonical_name": "Kuldip Das"}}, {"text": "12th June, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11011, "end_char": 11026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In one of these letters exhibit A-10, Nandkishore Das wntmg to Kuldip on the 12th June, 1934, states that he was sending 25 maunds of rice, 7 maunds of khesari and rupees seventy-five and then adds: \"I have got with me all the accounts written, which will be explained when you will come and you will render a just account of your share when you come\", In an(1ther :letter, exhibit A-12, which was written by Nandkishore to Kuldip on the 15th October, 1936, the former states : \"I wrote to you several times to adjust account of your share, but you did not do so up till now."}}, {"text": "15th October, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11372, "end_char": 11390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In one of these letters exhibit A-10, Nandkishore Das wntmg to Kuldip on the 12th June, 1934, states that he was sending 25 maunds of rice, 7 maunds of khesari and rupees seventy-five and then adds: \"I have got with me all the accounts written, which will be explained when you will come and you will render a just account of your share when you come\", In an(1ther :letter, exhibit A-12, which was written by Nandkishore to Kuldip on the 15th October, 1936, the former states : \"I wrote to you several times to adjust account of your share, but you did not do so up till now."}}, {"text": "Gur Narain Du", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12579, "end_char": 12592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gur Narain Du\n\n1md Anotl11:r The third contention urged on behalf of the appel- T. 1 1 h .", "canonical_name": "GUR NARAIN DAS AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Fal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12862, "end_char": 12869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rights of an Fal Ali /. illegitimate son of a Sudra are considered in Mitakshara, Ch.", "canonical_name": "Faz! Ali/."}}, {"text": "Mitakshara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12919, "end_char": 12929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rights of an Fal Ali /. illegitimate son of a Sudra are considered in Mitakshara, Ch."}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12938, "end_char": 12943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14527, "end_char": 14529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gu, r Narai~ Dai\n\nand Another v •.\n\nGur Tahal Das ·\n\nand Others •.\n\nFazz'Ali /.\n\nIt seems to us that the second proposition enunciated ."}}, {"text": "Gur Tahal Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14563, "end_char": 14576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gu, r Narai~ Dai\n\nand Another v •.\n\nGur Tahal Das ·\n\nand Others •.\n\nFazz'Ali /.\n\nIt seems to us that the second proposition enunciated .", "canonical_name": "GUR TAHAL DAS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Fazz'Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14595, "end_char": 14603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gu, r Narai~ Dai\n\nand Another v •.\n\nGur Tahal Das ·\n\nand Others •.\n\nFazz'Ali /.\n\nIt seems to us that the second proposition enunciated ."}}, {"text": "Mahanth Budh Parkash Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16270, "end_char": 16294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahanth Budh Parkash Das was living separately in the northern house allotted to him and the southern portion was allotted to the thakhta of Nandkishore Das, : the . ·"}}, {"text": "Nandkishore . Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16676, "end_char": 16693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this defendant has nothing to do with the eight annas interest in the properties given in schedule under than C and D relating to jagir and kasht lands, which rightfully belonged to Nandkishore .", "canonical_name": "Nandkishore . Das"}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17425, "end_char": 17435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17494, "end_char": 17508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the legal representative of 4th respondent: _ R. N. Sachthey."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17515, "end_char": 17530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nti."}}, {"text": "VIRKUMAR GULABCHAND SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17537, "end_char": 17561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VIRKUMAR GULABCHAND SHAH\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17564, "end_char": 17578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VIRKUMAR GULABCHAND SHAH\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17583, "end_char": 17594, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "ss. 2(a), 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17661, "end_char": 17676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali/.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18410, "end_char": 18420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali/.\n\n1952.", "canonical_name": "Faz! Ali/."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_877_889_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "I -'\n\n:S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 877\n\n11. That this defendant has nothing to do with the eight annas interest in the properties given in schedule under than C and D relating to jagir and kasht lands, which rightfully belonged to Nandkishore . Das and has no concern with the properties noted in those schedules.\"\n\nParagraph 11 is rather ambiguously worded, but it was conceded before us by the counsel for defendant No. 5 that the latter had no claim to any interest in the properties set out in schedules other than schedules C and D.\n\nSuch being the purport of paragraphs 8 . and 11, the decree should provide that defendant -No. 5 will be entided only to a share in the properties\n\nset out in schedules C and D and will have no . share in the properties set out in the other schedules.\n\n Subject to this modification, the decree of the High Court is affirmed, and this appeal is dismissed. There ·:will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal. dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Naunit Lal.\n\nAgent for the legal representative of 4th respondent: _ R. N. Sachthey.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nti.\n\nVIRKUMAR GULABCHAND SHAH\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nEssential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XX/V of 1946), . ss. 2(a), 17(2)-Spices (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1946, els. 2, 3-Turmeric, whether \"foodstuff\"-Meaning of \"foodstuff\".\n\n~ The term \"foodstuff\" is ambiguous.\n\nIn one sense it has a narrow meaning and is limited to articles which are eaten as food for purposes of nutrition and nourishment and so would • excl?de condiments and spices such as yeast, salt, pepper, bakmg powder and turmeric. In a wider sense it includes every- . thing that goes into the preparation of food proper (as under- stood in the narrow sense) to make it more palatable and digestible.\n\nWhether the term is used in a particular statute in i its wider or narrower sense cannot be answered in the abstract\n\nGur Narain Das\n\nand Anothdv.\n\nGur Tahal Das\n\nand Others.\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\n1952.\n\nMay, 27.\n\n1952\n\n'The Stat< of\n\n'Bom'bay\n\nv. 'Virkumar Gulabchaml Shah.\n\nSUW'REME COURT XE.PORTS [1952]\n\nbut must .be answered with due r<; garil to the .backgromnd and context.\n\n''; furmeric :is a \"food-stuff\" within the meaning ofcl. (3) .of the Spices tForward Contract P.rohibition) Order of 1944, .read with s. 2 (a) of .the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XXIV of 1946). The said order of 1944 falls within the purview of s. 5 of Ordinance No. XVIII of 1946, which was later re-enacted as Act XXIV of 1946, and it is equally saved by s. 17(2) of the Act.\n\nJames v. Jones [1894] I Q. B. 304, Hinde v. Allmond (87 L.J.\n\nK.B. 893), Sainsbury v, Saunders (88 L.J.K.B. 441) roferred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRiso1cr10N : Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 1950.\n\nOn appeal by special leave from the judgment and' order dated the 13th November, 1950, of .the High Court of Judicature at Bonibay (Bavdeknr and' Dixit JJ.) in Criminal Appeal No. 712 of 1950, arising out of judgment dated the 14th August, 1950, of the Court of the Sessions Judge, South Satara, Sangli, in Criminal Appeal No. 35 of 1950 and Criminal Case No. 614 of 1950.\n\nC. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India\n\n( G~ N. Joshi, with him) for the appeHant.\n\nSomayya (B. K. V. Naidu, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1952. May 27. Faz! Ali and Bose JJ. delivered' Judgment as follows :\n\nFAzL ALI J.-I agree that the acquittal of the respondent should not be disturbed, and I also agree generally .with the reasoning of my brQl:her, Bose.\n\nThe question whether 'turmeric is 'foodstrtff' is not entirely free from difficulty. fo one sense, everything which .emer.s into the composition of llood so .as to make it :palatable may 'be described as 'foodstuff', but .that word is .commonly used with reference only to those .articles which .are eaten for .their nutritive value and which :form .the principal , ingredients of cooked or uncooketl •meal, such as wheat, 'rice, meat, fish, milk,. .,.._ 'bread, 'butter, etc.\n\nIt .seems to me desirable that the Act should be amended so as to expressly irrClu&:\n\n\\ \\\n\n~-)\n\nwithin the definition of the somewhat elastic expression \"foodstuff'', turmeric and such other condiments as the Legislature intends to be treated as such for achieving the objects in its: view.\n\nBosE J.-The question in this case is whether turmeric is a \"foodstuff\" within the meaning of clause 3 of the Spices (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944, read with section 2(a) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, (Act XXIV of 1946).\n\nThe respondent was charged with having contravened clause 3 of the Order of 1944 because he entered into a forward contract in turmeric at Sangli on the 18th of March, 1950, in contravention of clause 3 of the Order. He was convicted by the trial Court and sentenced to three months' simple imprisonment together with a fine of Rs. 1,000 and in default, a further three months. But he was acquitted on appeal by the Sessions Court. An appeal to the High Court against the acquittal failed.\n\nThe State of Bombay appeals here but makes 1t plain that it does not want to take any further steps against the respondent in this matter but merely wants to have the question of law decided as a test case as the judgment of the Bombay High Court will have far-reaching effects in the State of Bombay.\n\nIt will be necessary to trace the history of this legislation. In the year 1944 the then Central Government of India promulgated the Spices (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944, under Rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules. Clauses 2 and 3 read together prohibited forward contracts in any of the \"spices\" specified in the first cdlumn of the schedule to that Order. Among the artides listed in the schedule was turmeric.\n\nThe conviction is under that Order and it is admitted that if that Order is still valid the conviction would be good.\n\nThe Defence of India Act was due to expire on the 30th of September, 1946, and with it the Spices Order\n\nof 1944.\n\nBut before it expired an Ordinance called\n\nT /11: State of\n\nBOflfb11y\n\nVirk_umar Gulabclm•I\n\nS1'tr1'.\n\nBose /.\n\n'The State of.\n\nBombay v.\n\nVirkumar Gulabchand Shah.\n\n. Bose/.\n\nthe Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance of 1946 was issued.\n\nThis was Ordinance No. XVII of\n\n1946. The object of the Ordinance, as set out in the preamble, was to provide for the control of what it called \"essential commodities\".\n\nIt defined this to mean, among other things, \"foodstuffs\", and by a further definition \"foodstuffs\" was defined to include edible oilseeds and oils.\n\nNeither spices m general nor turmeric in particular were mentioned.\n\nSection 5 of this Ordinance embodied a •aving clause which saved , ertain Orders which would other .. wise have expired along with the Defence of India v .\n\nRules. The section ran as follows: \"Any order ...... made ...... under rule 81(2) of the .. _ ..\n\nDefence of India Rules, in respect of any matters specified in section 3, which was in force immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance, shaH, not- ' - withstanding the expiration of the said Rules continue in force so far as consistent with this Ordinance and be deemed to be an order made under section 3.\"\n\nThe Ordinance was later replaced by the Act with which we are now concerned, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, (Act XXIV of 1946).\n\nThe Act merely reproduces the language of the Ordi, nance in all material particulars and it is conceded that if the matter falls under the Ordinance it will also fall under the Act.\n\nThe appellant's contention is that turmeric is a foodstuff, therefore the Order of 1944 is saved. The respondent's contention is that turmeric is not a foodstuff. He contends that the Order of 1944 was limited to spices and that turmeric was included in the term by reason of a special definition which specifically included it ; and as the Act of 1946 and the Ordinance are limited to \"foodstuffs\" the Order of 1944 dealing with turmeric was not saved.\n\nThe question therefore is, is turmeric a \"foodstuff\"?_\n\nMuch learned judicial thought has been expended upon this problem-what is and what is not food and what is and what is not a foodstuff; and the only con- Clusion I can draw from a careful consideration of all\n\n•-..t -. -\n\nl -\n\nthe available material is that the t'erm \"foodstuff\" is ambiguous. In one sense it has a narrow meaning and is limited to articles which are eaten as food for purposes of nutrition and nourishment and so would exclude condiments and spices such as yeast, salt, pepper, backing powder and turmeric. In a wider sense, it includes everything that goes into the preparation of food proper (as understood in the narrow sense) to make it more palatable and digestible. In my opinion, the problem posed cannot be answered in the abstract and must be viewed in relation to its background and context. But before I dilate on this, I will exa1nine the dictionary meaning of the words.\n\nThe Oxford English Dictionary defines \"foodstuff\" as follows:\n\n\"that which is taken into the system to maintain life and growth and to supply waste of tissue.\"\n\nIn Webster's International Dictionary \"food\" is defined as:\n\n\"nutritive material absorbed or taken into the body of an organism which serves for purposes of growth, work or repair and for the maintenance of the vital processes.\"\n\nThen follows this explanation :\n\n\"Animals differ greatly from plants in their nutritive processes and require in addition to certain inorganic substances (water, salts etc.) and organic substances of unknown composition (vitamins) not ordinarily classed as foods (though absolutely indispensable to life and contained in greater or less quantities in the substances eaten) complex organic substances which fall into three principal groups, Proteins, Carbohydrates and Fats.\"\n\nNe.xt is given a special definition for legal purposes, namely-\n\n\" As used in laws prohibiting adulteration etc., 'food' is generally held to mean any article used as food or drink by man, whether simple, mixed or compound, including adjuncts such as condiments etc., and often excluding drugs and natural water.\"\n\nShah.\n\nBose f.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nVirkumar Gulabchand Shah.\n\nBose /.\n\nThe definition given of \"foodstuff\" is-\n\n\"1. Anything used as food.\n\n[1952]\n\n2. Any substance of food value as protein, fat etc. entering into the composition of a food.\"\n\nIt will be seen from these definitions that \"food stuff\" has no special meaning of its own.\n\nIt merely carries us back to the definition of \"food\" because \"foodstuff\" is anything which is used as \"food\".\n\nSo far as \"food\" is concerned, it can be used in a wlde as well a narrow sense and, ,1n my opm10n, much must depend upon the context and background.\n\nEven in a popular sense, when one asks another, \"Have you had your food?\", one means the composite preparations which normally go to constitute a meal-curry and rice, sweetmeats, pudding, cooked vegetables and so forth.\n\nOne does not usually think separately of the different preparaticms which enter into their making, of the various condiments and spices and vitamins, any mme than one woukl think of separating in his mind the purely nutritive elements of what is eaten from their non-nutritive adjuncts.\n\nSo also, looked at from another point of view, the various adjuncts of what I may term food proper which enter into its preparation for human consumption in order to make it palatable and nutritive, can hardly be separated from the purely nutritive elements if the effect of their absence would' be to render the particular commodity i:n its finished state unsavoury and indigestible to a whole class of persons whose stomachs are accustomed to a more spicely prepared product.\n\nThe proof of the pudding is, as it were, in the eating, and if the effect of eating what would otherwise be palatable and digestible and therefore nutrhive is to bring on indigestion to a stomach unaccustomed to to such unspiced fare, the answer must, I think, be that however nutritive a product may be in one form it can scarcely be classed as nutiitive if the only result of eating it is to produce the opposite effect; and if the essense of the definition is the nutritive element, then the commodity in. question. must cease\n\nI -\n\n.... _, r\n\n- -\n\n~ . .\\.\n\nto be food, within the strict meaning of the definition, to that particular class of persons, without the addition of the spices which make it nutritive. Put more colloquially, \"one man's food is another man's poison.\" I refer to this not for the sake of splitting hairs but to show the undesirability of such a mode of approach.\n\nThe problem must, I think, be solved in a commonsense way.\n\nI will now refer to the cases which were cited before us. In The Sun Jose, Cometa and Salerno(1) sausage skins-the envelope in which sausage meat is usually contained-were held to be foodstuffs. But this was a case of conditional contraband captured during the war in pursuance of a war-time measure, and the decision was given in accordance with international law.\n\nThis does not appear from the judgment but is plain from an earlier judgment of the same learned President on which . his later decision was based. The earlier judgment is reported in The Kim(2). He explains there at page 27 that the law of contraband is based on \"the right of a belligerent to prevent certain goods from reaching the country of the enemy for his military use,\" and he states, also at page 27, that-\n\n\"International law, in order to be adequate as well as just, must have regard to the circumstances of the times, including the circumstances arising out of the particular situation of the war, or the condition of the parties engaged in it.\"\n\nOne of the changing circumstances he felt he had to take into consideration is set out at page 29:\n\n\"The ren for drawing a distinction between foodstuffs intended for the civil population and those for the armed forces or enemy Government disappears\n\n~ when the distinction between the civil population and the armed forces itself disappears .... Experience shows that the power to requisition will be used to the fullest extent in order to make s.ure that the wants of the military are supplied, and however much goods may\n\n.... , be imported for civil use it is by the military that\n\n(1) 33 T.L.R. 12.\n\n(2) 32 T.L.R. 10.\n\nT lie Stt1te crf\n\nBomb•y\n\nVirkumar Gulabchand\n\nShah.\n\nBose].\n\nShah.\n\nBose /.\n\nthey will be consumed if military exigencies require it, especially now that the German Government have • taken control of all the foodstuffs in the country.\"\n\nIt is understandable that viewed against a background like that, the word \"foodstuffs\" would be construed in its wider sense fill order to give full effect to the object behind the law, namely the safety and preservation of the State.\n\nIt is also perhaps relevant to note that the term which was under consideration in those cases occurred in a war-time measure, namely a Proclamation promulgated on the 4th of August, 1914, the day on which the first world war started. There is authority for the view that war-time measures, which often have to be\n\nenacted hastily to meet a grave pressing national emergency in which the very existence of the State is at stake, should be construed more liberally in favour of the Crown or the State than peace-time legislation. The only assistance I can derive from this case is that the term \"foodstuffs\" is wide enough to cover matter which would not normally fall within the definition of what I have called food proper. I do not think it is helpful in deciding whether the wider or the narrower definition should be employed here because the circumstances and background are so different. .\n\nThe next case to which I will refer is James v ..\n\nJones('). That was a case of baking powder and it was held that baking powder is an article of food within the meaning of the English Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875.\n\nNow it has to be observed here that the object of that Act was to prevent the adulteration of food with ingredients which are injurious to health. It is evident that the definition would have to be wide so as to indude not only foodstuffs strictly so called but also ingredients which ultimately enter into its preparation,. otherwise the purpose of the legislation, which was to conserve the health of the British people, would\n\nhave been defeated. ·\n\n(!) [1894] 1 Q.B. 304.\n\nI I\n\nl..\n\n...\n\nNext comes a case relating to tea in which a narrower view was taken : Hinde v. Allmond(1). The question there was whether tea was an \"article of food\" within the meaning of an Order designed to prohibit the hoarding of food, namely the Food Hoarding Order of 1917. The learned Judges held it was not. But here it is necessary to note the background and at any rate some of the reasons given for the decision.\n\nThe prosecution there was directed against an ordinary housewife who had in her posses.sion a quantity of tea which exceeded the quantity required for ordinary used and consumption in her household. The Food Hoanling Order <lid not specify tea or indeed any other article.\n\nIt merely prohibited generally the hoarding of any \"article of food\" by requiring that no person should have in his possession or under his control at any one time more than the quantity required for use and consumption in his household or establishment. Shearman J. said that he rested his judgment on the \"commonsense interpretation of the word 'food' in the Order, apart from its meaning in any other statute\" and said :-\n\n\"I agree with my brother Darling that if it had been intended to include tea as food, it ought to have been expressly so provided in the Order.\"\n\nDarling J. explained what he meant in this case in a later decision, Sainsbury v.\n\nSaunders(2), and said that there was nothing to prevent the Food Controller from saying that a person should not have, for example, so much wine in his possession, provided he did not simply call it \"food\" and provided also that he let a person who was to be punished know what it was that he was not to do.\n\nI think it is clear that the learned Judges were influenced in their judgment by the fact that the Order in the earlier case was one which affected the ordinary run of householders and housewives who would not have lawyers at their elbows to advise them regarding their day to day marketing. In the circumstances, they decided that the word should be given\n\n(1) 87 L. J. K. B. 893. 8-9 S.c. India/71\n\n(2) 88 L. J. K. B. 441.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nVirkumar Gulabchand Shah.\n\nBose/.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nVirkumar G:<labchand\n\nShah.\n\nllose f.\n\nits o.rdinary and popular meaning, otherwise many mnocent householders), who had no intention of breaking the law, would be trapped; and this seems to be the ratio decidendi in the decision of the Bombay High Court in Hub/al Kamtaprasad v.\n\nGoel Bros. & Co. Ltd. (Appeal No. 14 of 1950) which is the decision virtually, though not directly, under appeal here, though the learned Judges also take into consideration two further facts, namely that the law should be construed in favour of the freedom of contracts and a penal enactment in favour of the subject.\n\nThe English decision about tea just cited is to be contrasted with another decision, also about tea, given a few months later in same year: Sainsbury v.\n\nSaunders('). Two of the Judges, Darling and Avary, JJ. were parties to the earlier decision; Salter J.\n\nwas not. He held that though tea 'had been held in the earlier case not to be a \"food\" for the purpose of the Food Hoarding Order of 1917, it was a \"food\" within the meaning of the expressions used in certain Defence of the Realm Regulations read with the New Ministries and Secretaries Act of 1916 which empowered the Food Controller to regulate \"the food supply of the country\" and the \"supply and consumption and production of food.\" Avary J. also considered that tea was an article of food for the purposes of rhese laws though Darling J. preferred to adhere to his earlier view. All three Judges also held that the provisions were wide enough to enable the Food Controller to hit at articles which were not food at all, such as sacks and tin containers (Darling J.) so long as he was able by these means even indirectly to regulate the supply of \"food\", but that portion of the decision does not concern us hen; because the laws they were interpreting were more widely phrased.\n\nNow the comparison of one Act with another is dangerous, especially when the Act used for comparison is an English Act and a war-time measure, and I have no intention of falling into that error. I am concerned here with the Act before me and must\n\n(!) 88 L. J. K. B. 441.\n\ninterpret its provisions uninfluenced by expressions, however similar, used in other Acts. I have referred to the cases discussed above, not for purposes of comparison but to show that the terms \"food\" and \"foodtuffs\" can be used in both a wide and a narrow sense and that the circumstanct:l\\ and background can alone determine which is proper in any given case.\n\nTurning to the Act with which we are concerned, it will be necessary again to advert to its history. Rule 81 (2) was wide and all embracing and the Order of 1944 clearly fell within its ambit.\n\nIt is also relevant to note that one of the purposes of the Order, as dis;. closed in its preamble, was to \"maintain supplies essential to the life of the community.\" As turmeric was specifically included with certain other spices, it is clear that turmeric was then considered tCJ be a commodity essential to the life of the community, that is to say, it wa& considered an essential commodity and not merely a luxury which at a time of austerity could be dispensed with.\n\nThen, when we turn to the Ordinance and the Act of 1946, we find from the preamble that the legislature considered that it was still necessary- \"to provide for the continuance . ....... of powersto control the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, foodstuffs . ... \"\n\nSection 3(1) of the Act continues this theme:\n\n\"The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, may by notified order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.\"\n\nThe Ordinance is in the same terms.\n\nNow I have no doubt that had the Central Government re-promulgated the Order of 1944 in 1946 after the passing of either the Ordinance of the Act of 1946, the Order would have been good. As we have seen, turmeric falls within the wider definition of \"food\"\n\nThe State of\n\nBorn bay v.\n\nVirkumar Gula be hand Shah.\n\nBose f.\n\nTh< Stat< of Bombay\n\nV.\n\nVirkumal\" Gula be hand\n\nShah.\n\nBou/.\n\nand \"foodstuffs\" given in a dictionary of international standing as well as in several English decisions. It is, I think, as much a \"foodstuff'', in its wider meaning, as sausage, skins and baking powder and tea.\n\nIn the face of all that I would find it difficult to hold that, an article like turmeric cannot fall within the wider meaning of the term \"foodstuffs\". Had the Order of 1944 not specified turmeric and had it merely prohibited forward oontracts in \"foddstuffs\" I would have held, in line with the earlier tea case, that that is not a proper way of penalising a man for trading in an article which would. not ordinarily be considered as a foodstuff. But in the face of the order of 1944, which specifically includes turmeric, no one can oomplain that his attention was not drawn to the prohibition of trading in this particular commodity and if, in spite of that, he chooses to disregard the Order and test its validity in a court of law, he can hardly complain that he was •trapped or taken unawares; whatever he may have thought he was at any rate placed on his guard. As I see it, the test here is whether the Order of 1944 would have been a good order had it been repromulgated after the Ordinance of\n\n1946. In my opinion, it would, and from that it follows that it is saved by the saving clauses of the Ordinance and the Act.\n\nI have already set out section 5 of the Ordinance.\n\nIn my opinion, the Order of 1944 falls within its purview, and if it is saved by thait, i!t is equally saved by section 17 (2) of the Act.\n\nThe section is in these terms:\n\n\"Any order . . . . . . . . . . deemed to be made under the said Ordinance and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue in force and be deemed to be an order made under this Act.\"\n\nIn my opinion, the conviction was good and the High Court was wrong in setting it aside, but though the matter has no relevance here because of the undertaking given by the learned Solicitor-General not to '- proceed against the respondent any further in this matter, I think it right to ob; erve that the attitude of\n\n'r -\n\nthe learned English Judges in the first tea case would not be without relevance on the question of sentence in many cases of this kind. There can, I think, be no doubt that businessmen who are not lawyers might well be misled into thinking that the Ordinance and the Act did not intend to keep the Order of 1944 alive because the Order related to certain specified spices while the Ordinance and the Act changed the .nomenclature and limited themsleves to \"foodstuffs\", a term which, on a narrow view, would not include condiments and spices.\n\nHowever, these observations are not relevant here because we are not asked to restore either the conviction or the sentence. In view of that, there will be no further order and the acquittal will be left as it stands.\n\n. \\ Order accordingly.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the respondent : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nfl. '\n\nMAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHW AR SINGH\n\nOF DARBHANGA AND OTHERS\n\n(CASES Nos. 305 TO 348 OF 1951 AND PETITION No. 612 OF 1951)\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nBihar Land Reforms Act (XXX of 1950)-Law for abolition of zamindaries-Validity-Necessity to provide for compensation and of public purpose-Jurisdiction of Court to enquire into validity- Delegation of legislative powers-Fraud on the Constitution-Constitution of India, 1950-Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951- Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, 362, 363-Sch. VII, List II, entries 18, 36 and List Ill, entry 42-Construction-Spirit of the Constitution- Right of eminent domain-\"Law\", \"Legislature\", \"Public purpose\", meanings of-Convent of merger-Compulsory acquisition of private property of Ruler-Acquisition of arrears of rent payinl 50%-Deduction for cost of works-Legality.\n\nShah.\n\nBose /.\n\nMay 2, 5.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "Nandkishore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 233, "end_char": 244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this defendant has nothing to do with the eight annas interest in the properties given in schedule under than C and D relating to jagir and kasht lands, which rightfully belonged to Nandkishore ."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 982, "end_char": 992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the legal representative of 4th respondent: _ R. N. Sachthey."}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1068, "end_char": 1087, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIRKUMAR GULABCHAND SHAH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1094, "end_char": 1118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIRKUMAR GULABCHAND SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1140, "end_char": 1155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 2(a), 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1218, "end_char": 1233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gur Narain Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1909, "end_char": 1923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether the term is used in a particular statute in i its wider or narrower sense cannot be answered in the abstract\n\nGur Narain Das\n\nand Anothdv."}}, {"text": "Gur Tahal Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1939, "end_char": 1952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gur Tahal Das\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Virkumar Gulabchaml Shah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2031, "end_char": 2055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1952\n\n'The Stat< of\n\n'Bom'bay\n\nv. 'Virkumar Gulabchaml Shah.", "canonical_name": "VIRKUMAR GULABCHAND SHAH"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2298, "end_char": 2302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2424, "end_char": 2428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2536, "end_char": 2544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bonibay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2848, "end_char": 2883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by special leave from the judgment and' order dated the 13th November, 1950, of .the High Court of Judicature at Bonibay (Bavdeknr and' Dixit JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bavdeknr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2885, "end_char": 2893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by special leave from the judgment and' order dated the 13th November, 1950, of .the High Court of Judicature at Bonibay (Bavdeknr and' Dixit JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2899, "end_char": 2904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by special leave from the judgment and' order dated the 13th November, 1950, of .the High Court of Judicature at Bonibay (Bavdeknr and' Dixit JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K.\n\nDaphtary", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India\n\n( G~ N. Joshi, with him) for the appeHant."}}, {"text": "G~ N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3174, "end_char": 3185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India\n\n( G~ N. Joshi, with him) for the appeHant."}}, {"text": "B. K. V. Naidu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3225, "end_char": 3239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Somayya (B. K. V. Naidu, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3286, "end_char": 3294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz!"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3299, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali and Bose JJ."}}, {"text": "FAzL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3342, "end_char": 3350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered' Judgment as follows :\n\nFAzL ALI J.-I agree that the acquittal of the respondent should not be disturbed, and I also agree generally .with the reasoning of my brQl:her, Bose."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4357, "end_char": 4365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4435, "end_char": 4447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4576, "end_char": 4584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sangli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4664, "end_char": 4670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was charged with having contravened clause 3 of the Order of 1944 because he entered into a forward contract in turmeric at Sangli on the 18th of March, 1950, in contravention of clause 3 of the Order."}}, {"text": "18th of March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4678, "end_char": 4697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was charged with having contravened clause 3 of the Order of 1944 because he entered into a forward contract in turmeric at Sangli on the 18th of March, 1950, in contravention of clause 3 of the Order."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4719, "end_char": 4727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5020, "end_char": 5035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bombay appeals here but makes 1t plain that it does not want to take any further steps against the respondent in this matter but merely wants to have the question of law decided as a test case as the judgment of the Bombay High Court will have far-reaching effects in the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5245, "end_char": 5262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bombay appeals here but makes 1t plain that it does not want to take any further steps against the respondent in this matter but merely wants to have the question of law decided as a test case as the judgment of the Bombay High Court will have far-reaching effects in the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Central Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5408, "end_char": 5435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1944 the then Central Government of India promulgated the Spices (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1944, under Rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6078, "end_char": 6080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6623, "end_char": 6632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6878, "end_char": 6900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6941, "end_char": 6950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7186, "end_char": 7195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "Virkumar Gulabchand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14350, "end_char": 14369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T lie Stt1te crf\n\nBomb•y\n\nVirkumar Gulabchand\n\nShah."}}, {"text": "German Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14483, "end_char": 14500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose /.\n\nthey will be consumed if military exigencies require it, especially now that the German Government have • taken control of all the foodstuffs in the country.\""}}, {"text": "4th of August, 1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14966, "end_char": 14985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also perhaps relevant to note that the term which was under consideration in those cases occurred in a war-time measure, namely a Proclamation promulgated on the 4th of August, 1914, the day on which the first world war started."}}, {"text": "Shearman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17347, "end_char": 17355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shearman J. said that he rested his judgment on the \"commonsense interpretation of the word 'food' in the Order, apart from its meaning in any other statute\" and said :-\n\n\"I agree with my brother Darling that if it had been intended to include tea as food, it ought to have been expressly so provided in the Order.\""}}, {"text": "Darling", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17543, "end_char": 17550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shearman J. said that he rested his judgment on the \"commonsense interpretation of the word 'food' in the Order, apart from its meaning in any other statute\" and said :-\n\n\"I agree with my brother Darling that if it had been intended to include tea as food, it ought to have been expressly so provided in the Order.\"", "canonical_name": "Darling"}}, {"text": "Darling", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17664, "end_char": 17671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Darling J. explained what he meant in this case in a later decision, Sainsbury v.\n\nSaunders(2), and said that there was nothing to prevent the Food Controller from saying that a person should not have, for example, so much wine in his possession, provided he did not simply call it \"food\" and provided also that he let a person who was to be punished know what it was that he was not to do.", "canonical_name": "Darling"}}, {"text": "Avary", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19363, "end_char": 19368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two of the Judges, Darling and Avary, JJ."}}, {"text": "Salter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19412, "end_char": 19418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were parties to the earlier decision; Salter J.\n\nwas not."}}, {"text": "Defence of the Realm Regulations read with the New Ministries and Secretaries Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19632, "end_char": 19713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22008, "end_char": 22020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22060, "end_char": 22078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3(1) of the Act continues this theme:\n\n\"The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, may by notified order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.\""}}, {"text": "Virkumal\" Gula", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22808, "end_char": 22822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose f.\n\nTh< Stat< of Bombay\n\nV.\n\nVirkumal\" Gula be hand\n\nShah."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24213, "end_char": 24222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24354, "end_char": 24364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25762, "end_char": 25773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25803, "end_char": 25818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25825, "end_char": 25839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nfl. '"}}, {"text": "MAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHW AR SINGH\n\nOF DARBHANGA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25848, "end_char": 25898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHW AR SINGH\n\nOF DARBHANGA AND OTHERS\n\n(CASES Nos."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25974, "end_char": 25990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "612 OF 1951)\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25998, "end_char": 26016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "612 OF 1951)\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26018, "end_char": 26027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "612 OF 1951)\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26037, "end_char": 26057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "612 OF 1951)\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26064, "end_char": 26086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26310, "end_char": 26331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 31, 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26380, "end_char": 26392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_889_1019_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 889\n\nthe learned English Judges in the first tea case would not be without relevance on the question of sentence in many cases of this kind. There can, I think, be no doubt that businessmen who are not lawyers might well be misled into thinking that the Ordinance and the Act did not intend to keep the Order of 1944 alive because the Order related to certain specified spices while the Ordinance and the Act changed the .nomenclature and limited themsleves to \"foodstuffs\", a term which, on a narrow view, would not include condiments and spices.\n\nHowever, these observations are not relevant here because we are not asked to restore either the conviction or the sentence. In view of that, there will be no further order and the acquittal will be left as it stands.\n\n. \\ Order accordingly.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the respondent : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR\n\nfl. '\n\nMAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHW AR SINGH\n\nOF DARBHANGA AND OTHERS\n\n(CASES Nos. 305 TO 348 OF 1951 AND PETITION No. 612 OF 1951)\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nBihar Land Reforms Act (XXX of 1950)-Law for abolition of zamindaries-Validity-Necessity to provide for compensation and of public purpose-Jurisdiction of Court to enquire into validity- Delegation of legislative powers-Fraud on the Constitution-Constitution of India, 1950-Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951- Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, 362, 363-Sch. VII, List II, entries 18, 36 and List Ill, entry 42-Construction-Spirit of the Constitution- Right of eminent domain-\"Law\", \"Legislature\", \"Public purpose\", meanings of-Convent of merger-Compulsory acquisition of private property of Ruler-Acquisition of arrears of rent payinl 50%-Deduction for cost of works-Legality.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nVirkumar Gulabchand\n\nShah.\n\nBose /.\n\nMay 2, 5.\n\n1952 - The State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaiadhira; aSir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nHeld per Curiah\n\n(MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRA SEKHARA AtYAR JJ.)-Thc Bihar Land Reforms Act,\n\nXXX of 1950, is not unconstitutional or void except with regard to the provisions in s. 4(b) and s. 23(f) thereof.\n\nThe provisions of s. 4(b) and s. 23(f) are unconstitutional.\n\nPer\n\nPATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C. J. and DAs J~The whole of the Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950, including the provisions contained in s. 4(b) and s. 23(f) is constitutional and valid.\n\nPer\n\nPATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C. J.,\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, D1i.s and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-(i) The Bihar Land Reforms Act, XXX of 1950, is not a law in respect of a matter mentioned in entry 18 of List II, viz., \"lands and land tenures\", but a law in respect of \"acquisition of property\", a matter covered by entry 36 of List II.\n\n(ii) The obligation to pay compensation for property acquired by the State is not an obligation imposed by entry 36 of List II read by itself or in conjunction with entry 42 of List III or by the spirit of the Constitution.\n\nConsequently, an objection to the validity of a statute in resixct of acquisition of property on the ground that it does not provide for payment of compensation is an objection on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of. art. 31(2) and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such an objection in respect of a statute mentioned in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution is barred by art. 31(4), art. 31-A and art. 31-B of the Constitution. Per DAs /.- Assuining that the obligation to pay compensation is also implicit in entry 36 of List II, in itself or read with entry 42 of List III, even then the validity of the Act cannot be questioned by reason of arts. 31( 4), 31-A and 31-B.\n\n(iii) Section 32(2) of the Act which empowers the State Government to frame rules providing for \"the proportion in which compeinsation shall be payable in cash and in bonds and the manner of payment pf such compensation\" does not involve any delegation of legislative powers especially as the legislature has itself provided in s. 32(2) that the compensation shall be payable in cash or in bonds . or partly in cash and partly in bonds and fixed the number of instalments in which it should be paid.\n\nThe words \"subject to\" in entry 36 of List II only mean that whenever a law is made by a State Legislature in exercise of its legislative power under entry 36, that law will be subject to the provisions of a law made by the Parliament under entry 42 of List III. The words do not mean that when a State makes a law under entry 36 it must lay down the principles on which compensation payable for property acquired is to be determined and the form and manner in which it should be given.\n\n(iv) Entries in the Lc; gislative Lists arc merely of an enabling character.\n\nThe power conferred thereunder on the legislatures is not coupled with any duty on the legislature to exercise\n\n• ..\n\n:such power and the principle laid down in /ulius v. Bishop of\n\nOxford [5 A.C. 214] has, therefore, no application to the Lists.\n\nPer\n\nPATANJALI\n\nSASTRI C.\n\nJ., MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.\n\n(MAHAJAN and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR\n\nJJ. dissenting).-The existence of a public purpose as a pre-requisite to the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition is an essential and integral part of the provisions of art. 31(2) and an infringement of such a provision cannot be put forward as a ground for questioning the validity of an Act providing for compulsory acquisition.\n\nDAs. J.-Even assuming that the necessity of a public purpose is implied in entry 36 of List II and/or entry 42 of List III also, arts. 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B would still protect the Act from being questioned on the ground that the acquisition was not for a public purpose. In any case the impugned Act is supported by a public purpose.\n\nPer MAHAJAN and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.-The scope -0f art. 31(4) is limited to the express provisions of art. 31(2) and though the courts cannot examine the extent or adequacy -0f the provisions of compensation contained in any law dealing with the acquisition of property compulsorily, yet the provisions of art. 31 ( 4) do not in any way debar the court from consider• ing whether the acquisition is for a public purpose.\n\nThough the main object of the Act, viz., the acquisition of estates, is for a public purpose, the acquisition of arrears of rent due to the zamindars on payment of 50 per cent. of their value cannot be held to be for a public purpose and sec. 4 clause (b) of the Act is therefore unconstitutional and void.\n\nPer MuKHERJEA J.-Assuming that art. 31 ( 4) relates to everything that is provided for in art. 31 (2) either in express terms or even impliedly and consequently thei question of the existence of a public purpose is not justiciable, as the real object of sec. 4, clause (b) is to deprive the man of his money, which is not a subject-matter for acquisition under the powers of eminent domain, without giving anything in exchanm under the guise of acting under entry 4 2 the legislature has in truth and substance evaded and nullified its provisions altogether and sec. 4 clause (b) is therefore unconstitutional \"'' and void.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-Whatever may be the pc>1t10n as regards the acquisition of money as such it is not correct to say that a law made under entry 36 of List II cannot authorise acquisition of choses in action like arrears 'of rent due from the tenants which are covered by the term \"property\" used in that entry and in art. 31. The view that .a payment in cash or in government bonds of half the amount of such arrears leaves the zamindar without compensation for the balance is equally fallacious. Section 4 clause (b) is not therefore ultra vires or unconstitutional.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nThe Sta~ of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhirajaSir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nPer MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHAllA AIYAR JJ. (PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J. and DAs J. dissenting).-&xtion 23 (b) of the Act which provides for a deduction on a percentage basis out of the gross asserts for \"costs of works of benefit to the raiyat\", is ostensibly enacted under entry 42 of List III, but it is merely a colourable piece of legislation, a mere device to reduce the gross assets, which does not really come under entry 42 and is unconstitutional.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C.\n\nJ. and DAs J.-The zamindars are under an obligation to maintain and repair the minor irrigation works in their villages which arc beneficial to the raiyats and the cost of such works is therefore a perfectly legitimate deduction in computing the net assets of the estate and sec. 23(f) is not unconstitutional. Further, as a payment of compensation is not a justiciable issue in the case of the im~ pugned statute, having regard to arts. 31 (4), 31-A and 31-B, it is not open to the Court to enquire whether a reduction which results in reducing the compensation is unwarranted and there fore a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nPer MAHAJAN J.-The phrase \"public purpose\" hao to be construed according to the spirit of the times in which the particular legislation is enacted and so construed, acquisition of estates for the purpose of preventing the concentration of huge blocks of land in the hands of a few individuals and to do away with intermediaries is for a public purpose.\n\n-Per DAs J.-No hard and fast definition can be laid down as to what is a \"public purpose\" as tho concept has been rapidly changing in all countries, but it is clear that it is the presence of the element of general interest of the community in an object or an aim that transforms such object or aim into a public purpose, and whatever furthers the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual must be regarded as a pnblic purpose.\n\nAPPEALS under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and decree dated 12th March, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\n(Shearer, Reuben and Das JJ.) in Title Suits Nos. 1 to 3 and Mis. Judicial Cases Nos. 230-234, 237-244, 246 to 254, 257, 261 to 264, 266, 262, 270 to 277, 287-290 and 297 of 1951. PETITION No. 612 of 1951, a petition under. article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights, was also heard along with , these appeals.\n\nThe facts that gave rise to these appeals and peti- ;. tion arc stated in the judgment.\n\nM. C. Settdvad (Attorney-General. for India) and Mahabir Prasad (Advocate-General. of Bihar) with G. N.\n\nJoshi, Lal Narain Singh and Alladi Kuppuswami for the State of Bihar.\n\nP. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the respondents in Cases Nos. 339, 319, 327, 330 and 332 of 1951.\n\nSanjib K. Chowdhury, S. N. Mukherjee, S. K. Kapur for the respondents in Cases Nos. 309, 328, and 336 of 1951.\n\nUrukramdas Chakravarty for the respondents in Cases Nos. 326, 337 and 344 of 1951.\n\nRaghosaran Ltd for the respondents in Cases Nos. 310, 311 and 329 of 1951.\n\nS. C. Mazumdar for the respondent in Case No. 315 of 1951.\n\nS. Mustafid and /agadish Chandra Sinha for the respondents in Cases Nos. 307, 313, 320, 321, and 322 of 1951.\n\nRay Parasnath for the respondent in Case No. 331 of 1951.\n\nS. K. Kapur for the petitioner in Petition No. 612 of 1951.\n\n1952. May 2, 5. The Court delivered judgment as follows:-\n\nPATANJALI SAsTR1 C.\n\nJ.-*These appeals and petitions which fall into three groups raise the issue of the constitutional validity of three State enactments called\n\nThe Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950),\n\n'*The Chief Justice, in his judgment, dealt with the above Cases and Petition and also Petitions Nos. 166; 228, 237, 245, 246, 257, 268, 280 to 285, 287 to 289, 317, 318 and 487 of 1951 (relating to the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates Mahals, Ali®ated Lands) Act, 1950) and Cases Nos. 283 to 295 of 1951 (relating to the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950).\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhangt;\n\nand Others.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaja- Jhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) (No. I of 1951), and\n\n[1952]\n\nProprietary Act, 1950\n\nThe Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U. P. Act No. I of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Bihar Act, the Madhya Pradesh Act and the Uttar Pradesh Act, respectively).\n\nThe common aim of these statutes, generally speaking, is to abolish zamindaries and other proprietary estates and tenures in the three States aforesaid, so as to eliminate the intermediaries by means of compulsory acquisition of their rights and interests, and to bring the raiyats and other occupants of lands in those areas into direct relation with the Government. The constitutionality of these Acts having been challenged in the respective State High Courts on nrious grounds, the Bihar Act was declared unconstitutional and void on the ground that it contravened article 14 of the Constitution, the other grounds of attack being rejected while the other two Acts were adjudged constitutional and valid. The appeals are directed against these decisions.\n\nPetitions have also been filed in this Court under article 32 by certain other zamindars seeking determination of the same issues. The common question which arises for consideration in all these appeals and petitions is whether the three State Legislatures, whch respetively passed the three impugned statutes, were constitutiona\\.ly competent to enact them, though some special points are also involved in a few of these cases.\n\nAs has been stated, various grounds of attack were put forward in the courts below, and, all of\n\nthem having been repeated in the memoranda of appeals and the petitions, they would have required consideration but for the amendment of the Constitution by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act) which was passed by the provisional Parlia- .._. ment during the pendency of these proceedings.\n\nThat Act by inserting the new articles 31-A and\n\n31-B purported to protect, generally, all laws providing for the acquisition of estates or interes.ts therein, and specifically, certain statutes, including the three impugned Acts, from attacks based on article 13 read with other relevant articles of Part III of the Constitution.\n\nAnd the operation of these articles was made retrospective by providing, in section 4 of the Amendment Act, that article 31-A shall be \"deemed always to have been inserted\" and, in article • 31-B, that none of the specified' statutes \"shall be deemed ever to have become void\". The validity of the Amendment Act was in turn challenged in proceedings instituted in this Court under article 32 but was upheld in Sankari Prasad Singh Dea v. Union of India and State of Bihar(1). The result is that the impugned Acts can no longer be attacked on the ground of alleged infringement of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III.\n\nIt will be noted, however, that articles 31-A and 31-B afford only limited protection against one ground of challenge, namely that the law in question is \"inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part\". This is made further clear by the opening words of article 31-A \"notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part\".\n\nThe Amendment Act thus provides no immunity from attacks based on the lack of legislative competence under article 246, read with the entries in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to enact the three impugned statutes, as the Amendment Act d!d not in any way affect the Lists.\n\nMr. P. R Das, leading counsel for the zamindars, accordingly based his main argument in these proceedings on entry 36 of List II and entry 42 of List III which read as follows :\n\n\"36. Acquisition or requisitioning except for the purposes of the Union, Provisions of entry 42 of List III.\n\nof property, subject to the\n\n42. Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 89.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga .\n\nand Others ......\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaj a. dhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanja/i Sastri C. /,\n\nor of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner . in which such compensation is to be given\".\n\nThe argument may be summarised thus.\n\nEntry 36 of List II read with article 246(3) was obviously intended to authorise a State Legislature to exercise the right of eminent domain, that is, the right of compulsory acquisition of private property, The exercise of such power has been recognised in the jurisprudence of all civilised countries as conditioned by public necessity and payment of compensation.\n\nAll legislation in this country authorising such acquisition of property from Regulation I of 1824 of the Bengal Code down to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, proceeded on that footing.\n\nThe existence of a public purpose and an obligation to pay compensation being thus the necessary concomitants of compulsory acquisition of private property, the term \"acquisition\" must be construed as importing, by necessary implication, the two conditions aforesaid. It is a recognised rule for the construction of statutes that, unless the words of the statute clearly so demand, a statute is not to be construed so as to take away the property of a subject without compensation : Attorney-General v.\n\nDe Keyser's Royal Hotel(1 ). The power to take compulsorily raises by implication a right to payment ; Central Control Board v. Cannon Brewery('). The words \"subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III\" in entry 36 reinforce the argument, as these words must be taken to mean that the power to make a law with respect to acquisition of property should be exercised subject to the condition that such law should also provide for the matters referred to in entry 4 2, in other words, a two-fold restriction as to public purpose and payment . of compensation (both of which are referred to in entry 42) is imposed on the exercise of the law making power under entry 36.\n\nIn any case, the legislative power conferred under entry 42 is a power coupled with a duty to exercise it for the benefit of the owners whose properties are compulsorily acquired\n\n(1) [1920) A.C. 508, 542.\n\n(2) [1919] A.C. 744.\n\n' ..\n\n; under a law made under entry 36. For all these reasons the State Legislatures, it was claimed, had no power to make a law for acquisition of property without fulfilling the two conditions as to public purpose .and payment of compensation.\n\nOn the basis of these arguments, counsel proceeded to examine elaborately various provisions of the impugned Acts with a view to show that the compensation which they purport to provide has, by \"various shifts :and contrivances\", been reduced to an illusory figure as compared with the market value of the properties acquired.\n\nThe principles laid down for the computation of compensation operated m reality as ·\"principles of confiscation\", and the enactment of the statutes was in truth a \"fraud on the Constitution\", each of them being a colourable legislative .expedient for taking private properties , without payment of compensation in violation of the Constitution, while pretending to comply with its requirements.\n\nNor were, these statutes enacted for any public pur~ pose ; their only purpose and effect was to destroy the dass of zamindars and tenure-holders and make the Government a \"super-landlord\".\n\nWhile such an aim might commend itself as a proper policy to be pursued by the politkal party in power, it could not, in law, be regarded as a public purpose.\n\nMr. Somayya, who appeared for some of the zamin- -dars in the Madhya Pradesh group of cases, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Das, put forward an additional ground of objection.\n\nHe argued that the impugned Acts were not passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in article 31 (3) which provides \"No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made :by the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent\".\n\nLearned counsel stressed the words \"law\" and ·•'legislature\" and submitted that, inasmuch as the legislature of a State included the Governor (article 116\n\n.{ ·-:-.\n\nThe State of Bihar v • MaharaiadhirajaSir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and O.t!zers.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\ny, MaharajadhirajaSir Kameshwar\n\nSinKh of Darbhanga\n\n11nd Ot7ters.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. f,\n\n168) and a bill could become a law only after the Governor assented to it under article 200, clause (3) of article 31 must be taken to require that a State law authorising compulsory acquisition of property should rei; eive the Governor's as well as the President's assent, the former to mab: it a law and the latter to give it \"effect\". As the relative bilbi were reserved in each case by the Governor concerned after they were passed by the House or Houses of Legislature, a& . the ::.;;,; may b~ without giving his assent under article 200, the statutes did not satisfy the require- , ments of article 31 (3) and so could not have \"effect\". This ground of attack, it was claimed, was not exclud- 'ed by article 31-A or article 31-B as it was not based on infringement of fundamental rights.\n\nDr. Ambedkar, who appeared for some of the zemindars in the Uttar Pradesh batch of cases, advanced a different line of argument. He placed no reliance upon entry 36 of List II or entry 42 of List III. He appeared to concede what Mr. Das so strenuously contested, that those entries, concerned as they were with the grant of power to the State Legislature to legislate with respect to matters specified therein, could not be taken, as a matter of construction, to import an obli-- gation to pay compensation.\n\nBut he maintained that a constitutional prohibition against compulsory acquisition of property without public necessity and payment of compensation was deducible from what hecalled the \"spirit of the Constitution\", which, according to him, was a valid test for judging the constitutionality of a statute.\n\nThe Constitution, being avowedly •one for establishing liberty, justice and equality and' a government of a free people with only limited powers, must be held to contain an implied prohibition against taking private property without just compensation and in the absence of a public purpose. He relied on certain American decisions. and text books as supporting the view that a constitutional prohibition can be derived by implication from the spirit of the Con-· stitution where no exprs prohibtion has been enacted in that behalf.\n\nArticles 31-A and 31-B barred.\n\nonly objections basd on alleged infringements of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III, but if, from the other provisions thereof it could be inferred that there must be a public purpose and payment of compensation before private property could be compulsorily acquired by the State, there was npthing in the two articles aforesaid to preclude objection on the ground that the impugned Acts do not satisfy these requirements and are, therefore, unconstitutional.\n\nIn addition to the aforesaid grounds of attack, which were common to all the three impugned statutes, the validity of each of them or of some specific provisions thereof was Aliso challenged on some special grounds • It will be convenient to deal with them after disposing of the main contentions summarised above which are common to all the three batches of case~.\n\nThese contentions are, in my judgment devoid of of substance and force and I have no hesitation in rejecting them.\n\nThe fact of the matter is the zemindars lost the battle in the last round when this Court upheld the constitutionality of the Amendment Act which the Provisional Parliament enacted with the object, among others, of putting an end to this litigation. And it is no disparagement to their learned counsel to say that what remained of the compaign has been fought with such weak arguments as overtaxed ingenuity could suggest.\n\nIt will be convenient here to set out the material provisions of the Constitution on which the arguments before us have largely turned.\n\nArticle 31 (2).\n\nNo property movable or immovable ........ shall be acquired for public purposes under any law authorising ........ such acquisition unless the law provides for compensation for the property .... acquired and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner\n\ni~ which the compensation is to be determined and given.\n\n(3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless\n\n3-10 S. C. India/71\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar v.\n\nMaharaia dhiraia Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhang_a\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\n•• Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh 11f Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nI such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.\n\n( 4) If any bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2).\n\n(5) Nothing in clause (2) hall affect- ( a) The provisions of any existing law other than a law to which the provisions of clause (6) apply, or\n\n(b) the provisions of any law which the State may hereafter make-\n\n(i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or penalty, or\n\n(ii) for the promotion of public health or the prevention of danger to life or property, or\n\n(iii) in pursuance of any agreement entered into between the Government of the Dominion of India or the Government of India and the Government of any other country, or otherwise, with respect to property declared by law to be evacuee property ....... , 31-A. Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provision;; of this Part no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any e.state or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part : .....•\n\n' -\n\n' 31-B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.- Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever r to have become void, on the ground that such Act,\n\n• ..\n\nRegulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the conuary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.\n\nIt will be seen that the scope of article 31 ( 4) is at once narrower and wider than that of article\n\n31-A ; the former has application only to statutes which were pending in the legislature at the commencement of the Constitution, whereas the latter is subject to no such restriction.\n\nAgain, article 31 ( 4) excludes attack only on the ground of contravention of article 31 (2), while article 31-A bars objections based on contravention of other provisions of Part III as well, such as articles 14 and 19.\n\nThis indeed was the reason for the enactment of articles 31-A and 31-B, as the words of exclusion in article 31(4) were found inapt to cover objections based on contravention of article 14.\n\nOn the other hand, the law referred to m article 31(4) covers acquisition of any kind of property, while ., article 31-A relates only to the acquisition of a particular kind of property, viz., estates and rights therein, and what is more important for our present purpose, the non obstante clause in article 31 ( 4) overrides all other provisions in the Constitution including the List of the Seventh Schedule, whereas a law which falls within the purview of article 31-A could only prevail over \"the foregoing provisions of this Part\".\n\nNow, the three impugned statues fall within the \" ambit of both article 31 ( 4) and articles 31-A and 31-B.\n\nPutting aside the later articles for the moment, it is plain that, under article 31 ( 4), the three impugned statutes are protected from attack in any court on the • ground that they contravene the provisions of article 31(2).\n\nThese provisions, so far as they are material here, e (i) that a law with respect to acquisition of • property hould authorize acquisition only for a ...., public purpose and (ii) that such law should provide for compensation, etc.\n\nMr. Das, while admitting that\n\nThe State of\n\nHihar\n\nMahRrajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaia\n\ndhiraia Sir Kameshwar1\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPalllniali Sastri C. /.\n\n902 SU:llREME COURT REPORTS [19521\n\n(ii) was a \"provisi9n\" of article 31(2), submitted that ( i) was not.\n\nAccording to him clause (2) assumed but did not \"provide\" that acqms1t10n should be authorised only for a public purpose. I cannot accept that view.\n\nIn my opinion, the clause seeks also to impose a limitation in regard to public purpose.\n\nThe clause was evidently worded in that form as it was copied (with minor variations) from section 299 (2) of the Govesrnment of India Act, 1935, which was undoubetedly designed to give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Parliamentary Committee in para. 369 of their Report that two conditions should be imposed on expropriation of private property : \"We think it (the provision proposed) should secure that legislation expropriating or authorising the expropriation of the property of private individuals should be lawful only if confined to expropriation for public purpose and if compernation, is determined either in the first instance or in appeal by some independent authority\".\n\nIt is thus clear that section 299(2) was intended to secure fulfilment of two conditions subject to which alone legislation authorising expropriation of private property should be lawful, and it seems reasonable to conclude th_at article 31 (2) was also intended to impose the same two conditions on legislation expropriating private property.\n\nIn other words, article 31 (2) must be understood as also providing that legislation authorising expropriation of private property should be lawful only if it was required for a public purpose and provision was made for payment of compensation.\n\nIndeed if this were not so, there would be nothing in the Constitution to prevent acquisition for a non-public or private purpose and without payment of compensation-an absurd result. -\n\n• It cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, while expressly enacting one of the two well-established restrictions on the exercise of the right of eminent domain, left the other to be imported from the common law.\n\nArticle 31 (2) must therefore, be taken to provide for both the limitations in express terms.\n\nAn attack on the ,...\n\nground of contravention of tliese provlSlons implies that the law m question authorises acquisition without reference to a public purpose and without payment of compensation.\n\nThis was precisely the objection raised both by Mr. Das and Dr. Ambedkar to the constitutional validity of the impugned statutes, and such objection really amounts to calling those laws in question on the ground that they contravened the provisions of article 31 (2), though learned counsel stoutly denied that they were relying on the provisions of article 31(2). The denial, however, seems to me to be based on a quibbling distinction without a difference in substance. Their main attack was really grounded on the absence of these two essential .. re requisites of valid legislation authorising acqms1t1on of private property, though Mr. Das would deduce them by implication from entry 36 of List II and entry 42 of List III, while Dr. Ambedkar sought to derive them from the spirit of the Constitution.\n\nBut this is only a form of stating the objection which, in substance, is that the statutes are bad because of the absence of a public purpose and the omission to provide for a just compensation.\n\nThis, in fact, was the burden of the argument before us.\n\nIf, then, these two grounds of attack fall within the purview of article 31 ( 4), the words \"notwithstanding anything m this Constitution\" are apt to exclude such grounds howsoever they are derived-whether from the entries in the legislative Lists or from the spirit of the Constitution-for both alike are covered by those words.\n\nIndeed, if the objection based on the absence of a public purpose and of a provision for just compensation were still to be open, clause ( 4) of article 31 would - be meaningless surplusage. It is obvious that that clause was specially designed to protect the impugned statutes and other laws similarly enacted from attack in a court of law on the aforesaid grounds and, if they were nevertheless to be considered as not being within the protection, it is difficult to see what the use of article 31 ( 4) would be. Learned counsel were unable to suggest any.\n\nThe fact is that article 31 ( 4) was\n\nThe Stateof\n\nBihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhang•\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nT lu State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanja/i Sastri C. /.\n\ndesigned to bar the jurisdiction 'of courts to entertain objections to the validity of a certain class of enactments on the two fold ground referred to above, and its whole purpose would stand defeated if the zemindars' contention were to prevail.\n\nEven if it were open to the court to consider these grounds of objection, they are, in my op1mon, unsustainable.\n\nAs po!nted out already, article\n\n31-A operates as an except10n to article 31 (2) read with article 13, only in respect of laws authorising acquisition of \"estates\" and rights thdein, and this exception is to be deemed to have been part of the Constitution from its commencement. But it has no application to laws authorising acquisition of other kinds of property and, as regards these, the requirements as to public purpose and payment of compensation are still enforced by the express provisions of article 31(2).\n\nIn the face of the limitations on the State's power of compulsory acquisition t'hus incorporated in the body of the Constitution, from which \"estates\" alone are excluded, it would, in my opinion, be contrary to elementary canons of statutory construction to read, by implication, those very limitations into entry 36 of List II, alone or in conjunction with entry 42 of list III of the Seventh Schedule, or to deduce them from \"the spirit of the Constitution\", and that, c too, in respect of the very properties excluded.\n\nIt is true that under the common law of eminent domain as recognised in the jurisprudence of all civilized countries, the State cannot take the property of its subject unless such property is required for a public purpose and without compensating the owner for its loss.\n\nBut, when these limitations are expressly provided for and it is further enacted that no law shall be made which takes away or abridges these safeguards, and any such law, if made, shall be void, there can be no room for implication, and the words\n\n\"acquisition of property\" must be understood in their natural sense of the act of acquiring property, without importing into the phrase an obligation to pay\n\ncompensation or a condition as to the existence of a public purpose.\n\nThe entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative competence of the Union and State Legislatures, and such context is hardly appropriate for the imposition of implied restriictions on the exercise of legislative powers, which are ordinarily matters for positive enactment in the body of the Constitution.\n\nThere are indications in article 31 itself to show that the expression \"acquisition of property in entry 36 of list II does not in itself carry any obligation to pay compensation.\n\nClause (4) of that article postulates a \"law\" authorising acquisition of property but contravening the provisions of clause (2), that is, without a public purpose or payment of compensation. Similarly, clall!se (5) (b ), which excepts certain categories of \"laws\" from the operation of clause (2), contemplates laws being made without a public purpose or payment of compensation.\n\nSuch laws can be made by a State Legislature only under entry 36 which must, therefore, be taken to confer a legislative power unfettered by any implied restrictions. t was suggested that the laws referred to in sub-clause (b) of clause (5) are laws made in exercise of the taxing power or the police power of the State as the case may be, and that the sub-clause was inserted only by way of abundant caution. This is hardly a .satisfactory answer. Whatever may .be the position as to a taxing law, in regard to the source of legislative power, laws. under heads (2) and (3) of subclause (b) must necessarily be referable to, and derive their competence from the legislative power under entry 36 of List II, in so far as they purport to authorise acquisition of any property, for the police power of the State is only the general power to regulate and control the exercise of private rights and lioerties in the interests of the community and does not represent any specific head of legislative power.\n\nAnd even that answer is not available to Mr. Das in regard to clause ( 4).\n\nII7\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhang11\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\n\"rhe State of Bihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Krlmeshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjaU Saitri C. J.\n\nNor is the position improved for the zemindars by reading entry 36 of List II and entry 42 of List III te>- gether.\n\nIt was said that the words \"subject to the provisions of entry 42 in List III\" must be taken to mean that the law-making power under entry 36 could only be exercised subject to the two conditions as to public purpose and payment of compensation, both of which are referred to in entry. 42.\n\nThose words, in my opinion, mean no more than that any law made under entry 36 by a State Legislature can be displaced or overridden by the Union Legislature making a law under entry 42 of List III. Tha.t they cannot bear the interpretation sought to • be put upon them by Mr. Das is clear from the fact that similar words do not occur in entry 33 of List I which confers on Parliament the power of making laws with respect to acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of the Union.\n\nFor if the restrictive conditions as to public purpose and pay_ment of compensa• tion are to be derived only from those words, then it must follow that in the absence of those words in entry 33, Parliament can make laws authorising acquisition or requisitioning of property without a public purpose and a provision for compensation. No reason was suggested why parliamentary legislation with respect to acquisition or requisitioning of property is to be free from such restrictive conC!itions while State legislation should be subject to them.\n\nThe fact is that the law-making power of both Parliament and State Legislatures can be exercised only subject to the aforesaid two restrictions, not by reason of anything contained in the entries themselves, but by reason of the positive provisions of article 31 (2), and, as laws falling under article 31 ( 4) or under articles 31-A and 31-B cannot be called in question in a court of law for non-compliance with those pre>- visions, such laws cannot be struck down as unconstitutional and void.\n\nIt was further contended that the power to make a law under entry 42 of List III was a power coupled with a duty, because such law was obviously intended\n\n.. >\n\nfor the benefit of the expropriated owners, and where the Legislature has authorised such expropriation, it was also bound to exercise the power of making a law laying down the principles on which such owners should be compensated for their loss.\n\nReliance was placed in support of this somewhat novel contention on the well-known case of Julius v. Bishop of Oxford.( 1 ) That case, however, has no application here.\n\nWhile certain powers may be granted in order to be exercised in favour of certain persons who are intended to be benefited by their exercise, and on that account may well be regarded as coupled with a duty to exercise them when an appropriate occasion for their exercise arises, the power granted to a legislature to make a law with respect to any matter cannot be brought under that category. It cannot possibly have been intended that the legislature should be under an obligation to make a law in exercise of that power, for no obligation of that kind can be enforced by the court against a legislative body.\n\nMr.\n\nSomayya's argument based -on clause (3) of article 31, to which reference has been made earlier, is equally untenable.\n\nIt is true that the \"Legislature\" of a State includes the Governor and that a bill passed by such Legislature cannot become a law until it receives the Governor's assent.\n\nArticle 200, however, contemplates one of three courses being adopted by the Governor when a bill is presented to him after it is passed by the House or Houses of Legislature : (1) to give his assent, or (2) to withhold as1sent, or (3) to reserve the bill for the consideration of the President. The first proviso, to that article deals with a situation where the Governor is bound to give his !lssent and has no relevance here. The second proviso makes reservation compul- 'Sory where the bill would, \"if it became law\", derogate from the powers of the High Court, but such reservation, it is important to note, should be made without the Governor himself giving his assent to the bill. It is significant that the article does not contemplate the\n\n(1) L.R. 5 H.L. 214.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of /)arbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\n1952.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaia dhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nGovernor giving his assent and thereafter, when the bill has become a full-fledged law, reserving it for the consideration of the President.\n\nIndeed, the Governor is prohibited from giving his assent where such reservation by him is made compulsory.\n\nThe Constitution would thus seem to contemplate only \"bills\" passed by the House or Houses of Legislature being reserved for the consideration of the President and not \"laws\" to which the Governor has already given his assent. It was said that article 31 (3) provides a special safeguard which, in order to ensure that ne> hasty or unjust expropriatory legislation is passed by a State Legislature, requires for such legislation the assent of both the Governor and the President, and, to make this clear, the words \"law\" and \"legislature\" were deliberately used in clause (3). I am unable to agree with this view.\n\nThe term \"legislature\" is not always used in the Constitution as including the Governor, though article 168 mak.es him a component part of the State Legislature. In article 173, for instance, the word is clearly used in the sense of the \"Houses of legislature\" and excludes the Governor.\n\nThere are other provisions also where the word is used in contexts which exclude the Governor. Similarly the word \"law\" is sometimes loosely used in referring to a bill. Article 31 (4), for instance, speaks of a \"bill\" being reserved for the President's assent \"after it has been passed\" by the \"legislature of a State\" and of \"the law so assented to.\" If the expression \"passed by the legislature\" were taken to mean \"passed by the Houses of the legislature and assented to by the Governor\" as Mr.\n\nSomayya would have it understood, then, it would cease to be a \"bill\" and could no longer be reserved as such. Nor is the phrase \"law so assented to,' strictly accurate, as the previous portion of the clause makes it clear that what is reserved for the President's assent and what he assents to is a \"bill\" and not a law. The phrase obviouslv refers to what has become a law after receiving the assent of the President.\n\nSimilarly, article 31(3) must, in my judgment, be understood as -\n\nhaving reference to what, in historical sequence, having been passed by the House or Houses of the State Legislature and reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President and assented to by the latter, has thus become a h1w. If it was intended that such a law should have the assent of both the Governor and the President, one would expect to find not only a more clear or explicit provision to that effect, but also some reference in article 200 to the Governor's power to reserve a measure for the consideration of the President after himself assenting to it.\n\nOn the other hand, as we have seen, where reservation by the Governor is made obligatory, he is prohibited from giving his assent.\n\n) In the view I have expressed above that the objections based on the lack of a public purpose and the failure to provide for payment of just compensation are barred under article 31(4) and are also devoid of of merits, it becomes unnecessary to consider what is a public purpose and whether the acquisition authorised by the impugned statutes subserves any public purpose. Nor is it necessary to examine whether the scheme of compensation provided for by the statutes is so illusory as to leave the expropriated owners without any real compensation for loss of their .. property.\n\nTurning now to the special points ansmg in particular cases, it was urged by Mr. Das that section 4(b) of the Bihar Act, which provides that all arrears of rent, royalti~ and cesses due for any period prior to the date of the vesting of the estates in Government \"shall vest and be recoverable by the State\" was unconstitutional and void.\n\nIn the first place, there was no public purpose to be served by the acquisition of such property.\n\nThe Government evidently lacked funds for the payment of even the illusory compensation provided for in the Act, and accordingly, hit upon the device of acquiring these arrears on payment of only 50 per cent. of their value as provided in section 24.\n\nRaising funds\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhang11\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh <Jf Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nfor augmenting the Treasury could not be regarded as a public purpose such as would justify expropriation of private property. Secondly, it was said that these 'arrears' would represent so much money when realised, and money could not be the subject of compulsory acquisition as the obligation to pay compensation would practically turn such acquisition into a forced loan.\n\nNor could the payment of 50 per cent of the face value of the arrears be regarded as compensation for the loss of the total arrears, for refund of one half of a sum of money taken away could never make good the loss of the balance.\n\nThe argument proceeds on a misconception. Whatever may be the position as regards the acquisition of money as such, it is not correct to say that a law made under entry 36 of List II cannot authorise acquisition of choses in action like arrears of rent due from the tenants which are covered by the term \"property\" used in that entry and in article 31.\n\nIt is equally fallacious to argue that a payment in cash or in Government bonds of half the amount of such arrears leaves the zemindar without compensation for the balance.\n\nIt is unrealistic to assume that arrears which had remained uncollected over a period of years during which the zemindar as landlord had the advantage of summary remedies and other facilities for collection, represented so much money or money's worth in his hands when he was to cease to he a landlord and to have no longer those remedies and facilities.\n\nWhen allowance is made for doubtful and irrecoverable arrears and the trouble and expense involved in the collection of the rest of them the payment of 50 per cent. of the face value of the entire arrears must, as it seems to me, be considered reasonable and fair compensation for taking them over.\n\nIndeed, the contention leaves one almost wondering what aavantage the zemindars would gain by seeking to overthrow a provision in the Act which may well prove beneficial to them. However tillit may be, for the reasons already indicated, article 31(4) bars a challenge on these two grounds, and the objections to section 4(b) cannot be entertained.\n\nAn attack was also directed against section 23 (l)(f) which provides for a deduction on a percentage basis out of the gross assets as \"cost of works of benefit to the raiyats of such estate or tenure\", in ascertaining the net assets on which compensation is to be based.\n\nIt was said that there was no evidence to show that it was usual for the zemindars to incur such expenditure, and that the deduction was a mere contrivance to reduce the compensation payable for the acquisition of their estates. The provision for such deduction was therefore a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nThe argument, however, overlooks the well-established obligation of the zemindars to maintain and repair the irrigation tanks and channels in the villages comprised in their estates.\n\nAs the Privy Council pointed out in The Madras ilway Co. v. Zemindar of Carvatenagaram(1),\n\n\"the zemandars have no power to do away with these tanks in the maintenance of which large numbers of people are interested, but are charged, under Indian law, by reason of their tenure, with the duty of preserving and repairing them\".\n\nThese are, obviously, the works of benefit to the raiyats of the estate, and their cost, which the zemindars are thus under an obligation to bear, is a perfectly legitimate deduction in computing the net assets of the estate.\n\nIf the zemindars had, in the past, neglected this duty, that does not affect the propriety of the deduction before determining the compensation payable to them.\n\nIt is, therefore, idle to say that it is a mere contrivance for reducing the compensation.\n\nThis apart, if, as I have endeavoured to show, payment of compensation isi not a justiciable issue in the case of the impugned statutes, having regard to articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B, it is not open to the court to inquire whether a deduction which results in reducing the compensation is unwarranted and therefore, a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nLastly, Mr. Das turned his attack on section 32(2) read with section 43(2) (p). Under the former provision compensation was payable in cash or in bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds. The bonds\n\n(1) (1874) 1 I.A. 364.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Karneshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe Stat< of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshtvar Singh cf Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /,\n\nwere to be either negotiable or non-negotiable and nontransferable and were payable in forty equal instalments. Power was given to the State Government under section 43 (2) (p) to frame rules providing for \"the proportion in which compensation shall be payable in cash and in bonds and the manner of payment of such compensation\".\n\nIt was argued that, whik' the Constitution conferred power on the legislatures under entry 42 of List III to make laws with respect to the principles on which compensatiop for property acquired was to be determined and the form and the mauner m wji.ich such compensation was to be given, it was not competent for the Bihar Legislature to delegate this essential legislative power to the executive government.\n\nSection 43 (2) (p) being thus void and inoperative, section 32 (2) must also fall to the ground, being vague and incapable by itself of being 'given effect to, <Jnd, as payment of compensation was an inextricable part of the scheme of acquisition under the Act, the entire Act must go.\n\nI see no force in this argument. The legislature has applied its mind to the form in which compensation has to be paid and has fixed the number of equal instalments in which it should be paid.\n\nIt has also provided for payment of interest on the compensation amount in the meantime.\n\nThe proportion in which the compensation could be paid in cash and in bonds and the intervals between the instalments have been left to be determined by the executive government as tliose must necessarily depend on the financial resources of the State and the availability of funds in regard to which the executive government alone can have special means of knowledge.\n\nBy no standard of permissible delegation can the vesting of such limited discretion by a legislature in an administrative body be held incompetent. The same remark applies to the delegation of rule-making powers in regard to payment of compensation under the other two, Acts.\n\nIt'was contended by Mr. Somayya that the Madhya Pradesh Act was not dU.ly passed as no question was put by the Speaker, at the third reading of the bilf,\n\n.. -\n\non the motion that it be passed into law, as required by the provisions of rule 20 (1) of the rules governing legislative business then in force, and that the omission was not a mere \"irregularity of procedure\" which the court is barred from enquiring into under article 212 (1) of the Constitution.\n\nRule 20 (1) reads as follows:\n\n\"A matter requiring the decision of the Assembly shall be decided by means of a question put by the Speaker on a motion made by a member\".\n\nWhat appears to have happened is this.\n\nOne of the Ministers moved that \"The C.\n\nP. and Berar.\n\nAbolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Bill, 1949, (No. 64 of 1949) as considered by the House be passed into law\".\n\nThereupon the Speaker read the motion to the House, and this was followed by several speeches welcoming the measure, amid general acclamation in the House, as a great boon to the tillers of the soil. The official report of the proceedings prepared by the Secretary under rule 115(1), however, did not record that the Sepaker put the question in the usual form : \"The question is etc.\" and that the motion was carried.\n\nIt was argued that the official report being the only \"authentic record of t11e proceedings of the Assembly\" under rule 115(2), it must be taken to be conclusively established that the motion was not put to the House and carried by it. There is, in my opinion no substance in the objection. The original Bill signed and authenticated by the Speaker was produced before us, and it contains an endorsement by the speaker that the Bill was passed by the Assembly on 5th April, 1950.\n\nThe endorsement was signed by the Speaker on 10th May, 1950.\n\nThe official report of the proceedings appears to have been prepared on 21st June, 1950, and was signed by the Speaker on 1st October, 1950.\n\nWhen he signed the report the Speaker did not apparently notice the omission as to tf:te motion having been put and carried .\n\nSuch omission cannot, in the face of the explicit statement by the Speaker endorsed on the Bill, be taken\n\nII8\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nto establish that the Bill was not put to the House and carried by it. In any case; the omission to put the motion formally to the House, even if true, was, in the circumstances, no more than a mere irregularity of procedure, as it is not disputed that the overwhelming majority of the members present and voting were in favour of carrying the motion and no dissentient voice was actually raised.\n\nMr. Somayya raised a further contention that in regard to the malguzari lands covered by the Madhya Pradesh Act, articles 31-A and 31-B could be of no assistance to the Government, as such lands are not \"estates\" within the meaning of clause (2) of article 31-A with the result that the objection based on article 14 as to discrimination in the matter of payment of compensation must prevail. It will be recalled that the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Act unconstitutional as being discriminatory in providing for payment of compensation, and it was to overcome that difficulty that articles\n\n31-A and\n\n31-B were inserted in the Constitution.\n\nIt was conceded by the learned , Advocate-General of 'Madhya Pradesh that these malguzari lands could not be regarded as estates within the meaning of article 31-A read with the Tenancy Acts in force in Madhya Pradesh, but he contended that, inasmuch as article 31-B purported to validate specifically the Madhya Pradesh Act among others, and as that article was not limited in its application to estates, the objection could not prevail. Mr. Somayya, however, submitted that the opening words of article\n\n31-B, namely, \"Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A\" showed that the mention of particular statutes in article 31-B read with the Ninth Schedule was only illustrative, and that, accordingly, article 31-B could not be wider in scope.\n\nReliance was placed in support of this argument upon the decision of the Privy Council in Sibnath Banerji's case(').\n\nI cannot agree with that view.\n\nThere is nothing in article 31-B to indicate that the specific mention of\n\n(!) [1945] F.C.R. 195 (P.C.)\n\ncertain statutes was only intended to illustrate the application of the general words of article 31-A.\n\nThe opening words of article 31-B are only intended to make clear that article 31-A should not be restricted in its application by reason of anything contained in article 31-B and are in no way calculated to restrict the application of the latter article or of the enactments referred to therein to acquisition of \" estates. \" The decision cited affords no useful analogy.\n\nIn some of the cases the estates sought to be acquired are situated in what was previously the territory of Indian States and belong to their former rulers.\n\nOn the merger of those States in Madhya Pradesh or Uttar Pradesh, as the case may be, by virtue of the \"covenant of merger\" entered into between the rulers and the Government of India the properties in question were recognised to be the \"private property\" of the Rulers. In these cases it was urged that that estates sought to be acquired formed part of the Rulers' \"personal rights\" guaranteed to them under the instrument of merger, and that neither the impugned statutes nor the notifications issued thereunder could deprive the Ruler of such properties in contravention of article 362.\n\nThe Attorney-General had several answers to this argument, including the bar under article 363 to interference by courts in disputes arising out of agreements, covenants, etc., by Rulers of Indian States to which the Government of India was a party.\n\nBut a short and obvious answer is that there was no contravention of any guarantee or assurance given by the Government under the covenant of merger, as the estates in question are sought to be acquired only as the \"private property\" of the Rulers and not otherwise.\n\nThe compensation provided for, such as it is, is in recognition of their private proprietorship, as in the case of any other owner. There is, therefore, no force in this objection.\n\nIn Appeal No. 285 of 1951 preferred by the Raja of Kapurthala, where a similar objection was raised, it was further alleged that the privy purse of the Ruler was fixed at a low figure in consideration of the Oudh\n\n4-10 S. c. India/71\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhang~\n\nand Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. J.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaja- Jhiraja Sir Kamcshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nEstate being left to be enjoyed by him as his plivate property, and that its compulsory taking over would deprive him of the means of discharging his liability to maintain the members of his family.\n\nIn the abse!Jce of any material to establish the facts, the allegation calls for no consideration.\n\nCertain other minor points were also raised in some of the cases but they are not worth mentioning as , they proceeded either on a misapprehension or were palpably unsound.\n\nThus all the objections raised to the constitutional validity of the Bihar Act, the Madhya Pradesh Act and the Uttar Pradesh Act or any part thereof fail and are overruled.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal under article 132(3) of the Constitution of India from a judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, dated the 12th March, 1951, whereby the High Court declared the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, ultra vires on the ground of its infringement of article 14 of the Constitution, but decided against the respondent on all other points.\n\nOn the 30th December, 1949, a Bill intituled the Bihar Land Reforms Bill was introduced in the Legislative Assembly qf Bihar and was passed by both the Houses of Legislature, and after having been reserved for the consideration of the President of India, received his assent on the 11th September, 1950.\n\nThe Act was published in the Bihar Government Gazette on the 25th September, 1950, and on the same day a notification under section 1 (3) of the Act was published declaring that the Act would come into force immediately.\n\nOn the same day, a notification under section 3 of the Act was published stating that the estates and tenures belonging to the respondent and two others passed to and became vested in th~ State of Bihar under the provisions of the Act. The respondent filed a petition in the High Court of Judicature at Patna under article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the constitutionality of the\n\nsaid Bihar Land Reforms Act and praying fur a writ in the nature of mandamus to be issued on the State of Bihar restraining it from acting in any manner by virtue of, or under the provisions of, the said Act.\n\nThis application was heard along with three title suits and other similar applications filed by various zemindars of Bihar by a Special Bench of the High Court.\n\nBy three separate but concurring judgments, the Court declared the Act to be unconstitutional and void on the ground of its infringement of fundamental right under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe validity of tl1e Act was attacked before the High Court on the following grounds :\n\n1. That the Bihar Legislature had no competence to pass it.\n\n2. That it contravened clause (I) of article 31 of the Constitution.\n\n3. That the vesting of the estates in the State of Bihar under the Act being in effect an acquisition of the estates, it was invalid as that acquisition was not for a public purpose and the provision for compensation was illusory.\n\n4. That it contravened article 19(1) (f) of tht' Constit, ution.\n\n5. That some of its provisions were invalid on the ground of delegation of legislative powers.\n\n6. That it was a fraud on the Constitution.\n\n7. That it was unconstitutional as it contravened article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Court held as follows :-\n\n1. That the Bihar Legislature was competent to enact the legislation.\n\n2. That the Act did not contravene article 31(1) of the Constitution.\n\n3. That the acquisition of the estates and tenures was for a public purpose.\n\n4. That the subject-matter of the Act fell under article 31 ( 4) of the Constitution.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMahara7adhiraja Sir I<.ameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaja Jhira7a Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\n5. That article 19 (1) (f) had no application.\n\n6. That whatever powers were delegated to the executive were permissible.\n\n7. That the Act was not a fraud on the Constitution.\n\n8. That the Act was unconstitutional as it contravened article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nDuring the pendency of the appeal against the decision of the High Court the Union Government with a view to put an end to the litigation of the zamindars brought forward a Bill to amend the Constitution and this was passed by the requisite majority as the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,\n\n1951. The zamindars brought petitions under article 32 of the Constitution impugning the Amendment Act itself as unconstitutional and void.\n\nAll these petitions were disallowed by this Court on the 5th October, 1951, and it was held that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, had been validly enacted.\n\nIn view of the Amendment Act any argu_ment regarding the unconstitutionality of the Bihar Act based on the ground that the prov1s1ons of that Act contravened articles 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution does not survive and the Act is not open to challenge on any such ground. As the Act has been held' invalid by the High Court solely on the ground that it violated the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution, the basis of the judgment declaring the Act to be unconstitutional is no longer tenable and it has therefore to be reversed in case this Court agrees with the decision of the High Court oii the points decided against the respondent.\n\nMr. P. R. Das for the respondent frankily conceded that no objection to the validity of the Act at this stage could be raised on the ground that it contravened any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. He, however, supported the decision of the Court on grounds decided against him by that Court and urged the following points :-\n\n1. That it was not within the competence of the Bih'\\r State Legislature to enact the impugned Act.\n\n2. That the acquisition of the estates not being for public purpose, the Act was unconstitutional.\n\n3. That the legislative power in various sections of the Act has been abdicated in favour of the executive and such abdication of power was unconstitutional.\n\n4. That the Act was a fraud on the Constitution and that certain parts of the Act were unenforceable on account of vagueness and indefiniteness.\n\nThe foundation of Mr. P. R. Das's attack on the vires of the Act mainly rests on the contention that it is implicit within the language of entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution that property could not be acquired without payment of compensation, the only effect of a compulsory power of acquisition against the individual being that there is the power to oblige him to sell and convey property when the public necessities require it, but that the power to take compulsorily raises by implication a right to payment ; in other words, there is a concomitant obligation to pay and the power to acquire is inseparable from the obligation to pay compensation and as the provisions of the statute in respect of payment of compensation are illusory, it is unconstitutional.\n\nAs regards article 31 (2) of the Constitution, it is said that it deals with the fundamental right regarding property which is expressed in the clause in negative language.\n\nIn entry 36 it is expressed in an affirmative form.\n\nThe provisions of articles 31(4) and 31-A and 31-B, though they deprive the expropriated proprietor of his rights provided in Part III of the Constitution, do not in any way affect the ambit of entry 36 and empower the State Legislature to make a law for compulsory acquisition of property without payment of compensation in the true sense of that term.\n\nEmphasis is laid on the words \"subject to the provisions of entry 42\" contained in entry 36 and it is contended that the exercise of legislative power under\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMshajan /.\n\nentry 36 is conditional on exercise of power under entry 42, that one could not be exercised without the other and that the power conferred by the two entries had to be construed on the assumption that the acquisitiop. was to be paid for. It is further contended that the legislative power in entry 42 is a power coupled with dnty which the legislature was bound to exercise for the benefit of the person whose property was taken in exercise of the legislative power under entry 36.\n\nIt is also said that the Bihar Legislature had legislated both under entry 36 and entry 42 and intended to take the property conditional on payment of compensation but if it transpires that the provisions it has made about payment of compensation are illusory, then that part of the Act would be void and as it could not have been intended by the legislature to pass the Act in any truncated form in which it would remain if the provisions regarding compensation are taken out of it, the whole Act should be held unconstitutional.\n\nTo appreciate the contentions raised by Mr. Das on the question of the competence of the Bihar Legislature to enact the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, it is necessary to refer to its provisions and to see on what subjects the legislature has purported to enact the law.\n\nThe title of the Act indicates that the law provides for some kind of land reform in Bihar.\n\nIts preamble gives no indication as to the nature of these reforms except that it provides for the constitution of a Land Commission to advise the St:ite Government on the agrarian policy, whatever that expression may mean.\n\nThe dominant purpose of the Act is that of transference to the State of the interests of proprietors and tenure-holders in land and of the mortgagees and lessees of such interests including the interests in trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars, ferries, huts, bazars, mines and minerals. Section 3 provides that the Government may, from time to time, by notification declare the estates or tenures mentioned therein to have passed and become vested in the State.\n\nSection 4 mentions the consequences of such vesting.\n\nIt enacts that the\n\ninterests of the proprietor or tenure-holder in any building or part of a building comprised in such estate or tenure and used primarily as office or cutchery for the colletion of rent of such estate or tenure, and his interests in trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars, huts, bazars, and ferries and all other sairati interests as also his interest in the subsoil including any rights in mines and minerals, whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worked or not, inclusive of such rights of lessee of mines and minerals, comprised in such estate or tenure (other than the interests of raiyats or under raiyats) shall vest absolutely in the State free from all incumhrances.\n\nClause (b) provides that all arrears of rents, including royalties and all cesses together with interest, if any, due thereon for any period prior to the date of vesting, which were recoverable in respect of the estates or tenures of the proprietor or tenure-holder and the recovery of which was' not barred by any law of limitation shall vest in, and be recoverable by, the State.\n\nThe expression \"arrears of rent\" includes arrears in respect of which suits were pending on the date of vesting or in respect of which decrees whether having the effect of rent decree or monev decree were obtained before the date of such vesting -and had not been satisfied and were not barred by limitation and also includes the costs allowed by such decrees.\n\nIn other words, all outstandi11gs in the nature of rents and rent decrees that were due to the proprietors or tenure-holders before tJ1e date of vesting and before the State had any right, :itle or inkn.:st in the estate would also pass to it. rhis seems to be a peculiar and rather extraordinary consequence of the vesting of an estate.\n\nNormally it has no relation to and cannot be regarded as an incident of the transference of tlie estates.\n\nThe clause is m effect an independent provision laying down that monies due to the proprietor or tenure-holder during the period antecedent to the vesting and not realized by him but which were in the course of realization, whether by private effort or by means of pending suit~ or decree~ including the costs of those\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh <Jf Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan /,\n\nsuits and decrees will stand forfeited to the State.\n\nIn clause ( c) the liability of the proprietors or tenureholders for payment of arrears of revenue and cesses to th.e Government prior to the date of vesting is kept alive.\n\nThe other consequences of vesting are that no suit can be maintained for recovery of any money from a proprietor or tenure-holder which is secured by a mortgage or charge on the estate and no such estate or tenure covered by the Act is liable to attachment.\n\nThe Collector is entitled to take charge of the estate and to inspect the documents and accounts which he thinks necesisary to do for the management of the estate or tenure.\n\nSection 5 permits the proprietors and tenure-holders to retain their homesteads but only in the capacity of tenants free from the obligation to pay rent.\n\nSection 6 allows them to retain possession of lands in their khas possession or in the possession of lessees under them, on payment of rent as raiyats to the State in the status of occupancy tenants. Section 7 provides that buildings together with lands on which such buildings stand and in the possession of proprietors and tenure-holders and used as golas, factories or mills shall be retained by them on payment of rent.\n\nSection 8 gives a right of appeal to a party aggrieved against the Collector's order.\n\nIn section 9 it is provided that all mines comprised in the estate or tenure as were in operation at the commencement of this Act and were being worked directly by the proprietor or tenure-holder shall he deemed to have been leased by the State Government to the proprietor or tenure-holder.\n\nThis section does not include within its scope mines on which considerable money might have been spent but which are actually not m operation.\n\nAn artificial definition has been given m section (2) sub-clause (m) to the expression \"mines in operation\" as, meaning mines regarding the working of which notice has been served on Government under the Indian Mines Act.\n\nSection 10 keeps alive subsisting lease of mines and minerals, the lessee being deemed to be a lessee under the Government.\n\nBuildings and lands appurtenant to a mine stand transferred\n\nto the State under the provisions of section 11 and they are to be deemed to be leased by the State to the lessee with effect from the date of vesting.\n\nSection 12 lays down the constitution of a Mines Tribunal.\n\nSection 13 provides for the management of the estates .and tenures that vest m the.\n\nState. Sections 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 make provisions relating to the investigation of debts of proprietors and tenure-holders and Jay down the procedure for payment of those debts.\n\nIn section 19 prov1SJon 1s made for the appointment of compensation officer.\n\nCertain directions are given in sections 20 and 21 regarding the procedure to be adopted by the compensation officer when the proprietor has only a certain share in an estate and where certain trusts have been created by the tenure-holder <lr proprietor.\n\nSection 22 defines \"previous agncultural year\" and the phrase \"gross assets\" with reference to a proprietor or tenure-holder. \"Gross assets\" in the Act means the aggregate of the rents including all cesses, which were payable in respect of the estates or tenures of such proprietor or tenureholder for the prevwus agricultural vear, whether payable by a subordinate tenant or the raivats.\n\nCertain details are laid down for the assessment of those rents.\n\nIn the exprnss1on \"gross assets\" 1s also included the gross mcome of the prev10us agricultural year from fisheries, trees, jalkiars, ferries, huts, bazars .and sairati interests.\n\nGross mcome from forests has to be calculated on the basis of the average gross annual income of twenty-five agricultural years preceding the agricultural year in which the date of vestmg falls, which in the opinion of a forest officer, the forests would have yielded if they had been placed during the said period of twenty-five years under the management of the State.\n\nSection 23 lays down the method of computation of net income.\n\nIt provides that the net mcome of a proprietor or tenure-holder shall be computed by deducting from the gross asset of such proprietor or tenure-holder, as the case may be, the following :-\n\n(a) any sum payable as land revenue or rent;\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\n11nd 0 thers.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan f.\n\n(b) any sum payable by such proprietor as agricultural income-tax in respect of any agricultural income derived from such estate or tenure for the previous agricultural year ;\n\n( c) any sum payable by such proprietor or tenure holder as income-tax in respect of any income derived from such estate or tenure, other than royalties for the previous agricultural year ;\n\n(d) any sum payable as chaukidari tax or municipal tax ;\n\n( e) cost of management of such estate or tenure at rates varying from five to twenty per cent. according to the amount of the gross asset The lowest limit fixed is at Rs. 2,000, and the highest at any amount exceeding Rs. 15,000.\n\nThese rates appear to have been fixed in an arbitrary manner bearing no relation whatsoeyer to the actual cost of management.\n\nTo illustrate, in the case of the Maharaja of Darhhanga whose estate has a gross income of nearly forty-eight lakhs, the cost of management, according to this calculation, would work out to a sum of nine an<l a half lakhs, which on the face of it looks starting; it can hardly have any relation to the costs actually incurred.\n\nThe expense ratio under the head \"management would ordinarily be lowest for the higheH gross income.\n\nIt goes up m proportion to the reduction in the amount of gross income. The Act has, however, reversed this rule of economics with the result that part of the money that on the principles stated for determining compensation would be payable by way of compensation to the proprietor or tenure-holder stands forfeite<l by this artificial reduction .of the net income.\n\nClause (f) provides for deduction from the gross assets of cost of works of benefit to the raiyats of such est2tes or tenures at rates varying from four to twelve and a haif per cent., the rate of four per cent. being applicable where the gross asset doos not exceed Rs. 5,000, and the rate of twelve and a half per cent. being applicable if the gross asset exceeds Rs. 25,000.\n\nIt is obvious\n\n. -'\n\nthat the calculation of the cost of works of benefit to the raiyats at a flat rate without any reference to the actual expenses that might have been incurred is a provision of a confiscatory character.\n\nIt artificially reduces the net income which is the basis of the assessment of compensation. The last clause (g) of this section allows deduction of any other tax or legal imposition, payable in respect of such estate or tenure not expressly mentioned in the earlier clauses.\n\nSection 24 provides the manner of determination of the compensation payable to the proprietor or tenureholder. It lays down a sliding scale for the assessment of compensation.\n\nWhere the net income does not exceed Rs. 500, the compensation payable is twenty times the net income and where the net income computed exceeds Rs. 1,00,000, it is payable at three times the amount. The compensation in such cases is merely nominal. In the case of the Maharaja of Darbhanga, the estate acquired also comprised land purchased by him by spending about a crore of rupees and also compri.<Jed mortgages, to the tune of half a crore. All these vest in the Bihar State along with the inherited\n\nzemindari~ of the Maharaja and arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 30,00,000, while the total compensation payable is ne:1rly a sum of Rs. 9,00,000.\n\nThis section further provides that to the amount thus payable shall be added the amount of fifty per cent. of he arrears of rent referred to in clause (b) of section 4 along with the amount of rnmpensation payable in respect of mines and minerals as determined under section 25.\n\nThe section also lays down the method of assessment of compensation in the case of persons who have only a share in the zamindari or have other minor interests in the tenures or estates where i-he estate or tenure is held in the trust etc., or where they are of an impartible nature. In the case of mines and minerals the method of assessment is laid down in section 25.\n\nIt has either to be fixed by agreement or by a tribunal appointed for the purpose.\n\nThe subsequent section~; provide for the preparation of compensation roll and for hearing of appeals etc. Section 32\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh <Jf Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nlays down the method and manner of pyment of compensation.\n\nSub-section (2) of this section enacts that the amount of compensation shall be paid in cash or in bonds or part! y in cash and partly in bonds.\n\nThe bonds shall be eitl-ier negotiable or non-negotiable and non-transferable and be payable in forty equal\n\ninstalmens to the perrnn named therein and shall carry interest at two and a half per cent. per annum with effect from the date of issue. Any disputes about compensation between the proprietors or tenure holders have to be determined by a tribunal appointed by the State Government.\n\nSection 34 provides for the constitution of a commission called the Bihar Land Commission.\n\nThe other provisions of the Act are of a miscellaneous character and require no special mention.\n\nThe last section authorizes the State Government to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act.\n\nFrom this survey of the Act it appears that the law enacted might be taken to relate to several items in the legislative lists, i.e., rights in or over land and land tenures, forests, fisheries, mines and minerals, acquisition of property and also principles on which compensation for property acquired is to be determined.\n\nThe pith and substance of the legislation however, in my opinion, is the transference of ownership of estates to the State Governmeru and falls within the ambit of legislative head entry 36 of L>st II.\n\nThere is no scheme of land reform within the framework of the statute except that a pious hope is expressed that the commission may produce one.\n\nThe Bihar Legislature was certainly competent to make the law on the subject of transference of estates and the Act as regards such transfers 1s constitutional.\n\nThe Act further deals with the realization of arrears of rents due before the date of vesting of the estates to the zemindars and forfeits fifty per cent. of such realization to the State exchequer.\n\nIt also in an indirect manner forfeits the State exchequer part of the compensation money which would have been payable\n\nto the proprietors or tenureholders if the net income was not reduced by deduction from the gross income of items of artificial nature which have no relation to any actual expenses.\n\nBoth these provlSlons will be separately dealt with hereinafter as, in my opinion, the enactment of these provisions is unconstitutional.\n\nHaving held that the Bihar Act is constitutional as regards transfer of estates to the State and that this\n\nis mainly an enactment under legislative head 36 of Lis:t II, it is convenient now to examine the contention of Mr. Das to the effect that in the contents of the power conferred on the legislature by this entry their exists a concomitant obligation to pay compensation and that as the provisions regarding payment of compensation are illusory, the Act i:s unconstitutional and that article 31 ( 4) of the Constitution does not afford any protection against this attack.\n\nFor a proper appreciation and appraisal of the proposition of Mr. P. R. Das that the obligation to pay compensation is implicit in the language of entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and that the power to take compulsorily raises by implication a right to payment, the power to acquire being inseparable from the obligation to pay compensation, it is necessary to examine briefly the origin of the power of the State on the subject of compulsory acquisition of property.\n\nThis power is a sovereign power of the State.\n\nPower to take property for public use has been exercised since olden times.\n\nKent speaks of it as an inherent sovereign power.\n\nAs an incident to thi,<; power of the State is the requirement that property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.\n\nMr.\n\nBroom in his work on Constitutional Law says, \"Next in degree to the right of personal liberty is that of enjoying private property without undue interference or molestation, and the requirement that property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is but an aflirmance of the great doctrine established by the common law for the protection of private property.\n\nIt is founded in natural equity and is\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga, and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh -0/ Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nlaid down as a principle of universal law.\" words of Lord Atkinson in Central Control Cannon Brewery Co. Ltd. ('), the power compulsorily raises by implication a right ment.\n\n(1952]\n\nIn the Board v. to take to pay-\n\nOn the continent the power of compulsory acqms1tion is described by the term \"eminent domain\". This term seems to have been originated in 1625 by Hugo Grotius, who wrote of this power in his work \"De Jure Belli et Pacis'' as follows :\n\n\"The property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the State, so that the State or he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even private persons have a right over the property of others, but for ends of public utility, to which ends those who founded civil society must be supposed to have intended that private ends should give way.\n\nBut it is to be added that when this is done the State is bound to make good the loss to those who lose their property.\"\n\nThe relationship between the individual's right to compensation and the sovereign's power to condemn is discussed in Thayer's Cases on Constitutional Law (Vol. I, p. 953) (mentioned on page 3 of Nichols on Eminent Domain) in these words .:-\n\n\"But while this obligation (to make compensation) is thus well established and clear, let' it be particularly noticed upon what grounded it stands viz., . upon the natural rights of the individual.\n\nOn the otht;.r hand, the right of the State to take springs from a different source, viz., a necessity of government.\n\nThese two, therefore, have not the same origin ; they do not come, for instance, from any implied watract between the State and the individual, that the former shall have the property, if it will make compensation ; the right is no mere right to pre-emption, and it has no condition of compensation annexed to it: either precedent or subsequent ; but there is a right to take,\n\n( 1) [19191 A.C. 744.\n\n.~.\n\nand attached to it as an incident, an obligation to make compensation ; this latter, morally speaking, follows the other indeed like a shadow but it is yet distinct from it, and flows from another source.\"\n\nhorn of all its incidents,· the simple definition of the power to acquire compulsorily or of the term \"eminent domain\" is the power of the sovereign to take property for public use. without the owner's consent. The meaning of the power in its irreducible terms is, (a) power to take, (b) without the owner's consent, ( c) for the public use.\n\nThe concept of the public use has been inextricably related to an appropriate exercise of the power and is considered essential in any statement of its meamng.\n\nPayment of compensation, though not an essential ingredient of the connotation of the term, is an essential element of the valid exercise of such power.\n\nCourts have defined \"eminent domain\" so as to include this universal J imitation as an essential constituent of its meaning. Authority is universal m support of the amplified definition of \"eminent domain\" as the power of the sovereign to take property for public use without the owner's consent upon making just com pensa ti on.\n\nIt is clear, . therefore, that the obligation for payment of just compensation is a necessary incident of the power of compulsory acquisition of property, both under the doctrine of the English Common Law as well as under the continental doctrine of eminent domain, subsequently adopted in America.\n\nThe question for consideration is whether this obligation to pay compensation for compulsory acquisition of property has been impliedly laid down by the constitution makers in our Constitution under legislative head in entry 36 of List II and entry 33 of List I, or whether this all important obligation which follows ocmpulsory acquisition as a shadow has been put in express and clear terms somewhere else in the Constitution. To my mind, our Constitution has raised this obligation to pay compensation for the\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan J,\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharafa dhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952) ' compulsory acquisition of property to the status of. a fundamental right and it has declared that a law that does not make provision for payment of compensation shall be void. It did not leave the matter to be discovered and spelt out by learned arguments at the Bar from out of the contents of entry 36 ; they explicitly provided for it in article 31 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nAs the obligation to pay has been made a compulsory part of a statute that purports to legislate under entry 33 of List I and entry 36 of List II, it is not possible to accede to the contention of Mr. P. R. Das that the duty to pay compensation is a thing inherent in the language of <; l).try 36. . I agree with the learned Attorney-General that tlY.: concept of acquisition and that of compensation are two different notions having their origin in different sources.\n\nOne is founded on the sovereign power of the State to take, the other is based on the natural right of the person who is dqirived of property to be compensated for his loss.\n\nOne is the power to take, the other is the condition flor the exercise of tl1at power.\n\nPower to take was mentioned in entry 36, while the condition for the exercise of that power was embodied in article 31 (2) and there was no duty to pay compensation implicit in the content of the entry itself.\n\nReference m this connection may be made to the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nBy section 299 of that statute a fetter was imposed on the power of legislation itself.\n\nThe Constitution, however, declared laws not providing for compensation as void and it not only placed a fetter on the power of legis. lation but it guaranteed the expropriated proprietor a remedv in article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement\n\n0of his fundamental right.\n\nI am therefore of the opinion that Mr. Das is not right in his contention that unless adequate provision is made by a law enacted under legislative power conferred by entry 36 of List I for compensation, the law is unconstitutional as entry 36 itself does not authorize the making of such a law without providing for compensation. Then\n\nit was said that entry 36 of List II was linked up with entry 42 of the Concurrent List by the words \"subject\n\nto\" occurring therein and that the validity of any law mad<'. in exercise of legislative power under entry 36 was conditional on the simultaneous exercise of the legislative power under entry 42 and because there has been no valid exercise of this power (the provisions of the impugned Act regarding the determination of compensation being illusory), the legislation under entry 36 fails.\n\nIn my opinion, this contention is unsound.\n\nThe two entries referred to above are merely heads of legislation and are neither interdependent nor complementary to one another.\n\nIt is by force of the provisions of article 31 (2) that it becomes obligatory to legislate providing for compensation under entry 42 of the Concurrent List in order to give validity to a law enacted under entry 36 and not by reason of the use of the words \"subject to\" in the wording of the entry.\n\nNo such words occur in entry 33 of the Union List.\n\nIt cannot reasonably be argued that Parliament could make a law for compulsory acquisition of property for hs purposes without fulfilling the condition of making a law under entry 42 of the Concurrent List, but a State Legislature in this respect is in a different situation.\n\nSuch a contention, in my opinion, is untenable.\n\nThe only purpose of the words \"subject to\" occuring in entry 36 is to indicate that legislation under entry 36 would be subject to any law made by Parliament in exercise of its legislative power under entry 42 of the Concurrent List.\n\nBoth legislatures can legislate under entry 42 but the Parliamentary statute made in exercise of powers under this entry would have preference over a State law in case of repugnancy and it was for this reason that reference was made to entry 42 in the head of legislation mentioned in the State List under entry 36. In other words, it only means that whenever a law is made by a State Legislature in exercise of its legislative power under entry 36, that law will be subject to the provisions of a Parliamentary statute made in exercise of its legislative powers under entry 42 of the C'nncurrent List.\n\n5-10 S. C. Tndiaf71\n\nThi: Stati: of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kami:shwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nLastly, it was urged that the legislative power conferred in entry 42 of the Concurrent List is a power conferred for the benefit of the expropriated owner and that the legislature is bound to exercise this power for his benefit whenever it takes property under its compulsory powers, in other words, it was said that the power conferred by the entry was coupled with a duty to exercise it.\n\nReference was made in this connection to the observations of Lord Cairns in Julius v. Bishop of Oxford(1).\n\nThe principle of that decision is that where power is conferred in the nature of a trust there is an obligation to exercise it for the benefit of the cestui que trust.\n\nThese o.bservations do not have any apposite application to the case of legislative powers conferred by a constitution.\n\nThe entries in the lists are merely legislative heads and are of an enabling character.\n\nDuty to exercise legislative power and in a particular manner cannot be read into a mere head of legislation. If the argument of the learned counsel was sound, then it would be open to this Court to issue a mandamus to the legislature to exercise its power of legislation under entry 42, if it failed to do so.\n\nMr. Das, when faced with this question, had to admit that he could not seriously contend that a legislature could be directed to enact a statute if it did not wish to do so.\n\nFailure to make a law under entrv 42 cannot make a law made under entry 36 bad.\n\nIi1 my opinion, the decision in the case of Julms v. Bishop of Oxford(') has no relevancy to the matter before us.\n\nThe crucial point for determination in these appeals h to discover the extent to which article 31 ( 4) of the Constitution or the new articles 31-A and\n\n31-B have deprived the expropriated proprietor of his rights or remedies in respect of this matter and of the guaranteed right to get compensation for property acquired. Article 31(4) is in these terms:-\n\n\"If any Bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been\n\n(1) (1880) 5 App. Cas. 214.\n\nreserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then notwithstanding any- ' thing in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2) .\"\n\nArticles 31-A and 31-B are in these terms:-\n\n\"31-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part : Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration the President has received his assent.\n\n(2) In this article- ( a) the expression 'estate' shall in relation to any local area have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include any jagir, inam or musafi or other similar grant;\n\n(b) the expression 'rights', in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under proprietor, tenure-holder or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue. 31-B. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void or even to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any jmlgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/,\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nto the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.\"\n\nThe language of article 31 ( 4) is unequivocal in its terms and states that when a Bill has received the assent of the President according to the procedure prescribed in article 31(3) and (4) then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2).\n\nIn order to determine the scope of this clause, it is necessary to determine what are the specific provisions of clause (2) which clause ( 4) makes unjusticiable. A strict construction has to be placed on the language of this clause, it being in the nature of a debarring provision.\n\nIn my opinion, the provisions of sub-clause\n\n(2) made unjusticiable by clause (4), relate to the determination and payment of compensation.\n\nThe whole purpose of the clause is to make the obligation to pay compensation a condition precedent to the compulsory acquisition of property.\n\nThe words of the clause preceding the word \"unless\" are merely descriptive of the law, the validity of which would be questionable if there was no provision for determination and for payment of compensation for the property taken in its contents.\n\nThe use of the word \"such\" fully supports this interpretation.\n\nThe mandate of the clause is that such a law must contain a provision for payment of compensation to the expropriated proprietor.\n\nAccording to the Oxford Dictionary, (Vol. 8, p. 1526) the expression \"Provision\" when used in statutes, has reference to what is expressly provided therein.\n\nWhat article 31 ( 4) really says is that the contravention of the express provisions of article 31 (2) relating to payment of compensation will not be a justiciable issue.\n\nIt has no reference to anything that may be implied within the language of that clause. The existence of a \"public purpose\" is undoubtedly an implied condition of the exercise of compulsory powers of acquisition by the State, but the language of article 31(2) does A not\n\n.. ~\n\nexpressly make it a condition precedent to acquisition.\n\nIt assumes that compulsory acquisition can be for a\n\n\"public purpose\" only, which is thus inherent in such acquisition.\n\nHence article 31(4), in my opinion, does not bar the jurisdiction of the court from inquiring whether the law relating to compulsory acquisition of property is not valid because the acquisition is not being made for a public purpose. This is also the view taken by the learned Judges of the Patna High Court.\n\nThe sovereign power to acquire property compulsorily is a power to acquire it only for a public purpose.\n\nThere is no power in the sovereign to acquire private property in order to give it to private persons.\n\nPublic purpose is a content of the power itself.\n\nReference in this connection may be made to Willoughby's Constitutional Law (page 795).\n\nTherein it is stated.\n\n\"As between individuals, no necessity, however great, no exigency, however imminent, no improvement, however valuable, no refusal, however unneighbourly, no obstinacy, however unreasonable, no offers of compensation, however extravagant, can compel or require any man to part with an inch of his estate.\"\n\nPublic purpose is an essential ingredient in the very definition of the expression \"eminent domain\" as given by Nichols and other constitutional writers, even though obligation to pay compensation is not a content of the definition but has been added to it by judicial interpretation. The exercise of the power to acquire compulsorily is conditional on the existence of a public purpose and that being so, this condition is not an express provision of article 31(2) but exists aliunde in the content of the power itself and that in fact is the assumption upon which this clause of the article proceeds.\n\nThe result of this discussion is that the scope of article 31 ( 4) is limited to the express provisions of article 31 (2) and courts cannot examine either the extent or the adequacy of the prov1S1ons of compensation contained in any law dealing with the\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMahara; adhiraia Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nacquisition of property compulsorily for public purpose but the barring provisions of article 31(4) <lo not in any way touch the powers of the court to see whether the acquisition has been made for public purpose.\n\nThe provisions of this clause also Jo not take away the court's power to examine whether the legislature that made the law has acted in exercise of its law making power within the lists or has merely made some other law though it has ostensibly exercised its powers under a certain legislative head which cannot be used to support the legislation.\n\nAs regards the new articles 31-A and 31-B, they merely place beyond the reach of the c; ourt any enactment dealing with compulsory acquisition of property which may infringe any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution ; in other words, article 13(2) of the Constitution cannot be called in aid to impugn the validity of such statutes.\n\nHaving determined the scope of article 31 ( 4), it is now convenie11t to examine the extent of the protection given by :i.rticle 31 (4) to the impugned statute.\n\nMr. Das is to a great extent right in his contention -the point was not seriously challenged by the learned Attorney-Gcneral,-that the law under challenge in the matter of compensation is highly unjust or inequitable to certain persons and in certain matters, and compensation in some cases is purely illusory.\n\nBe that as it may, the Constitution in express terms prohibits an enquiry in a court of law into those matters.\n\nThe same Constituent Assembly that provided the guarantees in article 31 (2) in respect of payment of compensation and provided the remedy .in article 32 for enforcing the guaranteed right, took awav that rcmedv in the case of the Bihar and othe~ zamindari estates and substituted for it the procedure of article 31(3) and (4), compliance with which wonld be sufficient to make tbe laws valid and effective.\n\nHowever repugnant the impugned law may be to our sense of justice, it is not possible\n\nfor us to examine its contents on the question of quantum of compensation.\n\nIt is for the appropriate legislature to see if it can revise some of its unjust provisions which are repugnant to all notions of justice and are of an illusory nature.\n\nThe courts' hands are tied by the provisions of article 31 ( 4) and that which has been declared by the Constitution in clear terms not to be justiciable, cannot be made justiciable in an indirect manner by holding that the same subjectmatter which is expressly barred is contained implicitly in some other entry and therefore open to examination.\n\nNone of these provisions, however, fetter the power of the court to inquire into any other matters the cognizance of which is not expressly taken away by the provisions of clause (4) and articles 31-A and 31-B.\n\nTherefore, the material point for determination is whether the acquisition of the estates is tor any public purpose and if it be not so, the law can certainly be held to be unconstitutional.\n\nMr. Das contended, and in my opinion rightly, that jurisdiction to acqmre private property by legislation can only be exercised for a public purpose.\n\nIt may be the purpose of the Union, or the purpose of the State or any other public purpose. Private property cannot be acquired for a private purpose.\n\nThe right to legislate under entry 36 postulates the existence of a public purpose and the contention is that there was no public purpose behind the Act.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court negatived this conten.tion on the ground that the question whether there was a public purpose in support of the acquisition of the estates had been by implication decided by the Constituent Assembly and therefore the Court could not go into this matter. Shearer J. said as follows :-\n\n\"We are, in my opm10n, estopped from saying that the acquisition of estates and tenures is not an acquisition for such a purpose. That it is, has been decided by the Constituent Assembly itself.\"\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMnharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nThis decision was reached in view of the prov1S1ons of clauses (4) and (6) of article 31 which were interpreted to mean that the Constituent Assembly gave their express approval to this legislation.\n\nReuben J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"From article 31, clause (2), it is clear that the Constituent Assembly considered two requirements as essential for compulsory acqumt10n, namely, a public purpose and provision for compensation.\n\nThe protection which the Constituent Assembly gave under clauses ( 4) and ( 6) was confined to the latter requirement.\n\nEvidently, therefore, the Constituent Assembly thought that protection was not reqaued under the other head, that is to say, the Constituent Assembly regarded that nationalization of land as itself constituting a public purpose.\n\nI would, therefore, hold that there is a pose for the impugned Act within the clause (2) of article 31.\"\n\nDas J. said as follows :-\n\npublic purmeaning of\n\n\"There is, I think, clear indication in the Constitu. tion of India itself that the expression 'public purpose' is to be understood in a wide and comprehensive sense.\n\nFurthermore, there is indication that the Constituent Assembly, representing the people of India which made the Constitution, was itself aware of the existence of legislation of the nature of impugned Act.\n\nThis is clear from clause ( 4) of article 31. As a matter of fact, the Land Reforms Hill was pending at the commencement of the Constitution ........ If the legislation then pending was not for a public purpose, it was, indeed, surprising that the Constituent Assembly tried to save such legislation by means of the provisions of clause (4) of article 31.\n\nOne may, I think, say that there was an implied declaration by the Constitue11t Assembly that such legislation was for a public purpose and such declaration will be given deference by the courts until it is shown to involve an impossibility.\n\n, .\n\n• ..\n\nFor the reasons given above, I hold that the impugned Act does not fall for want of a public purpose\".\n\nLearned counsel challenged this view of the High Court and contended that article 31 ( 4) of the Constitution is no answer on this point and that the Act was bad as it was silent on the question as to why the zamindaris were being acquired ; that it only provided for the interception of rents which instead of being realized by the zami11dars would . go into the coffers -0f the Government without any benefit being derived by the tenants ; that private property could not be acquired for merely augmenting the revenues of the\n\nState; and that the only purpose that could be gather- ed from this Act was the ruination of a large class of persons without any corresponding benefit to any section of the community.\n\nIt is said that there are 13,35,000 land-owners and tenure-holders m Bihar and if an average family be taken to consist of four persons, five and a half million people will be ruined by this legislation, while the ryots will not. benefit in any manner because all the lands excepting the waste lands sought to be transferred are 111 the possession and cultivation of the ryots and no part of the rent realisable from them Is being commuted for their benefit.\n\nIt IS pointed out that the waste lands were. sufficient to meet the requirements of villagers for grazing (; attle and for pasture and that in effect the acquisition of the estates was for the purpose of creating one machine-ridden and red-tapist super-landlord by depriving a substantial portion of the public of their means of livelihood.\n\nThe learned counsel proceeded to say that nationalization of land may be the policy of the party in power but this is not a public purpose which involves benefit to the community.\n\nReference in this connection was made to the decision in Hamabai Pramjee Petit v.\n\nSecretary of State for India (1), where it was observed :that the phrase \"public purpose\" whatever it . may\n\n(l) (1915) 42 I.A. 44.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State af\n\nBihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraia Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahaian ].\n\nmean, must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of individuals 1s directly and vitally concerned.\n\nThe impugned Act, it was contended, did not fall within this definition of \"public purpose\".\n\nReference was also made to Vol. II of Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, at page 744, wherein it is said as follows :-\n\n\"The purpose must be public, and must have reference to the needs or convenience of the public, and no reason of general pnblic policy will be sufficient to validate other transfers when they concern existing vested rights.\"\n\nFinally, it was urged tl1at there was nothing definite or tangible in the Act or in the views of the legislatures which gave any indication of the public purpose for which the estates were being acquired and all that could be gathered was that the legislature did not know its own mind at all and on a vague notion of some future policy directed the acquisition of the estates.\n\nIn my opinion, it will not serve any useful purpose to examine each and every argument that was addressed to us by the learned counsel. There can be no. manner of doubt that acquisition of private property by legislation under entries 33, 36 and 42 can only be made either for purposes of the Union or for purposes of the State or for a public purpose and that it is un-\n\n•1ecessary to state in express terms in the statute itself tne precise purpose for which property is being taken, nrovided from the whole tenor and inten<lment of the Act it could be gathere<l that the property was being acquired either for purposes of the State or for purposes of the public and that the intention was to benefit the community at large. It may be conceded that the present statute does not disclose the legislature's mind as to what it would ultimately do after the estates arc vested in the State Government.\n\nPerhaps the State Government has not yet made up .its mind how and for what purposes the lands and the tenures acqtiired will be utilized.\n\nThe statute\n\n• •\n\n,. '\n\n.. '\n\nprovides m section 34 for the establishment of a land commission whose function it will be to advise the Government as to its agranan policy.\n\nBe that as it may, it seems to me that m spite of the criticism levelled against the Act by the learned counsel, it cannot be said that the Act would fall because it fails to postulate a public purpose.\n\nThe Act 1s intituled \"The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950\".\n\nThe preamble of the Constitution says that India has been constituted into a Sovereign Democratic Republic to secure to all its citizens justice, social, economic and political. Article 39 of the Directive Principles of State Policy states as follows :--\n\n\"The State shall, in particular, direct its policy t!owards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good ; and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.\"\n\nNow it is obvious that concentration of big blocks of land in the hands of a few individuals is contrary to the principle on which the Constitution of India 1s based. The purpose of the acquisition contemplated by the impugned Act therefore is to clo away with the concentrat; on of big blocks of land ancl means of production in the hands of a few individuals and to so distribute the ownership and control of the material resources which come m the hands of the State as to subserve the common good as best as possible. In other wor<ls, shortly put, the purpose behind the Act is to bring about a reform in the land distribution system of Bihar for the general benefit of the community as advised.\n\nThe legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community, by whose suffrage it comes into existence and it is not possible for this Court to say that there was no public purpose behind the acquisition contemplated by the impugned statute.\n\nThe purpose of the statute certainly 1s m accordance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution of India.\n\nIt is fallacious to contend that the object of th1 Act is\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaliarajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh <Jf Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/;\n\nto ruin five and a half million people in Bihar.\n\nAll lands in khas possession of all these persons have not been made the subject-matter of acquisition.\n\nTheir homesteads, tbeir mineral wealth except mines not in operation have not been seriously touched by the provisions of the Act.\n\nVarious other exemptions have also been made in their favour in the Act, apart from the provisions as to compensation which in the case of small zamindaris can by no means be said to be of an illusory character. It is <liflicult to hold in the present day conditions of the world that measures adopted for the welfare of the community and sought to be achieved by process of legislation so far as the carrying out of the policy of nationalization of land is concerned can fall on the ground of want of public purpose.\n\nThe phrase \"public purpose\" has to he construed according to the spirit of the times in which particular legislation is enacted and so construed, the acquisition of the estates has to be held to have been made for a public purpose.\n\nThese observations. however, have no application to the acquisition of arrears of rent.\n\nOn the face of the statute, acquisition of fifty per cent. of these arrears was for the private purpose of the zemindars and the other fifty per cent. was either for supplementing the revenues of the State or for securing means for payment of compensation to the zemindars.\n\nThe purpose is to discharge the obligation of the acquirer to pay the price. The same observations apply to clause 23 (f) of the statute.\n\nThat provision has been made for the purpose of negativing partially the provisions of the Act regarding payment of compensation.\n\nClause ( 4) of article 31 affords no protection against the invalidity of these clauses.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contended that the acquisition of arrears was an acquisition of choses in action and that the compensation paid for it was fifty per cent. of the amount of arrears.\n\nI regret I am unable to accept this suggestion.\n\nIt is a well accepted\n\n.. _ ....\n\nproposition of law that property of individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under the power of compulsory acquisition for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State. \"The principle of compulsory acquisition of property,\" says Cooley (in Vol. II at p. 113, Constitutional Limitations) \"is founded on the superior claims of the whole community over an individual citizen but is applicable only in those cases where private property is wanted for public use, or demanded by the public welfare and that no instance is known in which it has been taken for the mere purpose of raising a revenue by sale or otherwise and the exercise of such a power is utterly destructive of individual right.\n\nTaking\n\n~10ney under the right of eminent domain, when 1t must be compensated in money afterwards is nothing more or less than a forced loan. Money or that which in ordinary use passes as such and which the Government may reach by taxation, and also rights in action which can only be avaiable when made lo produce money, cannot be taken under this power.\"\n\nWillis in his Constitutional Law, at page 816, offers the same opm1on.\n\nNichols on \"Eminent Domain\" (Vol. I, at page 97) has expressed a contrary opinion and reference has been made to the decision in Cincinnati v. Louisville etc., R. Co. (1). An examination of this case, however, does not disclose that any such proposition was stated therein.\n\nIt was held in that case that a Bill to restrain the enforcement of a State statute regulating fire insurance rights was a valid law in the State of Kansas.\n\nIt was not necessary to decide in this case whether under the compulsory acquisition power the State has the power to acquire choses in action or money, but it cannot be . seriously disputed that such an acquisition amounts to a forced loan and that the desired result can be more appositely obtained in exercise of the police power of the State than of the power of eminent domain or compulsory acquisition of property , and that compensation in such a case is the same amount of money\n\n(1) 223 U.S. 390.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan].\n\nthat is being taken and in the case of a chose in action the amount of money that it would produce.\n\nIn this situation it cannot be held that fifty per cent. of the outstanding arrears was compensation in any sense of that expression for this acquisition.\n\nThe true position is that the State took over all the arrears and decided to refund fifty per cent. of them and forfeit the rest. The validity of this acquisition has to be decided independently of the acquisition of the estates.\n\nIt has no connection with land reform or with' any public purpose.\n\nIt stands on the same footing as other debts due to zamindars or their other movable properties, which it was not the object of the Act to acquire.\n\nAs already stated, the only purpose to support this acquisition is to raise revenue to pay compensation to some of the zamindars whose estates are being taken.\n\nThis purpose does not fall within any definition, however wide, of the phrase \"public purpose\" and the law therefore to this extent is unconstitutional.\n\nOne or two illustrations of the public purpose involved in this provision will bring O\\lt its true character.\n\nIn Appeal No. 299 of 1951, the arrears of Darbhanga Raj 011 26th September, 1950, was a sum of Rs. 30,81,967.\n\nHalf of this amount is payable to the Raj and the other half stands forfeited. In the case of Raja P. C. Lal (Appeal No. 330 of 1951), the rents due were Rs. 10,26,103, and in Appeal No. 339 of 1951, the amount is Rs. 9,52,937.\n\nNext it was contended that the impugned Act is a fraud on the Cunstitution and therefore void.\n\nIt was said that the Act, while pretending to comply with the Constitution, evades and invades it ; that the Act merely pretends to comply with the Constitution when it says that it provides for payment of compensation but in effect it has produced a scheme for non-payment of compensation by shift and contrivance.\n\nReference was made to certain provisions of the Act of a confiscatory nature, already noticed in this judgment.\n\nSection 9 was mentioned under which mines in the -course of development and fetching no income yet\n\n' -\n\n. ~\n\nvest in the State without payment of compensation.\n\nNo compensation has been made payable in respect of forests or trees which were not fetching any income at the date of vesting.\n\nIn a nutshell, it was contended that the object of the Act was to acquire properties of the zemindars by payment of compensation (so-called) out of the moneys belonging to the zemindars themselves and that in some cases they had not only to give up their estates for nothing but would have to pay something, in addition, to the State, if the principles specified in the Act were to apply.\n\nIt was pointed out in the case of the Maharaja of Darbhanga that his zemindari would be acquired by the State Government without paying anythiµg but that the Maharaja would have to pay out of his own money six lakhs to the Government.\n\nIn Case No. 330 of 1951 (Raja P. C. Lall), it was said that Government would get the zemindari free, while in Case No. 339 of 1951 the State will get the zemindari and two and half lakhs out of the arrears, while in Case No. 331 of 1951\n\n(Chota Nagpur appe;:il) the zemindari will be acquired on payment of a small sum of Rs. 14,000 only.\n\nNothing will be payable to the zamindars out of the public exchequer.\n\nAttention was drawn to the observations of Shearer J. in the following passage :-\n\n\"The legislature, it is clear, are optimistic enough to hope that this reform may conceivably be effected without raising any great loan. The conclusion, to my mind, is irresistible that the intention is to take over the great estates in the province, paying no compensation or the most inadequate compensation, and out of the considerable profits which are likely to be derived from them, to take over, in course of time, the remaining estates and tenures.\n\nIn other words, a comparatively small minority belonging to this particular class are to be expropriated without compensation or with the most inadequate compensation in order that, when the great majorit} are expropriated, they receive compensation which will not be inadequate and may, quite possibly, in many cases, be more than adequate.\"\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nMr.\n\nDas vehemently contended that the statute was a fraud on republican Constitution which promised to deprive no one of his property without payment of compensation ; that it pretended to make elaborate provisions for paying it but that by shift and contrivance it has provided for the evasion of its payment. Reference was made to a passage in Moran Proprietary Ltd. v. Dy. Commissioner of Taxation for New Sottth Wales ('), which is in these terms:-\n\n\"Cases may be imagined in which a purported exercise of the power to grant financial assistance under section 96 would be merely colourable.\n\nUnder the guise or pretence of assisting a State with money, the real substance and purpose of the Act might simply be to effect discrimination in regard to taxation.\n\nSuch an Act might well be 11/tra vires the Commonwealth Parliament.\n\nTheir Lordships are using the language of caution because such a case may never arise, and also because it is their usual practice in a case dealing with constitutional matters to decide no more than their duty requires.\n\nThey will add only that, in the view they take of the matter, some of the legislative expedient-objected to as ttltra vires by Evatt J. in his forcible dissenting judgmentmay_ well be colourable, and such acts are not receiving the approval of their Lordships.\"\n\nIt was urged that a statute could be declared to be a fraud on the Constitution on the same principles that are applicable to cases of corporations or of executive bodies, whether they act in excess or in abuse of their statutory powers.\n\nReliance was placed in this connction on the observations of Abbott C.J. in Fox v. Bishop of Chester(\"), which are in these terms:-\n\n\"Our judgment is founded upon the language of the Statute 31 Eliz. c. 6 and the well-known principle of law, that the provisions of an Act of Parliament shall not be evaded by shift or contrivance.\"\n\n(!) [1940] A.C. 838, at p. 858.\n\n(2) 107 E.R. 520, at p. 527.\n\n' .\n\n>--l\n\n\" .\n\nIn Fox v. Bishop of Chester(1), it was said that there may be fraU<i on the law, an insult to an Act of Parliament, though in the language and text of the law no such fraud may have been mentioned.\n\nIn Westminster Corporation v. London & North Western Raz'lway(2), it was observed :-\n\n\"It is well settled that a public body invested with statutory powers such as those conferred upon the corporation must take care not to exceed or abuse its powers. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it.\n\nIt must act in good faith. And it must act reasonably. The last proposition is involved in the second, if not in the first.\"\n\nIn Maharaja Luchmeswar Singh v. Chairman of the Darbhanga Municipality(8), it was pointed out that the offer and acceptance of one rupee was a colourable attempt to obtain a title under the Land Acquisition Act without paying for the land. lq Alexander v.\n\nBrame( 4 ), it was observed that i£ it had appeared that sufficient ground existed for holding that the deed in question was a device on the part of Mr. Brame for the purpose of evading and eluding the statute, by keeping seemingly and colourably clear of it, while meaning substantially to infringe it, a view might have been taken favourable to the appellants.\n\nAll these principles are wellcsettled. But the question is whether they have any application to the present case.\n\nIt is by no means easy to impute a dishonest motive to the legislature of a State and hold that it acted mala fide and maliciously in passing the Bihar Land Reforms Act or that it perpetrated a fraud on the Constitution by enacting this law. It may be that some of the provisions of the Act may operate harshly on certain persons or a few of the zamindars and may be bad if they are in excess of the legislative power of the Bihar Legislature but from that circumstance it does not follow that the whole enactment is a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nFrom the premises that the estates of half a dozen zemindars may be expropriated\n\n(1) 6 E.R. 581.\n\n(3) 17 I.A. 90.\n\n(2) (1905] A.C. 426 at p. 430.\n\n(4) 44 E.R. 205. 6-10 S. C. India/71\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar v • M aharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMa/iajan /.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMahar11ia- 4hiraia Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh •f Darbhanga •al Otherr.\n\nwithout payment of compensation, one cannot jmp to the conclusion that the whole of the enactment ts a fraud on the Constitution or that all the provisions as to payment of compensation are illusory.\n\nAt best they are illusory only in the case of some only of the large body of persons affected by it.\n\nSection 23(f), however, in my opinion, is a colourable piece of legislation.\n\nIt has been enacted under power conferred by legislative entry 42 of List III.\n\nIt is well-settled that Parliament with limited powers cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. (Vide South Australia v. The Commonwealth(') and Madden\n\nv. Nelson & P<>rt Sheppard R. W. Co.(2). In Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (N. S. W.) v. W.R.\n\nMoran Proprietary Ltd. (8), it was observed as follows:-\n\n\"Where the law-making authority is of a limited or qualified character, obviously it may be necessary to examine with some strictness the substance of the legislation for the purpose of determ'ining what it is that the legislature is really doing. In such cases the court is not to be over persuaded by the appearance of the challenged legislation ........ In that case, this court applied the well known principle that in relation to constitutional prohibitions binding a legislature, that legi.lature. cannot disobey the prohibition merely by employing an indirect method of achieving exactly the same result ........ The same issue may be whether legislation whieh at first sight appears to conform to constitutional requirlements is coble or disguised.\n\nIn such cases the court may have to look behind names, form and appearances to determine whether or not the legislation is colourable or disguised.\"\n\nThe provision herein impeached has not been arrived at by laying down any principles of payh; g compensation bur in truth, is designed to deprive a number of people of their property without payment of compensation.\n\nThe State legislature is authorised to pass an Act in the interests of persons deprived of\n\n(1) 65 C.L.R. 373.\n\n(3) 61 C.L.R. 735 at p. 793.\n\n(2) (1899) A.C. 626.\n\nI _A - '.\n\n' ..\n\n. ..,\n\npropeny under entry 42. They could not be permitted under that power to pass a law that operates to the detriment of those persons and the object of which provision is to deprive them of the right of compensation to a certain extent.\n\nIn this connection it is no~ convenient to examine the contention of the learned Attorney-General as to the interpretation of legislative head entry 42 of List III.\n\nHe contended that under this head it was open to the Parliament or the State Legislature to make a law laying down the principles which may result in non-payment of compensation or which may result in not paying any compensation whatsoever.\n\nI cannot possibly assent to any such construction of this entry.\n\nThe entry reads tfius:-\n\n\"Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and manner in which such compensation is to be given.\"\n\nThis head of legislation seems to have been expressly mentioned in the Concurrent List not only in view of the accepted principle of law that in cases of compulsory acquisition of property compensation has to be made but also in view of the clear and mandatory provisions of article 31(2) which require that a law authorising the taking or acquisition of propeny will be void if it does not provide for payment of compensation for the property acquired or does not either fix\n\nthe amount of compensation or specify the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given.\n\nThe power of legislation in entry 42 is for enacting the principles of determining such compensation and for paying it.\n\nThe principles to be enacted are for determining such compensation and for paying it.\n\nThe principles to be enacted are for determining the equivalent price of the property taken away.\n\nIt may be that the determination of the equivalent may be left for ascertainment on the basis of certain uniform rul('s;\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\n•• Maharajatlhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSin1h of Darbhan111\n\nand Otliers.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nfor instance, it may be laid down that the principles for determining compensation will be the rental basis or the market value of the property etc.\n\nBut it is difficult to imagine that there can be any principles fur nonpayment of compensation or for negativing the payment of compensation.\n\nNo principles are required to be stated for non-payment of compensation. A simple statement that no compensation will be paid is quite enough to attain the object. I know of no principles __ ior determination of compensation which result in its nonpayment except in the Act under notice.\n\nAlCfcgiS: lative heads have to be reasonably construed and the power given under entry 42 is a positive power given to bring about the resuit of payment of compensation and not non-payment of the same.\n\nThe key words in the entry are \"compensation\" and \"given\". Anything that is no.related to compensation or the giving of it cannot be justified by legislation under entry 42, Reference was made in this connection to the United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum('), in which it was held that the descriptive words under the legislative head\n\n- \"collection of rents\" are wide .enough to permit k~-\n\nlation in respect of remission of rents and that under item 22 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the legislative head \"forests\" include the power to legislate with respect not only to afforestation but also to disafforestation and that the legislative head \"fisheries\" would include the power to legislate on the prohibition of fishing altogether.\n\nIn my opinion, these analogies have no application . to the construction of the language employed in entry 42, These entries are not in par[ materia to entry\n\n42. Perhaps a more analogous case on the point is the decision in Attorney- General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for t!te Dominion ( 2). The question there was whether the legislative head \"Regulation of Trade and Commerce\" included the power to abolish it also.\n\nTheir Lordships of the Privy Council made the following observations which appear at page 363 of the report:- (!) [1940] F.C.R. 110 at p. 135.\n\n(2) [1896] A.C. '!48.\n\n' J\n\n' .\n\n' .,\n\n\"A . power to regulate assumes the conservation 1952 of the thing which is to be made the subject of regu- Tl• Stat• of lation. In that view, their Lordships are unable to Bihar _ regard the. prohibitive enactments of the Canadian v •. statute as regulations of trade and commerce .... there Maharaja is marked distinction between the prohibition or predhiroja Sir vention of a. trade and the regufation or governance Kash~• f 't\" . ..g,. 0 1 • . of Darbhanga An entry concerning payment of compensation in no•v ornlOthera. sense includes legislative power of non-payment of\\ compensation, The whole purpose of this head of/ MohajanJ. legislation is to provide payment of compensati_on andi -not the confiscation of property. . - The provision that four per cent. to twelve and a half per cent. has to be deducted out of thenet income on account of costs of works for the benefit of raiyats etc. has no relation to real facts. Even the earlier provision in clause (d) that costs of management have to be deducted up to twenty per cent. has in its entirety no real relation to actual state of affairs. As already pointed out, it is partially of a confiscatory character in sufficient number of cases. The deduction under clause (f) from the gross income is merely a deduction of an artificial character, the -whole objecLbeing.. to inflate the deductions and thusJ1r.ing_about_11on, payment of compens_aJ; ion. -such legislation, in my op1mon, is not permitted by entry 42 of List III.\n\nSuppose, for instance, instead of a twelve and a half per cent. it declared that a deduction of seventy per cent. be made on that account. Could it be said by any reasonable person that such a piece of legislation (ti was legislation on principles of determining compensa- D tion or of making payment of compensation. This provision, therefore, in my opinion has been inserted in the Act as a colourable exercise of legislative power under entry 42 and is unconstitutional on that ground.\n\nThe power has not been exercised -under any -- other legislative head authorizing the State legislature to pass such a law. Legislation ostensibly under one or other of the powers conferred by the Constitution but\n\njn truth and fact not falling within the content of thai\n\nTAe State of\n\nBihm\n\nMah1Jrajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhan ga\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan /.\n\npower is merely colourably constitutional but is really not so. [Vide Quebec v.\n\nQueen Insurance Co. (') ; Russell v. The Queen(').] Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision of the Privy Council in Madden v. Nelson & Fort Sheppard R. W. Co. (').\n\nThis clause therefore is unconstitutional legislation made colourable valid under exercise of legislative power under entry 42 of List II.\n\nIt was contended by Mr. Das that if some provisions in the Act are ultra vires, the statute as a whole must be pronounced to be ultra vires and that it could not be presumed that the legislature intended to pass it in what may prove to be a truncated form.\n\nThe real quc:stion to decide in all such cases is whether what reamins is so inextricably bound up with the part declared invalid that what remains canno~ independently survive, or, as it has sometimes been put, whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that the legislature would have enacted at all that which survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires.\n\nLook[ng at the Act as a whole, it seems to me that the offending provisions of the Act are not so inextricably bound up with the part that is\n\nvalid as to hit or kill the remainder also. In this case a presumption cannot be drawn that the legislature would not have enacted the Act leaving out the two or three provisions which have to be declared to be invalid.\n\nMr. Das also raised a Act was unenforceable. section 32(2) of the Act\n\nminor point that the Bihar Reference was made to which runs as follows :- \"The amount of compensation so payable in terms of a compensation Assessment-roll as finally published shall be paid in cash or in bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds.\n\nThe bonds shall be either negotiable or non-negotiable and non-transferable and be payable in forty equal instalments to the person named the1ein and shall carry interest at two and a half per centum per annum with effect from the date of issue.\"\n\n(!) (1878) App. Cas. 1090.\n\n(3) [1899] A.C. 626.\n\n(2) 7 (1882) App. Cas. 841.\n\n' .\n\n)., .\n\nIt was contended that as no date has been ment_ioned for payment of compensation and no interval has been stated between the instalments mentioned therein and it has not been mentioned how much would be payable in cash and how much in bonds, the Act could not be enforced.\n\nSection 43 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Clause (p) is in these terms :-\n\n\"The proportion in which compensation shall be payable in cash and in bonds and the manner of pay. ment of such compensation under sub-sections (2) and\n\n(3) of section 32.\"\n\nIt seems clear that the Act has made sufficient provision for enforcing its provisions if section 32(2) is read with the provisions contained in section 43 and it cannot be said that the Act is unenforceable for this\n\nreasi;.>n.\n\nThe last point urged by M. Das was that section 32\n\n(2) of the Act was void as in it legislative functions had been abdicated by the legislature in favour of the executive.\n\nA two-fold attack was levelled against this prov1S1on.\n\nFirstly, it was said that the Constitution having _in entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule\n\nvested authority in the legislature to make laws on the question of the principles as to the payment of compensation and the manner and form of its payment, in other words, it h;, ving trusted these matters to the care, judgment and wisdom of the legislature, it had no power to delegate these matters to the executive.\n\nSecondly, it was contended that section 32 (2) delegated essential legislative power to the executive which it was incompetent to do. Reference was made to the opinion of this court in Special Reference No. 1 of\n\n1950.\n\nThe matters alleged to have been delegated are these:-\n\n1. The determination of the proportion of the cash payment to the payment by giving bonds, negotiable ' ' or non-negotiable.\n\nT }11: Stau of\n\nBihlll' . y, Maharaia tlhiraia Sir Kameshwllf'\n\nSingh of Darbh11,, g11.\n\nand Others.\n\nM ahaian J.\n\n'TM State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiailhiraia Sir Kamcshu1ar\n\nSingh t'>f Darbhanga\n\nond Others.\n\nMahaian /.\n\n2. The determination of the period of redemption of the<e bonds.\n\n3. The period of interval between the several instalments.\n\nThe section enacts that the compensation payable shall be paid in cash or in bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds. It therefore determines the principle that the payment of compensation will be in these two forms. It further enacts that bonds shall be either negotiable or non-negotiable and non-transferable. It therefore also determines the nature of the bonds that would be issued.\n\nIt further enacts that the payment, if made in bonds, will be paid in forty equal instalments.\n\nIt is obvious that the time of redemption of the bonds will be co-terminous with the period of the instalments. It has further enacted that the bonds will carry interest at the rate of two and a half per cent.\n\nWhat has been left to the executive is the question of the determination of proportion in which compensation is to be paid in cash or in bonds and the fixation of the interval of the instalments. It seems to me that the delegation to this extent is permissible in view of the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v.\n\nNarottamdas fethabai (') and the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Queen v. Burah(2).\n\nThe legislature applied its mind to the question of the method and manner of payment of compensation.\n\nIt settled its policy and the broad principles.\n\nIt gave the State Government the power to determine matters of detail after having settled vital matters of policy.\n\nIt cannot be said that the legislature did not apply its mind to the subjectmatter of the legislation and did not lay down a policy.\n\nThe proportion in which compensation was payable in cash or in bonds or whether the whole of it was to be paid in cash is a matter which only the State Government could fix and similarly, the interval of instalments and the period of redeemability of the bonds were also matters of detail which the; executive could\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 51.\n\n(2) (1877) 5 I.A. 178.\n\n,). .\n\n.more oppositely determine in exercise of its rule-makmg power.\n\nIt cannot be said in this case that any essential legislative power has been delegated to the executive or th.at the legislature did not discharge the trust which the Constitution had reposed in it. If the rule-making authority abuses its power or makes any attempt to make the payment illusory, the expropriated proprietor will not be without a remedy.\n\nFor the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that section 32(2) of the Act cannot be held bad on the ground that it is a piece of unregulated delegation of legislative power.\n\nMr. Das's contention in Cases Nos. 319, 327, 330 and 332 of 1951 and in the other cases in which he appeared were the same.\n\nMr. Chaudhury appearing in Cases Nos. 309 and 328 of 1951 raised a large number of points, some of which are covered by the arguments of Mr. P. R. Das, which I have discussed already.\n\nThe rest seem to me to be unsubstantial but it is necessary to notice a few of them upon which great stress was laid by the learned counsel.\n\nMr. Choudhury contended that the field of legislation on the question of principles of determination of compensation and the mode and manner of payment of such compensation was already occupied by the Land Acquisition Act which was an existing law of Parliament and, trefore, the State Legislature could not enter on this field and legislate on the principles of payment of compensation. This argument really has no force, because the provisions as to asessment of compensation enacted in the Land Acquisition Act only apply to acquisitions that are made by notification under that Act.\n\nIts provisions have no application to acquisitions made under either local or central laws unless they are specifically made .applicable by the provisions of these statutes.\n\nAnother point put forward by him, that articles 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution cannot affect pending cases cannot be seriously entertained because retrospectivity is writ large on the face of those\n\n 1952\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\n. v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nThe Stau of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaiadhiraia Sir Ka111eshwar-\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan/.\n\narticles.\n\nSimilarly, I cannot but regard as unsubstantial his contention that transference of estates of zamindars to the State under the provisions of a statute requires registration.\n\nThe only other point seriously pressed by him iis that the Bihar Legislature had no power to issue bonds without complying with the procedure laid down in article 293 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is enough to state with regard to this poiint that the stage for issuing bonds has not arrived as yet.\n\nWhen the State legislature issues bonds which are unenforceable or which it is not competent to issue, the contention can possibly be raised.\n\nMr. Chakravarty who appeared m three cases, Noo. 326, 337, and 344 of 1951, urged that as regards trust properties, the Bihar legislature had no power to acquire them without payment of full compensation as certain educational and charitable institutions would thereby be seriously affected. He was, however, unable to point out how the Bihar Legislature had no power to acquire trust properties.\n\nMr. Raghav Saran who appeared in Cases Nos. 310, 311 and 329 of 1951, raised a novel point that the Act not being reasonable and just, the Supreme Coun had jurisdiction to declare it void on that ground. He was unable to support his argument on any reasonable basis.\n\nThe constitutionality of a statute passed by a competent legislature cannot be challenged on the ground that the law made is not reasonable or just.\n\nCounsel who appeared in Cases Nos. 307, 313, 315, 320, 321, 322 and 331 and Petition No. 612 of 1951 merely adopted the points urged by Mr. P. R. Das.\n\nThe result is that the provisions o f the Bihar Land Reforms Act contained in sections 4(~) and 23(f) are held not constitutional. The rest of the Act is good.\n\nThe appeals are therefore allowed except to the extent indicated above.\n\nA writ of mandamus will issue to the State Government not to give effect to the two \\ provisions mentioned above and held unconstitutional.\n\nJo. •\n\n.,.\n\nPetition No. 612 of 1951 under article 32 is dismissed as it is not maintainable ; no infringement of any fundamental right has been alleged therein.\n\nThere was no appearance for the respondents in Cases Nos. 18 of 1950 and 299 of 1951 and no opposition to the appeals being allowed. They are accordingly allowed.\n\nI will make no order as to costs in any of these appeals and petition.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-1 had the advantage of going carefully through the judgment of my learned brother Mahajan J. and I concur entirely in the conclusions arrived at by him.\n\nIn my opinion, the Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950 is not unconstitutional, with the exception of the provisions contained in section 4(b) and 23(f) of the Act and these provisions alone must be held to be void and inoperative.\n\nAs regards section 23(f) the Bihar Land Reforms Act, my learned brother has based his decision on the ground that the provision of this clause constitutes a fraud on the Constitution, and although in enacting the provision, the legislature purported to exercise its powers under entry 42 of the Legislative List III in Schedule VII of the Constitution, in reality i:t is a colourable exercise of that power under which a thing has been done wliich is not contempleted by that entry at all and lies outside its ambit.\n\nI agree with the line of reasoning adopted by my learned brother in this connection and there is nothing further which I can usefully add.\n\nAs regards section 4 (b) it has been held by my learned brother that the provision of this clause is unconstitutional as it does not disclose any public purpose at all.\n\nThe requirement of public purpose . is implicit compulsory acquisition of property by the State or, what is called, the exercise of its power of eminent domain. This condition is implied in the provision of :irticle 31 (2) of the Constitution and although the enactment in the present case fulfills the requirements of clause (3) of article 31 and as\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Karneshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhangrr\n\nand Others.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kanieshwar\n\nSingh cf Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nsuch attracts the operation of clause (4) of that article, my learned brother has takien the view that the bar created by cleause ( 4) is confined to the question of compensation only and does not extend to the existence or necessity of a public purpose which, though implicit in, has not been expressly provided for by clause (2) of the article.\n\nFor my part I would be prepared to assume that clause ( 4) of article 31 relates to everything that is provided for in clause (2) either in express terms or even impliedly and consequently tl1e question of the existence of a public purpose does not come within the purview of our enquiry in the present case. Even then I would hold that the same reasons, which have weighed with my learned brother in declaring section 23(f) of the impugned Act to be unconstitutional, apply with equal, if not greater, force to section 4 (b) of the Act and I have no hesitation in agreeing with him as regards his decision on the constitutionality of this provision of the Act though I would prefer to adopt a different line of reasoning in support of the same.\n\nSection 4 (b) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act lays down, as one of the results of the publication of a notification under section 3(1) of tl1e Act that \"all arrears of rents........ and all cesses together with interest, if any, due thereon for any period prior to the date of vesting which were recoverable in respect of the estate or tenure by the proprietor or tenureholder and the recovery of which was not barred by any law of limitation shall vest in and be recoverable by the State\".\n\nThe explanation attached to the clause further provides that for purposes of the clause the expre\"ion \"arrears of rent\" shall include arrears in respect of which suits were pending on the date of vesting or in respect of which decrees were obtained before that date together with costs allowed by such decrees.\n\nUnder section 24 of the Act, 50\" lo of these arrears of rent are directed to be added to the amount of compensation money payable for the estate or interest calculated in accord- JP ance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nf '\n\nThe arrears of rent whether merged in decrees or not, whic.h were due to the landlord for a period anterior to the date of notification under section 3(1) of the Act, were undoubtedly the property of the landlord, irrespective of his interest in the estate or tenure which is the subject-matter of acquisition. Such arrears could not vest in the State as a normal result of acquisition of any estate or interest therein, and it is con..:cdcd by the learned Attorney-General that article 31-A of the Constitution has no application so far as these arrears of rent are concerned. The arrears of rent, therefore, are the subject-matter of separate and indipendent acquisition i1nrler the Rih:i.r I,, nd Reforms Act, if the word \"acquisition\" can at a11 be appropriate to cases of this description.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that in every Government there is inherent authority to appropriate the property of the citizens for the necessities of the Statt: and constitutional provisions do not confer this power though they generally surround it with safeguards.\n\nThe restrains invariably are that when private property is taken, a pecuniary compensation must be paidC1 ).\n\nThus eminent domain is an attribute of sovereign power supposed to be tempered by a principle of natural law which connects its exercise with a duty of compensation(2).\n\nPossibly under the impression that the sacredness of private property should not be confided to the uncertain virtues of the party in power for the time being, the Constitution-makers of our country have declared it as one of the fundamental rights that no property shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purpose unless the law directing its appropriation makes provision for compensation in the manner laid down in article 31 ( 2). Clause ( 4) of article 31 does not do away with the obligation to pay compensation ; it merely lays down that laws which are referred to in clause (3) of the article would be immune from judicial scrutiny on the ground of inadequacy of the (I) Vi de Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. II, p. 1110.\n\n(2) Vide Encyclopaedia of Social Science, Vol. V, p. 493.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nMukhtriea f.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaja- Jlziraja Sit Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\namount of compensation or the impropriety of the principle for assessing the same as provided for in the enactment.\n\nThe clause presupposes however that the enactment is the result of a valid exercise of a legis lative power conferred on the legislature by the appropriate entries in the Legislative Lists and if the legislature acts outside these entries or, under the pretence of acting within them, does something which is in flat contradiction with its contents, clause ( 4) of article 31 could not be invoked to afford any protection to such legislation.\n\nClause ( 4) (b) of the impugned Act read with the provision of section 24 of the same, empowers the State Government to appropriate all the arrears of rent due to a landlord at a particular time and the only obligation it casts on the Government in this respect is to allow 50\"/o of the amount thus appropriated as sol'lllium for the so-called acquisition. On\n\nthe face of it the legislative provision purports to have been made in exercise of the powers conferred on the State legislature under entry 36 of List II and entry 42 of List III of Schedule, VII of the Constitution.\n\nIn my opinion, this is a mere device or pretence and the real object which the legislation intended to accomplish is to deprive a man of his money which is not ordinarily a subject-matter of acquisition, in exercise of what are known as powers of eminent domain by the State, without giving him anything in exchange; and under the guise of acting under entry 42 of List III, the legislature has in truth and substance evaded and nullified its provisions altogether.\n\nThe general p_rinciples, which distinguish the powers of eminent domain from other powers of the State under which the sacrifice of the proprietary interest of a citizen could be demanded or imposed, are fairly well-known.\n\nAs has been observed by Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations \"every species of property which the public needs may require and which the Government cannot lawfully appropriate under any other right, is subject to be seized and\n\n,.. '\n\n• t\n\nppropriated under the right of eminent domain(').\n\nMoney as such and also rights in action arc ordinarily excluded from this List by American jurists and for good reasons(2). There could be no possible necessity for taking either of them under the power of eminent domain. Money in the hands of a citizen can be reached by the exercise of the power of taxation, it may be confiscated as a penalty under judicial order and we can even conceive of cases where the State seizes -or confiscates money belonging to or in the hand~ of a citizen under the exercise of its 'police' powers on the ground that such fund may be used for unlawful purposes to the detriment of the interest of the community.\n\nBut, as Cooley has pointed out(3), taking money under the right of eminent domain when it must be eompc\"'ated by money afterwards could be nothing mor-e or less than a forced loan and it is difficult to say Stat it comes under the head of acquisition or requisitioning of property as described !n entry 36 of List II and is embraced within its ordinary connotation.\n\nIt is said by the learned Attorney-General that the subject matter of acquisition in the present case is not money but choses in action. It seems to me that there is no difference in principle between them because a -chose in action can be available to the acquiring authority only when it is made to produce money ; Otherwise it is useless altogether(3).\n\nAssuming however that entry 36 of List II is wide enough to include acquisition of money or a right of action, I have no hesitation in holding that in Qrvid ing for compensation in respect of such acquisition the legislature has made a colourable use of entry 4:l oi List III and has thereby defeated the purpose of that entry altogether.\n\nEntry 42 of List\n\nIII speaks of \"principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or any other public purpose is to be ( l) Sec Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. II, p. 1113.\n\n(2) Cooley, Vol. If\\ p. 1118; Willis on Constitutional Law, p. 816.\n\n(3) Vidc Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. II, p.1118, F. N.\n\nT lie State of\n\nBihar\n\n\"· Maliorajatlhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\na11d Others.\n\nMuJc/1erjea [.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraia Sir Kameshtuar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\ndetermined, and the form and the manner m which such compensation is to be given\".\n\nThis is a description of legislative head and I agree with the learned Attorney-General that in deciding the competency of the legislation under this entry, we are not concerned with the justice or propriety of the principles upon which the assessment of compensation is to be made under a particular legislation nor are we concerned with the justice or otherwise of the form or manner in which such compensation is to be given.\n\nI do not, however, agree with the learned Attorney-General for the reasons already given by my learned brother in his judgment that legislation under this head need not provide for any compensation at all and that a legislative provision which declares that no compensation is to be given comes within the ambit of this legislative head.\n\nSuch construction is repelled by the very language of the entry which speaks of giving compensation and not of denying or witholding it.\n\nStripped of all disguise, the net result of the impugned provision is that it would be open to the State Government to appropriate to itself half of the arrears of rent due to the landlord prior to the date of the acquisition without giving him any compensation whatsoever.\n\nTaking of the whole and returning a half means nothing more or less than . taking half without any return and this is naked confiscation, no matter in whatever specious form it may be clothed or disguised.\n\nThe impugned provision, therefore, in reality does not lay down any • principle for determining the compensation to be paid for acquiring the arrears of rent, nor does it say any-_ thing relating to the form of payment, though apparently it purports to determine both.\n\nThis, in my opinion, is a fraud on the Constitution and makes the legislation, which is a colourable one, void and inoperative.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General has contended that it is beyond the compentency of the Court to enter into a question of bona fides or mala fides of the legislature.\n\nIn a sense this is true. If the legislature is omnipotent, tl:; i.e mqtives, which impel it to enact a particular law, are absolutely irrelevant; arid\n\non the other hand, if it lacks competence the question of motives does not at all arise.\n\nBut when a legislatU.re has a limited or qualified power and has got to act within a sphere circumscribed by legislative entries, the question, whether in purporting to act under these entries, it has, in substance, gone beyond them and has done certain things which cannot be accomplished within the scope of these entries, is really a question affecting the competency of the legislature.\n\nIn such cases, although the legislation purports to have been enacted under a particular entry, if it is really outside it, it would be void(1). It has been suggested in course of the argument on behalf of the State that in the present case the Government in the exercise of its powers of acquisition could acquire the arrears of rent and as the arrears were still unrealised, it was quite legitimate and proper for the Government to deduct half of the gross amount as consideration for the trouble and expense that it would have to undergo in the matter of realising these arrears.\n\nThis would mean that what the legislature intended is simply to enable the Government to help the zamindars in realising the arrears' of rent and as a return for the help which it is to render, the Government is given the right to retain half of the arrears that were actually due.\n\nThis could not possibly have been the real intention of the legislature and I do not think that there is any item in the long legislative lists framed by the Constitution which empowers the legislature to interfere with the legal rights of the landlord in this manner apart from special circumstances like indebtedness or otherwise and impose upon him an onerous obligation to which he is not a consenting party. A legislation of this character is a complete novelty, the like 0£ which has seldom been witnessed before.\n\nThe result is that I concur in the order which has been made by my learned brother Mahajan J. in this case and I allow the appeals subject to the two modifications indicated above. There would be no order as to costs.\n\n(I) See Lefroy on Canadian Constitution, pp. 79-80.\n\n7-10 S. C. India/71\n\n• 1952\n\nThe State ot\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaja- __ _ dhiraja Sir ' Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nMu/f..herjea /.\n\nThe State of Bikar v.\n\nMaharajatlhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh flf Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nDAs J.-The proceedings out of which these appeals have arisen were initiated by different proprietors of estates in Bihar challenging the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950) which will hereafter in this judgment be referred to as \"The Act\".\n\nOn January 26, 1950, when our Constitution came into force, the Bill which eventually became the Act was pending before the Legislature of the State of Bihar.\n\nAfter the Bill had been passed by the State Legislature, it was reserved for the consideration of the President.\n\nOn September 11, 1950, that Bill received the assent of the President and became the Act. The provisions of the Act have been analysed and summai; ised in the judgment just delivered by Mahajan J. and it is not necessary for me to burden this judgment by recapitulating the same.\n\nOn September 25, 1950, the text of the Act was published in the Official Gazette with a notification under section 1 (3) dated September 24, 1950, bringing the Act into operation.\n\nA notification under section 3 of the Act dated September 25, 1950 vesting the estates of certain named proprietors was published in the Official Gazette on the next day.\n\nThis Notification having been published in the Official Gazette, some of the proprietors affected thereby instituted suits in the Subordinate Courts in Bihar after giving the requ1S1te notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and prayed for a declaration that the Act was unconstitutional and void and that their title to the properties remained unaffected.\n\nSome of the other proprietors filed applications in the High Court at Patna under article 226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of appropriate writs, directions or orders.\n\nThe State of Bihar filed its written statements in the suits which were transferred to the High Court for disposal in exercise of its extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction.\n\nThe suits and the applications were heard together.\n\nAs the issues involved grave questions of intcroretation of the Constitution, the suits and applications were placed before a Special Bench '\n\nof the Patna High Court and were disposed of on March 12, 1951.\n\nAll the learned Judges, for one reason or another, repelled all the main contentions of the proprietors but held that the Act was unconstitutional in that it. denied to the proprietors equal protection of the laws guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court rejected the plea of the State that article 31 ( 4) of the Constitution by reason of the words \"notwithstanding anything in this Constitution\" excluded article 14 at least in its application to the alleged inequality of compensation.\n\nArticle 31(4) is in these terms:-\n\n\"lf any Bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2).\"\n\n. The State of Bihar obtained leave of the Patna High Court under article 132 (1) of the Constitution to appeal to this Court and preferred these appeals before us.\n\nIt may be mentioned here that the States of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh also passed legislation for the abolition of zamindaries in their respective States and the validity of those legislations was also contested by the proprietors affected thereby.\n\nThe respective High Courts of those States, however, upheld the validity of the respective State legislations and the aggrieved proprietors came up to this Court either on appeal or on substantive application under article 32.\n\nIt was at that stage that the Constituent Assembly passed the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.\n\nSections 4 and 5 of the Act which are material for our purpose are as follows :-\n\nInsertion of new 4. After article 31 of the Constitution article 31-A. the following article shall be inserted, :i.nd shall be deemed always to have been inserted, namely:-\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaja-- dhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\n3l~A. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the fore- Saving of laws going provisions of this Part, no law\n\nproi.ding for acproviding for the acquisition by the rqmsitton of estates, State of any estate or of any rights etc. therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part :\n\nProvided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has recdved his assent.\n\n(2) In this article,-\n\n(a) the expression \"estate\" shall, in i; elation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has1 in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or mttafi or other similar grant;\n\n(b) the expression \"rights\", in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder or other iterme<liary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue.\n\n5. After article\n\n31-A of the Con- Insertion of new stitution as inserted by section 4, the article 31-B. following article shall be inserted, namely :-\n\n31-B. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions con- Validation of certain Acts and Regulations. tained in article\n\n31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule or any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part,\n\nand notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.\"\n\nA new Schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying thirteen several Acts and Regulations of which the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, was the first was added to the Constitution.\n\nThe legal validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, has been recently upheld by this Court and all Courts must give effect to the two new articles which are now rubstantive parts of our Constitution.\n\nArticle\n\n31-A relates back to the date of the Constitution and article 31-B to the respective dates of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule.\n\nIt has not been disputed that the provisions of the above two newly added articles have to be taken into consideration in disposing of these appeals.\n\nLearned counsel appearing for the respondents accept the position that as a result of the constitutional amendments tl1e impugned Act has been removed from the operation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution including article 14 and that the respondents cannot, therefore, complain of the breach of the equal protection of the laws under arcicle 14 which was the only ground on which the respondents succeeded in the High Court.\n\nLearned counsel, however, maintain that although they cannot now challenge the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it contravenes or is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution ; it is, nevertheless, open to them to call the Act into question on other grounds founded on other parts of the Constitution or on general principles of law.\n\nAccordingly Mr. P. R. Das formulates the following five principal grounds of attack against the Act, namely:\n\nA. On a proper interpretation of articles 245 and 246 read with entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of\n\nJV¥!El\n\nMaharajat!hiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nList III the Bihar Legislature had no power to enact the said Act inasmuch as it makes no provision for the payment of just compensation . for the proposed acquisition of the zamindaries and tenures.\n\nB. Even if the Court does not accept the correctness of the arguments based on entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III and holds the respondents barred from going into the question of compensation by reason of articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B the respondents are still entitled to challenge the Act on the ground that the proposed acquisition is not for a public purpose.\n\nC. The Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution, tllat is to say, while it purports to be in conformity with the Constitution it, in fact, constitutes a definance of it.\n\nD. The Act is unenforceable 111 that section 32(2) provides for payment of compensation in 40 equal instalments' without specifying the period of interval between the instalments.\n\nE. The Act delegated essential legislative functions to the executive Government.\n\nThe heads of objections Mr. P. R. Das apparently look necessary, therefore, to consider the arguments advanced by him of them.\n\nthus formulated by formidable and it 1s with close attention in support of each\n\nRe Ground A : That article 31 (2) imposes upon a law for the compulsory acquisition of private property the obligation to provide for compensation and that such obligation is, therefore, a provision of article 31(2) is not challenged.\n\nNor is it claimed, in view of articles 31( 4), 31-A and 31-B, that it is still open to the respondents to call in question the validity of the impugned Act on the ground that it contravenes or is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges the provision for compensation made in article 31(2). What is urged is that the obligation to provide for compensation is not a provision to be found exclusively in article 31(2) but that it is also provided for in other parts of the Constitution and\n\nthat, in so far as such obligation is found provided elsewhere, the impugi:ed Act can well be challenged on the ground that it contravenes or is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges the provisions of those other parts of the Constitution, for that ground of challenge has not been taken away by articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B, by reason of the delimiting words used therein.\n\nThe argument is developed in the following way. The State's power to acquire private property is, in essence, a power to compel the owner to sell his property when the public interest requires it.\n\nAuthority for this: proposition is to be found in Blackstone's Commentary (Broom's Edn.) p. 165 and in Cooley's C, onstitutional Limitations, 8th Edn., Vol. II, p. 1201, Footnote (3).\n\nIndeed, In some of the English statutes for compulsory acquisition of lands and hereditaments (e.g. 5 & 6 Vic. C. 94 and 8 & 9 Vic. C. 18) the word \"purchase\" was used to denote acquisition.\n\nAs there can be no sale without a price, there can be no compulsory acquisition of private property without a provision for payment of just compensation, i.e., its equivalent value in money. That the obligation to pay just compensation for compulsory acquisition of private property is a principle of natural equity recognised by all temperate and civilized governments, that the right to compensation is an incident to the exercise of the power of eminent domain and that the one is so inseparably connected with the other that they may be siaid to exist, not as separate and distinct principles but, as parts of one and the same principle are well-established by a series of decisions of the American courts quoted by Harlan J. in Chicago, Burlinghton and Quincy. Railroad Company v. Chicago(1).\n\nIn England Lord Dunedian in Attorney-General v.\n\nDe Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd.(2), described the obligation to pay compensation as \"a necessary concomitant to taking\".\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the obligation to pay compensation is inseparable from and is implicit in the power of acquisition. This obli-\n\n(1) 166 U.S. 216; 41 L. Ed. 979.\n\n(2) [ 1920] A.C. 508.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nDas f.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\ngation flows ftom the mere use of the word \"acquisition\" in entry 36 in List II, as in entry 33 in List I.\n\nThat word, by itself, according to Mr. P. R. Das, connotes a compound concept, namely, the concept of a power of taking on just terms and confines the very legislative competency under those entries within the limits of that compound concept.\n\nIf, however, the word \"acquisition\" in entry 36 in List II and entry 33 in List I does not by itself imply the obligation to pay just compensation, then, urges Mr. P. R. Das in the alternative, the words \"subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III\" occurring at the end of entry 36 in List II certainly brings in that obligation.\n\nOn a plain reading of entry 36 in List II the power to make law with respect to matters specified therein is \"subject to\", that is to say, \"conditional upon\" the exercise of legislative power under entry 42 in List III.\n\nThose concludng words\\ Mr. P. R. Das says, import the obligation to provide for compensation as provided in entry 42 in List III into entry 36 in I)st II and thereby enlarge the content of the last mentioned entry so as to make it a legislative head comprising \\he compound concept referred to above.\n\nThe third alternative position is that if the word \"acquisition\" in entry 36 in List II does not, by itself, imply the obligation to provide for compensation and if the words. \"subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List !Ii\" do not import that obligation as stated above, entry 42 in List III should, nevertheles~, be construed as conferring a power coupled with a duty, so that if the law-making power under entry 33 in List I or entry 36 in List II is at all exercised, the lawmaking power under entry 42 in List III must, on the principle laid down by the House of Lords in /ulus v.\n\nLord Bishop of Oxford(') and adopted by this Court in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd.('), also be exercised.\n\nIt is urged that the Bihar Legislature having purported to exercise its power to make a law for compulsory acquisition of property under entry 36 m ( 1) L.R. 5 App. Cas. 214.\n\n(2) [1950] S.C.R. 536.\n\n...\n\nList II but not having made any law laying down any principle for determining what may, in the eye of the law, be regarded as just compensation at all, the Act is ultra vires and void.\n\nThe arguments thus developed by Mr. P. R. Das undoubtedly have the merit of attractive ingenuity and apparent cogency and certainly call for very careful consideration.\n\nTo cut at the root of the above argument the learned Attorney-General appearing for the appellant State contends that the impugned Act is a law made with respect to matters mentioned in entry 18 in List II and not under entry 36 in List II. The contention is that it is essentially a legslation for land reforms and alteration of land tenures. It is pointed out that the Act eliminates the interests of all zernindars and intermediate tenure-holders so that the State and the actual tiller of the soil may be brought into direct relationship.\n\nIncidental to this primary object is the acquisition of the various interests in the land.\n\nReference is made to the cases of The United Province;\n\nv. Mst. Atiqa Begum and Others('), Thakur /agannath\n\nBaksh Singh v. The United Provinces(2) and Megh Raj -and Another v. Allah Rakhia and Others(8) in support of the proposition that each entry in the list, which is a category or head of the subject-matter of legislation, must be construed as widely as possible so as to include all ancillary matters.\n\nThis lien of reasoning found favour with Shearer J. but was rejected by Reuben J. and S. K. Das J.\n\nThere is no doubt that \"land\" in entry 18 in List II has been construed in a very wide way but if \"land\" or \"land tenures\" in that entry is held to cover acquisition of land also, then entry 36 in List II will have to be held as wholly redundant, so far as acquisition of land is concerned, a conclusion to which I am not prepared to assent.\n\nIn my opinion, to give a meaning and content to each of the two legislative heads under entry Ht and entry 36 in List II the former should be read as a legislative\n\n(1) [1940] F.C.R. 110 at p. 134.\n\n(3) [1947] F.C.R. 77.\n\n(2) [1946] F.C.R. 111 at p. 119.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe Stat• of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\ncategory or head comprising land and land tenures and all matters connected therewith other than acquisition of land which should be read as covered by entry 36 in List II.\n\nFurther, the impugned Act purports to acquire all arrears of rent and a la~ for acquisition of the arrears of rent cannot possibly be said to be a law with respect to matters specified in entry 18 in List II for it cannot be supposed to be a law relating to the collection of rent within the meaning of that entry.\n\nOn this point I find myself in agreement with Reuben J. and S. K. Das J. and I cannot accept the arguments of the learned Attorney-General to the contrary. Therefore, the arguments of Mr. P. R.\n\nDas founded on entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III cannot be rejected in limine but have to be considered and I proceed to do so immediately. -\n\nThat the obligation to pay compensation is concomitant to, that is to say, accompanies, the power of compulsory taking of private property by the State cannot be disputed. The first important question is whether this obligati'on is implicit in the term \"acquisition\" as used in entry 36 in List II, or in other words whether this obligation is to be inferred simply from the nse of that term as a part of the content or meaning thereof.\n\nIn Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Limited (supra) Lord Dunedin pointed out that the power of acquisition was, in its origin, derived from the prerogative of the Crown and that the payment of compensation was originally a matter of negotiation and bargain between the Crown and the subject, but came to be determined later on by statutes of local application and finally by statutes of general application and that, therefore, the Crown, which is an assenting party to every statute, must, in effect, be regarded as having consented to the exercise of its prerogative being made subject to payment of compensation regulated by statutes.\n\nIn that case, however, it was not disputed in arguments that the taking itself was a matter of prerogative right.\n\nIn the United States of America the power of eminent domain was not originally, in terms, conferred on\n\n- •\n\nthe United States by any provision of the Federal Constitution, but this power has always been recognised to exist as an inherent attribute of the sovereignty of the State.\n\nSo far as the United States are concerned, the Fifth Amendment by providing that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation gave a constitutional recognition to the right of eminent domain and, to protect the subjects, imposed a limitation on the exercise of that right by the State.\n\nThis indicates that the power of acquisition and the obligation to pay compensation are two separate and distinct concepts although the second follows the first. If the obligation to pay compensation were an integral part of the concept or the meaning of \"taking\" itself, then this part of the Fifth Amendment was wholly unnecessary.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the expression \"acquisition\" does not, by itself and without more, import any obligation to pay compensation.\n\nIt is urged by Mr.\n\nP. R. Das that entry 42 in List III really implements the obligation implicit in entry 36 in List II and the two entries are complementary to each other. If this obligation were not implicit in entry 36 in List II then where else, it is asked, is the obligation to pay compensation to be found ? The obvious answer is that that obligation is to be found in article 31(2) in . Part III of our Constitution.\n\nThe obligation to pay compensation may be introduced as a part of the legislative power itself, in which case it becomes a composite power, namely, a power to make law with respect to acqui.sition circumscribed by the obligation to provide for compensation.\n\nThus in section 31 (XXXI) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act the acquisition of property on just terms has been made a head or category of legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament.\n\nThere the power is not to make a law for the acquisition of property simpliciter but is to make a law for the acquisition of property on just terms which connotes that the legislative power itself is circumscribed by the necessity for providing just terms. But there is no overriding\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir\n\nKamshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhangt¥\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhan ga and Others.\n\nDas].\n\nnecessity of constitutional law that I know of, or that has been brought to our notice, which requires that the obligation to pay compensation for the acquisition of property must be made part and parcel of the very legislative power to make a law with respect to the compulsory acquisition of private property.\n\nIt must depend on the provisions of the particular constitution under consideration.\n\nWhat do we find in our Constitution ? We find that under article 246 Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect, inter ulia, to matters specified in entry 33 in List I, namely,\n\n\"acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of the Union, that the State Legislatures have exclusive power to make laws with respect, inter alia, to matters specified in entry 36 in List II, namely, the \"acquisition or requisitioning of property except for the purposes of the Union subject to the provision of entry 42 of List III\" and that both Parliament and the State Legislatures may make laws with respect to matters set forth in entry 42 in List III, namely, the principles for determining the compensation and the form and manner of giving such compensation.\n\nThis legislative power of Parliament or of the State Legislatures is, by article 245, made \"subject to the provisions of this Constitution.\" One of the provil; ions 0f the Constitution is article 31 (2) under which no property can be \"taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition unless the law provides for compensation for the property and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the mam:1er in which, the compensation is to be determined and given.\" The scheme of our Constitution obviously is to provide the three things separately, namely, the power of making a law for acquisition of property in article 246 read with entry 33 in List I and entry 36 in List II, the obligation of such law to provide for compensation in article 31 (2) and the power of making a law laying down the principles for determining such compensation in article 246 read with entry 42 in List III.\n\n... •\n\nAccording to this scheme it is not necessary at all to regard entry 33 in List I and entry 36 in List II, which are mere heads of legislative power, as containing within themselves any obligafion to provide for the payment of compensation.\n\nIn other words, it is not necessary to treat the obligation to pay compensation as implicit in or as a part or parcel of these legislative heads themselves, for it is separately and expressly provided for in article 31 (2).\n\nThe well-known maxim expressum f acit cessare tacit um is, indeed, a principle of logic and common sense and not merely a technical rule of construction (See Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Edn., p. 443 at p. 452). The express provision in article 31 (2) that a law of acquisition, in order to be valid, must provide for compensation, will, therefore, necessarily exclude all suggestion of an implied obligation to provide for compensation sought to be impo.i;.ted into the meaning of the word \"acquisition\" in entry 36 in List II.\n\nIn the face of the express provision of article 31 (2) there remains no room £or reading any such implication in the legislative heads.\n\nMr. P. R. Das suggests, in the alternative, that if the obligation to provide for compensation is not implicit in the word \"acquisition\" itself as used in entry 36 in List II that obligation is atracted and made a part and pared of that entry by reason of the words \"subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III\".\n\nThe last mentioned words are, however, not to be found l.n entry 33 in List I and this pan of Mr. P. R. Das's argument would lead to this anomalous result that while the obligation to provide for compensation is made a part of the legislative power under entry 36 in List II by virtue of its last few words quoted above, no such obligation is attractedt and made part of the legislative power under entry 33 in List I, and that, therefore, in making a law with respect to acquisition of property under entry 33 in List I Parliament, unlike the State Legislatures, will not be bound to provide for any compensation at all.\n\nThis cannot possibly be the intention of the framers\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas f.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nof our Constitution.\n\nFurther, Mr. P. R. Das reads the words \"subject to\" as meaning \"conditional upon\" the exercise of the legislative power under entry 42 in List III, that is to say, conditional upon fulfilling the obligation to provide for compensation and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given.\n\nI agree with S. K. Das J. that the~ words \"subject to\" have not the meaning sought to be given uo them by Mr. P. R. Das but that they mean \"but not\" so as to indicate that the scope of entry 36 in List II is restricted, that is to say, that the subjectmatter of entry 42 in List III is not within the content of entry 36 in List II.\n\nIf entry 42 in List III were, by reason of the words \"subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III\" occurring in -entry 36 in List II, to be read as having been made a part of the content of entry 36 in List II then it may well be argued that, in view of article 246, . Parliament will not be competent to maintain law with respect to principles on wh'ich compensation is to be determined.\n\nIt is in order to prevent this argument and out of aqundant caution that - the subjectmatter of entry 42 in List III has been excluded from the content of entry 36. in List II by the words \"subject to\" et cetera and Parliament may, therefore, freely make a law with respect to the matters thus excluded from entry 36 in List II and set forth as a separate and independent item in entry 42 'in List III.\n\nThis consideration was not material in connection with entry 33 in List I which explains the omission of the words \"subject to\" et cetera from that entry.\n\nMr. P. R. Das finally urges that if the obligation to provide for compensation is not implicit in the word \"acquisition\" in entry 36 in List II and if that obligation is not to be read into that entry even in view of the words \"subject to .............. \" at the end of it, even then if the State exercises its power to make a law with respect to acquisition of property under entry 36 in List II it is the duty of the State Legislature to make a law also with respect to matJters specified in entry 42 in List III on the principles that as\n\n. ...,\n\nentry 42 in List III confers a power on the Legislature for the protection of the interest of persons; whose property is compulsunly acquired, such power must, therefore, be regarded as coupled with a duty to exercise it. No authority has been brought to our notice establishing or even suggesting that the principle laid dawn by the House of Lords in Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford (supra) has been extended to the exercise of Legislative power and I am not prepared to assent to the proposition.\n\nArticle 246 does not make it obligatory for Parliament or the State Legislatures to make a law under any of the entries in any of the Lists in the Seventh . Schedule.\n\nEntry 42 in List III does not, therefore, impoe any duty upon Parliament or the State Legislatures to make any law for payment of compensation. What requires Parliament or State Legislatures, when making . a law for compulsory acquisition of private property, to provide for compensation and either to fix the amount thereof or specify the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given is the provision of art'icle 31 (2). Entry 42 in List III only constitutes a legislative head under which Parliament or the State Legislatures may make a law so as to give effect to the obligation expressly imposed on them by article 31 (2). In view of the clear provision of that article it is wholly unnecessary to read entry 42 in List III as imposing an implied duty on the Legislature on the principle referred to in the Hoose\n\nof Lords case.\n\nThat the obligation to provide for compensation is not included in the content of the legislative power\n\nu_nder entry 36 in List II, by itself or read with entry 42 in List III, will be made further clear when we come to consider closely clauses (4) and (5) of article 31 and article 31-A. Article 31 ( 4) protects a law of the description mentioned therein against the provisions. of article 31 (2). It follows, therefore, that what is sought to be protected by article 31 (4) is a law for the acquisition or taking possession of property which does not, amongst other things, pro-ifide for compensation or\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaiadhiraia Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\ndoes not fix the amount or specify the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given, for otherwise there would be no necessity for any protection.\n\nThe question at once arises as to whether there is any legislative entry in List II under which a law for acquisition or taking possession of property without compensation can be made by a State Legislature.\n\nTo test the validity of Mr. P. R. Das' s argument and to avoid the complication arising out of the residuary powers of Parliament under article 248 and entry 97 of List II I have taken the case of a law otf acquisition made by the legislatures of a State which also come within article 31(4). Is there, then, any entry in List II under which a State Legislature can make a law for acquisition without compensation or pub!'ic purpose ? Obviously there is none, except entry 36 in List II. If that entry by itself or read with entry 42 in List III has any implication as suggested, namely, that a law for acquisition of property made under entry 36 in List II without a provision for compensation wiJll be beyond the legislative compentency of the State \\Legislatures, then there is no other entry under which such a law can be made by a State Legislature and there can, therefore, be no point in making a prOIVision in article 31(4) for protecting, against article 31(2), a law which, on this hypothesis, cannot be made at all. Article 31(4) postulates a law which offends against 31(2) and so far as the State Legislatures are concerned there is no entry in List II except entry 36 under which such an offending law may made by the State Legislatures. This circumstance unmiistakabRy establishes thait entry 36 in List II, by itself or read with entry 42 in List III, ha.s not any such implication as is imputed to it. Likewise . tak:e article 31(5) (b) (ii) which protects the provisions of any law which the State may hereafter make for the promotion of public health or the prevention of danger to life or property. The law wh'ich is thus sought to be protected must also involved acquisition of property without any provision. for compesation, for otherwise there can be no occas10n or necessity for\n\nany protection against article 31 (2).\n\nA law of this kind, in so far as such law provides for acquisition of property, must necessarily be made by a State Legislature, if at all, under entry 36 in List II. If Mr .\n\nP. R. Das's contentions were correct, a law for the promotion of health or the prevention of danger to life or property involving the acquisition of property without a provision for compensation, which is what is sought to be protected from article 31 (2), can never be made, for the obligation to provide for compensation is, according to him, implicit 'in entry 36 in List II, by itself or read with entry 42 in List III, and there is no other entry under which a law may be made by a State Legislature with respect to acquisif1on of property.\n\nIt is futile to attempt to get over this anomaly by suggesting that clauses ( 4) and (5) (b)\n\n(ii) of article 31 have been inserted in the Constitution ex abundanti cautela, for, if Mr. P. R. Das were correct in his submission, no amount of caution was necessary for protecting a law that, ex hypothesi, cannot be made at all. Similar arguments may as well be founded on article 31-A, for that article also protects a law from article 31 (2) which is in Part III of the Constitution.\n\nIt is - suggested that article 31-A postulates a valid law made by a competent legislature within the ambit of its legislative powers. If a State Legislature in making a law for the acquisition of property for a public purpose under entry 36 in List II must provide for compensation then a law made conformably with this supposed requirement of that entry by a\n\nState Legislature will require no protection ar all agalnst article 31 (2), and article 31-A must be regarded as meaningless and unnecessary.\n\nSurely, that conclusion is manifestly untenable.\n\nIn my opinion clauses ( 4) and (5) (b) (ii) of article 31 and article 31-A clearly negative Mr. P. R. Das's proposition.\n\nIn my judgment, for the reasons stated above, the major premise in the arguments advanced by Mr. P. R. Das under the first head, namely, that the obligation to pay compensation is implicit in entry 36 in List II by itself or read wiith entry 42 in list III is unsound. 8-10 S. C. lnida/71\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraia Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe obligation to provide for compensation being, as I hold, a provision of article 31 (2) and not being implicit m or a part and parcel of the legislative power itself under entry 36 in List II read by itself or in conjunction with entry 42 in List III, the impugned Act cannot, by virtue of article 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B, be called in question on the ground that it contravenes or is 'inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by the provisions of clause (2) of a~ 'de 31, that is to say, that it does not provide for compensation.\n\nAssuming that the obligation to pay compensation which is expressly provided in article 31 (2) is also implicit in entry 36 in List II by itself or read with entry 42 in List III the respo!ldents cannot, even then, be permitted to call in question the validity of the impugned Act on the ground that it does not provide for compensation, for then they will be doing exactly what they are forbidden to do by article 31\n\n(4) and the newly added articles. Article 31 (4) and the added articles debar the respondents from questioning the validity of the Act on the ground, inter alia, that it contravenes or is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by the provisions of clause (2) of article 31. The emphasis in those articles is rather on the \"provisions\" than on the number of the article or the Part of the Constitution.\n\nIt is obvious that the real substance of the matter is that articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B expressly seek to prevent a challenge to the validity of the Act based on the ground, inter alia, that it does not provide for compensation.\n\nTIJils obliganbn to provide for compensation is no doubt one of the provisions of articles 31\n\n(2) but if, as contended by Mr. P. R. Das, the self same provision be found elsewhere in the same Constitution, e.g., entry 36 in List II or entry 42 in List III, then that \"prorvision\" must also be regarded as having been covered by article 31 ( 4) and the two added articles, for otherwise those articles will be ren dered nugatory.\n\nIn my opinion, if two constructions are possible, the Court should adopt that which\n\nwill implement and discard that which will stultify the apparent intention of the makers of the Constitution.\n\nFurther, it must be borne in mind that article 31 ( 4) which applies \"notwithstanding anything in this Constitution'', will, by force of the very words, protect the Act against everi legislative incompetency, if any arising out of the alleged noncompliance with the suggested implied provisions, if any, of entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III.\n\nIn my judgment the respondents are not, by reason of articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B, entitled to call the Act in question on the ground that it does not provide for compensation, whether the ground s formulated as a breach of article 31 (2) or of the implied provision, if any,. of the legislative heads mentioned above.\n\nIt will be noticed that the argument that the .Act is unconstitutional is founded on the assumption that it has not laid down any principle for determining compensation as required by entry 42 in List III and that the provision for compensation is wholly illusory.\n\nChapter V of the Act deals with assessment of compensation.\n\nShortly put, the scheme is to start with the gross assets which are taken to be synonymous with the gross income and then to make certain deductions therefrom and to arrive at the net assets.\n\nThen the compensation is to be calculated at a sliding scale 0£ rates varying from 20 to 3 times of the net income.\n\nTo the amount thus determined is to be added a moiety of the accumulated arrears of rent etc. and the compensation for the mines and minerals as determined under section 25.\n\nEx f acie, it cannot be disputed that the Act does prescribe some principles for determining the compensation payable to the proprietor c.r\n\ntenure-holder.\n\nIt is, however, pointed out that the deduction of 5 to 20 per cent. of the gross assets as and by way of cost of management is quite arbitrary.\n\nIt is said that although it is well known that the percentage of cost of management in relation to the income of a small estate is greater than that of a larger estate, yet the Act provides for deducting 20 percent. of the gross assets in the case of proprietors\n\nThe State •f\n\nBihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanz11\n\nand Others.\n\nDRs /.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraia Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh . of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nof the larger estates but only 5 per cent. in the case of the smaller estates.\n\nObjection is next taken to the deduction of any amount under the head of works of benefit to raiyats the and also to the scale of such deduction. These arguments, to my minct, do not, on close scrutiny, amount to saying tha:: the Act does not lay down any principle for determining the compensation. The real underlying implica tion of these arguments, as I understand them, is that the principles are not good enough in that they do .not produce fair compensation.\n\nI do not think the Court can go into the policy of the legislation. All that the Court is concerned with is to see whether any principle has been laid down as mentioned in entry 42 in List III.\n\nIt is true that the percentage of costs of management calculated on the basis of the income of a big estate is less than that of a smaller estate, but it is quite clear that the Act has fixed the scale of deducion under this head and under the head of works of benefit according to the capacity of the proprietor or tenureholder to bear it. It is impossible to say that the provision for deduction for works of benefit to the raiyats is not supported by any principle.\n\nA landlord .is expected to spend money on works of benefit to his raiyats, e.g., providing tanks and wells, irrigation, charitable dispensary, schools and so forth and be it said to the credit of some of the landlords that in practice they do spend money on this account. Therefore, there is nothing wrong, when calculating the net income of a landlord, to deduct something which the landlords should and some of them often do, in practice, spend under this head.\n\nI see no absence of principle in this provision. The rate of deduction, I have said, has been fixed according to the capacity of the proprietors or tenure holdens.\n\nIt has been shown, and it is not denied that in many cases a calculation of the net income on the basis of the principles laid down in in the Act operates to reduce the gross income to a very small net income. To take only one instance, the gross annual income of the barbhanga estate is about Rs. 47,85,069, the deduction\n\nj •\n\nallowed by the Act is about Rs. 44,88,585, and the net income computed according to the principles laid down in the Act comes to about Rs. 2,96,484 or say Rs. 3 lacs and the compensation payable to the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga will be only rupees 9 lacs. It has also been shown that at least in one case, e.g., iu the case of the Raja of Purnea the compensation calculated according to the principle laid down in the Act works out at a deficit figure. The fact that in one isolated case the calculation may work out in thi~ way, does not, however, prove that no principle has been laid down. Indeed, in all other cases the principle laid down in the Act actually produces compensation, however inadequate it may be said to be in some\n\ncases.\n\nIf a principle has been laid down, then the provisions of entry 42 in List III are amply satisfied and no question of legislative incompetency can arise.\n\nIf a principle has beeh laid down in the Act but that principle does not in fact produce any compensation in any rare case or adequate compensation in some cases then the real complaint should be, not that no principle has been laid down but, that the principle laid down does not produce what may be called just compensation.\n\nThat result may offend aga1nst the provisions of article 31 (2) but certainly not against entry 42 in List III and in view of articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B the Act cannot be challenged for non-compliance with article 31 (2). On the other hand, even if i; t is held that no principle has, in fact, been laid down by the Act, as contended, then that fact not only amounts to a breach of the provisions of entry 42 in List III but also constitues a breach of the provisions of article 31 (2) which clearly and emphatically requires the law to either fix the compensation or lay down the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be given and a breach of this \"provision\", call it a provision of article 31 (2) or one of entry 42 in List III, cannot, for reasons already stated be questioned in view of articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B.\n\nIt should also be remembered that article 31 ( 4) by reason of the words \"notwithstanding\n\nThe State of Bihar v • Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/,\n\n. The State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajatlhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh •f Darbhanga •nd Others.\n\nD\"' /.\n\nanything in this Constitution\" occurring therein will also protect the Act even against the alleged legislative incompetency arising out of the noncompliance with all provisions of the Constitution relating to the payment of compensation or the existence of a public purpose including the supposed requirement of producing actual compensation said to be implicit in the provisions of entry 42 in List III.\n\nIn my judgment, the Act cannot be called in question on the ground of legislative incompetence of the Bihar Legislature to enact it under entry 36 in List II or entry 42 in List III.\n\nWhat I have stated above is sufficient to repel the first ground of attack levelled against the Act by Mr. P. R. Das.\n\nBut before passing on to the second main ground of attack I think it right to deal with a few subsidiary points canvassed before us.\n\nIt is said that section 3 of the Act, which is its main operative section, does not contemplate or authorise the acquisition of arrears of rent at all, for the notification under that section only refers to the vesting of the estates or tenures in the State.\n\nIt is, however, to be noticed that the consequeunce of issuing that notification is that the arrears of rent including all that are mentioned in clause (b) of section 4 are also to vest in, and be recoverable by, the State. This vesting of the arrears of rent in the State necessarily implies the transfer of the rights of the proprietors or tenureholders to the State and this process must, therefore, amount to the acquisition of that right by the State, Therefore, in effect, the Act does contemplate the acquisition of the arrears of rent by the State.\n\nOn the authority of a passage in Willis' Constitutional Law, p. 816, it is argued that the power of eminent domain cannot be exercised with respect to money and choses in action besides certain other unusual forms of property. This passage is . founded on certain earlier decisions of the American Courts. It is, however, clear from Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. I, p. 99, paragraph 2, an<l the case of Cincinnati\n\n; •\n\nv. Louisville & N. R. Co.(1) cited therein that the modern view is that the right of eminent domain can be exercised on choses in action. In any case we are to consider whether arrears of rent are \"property\" in the sense m which that expression ts used in our Constitution and understood m our law.\n\nWhat are the arrears of rent but rents that have fallen due but have not been paid? It is not at all money in the till of the landlord but it is a debt due by the tenants.\n\nIt is, therefore, nothing but an actionable claim against the tenants which is undoubtedly a species of \"property\" which is assignable.\n\nTherefore, it can equally be acquired by the States as a species of \"property.\"\n\nIt is finally urged that the Act makes no provision for payment of compensation for taking this item of property.\n\nIt is true that in section 24 the word \"compensation\" is used m connection with the taking of the estates or tenures and also the taking of mines and minerals but not in connection with the fifty per cent. of the arrears of rent which are directed to be added to the compensation.\n\nBut this prov1S1on for adding the fifty per cent. of the arrears also appears in the chapter headed \"Assessment of Compensation\" and, therefore, the fifty per cent. of the arrears ts added m the process of the assessment of the compensation.\n\nFurther, why is this: fifLY per cent. given to the proprietors or tenure-holders at all unless it were for compensation?\n\nIt ts pointed out that when the State takes away a lac of rupees and returns 50,000 rupees, it, in reality, pays no compensation but by this shift and contrivance only takes away thet other 50,000 rupees for nothing.\n\nThis argument sounds plausible at first but is not founded on any good principle. This argument arises only because a moiety js paid back, as it were, m the same com.\n\nIf compensation for money were made, say, by g1vmg some land of the value of a moiety of the money taken, the same argument would not have been available and all that could be said\n\n(1) 223 U.S. 390; 50 L.Ed .. 481.\n\n1~7\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas].\n\nwould have been that the land so given, not being equivalent in value to the money compulsorily taken away, could not be said to be a JUSt compensation.\n\nThat argument, in view of articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B, would , of course, have been futile.\n\nBut I see no difference in principle or law when compensation for acquisition of arrears is made in money. In such a case if only a moiety of the amount of arrears is returned the obvious complaint will be that the return of 50,000 rupees is not fair or adequate compensation for taking away Rs. 1,00,000 and that complaint may have prevailed had there been no provision like those we have in articles 31(4), 31-A and\n\n31-B.\n\nApart from this, the argument completely overlooks the fact that the arrears of rent are not really cash in the till of the proprietor or tenure-holder but is only a\n\ndbt due by the tenants. What is the market value of this book debt ? This debt will have to be realised, possibly by suit followed by execution proceedings involving time and money in costs.\n\nPart of it, quite conceivably, may not be realised at all. Therefore, the State takes the risk< of realising or not realising the arrears of rent but irrespective of the results of its efforts for their realisation the fifty per cent. of the arrears is in a lump added to the compensation. This, to my mind, indicates clearly that compensation is in fact paid for the arrears of rent and I am not prepared to say that the payment of a moiety of the book debts as compensation is so illusory as to amount to nothing, as contended by Mr. P. R. Das. Even if it be inadequate, the grievance will be not that no principle has been laid down in the Act as required by entry 42 in List III but, that the principle so laid down does not produce adequate compensation and there is, therefore, a contravention of the provisions of article 31(2). That defect cannot, however, _be made a ground of attack in view of articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B for reasons explained above.\n\nRe Ground B: The second point urged by Mr. P.R. '\\ Das is that even if the Court does not accept the argu- . ment as to the necessity for providing for compensation\n\nbeing implicit in entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III and holds that the respondents are, by reason of the provisions of articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and\n\n31-B, debarred from questioning the validity of the Act on the ground that it does not provide for compens.i.tion the respondents are, nevertheless, entitled to challenge the Act on the ground of the absence of a public purpose.\n\nThat the existence of a public purpose is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition has not been disputed by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nThe contention put forward on behalf of the respondents is that the necessity for the existence of a public purpose as a condition precedent to compulsory acquisition of private property is not a \"provision\" 0£ articl\\! 31 (2) but is a requirement of entry 36 in List II or entry 42 in List III.\n\nThe words \"for public purposes\" do occur in article 31 (2) but it is said that there is a distinction between a \"provision\" and an assumption. It is urged that article 31 (2) assumes a law authorising the taking of possession or the acquisition of property for a public purpose and provides that the property shall not be taken possession of or acquired even for that public purpose unless the law also provides for compensation.\n\nIt is, therefore, concluded that the only \"provision\" of article 31 (2) is that the law authorising the taking of possession or the acquisition of property for a public purpose must provide for compensation and it is this \"provision\" only that cannot be made a ground of attack on the Act by reason of articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution. This argument has found favour with Reuben J. and S. K. Das J.\n\nThe latter learned Judge; after referring to a passage in his own judgment in the earlier case of Sir Kameswar Singh v. The Province of Bihar(1) concludes as follows :-\n\n\"Clause (2), strictly speaking, does not, in express words, make \"public purposes\" a condition precedent .to compulsory acquisition but rather assumes that such acquisition can be for public purposes only ; it <loes so by necessary implication.\"\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1950 Pat. 392.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga .\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe learned Judge then refers to the following passage in the judgment of my learned brother Mukherjea J. in Chiranjit Lal Choudhury v. The Union of India & Others(') :-\n\n\"Article 31 (2) of the Constitution prescribes a twofold limit within which such superior right of the State should . be exercised.\n\nOne limitation imposed upon the acquisition of taking possession of private property which is implied in the clause is that such taking away must be for public purpose.\n\nThe other condition is that no property can be taken unless the law which authorises such appropriation contains a provision for payment of compensation in the manner laid down in the clause.\"\n\nI do not, however, see how the above observations of Mukherjea J. in any way support the argument of Mr. P. R. Das that the existence of a public purpose is not a provision of article 31 (2) but is an inherent condition of any legislation for compulsory acquisition of private property.\n\nIt is significant that Mukherjea J. recognises that article 31 (2) \"prescribes\" a two-fold limit.\n\nSurely, a Emit which is \"prescribed\" by the articles must be a provision thereof. In any case, what is implied in the clause must, nevertheless, be a provision of the clause, for the expression \"provision\" is certainly wide enough to include an implied as well as an express prov.1S1on.\n\nBe that as it may, I am prepared to go further and say, fur reasons I shall presently explain, that the requirement of a public purpme as an essential prerequisite to compulsory acquisition is, if anything, essentially a provision of tha.t clause and an integral part of it.\n\nArticle 31 is one of a group of articles included in Part III of tl1e Constitution under the heading \"Fundamental Rights\".\n\nIt confers fundamental right in so far as it protects private property from State action.\n\nCh use (1) of the article protects the owner from being deprived of his property save by authority of law. A close examination of the language of clause ( 1) will.\n\n(2) [ 1950] S.C.R. 869.\n\nshow that this immunity is a limited one and this will at once be clearly perceived if we convert the negative language of clause (1) into positive language.\n\nIn its positive form clause (1) will read :-\n\n\"Any person may be deprived of his property by authority of law\".\n\nThe only limitation put upon the State action is the requirement that the authority of law is a prerequisite for the exercise of its power to deprive a person of his property.\n\nThis confers some protection on the owner in that he will not be deprived of his property save by authority of law and this protection is the measure of the fundamental right.\n\nIt is to emphasise this immunity from State action as a fundamental right that the clause has been worded in negative language.\n\nLikewise, clause (2) is worded 'm negative language in order to emphasise the fundamental right contained therein.\n\nThe enunciation of this fundamental right necessarily requires a statement of the ambit and scope of the State action and to fix the ambit and scope of the State action it is necessary to specify the limitations on the State action, for that limitation alone i' the measure of the fundamental right.\n\nClause (2) of the article, in its positive form, omitting words unnecessary for our present purpose, w\n\n111l read as follows :-\n\n\"Any property, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . may be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law auhorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition if the law provide for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired ............ \"\n\nPut in the above form, the clause makes it clear at once and beyond any shadow of doubt that there are three limitations imposed upon the power of the State, namely, (1) that the taking of possession or acquisition of property must be for a public purpose, (2) that such taking of possession or acquisition must be under a law authorising such taking of possession or acquisition and (3) that the law must provide for compensation\n\nThe State of Bihar v .\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/,\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nfor the property so taken or acquired.\n\nThese three limitations constitute the protection granted to the owner of the property and is the measure of his fundamental right under thi; clause.\n\nUnless these limitations were provisions of the article, the article would have afforded no immunity at all. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the existence of a public purpose as a prerequisite to the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition is an essential and integral part of the \"provisions\" of clause (2). If the requirement of a public purpose were not a provision of article 31 (2), then it will obviously lead us to the untenable conclusion that Parliament will be free under its residuary powers under article 248 and entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to make a law for acquiring private property without any public purpose at all and to the still more absurd result that while Parliament will have to provide for compensation under article 31 (2) in a law made by it for acquisitio• of property for a public purpose it will not have to make any provision for compensation in a law made for acquisition of property to be made without a public purpose.\n\nSuch could never have been the intention of the framers of our Constitution. The existence of a public purpose as a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of compulsory acquisition being then, as I hold, a \"provision\" of article 31 (2), an infringement of such a provision cannot, under articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-B, be put forward as a ground for questioning the validity of the Act.\n\nMr. P. R. Das's second line of argument on this main head is that the necessity for the existence of a public purpose is . implicit in entry 36 in List II and that the existence of a public purpose is also a requirement of entry 42 in List III which is made a part of entry 36 in List II by virtue of the words \"subject to\" etc., appearing at the end of that entry and his conclusion is that in the absence of a public purpose the Bihar Legislature had no legislative competency under those two entries to enact the impugned Act and that this ground of attack, is still available\n\nto him notwithstanding the provisions of articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-B. He does not rely on any other part of the Constitution as insisting on the existence of a public purpose as a prerequisite for compulsory acquisition of private property.\n\nEntry 36 covers any purpose except the purpose of the Union and is not, in terms, limited to public purpose.\n\nSecondly, the argument based on the words \"subject to\" etc. at the end of entry 36 in List II which are supposed to import the provisions of entry 42 in List III into entry 36 in List II is not well-founded and it becomes obvious when we look at entry 33 in List I. There are no words at the end of that entry as \"subject to\" etc. and, therefore, the alleged requirement of a public purpose under entry 42 in List III cannot be said to be incorporated in entry 33 in List I. It would, therefore, follow that whereas under entry 36 in List II which is to be read with entry 42 in List III by reason of the words \"subject to\" etc. in entry 36 in List II the Legislature of a State can only make a law for compulisory acquisition of property for a public purpose, Parliament may, under entry 33 in Llst I which does not attract entry 42 in List III, make a law for compulsory acquisition of property without a public purpose. Such a result could never have been intended by the Constitution.\n\nBesides, turning to entry 42 in List III, I find nothing in support of Mr. P. R. Das's contention.\n\nThe words \"acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose\" in that entry are merely words descriptive of the preceding word \"property\". The matters comprised in entry 42 in List III, as a legislative head, are the principles for the determination of compensation and the form and manner of giv'ing the compensation for property which is described as having been acquired or requisitioned for the stated purposes.\n\nThat entry cannot possibly be regarded as a legislative head for acquisition of property and much less is the purpose or province of that entry to lay down any requirement of a public purpose as a condition precedent for the\n\nThe State of Bihar v • Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas].\n\nacqms1t10n of any property.\n\nIn my opm10n entry 42 in List III is of no assistance to Mr. P. R. Das for this part of his argument.\n\nFurther, the reasons for which I have discarded his . arguments as to the obligation to provide for compensation being implied in entry 36 in List II by itself or read with entry 42 in List III will also apply to this contention mutatis mutandis and they need not be restated here. To put it shortly, the provisions of article 31 (2) which, as I have explained, require the existence of a public purpose, will exclude the implication sought to be read into entry 36 in List II and entry 42 111 List III. Secondly, what articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B exclude is a challenge to the Act on the ground of contravention of the \"provision\" of clause (2). If the \"provision\" of clause (2) of article 31 as to the necessity for the existence of a public purpose as a prerequisite to compulsory acquisition of property is also to be regarded as implicit in those two legislative entries, surely articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-B and in particular article 31 (4) which contain the words \"notwithstanding anything in this Constitution\" will protect the Act from such implied prov!S!on, for reasons I have already explained.\n\nMr. P. R. Das's second main point must accordingly be rejected as untenable.\n\nAssuming that the necessity for the existence of a public purpose is not a provision of article 31 (2) but is a provision only of entry 36 in List II and/or of entry 42 in List III and that consequently articles 31 ( 4 ), 31-A and 31-B do not preclude the respondents from challenging the validity of the Act on the ground of the legislative incompetency arising out of the absence of a public purpose, the question still remains whether there is in fact a public purpose within the meaning of our Constitution to support the Act. It is to be noted that there is no recital of any public purpose . in the Act itself, but it is conceded that this circumstance is not fatal to the validity of the Act.\n\nIt is, however, urged that this circumstance, nevertheless, shows that the Legislature had, at the time of the passing of the Act, no public purpose in its view.\n\nIt is claimed\n\nthat, apart from the absence of any such recital, there is no indication whatever as to the existence of any public purpose in any of the operative provisions of the Act.\n\nIt is not disputed that as a result of this enactment a very large sum of money now payable by the tenants as and by way of current rent and arrears of rent to their respective landlords will be intercepted by the State but it is urged, on the authority of certain passages in Cooley's Constitutional Lirri1tations, 8th Edn., Vol. II, p. 1U8 (Footnote 1) and in Professor Willis' Constitutional Law, p. 817, that the exercise of the power of taxation and not that of the power of eminent domain is the legitimate means for swelling the public revenue. That the Act has no public purpose to support it is sought to be established by saying that ln Bihar the recorded proprietors are about 13,35,919 in number and that assuming that there are four persons in a family, nearly five and a half million people will be ruined as a result of this legislation, although the actual tillers of the soil will derive no benefit whatever therefrom, for they will remain where they are and will have to continue, as heretofore, to pay rJ.eir rent, instead of to their present landlords, to the tate which, they will find, is no better than a ruthless machine unsusceptible to any humane feeling. The contention is that the public purpose must be something definite, something tangible and something immediate and that there must be some indication of its existence in the Act itself and that the State cannot take private property to-day and say that it will think of the public purpose at its leisure.\n\nThis leads me to a consideration of what is a public purpose within the meaning of our Constitution.\n\nWe have been referred to some American authorities for ascertaining the meaning and implication of \"public use\", an expression which obviously is of a more limited import than the expression \"public purpose\" used in our Constitution.\n\nApart from this, a perusal of the text books, e.g., Constitutional Law by Professor Willis, p. 817 et seq., will immediately make it clear\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kame sh war Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas f.\n\nthat the notion as to what is a \"public use\" is rapidly changing in America.\n\nFormerly \"public use'', meant a use by the public.\n\nAccording to the modern view \"public use\" means useful to the public.\n\nThe . passage in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol.\n\nII pp. 1139-40 quoted by S. K. Das J. of the Patna High Court summarises the position thus :-\n\n\"No satisfactory definition of the term \"public use\" has ever been achieved by the Courts.\n\nTwo different. theories are presented by the judicial attempts to describe the subjects to which the expression would apply.\n\nOne theory of \"public use\" limits the application to \"employment\"-\"occupation\".\n\nA more liberal and more flexible meaning makes it synonymous with \"public advantage\", \"public benefit\".\n\nA little investigation will show that any definition attempted would exclude some subjects that properly should be included in, and include some subjects that must be excluded from, the operation of the words \"public use\". As might be expected, the more limited application of the principle appears in the earlier cases, and the more liberal agplication has been rendered necessary by complex conditions due to recent dvelopments \"of civilization and the increasing density of population.\n\nIn the very nature of the case, modern cond 11tions and the increasing inter-dependence of the different human factors in the progressive complexity of a community make it necessary for the Government to touch upon and limit individual activities at more points than formerly\".\n\nTo the like effect are the be found in Corpus r uris, pp. 552 and 553 under the use\":-\n\nfollowing observations to Vol. XX, article 39, at caption \"What is a public •\n\n• \"No general definition of what degrees of public. good will meet the constitutional requirements for a ·\"public' use\" can be framed, as it is in every case a question of J public policy. The meaning of e term is flxible and , is not confined to what may constitute a public use at any given time, but in general it may be said to cover\n\na use affecting the public generally, or any number thereof, as distinguished from particular individuals.\n\nSome Courts have gone so far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that \"public use\" is synonymous with \"public benefit'', \"public utility\", ' or \"public advantage\", and to authorise the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interests involved are of considerable magnitude, and it is sought to use the power in order that the natural resources and advantages of a locality may receive the fullest development in view of the general welfare\".\n\nThe learned author thereupon proceeds to discuss the more restricted meaning given to that expression.\n\nMr. P. R. Das has drawn our attention to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Hamabai Framjee Petit\n\nv. Secretary of State for lndia(1). It should be borne in mind that the Judicial Committee in that case had to consider the meaning of the words \"public purposes\" occurring in a lease of the 19th century. Even in 1914 the Judicial Committee did not think fit to attempt a precise definition of the expression \"public purpose\" and was content to quote with approval the following passage from the judgment of Batchelor J. ': -\n\n\"General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase 'public purposes' in the lease ; it is enough to say . that, in my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned\".\n\nAnd it is well that no hard and fast definition was laid down, for the concept of \"public purpose\" has been rapidly changing in all countries of the world.\n\nThe reference in the above quotation to \"the general\n\n(1) (1915) L.R. 42 I.A. 44. 9-10 S.C.In1tia/7l\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaja dhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga\n\nand-Others.\n\nDas].\n\ninterest of the community\", however, clearly indicates that it is the presence of this element in an object. or aim which transforms such object or aim ino a public purpose.\n\nFrom what I have stated so far it follows that whatever furthers the general interests of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the in-. dividual must be regarded as a public purpose.\n\nWith the onward march of civilization our notions as to the scope of the general interest of the community are fast changing and widening with the result that our old and narrower notions as to the sanctity of the private interest of the individual can no longer stem the , forward flowing tide of time and must necessarily give way to the broader notions of the general interest of the community.\n\nThe emphasis is unmistakably shifting from the individual to the community.\n\nThis modern trend in the social and political philosophy is well reflected and given expression to in our Constitution. Our Constitution, as I understand it, has not ignored the individual but has endeavoured to harmonise the individual interest with the paramount interest of the community. As I explained in Gopalan's case (') and again in Chiranjit Lat's case (supra) our Constimtion protects the freedom of the citizen by article 19(1) (a) to ( e) and (g) but empowers the State, even while those freedoms last, to impose reasonable\n\nresrictions on them in the interest of the State or of public order or morality or of the general public as mentioned in clauses (2) to (6).\n\nFurther, the moment even this regulated freedom of the individual becomes incompatible wi, th and threatens the freedom of the community the State is given power by article 21, to <leprive the individual of his life and personal liberty\n\nin accordance with procedure established by law, subject, of course, to the provisions of article 22.\n\nLikewise, our Constimtion gives protection to the right of private property by article 19 ( 1) ( f) not absolutely but subject to reasonable restrictions to be imposed by law m the interest of the general public\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\n- ,, ,.\n\nunder clause (5) and, what is more important, as soon a:i the interest of the community so requires, the State may, under article 31, deprive the owner of his property by authority of law subject to payment of compensation if the deprivation is by way of acquisition or requisition of the property by the State.\n\nIt is thus quite clear that a fresh outlook which places the general interest of the community above the interes~ of the individual pervades our Constitution.\n\nIndeed, what sounded like idealistic slogans only in the recent past are now enshrined in the glorious preamble to our Constitution proclaiming the solemn resolve of the people of tills country to secure to all citizens justice, social, economic and political, and equality of status and of opportunity.\n\nWhat were regarded only yesterday, so to say, as fantastic formulae have now been accepted as directive principles of State policy prominently set out in Part IV of the Constitution.\n\nThe ideal we have set before us in article 38 is, to evolve a State which must constantly strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and making as effectively as it may be a social order in which social, economic and political justice shall inform all the institutions of the national life.\n\nUnder article 39 the State is enjoined to direct its policy. towards securing, inter alia, that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as to subserve the common good and that the opera~ tion of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.\n\nThe words \"public purposes\" u.sied in article 23(2) indicate that the Constitution uses those words in a very large sense.\n\nIn the neverending race the law must keep pace with the realities of the social and political evolution of the cow1try as reflected in the Constitution. If, therefore, the State is to give effect to these avowed purposes of our Constitution we must regard as a public purpose all that will be calculated to promote the welfare of the people as envisaged in these directive principles of State policy whatever else that expression may mean.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraia Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nthe light of this new outlook what, I ask, is the purpose of the State in adopting measure~ for the acquisition of the zamindaries and the interests of the intermediaries ? Surely, it is to subserve the common good by bringing the land, which feeds and sustains the community and also produces wealth by its forest, mineral and other r=urces, under State ownership or control.\n\nThis State ownership or control over land is a necessary preliminary step towards the implementation of the directive principles of State policy and it cannot but be a public purpose. It cannot be overlooked that the directive principles set forth in Part IV of Constitution are not merely the policy of any partic cular political party but are intended to be principles fixed by the Constitution for directing the State policy whatever party may come into power.\n\nFurther, it must always be borne in mind that the object of .the impugned Act is not to authorise the stray acquisition of a particular property for a limited and narrow public purpose but that its purpose is to bring the bulk of the land producing wealth under State ownership or control by the abolition of the system of land tenure which has been found to be archaic and non-conducive to the general interest of the community.\n\nThe Act also sets up a Land Commission to advise the State Government generally with regard to the agrarian policy which it may from time to time follow.\n\nIt is impossible to say that there is no public purpose to support the Act.\n\nThis very Bihar Act was before the Constituent Assembly when it passed article 31 ( 4) and again when it took the trouble of amending the Constitution for saving this very Act.\n\nWould the Constituent Assembly have thought fit to protect these Acts unless it were convinced that this Act was necessary in -the general interest of the community '?\n\nI find myself in agreement with Reuben J. and S. K. Das J. that these circumstances also clearly indicate that the Constituent Assembly regarded this Act as well supported by a .public purpose. To put a narrow constniction on the expression \"public purpose\" will, to my mind, be to\n\n., -,\n\n-•r\n\ndefeat the general purpose of our Constitution and the particular and immediate purpose of the recent amendments.\n\nWe must not read a measure implementing our mid-twentieth century Constitution through spectacles tinted with early nineteenth century notions as to the sanctity or inviolability of individual rights.\n\nI, therefore, agree with the High Court that the impugned Act was enacted for a public purpose.\n\nMr. P. R. Das then puts. up a narrow argument.\n\nAssuming, says he, that, there is in the Act a general public purpose for compulsory acqui>9ition of zamindaries and tenures, there cannot conceivably be any public purpose in suport of the Act in so far as it authorises the taking of the arrears of rent or the taking away of 4 to 12! per cent. of the gross assets on the specious pka that the landlords must be supposed to spend that percentage of their gross income on works of benefit to the rayats of the estates and, therefore, that part of the Act is beyond the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature.\n\nI regard this argument as unsound for more reasons than one.\n\nIn the first place the existence of a public purpose being, as I hold, a provision of article 31 (2), its absence, if any, in relation to the arrears of rent cannot, by reason of articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-B be made a ground of attack against the Act.\n\nSecondly, it is ari entirely wrong approach to pick out an item out of a scheme .of land reforms and say that that item is not supported by a public purpose.\n\nOne may just as well say that there is no public purpose in the acquisition of forests or of mines and particularly of u::ideveloped mines, for such acquisition has no bearing on a scheme of agrarian reforms in that it does not improve or affect the conditions of the tillers of the surface of the soil.\n\nThis, I apprehend, is not the right way of looking at things.\n\nThe proper approach is to take the &cheme as a whole and than examine whether the entire scheme of acqms1t10n is for a public purpose.\n\nThirdly, I do not regard the deduction of 4 to 12! per cent. of the gross assets as acquisition or confiscation\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga ·\n\nand Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajatlhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhan ga\n\nanti Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nat all, but I regard it, for reasons &tated above, as a part of a principle laid down by the Act for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation as required by article 31 (2) and entry 42 in List III.\n\nFinally, I do not see why the taking over of the arrears of rent, in the context of the acquisition of zamindaries, is not for a public purpose. As I have said, the acquisition of zamindaries and tenures is a scheme for bringing about agrarian reforms and ameliorating the conditions of the tenants.\n\nThe object is, inter alia, to bring the tillers of the soil in direct contact with the States so as to free them from the clutches of rapacious landlords and make them the masters of their holdings subject to payments of the dues to the State.\n\nIt is well-known that the bulk of the tenants are in arrears with their rents and once the rents fall into arrear the tenants find it difficult to pay the current rent after liquidating a part of the arrears so that while they clear part of the old arrears the current rent falls into arrear.\n\nAccording to annexure B (2) to the affidavit of Lakshman Nidhi affirmed on J anuary 22, 1951, the total amount of Raiyati rent payable by the various tenants in the different circles of the Darbhanga Estate alone will exceed rupees three lacs.\n\nIt is not quite clear whether all these arrears are due from the actual rayats in the sense of actual tillers of the soil.\n\nBut leaving out from consideration for the present purposes the arrears of rent due by the -tenure-holders to their immediate superior tenureholder or to the zamindar it can safely be taken that the bulk, if not all, of the actual rayats or tiiJ!ers of the soil are habitually and perpetually in arrear with the rent of their holdings on account of financial stringency resulting from their chronic indebtedness.\n\nIn these circumstances if the zamindaries and the tenures only are acquired under the Act leaving the zamindars and the tenure holders free to realise the huge arrears of rent due by the actual cultivating tenants by legal process it will eventually results in the sale of the holdings of the actual tenants or, at any rate, of their right, title and\n\ninterest therein and the possible purchase thereof by the zamindars or tenure-holders themselves at Court sales in execution of decrees or by private sales forced upon the tenants. The bulk of the actual tillers of the soil wiH then become landless labourers and the entire scheme of land reforms envisaged in the Act will be rendered wholly nugatory.\n\nIf the acquisition of th~ zamindaries and the tenures is, as I hold, dictated or inspired by the sound public purpose of ameliorating the economic and political conditions of the actual tenants, the self same public purpose may well require the acquisition of the arrears of rent so as to avert the undesirable but inevitable consequences I have mentioned The Bihar Legislature obviouslly thought that the tenants in arears will have better treatment and a more reasonable accommodation, in the matter of the liquidation of the huge arrears, from the State which will act under the guidance of the Land Commission than from the expropriated landlords whose sole surviving interest in their erstwhile tenants will only be to realise as much of the arrears as they can from the tenants and within the shortest possible time without any mercy or accommodation. The same remarks apply to the acquisition of decrees for arrears of rent. The overriding public purpose of ameliorating the conditions of the cultivating raya~ may well have induced the Legislature to treat the arrears of rent and the decrees for rent differently from the other ordinary moveable properties of the zamindars or tenure-holders, e.g., their money in the bank or their jewellery or ornaments with which the rayats have no concern and to provide for the acquisition of the arrears and the decrees.\n\nIn the premises, the second main ground of attack levelled by Mr. P. R. Das against the Act must be rejected.\n\nI am, however, free to confess that if I could agree with Mr. P.\n\nR. Das that these provisions . of the impugned Act are bad for want of a public purpose, I am not at all sure that I would not have found it extremely difficult to resist his further argument that the entire Act was bad, for it might\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhira; a Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nT lze State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh . of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nDas J.\n\nnot have been very easy to presume that if the Bihar Legislature had known that these provisions of the Act might be held bad it would nevertheless have passed the other parts of the Act in that truncated form.\n\nThe acquisition of the arrears of rent appears to me to be an integral part of the scheme and inextricably interwoven with it.\n\nIndeed, it may well have been that the scheme of agrarian reform was not considered by the Bihar Legislature to be at all capable of easy implementation by the State without the acquisition of the arrears of rent.\n\nAs, however, I have taken the view that no par:t of the Act is bad for want of a public purpose, I need not pursue any further the question of the severability of the Act or to refer to the judicial decisions relied on by learned counsel on both sides.\n\nRe Ground C: Mr. P. R. Das's third point is that the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution, that is to say, while it purports to be in conformity with the Constitution, it, in effect, constitutes a defiance of it.\n\nThe Act, according to him, pretends to comply with the constitutional requirements in that it sets out to lay down certain principles on which compensation is to be determined and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given but, in effect, makes out a scheme for non-payment of compensation.\n\nThe Act, he urges, purports to pay back fifty per cent. of the arrears of rent as compensation but in reality confiscates the other fifty per cent. without any compensation.\n\nFurther, under the guise of deducting 4 to 12f per cent. of the gross income the State is in reality appropriating a large sum under tllli head.\n\nAll this, he concludes, is nothing but pretence or a mere shift and contrivance for confiscating private property.\n\nThe argument, when properly understood, will be found to resolve itself into an attack on the legislative competency of the Bihar Legislature to pass this Act.\n\nOn ultimate analysis it amounts to nothing more than saying that while pretending to give compensation the Act does not really give it. It is the absence of a provision\n\nfor just and adequate compensation that mak~ the Act bad, because, according to Mr.\n\nDas, the legislative power under entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III requires the making of such a prov1S1on.\n\nThe failure to comply with this constitutional condition for the exercise of legislative power may be overt or it may be covert.\n\nWhen h is overt, we say the law is obviously bad for non-compliance with the requirements of the Constitution, that is to say, the law is ultra vires.\n\nWhen, however, the noncompliance is covert, we say that it is a fraud on the Constitution, the fraud complained of being that the Legislature pretends to act within its power while in fact it is not so doing. Therefore, the charge of fraud on the Constitution is, on ultimate analysis, nothing but a picturesque and epigrammatic way of expressing the idea of non-compliance with the terms of the Constitution. Take the case of the acquisition of the arrears of rent. It is said that the provision in the Act for the acquisition of arrears of rent is a fraud on the legislative power given by the Constitution. I ask myself as to why must it be characterised as a fraud ? I find nothing in the Constitution which says that the arrears of rent must not be acquired and, therefore, there is no necessity for any covert attempt to do what is not prohibited.\n\nI have already explained that in a scheme of land <eforms such as is envisaged in the Act the acquisition of the arrears of rent may properly accompany the acquisition of the zamindaries and the tenures.\n\nWhere, then, does this theory of fraud come in? The answer must eventually be that a moiety of arrears are taken away without compensation.\n\nAgain, take the case of the acquisition of non-income-yielding properties.\n\nWhy, I ask, is it called a fraud on the Constitution to take such property ? Does the Constitution prohibit the acquisition of such property ? Obviously it does not.\n\nWhere, then, is the fraud ? The answer that comes to imy mind is that it is fraud because the Act provides for compensation only on the baSiis of income and, therefore, properties which are at present non-income-yielding but whii; h have very rich\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga ,\n\nand Others.\n\nDas f.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraia Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas 1potentialities are acquired without any compensation at all.\n\nSimilar answer becomes obvious in connection with the deduction of 4 to 12~ per cent. of the gross assets under the head \"Works of Benefit to the Rayats\".\n\nOn ultimate analysis, therefore, the Act is really attacked on the ground that it fails to do what is required by the Constitution to do, namely, to . provide for compensation for the acquisition of the properties and is, therefore, ultra vires. This, to my mind, is the same argument as to the absence of just compensation in a different form and expressed in a picturesque and attractive language.\n\nI have already dealt with the question of absence of a provision for just compensation while dealing with Mr. P. R. Das's first point and I repeat that the obligation to provide for compensation is not implicit in entry 36 List II by itself or read with entry 42 in Lisit:\n\nIII but is to be found only in article 31 (2), that under entry 42 in List III the Act has laid down a principle for determining compensation and, therefore, there can be no question as to legislative incompetency for any alleged non-compliance with any supposed requirement said to be implicit . in these entries.\n\nIf the principles so laid down in the Act do not in any rare case produce any compensation or do not produce adequate compensation in some cases, such absence of compensation may be a contravention of article 31 (2) but in view of articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-B and particularly due to the words \"notwithstanding anything in this Constitution\" occurring in article 31 ( 4) it cannot be made a ground of attack on the Act, even though such ground is formulated in a different but attractive language, namely, as a fraud on the Constitution. Accordingly, this point must also be rejected.\n\nI, however, repeat that if I took a different view I would still have the same difficulty as to the inseverability of the different provisions of the Act as I have hereinbefore indicated.\n\nRe. Ground D : Mr. P. R. Das's fourth point is that the Act is unenforceable in that section 32 (2)\n\nI -\n\nprovides for compensation in forty equal instalments without specifying the period of interval between the instalments.\n\nIn course of arguments, however, Mr. P.\n\nR. Das has thought fit not to preSlil this point and accordingly it does not require any refutation.\n\nRe. Ground E : Mr. P. R. Das's last main point is that the Act has delegated essential legislative functions to the Effective Government and is, therefore, invalid.\n\nArticle 31 (2) requires that the law authorising the taking poss, ession or the acquisition of land for public purpose should provide for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and should either fix the amount or specify the principles on which, and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given.\n\nEntry 42 in List III talks of principles on which compensation is to be determined and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given.\n\nThe argument is that the Constitution has left to Parliament or the State Legislature the duty of specifying the principle on which, and the form and manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given but the Bihar Legislature by section 3 (22) of the Act has simply provided that the amount of compensation shall be paid i:n cash or in bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds and that the bonds shall be either negotiable or non-negotiable and non-transferable and be payable in forty equal instalments and has 'not laid down any decisive provision but has left the matter to the State Government to decide.\n\nIt has, therefore, failed to discharge the duty which was expressly left to its knowledge, wisdom and patriotism.\n\nMr. P. R. Das complains that the Legislature has shirked its responsibility and delegated this essential legislative power to the State Government to be exercised under rules made by itself under its rulemaking power under section 43 (2) (p). The question of the propriety and legality of the delegation of legislative power has recently been considered by this Court in In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc.(1). If I\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 747.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar v .\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhangtr\n\nand Others.\n\nDas J.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaja dhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh .of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nDas/.\n\nwere to deal with this matter according to my own notions, I would have dismissed this argument in limine, for here the Legii>lature has not abdicated or effaced itself in the sense I have explained in my opinion in that case.\n\nWhen I look at the matter on the basis of the principles laid down in that case by the late Chief Justice and my learned brothers to which Mr. P. R. Das has referred, I have to overrule his contention all the same.\n\nHere section 32 clearly indicates that the Legislature has applied its mind to the problem and it has laid down the principle that the compensation may be paid in cash or in bonds or pardy in cash and partly in bonds and that if a payment is to be made either wholly or partly in bonds, these bonds may be either negotiable or non-negotiable and non-transferable.\n\nHaving laid down the principle, the Legislature has, by a rule made under section 43 (3) (p), left it to the Executive to determine the proportion in which the compensation shall be payable in cash and in bonds and the manner of such payment of compensation.\n\nThese details, it will be observed, depend on special circumstances, e.g., the extent of the ability of Government to pay, the extent of the necessities of the proprietors and many other considerations, with which the Executive Government would be more familiar than the Legislature itself.\n\nI am unable to accept Mr. P. R. Das's contention that this amounts to a delegation of an essential legislative function within the meaning of the decision of my learned brothers.\n\nMr. Sanjiva Chowdhuri has urged that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 being continued by the Constitution and that Act which is a Central Act having been extended by notilication in 1899 to Ramgarh State for which he appears, the Central Act must apply to Ramgarh until the notification is withdrawn and the impugned Act cannot apply for determining the compensation, for the field is already occupied by the Central Act of 1894.\n\nIt may, however, be noticed that the provision for compensation in that Act\n\napplies only to lands acquired under that Act. It has no application to lands acquired under other statutes and, therefore, the provision for compensation of the Land Acquisition Act cannot . apply to acquisitions under the Bihar Act and, therefore, the doctrine of occupied field can have no application.\n\nIn my opinion there is no substance in this contention.\n\nFor reasons stated above, I allow these appeals.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR J.-The faits which have given rise to these cases have been fully set out in the judgment just now delivered by my learned brother Mahajan J. and need not be repeated.\n\nThe conclusions reached by him and Mukherjea J. have my concurrence.\n\nOrdinarily, I would have stopped with the expression of my agreement, but having regard to the importance of the guestion argued and the stakes i, nvolved, I desire to add a few words of my own on some of the points discussed.\n\nArticle 31 (I) of our Constitution provides \"No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law\".\n\nThere are three modes of deprivation-(a) destruction, (b) acquisition and ( c) requisition.\n\nDestruction may take place in the interests of public health or the prevention of danger to life or property, but with this we are not now concerned.\n\nIn the case of \"acquisition\", there is an element of permanency, and in the case of \"requisition\" there is an element of temporariness.\n\nExcept for this distinction, both modes stand on the same footing, as regards the rights of the State vis-a-vis the rights of the private citizens.\n\nUnder the Constitution, when property is requisitioned or acquired, it may be for a Union purpose or a State purpose, or for any other public purpose.\n\nEntry 33 in List I (Union List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution speaks of acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of the Union.\n\nWhen we come to entry 42 of List III (Concurrent List), we find these words : \"Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nChandrasek_hara\n\nAiyar f.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh cf Darbhanga and Others.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar f.\n\nof the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given.\"\n\nFrom very early times, law has recognized the right of Government compulsorily to acquire private properties of individuals for a public purpose and this has come to be known as the law of eminent domain.\n\nBut it is a principle of universal law that the acquisition can only be on payment of just compensation.\n\nStory on the Constitution, Vol. 2, page 534, paragraph .1790, has the following passage in discussing the concluding clause of the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution :\n\n. \"The concluding clause is that private property shall not be taken for public use witltout just compensation. This is an affirmance . of a great doctrine established by the common law for the protection of private property.\n\nIt is founded in natural equity, and is laid down by jurists as a principle of universal law.\n\nIndeed, in a free government, almost all other rights would become utterly worthless, if the Government possessed an uncontrollable power over the private fortune of every citizen. One of the fundamental objects of every good government must be the due administration of justice ; and how vain it would be to speak of such an administration, when all property is subject to the will or caprice of the legislature and the rulers.\"\n\nThe payment of compensation is an essential element of the valid exercise of the power to take. In the leading case of Attorney-General v. De Keyser' s Royal Hotel, Ltd. (') Lord Dunedin spoke of the payment of compensation as a necessary concomitant to the taking of property.\n\nBowen L. J. said in London and North\n\nWetern Ry. Co. v. Evans (') :-\n\n\"The Legislature cannot fairly be supposed to intend, in the absence of clear words showing such intention, that one man's property shall be confiscated for the benefit of others, or of the public, without any\n\n(1) [1920] A.C. p. 508.\n\n(2) [1893] 1 Ch. pp. 16 & 28.\n\ncompensation being provided for him in respect of what is taken compulsorily from him. Parliament in its omnipotence can, of course, override or disregard this ordinary principle ...... if it sees fit to do so, but it is not likely that it will be found disregarding it, without plain expres1sions of such a purpose.\"\n\nThis principle is embodied in article 31 (2) of our Constitution in these terms :-\n\n\"o prop_erty, i:iovable or immovaJ:le, including any mterest m, or m any company ownmg, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation JS to be determined and given.\"\n\nWe shall not here trouble ourselves with sub-clauses\n\n(3) and (4) of the article and with articles 31-A and\n\n31-B which were introduced by way of amendment under the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951, dated 18-6-1951.\n\nThey will be considered later.\n\nThe argument of Shri P. R. Das that the payment of compensation is a concomitant obligation to the compulsory acquisition of properties by the State can be accepted as sound ; but when he went further and urged that it was found in an implicit form in entry 42 of the Concurrent List, he was by no means on sure ground. The entries give us the bare heads of legislation.\n\nFor ascertairU, ng the scope or extent or ambit of the legislation and the rights and the duties created thereby, we must . examine the legislation itsdf or must have resort to general and well-recognized principles of law of jurisprudence.\n\nNo resort can be had to anything implicit or hidden when the statute makes an express provision on the same subject. As just compensation has to be paid when property is acquired for a public purpose, the legislation has to\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nformulate the principles for determining the compensation and the form and the manner in which it is to be given.\n\nEntry 42 means nothing more than a power conferred on the Legislature for achieving this end.\n\nThe power is conferred but there is no duty cast to provide for compensation.\n\nFor any statement that the payment of compensation is a primary condition for acquisition of property for a public purpose, we have to look at the provisions of the Constitution itself and this we find in article 31(2) as stated already.\n\nMr. Das was obliged to take up the untenable position that entry 42 of its own force implies an obligation to pay compensation, as he could not otberwi:; e jump over the hurdles created in his way by sub-sections\n\n(3) and (4) of article 31 and the new articles 31-A and 31-B.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contended in dealing with entry 42 that legislation under entry 42 can also lay down principles that would lead to the non-pay-.• ment of any compensation and he cited Atiqa Begum's case(') as an authority in his support. This contention appears to me to be as unsound as Mr. Das's argument that the obligation to pay or give compensation was implicit in the. said entry.\n\nAs there can be no acquisition without compensation, th'e terms of entry 42 enable the legislature to lay down the principles and provide further for the form and . manner of payment.\n\nIf the principles are so formu~ lated as to result in non-payment altogether, then the legislature would be evading the law not only covertly but flagrantly.\n\nThere is nothing in Atiqa Begum's case that supports the argument.\n\nIt was there hefd' that under the head \"payment of rent\" there could be legislation providing for remission of rent.\n\nPayment of rent is not a legal obligation of every tenure and the legislature can enact that under certain circumstances .or conditions there shall be remission of rent.\n\nBut as .regards compensation foi State acqu1S1t:lon, its pay- .. . ment is a primary requisite universally recognized by )\"\":\n\nlaw~ This is the essential distinction to remember\n\n(!) [1940] F.C.R. 110.\n\nwhen we seek to apply the case quoted. The last words in entry 42 \"form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given\" clearly mean that the principles determining compensation must lead to the giving or payment of some <:01npensation.\n\nTo negate compensation altogether by the enunciation of principles. leading to such a result would be to contradict the very terms of the entry and such a meaning could not be attributed to the framers of the Lists.\n\nThis, however, does not carry Shri P. R. Das anywhere near success. Article 31 ( 4) is the first stumbling block in his way.\n\nIt provides :- \"If any Bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, beert reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything m this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2).\"\n\nThe Bill which subsequently became \"The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950\" was pending at the commencement of the Constitution in the legislature of the State, and after it was passed by the legislature, it was reserved for the consideration of the President and received his assent.\n\nTherefore the bar that it shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2) becomes applicable.\n\nTrue, compensation has to be provided for, by reason of sub-clause (2) of the article, but sub-clause ( 4) postulates an exception and the right to challenge the validity of the Act on the ground that no compensation has been provided for or that the compensation is really illusory or inadequate ts taken away.\n\nAs if this were not enough, two more stiles have been erected in his way and they are the new articles 31-A and\n\n31-B brought in by way of amendment.\n\nArticle 31-A, sub-clause (1) is in these terms;:-\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything m the foregoing provisions of this Part, no law providing for the\n\n10~!0 S.C. India/7!\n\nThe State of Bihat v.\n\nMahara; adhiraja Sir Kameshwaf'\n\nSingh of Darbhang11 ·\n\nam! Othe:ts.\n\nChandrasekhar•\n\nAiyar /.\n\nThe State of Bihar 1 v.\n\nMaharaia- Jhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\n•nd Others. ·\n\nCband; asek._hara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nacquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Parr:\n\nProvided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a.\n\nState, the provisions of this arricle shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.\n\nArticle 31-B provides :- \"Validation of certain Acts and Regulations :-Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or even to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions . of . this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment; decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.\"\n\nWhen we look at the Ninth Schedule to the Amending Act, the very first item mentioned is. \"The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950.''\n\nIn the face of these almt insuperable obstacles, Shri P. R\". Das candidly admitted that he could urge nothing as regards the adequacy or the illusory nature -0£ the . compensation provided in the Act, if he was not able to convince the Court on his main point that he\n\ncould challenge the offending Act on grounds other than those mentioned in Part III of the Constitution, and that there was something in entries No. 36 of the State List and No. 42 of the Concurrent List read together which imposed on the State Legislature an obligation to provide for the payment of just or proper compensation and that the non-observance of this\n\nobligation entitles him to challenge the validity of the Act as unconstitutional.\n\nThe acquisition of property can only be for a public purpose.\n\nUnder the Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894, a declaration by the Government that land is needed for a public purpose shall be conclusive evidence that the land is so needed and Courts cannot go into the question whether the public purpose has been made out or not. There is no such provision in any article of the Constitution with which we have to deal. It is true that sub-clause (2) of article 31 speaks of property being acquired for public purposes.\n\nThe bar created by sub-clause ( 4) of article 31 relates to the contravention of the provisions of clause (2).\n\nThe provision of clause (2) is only as regards compensation as can be gathered from its latter part :-\n\n\"Unless the law provides 'for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given.\"\n\nIt is assumed, rightly, that the existence of a public purpose is part and parcel of the law and is inherent in it.\n\nThe existence of a public purpose is not a pro- VlSlOn or condition imposed by article 31 (2) as a limitation on the exercise of the power of acquisition.\n\nThe condition prescribed is only as regards compen~ sation. Article 31 ( 4) debars the challenge of the constitution.ality of an Act on this ground but no other.\n\nWhether there is any public purpose at all, or whether the purpose stated is such a purpose is open, in my opinion, to judicial scrutiny or review.\n\nWhen the legislattire declares that there is a public purpose behind the legislation, we have of course to respect its words. The object of the Act in question is to extinguish the interests of intermediaries like zamindars, proprietors, and estate and tenure-holders etc., and to bring the actual cultivators into direct relations with the State Government.\n\nTo achieve this end, several provisions have been enacted for the\n\nThe State.of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nC handrasek hara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nTiu State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaja~ dhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhan ga and Others.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiy\"1' /.\n\ntransfer and the vesting of such interest m the State as regards various items of ptoperties.\n\nIt is impos.•iblc to deny that the Act is inspired and dominated by a public purpose, but the question still remains whether the taking over of particular items can be said to be for a public purpose. It is in thi~ connection that the two items of \"arrears of rent\" and \"cost of works of benefit to the raiyats\" dealt with in section 4, clause (b), and section 23, clause ( f), respectively of the Act, have to be considered.\n\nThe taking over of \"arrears of rent\" does not seem to have even a remote connection with any question of land reform.\n\nIt stands on no better footing than if the Act sought to take over the cash on hand or in the banks of the zamindars, proprietors or tenureholders.\n\nIt is only an accident that the rents in question were not realised before the passing of the Act.\n\nWhether realised or not, they are his moneys due and payable to him by the ryots.\n\nThe consequences of vesting of estates must have some relation to the tenures themselves and have some connection, remote though it may be, with the agrarian reforms undertaken or contemplated.\n\nSupposing that we have a legislation stating that as it is necessary to eliminate rent collectors and farmers of revenue and to apportion and distribute land on an equitable basis amongst the . tillers of the land and confer on them rights of permanent occupancy and also to bring them directly into contact with the State, all moneys which the proprietors had collected as and by way of rent from their estates for three years prior to the commencement of the Act, shall vest in and be payable to the State, could it be said by any stretch of reason that any public purpose had been established for the taking of the moneys ?\n\nArrears of rent stand on no better footing. Any public purpose in taking them over is conspicuous by its absence.\n\nIt is fairly obvious that resort was had to the arrears either for augmenting the financial resources of the State or for paying compensation to the smaller proprietors out of this particular item of acquisition.\n\nProperty of individuals\n\ncannot be appropriate<l by the State un<ler the power 1952 of eminent domain for the mere purpose of adding to The State of its revenues; taxation is the recognised mode to secure Bihar this end. If the latter was the real object, it must be ,. v. observed that to take one man's property compulsorily Maharajitfor giving it away to another in discharge of Governdhiraja Sir ment's obligations is not a legitimate and permissible Kameshwar Singh exercise of the power of acquisition. of Darbhanga\n\nSub-clause (1) of section 24 no doubt provides that 50 per cent. of the arrears of rents shall be added to the amount of compensation. This means one of two things (a) either the other 50\"/o is taken without payment of any compensation, which is confiscation virtually or (b) 50 per cent. is taken as the consolidated value of the arrear~ of rent-lump sum payment for the acquisition of choses in action or actionable claims.\n\nTaken either way, it is difficult to see wherein the public purpose consists.\n\nWhether moneys could be compulsorily acquired at all by a State is a moot question. Willis say!l in his Constitutional Law at page 816:-\"While, as stated above, any and all property is in general subject to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, there are certain rather unusual forms of private property which cannot thus be taken.\n\nThese are corpses, money, choses in action, property used by the government in its governmental capacity, property to be used for a mere substituted ownership unless such substituted ownership i.s a more necessary use, and perhaps trust property dedicated to a State, mortgage liens, and suits to quiet title.\" Under the heading \"what property is subject to the right'', Cooley observes in Vol. II of his book on Constitutional Limitations, at page 1117:- \"From this statement, however, must be excepted money, or that which in ordinary use passes as such, and which the Government may reach by taxation, and also rights in action, which can only be available when made to produce money; neither of which can it be needful to take under this power.\" In the footnote he points out:-\n\nand Others.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\n; i Mahtwaia Jhiraja Sir\n\nKameshwar\n\n. Singh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.\n\nChandrase/(.hara\n\nAiyflr /.\n\n\"Taking money under the right of eminent domain, when it must be compensated in money afterwards, could be nothing more or less than a forced loan, only to be justified as a last resort in a time of extreme peril, where neither the credit of the government nor the power of taxation could be made available.\" Nicols in his work on \"Eminent Domain\" does not disagree with this view ; on the other hand, he says at page 100 of Vol. I, paragraph 2. 1 (3) :-\n\n\"The question has arisen whether money can be taken by eminent domain and it has been held or intimated, at least in so far as a state or a private corporation is concerned, that it is not subject to such taking.\n\nThe objection is not based on an implied inherent limitation upon the power of government, but upon the difficulty of effecting a taking of money that would be of any service to the public without violating the Constitution.\n\nThe use for which it was needed might well be public, but, as compensation must be paid in money, and, if not in advance, at least with such expedition as conveniently may be had, the seizure of money without compensation, or with. an offer of payment in notes, bonds or merchandise,-in other words, a forced sale or loanhowever it might be justified by dire necessity would not be a constitutional exercise of the power of eminent domain.\"\n\n The 'learned Attorney-General sought to justify this acquisition on the ground that it was a compulsory taking of choses in action.\n\nEven so, they stand on the same footing as money, of less value no doubt than if they were coin or currency notes.\n\nIt seems that choses in action too cannot be so acquired ; reference has been made already to Cooley's observations.\n\nThe two cases Long Island Water Supply Company\n\nv. City of Brooklyn(') and City of Cincinnati v.\n\nLouisville & Nashville Railroad Company (') do not support the contrary view.\n\nIn the former case,\n\n(1) 166 U.S. 685; 41 L. Ed. pp. 1, 165.\n\n(2) 223 U.S. 389; 56 L. Ed. 481.\n\na Water Supply Company was under a contract to supply water to the town of New Lots (which subsequently became merged in the city of Brooklyn) in consideration of the town paying for hydrants to be furnished and supplied as provided in the contract.\n\nThe contract was for a term of 25 years.\n\nWhen the merger took place, the city of Brooklyn was given power to purchase or to condemn the property of the company within 2 years but it did neither.\n\nIn 1892, the legislature passed another Act authorising the City of Brooklyn to condemn the property of the company, provided the necessary proceedings were commenced within one year after the passing of the Act.\n\nThe procedure for the acquisition was prescribed in the Act itself. The power was exercised by the city and the compensation payable was determined by the Commissioners at a particular figure.\n\nThe company objected to the acquisition on the strength of article l, Paragraph 10, of the U.\n\nConstitution which forbids any State to pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts and was not \"due process of law\" as required by the 14th Amendment.\n\nOn error, the Supreme Court confirmed the condemnation and rejected the argument that there was any impairment of the contract.\n\nMr.\n\nJustice Brewer points out that the contract is a mere incident to the tangible property and that it is the later which, being fitted for public uses, is condemned.\n\nThe contract is not the thing which is sought to be condemned and its impairment, if impairment there be, is a mere consequence of the appropriation of the tangible property.\n\nIn the present cases, it is untenable to state that the taking over of arrears of rent is a natural consequence of the acquisi~ tion of the estates.\n\nIn the latter case, a railroad company filed a suit to condenin a right of way for an elevated railroad track across the public landing at Cincinnati.\n\nThe city objected on the ground that the public landing had become property dedicated to the public under an earlier contract and to allow the condemnation under a\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaja- Jhiraia Sir\n\nKameshwar Singh of Darbhangtfl\n\na1id Others.\n\nChandrasekhar•\n\nAiyar J.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaja- Jhiraja Sir\n\nKameshwar\n\nSingh of Darhhan ga and Others.\n\nCli•ndrasekhara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nstatute of Ohio was an impairment of the contract, forbidden by the 10th section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States.\n\nThe court through Mr. Justice Lurton held : ''The constitutional inhibition upon any state law impairing the obligation of contracts is not a limitation upon the power of eminent domain.\n\nThe obligation of a contract is not impaired when it is appropriated to a public use and compensation made therefor.\n\nSuch an exertion of power neither challenges it.• validity nor impairs its obligation.\n\nBoth are recognised, for it is appropriated as an existing enforceable contract. It is a taking, not an impairment of its obligation.\n\nIf compensation be made, no constitutional right is violated.\"\n\nIt would thus be evident that they were not cases of the compulsory acquisition of choses in action. Choses in action unrelated to any tangible property can be useful for a public purpose only when converted into money.\n\nArrears of money are particularly so.\n\nWhen it is said that money and choses in action are exempt from compulsory acquisition, it is not on the ground that they are movable property but on the ground that generally speaking there could be no public purpose in their acquisition.\n\nThe provisions in section 23, sub-clause (£) that 4 to 12! per cent. of the gross assets can be deducted from the amount as representing \"cost of works of benefit to\n\nth~ raiyats\".\n\nThis is, an obvious device to reduce the gross assets and bring it down to as low a level as possible.\n\nThe Act does not say that this charge represents the expenditure on works of benefit or improvements which the zamindars and proprietors were under any legal obligation to carry out and which\n\nthey failed to discharge.\n\nNor are we told anything 1 about the future destination of this. deducted sum. It is an arbitrary figure which the legislature has said must be deducted from the gross assets.\n\nThe deduction i• a mere contrivance to reduce the compensation <1 and it is a colourable or fraudulent exercise of legisla- \"\" tive power to subtract a fanciful sum from the calculation of gross assets.\n\nt .1\n\nStripped of their veils or vestments, the rov1S1ons in the Act about \"arrears of rent\" and the \"cost of\n\nworks of benefit\" amount to naked confiscation. Where the legislative action is arbitrary in the sense that it has no reasonable relation to the purpose in view, there is a transgression by the legislature of the limits of its power. Under the guise of legislating for acquisition, the legislature cannot enable the State l 'Ocrpetrate confiscation ; and if it does so, the Act to that extent has to be declared unconstitutional and void. If the part that is void is so inextricably interwoven into the texture of the rest, the whole Act has to be struck .down. Such, however, is not the case here.\n\nIt is gratifying to note that the Madhya Pradesh AboJition o{ Proprietory Rights Act of 1950 and the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act of 1950 which are also in question are free from this blemish of reaching at arrears of rent due for any period anterior to the date of vesting.\n\nAppeals allowed: Petition No. 612 dismissed .\n\nAgent Agent\n\nfor the appellant (State of Bihar) : P.A. Mehta. for the respondents in Cases Nos. 339, 319, 327,\n\n330, 332 of 1951 : /. N. Shroff. in Cases Nos. 3o9, 326, 328, 336, 337, 344 of 1951 : Ganpat Rai. \"\n\nin Cases Nos. 310, 311, and 329 of 1951 : R. C. Pra&td. in Case No. 315 of 1951 : P. K. Chatterjee. in Cases Nos. 307, 313, 320, 321, and 322 of 1951 : Sukumar Chose. in Case No. 331 of 1951 : S. P. Varma.\n\nAgent for the petitioner in Petition No. 612 of 1951 : Ganpat Rai .\n\n. -,.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 2 in Petition No. 612 of 1951: P.A. Mehta.\n\nTlie State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA1yar /.", "total_entities": 634, "entities": [{"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 847, "end_char": 858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: P. A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "P. A. Mehta"}}, {"text": "Agent for the respondent : M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 861, "end_char": 903, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. 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J.-Whatever may be the pc>1t10n as regards the acquisition of money as such it is not correct to say that a law made under entry 36 of List II cannot authorise acquisition of choses in action like arrears 'of rent due from the tenants which are covered by the term \"property\" used in that entry and in art.", "canonical_name": "Patanja/i Sastri C."}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7454, "end_char": 7461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7634, "end_char": 7643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHAllA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7903, "end_char": 7924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHAllA AIYAR JJ. (", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "sec. 23(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8635, "end_char": 8645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "arts. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8792, "end_char": 8800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9828, "end_char": 9842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9850, "end_char": 9871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9932, "end_char": 9965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEALS under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and decree dated 12th March, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\n(Shearer, Reuben and Das JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Shearer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9968, "end_char": 9975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEALS under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and decree dated 12th March, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\n(Shearer, Reuben and Das JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Reuben", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9977, "end_char": 9983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEALS under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and decree dated 12th March, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\n(Shearer, Reuben and Das JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9988, "end_char": 9991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEALS under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and decree dated 12th March, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\n(Shearer, Reuben and Das JJ.)", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10191, "end_char": 10201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. C. Settdvad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10394, "end_char": 10408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Settdvad (Attorney-General."}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10443, "end_char": 10457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for India) and Mahabir Prasad (Advocate-General."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10492, "end_char": 10504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bihar) with G. N.\n\nJoshi, Lal Narain Singh and Alladi Kuppuswami for the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10506, "end_char": 10522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bihar) with G. N.\n\nJoshi, Lal Narain Singh and Alladi Kuppuswami for the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Alladi Kuppuswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10527, "end_char": 10544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bihar) with G. N.\n\nJoshi, Lal Narain Singh and Alladi Kuppuswami for the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10553, "end_char": 10567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bihar) with G. N.\n\nJoshi, Lal Narain Singh and Alladi Kuppuswami for the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "P. R. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10570, "end_char": 10579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the respondents in Cases Nos.", "canonical_name": "P.R. '\\ Das"}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10581, "end_char": 10587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the respondents in Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "Sanjib K. Chowdhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10670, "end_char": 10689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sanjib K. Chowdhury, S. N. Mukherjee, S. K. Kapur for the respondents in Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "S. N. 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Mustafid and /agadish Chandra Sinha for the respondents in Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "/agadish Chandra Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11018, "end_char": 11040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mustafid and /agadish Chandra Sinha for the respondents in Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "Ray Parasnath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11113, "end_char": 11126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray Parasnath for the respondent in Case No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11172, "end_char": 11183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur for the petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Kapur"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11292, "end_char": 11308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court delivered judgment as follows:-\n\nPATANJALI SAsTR1 C.\n\nJ.-*These appeals and petitions which fall into three groups raise the issue of the constitutional validity of three State enactments called\n\nThe Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950),\n\n'*The Chief Justice, in his judgment, dealt with the above Cases and Petition and also Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Patanja/i Sastri C."}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11489, "end_char": 11510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11859, "end_char": 11919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) (No. I of 1951)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12127, "end_char": 12212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) (No."}}, {"text": "Proprietary Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12227, "end_char": 12248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12254, "end_char": 12314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13019, "end_char": 13029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13261, "end_char": 13271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14113, "end_char": 14124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14336, "end_char": 14346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14491, "end_char": 14500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14528, "end_char": 14538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14796, "end_char": 14806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15087, "end_char": 15098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15367, "end_char": 15377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15557, "end_char": 15568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15622, "end_char": 15638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. R Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15760, "end_char": 15768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. R Das, leading counsel for the zamindars, accordingly based his main argument in these proceedings on entry 36 of List II and entry 42 of List III which read as follows :\n\n\"36.", "canonical_name": "P.R. '\\ Das"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16298, "end_char": 16314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others ......\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaj a. dhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.", "canonical_name": "Patanja/i Sastri C."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16326, "end_char": 16340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others ......\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaj a. dhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBihar"}}, {"text": "Patanja/i Sastri C.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16411, "end_char": 16430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanja/i Sastri C. /,\n\nor of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner .", "canonical_name": "Patanja/i Sastri C."}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16645, "end_char": 16659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal Code down to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17089, "end_char": 17139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Somayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19903, "end_char": 19910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Somayya, who appeared for some of the zamin- -dars in the Madhya Pradesh group of cases, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Das, put forward an additional ground of objection."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19961, "end_char": 19975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Somayya, who appeared for some of the zamin- -dars in the Madhya Pradesh group of cases, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Das, put forward an additional ground of objection."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21330, "end_char": 21341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21396, "end_char": 21406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21505, "end_char": 21515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21521, "end_char": 21531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ambedkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21598, "end_char": 21606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ambedkar, who appeared for some of the zemindars in the Uttar Pradesh batch of cases, advanced a different line of argument."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21654, "end_char": 21667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ambedkar, who appeared for some of the zemindars in the Uttar Pradesh batch of cases, advanced a different line of argument."}}, {"text": "Articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22942, "end_char": 22953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24489, "end_char": 24499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of the Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26167, "end_char": 26202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(5) Nothing in clause (2) hall affect- ( a) The provisions of any existing law other than a law to which the provisions of clause (6) apply, or\n\n(b) the provisions of any law which the State may hereafter make-\n\n(i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or penalty, or\n\n(ii) for the promotion of public health or the prevention of danger to life or property, or\n\n(iii) in pursuance of any agreement entered into between the Government of the Dominion of India or the Government of India and the Government of any other country, or otherwise, with respect to property declared by law to be evacuee property ....... , 31-A. Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provision;; of this Part no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any e.state or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part : .....•\n\n' -\n\n' 31-B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.- Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever r to have become void, on the ground that such Act,\n\n• ..\n\nRegulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the conuary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26937, "end_char": 26947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27000, "end_char": 27014, "source": "regex", 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'\\ Das"}}, {"text": "State Legislature to enact the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66404, "end_char": 66447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67021, "end_char": 67037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Legislature to enact the impugned Act", "statute": "State Legislature to enact the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67660, "end_char": 67670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31(4) and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67894, "end_char": 67915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70473, "end_char": 70482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Das on the question of the 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 75595, "end_char": 75625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government under the Indian Mines Act", "statute": "Government under the Indian Mines Act"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75774, "end_char": 75784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government under the Indian Mines Act", "statute": "Government under the Indian Mines Act"}}, {"text": "sections 20 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75881, "end_char": 75899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government under the Indian Mines Act", "statute": "Government under the Indian Mines Act"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76105, "end_char": 76115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77113, "end_char": 77123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Darhhanga", "label": "GPE", 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81169, "end_char": 81179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81541, "end_char": 81551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81744, "end_char": 81754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82550, "end_char": 82560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 82618, "end_char": 82639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 34 provides for the constitution of a commission called the Bihar Land Commission."}}, {"text": "Having held that the Bihar Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84327, "end_char": 84357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84817, 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"label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118037, "end_char": 118047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Willis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 119457, "end_char": 119463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Willis in his Constitutional Law, at page 816, offers the same opm1on."}}, {"text": "Kansas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 119953, "end_char": 119959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held in that case that a Bill to restrain the enforcement of a State statute regulating fire insurance rights was a valid law in the State of Kansas."}}, {"text": "S. 390", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120460, "end_char": 120466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 121854, "end_char": 121874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "299 of 1951, the arrears of Darbhanga Raj 011 26th September, 1950, was a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Raja P. C. Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 121999, "end_char": 122013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Raja P. C. Lal (Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Raja P. C. Lall"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122660, "end_char": 122669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja P. C. Lall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 123602, "end_char": 123617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "330 of 1951 (Raja P. C. Lall), it was said that Government would get the zemindari free, while in Case No.", "canonical_name": "Raja P. C. Lall"}}, {"text": "Chota Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 123816, "end_char": 123828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "331 of 1951\n\n(Chota Nagpur appe;:il) the zemindari will be acquired on payment of a small sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 125073, "end_char": 125076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nMr.\n\nDas vehemently contended that the statute was a fraud on republican Constitution which promised to deprive no one of his property without payment of compensation ; that it pretended to make elaborate provisions for paying it but that by shift and contrivance it has provided for the evasion of its payment.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125625, "end_char": 125635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commonwealth Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 125876, "end_char": 125899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an Act might well be 11/tra vires the Commonwealth Parliament."}}, {"text": "Evatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126251, "end_char": 126256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They will add only that, in the view they take of the matter, some of the legislative expedient-objected to as ttltra vires by Evatt J. in his forcible dissenting judgmentmay_ well be colourable, and such acts are not receiving the approval of their Lordships.\""}}, {"text": "Abbott", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126687, "end_char": 126693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed in this connction on the observations of Abbott C.J. in Fox v. Bishop of Chester(\"), which are in these terms:-\n\n\"Our judgment is founded upon the language of the Statute 31 Eliz."}}, {"text": "Brame", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 127937, "end_char": 127942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lq Alexander v.\n\nBrame( 4 ), it was observed that i£ it had appeared that sufficient ground existed for holding that the deed in question was a device on the part of Mr. Brame for the purpose of evading and eluding the statute, by keeping seemingly and colourably clear of it, while meaning substantially to infringe it, a view might have been taken favourable to the appellants."}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislature but", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 128841, "end_char": 128862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be that some of the provisions of the Act may operate harshly on certain persons or a few of the zamindars and may be bad if they are in excess of the legislative power of the Bihar Legislature but from that circumstance it does not follow that the whole enactment is a fraud on the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Section 23(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129640, "end_char": 129653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132678, "end_char": 132691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134886, "end_char": 134915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1940] F.C.R. 110", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 135709, "end_char": 135726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Darbhanga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 136228, "end_char": 136237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Darbhanga An entry concerning payment of compensation in no•v ornlOthera."}}, {"text": "Mah1Jrajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 138047, "end_char": 138077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Legislation ostensibly under one or other of the powers conferred by the Constitution but\n\njn truth and fact not falling within the content of thai\n\nTAe State of\n\nBihm\n\nMah1Jrajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhan ga\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHW AR SINGH\n\nOF DARBHANGA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "section 32(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139590, "end_char": 139603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140480, "end_char": 140490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140781, "end_char": 140791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140885, "end_char": 140898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140940, "end_char": 140950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141049, "end_char": 141055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last point urged by M. Das was that section 32\n\n(2) of the Act was void as in it legislative functions had been abdicated by the legislature in favour of the executive."}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141065, "end_char": 141075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141337, "end_char": 141353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141708, "end_char": 141718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144801, "end_char": 144814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chaudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 145056, "end_char": 145065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chaudhury appearing in Cases Nos.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhury"}}, {"text": "Choudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 145383, "end_char": 145392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Choudhury contended that the field of legislation on the question of principles of determination of compensation and the mode and manner of payment of such compensation was already occupied by the Land Acquisition Act which was an existing law of Parliament and, trefore, the State Legislature could not enter on this field and legislate on the principles of payment of compensation.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhury"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146181, "end_char": 146192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 293", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146891, "end_char": 146902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chakravarty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 147179, "end_char": 147190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chakravarty who appeared m three cases, Noo."}}, {"text": "Bihar legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 147295, "end_char": 147312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "326, 337, and 344 of 1951, urged that as regards trust properties, the Bihar legislature had no power to acquire them without payment of full compensation as certain educational and charitable institutions would thereby be seriously affected."}}, {"text": "Raghav Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 147577, "end_char": 147589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Raghav Saran who appeared in Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "sections 4(~) and 23(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148221, "end_char": 148244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148561, "end_char": 148571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4(b) and 23(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149209, "end_char": 149231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149323, "end_char": 149336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149631, "end_char": 149643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149981, "end_char": 149990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150473, "end_char": 150483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151094, "end_char": 151104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of 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of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154571, "end_char": 154581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154603, "end_char": 154613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 154977, "end_char": 155006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharaiadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHW AR SINGH\n\nOF DARBHANGA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155625, "end_char": 155635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155767, "end_char": 155777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cooley", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 159235, "end_char": 159241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Cooley, Vol.", "canonical_name": "Cooley"}}, {"text": "Vidc Cooley", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 159304, "end_char": 159315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Vidc Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, Vol."}}, {"text": "Maliorajatlhiraja Sir Kameshwar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 159397, "end_char": 159428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II, p.1118, F. N.\n\nT lie State of\n\nBihar\n\n\"· Maliorajatlhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga\n\na11d Others."}}, {"text": "Maharajadhiraia Sir Kameshtuar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 159503, "end_char": 159533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraia Sir Kameshtuar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHW AR SINGH\n\nOF DARBHANGA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Lefroy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 163866, "end_char": 163872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) See Lefroy on Canadian Constitution, pp."}}, {"text": "State ot\n\nBihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 163944, "end_char": 163959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-10 S. C. India/71\n\n• 1952\n\nThe State ot\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaja-   dhiraja Sir ' Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBihar"}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XXX of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164344, "end_char": 164365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 164438, "end_char": 164454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 26, 1950, when our Constitution came into force, the Bill which eventually became the Act was pending before the Legislature of the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "September 11, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 164712, "end_char": 164730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 11, 1950, that Bill received the assent of the President and became the Act."}}, {"text": "Bill received the assent of the President and became the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164737, "end_char": 164797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 164993, "end_char": 165011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 25, 1950, the text of the Act was published in the Official Gazette with a notification under section 1 (3) dated September 24, 1950, bringing the Act into operation."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165097, "end_char": 165106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bill received the assent of the President and became the Act", "statute": "Bill received the assent of the President and became the Act"}}, {"text": "September 24, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 165117, "end_char": 165135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 25, 1950, the text of the Act was published in the Official Gazette with a notification under section 1 (3) dated September 24, 1950, bringing the Act into operation."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165192, "end_char": 165201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bill received the assent of the President and became the Act", "statute": "Bill received the assent of the President and became the Act"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Courts in Bihar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 165473, "end_char": 165500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Notification having been published in the Official Gazette, some of the proprietors affected thereby instituted suits in the Subordinate Courts in Bihar after giving the requ1S1te notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and prayed for a declaration that the Act was unconstitutional and void and that their title to the properties remained unaffected."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165541, "end_char": 165551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bill received the assent of the President and became the Act", "statute": "Bill received the assent of the President and became the Act"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165555, "end_char": 165582, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 165772, "end_char": 165791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of the other proprietors filed applications in the High Court at Patna under article 226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of appropriate writs, directions or orders."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165798, "end_char": 165809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 165901, "end_char": 165915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar filed its written statements in the suits which were transferred to the High Court for disposal in exercise of its extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 166319, "end_char": 166333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the issues involved grave questions of intcroretation of the Constitution, the suits and applications were placed before a Special Bench '\n\nof the Patna High Court and were disposed of on March 12, 1951."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166564, "end_char": 166574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166648, "end_char": 166658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166764, "end_char": 166774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166847, "end_char": 166860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167360, "end_char": 167371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167932, "end_char": 167942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sections 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168050, "end_char": 168066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168158, "end_char": 168168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168189, "end_char": 168199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169718, "end_char": 169729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169786, "end_char": 169795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169801, "end_char": 169811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169982, "end_char": 169993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions con- Validation of certain Acts and Regulations", "statute": "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions con- Validation of certain Acts and Regulations"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170047, "end_char": 170061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions con- Validation of certain Acts and Regulations", "statute": "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions con- Validation of certain Acts and Regulations"}}, {"text": "Article\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170941, "end_char": 170952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying thirteen several Acts and Regulations of which the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying thirteen several Acts and Regulations of which the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171004, "end_char": 171014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying thirteen several Acts and Regulations of which the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying thirteen several Acts and Regulations of which the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171086, "end_char": 171100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying thirteen several Acts and Regulations of which the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying thirteen several Acts and Regulations of which the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171484, "end_char": 171494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying thirteen several Acts and Regulations of which the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying thirteen several Acts and Regulations of which the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "articles 245 and 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172276, "end_char": 172296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nJV¥!El\n\nMaharajat!hiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 172440, "end_char": 172508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das/.\n\nThe State of\n\nJV¥!El\n\nMaharajat!hiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others."}}, {"text": "List III the Bihar Legislature had no power to enact the said Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 172529, "end_char": 172594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 31(4), 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172945, "end_char": 172963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List III the Bihar Legislature had no power to enact the said Act", "statute": "List III the Bihar Legislature had no power to enact the said Act"}}, {"text": "section 32(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173316, "end_char": 173329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List III the Bihar Legislature had no power to enact the said Act", "statute": "List III the Bihar Legislature had no power to enact the said Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173771, "end_char": 173781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173954, "end_char": 173967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31( 4), 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174018, "end_char": 174037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": 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"source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the obligation to pay just compensation for compulsory acquisition of private property is a principle of natural equity recognised by all temperate and civilized governments, that the right to compensation is an incident to the exercise of the power of eminent domain and that the one is so inseparably connected with the other that they may be siaid to exist, not as separate and distinct principles but, as parts of one and the same principle are well-established by a series of decisions of the American courts quoted by Harlan J. in Chicago, Burlinghton and Quincy."}}, {"text": "Chicago", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 176172, "end_char": 176179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the obligation to pay just compensation for compulsory acquisition of private property is a principle of natural equity recognised by all temperate and civilized governments, that the right to compensation is an incident to the exercise of the power of eminent domain and that the one is so inseparably connected with the other that they may be siaid to exist, not as separate and distinct principles but, as parts of one and the same principle are well-established by a series of decisions of the American courts quoted by Harlan J. in Chicago, Burlinghton and Quincy."}}, {"text": "Dunedian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 176254, "end_char": 176262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England Lord Dunedian in Attorney-General v.\n\nDe Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd.(2), described the obligation to pay compensation as \"a necessary concomitant to taking\".", "canonical_name": "Dunedian"}}, {"text": "S. 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176556, "end_char": 176562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thakur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 180028, "end_char": 180034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atiqa Begum and Others('), Thakur /agannath\n\nBaksh Singh v. The United Provinces(2) and Megh Raj -and Another v. Allah Rakhia and Others(8) in support of the proposition that each entry in the list, which is a category or head of the subject-matter of legislation, must be construed as widely as possible so as to include all ancillary matters."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 180433, "end_char": 180442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This lien of reasoning found favour with Shearer J. but was rejected by Reuben J. and S. K. Das J.\n\nThere is no doubt that \"land\" in entry 18 in List II has been construed in a very wide way but if \"land\" or \"land tenures\" in that entry is held to cover acquisition of land also, then entry 36 in List II will have to be held as wholly redundant, so far as acquisition of land is concerned, a conclusion to which I am not prepared to assent."}}, {"text": "[1940] F.C.R. 110", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 180959, "end_char": 180976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1947] F.C.R. 77", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 180993, "end_char": 181009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1946] F.C.R. 111", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 181016, "end_char": 181033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 181067, "end_char": 181116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar\n\nSingh of Darbhanga and Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHW AR SINGH\n\nOF DARBHANGA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 181160, "end_char": 181208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das/.\n\nThe Stat• of Bihar v.\n\nMaharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJADHIRAJA SIR KAMESHW AR SINGH\n\nOF DARBHANGA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "P. R.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 181907, "end_char": 181912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the arguments of Mr. P. R.\n\nDas founded on entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III cannot be rejected in limine but have to be considered and I proceed to do so immediately. -", "canonical_name": "P.R. '\\ Das"}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182574, "end_char": 182581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Attorney-General v. 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'\\ Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 214768, "end_char": 214779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Re Ground B: The second point urged by Mr. P.R. '\\ Das is that even if the Court does not accept the argu- .", "canonical_name": "P.R. '\\ Das"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215021, "end_char": 215032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215799, "end_char": 215809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 215915, "end_char": 215925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216243, "end_char": 216253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216488, "end_char": 216499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 217329, "end_char": 217338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das/.\n\nThe learned Judge then refers to the following passage in the judgment of my learned brother Mukherjea J. in Chiranjit Lal Choudhury v. The Union of India & Others(') :-\n\n\"Article 31 (2) of the Constitution prescribes a twofold limit within which such superior right of the State should .", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217408, "end_char": 217418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218080, "end_char": 218090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218244, "end_char": 218254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 218855, "end_char": 218865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222068, "end_char": 222078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222205, "end_char": 222216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222247, "end_char": 222263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222445, "end_char": 222455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222896, "end_char": 222906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222962, "end_char": 222973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 223685, "end_char": 223696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226419, "end_char": 226429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226619, "end_char": 226630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226786, "end_char": 226796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 226987, "end_char": 226998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227036, "end_char": 227046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227378, "end_char": 227388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227493, "end_char": 227504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232148, "end_char": 232158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Batchelor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 233778, "end_char": 233787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in 1914 the Judicial Committee did not think fit to attempt a precise definition of the expression \"public purpose\" and was content to quote with approval the following passage from the judgment of Batchelor J. ': -\n\n\"General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase 'public purposes' in the lease ; it is enough to say ."}}, {"text": "(1915) L.R. 42 I.A. 44", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 234473, "end_char": 234495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 235867, "end_char": 235874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As I explained in Gopalan's case (') and again in Chiranjit Lat's case (supra) our Constimtion protects the freedom of the citizen by article 19(1) (a) to ( e) and (g) but empowers the State, even while those freedoms last, to impose reasonable\n\nresrictions on them in the interest of the State or of public order or morality or of the general public as mentioned in clauses (2) to (6)."}}, {"text": "Chiranjit Lat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 235899, "end_char": 235912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As I explained in Gopalan's case (') and again in Chiranjit Lat's case (supra) our Constimtion protects the freedom of the citizen by article 19(1) (a) to ( e) and (g) but empowers the State, even while those freedoms last, to impose reasonable\n\nresrictions on them in the interest of the State or of public order or morality or of the general public as mentioned in clauses (2) to (6)."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 235983, "end_char": 235996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236402, "end_char": 236412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236565, "end_char": 236575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236657, "end_char": 236667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236945, "end_char": 236955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 237820, "end_char": 237830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238096, "end_char": 238106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238488, "end_char": 238501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240777, "end_char": 240787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242527, "end_char": 242537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242620, "end_char": 242631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243836, "end_char": 243846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Lakshman Nidhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 244766, "end_char": 244780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to annexure B (2) to the affidavit of Lakshman Nidhi affirmed on J anuary 22, 1951, the total amount of Raiyati rent payable by the various tenants in the different circles of the Darbhanga Estate alone will exceed rupees three lacs."}}, {"text": "J anuary 22, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 244793, "end_char": 244810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to annexure B (2) to the affidavit of Lakshman Nidhi affirmed on J anuary 22, 1951, the total amount of Raiyati rent payable by the various tenants in the different circles of the Darbhanga Estate alone will exceed rupees three lacs."}}, {"text": "P.\n\nR. Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 247749, "end_char": 247759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am, however, free to confess that if I could agree with Mr. P.\n\nR. Das that these provisions ."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253584, "end_char": 253594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "List III the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 253623, "end_char": 253639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254070, "end_char": 254080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List III the Act", "statute": "List III the Act"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254100, "end_char": 254111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List III the Act", "statute": "List III the Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254226, "end_char": 254236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List III the Act", "statute": "List III the Act"}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254731, "end_char": 254741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255182, "end_char": 255192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255921, "end_char": 255930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256643, "end_char": 256653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257502, "end_char": 257512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257936, "end_char": 257946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanjiva Chowdhuri has urged that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 258598, "end_char": 258661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 258782, "end_char": 258789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sanjiva Chowdhuri has urged that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 being continued by the Constitution and that Act which is a Central Act having been extended by notilication in 1899 to Ramgarh State for which he appears, the Central Act must apply to Ramgarh until the notification is withdrawn and the impugned Act cannot apply for determining the compensation, for the field is already occupied by the Central Act of 1894."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 259514, "end_char": 259534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR J.-The faits which have given rise to these cases have been fully set out in the judgment just now delivered by my learned brother Mahajan J. and need not be repeated.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260002, "end_char": 260012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260840, "end_char": 260856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bowen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 263031, "end_char": 263036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bowen L. J. said in London and North\n\nWetern Ry."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 263051, "end_char": 263057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bowen L. J. said in London and North\n\nWetern Ry."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 263717, "end_char": 263727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264381, "end_char": 264392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 264457, "end_char": 264495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "18-6-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 264503, "end_char": 264512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall not here trouble ourselves with sub-clauses\n\n(3) and (4) of the article and with articles 31-A and\n\n31-B which were introduced by way of amendment under the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951, dated 18-6-1951."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 265582, "end_char": 265602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nformulate the principles for determining the compensation and the form and the manner in which it is to be given.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 266101, "end_char": 266114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 266364, "end_char": 266374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 266387, "end_char": 266398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atiqa Begum", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 266609, "end_char": 266620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Das was obliged to take up the untenable position that entry 42 of its own force implies an obligation to pay compensation, as he could not otberwi:; e jump over the hurdles created in his way by sub-sections\n\n(3) and (4) of article 31 and the new articles 31-A and 31-B.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contended in dealing with entry 42 that legislation under entry 42 can also lay down principles that would lead to the non-pay-.• ment of any compensation and he cited Atiqa Begum's case(') as an authority in his support."}}, {"text": "[1940] F.C.R. 110", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 267698, "end_char": 267715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 268251, "end_char": 268261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 268776, "end_char": 268804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 269578, "end_char": 269589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 269635, "end_char": 269645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "State of Bihat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 269804, "end_char": 269818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihat v.\n\nMahara; adhiraja Sir Kameshwaf'\n\nSingh of Darbhang11 ·\n\nam!", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nBihar"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 270559, "end_char": 270569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 270697, "end_char": 270707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 270760, "end_char": 270774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 271282, "end_char": 271296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 271357, "end_char": 271385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. R\". Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 271444, "end_char": 271454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the face of these almt insuperable obstacles, Shri P. R\".", "canonical_name": "P.R. '\\ Das"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 272559, "end_char": 272569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 272664, "end_char": 272674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 273292, "end_char": 273302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 273429, "end_char": 273439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 274307, "end_char": 274321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiy\"1' /.\n\ntransfer and the vesting of such interest m the State as regards various items of ptoperties.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274755, "end_char": 274764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274782, "end_char": 274792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kameshwar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 276914, "end_char": 276929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. observed that to take one man's property compulsorily Maharajitfor giving it away to another in discharge of Governdhiraja Sir ment's obligations is not a legitimate and permissible Kameshwar Singh exercise of the power of acquisition."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 277000, "end_char": 277010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nicols", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 279079, "end_char": 279085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nicols in his work on \"Eminent Domain\" does not disagree with this view ; on the other hand, he says at page 100 of Vol.", "canonical_name": "Nichols"}}, {"text": "S. 685", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280684, "end_char": 280690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280725, "end_char": 280731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "a Water Supply Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 280749, "end_char": 280771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Water Supply Company was under a contract to supply water to the town of New Lots (which subsequently became merged in the city of Brooklyn) in consideration of the town paying for hydrants to be furnished and supplied as provided in the contract."}}, {"text": "Brooklyn", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 280882, "end_char": 280890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Water Supply Company was under a contract to supply water to the town of New Lots (which subsequently became merged in the city of Brooklyn) in consideration of the town paying for hydrants to be furnished and supplied as provided in the contract."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 281872, "end_char": 281885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On error, the Supreme Court confirmed the condemnation and rejected the argument that there was any impairment of the contract."}}, {"text": "Brewer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 282000, "end_char": 282006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nJustice Brewer points out that the contract is a mere incident to the tangible property and that it is the later which, being fitted for public uses, is condemned."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 282906, "end_char": 282911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhar•\n\nAiyar J.\n\nThe State of\n\nBihar\n\nMaharaja- Jhiraja Sir\n\nKameshwar\n\nSingh of Darhhan ga and Others."}}, {"text": "Lurton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 283206, "end_char": 283212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court through Mr. Justice Lurton held : ''The constitutional inhibition upon any state law impairing the obligation of contracts is not a limitation upon the power of eminent domain."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284288, "end_char": 284298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Proprietory Rights Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 285930, "end_char": 285952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 286267, "end_char": 286277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent Agent\n\nfor the appellant (State of Bihar) : P.A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "P. A. Mehta"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 286415, "end_char": 286425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3o9, 326, 328, 336, 337, 344 of 1951 : Ganpat Rai. \""}}, {"text": "R. C. Pra&td", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 286472, "end_char": 286484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "310, 311, and 329 of 1951 : R. C. Pra&td."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 286512, "end_char": 286528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "315 of 1951 : P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Chose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 286582, "end_char": 286595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "307, 313, 320, 321, and 322 of 1951 : Sukumar Chose."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 286623, "end_char": 286634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "331 of 1951 : S. P. Varma."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_1020_1055_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1952J\n\nVISWESHW AR RAO\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n(AND OTHER CASES)\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nMadhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act (l of 1951)-Law for abolition of proprietary estates and tenures-Compensation inadequate-/urisdiction of Court to inquire into validity of Act-Right of eminenr tiomain--Necessity of provision for paynlent of compensation and public purpose-Spirit of Constitution-Delegation of legislative potuers-Fraud on the Constitution-Passing of Bills-Certificate of Speaker that Bill was passed-Conclusiveness-Omission to note on record that Bill was passed-Effect-Reserving law for astent of President~Governor's signature to Bill, whether necessary-- \"Law\", \"Legislature\", \"Public purpose\" f'eanings of-Compulsory Requisition of 1nalguzari villages, and property set apart as private property of ~\"ler under covenant of merger-Legalit}'-Constitution of India, 1950-Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951- Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, 362, 363.\n\nHeld by the Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN, MoKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.)-The Madhya. Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands), Act (I of 1951) is valid in its entiret\" In view of the provisions contained in arts.\n\n31(4), 31-A an.1 31-B of the Constitution the court has no jurisdiction to enquire into an objection to the validity of the Act on the ground that it drxs not provide for adequate compensation.\n\nThe Act does. not involve any de:legation of legislative powers and the provisions relating to compensation therein are not a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nHeld also, that the certificate of the Speaker on the original Bill when it was submitted to the President for his assent, tht the Bill was passed by the House was conclusive proof that the Bill was passed, and the mere fact that there was nothing on the record of the proceedings to show that the motion that the Bill be passed was voted upon and carri,, d, as required by rule 20( l) of the Rules of Procedure, could not invalidate the Act.\n\nPer PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-In any case, the omission to put the motion formally to the House, even if true, \\Vas, in the circun1stances no more thap_ a mere irregularity of procedure as it was not disputed that the overwhelming majority of the members\n\npresent were in favour of carrying the motion and no dissentient voice was actually raised.\n\nHeld further, (i) that though art. 31(3) speaks of a \"law\" being reserved for the consideration of the President; the Constitution does not contemplate that before submitting a Bill which has been passed by a Legislative Assembly for the assent of the President, the Governor should give his assent to it;\n\n(ii) that the President can perform both the duties entrusted to him under art. 200 and art. 31(3) and (4) at one and the same time; he need not give his assent twice, once to make the Bill a law under art. 200 and then give his assent oncei more in order to make the law effective against art. 31 (2); the word \"Legislature\" used in this connection in art. 31 ( 4) means the House or Houses of Legislature and does not include the Governor;\n\n(iii) that though malguzari villages are not included in the expression \"estate\" as defined in art. 31-A, art. 31-B (which is not merely illustrative of art. 31-A, but an independent provision) validated the Act even in respect of rnalguzari villages, and since art. 31 ( 4) is not limited to \"estates\" its provisions also saved the law in its entirety;\n\n(iv) Article 362 does not prohibit the acquisition of properties set apart as private properties of a Ruler by a covenant of merger.\n\nPer MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.-In any event, the jurisdiction of the Court to decide disputes which arise out of a covenant of merger was barred by art. 363.\n\nPETITIONS under article 32 of the Constitution of Indi; i for enforcement of fundamental rights. (Petitions Nos. 166, 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 257, 268, 280 to 285, 287 to 289, 317, 318 and 487 of 1951).\n\nThe facts which gave rise to these petitions and the arguments of counsel are stated in the judgment.\n\nB. Somayya (V. N. Swami, with him) for the petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951.\n\nN. S.\n\nBindra (P. S. Safeer, with him) for the petitioner in Petition No. 317 of 1951.\n\nSwami for the petit10ners in Petitions Nos. 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, . 280 to 285 of 1951, 257 and 287 to 289 of 1951.\n\nAsthana for the petitioners 111 Petition No. 26 of 1951.\n\nS. N. Mukherjee for the petitioner in Petition No. 318 of 1951.\n\nViswcshwar R11Q\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhj'a Pradesh.\n\nViscueshtvar Rao\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nM. N. Jog for the petitioner in Petition No. 487 of 1951.\n\nShivde (Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh), with T. P. Naik for the respondent.\n\n1951. May 2, 5, The judgment of the CHIEF JusTICE printed at pp. 893-916 supra. covers these cases also.\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. delivered separate judgments.\n\nMAHAJAN J.\n\nPetition No. 166 of 1951.\n\nThis is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India by Shri Visweshwar Rao, zamindar and proprietor of Ahiri zamindari, an estate as defined in section 2(3) of the Central Provinces Land Revi; nue Act, II of 1917, and situated in tehsil Sironcha, district Chanda (Madhya Pradesh), for the enforcement of his fundamental right to property under article 31(1) of the Constitution by the issue of an appropriate writ or a direction to the respondent State\n\nrestraining it from disturbing his possession of the estate, and eighty malguzari villages situate in the Garchiroli tehsil of the san1e district.\n\nThe petitioner and his ancestors have been owning and enjoying these properties in full proprietary right for several generations past.\n\nOn the 5th April, 1950, the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly enacted an Act called the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary ·, Rights Act. The Act received the assent of the President of India on the 22nd January, 1951, and was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on the 26th January, 1951, as Act I of 1951.\n\nBy a notification in a gazette extraordinary issued on the 27th January, 1951, the Madhya Pradesh Government fixed 31st March, 1951, as the date of vesting of the estates under section 3 of the Act.\n\nThe petitioner thus was to lose his estate and lands on the 31st March, 1951. On the 9th March, 1951, i.e., before the vesting date, he presented the present application to this court for the issue of appropriate writs against . the Government prohibiting it from taking possession of his properties.\n\nIt was alleged\n\nthat the Madhya Pradesh Act, I of 1951, was unconstitutional and void and infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioner in a variety of ways.\n\nFor a proper appreciation of the ground on which the validity of the Act is being challenged, it is necess:u-y to set out the relevant provisions of the Act and to state the facts which Jed to this enactment.\n\nMadhya Pradesh is a composite State, comprising the Central Provinces, Berar and the merged territories.\n\nBy an agreement of merger made between the rules of States and the Dominion of India dated the 15th December, 1947, certain territories which at one time were under the Indian States Agency and were held by these rulers were integrated with the Dominion. The integration actually took place on the 1st January,\n\n1948. On the 1st August, 1949, the States were merged in the Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThere were in all 106 estates in Madhya Pradesh as defined in section 2(3) of Act I of 1951 aI1d held by zamindars.\n\nMost ot the lands are owned by malguzars of mahals in the status of \"Malkan cabza\".\n\nThe land system prevailing in Madhya Pradesh is malguzari (except in certain areas where the ryotwari system iis in vogue), the malguzar being an intermediary between the State and the tiller.\n\nLand is also held on a variety of subordinate tenures by absolute occupancy tenants, occupancy tenants, ryots, thikedars, mafidars, ilaqadars, etc.\n\nLand revenue in Madhya Pradesh was last assessed under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, II of 1917.\n\nThe estate holders pay land revenue on the lands comprised in the estates at a concession rate.\n\nThe payment is technically called \"tekoli\".\n\nIn 1939 there was an ad hoc increase in the amount of tekoli by the Central Provinces Revision of Land Revenue Estates Act, I of 1939.\n\nO; i the 3rd September, 1946, the Central Provinces and Herar Legislative Assembly passed a resolution for the elimination of intermediaries between the State and the peasant.\n\nSoon after the passing of this\n\nVisweshwar RaO'\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahaian f.\n\nViswes hwar Rao\n\n.v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nresolution several laws were enacted, it is said, with a view to achieve this result, the impugned Act being the_ last of that series. In 1947, the Central Provinces Land Revenue Estates Act, :X:XV of 1947, was enacted.\n\nThe revenue assessment, viz., tekoli, on the estates was, we are told, enhanced in some places from thirty to fifty per cent. of the full jama and in others from forty to sixty per cent.\n\nIn the same year was enacted the Central Provinces Land Revenue Revision Mahals Act, XXVI of 1947. The land assessment on malguzari villages ' was, it is alleged, raised to 75 per cent. from 45 to 50 per cent. of malguzari assets. This was done without . recourse to a settlement.\n\nIn 1948 came the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Exemptions Act, XXXVII of 1948 making persons exempted from payment of land revenue liable for it.\n\nThis legislation, it is urged, resulted in the reduction of the net income of the proprietor5 to a large extent.\n\nOn the 11th October, 1949, the impugned Act was introduced in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly.\n\nIt was referred to a Select Committee on the 15th October, 1949; the Select Committee reported on the 9th March, 1950, the report was published on the 17th March, 1950, and was taken into consideration on the 29th March, 1950, by the Assembly. On the 30th March, 1950, the opposition moved for the circulation of the Bill. The circulation motion was negatived on the 3rd April, 1950, and the Bill was discussed clause by clause and the clauses were passed between the 3rd oE April and .the 5tl1 of April.\n\nOn the 5th April, 1950, the member in charge of the Bill moved as follows:-\n\n\"Speaker Sir, I now move that the Central Provinces & Bera!\n\nAbolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Bill, 1949 (No. 64 of 1949) as considered by the House be passed into law.\"\n\nTI1e Hon'ble the Speaker said : \"Motipn moved, that the Central Provinces & Berar Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Bill, 1949 (No. 64 of 1949) as considered by the House be passed into law.\"\n\nt J\n\n. A number of speeches were made at the third reading stage.\n\nThe opposition was in a hopeless minority.\n\nThe trend of the speeches was of a laudatory character, each member hailing the Bill as a piece of great reform in the Madhya Pradesh land system.\n\nNo motion of a dilatory nature was tabled and as a matter of fact there was no opposition whatsoever to the passing of the Bill.\n\nSome members expressed the opinion that the provisions of the Act did not go far enough, others thought that the provi, sions as tci compensation should have been more liberal, but there was none who was for rejecting the Bill as it stood. The report of the proceedings of the 5th April, 1950, does not cor1tain the note that the motion tlhat the Bill be passed into law was carried.\n\nThe omission of this note in the proceedings of the legislature has furnished a basis for the argument that the Bill was never passed into law.\n\nThe proceedings were printed Olil the 21st June, 1950, md were signed by the Speaker on the 1st October, 1950. The original Bill that was submitted to the President for his assent was printed on the 29th April, 1950, and it bears on it the certificate of the Speaker dated the 10th May, 1950, stating that the Bill was duly passed by the legislature on the 5th April, 1950.\n\nThis certificate Was signed by the Speaker a considerable time ahead of his signing the proceedings.\n\nThe Act, as already stated, received the assent of the President on the 22nd January, 1951, and was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on the 26th January, 1951, as Madh}'a Pradesh Act I of 1951.\n\nAgainst the constitutionality of this Act a number of petitiops were made in the High Court of Nagpur but they were all dismissed by that court on the 9th April, 1951, while this petition along with some others was pending in this Court.\n\nThe preamble of the Act is in these terms :-\n\n\"An Act to provide for the acquisition of the rights of proprietors in estates, mahals, alienated villages and alienated lands in Madhya Pradesh and\n\n V istueshwitr Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya\n\nPrailesh.\n\nM11hajan f.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan].\n\nto make provi, sion for therewith.\"\n\nother matters connected\n\nThe legislation clearly falls within entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh Legislature had therefore undoubted competence to enact it. The Act is divided into eleven chapters and three schedules.\n\nChapter II deals with the vesting of proprietary rights i.n the State and states the consequences of the vesting. Section 3 is in these ter.ms :-\n\n\"Save as otherwise provided in this Act, on and' from a date to be specified by a notification by the State Government in this behalf, all proprietary rights in an estate, mahal, alienated village or alienated land, as the case may be, in the area specified in ri\\.Cnotification vesting in a proprietor of such . estate, mahal, alienated village, alienated land, or in a person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor, shall pass from such proprietor or •Ud1' other person to and vest in the State for the purpose;\n\nof the State free of all encumbrances .......... \".\n\nSection 4 provides that after the publication of the notification under section 3, all rights, title and interest vesting in the proprietor or any person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietur in such area including land (cultivable or barren}, grass land, scrub jungle, forest, trees, fisheries, wells, tanks, ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, village sites,. hats, bazars and melas; and in all subsoil, including rights, if any, in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not, shall cease and be vested in the State for purposes of the State free of all encumbrantes ;·\n\nbut that the proprietor shall continue to retain the possession of his homestead, home-farm land, and in the Central Provinces, also of land brought under cultivation by him after the agricultural year 1948-49' but before the date of vesting.\n\nThe proprietor is entitled to recover any sums which became due to him before the date of vesting by virtue of his proprietary rights.\n\nAll open enclosures used for agricultural or domestic purposes, all buildings, places\n\n• /\n\nof worship, wells situated in and trees standing on lands included in such enclosures or house sites etc. continue to remain in possession of the proprietor and are to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as it may determine.\n\nSimilarly, certain private wells, trees, tanks and groves continue to remain in possession of the proprietor or other person who may be interested in them.\n\nChapteir III deals with the as!essment of compensation.\n\nIt is provided in section 8 that the State Government shall pay compensation to the proprietor in accordance with the rules contained in Schedule I.\n\nBesides the amount so determined, Government has to pay compensation for any amount spent on the construction of a tank or well used for agricultural purposes, where such tank: or well vests in the State Government. In addition to all these amounts, the State Government has to pay compensation for lands within the area of a municirpality or cantonment in accordance with the rules contained in Schedule II.\n\nThe compensation for divestment of proprietary rights becomes due from the date of vesting and it is enacted that it shall carry interest at the rate of tw(}\n\nand a half per cent. per annum from the date of ' vesting to the date of payment.\n\nSection 9 provides as follows :-\n\n\"The compensation payable under section 8 may, in accordance with the rules made in this behalf, be paid in one or more of the following modes, namely :- ( i) in cash in full or in annual instalments not exceeding thirty ;\n\n(ii) in bonds either negotiable or not negotiable carrying interest at the rate specified in sub-section ( 4) of section 8 and of guaranteed face valJue maturing within a specified period. not exceeding thirty years.\"\n\nThe other sections in this chapter deal with interim payment and appointment of compensation officers and lay down the procedure for the determinatiqn of compensation.\n\nSchedule I provides that the amount 11-10 S.C. India/71\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nVi'swes hwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nof compensation in the Central Provinces and in Berar shall be ten times the net income determined in accordance with the rules mentioned in the schedule.\n\nIn merged territories the compensation is payable on a sliding scale varying from two times to ten times the net income.\n\nSchedule II lays down the measure of compensation on a scale varying from five to fifteen times the assessment on the land as specified in the schedule. Section 2 of Schedule I provides for the calculation of the gross income by adding the amount of income received by a proprietor from the aggregate of the rents from the tenants as recorded in the jamabandi for the previous agricultural year ; the siwai income, that is, income from various sources such as jalkar, bankar, phalkar, h<]ts, bazars, melas, grazing and village forest calculated at two times the income recorded in the current settlement of 1923 ; and the consent money on transfer of tenancy lands-the average of transactions recorded in the village papers for ten years preceding the agricultural year in which the date of vesting falls.\n\nThe schedule also provides , the method of determination of the gross income of a mahal as well as of an alienated village or alienated land separately.\n\nIt also provides for the determination of this income in the case of mines and forests. The method suggested for assessing the net income is that out of the gross income the following items have to be deducted, i.e., the assessed land revenue, sums payable during the previous agricultural year on account of cesses and local rates> the average of income-tax paid in respect of income received from big forests <:luring the period of thirty agricultural years preceding the agricultural year in which the relevant date falls and cost of management varying from 8 to 15 per cent. of the gross annual income on incomes varying from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 15,000.\n\nIt is further provided that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule\n\n(2) the net income shall in no case be reduced to less than five per cent. of the gross income. - Chapter IV deals with certain incidental matters in respect of the determination of the debts of proprietors. Its\n\nprovisions are analogous to the provisions 0£ Debt Conciliation or Relief of Indebtedness Act.\n\nIt is provided in Chapter V how the actual amount of compensation is to be determined and paid.\n\nChapter VI deals with that part of Madhya Pradesh which is defined as Central Provinces in the Act. It is provided herein that a proprietor who has been divested of his estate will have malik-makbuza rights in his homefarm lands.\n\nAbsolute occupancy tenants and occupancy tenants can also acquire malik-makbuza rights.\n\nProvision is made for reservation of grazing lands and for the collection of land revenue.\n\nSimilar provisions are made in Chapter VII in respect of management and tenures of land in the merged territories.\n\nChapter VIII deals with management and tenures of lands in Berar.\n\nSeparate provision has been made for the determination of compensation payable to lessees of mines and minerals. Under the provisions of section 218 of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act and section 44 of the Berar Land Revenue Code there is a presumption that all mines and minerals belong to the State and the proprietary rights in them could be granted by the State to any person.\n\nWherever a right of minerals has been so assigned, provision has been made regarding its acquisition and the consequences\n\nas resulting from such acquisition.\n\nThe Act provides for the giving of rehabilitation grant to expropriated proprietors within a certain range provided for in Schedule III. The last chapter in the Act deals with miscellaneous matters including the power of making rules.\n\n\" .) The main purpose of the Act is to bring the actual tillers of the soil in direct contaot wfrh the State by the elimination of intermediary holders.\n\nIn short, the\n\n~ Act aims at converting malguzari into ryotwari land system.\n\nIt also aims at giving to the gram panchayats the map; igement of common lands freed from the grip ,. of proprietors and contemplates the establishment of\n\n,_ -<: self-government for the villages. The provisions of the \\ Ace in respect of payment of compensation, though they do not in any way provide for an equivalent\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan ].\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nin money of the property taken and in that sense may not be adequate, cannot be called illusory.\n\nThis Act 'is a definilte improvement on the Bihar Act ; it leaves the arrears of rents due in the hands of the proprietors and do~ not operate artificially to reduce the net income by any device.\n\nIt also provides that in no case the net income should be reduced below five per cent. of the gross income. The result is that in every case some amount of money . becomes payable by the State by way of compensation co the proprietor and in no case does the compensation work into a negative sum or to a mere zero or a minus figure. In other respects the provisions of the Act in regard to compensation follow the pattern which is common to all zamindari, legislation, which is to inflate the amount of expenditure and deflate the actual income.\n\nThe siwai income from jalkar, bankar, etc. and from village forests is calculated at two times the siwai income recorded in the . settlement made in 1923.\n\nThis Act was passed in 1951. The siwai income recorded in the year 1923 is appreciably less than the actual income of the proprietors from these sources in 1951.\n\nSimilarly the income from consent money has to be calculated by taking the average income for ten years preceding the date . of vesting and not the actual income as in the case of. rent realized during the previous agricultural year.\n\nThe expenditure has been infiared by taking in respect of the big forests the average income tax paid during the period of thirty agricultural years.\n\nNo agricultural income-tax existed during most of this period.\n\nI~ only came into exitence recently.\n\nThe cost of management has been calculated at a flat rate of eight to fifteen per cent. There can therefore be no doubt that the principles laid down for determination of compensation cannot be called equitable and they do not provide for payment of just compensation to the expropriated proprietor.\n\nThe petitioner's case is that under the formula stated\n\nin the Act, a compensation of 25 lakhs which would be due to him on the basis of the value of the property taken, has been reduced to a sum of Rs. 65,000 and is\n\npayable in thirty unspecified instalments and therefore it is purely nominal and illusory.\n\nThis figure of Rs. 65,000 is arrived at by the following proce_ss : -\n\n(a) Gross income from rents ... Rs. 55,000\n\n(b) Siwai income ... Rs. 80,050 Actually (according to the affidavit the petitioner was relizing 4,65,000 from this source) .\n\nTotal 1,35,000 Deductions permissible under the Act are the following :-\n\n(a) Revenue ... 45,000\n\n(b) Income-tax on 30 years' average 66,600\n\n(c) Cost of management ... 21,000 Total . . . 1,32,600 Net income 2,400 Ten times net income would be Rs. 24,000; but as the net income cannot be reduced below five per cent. of the gross income which comes to Rs. 6,500, compensation payable is Rs. 65,000, while the yearly income of the petitioner was in the neighbourhood of Rs. 5,65,000 and the mar{Qet value of his property is 25 lakhs.\n\nThe first and the main objection to the validity of the Act taken by the learned counsel is that the Bill was never passed into law.\n\nAs already indicated, this objection is founded on the omission from the proceedings of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly dated the 5th April, 1950, of a statement to the effct that the Bill was put to the House by the Speaker and was passed by it. Reference was made to rules 20, 22, 34 and 115 of the rules regulating 'the procedure of the legislature framed under the Government of India Act, 1935, in the year 1936, which provides as follows :-\n\n\"20( 1). A matter requiring the decision of the Assembly shall be decided by means of a ques.tlion put by the Speak; er on a motion made by a member.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.\n\n'J:1ahajan /.\n\nVisweshwar Rao\n\n• v.\n\nThe State of Madhya .Pradesh.\n\nMahajan ].\n\n22. After a motion has been made, the Speaker shall read the motion for the consideration of the Assembly . 34 (1). Votes may be taken by sion and shall be taken by division if desires.\n\nThe Speaker shall determine taking votes by division.\n\nvoices or diviany member so the method of\n\n•(2). The result of a division shall be announced by the Speaker and shall not be challenged.\n\n115 (1). The Secretary shall cause to be prepared a f!u.11 report of the proceedings of the Assembly at each of its meetings and publish it as soon as practicable.\n\n(2) One impression of this printed report shall be submitted to the Speaker for his confirmation and signature and when signed shall constitute the authentic record of the proceedings of the Assembly.\"\n\nIt was urged that the authentic report of the proceedings of the Assembly was conclusive on the point, that the Bill was not put to the Assembly by means\n\nof a question and was not voted upon, and hence it could not be said to have been passed by the legislature.\n\nIt was said that even if there was no open opposition to the passing of the Bill, it was possible that if ix was put to the Assembly, it might have rejected it.\n\nAs already pointed out, the proceedings were signed by the Speakr on the 1st October, 1950, while the certificate that the Bill was passed was recorded by him on the original Bill when it was submitted to the President for his assent on the 10th May,\n\n1950. The certificate of the Speaker is conclusive on the point that the Bill was passed by the legislature\n\n(Vide Cra\\es' Statute Law, 4th Edn., p. 36). It eems to me that by an oversight it was not recorded in the proceedings that the motion was put to and passed by the House and the Speaker while signing the proceedings six months after the event failed to notice the error. There can be no doubt that the sense of the House on the 5th April, 1950, was for passing the Bill and there was no one present who was for rejecting it\n\nThe motion before the House was that the Bill be passed.\n\nThe Speaker could not possibly have appended a certificate on a Bill that it was pass.ed by the House if it had not been so passed. There are no grounds whatever for doubting the._ correctness of his certificate.\n\nIn my opinion, the contention raised that the Bill was not passed into law fails and must be rejected.\n\nNext it is contended that articles 31-A and 31-B have no application to this Bill as it never became law by following the Procedure prescribed in the Constitution and that those articles have only application to a Bill that had become an Act. The Legislature of Madhya Pradesh consists of the Governor and the Legislative Assembly. It was said that even if the Bill was passed by the Legislative Assembly, it was not assented to by the Governor but was straightaway sent to the President and that without the assent of the Gqvernor: the Bill could not become law despite the fact that it was assented to by the President and it was pointed out that sub-clause (3) of article 31 of the Constitution speaks of \"law\" being reserved for the consideration of the President and not merely a \"Bill\" .\n\nThis argument, in my opinion, has not much force having regard to the terms and scope of article 200.\n\nThe Governor under that article could assent to a Bill or could reserve it for the consideration of the President at his option.\n\nThe Governor being empowered to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President and this having been done, it was for the President either to assent to the Bill or to withhold his assent.\n\nThe President having given his assent, the Bill must be held to have been passed into law.\n\nIt does not seem to have been intended that the Governor should give his assent to the Bill and make it a full:.S.edged law and then reserve it for the President's consideration so that it may have effect.\n\nMr. Somayya pressed the point that the President could not perform both his functions under article 200 and article 31(4) concerning this Bill at one and the\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan].\n\nsame time, that first the procedure laid down in article 200 for the passing of the Bill into law should been followed, t.e., the Governor should have either assented to the Bill or should have reserved it for the consideration of the President and if it was so reserved, the President should then have given his assent and the Bill would then become law, that after the Bill had become law, the Governor should again have reserved this Bill for the consideration of the President as required by the provisions of article 31 (3) in order to make it effective law against the provisions of article 31(2) and that if the President then gave his assent, the law so assented to could not be called in question in a court of law.\n\nIt was said that only in case where this double procedure is followed that it could be said that the President l; id satisfied himself that the law did not contravene the prov1S1ons of article 31 (2).\n\nIn my opinion, the argument is fallacious.\n\nIt would be a meaningless formality for the President to give his assent to the same Bill twice over.\n\nI cannot see why the President cannot perform both the duties entrusted to him by articles 200 and 31(3) and (4) at one and the same time. He is not disabled under the Constitution from applying his mind to such a Bill once and for all and to see whether it has to be passed into law and whether it fulfils the requirements of article 31(2).\n\nThe President's assent therefore to the Bill attracts the application of articles 31-A and\n\n31-B to it and deprives persons affected by it of the rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe provisions of article 31 ( 4) support the view of the learned Attorney-General that what has to be sent to the President is the Bill as passed by the legislature and not the Bill after it has been assented to by the Governor. T_l-1e article reads thus :-\n\n\"If any Bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything m this\n\n' /\n\nI I\n\nConstitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2) .\"\n\nIn this context the word \"Legislature\" means the House or Houses of Legislature and does not include the Governor within its ambit. This word has not the same meaning in all the articles.\n\nIn some articles it means the Qoivernor as well as the Houses of Legislature, while in a number of other articles it only means the House or Houses of Legislature. Article 31(4) means that i.f any Bill contravening the provisions of clause (2) of article 31 is passed by the House or Houses of Legislature but is reserved for the consideration of the President and receives his assent, then it s}iall become law, not open to any objection on the ground o{ such contravention.\n\nNext it was contended that the obligation to pay compensation was implicit i; n the legislaltive power contained in entry 36 of Ust LI and that the Act was unconstitutional as it had provided for acquisition of zamindaris without payment of compensation, the provisions relating to it being illusory.\n\nThis contention fails for the reasons given in my judgment in the Bihar case.\n\nMoreover, the compensation provided for in the impugned Act cannot be dubbed as illusory.\n\nAll that can be said is that it is grossly inadequate and it is not the equivalent of the value of the property acquired, but this issue is no justiciable in view of the provisions of article 31(4). This Bill was pending at the commencement of the Constitution, it was reserved for the consideration of the President and the President gave his as, sent to it.\n\nThe conditions for the application of article 31 ( 4) thus stand fulfilled.\n\nBesides the obstacle of article 31 ( 4), two further hurdles, viz., of articles 31-A and 31-B introduced by the amendments to the Constitution, stand in the way -0f the petitioner and bar an enquiry into the question of the quantum of compensation.\n\nThe contention that there is no public purpose .behind the impugned Act has also to be repelled on the\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan /,\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nsame reasoning as given by me in the Bihar case. The purpose behind the Act is to establish airect contact between tillers of the soil and the Government and to eliminate the intermediaries, as in the view of the Government this is for the welfare of the society as a whole.\n\nIt is also the purpose of the Act to confer malik maqbuza tatus on occupancy tenants and improve their present position and to vest management\n\nof village affairs and cultivation in a democratic village body. It is too late in the day to contend that reform in this direction is not for general public benefit.\n\nThe next argument of Mr. Somayya that the Act is a fraud on the Constitution in that in legislating under entry 42 of List III, it has legislated for non-payment of compensation has also to be repelled, for the reasons given in the Bihar case.\n\nUnder the provisions of this Act compensation can in no case work out into a mere nothing.\n\nOn the other hand, in every case some amount of compensation is payable and in the majority of cases it is also not inadequate.\n\nMr. Somayya contended that payment of Rs. 65,000 as compensation to his client for property worth twenty-five lakhs of rupees was purely illusory.\n\nThe assessment of value by rhe petitioner cannot be taken at its full value.\n\nIt cannot at any rate be held that legislation which provides for the payment of a sum of Rs. 65,00U provides for no compensation.\n\nThe amount of instalments, if payment is to be in instalments, is bound to be fixed by the rules made under the statute and in case the rules are so made that they amount to an abuse of the exercise of that power,\n\nthey can always be challenged on that ground.\n\nThe argument that the Act is bad inasmuch as it delegates essential legislative power to the executive is negatived for the reasons given in the Bihar case.\n\nA point was raised that the constitutional amendments in articles 31-A and 31-B could not affect the petitioner's guaranteed rights contained in Part III of the Constitution in so far as the eighty malguzari villages were concerned, because those mah1ls did not\n\n, '\n\nfall within the ambit of the word \"estate\" as defined in article 31-A.\n\nIn sub-clause (2) (a) the definition is in these terms :-\n\n\"The expression 'estate' shall, m relation to any local area, have the same meamng as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant.\"\n\nSection 2(3) of Act II of 1917, C. P. Land Revenue Act, defines the expression \"estate\" thus :-\n\n\"an estate as declared by the State Government.\" The learned Advocate-General conceded that these villages are not within the ambit of this definition but he contended that they are within the scope of the definition of the expression given m article 31-A, as mahals in Central Provinces are local equivalents of the expression \"estate'', though not so declared by the Act.\n\nThere is nothing on the record to support this contention.\n\nThe contention that those eighty mahals are not \"an estate\" and are thus excluded from the reach of article 31-A does not, however, very much advance the petitiioner's case, because the hurdles created in his way by articles 31-B and 31( 4) stand in spite of the circumstance that article 31-A has no application. It was contended that article 3l~B was merely illustrative of the rule stated m article 31-A and if article 31-A had no application, that article also should be left out of consideration.\n\nReference was made to the decision of the Privy Council in King- Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee(1 ) on the construction of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 2 of the Defence of India Act.\n\nThe material portion of section 2 considered in that case runs thus :-\n\n\" (I). The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, make such rules as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.\n\n(1) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195.\n\nVisweshwar Rar>\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan/.\n\n(2). Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the. rules may provide for, or may empower any authority to make orders providing for, all or any of the following matters, namely, ............ \".\n\nTheir Lordships made the following observati0ns aboµt. the meaning to be given to the language of subsection (2) :-\n\n\"the function of sub-section (2) is merely an illustrative one ; the rule-making power Is conferred by sub-section ( 1), and 'the rules' which are referred to in the opening sentence of sub-section (2) are the rules which are authorized by, and made under, sub-section ( l) ; the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section ( 1), as, indeed, is expressly stated by the words 'without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-section ( 1 )'.\"\n\nArticle 31-B is in these terms :-\n\n\"Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void ........ on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.\"\n\nOn the basis of the similarity of the language in the opening part of article 31-B with that of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Defence of India Act, \"without prejudiC:e to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A\", it was urged that article 31-B was merely illustrative of article 31-A and as the latter was limited in its application to estates as defined therein, article 31-B was also so limited.\n\nIn my opinion, the observations in Sibnath Baneriee's case(')\n\n(1) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195.\n\n>.-,\n\nfar from supporting the contention raised, negatives it.\n\nArticle 31-B specifically validates certain Acts mentioned in the schedule despite the provisions of article 31-A and is not illustrative of article 31-A but stands independent of it.\n\nThe impugned Act in this situation qua the acquisition of the eighty malguzari villages cannot be questioned on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of article 31 (2) of the Constitution or any of the other provisions of Part III.\n\nThe applicability of article 31(4) is not limited to estates and its provisions save the law in its entirety.\n\nThis petition is accordingly dismissed but m the circumstances I make no order as to costs.\n\nPetition No. 317 of 1951.\n\nMr. Bindra, who appeared for the petitioner, placed reliance on the observations of Holmes C. J. in Communications Assns. v. Douds(1 ), viz., \"that the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form ; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital, not formal ; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth\", and contended that if the Constitution of India was construed in the light of these observations, then despite the express provisions of article 31 (2) it would be found that there is something pervading it which makes the obligation to pay real compensation a necessary incident of the compulsory acquisition of property. It was said that the right to compensation is implied in entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and that article 31 (2) does not confer the right but merely protects it.\n\nMr. Bindra merely tried to annotate the arguments of Mr. Das but with no better result.\n\nThe dictum of Holmes C. J. has no application to the construction of a Constitution which has in express terms made the payment of compensation obligatory for compulsory acquisition of property, which again in express terms by an amendment of it,\n\n(1) 339 U.S. 382, 384.\n\nVisweshwar Rao,\n\nThe State of Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan].\n\nhas deprived persons affected by the impugned Act of this right.\n\nOne further point taken by Mr. Bindra was that \"nationalization\" of land is . a separate head of legislation and that \"acquisition in general\" does not fall within the scope of entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.\n\nThis proposition was sought to be supported by reference to a passage from Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. III, p. 541.\n\nThe passage, however, read in its entirety, negatives the contention. It may be mentioned that under powers of compulry acquisition a number of properties have been nationalized in England and other countries.\n\nLastly, it was urged that the legislation in question was not enacted bona fide inasmuch as in 1946 the legislature having passed a resolution to end zamindaries, proceeded to enact laws with the purpose of defeating the constitutional guarantees regarding payment of compensation by various devices.\n\nAs a first step in this direction the revenue was enhanced in order to reduce the gross income of the zamindars, then other Acts mentioned in the earlier part of the main judgment were enacted with the same end in view. In my opinion, this argument is void of force.\n\nIt was within tl1e competence of the Government in exercise of its governmental power to enhance land revenue, to w'i, thdraw exemption of land revenue, wherever those had been granted, and to enact other laws of a similar character.\n\nThere is no evidence whatsoever that all these enactments were enacted witl1 a fraudulent design of defeating the provisions of paymenti of compensation contained in the Constitution.\n\nThe Constitution had . not even come into force by the time that most of these statutes were enacted.\n\nThe petition is therefore dismissed. make no order as to costs.\n\nPetition No. 268 of 1951\n\nI, however,\n\nThis petition is concluded by my decision in Petition No. 166 of 1951 except as regards one matter,\n\nThe properties belonging to the petitioner and acquired under the statute were originally situate in an Indian State which became subseql, lently merged with Madhya Pradesh. It was contended that by the terms of the covenant of merger those properties were declared as the petitioner's private properties and were protected from State legislation by the guarantee given . in article 362 of the Constitution and hence the impugned Act was bad as it contravened the provisions of\n\nthis article. Article 362 is in these terms :-\n\n\"In the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (1) of article 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State.\"\n\nArticle 363 takes away the jurisdiction of the courts\n\n~. regarding disputes arising out of treaties, agreements, covenants, engagements, sanads etc.\n\nIt is true that by the covenant of erger the properties of the petitioner became his pnvate properties as distinguished from properties of the State but in respect of them he is in no better position than any other owner possessing private property.\n\nArticle 362 does not prohibit the acquisition of properties declared as private properties by the covenant; of merger and does not guarantee their perpetual existence.\n\nThe guarantee contained in the article is of a limited extent only. It assures that the Rulers' properties declaed as their private properties will not be claimed as State properties.\n\nThe guarantee has no greater scope than this. That guarantee has been fully respected by the impugned statute, as it treats those properties as their private properties and seeks to acquire them on that assumption. Moreover, it seems to me that in view of the comprehensive language of article 363 this issue is not justiciable.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nVi'sweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nThis petition is accordingly dismissed but there will be no order of costs.\n\nPetitions Nos. 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 257, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288 and 289 of 1951.\n\nIn all these fifteen petitions, Mr.\n\nSwami appeared for the petitioners.\n\nSeven of these are by zamindars from Madhya Pradesh who are owners of estates. The petitioner in Petition No. 246 also owns certain malguzari villages.\n\nPetitioner in Petition No. 237 is a malguzar of eighteen villages but owns no estate.\n\nPetitions Nos. 280 to 285 and 257 relate to merged territories.\n\nThe petitioner in Petition No. 282 was ruler of a State (Jashpur) and the petition concerns his private properties.\n\nPetitioners in Petitions Nos. 283, 284 and 257 are Ilakadars and in Petitions Nos. 280 and 285 they are mafidars.\n\nPetitioner in Petition No. 281 is a Thikedar,. i.e., revenue farmer of three villages. Mr. Swami reiterated the contention raised by Mr. Somayya that the Act was not duly passed by the legislature.\n\nFor the reasons given in Petition No. 166 of 1951, I see no force in this contention.\n\nMr. Swami also reiterated Mr.\n\nBindra's contention that the legislation was not bona fide. For the reasons given in Petition No. 317, this contention is not accepted.\n\nMr. Swami vehemently argued that the Government has by this Act become a super-zamindar, that there is no public purpose behind the Act, that there is no change in the existing order of things, that the Act has achieved nothing new, the tenants remain as they were, the malikan cabza were also already in existence, that acquisition of that status by occupancy tenants was possible under ex1stmg statutes and that they had also the power of transfer of their holdings.\n\nIn my opinion, the argument is based on a fallacy.\n\nAs already stated, the purpose of the Act is to bring about reforms in the land tenure system of the State by establishing direct contact between the tillers of the soil and the Government.\n\nThese petitions are accordingly dismissed.\n\nI make no order of costs in them.\n\nPetition No. 318 of 1951.\n\nMr. Mukherji who appeared in this petition merely adopted the arguments taken in other petitions.\n\nFor the reasons given therein this petition is also dismissed, but I make no order as to costs in it.\n\nPetition No. 487 of 1951.\n\nMr. Jog appeared in this petition and raised the same points as in other petitions. This petition also fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-1 agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that these petitions should be dismissed.\n\nDAs J.-The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Act I of 1951) having on January 22, 1951, received the assent of the President of India a Notification was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette of January 27, 1951, fixing March 31, 1951, as the date of vesting of all proprietary rights in the State under section 3 of the Act. A number of applications were made under article 226 of the Constitution to the Madhya Pradesh High Court by or on behalf of different persons variously described as Zamindars or Malguzars or Proprietors of \"alienated villages\" praying for the issue of appropriate writs against the State of Madhya Pradesh prohibiting them from proceeding under the Act the validity of which was challenged on a variety of grounds. Eleven of these applications came up for haring before a Full Bench of the High Court (B. P. Sinha C.J. and Mangalmurthi and Mudholkar JJ.) and were, on 9th April, 1951, dismissed.\n\nThe High Court certified under article 132 (1) that the cases inv-0lved a substantial question of law as to the interprettion of the Constitution.\n\nNo appeal, however, appears to have been actually filed presumably because the present applications under article 32 had already been filed in this Court.\n\nIt may be mentioned here that the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh also passed legislation for the 12-10 S.C. India/71\n\nVisweshwar Ra<>\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nVistveshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nDas].\n\nabolition of zamindaries in their respective States and the validity of those legislations was also contested by the proprietors affected thereby.\n\nWhile the High Court of Allahabad upheld the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Act, the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, to be unconstitutional only on the ground that it offended the fundamental right of equal protection of the law guaranted by article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIn the circumstances, the Constituent Assembly passed the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, by sections 4 and 5 of which two new articles, namely, article 31-A and article 31-B were inserted into the Constitution.\n\nA new schedule called the Ninth Schedule specifying 13 several Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act, I of 1951, was also added to the Constitution.\n\nThe legal validity of the Constitntion (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which was challenged, has however, been upheld by this Court and all Courts must give effect to the two new articles which are now substantive parts of our Constitution. Article 31-A relates back to the date of the ConstitlUtion and article 31-B to the respective dates of Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule.\n\nThe present bunch of petitions has been filed in this Court under article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Madhya Pradesh Act and praying for appropriate writs, directions and orders restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from acting under that Act and disturbing the petitioner's title to, and possession of, their respective estates, villages or properties.\n\nLearned counsel appearing for the different petitioners accept the position that as a result of the Constitutional amendments the impugned Act has been removed from the operation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and that consequently the attack on the Act will have to be founded on some other provisions of the Constitution.\n\nMr. B. Somayya appearing for the petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951 (Visheshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pr1adesh)\n\n• •\n\n1 ..\n\n....,\n\n_, -- ' ...\n\nchallenged the validity of the Act on the following grounds:-\n\n(a) that the Bill itself was not passed by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature ;\n\n(b) that the procedure laid down in article 31 (3) had not been complied with ; ( c) that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature was not competent to enact the said Act, inasmuch as- ('i) the acquisition sought to be made under the Act is not for a public purpose, and\n\n(ii) there is no provision for payment of compensation in the legal sense ; ( d) that the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution ; ( e) that the Act is unenforceable in that it provides for payment of compensation by instalments but does not specify the amount of the instalments ; ( f) that the Act has delegated essential legislative functions to the executive Government ;\n\n(g) that the Act in so far as it purports to acquire the Malguzari villages or Mahals is not protected by article 31-A.\n\nLearned counsel for other petitioners adopted and in s9me measure reinforced the argume!lts of Mr.\n\nB. Somayya.\n\nRe (a) : In dealing with this ground of objection it will be helpful to note the course which the Bill took before it was put on the Statute Book. There is no dispute as to the correctness of the dates given to us by counsel for the petitioners. The Bill was introduced in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly on 11th October,\n\n1949. It was referred to a Select Committee on 15th October, 1949. The Select Committee made its Report on 9th March, 1950, which was presented to the Assembly on 29th March, 1950.\n\nThe Assembly considered the Bill in the light of the Report between that date and 5th April, 1950, during which period the amendments proposed by the Select Committee were moved and dfoposed of.\n\nIt appears from the Official\n\nVisweshwar Rao\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas].\n\nV1swshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nDas f.\n\nroceedings of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly of 5th April, 1950, that after the last amendment had been put to the House and accepted, the Hon'ble Minister for Education (Sri P. S. Deshmukh) moved that the Bill be passed into law and delivered a short speech inviting the members to finally pass the Bill. The Speaker then read out the motion.\n\nThen followed speeches by 11 speakers congratulating the Government and some of the members who took an active part in carrying through this important measure of land reform and relief to the tillers of the soil. Nobody put forward any reasoned amendment and the trend of the speeches shows that the House accepted the Bill.\n\nFrom the Official Report of proceedings it does not, however, appear that after the speeches the Speak.er formally put the motion to the vote or declare it carried.\n\nIt only shows that the House passed on to discuss another Bill, namely, the Madhya Pradesh State Aid to Industries (Amendment) Bill, 1950.\n\nThe text of the Bill as it emerged through the House was printed on 29th April, 1950, and the Speaker signed a copy of the Printed Bill on 5th May, 1950, and certified that it had been passed by the House and forwarded it to the Governor.\n\nBy an endorsement on that copy of the Printed Bill the Governor reserved the Bill for the assent of the President and the President, on 22nd January, 1951, signified his assent by endorsing his signature at the foot of that copy.. of the Printed Bill.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General has produced the original printed Act signed by the Speaker, the Governor and the President.\n\nIt appears that the Official Report of Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of 5th April, 1950, was printed in June, 1950, and were on 1st October, 1950, signed by the Speaker along with the proceedings of many other meetings of the Assembly.\n\nIt is to be noted that the Speaker simply signed the printed proceedings without stating one way or the other whether the Bill in question was passed or not.\n\nThe objection formulated by learned counsel for the petitioners is founded on the Rules of Procedure\n\n1952 framed by the Assembly under section 84 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which were continued in force until new rules were framed under article 208 of the Constitution. That old rule 22 which required that after a motion was made the Speaker should read the motion for the consideration of the Assembly has been complied with is not disputed.\n\nWhat is contended is that the provisions of old rule 20(1) have not been followed.\n\nThat rule was in these terms:\n\nVisweshwar &lo\n\n\"A matter requiring the decision of the Assembly shall be decided by means of a question put by the Speaker on a motion made by a member.\"\n\nIt is urged that the question that the Bill be passed into law was not put to the Assembly under rule 20\n\n-and if it was at all put the result of the voting, whether by voices or division, was never announced by the Speaker as required by old rule 34. There being a presumption of regularity attached to all official business the onus is undoubtedly on the peti,.\n\ntioners to allege and prove that the procedure prescribed by the rules was not followed.\n\nThere is no evidence on affidavit by anybody who was present at the meeting of the Assembly held on 5th April,\n\n1950, as to what had actually happened on that date.\n\nThe petitioners rely only on the absence in the Official Report of proceedings of any mention of the question being put to or carried by the Assembly.\n\nThe Official Proceedings were prepared and confirmed in terms of old rule 115 which was as follows : -\n\n\" (1) The Secretary shall cause to be prepared a full report of the proceedings of the Assembly at each of its meetings and publish it as soon as practicable.\n\n(2) One impression of this printed report shall be submitted to the Speaker for his confirmation and signature and when signed shall constitute the authentic record of the proceedings of the Assembly.\"\n\nThe argument is that the initial onus that was on the petitioners has been quite adequately and\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nDas/.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas J.\n\neffectively discharged by the authentic record of the proceedings of the Assembly and consequently it must be held that the Bill did not actually become law at all.\n\nI am not prepared to accept this contention as sound.\n\nI have already pointed out that the original printed Act produced before us clearly shows that on 5th May, 1950, the Speaker certified that the Bill had been passed by the Assembly.\n\nIt is pointed out that old rule 87 under which the Speaker certified that the Bill had been passed did not give any finality or conclusiveness to the speaker's certificate that the Bill had been passed, such as is provided for in old rules 34(2) or 39(3) and, therefore, the certification under old rule 87 cannot affect the authenticity of the record confirmed and signed by the Speaker under old rule 115. This does not appear to me to be a correct approach to the problem.\n\nThe question before us is whether as a matter of fact the Bill had been duly passed ccording to the rules.\n\nThe certification of the Speaker was within a month from 5th April, 1950, while the conlirmation of the proceedings took place on 1st October, 1950.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the memory of the Speaker was fresher on 5th May, 1950, than it was on 1st October, 1950, when he signed a bunch of reports of proceedings. Therefore, as a statement of a fact more reliance must be placed on the certlfication of the Bill than on the confirmation of the proceedings and it will not be unreasonable to hold that the omission of any mention of the question having been put to and carried by the Assembly was an accidental slip or omission.\n\nFurther, the speeches delivered by the eleven speakers clearly indicate that at that stage there was no opposition to the Bill.\n\nTherefore, putting the question at the end of the third reading of the Bill would have been at best a mere formality. (See May's Parliamentary Practice, 14th Edn., p. 544). It is, after all, a matter for the Speaker to declare the result.\n\nThe authentication by the Speaker on the printed Act that the Bill was passed involves such a declaration having been duly made.\n\nIn British Parliamentary\n\npractice the Speaker's authentication is taken as conclusive. (See Craies' on Statute Law, 4th Edn., p. 36). The petitioners, as I have said, strongly rely on the Official Report of the Proceedings. It should, in this connection be borne in mind that article 208 of the Constitution continued the old rules until new rules were framed.\n\nIt appears that new rules were framed and actually came into force on 8th September, 1950. New rule 148 does not reproduce sub-rule (2) of old rule 115.\n\nAfter the new rules came into force it was no longer the duty of the Speaker to confirm the proceedings at all.\n\nTherefore, the purported confirmation of the proceedings by the Speaker on 1st October, 1950, cannot be given any legal validity and the argument founded on authentication under defunct rule 115 (2) must lose all iits force.\n\nFinally, the irregularity of procedure, if any, is expressly cured by article 212.\n\nI am not impressed by the argument founded on the fine distinction sought to be made between an irregularity of procedure and an omission to take a particular step in the procedure.\n\nSuch an omission, in my opinion, is nothing more than an irregularity of procedure.\n\nIn my judgment this ground of attack on the validity of the Act is not well-founded and must be rejected.\n\nRe (b) : Article 31 (3) on which this ground of attack is based runs as follows :-\n\n\" (3). No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.\"\n\nGreat stress is laid on the words \"law\" and \"legislature of a State\". It is said that this clause postulates a \"law\" made by the \"Legislature of a State\".\n\nReference is then made to article 168 which provides that for every State there shall be a Legislatue which shall consist of the Governor and, so far as Madhya Pradesh is concerns:d, of one House, i.e., the Legislative Assembly.\n\nThe argument is that article 31 (3) requires that a \"law\" must be reserved for the consideration of the President.\n\nIf a Bill passed by the Assembly 1s\n\nVisweshwar Ra<>\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas f.\n\nVisweshwar Rao\n\n•• The State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas [.\n\nreserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President without giving his own assent thereto, it cannot be said that a \"law\" is reserved for the consideration 0£ the President, for up to that stage the Bill ~ns a Bill and has not been passed into law. Therefore, it is urged, that after a Bill is passed by the State Assembly, the Governor must assent to it so that the Bill becomes a law and then that law, to have effect, must be reserved for the consideration of the President.\n\nThis, admittedly, not having been done, the provisions of article 31 (3) cannot be said to have been complied with and, therefore, the Act cannot have any effect at all.\n\nI am unable to accept this line of reasoning.\n\nFor one thing, it assumes that a Eill passed by the State Assembly can become a law only by the assent of the Governor. That is not so. The procedure to be followed after a Bill is passed by the State\n\nAssembly is laid down in article 200. Under that article, the Governor can do one of three things, namely, he may declare that he assents to it, in which case the Bill becomes a law, or he may declare that he with\" holds assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless th~ .procedure indicated in the proviso is followed, or he may declare that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President, in which case the President will adopt the procedure laid down in article 201.\n\nUnder that article the President shall declare either .that he assents to the Bill in which case the Bill will become law or that he withholds assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless the procedure indicated in the proviso is followed.\n\nThus it 'is clear that a Bill passed by a State Assembly may become a law if the Governor gives his assent to it or if, having been reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President, it is assented to by the President. In the latter e'ient happening, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners will require that what has become a law by the assent of the President will, in order to be effective, have to be again reserved for the consideration of the President, a curious conclusion I should be loath to reach unless I\n\n_.I\n\n.am compelled to do so. Article 200 does not contemplate a second reservation by the Governor. The plain meaning of the language of article 31 (3) does not lead me to the conclusion. The whole argument is built on the word \"law\". I do not think that what is referred to as law in article 31 (3) is necessarily what had already become a law before receiving the assent of the Presi- ·.dent. If that were . the meaning, the clause would have said \"unless such law, having been reserved for the consi<leration of the President, receives his assent\".\n\nThe words \"has received his assent\" clearly imply and point to an accomplished fact and the clause read as a whole does not grammatically exclude a law that eventually became a law by having had received the assent -0£ the President.\n\nThe question whether the requirements of article 31 (3) have been complied with will .arise only when the State purports to acquire the property of any person under a law and that person denies that the asserted law ha& any effect.\n\nIt is at that point of time that the Court has to ask itself-\"is it a law which, having been reserved for the oOlllsideration -of the President, has received his assent\".\n\nI think it 'is in this sense that the word \"law\" has been used. In other words, the word \"law\" has been used to mean what at the time of dispute purports to be or is assert- ed to be a law.\n\nThe language of article 31 (4) also supports this interpretation. In my judgment article 31 (3), on its true interpretation, does not require that the Governor must first assent to the Bill passed by the Assembly so as to convert it into a law and then reserve that law for the consideration of the President.\n\nI have already pointed out that article 200 does not contemplate a second reservation which will be necessary if initially the Governor instead of himself assenting to the Bill had reserved it for the consideration of the J>resident. In my op1mon there is no substance in the second objection which must, therefore, be overruled.\n\n..-r- Re (c), (d), (e) and (f) : Similar heads of objections , were formulated and argued at considerable length by Mr. P. R. Das in the Bihar appeals and learned counsel\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas J.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas/.\n\nappearing for the petitioners in the present proceedings have adopted the same. Shortly put, the argument E_ that although the impugned Act cannot, in view of articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B be called in question on the ground that it takes away or abridges or is inconsistent with the fundamental rights, it can, nevertheless, be challenged on other grounds.\n\nThus it is open: to the petitioners to show that the Legislature had n() power to enact the law or that it offends against any other provision of the Constitution.\n\nMr. N. S. Bindra and Mr. Swami have sought to reinforce those arguments by citing certain further passages from certain text books and reported decisions.\n\nThe provisions of the impugned Act have been analysed and summarised by Mahajan J. in the judgment just delivered by him and it is not necessary for me to recapitulate the same.\n\nNor is it necessary for me to formulate in detail the various heads of arguments founded principally on what is said to be the legislative incompetence of the Madhya Pradesh Legislature to enact the impugned Act in view of the language of Legislative topics set forth in entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List Ill or on the ground that t11e Act is a fraud on the Constitution or that it delegates essential legislative power to the executive Government which is not permissible.\n\nSuffice it to say that for reasons stated in my judgment in the Bihar appeals I repel these heads of objections.\n\nIf anything, the existence of a public purpose is more apparent in the Madhya Pradesh Act than in the Bihar Land Reforms Act.\n\nFurther, thecompensation provided in the Madhya Pradesh Act is more liberal than that provided in the Bihar Act, for under clause 4(2) of Schedule I the net income can in no case be reduced to less than 5 per cent. of the gross income. In any event the Act cannot, for reasons stated by me in my judgment in the Bihar appeals, bequestioned on the ground of absence of public purpose or of compensation. The fact that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature passed several Acts\n\nOIJ.!' after another e.g., C. P Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act, 1947, enhancing the land revenue of the Mahals,.\n\n•..\n\n' -.\n\n)'-:\n\n. .\n\n./,/\n\n. ~.\n\nC. P. Revision of Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939 and C. P.\n\nRevision of Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1947, increasing the land revenue of the estates, Revocations of Exemptions Act, 1948, revoking the exemptions from land revenue enjoyed by certain proprietors and finally the impugned Act, has been relied on as evidence of a systematic scheme for expropriating the zamindars and it is contended that such a conduct clearly amounts to a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nI am unable to accept this line of reasoning, for the series of legislation referred to above may well have been conceived and undertaken from time to time in utmost good faith.\n\nIt is true that section 9 of the Act does not specifically indicate when the insttalments will begin or what the amount of each instalment will be but the section clearly contemplates that these details should be worked out by rules to be framed under section 91 of the Act. Further, under section IO the State Government is bound to direct payment of an interim compensation amounting to one-tenth of the estimated amount of compensation if the whole amount is not paid within a period of six months from the date of vesting of the property in the State.\n\nI see no improper delegation of legislative power at all.\n\nIn my opinion all these heads of objections must be rejected.\n\nRe (g) : The last ground of attack is that the 80 Malguzari Mahals belonging to the petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951 are not estates and, therefore, the impugned Act in so far as it purports to acquire the Malguzari Mahals is not a law which is protected by article 31-A.\n\nLearned Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh concedes that these Malguzari Mahals are not estates within the meaning of the C. P. Land Revenue Act but contends that the word \"estate\" has been used in a larger sense in article 31-A.\n\nIn any case the impugned Act is protected by article 31-B.\n\nI do not think it necessary to discuss the meaning of the word \"estate\" as used in article 31-A for, in my opinion, the argument of the learned Advocate-General founded on article 31-B is well founded and ought to prevail.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas f.\n\nVjstveshiuar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas/.\n\nMr. B. Somayya has drawn our attention to the words \"without prejudice to the generality of the provmons of article 31-A occurring in the beginning of article 31-B and contended that •the interpretation put upon these words by the Judicial Committee in Shibnath Banerjee's case(') should be applied to them.\n\nI do not see how the principles enunciated by the Judicial Committee can have any possible application in the interpretation of article 31-B.\n\nArticle 31-B is neither illustrative of, nor dependant on, article 31-A.\n\nThe words referred to were used obviously to prevent any possible argument that article 31-B cut down the scope or ambit of the general words used in article 31-A.\n\nA question was raised by Mr. Asthana appearing for the Ruler of Khairagarh who is the petitioner in !Petition No. 268 of 1951.\n\nKhairagarh is one of the States which formerly fell within the Eastern States Agency.\n\nOn 15th December, 1947, the Ruler entered into a covenant of merger. In that covenant the properties in question were recognised as the personal properties of the Ruler as distinct from the State properties.\n\nReference is made to article 362 which provides that in the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause ( 1) of article 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State. It is said that the impugned Act is bad as it contravenes the above provisions.\n\nThere occur to me several answers to this contention.\n\nThe guarantee or assurance to which due regard is to be had is limited to personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler qua a Ruler.\n\nIt does not extend to personal property which is different from personal rights.\n\nFurther, this article does not import any legal obligation but is an assurance only.\n\nAU that the covenant does is to recognise the title of the Ruler as owner of certain properties.\n\nTo say that the Ruler is\n\n(I) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195.\n\n' \\ \\.\n\nthe owner of certnin properties is not to say that those properties shall in no circumstances be acquired by the State.\n\nThe fact that his personal properties are sought to be acquired on payment of compensation clearly recognises his title just as the titles of other proprietors are recognised.\n\nFinally, the jurisdiction of the Court to decide any dispute arising out of the covenant is barred by article 363.\n\nIn my judgment, for reasons stated above and those stated in my judgment in the Bihar appeals, these petitions must be dismissed.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR J.-I have nothing useful to add and I agree with the orders made by my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brothers.\n\nPetitz\"ons dismissed.\n\nAgents for the petitioners : Petition No. 166 of 1951 : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\n,, No. 317 of 1951 : R. S. Narula. ,, Nos. 228, 237, 245, 246 and 280 to 285 of\n\n\" \" \"\n\n1951 : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nNos. 230, 257 and 287 to 289 of 1951 : Rajinder Narain.\n\nNo. 268 of 1951 : S. P. Varma.\n\nNo. 318 of 1951 : Ganpait Rai.\n\nNo. 487 of 1951 : Naunit Lal.\n\nAgent for the Respondent (the State of Madhya Pradesh) in all the petitions : P. A. Mehta.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas/.", "total_entities": 273, "entities": [{"text": "RAO\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 185, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1002, "end_char": 1023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 31, 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1072, "end_char": 1084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "arts.\n\n31(4), 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1377, "end_char": 1393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2181, "end_char": 2197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-In any case, the omission to put the motion formally to the House, even if true, \\Vas, in the circun1stances no more thap_ a mere irregularity of procedure as it was not disputed that the overwhelming majority of the members\n\npresent were in favour of carrying the motion and no dissentient voice was actually raised.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "art. 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2553, "end_char": 2563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2905, "end_char": 2913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2918, "end_char": 2928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3032, "end_char": 3040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3120, "end_char": 3127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3368, "end_char": 3375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3379, "end_char": 3386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3426, "end_char": 3433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3535, "end_char": 3542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3633, "end_char": 3644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3903, "end_char": 3911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. Somayya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4222, "end_char": 4232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Somayya (V. N. Swami, with him) for the petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "B. Somayya"}}, {"text": "N. S.\n\nBindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4306, "end_char": 4319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S.\n\nBindra (P. S. Safeer, with him) for the petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "N. S.\n\nBindra"}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4572, "end_char": 4587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Mukherjee for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMadhj'a Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4658, "end_char": 4683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viswcshwar R11Q\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhj'a Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nMadhj'a Pradesh"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4708, "end_char": 4731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscueshtvar Rao\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nMadhj'a Pradesh"}}, {"text": "M. N. Jog", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4746, "end_char": 4755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nM. N. Jog for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Shivde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4805, "end_char": 4811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shivde (Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh), with T. P. Naik for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. P. Naik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4855, "end_char": 4865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shivde (Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh), with T. P. Naik for the respondent."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5142, "end_char": 5152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5160, "end_char": 5181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Visweshwar Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5190, "end_char": 5204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India by Shri Visweshwar Rao, zamindar and proprietor of Ahiri zamindari, an estate as defined in section 2(3) of the Central Provinces Land Revi; nue Act, II of 1917, and situated in tehsil Sironcha, district Chanda (Madhya Pradesh), for the enforcement of his fundamental right to property under article 31(1) of the Constitution by the issue of an appropriate writ or a direction to the respondent State\n\nrestraining it from disturbing his possession of the estate, and eighty malguzari villages situate in the Garchiroli tehsil of the san1e district.", "canonical_name": "VISWESHW AR RAO"}}, {"text": "section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5274, "end_char": 5286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5474, "end_char": 5487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "5th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th April, 1950, the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly enacted an Act called the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary ·, Rights Act."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th April, 1950, the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly enacted an Act called the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary ·, Rights Act."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6272, "end_char": 6297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification in a gazette extraordinary issued on the 27th January, 1951, the Madhya Pradesh Government fixed 31st March, 1951, as the date of vesting of the estates under section 3 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6478, "end_char": 6489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th March, 1951, i.e., before the vesting date, he presented the present application to this court for the issue of appropriate writs against ."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7065, "end_char": 7079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh is a composite State, comprising the Central Provinces, Berar and the merged territories."}}, {"text": "Berar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7136, "end_char": 7141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh is a composite State, comprising the Central Provinces, Berar and the merged territories."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7238, "end_char": 7255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement of merger made between the rules of States and the Dominion of India dated the 15th December, 1947, certain territories which at one time were under the Indian States Agency and were held by these rulers were integrated with the Dominion."}}, {"text": "15th December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7266, "end_char": 7285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement of merger made between the rules of States and the Dominion of India dated the 15th December, 1947, certain territories which at one time were under the Indian States Agency and were held by these rulers were integrated with the Dominion."}}, {"text": "1st January,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7469, "end_char": 7487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The integration actually took place on the 1st January,\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "1st August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7496, "end_char": 7512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st August, 1949, the States were merged in the Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7544, "end_char": 7558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st August, 1949, the States were merged in the Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7623, "end_char": 7635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land revenue in Madhya Pradesh was last assessed under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8106, "end_char": 8199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "3rd September, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8501, "end_char": 8520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O; i the 3rd September, 1946, the Central Provinces and Herar Legislative Assembly passed a resolution for the elimination of intermediaries between the State and the peasant."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Herar Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8526, "end_char": 8574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O; i the 3rd September, 1946, the Central Provinces and Herar Legislative Assembly passed a resolution for the elimination of intermediaries between the State and the peasant."}}, {"text": "Visweshwar RaO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the passing of this\n\nVisweshwar RaO'\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.", 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J. in Communications Assns."}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41257, "end_char": 41263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bindra, who appeared for the petitioner, placed reliance on the observations of Holmes C. 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result.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "S. 382, 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42513, "end_char": 42524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Visweshwar Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42527, "end_char": 42541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Visweshwar Rao,\n\nThe State of Madhya\n\nPradesh.", "canonical_name": "VISWESHW AR RAO"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42548, "end_char": 42572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Visweshwar Rao,\n\nThe State of Madhya\n\nPradesh."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42916, "end_char": 42932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43257, "end_char": 43264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that under powers of compulry acquisition a number of properties have been nationalized in England and other countries."}}, {"text": "article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44960, "end_char": 44971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45078, "end_char": 45089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45145, "end_char": 45155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 362 is in these terms :-\n\n\"In the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (1) of article 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State.\""}}, {"text": "article 291", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45404, "end_char": 45415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45513, "end_char": 45524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45915, "end_char": 45926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46555, "end_char": 46566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Swami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 46938, "end_char": 46943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In all these fifteen petitions, Mr.\n\nSwami appeared for the petitioners.", "canonical_name": "Swami"}}, {"text": "Swami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47603, "end_char": 47608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Swami reiterated the contention raised by Mr. Somayya that the Act was not duly passed by the legislature.", "canonical_name": "Swami"}}, {"text": "Swami vehemently argued that the Government has by this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47970, "end_char": 48029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukherji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48789, "end_char": 48797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mukherji who appeared in this petition merely adopted the arguments taken in other petitions.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Jog", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49018, "end_char": 49021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Jog appeared in this petition and raised the same points as in other petitions."}}, {"text": "January 22, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49402, "end_char": 49418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAs J.-The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Act I of 1951) having on January 22, 1951, received the assent of the President of India a Notification was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette of January 27, 1951, fixing March 31, 1951, as the date of vesting of all proprietary rights in the State under section 3 of the Act."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49460, "end_char": 49465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAs J.-The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Act I of 1951) having on January 22, 1951, received the assent of the President of India a Notification was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette of January 27, 1951, fixing March 31, 1951, as the date of vesting of all proprietary rights in the State under section 3 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49637, "end_char": 49646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49700, "end_char": 49711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49739, "end_char": 49764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of applications were made under article 226 of the Constitution to the Madhya Pradesh High Court by or on behalf of different persons variously described as Zamindars or Malguzars or Proprietors of \"alienated villages\" praying for the issue of appropriate writs against the State of Madhya Pradesh prohibiting them from proceeding under the Act the validity of which was challenged on a variety of grounds."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49942, "end_char": 49965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of applications were made under article 226 of the Constitution to the Madhya Pradesh High Court by or on behalf of different persons variously described as Zamindars or Malguzars or Proprietors of \"alienated villages\" praying for the issue of appropriate writs against the State of Madhya Pradesh prohibiting them from proceeding under the Act the validity of which was challenged on a variety of grounds."}}, {"text": "B. P. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50162, "end_char": 50173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eleven of these applications came up for haring before a Full Bench of the High Court (B. P. Sinha C.J. and Mangalmurthi and Mudholkar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Mangalmurthi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50183, "end_char": 50195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eleven of these applications came up for haring before a Full Bench of the High Court (B. P. Sinha C.J. and Mangalmurthi and Mudholkar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50200, "end_char": 50209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eleven of these applications came up for haring before a Full Bench of the High Court (B. P. Sinha C.J. and Mangalmurthi and Mudholkar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50288, "end_char": 50299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50511, "end_char": 50521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "While the High Court of Allahabad upheld the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50946, "end_char": 51024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51030, "end_char": 51087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51214, "end_char": 51224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "sections 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51350, "end_char": 51366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51402, "end_char": 51412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51419, "end_char": 51429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51496, "end_char": 51510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "the High Court of Patna held the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51533, "end_char": 51586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51874, "end_char": 51884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51937, "end_char": 51947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52015, "end_char": 52029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52098, "end_char": 52108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Acts and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "B. Somayya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 52764, "end_char": 52774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. B. Somayya appearing for the petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "B. Somayya"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53023, "end_char": 53049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "166 of 1951 (Visheshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pr1adesh)\n\n• •\n\n1 ..\n\n....,\n\n_, -- ' ...\n\nchallenged the validity of the Act on the following grounds:-\n\n(a) that the Bill itself was not passed by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature ;\n\n(b) that the procedure laid down in article 31 (3) had not been complied with ; ( c) that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature was not competent to enact the said Act, inasmuch as- ('i) the acquisition sought to be made under the Act is not for a public purpose, and\n\n(ii) there is no provision for payment of compensation in the legal sense ; ( d) that the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution ; ( e) that the Act is unenforceable in that it provides for payment of compensation by instalments but does not specify the amount of the instalments ; ( f) that the Act has delegated essential legislative functions to the executive Government ;\n\n(g) that the Act in so far as it purports to acquire the Malguzari villages or Mahals is not protected by article 31-A.\n\nLearned counsel for other petitioners adopted and in s9me measure reinforced the argume!lts of Mr.\n\nB. Somayya."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53089, "end_char": 53099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53803, "end_char": 53813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53871, "end_char": 53873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Somayya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53918, "end_char": 53928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "166 of 1951 (Visheshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pr1adesh)\n\n• •\n\n1 ..\n\n....,\n\n_, -- ' ...\n\nchallenged the validity of the Act on the following grounds:-\n\n(a) that the Bill itself was not passed by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature ;\n\n(b) that the procedure laid down in article 31 (3) had not been complied with ; ( c) that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature was not competent to enact the said Act, inasmuch as- ('i) the acquisition sought to be made under the Act is not for a public purpose, and\n\n(ii) there is no provision for payment of compensation in the legal sense ; ( d) that the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution ; ( e) that the Act is unenforceable in that it provides for payment of compensation by instalments but does not specify the amount of the instalments ; ( f) that the Act has delegated essential legislative functions to the executive Government ;\n\n(g) that the Act in so far as it purports to acquire the Malguzari villages or Mahals is not protected by article 31-A.\n\nLearned counsel for other petitioners adopted and in s9me measure reinforced the argume!lts of Mr.\n\nB. Somayya.", "canonical_name": "B. Somayya"}}, {"text": "11th October,\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54235, "end_char": 54254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bill was introduced in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly on 11th October,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "P. S. Deshmukh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 54950, "end_char": 54964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das f.\n\nroceedings of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly of 5th April, 1950, that after the last amendment had been put to the House and accepted, the Hon'ble Minister for Education (Sri P. S. Deshmukh) moved that the Bill be passed into law and delivered a short speech inviting the members to finally pass the Bill."}}, {"text": "5th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55891, "end_char": 55904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The text of the Bill as it emerged through the House was printed on 29th April, 1950, and the Speaker signed a copy of the Printed Bill on 5th May, 1950, and certified that it had been passed by the House and forwarded it to the Governor."}}, {"text": "Rules of Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56856, "end_char": 56874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56910, "end_char": 56920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rules of Procedure\n\n1952", "statute": "the Rules of Procedure\n\n1952"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56928, "end_char": 56957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57023, "end_char": 57034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Visweshwar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 57346, "end_char": 57356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That rule was in these terms:\n\nVisweshwar &lo\n\n\"A matter requiring the decision of the Assembly shall be decided by means of a question put by the Speaker on a motion made by a member.\"", "canonical_name": "VISWESHW AR RAO"}}, {"text": "5th April,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58057, "end_char": 58073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no evidence on affidavit by anybody who was present at the meeting of the Assembly held on 5th April,\n\n1950, as to what had actually happened on that date."}}, {"text": "article 208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61329, "end_char": 61340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "8th September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61485, "end_char": 61504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that new rules were framed and actually came into force on 8th September, 1950."}}, {"text": "article 212", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61978, "end_char": 61989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62376, "end_char": 62386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62842, "end_char": 62853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63067, "end_char": 63077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63858, "end_char": 63868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64245, "end_char": 64256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64706, "end_char": 64717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65551, "end_char": 65562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65659, "end_char": 65669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65807, "end_char": 65817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66351, "end_char": 66361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66922, "end_char": 66932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66987, "end_char": 66997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67249, "end_char": 67260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. R. Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67668, "end_char": 67677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..-r- Re (c), (d), (e) and (f) : Similar heads of objections , were formulated and argued at considerable length by Mr. P. R. Das in the Bihar appeals and learned counsel\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas J.\n\nVisweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas/.\n\nappearing for the petitioners in the present proceedings have adopted the same."}}, {"text": "articles 31(4), 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67990, "end_char": 68008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 68359, "end_char": 68371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. N. S. Bindra and Mr. Swami have sought to reinforce those arguments by citing certain further passages from certain text books and reported decisions.", "canonical_name": "N. S.\n\nBindra"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68583, "end_char": 68590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provisions of the impugned Act have been analysed and summarised by Mahajan J. in the judgment just delivered by him and it is not necessary for me to recapitulate the same.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "clause 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69536, "end_char": 69547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69551, "end_char": 69561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69914, "end_char": 69962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Revision of Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70048, "end_char": 70093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Revision of Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70105, "end_char": 70150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Revocations of Exemptions Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70196, "end_char": 70231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70706, "end_char": 70715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Revocations of Exemptions Act, 1948", "statute": "Revocations of Exemptions Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70942, "end_char": 70952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Revocations of Exemptions Act, 1948", "statute": "Revocations of Exemptions Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71633, "end_char": 71643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71776, "end_char": 71792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71864, "end_char": 71874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71924, "end_char": 71934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72022, "end_char": 72032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72111, "end_char": 72121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72384, "end_char": 72394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72427, "end_char": 72437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Shibnath Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72529, "end_char": 72546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Visweshwar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas f.\n\nVjstveshiuar Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nDas/.\n\nMr. B. Somayya has drawn our attention to the words \"without prejudice to the generality of the provmons of article 31-A occurring in the beginning of article 31-B and contended that •the interpretation put upon these words by the Judicial Committee in Shibnath Banerjee's case(') should be applied to them."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72713, "end_char": 72723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72728, "end_char": 72738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72787, "end_char": 72797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72882, "end_char": 72892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72952, "end_char": 72962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Asthana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72996, "end_char": 73003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not see how the principles enunciated by the Judicial Committee can have any possible application in the interpretation of article 31-B.\n\nArticle 31-B is neither illustrative of, nor dependant on, article 31-A.\n\nThe words referred to were used obviously to prevent any possible argument that article 31-B cut down the scope or ambit of the general words used in article 31-A.\n\nA question was raised by Mr. Asthana appearing for the Ruler of Khairagarh who is the petitioner in !"}}, {"text": "Khairagarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 73031, "end_char": 73041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not see how the principles enunciated by the Judicial Committee can have any possible application in the interpretation of article 31-B.\n\nArticle 31-B is neither illustrative of, nor dependant on, article 31-A.\n\nThe words referred to were used obviously to prevent any possible argument that article 31-B cut down the scope or ambit of the general words used in article 31-A.\n\nA question was raised by Mr. Asthana appearing for the Ruler of Khairagarh who is the petitioner in !"}}, {"text": "Khairagarh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 73095, "end_char": 73105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khairagarh is one of the States which formerly fell within the Eastern States Agency."}}, {"text": "article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73412, "end_char": 73423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 291", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73736, "end_char": 73747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 74418, "end_char": 74441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 195", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 74443, "end_char": 74460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74871, "end_char": 74882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75016, "end_char": 75036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR J.-I have nothing useful to add and I agree with the orders made by my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brothers.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75236, "end_char": 75251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "166 of 1951 : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "R. S. Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 75275, "end_char": 75287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "317 of 1951 : R. S. Narula. ,,"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 75406, "end_char": 75421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "230, 257 and 287 to 289 of 1951 : Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75442, "end_char": 75453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "268 of 1951 : S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "Ganpait Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75474, "end_char": 75485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "318 of 1951 : Ganpait Rai."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75506, "end_char": 75516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "487 of 1951 : Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75597, "end_char": 75608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Respondent (the State of Madhya Pradesh) in all the petitions : P. A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_1056_1090_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "May 2, 5.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nRAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH\n\nTHE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER\n\n(AND OTHER CASES)\n\n[PATANJALI SASTR! C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nUttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (I of 1951 )-Law for abolition of zamindaries and intermediate tenures-Validity-Provision for compensation and public purpose -Necessity of-Right of eminent domain-Jurisdictfrm of Court to enquire into validity of Act-Constitution of India, 1950-- Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, 362; Sch. VII, List II, entries 18, 36, List l/l, entry 42-De/egation of legislative powers-Fraud on the Constitution-Spirit of the Constitution-Meanings of \"public purpose 11 , \"law\", \"legislature\" - Compulsory acquisitiq_n of Crown grants, charities and private pro~ perty of Rulers under covenat of merger-Legality.\n\nHeld by the Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AtYAR JJ.).-The Uuar Pradesh Za1nindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, is valid in its entir.ety. The jurisdiction of the court to question its validity on the ground that it does not provide for payment of compensation is barred by arts. 31(4), 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution. The said Act is not a fraud on the Constitution ; it does not delegate essential legislative power to the executive ; and is not liable to be impugned on the ground of absence of a public purpose.\n\nPer MAHAJAN J.-(i) The expression \"public purpose\" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning.\n\nIt can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.\n\nThe definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and the state of society and its needs.\n\nThe point to be determined in each case is whether it is in the interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual.\n\n(ii) There, _is nothing in law to prevent the subject-matter of a Crown grant being compulsorily acquired for a public pur~ pose and land held by the taluqdars of Oudh does not therefore stand on a higher footing than that of other owners of Oudh.\n\n(iii) Property dedicated to charity by a private individuals is not immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire property for a public purpose.\n\n(iv) Recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution when its provisions are explicit ; and when the fundamental law has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the general powers conferred on the legislature it is not proper to\n\n~ deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in the spirit of the Constitution.\n\n(v) The provisions of art. 31(2) do not stand repealed by art. 31-A.\n\nOn the other hand the proviso to art. 31-A keeps them\n\n-> alive.\n\nThe only difference is that with regard to estates the '-' President has been constituted the sole judge for deciding whether a State law has complied with art. 31(2).\n\n(vi) When a whole estate is being acquired and payment of _... compensation is based on the net income of the whole estate, it cannot be said that the legislation is of a confiscatory character merely because there are non-income fetching properties also in the estate.\n\nDAs J.-(i) The existeince of a public purpose and the necessity for payment of compensation cannot be said to be an inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of Government. ;, The Indian Constitution has in art. 31 (2) recognised these two\n\nc elements as a pre-requisite to the exercise of the porer of eminent domain, and as the impugned Act has been expressly taken out J\n\nof the operation of those provisions, the question of invoking any imaginary spirit of the Constitution cannot be entertained. The invocation of such an imaginary spirit will run counter to the express letter of arts. 31( 4), 31-A and 31-B. (ii) The claim\n\nof the Rulers with regard to their private properties is not within • art. 362; by offering compensation their ownership is recognised; in any event, art. 362 imposes no legal obligation on the Parliament or State Legislature, and art. 363 bars the jurisdiction of the court with respect to disputes 'arising out of covenants of merger.\n\n• -t\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRrsmcTION.\n\nCases Nos. 283 to 295 of 1951.\n\nAppeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and decree dated 10th May, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Malik C. J., Mootham, Chandiramani, Agarwala and Bhargava JJ.) in Writ Application Nos. 23, 25, 3330, 3329, 3331 and 3332 of 1951 and Miscellaneous Judicial <; ases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1951 and Civil Miscellaneous Nos. 335, 340, 345 of 1951 (Luck.now Bench) and from the judgment and order dated 9th July, 1951, of Sapru and Agarwala JJ. in Writ Application No. 3403 of 1951.\n\nRaja Suriya Pal Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPal Singh v.\n\nThe State of u. p. and Another.\n\nMahajan].\n\nThe facts that gave rise to these appeals and petitions are stated in the judgment.\n\nP. R. Das and S. K. Dar (B. Sen and Nanakchand, with them) for the appellants in Cases Nos. 283 to 286, 289 and 290 of 1951.\n\nB. R. Ambedkar and Bishan Singh for the appellants in Cases Nos. 285 and 288 of 1951.\n\nN. P. Asthana and (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the appellants in Cases Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951.\n\nPrem Mohan Varma for the appellants in Case No. 295 of 1951.\n\nC. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Kanhaiya Lal Misra ( Gopalji Mehrotra and Lakshmi Saran, with them) for the respondents.\n\n1951. May 2, 5. The judgment of the CHIEF JusncE printed at pp. 893-916 supra covers these cases also.\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAS and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ. delivered separate jugdments.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-These appeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution concern the constitutionality of an Act known as the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act I of 1951), and fan be conveniently disposed of by one judgment.\n\nThe appellants in most of them are owners and proprietors of extensive landed properties in the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nSome of them are holders of estates in Oudh under taluqdari sanads granted to their ancestors by the British Government. H. H. Maharaja Paramjit Singh of Kapurthala, appellant in Appeal No. 285 of 1951, is the holder of an estate in Oudh, the full ownership, use and enjoyment of which was guaranteed to him by the Government of India under article XII of the Pepsu Covenant of Merger.\n\nAppeals Nos. 291 to 295 of 1951 have been preferred by religious institutions holding endowed properties.\n\nOn 8th August, 1946, the United Provinces Legislative Assembly passed the following resolution :-\n\n\"This Assembly accepts the principle of the abolition of the zamindari system in this Province which involves intermediaries between the cultivator and the State and resolves that the rights of such intrmedi aries should be acquired on payment of equitable compensation and that Government should appoint a committee to prepare a scheme for this purpose.\"\n\nA committee was appointed to give effect to the resolution and to prepare the necessary scheme.\n\nIt made its report in July, 1948.\n\nA Bill was introduced in the United Provinces Legislative Assembly on the 7th July, 1949, was referred to a Select Committee which made its report on 9th January, 1950, and was read before the Assembly for the first time on 17th January, 1950.\n\nOn the 21st January, 1950, the Assembly was prorogued.\n\nIt reassesmbled on the 2nd February, the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th February, 1950, and was read for the second time on 28th July, 1950, and for the third time on 4th August\n\n1950.\n\nOn 6th September, 1950, it came before the Legislative Council and the Council passed it with certain amendments on the 30th November, 1950.\n\nThe Legislative Assembly was prorogued on the 13th October, 1950, and in view of the amendments made in the Legislative Council, the Bill was reintroduced in the Legislative Assembly on 26th December, 1950, and was passed in its amended form on 10 January, 1951.\n\nIt was subsequently passed by the Legislative Council and after having received the assent of the President came into force on or about the 25th January, 1951.\n\nThe Preamble of the Act declares that-\n\n\"Whereas it is expedient to provide for the abolition of the zamindari system which involve.<i intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State in the Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent on such abolition and acquisition and to make provision for other matters connected therewith.\" 13-10 S. C. India 71\n\nRaja SNriya Pal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahaian f.\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and A nothcr.\n\nMahajan J,\n\nSub-section (1) of section 4 provides that as from such date as the State Government may by notification declare, all estates situated in the Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the Stae free from all encumbrances. \"Estate\" is defined in section 3 (8) as meaning \"the . area included under one entry in any of the registers prepared and maintained under clause (a), (b), ( c) or\n\n(d) of section 32 of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, or in the registers maintained under clause ( e) of the said section in so far as it relates to a permanent tenure holder and includes share in or of an estate.\" Section 6 enacts that subject to certaii:\n\nvery minor exceptions, upon the publication of a notification under section 4, the rights, title and interest of all intermediaries in everv estate in the area referred to in the notification, and in all sub-soil in such estates including rights, if any, in mines and minerals, shall cease and shall be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances.\n\nThe expression \"intermediary\" is defined in section 3(2) as meaning with . reference to any estate, \"a proprietor, under-proprietor, sub-proprietor, thekadar permanent lessee in Avadh, and permanent tenure-holder of such estate or part thereof.\"\n\nThe intermediaries whose ; ights, title and interest are thus acquired become entitled to receive compensation at eight times the net assets mentioned in the Compensation Assessment Roll prepared in ; ccordance with the provisions of tl1e Act.\n\nThe Act further provides that the State Government shall pay to every intermediary other than a thekadar, whose estate or estates have been acquired under the Act, a rehabilitation gram on a graduated scale provided that the land revenue payable by such an intermediary does not exceed Rs. 10,000.\n\nThe scale of the grant is given in Schedule I. Save in the case of wakfs, trusts and endowments which are wholly for religious or charitable purposes, the highes• :inultiple is for class paying land revenue up to !.<s. 25, the multiple being twenty, while the lowest is for the class\n\n' > -\n\npaying land revenue exceeding Rs. 5,000, but not exceeding Rs. 10,000 when the multiple is one.\n\nPart I of the Act includes provisions for the vesting of all estates in the State, for assessment of compensation, for payment of compensation to all intermediaries and of rehabilitation grant to those of them who pay Rs. 10,000 or less as land revenue and similar matters.\n\nPart II deals with consequential changes that become necessary by reason of the vesting of all estates in the State and provides for the incorporation in each village of a gaon samaj and the vesting of certain lands in the gaon samaj ; it divides the cultivators into four classes, viz., bhumidars, sirdars, asamis and adhivasis, determines their rights and provides for the payment of land revenue; it further contains provisions designed to prevent the fragmentation of holdings or their division into holdings of uneconomic size, and to facilitate the establishment of\n\nco-operative farms, and other similar matters.\n\nThe following provisions of the Act which came in for severe criticism during the course of the arguments addressed to us may be set out in extenso.\n\nSection 6 (a) provides for the vesting in the State of all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren), grove land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, wells (other than private wells in village abadi, holding or grove), tanks, ponds, water channels, ferries, pathways, abadi sites, hats, bazars and melas.\n\nClauses ( e) and (g) of this section are in these terms : -\n\n\"(e) All amounts ordered to be paid by an intermediary to the State Government under sections 27 and 28 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, and all amounts due from him under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, or the Agricultural Loans Act, 1884, shall notwithstanding anything contained in the said enactment, become due forthwith and may, without prejudice to any other mode of\n\nRaja Suriya Pal Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahaian /.\n\naia Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. ,.,.d Another.\n\nMahaian f.\n\nrecovery provided tharefore, be realised by deducting the amount from the compensation money payable to such intermediary under Chapter III.\n\n(g) (i) Every mortgage with possessiop ex1stmg on any estate or part of an estate on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent of the amount secured on such estate or part, be deemed without prejudice, to the rights of the State Government under section 4, to have been substituted by a simple mortgage ;\n\n(ii) notwithstanding anything contained in the mortgage deed or any other argreement, the amount declared due on a simple mortgage substituted under sub-clause (i) shall carry such rate of interest and from such date as may be prescribed.\"\n\nSection 7 saves certain rights at present held by the proprietors from the purview of the Act.\n\nThe rights included are in respect of mines which are being worked by the zamindars.\n\nSection 9 provides that private wells, trees in abadi and buildings situate within the limits of an estate shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary.\n\nSection 10 makes every tenant of land belonging to an intermediary and paying land revenue up to Rs. 250, a hereditary tenant thereof at the rate of rel).t payable on the date of vesting.\n\nSection 12 gives the same privilege :to thekadars.\n\nSimilarly section 15 confers the status of hereditary tenants on occupants of lands in which such rights did not exist.\n\nSection 18 provides that all land in the possession of intermediaries as sir, khudkasht or an 'intermediary's grove shall be deemed to qe settled by the State Government with such intermediary etc., subject to the provisions of the Act and he will be entitled to possession of it as bhumidar thereof. Land held by any person as a tenant is deemed to be settled by the State Government on such person as sirdar.\n\nSection 27 and 28 are in these terms ·-\n\n\"27. Every intermediary, whose rights, title or interest in any estate are acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation as hereinafter provided.\n\n28. ( 1). Compensation for acqms1t10n under this Act shall be due as from vesting subject to determination of thereof.\n\nof estates the date of the amount\n\n(2) There shall be paid by the State Government on the amount so determined interest at the rate of two and half per centum per annum from the date of vesting to the date of-\n\n(i) in the case of the amount to be paid in cash, determination,\n\n(ii) in the case of the amount to be given in bonds, the redemption of the bonds.\"\n\nSection 39 lays down the method of determination of the gross income of the land comprised in a mahal, while section 42 provides for the determination of the gross assets of an intermediary.\n\nSection 44 lays down the manner of assessing the net income of an intermediary. It provides as follows :-\n\n\"The net assets of an intermediary in respect of a mahal shall be computed by deducting from his gross assets the following, namely :\n\n(a) any sum which was payable by hini in the previous agricultural year to the State Government on account of land revenue ............. .\n\n(b) an amount on account of agricultural incometax, if any, paid for the previous agricultural year ....... . ( c) cost of management equal to 15 per centum of the gross assets.\"\n\nProvision has been made for the appointment of assessment officers and for the preparation of draft compensation assessment roll by them after hearing objections. Right of appeal has also been provided against their decision.\n\nChapter IV concerns itself with the payment of compensation.\n\nSection 65 of this chapter provides that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation in respect of the acquiition of his rights, title and interest in every estate the amount declared in that behalf under section 60.\n\nSection 68 is in these terms:-\n\nRaja Suriya Pal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nRaja Suriya Pal Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan f.\n\n\"The compensation payable under this Act shall be given in cash or in bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds as may be prescribed.\"\n\nSection 72 empowers the State Government to make rules on all matters which are to be and may be prescribed. Sections 113 and 117 provide for the establishment and incorporation of a gaon samaj and for the vesting of all lands not comprised in any holding or grove and forests within the village boundaries, trees, public wells, fisheries, hats, bazars etc., tanks and ponds in the gaon Mmaj, which is to supervise and manage and control the lands subject to supervision by the Government. Other provisions of the Act relate to acquisition of bhumidari rights and of sirdari rights by tenants, thekiadars etc., on payment of a certain amount mentioned in the Act.\n\nA bhumidar has the status of a peasant proprietor in direct relation to Government and these agrarian reforms contemplated by the Act aim at converting the zaminclari tenure system into a ryotwari system.\n\nThe main questions for appeals are the following :-\n\n1. Whether the impugned enacted.\n\nconsideration\n\nAct was\n\n111 these\n\nvalidly\n\n2. Whether thee acquisition of properties contemplated by the Act is for a public purpose.\n\n3. 'Vhether the delegation of power in the various sections of the Act is within the permissible limits.\n\n4. Whether the taluqclari properties held under \"sanads\" from the British Government can be the 'subject-matter of acquisition.\n\n5. Whether the properties of the Maharajah of Kapurthala in Oudh could in view of the article 12 of the Pepsu Union Covenant be acquired under the Act.\n\n6. Whether the said Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution.\n\nThe validity of the Act was attacked on a variety of grounds by the learned counsel appearing 111 the different cases and the grounds urged were by ne>\n\nmeans uniform or consistent and me of these were destructive of one another.\n\nMr. P. R. Das, who opened the attack, reiterated the arguments he had addressed to us in the Bihar appeals and urged that the obligation to provide for compensation is implicit in the power conferred on the State Legislature by entry 36 of List II with respect to acquisitions, that the words \"subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III\" in entry 36 compel the court to construe entry 36 of List II along with entry 42 of List III and, when so construed, it is clear that compensation has to be provided for whenever power is exercised under entry 36, that there is no provision for payment of compensation in the impugned Act, the word \"compensation\" meaning the equivalent in money of the property compulsorily acquired, that the U. P. Legislature had no power to enact this Act without making provision for payment of: compensation and in legal contemplation the Act is\n\nlh>t law, that article 31 (2) confers a fundamental right but has nothing to do with legislative, powers which have been conferred by articles 245 and 246 read with the three lists, that: article 31(4) does not in any way affect the rights conferred by article 31(2), which exist notwithstanding article 31 ( 4), and it only bars the remedy to challenge the Act on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2), that the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution, and lastly that the Act is void by reason of delegation of essential legislative power.\n\nOn the question of the invalidity of tl1e Act for want of a provision for payment of compensation, Mr. P. R. Das reinforced his arguments by reference to legislative practice in India and England and contended that even without any express provision for compensation in the different enactments to which our attention was drawn, the mere use of the word \"purchase\" implied that compensation was a concomitant obligation of the exercise of the power to compulsorily acquire property.\n\nFor the reasons\n\nRaia Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nRaia Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan/.\n\ngiven by me in the Bihar appeals I cannot accept this contention.\n\nIf the Constitution was silent on the point and provided for compulsory acquisition, the position might have been different.\n\nMr. Dhar, who appeared in some of the appeals, supplemented the arguments of Mr.\n\nDas on this point.\n\nHe contended that regarding half of the properties acquired, the Act was a piece of confiscatory legislation as these properties were nonincome bearing, and that as regards the other half, though compensation at eight times the net income is provided, it is a mere sham inasmuch as the Act makes payment of compensation discretionary at the will and pleasure of the Government; the provision being that Government will pay when it chooses to do so and it may never make the choice. He further contended that the provisions of the Act regarding compensation are colourable because they completely ignore the potential incomes of the zamindars, take notice only of the income recorded in the khatuni entries which do not include the sir income, and acquire rent-free holdings and undeveloped mines without any compensation, that the deduction of agricultural income-tax . from the gross-income was unjust and the object of deduction was to artiiicially reduce the net income, and the same procedure had been adopted in the case of forests.\n\nDr.\n\nAmbedkar, who appeared m some of the appeals, suggested a new approach for declaring the Act to be bad.\n\nHe contended that qua \"estates\" defined in article 31-A, Part I of the Constitution should be deemed as repealed and struck off from the Constitution.\n\nIn deciding these appeals, therefore, we are to look at the Constitution without the chapter on Fundamental Rights ; but as the Constitution aims at securing liberty and equality for the people and gives only a restricted power to the State, the obligation to pay compensation when private property is taken is implicit in the very spirit of the Constitution.\n\nMr. Das found the obligation to pay compensation implicit in entry 36, but Dr. Ambedkar could not see\n\neye to eye with him though he supported his contention by urging that the prohibition to acquire property by legislation without payment of compensation was implicit in the spirit of the Constitution .\n\nMr. Varma, who appeared in some other appeals, supported Mr.\n\nDas's argument that entry 36 should be read subject to the provisions of entry 42 and further contended that the impugned Act was the culminating point of a series of enactments passed as a device to confiscate the properties of the zamindars after the passing of the resolution in 1946 by the U. P. Legislature.\n\nHaving negatived the contentions of Mr. Das, I cannot for the same reasons accept the contentions of Mr. Dhar as sound.\n\nIt is convenient now to examine the point made by Dr.\n\nAmbedkar that the obligation to pay compensation is implicit .in the spirit of the Constitution.\n\nIt is well-settled that recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution when its provisions are explicit in respect of a certain right or matter.\n\nWhen the fundamental law has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the general powers conferred on the legislature, it is not possible to deduce a limitation from oomething supposed to be inherent in the spiirit of the Constitution.\n\nThis elusive spirit is no guide in this matter. The spirit of the Constitution -cannot prevail as against its letter.\n\nDr. Ambedkar Telied on the observations of Nelson J. in People v.\n\nMorris ('), quoted in the footnote, at p. 357 of Cooley's Constitutional Limitation.\n\nThe footnote states :-\n\n\"It is now considered an uni versa! and fundamental proposition in every well regulated and properly administered government, whether embodied in a constitutional form or not, that private property cannot be taken for strictly private purposes at all nor for public uses without a just compensation; and that the obligation of contracts cannot be abrogated or essentially impaired.\n\nThese and other vested rights of the citizen are held sacred and inviolable, even\n\n(1) l3 Wend. 325.\n\n1952 - Raja Suriya Pal Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Annther.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nRaia Suriya\n\nPal Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nagainst the plenitude of power of the legislative department.\"\n\nThose observations of the learned Judge, however, do not lend support to the contention urged; on the other hand, it seems to me that the proposition stated by Dr. Cooley at page -351 (Vol. I) that the courts are not at liberty to declare an Act void, because in their opinion it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words, has an opposite application here.\n\nIt is difficult upon any general principle to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial interposition except so far as the express words of a written constitution give that authority.\n\nThe argument of Dr. Ambedkar cannot be accepted for the further reason that it is based on an unwarranted assumption that qua the estates of the zamindars, Part III of the Constitution stands repealed and is non est. The truth is that Part III of the Constitution is an importa11t and integral part of it and has not been repealed or abrogated by anything contained in article 31-A of the Constitution ; on the other hand article 31-A, while providing that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III, clearly provides that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent.\n\nThis proviso in express term5 keeps alive the alternative provisions of Part III of the Constitution 'm article 31 (3) for judging whether the State law has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2).\n\nThe provisions of article 31(2), therefore, <lo not stand repealed by article\n\n31-A.\n\nOn the other hand, they are kept alive.\n\nThe difference is that persons whose properties fail within the definition of the expression \"estate\" in article 31-A are deprived of their remedy under article 32 of the Constitution and\n\n.. ..\n\n..,, .\n\n_.J\n\nthe President has been constituted the sole judge of deciding whether a State Law acquiring estates under compulsory power has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The validity of the law in those cases depends on the subjective opinion of the President and IS not justiciable.\n\nOnce the assent IS given, the law is taken to have complied with the provisions of article 31(2).\n\nIt is true that the principles of payment of compensation stated in the Act do not give anything like an equivalent or quid pro quo for the property acquired and provide only for payment of what is euphemistically described in the resolution of the U. P. Legislature as \"equitable compensation\".\n\nProperties fetching no income pass to the State without payment of any separate compensation and as comprising part of an estate which yields some net income to the proprietor.\n\nAccording to the affidavit filed in the Balrampur Raj case, actual income of Rs. 1,42,000 that the owner receives at present, works out to a sum of Rs. 10,000 under the provisions of the Act and property worth several crores is being acquired for a mere fraction of it~ true value.\n\nCulturable waste which\n\nfor~ twenty per cent. of the entire area of the estate, trees, sen:ral lakhs m number, water channels and irrigation works etc., are being acquired along with the cultivated lands and income-fetching properties without :my separate provision for payment of compensation.\n\nBut from those facts the conclusion cannot be drawn that the provisions as to compensation in the Act are illusory .\n\nIn none of the cases could it be said that the provisions of the impugned Act would result m nonpayment of compensation.\n\nGreat emphasis was laid on the circumstance that nothing was being paid fornon-income fetching properties.\n\nIt has, however, to be observed that these non-income fetching properties are integral parts of an esate as defined m article 31-A and it cannot be said when payment of compensation is provided for on the basis of the net income of the whole of the estate, that the legislation\n\nRaia Suriya Pal Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPal Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nis of a confiscatory character.\n\nDifferent coruiderations might have prevailed if the estates as a whole were not being acquired but different pieces of property were made the subject-matter of acquisiticn.\n\nProperties comprised in an estate may be incomefetching and non-income fetching, the value of these to the owner in the market may well be on the basis of income and if the Act has laid down the principle of payment of compensation on the foot of net income, it cannot be said tha.t the kgislattion is outside the ambit of entry 42 of List III.\n\nDr. Ambedkar frankly conceded that he was not prepared to go to the length of contending that the compensation provided for in the Act was illusory.\n\nHe, however, said that it was inadequate, whether tested subjectively or objectively.\n\nDuring the period that the Balrampur Raj was under the supervision of the Court of Wards, part of the property acquired was purchased on payment of Rs. 24,09,705 fetching a net income of Rs. 25,915.\n\nThis property, however, under the Act would be acquired on payment of Rs. 2,08,000.\n\nUnder the U.\n\nEncumbered Estates Act the Government itself had valued properties in various places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act on standard multiples, viz., from 37 to 20 times the net income.\n\nPrice of part of the property acquired on this basis comes to Rs. 47,14,696, while compensation according to the Act payable would be about onefourth of this amount.\n\nBe that as it may, article 31\n\n(4) is a complete answer to all these contentions, as held by me in the Bihar appeals. This Bill was pending in the legislature of the State on the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution came into force and this circumstance makes article 31 ( 4) applicable to all these cases.\n\nIt was contended by Mr. Varma that the U. P. Assembly was prorogued on the 21st January, 1950, and the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th February, 1950, and on the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution came into force it could not be said to be pending as it had lapsed.\n\nThis contention seems to be based on a misapprehension as to the provisions of the\n\n~- -\n\nConstitution Act of 1935 and the provisions of the present Constitution. Section 73 of the Government of India Act, 1931, and article 196 of the present Constitution provide in unambiguous terms that a Bill pending in the legislature of a State shall not lapse by reason of the prorogation of the House or Houses thereof.\n\nIn view of these clear provisions the contenton of the learned counsel that the Bill was not pending on 26th January, 1950, has to be rejected.\n\nFurther the provisions of articles 31-A and 31-B completely shelter this law from any attack based on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThis proposition was not disputed.\n\nAs the validity of the Act could not be impugned on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, that was the reason why the attack on its constitutionality was made on other groundsingenious but unsubstantial-lying outside the ambit of Part III.\n\nAs regards the contention that the provisions with regard to payment of compensation would result in non-payment of it as it is payable at the pleasure of Government and the debts of the zamindars are to be deducted out of it, my view is that both these contentions are unsound.\n\nUnder the provisions of the Act above cited, compensation becomes, due on the date of the vesting of the estate.\n\nInterest at two and a half per cent. runs from that date and becomes payable forthwith.\n\nSection 27 of the Act makes it obligatory on the Government to pay compensation.\n\nSection 65 in clear terms provides that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation the amount declared in that behalf und_e.r section 60.\n\nSection 68 gives option to the Government to pay compensation either in cash or in bonds, or partly in cash and partly in bonds as: may be prescribed.\n\nIf the Government does not prescribe anything, it is obvious that CClffipensation will be payable forthwith.\n\nIf, on the other hand, Government makes any rules and prescribes that compensation will be payable at some remote time and not within a reasonable period it will be open to the\n\nRaia Suriya Pal Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan /.\n\n.Raja Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nparties affected to challenge the validity of the rules on the ground of abuse of power.\n\nThese provisions, however, do not vitiate the Act and affect its validity.\n\nSo far as the debts are concerned, they were payable in certain instalments out of the income of the lands, they have been made payable at once and provision has been made that the amount be deducted from the amount of compensation.\n\nInstalments had been fixed because of the fact that they were recoverable from the income of the land. When the lands are converted into money, it follows as a matter of course that the right to recover the debts from the income of the lands is transferred to the compensation money and the provision regarding instalments becomes infructuous by the fact of acquisition.\n\nDr. Ambedkar further contended that in fixing the amount of compensation the State was a judge in its own cause and this was against the spirit of the Constitution.\n\nThere is no substance in this contention as the actual amount of compensation is to be determined by the compensation officer and his adjudication on the point is subject to an appeal.\n\nGovernment is not the judge of the actual amount of compensation.\n\nSo far as the law is concerned, it is the act o~ the legislature and being within its competence, no challenge can be made against the validity of the Act on this ground.\n\nThe question that the Act does no postulate any public purpose and is thus unconstitutional was argued by Mr. Dhar and Dr.\n\nAmbedkar with some vehemence and it was contended that there was no public purpose behind this legislation.\n\nMr.\n\nDhar urged that the sole purpose of the acquisition of zamindars' estates was for increasing the revenues of the State and for selling the intermediaries' interests to private individuals, the intention being to make money by trading activities and at the same time root out the zamindarswho constitute one-fourth of the population of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nIt was contended that no community in Uttar Pradesh derived any benefit from the provisions of the Act because the tenants whose status was intended to be raised, had been given\n\n• ·-\n\nsufficient relief under statutes already passed and what was humanly possible to do for them had been done, that they were at present more prosperous than the middle class: people and that the creation of a classless society by destroying a class was not a public purpose. Dr. Ambedkar on the other hand argued that he would have been content had the State nationalised the zammdaries because then the acquisition would be for a public purpose, but as under the impugned Act the State had merely constituted itself a trustee for distribution of the intermediaries' interests amongst h \"h \" d I \"h \" . t e aves an not amongst tie ave nots , t.e., amongst the bhumidars, sirdars, asamis and adhivasis\n\nand not amongst the landless, the Act was not for a public purpose at all but was an unfortunate piece of legislation as property was being acquired for the private benefit of persons and not for public use and that giving of property to gaon samaj also could not be held to be for public benefit or public use.\n\nIn my opm10n, as already stated by me in the Bihar appeals, these arguments are unsound.\n\nThe expression \"public purpose\" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning.\n\nIt can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and ex, clusion.\n\nIn other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs.\n\nThe point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual.\n\nProf. Willis has summarized the present position in the United States on this subject, at pages 817 and 818 of his book, in these words :-\n\n\"What is public use ? On this question there have been two view-points.\n\nOne may be called the older view-point and the other newer view-point.\n\nAccording to the older view-point, in order to have a public use, there must be the use by the public . . . . . . . . . . According to the newer view-point there\n\nRaia Suriya Pal Singh v • The State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nRaia Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nis a public use if the thing taken is useful to the public. This makes public use for eminent domain practically synonymous with public purpose for taxation and somewhat like social interest for police power.\n\nUnder this rule it is not necessary for the benefit to be for the whole community, but it must be for a considerable number.\"\n\nThe High Court took the view that acquisition of property under compulsory powers for securing an aim declared in the Constitution to be a matter of State policy is an acquisition for a public purpose.\n\nThe following observations from the judgment of Bhargava J. may be quoted with advantage:-\n\n\"The effect of the impugned Act is to vest the ownership and control of a considerable part of the material resources of the community in the State Government ; .............. the vesting in the State of the estate of the intermediaries is an indispensable preliminary to the pursuit of measures for the eradication or mitigation of the principal causes of agricultural poverty.\n\nTwo of such measures are embodied in the Act, which makes provision for three new classes of tenure-holders, bhumindar, sirdar and .asami, \"and for t'll.e formation of co-operative farms.\n\nThe provisions of Chapter VII of the Act, which depend in some measure for their efficacy on the transfer of property to the State effected by Part I of the Act, are clearly directed to the development of village self-government.\n\nIt can, we think, be inferred from the Act that the scope is given for more effective development of the State's agricultural resources than is at present possible. . . . . . . . . . . . . Reading the Act as a whole there can, we think, be no doubt that the primary object of the legislature is to effect a radical change in the system of the land tenure now prevailing in this State.\" • In my opinion, legislation, which aims at elevating the status of tenants by conferring upon them the bhumidari rights to which status the big zamindats have also been levelled down cannot be said as wanting\n\n' \"'- + - ' .,. .,_ .\n\n• •\n\nin public purposes in a democratic State.\n\nIt aims at destroying the inferiority complex in a large number\n\nof citizens of the State and giving them a status of equality with their former lords and prevents the accumulation of big tracts of land in the hands of a few individuals which is contrary to the expressed intentions of the Constitution.\n\nRa; a Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nT lie State of\n\nU. P.\n\nRnd Anotlier.\n\nDr. Ambedkar combated this view and urged that Mahaian /. the expression \"public purpose\" was not a new concept when the Constitution of India was framed ; on the other hand, it had a settled meaning in the past legislative history of this country and it must be presumed that the Constitution used the expression in the same sense in which it had been used in the earlier Acts and in the Government of India Act, 1935, and that it should not be construed in the light of the directive principles laid down in Part IV of . the Constitution. He contended that had the constitution- , makers intended to give this concept a different meaning than it had acquired in .the past, they would have clearly given expression to that intention by saying that the expression \"public purpose\" includes purposes which aim at implementing the directive ' principles of State policy and that Part IV of the Constitution merely contained glittering generalities which had no justification behind them and should not be taken into consideration in construing the phrase \"public purpose\".\n\nIn my opinion, the contentions raised by Dr.\n\nAmbedkar, though interesting, are not sound because they are based on the assumption that the concept of • public purpose is a rigid concept and has a settled\n\n~ meaning. Dr. Ambedkar is right in saying that in the concept of public purpose there is a negative element in that no private interest can be created in the property acquired compulsorily ; in other words, property of A cannot be acquired to be given to B for his own private purposes and that theI'C is a positive element in the concept that the property taken must be for public benefit.\n\nBoth these concepts are present in the acquisition l+-10 s. a. India 71\n\nRaia Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P.\n\nnd Another.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nof the zamindari estates.\n\nZamindaries are not being taken for the private benefit of any particular individual or individuals, but are being acquired . by the State in the general interests of the communit}'.\n\nProperty acquired will be vested either in the State or in the body corporate, the gaon samaj, which has to function under the supervision of the State.\n\nTenants, sirdars, asamis etc., are already in possession of the lands in which their status is to be raised to that of bhumidars, Zamindars who are being reduced to the status of bhumidrs are also in possession of the lands..\n\nThere is no question in these circumstances of taking property. of A and giving it to B.\n\nAll that the Act achieves is the equality of the status of. the different persons holding lands in the State.\n\nIt is not correct to say that Government is acquiring the properties for the purpose of carrying on a business or a trade. The moneys received from persons seeking bhumidari status or from the income of zarnindari estates will . be used for State purposes and. for the benefit of the community at large.\n\nFor the reasons given above I hold that the impugned Act is not void by reason of the circumstance that it does not postulate a public purpose.\n\nAs regards the question of delegation, our attention was drawn particularly to the proviqions of sections 6 ( e) and (g) and 68.\n\nThese sections provide for the prescription of the rate of interest by the executive government on mortgages and they also authorize the local government to determiille the period of redemption of the bonds and the fixation of the ratio between payment of compensation in bonds and payment in cash.\n\nIn my opinion, the delegation is within the permissible limits and does not amount to delegation of essential legislative power.\n\nThe main principles on these matters have been laid down in the Act and matters of detail have been left to the rule-making power.\n\nAs regards the appeal of the Maharaja of Kapurthala (Appeal No. 285 of 1951), the facts are these: By article 12 of the Covenant of Merger dated the 5th\n\n'\\_ .. -\n\nMay, 1948, entered into between the Rulers of the States now comprised in the Pepsu Union, the properties which are the subject-matter of the appeal were declared and guaranteed as the private properties of the . Mararaja.\n\nThe Maharaja was also guaranteed a privy purse of Rs. 2,40,000.\n\nIt was. suggested that the Maharaj:a accepted this sum which was smaller in amount than what was allowed to other Rulers as privy purse because he was assured of the income of th.e Oudh estate.\n\nOn these facts it was contended that the impugned Act contravened the provisions of article 362 of the Constitution inasmuch as it has not paid due regard to the guarantees contained in article 12 of the Covenant.\n\nAs already held by me in the Madhya Pradesh petitions, this contention is devoid of force. The impugned Act has fully respected the Covenant of the 5th May, 1948, inasmuch as it has treated the Oudh estate as the private property of the Maharaja as disitingui:shed from th~ State Properties and it is on that basis that it has proceeded to acquire it on payment of compensation.\n\nThe allegation that the income of this estate was tlo supplement the privy purse and that the appellant accepted a lower sum by way of privy purse than given to the other Maharaj as has been denied by the Government and we see no reason to hold in the asbence of any material to the contrary, that this denial is not true. This Act, therefore,· constitutes no breach of the guarantees given in article 362 of the Constitution.\n\nIt was urged by the learned Attorney-General that article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of this Court from going into this question. Dr. Ambedkar, on the other hand, contended that this article has no application because of the fact that the Government of India was not a party to this Covenant.\n\nAs at present advised, I see goOd deal of force in the point raised by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nNot only did the Government of India sign the Covenant as a guarantor but it also signed it as a concurring party and that being so, the provisions of article 363 seem to be altracted to the case.\n\nThe appeal of the Maharaja. therefore fails on this point.\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\n.v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nRaja Suriy\"\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan ].\n\nMr. Bishan Singh, who appeared in Appeals Nos. 284, 285, 288, 289 and 290, argued the special cases of the taluqdars of Oudli.\n\nIt was contended that the taluqdars were absolute owners of these holdings at the time of the annexation of Oudh in February, 1856, that subsequently the British Govern• ment under the directions of Lord Dalhousie tried to take away the taluqdars' rights, but that after the mutiny they were reinstated in their earlier status and that status was reaffirmed by the enactment of the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1856, that the permanent and hereditary rights of the appellants under that Act in the lands granted to them under the sanads could not be affected by any legislation made by the succes.sors in interest of the British Government and that Government could not derogate from its grant. It seems to me tl1at the lands held by nhe taluqdars stand on no higher footing .than the properties of other owners in Oudh.\n\nBe that as it may, the matter seems to have been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur fagannath.\n\nBaksh Singh v. United Provinces (').\n\nAt page 119 of the report it was observed as follows :-\n\n\"It is, however, desirable to examine the particular grounds on which it is sought to induce the court to arrive at tliis paradoxical conclusion.\n\nSome of these are said to be based on tl1e general principle of law tliat tlie Crown cannot derogate from its own grant, others are said to depend on particular provisions of the Government of India Act.\n\nIt has not been possible for tlie appellant to adduce any autliority for tlie principle involved. which tlieir Lordships apprehend to be tl1at Parliament,. whether Imperial, Federal or Provincial, in tlie absence of express prohibition, is debarred from legislating so as to vary the effect of a Crown grant.\"\n\nThe Crown carmot deprive a legislature of its leg'islative authority by the mere fact that in tlie exercise of its prerogative it makes a grant of land within tlie '9 territory over which such legislative authority exists\n\n(1) [1946] F.C. R.111,\n\nI •\n\nand no court can annul the enactment of a legislative body acting within the legitimate scope of its sovereign competence. If therefore it be found that the subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the competence of a provincial legislature, nothing can prevent that legislature from legislating about it, unless the Constitution Act itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally.\n\nDr. Asthana, who appeared in Appeals Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951, argued the case of the religious institutions.\n\nHe contended that the properties held by these institutions had already been dedicated for public purposes, that the income of these properties was being used for holding melas, feeding sadhus and other charitable purposes and tihat any reduction in that income would adversely affect those institutions imd the properties. that were already dedicated for public purposes could not be acquired under compulsory powers of acquisition.\n\nThe argument is fallacious.\n\nA charity created by a private individual is not immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes.\n\nIt is incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them.\n\nMr. Varma, who appeared in Appeal No. 295 of 1951, raised several new and ingenious points, none of which, however, he was able to substantiate.\n\nHe contended that the impugned Act may not be void but the noti1ication which the Government was authorised to issue under the powers conferred on it by the statute would be void because the executive government could not infringe fundamental rights by a notification which remained unaffected by articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-R The argument does not seem to be valid because it suffers from the defect that if the statute is good, the notification which is of a consequential nature cannot be held to be bad. It was\n\n. 1952\n\nRaja Suriy•\n\nPal Singh\n\n....\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nR•i• Suriya\n\nP•l Singh\n\n.v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nMahajan . /.\n\nnext contended by the learned counsel that the zamin-' daw had vested rights in existing law, namely, the Land Acquisition Act and the impugned statute could not deprive them of the benefits of the provisions of that Act.\n\nSimilar argument was raised in the Bihar appeals and for the reasons given therein it is repelled; It was then contended that in view of the provisions of the Religious Endowments Act, lands of religiowi endowments could not be acquired under the provisions of the impugned statute.\n\nThis contention seems to have been raised on some misapprehension as. to the scope and extent of the Religious Endowments Act, XX of 1863.\n\nIt is not. proved that that Act has any application to the properties sought to be acquired under the impugned Act.\n\nMoreover, that Act only deals with management of certain properties and does not stand in the way of their acquisition.\n\nGreat effort was made by Mr.\n\nVarma to establish that the impugned Act was a piece of fraud on the Constitution. It was contended that the U. P. Govern~ ment had been &ince a long time enacting laws with the fraudulent intention of depriving the zamindars of compensation by reducing their incomes,-he made mention of half a dozen Acts that were enacted iri U. P. prior to the impugned Act.\n\nThe argument, to my' mind, is based on a confusion of thought.\n\nThe enactments referred to were enacted by the legislature of U. P. between 1939 and 1949, before the Constitu'. tion came into force, and have no Connection whatever with acquisition of properties.\n\nMr. Vanna attacked the validitv of section 340 of the Act which enacts that- , \"where any orders had been made ................ or jurisdiction exercised under the provisions of th/!\n\nU. P. Agriculture Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, the provisions of the said Act shall be so read and construed as if the amendments mentioned in Schedule IV had been made thercin and were in force from the commencement of the said Act'\"\n\nIt wa~ contended that tpe U. P. Agriculture Tnants (Acquisition of 'Privileges) Act, 1949, was an existing\n\n;-. .J\n\n....\n\n,~ -\n\n• •\n\nlaw in U. P. and had not been repealed by the impugned Act and that being so, this Act could not validate notifications made under that existing law. I have not been able to see the force of this suggestion. Be that as it may, the constitutionality of this section does not affect the legislation as a whole.\n\nThe point was never raised before the High Court and has no substance.\n\nIt was also contended that mere rights in land apart from the lands themselves could not be acquired uD:der compulsory power and that the U. P. Legislature\n\ncould not acquire proprietary rights in lands and leave the bhumidari rights with the landlords.\n\nThis proposition sounds strange.\n\nIt is open to Government to acquire the whole of the rights of an owner or a , part of that right.\n\nLeasehold and other similar rights can always be acquired and if a person owns the totality of rights, it is not necessary to acquire the whole interest of that person if it is not needed for public purposes .\n\nLastly, it was urged that in truth the legislation in question fell under legislative power conferred by entry 18 of List II and this power could only be exer. cised subject to the freedom guaranteed by article 19(f) of the Constitution, that the total abolition of the zamindaris could not be protected by the provisions\n\nof clause 6 of article 19 in that it could not be regarded a reasonable restriction. on the exercise of the right to hold property. . This argument lose.'l sight of the fact that no help can be oought in these cases from any of the provisions of Part III; moreover, the legislation in question has been enacted under legislative powers given by entry 36 of List II and not under entry 18 of that List.\n\nMr. Varma raised some other contentions also but during the discussion he eventually abandoned them.\n\n,. ' The result therefore is· that there is no substance in any one of the appeals and I would accordingly dismiss a:ll of them. I would however, make no order\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPal Si11gA\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. find Another.\n\nMahajan J. '\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. tMld Another.\n\nDas /.\n\nas to costs in any of them in view of the peculiar circumstances of these cases.\n\nThe Constitution was amended during the pendency of the litigation and any costs allowed to the Government would further '1\"educe the inadequate compensation that the Government is paying for the acqwsition .of these estates.\n\nMUKHERJEA J.-1 agree that these appeals should be dismissed.\n\nDAs J.-This group of appeals arises out of various proceedings instituted in the High Court of Allahabad under article 226 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U. P. Act No. I of 1951) hereinafter referred to as The Act.\n\nOn 8th August 1946, the United Provinces Legislative Assembly passed a resolution accepting the. princip1e of the abolition of the zarnindari system in the 'Province involving intermediaries between the cultivators and the State and reoolving that the rights of such intermediaries should be acquired on payment of equitable compensation.\n\nTo prepare the necessary .scheme a committee, called the Zamindari Abolition Committee, was appointed.\n\nThat committee submitted its r.eport in August, 1948, making various recommendations which have been summarised by Mr. S. K. Dhar appearing for some of the appellants as follows :-\n\n(1) Abolition of zamindari on payment of Rs. 137 crores at 2i per cent. mterest ;\n\n(2) Establishment of gaon samai; .(3) Supply of rura:l credit by Government ; ('I) iintroduction of a modified form of peasant proprietorship combined with voluntary co-oper:nivc fanning;\n\n(5) Introiluccion of a restricted form of 'land lordism;\n\n{6) Pr.ohibiting sub-letting and permitting alienation only to 'llhe extem .that the alienee will not get\n\nmore than 35 acres including n'is previous possessions.\n\n' .\n\n...\n\nTo give effect to the recommendations of the committee a Bill which eventually became the Act was introduced in the U. P. Legislative Assembly on 17th July, 1949.\n\nAfter having been passed by the U. P.\n\nLegislature the Bill received the assent of the President on 24th January, 1951.\n\nThere is no dispute in this case that the provisions of article 31 (3) have been complied with. It is also clear, notwithstanding that at one stage it was disputed by one of the learned counsel evidently out of some misapprehension, that the Bill was pending before the Legislature at the commencement of the Constitution and comes within article 31 ( 4) of the Constitution.\n\nThe title and preamble of the Act follow the wording of the resolution of the Legislature. The preamble recites that it is expedient to provide for the abolition -of the zamindari system which involves intermediaries between the tillers of the soil and the State in the Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent upon such abolition and :acquisition and to make a provision for other matters connected therewith.\n\nThe body of the Act is divided into two parts, each part containing six chapters.\n\nChapter TI of Part I deals with acquisition ; Chapter III with assessment of compensation and Chapter IV with payment of compensation.\n\nChapter V is concerned with rehabilitation grant, while Chapter VI deals with mines and minerals.\n\nChapter VII, which is in Part II, deals with the constitution of gaon samaj and gaon sabha, Chapter VIII relates to tenure, Chapter IX to Adhivasis, Chapter X is concerned with land revenue and Chapter XI with co-operative farms.\n\nChapter XII deals with miscellaneous matters. Broadly speaking, the Act provides for acquisition of the interest of intermediaries for a compensation calculated at eight times the net income arrived at by deducting from the:. gross assets (which are the same as the gross income) the Government revenues, cesses and local rates, agricultural income\"tax and costs of management.\n\nRaia Suriy•\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Anothtl'.\n\nDas /.\n\nRlli• Sun'ya\n\nPal Singh ...\n\nThe State of\n\nU •. P. 1md Another.\n\nDas J.\n\nBefore notification was issued by the State Government under section 4 of the Act, the intermediaries filed petitions under article 226 of the Constitution praying, inter aJia, for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or other appropriate directions, orders or writs calling upon the State to forbear from giving effect to or acting in any manner by virtue of or. under the Act. By a judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court delivered on 10th May, 1951, the petitions were dismissed.\n\nThe High Court, however, certified; under article 132 (1), that the cases involved substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.\n\nThe intermediaries accordingly have come up on appeal before us.\n\nMr. P. R. Das who appears in support of several of these appeals raises the same questions as were raised by him in the Bihar appeals.\n\nOther learned counsel appearing for the other appellants mainly supported Mr. P. R. Das and also sought to reinforce. the appellants' cases on some additional grounds.\n\nMr. S. K. Dhar has taken us through the provisions of the Act and drawn our attention to the facts and figures appearing in the affidavit of Sri J. Nigam filed in Appeal No. 285 of 1951 and the Report of the Zamindari Abolition Committee. He has contended that of the 20, 16, 783 zamindars in U. P. about 20,00,000 are tillers of the soil also; that one-fourth of the cultivable lands is with peasant proprietors and the remaining three-fourths is with tillers who pay rent to the zamindars. •Most of the tillers have OCCU' pancy rights and cannot be ejected. Since 1947, the Congress Government has carried out extensive agrarian reforms ; the zamindars' profits have gone down from 1108 crores in 1939-40 to 1,069 crores in 1945-46, that is to say, there has been a drop of about 39 crores ; cess has been raised by 27 lacs and incometax has been imposed to the exte,; t of about one crore of rupees. The price of agricultural produce has gone up by 400 per cent. so that the price f produce aggregates to about rupees 851 crores while the rent payable by the tenants is only 17 crores.\n\nTherefore; it is\n\n...\n\n...\n\ncontended that there does not appear any essential or urgent public purpose for which the impugned Act was necessary at all.\n\nDr. Ambedkar appearing for the appellants in Appeals Nos. 285 . and 288 of 1951 has addressed us at length as to the meaning of the expression \"public purpose\" as explained in various judicial decisions and. text books. He has contended that it is wrong to say that the Act proposes to acquire the zamindaries for the State.\n\nWhat, he asks, is the destination of the property acquired ? Under the Act the State assumes the. function of a trustee for distributing the property.\n\nThe main purpose of the Act is to convert the tenants into bhoomidars, sirdars and so on.\n\nThe net result of the Act, according to him, is that the property of the zarnindars is taken away and vested in the tenants.\n\nHe points out that the Act makes no prov1s1on for the landless labourers.\n\nDr. Ambedkar maintains that this cannot be called \"acquisition for a public purpose\".\n\nHe submits that public purpose must be distinguished from a mere public interest or public benefit or public utility.\n\nHe further contends that the establishment of gaon samaj cannot be said to be a public purpose.\n\nAs regards compensation Mr.\n\nDhar points out that in fixing compensation under Table A regard is to be had only to income.\n\nNon-income yielding property goes without any compensation, e.g., culturable waste.\n\nIn point of fact Government acquired a large area of culturable waste at Rs. 300 per acre and yet no compensation will be paid under the Act for culturable waste.\n\nAbadi sites also will bring no compensation.\n\nEven income yielding property, e.g., irrigation works like 600 miles of canal in Balrampur and 14.J.! miles in Bird estate, will yield no compensation although the Government will get additional revenue qut of them.\n\nScattered trees in Balrampur alone will coine up to 85,000 . in number.\n\nThe income of Seyer property will only be taken :i.t the figure recorded iri, Khataunis, although ii: is well-known that actual incomes are not recorded therein.· Seyer and khud\n\nRaia Suriya 1952\n\nPal Singh v.\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nD•s f.\n\nRaia Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. .,,, j Another.\n\nDas/.\n\nkhast were never assessed to revenue, but under the Act they will be so assessed.\n\nNo compensation is, however, provided for the loss of status from Zamindari to Bhoomidari. Rent-free holdings granted by the zamindar which at present yield no income are not taken into account althougb there is always a possibility of tbeir resumption.\n\nAgricultural income-tax is rlcducted and forest is valued on an average of 20 t10 40 years' income although forest industry is of a very recent growth.\n\nFinally, the income of mines is to be computed on an average of 12 years' income.\n\nThe undeveloped mines or mines which have not started yielding any income will not fetch any compensation.\n\nThese are, in short, the main objections of the landlords as summarised by Mr. S. K. Dhar as to the method of assessment of compensation.\n\nAs regards the manner of payment of compensation Mr. S.\n\nK. Dhar points out that the Act does not really provide for payment of compensation at all in the eye of the law. Under section 68 no time is fixed for payment.\n\nIt is left to be prescribed by rules, but no rules have been made.\n\nCompensation payable, say in 40 years or SO years or 200 years, may be a charity or a dole but is certainly not compensation, prompt and certain such as is contemplated by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sweet v. Rachel (') and several other •cases cited by him. He maintains that the compensation is illusory because-\n\n(i) it is based not on the actual income but on arbitrarily determined income ;\n\n(ii) the determination of time and manner of payment is left entirely at the discretion of the appropriator, and\n\n(iii) the source of payment is not the community as a whole but the expropriated proprietors' own property.\n\nIn my judgment in the Bihar appeals I have dealt at length with the meaning of \"public .purpose\" and I ha¥e also dealt with the question or compensation. (I) 40 L. Ed. 188 at pp. 196-97.\n\nIt is, therefore, unnecessary for me to reiterate the , principles as I apprehend them.\n\nFor reasons stated by me in that judgment the impugned Act cannot be questioned on the ground of ablience of a public purpose or absence of just compensation. If anything, the public purpose in the impugned Act is much . more evident and pronounced than it is in the Bihar Land Reforms Act.\n\nIt is impossible to say that the impugned Act is not . a law with respect to principles on which compensation is to be determined and the manner of its payment. If the Government dpes not prescribe how much of the compensation will be paid in cash and how much will be paid by bonds as mentioned in section 18, the intermediaries will not suffer because under section 65 their right will remain enforceable.\n\nI have also dealt with the questions of fraud on the Constitution and the improper delegation of essential legislative power in my judgment in the Bihar appeals and I need not repeat the answers given by me.\n\nSuffice it to say that for reasons stated in my judgment in the Bihar appeals the main grounds on which the Act is impugned must be rejected.\n\nDr. Ambedkar has urged that the spirit of the Constitution is a valid test for judging the constitutionality of the impugned Act. He maintains that our Constitution being one for establishing liberty and equality and a government of a free people it must be held to contain an implied prohibition against the taking of private property except for a public purpose and on payment of just compensation.\n\nThe necessity for the existence of a public purpose and for providing for compensation are, as I have said in my judgment in the Bihar appeals, provisions of article 31 (2) and, therefore, it is not necessary to have recourse to any spirit of the Constitution, for the letter of the Constitution itself requires the two requisites. Dr. Ambedkar, however, argues that, so far as the appellants are concerned, Part III of the Constitution does not exist and, therefore, the maxim expressum f acit cessare tacitum does not apply.\n\nI am not prepared to accept this argument u\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPa/Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nDas f.\n\nRaja Suriya Pal Singh v. 1.\"he State of\n\nU. P. 1111d Another.\n\nDas J.\n\nsound.\n\nIt is true that. the appellants cannot question the impugned Act on the ground that it is inconsistent , with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III, but this circumstance does not imply tha,~ Part IiI is wholly erased out f the Constition. It exists for all other purposes.\n\nFor instance, article 31-A protects a law providing foi:. acqui.-; ition by the State of any estate, but it does not protect a law providing for acquisition by the State oc any property which does not come within the expre~\n\nsion \"estate\" as defined in that article.\n\nFor all laws for acquisition of all other properties Part III certainly exists and if it is conceded that the provisions of Part III exist in so far as such other laws are concerned the provision of article 31 (2) requiring the existence of a public purpose and the provision for compensation must exclude any theory of the implied existence of those two requirements.\n\nIn the next place, the spirit of the Constitution has to he inferred from some provi- &ion, express or implied, of the Constitution. Mr. P. R.\n\nDas based his argument on the implications to be deduced from the language of entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III. Dr. Ambedkar, however, says that it is not necessary for him to go to any entry at all.\n\nHe points out that the American Courts have held that where in a Constitutlion there is a representative form of government in which there is liberty and equality and when the government is a limited one such a Constitution carries with it the implication that the State cannot take private property except for a public purpose and on payment of compensation.\n\nI find it very difficult to accept this argument.\n\nThe existence of a public purpose and the necessity for payment of compensation have been insisted upon from very old times when the constitutions of governments in different countries were entirely different from the Constitution of the United States.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that these two elements cannot be said to be an inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of government.\n\nOur Cons.titution has in article 31 (2) recognised the existence of the two elements as a\n\n...\n\nIJprerequisite to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The impugned Act having been expressly taken out of the operation of those provisions, the question of invoking any imaginary spirit of the Constitution cannot be entertained.\n\nIndeed, invocation of such an imaginary spmt will run counter to the express letters of articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B.\n\nDr.\n\nAmbedkar appearing for the Maharaja of Kapurthala, who is the appellant in Case No. 289 of 1951, has also raised the point that the private property of the appellant is protected by article 362 of the Constitution and as the impugned Act does not pay any regard to those rights , it is void. On 5th May, 1948, certain covenants of merger were entered into between the Rulers of seven Punjab States. {Jnder article 12 of the covenant each Ruler is to be entitled to the . ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties.\n\nA list was furnished to . the Rajpramukh in which certain Oudh properties belonging to the appellant were shown as his private property. The appellant states that the amount of his privy purse was fixed at a low figure in consideration of the income of the Oudh estate.\n\nThese allegations are not admitted by the respondents.\n\nI have already dealt with the correctness of a similar argument raised by Dr. Asthana on behalf of the Ruler of Khairagarh in petition No. 268 of 1951 which was concerned with the Madhya Pradesh Act.\n\nShortly put, my view is that this claim to the private property is not within article 362, that by offering him compensation the Act has recognised his ownership, that, in any event, that article imposes no legal obligation on the Parliament or the State Legislature and, finally, that article 363 bars the jurisdiction of this Court with respect to any dispute arising out of the covenant of merger.\n\nThose covenants were entered into by the seven Rulers and the Government of the Dominion of India was a party thereto in that it concurred in the covenants and guaranteed the same.\n\nIn my opinion, for reasons stated in my judgment in the Madhya Pradesh petitions, there is no s.ubstance in this point.\n\n1952 'il\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nDas /.\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPa/. Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.\n\nDas/.\n\nDr. Asthana appearing for certain religious institutions which are appellants in Appeals Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951 contended that their property already dedicated to a public purpose cannot be acq_uired for another public purpose. I see no substance in this contention.\n\nThe property belonging to the religious institutions will only change its form, namely, from immovable property into money.\n\nCertain subsidiary points raised by Mr. Bishun Singh and Mr. Prem Manohar Varma have been dealt with by my learned brother Mahajan J. and it is unnecessary for me to add anything thereto.\n\nIn. my judgment, for reasons stated in my judgments in the Bihar appeals and the Madhya Pradesh petitions and those mentioned above, these appeals should be dismissed.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAYYAB. appeals should be dismissed costs.\n\nJ .-I agree that the without any order as to\n\nAppeals dismiSS1:tl •.\n\nAgent for the appellant : S. S. Sukla.\n\nAgent for the respondents: C. P. 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"source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th September, 1950, it came before the Legislative Council and the Council passed it with certain amendments on the 30th November, 1950."}}, {"text": "30th November, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7879, "end_char": 7898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th September, 1950, it came before the Legislative Council and the Council passed it with certain amendments on the 30th November, 1950."}}, {"text": "13th October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7947, "end_char": 7965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Legislative Assembly was prorogued on the 13th October, 1950, and in view of the amendments made in the Legislative Council, the Bill was reintroduced in the Legislative Assembly on 26th December, 1950, and was passed in its amended form on 10 January, 1951."}}, {"text": "26th December, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8087, "end_char": 8106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Legislative Assembly was prorogued on the 13th October, 1950, and in view of the amendments made in the Legislative Council, the Bill was reintroduced in the Legislative Assembly on 26th December, 1950, and was passed in its amended form on 10 January, 1951."}}, {"text": "10 January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8146, "end_char": 8162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Legislative Assembly was prorogued on the 13th October, 1950, and in view of the amendments made in the Legislative Council, the Bill was reintroduced in the Legislative Assembly on 26th December, 1950, and was passed in its amended form on 10 January, 1951."}}, {"text": "25th January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8305, "end_char": 8323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was subsequently passed by the Legislative Council and after having received the assent of the President came into force on or about the 25th January, 1951."}}, {"text": "Raja SNriya Pal Singh", 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C. India 71\n\nRaja SNriya Pal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. 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"metadata": {}}, {"text": "Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12876, "end_char": 12908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Agricultural Loans Act, 1884", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12917, "end_char": 12945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13642, "end_char": 13651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Agricultural Loans Act, 1884", "statute": "the Agricultural Loans Act, 1884"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13943, "end_char": 13952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Agricultural Loans Act, 1884", "statute": "the Agricultural Loans Act, 1884"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14125, "end_char": 14134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14294, "end_char": 14304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14483, "end_char": 14493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14545, "end_char": 14555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14656, "end_char": 14666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27 and 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15068, "end_char": 15085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15787, "end_char": 15797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15896, "end_char": 15906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15979, "end_char": 15989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16830, "end_char": 16840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17049, "end_char": 17059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17062, "end_char": 17072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17372, "end_char": 17382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 113 and 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17481, "end_char": 17501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kapurthala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18747, "end_char": 18757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether the properties of the Maharajah of Kapurthala in Oudh could in view of the article 12 of the Pepsu Union Covenant be acquired under the Act."}}, {"text": "article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18787, "end_char": 18797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "U. P. Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19890, "end_char": 19907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. R. Das, who opened the attack, reiterated the arguments he had addressed to us in the Bihar appeals and urged that the obligation to provide for compensation is implicit in the power conferred on the State Legislature by entry 36 of List II with respect to acquisitions, that the words \"subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III\" in entry 36 compel the court to construe entry 36 of List II along with entry 42 of List III and, when so construed, it is clear that compensation has to be provided for whenever power is exercised under entry 36, that there is no provision for payment of compensation in the impugned Act, the word \"compensation\" meaning the equivalent in money of the property compulsorily acquired, that the U. P. Legislature had no power to enact this Act without making provision for payment of: compensation and in legal contemplation the Act is\n\nlh>t law, that article 31 (2) confers a fundamental right but has nothing to do with legislative, powers which have been conferred by articles 245 and 246 read with the three lists, that: article 31(4) does not in any way affect the rights conferred by article 31(2), which exist notwithstanding article 31 ( 4), and it only bars the remedy to challenge the Act on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2), that the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution, and lastly that the Act is void by reason of delegation of essential legislative power."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20047, "end_char": 20057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 245 and 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20166, "end_char": 20186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20220, "end_char": 20233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20285, "end_char": 20298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20328, "end_char": 20338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20779, "end_char": 20784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question of the invalidity of tl1e Act for want of a provision for payment of compensation, Mr. P. R. Das reinforced his arguments by reference to legislative practice in India and England and contended that even without any express provision for compensation in the different enactments to which our attention was drawn, the mere use of the word \"purchase\" implied that compensation was a concomitant obligation of the exercise of the power to compulsorily acquire property."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20789, "end_char": 20796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question of the invalidity of tl1e Act for want of a provision for payment of compensation, Mr. P. R. Das reinforced his arguments by reference to legislative practice in India and England and contended that even without any express provision for compensation in the different enactments to which our attention was drawn, the mere use of the word \"purchase\" implied that compensation was a concomitant obligation of the exercise of the power to compulsorily acquire property."}}, {"text": "Dhar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21438, "end_char": 21442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Dhar, who appeared in some of the appeals, supplemented the arguments of Mr.\n\nDas on this point.", "canonical_name": "Dhar"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21516, "end_char": 21519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Dhar, who appeared in some of the appeals, supplemented the arguments of Mr.\n\nDas on this point.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "Ambedkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22580, "end_char": 22588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.\n\nAmbedkar, who appeared m some of the appeals, suggested a new approach for declaring the Act to be bad.", "canonical_name": "Ambedkar Telied"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22728, "end_char": 22738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Varma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23508, "end_char": 23513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Varma, who appeared in some other appeals, supported Mr.\n\nDas's argument that entry 36 should be read subject to the provisions of entry 42 and further contended that the impugned Act was the culminating point of a series of enactments passed as a device to confiscate the properties of the zamindars after the passing of the resolution in 1946 by the U. P. Legislature."}}, {"text": "Ambedkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24056, "end_char": 24064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is convenient now to examine the point made by Dr.\n\nAmbedkar that the obligation to pay compensation is implicit .in the spirit of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Ambedkar Telied"}}, {"text": "Ambedkar Telied", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24685, "end_char": 24700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ambedkar Telied on the observations of Nelson J. in People v.\n\nMorris ('), quoted in the footnote, at p. 357 of Cooley's Constitutional Limitation.", "canonical_name": "Ambedkar Telied"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25483, "end_char": 25490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan f.\n\nagainst the plenitude of power of the legislative department.\"", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "Cooley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25723, "end_char": 25729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those observations of the learned Judge, however, do not lend support to the contention urged; on the other hand, it seems to me that the proposition stated by Dr. Cooley at page -351 (Vol."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26545, "end_char": 26555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26598, "end_char": 26608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27197, "end_char": 27207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27293, "end_char": 27303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27328, "end_char": 27341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27380, "end_char": 27391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27542, "end_char": 27552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27590, "end_char": 27600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27816, "end_char": 27826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28030, "end_char": 28043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29566, "end_char": 29576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31343, "end_char": 31353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act the Government itself had valued properties in various places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act the Government itself had valued properties in various places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act"}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31503, "end_char": 31521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Bill was pending in the legislature of the State on the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution came into force and this circumstance makes article 31 ( 4) applicable to all these cases."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31589, "end_char": 31599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act the Government itself had valued properties in various places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act the Government itself had valued properties in various places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act"}}, {"text": "U. P. Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31676, "end_char": 31690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended by Mr. Varma that the U. P. Assembly was prorogued on the 21st January, 1950, and the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th February, 1950, and on the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution came into force it could not be said to be pending as it had lapsed."}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32075, "end_char": 32085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Encumbered Estates Act the Government itself had valued properties in various places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act", "statute": "Encumbered Estates Act the Government itself had valued properties in various places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1931", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32093, "end_char": 32122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 196", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32128, "end_char": 32139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1931", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1931"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32496, "end_char": 32507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1931", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1931"}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33405, "end_char": 33415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33487, "end_char": 33497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33628, "end_char": 33638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33641, "end_char": 33651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Willis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38009, "end_char": 38015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. Willis has summarized the present position in the United States on this subject, at pages 817 and 818 of his book, in these words :-\n\n\"What is public use ?"}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38059, "end_char": 38072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prof. Willis has summarized the present position in the United States on this subject, at pages 817 and 818 of his book, in these words :-\n\n\"What is public use ?"}}, {"text": "Raia Suriya Pal Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38451, "end_char": 38472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the newer view-point there\n\nRaia Suriya Pal Singh v • The State of\n\nU. P. and Another.", "canonical_name": "Raia Suriya\n\nPal Singh"}}, {"text": "Raia Suriya\n\nPal Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38511, "end_char": 38533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raia Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.", "canonical_name": "Raia Suriya\n\nPal Singh"}}, {"text": "Pal Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41000, "end_char": 41009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ra; a Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\nT lie State of\n\nU. P.\n\nRnd Anotlier.", "canonical_name": "Pal Singh"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41170, "end_char": 41191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44203, "end_char": 44213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44900, "end_char": 44910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mararaja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45175, "end_char": 45183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mararaja."}}, {"text": "article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45530, "end_char": 45541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45632, "end_char": 45642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "5th May, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45809, "end_char": 45822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The impugned Act has fully respected the Covenant of the 5th May, 1948, inasmuch as it has treated the Oudh estate as the private property of the Maharaja as disitingui:shed from th~ State Properties and it is on that basis that it has proceeded to acquire it on payment of compensation."}}, {"text": "article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46435, "end_char": 46446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46519, "end_char": 46530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47035, "end_char": 47046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raja Suriya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47142, "end_char": 47153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Suriya\n\nPal Singh\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH"}}, {"text": "Oudli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47407, "end_char": 47412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "284, 285, 288, 289 and 290, argued the special cases of the taluqdars of Oudli."}}, {"text": "Dalhousie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47619, "end_char": 47628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that the taluqdars were absolute owners of these holdings at the time of the annexation of Oudh in February, 1856, that subsequently the British Govern• ment under the directions of Lord Dalhousie tried to take away the taluqdars' rights, but that after the mutiny they were reinstated in their earlier status and that status was reaffirmed by the enactment of the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1856, that the permanent and hereditary rights of the appellants under that Act in the lands granted to them under the sanads could not be affected by any legislation made by the succes.sors in interest of the British Government and that Government could not derogate from its grant."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48030, "end_char": 48048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that the taluqdars were absolute owners of these holdings at the time of the annexation of Oudh in February, 1856, that subsequently the British Govern• ment under the directions of Lord Dalhousie tried to take away the taluqdars' rights, but that after the mutiny they were reinstated in their earlier status and that status was reaffirmed by the enactment of the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1856, that the permanent and hereditary rights of the appellants under that Act in the lands granted to them under the sanads could not be affected by any legislation made by the succes.sors in interest of the British Government and that Government could not derogate from its grant."}}, {"text": "Thakur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48351, "end_char": 48357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Be that as it may, the matter seems to have been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur fagannath."}}, {"text": "Asthana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49810, "end_char": 49817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Asthana, who appeared in Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51248, "end_char": 51259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raja Suriy•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51476, "end_char": 51487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1952\n\nRaja Suriy•\n\nPal Singh\n\n....\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Another.", "canonical_name": "RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH"}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51999, "end_char": 52023, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52225, "end_char": 52249, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Vanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53162, "end_char": 53167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Vanna attacked the validitv of section 340 of the Act which enacts that- , \"where any orders had been made ................ or jurisdiction exercised under the provisions of th/!"}}, {"text": "section 340", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53193, "end_char": 53204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53503, "end_char": 53514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54914, "end_char": 54927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55037, "end_char": 55045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55049, "end_char": 55059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raja Suriya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55700, "end_char": 55711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I would however, make no order\n\nRaja Suriya\n\nPal Si11gA\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. find Another.", "canonical_name": "RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH"}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56150, "end_char": 56159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUKHERJEA J.-1 agree that these appeals should be dismissed.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 56293, "end_char": 56316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAs J.-This group of appeals arises out of various proceedings instituted in the High Court of Allahabad under article 226 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U. P. Act No."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56323, "end_char": 56334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "8th August 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56514, "end_char": 56529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 8th August 1946, the United Provinces Legislative Assembly passed a resolution accepting the."}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56908, "end_char": 56937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To prepare the necessary .scheme a committee, called the Zamindari Abolition Committee, was appointed."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dhar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57074, "end_char": 57084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That committee submitted its r.eport in August, 1948, making various recommendations which have been summarised by Mr. S. K. Dhar appearing for some of the appellants as follows :-\n\n(1) Abolition of zamindari on payment of Rs.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dhar"}}, {"text": "To give effect to the recommendations of the committee a Bill which eventually became the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57641, "end_char": 57734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57787, "end_char": 57802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nTo give effect to the recommendations of the committee a Bill which eventually became the Act was introduced in the U. P. Legislative Assembly on 17th July, 1949."}}, {"text": "24th January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57905, "end_char": 57923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After having been passed by the U. P.\n\nLegislature the Bill received the assent of the President on 24th January, 1951."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57982, "end_char": 57992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To give effect to the recommendations of the committee a Bill which eventually became the Act", "statute": "To give effect to the recommendations of the committee a Bill which eventually became the Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58265, "end_char": 58275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To give effect to the recommendations of the committee a Bill which eventually became the Act", "statute": "To give effect to the recommendations of the committee a Bill which eventually became the Act"}}, {"text": "Raia Suriy•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 59733, "end_char": 59744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raia Suriy•\n\nPal Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nU. P. and Anothtl'.", "canonical_name": "RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59833, "end_char": 59844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das /.\n\nRlli• Sun'ya\n\nPal Singh ...\n\nThe State of\n\nU •. P. 1md Another.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nU. P. 1111d Another"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59934, "end_char": 59943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59997, "end_char": 60008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 60298, "end_char": 60318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court delivered on 10th May, 1951, the petitions were dismissed."}}, {"text": "May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60337, "end_char": 60346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court delivered on 10th May, 1951, the petitions were dismissed."}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60421, "end_char": 60432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J. Nigam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61054, "end_char": 61062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S. K. Dhar has taken us through the provisions of the Act and drawn our attention to the facts and figures appearing in the affidavit of Sri J. Nigam filed in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "U. P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 61202, "end_char": 61207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has contended that of the 20, 16, 783 zamindars in U. P. about 20,00,000 are tillers of the soil also; that one-fourth of the cultivable lands is with peasant proprietors and the remaining three-fourths is with tillers who pay rent to the zamindars."}}, {"text": "Congress Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61485, "end_char": 61504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since 1947, the Congress Government has carried out extensive agrarian reforms ; the zamindars' profits have gone down from 1108 crores in 1939-40 to 1,069 crores in 1945-46, that is to say, there has been a drop of about 39 crores ; cess has been raised by 27 lacs and incometax has been imposed to the exte,; t of about one crore of rupees."}}, {"text": "Dhar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 63255, "end_char": 63259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards compensation Mr.\n\nDhar points out that in fixing compensation under Table A regard is to be had only to income.", "canonical_name": "Dhar"}}, {"text": "Balrampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63726, "end_char": 63735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even income yielding property, e.g., irrigation works like 600 miles of canal in Balrampur and 14.J.!"}}, {"text": "Zamindari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64405, "end_char": 64414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No compensation is, however, provided for the loss of status from Zamindari to Bhoomidari."}}, {"text": "Bhoomidari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64418, "end_char": 64428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No compensation is, however, provided for the loss of status from Zamindari to Bhoomidari."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nK. Dhar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65130, "end_char": 65141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the manner of payment of compensation Mr. S.\n\nK. Dhar points out that the Act does not really provide for payment of compensation at all in the eye of the law."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65254, "end_char": 65264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 65556, "end_char": 65583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Compensation payable, say in 40 years or SO years or 200 years, may be a charity or a dole but is certainly not compensation, prompt and certain such as is contemplated by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sweet v. Rachel (') and several other •cases cited by him."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66875, "end_char": 66885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66936, "end_char": 66946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67897, "end_char": 67907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ambedkar has urged that the spirit of the Constitution is a valid test for judging the constitutionality of the impugned Act", "statute": "Ambedkar has urged that the spirit of the Constitution is a valid test for judging the constitutionality of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nU. P. 1111d Another", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68408, "end_char": 68437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das f.\n\nRaja Suriya Pal Singh v. 1.\"he State of\n\nU. P. 1111d Another.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nU. P. 1111d Another"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68440, "end_char": 68443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\nsound.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68791, "end_char": 68801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69244, "end_char": 69254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. R.\n\nDas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69552, "end_char": 69562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. R.\n\nDas based his argument on the implications to be deduced from the language of entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III.", "canonical_name": "P. R.\n\nDas"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70601, "end_char": 70611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71000, "end_char": 71011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71221, "end_char": 71232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71445, "end_char": 71455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71597, "end_char": 71607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Rajpramukh in which certain Oudh properties belonging to the appellant were shown as his private property."}}, {"text": "Khairagarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 72006, "end_char": 72016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have already dealt with the correctness of a similar argument raised by Dr. Asthana on behalf of the Ruler of Khairagarh in petition No."}}, {"text": "article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72173, "end_char": 72184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72381, "end_char": 72392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of the Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 72559, "end_char": 72594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those covenants were entered into by the seven Rulers and the Government of the Dominion of India was a party thereto in that it concurred in the covenants and guaranteed the same."}}, {"text": "Bishun Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73376, "end_char": 73388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain subsidiary points raised by Mr. Bishun Singh and Mr. Prem Manohar Varma have been dealt with by my learned brother Mahajan J. and it is unnecessary for me to add anything thereto.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Singh"}}, {"text": "Prem Manohar Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 73397, "end_char": 73415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain subsidiary points raised by Mr. Bishun Singh and Mr. Prem Manohar Varma have been dealt with by my learned brother Mahajan J. and it is unnecessary for me to add anything thereto.", "canonical_name": "Prem Manohar Varma"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73459, "end_char": 73466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain subsidiary points raised by Mr. Bishun Singh and Mr. Prem Manohar Varma have been dealt with by my learned brother Mahajan J. and it is unnecessary for me to add anything thereto.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 73694, "end_char": 73708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAYYAB.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "S. S. Sukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 73849, "end_char": 73860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J .-I agree that the without any order as to\n\nAppeals dismiSS1:tl •.\n\nAgent for the appellant : S. S. Sukla."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 73890, "end_char": 73899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: C. P. Lal."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_1091_1112_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nHANUMANT\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.\n\nRAOJIBHAI\n\nti,\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BHAGWATI JJ.] Criminal trial-Circumstantial evidence-Sufficiency of evidence for conviction-Caution against basing conviction on guess or suspicion-Admission-Must be taken as a whole.\n\nIn dealing with circumstantial evidenee there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. It is therefore right to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantal nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.\n\nAgain, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved.\n\nIn other words; there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.\n\nReg. v. Hodge [(1838) 2 Lew. 227] referred to.\n\nAn admission made by a person whether amounting to a confession or not cannot be split up and part of it used against him. It must be used either as a whole or not at all.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDicTION Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1951.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th March, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur (C. R. Hemeon J.) in Criminal Revisions Nos. 152 and 153 of 1949 arising out of Judgment and Order dated the 24th March, 1949, of the Court of the Sessions: Judge, Nagpur, in Criminal Appeals Nos. 26 and 27 of 1949 and Judgment and Order dated the 15th January, 1949, of the Court of the Special Magistrate, Nagpur, in Criminal Case No. 1 of 1948. 15-1 O S. C. India 71\n\nSepl. ZJ,\n\nHanumant 'v:\"· The State of Madhya Pradesh,\n\n1092 Sl]PRE!vfE COURT REPORTS [19?2]\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (B. Bannerjee and A. K. Datt, with him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1951.\n\nBakshi Tek Chand (K. V. Tambay, with him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1951.\n\nT. L. Shiv de, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (T. P. Naik; with him) for the respondent.\n\n1952. Sept. 23.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This 1s a consolidated appeal by special kave from the two orders of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur passed on the 9th March, 1950, 'in Criminal Revisions Nos. 152 and 153 of 1949.\n\n, On a complaint filed by the Assistant Inspector- General of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Nagpur, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1951\n\n. (H.\n\nNargundkar, Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh), and tne appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1951 (R. S. Patel) were tried in the court of _Shri\n\nB. K.\n\nChaudhri, Special Magistrate, Nagpur, for the offence of conspiracy to secure the contract of Seoni Distillery from April, 1947, to March 1951 by forging the tender, Exhibit P-3A, and for commission of the offences of forgery of the tender (Exhibit P-3A) and of another document, Exhibit\n\nP-24.\n\nThe learned-Special Magistrate convicted both the appellants on all the three charges. He sentenced\n\nR. S.\n\nPatel to rigorous imprisonment for one year under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs. 2,000, and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third charges respectively.\n\nThe appellant Nargundkar was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third charges respectively.\n\nEach of the appellants appealed against their respective convictions and sentences to _the Court of the Sessions Judge, Nagpur.\n\nThe learned . Sessions Judge quashed the conviction of both the appellants under the first charge of criminal conspiracy under section\n\n120-B,\n\nI. P. C., but maintained he\n\nconv1ct1ons and sentences under section 465, I.P.C., on the charges of forging Exhibits P-3 (A) and P-24.\n\nBoth the appellants went up in revision against this decision to the H'.1gh Court but without any success.\n\nAn application was then made under article 136 of the Constitution of India for special leave to appeal and this was allowed by this Court on 24th March, 1950.\n\nThe appellant, Nargundkar, 1s a member of the Central Provinces & Berar Provincial Service and held the substantive post of Deputy Commissioner for several years.\n\nIn April, 1946, he was appointed Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, and continued to hold that office till tl.ie 5th September, 1947.\n\nThe appellant, R. S. Patel, is a sugar Technologist and Chemical Engineer.\n\nHe received his technical education and practical trainirtg in America and after working as Chief Chemist and General Manager in factories in Madras for five years, came to the Central Provinces m 1944, when the Provincial Government gave him a licence to set up a distillery for the manufacture of industrial spirit.\n\nOn the 11th September, 1946, Nargundkar m his capacity as Excise Commissioner invited tenders for working the Government distillery at Seoni and supplying spirit to certain specified districts for a period of four years from 1st April, 1947, to 31st March, 1951.\n\nThe last date for submitting the tenders was the 31st October, 1946.\n\nIn response to this tender notice, five tenders were filed including those filed by ( 1) appellant, R. $. Patel, (2) K. B. Habibur Rahman, (3) Zakirur Rahman, and (4) Edulji P.\n\nDoongaji (P. W. 4), in sealed covers with the Excise Commissioner on the 31st October, 1946, and he handed them over with the seals intact to the office superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13), for safe custody.\n\nGadgil took them to his room and kept them under lock and key in the office safe.\n\nThe case for the prosecution 1s that on the gth November, 1946, accused Nargundkar took these sealed tenders home, that the tenders were opened b-y him at his house, that the rates of the tender (Exhibit\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nP-6) of E. J. Doongaji (P. W. 4) were divulged to accused 2 (R. S. Patel), who was allowed to substitute another tender (Exhibit P-3A), containing rates lower than those of Doongaji, that thereafter these open tenders were brought to the office on the 11th November, 1946, and given to Amarnath (P.W. 20) who was the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, for submitting a report and that on the recommendation of Nargundkar the tender of accused 2 (Patel) was accepted and the contract was given to him. In May, 1947, on receipt of. an application (Exhibit P-1) from one Dilbagrai (P. W. 14), enquiries were started by the Anti-Corruption Department.\n\nBoth the accused became aware of the enqmry.\n\nIn order to create evidence in their favour they brought into existence a letter (Exhibit P-24) and antedated it to 20th November, 1946.\n\nThis document was forged with the intention of committing fraud and of causing injury to, Amarnath\n\n(P. W. 20) and also to Doongaji (P. W. 4). Exhibit P-24 is alleged to have been typed on a typewriter (Article A) which was purchased on the 30th December, 1946, by the National Industrial Alcohol Co., Nagpur, of which accused Patel was the managmg director. It was further alleged that the endorsement made by accused 1 (Nargundkar) in the said letter \"No action seems necessary. File'', and marked to Superintendent \"S\" was not made on the 21st November, 1946, which date it bears. This letter was handed over by accused 1 to the Office Superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13) about the middle of August, 1947, and thereafter accused 1 wrote a letter (Exhibit P. 26), on the 2nd October, 1947, to Sri S. Sanyal (P. W. 19) who was then the Excise Commi5.'ioner, requesting that this letter (Exhibit P-24) and a note sheet (Exhibit P-27) be kept in safe custody.\n\nBoth the accused denied the commission of the offences of criminal conspuacy, forgery and abet- / ment thereof.\n\nNargundkar denied having attended office on the 9th November, 1946.\n\nHe denied having taken the tenders home.\n\nAccording to him, the tenders were opened by him in the office on the\n\n11th November, 1946.\n\nAccused 2 denied that the ). tender of Doongaji was shown to him by accused 1 between the 9th and 11th November, 1946. He stated that the tender (Exhibit P-3A) was the original t tender submitted by him on the 31st October, 1946.\n\nAs regards Exhibit P-24, it was denied that it was fabricated or antedated. Accused 2 stated that it was not typed on article A. He also alleged that the allegat tions made in exrubit P-24 were correct.\n\nAccused ' Nargundkar stated that the endorsement was made by him on the 21st November, 1946.\n\nThe first charge .. having failed, nothing need be said about it herein.\n\nIn order to prove the second charge the prosecution had to establish that Gadgil, P. W. 13, handed over the sealed tenders on the 9th November, 1946, to accused Nargundkar, that the latter took them home, that between the 9th and the 11th November he met Patel at his house or elsewhere and that accused Nargundkar showed or communicated the particulars of the tender of Doongaji to accused Patel who substituted Exrubit\n\nP-3A for his original tender before ) the 11th November, 1946. Admittedly there is no direct evidence to prove any of these facts except the first one, and the nature of the case is such that recourse could only be had to circumstantial evidence to establish those facts.\n\nThe fact that the sealed tenders were handed over by Gadgil to accused Nargundkar on the 9th November has been held proved solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Gadgil as against the denial of Nargundkar, Gadgil was himself a suspect in the case.\n\nHe was kept by the police away from the office for alxmt eight months during the investigation, he I was asked to proceed on leave at the instance of the police and ills leave was extended at their request.\n\nOn the expiry of his leave he was kept off duty without salary for a period of about five months but :.. later on he was paid his full salary after he had given evidence in support of the prosecution. He made additions and improvements on vital points from stage to ,. stage of his deposition and in certain particulars his -. statement was contradicted by Ramaswami, P. W. 30 . . •'~ On his , own admission he is an accomplice in respect\n\nHanumant\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\n' . 1952\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe Stat.e of\n\nMadhya Pradesh. ,-.\n\nMahaian ].\n\nof the forgery of Exhibit P-27, one of the documents alleged to have been forged for purposes of. the defence but concerning which no prosecution was started.\n\nExhibit P-27. bears date 31st October, 1946.\n\nGadgil's statement about it is as follows :\n\n~, I\n\n' . \"He (Nargundkar) put down his signature and the date 31st October, ,1946. This. order was actually written by Sh. Nargundkar \\n the note-sheet, Exhibit P-27, in the month of July or August, 1947. The dates were antedated. In the margin of the note sheet I have put down my ., initials S. W. G. and put the date 31st October, 1946.\n\nThis note-sheet was not prepared on 31st October, 1946. He asked me to keep it in my custody.\"\n\nThe wit:lless admittedly became a party to the preparation of a forged document.\n\nWhether he was telling the truth, or he was telling a lie, as appears likely from his cross-examination, he is in either event, not a person on whom any relian.ce could be placed.\n\nIt is curious that this aspect of the evidence of Gadgil has not been noticed by any of the three courts below.\n\nWhen the ourt of first istance ad the court of appeal arnve .. t concurrent. findings of fact after believing the evidence of a witness, this court as the final court does not disturb such findings, save m most exceptional cases.\n\nBut where a finding of fact is arrivd at on the testimony. of a witness of. the character of Gadgil and the courts below depart from the rule of prudence that such . testimony should not be accepted. unless it is corroborated by some other evidence on\n\n...\n\nthe record, a finding of that character in the circum, stances of a particular. case may well be reviewed even.\n\nOU , special leave if the other circumstances in the c; l.Se require . it,, and sµbstantial and grave injustice has resulted.. After £ully examining t; he material on tht; record we have reached the conclusion that the courts below were in error in accepting the uncorroborated testimony of Gadgil to find . the. fact that he handed, .. over the tenders . to Nargundkar. on . the 9tli ., November, 1946.\n\nThe witness was not allowed to live ill a free atmosphere and was kept under poliC:e\n\nt ..\n\nsurveillance during the whole of the period of investi gation and the trial and was rewarded with payment of his full salary after he had given evidence to the satisfaction of the prosecution.\n\nHe s a person who (elt no hesitation in deposing on oath that he willingly' became a party to the forgery of Exhibit P-27.\n\n1'952\n\nHanumant\n\nThe State df\n\nMaahya\n\nPradesh;\n\nAssuming that the accused Nargundkar had taken Mahaian /. the tenders to his house, the prosecution, in order to bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove the other facts referred to above.\n\nNo direct evidence was, adduced in proof of those facts.\n\nReliance was placed by the prosecution and by the courts below on certain circumstances, and intrinsic eyidence contained in the impugned document, Exhibit P-3A.\n\nIn dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind.\n\nIn such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or. suspicion may take the place of legal proof and therefore it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson to the jury in Reg v. Hodge (1) where lie said :-\n\n\"The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting .circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was ii:, considering such matters, to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete.\"\n\nIt is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circum~ stances from which the conclusion of guilt is fo be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.\n\nAgain, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis, but the one proposed to be proved.\n\n(1) (1838) 2 Lew. 227.\n\nHanumant\n\n.v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajiJ11 f.\n\nother words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclµsion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.\n\nIn spite of the forceful arguments addressed to us by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State we have not been able to discover any such evidence either intnns1c within Exhibit P-3A or outside and we are constrained to observe that the courts below have just fallen into the error against which warning was uttered by Baron Alderson in the above mentioned case.\n\nThe trial magistrate was of the opinion that friendship between the two accused was of a very rapid growth and that their relations were very intimate and accused 2 was in a position to influence accused 1.\n\nHe thus found that there was motive for the commission of the crime.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge disagreed with this finding and the High Court agreed with the Sessions Judge on this point. It observed that the evidence which tended to prove friendship or undue favour was not such as to form the basis for a finding.\n\nIt further found that there was nothing to show that the appellant Nargundkar received any illegal reward or the promise of one for showing Doongaji's tender to accused R. S. Patel.\n\nThe first circumstance therefore on which the trial Judge placed considerable reliance was negatived by the court of appeal and in revision.\n\nIt having been found that there was no motive whatsoever for accused Nargundkar to show the tenders to accused Patel and to take a substituted tender from him, the main link in the chain of reasoning of the trial court vanishes.\n\nAmiable relations between the two accused or their official relationship could not be regarded as sufficient motive for committing the crime of forgery.\n\nThe mainstay of the prosecution case is the intrinsic evidence of the contents of Exhibit P-3A itself which according to the courts below are unusual, peculiar and strange and which according to the Advocate- General could not be there if it was a genuine\n\n~ , .\\\n\ndocument.\n\nThe argument would have force provided the premises on which it is based are correct.\n\nHaving examined the contents of Exhibit P-3A, we do not find anything very unusual or extraordinary in it which could not be there without its author having seen Exhibit P-6.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nWe now proceed to examine the s0-called peculiar Mahajan /. features m Exhibit P-3A.\n\nIn order to appreciate the points made by the learned Advocate-General it is necessary to set out certain facts.\n\nExhibit P-9 is the notice calling for tenders for the supply of country spirit in the Seoni distillery area.\n\nThe rates which were called for by this notice were as follows :\n\n1. Flat rate for four years.\n\n2. Rates on sliding scale for four years,\n\n3. All-in-rate on the sliding scale for one year 1947-48.\n\n4. Flat rates on the basis of the price of mahua flowers for three years 1948-51.\n\n5. All-in-sliding scale rate on the basis of the price of mahua flowers for three years 1948-51.\n\nThe trial magistrate held on a construction of it that no rate or rates of separate years were asked for in this notice and that one flat rate was only asked for, for four years.\n\nHabibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman in their tenders, Exhibits P-4 and P-5, quoted one flat rate for four years and did not mention separate flat rates for separate years.\n\nDoongaji m his tender, Exhibit\n\nP-6, mentioned separate flat rates for each separate year also.\n\nHe did so because he consulted one Mr.\n\nMunshi, Personal Assistant to the Excise Commissioner, whether he should quote each rate separately and Mr. Munshi told him that he could give flat rate for the combined years as well as flat rates and also sliding scale rates for each year separately.\n\nAdmittedly accused 2 was working as an agent of Habibur Rahman and his son Zakirur Rahman for the distillery contracts of Betul and Seoni, and, therefore, he must have been the author not only of his own tender but of the tenders submitted bv Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman, Exhibits\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe Stat~ of Madhya Pradesh,\n\nMahajan/,\n\nllOO\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nP-4 and P-5.\n\nAll of them were acting together with the object of getting the contract though they were submitting three separate tenders.\n\nThe trial magistrate held that as Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman gave one flat' rate for four years as called for by Exhibit P-9, but accused 2, the author of all these tenders, did not do it in Exhibit P-3A, but followed the method of Doongaji in giving the rates of each year separately as well as the rate for the combined four years.\n\nHe must have done so as he was shown the tender Exhibit P-6.\n\nThe question arises whether the circumstance that the accused Patel and Habibur Rahman and' Zakirur Rahman were acting together was such from which a necessary inference arises that the accused Patel must have been the author of all the three tenders and, if he were, that he could not have departed from the method adopted by him .in preparing Exhibits\n\nP-4 and P-5 unless and until he had seen Exhibit P-6.\n\nWe are clearly of. the opm10n that from the premises stated this inference does not necessarily follow.\n\nDoongaji even . aftr i; eadfr1g Eiilibii: P-9, could not make up his mind whether to submit the tender with one flat rate for all th~ four years or whether to submit it by giving separate flat rates for .each of the four years and made enquiry from .the office of the Excise Commissioner and then quoted separate rates for each of the four years separately also: Patel ho has admittedly considerable . experiene , of distillery contracts and about the method. 0f submitting tenders might very well have thought that it was best to quote a flat rate for all the years as well as a flat rate for each year separately.\n\nThe circumstance that he did, not .do so in the other two tenders prepared by him does not materially advance. the prosecution case. . The very object of submitting several tenders on behalf of three persons acting. in unison was to indiCate to the excise authorities that they were being submitt, ed by three different persons. If there . were no. variations whatsoever between tho; e tendrs that woi'.il<l have ' defeated the ,/ery purpose of submitting them.\n\nMoreover,. a. variation of this trifling nature between Exhibits P-3A and P-4\n\nf ,_\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 1101\n\nand P-5 cannot be said to be of such an unusual or of such an extraordinary character as to warrant the inference that it could not have been made except without a look at the tender of Doongaji. The circumstance is of a neutral character and the trial magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge gave undue importance to it being obsessed with the idea that such ' ' b a quotation of flat rates for each year could not e mentioned in a tender by a contractor merely on a construction of Exhibit P-9 and without any further inquiry or without seeing the _tender of somebody else who had followed that method.\n\nThe next <; ircumstance on which considerable reliance is placed is that accused 2 studiously maintained rates below the rates of Doongaji throughout, that when Doongaji lowered his rates for the second year accused 2 did the same, and when Doongaji raised his rates for the third and fourth years accused 2 also did so, at the same time maintaining rates lower than Doongaji's rats. , It is said that the system followed by Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman and Patel originally must have been the same as Patel was the author of all the three tenders, that Habibur Rahman' s rates were higher .. than Zakirur Rahman's by six pies and this variation was constant throughout, that in Patel's original tender which must have followd the same. system his rates. would be lower than Habibur Rahman's by three pies throughout. Exhibit P-3A, however, shows that this is not so.\n\nPatel abandoned . the system when he . found that his rates on his original scheme would be higher than the corresponding rates of Doongaji. earned Advoate General contended that it was impossible for Patel unless he had seen Exhibit P-6, to quote rates of a large number of items numbering about 197, in every case lower than the rates given in Exhibit P-6 and the circumstance that in not a single case. he has quoted a higher rate than Exhibit P-6 is conclusive of the fact that he had done so after he had seen Exhibit P-6.\n\nas al.so said that there is no satisfactory explanation' why Patel abandoned the scheme adopted by him in\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nTht Stat• of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.\n\nMahaJan /.\n\ndrawing up Exhibits P-4 and P-5 and his original tender.\n\nIn our view, this circumstance again is not so strange or peculiar as was made out by the learned Advocate-General or in the courts below. In the first place, there is no material whatsoever for the assumption that the so-called original tender was drawn up on the same scheme as Exhibits P-4 and P-5 or that there was a constant variation in rates between it and Habibur Rahman's tender.\n\nIt has been assumed on !J1ere surmise that the first five rates in the tender, Exhibit P-3A, are the rates that had been originally quoted.\n\nThe original \"tender is not forthcoming and there is no evidence at all about its contents.\n\nMoreover, in the deposition of Doongaji it was elicited that in the year 1942 when tenders for the Seoni distillery contract were called for, the rates quoted by Ratanshah were lower than his rates for all items. He, however, voluntarily added that Ratanshah obtained his rates of the previous contracts before he submitted his tender for the year 1942 and that he had made a reduction of annas two to three in those rates but he was forced to admit that the rate of Ratanshah in the tender was not only lower than his but was also lower throughout than the rates of Laxminarain, Haji Ismail and Habibur Rahman even without seeing their tenders.\n\nFrom this statement it is quite clear that even without seeing the tenders of different tenderers a eontractor may quote rock-bottom rates of all items on his own calculation or impelled by the desire of taking the contract anyhow.\n\nWe do not follow why Patel could not do in 1946 what was done by Ratanshah in his tenders in 1942 and quote rates lower in all particulars and regarding all items than the rates of Doongaji. If a person is out to give rockbottom rates and his calculation is such that his rates work out lower than tihe rates of others, it may well be that he may quote lower rates in respect of all items. .\n\nIt was then said that Patel had adopted a particular plan in submitting the three tenders, . of himself, Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman and that his plan was that his rates should be l<Jss by three pies\n\n. than the rates he had quoted for Habibur Rahman, that in the first five items of Exhibit 145 he stuck to that plan and did not alter the rates of those items as originally submitted by him, as those rates were lower than the rates of Doongaji but from the sixth item onwards he substituted new rates for the ones he had originally submitted and he departed from the plan so that his rates for each item were to be lower only by three pies as compared with the rates of Habibur Rahman.\n\nIt is no doubt true that Patel did not adhere to the plan that he adopted in the first five items of his tender but is that a circumstance from which any inference can be drawn that the first five items are a part of his original tender or that he did so depart from them because he had seen Exhibit P-6 and he wanted to underbid Doongaji. As we have already said, the object of submitting three separate tenders ostensibly by persons who were acting together was to secure the contract in one or the other name and Patel who was the author of all the three documents may very well in his own document have quoted much lower figures than were quoted by Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman, in order also to give the impression that all these tenders had not been submitted by one and the same person.\n\nBe that as it may, a closer examination of the tenders of Doongaji and Patel completely negatives the theory of the courts below.\n\nThe rates quoted in the first five items of Exhibit P-145 are lower than the rates of Doongaji by 102, 69, 18, 12 and 9 pies respectively.\n\nEven in the subsequent quotations except in one case where the disparity in the rates of Doongaji and Patel is only two pies, the disparity in the rates is from 9 to 11 pies.\n\nPatel is certainly a businessman and the whole object of quoting the rates was to earn the maximum profit.\n\nIf he had seen the tender of Doongaji he would have modelled the rates in a manner that would give him the highest profit.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General could not suggest any reason whatsoever why Patel would maintain his quotation for the quantity of 50,000 gallons at Rs. 2-10-6 when the rate of Doongaji was Rs. 3-3-0.\n\nHanumant 1'.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahaian /.\n\n1952 ,_,_\n\nHanumant . v.\n\nThe State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\n•• . i. i ' j - • . [195~]\n\nHe, could easily raise the quotation to Rs. 3 and similarly in all other cases he could have underbid Doongaji by 2, 3 or 6 pies at the most. He need not have maintained a disparity of 9 to 11 pies between his rates and the rates of Doongaji.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, no conclusion of any character could be drawn from the disparity in the rates of Doongaji or of Patel or of the expected uniformity in the rates of Habibur Rahman or of R. S. Patel which would establish that Exhibit P-3A had been prepared by having a look at Exhibit P-6.\n\nAnother circumstance on which reliance was placed was that certain rates in Exhibit P-3A are lower than the corresponding rates in Exhibit P-6 by only one or two pies.\n\nThere is no doubt that one or two rates are lower by two pies than the rates in Exhibit P-6 but 'nothing follows from that innocent circumstance, unless one starts with a presumption of guilt. Once it is assumed that the tender of Doongaji was shown to Patel, all these circumstances might to some extent fit in with the view that in certain respects it may have been copied from Exhibit P-6.\n\nThe courts below fell into this error and departed from the rule that in a criminal case an accused person is to be presumed to be innocent and that it is for thP. prosecution to establish his guilt conclusively.\n\nNext it was urged that in the covering letter Exhibit P-3 sent by Patel he memions three appen- dices numbered 1, 2 and 3. The same expressioP. finds place in the covering letter Exhibit P-4 of Habibur Rahman and Exhibit P-5 of Zakirur Rahman, that appendices 1 to 3 of the tender of Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman correctly answer to the reference in the covering letters but this is not so in Patel's case; on the other hand, instead of appendix 1, Patel has appendix l(a) and l(b) and the _number of his appendices thus goes' up t<i four and this departure from Exhibits P-4 and P-5 came about because of his having seeri Exhibit P-6 and the number of appendices annexed to it.\n\nIt was urged that 'the original tender of Patel must have contained three appendices like those of Habibur \"Rahman amt . ' . !\n\n.. -\n\nZakirur Rahman and not appendix l(a) and I(b) as now found and that this circumstance showed substitution of the tender.\n\nThe learned magistrate, in our opinion, in giving importance to this circumstance mislead himself completely.\n\nIn the first place, it is not accurate to say that the expression appendices 1, 2 and 3 was common to the covering letters Exhibits\n\nP-4 and\n\nP-5.\n\nIn Exhibit P-5 the appendices are marked A, B and C.\n\nTherefore, no uniform method was adopted by Patel in marking the appendices to the tenders, Exhibits P-4 and P-5.\n\nSecondly, there is no conflict in the expression of the appendices of Habbibur Rahman and Patel. They have been marked as 1, 2 and 3 and a mere subdivision of the first appendix into (a) and (b) could not be taken to be a departure from the method adopted in the description of the appendices.\n\nIt may further be observed that the covering letter signed by Patel mentions four appendices, while the covering letters of Habibur and Zakirur Rahman only mention three appendices. The trial magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge ignorc; d all these differences in the method of the description of the appendices and assumed that they had been uniformly described.\n\nThe result therefore is that all these so-called peculiar features found by the courts below in Exhibit P-3A should be eliminated from consideration and it must be held that there are really no cucumstances inconsistent with Exhibit\n\nP-3A being a genuine document.\n\nIt could have been made out without looking at Exhibit P-6.\n\nIn this view of the case the whole basis on which the judgments of the courts below are founded vanishes, and in the absence of any evidence of motive, we are of the opinion that the facts did not on any just or legal view of them warrant a conviction, and although the proceedings are taken to have been unobjectionable in form, justice has gravely and injurious1y miscarried.\n\nWe therefore set aside the convktion of both the appellants on the second charge and acquit them.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe Stai. of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nIn order to appreciate the third charge, it Is necessary to set out the terms of Exhibit P-24 which it IS said was antedated in order tt> create evidence for the defence of the accused and to miure Amarnath.\n\nIt is in these terms : \" Congress Nagar, Nagpur, 20th November, 1946.\n\nThe Commissioner of Excise, C. P. & Berar, Nagpur.\n\nDear Sir,\n\nI beg to submit few of my complaints for such action as you may be pleased to take, which aie as under.\n\nI went to see Mr. Amarnath last week, at his residence in connection with Seoni Distillery work. I saw Mr. Edulji and his partner with Mr. Amarnath in the office room of his residence with some office files.\n\nFrom the papers I could recognize my tender open on the table in front of them.\n\nAs soon as I went there, all of them were astonished and they could not speak with me for a moment, and then they carried on some dry general conversation with me.\n\nSame way after about a week, when I went to Seoni for mahua bill, when Mr.\n\nAmarnath visited for sanctioning the advance, I had the opportunity to see Mr. Amarnath in dak bungalow at about 9-30 p. m. when I saw Mr. Mehta the ex-manager of Mr. Edulji (who ii also the manager of Seoni Electric Co.) with Mr. Amarnath near table with the same file of the tender. No doubt after seeing the above two incidents I requested Mr. Amarnath to be fair in this affair.\n\nI am bringing these incidents to your notice, as I fear that something underhand may not be going on, and I am afraid that my tender may be tampered with.\n\nHoping to get justice,\n\nYours faithfully, Sd. R. S. Patel.\"\n\n' ..\n\n• -\n\nThe words \"Congress Nagar, Nagpur, 20th November, 1946\" are in manuscr 11pt, while the rest of the letter has been typed.\n\nThe digit 6 of the year 1946 has been over-written on digit 7 written in continental style and i't is apparent to the naked eye that originally the writer wrote 7 and subsequently changed it to 6.\n\nIt was contended by the learned Advocate- General,-and this is the finding of the courts below, -that this letter was written some time during the investigation of the case in July or August 1947, and was antedated in order to implicate Amarnath and to use it as evidence in defence.\n\nThe point for decision is whether there is any evidence whatsoever to establish this fact.\n\nWe have not been able to discover any such evidence on the reconi; on the other hand the instrinsic evidence in the letter proves that most likely jn came into existence on the date It\n\nbears.\n\nThe relevant facts are that the tenders were opened by accused Nargundkar on the 11th November, 1946, he handed them over after making the endorsements to Amarnath and Amarnath had to submit a report about them.\n\nIt is alleged in thi~ letter that \"last week\", i.e., during the week commencing on the 11th November, 1946, accused Patel went to see Amarnath and there he saw Edulji Doongaji with him with his tender open on his table in front of him and that he was astonished at it, that about a week later he again went to Seoni and had the opportunity to see Amarnath and Mr.\n\nMehta, exmanager of Edulji Doongaji, was with him and the tender file was lying there.\n\nIt was stated that he had requested Amarnath to be fair in this affair and the Commissioner was asked that he should see that his tender was not tampered with and he got justice. The whole purpose and object of this letter was to protect himself against any underhand dealing in the grant ing of the contract. In his statement under section 342, Cr. P. C., Patel said that he saw Amarnatt on the morning of the 15th or 16th November, 1946, and he met Amarnath at Seoni at the distillery premises on the 16th November, 1946, and on the sam<!\n\n16-10 S. C. India 71\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Prades/J.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nTheState of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nday he met him at about 9 p.m. at: the Seoni dak bungalow and that he agam met Him on the 17th November, at 10 a.m.\n\nHe also stabed that he had gone to see Amarnath at his residence at Nagpur between the dates 12th and 18th November.\n\nIt was contended by the learned Advocate-General that his statement was inconsistent with the recitals contained\n\n111 Exhibit P-24.\n\nWe see nothing inconsistent between this statement and the recitals.\n\nIf accused Patel saw Amarnath on the 12th, the letter having been written on the 20th November, it would be quite a correct thing to say that he saw him \"last week\" and the next recital when he said that about a week thereafter he saw him again is quite consistent with his going and seeing him on the 16th or 17th November.\n\nThat would be about a week after the first visit.\n\nTo draw any conclusion adverse to 'the accused from a slight inaccuracy in the description of dates and to conclude therefrom that it was established that the accused Patel had seen Amarnath on the 9th November, 1946, amounts to unnecessarily stretching a point against the accused.\n\nThe recitals m the letter, true or false, are quite consistent with the letter bearing date 20th November, 1946.\n\nThe magistrate observed that the vagueness about the date and the week shows that the allegations therein are not correct.\n\nWe have not been able to understand how the vagueness about the date could lead to the conclusion arrived at.\n\nEmphasis was laid on the overwriting of the figure 6 over the figure 7 in the manuscript part of the letter. It was said that the normal expenence is that it becomes a subconscious habit •o automatically write the year correctly when several months have elaped after the change of the year 2nd that by sheer force of habit the correct year must have been put down when the date was entered in the letter Exhibit P-24 and that the figure was subsequently changed to 6 and this fact was an indication tliat the letter was written some time in the year 1947.\n\nIn our view this argument again involves an element\n\n' •\n\nof conjecture.\n\nThe mistake may well have been inadvertently made and the correction made there and then.\n\nThat such mistakes are not very uncommon or unusual and occur in official documents is fully established on the record, in para 93 of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and it is said as follows:\n\n\"The appellants have produced a file which is Exhibit ID-35. It contains a sheet which bears pages 9 and 10.\n\nOn the 10th page there are two office notesone is written by A. M. Naidu and the other by the appellant Nargundkar.\n\nA. M. Naidu below his signature has written '6-4-1948'.\n\nThe appellant Nargundkar below his signature has written '6-4-1947'.\n\nThe other notes in the office file show that the correct date of the two signatures was 6th August,\n\n1947. Thus in this sheet there are two mistakes in mentioning the number of the month and one mistake in mentioning the number of the year. The appellants contend that such mistakes are possible. Nobody can deny that such mistakes are possible ; but it has to be decided what inferences can be drawn from such mistakes, if there is other evidence also.\"\n\nWe have looked in vain for other evidern; e to prove that the letter was not written on the date it bears.\n\nEven Gadgil could not explain why he said that the letter was written in July, 1946. It is clear that he is not telling the truth in this respect.\n\nThe endorsement made on the letter by accused Nargundkar clearly bears the date 21st November, 1946, and if this letter was not given to him on the date of the endorsement and was given to him several months afterwards he would in ordinary course have made some note either on the letter or in the receipt register of his office when that letter was received by him.\n\nThen it was said that this letter was not in the file of the tenders which were kept separate.\n\nThe Commissioner had noted that the letter be filed and he sent it to the office.\n\nIf the office people did not put it in the file, from that circumstance no adverse inference could\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pr.adesh.\n\nMahajan /.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nlllO\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nbe drawn as to the date that the letter bears.\n\nIt is clear that no forger would have in such a clumsy manner corrected 1947 into 1946 so as to leave the original figure \"7\" intact and thus leave evidence of its suspicious character writ large on its face.\n\nThere was no hurry about it, and a second letter without the alteration could easily have been typed.\n\nNext it was argued that the letter was not typed on the office typewriter that was in those davs, viz., article B, and that it had been typed on the typewriter article A which did not reach Nagpur till the end of 1946.\n\nOn this point evidence of certain experts was led.\n\nThe High Court rightly held that opinion of such experts was not admissible under the Jndian Evidence Act as they did not fall within the ambit of section 45 of the Act. This view of the High Court was not, contested before us.\n\nIt is curious that the learned Judge in the High Court, though he held that the evidence of the experts was inadmissible, proceeded nevertheless to discuss it and placed some reliance on it. The trial magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge used this evide1ice to arrive at the finding that, as the letter wa~ typed on article A which had not reached Nagpur till the end of December, 1946, obviously the letter was antedated. Their conclusion based on inadmissible evidence has therefore to be ignored.\n\nIt was further held that the evidence of experts was corroborated by the statements of the accused recorded under section 342.\n\nThe accused Patel, when questioned about this letter, made the following : i statement:\n\n\"Exhibit P-31 was typed on the office typewriter article B. Exhibit P-24 being my personal complaint letter was typed by my Personal Assistant on one of the typewriters which were brought in the same office for trial, with a view to purchase. As this was my personal complaint no copy of it was kept in the Correspondence Files Exhibit P-34 and Exhibit P-35 just\n\nas there is no copy in these files of my tender Exhibit P-3A.......... In the month of September, October and November, 1946, several machines were brought for trial from various parties in our office till the typewriter article A was purchased by National Industrial Alcohol Ltd. Company.\"\n\nIf the evidence of the experts is elimimated, there is no material for holding that Exhibit P-24 was typed on article A.\n\nThe trial magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge used part of the statement of the accused for arriving at the conclusion that the letter not having been typed on article B must necessarily have been typed on article A.\n\nSuch use of the statement of the accused was wholly unwarranted.\n\nIt is settled law that an admission made by a person whether amounting to a confession or not cannot be split up and part of it used against him.\n\nAn admission must be used either as a whole or not at all. If the statement of the accused is used as a whole, it completely demolishes the prosecution case and, if it is not used at all, then there rema.ins no material on the record from which any inference could be drawn that the letter was not written on the date it bears.\n\nFor the reasons given above we hold that there is no evidence whatsoever on the record to prove that this letter Exhibit P-24 was antedated and ttl1at being so, the charge in respect of forgery of this letter also fails.\n\nRead as a whole, this letter cannot be said to have been written with the intention of causing any injury to Amarnath or for the purpose of creating a defence in respect of the second charge.\n\nThe letter read as a whole is an innocuous document and its dominant purpose and intent was to safeguard the interests of accused Patel and to protect him against any underhand or unfair act of his ri!val contractors.\n\nWe cannot infer any intent to defraud or any intention to injure Amarnath, though in order to protect himself accused Patel maL!c certain allegations against him.\n\nWe therefore set aside the conviction of both the appeallants under the third charge and acquit them.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nHanumant v. T lie State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nOct. 16.\n\nThe result is that the consolidated appeal is allowed, the judgments of all the three courts below are set aside and the appellants are acquitted.\n\nAppellants acquitted.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1951 : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1951 : Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nSTATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS\n\nTHE BOMBAY CO. LTD.\n\nSTATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nMICHAEL FREDERICK AND BROS.\n\nSTATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nSTAGBROOK RUBBER AND TEA\n\nESTATES LTD.\n\nUNION OF\n\nINDIA,\n\nSTATE OF\n\nBOMBAY, STATil OF\n\nMADRAS, STATil OF\n\nHYDERABAD,\n\nSTATE OF\n\nPUNJAB, STATil OF\n\nMYSORE,\n\nSTATE\n\nOF 0RISSA\n\nAND\n\nSTATE OF UTIAR PRADESH-Interveners.\n\n[PATANJALI SAsrn1 C.J., MuKHERJEA, DAs,\n\nVIVIAN BosE and Gnm.AM HASAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Article 286( I) ( b )-Sales tax-Exemp. tion of sales in the course of export or import-Meant\"ng of \"in the course of\"-..'iolcs tvhel'e property passes and sale is co1nplete before\n\n' \\", "total_entities": 112, "entities": [{"text": "HANUMANT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HANUMANT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAOJIBHAI\n\nti,\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH."}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. R. Hemeon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1635, "end_char": 1647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th March, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur (C. R. Hemeon J.) in Criminal Revisions Nos."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2035, "end_char": 2058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ZJ,\n\nHanumant 'v:\"· The State of Madhya Pradesh,\n\n1092 Sl]PRE!vfE COURT REPORTS [19?2]\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (B. Bannerjee and A. K. Datt, with him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan"}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2099, "end_char": 2115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ZJ,\n\nHanumant 'v:\"· The State of Madhya Pradesh,\n\n1092 Sl]PRE!vfE COURT REPORTS [19?2]\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (B. Bannerjee and A. K. Datt, with him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B. Bannerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2117, "end_char": 2129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ZJ,\n\nHanumant 'v:\"· The State of Madhya Pradesh,\n\n1092 Sl]PRE!vfE COURT REPORTS [19?2]\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (B. Bannerjee and A. K. Datt, with him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Datt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2134, "end_char": 2144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ZJ,\n\nHanumant 'v:\"· The State of Madhya Pradesh,\n\n1092 Sl]PRE!vfE COURT REPORTS [19?2]\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (B. Bannerjee and A. K. Datt, with him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Tek Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2210, "end_char": 2226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bakshi Tek Chand (K. V. Tambay, with him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. V. Tambay", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2228, "end_char": 2240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bakshi Tek Chand (K. V. Tambay, with him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "T. L. Shiv de", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2306, "end_char": 2319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shiv de, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (T. P. Naik; with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. P. Naik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2357, "end_char": 2367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. L. Shiv de, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (T. P. Naik; with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2461, "end_char": 2468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This 1s a consolidated appeal by special kave from the two orders of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur passed on the 9th March, 1950, 'in Criminal Revisions Nos.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "H.\n\nNargundkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2819, "end_char": 2833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.\n\nNargundkar, Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh), and tne appellant in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "H.\n\nNargundkar"}}, {"text": "R. S. Patel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2926, "end_char": 2937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "57 of 1951 (R. S. Patel) were tried in the court of _Shri\n\nB. K.\n\nChaudhri, Special Magistrate, Nagpur, for the offence of conspiracy to secure the contract of Seoni Distillery from April, 1947, to March 1951 by forging the tender, Exhibit P-3A, and for commission of the offences of forgery of the tender (Exhibit P-3A) and of another document, Exhibit\n\nP-24.", "canonical_name": "R. S.\n\nPatel"}}, {"text": "B. K.\n\nChaudhri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2973, "end_char": 2988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "57 of 1951 (R. S. Patel) were tried in the court of _Shri\n\nB. K.\n\nChaudhri, Special Magistrate, Nagpur, for the offence of conspiracy to secure the contract of Seoni Distillery from April, 1947, to March 1951 by forging the tender, Exhibit P-3A, and for commission of the offences of forgery of the tender (Exhibit P-3A) and of another document, Exhibit\n\nP-24."}}, {"text": "R. S.\n\nPatel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3377, "end_char": 3389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He sentenced\n\nR. S.\n\nPatel to rigorous imprisonment for one year under each charge and to pay fines of Rs.", "canonical_name": "R. S.\n\nPatel"}}, {"text": "Nargundkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3574, "end_char": 3584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Nargundkar was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months under each charge and to pay fines of Rs.", "canonical_name": "H.\n\nNargundkar"}}, {"text": "section\n\n120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4026, "end_char": 4038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4104, "end_char": 4115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4117, "end_char": 4122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4322, "end_char": 4333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4341, "end_char": 4362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "24th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4429, "end_char": 4445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application was then made under article 136 of the Constitution of India for special leave to appeal and this was allowed by this Court on 24th March, 1950."}}, {"text": "R. S. Patel", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4764, "end_char": 4775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, R. S. Patel, is a sugar Technologist and Chemical Engineer.", "canonical_name": "R. S.\n\nPatel"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4967, "end_char": 4973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He received his technical education and practical trainirtg in America and after working as Chief Chemist and General Manager in factories in Madras for five years, came to the Central Provinces m 1944, when the Provincial Government gave him a licence to set up a distillery for the manufacture of industrial spirit."}}, {"text": "11th September, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5151, "end_char": 5171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th September, 1946, Nargundkar m his capacity as Excise Commissioner invited tenders for working the Government distillery at Seoni and supplying spirit to certain specified districts for a period of four years from 1st April, 1947, to 31st March, 1951."}}, {"text": "Nargundkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5173, "end_char": 5183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th September, 1946, Nargundkar m his capacity as Excise Commissioner invited tenders for working the Government distillery at Seoni and supplying spirit to certain specified districts for a period of four years from 1st April, 1947, to 31st March, 1951.", "canonical_name": "H.\n\nNargundkar"}}, {"text": "Seoni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5279, "end_char": 5284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th September, 1946, Nargundkar m his capacity as Excise Commissioner invited tenders for working the Government distillery at Seoni and supplying spirit to certain specified districts for a period of four years from 1st April, 1947, to 31st March, 1951."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5369, "end_char": 5384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th September, 1946, Nargundkar m his capacity as Excise Commissioner invited tenders for working the Government distillery at Seoni and supplying spirit to certain specified districts for a period of four years from 1st April, 1947, to 31st March, 1951."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5389, "end_char": 5405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th September, 1946, Nargundkar m his capacity as Excise Commissioner invited tenders for working the Government distillery at Seoni and supplying spirit to certain specified districts for a period of four years from 1st April, 1947, to 31st March, 1951."}}, {"text": "31st October, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5457, "end_char": 5475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last date for submitting the tenders was the 31st October, 1946."}}, {"text": "K. B. Habibur Rahman", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5595, "end_char": 5615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patel, (2) K. B. Habibur Rahman, (3) Zakirur Rahman, and (4) Edulji P.\n\nDoongaji (P. W. 4), in sealed covers with the Excise Commissioner on the 31st October, 1946, and he handed them over with the seals intact to the office superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13), for safe custody."}}, {"text": "Zakirur Rahman", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5621, "end_char": 5635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patel, (2) K. B. Habibur Rahman, (3) Zakirur Rahman, and (4) Edulji P.\n\nDoongaji (P. W. 4), in sealed covers with the Excise Commissioner on the 31st October, 1946, and he handed them over with the seals intact to the office superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13), for safe custody."}}, {"text": "Edulji P.\n\nDoongaji", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5645, "end_char": 5664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patel, (2) K. B. Habibur Rahman, (3) Zakirur Rahman, and (4) Edulji P.\n\nDoongaji (P. W. 4), in sealed covers with the Excise Commissioner on the 31st October, 1946, and he handed them over with the seals intact to the office superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13), for safe custody."}}, {"text": "S. W. Gadgil", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5825, "end_char": 5837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patel, (2) K. B. Habibur Rahman, (3) Zakirur Rahman, and (4) Edulji P.\n\nDoongaji (P. W. 4), in sealed covers with the Excise Commissioner on the 31st October, 1946, and he handed them over with the seals intact to the office superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13), for safe custody."}}, {"text": "Gadgil", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5869, "end_char": 5875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gadgil took them to his room and kept them under lock and key in the office safe."}}, {"text": "Hanumant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6200, "end_char": 6208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hanumant v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "HANUMANT"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6217, "end_char": 6241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hanumant v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6244, "end_char": 6251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nP-6) of E. J. Doongaji (P. W. 4) were divulged to accused 2 (R. S. Patel), who was allowed to substitute another tender (Exhibit P-3A), containing rates lower than those of Doongaji, that thereafter these open tenders were brought to the office on the 11th November, 1946, and given to Amarnath (P.W. 20) who was the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, for submitting a report and that on the recommendation of Nargundkar the tender of accused 2 (Patel) was accepted and the contract was given to him.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "E. J. Doongaji", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6264, "end_char": 6278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nP-6) of E. J. Doongaji (P. W. 4) were divulged to accused 2 (R. S. Patel), who was allowed to substitute another tender (Exhibit P-3A), containing rates lower than those of Doongaji, that thereafter these open tenders were brought to the office on the 11th November, 1946, and given to Amarnath (P.W. 20) who was the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, for submitting a report and that on the recommendation of Nargundkar the tender of accused 2 (Patel) was accepted and the contract was given to him."}}, {"text": "R. S. Patel", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nP-6) of E. J. Doongaji (P. W. 4) were divulged to accused 2 (R. S. Patel), who was allowed to substitute another tender (Exhibit P-3A), containing rates lower than those of Doongaji, that thereafter these open tenders were brought to the office on the 11th November, 1946, and given to Amarnath (P.W. 20) who was the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, for submitting a report and that on the recommendation of Nargundkar the tender of accused 2 (Patel) was accepted and the contract was given to him."}}, {"text": "11th November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6508, "end_char": 6527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nP-6) of E. J. Doongaji (P. W. 4) were divulged to accused 2 (R. S. Patel), who was allowed to substitute another tender (Exhibit P-3A), containing rates lower than those of Doongaji, that thereafter these open tenders were brought to the office on the 11th November, 1946, and given to Amarnath (P.W. 20) who was the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, for submitting a report and that on the recommendation of Nargundkar the tender of accused 2 (Patel) was accepted and the contract was given to him."}}, {"text": "Amarnath", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6542, "end_char": 6550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nP-6) of E. J. Doongaji (P. W. 4) were divulged to accused 2 (R. S. Patel), who was allowed to substitute another tender (Exhibit P-3A), containing rates lower than those of Doongaji, that thereafter these open tenders were brought to the office on the 11th November, 1946, and given to Amarnath (P.W. 20) who was the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, for submitting a report and that on the recommendation of Nargundkar the tender of accused 2 (Patel) was accepted and the contract was given to him."}}, {"text": "Dilbagrai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6823, "end_char": 6832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "an application (Exhibit P-1) from one Dilbagrai (P. W. 14), enquiries were started by the Anti-Corruption Department."}}, {"text": "20th November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7066, "end_char": 7085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to create evidence in their favour they brought into existence a letter (Exhibit P-24) and antedated it to 20th November, 1946."}}, {"text": "Doongaji", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7211, "end_char": 7219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This document was forged with the intention of committing fraud and of causing injury to, Amarnath\n\n(P. W. 20) and also to Doongaji (P. W. 4)."}}, {"text": "30th December, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7329, "end_char": 7348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit P-24 is alleged to have been typed on a typewriter (Article A) which was purchased on the 30th December, 1946, by the National Industrial Alcohol Co., Nagpur, of which accused Patel was the managmg director."}}, {"text": "National Industrial Alcohol Co., Nagpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7357, "end_char": 7396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit P-24 is alleged to have been typed on a typewriter (Article A) which was purchased on the 30th December, 1946, by the National Industrial Alcohol Co., Nagpur, of which accused Patel was the managmg director."}}, {"text": "21st November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7630, "end_char": 7649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "File'', and marked to Superintendent \"S\" was not made on the 21st November, 1946, which date it bears."}}, {"text": "2nd October, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7865, "end_char": 7882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was handed over by accused 1 to the Office Superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13) about the middle of August, 1947, and thereafter accused 1 wrote a letter (Exhibit P. 26), on the 2nd October, 1947, to Sri S. Sanyal (P. W. 19) who was then the Excise Commi5.'ioner, requesting that this letter (Exhibit P-24) and a note sheet (Exhibit P-27) be kept in safe custody."}}, {"text": "S. Sanyal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7891, "end_char": 7900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was handed over by accused 1 to the Office Superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13) about the middle of August, 1947, and thereafter accused 1 wrote a letter (Exhibit P. 26), on the 2nd October, 1947, to Sri S. Sanyal (P. W. 19) who was then the Excise Commi5.'ioner, requesting that this letter (Exhibit P-24) and a note sheet (Exhibit P-27) be kept in safe custody."}}, {"text": "9th November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8213, "end_char": 8231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nargundkar denied having attended office on the 9th November, 1946."}}, {"text": "Exrubit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9385, "end_char": 9392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to prove the second charge the prosecution had to establish that Gadgil, P. W. 13, handed over the sealed tenders on the 9th November, 1946, to accused Nargundkar, that the latter took them home, that between the 9th and the 11th November he met Patel at his house or elsewhere and that accused Nargundkar showed or communicated the particulars of the tender of Doongaji to accused Patel who substituted Exrubit\n\nP-3A for his original tender before ) the 11th November, 1946."}}, {"text": "Gadgil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9720, "end_char": 9726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the sealed tenders were handed over by Gadgil to accused Nargundkar on the 9th November has been held proved solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Gadgil as against the denial of Nargundkar, Gadgil was himself a suspect in the case."}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10484, "end_char": 10493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "statement was contradicted by Ramaswami, P. W. 30 . ."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.\n\nMahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10581, "end_char": 10615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•'~ On his , own admission he is an accomplice in respect\n\nHanumant\n\nThe State of\n\nMadhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan"}}, {"text": "Stat.e of\n\nMadhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10647, "end_char": 10672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1952\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe Stat.e of\n\nMadhya Pradesh. ,-.", "canonical_name": "State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13194, "end_char": 13199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'952\n\nHanumant\n\nThe State df\n\nMaahya\n\nPradesh;\n\nAssuming that the accused Nargundkar had taken Mahaian /. the tenders to his house, the prosecution, in order to bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove the other facts referred to above."}}, {"text": "Mahaian", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13269, "end_char": 13276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'952\n\nHanumant\n\nThe State df\n\nMaahya\n\nPradesh;\n\nAssuming that the accused Nargundkar had taken Mahaian /. the tenders to his house, the prosecution, in order to bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove the other facts referred to above.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Alderson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13930, "end_char": 13938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "suspicion may take the place of legal proof and therefore it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson to the jury in Reg v. Hodge (1) where lie said :-\n\n\"The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting .circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was ii:, considering such matters, to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete.\""}}, {"text": "MahajiJ11", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15009, "end_char": 15018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MahajiJ11 f.\n\nother words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclµsion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."}}, {"text": "R. S. Patel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16367, "end_char": 16378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further found that there was nothing to show that the appellant Nargundkar received any illegal reward or the promise of one for showing Doongaji's tender to accused R. S. Patel.", "canonical_name": "R. S.\n\nPatel"}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17519, "end_char": 17521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Habibur Rahman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18358, "end_char": 18372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman in their tenders, Exhibits P-4 and P-5, quoted one flat rate for four years and did not mention separate flat rates for separate years.", "canonical_name": "Habbibur Rahman"}}, {"text": "Zakirur Rahman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18377, "end_char": 18391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman in their tenders, Exhibits P-4 and P-5, quoted one flat rate for four years and did not mention separate flat rates for separate years."}}, {"text": "Munshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18666, "end_char": 18672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He did so because he consulted one Mr.\n\nMunshi, Personal Assistant to the Excise Commissioner, whether he should quote each rate separately and Mr. Munshi told him that he could give flat rate for the combined years as well as flat rates and also sliding scale rates for each year separately."}}, {"text": "Betul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19042, "end_char": 19047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly accused 2 was working as an agent of Habibur Rahman and his son Zakirur Rahman for the distillery contracts of Betul and Seoni, and, therefore, he must have been the author not only of his own tender but of the tenders submitted bv Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman, Exhibits\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe Stat~ of Madhya Pradesh,\n\nMahajan/,\n\nllOO\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nP-4 and P-5."}}, {"text": "Seoni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19052, "end_char": 19057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly accused 2 was working as an agent of Habibur Rahman and his son Zakirur Rahman for the distillery contracts of Betul and Seoni, and, therefore, he must have been the author not only of his own tender but of the tenders submitted bv Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman, Exhibits\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe Stat~ of Madhya Pradesh,\n\nMahajan/,\n\nllOO\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nP-4 and P-5."}}, {"text": "MahaJan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23776, "end_char": 23783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MahaJan /.\n\ndrawing up Exhibits P-4 and P-5 and his original tender.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Ratanshah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24632, "end_char": 24641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, in the deposition of Doongaji it was elicited that in the year 1942 when tenders for the Seoni distillery contract were called for, the rates quoted by Ratanshah were lower than his rates for all items."}}, {"text": "Laxminarain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25037, "end_char": 25048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, however, voluntarily added that Ratanshah obtained his rates of the previous contracts before he submitted his tender for the year 1942 and that he had made a reduction of annas two to three in those rates but he was forced to admit that the rate of Ratanshah in the tender was not only lower than his but was also lower throughout than the rates of Laxminarain, Haji Ismail and Habibur Rahman even without seeing their tenders."}}, {"text": "Haji Ismail", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25050, "end_char": 25061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, however, voluntarily added that Ratanshah obtained his rates of the previous contracts before he submitted his tender for the year 1942 and that he had made a reduction of annas two to three in those rates but he was forced to admit that the rate of Ratanshah in the tender was not only lower than his but was also lower throughout than the rates of Laxminarain, Haji Ismail and Habibur Rahman even without seeing their tenders."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMadhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahaian", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28134, "end_char": 28169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nMadhya\n\nPradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan"}}, {"text": "State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28204, "end_char": 28240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan"}}, {"text": "Habibur \"Rahman amt . ' . !\n\n.. -\n\nZakirur Rahman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30378, "end_char": 30427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that 'the original tender of Patel must have contained three appendices like those of Habibur \"Rahman amt . ' . !"}}, {"text": "Habbibur Rahman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31033, "end_char": 31048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, there is no conflict in the expression of the appendices of Habbibur Rahman and Patel.", "canonical_name": "Habbibur Rahman"}}, {"text": "Habibur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31382, "end_char": 31389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may further be observed that the covering letter signed by Patel mentions four appendices, while the covering letters of Habibur and Zakirur Rahman only mention three appendices.", "canonical_name": "Habbibur Rahman"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32475, "end_char": 32482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe Stai.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Stai. of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32504, "end_char": 32527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe Stai.", "canonical_name": "State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan"}}, {"text": "Amarnath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32740, "end_char": 32748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nIn order to appreciate the third charge, it Is necessary to set out the terms of Exhibit P-24 which it IS said was antedated in order tt> create evidence for the defence of the accused and to miure Amarnath.", "canonical_name": "Amarnath"}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Excise, C. P. & Berar, Nagpur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32826, "end_char": 32871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Excise, C. P. & Berar, Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Seoni Distillery", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33064, "end_char": 33080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I went to see Mr. Amarnath last week, at his residence in connection with Seoni Distillery work."}}, {"text": "Edulji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33097, "end_char": 33103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I saw Mr. Edulji and his partner with Mr. Amarnath in the office room of his residence with some office files."}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33660, "end_char": 33665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Same way after about a week, when I went to Seoni for mahua bill, when Mr.\n\nAmarnath visited for sanctioning the advance, I had the opportunity to see Mr. Amarnath in dak bungalow at about 9-30 p. m. when I saw Mr. Mehta the ex-manager of Mr. Edulji (who ii also the manager of Seoni Electric Co.) with Mr. Amarnath near table with the same file of the tender."}}, {"text": "Seoni Electric Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33723, "end_char": 33741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Same way after about a week, when I went to Seoni for mahua bill, when Mr.\n\nAmarnath visited for sanctioning the advance, I had the opportunity to see Mr. Amarnath in dak bungalow at about 9-30 p. m. when I saw Mr. Mehta the ex-manager of Mr. Edulji (who ii also the manager of Seoni Electric Co.) with Mr. Amarnath near table with the same file of the tender."}}, {"text": "Edulji Doongaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35398, "end_char": 35413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged in thi~ letter that \"last week\", i.e., during the week commencing on the 11th November, 1946, accused Patel went to see Amarnath and there he saw Edulji Doongaji with him with his tender open on his table in front of him and that he was astonished at it, that about a week later he again went to Seoni and had the opportunity to see Amarnath and Mr.\n\nMehta, exmanager of Edulji Doongaji, was with him and the tender file was lying there."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36024, "end_char": 36035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amarnatt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36071, "end_char": 36079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. C., Patel said that he saw Amarnatt on the morning of the 15th or 16th November, 1946, and he met Amarnath at Seoni at the distillery premises on the 16th November, 1946, and on the sam<!", "canonical_name": "Amarnath"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Prades", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36272, "end_char": 36294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16-10 S. C. India 71\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Prades/J.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nTheState of Madhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of ' Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nMahajan"}}, {"text": "of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36332, "end_char": 36349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16-10 S. C. India 71\n\nHanumant v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Prades/J.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nHanumant v.\n\nTheState of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36352, "end_char": 36359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nday he met him at about 9 p.m. at: the Seoni dak bungalow and that he agam met Him on the 17th November, at 10 a.m.\n\nHe also stabed that he had gone to see Amarnath at his residence at Nagpur between the dates 12th and 18th November.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36549, "end_char": 36555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nday he met him at about 9 p.m. at: the Seoni dak bungalow and that he agam met Him on the 17th November, at 10 a.m.\n\nHe also stabed that he had gone to see Amarnath at his residence at Nagpur between the dates 12th and 18th November."}}, {"text": "A. M. Naidu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38910, "end_char": 38921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th page there are two office notesone is written by A. M. Naidu and the other by the appellant Nargundkar.", "canonical_name": "A. M. Naidu"}}, {"text": "A. M. Naidu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38966, "end_char": 38977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. M. Naidu below his signature has written '6-4-1948'.", "canonical_name": "A. M. Naidu"}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41379, "end_char": 41389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42081, "end_char": 42092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Industrial Alcohol Ltd. Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42796, "end_char": 42836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As this was my personal complaint no copy of it was kept in the Correspondence Files Exhibit P-34 and Exhibit P-35 just\n\nas there is no copy in these files of my tender Exhibit P-3A.......... In the month of September, October and November, 1946, several machines were brought for trial from various parties in our office till the typewriter article A was purchased by National Industrial Alcohol Ltd. Company.\""}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44980, "end_char": 44990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "56 of 1951 : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 45053, "end_char": 45068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "57 of 1951 : Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 45097, "end_char": 45108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45111, "end_char": 45137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS\n\nTHE BOMBAY CO."}}, {"text": "STAGBROOK RUBBER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45283, "end_char": 45299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nSTAGBROOK RUBBER AND TEA\n\nESTATES LTD."}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45462, "end_char": 45484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF\n\nINDIA,\n\nSTATE OF\n\nBOMBAY, STATil OF\n\nMADRAS, STATil OF\n\nHYDERABAD,\n\nSTATE OF\n\nPUNJAB, STATil OF\n\nMYSORE,\n\nSTATE\n\nOF 0RISSA\n\nAND\n\nSTATE OF UTIAR PRADESH-Interveners."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsrn1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45500, "end_char": 45516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SAsrn1 C.J., MuKHERJEA, DAs,\n\nVIVIAN BosE and Gnm."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45523, "end_char": 45532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SAsrn1 C.J., MuKHERJEA, DAs,\n\nVIVIAN BosE and Gnm."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45540, "end_char": 45551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SAsrn1 C.J., MuKHERJEA, DAs,\n\nVIVIAN BosE and Gnm."}}, {"text": "AM HASAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45560, "end_char": 45568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AM HASAN JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45575, "end_char": 45596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 286( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45598, "end_char": 45613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_1112_1122_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Hanumant v. T lie State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nMahaian /.\n\nOct. 16.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1952]\n\nThe result is that the consolidated appeal is allowed, the judgments of all the three courts below are set aside and the appellants are acquitted.\n\nAppellants acquitted.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1951 : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1951 : Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nSTATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS\n\nTHE BOMBAY CO. LTD.\n\nSTATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nMICHAEL FREDERICK AND BROS.\n\nSTATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nSTAGBROOK RUBBER AND TEA\n\nESTATES LTD.\n\nUNION OF\n\nINDIA,\n\nSTATE OF\n\nBOMBAY, STATil OF\n\nMADRAS, STATil OF\n\nHYDERABAD,\n\nSTATE OF\n\nPUNJAB, STATil OF\n\nMYSORE,\n\nSTATE\n\nOF 0RISSA\n\nAND\n\nSTATE OF UTIAR PRADESH-Interveners.\n\n[PATANJALI SAsrn1 C.J., MuKHERJEA, DAs,\n\nVIVIAN BosE and Gnm.AM HASAN JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Article 286( I) ( b )-Sales tax-Exemp. tion of sales in the course of export or import-Meant\"ng of \"in the course of\"-..'iolcs tvhel'e property passes and sale is co1nplete before\n\n' \\\n\ngoods move out of State, whether exempt-Interpretation of article 286 (!) (b)-Decisions on Commerce and Import-Export clauses of American Constitution-Speeches of Members of Constituent Assembly-Relevancy.\n\nWhatever else may or may not fall within art. 286( 1) (b) of the Constitution, sales and purchases which themselves occasion the export or the import of the goods as the case may be, out of or into, the territory of India come within the exemption.\n\nThe view that no sale or purchase can be said to take place in the course of export or import unless tho property in the goods is transferred to the buyer during their actual movement, as for instance, where the shipping documents are indorsed and delivered within the State by the seller to a local agent of the foreign buyer after the goods have been actually shipped or where such documents are cleared on payment, or on acceptance, by the Indian buyer before the arrival of the goods within the State, puts too narrow a construction upon art. 286(1)(b) and is not correct.\n\nA sale by export involves a series of integrated activities commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and ending with the delivery of the goods to a common carrier for transport out of the country by land or sea.\n\nSuch a sale cannot be dissociated from the export without which it cannot be dtectuated an<l the sale and the resultant export form parts of a single transaction. Of these two integrated activities which to gether constitute an export sale. whichever first occurs can well he rer1rded as taking place in the course of the other.\n\nEven in cases where the property in the goods passed to the foreign buyers and the sales were thm completed, within the State before the goods commence<l their journey from the State, the sales must be regarded as having taken place in the course of the\n\ncport and therefore ,.,; empt under art. 286(1)(h).\n\nThe Commerce clause (article l, section 8(3)) and the Import-Export clauses [article I, sections 9 (5) anJ 10 (2)] of the American Constitution are widely different in language, scope and purpose, .rnd a varying body of doctrines and tests have grown around them interpreting, extending or restricting from time to time, their operation and application in the context of\n\nI he expanding American commerce and industry and much help qnnot be derived from them in the solution of the problems arising under article 286 of the Indian Constitution.\n\nSpeeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debates on the draft Constitution cannot be used as aids for interpreting the Constitution.\n\nAdministrator General of Bengal v. Prem Nath Mullick [22 LA. 107 at 1181, A. K. Gopalan v. The State [(1950) S.C.R. 881, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association\n\n[ 169 U.S. 290 at 318) referred to. 143\n\nState of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nState of Travancore\n\nCochin 11nd Others v.\n\nTAc Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1snicTioN : Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1952.\n\nAppeals from the Judgment and Order dated the 10th day of January, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature of Travancore-Cochin at Ernakulam (Kunhiraman C.J. and Subramania Iyer J.) in Original Petitions Nos. 4, 23 and 24 of 1951 respectively.\n\nT. N. Subramania Iyer, Advocate-Genet', a/ of Travancore-Cochin, (T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him) for the State of Travancore-Cochin.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (C.R. Pattabhirainan, with him) for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1952.\n\nC. R. Pattabhi112man for the respondent m Civil Appeal No. 28 of 1952.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (Thomas Vellappally, with him) for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1952.\n\nM. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for India, and C. K. Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India ( G. N. foshi, with them) for the Union of India.\n\n1952. October 16. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsmI C.J.-These arc connected appeals from the judgment and order of the High Court of Travancore-Cochin quashing the assessments under the United State of Travancore and Cochin Sales Tax Act (No. 11 of 1125 M.E.) (hereinafter referred to\n\nas \"the Act\"') on the respondents on the turnover of the sales of the commodities ( coir products in C.A. 25, lemon grass oil in C.A. 28 and tea in C.A. 29) in which they respectively deal.\n\nThe dealings followed more or less the same pattern in all the cases and consisted of export sales of the respective commodities to foreign buyers on c.i.f. or f.o.b. terms as the case may be.\n\nThe respondents in each case claimed exemption from assessm<; nt in respect of the sales effected by them on the ground, inter alia, that such sales . took place \"in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India\" within the meaning of article\n\n....\n\n286(1) (b) of the Constitution. The Sales Tax Authorities rejected the contention as, in their view, the sales. were completed before the goo<ls were shipped and could not, therefore, be considered to have taken place in the course of the export.\n\nThereupon the respondents by separate petitions applied t'O the High Court of the United States of Travancore and Cochin (hereinafter referred to as the State) under article 226 of the Constitution for issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition quashing the assessments made on them and prohibiting such assessment in future.\n\nThe applications were heard, along with nine 9ther applications for similar reliefs by dealers iri cashew nuts, by a Division Bench (Khunhiraman C.J. and Subramania Iyer J.) who upheld the claim of exemption and quashed the assessment orders in respect of the transactions subsequent to the commencement of the Constitution. From that decision the State has preferred appeals in all the cases on a certificate granted by the High Court under article 132 ( 1) of the Constitution.\n\nAs the appeals involved important questions of law which may have a bearing on the sales tax legislation Qf the various States in India, this Court directed notice of these proceedings to the Attorney-General for India and the Advocates-General of those States, and they have intervened and participated m the debate at the hearing of these appeals.\n\nWhen the argument had proceeded for some time, it was discovered that the material facts relating to the course of dealings in cashew nuts, which were more complex in character, had not been clearly ascertained and consequently the relative appeals were remitted to the High Court for findings on certain points agreed upon by the parties.\n\nThese three appeals were, 'however, fully heard as they were found to admit of disposal on the materials on record.\n\nArticle 286(1), on which the respondents found their claim to exemption, runs thus :\n\nState of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of Travancorc\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nNo law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a t!lx on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place- ( a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the inwort of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.\n\nExplan11tion.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been deliYered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goo<ls the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed m another State.\n\nOn the scope and meaning of clause (b ), the learned Judges expressed their view as follows :-\n\n\"The words 'in the course of' make the scope of thi.s clause very wide. It is not restricted to the point of time at which goods are imported into or exported from India. The series of transactions which necessarily precede export or import of goods will come within the purview of this clause.\n\nTherefore, while in the course of that: senes of transactions, the sale has taken place, such a sale 1s exempted from the levy of sales tax.\n\nThe sale may have taken place within the boundaries of the State.\n\nEven then sales tax cannot be levied if the sale had taken place while the goods were m the conrse of import into lndia or Ill the conrse of export out of India.\n\nWe arc stressing this point because both parties 111 what we may describe as the cashew nut cases entered into a lengthy discussion as to the exact point of time when the sale became completed and as to the exact place where the goods were when the sale became a completed transaction.\"\n\nOn this interpretation, local purchases \"made for the purpose of export\" were held by the learned Judges to be \"integral parts of the process of exporting\".\n\nIn support of this construction the learned Judges referred\n\n• f\n\n...\n\n~ to the debates in the Constituent Assembly on clause 264-A of the draft Constitution which corresponded to article 286 and quoted from the speech of one of t the members who unsuccessfully moved an amendment defining export as meaning the last transaction and import as meaning the first transaction.\n\n~ In view of the wide construction thus placed upon clause (b) of article 286 ( 1), the arguments before us ranged over a large field, and as many as four different ':) views as to its scope and meaning were pressed upon us for our acceptance :- ( 1) The exemption is limited to sales by export and purchases by import, that is to say, those sales and purchases which occasion the export or import as the case mav be. and extends to no other transactions -• however diiectlyor immediately connected, in intention or purpose, with such sales or purchases, and wheresoever the property in the goods may pass to the buyer.\n\nThi~ is the view put forward on behalf of the ' State of Madras.\n\nThe Advocate-General thought that a State_ could not impose sales tax though title passed within State limits while the goods were still under • transport on the high seas and no question of exemption could •herefore arise. He said. however, that no such case had actually arisen.\n\n(2) In addition to the sales and purchases of the kind described above, the exemption covers the last purchase by the exporter and the first sale by the importer, if any, so directly and proximately connected with the export sale or import purchase as to form _) part of the same transaction.\n\nThis view was sponsored by the Attorney-General who was also inclined to think, as advised at the moment, that sales or purtchases made while the goods were on the high seas would be exempt, but he would prefer not to go into the wider question, because, whatever view was '\\ taken, sales such as those involved m lhe present -• cases must, in any event, be exempt.\n\n(3) The exemption covers only those sales and purchases under which the property m the goods\n\nState of Travancore- Cochin and Others v.\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of T ravancore-\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nconcerned is transferred from the seller to the buyer (' during the course of the transit, that is, after the goods begin to move and before they reach their foreign destination. This view is supported by the State of • Bombay and certain other States. ( 4) The view which found favour with the learned Judges of the High Court in the passage already ex- tracted.\n\nIt will be seen that the construction first mentioned 1s the narrowest and the last mentioned the widest.\n\nWe arc clearly of op11110n that the sales here in question, which occasioned the export in each case, fall within the scope of the exemption under article 286(1)(b). Such sales must of necessity be put through by transporting the goods by rail or ship or both out • of the territory of India, that is to say, by employing the machinery of export. A sale by export thus involves a series of integrated activities commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and ending with the delivery of the goods to a common carrier for transport out of the country by land or sea.\n\nSuch a sale cannot be dissociated from the export with- • out which it cannot be effectuated, and the sale and resultant export form parts of a single transaction.\n\nOf these two integrated activities, which together constitute an export sale, whichever first occurs can well be regarded as taking place in the course of the other. Assuming without deciding that the property in the goods in the present cases passed to the foreign buyers and the sales were thus completed within the / State before the goods commence<! their journey a~ \\.c.. founcl by the Sales Tax Authorities, the sales must, nevertheless, be regarded as having taken place in the course of the export and are, therefore, exempt under 1 article 286(1) (b ).\n\nThat clause, indeed, assumes that the sale had taken place within the limits of the State and exempts it if it took place in the course of the ( export of the goods concerned. In the foregoing discussion we have assumed that the word \"sale\" used in the Constitution has the same\n\n'\"'\\meaning as in the law relating to the sale of goods, but it has been suggested in the course of the argument that it imports a wider concept than the passing • of title from the seller to the buyer which under that law is determined by highly technical rules based upon the presumed intention of the parties and liable to be displaced by their expressed intention.\n\nWe ' leave the point open as it is unnecessary for the purpose of these appeals to pronounce any opinion upon it.\n\nIt was said that, on the construction we have indicated above, a \"sale in the course of export\" would become practically synonymous with \"export'', and would reduce clause (b) to a mere redundancy, because article 246 (1), read with entry 83 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, vests legislative power with respect .. to \"duties of customs including export duties\" exclusively in Parliament, and that would be sufficient to preclude State taxation of such transactions.\n\nWe sec no force in this suggestibn. It might well be argued,\n\n), in the absence of a provision like clause (b) prohibiting in terms the levy of tax on the sale or purchase of • goods where such sales and purchases are effected through the machinery of export and import, that both the powers of taxation, though exclusively vested in the Union and the States respectively, could be exercised in respect of the same sale by export or purchase by import, the sales tax and . the export duty being regarded as essentially of a different character.\n\nA similar argument induced the Federal Court to hold in Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons(') J that both central excise duty and provincial sales tax could be validly imposed on the first sale of groundnut oil and cake by the manufacturer or producer as \"the\n\n_. two taxes are economically two separate and distinct imposts\".\n\nLest similar reasoning should lead to the imposition of such cumulative burden on the export- \"'-import trade of this country which is of great impor-\n\n_w:ance to the nation's economy, the Constituent ft\\ssembly may well have thought' ; t necessary to exempt\n\n(J) [1942] F.C.R. 90.\n\nState of Travancore- Cochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of\n\n\"Travancore~\n\nCochin .and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatan1ali .Sastri C. f.\n\nin terms sales from sales tax Constitution.\n\nby export and purchases by import r by inserting article 286 (1) (b) in the\n\nWe are not much impressed with the contention t that no sale or purchase can be said to take place \"in the course of\" export or import unless the property in the goods is transferred to the buyer during their 4 actual movement, as for instance, where the shipping t documents are indorsed and delivered within the State . by the seller to a local agent of the foreign buyer after the goods haYc been actually shipped, or where such ff documents are cleared on payment, or on acceptance, by the Indian buyer before the arrival of the goods within the State.\n\nThis view, which lays undue stress on the etymology of the word \"course\" and formulates a mechanical test for the application of clause (b ), places, in our opinion, too narrow a construction upon that clause, in so far as it seeks to limit its operation only to sales and purchases effected during the transit of the goods, and would, if accepted, rob the exemption of much of its usefulness. j V'fe accordingly hold that whatever else may or may not fall within article 286 (l)(b), sales and purchases which themselves occasion the export or the import of the goods, as the case may be, out of or into the territory of India come within the exemption and that is enough to dispose of these appeals.\n\nOur attention was called, in the course of the debate,\n\nto various American decisions which hold that the power \"to regulate\" inter-State commerce vested exclusively in the Congress by article 1 section 8(3) of; the American Constitution (the Commerce clause) ex- \\L eludes by implication the States' power of taxation only when the goods enter \"the export stream\", and until then such goods form part of \"the general mass .,\n\nof property in the State\" subject, as such, to its jurisdiction to tax, and that this principle was also applicable to cases arising under article 1 section 9(5) and/ section 10(2) (the Import-Export clause), [see e.g., Empresa Sidernrgica v. Merced Co.(1)]. These clauses{\n\n(1) 337 U.S. 154.\n\nare widely different in language, scope and purpose, and a varying body of doctrines and tests have grown around them interpreting, extending or restricting, from time to time, their operation and application in the context of the expanding American commerce and industry, and we are of opinion that not much help can be derived from them in the solution of the problems ansmg under article 286 of the Indian Constitution.\n\nIt remains only o point out that the use made by the learned Judges below of the speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debates on the draft Constitution is unwarranted. That this form of extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statutes is not admissible has been generally .iccepted in England, and the same rule has 1been observed in the construction of Indian statutes-see Administrator-Genet<al of Bengal v.\n\nPrem Nath Mallick(1). The reason behind the rule was explained by one of us in Gopalan's case(2) thus :-\n\n\"A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill.\n\nNor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord,\"\n\nor, as it is more tersely put in an American case-\n\n\"Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other-United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (3).\"\n\nThis rule of exclusion has not always been adhered to in America, and sometimes distinction is made between using such material to ascertain the purpose of a statute and using it for ascertaining its meaning.\n\nIt would seem that the rule is adopted in Canada and Australia-see Craies on Statute Law, 5th Ed., p. 122.\n\n(!) (1895) 22 I.A. 107, 118.\n\n(3) 169 U.S. 290, 318.\n\n(2) [ 1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\nState of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others v.\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. ].\n\nState of\n\nTravancore~\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nOct. 20.\n\nIn the result, agreeing with the conclusion of the High Court, though on different grounds, we dismiss the appeals with costs.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the respondent in C. A. No. 25 of 52 : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for the respondent in C. A. No. 28 of 52 : Sardar Bahadur.\n\nAgent for the respondent in C. A. No. 29 of 52 : V. P. K. Nambiyar.\n\nAgent for the Interveners (Union of India, State of Bombay, State of Madras, State of Hyderabad, State of Punjab, State of Mysore, and State of Orissa) : P. A. Mehta. • ~\n\nAgent for the State of Uttar Pradesh : C. P. Lal.\n\nSHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS\n\nDISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nArYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.)\n\nDistrict Boards Act (X of 1922), ss. 71, 90-District Board-Dismissal of secretary-Resolutions far dismissal, and suspension pending decision of appeal to Government-Validity of suspension.\n\nSection 71 of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922, as amend~ cd in 1933 provided that a resolution of the Board for the dis~ missal of its secretary shall not take effect until the period of one month has expired or until the State Government have passed orders on any appeal preferred by him.\n\nA District Board passed a resolution for dismissal of its secretary and also for his suspension till the matter oi his dismissai was deci<led unde:r section 71 of the Act on an appeal if any preferred by the secretary : H'lld, that under section 90 of the Act a secretary could be suspended only as a punishment or pending inquiry or", "total_entities": 91, "entities": [{"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 327, "end_char": 337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "56 of 1951 : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 400, "end_char": 415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "57 of 1951 : Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 458, "end_char": 496, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE BOMBAY CO. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 498, "end_char": 516, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE BOMBAY CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 870, "end_char": 879, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 881, "end_char": 884, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 898, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Gnm.AM HASAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 903, "end_char": 919, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHULAM HASAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 922, "end_char": 943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 286( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 945, "end_char": 960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1189, "end_char": 1200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1379, "end_char": 1391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1554, "end_char": 1559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286( 1) (b) of the Constitution, sales and purchases which themselves occasion the export or the import of the goods as the case may be, out of or into, the territory of India come within the exemption."}}, {"text": "art. 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2130, "end_char": 2144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 286(1)(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3018, "end_char": 3032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3067, "end_char": 3079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3123, "end_char": 3133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3540, "end_char": 3551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3934, "end_char": 3940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3967, "end_char": 3987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "143\n\nState of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nState of Travancore\n\nCochin 11nd Others v.\n\nTAc Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1snicTioN : Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "Kunhiraman C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the Judgment and Order dated the 10th day of January, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature of Travancore-Cochin at Ernakulam (Kunhiraman C.J. and Subramania Iyer J.) in Original Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Subramania Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4318, "end_char": 4333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the Judgment and Order dated the 10th day of January, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature of Travancore-Cochin at Ernakulam (Kunhiraman C.J. and Subramania Iyer J.) in Original Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "T. N. Subramania Iyer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4401, "end_char": 4422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. N. Subramania Iyer, Advocate-Genet', a/ of Travancore-Cochin, (T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him) for the State of Travancore-Cochin."}}, {"text": "T. R. Balakrishna Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4467, "end_char": 4489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. N. Subramania Iyer, Advocate-Genet', a/ of Travancore-Cochin, (T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him) for the State of Travancore-Cochin."}}, {"text": "M. R. Krishna Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4494, "end_char": 4514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. N. Subramania Iyer, Advocate-Genet', a/ of Travancore-Cochin, (T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him) for the State of Travancore-Cochin."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (C.R. Pattabhirainan, with him) for the respondent in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "C.R. Pattabhirainan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4581, "end_char": 4600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (C.R. Pattabhirainan, with him) for the respondent in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "C. R. Pattabhi112man", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4664, "end_char": 4684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. R. Pattabhi112man for the respondent m Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Thomas Vellappally", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4754, "end_char": 4772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (Thomas Vellappally, with him) for the respondent in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4836, "end_char": 4851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for India, and C. K. Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India ( G. N. foshi, with them) for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daplitary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4885, "end_char": 4900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for India, and C. K. Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India ( G. N. foshi, with them) for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "G. N. foshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4931, "end_char": 4942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General for India, and C. K. Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India ( G. N. foshi, with them) for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsmI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5042, "end_char": 5057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsmI C.J.-These arc connected appeals from the judgment and order of the High Court of Travancore-Cochin quashing the assessments under the United State of Travancore and Cochin Sales Tax Act (No.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri C."}}, {"text": "High Court of the United States of Travancore and Cochin", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6262, "end_char": 6318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the respondents by separate petitions applied t'O the High Court of the United States of Travancore and Cochin (hereinafter referred to as the State) under article 226 of the Constitution for issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition quashing the assessments made on them and prohibiting such assessment in future."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6364, "end_char": 6375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Khunhiraman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6660, "end_char": 6671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applications were heard, along with nine 9ther applications for similar reliefs by dealers iri cashew nuts, by a Division Bench (Khunhiraman C.J. and Subramania Iyer J.) who upheld the claim of exemption and quashed the assessment orders in respect of the transactions subsequent to the commencement of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6969, "end_char": 6980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7817, "end_char": 7831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7948, "end_char": 7963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 286(1), on which the respondents found their claim to exemption, runs thus :\n\nState of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of Travancorc\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nNo law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a t!lx on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place- ( a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the inwort of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.", "canonical_name": "Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri C.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7965, "end_char": 7984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 286(1), on which the respondents found their claim to exemption, runs thus :\n\nState of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of Travancorc\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nNo law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a t!lx on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place- ( a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the inwort of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri C."}}, {"text": "State of Travancorc", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7989, "end_char": 8008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 286(1), on which the respondents found their claim to exemption, runs thus :\n\nState of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of Travancorc\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nNo law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a t!lx on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place- ( a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the inwort of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8033, "end_char": 8049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 286(1), on which the respondents found their claim to exemption, runs thus :\n\nState of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of Travancorc\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nNo law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a t!lx on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place- ( a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the inwort of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.", "canonical_name": "Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd."}}, {"text": "clause 264", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10109, "end_char": 10119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10170, "end_char": 10181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10431, "end_char": 10442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11043, "end_char": 11049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi~ is the view put forward on behalf of the ' State of Madras."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12241, "end_char": 12257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) The exemption covers only those sales and purchases under which the property m the goods\n\nState of Travancore- Cochin and Others v.\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of T ravancore-\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nconcerned is transferred from the seller to the buyer (' during the course of the transit, that is, after the goods begin to move and before they reach their foreign destination.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri C."}}, {"text": "State of • Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12474, "end_char": 12491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view is supported by the State of • Bombay and certain other States. ("}}, {"text": "article 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12884, "end_char": 12901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14026, "end_char": 14040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15019, "end_char": 15030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15072, "end_char": 15088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15192, "end_char": 15202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that, on the construction we have indicated above, a \"sale in the course of export\" would become practically synonymous with \"export'', and would reduce clause (b) to a mere redundancy, because article 246 (1), read with entry 83 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, vests legislative power with respect .. to \"duties of customs including export duties\" exclusively in Parliament, and that would be sufficient to preclude State taxation of such transactions."}}, {"text": "[1942] F.C.R. 90", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16432, "end_char": 16448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Travancore- Cochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16451, "end_char": 16478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Travancore- Cochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of\n\n\"Travancore~\n\nCochin .and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatan1ali .Sastri C. f.\n\nin terms sales from sales tax Constitution.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "State of\n\n\"Travancore~\n\nCochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16537, "end_char": 16567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Travancore- Cochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nState of\n\n\"Travancore~\n\nCochin .and Others\n\nThe Bombay\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPatan1ali .Sastri C. f.\n\nin terms sales from sales tax Constitution.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16722, "end_char": 16733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17772, "end_char": 17783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18195, "end_char": 18204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18205, "end_char": 18217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18576, "end_char": 18585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 9(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18586, "end_char": 18598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18604, "end_char": 18617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18722, "end_char": 18728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19114, "end_char": 19125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19480, "end_char": 19487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this form of extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statutes is not admissible has been generally .iccepted in England, and the same rule has 1been observed in the construction of Indian statutes-see Administrator-Genet<al of Bengal v.\n\nPrem Nath Mallick(1)."}}, {"text": "Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19685, "end_char": 19692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason behind the rule was explained by one of us in Gopalan's case(2) thus :-\n\n\"A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill."}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20318, "end_char": 20325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule of exclusion has not always been adhered to in America, and sometimes distinction is made between using such material to ascertain the purpose of a statute and using it for ascertaining its meaning."}}, {"text": "Canada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20513, "end_char": 20519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would seem that the rule is adopted in Canada and Australia-see Craies on Statute Law, 5th Ed.,"}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20524, "end_char": 20533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would seem that the rule is adopted in Canada and Australia-see Craies on Statute Law, 5th Ed.,"}}, {"text": "S. 290, 318", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20619, "end_char": 20630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Travancore-", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20657, "end_char": 20677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others v.\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. ].", "canonical_name": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20679, "end_char": 20685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Travancore-\n\nCochin and Others v.\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. ]."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nTravancore~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20746, "end_char": 20767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of\n\nTravancore~\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nOct. 20.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21081, "end_char": 21096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 of 52 : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21148, "end_char": 21162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28 of 52 : Sardar Bahadur."}}, {"text": "V. P. K. Nambiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21214, "end_char": 21231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29 of 52 : V. P. K. Nambiyar."}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21348, "end_char": 21363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Interveners (Union of India, State of Bombay, State of Madras, State of Hyderabad, State of Punjab, State of Mysore, and State of Orissa) : P. A. Mehta. •"}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21445, "end_char": 21454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nAgent for the State of Uttar Pradesh : C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "SHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21457, "end_char": 21476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS\n\nDISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nArYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21520, "end_char": 21538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS\n\nDISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nArYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21540, "end_char": 21554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS\n\nDISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nArYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ArYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21556, "end_char": 21561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS\n\nDISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nArYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21566, "end_char": 21574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS\n\nDISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nArYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "District Boards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21581, "end_char": 21600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 71, 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21614, "end_char": 21624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Boards Act", "statute": "District Boards Act"}}, {"text": "Section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21771, "end_char": 21781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Boards Act", "statute": "District Boards Act"}}, {"text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21795, "end_char": 21820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22215, "end_char": 22225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "statute": "District Boards Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22304, "end_char": 22314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "statute": "District Boards Act, 1922"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_1122_1133_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "State of\n\nTravancore~\n\nCochin and Others\n\nThe Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nOct. 20.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19521\n\nIn the result, agreeing with the conclusion of the High Court, though on different grounds, we dismiss the appeals with costs.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the respondent in C. A. No. 25 of 52 : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for the respondent in C. A. No. 28 of 52 : Sardar Bahadur.\n\nAgent for the respondent in C. A. No. 29 of 52 : V. P. K. Nambiyar.\n\nAgent for the Interveners (Union of India, State of Bombay, State of Madras, State of Hyderabad, State of Punjab, State of Mysore, and State of Orissa) : P. A. Mehta. • ~\n\nAgent for the State of Uttar Pradesh : C. P. Lal.\n\nSHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS\n\nDISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nArYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.)\n\nDistrict Boards Act (X of 1922), ss. 71, 90-District Board-Dismissal of secretary-Resolutions far dismissal, and suspension pending decision of appeal to Government-Validity of suspension.\n\nSection 71 of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922, as amend~ cd in 1933 provided that a resolution of the Board for the dis~ missal of its secretary shall not take effect until the period of one month has expired or until the State Government have passed orders on any appeal preferred by him.\n\nA District Board passed a resolution for dismissal of its secretary and also for his suspension till the matter oi his dismissai was deci<led unde:r section 71 of the Act on an appeal if any preferred by the secretary : H'lld, that under section 90 of the Act a secretary could be suspended only as a punishment or pending inquiry or\n\npending the orders of any . authority whose sanction is necessary for his dismissal.\n\nThe words \"pending the orders of any authonty whose sanction is necessary for his dismissal\" could not appropriately cover the_ case of a suspension like the present one and the resolution for suspension was therefore ultra vircs. ·\n\nHeid furtlier, that since the Board was created by statute, and its powers of dismissal and suspension are defined and circumscribed by sections 71 and 90 of the Act it would not be legitimate to have resort to general or impliQC] powers under the law of master and servant or under section 16 of the U.P.\n\nC.eneral Clauses Act ; and even under section 16 of that Act powers which are vested in an authority to suspend or dismiss any person appointed, are to be operative only \"unless a differ. oo.t intention appears\" and such a different int.ention is to be found in sections 71 and 90 of the Act which codify the powers of dismissal and suspension vested in the Board.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 114 of 1951.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 5th September, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Waliullah and Sapru JJ.) in First Appeal No. 516 of 1942 arising out of Judgment and Decree dated the 3rd October, 1942, of the Court of the Civil Judge of Shahjahanpur in Original Suit No. 1() of 1941.\n\nAchhru Ram (N. C. Sen, with him) for the appel~ Ian ts.\n\nC. K. Daphtary (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1952. October 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal by the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff against the decree of the High Court qf Judicature at Allaha bad allowing the appeal of the defendants against the decree passed by the Court of the Civil Judge of Shah-\n\n~ jahanpur in favour of the plaintiff allowing the plain tiff's claim in part.\n\nOne Kailashi Nath Kapoor, the plaintiff, was employed by the District Board of Shahjahanpur, the defendants, as their Secretary in the year 1924.\n\nHe 17-10 S. C. India 71\n\n•1952\n\nShrimati Hira Devi and Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur.\n\nBhogwati /.\n\nSArimati Hira Deui ttnd Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahiahanpur.\n\nBhagwati /,\n\nwas also entrusted in 1929 with the additional duties\n\nof doing assessment work for the defendants.\n\nThe work done by the plaintiff did not find favour with some members of the Board and on the 9th November. 1939, six members of the Board tabled a resolution asking the Chairman to convene a special meeting of the Board to consider a resolution for the dismissal of the plaintiff.\n\nA special meeting of the Board was convened on the 17th December, 1939. Twelve charges were framed against the plaintiff and he was required to furnish his answers to them.\n\nA special meeting .of the Board was thereafter convened on the 20th January, 1940.\n\nThe resolution for the dismissal of the plaintiff was on the agenda but the meeting had to be adjourned for want of quorum to the 29th January, 1940.\n\nAt the adjourned meeting of the 29th January, 1940, twenty-five out of the twentyseven members of the Board were present.\n\nThe .. charges against the plaintiff were gone into and eleven . out of the twelve charges were held proved.\n\nTwo 'resolutions were consequently passed by the Board at this meeting, one being a resolution for his dismissal, and the other being a resolution for his suspension till the matter of his dismissal was decided under Section 71 :of the U. P. District Boards Act, X of 1922, on an appeal if any preferred by the plaintiff to the Government.\n\nThe plaintiff preferred an appeal to the '\"Government against the resolution for his dismissal and thi~ ppcal was dismissed by the Government on the 19th Dcember, 1940.\n\nThe plaintiff thereafter commenced in the Court of ( the Civil Judge at Shahjahanpur the suit out of which this appeal arises against the defendants for a declaration that the two resolutions passed by the Board on the 29th January, 1940, were illegal and ultra vire! of of the Board and that he continued to be the Secretary and Assessing Officer of the Board, for an miunction restraining the Board from preventing him from dis-\n\n~.A charging his duties as such Secretary and Asses.sing \\ Officer, for arrears of his salary with interest and contribution to his provident Fund and in the alternative\n\nfor damages and compensation for illegal dismissal and suspension and for costs. The defendents contended that the sai<l resolutions were valid and binding on the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief as claimed.\n\nThe learned trial judge held that the two resolutions passed by the Board on the 29th January, 1940, were properly passed and that there was no irregularity in the procedure. He held that the resolution for dismissal of the plaintiff was valid and binding on the plaintiff but the resolution for suspension was not legal.\n\nJn the result he decreed the . plaintiff's claim for arrears of salary, and the contribution towards the provident fund ·· against the defendants for the period of suspension and awarded to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 6,629-4-0 with proportionate costs, the rest of the . plaintiff's claim was dismissed.\n\nThe defendants appealed to the High. Court against this decree and the plaintiff filed cross-objections in regard to , his claim which had been disallowed. The plaintiff died during the pendency of the appeal and his heirs and legal representatives, being his widow and his four sons, were brought on the record. The High Court concurred with the trial court in the finding that there was no irregularity, impropriety or illegality il'l the procedure followed and the steps taken before the meeting or at the meeting of the Board when the two resolutions were considered and passed.\n\nIt however disagreed with the conclusion reached by the trial Court that the resolution for suspension was ultra Vires the Board. It held that the resolution for suspension also was valid and binding on the plaintiff and thus dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.\n\nThe crossobjections of the plaintiff were of course dismissed with costs.\n\nThe heirs and legal representatives of the plaintiff obtained leave to appeal to the Federal Court against this decision of the High Court and the appeal was admitted on the 5th November, 1948.\n\nBoth the Courts below having found that there was no irregularity, impropriety or illegality in the procedure followed and the . steps taken when the two\n\n 1952\n\nShrimatt Hira Devi and Othcfs\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\n'1952\n\nShrimati Hira Devi \"nd Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahiahanpur.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nresolutions in question were passed by the Board the r only question that survived for consideration by this Court was whether the resolution for suspension of the plaintiff was valid and binding on the plaintiff or in ) other words whether it was competent to the Board to pass the resolution for the suspension of the plaintiff\n\nafter it had passed the resolution for his dismissal <\". under section 71 of the Act. \\ Section 71 of the Act provides for the dismissal and punishment of the secretary :\n\n\"A board may by special resolution punish or dis- { . miss its i; ecretary : Provided, firstly, that such resolution is passed by a vote of not less than two-tllirds of the total number of members of the board for the time being : Provided, secondly, that the secretary of a board shall have a right of appeal to the State Government against such resolution within one month from the date of the communication of the resolution to him, and that the resolution shall not take effect until the 1-_ period of one month has expired or until the State\n\nGovernment have passed orders on any appeal preferred by him.\"\n\nIt will be relevant at this stage to note that this section 71 was amended by U. P. Act I of 1933. Section 71 as it originally stood ran thus :\n\n\"A board may by special resolution punish or dismiss its secretary provided,\n\n(a) that such a resolution is passed by a vote of: not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of the board for the time being, or (b) that it is \\._ passed by a vote of not less than one-half of the total number of members and is 'sanctioned by the Local Government'.\"\n\nIt may be noted that in the original section 71 provision was made for the sanction of the Local Government in certain cases. No such provision is to i.' be found in the amended section 71 of the Act. The l\n\nresolution according to the amended section 71 is to .be passed by a vote of not less than two-tllirds of the\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1127 1 total number of members of the Board and such a resolution is not to take effect until the period of one month has expired within which the secretary can ( exercise his right of appeal or until the Government have passed orders on the appeal if any preferred by him.\n\nThere is no question of the sanction of the Local Government to any resolution for dismissal, the only provision being that the resolution is to take effecv after the expiration of the period of one month or after the Government have passed orders on the , appeal if any preferred by the secretary within that period of one month.\n\nOnce that period of one month expires without the secretary preferring any appeal against the resolution of the Board or the Government passes final orders on the appeal preferred by him, the resolution takes effect without anything more in the nature of a sanction by the Government.\n\nThe power of suspension is conferred and regulated in section 90 of the Act :-\n\n\" ( 1) Suspension may be of two kinds:\n\n(a) suspension as a punishment, and\n\n(b) suspension pending inquiry or orders.\n\n(2) Where a general power to punish is conferred by this Act, it shall be deemed to include a power to suspend as a punishment for a period not exceeding three months.\n\n(3) Where a power of dismissal, whether subject to the sanction of any other authority or not, is conferred by this Act, it shall be deemed to include a power to suspend any person against whom the power of dismissal might be exercised, pending en- quiry into his qmduct or pending the orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary for his dismissal. ( 4) Where suspension is ordered pending inquiry or orders, and the officer suspended is ultimately restored,\n\nit shall be at the discretion of the authority ordering , his suspension whether he shall get any, and, if so,\n\n~ what, allowance during the period of suspension; but in the absence of any order to the contrary he shall be\n\nShrimati Hira Devi and. Othe1s\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur,\n\nBhagwati ].\n\n1952'\n\nShn\"mati Hira rJcvi and Oth<rs\n\n~ District B0ard, Shahiahanpur.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nentitled to the full remuneration which he would have f received but for such suspension.\"\n\nThe suspension which has been thus provided for is of two categories, ( 1) suspension as a punishment and (2) suspension pending enquiry or orders.\n\nIn the case of a suspension falling within the latter, categorv the only power of . suspension which is provided is that of suspending any person against whom the power of dismissal might be exercised pending enquiry into Ills conduct or pending the orders o£ any authority whose sanction is necessary for Ills dismissal.\n\nThe power of suspension pending enquiry into the conduct of the perSl)n can only be exercised if an enquiry against him has been started and before any order is made for Ills dismissal as a result of such enquiry.\n\nThe power of suspension pending . the orders of the authority whose sanction is necessary for Ills dismissal can similarly be exercised provided , the order of dismissal is made hilt that dismissal could be effective only after the orders of the authority whose sanction is needed for effectuating the same. The section does not provide for any other case where as on the facts before us the order of dismissal does not require the sanction of any authority but has got to await either the expiry of a particular period after such order of dismissal has been made or the result of an appeal which may be preferred to the Government within the period prescribed in that behalf. A decision of an authority to which an appeal is provided is not the same thing as a sanction by the authority.\n\nA perusal of sub-section ( 4) of section 90 make.< this position quite clear.\n\nThe authority ordering the suspension is vested with the discretion to d<>termine whether the officer suspended would get any or if so what allowance during the period of suspension where suspension is ordered pending enquiry or orders and the officer suspended is ultimately restored.\n\nThere is no\n\nprovision for any allowance where the officer f having been idismissled is also suspended for the , period which has of necessity to expire before his l; appi:al is time-barred or before the Government passes\n\norders on the appeal if any pref erred by him within the prescribed period. Such a case is not at all pro- Vided for in sub-section 4 of section 90 and the officer so suspended would be without any remedy whatever and would not be able to get any allowance at all from the a'uthority ordering his suspension during such period of suspension.\n\nIt is necessary to bear in mind the provisions of these sections 71 and 90 of the Act in order to determine whether it was competent t!O the Board to pass a resolution for suspension of the plaintiff after . it had passed the resolution for his dismissal on the 29th January, 1940.\n\nOn a construction of these sections 71 and 90 of the Act the trial Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of section 90 of the Act were exhaustive, that no other category of suspension apart from those specified cold be ordered and that therefore the resolution for suspension of the plaintiff was ultra vires the Board.\n\nThe High Court in appeal realised the difficulty of the position. It came to ' the conclusion that section 90 as it stood was in close conformity with . the provisions of the old section 71 of the Act which provided for the resolutipn for dismissal passed by a vote of no:t less than one-half of the total number of members being required to be sanctioned by the Local Government.\n\nThe sanction was expressly provided there.\n\nBut when that section came to be amended by the U.P. Act I of 1933, the provision for sanction was deleted and it provided for the resolution not taking effect until the period of one month had expired within which the secretary could exercise his. right of appeal or until the Government had passed orders on the appeal if any preferred by him. When this amendment was made in the old sec;.\n\nlion 71 of the Act of the provision made in section 90 in regard to the power of suspension was lost sight of and no corresponding amendment was made in section 90, sub-section (1) (b), sub-section (3) or subsection ( 4) which would bring the provisions of 145\n\nSlirimati Hira Dvi and Othe1s\n\nDistrict Board, .Shahjahanpur.\n\nBkagwati /. ·\n\nSnrimati Hira Dvi \"\"d Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur.\n\nBhagwati /,\n\nsectian 90 in conformity with the amended section 71 of the Act. The High Court was therefore at pains to place what it called a liberal construction on the provisions of section 71 and section 90 of the Act trying to read in the power of suspensionprovided in section 90 also a power of suspension during the period that the secretary preferred an appeal to the Government against the order of his dismissal and the Government passed orders on such appeal.\n\nApart from placing this so-called liberal construction on the expression \"the orders of any authority. whose sanction is necessary\" in section 90 subsection 3, the High Court also brought to its aid the provisions of Section 16 of the U. P. General Clauses Act of 1904 which provides that \"unless a different intention appears the authority having: power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed by it in exercise of that power\". It came to the conclusion. that nothing in the terms of section 71 or section 90 of the Act controlled or negatived an intention to sustain the general power of suspension, i.e., suspension pending orders on an appeal. The High Court thus justified the resolution for the suspenslon of the plaintiff passed by the Board on the 29th January, 1940.\n\nWe are afraid we cannot agree with this line of reasoning adopted by the High Court. The defendants were a Board created by statute and were invested with powers which of necessity had to be found within the four corners of the statute itself.\n\nThe powers of dismissal and suspension given to the Board are defined and circumscribed by the provisions of sections 71 and 90 of the Act and have to be culled out from the express provisions of those sections.\n\nWhen express powers have been given to the Board under the terms of these sections it would not be legitimate to have resort to general or implied powers under the law of master and servant or under section 16 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. Even under the terms of section 16 of that Act, the powers which are vested\n\n' i J\n\nI I\n\nin the authority to suspend or dismiss any person appointed are to be operative only \"unless a different intention . appears\" and such different intention is to be folJ.Ild in the enactment of sections 71 and 90 of the Act which codify the powers of dismissal and suspension vested in the Board. It would be an unwarranted extension of the powers of suspension vested in the Board to read, as the High Court purported to do, the power of suspension of the type 1n question into the words \"the orders of any author- :ity whose sanction is necessary\".\n\nIt was unfortunate that when the Legislature came to amend the old section 71 of the Act it forgot to amend section 90 in conformity with the amendment of section 71.\n\nBut this lacuna cannot be supplied by any such liberal <:011struction as the High Court sought to put upon the\n\napressibn . \"orders of any authority whose sanction is\n\nnecessary\".\n\nNo doubt it is the duty of the court to try to 4armonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature.\n\nBut it is certainly not the <iuty of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provi- .sions of an Act.\n\nReading the present section 71 of the Act along with section 90 of the Act we are of the opinion that the power of suspension of the nature purported to be exercised by the Board in the case before us was not. the power of suspension contemplated in section 90 -sub-section ( 3) of the Act. If the plaintiff allowed the period of one month to expire without preferring an appeal against the resolution to the Government or if the Government passed orders dismissing his appeal, if any, the resolution for his dismissal would become •effective without any sanction of the Government.\n\nThe words used therefore in section 90, sub-section (3)\n\n\"pending the ordern of any authority whose sanction is necessary for his dismlssal\" are inappropriate to the present facts and could not cover the case of a suspension of the nature which was resorted to by the Board on the 29th January, 1940.\n\nWe are therefore of the view that the resolution for suspension which was\n\nShrimatf Hira Devi and Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nShrimati Hira Devi and Others\n\nDistrici Board, Shahiahanpur.\n\nBhagw•ti ].\n\npassed on the 29th January, 1940, was ultra vires the powers of the Board.\n\nWe have accordingly come to the conclusion that the decision reached by the High Court that the resolution for suspension which was passed by the Board on the 29th January, 1940, was valid and bindiog on the plaintiff was erroneous and that the conclusion reached by the trial Court was correct. The learned Solicitor- General appearing for the defendants has however informed us that the sum of Rs. 6,629-4.0 and the proportionate costs which were awarded by the trial Court to the plaintiff have already been paid to the plaintiff.\n\nNothing therefore remains to be recovered by the . heirs and legal representatives of the plaintiff even on the basis that the decree of the trial Court is restored as a result of this judgment of ours ..\n\nThe only thing which therefore survives is the question of the costs of this. appeal. The trial Court had already awarded to the plaintiff proportionatecosts.\n\nThe High Court in reversing the. judgment of the trial Court disrnis.<ed the plaintiff's suit with costs. throughout including the costs of the cross-objections which were filed by the plaintiff. The heirs and legal' representatives of the plaintiff filed the present appeal in regard to the whole claim of the plaintiff as laid in\n\nthe plaint.\n\nThat claim could not be sustained beforeus by the heirs and legal representatives of the plaintiff and they only succeeded before us in regard to the claim of the plaintiff which had been allowed by the trial Court. If an order for proportionate costs. of this appeal were made it would certainly work to the prejudice of the heirs and legal representatives of the plaintiff.\n\nWe are not disturbiog the order which had been made by t11e High Court in regard to tliecosts of t11e appeal before it.\n\nNo time was taken up before us in arguing the appeal on oilier points except the one in regard to the resolution for the suspension of tlie plaintiff being ultra vires and we think that under the circumstances of tlie case tlie proper order to pass in regard to tlie costs of this appeal before us should be tliat each party should bear its own costs.\n\nThe only order which we need pass in this appeal before us under the circumstances i\"' that the appeal ft; allowed, the decree of the trial court is restored, and each party do bear and pay. its own costs of this appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: C. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent : S. S. Shukla.\n\nMOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS\n\nVAKIL AHMED AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nMahomedan Law-Guardianshi[>-De facto guardian-Powers of alienation-Benefit to minor, whether material-Whether transaction can be upheld as family arrangement-marriage--Co-habitation -Presumption of valid marriage.\n\nUnder Mahomedan law a person who has charge of the person or property of a minor without being his legal guardian, i.e., a de facto guardian, has no power to convey to another any right or interest in immoveable property which the transferee can enforce against the minor.\n\nThe question whether the transaction has resulted in a benefit to the minor is immaterial in such cases.\n\nWhere disputes arose, relating to succession to the estate of a deceased Mahomedan between his 3 sons, one of whom was a minor, and other relations, and a deed of settlement embodying an agreement in regard to the distribution of the properties belonging to the estate was executed by and between the parties the eldest son acting as guardian for and on behalf of the minor son : l-I eld, that the deed was not binding on the minor son as his brother was not his legal guardian; as the deed was void it cannot be held as valid merely because it embodied a family arrangement ; and the deed was void not only qua the minor, but with regard to all the parties including those who were sui juris.\n\nlmambandi v. Mutsaddi [1918] 45 I.A. 73 relied on. Mahomed Keramatullah Miah v. Keramatulla\n\n(A.LR. 1919 Cal. 218) and Ameer Hasan v. Md. Ejay Hussain (A.I.R. 1929 Oudh 134) commented upon.\n\nShrimati Hil'a Devi and Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur •.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nOct. 22.", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 302, "end_char": 313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 365, "end_char": 380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 of 52 : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 432, "end_char": 446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28 of 52 : Sardar Bahadur."}}, {"text": "V. P. K. Nambiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 498, "end_char": 515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29 of 52 : V. P. K. Nambiyar."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 729, "end_char": 738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nAgent for the State of Uttar Pradesh : C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "SHRIMA TI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 741, "end_char": 771, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRIMATI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 773, "end_char": 801, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 804, "end_char": 822, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 850, "end_char": 862, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "District Boards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 865, "end_char": 884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 71, 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 898, "end_char": 908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Boards Act", "statute": "District Boards Act"}}, {"text": "Section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1055, "end_char": 1065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Boards Act", "statute": "District Boards Act"}}, {"text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1079, "end_char": 1104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1499, "end_char": 1509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "statute": "District Boards Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1588, "end_char": 1598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "statute": "District Boards Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "sections 71 and 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2141, "end_char": 2159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2288, "end_char": 2298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2350, "end_char": 2360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 71 and 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2574, "end_char": 2592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2815, "end_char": 2852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 5th September, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Waliullah and Sapru JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Waliullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2854, "end_char": 2863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 5th September, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Waliullah and Sapru JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Sapru", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2868, "end_char": 2873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 5th September, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Waliullah and Sapru JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3058, "end_char": 3068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram (N. C. Sen, with him) for the appel~ Ian ts."}}, {"text": "N. C. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3070, "end_char": 3079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram (N. C. Sen, with him) for the appel~ Ian ts."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3115, "end_char": 3129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3131, "end_char": 3144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "High Court qf Judicature at Allaha", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3361, "end_char": 3395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal by the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff against the decree of the High Court qf Judicature at Allaha bad allowing the appeal of the defendants against the decree passed by the Court of the Civil Judge of Shah-\n\n~ jahanpur in favour of the plaintiff allowing the plain tiff's claim in part."}}, {"text": "Kailashi Nath Kapoor", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3590, "end_char": 3610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Kailashi Nath Kapoor, the plaintiff, was employed by the District Board of Shahjahanpur, the defendants, as their Secretary in the year 1924."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Hira Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3765, "end_char": 3783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He 17-10 S. C. India 71\n\n•1952\n\nShrimati Hira Devi and Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur.", "canonical_name": "Shrimati Hira Devi"}}, {"text": "17th December, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A special meeting of the Board was convened on the 17th December, 1939."}}, {"text": "20th January, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4536, "end_char": 4554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A special meeting .of the Board was thereafter convened on the 20th January, 1940."}}, {"text": "29th January, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4687, "end_char": 4705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The resolution for the dismissal of the plaintiff was on the agenda but the meeting had to be adjourned for want of quorum to the 29th January, 1940."}}, {"text": "Section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5158, "end_char": 5168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18776, "end_char": 18795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18821, "end_char": 18831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "sections 71 and 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19079, "end_char": 19097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19504, "end_char": 19514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "section 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19545, "end_char": 19555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19592, "end_char": 19602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "section 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20078, "end_char": 20088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20111, "end_char": 20121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20308, "end_char": 20318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20670, "end_char": 20680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shrimati Hira Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21094, "end_char": 21112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati /.\n\nShrimati Hira Devi and Others\n\nDistrici Board, Shahiahanpur.", "canonical_name": "Shrimati Hira Devi"}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23647, "end_char": 23659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : S. S. Shukla."}}, {"text": "MOHD. AMIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23662, "end_char": 23672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MOHD."}}, {"text": "VAKIL AHMED", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23685, "end_char": 23696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AMIN AND OTHERS\n\nVAKIL AHMED AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23711, "end_char": 23730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR and BHAGWATI JJ.]", "canonical_name": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23732, "end_char": 23746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23748, "end_char": 23753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR and BHAGWATI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Mahomedan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24441, "end_char": 24450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where disputes arose, relating to succession to the estate of a deceased Mahomedan between his 3 sons, one of whom was a minor, and other relations, and a deed of settlement embodying an agreement in regard to the distribution of the properties belonging to the estate was executed by and between the parties the eldest son acting as guardian for and on behalf of the minor son : l-I eld, that the deed was not binding on the minor son as his brother was not his legal guardian; as the deed was void it cannot be held as valid merely because it embodied a family arrangement ; and the deed was void not only qua the minor, but with regard to all the parties including those who were sui juris."}}, {"text": "Shahjahanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25302, "end_char": 25314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shrimati Hil'a Devi and Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur •.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nOct. 22."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_1133_1144_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1133\n\nThe only order which we need pass in this appeal before us under the circumstances i\"' that the appeal ft; allowed, the decree of the trial court is restored, and each party do bear and pay. its own costs of this appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: C. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent : S. S. Shukla.\n\nMOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS\n\nVAKIL AHMED AND OTHERS.\n\n[MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR and BHAGWATI JJ.]\n\nMahomedan Law-Guardianshi[>-De facto guardian-Powers of alienation-Benefit to minor, whether material-Whether transaction can be upheld as family arrangement-marriage--Co-habitation -Presumption of valid marriage.\n\nUnder Mahomedan law a person who has charge of the person or property of a minor without being his legal guardian, i.e., a de facto guardian, has no power to convey to another any right or interest in immoveable property which the transferee can enforce against the minor.\n\nThe question whether the transaction has resulted in a benefit to the minor is immaterial in such cases.\n\nWhere disputes arose, relating to succession to the estate of a deceased Mahomedan between his 3 sons, one of whom was a minor, and other relations, and a deed of settlement embodying an agreement in regard to the distribution of the properties belonging to the estate was executed by and between the parties the eldest son acting as guardian for and on behalf of the minor son : l-I eld, that the deed was not binding on the minor son as his brother was not his legal guardian; as the deed was void it cannot be held as valid merely because it embodied a family arrangement ; and the deed was void not only qua the minor, but with regard to all the parties including those who were sui juris.\n\nlmambandi v. Mutsaddi [1918] 45 I.A. 73 relied on. Mahomed Keramatullah Miah v. Keramatulla\n\n(A.LR. 1919 Cal. 218) and Ameer Hasan v. Md. Ejay Hussain (A.I.R. 1929 Oudh 134) commented upon.\n\nShrimati Hil'a Devi and Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur •.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nOct. 22.\n\niMohd. Amin and Others\n\nv. :Vakil Ahmed and Others.\n\n.Bhagwati /.\n\nUnder Mahomedan law if thexe was no insurmountable obstacle to a marriage and the man and woman had cohabited with each other continuously and for a prolonged period the presumption of lawful marriage would arise and it would be sufficient to establish a lawful marriage between them.\n\nKhaja Hidayut Ool/ah v. Rai fan Khanam (1844, 3 Moo I.A.\n\n295) referred to.\n\nCrv1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1cTION : Civil Appeal No. 51 of 1951.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 11th September, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Brand and Waliullah JJ.) in First Appeal No. 212 of 1942 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 28th February, 1942, of the Court of the Civil Judge of Azamgarh in Original Suit No. 4 of 1941.\n\nS. P. Sinha (Shaukat Hussain, with him) for the appellants.\n\nC. K. Daphtary (Nuruddin Ahmed, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1952. Oct. 22. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad which set aside a decree passed by the Civil Judge of Azamgarh decreeing the plaintiff's claim.\n\nOne Haji Abdur Rahman, hereinafter referred to as \"Haji\" a Sunni Mohammedan, died on the 26th January, 1940, leaving behind him a large estate.\n\nHe left him surviving the plaintiffs 1 to 3, his sons, plaintiff 4 his daughter and plaintiff 5 his wife, defendant 6 his sister, defendant 7 bis daughter, by a predeceased wife Batu! Bibi and defentlants 1 to 4 his\n\nnephws and defendant 5 his grand-nephew.\n\nPlaintiffs case is that immediately after His death the defendant 1 who was the Chairman, Town Area qasba Mubarakpur and a member of the District Boa.rd, Azamgarh and defendant 5 who was an old associate of his started propaganda against them, that they set afloat a rumour to the effect that the plaintifl's 1 to 4\n\n' _f\n\nwere not the legitimate children of Haji and that the plaintiff 5 was not his lawfully wedded wife, that the defendants 1 to 4 set up an oral gift of one-third of the estate in their favour and defendant 5 set up an oral will bequeathing one-third share of the estate to him and sought to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs over the estate and nearly stopped all sources of income.\n\nIt was alleged that under these circumstances a so-called deed of fam'ily settlement was executed by and between the parties on the 5th April,\n\n1940, embodying an agreement in regard to the distribution of the properties belonging to the estate, that plaintiff 3 was a minor of the age of about 9 years and he was represented by the plaintiff 1 who acted as his guardian and exec; uted the deed of settlement for and on his behalf. On these allegations the pla.lntiff filed on the 25th November, 1940, in the Court of Civil Judge of Azamgarh the suit out of which the present appeal arises against the defendants 1 to 5 and defendants 6 and 7 for a declaration that the deed of settlement dated 5th April, 1940, be held to be invalid and to establish their claim to ith.eir 1legiit'im.ate hares in the estate of Haji under Mohammedan law. The defendant 8 a daughter of the plaintiff 5 whose paternity was in dispute was added as a party defendant to the suit, the plaintiffs claiming that she was the daughter of the plaintiff 5 by Haji and the defendants 1 to 5 alleging that she was a daughter of the plaintiff 5 by her former husband Alimullah.\n\nThe only defendaats who contested the claim of the plaintiffs were the defendants 1 to 5.\n\nThey denied that the plaintiff 5 was the lawfully wedded wife and the plaintiffs 1 to 4 were the legitimate children of Haji.\n\nThey also contended that the deed of settlement embodied the terms of a family settlement which had been bona fide arrived at between the parties in regard to the disputed claims tio the estate of Haji and was binding on the plaintiffs.\n\nIt is significanlt to observe that the defendants 6 and 7 who were the admitted heirs of Haji did not contest the plaintiff's claim at all.\n\nMohd. Aminand Others\n\nVakil Ahme~\n\nand Others.\n\nBhagwati f ..\n\nNohd. Amin\n\nand Others\n\nVakil Ahmed\n\nand Others.\n\nBhagwati f.\n\nThe two issues which were mafoly contested before the trial Court were, (1) Whether the plaintiffs 1 to 4 are the legitimate issue of and the plaintiff 5 is the wedded wife of Abdul Rahman deceased ; .\n\n(2) Whether the agreement dated 5th April, 1940, was executed by the plaintiffs after understanding its contents fully or was obtained from them by fraud or undue influence ? Was the said deed insuffi- . ciently stamped?\n\nWas it beneficial to the rrunor plaintiffs?\n\nAs regards the first issue there was no document evidencing the marriage between the plaintiff 5 and Haji. The plaintiff 5 and Haji had however lived together as man and wife for 23 to 24 years and the plaintiffs l to 4 were born of that union. There was thus a strong presumption of the marriage of Ha ii with plaintiff 5 huing taken place and of the legitimacy of plaintiffs 1 to 4.\n\nThe trial Court did not attach any importance to the question of onus or presumption, examined the evidence which was led by both the pames with a view to come to finding in regard to this issue, and found as follows :\n\n\"So far as Musammat Rahima's , marriage with Alimullah or anotl1er Abdul Raliman is concerned the evidence of both the parties stands on the same level and ,, is not worthy of much credit. I have however, not the least hesitation to observe that so far as the oral evidence and the circumstances of the case are concerned, they all favour the plaintiffs.\n\nI, however, find it difficult to 'ignore the testimony of the defendants' witnesses Shah Allaul Haq and Molvi Iqbal Ahmad ................ Owing 'to the voluminous oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs and the circum- . Stances that , apparently favour them, I gave my best attention to this case, but upon a careful consideration of the whole evidence on the record, I am not prepared to hold that the plaintiffs 1 to 4 are the legitimate issues of the plaintiff No. 5, the lawfully wedded\n\nwife of the deceased, Haji Abdul Rahman. I frankly :admit that the matter is not free from difficulty and\n\n~ r I\n\n~ ~\n\nI I,\n\n<loubt but to my mind the scale leans away from the plaintiffs and I am not satisfied that their version is\n\ncorrect.\"\n\nOn the second issue the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the disputed compromise amounted to a family settlement; that is was beneficial to the interests of the minor plaintiff and that it was made by the parie5; :WiUlingly and without any fraud or undue influence. On these findings the suit was dismissed with costs .\n\nThe plaintiffs filed an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.\n\nAfter considering the several authorities on the binding nature of family settlements cited before It, it came to the conclusion that it did not bind the plaintiffs. As regards defendants 1 to 5 'it was held that there was no consideration whatsoever which could in any way support the arrangement.\n\nPlaintiffs 4 and 5 being Purdanashin ladies, it was found that they had no chance at any stage of the transaction of gettilng ilndependent advice in regard to the contents or the affect qf the document which they were executing and that even if the deed were valid otherwise it would not be binding on them.\n\nIt was further held that the plaintiff 3 who would be about 9 years of age at the time of the execution of the deed was re:presentied in the transaction by his brother who could not be tl1e. legal guardian of his property and that the deed in so far as it adversely -affected the interest of plaintiff 3 would not be binding on him. On the question of marriage and legitimacy the High Court came to the conclusion that if the trial Court had considered the question of onus in its proper light and given the plaintiffs the benefit of the initial presumptipn in favour of legitimacy and lawful wedlock under the Mahomedan Law, he would have recorded a finding in their favour.\n\nThe defendants 1 to 5 had alleged that at the time of the commencement of sexual relations between the plaintiff 5 and Haji, plaintiff 5 was the wife of one Alimu!lah who was alive and that therefore the connection between the\n\nMohd. Amin\n\natttl Others\n\nVak_il Ahmed\n\nanti Others.\n\nBhagwati T.\n\nMohd. Amin\n\nantl Others\n\nVakil Ahmed\n\nand Others.\n\nBhagtuati J.\n\nplaintiff 5 and Haji was \"in it:S i>rigin illicit and continued as such, with the result that the presumption in favour of a marriage between the plaintiff 5 and Haji and in favour of the legitimacy of plaintiffs 1 to 4 would_ not arise. The learned trial Judge disbelieved the evidence led by the defendants 1 to 5 in regard ti> this marriage between the plaintiff 5 and Alimullah.\n\nThe High Court upheld the finding and said :-\n\n\"All these circumstances, to my mind, strongly militate against the theory of a first marriage of Musammat Rahima Bibi with the man called Alimullah. In this st:a; te of evidence one cannot but hold that this story of the marnage with Alimullah was purely an after-thought on the part of the defendants I to 5 and it was invented only to get rid of the strong presumption under the Mahomedan law in favour of the paternity of plaintiffs I to 4 and the lawful wedlock of the plaintiff 5.\"\n\nHaving thus discredited the theory of the first marriage of the plaintiff 5 with Alimullah the High Court came to the conclusion that it was fully established that Musarnmat Rahima Bibi was the lawfully wedded wife and that the plaintiffs 1 to 4 are the legitimate children of Haji. The defendants I to 5 obtained leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council and the appeal was admitted on the 10th January, 1947.\n\nShri S. P. Sinha who appeared for the defendants 1 to 5 before us has urged the self-same two questions, namely, ( 1) Whether the deed of settlement is binding on the plaintiffs and (2) Whether the plaintiff 5 was the lawfully wedded wife and the plaintiffs I to 4 are the legitimate children of Haji . . In regard to the first question, it is unnecessary to discuss the evidence in regard to fraud, undue influence, wam of independent advice etc~ as the question in our opinion is capable of being disposed of on a hort point. It is admitted that the plaintiff 3 Ishtiaq Husan was a minor of the age of about 9 years at the date of the deed, and . he was not represented as\n\n.. ,_\n\nl' \\\n\nalready stated by any legal guardian in this arrangement.\n\nThe minor's brother had no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of the minor and such a transfer if made was void. (See Mulla's Mahomedan Law, 13th Edition, page 303, section 364).\n\nReference may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi (1). In that case the mother who was neither the legal guardian of her minor children nor had been appointed their guardian under the Guardian and Wards Act had purported to transfer the shares of her minor children in the property mherited by them from their deceased father. Mr. Ameer Ali who delivered the judgment of the Board observed at page 82 as follows:-\n\n\"The question how far, or under what circumstances according to Mahomedan law, a mother's dealings with her minor child's property are binding on the infant has been frequently before the courts in India.\n\nThe decisions, however, are by no means uniform, and betray two varying tendenci/es : one set of decisions purports to give such dealings a qualified force; the other declares them wholly VQid and ineffective.\n\nIn the former class of cases the main test for determining the validity of the particular transaction has been the benefit resulting from it to the minor; in the latter, the admitted absence of authority or power on the part of the mother to ahenate or incumber the minor's property.\"\n\nThe test of benefit resulting from the transaction to the minor was negatived by the Privy Council and it was laid down that under the Mahomedan law a person who has charge of the person or property of a minor without being his legal guardian, and who may, therefore, be conveniently called a \"de-facto guardian,\" has no power to convey to another any right or interest in immovable property which the transferee can enforce against the infant.\n\n(1) (1918) 45 I.A. 73. 18-10 S. c. India/71\n\nMohd. Amin and Others v.\n\nVakil Ahmed\n\nand Others.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nMohd. Amin\n\naqt/ Others\n\nv. l(.a{il Ah.med\n\nand Others.\n\nBhagw_ati ],\n\nShri S. P. Sinha relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Mahomed Keramutullah Miah v. Keramutulta(') wh, ere it was held that there was nothing in the doctrine of family arrangements opposed to the general principle that when it was sought to bind a minor by an agreement entered into .on his behalf, it .must be shCJ'(>'n that the agreement was for the benefit of the niinor; that if improper advantae had been taken of the minor's position, a family arrangement.._ could be set as1de on the ground of undue\n\nipfluer:c~ or _inequality o~ position or one or other. of the grounds which would v1t1ate such arrangement in the\n\ncae of adults; but where there \\vas no defect of this nattire, the settlement of a •doubtful claim was of as much advantage to a minor as to an adult, and--Wrfere l' genuiri.e dispute had been fairly settled the dispute could not be re-opened solely on the ground that one of the parties to •the 'family arrangement was a\"minor.\n\nThis dedsion was reached .'on the 19th July, 1918, I.e., almost 5 moi=i.ths 1 after the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Col!flcil, but it does .not appear that the ruling ws brought to the notice of the learned Judges qf the. Calcutta High Court.\n\nThe test of the benefit, resulting from the transacti/on to the minor whiFh was n_egatived, by their Lordships of the Privy , Q>, Wlcil }Vas applied, i; y th~ learned Judges of the\n\nGa1cutt~ f{igh Ci>1.!_rf in prder to determine whther the f.amily_, aqangeµient }Vhic~ was the subject-matter of the suit before them wa~ binding on the mii).or.\n\nShri S. P. Sinha next relied upon a decision of the Chief Court of Oudh, Ameer Hasan\n\nv. Md. Ejaz HufCiin(2). ' Iri tht ' ease an agreement to reer to arbittaiion was l!ntered into .by the 'mother for her hlinor' children arid ah' awatd was made by\n\ntlie '.arbitrators.\n\nThe schc!'me of dt'.ribution of :pr~ pfrties. promulgated. in the award was followed without agy qbjeiioq whateyer fo, t a long period extending over 14' yeas :md. proc, eedin¥s . were take~. at the instance f the minors for recovery of p9sessmn by actual partli' tion of their shares in the properties. The Court held ~\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1919 Cal. 218.\n\n(2) A.I.R., 1929 Oudh p4. •\n\nthat the reference to arbitration could not be held bind' ing on the mmors and the award coulsJ not be' held to be an operative document, but if the scheme of distribution promulgated in the ward was In no way. perverse or unfair on i, nf!uenced by any corruption or misconduct of the arbitrators and had been followed without any objection whatever for a long period extending over 14 years; it w0iiJd as well be recognised as a family settlement and the court would be extremely reluctant to disturb the arrangement arriv5!d at so many years ago.\n\nThis line of, reasoning was deprecated by their Lordships of the Priry Council in Indian Law 'Reports 19 Lahore 313 at page 317 where their Lordships observed \"it is, however, argued that the transactioo should be upheld, because it was a family settlement.\n\nTheir Lordships cannot assent to the proposition that a party can, by describing a .con, tract as a family settlement, claim for it an exemption from the law governing \\he capacity. of a person to make a valid contract.\" We are therefore unable to accept this case as an authority for the proposition that a deed of settlement which is. void by reason of the minor not having been propei; ly represented in tl; i.e transaction can be rehabilitated by the adoption of any such line , of reasoning.\n\nIf the deed of settlement was thus .void it could not be vo'd only qua the minor Plaintiff 3 but would be void .al.together qua all the parties including those who were sui juris.\n\nThis position could not be and was , not as a matter of fact contested before us.\n\nThe contention of the defendants 1 to 5 in regard to the lawful weolock between plainfiff . 5 and Haji and the legitimacy of the plai11tiffs 1 to 4 is equally untenable. The plaintiffs had no Cloubt to prove that the plaintiff 5 was the lawfully wedded wife and the plaintiffs l to 4 were the legitimate children of Haji.\n\nBoth the COurts found that the factun1 of the marriage was not proved and the plaintiffs .Ii.ad therefore of necc:Ssity to fall back upon the presnmption of marriage arising in Mahoniedan law. If that presumption of mqrri; ig\\: arose, there would be no difficulty -in\n\nJ9j2\n\nMohd. -Amin\n\nand Othcts\n\nVakjl Ahmed\n\nand 'Others.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nMohd. Amin and Others v.\n\nVakil Ahmed\n\na; id Others.\n\nBhagwatl /.\n\nestablishing the status of the Plaintiffs l to 4 as the legitimate children of Haji because they were admittedly born by the plaintiff 5 to Haji. The presumption of marriage arises in Mahomedan law in the absence of direct proof from a prolonged and oontinual cohabitation as husband and wife.\n\nIt will be apposite in this connection to refer to a passage from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Khajah Hidayut Oollah v. Rai fan Khanum (' ). Their Lordships there quoted a passage from Macnaghten's Principles of Mahomedan Law:-\n\n\"The Mahomedan Lawyers carry this disinclination (that is against bastardizing) much further; they consider it legitimate of reasoning no infer the existence of marriage from the proof of cohabitation.· ...... .\n\nNone but children who are in the strictest sense of the word spurious. are considered incapable of inheriliing the estate of their putative father.\n\nThe evidence of persons, who would, in other cases, be considered incompetent witnesses is admitted to prove wedlock, and, in short, where by any possibility a marriage may be presumed, the law w'1ll rather do so than bastardize the issue, and whether a marriage be simply voidable or void ab initio the offspring of it will be deemed legitimate ...................... This I apprehend, with all due deference, is carrying the doctrine to an extent unwarranted by law; for where children are not born of women proved to be married to their father, or of female slaves to their fathers, some kind of evidence (however slight) is requisite to form a presumption of matrimony .................................. The mere fact of casual concubinage is not sufficient to establish legitimacy; and if there be proved to have existed any in insurmountable obstacle to the marriage of their putative father with their mother, the children, though not born of common women, will be considered bastards to all intents and purposes.\"\n\nTheir Lordships deduced from this Passage the principle that where a child had been born to a father, of a mother where there had been not a mere casual (I) (1844) 3 Moore's Indian Appeals 295 at P. 317.\n\n' ;• A\n\nconcubinage, but a more permanent connection, and where there was no insurmountable obstacle to such a marriage, then according to the Mahomedan Law, the presumption was in favour of such marriage having taken place.\n\nThe presumption m favour of a lawful marriage would thus arise where there was prolonged and continued cohabitation as husband and wife and where there was no insurmountable obstacle to such a marriage, e.g., prohibited relationship between the parties, the woman being an undivorced wife of a husband who was alive and the like. Further illustrations are to be found in the decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 21 Indian Appeals 56 and 37 Indian Appeals 105 where it was laid down that the presumption does not apply Vf the conduct of the parties was incompatible with the existence of the relation of husband and wife nor did it apply if the woman was admittedly a prostitute before she was brought to the man's house (see Mulla's Mahomedan Law, p. 238, section 268).\n\nIf therefore there was no insurmountable obsQacle to such a marriage and the man and woman had cohabited with each other continuously and for a prolonged period the presumption of lawful marriage would arise and it would be sufficient to establish that there was a lawful marriage between them.\n\nThe plaintiff 5 and Haji had been living as man and wife for 23 to 24 yearn openly and to the knowledge of all their relations and friends. The plaintiffs I to 4 were the children born to them. The plaintiff 5, Haji, and the children were all staying in the family house and all the relations including the defendant 1 himself treated the plaintiff 5 as a wife of Haji and the plaintiffs 1 to 4 as his children.\n\nThere was thus sufficient evidence of habit and repute. Haji moreover purchased a house and got the sale deed executed in the names of the plaintiffs I and 2 who were described therein as his sons.\n\nThe evidence which was led by the defendants 1 to 5 to the contrary was dis.- carded by the High Court as of a negative character 19-10 s. a. India/71\n\nMohd. Ami1'\n\nand Others v.\n\nVakil Ahmed and Others.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nMohd. Amin and Others\n\nVakil Ahmed and Others.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nand of no value. Even when the deed of settlement was executed between the parties the plaintiff 5 was described as the widow and plaintiffs 1 to 4 were described as the children of Haji. All these circumstances raised the presumption that the plaintiff 5 was the lawfully wedded wife and the plaintiffs 1 to 4 were the legitimate children of Haji.\n\nThe result therefore is that both the contentions urged by rhe defendants l to 5 against the plaintiffs' claim in suit fail and the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs by the High Court must be affirmed.\n\nIt was however pointed out by Shri S. P. Sinha that the High Court erred in awarding to the plaintiffs mesne profits even though there was no demand for the same in the plaint.\n\nThe learned Solicitor-General appearing for the plaintiffs conceded that there was no demand for mesne profits as such but urged that the claim for mesne profits would be included within the expression \"awarding passession and occupation of the property aforesaid together . with all the rights appertaining thereto.\" We are afraid that the claim for mesne profits cannot be included within this expression and the High Court was in error in awarding to the plaintiffs mesne profits though they had not been claimed in the plaint. The provision in regard to the mesne profits will therefore have to be deleted from the decree. We dismiss the appeal of the defendants l to 5 and affirm the decree passed by the High Coutt in favour of the plaintiffs, deleting therefrom the' provision in regard to mesne profits.\n\nThe plaintiffs will of course be entitled to their costs throughout from the defendants l to 5.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: V.P.K. Nambiyar.\n\nAgent for the respondents: B. P. Maheshwari.\n\nEND OF VoL. III.", "total_entities": 63, "entities": [{"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 301, "end_char": 310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 340, "end_char": 352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : S. S. Shukla."}}, {"text": "MOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 355, "end_char": 376, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VAKIL AHMED AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 378, "end_char": 400, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VAKIL AHMED AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 404, "end_char": 423, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 451, "end_char": 463, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Mahomedan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1134, "end_char": 1143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where disputes arose, relating to succession to the estate of a deceased Mahomedan between his 3 sons, one of whom was a minor, and other relations, and a deed of settlement embodying an agreement in regard to the distribution of the properties belonging to the estate was executed by and between the parties the eldest son acting as guardian for and on behalf of the minor son : l-I eld, that the deed was not binding on the minor son as his brother was not his legal guardian; as the deed was void it cannot be held as valid merely because it embodied a family arrangement ; and the deed was void not only qua the minor, but with regard to all the parties including those who were sui juris."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Hil'a Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1947, "end_char": 1966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shrimati Hil'a Devi and Others\n\nDistrict Board, Shahjahanpur •.\n\nBhagwati /.\n\nOct. 22."}}, {"text": "iMohd. Amin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2035, "end_char": 2046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iMohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Vakil Ahmed", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2063, "end_char": 2074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amin and Others\n\nv. :Vakil Ahmed and Others.", "canonical_name": "VAKIL AHMED AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Brand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2641, "end_char": 2646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 11th September, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Brand and Waliullah JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Waliullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2651, "end_char": 2660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 11th September, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Brand and Waliullah JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Waliullah"}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2845, "end_char": 2856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (Shaukat Hussain, with him) for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "S. P. Sinha"}}, {"text": "Shaukat Hussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (Shaukat Hussain, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2906, "end_char": 2920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (Nuruddin Ahmed, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (Nuruddin Ahmed, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3095, "end_char": 3132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad which set aside a decree passed by the Civil Judge of Azamgarh decreeing the plaintiff's claim."}}, {"text": "Haji Abdur Rahman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3234, "end_char": 3251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Haji Abdur Rahman, hereinafter referred to as \"Haji\" a Sunni Mohammedan, died on the 26th January, 1940, leaving behind him a large estate.", "canonical_name": "Haji Abdur Rahman"}}, {"text": "Batu! Bibi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3553, "end_char": 3563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He left him surviving the plaintiffs 1 to 3, his sons, plaintiff 4 his daughter and plaintiff 5 his wife, defendant 6 his sister, defendant 7 bis daughter, by a predeceased wife Batu!"}}, {"text": "s 1 to 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3941, "end_char": 3949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3993, "end_char": 3997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Plaintiffs case is that immediately after His death the defendant 1 who was the Chairman, Town Area qasba Mubarakpur and a member of the District Boa.rd, Azamgarh and defendant 5 who was an old associate of his started propaganda against them, that they set afloat a rumour to the effect that the plaintifl's 1 to 4\n\n' _f\n\nwere not the legitimate children of Haji and that the plaintiff 5 was not his lawfully wedded wife, that the defendants 1 to 4 set up an oral gift of one-third of the estate in their favour and defendant 5 set up an oral will bequeathing one-third share of the estate to him and sought to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs over the estate and nearly stopped all sources of income.", "canonical_name": "Haji"}}, {"text": "5th April,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4485, "end_char": 4495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that under these circumstances a so-called deed of fam'ily settlement was executed by and between the parties on the 5th April,\n\n1940, embodying an agreement in regard to the distribution of the properties belonging to the estate, that plaintiff 3 was a minor of the age of about 9 years and he was represented by the plaintiff 1 who acted as his guardian and exec; uted the deed of settlement for and on his behalf."}}, {"text": "25th November, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4834, "end_char": 4853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these allegations the pla.lntiff filed on the 25th November, 1940, in the Court of Civil Judge of Azamgarh the suit out of which the present appeal arises against the defendants 1 to 5 and defendants 6 and 7 for a declaration that the deed of settlement dated 5th April, 1940, be held to be invalid and to establish their claim to ith.eir 1legiit'im.ate hares in the estate of Haji under Mohammedan law."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge of Azamgarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4871, "end_char": 4894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these allegations the pla.lntiff filed on the 25th November, 1940, in the Court of Civil Judge of Azamgarh the suit out of which the present appeal arises against the defendants 1 to 5 and defendants 6 and 7 for a declaration that the deed of settlement dated 5th April, 1940, be held to be invalid and to establish their claim to ith.eir 1legiit'im.ate hares in the estate of Haji under Mohammedan law."}}, {"text": "5th April, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5048, "end_char": 5063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these allegations the pla.lntiff filed on the 25th November, 1940, in the Court of Civil Judge of Azamgarh the suit out of which the present appeal arises against the defendants 1 to 5 and defendants 6 and 7 for a declaration that the deed of settlement dated 5th April, 1940, be held to be invalid and to establish their claim to ith.eir 1legiit'im.ate hares in the estate of Haji under Mohammedan law."}}, {"text": "Alimullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5490, "end_char": 5499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant 8 a daughter of the plaintiff 5 whose paternity was in dispute was added as a party defendant to the suit, the plaintiffs claiming that she was the daughter of the plaintiff 5 by Haji and the defendants 1 to 5 alleging that she was a daughter of the plaintiff 5 by her former husband Alimullah.", "canonical_name": "Waliullah"}}, {"text": "Mohd. Aminand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6099, "end_char": 6112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Vakil Ahme~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6121, "end_char": 6132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aminand Others\n\nVakil Ahme~\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "VAKIL AHMED AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Nohd. Amin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6162, "end_char": 6172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati f ..\n\nNohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Abdul Rahman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6401, "end_char": 6413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati f.\n\nThe two issues which were mafoly contested before the trial Court were, (1) Whether the plaintiffs 1 to 4 are the legitimate issue of and the plaintiff 5 is the wedded wife of Abdul Rahman deceased ; .", "canonical_name": "Abdul Raliman"}}, {"text": "Haji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6796, "end_char": 6800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the first issue there was no document evidencing the marriage between the plaintiff 5 and Haji.", "canonical_name": "Haji"}}, {"text": "Ha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6995, "end_char": 6997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was thus a strong presumption of the marriage of Ha ii with plaintiff 5 huing taken place and of the legitimacy of plaintiffs 1 to 4."}}, {"text": "Musammat Rahima", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7312, "end_char": 7327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Court did not attach any importance to the question of onus or presumption, examined the evidence which was led by both the pames with a view to come to finding in regard to this issue, and found as follows :\n\n\"So far as Musammat Rahima's , marriage with Alimullah or anotl1er Abdul Raliman is concerned the evidence of both the parties stands on the same level and ,, is not worthy of much credit.", "canonical_name": "Musarnmat Rahima Bibi"}}, {"text": "Abdul Raliman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7368, "end_char": 7381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Court did not attach any importance to the question of onus or presumption, examined the evidence which was led by both the pames with a view to come to finding in regard to this issue, and found as follows :\n\n\"So far as Musammat Rahima's , marriage with Alimullah or anotl1er Abdul Raliman is concerned the evidence of both the parties stands on the same level and ,, is not worthy of much credit.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Raliman"}}, {"text": "Shah Allaul Haq", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7741, "end_char": 7756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, however, find it difficult to 'ignore the testimony of the defendants' witnesses Shah Allaul Haq and Molvi Iqbal Ahmad ................ Owing 'to the voluminous oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs and the circum- ."}}, {"text": "Molvi Iqbal Ahmad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7761, "end_char": 7778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, however, find it difficult to 'ignore the testimony of the defendants' witnesses Shah Allaul Haq and Molvi Iqbal Ahmad ................ Owing 'to the voluminous oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs and the circum- ."}}, {"text": "Haji Abdul Rahman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8173, "end_char": 8190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, the lawfully wedded\n\nwife of the deceased, Haji Abdul Rahman.", "canonical_name": "Haji Abdur Rahman"}}, {"text": "Mohd. Amin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10324, "end_char": 10334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants 1 to 5 had alleged that at the time of the commencement of sexual relations between the plaintiff 5 and Haji, plaintiff 5 was the wife of one Alimu!lah who was alive and that therefore the connection between the\n\nMohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Vak_il Ahmed", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10350, "end_char": 10362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amin\n\natttl Others\n\nVak_il Ahmed\n\nanti Others.", "canonical_name": "VAKIL AHMED AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10378, "end_char": 10386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati T.\n\nMohd.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "Bhagtuati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10442, "end_char": 10451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagtuati J.\n\nplaintiff 5 and Haji was \"in it:S i>rigin illicit and continued as such, with the result that the presumption in favour of a marriage between the plaintiff 5 and Haji and in favour of the legitimacy of plaintiffs 1 to 4 would_ not arise.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI JJ."}}, {"text": "Alimullah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10828, "end_char": 10837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned trial Judge disbelieved the evidence led by the defendants 1 to 5 in regard ti> this marriage between the plaintiff 5 and Alimullah.", "canonical_name": "Waliullah"}}, {"text": "Musammat Rahima Bibi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10985, "end_char": 11005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court upheld the finding and said :-\n\n\"All these circumstances, to my mind, strongly militate against the theory of a first marriage of Musammat Rahima Bibi with the man called Alimullah.", "canonical_name": "Musarnmat Rahima Bibi"}}, {"text": "Musarnmat Rahima Bibi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11540, "end_char": 11561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having thus discredited the theory of the first marriage of the plaintiff 5 with Alimullah the High Court came to the conclusion that it was fully established that Musarnmat Rahima Bibi was the lawfully wedded wife and that the plaintiffs 1 to 4 are the legitimate children of Haji.", "canonical_name": "Musarnmat Rahima Bibi"}}, {"text": "10th January, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11767, "end_char": 11785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants I to 5 obtained leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council and the appeal was admitted on the 10th January, 1947."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11793, "end_char": 11804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri S. P. Sinha who appeared for the defendants 1 to 5 before us has urged the self-same two questions, namely, ( 1) Whether the deed of settlement is binding on the plaintiffs and (2) Whether the plaintiff 5 was the lawfully wedded wife and the plaintiffs I to 4 are the legitimate children of Haji . .", "canonical_name": "S. P. Sinha"}}, {"text": "Ishtiaq Husan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12352, "end_char": 12365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is admitted that the plaintiff 3 Ishtiaq Husan was a minor of the age of about 9 years at the date of the deed, and ."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12685, "end_char": 12690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Mulla's Mahomedan Law, 13th Edition, page 303, section 364)."}}, {"text": "section 364", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12732, "end_char": 12743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ameer Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13131, "end_char": 13140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ameer Ali who delivered the judgment of the Board observed at page 82 as follows:-\n\n\"The question how far, or under what circumstances according to Mahomedan law, a mother's dealings with her minor child's property are binding on the infant has been frequently before the courts in India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13413, "end_char": 13418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ameer Ali who delivered the judgment of the Board observed at page 82 as follows:-\n\n\"The question how far, or under what circumstances according to Mahomedan law, a mother's dealings with her minor child's property are binding on the infant has been frequently before the courts in India."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Amin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14409, "end_char": 14419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18-10 S. c. India/71\n\nMohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "l(.a{il Ah.med", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14502, "end_char": 14516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amin\n\naqt/ Others\n\nv. l(.a{il Ah.med\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14592, "end_char": 14611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagw_ati ],\n\nShri S. P. Sinha relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Mahomed Keramutullah Miah v. Keramutulta(') wh, ere it was held that there was nothing in the doctrine of family arrangements opposed to the general principle that when it was sought to bind a minor by an agreement entered into .on his behalf, it .must be shCJ'(>'n that the agreement was for the benefit of the niinor; that if improper advantae had been taken of the minor's position, a family arrangement.._ could be set as1de on the ground of undue\n\nipfluer:c~ or _inequality o~ position or one or other."}}, {"text": "19th July, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15556, "end_char": 15571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This dedsion was reached .'on the 19th July, 1918, I.e., almost 5 moi=i.ths 1 after the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Col!flcil, but it does .not appear that the ruling ws brought to the notice of the learned Judges qf the."}}, {"text": "Chief Court of Oudh, Ameer Hasan\n\nv. Md. Ejaz HufCiin(2", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16176, "end_char": 16231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri S. P. Sinha next relied upon a decision of the Chief Court of Oudh, Ameer Hasan\n\nv. Md. Ejaz HufCiin(2). '"}}, {"text": "Mohd. -Amin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18942, "end_char": 18953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that presumption of mqrri; ig\\: arose, there would be no difficulty -in\n\nJ9j2\n\nMohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Vakjl Ahmed", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18967, "end_char": 18978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-Amin\n\nand Othcts\n\nVakjl Ahmed\n\nand 'Others.", "canonical_name": "VAKIL AHMED AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19581, "end_char": 19591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships there quoted a passage from Macnaghten's Principles of Mahomedan Law:-\n\n\"The Mahomedan Lawyers carry this disinclination (that is against bastardizing) much further; they consider it legitimate of reasoning no infer the existence of marriage from the proof of cohabitation.· ...... ."}}, {"text": "section 268", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22213, "end_char": 22224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mohd. Ami1", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23288, "end_char": 23298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence which was led by the defendants 1 to 5 to the contrary was dis.- carded by the High Court as of a negative character 19-10 s. a. India/71\n\nMohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. AMIN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "V.P.K. Nambiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25109, "end_char": 25124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: V.P.K. Nambiyar."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25154, "end_char": 25170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: B. P. Maheshwari."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_218_240_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Jan. 21.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nN. P. PONNUS\\V AMI\n\nti.\n\nRETURNING OFFICER, NAMAKKAL\n\nCONSTITUENCY and OTHERS\n\n[1952J\n\nUNION OF INDIA and STATE OF MADHYA\n\nBHARA T-INTERVENERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SAsTRr C.J., FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India Arts. 226, 324 to 329-Representation of the People Act, 1951, ss. 36, 80--Election to Legislatures-Rejection of nomination paper-Applicati-on to High Court for writ of certiorari -Maintainability-..furisdiction of High Court-Meaning of \"election\" and \"questioning election\"-Poli\"cy of Legislature with regard to elections-Special remedies.\n\nArticle 329 (b) of the Constitution of India provides that \"no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for, by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature.\" The Representation of the People Act, 1951, which made detailed provisions for election to the various Legislatures of the country also contains a provi~ sion (sec. 80) that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provi~ sions of the Act.\n\nThe appellant\\ who was a candidate for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Madras_ and whose nomination paper was rejected by the Returning Officer, applied to the High Court of Madras under article. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari' to quash the order of the Returning Officer rejecting his nomination paper and to direct the Returning Officer to include his name in the list of valid nominations to be published: Held by the Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI, C. J., FAZL Au,\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA,\n\nDAS and\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR.A AiYAR JJ.) that in view of the provisions of articles 329 (b) of the Constitution and sec. 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Returning Officer.\n\nThe word uelection\" has by long usage in connection with the process of selection of proper representatives in democratic institutions acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the\n\nnarrow sense it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate 1952 which may embrace the. result of the poll when there is polling or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is N. P. Ponnuno poll. In the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire f.Wam1 process culminating in a candidate being declared elected and it\" .v. is in this wide sense that the word is used in Part XV of the Returmng Officer, Constitution in which article 329 (b) occurs.\n\nNamak, k, al Constituency a1ld The scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Repre- Others. sentation of the People Act, 1951,' seems to . be that any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up' only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any court.\n\nUndl:r the election law, the only significance which the rejection of a nomination paper has, consists in the fact that it can be used as a ground to call the election in question. _Article 329 (b) was apparently enacted to preS<:ribe the manner in which and the stage at which this ground, anel other grounds which inay be raised under. the \\aw to call the election in question., could be urged.\n\nIt follows by necessary implication from the language of this provision that those grounds cannot be urged in any . other manner, at any other stage and before any other court. If tl1e grounds oh .which. an election can be called in question could be raised at an earlier stage and errors, if any, are rectified, there will be no meaning in enacting a provision like article 329 (b) and in setting up a special tribunal.\n\nAny other meaning ascribed to the words used in the article would lead to anomalies, which the Constitution col, lld not have contemplated, one of them being that canflicting views may be expressed by the High Court at the pre-polling stage and by the election tribunal whicli is to be an independent body, at the stage when the matter is brought up before it.\n\nTherefore, questioning the rejection of a nomination paper is \"questioning. the election\" within the meaning of article 329 (b) of the Constitu- \\ tion and sec. 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.\n\nHaving regard to the important functions which tlie legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognized to be a matter of first importance tliat elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time S<:hedule and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after tlie elections are over, . so tliat the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted. In conformity with this principle, the sclieme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attaclied to anything which does not affect the \"election\"; and if any irregularities are committed while, it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the \"election\" and enable the persons . affected rn\n\n8:.....3 S. C. India/71\n\n1952 call it in qustion, they should be brought up before a special tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the N. P: Ponnu subject of a dispute before any court while the election is in swami progress.\n\nReturning Of/k.r, Th . h J d\"d f 1 · e rig t to vote or stan as a can i ate or e ection ts not a N, v.kkal civil right but is a creature of statute or specjal law and n1ust be Co ::a c an J subject to the limitations imposed by it.\n\nStrictly speaking, it ns ~,:; Y ' is the sole rightof the Legislature to examine and determine all\n\n'S. matters relating to the election of its own members, and if the legislature takes it out of its own hands and vests in a special tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdiction, that special jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with the law which creates it.\n\nWhere a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that\n\nstatute only must be availed of.\n\nWolverhampton New Water 'Works Co. v. Hawkesford [6 C. B. -(N. S.) 336], Neville v. London Express Newspaper Limited ([1919] A. C. 368), Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co. ([1935] A. C. 532), Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. ( 44 C. W. N. 709), Hurdutrai v. Official Assignee of Calcutta (52\n\nC. W. N. 343), Theberge v. Laudry (1876, 2 App. Cas. 102) referred to.\n\nJudgment of the l-Iigh Court of Madras affirmed.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTioN : Case No. 351 of 1951.\n\nAppeal under article 132 of the Constitution from the Judgment and Order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Subba Rao and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ.) dated 11th December, 1951, in Writ Petition No. 746 of 1951. The facts of the case and arguments of the counsel are set out in detail in the judgment.\n\nN. Rajagopal Iyengar, for the appellant.\n\nR. Ganapathi Iyer, for the 1st respondent.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the Union of India.\n\nK. A. Chiklle, Advocate-General of Madhya Bharat. -(G. N. foshi; with him) for the State of Madhya Bharat.\n\n1952. January 21.\n\nFaz! Ali J. delivered as follows.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. J.\"Mahajan, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. agreed. .Ali J.\n\nJudgment Mukherjea, with Faz!\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal from an order of the Madras High Court dismissing the petition of the .appellant praying for a writ of certiorari.\n\nThe appellant was one of the persons who had filed nomination papers for election to the Madras Legislative Assembly fro111 the Namal<lkal Constituency in Salem district.' On the 28th November, . 1951, .the Returning\n\nOfficer for that constituency took up for scrutiQy the nomination papers filed by the various candidates and on the same day he rejected the appellant's nomination paper on certain grouns wich 1 need' not be set out as they are .not material to the point raised in this\n\naweal. . The appellant thereupon moved the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Returning Officer rejecting his nomination paper and to dim:t the Returning Officer to include his name in the list of valid nominations to be published.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the appellant's application on the. ground that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Returning Officer by reason of the provisions of article 329(b) of the Constitution.\n\nThe :appellant's contention in this appeal is that the view .expressed by the High Court is not correct, that the jurisdiction of the High Court is not affected by article 329 (b) of the Constitution and that he was entitled to a writ o£ certiorari in the circumstances of the case.\n\nBroadly speaking, the arguments on whih the judgment of the High Court is assailed are two-fold :-\n\n(1) that the conclsion 'arrived at by the High Court does not follow from the language of article 329\n\n(b) of the Constitution, whether that article is . read by itself or along with the other articles in Part XV of the Constitution : anrl\n\n(2) that the anomalies which will arise if the construction put by the High Court on article 329 (b) is accepted, are so startling that the courts should lean in favour of the construction put forward on behalf of the appellant. 29\n\nN. P. Ponnu\n\nswami\n\nv. -Returning Officer,\n\nNamakkfd Constituency and\n\n. Others.\n\nFazl Ali f.\n\n1952 The first argument which turns on the contruction of article 329(b) requires serious consideration, but I N. P. Ponnuthink the secon.d argument can be disposed of briefly Jtuami\n\nT. at the outset.\n\nIt should be stated that what the appel- Returning Officer, !ant chooses to call anomaly can be more appropriately Namakkal described as hardship or prejudice and what their Constituency and nature will be has been stated in forceful language by Otlii:rs.\n\nFaz/ Ali /. Wallace J. in Sarvothama Rao v. Chairman, Municipal\n\nCouncil, Saidapet(') in these words :- '\n\n\"I am quite clear that any post-election remedy is wholly inadequate to afford the relief which the petitioner seeks, namely, that. this election, now published be stayed, until it can be held with himself as candidate.\n\nIt is no consolation to tell him that he can stand for some other election.\n\nIt is no remedy to tell him that he must let the election go on and then have it set aside by petition and have a fresh election ordered.\n\nThe fresh election may be under altogether different conditions and may bring forward an array of fresh candidates. The petitioner can only have his proper relief if the proposed election without him is stayed until his rejected nomination is restored, and hence an injunction staying this election was absolutely necessary, unless the relief asked for was to be denie<l him altogether in limine. In most cases of this kind no doubt there will be difficulty for the aggrieved party to get in his suit in time before the threatened wrong is committed ; but when he has succeeded in so doing, the Court cannot stultify itself by allowing the wrong which it is asked to prevent to be actually consummated while it is engaged in trying the suit.\"\n\nThese observations however represent only one side of the picture and the same learned Judge presented the other side of the picture in a subsequent case [Desi Chettiar v. Chinttasami Chett1ar(2 )] in the following passage:-\n\n\"The petitioner is not without his remedy.\n\nHis remedy lies in an election. petition which we understand he has already put in. It is argued for him\n\n(1) (1924) IL.R. 47 Mad. 585. at 600.\n\n(2) (1928) A.I.R. Mad. 1271 at 1272.\n\n...\n\nthat that remedy which 'merely allows him to have set .aside an election once held is not as efficacious as the one which .would enable him to stop the. election altogether'; and certain observations at p. 600 of Sar-- voihama Rao v. Chairman, Municipal Council, Saidapet(1) are quoted.\n\nIn the first place, we do not see how the mere fact that thi: petitioner cannot get the election stopped and has his remedy only after it is -0ver by an election petition, will in itself confer on him any right to obtain a writ. In the second place, these observations were directed to the consideration Qf the propriety of an injunction in a civil suit, a matter with which we are not here concerned. And finally it may be observed that these remarks were made some years ago when the practice of individuals coming forward to stop elections in order that their own individual interest may be safeguarded was not so common. It is clear that there is another side of the question to be considered, namely, the i inconvenience to the public administration of having elections and the business of \"Local Boards held up while individuals prosecute their individual grievances.\n\nWe understan~ the election for the elective seats in this Union has been held up since 31st May because of this petition, the result being that the electors have been unable since then to have any representation on the Board, and .the Board is functioning, if indeed it is functioning, . with a mere nominated fraction of its total strength; and this state of affairs the petitioner proposes to have continued until his own personal griev- ;; mce is' satisfied.\"\n\nThese obser¥ations which were made in regard to e1ections to Local Boards will apply with greater force to elections to legislat\\Jres, because it does not require much argument to show that in a country with a Aemocratic constitution in which the legislatures have to play a very important role, 1t will lead to serious consequences if the elections are unduly protracted or obstructed .. To this. aspect of the matter I shall have to\n\n.advrt later, but , it .is sufficient for the present purpose\n\n(1) ( 1924) I.L.R. 47 Mad. 585 at 600.\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami v.\n\nReturning Officer,\n\n Namakkal .\n\nConstituency and\n\nOthers.\n\nFazl Ali /.\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami\n\nReturnint Of!icet,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nOthers.\n\nFaz/ Ali/.\n\nto state firstly that in England the hardship and inconvenience which rnay be suffered by an individual candidate has not been regarded as of sufficient weight to induce Parliament to make provision for immediate relief and the aggrieved candidate has tc> wait_ until after the election to challenge the validity of the rejection of his nomination paper, and secondly, that the question of hardship or inconvenience is after all . only a secondary question, because if the construction put by the High Court on article 329 (b) of the Constitution is found to be correct, the fact that such construction will lead to hardship and inconvenience becomes irrelevant.\n\nArticle 329 is the last article in Constitution the heading of which it runs as follows :-\n\nPart XV of the is \"Elections\", and\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution-- ( a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purporting to be made under article 327 or article 328, shall not be called in question in any court ;\n\n(b) no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for, by, or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature.\"\n\nIn construing this article, reference was made by both parties in the course of their arguments to the other articles in the same Part, namely, articles 324, 325, 326, 327 and 328.\n\nArticle 324 provides for the constitution and appointment of an Elecetion Commissioner to superintend, direct and control elections to the legislatures ; article 325 prohibits discrimination against electors on the ground of religion, race, ca<te or sex ; article 326 provides for adult suffrage ; article 327 empowers Parliament to pass laws making provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the legislatures, subject\n\nto the provisions of the Constitution ; and article 328 is a complementary article giving power to the State Legislature to make provisions with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the State Legislature.\n\nA notable difference in the language used in articles 327 and 328 -on the one hand, and article 329 on the other, is that while the first two articles begin with the words \"subject to the pro. visions of this Constitution\", the last article begins with -the words \"nothwithstanding anything in this Constitution.\" It was conceded at the bar that the effect of this difference in language is that whereas any law made by Parliament under article 327, or by the State Legislatures' under article 328, cannot exclude _ the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution, that jurisdiction is excluded in regard to matters provi<}ed Jor in article 329.\n\nNow, the main controversy in this appeal centres round the meaning of the words \"no election shall be called in question except by an election petition'~ in article 329(b ), and the point to be decided is wheter questioning the action of the Returning Officer in rejecting a nomination paper can be said to be comprehended within the words, \"no election shall be called in question.\" The appellant's case is that questioning something which has happened before a candidate is dedared elected is not the same thing as questioning an election, and the arguments advanced on his bebalf in support of this construction were these :-\n\n(1) That the word \"election\" as used in article 329(b) means what it normally and etymologically means, namely, the result of polling or he final selection of a candidate ; • (2) That the fact that an election petition can be filed only after polling is over or after a candidate is declared elected, and what is normally called in question by such petition is the final result, bears out the contention that the word \"election\" can have no other meaning in article 329\n\n(b) than the result of polling or the final selection of a candidate ; -\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami\n\nReturning Otficn-,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nOthers.\n\nFnl Ali/.\n\n(3) That the words \"arising out of or in connection with\" which are used in article 324(1) and the words N. P. Ponnu- \"with respect to all matters relating to, or in connecswam1 tion with\" which are used in articles 327 and 328, v.\n\nReturning Officer, show that the framers of the Constitution knew that it Namakkal was necessary to use different languages when referring Constituency and respectively to matters which happen prior to and Others. after the result of polling, and if they had intended Fazl Ali /. to include the rejection of a nomination paper within the ambit of the prohibition contained in article 329\n\n(b) they would have used similar language in that article ; and\n\n( 4) That the action of the Returning Officer in rejecting a nomination paper can be questioned before the High Court under article 226 of . the Constitution for the following reason :-Scrutiny of nomination papers and their rejection .are provided for in section 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Parliament has made this provision in exercise of the powers c0nferred on it by article 327 of the Constitutio11 which is \"subject to the provisions of the Constitution\".\n\nTherefore, the action of the Returning Officer is subject to the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226.\n\nThese arguments appear . a~ first sight to be quite impressive, but in my opm1on there are weightier and basically more important arguments in support of the view taken by the High Court.\n\nAs we have seen, the most important question for determination is the meaning to be given to the word \"election\" in article 329 (b).\n\nThat word has by long usage in <:onnection with the process of selection of proper representatives in democratic institutions, acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning.\n\nIn the narrow sense, it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate which may embrace the result of the poll when there is polling or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is no poll.\n\nIn the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared\n\nI J\n\n:S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT ~EPORTS 227\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami v.\n\nelected. In Srinivasalu v. 1;..uppuswami(1), the learned Judges of the Madras High Court after examining the question, expressed the opinion that : the term \"election\" may be taken to embrace the whole procedure where by an \"elected member\" is returned, whether or not it be found necessary to take a poll. With this\n\nview, my brother, Mahajan J. expressed his agreement .in Sat Narain v. Hanuman Pramd(2) ; and I also find myself iJ1 agreement with it. It seems to me that the word \"election\" has been used in Part XV of the Constitution in the wide sense, that is to say, to con- .note the entire procedure to be gone through to return .a candidate to the legislature. The use of the expres-\n\nReturning Officer,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nOthe1s.\n\n.. sion \"conduct of elections\" in article 324 specifically points to the wide meaning, and that meaning can also be read consistently into tile other provisions which •occur in Part XV including article 329 (b). That the word \"election\" bears this wide meaning whenever we :talk, of elections in a democratic country, is borne out by the fact that in most of the books on the subject :and in several cases dealing . with the matter, one of the questions mooted is, when the election begins.\n\nThe -subject is dealt with quite concisely in Ha1sbury's Laws of England in the following passage(3) under the .beading \"Commencement of the Election\" :-\n\n\"Although the first formal step in every election is the issue of the writ, the election is considered for some _purposes to begin at an earlier date. It is a question d fact in each case when an election begins in such a way as to make the parties concerned responsible for breaches of election law, the test being whether the .contest is \"reasonably imminent\".\n\nNeither the issue of :the writ nor the publication of the notice of election can be looked to as fixing the date when an election begins from this point of view. Nor, again, does the nomination day afford any criterion. The election. will usually begin at least earlier than the issue of the writ. 'The question when the election begins . must be care-\n\n( 1) (1928) A.LR. Mad. 253 at 255.\n\n(2) (1945) A.LR. Lah. 85.\n\n(3) See page 237 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd edition, Volume 12.\n\nFaz/ Ali f.\n\nN. P. Ponnu-\n\nJWami\n\nReturning Officer,\n\nNamak._k._al ( onstituency and\n\nOt, hers.\n\nFazl Ali ].\n\nfully distinguished from that as to when \"th~ conduct and management of\" an election may be said to begin.\n\nAgain, the question as to when a particular person commences to be a candidate is a question to be considered in each case.\"\n\nThe discussion in this passage makes it clear that the word \"election\" can be and has been appropriately used with reference to the entire process which consists. of several stages and embraces many steps, some of which may have an important bearing on the result of the process.\n\nThe next important question to be considered 1s what is meant by the words \"no election shall be called in question\".\n\nA reference to any treatise on elections in England will show that an election proceeding in that country is liable to be assailed on very limited grounds, one of them being the improper rejection of a nomination paper. The law with which we are concerned is not materially different, and we find that in section 100 of the Representation of the People\n\nAct, 1951, one of the grounds for declaring an election to be void is the improper rejection of a nomination paper.\n\nThe question now arises whether the law of elections in this country contemplates that there should be two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts having been expressly excluded), and another\n\nafter they have been completed by means of an elec-· tion petition.\n\nIn my opinion, to affirm such a position would be contrary to the scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act,. which, as I shall point out lateq seems to be that any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any court. It seems to me that under the elec-·\n\ntion law, the only significance which the rejection of\n\n\\ -~ I\n\na nominatiorl: paper . has consists in the fact that it 1952 can be used as a ground to call the election m question.\n\nArticle 329(b) was apparently enacted to N. ~~::riu· prescribe the manner in which and the stage at which v. this ground, and other. grounds which may be raised Returning Office1',\n\nunder the law to call the electio11 in question, Nmakkal d could be urged. I think it follows by necessary im- Consigu; ncyan plication from the language of this provision\n\n1 ers. that those grounds cannot be urged in any other Faz/ dli /,· manner, at any other stage and before any other court.- If the grounds on which an election can be called .irr question could be raised at an earlier stage and errors,, if any, are rectified, there will be no meaning in enact-' ing a provision like article 329(b) and in setting' up a special tribunal. Any other meaning ascribed to the words used' in the article would lead to anomalies, which the Constitution could not have contemplated,, one of them being that conflicting views may be expressed by the High Court at the pre-polling stage and by the election tribunal, which is to be an independent body, at the stage when the matter is brought up before it.\n\nI think that a brief examination of the scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation. of the People Act, 1951, will show that the construction I have suggested is the correct one.\n\nBroadly speaking, before an election machinery can be brought into operation, there are three requisites which , requii;-e\n\nto be attended to, namely, (1) there should be a set of laws and rules making provisions with respect to all matters relating . to, or in connection with, elections, and it should be decided as to how these laws and rules are to be made; (2) there should be an executive charged with the duty of securing the due conduct of elections; and (3) there should be a judicial tribunal to deal with disputes arising out of or in connection with elections.\n\nArticles 327 and 328 deal with the first of these requisites, article 324 with the second ai1d article 329 with the third requisite.\n\nThe other two articles in Part . XV, viz., articles 325 and 326, deal with two matters of principle to which the Constiu tion-fotmers have attached much importance.\n\nThey 30\n\n1952 are :-( 1) prohibition against discrimination in the preparation of, or eligibility for inclusion m, the N. P. Ponnuelectoral rolls, on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex swatnt v. or any of them ; and (2) adult suffrage. Part XV of Returning Officer, the Constitution is really a code in itself providing Namakkal the entire ground-work for enacting appropriate laws Constituency and and setting up suitable machinery for the conduct of Others.\n\nFaz/ Ali f.\n\nelections.\n\nThe Representation of the People Act, 1951, which was passed by Parliament under article 327 of the Constitution, makes detailed provisions in regard to all matters and all stages connected with elections to the various legislatures in this country.\n\nThat Act is divicjed into 11 parts, and it is interesting to see the wide variety of subjects they deal with.\n\nPart II deals with \"the qualifications and disqualifications for membership'', Part III deals with the notification of General Elections, Part IV provides for the administrative machinery for the conduct of elections, and Part V makes provisions for the actual conduct of elections and deals with such matters as presentation of nomination papers, requirements of a valid nomination, scrutiny of nominations, etc., and procedure for polling and counting of votes.\n\nPart VI deals with disputes regarding elections and provide~ for the manner of presentation of election petitions, the constitution of election tribunals and the trial of ekction petitions. Part VII outlines the various corrupt and illegal practices which may affect the elections, and electqral offences.\n\nObviously, the Act is a self-contained enactment so far as elections are concerned, which means that whenever we have to ascertain the true position in regard to any matter connected with elections, we have only to look at the Act and the rules . made thereunder. The provisions of the Act which are material to the present discussion are sectioru 80, 100, 105 and 170, and the provisions of Chapter I.I of Part IV dealing with the form of election petitions, their contents and the reliefs which may be sought in them. Section 80, which is drafted in almost the same language as article 329(b), provides that \"no election shall be called m question except by an election\n\n\\..\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS 231\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami\n\npetition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part\". Section 100, as we have already seen, provides for the grounds on which an election may be , called in question, one of which is the imriroper rejection of a nomination paper.\n\nSection 10) says that \"every order 'of the Tribunal made under this Act shall be final and conclusive\".\n\nSection 170 provides that \"no civil court shall have jurisdiction to question the legaiity of any action taken or of any decision given by the Returning Officer or by any other person appointed under this. Act in connection with an election.\" These are the roam provisions regarding election matters being judicially dealt with, and it should be noted that there is no provision anywhere to the effect that anything connected with elections can be\n\nReturning Officer~\n\nN11mak, k, al Constituency and\n\nOthers.\n\n questioned at an intermediate stage.\n\nIt is now well-recognized that where a right of liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes J. in WoltJerhampton -New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford( 1 ) in the following passage :-\n\n\"There are three dasses of cases in which a liability may b~ established founded upon statute.\n\nOne is, where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and , peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law; 'there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the co, nimon law remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue, either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy~ there,_ the party can only proceed by action . at common law.\n\nBut there is a third class, tJiz,, where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. . . . . . . . . . The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not\n\n(l) 6 C.B. (N.S.) 336, 356.\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\nN. P. Ponnustvami\n\ncompetent to the party t~ pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.\n\nThe form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.\"\n\n/.?.<turning Officer,\n\nNamakkal\n\nl~'(Jnstztuency and\n\nOther;.\n\nThe rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v.\n\nLondon Express Newspaper Limited(') and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v.\n\nGordon Grant & Co.(') and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.(3 ) ; and it has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights : see Hurdutrai v.\n\nOfficial Assignee of Calrntta(•).\n\nThat being so, I think it will be a fair inference from the provisions of the Representation of the People Act to state that the Act provides for only one remedy, that remedy being by an election petition to be presented after the election is over, and there is no remedy provided at any intermediate stage.\n\n.Fa~I Ali f.\n\nIt was argued that since the Representation of the People Act was enacted subject to the provisions of the Constitution, it cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the -Constitution.\n\nThis argument however is completely shut out by reading the Act along with article 329(b).\n\nIt will be noticed that the language used in that article and in section 80 of the Act is almost identical, with 1:his difference only that the article is preceded by the words \"notwithstanding anything in this Constitution\". I think that those words are quite apt to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with any matter which may arise while the elections are in progress.\n\nIt may be stated that section 107(1) of the Representation of People Act, 1949 ( 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 68) in England is drafted almost in the same language as article 329(b). That section runs thus:\n\n\"No parliamentary election and no return to Parliament shall be questioned except by a petition complaining of <tll undue election or undue return (hereinafter referred to as a parliamentary election petition) '.Presented in accordance with this Part of this Act.\" .\n\n(1) [1919] A.C. 368.\n\n(3) (1940) 44 C.W.N. 709.\n\n{?) [1935] A.C. 532.\n\n( 4) (1948) 52 C.W.N. 343, 349.\n\n,..\n\nt •\n\n':S.C.R.-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 233\n\n1$52\n\nN. P. Ponnu-·\n\nswami\n\nIt appears that similar language was used in the earlier statutes, and it is noteworthy that it has never been held in England that the improper rejection of a nomination paper can be the subject of a writ of certiorari or mandamus. On the other hand, it was conceded at the bar that. the question of improper rejection of a.nomination paper has always been brought up in that country before the appropriate tribunal by means of an election petition after the conclusion of the election. It is true that there is no direct dedsfon\n\nholding that the words used in the' relevant provisions exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue ap- _propriate prerogative writs at an intermediate stage of the election, but the total absence of any such decision can be accounted for only on the view that the provi- ::1ions in question have been generally understood'to have that effect.\n\nOur attention .was drawn to rule 13 ot the rules appended to the Ballot Act of 1872 and a similar rule in the Parliamentary Elections Rules of _ 1949, providing that the decision of the Returning Officer <lisallowing an objection to a nomination paper shall be final, but allowing the same shall be subject to reversal on a petition questioning the election or return.\n\nThese rules however do not affect the main argument.\n\nI think it can be Iegitim_ately stated that 1f words similar to those used in article 329 (b) have .been consistently treated in England as words apt to\n\nexclude the jurisdiction of the CQJtrts including the High Court, the same consequence must follow from the words used in article 329(b) of the Constitution. fhe words \"notwithstanding anything in this Constitution\" give to that article the same wide and binding effect as a statute passed by a sovereign legislature like the English Parliament.\n\nReturning Officer,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nOthers:\n\nIt may be pointed out that article 329(b) must be . read as complimentary to clause (a) of that ;µ-tide.\n\nClause (a) bars the jurisdiction of the courts with regard to such law as may be made under articles_327 and 328 relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies. . It was conceded before us that article 329(b) ousts the jurisdiction of the courts with regard to matters\n\nFflzl Ali /.\n\n1952 ansmg between the commencement of the polling and the final selection. The question which has to be asked N. ~~::.?nuis what conceivable reason the legislature could have v. had to leave only m:itters connected with nominations Returning Officer, subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Namak/r..ol article 226 of the Constitution. If Part XV of the Constituency and Constitution is a code by itself, i.e., it creates rights.\n\nOthers. d \"d f h . fo b . l an prov1 es or t e1r en rcement y a specia .\n\nFazl Ali /. tribunal to the exclusion of all courts includ:ng the High Court, there can be no reason for assuming that the Constitution left one small part of the election process to be made the subject-matter of contest before. the High Courts and thereby upset the time-schedule of the elections.\n\nThe more reasonable view .seems to be that article 329 covers all \"electoral matters\".\n\nThe conclusions which I have arrived at may be summed up briefly as follows : - ( 1) Having regard to the important functions. which the legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always been recognized to be a: matter of first importance that elections should be concluded as early as possible according to time schedule and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after the elections are over, so that the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or protracted.\n\n(2) In conformity with this principle, the scheme of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to anything which does not affect the \"election\"; and if any irregularities are committed while it is in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect of vitiating the \"election\" and enable the person affected to call it in question, they should be brought up before a special tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the subject of a dispute before any court while the election is in progress.\n\nIt will be useful at this stage to refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Theberge\n\nv. Laudry('). The\n\n. (1) (1876) 2 App. Cas. 102.\n\n. .\n\n...\n\npetitioner in that case having been declared duly elected a member to represent an electoral district in the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Quebc:c, his election was afterwards, on petition, declared null and void by judgment of the Superior Court, under the Quebec Controverted Elections Act, 1875, and himself declared guilty of corrupt practices, both personally and by his agents.\n\nThereupon, he applied for special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, but it was refused on the ground that the fair construction of the Act of 1875 and the Act of 1872 which preceded it providing among other things that the judgment of the Superior Court \"shalf not be susceptible of appeal\" was that it was the intention of the legislature to create a tribunal for the purpose of trying election petitions in a manner which should make its decision final for all purposes, and should not annex to it the incident of its judgment being reviewed by the Crown under its prerogative.\n\nIn delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, Lord Cairns observed as' follows :-\n\n\"These two Acts of Parliament, the Acts of 1872 and 1875, are Acts peculiar in their character.\n\nThey are not Acts constituting or providing for the decision of mere ordinary civil rights ; they are Acts creating an entirely new, and up to that time unknown, jurisdiction in a particular Court ..... for the purpose of taking out, with i~ own consent, of the Legislative Assembly, and vesting in that Court, that very peculiar jurisdiction which, up to that time, had existed in the Legislative Assembly of deciding election petitions, and determining the status of those who claimed to be members of the Legislative Assembly.\n\nA jurisdiction of that kind is extremely special, and one of the obvious incidents or consequences of rnch a jurisdiction must be that the jurisdiction, by whomsoever it is to he exercised, should be exercised in a way that should as soon as possible become conclusive; and enable the constitution of the Legislative Assembly to be distinctly and speedily known.\" 9-3 S. c. Iuctia/71\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami\n\nRetur.ning Officer,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nnthers.\n\nFaz! Ali{.\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami\n\nAfter dealing with certain other matters, the Lord Chancellor proceeded to make the following further observations :-\n\nR . v. 0 \"Now, the subject-matter, as has been said, of the eturmng fficer, l . l . l 1.\n\nI Namakkal gts at10n IS •. extreme y pecu iar. t concerns the Constituency and nghts and prmleges of the electors and of the Legisla-\n\nOthers. tive Assembly to which they elect members.\n\nThose rights and privileges have always in every colony, Fazl Ali /. following the example of the mother country, been jealously maintained and guarded by the Legislative Assembly.\n\nAbove all, they have been looked upon as rights and privileges which pertain to the Legislative Assembly, in complete independence of the Crown, so far as they properly exist.\n\nAnd it would be a result somewhat surprising, and hardly in consonance with the general scheme of the legislation, if, with regard to rights and privileges of this kind, it were to be found that in the last resort the determination of them no longer belonged to the Legislative Assembly, no longer belonged to the Superior Court which the Legislative Assembly haq put in its place, but belonged to the Crown in Council, with the advice of the adviers 0£ the Crown at home, to be determined without reference either to the judgment of the Legislative Assembly, or of that Court which the Legislative Assembly had substituted in its place.\"\n\nThe points which emerge from this decision may be stated as follows :-\n\n(1) The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed, by it.\n\n(2) Strictly speaking, it is the sole right of the Legislature to examine and determine all matters relating to the election of its own members, and if the legislature takes it out of its own hands and vests in a special tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdic- . tion, that special jurisdiction should be exercised in\n\naccordance with the law which creates it. t\n\nI !\n\nIt should be mentioned here that the question as to what the powers of the High Court under articles 226 and 227 and of this Court under article 136 of the Constitution may be, is one that will have to be decided on a proper occasion.\n\nIt is necessary to refer at thi~ stage to an argument advanced before us on behalf of the appellant which was based on the language of article 71 (1) of the Constitution. That provision runs thus :-\n\n\"All doubts and disputes ari$ng out of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice-President shall be inquired into and decided by the Supreme Court whose decision shall be final.\"\n\nThe argument was as follows. There is a marked contrast between the language used in article 71 (1) and that of article 329 (b). The difference in the phraseology employed in the two provisions suggests that they could not have been intended to have the same meaning and scope as regards matters to be brought up before the tribunals they respectively deal with. If the framers of the Constitution, who apparently knew how to express themselves, intended to include within the ambit of article 329 (b) all possible disputes connected with elections to legislatures, including disputes as to nominations, they would have used similar words as are to be found in article 71 ( 1).\n\nIt is true that it is not necessary to use identical language in every provision, but one can conceive of various alternative ways of expression which would convey more clearly and properly what article 329 (b) is said to convey.\n\nIt seems to me that once it is admitted that the same idea can be expressed in different ways and the same phraseology need not be employed in every provision, the argument loses much of its force.\n\nBut, however that may be, I think there is a good explanation as to why article 329 (b) was drafted as it stands.\n\nA reference to the election rules made under the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 will show that the provisions in them on the subject were almost in the same language as artVle 329 (b). The\n\nN. P.· Ponnuswami\n\nReturning Officer,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nOthers.\n\nFaz/ Ali j.\n\n1952 corresponding rule made under the Government of India Act, 1919, was rule 31 of the electoral rules, and N. P. Ponnuit runs as follows :- swami\n\nv. \"No election shall be called in question, except by Returning Officer, an election petition presented in accordance with the\n\nNmakkal provisions of this Part.\" Constituency and . • Others.\n\nIt should be noted that this rule occurs m Part VII, the heading of which is \"The final decision of doubts Faz/ Ali/. and disputes as to the validity of an election\". These words throw .some light on the function which the election tribunal was to perform, and they are the very words which the learned counsel for the appellant argued, ought to have been used to make the meaning clear.\n\nThe same scheme was followed in the election rules framed under , the Government of India Act, 1935, which are contained in \"The Government of India (Provincial Elections) (Corrupt Practices and Election 1.>etitions) Order, 1936\", dated the 3rd July, 1936.\n\nIn that Order, the rule corresponding to rule 31 under the earlier Act, runs thus :- -\n\n\"No election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part of the Order.\"\n\nThis rule is to be found in Part III of the Order, the heading of which is \"Decision of doubts and disputes as to validity of an election and disqualification for corrupt practices.\"\n\nThe rules to which I have referred were apparently framed on the pattern of the corresponding provisions of the British Acts of 1868 and 1872, and they must have been iutended to cover the same ground as the provisions in England have been understood to cover in that country for so many years.\n\nIf the language used in article 329 (b) is considered against this historical background, it should not be difficult to see why the framers of the Constitution framed that provision in its present form and chose the language which had been consistently used in certain earlier legislative provisions and which had stood the test of time.\n\nAnd now a word as to why negative language was used in article 329 (b). It seems to me that there is an important difference between article 71 ( 1) and article 329 (b). Article 71 (1) had to be in an affirmative form, because it confers special jurisdiction on the Supreme Court which that Court could not have exercised but for this article. Article 329 (b), on the other hand, was primarily intended to exclude or ousl the jurisdiction of all courts in regard to electoral matters and to lay down the only mode in which an election could be challenged.\n\nThe negative form was therefore more appropriate, and, that being so, it is not surprising that it was decided to follow the preexisting pattern in which also the negative language had been adopted.\n\nBefore concluding, I should refer to an argument which was strenuously pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant and which has been reproduced by one of the learned Judges of the High Court in these words:-\n\n\"It was next contended that if nomination is part. of election, a dispute as to the validity of nomination is a dispute relating to election and that can be. called in question only in accordance with the provisions of article 329 (b) by the presentation of an election petition to the appropriate Tribunal and that the Returning Officer would have no jurisdiction to decide that matter, and it was further argued that section 36 of Act XL.III of. 1951 would be utlra vires inasmuch as it confers on the Returning Officer a jurisdiction which article 329 (b) confers on a Tribunal to be appointed in accordance with the article.\"\n\nThis argument displays great dialectical ingenuity, but it has no bearing on the result of this appeal and I think it can be very shortly answered.\n\nUnder section 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it is the duty of the Returning Officer to scrutinize: the nomination papers to ensure that they comply with the requirements of the Act and decide all objections which be made to any nomination.\n\nIt is clear that unless this duty is discharged properly, any number of candidates may stand for election without complying with the provisions of the Act and a great deal of\n\nN. P. Ponnu\n\nswami\n\nv. lteturning Officer,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nOthers.\n\nFaz/ Ali f.\n\nconfusion may ensue.\n\nIn . discharging the statutory duty imposed on him, the Returning Officer does not swami call in question any election. Scrutiny of nomination v. papers is only a stage, though an important stage, in\n\nN. P. Ponnu-\n\nRettirning Of!i\"r, the election process. It is one of the essential duties to Namakkal be performed before the election can be completed, and Constituency and anything done towards the completion of the election Othtrs.\n\nFaz/ Ali/. proceeding can by no stretch of reasoning be described as questioning the election. The fallacy of the argument lies in treating a single step taken in furtherance of an election as equivalent .to election. The decision of this appeal however turns not on the construction of the single word \"election\", but on the construction of the compendious expression-\"no election shall be called in question\" in its context and setting, with due regard to the scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1951.\n\nEvidently, the argument has no bearing on this method of approach to the question posed in this appeal, which appears to me to be the only correct method.\n\nWe are informed that besides the Madras High Court, seven other State High Courts have held that they have no jurisdiction under article 226 of the Omstitution to entertain petitions regarding improper rejection of nomination papers.\n\nThis view is in\n\n!PY opinion wrrect and must be affirmed. The appeal must therefore fail and is dismissed.\n\nIn view of the nature and importance of the points raised m this appeal, there should be no order to costs. p ATANJ ALI SASTRI c. J ,_:I agree.\n\nMEim CHAND MAHAJAN J.-1 agree.\n\nMuKHERJEA f.-1 agree.\n\nDAs J.-1 agree.\n\nCHANDllASEKHARA AIYAR r.-I agree.\n\nAppeal dismitsed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : S. Subt<ahmanyam.\n\nAgent for the 1st respondent : P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the Union of India and the State of Madhya Bharat : P. A. 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P. Ponnu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9726, "end_char": 9737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29\n\nN. P. Ponnu\n\nswami\n\nv. -Returning Officer,\n\nNamakkfd Constituency and\n\n.", "canonical_name": "N. P. Ponnustvami"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9808, "end_char": 9816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali f.\n\n1952 The first argument which turns on the contruction of article 329(b) requires serious consideration, but I N. P. Ponnuthink the secon.d argument can be disposed of briefly Jtuami\n\nT. at the outset."}}, {"text": "article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9879, "end_char": 9893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. P. Ponnuthink", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9932, "end_char": 9948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali f.\n\n1952 The first argument which turns on the contruction of article 329(b) requires serious consideration, but I N. P. Ponnuthink the secon.d argument can be disposed of briefly Jtuami\n\nT. at the outset.", "canonical_name": "N. P. Ponnustvami"}}, {"text": "Faz/ Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10281, "end_char": 10289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali /. Wallace J. in Sarvothama Rao v. Chairman, Municipal\n\nCouncil, Saidapet(') in these words :- '\n\n\"I am quite clear that any post-election remedy is wholly inadequate to afford the relief which the petitioner seeks, namely, that.", "canonical_name": "Faz! Ali"}}, {"text": "N. P. Ponnuswami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14193, "end_char": 14209, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. P. Ponnustvami", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "N. P. Ponnuswami", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14287, "end_char": 14303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali /.\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami\n\nReturnint Of!icet,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "N. P. Ponnustvami"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14884, "end_char": 14895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15037, "end_char": 15048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15375, "end_char": 15386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15390, "end_char": 15401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 324, 325, 326, 327 and 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15893, "end_char": 15928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15931, "end_char": 15942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16085, "end_char": 16096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16187, "end_char": 16198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16229, "end_char": 16240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16439, "end_char": 16450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 327 and 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16681, "end_char": 16701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16724, "end_char": 16735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17073, "end_char": 17084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17122, "end_char": 17133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17193, "end_char": 17204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17294, "end_char": 17305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329(b )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17465, "end_char": 17480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17978, "end_char": 17992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18396, "end_char": 18407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. P. Ponnuswami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18483, "end_char": 18499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's case is that questioning something which has happened before a candidate is dedared elected is not the same thing as questioning an election, and the arguments advanced on his bebalf in support of this construction were these :-\n\n(1) That the word \"election\" as used in article 329(b) means what it normally and etymologically means, namely, the result of polling or he final selection of a candidate ; • (2) That the fact that an election petition can be filed only after polling is over or after a candidate is declared elected, and what is normally called in question by such petition is the final result, bears out the contention that the word \"election\" can have no other meaning in article 329\n\n(b) than the result of polling or the final selection of a candidate ; -\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami\n\nReturning Otficn-,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "N. P. Ponnustvami"}}, {"text": "article 324(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18644, "end_char": 18658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. P. Ponnu-", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18673, "end_char": 18685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fnl Ali/.\n\n(3) That the words \"arising out of or in connection with\" which are used in article 324(1) and the words N. P. Ponnu- \"with respect to all matters relating to, or in connecswam1 tion with\" which are used in articles 327 and 328, v.\n\nReturning Officer, show that the framers of the Constitution knew that it Namakkal was necessary to use different languages when referring Constituency and respectively to matters which happen prior to and Others.", "canonical_name": "N. P. Ponnustvami"}}, {"text": "articles 327 and 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18775, "end_char": 18795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19177, "end_char": 19188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19379, "end_char": 19390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19511, "end_char": 19521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19529, "end_char": 19567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19649, "end_char": 19660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19857, "end_char": 19868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20176, "end_char": 20187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "uppuswami(1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20780, "end_char": 20791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Srinivasalu v. 1;..uppuswami(1), the learned Judges of the Madras High Court after examining the question, expressed the opinion that : the term \"election\" may be taken to embrace the whole procedure where by an \"elected member\" is returned, whether or not it be found necessary to take a poll."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20820, "end_char": 20837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Srinivasalu v. 1;..uppuswami(1), the learned Judges of the Madras High Court after examining the question, expressed the opinion that : the term \"election\" may be taken to embrace the whole procedure where by an \"elected member\" is returned, whether or not it be found necessary to take a poll."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21085, "end_char": 21092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With this\n\nview, my brother, Mahajan J. expressed his agreement .in Sat Narain v. Hanuman Pramd(2) ; and I also find myself iJ1 agreement with it.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "article 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21534, "end_char": 21545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21695, "end_char": 21706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24050, "end_char": 24061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24099, "end_char": 24108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24474, "end_char": 24485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People\n\nAct, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People\n\nAct, 1951"}}, {"text": "Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24738, "end_char": 24806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25312, "end_char": 25326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25984, "end_char": 25998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26508, "end_char": 26524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 327 and 328", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27170, "end_char": 27190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "article 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27232, "end_char": 27243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27265, "end_char": 27276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "articles 325 and 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27347, "end_char": 27367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Namakkal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27793, "end_char": 27801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Part XV of Returning Officer, the Constitution is really a code in itself providing Namakkal the entire ground-work for enacting appropriate laws Constituency and and setting up suitable machinery for the conduct of Others.", "canonical_name": "Namakkal"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27963, "end_char": 28001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28040, "end_char": 28051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "The Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29613, "end_char": 29623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29673, "end_char": 29687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29892, "end_char": 29903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30069, "end_char": 30079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 170", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30174, "end_char": 30185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Willes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30956, "end_char": 30962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes J. in WoltJerhampton -New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford( 1 ) in the following passage :-\n\n\"There are three dasses of cases in which a liability may b~ established founded upon statute."}}, {"text": "N. P. Ponnustvami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32056, "end_char": 32073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali/.\n\nN. P. Ponnustvami\n\ncompetent to the party t~ pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.", "canonical_name": "N. P. Ponnustvami"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32775, "end_char": 32807, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33049, "end_char": 33081, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33211, "end_char": 33222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33321, "end_char": 33335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33403, "end_char": 33413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 107(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33749, "end_char": 33763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33771, "end_char": 33805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33884, "end_char": 33898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1949", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Presented in accordance with this Part of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34137, "end_char": 34187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35760, "end_char": 35771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35958, "end_char": 35972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "English Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36162, "end_char": 36180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe words \"notwithstanding anything in this Constitution\" give to that article the same wide and binding effect as a statute passed by a sovereign legislature like the English Parliament."}}, {"text": "article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36266, "end_char": 36280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36588, "end_char": 36602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36994, "end_char": 37005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37539, "end_char": 37550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Quebec Controverted Elections Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39190, "end_char": 39229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cairns", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39961, "end_char": 39967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, Lord Cairns observed as' follows :-\n\n\"These two Acts of Parliament, the Acts of 1872 and 1875, are Acts peculiar in their character."}}, {"text": "Namakkal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41322, "end_char": 41330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Namakkal gts at10n IS •. extreme y pecu iar.", "canonical_name": "Namakkal"}}, {"text": "articles 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43226, "end_char": 43246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43271, "end_char": 43282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43505, "end_char": 43515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43719, "end_char": 43732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That provision runs thus :-\n\n\"All doubts and disputes ari$ng out of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice-President shall be inquired into and decided by the Supreme Court whose decision shall be final.\""}}, {"text": "article 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43851, "end_char": 43861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43878, "end_char": 43889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44252, "end_char": 44263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44427, "end_char": 44437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44640, "end_char": 44651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44947, "end_char": 44958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. P.· Ponnuswami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45191, "end_char": 45208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nN. P.· Ponnuswami\n\nReturning Officer,\n\nNamakkal Constituency and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "N. P. Ponnustvami"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45318, "end_char": 45347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. P. Ponnuit", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45389, "end_char": 45402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali j.\n\n1952 corresponding rule made under the Government of India Act, 1919, was rule 31 of the electoral rules, and N. P. Ponnuit runs as follows :- swami\n\nv. \"No election shall be called in question, except by Returning Officer, an election petition presented in accordance with the\n\nNmakkal provisions of this Part.\"", "canonical_name": "N. P. Ponnustvami"}}, {"text": "swami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45422, "end_char": 45427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali j.\n\n1952 corresponding rule made under the Government of India Act, 1919, was rule 31 of the electoral rules, and N. P. Ponnuit runs as follows :- swami\n\nv. \"No election shall be called in question, except by Returning Officer, an election petition presented in accordance with the\n\nNmakkal provisions of this Part.\""}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46081, "end_char": 46110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "3rd July, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46252, "end_char": 46266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same scheme was followed in the election rules framed under , the Government of India Act, 1935, which are contained in \"The Government of India (Provincial Elections) (Corrupt Practices and Election 1.>etitions) Order, 1936\", dated the 3rd July, 1936."}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47006, "end_char": 47017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47376, "end_char": 47387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47454, "end_char": 47464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47474, "end_char": 47485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47491, "end_char": 47501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47665, "end_char": 47676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48512, "end_char": 48523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48712, "end_char": 48722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48836, "end_char": 48847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49079, "end_char": 49089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49097, "end_char": 49135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50533, "end_char": 50607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50895, "end_char": 50906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "ATANJ ALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51219, "end_char": 51235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p ATANJ ALI SASTRI c. J ,_:I agree.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri C. J.\"Mahajan"}}, {"text": "MEim CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51254, "end_char": 51272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEim CHAND MAHAJAN J.-1 agree."}}, {"text": "CHANDllASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51326, "end_char": 51347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDllASEKHARA AIYAR r.-I agree."}}, {"text": "S. Subt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51406, "end_char": 51413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : S. Subt<ahmanyam."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51456, "end_char": 51467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the 1st respondent : P. A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_284_367_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "'1952\n\n/<1n. 11\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1952)\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL v.\n\nANWAR ALI SARKAR\n\nHABIB MOHAMED, I THE STATE OF HYDERABAD, and J\n\nTHE STATE OF MYSORE\n\nTHE ST A TE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nfl.\n\nGAJAN MALI\n\nlntervcners.\n\n[PATANJALI SAs'i'RI\n\nC.J., FAZL Au, MEim\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs,\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1Y AR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nWest Bengal Spetial Courts Act (X of 1950), ss. 3, 5-Constitulion of India, Art. 14-Act constituting special courts and empower~ ing State Government to refer \"cases\" or noffences,, or \"classes of cases\" or \"classes of offencel' to such Court-Constitutional validity -Fundamental right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws-Construction of Act-Reference to preamble-Act not classifying cases or laying down standard for classification-lnten tion of legislature hotu far material-Validity of notification under Act-Test of equality before law-Essentials of reasonable classifica. tion-N ecessity of speedier trial, whether reasonablt: ground for discrimination.\n\nThe West Bengal Special Courts Act (X of 1950) was entitled uAn Act to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences~\" and the object of the Act, as declared in the preamble, was \"to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences\".\n\nSection 3 of the Act empowered the State Government by notification in the official gazette to constitute Special Courts, and sec. 5 pro-. vided that \"A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may by general or special order in writing, direct.n The Act laid down a procedure for trial before Special Courts which was different in several respects from that laid down by the Criminal Procedure Code for trial of offences generally.\n\nThe respondent, who was convicted by a Special Court which tried his case under a notification issued by the Government under sec. 5, contended that the said section was unconstitutional and void inasmuch as it contravened Art. 14 of the Constitutiorl, which provides that \"the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws Within the tertitory of India\":\n\n-\"\"\n\n--- . -i-.\n\n,. .\n\n, .\n\nHeld, per FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and BosE JJ. (PATANJALI SAsTRI C. ]., dissenting)-Section 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Acti, 1950, contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution and is void inasmuch as (per\n\nFAZL Au,\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YAR JJ.) the procedure laid down by the Act for the trial by the Special Courts varied substantially from that laid down for the trial of offences generally by the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Act did not classify, or lay down any basis for classification, of the cases vthich may be directed to be tried by the Special Court, but left it to the uncontrolled discretion of the State Government to direct any case which it liked to be tried by the Special Court.\n\nDAs ].-Section 5 ( 1 )of the Act, in so far as it empowered the State Government to direct \"offences\" or \"classes of offences\" or \"classes of cases\" to be tried by a Special Court, does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government but by necessary implication contemplates. a proper classification and is not void.\n\nThat part of the section which empowered the Government to direct \"cases\" as distinct from \"classes of cases\" to be tried by a Special Court is void.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. ].-Section 5 (I) ot the Act is not void or unconstitutional wholly or even in part.\n\nPer FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR.\\ ArYAR JJ.-A rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Art. 14 of the Constitution as any rule of substantive law and it is necessary that all litigants, who arc similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and for defence with like protection and without discrimination.\n\n(ii) If it is established that the person complaining has been discriminated against as a result of legislation and denied equal privileges with others occupying the same position, it is not inc um bent upon him before he can claim relief on the basis of fundamental rights to assert and prove that, in making the Jaw, the legislature was actuated by a hostile or inimical intention against a particular person or class ; nor would the operation of Art. 14 be excluded merely because it is proved that the legislature had no intention to discriminate, though discrimination was the necessary consequence of the Act. The question of intention may arise in ascertaining whether an officer acted mala\n\nfide or not ; but it cannot arise when discrimination follows or arises on the express terms of the law itself.\n\n(iii) The language of sec. 5 (1) clearly and unambiguously vests the State Government with unrestricted discretion to direct any cases or class of cases to be tried by the Special Court, not a discretion to refer cases only when it is of opinion that a speedier trial is necessary.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.·\n\n(iv) Assuming that the preamble throws any light on the section, the necessity of speedier trial is too vague, uncertain and elusive a criterion to form a rational basis for discrimination.\n\n(v) It cannot be said that an Act does not contravene the equality rule 'laid down by Art. 14 simply because it confers unregulated discretion on officers or adn1inistrative bodies.\n\nThe true position is that if the statute itself is not discriminatory the charge of violation of the article may be only against the official who administers it, but if the statute itself makes a dis~ crimination without any proper or reasonable basis, it would be void for being in conflict with Art. 14.\n\n(vi) The notification issued under the Act in the present case would also come within the definiton of law and could be impeached apart from the Act if it violates Art. 14.\n\nDAs J.--(1) Article 14 does not insist that every piece of legislation must have universal application and it does not take away from the State the power to classify persons for the purposes of legislation, but the classification must be rational, and in order to satisfy this test (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguished those that are grouped together from others, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.\n\nThe differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them.\n\nBut the mere fact that the inequality has not been made with the special intention of prejudicing a particular person or persons but in the general interest of administration will not validate a law if in fact it results in inequality of treatlnent.\n\nNor can the constitutionality of a statute depend on the degree of the inequality brought about by ihe law. ·\n\n(2) Although the preamble to an Act cannot override the plain meaning of its operative parts, it may nevertheless assist in ascertaining what the true meaning or implication of a particular section is ; and the part of sec. 5 (I) of the Act which relates to \"offences\", \"classes of offences\" and \"classes of cases\", construed in the light of the preamble, does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government, but by necessary implication and intendment empowers the State to classify the offences or classes of offences or classes of cases, that is to say, to make a proper classification having a relation to the object of the Act as recited in the preamble; and this part of sec. 5(1) does not therefore contravene Art. 14.\n\n(3) That part of sec. 5(1) which empowers the State Government to direct \"cases\" as distinct from \"classes of cases\" to be i; ried hy the Special Court lies beyond the ambit of the object laid down by the preamble and contemplates and involves a purely arbitrary selection based on nothing more substantial\n\n. •.\n\n.Ao-\n\n...\n\nthan the whim and pleasure of the State Government without any appreciable relation to the necessity for a speedier trial and therefore offends against the provisions of Art. 14 and is void.\n\nBosE J .-The test under Art. 14 is neither classification nor whether there is absolute equality in any academical sense of the term but whether the collective conscience of a sovereign democratic republic as reflected in the views of fair-minded, reasonable, unbiassed men, who are not swayed by emotion or prejudice, can consider the impunged laws as reasonable, just and fair and regard them as that equal treatment and protection in the defence of liberties which is expected of a sovereign democratic republic in the conditions which obtain in India to-day.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI\n\nC. J. (dissenting).-Section 5 (1) of the impunged Act is not void or unconstitutional wholly or even in part because : ( 1) The words in the enacting part of a statute must be confined to that which is the plain object and general intention of the legislature in passing the Act and the preamble affords a good clue to discover what that object was. The title and the preamble of the Act in the present case show unmistakably that the whole object and purpose of the Act was to devise machinery for the speedier trial of certain offences.. The discretion intended to . be exercised by the State Government must be exercised bona fide on a consideration of the special features or circumstances which call for comparatively prompt disposal of a case or cases proposed to be referred and sec. 5 ( 1) must be read as empowering the Government to direct the Special Court ro try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases as in its judgment, require speedier trial.\n\n(2) Article 14 of the Constiution does not mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in application.\n\nThe State must possess the power of distinguishing and classifying persons or things ro be subjected to particular laws and in making a classification the legislature must be allowed a wide latitude of discretion and'. judgment.\n\nThe classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary but is founded on a reasonable basis having regard to the object to be attained. (3) The powers of the legislature must include the power of entrusting an administrative body with a plenary but not arbitrary discretion to be exercised so as to carry out the purpose of the Act and the mere fact that the discretion might be exei;:cised arbitrarily by the administrative body cannot make the law itself unconstitutional. ( 4) The impugned Act does not in terms or by implication discriminate between persons or classes of persons nor does it purport to deny to any one equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. (5} Even from the point of view of reasonable classification the expediency of speedier trial is not too vague or indefinite to be the basis of classification. ( 6) The notification of the Government in the present case referring the case to the Special Court did not contravene Art. 14 and is not void inasmuch as there is nothing\n\n4-4 S. C.India/71\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nThe St•le of\n\nWesl Bengal v.\n\nAnwll1' Ali\n\nSark\"'\n\nto show that the Government was influenced by any discriminatory motive or design or acted arbitrarily, but on the other hand there are obviously special features which mark off the group of cases referred as requiring speedier disposal.\n\nJudgment of the Calcutta High Court affirmed.\n\nRomesh Tappar v. The Stale of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 594), Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh ([1950] S.C.R. 759), Dr. Khare's Case ([1950] S.C.R. 519), Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India and Others ([1950] S.C.R. 869) and Stale of Bombay v. F. N.\n\nBalsara ([1951] S.C.R. 682), explained.\n\nTruax v. Corrigan (257 U.S. 312), Yick. Wo v. Hopk.int (ll8 U.S.\n\n356) and other American cases on the right to equal prot<:ction of the laws considered.\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nCIVIL JuRJsmcTioN : Cases Nos. 297 and 298 of 1951.\n\nAppeals under Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution from the judgment and order dated 28th August, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J., Chakravarthi, Das, Banerjee and S. R. Das Gupta JJ.) in Civil Revision Cases Nos. 942 and 1113 of 1951.\n\nThe facts of the case and the argument of Counsel appear fully in the judgment.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (B. Sen, with him) for the appellant in Case No. 297. fitendra Nath Ghose (R. P. Bagchi, with h'im) for the respondent in Case No. 297.\n\nA. A. Peerbhoy and /. B. Dadachanji for Habib Mohammad (Intervener).\n\nV. Rajaram Iyer, Advocate-General of Hydei-abad\n\n(R.\n\nGanapathy Iyer, with him) for the State of Hyderabad.\n\nA. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore (K. Ramaseshayya Chaudhry, with him) for the State of Mysore.\n\nB. Sen, for the appellant in Case No. 298.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (S. K. Kapur, with him) for the respondent in Case No. 298. 1952.\n\nJanuary 11.\n\nThe following judgments were delivered.\n\n' ..\n\n...\n\n-~ .\n\n> . -\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-This is an appeal by the State of West Bengal from a judgment of a Full Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta quashing the conviction of the respondent by the Special Court established under section 3 of the West Bengal Special Courts Ordinance, 1949, (Ordinance No. 3 of 1949) which was replaced in March, 1950, by the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, (West Bengal Act X of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\").\n\nThe respondent and 49 other persons were charged with various offences alleged to have been committed by them in the course of their raid as an armed gang on a certain factory known as the Jessop Factory at Dum Dum, and they were convicted and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment by the Special Court to which the case was sent for trial by the Governor of West Bengal by a notification dated 26th January,\n\n1950, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 5\n\n(1) of the Act. Thereupon the respondent applied to the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the conviction and sentence on the ground that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to try the case inasmuch as section 5 (1), under which it was sent to that Court for trial, was unconstitutional and void under article 13(2) as it denied to the respondent the equal protection of the laws enjoined by article 14. The High Court by a Full Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and four other Judges quashed the conviction :md directed the trial of the respondent and the other accused persons according to law. Hence the appeal.\n\nThe Act is intituled \"An Act to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences\", and the preamble declares that \"it is expedient to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences\". Section 3 empowers the State Government by notification in the official gazette to constitute Special Courts, and section 4 provides for the appointment of special judges to preside over such courts, Section S, whose constitutionality is impugned, runs thus :\n\nThe Stat1 of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\n\"5 ( 1) A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the\n\nState Government may by general or special order in writing, direct.\n\n(2) No direction shall be made under sub-section (1) for the trial of an offence for which an accused person was being tried at the commencement of this Act before any court but, save as aforesaid, such direction may be made in respect of an offence, whether such offence was committed before or after the commencement of this Act.\"\n\nSections 6 to 15 prescribe the special procedure which the court has to follow in the trial of the cases referred to it. The main features of such procedure which mark a departure from the established procedure for criminal trials under the Code of Criminal Procedure are the elimination of the committal procedure in sessions cases and the substitution of the procedure laid down in the Code for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate, trial without jury or assessors, restriction of the court's power in granting adjournments, special powers to deal with refractory accused and dispens- ation of de novo trial on transfer of a case from one special court to another. While some of these departures from the normal procedure might, in practice, operate in some respects to the disadvantage of persons tried before the Special Court, it cannot be said that they derogate from the essential requirements of a fair and impartial trial, so as to give rise, from their very nature, to an inference of a discriminatory design.\n\nIn other words, it cannot be said that the special procedure provided in the Act is, on its face, calculated to prejudice the fair trial of persons subjected to it.\n\nThe departure in each case is plainly calculated to shorten the trial and thus to attain the declared objective of the statute.\n\nHarries C. J. who delivered the leading judgment, in which Das and Banerjee JJ. concurred, applied the test of what may be called \"reasonable classification\" and held that, although the need for a speedier trial\n\nthan what is possible under the procedure prescribed\n\n... >\n\n; .\n\nby the Code of Criminal Proce<lu°re might form the basis of a reasonable classification and section 5(1) could not be regarded as discriminatory in so far as it authorises the State Government to direct that certain offences or classes of offences or classes of cases should be tried by a special court, the provision was discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution in so far as it purported to vest in the State Government an absolute and arbitrary power to refer to a special court for trial \"any cases\", which must include an individual case, \"whether the duration of such a case is likely to be long or not\". The learned Chief Justice rejected the argument that the word\n\n\"cases\" in the sub-section should, in view of the !5'tle and preamble of the Act, be construed as meaning cases requiring speedier trial.\" He found it \"impossible to cut down the plain meaning of the word 'cases' as used i!n the section\".\n\nHe realised that \"the powers under the sub-section could be so exercised as not to involve discriminati.on, but they also could, in my view, be exercised m a manner involving discrimination.\n\nWhen an Act gives power which may and can offend against a provision, or provisions of the Constitution such an Act is ultra vires though it could be administered so as not to offend against. the Constitution'', and he relied in support of this view on certain observations in the judgment of the majority m the Crossroads case(1).\n\nChakravartti and Das JJ. delivered separate judgments agreeing with the conclusion of the Chief Justice, Das Gupta J., however, going further and holding that section 5 ( 1) was unconstitutional in its entirety inas-, much as \"the classification sought to be made on the expediency of speedier trial is not a well-defined classification. It IS too indefinite and there can hardly be any definite objective test to determine it.\"\n\nBefore considering whether section 5(1) infringes, to any and what extent, the constitl!tional prohibition under article 14 it IS necessary to ascertain the true scope and intendment of the impugned provision.\n\n0) [lllSO] s.c.R. 594, 603 ..\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. T.\n\nThe State of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nv. .4•war Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPotaniali Stzstri C. f.\n\npurports to provide for the matters to be tried by a special court and does not .• in form, seek to define the kind or class of offences or cases which the State Government is empowered under the Act to assign to such a court for trial. In other words, the purpose of section 5 ( 1) is to define the jurisdiction of a special court appointed under the Act and not the scope of the power conferred on the State Government \"to refer cases to such court. As the very object of the Act was to provide for speedier trials by instituting a system of special courts with a simplified and shortened procedure, it is reasonable to conclude that, so far as the legislature was concerned, its intention was that courts constituted under the Act and applying such procedure should deal only with cases requiring speedier trial and that, accordingly, the State Government should refer to such courts only cases of that description. The principle of construction 'applicable here is perhaps nowhere better stated than by Lord Tenterden C.J. in Halton v. Cove(') : \"It is very true, as was argued for the plaintiff, that the enacting words of an Act of Parliament are not always to be limited by the words of the preamble, but must in many cases go beyond it.\n\nYet, on a sound construction of every Act of Parliament, I take it the words of the enacting part must be confined to that which is the plain object and general intention of the legislature in passing the Act, and that the preamble affords a good clue to discover what that object was\".\n\nThe same view was expressed by Holmes J. in an American case, Carroll v. Greenwich lnsc. Co.('). \"The object of the law, we assume, until the lower Court shall decide otherwise, is singleto keep up competition-and the general language is to be restricted by the specific provisions apd to the particular end.\" The title and the preamble as well as the other specific provisions of the Act here in question show unmistakably that the whole object and purpose of the legislation was to devise machinery for \"speedier trial of certain offences'', (which must mean trial of cases involving the commission of certain\n\n(I) (1830) I B. & Ad.S38, SSS.\n\n(2) 199 U.S. 401.\n\n...\n\noffences as there can, of course, be no trial of ofJence1\n\nin the abstract) and the general expressions used in providing for the power to set that machinery in operation must be restricted to that end in accordance with the intention of the legislature ; for, a literal construction of the general language would impute to the legislature an intention to confer an arbitrary power of reference which would be inconsistent not only with the declared object of the statute but also with the constitutional prohibition against . discrimination, which the legislature must be taken to have been aware of when it deliberately re-enacted the provisions of the old Ordinance.\n\nThe discretion vested in the State Government in selecting cases for reference to a special court may not be subject to judicial review and may, in that sense, be absolute, but that is very different from saying that it was intended to be arbitrary.\n\nIts exercise must involve bona fide consideration of special features or circumstances which call for a comparatively prompt disposal of the case or cases proposed to be referred. In other words, section 5(1) must, in my opinion, be read as empowering the State Government to direct a special court to try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases a.5, in its judgment, require speedier trial.\n\nThe question next arises as to whether the provision, thus understood, violates the prohibition under article 14 of the Constitution. The first part of the article, which appears to have been adopted from the Irish Constitution, is a declarat!ion of equality of the civil rights of all persons within the territories of India and thus enshrines what American Judges regard as the \"basic principle of republicanism\" [cf.\n\nWard v. Flood (1)]. The second part which is a corollary of the first and is based on the last clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, enjoins that equal protection shall be secured to all such persons in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties without discrimination or favouritism, or as an American Judge put it \"it is a\n\n(I) 17 Am Rep.405.\n\nWest Be11g•l\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /. '\n\nThe Stat< of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nT, Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\npledge of the protection of equal laws\" [Yick Wo v.\n\nHopkins('),] that is, laws that operate alike on all .persons under like circumstances. And as the prohibition under the article is directed against the State, which is defined in article 12 as including not only the legislatures but also the Governments in the country, article 14 secures all persons within the territories of India against arbitrary laws as well as arbitrary application of laws. This is further made clear by defining \"law\" in article 13 (which renders void any law which takes away or abridges their rights conferred by Part III) as including, among other things, any \"order\" or \"notification'', so that even executive orders or notifications must not infringe article 14.\n\nThis trilogy of articles thus ensures non-discrimination in State action both in the legislative and the administrative spheres in the democratic republic of India. This, however, cannot mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in application.\n\nAs pointed 'out in Chiraniit Lal's case( 2 ) and in numerous American decisions deal- . ing with the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, the State in the exercise of its governmental power must of necessity make laws operating differently on different groups or classes of persons within its territory to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies, and it must possess for that purpose large powers of distinguishing and classifying persons or thing to be subjected to such laws.\n\nBut classification necessarily implies discrimination between persons classified and those who are not members of that class. \"It is the essence of a classification\" said Mr. Justice Brewer in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v.\n\nMatthews(\"), \"that upon the class are cast duties and burdens different from those resting upon the general public.\n\nIndeed the very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines this matter -of constitutionality\".\n\nCommenting on this observa- tion in his dissenting opinion in Connolly v.\n\nUnion :Sewer Pipe Co.(') which later prevailed in Tigner v.\n\n(I) 118 u.S. 356, 369.\n\n<3) 174 U.S. P6, 106.\n\n(2) [1950] SiiC 869.\n\n(4) 184 U.S. 540, 566, 567, 568.\n\n...\n\n... ~· .\n\nTexas(1)] Mr. Justice McKenna posed a problem and proceeded to answer it: \"It seems like a contradiction to say that a law having equality of operation may yet give equality of protection.\n\nViewed rightly, however, the contradiction disappears .... Government is not a simple thing.\n\nIt encounters and must deal with the problems which come from persons in an infinite variety of relations.\n\nClassification is the recognition of those relations, and, in making it, a legislature must be allowed a wide latitude of discretion and judgment ...... Classification based on those relations need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things.\n\nTherefore it has been repeatedly declared that classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary\". (Italics mine.)\n\nThus, the general language of article 14, as of its American counterpart, has been greatly qualified by the recognition of the State's regulative power to make laws operating differently on different classes of persons in the governance of its subjects, with the result that the principle of equality of civil rights and of equal protection of the laws is only given effect to as a safeguard against arbitrary State action.\n\nIt follows that in adjudging a given law as discriminatory and unconstitutional two aspects have to be considered.\n\nFirst, it has to be seen whether it observes equality between all the persons on whom it is to operate. An affirmative finding on the point may not, however, be decisive of the issue. If the impugned legislation is a special law applicable only to a certain class of persons, the court must further enquire whether the classification is founded on a reasonable basis having regard to the object to be attained, or is arbitrary.\n\nThus, the . reasonableness of classification comes into question only in those cases where special legislation affecting a class of persons is challenged as discriminatory. But there are other types of legislation such as, for instance, the Land Acquisition Act, which do not rest on classification, and no question of reasonable classification could fairly arise in respect of such\n\n(1) 310 U.S. 141.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /,\n\nThe Stat<! of\n\nWett Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nenactments. Nor, obviously, could it arise when executive orders or notifications directed against individual citizens are assailed as discriminatory. It is interesting to find that the trend of recent decisions in America has been to lean strongly toward sustaining State action both in the legislative and in the administrative spheres against attacks based on hostile discrimination.\n\nClassifications condemned .as discriminatory have been subsequently upheld as being: within the powers of the legislature. In Tigner v ..\n\nTexas('), the majority view in Connolly's case(') holding that an Illinois anti-trust law, which made certain forbidden acts criminal if done by merchants. and manufacturers but declared them to be civil wrongs if done by farmers and stockmen, was. \"manifestly a denial of the equal protection of thclaws\") was considered to be no-longer \"controlling\" •.\n\nWhile in Gulf, Colorado & SanAa Fe R. Co. v. Ellis(3 ) a Texas statute imposing an attorney's fee in addition to costs upon railway corporations which unsuccess-. fully defended actions for damages for stock killed orinjured by their train was struck down as discriminatory because such corporations could not recover any such fee if their defence was successful, a similar provision in a Kansas statute in respect of an action against railroad companies for damages by fire caused' by operating the rail-road was upheld as not discriminatory in Atchison; Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co v.\n\nMatthews(•), the earlier case being distinguished on some ground which Harlon J. in his dissenting opinion confessed he was not \"astute enough to perceive\" •.\n\nAnd the latest decision in Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs(\") marks, perhaps, the farthest swing of the pendulum ..\n\nA Louisiana pilotage law authorised the appointment of State pilots only upon certification by a State Board' of river pilot commissioners who were themselves State Pilots.\n\nAmong the prescribed qualifications was apprenticeship under a State pilot for a certai~ period. By admitting only their relatives and friends:\n\nCl) 3IOU.S. l41..\n\n(4) 174 U.S. 96 ..\n\n(2) 184 U.S. 540.\n\n(5) 330 U.S. 552.\n\nC3) 165 U.S. 666.\n\n. . -\n\n• - •\n\n. .,\n\nto apprenticeship, the members of the board made it impossible, with occasional exceptions, for others to be appointed as State pilots. . Upholding the constitutionality of the law as well as the manner in which it was administered, the Court said : \"The constitutional command for a State to afford equal protection of the law sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula.\n\nThis Court has never attempted that impossible task;.\n\nA law which affects the activities of some groups differently from the way in which it affects the activities of other groups is not necessarily banned by the 14th Amendment.\n\nOtherwise, effective regulation in the public interest could not be provided, however essential that regulation might be.\"\n\nThese decisions seem, to my mind, to reveal a change of approach marked by an increasing respect for the State's regulatory power in dealing with equal protection claims and underline the futility of wordy formulation of so called \"tests\" in solving problems presented by concrete cases.\n\nGreat reliance was placed on behalf of the respondent upon the decision in Truax v. Corrigan(1) and Yick.\n\nWo v. Hopkjns(2). In the former case it was held by a majority of 5 : 4 that a law which denied the remedy of injunction in a dispute between the employer and his ex-employees was a denial of the equal protection of laws, as such a remedy was allowed in all other cases.\n\nBut it is to be noted that the minority, which included Holmes and Brandies JJ., expressed the opinion that it was within the power of the State to make such differentiation and the law was perfectly constitutional.\n\nThe legislation was obviously applicable to a class of persons and the decision was an instance where the classification was held to be arbitrary and is not of much assistance to the respondent.\n\nIn the other case a San Francisco Ordinance, which prohibited the carrying on of a laundry business within the limits of the City without having first obtained the consent of\n\n(l) 257 U.S. 312.\n\n(2) 118 U.S. 356.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark.ar.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\n19~2\n\nThe St11te of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark111-.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nthe Board of Supervisors unless it was located in a building constructed of brick or stone, was held discriminatory and unconstitutional.\n\nThe undisputed facts disclosed in the record were that out of 320 laundries in San Francisco about 310 were constructed of wood, and about 240 of the 320 were owned and conducted by subjects of China.\n\nThe pet1t10ner, a Chinaman, and about 200 oB his countrymen applied to the Board of Supervisors to continue their dothcswashing business in wooden buildings which they had been occupying for many years, but in all cases licence was refused, whereas not a single one of the petitions presented by 80 persons who were not subjects. of China had been refused. Dealing with these facts the court observed : \"Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet if it is applied and\n\nadministered by a public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand so as to practically make unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution\" (Italics mine). It is to be noted that the law was \"administered'', i.e., not merely applied in a few stray cases, but regularly and systematically applied, making a hostile discrimination against a particular class of persons on grounds of race and colour.\n\nSuch systematic discriminatory administration in practice of the ordinance though impartial on its face was, evidently, taken to give rise to the inference that it was designed to be so administered.\n\nThat is how the decision has been explained in later cases.\n\nFor instance, in Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co, v. Miatthews\"(')\n\nit was said \"In that case (Yick Wo's case(')) a municipal ordinance of San Francisco designed to prevent the Chinese from carrying on the laundry business was adjudged void.\n\nThis Court looked beyond the mere letter of the ordinance to the condition of things as they existed in San Francisco and saw under the guise of regulation an arbitrary classification was intended and accomplished\". (Italics mine).\n\n(I) 174 U, S. 96, JOS.\n\n(2) 118U .S. 356.\n\n• -\n\nThat is to say, the ordinance was what the Privy\n\nCouncil called a \"colourable legislative expedient\" which, under the \"guise or pretence\" of doing what is constitutionally permissible, \"in substance and purpose seeks to effect discrimination\" : Morgan Proprietary Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for New South Wales(1).\n\nThus explained, the Yick Wo case is no authority for the view that the vesting in a public authority of a discretion which is liable to abuse by arbitrary exercise contrary to its intendment is a sufficient ground for condemning a statute as discriminatory and unconstitutional.\n\nOn the other hand, there is ample authority in the American decisions for the view that the necessarily large powers vested in a legislature must include the power of entrusting to an administrative body a plenary but not arbitrary discretion to be exercised so as to carry out the purpose of an enactment. In Engel v. O' Malley(2) a New York statute prohibiting individuals or partnerships to engage in the business of receiving deposits of money without a licence from the controller \"who may approve or disapprove the application for a licence in his discretion\" was sustained as constitutional. . In answer to the argument that the controller might refuse a licence on his arbitrary whim, Holmes J. said: \"We should suppose that in each case the controller was expected to act for cause.\n\nBut the nature and extent of the remedy, if any, for a breach of duty on !iis part, we think it unnecessary to consider ; for the power of the state to make the pursuit of a calling dependent upon obtaining a licence is well established where safety seems to require it.\"\n\nIn New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr(8 ) a provision in the Sanitary Code of the City of New York vested discretion in Local Health Boards to grant or withhold licences for carrying on milk business in the City.\n\nUpholding the constitutionality of the\n\n(1) [1940] A.C. 838, 858.\n\n(3) 199 U.S. SS2.\n\n(2) 219 U.S.128.\n\nTiie State ol West Bengd\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nPatafliali Sastri C. /,\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark..ar.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nprovision, Day J. observed after referring to certain prior decisions :-\n\n\"These cases leave m no doubt the proposition that the conferring of discretionary power upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission to carry on a trade or business which is the proper subject of regulation within the police power of the state 1s not violative of rights secured by the 14th Amendment. There is no presumption that the power will be arbitrarily exercised, and when it 1s shown to be thus exercised against the individual, under sanction of state authority, this court has not hesitated to interfere for his protection, when the case has come before it in such manner as lP authorise the interfetence of a Federal Court.\"\n\nAnd Holmes J. added that, although it did not appear from the statute that the action of the Board of Health was intended to be subject to judicial revision as to its reasonableness, he agreed that it Wai not hit at by the 14th Amendment.\n\nIn the light of the foregoing di'scussion, it seems to me diflicult to hold that section' 5 (1) in whole or in part is discriminatory.\n\nIt does not, either in terms or by necessary implication, discriminate as between persons or classes of persons ; nor does it purport to deny to any one equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. Indeed, it does not by its own force make the special procedure provided in the Act applicable to the trial of any offence or classes of offences or classes of cases ; for, it is the State Govern-, ment's notification under the section that attracl:i the application of the procedure.\n\nNor is that procedure, as I have endeavoured to show, calculated to impair the chances of a fair trial of the cases to which it may be made applicable, and no discriminatory intent or design is discernible on its face, unless every departure from the normal procedure is to be regarded aa involving a hostile discrimination. I have already held, as a matter of construction, that section 5 ( 1) vests a discretion in the State Government to refer to a special court for trial such offences or classes of offences or\n\n• -\n\ncases or classes of cases as may, in its opinion, require a speedier trial. Such discretion the State Government is expected to exercise honestly and reasonably, and the mere fact that it is not made subject to judicial review cannot mean that it was intended to be exercised in an arbitrary manner without reference to the declared object of the Act or, as Harries C.J. put it, \"whether the duration of a case is likely to be long or not.\" In the face of all these considerations, it seems to me difficult to condemn section 5(1) as violative of article 14. If the discretion given to the State Government should be exercised improperly or arbitrarily, the administrative action may be challenged as discriminatory, but 'it cannot affect the constitutionality of the law.\n\nWhether a law conferring discretionary powers on an administrative authority is constitutionally valid or not should not be determined on the assumption that such authority will act in an arbitrary manner in exercising the discretion committed to it.\n\nAs observed by Kania C.J. in Dr. Khare's case(1). \"It is improper to start with such an assumption and decide the legality of an Act on that basis.\n\nAbuse of power given by law sometimes occurs ; but the validity of the law cannot be contested because of such an apprehension.\" On the contrary, it is to be presumed that a public authority will act honestly and reasonably in the exercise of its statutory powers, and that the State Government in the present case will , before directing a case to be tried by a Special Court, consider whether there are special features and circumstances which might unduly protract its trial under the ordi\" nary procedure and mark it off for speedier trial under the Act. •\n\nBut it was said that the possibility of the Act being applied in an unauthorised and arbitrary manner was sufficient to make it unconstitutional according to the decisions of this Court in Ramesh Thapar v. The State\n\nof Madras(2 ) and C[tintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh( 8 ). It will be recalled tha~ this was the main\n\n(1) [1950] s.c.R. 519, S26.\n\n(3) [19SO] s.c.R. 7,9,\n\n(2) [19SO] S.C.R. S94.\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nground on which the learned Judges in the High Court rested their decision.\n\nWith respect, those decisions have, I think, no application here. In Romesh Thapar's case the constitutionality of a provincial enactment purporting to authorise the Provincial Government to regulate the circulation of a news-sheet in the Province of Madras for the purpose of \"securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order\" was challenged as being inconsistent with the petitioner's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression conferred by article 19 ( 1) (a) of_. the Constitl)tion.\n\nBut the only relevant constitutional limitation on freedom of speech was that the State could make a law directed against the undermining of the security of the State pr the overthrow of it, and as the impugned enactment ' covered a wider ground by authorising curtailment of that freedom for the purpose of security the public safety or the maintenance of public order, this Court held it to be wholly unconstitutional and void, observing:-\n\n\"Where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constiutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not severable.\n\nSo long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. In other words, clause (2) of article 19 having allowed the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression only in cases where danger to the State is involved, an enactment, which is capable of being applied to cases where no such danger could arise, cannot be held to be constitutional and valid to any extent.\"\n\nThis passage, which was relied on by the learned Chief Justice lends no support to the view that the mere possibility of an Act being used in a\n\nmanner not contemplated by the legislature, though\n\nsuch use may not be subject to judicial review on that ground, or, in other words, the mere possibility of its abuse in practice, would justify its condemnation as unconstitutional. The important distinction is that in Rome sh T hapar' s case, the impugned enactment, having been passed before the commencement of the Constitution, did contemplate the use to which it was actually put, but such use was outside the permissible constitutional restrictions on the freedom of speech, that is to say, the Act was not condemned on the ground of the possibility of its being abused but on the ground that even the contemplated and authorised use was outside the limits of constitutionally permis.- sible restrictions.\n\nThe same remarks apply to the other decision relied on.\n\nThe observations of Kania C.J. quoted above indicate the correct approach.\n\nEven from the point of view of reasonable classification, I can see no reason why the validity of the Act should not be sustained.\n\nAs already pointed out, wide latitude must be allowed to a legislature in classifying persons and things to be brought under the operation of a special law, and such classification need not be based on an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion. I cannot share the view of Das Gupta J. that the expediency of speedier trial is \"too vague and • indefinite\" to be the basis of a \"Well defined\" classification.\n\nLegislative judgment in such matters should not be canvassed by courts applying doctrinaire \"definite objective tests\".\n\nThe Court should not ms1st in such cases on what Holmes J. called \"delusive exactness\" (Truax v. Corrigan, supra)_. All that the court is expected to see, in dealing with equal protection claims, is whether the law impugned is \"palpably discriminatory\", and, in considering such a question great weight ought to be attached to the fact that a majority of the elected representatives of the people who made the law did not think so, though that is not, of course, conclusive.\n\nThey alone know the local conditions and circumstances which demanded the enactment of such a law, and it must be remembered that \"legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and 5-4 s a India/71\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSt1rkar.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\n:The Staie of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nPatanja/i Sastri C. /.\n\nwelfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the Courts\" (per Holmes J. in Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v.\n\nMay(')). After all, what the Legislature of West Bengal has sought to do by passing this Act is to regulate criminal trials within its territories by instituting a system o; f special courts with a shortened and simplified procedure, without impairing the requirements of a fair and impartial trial, which is to be made applicable to such cases or classes of cases as, in the opinion of the executive government, require speedier disposal.\n\nI do not think that article 14 denies to the State Legislature such regulative power. (cf. Missouri v. Lewis(')). To sustain a law as not being discriminatory is not, however, to leave the party affected by a discriminatory application of the law without a remedy, for, as we have seen, state action on the administrative side can also be challenged as a denial of equal protection and unconstitutional.\n\nThat brings us to the consideration of the validity of the notification issued in the present case. In Snowden\n\nv. Hughes(2) it was laid down that \"the unlawful administration by State officers of a state statute fair on its face resulting in its unequal application to those who were entitled to be treated alike is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discri- • mination.\n\nThis may appear on the face of tl1e action taken with respect to a particular class or person or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a .discriminatory design to favour one individual or a class over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed ; :there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination\". No attempt has been made in the present case to prove that the State Government was influenced by any discriminatory motive or design.\n\nOn the other hand, the facts appearing on the record would seem to. justify the reference of the case to the special court for trial.\n\nAs pointed out by Chakravartti J. (I) 101 u.s.22.\n\n(2) :1'21 U.S. I.\n\n\"The notification by which the case of Anwar Ali Sirkar (the respondent herein) was directed to be tried by the special court did not relate merely to that case but covered five more cases in each of which the accused were several in number. In Anwar Ali's case itself, there were 49 other accused. All these cases related to the armed raid on the premises of Jessop & Co. in the course of which crimes of the utmost brutality were committed on a large scale and to incidents following the raid. There can be no question at all that the cases were of a very exceptional character and although the offences committed were technically offences defined in the Indian Penal Code, the Indian Arms Act and the High Explosives Act, it would be futile to contend that the offenders in these cases were of the same class as ordinary criminals, committing the same offences or that the acts which constituted the offences were of the ordinary types .... All these cases again have arisen out of serious disturbances which, according to the prosecution, partook of the nature of an organised revolt.\"\n\nIn view of these facts it seems to me impossible to say the State Government has acted arbitrarily or with a discriminatory intention in referring these cases to the Special Court, for there are obviously special features which mark off this group 0£ cases as requiring speedier disposal than would be possible under the ordinary procedure, and the charge of discriminatory treatment must fail.\n\nI would allow this appeal as also Appeal No. 298 of 1951 (The State of West Bengal v. Gajen Mali) which raises the same questions.\n\nFAZL Au J.-I have come to the conclusion that these appeals should be dismissed, and since that is also the conclusion whiCh has been arrived at by several of my colleagues and they have written very full and elaborate judgments in support of it, I shall only supplement what they have said by stating briefly how I view some of the crucial points arising in the case.\n\nT h1: Stat!! of West Bengal . v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nThere is no doubt that the West Bengal Special Courts Ordinance, 1949, which was later replaced by the impugned Act (West Bengal Special Courts Act X of 1950, to be hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\"), was a valid Ordinance when it was promulgated on the 17th August, 1949.\n\nThe Act, which came into effect on the 15th March, 1950, is a verbatim reproduction of the earlier Ordinance, and what we have to decide is whether it is invalid because it offends against article 14 of the Constitution. In dealing with this question, the following facts have to be borne in mind :-\n\n(1) The framers of the Act have merely copied the provisions of the Ordinance of 1949 which was promulgated when there was no provision similar to article 14 of the present Constitution.\n\n(2) The provision of the American Constitution which corresponds to article 14 has, ever since that Constitution has been in force, greately exercised the minds of the American Judges, who notwithstanding their efforts to restrict its application within reasonable limits, have had to declare a number of laws and executive acts to be unconstitutional.\n\nOne is also amazed at the volume of case-law which has grown round this provision, which shows the extent to which its wide language can be stretched and the large variety of situations in which it has been invoked.\n\n(3) Article 14 is as widely worded as, if not more widely worded than, its counterpart in the American Constitution, and is bound to lead to some inconvenient results and seriously affect some pre-Constitution laws. ( 4) The meaning and scope of article 14 have been elaborately explained in two earlier decisions of this Court, viz., Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others(') and The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara('), and the principles laid down in those decisions have to be kept in view in deciding the present case.\n\nOne of these principles is that article 14 is designed to protect all persons placed in similar circumstances against legislative discrimination, and if the legislature takes care to\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.\n\n(2) [1951] S.C.R. 682.\n\nreasonably classify persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all persons belonging to a well-defined class, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the law does not apply to other persons.\n\n(5) There is nothing sacred or sacrosanct about the test of reasonable classification, but it has undoubtedly proved to be a useful basis for meeting attacks on laws and official acts on the ground of infringement of the equality principle. ( 6) It follows from the two foregoing paragraphs that one of the ways in which the impugned Act can be saved is to show thut it is based on a reasonable classification of the persons to whom or the offences in respect of which the procedure laid down in it is to apply, and hence it is necessary to ascertain whether it is actually based on such a classification.\n\nWith these introductory remarks, I will proceed to deal with some of the more important aspects of the case.\n\nThe first thing to be noticed is that the preamble of the Act mentions speedier trial of certain offences as its object.\n\nNow the framers of the Criminal Procedure Code (which is hereinafter referred to as \"the Code\") also were alive to the desirability of having a speedy trial in certain classes of cases, and with this end in view they made four differenct sets of provisions for the trial of four classes of cases, these being provisions relating to summary trials, trial of summons cases, trial of warrant cases and trial of cases triable by a court of session.\n\nBroadly speaking, their classification of the offences for the purpose of applying these different sets of provisions was according to the gravity of the offences, though in classifying the offences fit for summary trial the experience and power of the trying Magistrate was also taken into consideration.\n\nThe net result of these provisions is that offences which are summarily triable can be more speedily tried than summons cases, summons cases can be more speedily tried than warrant cases, and warrant cases can be more speedily tried than sessions cases.\n\nThe\n\nThe State of West Benial\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nFazl Ali /.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nFazl Ali /.\n\nframers of the Code appear to have been generally of the view that the graver the offence the more elaborate should be the procedure for its trial, which was undoubtedly an understandable point of view, and no one has suggested that their classification of offences for the four different modes of trial to which reference has been made is unreasonable in any sense.\n\nThe impugned Act has completely ignored the principle of classification followed in the Code and it proceeds to lay down a new procedure without making any attempt to particularize or classify the offences or cases to which it is to apply. Indeed section 5 of the Act, which is the most vital section, baldly states that the \"Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may, by general or special order in writing direct\".\n\nI agree with my learned brothers that to say that the reference to speedier trial in the preamble of the Act is the basis of classification is to read in; o the Act some thing which it does not contain and to ascribe to its authors what they never intended.\n\nAs I have already stated, the Act is a verbatim copy of the earlier Ordinance which was framed before the present Constitution came into force, and article 14 could not have been before the minds of those who framed it because that Article was not then in existence.\n\nThe second point to be noted is that in consequence of the Act, two procedures, one laid down in the Code and the other laid down in the Act, exist side by side in the area to which the Act applies, and hence the provisions of the Act are apt to give rise to certain anomalous results ; some of which may be stated as follows:-\n\n(1) A grave offence may be tried according to the procedure laid down in the Act, while a less grave offence may be tried according to the procedure laid down in the Code.\n\n(2) An accused person charged with a particular offence may be tried under the Act while another accused person charged with the same offence may be tried under the Code.\n\n(3) Certain offences belonging to a particular group or category of offences may be tried under the Act whereas other offences belonging to the same group or category may be tried under the Code.\n\nSome of my learned colleagues have examined the provisions of the Act and shown that of the two procedures-one laid down in the Act and the other in the Code-the later affords greater facilities to the accused for the purpose of defending himself than the former ; and once it is established that one procedure is less advantageous to the accused than the other, any person tried by a Special Court constituted under the Act, who but for the Act would have been entitled to be tried according to the more elaborate procedure of the Code, may legitimately enquire :-Why 1s this discrimination being made against me and why should I be tried according to a procedure which has not the same advantages as the normal procedure and which even carries with it the possibility of one's being prejudiced in one's defence ?\n\nIt was suggested that the reply to this query is that the Act itself being general and applicable to all persons and to all offences, cannot be said to discriminate in favour of or against any particular case or classes of persons or cases, and if any charge of discrimination can be levelled at all, it can be levelled only against the act of the executive authority if the Act 1s misused. This kind of argument however does not appear to me to solve the difficulty. The result of accepting it would be that even where discrimination JS quite evident one cannot challenge the Act simply because it JS couched in general terms ; and one cannot also challenge the act of the executive authority whose dut:y it 1s to administer the Act, because that authority will say :-I am not to blame as I am acting under the Act. It is clear that if the argument were to be accepted article 14 could be easily defeated.\n\nI think the fallacy of the argument lies in overlooking the fact that the \"insidious discrimination complained of JS incorporated m the Act itself\", it being so drafted that whenever any\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nFazl Ali f.\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nFazJ Ali f.\n\ndiscrimination is made such discrimination would be ultimately traceable to it.\n\nThe Act itself lays down a procedure which is less advantageous to the accused than the ordinary procedure, and this fact must in all cases be the root-cause of the discrimination which may result by the application of the Act.\n\nIn the course of the arguments, it was suggested that the Act is open to criticism on two different and distinct grounds, these being- ( 1) that it involves excessive delegation of legislative authority amounting to its abdication in so far as it gives unfettered discretion to the executive, without laying down any standards or rules of guidance, to make use of the procedure laid down by it ; and\n\n(2) that it infringes article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe first criticism which is by no means an unsubstantial one, may possibly be met by relying on the decision of this Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1951, In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, etc.('), but the second criticism cannot be so easily met, since an Act which gives uncontrolled authority to discriminate cannot but be hit by article 14 and it will be no answer simply to say that the legislature having more or less the unlimited power to delegate has merely exercised that power. Curiously enough, what I regard as the weakest point of the Act (viz., its being drafted in such general terms) is said to be its main strength and merit, but I really cannot see how the generality of language which gives unlimited authority to discriminate can save the Act.\n\nIn some American cases, there is a reference to \"purposeful or intentional discrimination\", and it was argued that unless we can discover an evil intention or a deliberate design to mete out unequal '1:1!'eadment behind the Act, it cannot be impugned. It should be noted however that the words which I have put in inverted commas, have been used in a few American cases with reference only to executive action, where certain Acts were found to be innocuous but they were\n\nOl [195IJ s.c.R. 747.\n\nadministered by public authority with \"an evil eye and an unequal hand.\" I suggest most respectfully that it will be extremely unsafe to lay down that unless there was evidence that discrimination was \"purposeful. or intentional\" the equality clause would not be infringed.\n\nIn my opinion, the true position is as follows :-As a general rule, if the Act is fair and good, the public authority who has to administer it will be protected. To this general rule, however, there is an exception, which comes into play when there is evidence of mala fides in the application of the Act.\n\nThe basic question however still remams whether the Act itself is fair and good, which must be decided mainly with reference to the specific provisions of the Act. It should be noted thau there 1s no reference to intention 111 article 14 and the gravamen of that Article is equality of treatment.\n\nIn my opinion, it will be dangerous to introduce a subjective test when the Article itself lays down a clear and objective test.\n\nI must confess that I have been trying hard to think how the Act can be saved, and the best argument that came to my mind in support of it was this :-The Act should be held to be a good one, because it embodies all the essentials of a fair and proper trial, namely, ( 1) notice of the charge, (2) right to be heard and the right to test and rebut the prosecution evidence,\n\n(3) access to legal aid, and ( 4) trial by an impartial and experienced court.\n\nIf these are the requisites, so I argued with myself, to which all accused persons are equally entitled, why should a particular procedure which ensures all those requisites not be substituted for another procedure, if such substitution 1s necessitated by administrative ex1genc1es or 1s in public interest, even though the new procedure may be different from and less elaborate than the normal procedure.\n\nThis seemed to me to be the best argument in favour of the Act but the more I thought of it the more it appeared to me that it was not a complete answer to the problem before us. In the first place, it brings in the \"due process\" idea of the American Constitution, which our Constitution has\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nFazl Ali f.\n\nnot chosen to adopt. Secondly, the Act itself does. not state that public interest and administrative exigencies will provide the occasion for its application.\n\nLastly, the discrimination involved in the application of the Act is too evident to be explained away.\n\nThe framers of the Constitution have referred to equality in the Preamble, and have devoted as many as five articles, namely, articles 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights, to ensure equality in all its aspects. Some of these Articles are confined to citizens only and some can be availed of by non-citizens also ; but on reading these provisionsas a whole, one can see the great importance attached to the principle of equality in the Constitution .. That being so, it will be wrong to whittle down the meaning of article 14, and however well-intentioned the impugned Act may be and however reluct; mt one may feel to hold it invalid, it seems to me that section 5 of the Act, or at least that part of it with which alone we are concerned in this appeal, does offend against article 14 of the Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional and void.\n\nThe Act is really modelled upon a pre-Constitution pattern and, will have to be suitably redrafted in order to conform to the requirements of the Constitution.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-I had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my brother Mukherjea and I am in respectful agreement with his opinion.\n\nSection 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act 1s hit by article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it mentions no basis for the differential treatment prescribed in the Act for trial of criminals in certain cases and for certain offences.\n\nThe learned Attorney- General argued that the Act had grouped cases requiring speedier trial as forming a class in themselves, differentiating that class from cases not needing expedition and that it was on this basis that the special procedure prescribed in the Act was applicable.\n\nIn order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to state shortly the scope of article 14 of the\n\nConstitution. It is designed to prevent any person or class of persons for being singled out as a special subject for discriminatory and hostile legislation.\n\nDemocracy implies respect for the elementary rights of man, however suspect or unworthy. Equality of right is a principle of republicanism and article 14 enunciates this equality principle in the administration of justice.\n\nIn its application to legal proceedings the article assures to everyone the same rules of evidence and modes of procedure.\n\nIn other words, the same rule must exist for all in similar circumstances.\n\nThis principle, however, does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstance, in the same position.\n\nBy the process of classification the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.\n\nThis power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well-defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. The classification permissible, however, must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the objects sought to be attained and cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis.\n\nClassification thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics.\n\nIt postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily. Thus the legislature may fix the age at which persons shall be deemed competent to contract between themselves, but no one will claim that competency to contract can be made to depend upon the stature or colour of the hair. \"Such a classification for such a purpose would be arbitrary and a piece of legislative depotism\" (1) :\n\n(1) Vi de Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. W. H. Ellis, 166\n\nU.S.150.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nSpeedier trial of offences may be the reason and motive for the legislation but it does not amount either to a classification of offences or of cases.\n\nAs pointed out by Chakravarti J. the necessity of a speedy trial is too vague and uncertain a criterion to form the basis of a valid and reasonable classification.\n\nIn the words of Das Gupta J. it is too indefinite as there can hardly be any definite objective test to determine it.\n\nIn my opinion, it is no classification at all in the real sense of the term as it is not based on any characteristics which are peculiar to persons or to cases which are to be subject to the special procedure prescribed by the Act.\n\nThe mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of article 14.\n\nTo get out of its reach it must appear that not only a classification has been made but also that it is one based upon a reasonable ground on some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted class'ification and is not a mere arbitrary selection.\n\nPersons concerned in offences or cases needing so called speedier trial are entitled to inquire \"Why are they being made the subject of a law which has short-circuited the normal procedure of trial ; why has it grouped them in that category and why has the law deprived them of the protection and safeguards which are allowed in the case of accused tried under the procedure mentioned in the Criminal Procedure Code ; what makes the legislature or the executive to think that their cases need speedier trial than those of others like them ?\" The only answer, that so far as I am able to see, the Act gives to these inquiries is that they are being made the subject of this special treatment because they need it in the opinion of the provincial government; in other words, because such is the choice of their prosecutor.\n\nThis answer neither sounds rational nor reasonable.\n\nThe only answer for withholding from such persons the protection of article 14 that could reasonably be given to these inquiries would be that \"Of all other accused persons they are a class by themselves and there is a reasonable\n\ndifference between them and those other persons who may have committed similar offences.\" They could be told that the law regards persons guilty of offences against the security of the State as a class in themselves. The Code of Criminal Procedure has by the process of classification prescribed different modes of procedure for trial of different offences. Minor offences can be summarily tried, while for grave and heinous offences an elaborate mode of procedure has been laid down.\n\nThe present statute suggests no reasonable basis or classification, either in respect of offences or in respect of cases.\n\nIt has laid down no yardstick or measure for the grouping either or persons or of cases or of offences by which measure these groups could be distinguished from those who are outside the purview of the Special Act.\n\nThe Act has left this matter entirely to the unregulated discretion of the provincial government. It has the power to pick out a case of a person similarly situate and hand it over to the special tribunal and leave the case of the\n\nother person in the same circumstance to be tried by the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe State government is authorized, if it so chooses, to hand over an ordinary case of simple hurt to the special tribunal, leaving the case of dacoity with murder to be tried in the ordinary way.\n\nIt is open under this Act for the provincial government to direct that a case of dacoity with firearms and accompanied by murder, where the persons, killed are Europeans be tried by the special Court, while exactly similar cases where the persons killed are Indians may be tried under the procedure of the Code.\n\nThat the Special Act lays down substantially different rules for trial of offences and cases than laid down in the general law of the land, i.e., tJhe Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be seriously denied.\n\nIt short-circuits that procedure in material particulars.\n\nIt imposes heavier liabilities on the alleged culprits than are ordained by the Code.\n\nIt deprives them of certain privileges which the Code affords them for their protection. Those singled out for treatment under the\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nMahajan f.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar. '\n\nMahajan /.\n\nprocedure of the Special Act are to a considerable extent prejudiced by the deprivation of the trial by the procedure prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nNot only does the special law deprive them of the safeguard of the committal procedure and of the trial with the help of jury or assessors, but it also deprives them of the right of a de novo trial in case of transfer and makes them liable for conviction and punishment for major offences other than those for which they may have been charged or tried.\n\nThe right of the accused to call witnesses in defence has been curtailed and made dependent on the discretion of the special judge.\n\nTo a certain extent the remedies to which an accused person is entitled for redress in the higher courts have been cut down.\n\nEven if it be said that the statute on the face of it is not discriminatory, it is so in its effect and operation inasmuch as it vests in the executive government unregulated official discretion and therefore has to be adjudged unconstitutional.\n\nIt was suggested that good faith and knowledge of existing conditions on the part of a legislature has to be presumed.\n\nThat is so ; yet to carry that presumption to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed intention or reason for subjecting certain individuals to a hostile and discriminatory legislation is to make the protection clause of article 14, in the words of an American decision, a mere rope of sand, in no manner restraining State action.\n\nThe protection afforded by the article is not a mere eyewash but it is a real one and unless a just cause for discrimination on the basis of a reasonable classification is put forth as a defence, the statute has to be declared unconstitutional. No just cause has been shown in the present instance.\n\nThe result 1s that the appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-These two appeals are directed against the judgment of a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court -dated the 28th of August, 1951, and they arise out of two petitions presented, respectively, by the respondent in the two appeals under article 226 of\n\n...\n\n...\n\nthe Constitution praymg for writs of certiorari to quash two criminal proceedings, one of which has -ended in the trial court, resulting in conviction of the accused, while the other is still pending hearing. The questions requiring consideration in both the appeals are the same and the whole controversy centres round the point as to whether the provision of section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, as well as certain notifications issued under it are ultra vires the Constitution by reason of their being in conflict with article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe material facts, which are not controverted; may be shortly stated as follows.\n\nOn August 17, 1949, an Ordinance, known as the \\Vest Bengal Special Courts Ordinance, was promulgated by the Governor of West Bengal under section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935. On 15th March, 1950, this Ordinance was superseded and replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act which contained provisions almost identical with those of the Ordinance. Section 3 of the Act empowers the State Government to constitute, by notification, Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such areas and to sit at such places as may be notified in the notification.\n\nSection 4 provides for appointment of a Special Judge to preside over a Special Court and it mentions the qualifications which a Special Judge should possess.\n\nSection 5(1) then lays down that a Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases as the State Government may, by general or special order, m writing direct.\n\nSections 6 to 15 set out m details the procedure which the Special Court has to follow in the trial of cases referred to it.\n\nBriefly stated, the trial is to be without any jury or assessors, and the court has to follow the procedure that is laid down for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate under the Criminal Proce~ <lure Code.\n\nThe procedure for committal in the sessions cases is omitted altogether ; the court's powers -of granting adjournment are restricted and special provisions are made to deal with refractory accused and also for cases which are transferred from one\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nMukherjea 7.\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark_ar.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nSpecial Court to another. The Court is expressly empowered to convict a person of an offence with which he was not charged if it transpires from the evidence adduced at the time of trial that such offence was committed by him, and it is immaterial that the offence is not a minor offence.\n\nThe right of revision to the High Court has been taken away entirely, though appeals have been allowed in all cases both at the instance of the accused as well as of the State and they lie both on questions of fact and law.\n\nOn October 28, 1949, when the Ordinance wa• still in force, the West Bengal Government appointed Shri S. N. Guha Roy, who was then the Sessions Judge of Alipore, a Special Judge, with powers to try cases under the Ordinance.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar, who is the respondent in Appeal No. 297, along with 49 other persons, were the accused in what is known as Dum Dum Factory Raid case, where crimes of the utmost brutality were committed by an armed gang of men on the factory of Messers. Jessop and Company at Dum Dum.\n\nThe raid took place on February 26, 1949. The accused or most of them were arrested some time after the Ordinance was promulgated.\n\nOn 25th of January, 1950, the State Government by a notification directed that the case of Anwar Ali and his 49 co-accused should be tried by Mr. S. N. Guha Roy in accordanrn with the provisions of the Ordinance.\n\nA formal complaint was lodged before the Special Judge in respect of these 50 persons on April 2, 1950, that is to say, after the Special Courts Act was passed, superseding the Ordinance. The trial lasted for several months and by his judgment dated the 31st of March, 1951, the Special Judge convicted the accused under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, some of them being sentenced to transportation for life, while others were sentenced to undergo various terms of imprisonment according to the gravity of their offence.\n\nThe State Government applied for enhancement of sentence with regard to some of the accused and a rule was actually issued by the High Court upon them to show cause why they should not be sentenced\n\nto death. On May l, 1951, Anwar Ali, the respondent in Appeal No. 297, presented an application before Mr. Justice Bose of the Calcutta High Court under article 226 of the Constitution and a rule was issued by the learned Judge upon that petition calling upon the State of West Bengal to show cause why the proceedings, conviction and sentence, passed by the Special Court on the petitioner and his co-accused should not be quashed.\n\nOn 21st of May following, a similar application for quashing a pending criminal trial was filed by Gajen Mali, the respondent in the other appeal, who along with 5 other persons is being tried for offences of murder and conspiracy to murder before Mr. M.\n\nBhattacharya, another Special Judge, appointed under the West Bengal Special Courts Act.\n\nA rule was issued on this application also. Both the rules came up for hearing before Mr. Justice Bose, and as the karned Judge was of opinion that they involved questions of general constitutional importance, he referred them to the Chief Justice for decision by a larger Bench.\n\nAccordingly a Special Bench was constituted, consisting of the Chief Justice and four other Judges who heard bgth these cases.\n\nIt was conceded during the hearing of these rules by the State Government that although in the case of Anwar Ali the notification was issued a day before the coming into force of the Constitution, the provisions of the Constitution of India, which came into force on the 26th of January, 1950, applied to his case also. On the 28th of August, 1951, the Special Bench made the rules absolute and held that section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act was void to the etent that it empowers the State to direct any case to be tried by the Special Court. The notifications issued under that sub-section were also held to be invalid for the same reason. It is against this decision that these two appeals have been taken to this court by the State of West Bengal.\n\nIn order to appreciate the points that have been canvassed before us, it would be convenient first of all\n\n6-4 S.C. India/71\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark_ar.\n\nMuk_heriea f.\n\n1952 .\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar,\n\n/Jukherjeo /.\n\nto refer to the provision of article 14 of the Constitution with a view to determine the nature and scope of the guarantee that is implied in it.\n\nThe article lays down that \"the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.\" It is, in sub., stance, modelled upon the equal protection clause, occurring in the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution with a further addition of the rule of \"equality before the law\", which is an established maxim of the English Constitution. A number of American decisions have been cited before us on behalf of both parties in course of the arguments; and while a too rigid adherence to the views expressed by the Judges of the Supreme Court of America while\n\nealing with the equal protection clause in their own\n\nConstitution-may not be necessary or desirable for the purpose of determining the true meaning and scope of article 14 of the Indian Constitution, it cannot be denied that the general principles enunciated in many of these cases do afford considerable help and guidance in the matter.\n\nIt can be taken to be well settled that the principle underlying the guarantee in article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances(').\n\nIt only means that all . persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed(').\n\nEqual laws would have to be applied to all in the same 'l<ituation, on there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subjectmatter of the legislation their position is substantially the same. This brings in the question of classification.\n\nAs there is no infringement of the equal protection rule, if the law deals alike with all of a certain class, the legislature has the undoubted right of classifying\n\n(1) Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India [1950] S.C.R. 869.\n\n(2) Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corpor\"1ion\n\n299U.S. J83. ·\n\npersons and placing those whose conditions are substantially similar under the same rule of la}\\', while applying different rules to persons differently situated.\n\nIt is said that the entire problem under the equal protection clause is one of classification or of drawing lines(1).\n\nIn making the classification the legislature cannot certainly be expected to provide \"abstract symmetry.\" It can make and set apart of the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience.\n\nIt can recognise even \"degrees of evil\" (2), but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.\n\nIt must rest always upon real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the thing in respect to which the classification is made; and classification made without any reasonable basis should be regarded as invalid(3).\n\nThese propositions have not been controverted before us and it is not disputed also on behalf of the respondents that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it, to show that there has been transgression of constitutional principles.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General, appearing in support of the appeal, has put forward his contentions under two different heads.\n\nHis first line of argument is that quite apart from the question of classification there has been no infringement of article 14 of the Constitution in the present case.\n\nIt is said that the State has full control over procedure in courts, both in civil and criminal cases, it can effect such changes as it likes for securing due and efficient administration of justice and a legislation of the character which we have got here and which merely regulates the mode of trial in certain cases cannot come within the description of discriminatory or hostile legislation.\n\nIt is further argued that the differences that have been inade in the procedure for criminal trial under the West Bengal\n\n(1) Vide O;:iwling: Cases on Constitutional Law, 4th edn. 1139.\n\n(2) Vide Skinner v, Oklahoma (316 UtS. 535 at 540).\n\n(3) Sotlzern Railway Co. v. Greene (216 U.S. 400 at 412).\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar,\n\nMukheriet1 /,\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAtuvar Ali Sarkar.\n\nMukherjea ]~\n\nSpecial Courts Act, 1950, are of a minor character and there are no substantial grounds upon which discrimination could be alleged or founded. The second head of arguments advanced by the Attorney-General is that there is a classification and a justifiable classification on the basis of which differences in the procedure have been made by the West Bengal Act ; and even if any unguided power has been conferred on the executive, the Act itself cannot be said to have violated the equality clause, though questions relating to proper exercise of such power or the limits of permissible delegation of authority might arise.\n\nAs regards the first point, it cannot be disputed that a competent legislature •is entitled to alter the procedure in criminal trials in such way as it considers proper.\n\nArticle 21 of the Constitution only guarantees that \"no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure et.ab lished by law.\" The word \"law\" in the Article means a State made law('), but it must be a valid and bind. ing law having regard not merely to the competency of the legislature and the subject it relates to, but it must not also infringe any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.\n\nA rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of article 14 as any rule of substantive law and it is necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same pr<>- cedural rights for relief and for defence with like protection and without discrimination('). The two cases referred to by the learned Attorney-General in this connection do not really support his contention. In Hayes v.\n\nMzsrouri(') the subject-matter of complaint was a pr<>- vision of the revised statutes of Missouri which allowed the State, in capital cases, fifteen peremptory challenges in cities having a population of 100,000 inhabitants in place of eight in other parts of the State. This was held to be a valid exercise of legislative discretion not_\n\n(]) Vide A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras [1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\n(2) Weaver : Constitutional La\\v, page 407. ·\n\n(3) 120 U.S. 68; 30 L. Ed. 578.\n\ncontravening the equality clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nIt was said that the power of the Legislature to prescribe the number of challenges was limited by the necessity of having impartial jury, With a view to secure that end, the legislature could take into consideration the conditions of different <:ommunities and the strength of population in a particular city ; and if all the persons within particular territorial limits are given equal rights in like cases, there could not be any question of discrimination. The Qther case relied upon by the learned Attorney-General is the case of Brown v.\n\nThe Strate of New fersey(1).\n\nIn this case the question was whether the provision of the State Constitution relating to struck jury in murder, cases was in conflict with the equal protection clause.\n\nThe grievance made was that the procedure of struck jury denies the defendant the same number of peremptory challenges as he would have had in a trial before an ordinary jury.\n\nIt was held by the Supreme Court that the equal protection clause was not violated by this provision. \"It is true\", thus observes Mr.\n\nJustice Brewer, \"that here there is no territorial dis- tribution but in all cases in which a struck .jury is ordered the same number of challenges is permitted and similarly in all cases in which the trial is by an ordinary jury either party, State or defendant, may apply for a struck jury and the matter is one which is determined bv the court in the exercise of a sound discretion ........ That in a given case the discretion of the . court in awarding a trial by a struck jury was improperly exercised may perhaps present a matter for consideration in appeal but it amounts to nothing more\".\n\nThus it was held that the procedure of struck jury did not involve any discrimination between one person and another.\n\nEach party was at liberty to apply for d struck jury if he so chose and the application could be granted by the court if it thought proper having regard to the circumstances of each individual case.\n\nThe procedure would be identi- <:al in respect of all persons when it was allowed and\n\n{I) 17SU.S.17J :44L.Ed.lJ9.\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nMukherjea f,\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nMukheriea /.\n\nail parties would have equal apportunities of availing themselves of this procedure if i!hey so liked. That a judicial discretion has to be exercised on the basis of the facts of each case in the matter of granting the application for a struck jury does not really involve discrimination. These decisions, in my opinion, have no bearing on the present case.\n\nI am not at all impressed by the argument of the learned Attorney-General that to enable , the respon- dents to invoke the protection of article 14 of the Constitution it has got to be shown that the legislation complained of is a piece of \"hostile\" legislation.\n\nThe expressions \"discriminatory\" and \"hostile\" are found to be used by American Judges often simultaneously and almost as synonymous expressions in connection with discussions on the equal protection clause.\n\nIf a legislation is discriminatOfY and discriminates one person or class of persons against other similarly situated and denies to the former the privileges that are enjoyed by the latter, it cannot but be regarded as \"hostile\" in the sense that it affects injuriously the interests of that person or cla_ss. Of course, if one's interests are not at all affectedby a particular piece of legislation, he may have no right to complain. But if it is established that the person complaining has been discriminated against as a result of kgisfation and denied equal privileges with others occupying the same position, I do not think that it is incumbent upon him, before he can claim relief on the basis of his fundamental rights, to assert and prove that in making the law, the legislature was actuated by a hostile or inimical intention against a particular person or class.\n\nFor the same reason I cannot agree with the learned Attorney-General that in cases like these, we should enquire as to what was the dominant intention of the legislature in enacting -the law and that the operation of article 14 would be excluded if it is proved that the legislature had no intention to discriminate, though discrimination was the necessary consequence of the Act.\n\nWhen discrimination is alleged against officials in carrymg\n\nS.C.R.·\n\nSPPREME COURT REPORTS 325\n\nout the law, a . question of intention . may be material in ascertaining whether the officer acted mala fide or not(1); but no question of intention can arise when discrimination follows or arises on the express terms of the law itself.\n\nI agree with the Attorney-General that if the differences are not material, there may not be any discrimination in the proper sense of the word and minor deviations from the general standard might not amount to denial of equal rights.\n\nI find it difficult however, to hold that the difference in the procedure that has been introduced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act is of a minor or unsubstantial character which has not prejudiced the interests of the accused.\n\nThe first difference is that made in section 6 of the Act which lays down that the Special Court may take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial, and that in trying the accused it has to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases by Magistrates.\n\nIt is urged by the Attorney- General that the elimination of the committal proceedings a matter of no importance and that the warrant procedure, which the Special Court has got to follow,\n\naffords a scope for a preliminary examinat.i'on of the evidence against the accused before a charge is framed.\n\nIt cannot be denied that there is a difference between the two proceedings.\n\nIn a warrant case the entire proceeding is before the same Magistrate and the same officer who frames the charge hears the case finally.\n\nIn a sessions case, on the other hand, the trial is actually before another Judge, who was not connected with the earlier proceeding. It is also clear that after the committal and before the sessions judge actually hears the case,' !there is generally a large iilltlerval of time which gives the accused ample opportunity of preparing his defence, he being acquainted beforehand with the entire evidence that the prosecution wants to adduce against him.\n\nHe cannot have the same advantage in a warrant case even if an adjournment is granted by the Magistrate after the charge is\n\n(1) Sunday Lake Iron Company v. Wake/ield(247 U.S. 350).\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nMukherjea f.\n\nThe State of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark._ar.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nframed. Be that as it may, this is not the only matter upon which the normal procedure has been departed from in the Special Courts Act.\n\nOne of the most important departures is that the trial by the Special Court is without the aid of jury or assessors.\n\nThe trial by jury is undoubtedly one of the most valuable rights which the accused can have. It is true that the trial by jury is not guari'nteed by the .Constitution and section 269(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the State Government to direct that the trial of all offences or any particular class of offences before any sessions court shall be by jury in any district ; and it may revoke or alter such orders.\n\nThere is nothing. wrong therefore if the State discontinues trial by jury in any district with regard to all or any particular class of offences ; but as has been pointed out by Mr. Justice Chakravarti of. the Calcutta High Court, it cannot revoke jury trial in respect of a particular case of a particular accused while in respect of other cases involving the same offences the order still remains.\n\nAmongst other important changes, reference may be made to the. provision of section 13 of the Act which empowers the Special Court to convict an accused of any offence if' the commission of such offence is proved during trial, although he was not charged with the same or could be charged with it in the manner contemplated by section 236 of the Criminal Procedure Code, nor was it a minor offence within the meaning of section 238 of the Code. Under section 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when a case after being heard in part goes for disposal before another Magistrate, the accused has the right to demand, before the second Magistrate commences the proceedings, that the witnesses already examined should be re-examined and re-heard. This right has been taken away from the accused in cases where a case is transferred from one Special Court to another under the provision of section 7 of the Special Courts Act. Further the right of revision to the High Court does not exist at all under the new procedure, although the rights under the Constitution of India are retained.\n\nk has been pointed out and quite correctly by one of the learned Counsel for respondents . that an application for bail cannot be made before the High Court on behalf of an accused after the Special Court has refused bail.\n\nThese and other provisions of the Act make it dear that the rights of the accused have been curtailed in a substantial manner by the impugned legislation ; and if the rights are curtailed only in certain cases and not in others, even though the circumstances in the latter cases are the same a question of discrimination may certainly arise.\n\nThe first line of argument adopted by the learned Attorney-General cannot, therefore, be accepted.\n\nI now come to the other head of arguments put forward by him and the principal point for our consideration is whether the apparent discriminations that have been made in the Act can be justified on the basis of a reasonable classification.\n\nSection 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act lays down that\n\n\"A Special Court shall try such offences of offences or cases or classes of cases as Government may, by general or special writing direct.\"\n\nor classes the State order m\n\nThe learned Attorney-General urges that the principle of classification upon which the differences have been made between cases and offences triable by the Special. Court and those by ordinary courts 1s indicated in the preamble to the Act which runs as follows :\n\n\"Whereas it 1s expedient to provide for the -speedier trial of certain offences\".\n\nWhat is said is, that the preamble is to be read as a part of section 5(1) and the proper interpretation to be put upon the sub-section is that those cases and offences which in the opinion of the State Government would require speedier trial could be assigned by it to the Special Court.\n\nIn my opinion, this contention cannot be accepted for more reasons than one. In the first place, I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court that the express provision of an enactment, if it is clear and unambiguous, cannot be\n\nThe State of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea /.\n\ncurtailed or extended with the aid of the preamble to the Act. It is on\\y when the object ormeaning of the enactment' is not clear that recourse can be had to the preamble to explain it(1 ), In the case before us the language of section 5( 1) is perfectly clear and free from any ambiguity.\n\nIt vests an unrestricted discretion in the State Government to direct any cases or classes of cases to be tried bv the Special Court in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act.\n\nIt is not stated that it is only when speedier trial is necessary that the discretion should be exercised. In the second place, assuming that the preamble throws any light upon the interpretation of these section, I am definitely of opinion hat tl1e necessity of a speedier trial is too vague, uncertain and elusive a criterion to form a rational basis for the discriminations made.\n\nThe necessity for speedier trial. may be the object which the Jegislatnre had in view or it may be the occasion for making the enactment.\n\nIn a sense quick disposal is a thing which is desirable in all legal, proceedings.\n\nThe word used here is \"speedier\" which is a comparative term and as there may be degrees of speediness, the word undoubtedly introduces an uncertain and variable element.\n\nBut the question is : how is this necessity of speedier trial to be determined ? Not by reference to the nature of the offences or the circm; nstances under which or the area in which they are committed, nor even by reference to any peculiarities or antecedents of the offenders tl1emselves, but the selection is left to the absolute and unfettered discretion of the executive government with nothing in the law to guide or control its action. This is not a reasonable classification at all but an arbitrary selection. A line is drawn artificially between two classes of cases.\n\nOn one side of the line are grouped those cases which the State Government chooses to assign to the Special Court ; on the other side stand the rest which the State Government does not think fit and proper to touch.\n\nIt has been observed in many cases by the Supreme Court of America that the fact that some\n\n( 1) See Craies on Statute La\\v, 4th edn., 184.\n\nsort of classification has been attempted at will not relieve a statute from the reach of 'the equality clause. \"It must appear not only that a classification has been made but also that it is based upon some reasonable ground-some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification\"(1). The question in each case would be whether the characteristics of the class are such as to provide a rational justification for the differences introduced ?\n\nJudged by this test, the answer in the present case should be in the negative ; for the difference in the treatment rests here solely on arbitrary selection by the State Government.\n\nIt is true that the p!resumption should always be that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds(2) ; but as was said by Mr. Justice Brewer in\n\nGulf Colorado etc. Company v. Ellis(3), \"to carry the presumption to the extent of holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile and discriminatory legislation is to make the protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment a mere rope of sand.\"\n\nA point was made by the Attorney-General in course of his arguments that the equality rule is not violated simply because a. statute confers unregulated discretion on officers or on administrative agencies.\n\nIn such cases it may be possible to attack the legislation on the ground of improper delegation of authority ot the acts of the officers may be challenged on the ground of wrongful or mala fide exercise of powers ; but no question of infringement of article 14 of the Constitution could possibly arise.\n\nWe were referred to a number of authorities on this point but I do not think that the authorities really support the proposition of law in the way it is formulated. In the well kinown case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins(4), the question was, whether the provision of a certain ordinance of the City and Country of San\n\n(I) G11/fColorado etc. Co. v.Ellis (165 U.S.150).\n\n(2) Middleton v. Texas Power & Li11ht Co. (249 U.S.152).\n\n(3> 165 U.S. 150.\n\n(4) 118 U.S. 356.\n\nThe State of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nThe State af\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nFancisco was invalid by reason of its being in conflict with the equal protection clause.\n\nThe order in question laid down that it would be unlawful for any person to engage in laundry business within the corporate limits \"without having first obtained the consent of the Board of Supervisors except the same to, be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone.\" The question was answered in the affirmative.\n\nIt was pointed out by Matthews, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, that the ordinance in question did not merely prescribe a rule and condition for the regulation of the laundry business.\n\nIt allowed without restriction the use for such purposes of building of brick or stone, but as to wooden buildings constituting nearly all those in previous use, it divided the owners or occupiers into two classes, not having respect to their personal character and qualifications of the business, nor the situation and nature and adaptation of the buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line, on one side of which were those who were permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors and on the other those from whom that consent was withheld at their will and pleasure.\n\nThis sort of committing to the unrestrained will of a public officer the power to deprive a citizen of his, right to carry on lawful business was held to constitute an invasion of the Fourteenth Amendment. The learned Judge pointed out in course of his judgment that there are cases where discretion is lodged by law in public officers or bodies to grant or withhold licences to keep taverns or places for sale of spirituous liquor and the like.\n\nBut all these cases stood on a different footing altogether.\n\nThe same view was reiterated in Crowley v. Christensen(') which related to an ordinance regulating the issue of licences to sell liquors.\n\nIt appears to he an accepted doctrine of American courts that the purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within the States against arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of the statute or by their\n\n(I) 137 U.S. 86.\n\n. ... '.\n\nimproper application through duly constitued agents.\n\nThis was clearly laid down in Sunday Lake Iron Company v. W akefield(1 ). In this case the complaint was against a taxing officer, who was alleged to have assessed the plaintiff's properties at their full value, while all other persons in the country were assessed at not more than one-third of the worth of their properties. It was held that the equal protection clause could e availed of against the taxing officer ; but if he was found to have acted bona fide and the discrimination was the result of a mere error of judgment on his part, the action would fail.\n\nThe position, therefore, is that when the statute is not itself discriminatory and the charge of violation of equal protection is only against the official, who is entrusted with the duty of carrying it into 'operation, the equal protection clause could be availed of in such cases ; but the officer would have a good defence if he could prove bona fides.\n\nBut when the statute itself makes a discrimination without_ any proper or reasonable basis, the statute would be invalidated for being in conflict with the equal protection clause, and the question as to how it is actually worked out may not necessarily be a material fact for consideration.\n\nAs I have said already, in the present case the. discrimination arises on the terms of the Act itself.\n\nThe fact that it gives unrestrained power to the State Government to select in any way it likes the particular cases or offences which should go to a Special Tribunal and withdraw in such cases the protection which the accused normally enjoy under the criminal law of the country, is on the face of it discriminatory.\n\nIt may be noted in this connection that in the present case the High Court has held the provision of section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act to be ultra vires the Constitution only so far as it allows the State Government to direct any case to be tried by the Special Court. In the opinion of the learned Chief Justice, if the State Government had directed certain offences or classes of offences committed within the\n\n( 1) 247 U.S. 350.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nMukheriea f.\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nterritory of West Bengal to be tried by the Special Court, the law or order could not have been impeached as discriminatory. It is to be noted that the Act itself does not mention in what classes of cases or offences such direction could be given ; nor does it purport to lay down , the criterion or the basis upon which the classification is to be made.\n\nIt is not strictly correct to say that if certain specified offences throughout the State were directed to be tried by the Special Court, there could nou be any infringement of the equality rule.\n\nIt may be that in making the selection the authorities would exclude from the list of offences other offences of a cognate character in respect to which no difference in treatment is justifiable.\n\nIn such circumstances also the law or order would be offending against the equality provision in the Constitution.\n\nThis is illustrated by the case of Skinder v.\n\nOklahoma(').\n\nThere a statute of Oklahoma provided for the sterilization of certairi habitual criminals, who were convicted two or more times in any, State, of felonies involving moral turpitude.\n\nThe statute applied to persons guilty of larceny, which was regarded as a felony but not to embezzlement.\n\nIt was held that the statute violated the equal protection clause.\n\nIt is said that in cases where the law does not lay down a standard or form in - accordance with which the classification is to be made, it would be the duty of the officers entrusted with the execution of the law, to make the classification in the way consonant with the principles of the Constitution (2).\n\nIf that be the position, then an action might lie for annulling the acts of the officers if they are found not to be in conformity with the equality clause.\n\nMoreover, in the present case the notification by the State Government could come within the definition of law as given in article 13(3) of the Constitution and can be impeached apart from the Act if it violates article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nI do not consider it necessary to pursue thls matter any further, as in my opinion even on the\n\n(I) 316 U.S. SSS.\n\n(2) Vi de Witlis on Cnstitutional Law, Page 587\n\nlimited ground upon which the High Court bases its decision, these appeals are bound tio fail.\n\nDAs J.-1 concur in dismissing these appeals but I am not persuaded that the whole of , section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act is invalid.\n\nAs I find myself in substantial agreement with the interpretation put upon that section by the majority of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court and most of the reasons adopted by Harries, C. J., in support thereof, I do not feel called upon to q:press myself in very great detail. I propose only to note the points urged before us and shortly state my conclusions thereon .\n\nThere is no dispute that the question of the validity of section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, has to be determined in the light of the provisions of the Constitution of India which came into force on January 26, 1950.\n\nThe contention of the respondents, who were petitioners before the High Court has been and is that the whole of section 5 of the Act or, at any rate, that part of it which authorises the State government , to direct particular \"cases\"\n\nto be tried by the Special Court offends against the guarantee of equality before the law secured by article 14. If the provision of section 5 of the Act is invalid even to the limited extent mentioned above, then also the whole proceedings before the Special Court which was directed by the State Government to try these particular \"cases\" must necessarily have been without jurisdiction as has been held by the tJigh Court Full Bench and these appeals would have to be dismissed.\n\nArticle 14 of our Constitution, it is well k:nown, corresponds to the last portion of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the American Constitution except that our article 14 has also adopted the English doctrine of rule of law by the addition of the words \"equality before the law.\" It' has not, however, been urged before us that the addition of these extra words has made any substantial difference in its practical application.\n\nThe meaning, scope. and effect of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnw\"r Ali Sarkar.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark_ar.\n\nDas J.\n\narticle 14 of our Constitution have been discusseed and laid down by this Court in the case of C hiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others(').\n\nAlthough Sastri J., as he then was, and myself differed from the actual decision of the majority of the Court, there was no disagreement between us and the majority as to the principles underlying the provisions of article 14. The difference of opinion in that case was not so much on the principles to be applied as to the effect of the application of such principles.\n\nThose principles were again considered and summarised by this Court in The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara(2 ). It is now well established that while article 14 is designed to prevent a person or class of persons from being singled out from others similarly situated for the purpose of being specially subjected to discriminating and h:>Stile legislation, it does not insist on an \"abstract symmetry\" in the sense that every piece of legislation must have universal application.\n\nAll persons are not, by nature, attaipment or circumstances, equal and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment and, therefore, the protecting clause has been construed as a guarantee against discrimination amongst equals only and not as taking away from the State the power to classify persons for the purpose of legislation.\n\nThis classification may be on different bases. It may be geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like.\n\nMere classification, however, is not enough to get over the inhibition of the Article.\n\nThe classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.\n\nIn order to pass the test, two conditions must be ftilfilled, namely,\n\n(1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible diffcrentia which distinguishes those that are gr011pc<l together from others\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.\n\n(2) [1951] S.C.R. 682.\n\nand (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sough~ to be achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while the Arllicle forbids class legislation in the sense of making improper discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferrecl or the liability proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense I have just explained.\n\nThe doctrine, as expounded by this Court in the two cases I have mentioned, leaves a considerable latitude to the Court in the matter of the application of article 14 and consequently has the merit of flexibility.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General, appearing m support of these appeals, however, contends that while a reasonable classification of the kind mentioned above may be a 'test of the validity of a particular piece of legislation, it may not be the only test which will cover all cases and that there may be other tests also.\n\nIn answer to the query of the Court he formulates an alternative test in the following words : If there is in fact inequality of treatment ana such inequality is not made with a special intention of prejudicing any particular person or persons but is made in the general interest of administration, there is no infringement of article 14.\n\nIt is at once obvious that, according to the test thus formulated, the validity of State action, legislative or executive, is made entirely dependent on the state of mind of the authority.\n\nThis test will permit even flagrantly discriminatory State action on the specious plea of good faith and of the subjective view of the executive authority as to the existence of a supposed general interest of administration.\n\nThis test, if accepted, will amount to adding at the end of article 14 the words \"except in good faith and in the 7-4 S. C. India/71\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nDas/.\n\nTh< Stat< of\n\nW<st B.ngal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nDas{.\n\ngeneral interest of administration.\" This is clearly not permissible for the Court to do. Further, it is obvious that the addition of these words will, in the language of Brewer, J., in Gulf Colorado >and Santa Fe Railway .Co. v. W. H. Ellis('), make the protecting clause a mere\n\nrope of sand, in no manner restraining State action I am not, therefore, prepared to accept the proposition propounded by the learned Attorney-General, unsupported as it is by any judicial decision, as a sound test for determining t:he validity of State action.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General next contends, on the authority of -a passage in Cooley's Constitutional Limitatioru, 8th Edition, Vol. 2, p. 816, that inequalities of minor importance do not render a law invalid and that the constitutional limitations must be treated as flexible enough to permit of practical application.\n\nThe passage purports to be founded on the decision in Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v.\n\nBlagg(\").\n\nA careful permal of this decision will make it quite clear that the Court upheld the validity of the statute impugned in that case, not on the ground that the inequality was of minor importance but, on the groundthat the classification of establishments according to the num- 'ber of workmen employed therein was based on an intelligible distinction having a rational relation to the subject-matter of the legislation m question.\n\nThat decision, therefore, does not support the propos1t10n so widely stated in the passage apparently adged by the editor to the original text of Judge Cooley.\n\nThe difference brought about 'by a statute may be of such a trival, unsubstantial and illusory nature that that circumstance alone maybe regarded as cognent ground for holding that the statute has not discriminated at all and that no inequality has in fact. been created. This aspect of the matter apart, if a statute brings about ineq)lality in fact and in substance, it will be illogical and highly -undesirable to make the constitutionality of such a oStatute depend on the degree of the inequality so\n\n(1) 165 U.S.150.\n\n(2) 235 U.S. 571; 59 L. Ed. 364.\n\nbrought about.\n\nThe adoption of such a principle will run counter to the plain language of article 14.\n\nAt one stage of his arguments the learned Attorney- General just put forward an argument, which he did not press very strongly, that the Article is a protection against the inequality of substantive law only and not against that of a procedural law. I am quite definitely not prepared to countenance that argument.\n\nThere is no logical basis for this distinction.\n\nA procedural law may easily inflict very great hardship on persons subjected to it, as, indeed, this very Act under consideration will presently be seen to have obviously done .\n\nThat the Act has prescribed a procedure of trial which is materially different from that laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be disputed.\n\nThe different sections of the Act have been analysed and the important differences have been clearly indicated by the learned Chief Justice of West Bengal and need not be repeated in detail. The elimination of the committal proceedings and of trial by jury (sec. 6), the taking away of the right to a de novo trial on transfer (sec. 7), the vesting of discretion in the Special Court to refuse to summon a defence witness if it be satisfied that his evidence will not be material (sec. 8), the liability to be convicted of an offence higher than that for which the accused was sent up for trial under the Act (sec. 13), the exclusion of interference of other Courts by way of revi, sion or transfer or under section 491 of the Code (sec. 16) are some of the glaring instances of inequality brought about by the impugned Act.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General has drawn our attention to various sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an endeavour to establish that provisions somewhat similar to those enacted in this Act are also contained in the Code.\n\nA comparison between the language of those sections of the Code and that of the several sections of this Act mentioned above will clearly show that tl1e Act has gone much beyond the provisions of the Code and the Act cannot by any .means\n\nWest Beng11l\n\nAnwar A/1\n\nSarkar.\n\nD11s /.\n\nThe Stole of\n\nWesi Bro1•I\n\nAn.war Ali Sarkar.\n\nDas J,\n\nbe said to be an innocuous substitute for the procedure prescribed by the Code. The far-reaching effect of the elimination of the committal proceedings cannot possibly be ignored merely by stating that the warrant procedure under the Code in a way also involves a committal by the trial Magistrate, namely to himself, for the warrant procedure minimises the chances of the prosecution being tl1rown out at the preliminary stage, as may be done by the committing Magistrate, and deprives the accused person of the opportu111ty of knowing, well in adavnce of the actual trial before the Sessions Court, the case sought to be made against him and the evidence in support of it and, what is of the utmost importance, of the benefit of a trial beiore\n\nand the decision of a different and mdependent mind.\n\nThe Jiabiiity to be c011 vie led of a higher o!Icnce has no parallel in the Code. It is true that the State can, under section 269 (1) of the Code, do away with trial by jury but that section, as pointed out by Chakravartti J. does not clearly contemplate elimination of that proceture only in particular cases which is precisely what the Act authorises the Government to do.\n\nOn a fair reading of the Act there can be no escape from the fact that it quite definitely brings afxmt a substantial nequality of treatment, in the matter of trial, between persons subjected to it and others who are left to be governed by the ordinary procedure laid down in the Code.\n\nThe question is whether section 5 ( 1) which really imposes this substantial inequality on particular persons can be saved from the operation of article 14 on the principle of rational classification of the kind permissikle in law.\n\nSection 5 ( 1) of the Act runs as follows :-\n\n\"A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may, by general or special order in writing, direct\".\n\nIt will be noticed that the sub-section refers to four distinct categories, namely, \"offences\", \"classes of of- . fences\", \"cases\" a11d \"classes of cases\" and empowers\n\n• ..\n\nthe State government to direct any one or more of these categories to be tried by the Special Court constituted under the Act.\n\nI shall first deal with the section in so far as it authorises the State government to direct \"offences\", \"classes of offences\" and \"classes of cases\" to be tried by a Special Court. These expressions clearly indicate, and obviously imply, a process of classification of offences or cases.\n\nPrima f acie those words do not contemplate any particular offender or any particular accused in any particular case.\n\nThe emphasis is on \"offences\", \"classes of offences\" or \"classes of cases\".\n\nThe classification of \"offences\" by itself is not calculated to touch any individual as such, although it may, after the classification is made, affect all individuals who may commit the particular offence.\n\nIn short, the classification implied in this part of the , sub-section has no reference to, and is not directed towards the singling out of any particular person as an object of hostile State action but is concerned only with the grouping of \"offences'', \"classes of offences\" and \"classes of cases\" for the purpose of being tried by a Special Court.\n\nSuch being the meaning and implication of this part or section 5 ( 1), the question arises whether the process of classification thus contemplated by the Act conforms to the requiremen~ of reasonable classification which does not offend against the Constitution.\n\nLearned Attorney-General claims that the impugned Act satisfies even this test of rational classification.\n\nHis contention is that offences may be grouped into two classes, namely, those that require speedier trial, that is speedier than what is provided for in the Code and those that do not require a speedier trial.\n\nThe Act, according to him, purports to deal only with offences of the first class.\n\nHe first draws our attention to the fact that the Act is intituled \"An Act to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences\" afld then points out that the purpose of the Act, as stated in its preamble, also is \"to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences\". He next l'ders us to the different sections of the Act and urges\n\nWert Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarka1.\n\nDas f.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAaivar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nDas/.\n\nthat all the procedural changes introduced by the Act are designed to accomplish the object of securing speedier t'rial The Act accordingly empowers the State government to direct the offences, which, in its view, require speedier trial, to be tried by a Special Court according to the special procedure provided by .it for the speedier trial of those offences.\n\nThis constmction of the section, he maintains, is consonant with the object of the Act as recited in the preamble and does not offend aginst the inhibition of article 14 of our Constitution.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents, on rhe other hand, urge that there is no ambiguity whatever in the language used in the sub-section, that there is no indication in the sub-section itself of any restriction or qualification on the power of classification conferred by it on the State government and that the power thus given to the State government cannot be controlled and cut down by calling in aid the preamble of the Act, for the preamble cannot abridge or enlarge the meaning of the plain language of the sub-section. This argument was accepted by the High Court in its application to the other part of the section dealing with selection of' \"cases\" but in judging whether this argument applies, with equal force, to that part of the ection I am now considering, it must be borne in mind that, although the preamble of an Act cannot override the plain meaning of the language of its operative parts, it may, nevertheless, assist in ascertaining what the true meaning or implication of a particular section is, for the preamble is, as it were a key to the understanding of the Act.\n\nI therefore, proceed to examine this part of section 5(1) in the light of the preamble so as to ascertain the true meaning of it.\n\nI have already stated that this part of the sub-section contemplates a process of classification of \":'offences\", \"classes of offences\" and \"classes of cases\".\n\nThis classification must, in order that it may not infringe the constitutional prohibition, fulfil the two conditions I have mentioned.\n\nThe preamble of the Act under consideration recites the expediency of providing for the speedier trial of certain\n\n• ..\n\noffences.\n\nThe provision for the speedier trial of certain offences is, therefore, the object of the Act. To achieve this object, offences or cases have to be classified uponthe basis of some differentia which will distinguish those offences or cases from others and which will have a reasonable relation to the recited object of the Act.\n\nThe <lifferentia and the object being, as I have said, different elements, it follows that the object by itself cannot be the basis of the classification of offences or the cases, for in the absence of any special circumstances which may distinguish one offence or one class of offences or one class of cases from another offence, or class of offences or class of cases, speedier trial is desirable in the disposal of all offences or classes of offences or classes of cases. Offences or cases cannot be classified in two categories on the basis of the preamble alone as suggested by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents then contended that as thG object of the Act as recited in the preamble cannot be the basis of classification, then this part of sub-section 5 (1) gives an uncontrolled and unguided power of classification which may well be exercised by the State government capriciously or \"with an f'Vil eye and an unequal hand\" so as to deliberntely .bring about . .It invidious discrimination between man and man, although both of .them are situated in exactly the same or similar circumstances.\n\nBy way of illustration it is pointed out that in the Indian Penal Code there are different chapters dealing with offences relating to different matters, e.g., Chapter XVII which. deals with offences against property, that under this generic head are set forth different species of offences against property, e.g., theft (section 378), theft in a dwelling house (section 380), theft by a servant (section 381), to take only a few examples, and that according to the language. of section 5(1) of the impugned Act it will be open to the State government to direct all offences of theft in a dwelling house under section 380 to be tried by the Special Court according to the special procedure laid down in the Act leaving all offences of theft by a servant under section 381 to be dealt with in the\n\n1952\n\nWest Beng1d\n\nAnwar Ali\n\n~\"rkar.\n\nDas T.\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nDas f.\n\n342 '\n\nSOPREMF COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nordinary Court in the usual way.\n\nIn other words, if a stranger is charged with theft in a dwelling house, he may be sent up for trial before the Special Court under section 380 whereas if a servant is accused of theft in a dwelling house he may be left to be tried under the Code for an offence under secti.on 381. The argument is that although there is no apparent reason why an offence of theft in a dwelling house by a stranger should require speedier trial any more than an offence of theft in a dwelling house by a servant should do, the State government may nevertheless select the former offence for special and discriminatory treatment in the matter of its trial by bringing it under . the Act.\n\nA little reflection will show that this argument is not sound.\n\nThe part of sub-section 5 ( 1) which I am now examining confers a power on the State Government to make a classification of offences, classes of offences or classes of cases, which, as said by Chakravartti J., \"means a proper classification.\" In order to be a proper classification so as not to offend against the Constitution it must be based on SOJ!le intelligible differentia which should have a reasonable relation to the object of tl1e Act as recited in the pre\" amble. In the illustration taken above the two offences are only two species of the same genus, the only difference being that in tl1e first the alleged offender is a stranger and in tl1e latter he is a servant of the owner whose property has been stolen.\n\nEven if this .difference in the circumstances of the two alleged offenders can be made the basis of a classification, there is no nexus between this difference and the object of the Act, for, in the absence of any special circumstances, there is no apparent reason why the offence of ilieft in a dwelling house by a stranger should require a speedier trial any more than the offence of theft by a servant should do.\n\nSuch classification will be wholly arbitrary and will be liable to be hit . by the principles on which the Supreme Court of the United States in fack Skinner v. Oklahoma(') struck down the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilisation Act which\n\n(1) 216 U.S. 535, 86 L. Ed. 1655.\n\nimposed sterilisation on a person convicted more than twice of larceny but not on one who was convicted of embezzlement on numerous occasions.\n\nThat sort of classification will, therefore, not clearly be a proper dassification such as the Act must be deemed to contemplate.\n\nOn the other hand, it is easy to visualise a situation when certain offences, e.g., theft in a dwelling house, by reason on the frequency of their perpetration or other attending circumstances, may legitimately call for a speedier trial and swift retribution by way of punishment to check the commission of such offences. Are we not familiar with gruesome crimes of murder, arson, loot and rape committed on a large scale during communal riots in particular localities and are they not really different from a case of a stray murder, arson, loot or rape in another district which may not be affected by any communal upheaval? Do not the existence -of the communal riot and and the concomitant crimes committed on a large scale call for prompt and speedier trial in the very interest and safety of the community ?\n\nMay not political murders or crimes against the State or a class of the community, e.g., women, assume such proportions as would be sufficient to constitute them into a special class of offences requiring special treatment?\n\nDo not these special circumstances add a peculiar quality to these offences or classes of offences or dasses of cases which distinguish them from stray cases of similar crimes and is it not reasonable and even necessary to arm the State with power to classify them into a separate group and deal with them promptly ? 1 hi; ive no doubt in my mind that the surrounding circumstances and the special features I have mentioned above will furnish a very cogent and reasonable basis 'Of classification, for it is obvious that they do clearly distinguish these offences from similar or even same species of offences committed elsewhere and under ordinary circumstances.\n\nThis differentia quite clearly .has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be \"'chieved by the Act, namely, the speedier trial of certain offences.\n\nSuch a classification will not be\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nDa; /.\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar . .\n\nDas/.\n\nrepugnant to the equal •protection clause of our Constitution for there will be no discrimination, for whoever may commit the specified offence in the specified area in the specified circumstances will be treated alike and sent up before a Special Court for trial under the special procedure. Persons thus sent up for trial by a Special Court cannot point their lingers to the other persons who may be charged before an ordinary Court with similar or even same species of offences in a different place and in different circumstances and complain of unequal treatment, for those other persons are of a different category and are not their equals.\n\nSection 5(1), in se> far as it empowers the State government to direct \"offences\" or \"classes of. offencs\" or \"classes of cases\" to be tried by a Special Court, also, by necessary implication and intendment, empowers the State government to dassify the \"offences\" or \"classes of offences\" or \"classes of cases'', that is to say, te> make a proper classification in the sense I have explained. In my judgment, this part of\" the section, properly construed and understood, does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State government.\n\nOn the contrary, this power is controlled by the necessity for making a . proper classification which is guided by the preamble in the sense that the classification mmt have a rational relation to the object of the Act as recited in the preamble.\n\nIt is, therefore, not an arbitrary power. I therefore, agree with Harries, C. J. that this part of section 5(1) is valid. If the State government classifies offences abritrarily and not on any reasonable basis having a relation to tbe object of the Act, its action will be either an abuse of its power if it is purposeful or in excess of its powers. even if it is done in good faith and in either case the resulting discrimination will encounter the challenge of the Constitution and the Court will strike down,. not the law which is good, but the abuse or misuse or the unconstitutional administration of the law creating or resulting in unconstitutional disrcrimination.\n\nIn the present case, however, the State government has not purported to proceed under that part of section 5(1) which I have been discussing so far.\n\nIt has, on the other hand, acted under that part of the section which authorises it to direct \"cases\" to be tried by the Special Court, for by the notifications it has directed certain specific cases identified by their individual numbers in the records of the particular thanas to be tried .by the Special Court.\n\nThere is ostensibly no attempt at, or pretence of, any classification on any basis whatever. The notifications simply direct certain \"cases\" to be _ tried by the Special ' Court and are obviously issued under that part of section 5(1) which authorises the State government to direct \"cases\" to be tried by the Special Court. The word \"cases\" has been used to signify a category distinct from \"classes of casses\". The idea of classification is, therefore, excluded.\n\nThis means that this part of the sub-section empowers the State Government to pick out or select particular cases against particular persons for being sent up to the Special Court for trial.\n\nIt is urged by the learned Attorney- General that this selection of cases must also be made in the light of the object of the Act as expressed in its preamble, tlf'at is to say, the State government can only select those cases which, in their view, require speedier trial.\n\nTurning to the preamble, I find that the object of the Act is \"to provide for the speedier trial • of . certain offences\" and not of a particular case or cases. In other words, . this part of section 5 ( 1) lies beyond the ambit of the object laid down in the preamble and, therefore, the preamble can have no manner of application in the selection of \"cases\" as distinct from \"offences\", \"classes of offences\" or \"classes of cases\".\n\nI agree with Harries C.J. that the preamble cannot control this part of the sub-section where the language is plain and unambiguous. Further, as I have already explained, the object of the Act cannot, by itself, be the basis of the selection which, I repeat, must be based on some differentia distinguishing th~ \"case\" from other \"cases\" and having a relation to the\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nDas/.\n\nThe Slate of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nDas f.\n\nobiect ot the Act. It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of an individual \"case\", as distinct from a \"class of cases\", as a class by itself within the rule of permissible and legitimate classification.\n\nAn mdi vi dual case of a crime committed with gruesome atrocity or committed upon an eminent person may shock our moral sense to a greater extent but, on ultimate analysis and in the absence of special circumstances such as I haxe meutioned, it is not basically different from another individual case of a similar crime although committed with less vehemence or on a less eminent person.\n\nIn any case, there is no particular bond connecting the circumstances of the first mentioned case with the necessity for a speedier trial.\n\nIn the absence of special circumstances of the kind I have described above, one individual case, say of murder, cannot require speedier trial any more than another individual case of murder may do.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear for the foregoing reasons, that the power to direct \"cases\" as distinct from \"classes of cases\" to be tried by a Special Court contemplates and involves a purely arbitrary selection based on nothing more substantial than the whim and pleasure of State Government and without any appreci-, able relation to the necessity for a speedier trial.\n\nHere the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offence.\n\nThis • power must inevitably result in discrimination and this discrimination is, in terms incorporated i12 this pan of the section itself and, therefore, this part of the sectiqn itself must incur our condemnation. It is not a question of an unconstitutional administration of a statute otherwise valid on its face but here the unconstitutionality is writ large on the face of , the statute itself.\n\nI, therefore, agree with the High Court that section 5(1) of the Act in so far as it empowers the State Government to direct \"cases\" to be tried by a Special Court offends against the provisions of article 14. and therefore the Special Court had no jurisdiction to try these \"cases\" of the respondents.\n\nIn my judgment, the High Court was right in quashing the conviction\n\nof the respondents in the. one case and in prohibiting further proceedings in the other case and these appeals should be dismissed.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIY AR J .-The s_hort question that arises for consideration in these cases is whether the whole, or any portion of the West Bengal Special Court Act, X of 1950, is invalid as being opposed to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution of India. The facts whicli have led up to the cases ha, c heen stated in the judgments of the High Court at Calcutta and their recapitulation is unnecessary.\n\nI agree in the conclusion reached by my learned brothers that the appeals should be dismissed and I propo5e to indicate my views as shortly as possible on a few only of, the points raised and discussed.\n\nThe preamble to the Constitution mentions one of the objects to be to secure to all its citizens equality of status and opportunity. Article 14 provides :\n\n\"The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.\"\n\nThen follow articles 15 and 16, the former prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them and the latter providing for equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Leaving aside articles 17 to 19 as irrelevant for present purposes, we proceed to articles 20, 21 and 22, which deal with prosecutions and convictions for offences and cases of preventive . detention and prescribe, in rough and general outline, certain matters of procedure. Article 21 is, so to say, the key of this group or bunch and it is in these terms:-\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure estblished by law.\"\n\nThere can be no doubt that as regards the cases to be sent before the Special Court or Courts, the Act\n\nThe State o} West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nI¥ est Bengal\n\nAntvar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\n,{.handrasekhara Aiyar f.\n\nunder scrutiny has deviated in • many matters of importance from the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial of offences and that this departure has been definitely adverse to the accused.\n\nPreliminary inquiry before committal to the sessions, trial by jury or with the aid of assesors, the right of a . de novo trial on transfer of a case from one Court to another, have been taken away from the accused who are to be tried by a Special Court ; even graver is section 13, which provides that a person may be wnvicted of an offence disclosed by the evidence as having been committed by him, even though he was not charged with it and it happens to be a more serious offence. This power of the Special Court is much wider than the powers of ordinary courts.\n\nThe points of prejudice gainst the accused which appear in the challenged Act have been pointed out in detail in the judgment of Trevor Harries C.J.\n\nThey cannot all be brushed aside as variations of minor and unsubstantial importance.\n\nThe argument that changes in procedural law are not material and cannot be said to deny equality beforn the law or the equal protection of the laws so long as the substantive law remains unchanged or that only the fundamental rights referred to in articles 20 to 22 should be safeguarded is, on the face of it, unsound.\n\nThe right to equality postulated by article 14 is as much a fundamental right as any other fundamental right dealt with in Part III of the Constitution.\n\nProcedural law may and does confer very valuable rights on a person, and their protection must be as milch the object of a court's solicitude as those conferred under substantive law.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contended that if the object of the legislation was a laudable one and had a public purpose in view, as in this case, which provided for the speedier trial of certain offences, the fac~ that discrimination resulted as a bye-product would not offend the provisions of article 14.\n\nHis point was that if the inequality of treatment was not specifically intended to prejudice any particular person or group\n\nS.C.lt\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 349\n\n, of persons but was in the gerieral interests of administration, it could not be urged that there is a denial of equality before the law.\n\nTo accept this position would be to neutralize, if not to abrogate altogether, article\n\n14. Almost every piece of legislation has got a public purpose in view and is generally intended, or said to be intended, to promote the general progress of the country and the better administration of Government.\n\nThe intention behind the legislatiqn may be unexcep-·\n\ntionable and the object sought to be ac11ieved may be praiseworthy but the question which falls to be considered under rarticle 14 is whether the legislation is discriminatory in its nature, and this has to be determined not so muCh by its purpose or objects but by its effects.\n\nThere is scarcely any authorityfor the position taken up by the Attorney-General.\n\nIt is well settled that equality before the law or the equal protection of laws does not mean identity or abstract symmetry of treatment.\n\nDistinctions have to be made for different classes and groups of persons and a rational or reasonable classification is permitted, as otherwise it would be almost impossible to carry on the work of Government of anv State or country.\n\nTo use the felicitous language of Mr. Justice Holmes in Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson(1) \"We must remember that the machinery of government could nor work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.\" The law on the subject has been well stated in a passage from Willis on Constitutional Law (1936 Edition, at page 579) and an extract from the pronouncement of this Court in what is known as the Prohibition Case, The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. BalsaraC), where my learned brother Faz! Ali J. has distilled in the form of seven principles most of the useful observations of this Court in the Sholapur Mills case, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Otlters(3) .\n\nWillis says:-\n\n\"The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws.\n\nIt forbids\n\n(1) 282 U.S. 499 at p. 501. m [1950] S.C.R.869.\n\n(2) [1951] S.C.R. 682.\n\nThi: Stati: of\n\nWi:st Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\n Sarkar. _,\n\nChandrasi:khara\n\nAiya1 /.\n\nThe Sl4te of\n\nWut Beng.U\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSari(ar.\n\nChimdr., ci(hara\n\n' Aiyar f.\n\nclass legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction.\n\nIt does not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. \"It merely requires that all persons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.\" \"The inhibition of the amendment was designed to prevent any person or dass of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation.\" It does not take from the states the power to classify either in the adoption of police laws, or tax l&ws, or er'1inent domain laws, but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and , nullifies what they <lo only when it is without any reasonable basis.\n\nMathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required.\n\nSimilarity; not identity of treatment, is enough. If any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification, the existence of that state of facts must be assumed.\n\nOne who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis.\"\n\nThe seven principles formulated by Faz! Ali J. are as follows :-\n\n\"1. The pn; umption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be assumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds.\n\n2. The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute, there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to . any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class.\n\n3. The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all\n\npersons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment.\n\n4. The principle does not take away from the State the power of clasifying persons for legitimate purposes.\n\n5. Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere production of mequality is not enough.\n\n6. If a law deals equally with members of a welldefined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons.\n\n7. While reasonable classification is permissible, such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained, and the classification cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis.\"\n\nAfter these citations, it is really unnecessary to refer to or discuss in detail most of the American decisions cited at the Bar.\n\nTbeir number is legion and it is possible to alight on Jecisions in support of propositions, apparently even conflicting, if we divorce them from the context of the particular facts and circumstances and ignore the setting or the background in which they were delivered.\n\nWith great respect, I fail to see why we should allow ourselves to be unduly w-:ighted-down or over-encumbered in this manner.\n\nTo say this is not to shut out illumining light from any quarter ; it is merely to utter a note of caution that we need not stray far into distant fields and try to clutch at something which may not after all be very helpful.\n\nWhat we have to find out is whether the statute now in question before us offends to any extent the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by our written Constitution.\n\nWhether the classification, if any, is reasonable or arbitrary, or is substantial or unreal, has to be adjudicated upon by 8-4 S. C. Cndia/71\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nThe State nf West Bengal \\'.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nthe courts and the decision must turn more on one's commonsense than on over-refined legal distinctions or subtleties.\n\nThe Attorney-General argued that if the principle of classification has to be applied as a necessary test, there is a classification in the impugned Act as it says that it is intended to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences ; and in the opinion of the legislature certain offences may require more expeditious trial than other offences and this was a good enough classification.\n\nBut as speedy administration of justice, especially in the field of the law of crimes, is a necessary characteristic of every civilised Government, the:e is not much point in stating that there is a class of offences that require such speedy trial.\n\nOf comse, there may be certain offences whose trial requires priority over the rest and quick progress, owing to their frequent occurrence, grave danger to public peace or tranquility, and any other special features that may be prevalent at a particular time in a specified area.\n\nAnd when it is intended to provide that they should be tried more speedily than other offences, requmng in certain respects a departure from the procedure prescribed for the general class of offences, it is but reasonable to expect the legislature to indicate the basis for any such classification.\n\nIf the Act does not state what exactly are the offences which in its opinion need a speedier trial and why it is so considered, a mere statement in general words of the object sought to be achieved, as we find in this case, is of 110 avail because the classification, if any, is illusive or evasive. The policy or idea behind the classification should at least be adumbrated, if not stated, so that the court which has to decide on the constitutionality might be seized of something on which it could base its view about the propriety of the enactment from the st:indpoint of discrimination or equal protection.\n\nAny arbitrary division or ridge will render the equal protection clause moribund or lifeless.\n\nApart from tne absence of any reasonable or rational classification, we have in this case the additional feature\n\n. -.\n\nof a carte blanche being given to the State Government to send any offences or cases for trial by a Special Court. Section 5, sub-clause (1), of the impugned Act is in these terms :-\n\n\"A Special Court shal try such offences or clascs of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may, by general or special order in writing, direct.\"\n\nIf the sco]Je or the meaning of the Act is doubtful, the preamble can be referred to for ascertaining its extent and purpose.\n\nBut where the operative parts of the Act are clear and there is no ambiguity, the preamble cannot be allowed to coutrol the express provisions.\n\nOn the terms of section S, it would be perfectly open to the State Government to send before the Special Court any case, whatever its nature, whether it has arisen out of a particular incident or relates to a crime of normal occurrence, whether the offence involved is grave or simple, whether it needs more expeditious trial or not.\n\nThus, we have before us an enactment which does not make any reasonable classification and which confers on the executive an uncontrolled and unguided power of discrimination.\n\nThe question whether there is any proper classifitation where no standard is set up by the enactment to control executive action has arisen for consideration before the American courts and has been differently answered.\n\nWillis says at page 586 : -; \"Is it proper classification to put in one class those who get the consent of a board or of an official and into another class those who do not, where no standard is set up to control the action of the board or official?\n\nSome cases answer this question in the affirmative, while other cases answer it in the negative.\n\nPerhaps the best view on this subject is that due process and equality are not violated by the mere conference of unguided power, but only by its arbitrary exercise by those upon whom it is conferred.\"\n\nThe case cited in support of this view, Plymo11th Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania(1), is really on authority for\n\n1) 232 u.s. 532.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nTh< Stat• of W<1t Bmgal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nChandraukhara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nany such position. In that case, the statute provided that it was \"obligatory on the owners of adjoining coal properties to leave, or cause to be left, a pillar of coal in each seam or vein of coal worked by them, along tnc ; ine of adjoining property, of such width that, taken in connection with the pillar to be left by the adjoining praperty owner, will be a sufficient barrier for the safety of the employees of either mine in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to fill water ; such width of pillar to be determined by the engineers of the adjoining property owners together with the inspector of the district in which the mine is situated.\" When the Inspector of Mines wrote to the plaintiff company, Plymouth Coal Co. asking their engineer to meet him so that they can meet the engineer of the neighbouring coal company to decide about the thickness of the barrier pillar to be left unmined between the two adjoining coal properties, the plaintiff company declined to co-operate.\n\nThereupon the Inspector filed a bill of complaint against the plaint~ iff company for a preliminary and a perpetual injunction from working its mines-without leaving a barrier pillar of the dimensions he thought necessary. The plaintiff company urged that the Act upon which the bill was based \"was confiscatory, unconstitutional, and void\".\n\nThe bill of complaint succeeded but it was provided in the final order that it was without prejudice to the Plymouth Coal Co.'s right to get dissolution or modification of the injunction. The matter came up on appeal to the Supreme Court.\n\nThe legislative Act was challenged by the Plymouth ' Coal Co. on the grounds that the method of fixing the width of the barrier pillar indicated in the Act was crude, uncertain and unjust, that there was uncertainty and want of uniformity in the membership of the statutory tribunal, that there was no provision of notice to the parties interested, that the procedure to be followed was not prescribed, and that there was no right of appeal. All these objections were negative.\n\nThe Court observed on the main contention that \"it was competent for the legislature to lay'\n\ndown a general rule, and then establish an administrative tribunal with authority to fix the precise width or thickness of pillar that will suit the necessities uf the particular situation, and constitute a compliance with the general rule.\" This case is no authority for the pmition that the mere conferment of naked ur uncontrolled power is no violation of the due process or equality clauses.\n\nIt is true that the power to deal with a particular situation within the general rule prescribed by the enactment may be conferred on an administrative body or even on a single individual but this entrustment or delegation is subject to the condition that the statute must itself be a valid one, as not being opposed to the 'ith or 14th Amendment of the American Constitution, corresponding to articles 14 and 22 of our Constitution.\n\nDiscrimination may not appear in the statute itself but may be evident in the administration of the law. If an uncontrolled or ungu:ded power is conferred without any reasonable and proper standards or limits being laid down in the enactment, the statute itself may be challenged and not merely the particular administrative act.\n\nCiting the case of Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, Rogers v. Alabama and Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, Prof. Weaver says at page 404 of his compedious book on Constitutional Law under the heading of 'D1scRIMINATION . IN\n\nTHE Ao- MINISTRATION OF THE LAws' :-.\n\n\"Discrimination may exist in the adn1inistration of the laws and it is the purpose of the equal protection clause to secure all the inhabitants of the state from intentional and arbitrary discrimination ansmg in their improper or prejudiced execution, as well as by the express terms of the law itself.\n\nThe validity or invalidity of a statute often depends on how it is construed and applied. It may be valid when given a particular application and invalid when given another.\"\n\nA difficulty was suggested and discussed in the course of the arguments in case article 14 was to receive a very wide interpretation.\n\nUnder article 12 of the\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nConstitution, even a local authority comes within the definition of \"the State\" and section 13 provides in sub-clause (3) that \"'law' includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification ............ \".\n\nTherefore any ordinance or notificatinn issued by a local authority acting under the powers conferred on it by a statute might be challenged as discriminatory and if this is permitted, the work of administration might be paralysed altogether.\n\nThis, no doubt, is a possible result but the difficulty envisaged is by no means insurmountable.\n\nIf the statute or the enactment makes a reasonable or rational classification and if the power conferred by the statute on a local authority is exercised to the prejudice of a person vis a 11is other persons similarly situated, two answers would be possible. One is that there was not discrimination at all in the exercise of the power.\n\nThe second is that the power was exercised in good faith within the limitations imposed by the Act and for the achievement of the objects the enactment had in view and that the person who alleges that he has been discriminated against will have to establish mala fides in the sense that the step was taken intentionally for the purpose of injuring him; in other words, it was a hostile act directed against him.\n\nIf the legislation itself is open to attack on the ground of discrimination, the question of any act done by a local or other authority under the power or powers vested in it will not arise. If the Act itself is invalid on the ground that it is ultra vires, the notification, ordinance, or rule falls to the ground with it, but if the Act remains, the validity of the notification or order etc., when impugned, may have to be considered independently.\n\nThere may be cases where individual acts of state ' officials are questioned and not the legislation itself. ._ As regards such cases, Willoghuby states at pages 1932 of his Volume III on the Constitution of the United States:-\n\n\"It is, however, to be observed in this connec; tion, that the prohibitions apply to the acts of State officials even when they are done in pursuance of some\n\nState legislative direction, for, while no constitutional objection may be made to any law of the State, it has been held that its officials may exercise their public authority in such a discriminatory or arbitrary manner as to bring them within the scope of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.\n\nThis, it will be remembered, was one of the grounds upon which, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 U.S. 356) it was held that due process of law had been denied.\n\nIn Tarrance v. Florida (188 U.S. 519) the administration of a State law and not the law itself was challenged and the court said : 'Such an actual discrimisatton is as potential in creating a denial of equality of rights as a discrimination made by law.'\"\n\nThere is only one other point that I would like to deal with.\n\nTrevor Harries C.J. has taken the view that section 5 of the Act would !iave been unexceptionable had it only provided for the trial by a Special Court of certain offences or classes of offences or certain classes of cases and that in his opinion the discrimination arose by the provision for the trial of cases, as distinguished from classes of cases.\n\nIt is rather difficult, however, to appreciate this distinction. If the statute makes on classification at all, or if the classification purported to a made is not reasonable. or rational but is arbitrary and illusory, as in this case, Section 5 would be void as contravening article 14.\n\nIt is no doubt true that totally different considerations might arise if specified offences or groups of offences in a particular area or arising out of a particular event or incident were to be tried by a Special Court but this is not the case here. I am unable to see how if the Act merely provided that certain \"classes of cases\" as distinguished from \"cases\" should be tried by a Special Court, the attack against discrimination could be avoided, as even then the test of rationality or reasonableness would still remain to be satisfied.\n\nIf the Act does not enunciate any principle on the basis of which the State Government could select offences or classe5 tJf offences or cases or class1::s of cases and the State Government is left free to make\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyur /.\n\nany arbitrary selection according to their will and pleasure then the Act is void.\n\nOn this point, I would invite special attention to the view tak:en by Mr.\n\nJustice D>s Gupta in the following passage of his judgment :- /\n\n\"The Act lays down no principle on which selection of \"classes of offnces\" or \"classes of cases\" should be made by the State Government. The State Government may even arbitracily determine the classes of cases to be tried by the Special Court and if it does so its action will be well within its powers conferred by the Act. The Act indicates no basis whatsoever on which such classification should be made.\n\nI am of opinion that the whole Act is ultra vires the Constitution and deletion of the word \"cases\" from section 5 would nN save the rest of the Act from being invalid.\"\n\nBosE J.-We are concerned here with article 14 of the Constitution and in particular with the words \"equality before the law\" and \"equal prot, ction of the law.\" Now I yield to none in my insistence that plain unambiguous words in a statute, or i n the Constitution, must having regard to the context, be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning and be given full effect. Bnt that predicates a position where the words .are plain and unambiguous.\n\nI am clear that that is not the case here.\n\nTake first the words \"equality before the law\".\n\nIt is to be observed that equality in the abstract is not guaranteed but only equality before the law.\n\nThat at once leads to the question, what is the law, and whethere \"the law\" does not draw distinctions between man and man and make for inequalities in the sense of differentiation?\n\nOne has only to look to the differing personal laws which are applied daily to see that it does ; to trusts and foundations from which only one particular race or community may benefit, to places of worship from which all but members of particular faith are excluded, to cemeteries and towers of silence which none but the faithful may use, to the ·\n\nlaws of property, marriage and divorce.\n\nAll that is part and parcel of the law of the land and equality before it in any literal sense is impossible unless these laws are swept away, but that is not what the Constitution says, for these very laws are preserved and along with equality before the law is also guaranteed the right to the practice of one's faith.\n\nThen, again, what does \"equality\" means ? All men are not alike. Some are rich and some are poor. Some by the mere accident of birth inherit riches, others are born to poverty.\n\nThere are differences in social standing and economic statuts.\n\nHigh -sounding phrases cannot alter such fundamental facts.\n\nIt is therefore impossible to apply rules of abstract equality to conditions which predicate inequality from the start ; and yet the words have meaning though in my judgmen~ their true content is not to be gathered by simply taking the words in one hand and a dictionary in the other, for the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulae which have their essence in mere form.\n\nThey constitute a frame-work of government written for men of fundamentally differing opinions and written as much for the future as the present. They are not just pages from a text book but from the means of ordering the life of a progressive people.\n\nThere is consequently grave danger in endeavouring to confine them in watertight compartments made up of ready-made generalisations like classification.\n\nI have no doubt those tests serve as a rough and ready guide in some cases but they are not the only tests, nor are they the true tests on a final analysis.\n\nWhat, fater all, is classification ?\n\nIt l.s merely a systematic arrangement of things into groups or classes, -\" usually in accordance with some definite scheme. But the scheme can be anything and the laws which are laid down to govern the grouping must necessarily be arbitrarily selected ; also granted the right to select, the classification can be as broadbased as one pleases, or it can be broken down and down until finally just one solitary unit is divided off from the rest.\n\nEven those\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nBose/.\n\nWe!t Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nBose f.\n\nwho propound this theory are driven to making qualifications. Thus, it is not enough merely to classify but the classification must not be 'discriminatory\", it must not amount to 'hostile action', there must be 'reasonable grounds for distinction', it must be 'rational' and there must be no 'substantial discrimination'.\n\nBut what then becomes of the classification ? and who are to be the judges of the, reasonableness and the substantiality or otherwise of the discrimination ?\n\nAnd, much more important, whose standards of reasonableness are to be applied ?-the judges ?-the governmf; nt's ?-or that of the mythical ordinary reasonable man of law which is no single man but a composite of many men whose reasonableness can be measured and gauged even though he can neither be seen nor heard nor felt ? With the utmost respect I cannot see how these vague generalisations serve to clarify the position.\n\nTo my mind they do not carry us one whit beyond the original words and are no more statisfactory than saying that all men are equal before the law and ' that all shall be equally treated and be given equal protection. The problem is not solved by substituting one generalisation for another.\n\nTo say that the law shall not be discriminatory carries us nowhere for unless the law is discriminatory the question cannot arise.\n\nThe whole problem is to pick out from among the laws which mah~ for differentiation the ones which do not offend axticle 14 and separate them from those which do.\n\nIt is true the word can also be useJ in the sense of showing favouritism, but in so far as it means that, it suffers from the same defect as the 'hostile action' test.\n\nWe are then compelled 'to import into the question the element of motive and delve into the minds of those who make the differentiation or pass the discriminatory law and thus at once substitute a subjective test for an objective analysis.\n\nI would always be slow to impute want of good faith in these cases, I have no doubt that the motive, except in rare cases, is beyond reproach and were it not for the fact that the Constitution demands\n\nequality of treatment these laws would, in my opinion, be valid.\n\nBut 1hat apart. What material have we for delving into the mind of a legislature?\n\nIt is useless to say that a man shall be judged by his acts, for acts of this kind can spring from good motives as well as bad, and in the absence of other material the presumption must be overwhelmingly in favour of the former.\n\nI can conceive of cases where there is the utmost good faith and where the classification is scientific and rational and yet which would offend this law. Let us take an imaginary case in which a State legislature considers that all accused persons whose skull measurements are below a certain standard, or who cannot pass a given series of intelligence tests, shall be tried summarily whatever the offence on the ground that the less complicated the trial the fairer it is to their sub-standard of intelligence. Here' is classification.\n\nIt is scientific and systematic. The intention and motive are good. There is no question of favouritism, and yet I can hardly believe that such a law would be allowed to stand.\n\nBut what would be the true basis of the decision ?\n\nSurely simply this that the judges would not consider that fair and proper.\n\nHowever much the real ground of decision may be hidden behind a screen of words like 'reasonable', 'substantial', 'rational' and 'arbitrary' the fact would remain that judges are substituting their own judgment of what is right and proper and reasonable and just for that of the legislature ; and up to a point that, I think, is inevitable when a judges is called upon to crystallise a vague generality like article 14 into a concrete concept.\n\nEven in England, where Parliament is supreme, that is inevitable, for, as Dicey tells us in his Law of the Constitution:\n\n\"Parliament is the supreme legislator, but from the moment Parliament has uttered its will as lawgiver, that will become subject to the interpretation put upon it by the judges of the land, and the judges, who are influenced by the feelings of magistrates no\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark_ar.\n\nBose /.\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nBose /.\n\nless than by the general spirit of the common law, are\n\ndispoed to construe statutory exceptions to common law principles in a mode which would not commend itself either to a body of officials, or to the Houses of Parliament, if the Homes were called upon to interpret their own enactments.\" This, however, does not mean that judges are to determine what is for the good of the people and substitute their individual and personal opinions for that of the government of the day, or that they may usurp the functions of the legislature.\n\nThat is not their province and though there must -always be a a narrow margin within which judges, who are human, will always be influenced by subjective factors, their training and their tradition makes the main body of their decisions speak with the same voice of reach impersonal results whatever their personal predilections or their individual backgrounds.\n\nIt is the function of the legislature alone, headed by the government of the day, to determine what is, and what is not, good and proper for the people of the land ; and they must be given the widest latitude to exercise their functions within the ambit of their powers, else all progress is barred.\n\nBut, because of the Constitution, there are limits beyond which they cannot go and even though it falls to the lot of judges to determine where those limit• lie, the ha.sis of their decision cannot be whether the Court thinks the law is for the benefit of the people or .not. Cases of this type must be decided solely on the basis whether the Constitution forbids it.\n\nI realise that this is a function which is incapable of exact definition but I do not view that with dismay.\n\nThe common law of England grew up in that way. It was gradually added to as each concrete case arose and a decision was given ad hoc on the facts of that particular case.\n\nIt is true the judges who thus contributed to its growth were not importing personal predilections into the result and merely stated what was the law applicable to that particular case.\n\nBut though they did not purport to make the law and merely applied\n\nwhat according to them, had always been the law handed down by custom and tradition, they nevertheless had to draw for their material on a nebulous mass of undefined rules which, though they existed in fact and left a vague awarenes in man's minds, nevertheless were neither clearly definable, nor even necessarily identifiable, until crystallised into concrete existence by a judicial decision ; nor indeed is it necessary to travel as far afield.\n\nMuch of the existing Hindu law has grown up in that way from instance to instance, the threads being gathered now from the rishis, now from custom, now from tradition.\n\nIn the same way, the laws of liberty, of freedom and of protection under the Constitution will also slowly assume recognisable shape as decision is added to decision.\n\nThey cannot in my judgment, be enunciated in static form by hidebound rules and arbitrarily applied standards or tests.\n\nI find it impossible to read these portions of the Constitution without regard to the background out oi whicJi they arose, I cannot blot out their history and omit from consideration the brooding spirit of the times.\n\nThey are not just dull, lifeless words static and hide-bound as in some mummified manuscript, but, living flames intended to give life to a great nation and order its being, tongues of dynamic fire, potent to mould the future as well as guide the present. The Constitution must, in my judgment, be left elastic enough to meet from time to time the altering conditions of . a changing world with its shifting emphasis and deffering needs.\n\nI feel therefore that in each case judges must look straight into the heart of things and regard the facts of each case concretely much as a jury would do ; and yet, not quite as a jury, for we are considering here a matter of law and not just one of fact : Do these \"laws\" which have been called in question offend a still greater law before which even they must bow ?\n\nDoing that, what is the history of these provisions ?\n\nThey arose out of the fight for freedom in this land\n\n- and are but the endeavour to compress into a few\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nBose /.\n\nWest Bengal v. .1ntuar Ali Sarkar.\n\nBose /.\n\npregnnt phrases some of the main attributes of a sovereign democratic republic as seen through Indian eyes.\n\nThere was present to the collective mind of the Constituent Assembly, reflecting the mood of the peoples of India, the memory of grim trials by hastily constituted tribunals with novel forms of procedure set forth in Ordinances promulgated in haste because of what was then felt to be the urgent necessities of the moment.\n\nWithout casting the slightest reflection on the judges and the Courts so constituted, the fact remains that when these tribunals were declared invalid and the same persons were retried in the ordinary Courts, many were acquited, many who had been sentenced to death were obsolved.\n\nThat was not the fault of the judges but of the imperfect tools with which they were compelled to work. The whole proceedings were repugnant to the peoples of this land and, to my mind, article 14 is but a reflex of this mood.\n\nWhat I am concerned to see is not whether there is absolute equality in any academical sense of the term but whether the collective conscience of a sovereign democratic republic can regard the impugned law, constrasted with the ordinary law of the land, as the sort of substantially equal treatment which men of resolute minds and unbiassed views can regard as right and proper in a democracy of the kind we have proclaimed ourselves to be. Such views must take into consideration the practical necessities of government, the right to alter the laws and many other facts, but in the forefront must remain the freedom of the individual from unjust and unequal treatment, unequal in the broad sense in which a democracy would view it. In my opinion, 'law' as used in article 14 does not mean the \"legal precepts which are actually recognised and applied in the tribunals of a given time and place\" but \"the more general bodv of doctrine and tradition from which those precepts are chiefly drawn, and by which we criticise, them.\"\n\n(Dean Pound in 34 Harvard Law Review 449 at 452).\n\nI grant that this means that the same things will be viewed differently at different times.\n\nWhat is\n\nconsidered right and proper in a given set of circumstances will be considered improper in another age and\n\nvice versa.\n\nBut that will not be because the law has changed but because the times have altered and it is no longer necessary for government to wield the powers which were essential in an earlier and more troubled world. That is what I mean by flexibility of interpretation.\n\nThis is no new or startling doctrine. It is just what happened in the cases of blasphemy and sedition in England.\n\nLord Sumner has explained this in Bo111man's case(1) and the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar's case(2) and so did Puranik J. and I in the Nagpur High Court in Bhagwati Charan Shuklds case( 3).\n\nComing now to the concrete cases with which we have to deal here.\n\nI am far from suggesting that the departures made from the proc!!dure ' prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code are bad or undesirable , in themselves. Some may be good in the sense that they will better promote the ends of justice and would thus form welcome additions to the law of the land. But I am not here to consider that.\n\nThat is no part of a Judge's province. What I have to determine is whether the differentiation made offends what I may call the social conscience of a sovereign democratic republic.\n\nThat is not a question which can be answered in the abstract, but, viewed in the background of our history.\n\nI am of opinion that it does.\n\nIt is not that these laws are necessarily bad in themselves.\n\nIt is the differentiation which matters ; the singling out of cases or groups of cases, or even of offences or classes of offences, of a k:ind fraught with the most serious consequences to the individuals concerned, for special, and what some would regad as peculiar, treatmeu.t.\n\nIt may be that justice would be fully done by fol. lowing the new procedure.\n\nIt may even be that it would be more truly done.\n\nBut it would not be satisfactorily done, satisfactory that is to say, not from\n\n(1) [1917] A.c. 406 at 454, 466 and 467.\n\n(2) [1942] p.c.R.32 at_42.\n\n(3) 1.L.R. 1946Nag.865 at 878 and879\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.\n\nBose/.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.\n\nBo.re f.\n\nSUPREME-COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nthe point of view of the governments who prosecute, but satisfactory in the view of the ordinary reasonable man, the man in the street.\n\nIt is not enough that jmtice shoul, l be done.\n\nJustice must also be seen to be done and a sense of satisfaction' and confidence in it engendered.\n\nThat cannot be when Ramchandra is tried by one procedure and Sakharam, similarly placed, facing equally serious charges, also answering for his life and liberty, by another which differs radically from the first.\n\nThe law of the Constitution is not only for those who govern or for the theorist, but also for the bulk of the people, for the common man for whose benefit and pride and safeguard the Constitution has also been written.\n\nUnle>s and until these fundamental provisions are altered by the constituent processes of Parliament they must be interpreted in a sense which the common man, not versed in the niceties of grammar and dialectical logic, can understand and appre .. .:iale so that he may have faith and confidence and unshaken trust in that which has been enacted for his benefit and protection.\n\nTested in the light of these considerations, I am of opinion that the whole of the West Bengal Special Courts Act of 1950 offends the provisions of article 14 and is therefore bad. When the froth and the foam of discussion is cleared away and learned dialectics placed on one side, we reach at last the human element which to my miud is the most important of all.\n\nW c find men accused of heinous crimes called upon to answer for their lives and liberties.\n\nWe find them picked out from their fellows, and however much the new procedure may give them a few crumbs of advantage, in the bulk they are deprived of substantial and valuable privileges of defence which others, similarly charged, are able to claim.\n\nIt matters not to me, nor indeed to them and their families and their friends, whether this be done in good faith, whether it be done for the convenience of government, whether the process can be scientifically class'fied and labelled, or whether it is an experiment in speedier trials made for the good\n\n. .,.·\n\n, ....\n\nof society at large.\n\nIt matters not how lofty and laudable the motives are.\n\nThe question with which I charge myself Is, can fair-minded, reasonable, unbiased and resolute men, who are not swayed by emotion or prejudice, regard this with equanimity and call it reasonable, just and fair, regard it as that equal treatment and protection in the defence of iiberties which is expected of a sovereign democratic xepublic in the conditions which obtain in India .today? I have but one answer to that.\n\nOn that short and simple ground I would decide this case and hold the Act bad.\n\nI; Appeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Case No. 297: P. K. Bose.\n\nAgent for the respondent in Case No. 297: Sukumar , Ghose.\n\nAgent for Habib Mohammad (Intervener) : Rajin4er Narain.\n\n. Agent for the State of Hyderabad and for the State 'of Mysore (Interveners): P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Case No. 298: P. K. Bose.\n\nAgent for the respondent in Case No. 298: Sukumar Ghose.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwa1 Ali Sarkar.\n\nBose /.", "total_entities": 403, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ANWAR ALI SARKAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 273, "end_char": 280, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 282, "end_char": 291, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 296, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 325, "end_char": 340, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "West Bengal Spetial Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 343, "end_char": 373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 387, "end_char": 395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Spetial Courts Act", "statute": "West Bengal Spetial Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 419, "end_char": 426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Spetial Courts Act", "statute": "West Bengal Spetial Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1269, "end_char": 1278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Spetial Courts Act", "statute": "West Bengal Spetial Courts Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1395, "end_char": 1401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1903, "end_char": 1909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2000, "end_char": 2007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2221, "end_char": 2228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per FAZL Au, MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and BosE JJ. 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T.\n\nThe State of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nv. .4•war Ali\n\nSarkar."}}, {"text": "Potaniali Stzstri C. f.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19782, "end_char": 19805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Potaniali Stzstri C. f.\n\npurports to provide for the matters to be tried by a special court and does not .• in form, seek to define the kind or class of offences or cases which the State Government is empowered under the Act to assign to such a court for trial."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20075, "end_char": 20084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenterden", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20819, "end_char": 20828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle of construction 'applicable here is perhaps nowhere better stated than by Lord Tenterden C.J. in Halton v. Cove(') : \"It is very true, as was argued for the plaintiff, that the enacting words of an Act of Parliament are not always to be limited by the words of the preamble, but must in many cases go beyond it."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21098, "end_char": 21108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yet, on a sound construction of every Act of Parliament, I take it the words of the enacting part must be confined to that which is the plain object and general intention of the legislature in passing the Act, and that the preamble affords a good clue to discover what that object was\"."}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21372, "end_char": 21378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was expressed by Holmes J. in an American case, Carroll v. Greenwich lnsc."}}, {"text": "S38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21975, "end_char": 21978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 401", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21996, "end_char": 22002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23128, "end_char": 23140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23453, "end_char": 23463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24534, "end_char": 24544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24625, "end_char": 24635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24801, "end_char": 24811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25036, "end_char": 25046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chiraniit Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25334, "end_char": 25347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed 'out in Chiraniit Lal's case( 2 ) and in numerous American decisions deal- ."}}, {"text": "Brewer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26003, "end_char": 26009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the essence of a classification\" said Mr. Justice Brewer in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v.\n\nMatthews(\"), \"that upon the class are cast duties and burdens different from those resting upon the general public."}}, {"text": "S. 356, 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26502, "end_char": 26513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 540, 566, 567, 568", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26571, "end_char": 26592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "McKenna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26632, "end_char": 26639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Texas(1)] Mr. Justice McKenna posed a problem and proceeded to answer it: \"It seems like a contradiction to say that a law having equality of operation may yet give equality of protection."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27447, "end_char": 27457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28781, "end_char": 28787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Connolly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29493, "end_char": 29501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tigner v ..\n\nTexas('), the majority view in Connolly's case(') holding that an Illinois anti-trust law, which made certain forbidden acts criminal if done by merchants."}}, {"text": "Harlon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30473, "end_char": 30479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fully defended actions for damages for stock killed orinjured by their train was struck down as discriminatory because such corporations could not recover any such fee if their defence was successful, a similar provision in a Kansas statute in respect of an action against railroad companies for damages by fire caused' by operating the rail-road was upheld as not discriminatory in Atchison; Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co v.\n\nMatthews(•), the earlier case being distinguished on some ground which Harlon J. in his dissenting opinion confessed he was not \"astute enough to perceive\" •.\n\nAnd the latest decision in Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs(\") marks, perhaps, the farthest swing of the pendulum ..\n\nA Louisiana pilotage law authorised the appointment of State pilots only upon certification by a State Board' of river pilot commissioners who were themselves State Pilots."}}, {"text": "S. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31018, "end_char": 31023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31038, "end_char": 31044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 552", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31057, "end_char": 31063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 666", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31076, "end_char": 31082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brandies", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32606, "end_char": 32614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is to be noted that the minority, which included Holmes and Brandies JJ.,"}}, {"text": "S. 312", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33138, "end_char": 33144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33157, "end_char": 33163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33170, "end_char": 33190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark.ar.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nWest Bengal"}}, {"text": "Board of Supervisors", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33321, "end_char": 33341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nthe Board of Supervisors unless it was located in a building constructed of brick or stone, was held discriminatory and unconstitutional."}}, {"text": "San Francisco", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33535, "end_char": 33548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The undisputed facts disclosed in the record were that out of 320 laundries in San Francisco about 310 were constructed of wood, and about 240 of the 320 were owned and conducted by subjects of China."}}, {"text": "China", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33650, "end_char": 33655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The undisputed facts disclosed in the record were that out of 320 laundries in San Francisco about 310 were constructed of wood, and about 240 of the 320 were owned and conducted by subjects of China."}}, {"text": "S. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35449, "end_char": 35454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35472, "end_char": 35478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SS2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37463, "end_char": 37466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37479, "end_char": 37484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patafliali Sastri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37532, "end_char": 37549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patafliali Sastri C. /,\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark..ar.", "canonical_name": "Patafliali Sastri"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37595, "end_char": 37611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nprovision, Day J. observed after referring to certain prior decisions :-\n\n\"These cases leave m no doubt the proposition that the conferring of discretionary power upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission to carry on a trade or business which is the proper subject of regulation within the police power of the state 1s not violative of rights secured by the 14th Amendment.", "canonical_name": "Patafliali Sastri"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39602, "end_char": 39611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40262, "end_char": 40274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40291, "end_char": 40301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40785, "end_char": 40790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Kania C.J. in Dr. Khare's case(1). \""}}, {"text": "Khare", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40803, "end_char": 40808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Kania C.J. in Dr. Khare's case(1). \""}}, {"text": "S26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41835, "end_char": 41838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41883, "end_char": 41886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41902, "end_char": 41911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea"}}, {"text": "Romesh Thapar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42165, "end_char": 42178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Romesh Thapar's case the constitutionality of a provincial enactment purporting to authorise the Provincial Government to regulate the circulation of a news-sheet in the Province of Madras for the purpose of \"securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order\" was challenged as being inconsistent with the petitioner's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression conferred by article 19 ( 1) (a) of_."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42563, "end_char": 42573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43619, "end_char": 43629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chief Justice lends no support to the view that the mere possibility of an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43972, "end_char": 44050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rome", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44339, "end_char": 44343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The important distinction is that in Rome sh T hapar' s case, the impugned enactment, having been passed before the commencement of the Constitution, did contemplate the use to which it was actually put, but such use was outside the permissible constitutional restrictions on the freedom of speech, that is to say, the Act was not condemned on the ground of the possibility of its being abused but on the ground that even the contemplated and authorised use was outside the limits of constitutionally permis.- sible restrictions."}}, {"text": "Legislature of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46586, "end_char": 46612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all, what the Legislature of West Bengal has sought to do by passing this Act is to regulate criminal trials within its territories by instituting a system o; f special courts with a shortened and simplified procedure, without impairing the requirements of a fair and impartial trial, which is to be made applicable to such cases or classes of cases as, in the opinion of the executive government, require speedier disposal."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47018, "end_char": 47028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48550, "end_char": 48554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali Sirkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48615, "end_char": 48631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) :1'21 U.S. I.\n\n\"The notification by which the case of Anwar Ali Sirkar (the respondent herein) was directed to be tried by the special court did not relate merely to that case but covered five more cases in each of which the accused were several in number.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea"}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48821, "end_char": 48830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Anwar Ali's case itself, there were 49 other accused.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea"}}, {"text": "Jessop & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48936, "end_char": 48948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these cases related to the armed raid on the premises of Jessop & Co. in the course of which crimes of the utmost brutality were committed on a large scale and to incidents following the raid."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49233, "end_char": 49250, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49263, "end_char": 49271, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Explosives Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49285, "end_char": 49299, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Stat!! of West Bengal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50571, "end_char": 50592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T h1: Stat!!", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nWest Bengal"}}, {"text": "is no doubt that the West Bengal Special Courts Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50711, "end_char": 50774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "West Bengal Special Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50822, "end_char": 50852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50962, "end_char": 50979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nThere is no doubt that the West Bengal Special Courts Ordinance, 1949, which was later replaced by the impugned Act (West Bengal Special Courts Act X of 1950, to be hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\"), was a valid Ordinance when it was promulgated on the 17th August, 1949."}}, {"text": "15th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51021, "end_char": 51037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act, which came into effect on the 15th March, 1950, is a verbatim reproduction of the earlier Ordinance, and what we have to decide is whether it is invalid because it offends against article 14 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51171, "end_char": 51181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Special Courts Act", "statute": "West Bengal Special Courts Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51430, "end_char": 51440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Special Courts Act", "statute": "West Bengal Special Courts Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51539, "end_char": 51549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Special Courts Act", "statute": "West Bengal Special Courts Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52046, "end_char": 52056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52288, "end_char": 52298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52629, "end_char": 52639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Now the framers of the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53917, "end_char": 53963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of West Benial", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54934, "end_char": 54954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nThe State of West Benial\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nWest Bengal"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55666, "end_char": 55675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56321, "end_char": 56331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Special Court constituted under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57697, "end_char": 57736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58998, "end_char": 59008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "FazJ Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59319, "end_char": 59327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FazJ Ali f.\n\ndiscrimination is made such discrimination would be ultimately traceable to it.", "canonical_name": "FazJ Ali"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60065, "end_char": 60075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "re Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60261, "end_char": 60284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60430, "end_char": 60440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62167, "end_char": 62177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64023, "end_char": 64053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64434, "end_char": 64444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64575, "end_char": 64584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64695, "end_char": 64705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65010, "end_char": 65019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-I had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my brother Mukherjea and I am in respectful agreement with his opinion.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65072, "end_char": 65081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65130, "end_char": 65140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65684, "end_char": 65694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66005, "end_char": 66015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67811, "end_char": 67816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chakravarti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68080, "end_char": 68091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Chakravarti J. the necessity of a speedy trial is too vague and uncertain a criterion to form the basis of a valid and reasonable classification.", "canonical_name": "Chakravarthi"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68691, "end_char": 68701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69917, "end_char": 69927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70301, "end_char": 70327, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71909, "end_char": 71935, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 72342, "end_char": 72349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan /.\n\nprocedure of the Special Act are to a considerable extent prejudiced by the deprivation of the trial by the procedure prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73745, "end_char": 73755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "28th of August, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74334, "end_char": 74354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-These two appeals are directed against the judgment of a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court -dated the 28th of August, 1951, and they arise out of two petitions presented, respectively, by the respondent in the two appeals under article 226 of\n\n...\n\n...\n\nthe Constitution praymg for writs of certiorari to quash two criminal proceedings, one of which has -ended in the trial court, resulting in conviction of the accused, while the other is still pending hearing."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74460, "end_char": 74471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74847, "end_char": 74859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74867, "end_char": 74903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75029, "end_char": 75039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "August 17, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75148, "end_char": 75163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 17, 1949, an Ordinance, known as the \\Vest Bengal Special Courts Ordinance, was promulgated by the Governor of West Bengal under section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "Vest Bengal Special Courts Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75193, "end_char": 75229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75284, "end_char": 75294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vest Bengal Special Courts Ordinance", "statute": "Vest Bengal Special Courts Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75302, "end_char": 75331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75508, "end_char": 75517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance was superseded and replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act which contained provisions almost identical with those of the Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance was superseded and replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act which contained provisions almost identical with those of the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75713, "end_char": 75722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance was superseded and replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act which contained provisions almost identical with those of the Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance was superseded and replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act which contained provisions almost identical with those of the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75873, "end_char": 75885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance was superseded and replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act which contained provisions almost identical with those of the Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance was superseded and replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act which contained provisions almost identical with those of the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Sections 6 to 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76075, "end_char": 76091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance was superseded and replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act which contained provisions almost identical with those of the Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance was superseded and replaced by the West Bengal Special Courts Act which contained provisions almost identical with those of the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "October 28, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77291, "end_char": 77307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 28, 1949, when the Ordinance wa• still in force, the West Bengal Government appointed Shri S. 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Guha Roy, who was then the Sessions Judge of Alipore, a Special Judge, with powers to try cases under the Ordinance."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Alipore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 77423, "end_char": 77448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 28, 1949, when the Ordinance wa• still in force, the West Bengal Government appointed Shri S. N. Guha Roy, who was then the Sessions Judge of Alipore, a Special Judge, with powers to try cases under the Ordinance."}}, {"text": "Messers. Jessop and Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 77760, "end_char": 77787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "297, along with 49 other persons, were the accused in what is known as Dum Dum Factory Raid case, where crimes of the utmost brutality were committed by an armed gang of men on the factory of Messers."}}, {"text": "February 26, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77824, "end_char": 77841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The raid took place on February 26, 1949."}}, {"text": "25th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77936, "end_char": 77957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th of January, 1950, the State Government by a notification directed that the case of Anwar Ali and his 49 co-accused should be tried by Mr. S. N. Guha Roy in accordanrn with the provisions of the Ordinance."}}, {"text": "Guha Roy in accordanrn with the provisions of the Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78085, "end_char": 78144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 2, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78236, "end_char": 78249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A formal complaint was lodged before the Special Judge in respect of these 50 persons on April 2, 1950, that is to say, after the Special Courts Act was passed, superseding the Ordinance."}}, {"text": "31st of March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78401, "end_char": 78420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial lasted for several months and by his judgment dated the 31st of March, 1951, the Special Judge convicted the accused under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, some of them being sentenced to transportation for life, while others were sentenced to undergo various terms of imprisonment according to the gravity of their offence."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78492, "end_char": 78509, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May l, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78893, "end_char": 78904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May l, 1951, Anwar Ali, the respondent in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78995, "end_char": 78999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "297, presented an application before Mr. Justice Bose of the Calcutta High Court under article 226 of the Constitution and a rule was issued by the learned Judge upon that petition calling upon the State of West Bengal to show cause why the proceedings, conviction and sentence, passed by the Special Court on the petitioner and his co-accused should not be quashed.", "canonical_name": "BosE"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79033, "end_char": 79044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guha Roy in accordanrn with the provisions of the Ordinance", "statute": "Guha Roy in accordanrn with the provisions of the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "21st of May", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79317, "end_char": 79328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st of May following, a similar application for quashing a pending criminal trial was filed by Gajen Mali, the respondent in the other appeal, who along with 5 other persons is being tried for offences of murder and conspiracy to murder before Mr. M.\n\nBhattacharya, another Special Judge, appointed under the West Bengal Special Courts Act."}}, {"text": "Gajen Mali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79413, "end_char": 79423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st of May following, a similar application for quashing a pending criminal trial was filed by Gajen Mali, the respondent in the other appeal, who along with 5 other persons is being tried for offences of murder and conspiracy to murder before Mr. M.\n\nBhattacharya, another Special Judge, appointed under the West Bengal Special Courts Act."}}, {"text": "M.\n\nBhattacharya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79566, "end_char": 79582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21st of May following, a similar application for quashing a pending criminal trial was filed by Gajen Mali, the respondent in the other appeal, who along with 5 other persons is being tried for offences of murder and conspiracy to murder before Mr. M.\n\nBhattacharya, another Special Judge, appointed under the West Bengal Special Courts Act."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80288, "end_char": 80309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80340, "end_char": 80361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was conceded during the hearing of these rules by the State Government that although in the case of Anwar Ali the notification was issued a day before the coming into force of the Constitution, the provisions of the Constitution of India, which came into force on the 26th of January, 1950, applied to his case also."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80474, "end_char": 80486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81122, "end_char": 81132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 81845, "end_char": 81869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of American decisions have been cited before us on behalf of both parties in course of the arguments; and while a too rigid adherence to the views expressed by the Judges of the Supreme Court of America while\n\nealing with the equal protection clause in their own\n\nConstitution-may not be necessary or desirable for the purpose of determining the true meaning and scope of article 14 of the Indian Constitution, it cannot be denied that the general principles enunciated in many of these cases do afford considerable help and guidance in the matter."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82039, "end_char": 82049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82299, "end_char": 82309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84688, "end_char": 84698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 400", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85420, "end_char": 85426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Special Courts Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85563, "end_char": 85587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86359, "end_char": 86369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86906, "end_char": 86916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Missouri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 87375, "end_char": 87383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hayes v.\n\nMzsrouri(') the subject-matter of complaint was a pr<>- vision of the revised statutes of Missouri which allowed the State, in capital cases, fifteen peremptory challenges in cities having a population of 100,000 inhabitants in place of eight in other parts of the State."}}, {"text": "S. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87748, "end_char": 87753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 88775, "end_char": 88788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Supreme Court that the equal protection clause was not violated by this provision. \""}}, {"text": "S.17J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89904, "end_char": 89909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90533, "end_char": 90543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91959, "end_char": 91969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92966, "end_char": 92975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 350", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94363, "end_char": 94369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nWest Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 94440, "end_char": 94461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea f.\n\nThe State of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark._ar.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nWest Bengal"}}, {"text": "section 269(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94926, "end_char": 94940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95658, "end_char": 95668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95909, "end_char": 95920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 238", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96002, "end_char": 96013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 350", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96033, "end_char": 96044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96467, "end_char": 96476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96629, "end_char": 96650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97574, "end_char": 97586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98222, "end_char": 98234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nWest Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 98704, "end_char": 98725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court that the express provision of an enactment, if it is clear and unambiguous, cannot be\n\nThe State of\n\nWest Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar."}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 98786, "end_char": 98814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea /.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea /.\n\ncurtailed or extended with the aid of the preamble to the Act.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea"}}, {"text": "section 5( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99048, "end_char": 99061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102701, "end_char": 102711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103107, "end_char": 103112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103165, "end_char": 103170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103184, "end_char": 103190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103203, "end_char": 103209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Matthews", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103783, "end_char": 103791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out by Matthews, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, that the ordinance in question did not merely prescribe a rule and condition for the regulation of the laundry business."}}, {"text": "S. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105484, "end_char": 105489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107296, "end_char": 107308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 350", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107636, "end_char": 107642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109630, "end_char": 109643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109719, "end_char": 109729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vi de Witlis", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 109871, "end_char": 109883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Vi de Witlis on Cnstitutional Law, Page 587\n\nlimited ground upon which the High Court bases its decision, these appeals are bound tio fail."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110099, "end_char": 110111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110600, "end_char": 110609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110617, "end_char": 110653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110714, "end_char": 110735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 110761, "end_char": 110777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no dispute that the question of the validity of section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, has to be determined in the light of the provisions of the Constitution of India which came into force on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110892, "end_char": 110901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111117, "end_char": 111127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111149, "end_char": 111158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111499, "end_char": 111509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111585, "end_char": 111594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111668, "end_char": 111678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112037, "end_char": 112046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das/.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark_ar.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112066, "end_char": 112076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112233, "end_char": 112239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although Sastri J., as he then was, and myself differed from the actual decision of the majority of the Court, there was no disagreement between us and the majority as to the principles underlying the provisions of article 14."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112439, "end_char": 112449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112746, "end_char": 112756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115179, "end_char": 115189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115883, "end_char": 115893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116372, "end_char": 116382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali Sarkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 116472, "end_char": 116488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This test, if accepted, will amount to adding at the end of article 14 the words \"except in good faith and in the 7-4 S. C. India/71\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea"}}, {"text": "Cooley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117174, "end_char": 117180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attorney-General next contends, on the authority of -a passage in Cooley's Constitutional Limitatioru, 8th Edition, Vol.", "canonical_name": "Cooley"}}, {"text": "Cooley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118096, "end_char": 118102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That decision, therefore, does not support the propos1t10n so widely stated in the passage apparently adged by the editor to the original text of Judge Cooley.", "canonical_name": "Cooley"}}, {"text": "S.150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118621, "end_char": 118626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 571", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118639, "end_char": 118645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118754, "end_char": 118764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119417, "end_char": 119443, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119723, "end_char": 119729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119793, "end_char": 119799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119946, "end_char": 119952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120075, "end_char": 120082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120173, 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{"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt that as regards the cases to be sent before the Special Court or Courts, the Act\n\nThe State o} West Bengal\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nI¥ est Bengal\n\nAntvar Ali\n\nSarkar.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyur"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143419, "end_char": 143429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trevor Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143845, "end_char": 143859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The points of prejudice gainst the accused which appear in the challenged Act have been pointed out in detail in the judgment of Trevor Harries C.J.\n\nThey cannot all be brushed aside as variations of minor and unsubstantial importance."}}, {"text": "articles 20 to 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144201, "end_char": 144218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the 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{"in_sentence": "The law on the subject has been well stated in a passage from Willis on Constitutional Law (1936 Edition, at page 579) and an extract from the pronouncement of this Court in what is known as the Prohibition Case, The State of Bombay and Another v. 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{"text": "S. 519", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162863, "end_char": 162869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163197, "end_char": 163206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163743, "end_char": 163752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163783, "end_char": 163793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 164639, "end_char": 164656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nWest Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSarkar.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali\n\nSarkar\n\nMukherjea"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 164659, "end_char": 164680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyur /.\n\nany arbitrary selection according to their will and pleasure then the Act is void.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyur"}}, {"text": "D>s Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164852, "end_char": 164861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this point, I would invite special attention to the view tak:en by Mr.\n\nJustice D>s Gupta in the following passage of his judgment :- /\n\n\"The Act lays down no principle on which selection of \"classes of offnces\" or \"classes of cases\" should be made by the State Government.", "canonical_name": "Das Gupta"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165423, "end_char": 165432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165524, "end_char": 165534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172636, "end_char": 172646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 172681, "end_char": 172688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in England, where Parliament is supreme, that is inevitable, for, as Dicey tells us in his Law of the Constitution:\n\n\"Parliament is the supreme legislator, but from the moment Parliament has uttered its will as lawgiver, that will become subject to the interpretation put upon it by the judges of the land, and the judges, who are influenced by the feelings of magistrates no\n\nThe State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali\n\nSark_ar."}}, {"text": "Dicey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 172747, "end_char": 172752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in England, where Parliament is supreme, that is inevitable, for, as Dicey tells us 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"label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 179433, "end_char": 179443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Dean Pound in 34 Harvard Law Review 449 at 452)."}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 180090, "end_char": 180096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Sumner has explained this in Bo111man's case(1) and the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar's case(2) and so did Puranik J. and I in the Nagpur High Court in Bhagwati Charan Shuklds case( 3)."}}, {"text": "Bo111man", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 180119, "end_char": 180127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Sumner has explained this in Bo111man's case(1) and the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar's case(2) and so did Puranik J. and I in the Nagpur High Court in Bhagwati Charan Shuklds case( 3)."}}, {"text": "Niharendu Dutt Majumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 180163, "end_char": 180186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord 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"metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Sumner has explained this in Bo111man's case(1) and the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar's case(2) and so did Puranik J. and I in the Nagpur High Court in Bhagwati Charan Shuklds case( 3)."}}, {"text": "Ramchandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182117, "end_char": 182127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That cannot be when Ramchandra is tried by one procedure and Sakharam, similarly placed, facing equally serious charges, also answering for his life and liberty, by another which differs radically from the first."}}, {"text": "Sakharam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182158, "end_char": 182166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That cannot be when Ramchandra is tried by one procedure and Sakharam, similarly placed, facing equally serious charges, also answering for his life and liberty, by another which differs radically from the first."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183059, "end_char": 183069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "On that short and simple ground I would decide this case and hold the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184442, "end_char": 184515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 184586, "end_char": 184596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "297: P. K. Bose."}}, {"text": "Sukumar , Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 184641, "end_char": 184656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "297: Sukumar , Ghose.", "canonical_name": "Sukumar , Ghose"}}, {"text": "Habib Mohammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 184669, "end_char": 184683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for Habib Mohammad (Intervener) : Rajin4er Narain.", "canonical_name": "Habib Mohammad"}}, {"text": "Rajin4er Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 184699, "end_char": 184714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for Habib Mohammad (Intervener) : Rajin4er Narain."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 184796, "end_char": 184807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the State of Hyderabad and for the State 'of Mysore (Interveners): P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 184906, "end_char": 184919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "298: Sukumar Ghose.", "canonical_name": "Sukumar , Ghose"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_395_402_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 395\n\nP. D. Sham\n\ndasani v.\n\n(I) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was never interpreted as prohibiting deprivation of property by private individuals.\n\nIts restoration, therefore, in the same form in article 31, after omission in the original draft article 19, could lead to no inference in support of the petitioner's contention, which indeed proceeds on the fundamental misconception that article 19(1) (£) and article 31(1), which are great constitutional safe. guards Vagainst State aggression on private property, are directed against infringements by private individuals for which remedies should be sought in the ordinary law.\n\nCentral Bank of India Ltd.\n\n In this view 1t 1s unnecessary to deal with certain other objections to the maintainability of the petition raised by the Solicitor-General on . behalf of the Bank.\n\nThe petition is dismissed. We make no order as to costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the respondent : Rajinder Narain,\n\nNARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN v.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF PUNJAB\n\n(and 13 other petitions).\n\nlPATANJALI SAsTRr C. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.] Preventive Detention-Ordt; r of detention challenged as illegal- Fresh order superseding previous order-Validity-Question of bad faith-Habeas corpus proceeding-Legality of detention must be determined as at date of return.\n\nIn the absence of bad faith the detaining authority can super-_ sedc an earlier order of detention which has been challenged as defective on merely formal grounds and make a fresh order wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies with the . requirements of the law in that behalf. The question of bad faith, if raised, must be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case.\n\nIn habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceedings.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nJan. 25.\n\nNaranian Singh\n\nNathawan v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPuniab.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nBasanta Chandra Glzose v. King Emperor ( [ 1945] F.C.R. 81) followed. Naranjan Singh v. The State of Punjab (unreporte<l) explained. Maklzan Singh Tarsikka v.\n\nThe State of Punjab ([1952] S.C.R. 368) referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nJURISDICTION: Petitions (Nos. 513, 566, 568, 570, 591, 595, 596, 601, 616, 617, 623, 625, 631 and 632 of 1951) under article 32 of the Constitution. for writs in the nature of habeas corpus. The facts are stated in the judgment.\n\nRaghbir Singh (amicus cu11ae) for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 513, 566, 568, 570, 595, 596, 609, 616, 617, 623, 625 and 631.\n\nA. S .. R. Chari (amicus curiae) for the petitioner in Petition No. 591.\n\nShiv Charan Singh (amicus curiae) for the petitioner in Petition No. 632.\n\nS. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of the Punjab (lindra Lal, with him) for the State of Punjab.\n\n1952. January 25. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution submitted through the\n\n4 •\n\nSuperintendent, Central Jail, Ambala, for the issue of -4 a writ of habeas corpus for the release of the petitioner from custody.\n\nOn 5th July, 1950, the petitioner was arrested and detained under an order of the District Magistrate of Amritsar in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. and the grounds of his detention were served o,; him as required by section 7 of the Act on 10th July, 1950.\n\nThe Act having been amended by the Preven- ..:~. tive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, with effect from 22nd February, 1951, a fresh order No. 7853- ADSB, dated 17th May, 1951, was issued in the following terms :-\n\n• \"Whereas the Governor of Puniab is satisfied with . respect to the person known as Naranjan Singh Nathawan, s/o Lehna Singh of village Chak Sikandar,\n\n.. .\n\n. )'\n\n•, -\n\n.).\n\nP. S. Ramdas, Amritsar District, that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary to make the following order : Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 and section 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, the Governor of Punjab hereby directs that the said Naranjan Singh Nathawan be committed to the custody of the Inspector-General of Prisons, Punjab, and detained in any jail of the State till 31st March, 1952, subject to such conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as have been specified by general order or as contained in te Punjab Detenu Rules, 1950.\"\n\nThis order was served on the petitioner on 23rd May, 1951, but no grounds in support of this order were served on him.\n\nThe petitioner thereupon presented this petition for his release contending that the aforesaid order was illegal inasmuch as (1) the grounds of detention communicated to him on 10th July, 1950, were \"quite vague, false and imaginary\" and (2) he was not furnished with the grounds on which the order dated 17th May, 1951, was pased. The petition was heard ex partt: on 12th November, 1951, when this Court issued a rule nisi calling upon the respondent to show cause why the petitioner should not be released, and it was posted for :final hearing on 23rd November, 1951.\n\nMeanwhile, the State Government issued an order on 18th Novemher, 1951, revoking the order of detention dated 17th May, 1951, and on the same date the District Magistrate, Amritsar, issued yet another order for the detention of the petitioner under sections 3 and 4 of the amended Act; this last order along with the grounds on which it was based was served on the petitioner on 19th November, 1951.\n\nThereupon the petitioner submitted a supplemental petition to thi's Court on 28th November, 1951, challenging the validity of the last order on the ground 3-5 S. c. India/71\n\nNaranjan Singh\n\nNathawan v.\n\nThe State uf\n\nPunjab.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nNaranian Singh Nathawan v.\n\nThe State of Punjab.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nthat \"it was only a device to defeat the habeas corpus petition of the petitioner in which a rule had already been issued\", and he put forward an additional ground of attack on the legality of the earlier order dated 17th may, 1951, namely, that it fixed the term of detention till 31st March, 1952, before obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board as required by section 11 of the amended Act. This ground was evidently based on the view expressed by this Court that the specification of the period of detention in the initial order of detention under section 3 of the amended Act before obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board rendered the order illegal.\n\nIn the return to the rule showing cause filed on behalf of the respondent, the Under Secretary (Home) to the Government explained the circumstances which led to the issue of the fresh order of detention dated 18th November, 1951. After stating that the petitioner's case was referred to and considered by the Advisory Board constituted under section 8 of the amended Act and that the Board reported on 30th May, 1951, that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner, ' ' the affidavit proceeded as follows :\n\n\"That the Government was advised that the orders made under section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, but carried out in the form of orders under section 3 of the said Act, should be followed by grounds of detention and, as this had not been .done in most cases, the detentions were likely to be called in question.\n\nThe Government was further advised there were other technical defects which might render the detention of various detenus untenable.\n\nIn view of this, the Government decided that the cases of all detenus should be reviewed by the District Magistrates concerned.\n\nAccordingly, the Punjab Government instructed the District Magistrates to review the cases and apply their minds afresh and emphasised that there must exist rational grounds with the detaining authority to justify the detention 9£ a person and they were asked to report clearly in each case if the District\n\n\"( .\n\n....\n\nJ...\n\n. 'Y\n\n..., -\n\nMagistrate concerned wanted the detenus to be detained. The Punjab Government also reviewed some cases.\n\nAccordingly all cases including the case of the petitioner were reviewed and in this case the District Magistrate was again satisfied that it was necessary that the detenu be detained with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order.\" And it concluded by stating \"that the petitioner is detained now under the orders of the District Magistrate, Amritsar.\"\n\nThe original and supplementary petitions came on in due course for hearing before Faz! Ali and Vivian Bose JJ. on. 17th December, 1951, when reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner on certain observations in an unreported decision of this Court in Petition No. 334 of 1951 (Naranjan Singh v. The State of Punjab) and it was claimed that in view of those observations and of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, the de6sion in Basant Chandra Chose v. King Emperor(1), on which the respondent relied, was no longer good law. The learned Judges thought that the matter should be considered by a Constitution bench and the case was accordingly placed before us.\n\nIt will be seen from the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent that the case of the petitioner, along with his representation against the detention order of 17th May, 1951, was placed before the Advisory Board for its consideration, and the Board reported on 30th May, 1951, that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. It is said that, on the basis of that report, the Government decided that the petitioner should be detained till 31st March, 1952, but while a properly framed order under section 11 should \"confirm\" the detention order and \"continue\" the detention for a specified period, the order of 17th May, 1951, was issued under a misapprehension in the form of an initial order under section 3 of the amended Act, on the same grounds as before without any fresh communication thereof to the petitioner.\n\n(1) [1945] F. C. R. 81. 52\n\nNaranian Singh\n\nNathawan v.\n\nThe State of Punjab. - Pataniali Sastri C. / •\n\nNaran; an Singh\n\nNathawan v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPuniab.\n\nPataniali Sastri C. /.\n\navoid arguments based on possible defects of a technical and formal character, the said order was revoked under section 13, and on a review of the case by the District Magistrate, a fresh order of detention was issued under section 3 on 18th November, 1951, and this was followed by a formal communication of the same grounds as before as there could be no fresh grounds, the petitioner having throughout been under detention.\n\nIt is contended bv the Advocate-General of the Punjab that the decisio'n reported in [ 1945] F.C.R. 81 is clear authority in support of the validity of the aforesaid order.\n\nOn essentially similar facts the court laid down two propositions both of which have application here. (1) Where an earlier order of detention is defective merely on formal grounds, there is nothing to preclude a proper order of detention being based on the pre-existing grounds themselves, especially in case& in which the sufficiency of the grounds is not examinable by the courts, and (2) if at any time before the court directs the release of the detenu, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention. The question is not whether the later order validates the earlier detention but whether in the face of the later valid order the court can direct the release of the petitioner. The learned Judges point out that the analogy of civil proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be ascertained as on the date of the institution of the proceedings has no application to proceedings in the nature of habeas corpus where the court is concerned solely with the question whether the applicant is being lawfully detained or not._\n\nThe petitioner's learned counsel conceded that he could not challenge the correctness of the second pr<> position, but took exception to the first as being no longer tenable after the Indian Constitution came into force.\n\nIt was urged that article 22 lays down the procedure to be followed in cases of preventive detention and the said procedure must be strictly observed\n\n...\n\nas the only prospect of release by a court must be on the basis of technical or formal defects, a long line of decisions having held that the scope of judicial review in matters of preventive detention is practically limited to an enquiry as to whether there has been strict compliance with the requirements of the law.\n\nThis is undoubtedly true and this Court had occasion in the recent case of Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab (Petition No. 308 of 1951) (1) to observe \"it cannot too often be emphasised that before a person is depriTed of his personal liberty the procedure established by law must be strictly followed and must not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person 2ffected\".\n\nTh~ proposition, however, applied with equal force to cases of preventive detention before the commencement of the Constitution, and it is difficult to see what difference the Constitution makes in regard to the position.\n\nIndeed, the position is now made more clear by the express provisions of section 13 of the Act which provides that a detention order may at 11ny time be revoked or modified and that such revocation shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order under section 3 against the same person. Once it is conceded that in habeas corpus proceedings the court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceeding, it is difficult to hold, in the absence of proof of bad faith, that the detaining authority cannot supersede an earlier order of detention challenged as illegal and make a fresh order wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies with the reqmrements of the law in that behalf .\n\n. ) As regards the observation in Naranjan Singh's case. we do not understand them as laying down any general proposition to the effect that no fresh order of detention could be made when once a petition challenging the validity of an earlie.r order has been filed in court.\n\nThe learned Judges appear to have inferred from the facts of that case that the later .order was\n\n( 1) Since reported as [ 1952] S.C.R. 368.\n\nNaranjan Singh\n\nNathawan v.\n\nThe State of Punjab.\n\nPatanjali Stlstri C. /.\n\nNaranjan Singh\n\nNathawan v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nJan. 30.\n\nnot made bona fide on being satisfied that the petitioner's detention was still necessary but it was \"obviously to defeat the present petition\".\n\nThe question of bad faith, if raised would certainly have to be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case, but the observations in one case cannot be regarded as a precedent in dealing with other cases.\n\nWe accordingly remit the case for further hearing.\n\nThis order will govern the other petitions where the same question was raised.\n\nPetitions remitted.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nSHRIMANT SARDAR\n\nBHUJANGARAO\n\nDAULATRAO GHORPADE\n\nSHRIMANT\n\nMALOJIRAO\n\nDA ULA TRAO\n\nGHORPADE AND OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J., DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.] Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), s. 4(a)-Saranjam-Dispute between branches of grantee's •family-Government Resolution regulating succession-Suit to declare Resolution ultra vires, for declaration of sole right as saranjamdar, and for injunc tion against other branches-Governtnent impleaded as party- Maintainability of suit.\n\nThe position of the Gajendrcigad estate which had been recog nised by the British Government as a saranjam and which had been declared by the Bombay High Court in 1868 to be partible, was re-examined in 1891 and Government passed a Resolution in 1891 that \"the whole of the Gajendragad estate was a saranjam continuable as hereditary in the fullest sense of the word.\n\nIt ls continuable to all made legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest.\" In 1932 by another Resolution Government formally resumed the grant and re-granted it to the plaintiff who belonged to the first branch of the family of the original grantee with a direction that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector. The other two branches felt aggrieved and in 1936 Government passed another Resolution which confirmed the Resolution of 1891 and modified the Resolution of 19321, by declaring that the portions of the\n\n~ .", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 98, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234, "end_char": 244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 283, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425, "end_char": 438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Central Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Central Bank of India Ltd.\n\n In this view 1t 1s unnecessary to deal with certain other objections to the maintainability of the petition raised by the Solicitor-General on ."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 970, "end_char": 985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : Rajinder Narain,\n\nNARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN v.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF PUNJAB\n\n(and 13 other petitions)."}}, {"text": "NARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 988, "end_char": 1011, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ST ATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1016, "end_char": 1036, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1090, "end_char": 1108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1111, "end_char": 1120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1122, "end_char": 1125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1989, "end_char": 2005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nJan. 25.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "1945] F.C.R. 81", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2142, "end_char": 2157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2440, "end_char": 2450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghbir Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2553, "end_char": 2566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghbir Singh (amicus cu11ae) for the petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "A. S .. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2685, "end_char": 2701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S .. R. Chari (amicus curiae) for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Shiv Charan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2759, "end_char": 2776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Charan Singh (amicus curiae) for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2834, "end_char": 2845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of the Punjab (lindra Lal, with him) for the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2989, "end_char": 3005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution submitted through the\n\n4 •\n\nSuperintendent, Central Jail, Ambala, for the issue of -4 a writ of habeas corpus for the release of the petitioner from custody.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3037, "end_char": 3047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Superintendent, Central Jail, Ambala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3096, "end_char": 3132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution submitted through the\n\n4 •\n\nSuperintendent, Central Jail, Ambala, for the issue of -4 a writ of habeas corpus for the release of the petitioner from custody."}}, {"text": "5th July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3230, "end_char": 3244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th July, 1950, the petitioner was arrested and detained under an order of the District Magistrate of Amritsar in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3390, "end_char": 3399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3407, "end_char": 3437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "17th May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3710, "end_char": 3724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7853- ADSB, dated 17th May, 1951, was issued in the following terms :-\n\n• \"Whereas the Governor of Puniab is satisfied with ."}}, {"text": "Puniab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3791, "end_char": 3797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7853- ADSB, dated 17th May, 1951, was issued in the following terms :-\n\n• \"Whereas the Governor of Puniab is satisfied with ."}}, {"text": "Naranjan Singh Nathawan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3849, "end_char": 3872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "respect to the person known as Naranjan Singh Nathawan, s/o Lehna Singh of village Chak Sikandar,\n\n.. .", "canonical_name": "NARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN"}}, {"text": "P. S. Ramdas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. Ramdas, Amritsar District, that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary to make the following order : Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 and section 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, the Governor of Punjab hereby directs that the said Naranjan Singh Nathawan be committed to the custody of the Inspector-General of Prisons, Punjab, and detained in any jail of the State till 31st March, 1952, subject to such conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as have been specified by general order or as contained in te Punjab Detenu Rules, 1950.\""}}, {"text": "Amritsar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3954, "end_char": 3971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. Ramdas, Amritsar District, that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary to make the following order : Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 and section 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, the Governor of Punjab hereby directs that the said Naranjan Singh Nathawan be committed to the custody of the Inspector-General of Prisons, Punjab, and detained in any jail of the State till 31st March, 1952, subject to such conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as have been specified by general order or as contained in te Punjab Detenu Rules, 1950.\""}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4194, "end_char": 4203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4208, "end_char": 4217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4225, "end_char": 4255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. Ramdas, Amritsar District, that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary to make the following order : Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 and section 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, the Governor of Punjab hereby directs that the said Naranjan Singh Nathawan be committed to the custody of the Inspector-General of Prisons, Punjab, and detained in any jail of the State till 31st March, 1952, subject to such conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as have been specified by general order or as contained in te Punjab Detenu Rules, 1950.\""}}, {"text": "31st March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4511, "end_char": 4527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. Ramdas, Amritsar District, that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary to make the following order : Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 and section 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, the Governor of Punjab hereby directs that the said Naranjan Singh Nathawan be committed to the custody of the Inspector-General of Prisons, Punjab, and detained in any jail of the State till 31st March, 1952, subject to such conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as have been specified by general order or as contained in te Punjab Detenu Rules, 1950.\""}}, {"text": "Punjab Detenu Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4690, "end_char": 4715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23rd May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4762, "end_char": 4776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was served on the petitioner on 23rd May, 1951, but no grounds in support of this order were served on him."}}, {"text": "10th July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5016, "end_char": 5031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner thereupon presented this petition for his release contending that the aforesaid order was illegal inasmuch as (1) the grounds of detention communicated to him on 10th July, 1950, were \"quite vague, false and imaginary\" and (2) he was not furnished with the grounds on which the order dated 17th May, 1951, was pased."}}, {"text": "12th November, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5207, "end_char": 5226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was heard ex partt: on 12th November, 1951, when this Court issued a rule nisi calling upon the respondent to show cause why the petitioner should not be released, and it was posted for :final hearing on 23rd November, 1951."}}, {"text": "23rd November, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5388, "end_char": 5407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was heard ex partt: on 12th November, 1951, when this Court issued a rule nisi calling upon the respondent to show cause why the petitioner should not be released, and it was posted for :final hearing on 23rd November, 1951."}}, {"text": "18th Novemher, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5461, "end_char": 5480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, the State Government issued an order on 18th Novemher, 1951, revoking the order of detention dated 17th May, 1951, and on the same date the District Magistrate, Amritsar, issued yet another order for the detention of the petitioner under sections 3 and 4 of the amended Act; this last order along with the grounds on which it was based was served on the petitioner on 19th November, 1951."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Amritsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5561, "end_char": 5590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, the State Government issued an order on 18th Novemher, 1951, revoking the order of detention dated 17th May, 1951, and on the same date the District Magistrate, Amritsar, issued yet another order for the detention of the petitioner under sections 3 and 4 of the amended Act; this last order along with the grounds on which it was based was served on the petitioner on 19th November, 1951."}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5659, "end_char": 5675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Detenu Rules, 1950", "statute": "Punjab Detenu Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6094, "end_char": 6109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pataniali Sastri C. /.\n\nNaranian Singh Nathawan v.\n\nThe State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6112, "end_char": 6128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nthat \"it was only a device to defeat the habeas corpus petition of the petitioner in which a rule had already been issued\", and he put forward an additional ground of attack on the legality of the earlier order dated 17th may, 1951, namely, that it fixed the term of detention till 31st March, 1952, before obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board as required by section 11 of the amended Act.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6502, "end_char": 6512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6691, "end_char": 6700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18th November, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7009, "end_char": 7028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the return to the rule showing cause filed on behalf of the respondent, the Under Secretary (Home) to the Government explained the circumstances which led to the issue of the fresh order of detention dated 18th November, 1951."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7142, "end_char": 7151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7202, "end_char": 7216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After stating that the petitioner's case was referred to and considered by the Advisory Board constituted under section 8 of the amended Act and that the Board reported on 30th May, 1951, that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner, ' ' the affidavit proceeded as follows :\n\n\"That the Government was advised that the orders made under section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, but carried out in the form of orders under section 3 of the said Act, should be followed by grounds of detention and, as this had not been .done in most cases, the detentions were likely to be called in question."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7389, "end_char": 7399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7407, "end_char": 7437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7545, "end_char": 7554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7996, "end_char": 8013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the Punjab Government instructed the District Magistrates to review the cases and apply their minds afresh and emphasised that there must exist rational grounds with the detaining authority to justify the detention 9£ a person and they were asked to report clearly in each case if the District\n\n\"( ."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8848, "end_char": 8856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And it concluded by stating \"that the petitioner is detained now under the orders of the District Magistrate, Amritsar.\""}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8942, "end_char": 8950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The original and supplementary petitions came on in due course for hearing before Faz!"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8955, "end_char": 8966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali and Vivian Bose JJ.", "canonical_name": "Vivian Bose"}}, {"text": "17th December, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8975, "end_char": 8994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17th December, 1951, when reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner on certain observations in an unreported decision of this Court in Petition No."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10074, "end_char": 10084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10277, "end_char": 10286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1945] F. C. R. 81", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10401, "end_char": 10419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPuniab.\n\nPataniali Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10536, "end_char": 10571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pataniali Sastri C. / •\n\nNaran; an Singh\n\nNathawan v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPuniab."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10691, "end_char": 10701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10803, "end_char": 10812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1945] F.C.R. 81", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11094, "end_char": 11109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12593, "end_char": 12603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13737, "end_char": 13747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13920, "end_char": 13929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Naranjan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14513, "end_char": 14527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the observation in Naranjan Singh's case.", "canonical_name": "NARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN"}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15603, "end_char": 15614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "SHRIMANT SARDAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15617, "end_char": 15632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMANT SARDAR\n\nBHUJANGARAO\n\nDAULATRAO GHORPADE\n\nSHRIMANT\n\nMALOJIRAO\n\nDA ULA TRAO\n\nGHORPADE AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "SHRIMANT\n\nMALOJIRAO", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15667, "end_char": 15686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMANT SARDAR\n\nBHUJANGARAO\n\nDAULATRAO GHORPADE\n\nSHRIMANT\n\nMALOJIRAO\n\nDA ULA TRAO\n\nGHORPADE AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15724, "end_char": 15740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J., DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15756, "end_char": 15767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J., DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]", "canonical_name": "Vivian Bose"}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15773, "end_char": 15804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15818, "end_char": 15825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "statute": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_402_417_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Naranjan Singh\n\nNathawan v.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nJan. 30.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nnot made bona fide on being satisfied that the petitioner's detention was still necessary but it was \"obviously to defeat the present petition\".\n\nThe question of bad faith, if raised would certainly have to be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case, but the observations in one case cannot be regarded as a precedent in dealing with other cases.\n\nWe accordingly remit the case for further hearing.\n\nThis order will govern the other petitions where the same question was raised.\n\nPetitions remitted.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nSHRIMANT SARDAR\n\nBHUJANGARAO\n\nDAULATRAO GHORPADE\n\nSHRIMANT\n\nMALOJIRAO\n\nDA ULA TRAO\n\nGHORPADE AND OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J., DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.] Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), s. 4(a)-Saranjam-Dispute between branches of grantee's •family-Government Resolution regulating succession-Suit to declare Resolution ultra vires, for declaration of sole right as saranjamdar, and for injunc tion against other branches-Governtnent impleaded as party- Maintainability of suit.\n\nThe position of the Gajendrcigad estate which had been recog nised by the British Government as a saranjam and which had been declared by the Bombay High Court in 1868 to be partible, was re-examined in 1891 and Government passed a Resolution in 1891 that \"the whole of the Gajendragad estate was a saranjam continuable as hereditary in the fullest sense of the word.\n\nIt ls continuable to all made legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest.\" In 1932 by another Resolution Government formally resumed the grant and re-granted it to the plaintiff who belonged to the first branch of the family of the original grantee with a direction that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector. The other two branches felt aggrieved and in 1936 Government passed another Resolution which confirmed the Resolution of 1891 and modified the Resolution of 19321, by declaring that the portions of the\n\n~ .\n\nestate held by the branches shall be entered as de facto shares and that each share shall be continuable hereditarily as if it were a separate saranjam estate.\n\nThe plaintiff instituted a suit impleading the representatives of the other two branches as defendants 1 and 2, and the Province of Bombay as the 3rd defendant, alleging that the Resolution of 1936 was tdtra vires and praying (A) for a declaration (i) that the defendants 1 and 2 had no right to go behind the Resolution of 1932 under which the plaintiff was recognised as the. sole saranjamdar and that the assignments held by defendants were held by them as mere potgi holders,\n\n(ii) that the plaintiff had the sole right to all privileges appertaining to the post of saranjamdar, and (iii) that the Government had no right to change the Resolution of 1932, and (B) for restraining the defendants I and 2 from doing anyacts in contravention of the aforesaid right of the plaintiff.\n\nHeld, (i) that the suit was a suit \"against the Crown\" and also a suit \"relating to lands held as saranjam\" within the meaning of sec. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit;\n\n(ii) that the plaintiff could not be given even the reliefs claimed against defendants 1 and 2 alone, as the rights claimed against these defendants could not be divorced from the claim ' against the Government and considered separately;\n\n(iii) in any event if the claim against the Government was to be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders could not be challenged and if the orders stood, the plaintiff could not succeed because both sides held their respective properties on the basis of those orders.\n\nBasalingappagowda v. Secretary and Basangauda v.\n\nSecretary of approved.\n\nProvince of Bombay v.\n\n103) distinguished.\n\nof State (48 Born. L.R. 651)\n\nState (32 Born. L.R. 1370) Hormusji Maneklal (74 I.A.\n\n- ll eld also, that sec. 4 of the said Act would apply even if the only relief claimed in the suit against the Government was a declaration.\n\nDattatreya Viswanath v. Secretary of State for India (I. L.R. 1948 Born. 809) disapproved. Daulatrao v.\n\nGovernment of Bombay (47 Born. L.R. 214) approved.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1950.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay (Bhagwati and Dixit JJ.) dated 16th December, 1948, in Second Appeal No. 1226 of 1945 confirming a judgment and decree of the District Judge of Dharwar in Appeal No. 123 of 1943. The facts of\n\nBhunjangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others.\n\n8h#njangrao\n\nDa11/atrao\n\nM•lojirao\n\nDa14/a1rao and Others.\n\nthe case and the the judgm_ent.\n\narguments of the counsel appear iil\n\nB. Somayya and Sanjiva Rao Naidu (N. C. Shaw, with them) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (V. N. Lokur, with him) for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-Genaal for India, ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for respondent No. 3 (the State of Bombay.) 1952.\n\nJanuary BosE J .. PATANJALI with BQse J.\n\n30.\n\nJudgment was delivered bv SAsTRI C. J. and DAs J. agreed\n\nBosE J.-The plaintiff appeals.\n\nThe suit relates to a Saranjam estate in the State of Bombay.\n\nThe plaintiff claims to' be the sole Saranjamdar and seeks certain declarations and other reliefs appropriate to such a claim.\n\nThe first and second defendants are members of the plaintiff's family while the third defendant is the State of Bombay (Province of Bombay at the date of the suit) •\n\n. The only question is whether the suit is barred by section 4(a) of Bombay Act X of 1876 (Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act).\n\nThe following genealogical tree will show the relationship between the parties :\n\nBhujangrao Appasaheb (British Grantee)\n\nI Daulatrao I (died 24-7-1864) r--------- 1 Bhujangfao 1 (died 1881)\n\n(widow) Krishnabai Daulatrao II (died 8-5-1931) .\n\nI Bhl\\langrao III\n\n(Plaintiff)\n\nI Mal.ojirao\n\nI Daulatrao III (Def. 1)\n\n----.\n\nI Yeshwantrao alias Annasaheb\n\n. I Bhuiangrao II (Def. 2)\n\n. :::..\n\nThe facts are as follows. A common ancestor of the _present parties was given the Gajendragad estate as a Saranjam .some time before the advent of the British.\n\nWhen they arrived on the scene they decided, as far as possible, to continue such Sararijams, jagirs and inams as had been granted by the earlier rulers, and accordingly they framed rules under Schedule B, Rule 10 of Bombay Act XI of 1852 (The Bombay Rent Free Estates AGt of 1852) to regulate the mode of recognition :and the succession and conditions of tenure to Saranjams, which are analogous to jagirs. In compliance with this, the common ancestor shown at the head of the genealogical tree set out above was recognised by the British Government as the Saranjamdar of the Gajendragad estate.\n\nHe may for convenience be termed the British Grantee.\n\nThe Register Ex. P-53 shows that the estate consisted of 26 villages. We do not know the date of the British recognition but the nature of the tenure is described as follows :-\n\n\"Continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of British conquest, viz., 'Bhujangrao Appasaheb, the first British Grantee, son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade.\"\n\nOn the death of the British Grantee (Bhujangrao Appasaheb) he was succeeded by his son Daulatrao I who died on the 24th of July, 1864. This Daulatrao I left three sons, Bhujangrao I, Y eshwantrao and Malojirao.\n\nIn the year 1866 Bhujangrao I and his brother Y eshwantrao alia1 Annasaheb sued Malojirao for possession -0£ this Saranjam.\n\nA question of impartibility was raised but the Bombay High Court declared that the ' property in British India was partible.\n\nThey further declared that Bhujangrao I was the head of the familv and as such was entitled to a special assignment which was not to exceed a quarter share, for the expenses and duties which might devolve on him by virtue of his position, and that after this had been set aside each of the three brothers was entitled to an equal one-third share in the landed property in India.\n\nThis judgment\n\nBhunjangrao Daulatrao. v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others.\n\nBose/.\n\nBhunjangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMaloiirao Daulatrao and Others.\n\nBose/.\n\nis reported in 5 Born. H.C.R. 161. The duties enumerated at page 170 included the \"keeping up of armed retainers for the fort of Gajendragad, and for the im provement of that village, which was the chief seat of this branch of the Ghorpade family, and also to enable him to distribute on ceremonial occasions the custom ary presents to the junior members of the family.\" The judgment is dated the 12th of October, 1868.\n\nAs a consequence a division of the property wa!> effected. Malojirao separated himself from his brothers and was allotted seven villages.\n\nThe other two brothers continued joint and took the remainder.\n\nBut this was only with respect to property situate in British India. .The parties also had property in the State of Kolhapur.\n\nThat was left undivided.\n\nBhujangrao I died in 1881 and his younger brother Y eshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) claimed to succeed as the sole heir. The Political Department of the Government of India refused to recognise this claim and permitted Bhujangrao I's widow Krishnabai to . adopt a a boy from the family and recognised him as the heir in respect of that portion of the estate which lay within the Principality of Kolhapur. This was on the 3rd of\n\n....\n\nFebruary, 1882. ....\n\nThe Bombay Government followed a similar course regarding the property in British India.\n\nOn the 26th of April, 1882, they passed a Resolution embodying the following decision : ( 1) The adoption was to be recognised and the adopted son was to occupy the same position as his adoptive father, that is to say, he was to get one-third of tle property plus the assignment given to him as head of the family.\n\n(2) Malojirao who had already taken his share of the estate was to continue in possession. (3) Yeshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) was given the option of remaining joint with the adopted boy or separating.\n\nFinally, the Resolution concluded-\n\n.. '\n\n_. • •\n\n,. .\n\n\"The two brothers will hold their respective shares as their private property in virtue of the decree of the High Court and the J ahagir will henceforth be restricted to the portion awarded by the High Court to Bhujangrao which the adopted son will now inherit.\n\nIt should however be clearly understood that the decision of the High Court is not to be held as a precedent and that no partition of the Jahagir Estate to be continued to the adopted son will ever be allowed.\"\n\nThis position was emphasised by Government in the same year on the 22nd August, 1882.\n\nKrishnabai, who had been allowed by Government to adopt Daulatrao II, asked that her husband's one-third share in the estate be also treated as private property in the same way as the shares of the other two brothers. This prayer was refused and Government stated :\n\n\"It should be plainly understood that Government allow the adoption to be made by her only in consideration of Bhujangrao's one-third share as well as the portion assigned to him as head of the family being continued to the adopted son as indivisible Jahagir Estate descending in the line of male heirs in the order of primogeniture and subject to no terms whatsoever as to the enjoyment of the same by Krishnabai during her lifetime.\"\n\nThe position was re-examined by Government in 1891 and its decision was embodied in the following resolution dated the 17th of March, 1891 :\n\n\"It appears to Government that the whole Gajendragad Estate is a Saranjam continuable as hereditary in the fullest sense of the word as interpreted by the Court of Directors in paragraph 9 of their Despatch No. 27 dated 12th' December, 1855.\n\nIt is continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest; and should Government ever sanction an adoption the terms of sanction would be those applicable to Saranjamdars.\n\nThe property should be dealt with like other Saranjams in the Political Department.\"\n\nBhuniangrao.\n\nDaulatrao v.\n\nMalo; irao Daulatrao and 0 thrt.\n\nBos~/.\n\nBhunjangrao\n\nD11Hl111rao\n\nJ4R/ojirll0 DRHlatrao \"'ml Others.\n\nBos•],\n\nIn the year 1901 the adopted son Daulatrao II sued Yeshwantrao's son Bhujangrao II for partition.\n\nIt will be remembered that in the litigation of 1866, which ended in the Bombay High Court's judgment reported in 5 Born. H.C.R. 161, Malojirao alone separated and the other two brothers continued joint.\n\nThe litigation of 1901 put an end to that position. The High Court's judgment dated the 12th of March, 1908,\n\nmakes it clear that as Government was not a party to that litigation its rights against either or both of the parties were not affected.\n\nBut as between the parties inter se they were bound by the previous decisiol'I and so the adopted son was entitled to partition and separate possession of uch properties as might fall to his share. After this decision was given the two partitioned the property between themselves amicably.\n\nIn or about the year 1930 a Record of Rights was introduced in fourteen of the villages in the Gajendragad Jahagir and a dispute arose again between the three branches of the family. The District Deputy C, ollector, after inspecting the records, found that \"the name of the Khatedar Saranjamdar alone has found place in the village Inam register, in the Saranjam list and the land alienation register,\" while in the other village records the various members of the family were entered according to the \"actual wahivat or enjoyment.\"\n\nAfter due consideration he thought that the interest of Government and the Saranjamdar would be sufficiently safeguarded by allowing the same position to con6nue.\n\nHe ordered the entries to be made accordingly.\n\nThe order also discloses that the matter had been referred to the Legal Remembrancer to the Bombay Government.\n\nIn the meanwhile, on the 5th of May, 1898, a set of Rules framed under Schedule B, Rule 10, of the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act of 1852 were drawn up and published in the Bombay Gazette.\n\nThese Rules were republished, probably with some modification, in the Gazette of 8th July,\n\n1901. The portions applicable here were as follows :-\n\n....\n\n. .:..,\n\n\"I. Saraniams shall ordinarily be continued in accordance with the decision already passed by Government in each case.\n\nII. A Saranjam which has been decided to be hereditarily continuable shall ordinarily descend to the eldest male representative, in the order of primogeniture, of the senior branch of the family descended from the first British Grantee or any of his brothers who were undivided in interest. But Government reserve to themselves their rights for sufficient reason to direct the continuance of the Saranjam to any. other member of the $aid family, or as an act of grace, to a person adopted into the same family with the sanction of Government.\n\n* * V. Every Saranjam shall be held as a life estate. It shall be formally resumed on the death of the holder and in cases in which it is capable of further continuance it shall be made over to the next holder as a fresh grant from Government, unencumbered by. any debts, or charges, 5ave such as may be specially imposed by Government itself. >· VI. No Saranjam shall be capable of sub-division ..\n\nVII. Every Saranjamdar shall be responsible for making a suitable provision for the maintenance of .... \" (certain members of the family enumerated m the Rule).\n\nIX. 'If an order passed by Government under Rule VII is not carried out, Government may, what-_ ever the reason may be, direct the Saranjam, or a portion of it, to be resumed .... Provision for the members of the Saranjamdar's family entitled to maintenance shall then be made by Government out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed.\"\n\nAfter the District Deputy Collector's orders were passed on the 20th of May, 1930, Daulatrao II died on the 8t11 of May, 1931, and the matter was again taken up by Government. This time it passed ilie following\n\nBhuniangrao\n\nDaulatrao v.\n\nMalo; irao Daulatrao and Others.\n\nBo; e / .\n\nBhunjangrao Dau/atrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others.\n\nBose /.\n\nResolution on the 7th of June, 1932.\n\nThe Resolution was headed, \"Resumption and regrant of the Gajendragad Saranjam standing at No. 91 of the Saranjam List.\" It reads-\n\n\"Resolution :-The Governor-in-Council 1s pleased to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be formally resumed and regranted to Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade eldest son of the deceased Saranjamdar Sardar Daulatrao Bhujangrao Ghorpade and that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from the date of the death of the last holder. The Collector should take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saranjam estate which were in possession of the deceased Saranjamdar.\n\nThe Governor-in-Council agrees with the Commissioner, Southern Division, that the assignments held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders should be continued to them as at present.\"\n\nThe Bhujangrao mentioned in the Resolution is the 1 plaintiff who is shown as Bhujangrao\n\nIII in the genealogical tree.\n\nThe defendants were evidently aggrieved by this, (or they filed Suit No. 23 of 1934 against the present plaintiff and the Secretary of State for India in Council praying inter alia \"that the properties in that suit, viz., the villages allotted to their shares, were their independent and private properties and in case they were held to be . Saranjam properties, they be declared as independent Saranjams, separate and distinct from the one held by the present plaintiff.\"\n\nThis suit was withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action against the present plaintiff but not against the Secretary of State for India in Council.\n\nAccording to defendants 1 and 2, this was pursuant to an arrangement between the Government and themselves that Government would issue a fresh Resolution in terms of the earlier Resolution dated the 17th of March, 1891.\n\n...: . -\n\n...\n\nThis was done. On the 25th of February, 1936, Government passed the following Resolution:-\n\n\"Resolution:-After careful consideration the Governor-in-Council 1s pleased to confirm the decision in Government Resolution (Political Department) No. 1769 dated the 17th of March, 1891, and to declare that the whole of the Gajendragad Estate shall be continuable as an inalienable and impartible Saranjam on the conditions stated in the said Resolution.· Having regard, however, to the manner in which different portions of the estate have been held by different branches of the family, the Governor-in- Council, in modification of the orders contained in Government Resolution No. 8%9 dated the 7th June, 1932, is ?leased to direct that the portions of the said estate held by Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade, Daulatrao Malojirao Ghorpade and Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, respectively, shall henceforth be entered in the Revenue Records as de facto shares in the said estate held by the said persons as representatives, respectively of three branches of the Ghorpade family.\n\nEach of the said de facto shares shall be continuable hereditarily as such as if it were\n\n~ separate Saranjam estate in accordance with the rules made for the continuance of Saranjams by the Governor-in-Council in exercise of the powers referred to in the rules framed under the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act, 1852, and section 2(3) of the Bombay Summary Settlement Act (VII of 1863) and such special orders as the Governor-in-Council may make in regard to the Gajendragad Estate as a whole or in regard to the said share.\n\nThe recognition of the aforesaid shares and their entry in the Revenue Records separate shares shall not be deemed to amoua.t to a recognition of the estate of Gajendragad as in any manner partible or alienable and shall not in any way affect the right of_ Government to treat the said estate as an entire impartible and inalienable Saranjam estate.\n\n2. The Governor-in-Council further directs that the aforesaid shares shall in no case be capable of\n\nBhunjangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others.\n\nBose/.\n\nBhuniangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMa/o; irao\n\nDaulatrao and bthers.\n\nBose f.\n\nsub-division and shall not in any way be alienated or encumbered except m accordance with the rules and orders referred to above ... \"\n\nThe present suit 1s an attack on the action of Government in passing this Resolution.\n\nThe first and second defendants are the present representatives of the other branches of the family and the third defendant is the Province of Bombay (now the State of Bombay). The plaint states-\n\n\"9. Government can have no . jurisdiction to. deprive the plaintiff at any rate during his lifetime of the full benefit of all the rights and privileges apertaining to the holder of a Sarani am.\n\nThe Order of Government of the 8th February, 1936 is, therefore, ultr.a vires and in no way binding on the present plaintiff ..... .\n\n10. Defendants 1 and 2, therefore, are not entitled to any rights or privileges claimable by the holder of a Saranjam which according to the G. R. is continuable 'as an inalienable and . impartible Saranjam', such as for example in the matter of appointment of the village officers m any of the 27 villages appertaining to the Gajendragad Saranjam. -\n\n11. The cause of action aose in April 1938 and the resolution and the entry being ultra \"titres is not binding ...\n\n12. As this is a suit claiming for relief primarily against defendants I and 2, defendant 3 is made a party to the suit in order to enable Government (defendant 3) to give proper effect to the decision of Government of the 17th March, 1891, and of 7th June, 1932, as against defendants I and 2 who have no right to the position which they claim ... \"\n\nThe reliefs prayed for are- \" (a) That is be declared that defendants I and 2 have no right to go behind the order of the Government as per Resolution No. 8969 of 7th June, 1932, under which plaintiff is entitled to be recognised as the sole Saranjamdar in the Revenue Records, and that the assignments held by defendants 1 and 2 are held by them as mere potgi holders.\n\n....\n\n....\n\n. •.\n\n./ .\n\n........\n\n(b) That in consequence of his position of a sole Saranjamdar, the plaintiff alone at any rate during his lifetime has the sole right to the rights and privileges appertaining to the post of a sole Saranjamdar, to wit, to be consulted in the appointment of the village officers in all the villages appertaining to the Saranjam estate, but assigned to defendants 1 and 2 for potgi ..•\n\n( c) Defendants 1 and 2 be restrained from doing any acts or taking any steps in contravention of the aforesaid right of the plaintiff.\n\n(d) That it be declared that defendant 3 (Government) have no right to change the Resolution No. 8969 of 7th June, 1932, and at any rate during the lifetime of the plaintiff.\"\n\nThe first Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the merits holding that Government had the right to amend its Resolution in the way it did.\n\nThe lower appellate Court also dismissed the suit on three grounds: (1) that the two previous decisions of 1868 and 1908 operate as res iudicata, (2) .that the impugned Resolution 1s intra vires and (3) that section 4\n\n(a) and (d) of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act bars the jurisdiction of the Court.\n\nIn second appeal the High Court only considered the question of jurisdiction and, agreemg with the lower appellate Court on the point, dismissed the appeal but it granted the plaintiff leave to appeal to this Court.\n\nThe only question we have to consider is the one of jurisdiction. Section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (Bombay Act X of 1876), runs~\n\nSubject to the exceptions hereinafter appearing, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to-\n\n(a) . . . claims against the Crown relating to lands ... held as Saranjam ... \"\n\nIt was strenuously contended that this is not a claim against the Crown but one against the first and second defendants.\n\nThat, m my opinion, is an idle contention in view of paragraphs 9 and 12 of the plaint and reliefs (a) and (d). In any event, Mr. Somayya was asked whether he would strike out the third defendant 4-'--5 S.C. India/71\n\nBhuiangr111:1\n\nDaulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Other$\n\nBose /.\n\n~ Bhujangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalo; irao Daulatrao and Others.\n\nBose/.\n\nand those portions of the plaint which sought relief against it.\n\nHe said he was not prepared to do so. I cannot see how a plaintiff can insist on retaining a person against whom he claims no relief as a party. I am clear that this is a suit against the \"Crown\" within the meaning of section 4(a).\n\nThe next question is whether, assuming that to be the case, it ts also one \"relating to lands held as Saranjam.\" So far as the reliefs sought against Government are concerned, that . is clearly the case.\n\nParagraph 9 of the plaint challenges Government's jurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff of the full benefit of all rights and privileges appertaining to the holder of a Saranjam. These rights cannot exist apart from the lands which form part of the Saranjam estate and the implication of the prayer is that Government has, for example, no right to resume the Saranjam either under Rule V on the death of the last Saranjamdar or under Rule IX during his lifetime. It 1s to be observed that a resumption under Rule IX can only be of the land because the rule directs that when the Saranjam is resumed Government itself shall make provisions for the maintenance of those entitled to it \"out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed.\" These revenues can only come out of the land.\n\nRelief ( d) in the prayer clause seeks a declaration that Government has no right to change Resolution No. 8969 dated the 7th of June, 1932. That Resolution directly relates to the land because it directs that the Gajendragad Saranjam be resumed and the Collector is directed to take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saran jam estate etc.\n\nIt is impossible to contend that this is not a claim relating to lands held as Saranjam.\n\nIt was next argued that if that be tlte case the claim against Government can be dismissed and the plaintiff can at least be given the reliefs claimed against the other two defendants.\n\nThese, it was contended, do not relate to land and in any event are not claims against the \"Crown\".\n\n....\n\nIn my opinion, this is not a suit in which the rights claimed against the other defendants can be divorced from the claim against Government and considered separately. That is evident enough from paragraph 10\n\nof the plaint.\n\nIn paragraph 9 the power of Government to deprive the plaintiff of the rights he claims is challenged and in paragraph 10 of the plaintiff explains that \"therefore\" the first and second defendants are not entitled to any of the rights and privileges of the Saranjamdar. One of those rights, as we have seen from Rules VII and IX, is to take the revenues of the entire estate in order that he might fulfil his obligation regarding the payment of maintenance to certain members of the family; and if the dfendants claim to hold their lands under the orders of Government and the plaintiff insists on retaining Government as a party in order that it may be bound by the decree he wants against the other defendants it 1s obvious that his claim against these defendants cannot . be separated from his claim against the Government. • In any event, if the claim against Government is to be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders cannot be challenged and if the orders stand it 1s evident that the plaintiff can have no hope of success because both sides hold their respective properties on the basis of those orders.\n\nThere are two decisions of the Bombay High Court which have taken this view.\n\nBasalingappagouda v.\n\nThe Secretary of State for India(1) was a Watan case.\n\nGovernment had recognised the second defendant as the W atandar.\n\nPlaintiff sued Government and the second defendant and sought a declaration and injunction. On being faced with the dilemma that the suit against Government did not lie because of section 4\n\n(a) (3) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876, he asked the Court, as here, to leave the Government out of consideration and decree his claim against the second defendant alone.\n\nThe learned Judges held that that would amount to striking out the main relief sought against both the defendants and would entirely\n\n. (I) 28 Born. L.R. 651.\n\nBhujangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others.\n\nBose/.\n\nBhujangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others.\n\nBos< /.\n\nchange the character of the suit and added that \"as\n\nlo1,1g as the Secretary of State is a party to the suit, such a declarat:ton could not be granted.\"\n\nIn the other case, Basangauda v. The Secretary of State('), Beaumont C. J. and Baker J. took the same view.\n\nThey said- \"Mr. Gumaste, who appears for the appellant, says that his claim is not a claim against the Government but in that case he ought to strike out the Government.\n\nHe is not prepared to strike out the Government, because if he does they will not be bound by these proceedings and will follow the decision of their revenue tribunals. Therefore, he wants to make the Government a party in order tliat they may be bound. But, if they remain a party, it seems to me tha~ there is a claim against them relating to property appertaining to the office of an hereditary officer, although no doubt it is quite true that the appellant does not desire to get any order against the Government as to the way in which the pl'bperty should be dealt with or anything of the sort, and he only wants a declaration as to his title which will bind Government.\"\n\nThey held that the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted.\n\nIt was next contended, on the strength of a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reported in Province of Bombay v.\n\nHormusji Manekji( 2 ), that the courts have jurisdiction to decide whether Government acted in excess of its powers and that that question must be decided first.\n\nIn my opinion, this decision does not apply here.\n\nTheir Lordships were dealing with a case falling under section 4(b) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876.\n\nThat provides that- \". . . no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to ..... . *\n\n(b) objections to the amount o~ incidence of any assessment of land revenue authorised by the Provincial Government.\"\n\n(!) 32 Born. L.R. 1370.\n\n(2) 74 I.A. 103.\n\n. \"'lo..\n\n... ..\n\n> .\n\n..... -\n\n,...\n\nI 1 • F - ' ' As pointed out by Strangman K. C., on behalf of the plaintiff respondent, \"authorised\" must mean \"duly authorised,\" and in that particular case the impugned .assessment would not be duly authorised if the Government Resolution of 11-4-1930 purporting to treat the .agreement relied on by the respondent as cancelled and authorising the levy of the full assessment was ultra vires under section 211 of the Land Revenue Code.\n\nThus, before the exclusion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction under section 4(b) could come into play, the Court had to determine the issue of ultra vires. Consequently, their Lordships held that that question was outside the scope of the bar.\n\nBut the position here is different.\n\nWe are concerned here with section 4(a) and under that no question about an authorised act of Government arise5.\n\nThe section is general and bars all \"claims .against the Crown relating to lands.... held as Saranjam.\" That is to say, even if the Government's act in relation to such lands was ultra vires, a claim impugning the validity of such an act would fall within the scope of the exclusion in clause (a) provided it relates to such land.\n\nThere is a difference of opinion in the Bombay High Court as to whether section 4 is attracted if the only relief sought against Government is a declaration.\n\nOne set of decisions holds that that does not amount \"to a \"claim against Government.\" Dattatraya Vishwanath v. The Secretary of State for lndia(1) is typical Of that view.\n\nOn the other hand, Daulatrao v. Government of Bombay(2), a case relating to the Gajendragad estate, took the oter view.\n\nIn my opinion, the latter view is correct.\n\nIn my opinion, the decision of the High Court was :right and I would dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI C. J.--:J agree . .S. R. DAs J.-I agree.\n\nAppeal dismissed Agent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for respondents Nos. 1 & 2 : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 3 : P. A. Mehta.\n\n(I) I.L.R. 1948 B°.m. 809 at 820.\n\n(2) 47 Born. L.R. 214.\n\nBhujangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others.\n\nBose/ .", "total_entities": 105, "entities": [{"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 660, "end_char": 671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "SHRIMANT SARDAR\n\nBHUJANGARAO\n\nDAULATRAO GHORPADE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 674, "end_char": 722, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRIMANT SARDAR BHUJANGARAO DAULATRAO GHORPADE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRIMANT\n\nMALOJIRAO\n\nDA ULA TRAO\n\nGHORPADE AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 724, "end_char": 777, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRIMANT MALOJIRAO DAULATRAO GHORPADE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 805, "end_char": 808, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 813, "end_char": 828, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 830, "end_char": 861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 875, "end_char": 882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "statute": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3195, "end_char": 3201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3209, "end_char": 3246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3981, "end_char": 3986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.R. 651)\n\nState (32 Born."}}, {"text": "Hormusji Maneklal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4008, "end_char": 4025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.R. 1370) Hormusji Maneklal (74 I.A.\nll eld also, that sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4056, "end_char": 4062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4439, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay (Bhagwati and Dixit JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4461, "end_char": 4469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay (Bhagwati and Dixit JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay (Bhagwati and Dixit JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bhunjangrao Daulatrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4653, "end_char": 4674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of\n\nBhunjangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others.", "canonical_name": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Malojirao Daulatrao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4679, "end_char": 4698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of\n\nBhunjangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others."}}, {"text": "B. Somayya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4842, "end_char": 4852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "arguments of the counsel appear iil\n\nB. Somayya and Sanjiva Rao Naidu (N. C. Shaw, with them) for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "B. Somayya"}}, {"text": "Sanjiva Rao Naidu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4857, "end_char": 4874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "arguments of the counsel appear iil\n\nB. Somayya and Sanjiva Rao Naidu (N. C. Shaw, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. C. Shaw", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4876, "end_char": 4886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "arguments of the counsel appear iil\n\nB. Somayya and Sanjiva Rao Naidu (N. C. Shaw, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4919, "end_char": 4933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (V. N. Lokur, with him) for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "V. N. Lokur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 4975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (V. N. Lokur, with him) for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5067, "end_char": 5079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-Genaal for India, ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "BQse", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5175, "end_char": 5179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January BosE J .. PATANJALI with BQse J.\n\n30."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5573, "end_char": 5588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first and second defendants are members of the plaintiff's family while the third defendant is the State of Bombay (Province of Bombay at the date of the suit) •\n\n."}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5690, "end_char": 5702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Act X of 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5706, "end_char": 5726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5728, "end_char": 5759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Daulatrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following genealogical tree will show the relationship between the parties :\n\nBhujangrao Appasaheb (British Grantee)\n\nI Daulatrao I (died 24-7-1864) r--------- 1 Bhujangfao 1 (died 1881)\n\n(widow) Krishnabai Daulatrao II (died 8-5-1931) .", "canonical_name": "Daulatrao II"}}, {"text": "Bhl\\langrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Bhl\\langrao III\n\n(Plaintiff)\n\nI Mal.ojirao\n\nI Daulatrao III (Def."}}, {"text": "Mal.ojirao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6040, "end_char": 6050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Bhl\\langrao III\n\n(Plaintiff)\n\nI Mal.ojirao\n\nI Daulatrao III (Def.", "canonical_name": "Mal.ojirao"}}, {"text": "Daulatrao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6054, "end_char": 6063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Bhl\\langrao III\n\n(Plaintiff)\n\nI Mal.ojirao\n\nI Daulatrao III (Def.", "canonical_name": "Daulatrao II"}}, {"text": "Yeshwantrao alias Annasaheb", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6087, "end_char": 6114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Yeshwantrao alias Annasaheb\n\n."}}, {"text": "Bhuiangrao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Bhuiangrao II (Def.", "canonical_name": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XI of 1852", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6531, "end_char": 6552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhujangrao Appasaheb", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7247, "end_char": 7267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhujangrao Appasaheb, the first British Grantee, son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade.\"", "canonical_name": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Bahirojirao Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7303, "end_char": 7323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhujangrao Appasaheb, the first British Grantee, son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade.\""}}, {"text": "Daulatrao I", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7414, "end_char": 7425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of the British Grantee (Bhujangrao Appasaheb) he was succeeded by his son Daulatrao I who died on the 24th of July, 1864.", "canonical_name": "Daulatrao II"}}, {"text": "24th of July, 1864", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7442, "end_char": 7460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of the British Grantee (Bhujangrao Appasaheb) he was succeeded by his son Daulatrao I who died on the 24th of July, 1864."}}, {"text": "Bhujangrao I", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7496, "end_char": 7508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Daulatrao I left three sons, Bhujangrao I, Y eshwantrao and Malojirao.", "canonical_name": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Y eshwantrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7510, "end_char": 7522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Daulatrao I left three sons, Bhujangrao I, Y eshwantrao and Malojirao.", "canonical_name": "Y eshwantrao"}}, {"text": "Malojirao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7527, "end_char": 7536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Daulatrao I left three sons, Bhujangrao I, Y eshwantrao and Malojirao.", "canonical_name": "Mal.ojirao"}}, {"text": "Annasaheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7604, "end_char": 7613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1866 Bhujangrao I and his brother Y eshwantrao alia1 Annasaheb sued Malojirao for possession -0£ this Saranjam."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7711, "end_char": 7728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A question of impartibility was raised but the Bombay High Court declared that the ' property in British India was partible."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7761, "end_char": 7774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A question of impartibility was raised but the Bombay High Court declared that the ' property in British India was partible."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8162, "end_char": 8167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They further declared that Bhujangrao I was the head of the familv and as such was entitled to a special assignment which was not to exceed a quarter share, for the expenses and duties which might devolve on him by virtue of his position, and that after this had been set aside each of the three brothers was entitled to an equal one-third share in the landed property in India."}}, {"text": "12th of October, 1868", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8717, "end_char": 8738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment is dated the 12th of October, 1868."}}, {"text": "Kolhapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9060, "end_char": 9068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The parties also had property in the State of Kolhapur."}}, {"text": "Bhujangrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9097, "end_char": 9107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhujangrao I died in 1881 and his younger brother Y eshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) claimed to succeed as the sole heir.", "canonical_name": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Krishnabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9334, "end_char": 9344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Political Department of the Government of India refused to recognise this claim and permitted Bhujangrao I's widow Krishnabai to ."}}, {"text": "3rd of\n\n....\n\nFebruary, 1882", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9515, "end_char": 9543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was on the 3rd of\n\n....\n\nFebruary, 1882. ...."}}, {"text": "Bombay Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9555, "end_char": 9572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay Government followed a similar course regarding the property in British India."}}, {"text": "26th of April, 1882", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9648, "end_char": 9667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th of April, 1882, they passed a Resolution embodying the following decision : ( 1) The adoption was to be recognised and the adopted son was to occupy the same position as his adoptive father, that is to say, he was to get one-third of tle property plus the assignment given to him as head of the family."}}, {"text": "Malojirao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9961, "end_char": 9970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Malojirao who had already taken his share of the estate was to continue in possession. (", "canonical_name": "Mal.ojirao"}}, {"text": "Yeshwantrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10052, "end_char": 10063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3) Yeshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) was given the option of remaining joint with the adopted boy or separating.", "canonical_name": "Y eshwantrao"}}, {"text": "22nd August, 1882", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10757, "end_char": 10774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position was emphasised by Government in the same year on the 22nd August, 1882."}}, {"text": "Daulatrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10833, "end_char": 10842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishnabai, who had been allowed by Government to adopt Daulatrao II, asked that her husband's one-third share in the estate be also treated as private property in the same way as the shares of the other two brothers.", "canonical_name": "Daulatrao II"}}, {"text": "17th of March, 1891", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11600, "end_char": 11619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position was re-examined by Government in 1891 and its decision was embodied in the following resolution dated the 17th of March, 1891 :\n\n\"It appears to Government that the whole Gajendragad Estate is a Saranjam continuable as hereditary in the fullest sense of the word as interpreted by the Court of Directors in paragraph 9 of their Despatch No."}}, {"text": "12th' December, 1855", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11843, "end_char": 11863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27 dated 12th' December, 1855."}}, {"text": "Bhunjangrao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12240, "end_char": 12251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bos~/.\n\nBhunjangrao\n\nD11Hl111rao\n\nJ4R/ojirll0 DRHlatrao \"'ml Others.", "canonical_name": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "12th of March, 1908", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12702, "end_char": 12721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court's judgment dated the 12th of March, 1908,\n\nmakes it clear that as Government was not a party to that litigation its rights against either or both of the parties were not affected."}}, {"text": "5th of May, 1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14036, "end_char": 14052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, on the 5th of May, 1898, a set of Rules framed under Schedule B, Rule 10, of the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act of 1852 were drawn up and published in the Bombay Gazette."}}, {"text": "8th July,\n\n1901", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14280, "end_char": 14295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These Rules were republished, probably with some modification, in the Gazette of 8th July,\n\n1901."}}, {"text": "20th of May, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15992, "end_char": 16009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the District Deputy Collector's orders were passed on the 20th of May, 1930, Daulatrao II died on the 8t11 of May, 1931, and the matter was again taken up by Government."}}, {"text": "Daulatrao II", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16011, "end_char": 16023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the District Deputy Collector's orders were passed on the 20th of May, 1930, Daulatrao II died on the 8t11 of May, 1931, and the matter was again taken up by Government.", "canonical_name": "Daulatrao II"}}, {"text": "8t11 of May, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16036, "end_char": 16053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the District Deputy Collector's orders were passed on the 20th of May, 1930, Daulatrao II died on the 8t11 of May, 1931, and the matter was again taken up by Government."}}, {"text": "Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16583, "end_char": 16612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads-\n\n\"Resolution :-The Governor-in-Council 1s pleased to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be formally resumed and regranted to Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade eldest son of the deceased Saranjamdar Sardar Daulatrao Bhujangrao Ghorpade and that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from the date of the death of the last holder.", "canonical_name": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Dharwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16772, "end_char": 16779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads-\n\n\"Resolution :-The Governor-in-Council 1s pleased to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be formally resumed and regranted to Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade eldest son of the deceased Saranjamdar Sardar Daulatrao Bhujangrao Ghorpade and that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from the date of the death of the last holder."}}, {"text": "Saranjamdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16884, "end_char": 16895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector should take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saranjam estate which were in possession of the deceased Saranjamdar."}}, {"text": "25th of February, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18214, "end_char": 18236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th of February, 1936, Government passed the following Resolution:-\n\n\"Resolution:-After careful consideration the Governor-in-Council 1s pleased to confirm the decision in Government Resolution (Political Department) No."}}, {"text": "June, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18886, "end_char": 18896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8%9 dated the 7th June, 1932, is ?"}}, {"text": "Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18964, "end_char": 19000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "leased to direct that the portions of the said estate held by Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade, Daulatrao Malojirao Ghorpade and Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, respectively, shall henceforth be entered in the Revenue Records as de facto shares in the said estate held by the said persons as representatives, respectively of three branches of the Ghorpade family."}}, {"text": "Daulatrao Malojirao Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19002, "end_char": 19030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "leased to direct that the portions of the said estate held by Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade, Daulatrao Malojirao Ghorpade and Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, respectively, shall henceforth be entered in the Revenue Records as de facto shares in the said estate held by the said persons as representatives, respectively of three branches of the Ghorpade family."}}, {"text": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19035, "end_char": 19066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "leased to direct that the portions of the said estate held by Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade, Daulatrao Malojirao Ghorpade and Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, respectively, shall henceforth be entered in the Revenue Records as de facto shares in the said estate held by the said persons as representatives, respectively of three branches of the Ghorpade family.", "canonical_name": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19591, "end_char": 19603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19955, "end_char": 19966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The recognition of the aforesaid shares and their entry in the Revenue Records separate shares shall not be deemed to amoua.t to a recognition of the estate of Gajendragad as in any manner partible or alienable and shall not in any way affect the right of_ Government to treat the said estate as an entire impartible and inalienable Saranjam estate.", "canonical_name": "Gajendragad Saranjam"}}, {"text": "Governor-in-Council", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20153, "end_char": 20172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governor-in-Council further directs that the aforesaid shares shall in no case be capable of\n\nBhunjangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others."}}, {"text": "8th February, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21031, "end_char": 21049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of Government of the 8th February, 1936 is, therefore, ultr.a vires and in no way binding on the present plaintiff ..... ."}}, {"text": "Gajendragad Saranjam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21461, "end_char": 21481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "impartible Saranjam', such as for example in the matter of appointment of the village officers m any of the 27 villages appertaining to the Gajendragad Saranjam. -", "canonical_name": "Gajendragad Saranjam"}}, {"text": "7th June, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22986, "end_char": 23000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8969 of 7th June, 1932, and at any rate during the lifetime of the plaintiff.\""}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23410, "end_char": 23419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23785, "end_char": 23794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23802, "end_char": 23839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay Act X of 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23841, "end_char": 23861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Somayya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24304, "end_char": 24311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event, Mr. Somayya was asked whether he would strike out the third defendant 4-'--5 S.C. India/71\n\nBhuiangr111:1\n\nDaulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Other$\n\nBose /.\n\n~ Bhujangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalo; irao Daulatrao and Others.", "canonical_name": "B. Somayya"}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24815, "end_char": 24827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act X of 1876", "statute": "Bombay Act X of 1876"}}, {"text": "7th of June, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25937, "end_char": 25954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8969 dated the 7th of June, 1932."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28325, "end_char": 28334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28351, "end_char": 28382, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Baker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29050, "end_char": 29055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the other case, Basangauda v. The Secretary of State('), Beaumont C. J. and Baker J. took the same view."}}, {"text": "Gumaste", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29096, "end_char": 29103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They said- \"Mr. Gumaste, who appears for the appellant, says that his claim is not a claim against the Government but in that case he ought to strike out the Government."}}, {"text": "section 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30392, "end_char": 30404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30412, "end_char": 30443, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Strangman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30773, "end_char": 30782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..... -\n\n,...\n\nI 1 • F - ' ' As pointed out by Strangman K. C., on behalf of the plaintiff respondent, \"authorised\" must mean \"duly authorised,\" and in that particular case the impugned .assessment would not be duly authorised if the Government Resolution of 11-4-1930 purporting to treat the .agreement relied on by the respondent as cancelled and authorising the levy of the full assessment was ultra vires under section 211 of the Land Revenue Code."}}, {"text": "section 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31141, "end_char": 31152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31247, "end_char": 31259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31488, "end_char": 31500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31979, "end_char": 31988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32506, "end_char": 32522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI C. J.--:J agree .", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastri"}}, {"text": ".S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32541, "end_char": 32551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".S. R. DAs J.-I agree."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32608, "end_char": 32618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed Agent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32656, "end_char": 32671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 & 2 : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "Bhujangrao Daulatrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32776, "end_char": 32796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhujangrao Daulatrao v.\n\nMalojirao Daulatrao and Others.", "canonical_name": "Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_418_424_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Feb. 1.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nW. H. KING v.\n\nREPUBLIC OF INDIA AND ANOTHER.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.,\n\nMEHR CHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.] Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Rates Control Act (LVII of 1947), s. 19-Tenant handing over possession to third person receiving \"pugrec\"-W hether constitutes urelinquishment\" -Difference between assignment and relinquishment-Construction of penal siatutes.\n\nSub-section (1) of sec. 19 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, LVJI of 1947, provided that \"it shall not be lawful for the tenant or any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the tenant to claim or receive any sum. or any consideration as a condition for the relinquishment of his tenancy of any premises\"; a.nd sub-sec.\n\n(2) provided that\" any tenant or person who in contravention of the provisions of subsec. (1) receives any sum or consideration shall on conviction be punished with imprisonment and also with fine.\n\nA, who was a tenant of a fiat, handed over vacant possession. of the fiat to B on receiving \"pugree\", under a document which recited that A shall have no claim whatever over the flat and that B shall pay the rent directly to the landlord. A was convicted of an offence under sec. 19(2).\n\nHeld, that there was no \"relinquishment\" of his tenancy by A, within the n1eaning of sec. 19(1) and the conviction could not be sustained.\n\nThere is a clear distinction bet\\veen an assignment of a tenancy on the one hand and a relinquishment or surrender on the other.\n\n-·\n\nIn the case of an assignment, the assignor cntinues to be liable .. to the landlord for the performance of his obligations under the tenancy and this liability is contractual, \\vhile the assignee becomes liable by reason of privity of estate.\n\nThe consent of the landlord to an assignment is not necessary, in the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary.\n\nBut in the case of relinquishment it c<:1nnot be a unilateral transaction; it can only be in favour of the lessor by mutual agreement between them.\n\nRel~ .. > inquishment of possession must be to the lessor or one who holds his interest; and surrender or relinquishment terminates the lessee's rights and lets in the lessor.\n\nAs sec. 19 of Bombay Act LVJI of 1947 creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. The Court is not concerned so much with what might possibly have been intended as with what has been actually said in and by the language employed in the statute. \"'\"\n\nJudgment of the Bombay High Court reversed.\n\n'>- _ _,\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 1951.\n\nAppeal from an Order of the High Court of Bombay (Bavdekar and Chainani JJ.) dated 20th February, 1950, in Criminal Appeal No. 106 of i950 arising out of an order dated 9th January, 1950, of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, in Case No. 10879/P of 1949.\n\nThe facts are stated m the judgment.\n\nlswarlal C. Dalal and R. B. Dalal, for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General f<>r India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the Republic of India (respondent No. 1).\n\n~ Jindra Lal for the respondent No. 2.\n\n1952. February 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR J.-The facts our of which this Criminal Appeal has arisen are not long.\n\nThe appellant, W. H. King, who is carrying on a business in Bombay under the name and style of Associated Commercial Enterprises, was the tenant of a Bat on the second Boor of a building called \"Ganga Vihar\", Marine Drive, Bombay, which belongs to a lady named Durgeshwari Devi. The tenancy was a monthly one, the rent being Rs. 215.\n\nIt is said that the appellant wanted to go to the United Kingdom for treatment of his failing eye-sight and he gon into touch with the complainant Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia, who is the second respondent in this appeal, through one Sayed for the purpose of making necessary arrangements about the Bat occupied by him in view of his intended departure. The prosecution case is that the accused demanded a sum of Rs. 30,000 which was later on reduced to Rs. 29,500 as consideration for putting the complainant in vacant possession of the Bat and an additional amount of Rs. 2,000 for the furniture, and that the complainant agreed to pay these sums.\n\nThe complainant actually paid the accused two sums of\n\nW. H. King\n\nRepublic of India\n\nand Another.\n\nW. H. King v.\n\nRepublic of India\n\nand Another.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar ].\n\n}' I ' ! ' I [1?521\n\nRs. 500 each on 7th November, 1948, and 17th November, 1948.\n\nHe, however, got into touch with the police on 1-12-1948, and in conjunction with the latter, a trap was laid for the appellant. It was arranged that the complainant should bring with him Rs. 1,000, being the balance due in res.pect of the furniture and tbat the police would give him Rs. 29,500 to be paid to the appellant.\n\nThe complainai'it and a Sub-Inspector, posing as the complainant's brother, went to the appellant on 4-12-1948, and paid him the two sums of money; and the keys of the flat and the motor garage were handed over to the complainant.\n\nAs the appellant and his wife were leaving the flar, the man, who masqueraded as the . complainant's brother; threw off his disguise and' disclosed his identity.· The police party, who were down below ready for tht 1 raid, held up the car of the appellant and recovered the sum of Rs. 30,500 from the rear seat of the car and also some papers,· a typed draft of a partnership agreement between the complainant and the appellant and an application form for permission to occupy the building as caretaker. ·\"From the complainant were recovered the bunch of keys and the documents that were handed over to him by the appellant, namely, the ktter handing vacant possession ·(Exhibit D), the receipt for \"'Rs.' 2,000 for the articles : of furniture (Exhibit E), a letter to the Bombay Gas Company for transfer of the gas' connection to. the name cif the complainant (Exhibit• F); and the ktter to the Bombay Electric Supply' and Transport Committee for transfer of the ' telephone connections' and the deposit of Rs. 27 (Exhibit G). . ..\n\n' . ..\n\nJ l The appellant was charged under section 18(1) of the• Bombay Rents;· Hotel i:ind Lodgmg House Rates 'Cbntrol Act, •LVII of 1947, for receiving a pugret: of 1Rs. •29,500 :ind' he was further- charged under section 19(2) ofthe\" said Act for receiving' the said sum ., • as a condition for the relinquishment of his tenancy. •His wife; who was the second accused in the 'case, was' char#d .. with . aiding . and ' abetting her husband in the:'l:ommission of the two offencci.\n\n... .\n\nThe defence of the appellant was that he was in search of a partner to carry on his business during his intended absence, who was also to act as caretaker of his flat and that it was in this connection and with this object in view that he entered into negotiations with the complainant. The sum of Rs. 29,500 was not pugree but represented capital for 0-12-0 share in the business and as the complainant was also to be a caretaker of the flat, the sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid arid received as a guarantee against disposal and damage of the furniture and it was agreed to be paid back on the appellant's return to India.\n\nThe wife of the appellant denied any aiding and abetting.\n\nThe Presidern:y Magistrate, who tried the case, disbelieved the defence on the facts, holding that what .,.., was received by the accused was by way of pugru.\n\nAs section 18(1) of the ct was not applicable he convicted him under section 19(2) of the Act and sentenced him, in view of his old age and blindness, to one day's simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 30,000. The wife was acquitted, the evidence being insufficient to prove any abetment.\n\nThe appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court of Bombay but it was summarily dismissed on 20-2-1950.\n\nHe asked for a certificate under :article 134(1) (c) of the Constitution but this was rejected on 10-4-1950.\n\nThereafter he applied for special: leave to appeal to this Court and it was grant- •ed on 3-10-1950.\n\nA short legal argument was advanced on behalf of the appellant based on the language of section 19(1) of the Act and this is the only point which requires our cons5deration.\n\nThe section which consists of two parts is in these terms :-\n\n\" (l) It shall not be •lawful for the tenant or any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the tenant to claim or receive any ., sum 6r any consideration as a condition for the relinquishment of his tenancy of any premises; . '\n\nW. H. King v.\n\nRepublic of India\n\nand Another.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nW. H. King v.\n\nRepublic of India\n\nand Another.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar ].\n\n(2) Any tenant or person who in contravention of the provisions of sub-section\n\n(1) receives any sum or consideration shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months and shall also be punished with fine which shall not be less than the sum or the value of the consideration received by him.\"\n\nIt was urged that the offence arises only on receipt of any sum or any consideration as a condition of the relinquishment by a tenant of his tenancy and that in the present case there was no such relinquishment ..\n\nExhibit D, which is the most material document,. under which the appellant handed over vacant possession of the flat to the complainant, constitutes or evidences an assignment of the tenancy and not a relinquishment. It says:-\n\n\"I, W. H. King, hereby ha11d over vacant possession of my flat No. 3 situated on 2nd floor and garage No. 4 on the ground floor of Ganga Vihar Building on Plot No. 55 situated on Marine Drive Road to Mr.\n\nMulchand Kodumal Bhatia from this day onward and' that I have no claim whatsoever over this flat and Mr.\n\nMulchand Kodumal Bhatia will pay the rent directly to the landlord.\"\n\nThe argument raised on behalf of the appellant appeaIIS to us to be sound and has to be accepted~ The learned Solicitor-General urged that the word \"relinquishment\" was not a term of art and was used in the section not 111 any strict technicar sense but in its comprehensive meaning as giving up of possession of the premises; and he pointed\" out that if it was intended by the legislature that \"relinquishment\" should have 'the limited meaning sought to be placed upon it on behalf of the appellant, the word \"surrender\" used in , the Transfer of Property Act would have been more appropriate, Sections 15 and 18 of the Act were referred to in this connection but in our opinion they lend no assistance to the argument of the learned counsel. Any subletting, assignment or transfer in any other manner of his\n\ninterest by the tenant is made unlawful under\n\n. .\n\n,. .\n\nsection 15.\n\nSection 18 deals with the grant, renewal 1952 or continuance of a lease of any premises or the giving\n\nW H K' of his consent by the landlord to the transfer of a lease • v mg. by sub-lease or otherwise, and it provides that the . Republic~! India landlord, who receives any fine, premium, or other and Another. like sum or deposit, or any consideration for the grant, renewal or continuance or the accord of consent Chandrast:khara would be guilty of an offence and liable to the punish- Aiyar ]. meI\\t therein specified.\n\nIt would thus be seen that an assignment of the lease or transfer in any other manner by a tenant is not made an offence; the statute merely says that it is not a lawful transaction. It is the landlord's consent to the transfer of a lease by sub-lease or otherwise on receipt of consideration that has been made an offence. Then follows section 19 which speaks of the relinquishment of his tenancy of any premises by a tenant. If, by the expression, an aSJSignment such as we have in the present case was meant, appropriate words could have been used, such as the transfer by a tenant of his interest, which we find in section 108, sub-clause (j), of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nThe distinction between an assignment on the one hand and relinquishment or surrender on the other is too plain to be ignored.\n\nIn the ce of an assignment, the assignor .continues to be liable to the landlord for the performance of his obligations under the tenancy and this liability is contractual, while the assignee becomes liable by reason of privity of estate. The consent of the landlord to an assignment is not necessary, in the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary.\n\nBut in the case of relinquishment, it cannot be a unilateral transaction; it can only be in favour of the lessor by mutual agreement b_etween them.\n\nThe relinquishment of possession must be to the lessor or one who holds his interest.\n\nIn fact, a surrender or relinquishment terminates the lessee's rights and lets in the lessor.\n\nIt is no doubt true that the word \"relinquishment\" does not occur in the Transfer of Property Act but it is found in many of the Tenancy Acts in various provinces were there are sections which deal with the\n\nW .. H. King v. !Republic of India and Another. •\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nSUJ>REME COURT REPORTS\n\n. ~- 1.. t f • :\n\n' J [1952]\n\nrelinquishment of their holdings by tenants in favour of the landlord by notice given to him in writing. The sectiOn' in'' question, it should .be further noted,. does hot peak of relinquishment or giving up of 'possession, in general terms.\n\nThe words are \"the relinquishment 'of his tenancy of any premises\". The relinquishment 'of a tenancy is -equivalent to surrender by' the lessee or teriant of his rights as such. Whether abandonment of a' tenancy would come within the meaning of relinquishment i~ a question that does not arise in this appeal, because in the face of Exhibit D, there is no abandonment' in the sense that 'the tenant dis:ippeafed from the scene altogether saying 'nothing and making no arrangements about his interest and 'possession under the lease~\n\nAs the statute creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section must be stictly construed in favour of the subject.\n\nWe' are not concerned so much with what might possibly have been intended as with what has been actually said m and by the langliage employed.\n\nAs in our view, there has been no \"relinquishment\" within the meaning of section 19, sub-clause {l),' the conviction under sub-clause (2) cannot be sustained.\n\nIt is set aside and the fine of .Rs. 30,000 will be refiinded if it has already been paid. The other parts of the order 'of the learned Presidency Magistrate, as 'regards the 'disposal of Rs. 1,000 , Paid by the complainant to t; he appellant and the sum of Rs. 29,500. brought in by the police, will, however, stand.\n\n~ , . ' . '\n\nConviction set aside.\n\n' Agent for the appellant: P. K. C hatteriee. ,, _, • Agent for respondent No .. 1: P.A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 2: Ganpat Rai.\n\n't' ot ' ·• ., . ., ~·\n\n' .\n\n• •", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "W. H. KING", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "W. H. KING", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 193, "end_char": 228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 245, "end_char": 250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 457, "end_char": 464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 486, "end_char": 527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1370, "end_char": 1380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2257, "end_char": 2264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2621, "end_char": 2638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Bombay High Court reversed."}}, {"text": "Bavdekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2778, "end_char": 2786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from an Order of the High Court of Bombay (Bavdekar and Chainani JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Chainani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2791, "end_char": 2799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from an Order of the High Court of Bombay (Bavdekar and Chainani JJ.)"}}, {"text": "lswarlal C. Dalal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3045, "end_char": 3062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lswarlal C. Dalal and R. B. Dalal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. B. Dalal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3067, "end_char": 3078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lswarlal C. Dalal and R. B. Dalal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3100, "end_char": 3114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General f<>r India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the Republic of India (respondent No."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3146, "end_char": 3158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General f<>r India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the Republic of India (respondent No."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3219, "end_char": 3229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ Jindra Lal for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3319, "end_char": 3340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR J.-The facts our of which this Criminal Appeal has arisen are not long.", "canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "W. H. King", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3429, "end_char": 3439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, W. H. King, who is carrying on a business in Bombay under the name and style of Associated Commercial Enterprises, was the tenant of a Bat on the second Boor of a building called \"Ganga Vihar\", Marine Drive, Bombay, which belongs to a lady named Durgeshwari Devi.", "canonical_name": "W. H. KING"}}, {"text": "Durgeshwari Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3675, "end_char": 3691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, W. H. King, who is carrying on a business in Bombay under the name and style of Associated Commercial Enterprises, was the tenant of a Bat on the second Boor of a building called \"Ganga Vihar\", Marine Drive, Bombay, which belongs to a lady named Durgeshwari Devi."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3799, "end_char": 3813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that the appellant wanted to go to the United Kingdom for treatment of his failing eye-sight and he gon into touch with the complainant Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia, who is the second respondent in this appeal, through one Sayed for the purpose of making necessary arrangements about the Bat occupied by him in view of his intended departure."}}, {"text": "Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3896, "end_char": 3919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that the appellant wanted to go to the United Kingdom for treatment of his failing eye-sight and he gon into touch with the complainant Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia, who is the second respondent in this appeal, through one Sayed for the purpose of making necessary arrangements about the Bat occupied by him in view of his intended departure.", "canonical_name": "Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia"}}, {"text": "Sayed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3978, "end_char": 3983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that the appellant wanted to go to the United Kingdom for treatment of his failing eye-sight and he gon into touch with the complainant Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia, who is the second respondent in this appeal, through one Sayed for the purpose of making necessary arrangements about the Bat occupied by him in view of his intended departure."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyar ].", "canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "1-12-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4699, "end_char": 4708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, however, got into touch with the police on 1-12-1948, and in conjunction with the latter, a trap was laid for the appellant."}}, {"text": "4-12-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complainai'it and a Sub-Inspector, posing as the complainant's brother, went to the appellant on 4-12-1948, and paid him the two sums of money; and the keys of the flat and the motor garage were handed over to the complainant."}}, {"text": "Bombay Gas Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5983, "end_char": 6001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000 for the articles : of furniture (Exhibit E), a letter to the Bombay Gas Company for transfer of the gas' connection to."}}, {"text": "Bombay Electric Supply' and Transport Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6106, "end_char": 6153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the name cif the complainant (Exhibit• F); and the ktter to the Bombay Electric Supply' and Transport Committee for transfer of the ' telephone connections' and the deposit of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6288, "end_char": 6301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6461, "end_char": 6474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7348, "end_char": 7353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000 was paid arid received as a guarantee against disposal and damage of the furniture and it was agreed to be paid back on the appellant's return to India."}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7578, "end_char": 7591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7644, "end_char": 7657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7906, "end_char": 7926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court of Bombay but it was summarily dismissed on 20-2-1950."}}, {"text": "20-2-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7961, "end_char": 7970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court of Bombay but it was summarily dismissed on 20-2-1950."}}, {"text": "article 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8007, "end_char": 8021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10-4-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8071, "end_char": 8080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He asked for a certificate under :article 134(1) (c) of the Constitution but this was rejected on 10-4-1950."}}, {"text": "3-10-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8173, "end_char": 8182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter he applied for special: leave to appeal to this Court and it was grant- •ed on 3-10-1950."}}, {"text": "section 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8273, "end_char": 8286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Republic of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8749, "end_char": 8766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyar /.\n\nW. H. King v.\n\nRepublic of India\n\nand Another.", "canonical_name": "REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "W. H. King", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9592, "end_char": 9602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It says:-\n\n\"I, W. H. King, hereby ha11d over vacant possession of my flat No.", "canonical_name": "W. H. KING"}}, {"text": "Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9793, "end_char": 9816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "55 situated on Marine Drive Road to Mr.\n\nMulchand Kodumal Bhatia from this day onward and' that I have no claim whatsoever over this flat and Mr.\n\nMulchand Kodumal Bhatia will pay the rent directly to the landlord.\"", "canonical_name": "Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10505, "end_char": 10529, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 15 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10564, "end_char": 10582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10838, "end_char": 10848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10851, "end_char": 10861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrast:khara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11267, "end_char": 11282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "like sum or deposit, or any consideration for the grant, renewal or continuance or the accord of consent Chandrast:khara would be guilty of an offence and liable to the punish- Aiyar ].", "canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11711, "end_char": 11721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11993, "end_char": 12004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12029, "end_char": 12053, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12952, "end_char": 12976, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13138, "end_char": 13158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nSUJ>REME COURT REPORTS\n\n.", "canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14371, "end_char": 14381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. K. C hatteriee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14840, "end_char": 14857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Agent for the appellant: P. K. C hatteriee. ,, _, •"}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14897, "end_char": 14907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondent No .. 1: P.A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14938, "end_char": 14948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2: Ganpat Rai."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_425_435_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "' '\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 425\n\nBATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS. [PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, Muui:ERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.]\n\nContempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 2(3)-lndian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), s. 499-Contempt of subordinate Court-/urisdiction of High Court to take cognisance-Contempt punishable as defamation under Penal Code-Whether iurisdiction ousted-Scope and object of Contempt of Courts Act.\n\nSub-sec. (3) of section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe fact that defamation of a judge of a subordinate Court constitutes an offence under sec. 499 of the Indian Penal Code does 11ot, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance of the act as a contempt of court.\n\nDefamatory statements about the conduct of a judge even in respect of his judicial duties do not necessarily constitute contempt of Court.\n\nIt is only when the defamation is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of justice that it amounts to contempt.\n\nKisan Krishna /i v. Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent de Paul (A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 334) disapproved.\n\nV. M. Bason v.\n\nA. H. Skone (LL.R. 53 Cal. 401) explained. Subordinate fudge, First\n\nClass Hoshangabad v. /awaharlal (A.LR. 1940 Nag. 407)> Narayan Chandra v. Panchu Pramanick (A.LR. 1935 Cal. 684), Naresh Kumar\n\nv. Umaromal (A.LR. 1951 Cal. 489), Kaulashia v. Emperor (I.L.R. 12 Pat. 1), State v.\n\nBrahma Prakash (A.I.R. 1950 All. 556), Emperor v. /agannath (A.LR. 1938 All. 358), Bennet Colman v.\n\nC. S. Monga (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34) approved.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JurusDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1951.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and and Balakrishna Ayyar J.) dated 10th April, 1950, in Contempt Application No. IO of 1949.\n\nFeb. 14.\n\nBathina Ramakrishna Reddy v.\n\nThe State of Madras.\n\nMukheriea /.\n\nS. P. Sinha ( S. S. Prakasam, with him), for the appellant.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondent. 1952.\n\nFebruary\n\n14. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKIIERJEA J.-This appeal has come up before us on special leave granted by this court on May 23, 1950, and it is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated April 1(}, 1950, by which the learned Judges found the appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to serve simple imprisonment .for three months.\n\nThe appellant is the publisher and managing editor of a Telugu Weekly known as \"Praja. Rajyam\" which is edited and published at Nellore in the State of Madras. In the issue of the said paper dated 10th February, 1949, an article appeared under the caption \"Is the Sub-Magistrate, Kovvur, corrupt?\" The purport of the article was that Surya Narayan Murthi, the stationary Sub-Magistrate of Kovvur, was known to the people of the locality to be a bribe taker and to be in the habit of harassing litigants in various ways.\n\nHe was said to have a broker, through whom negotiations in connection with these corrupt practices were carried on.\n\nSeveral specific instances were cited of cases tried by that officer, where it was rumoured that he had either taken bribes or had put the parties to undue harassment, because they were obdurate enough to refuse the demands of his broker. The article, which is a short one, concludes with the foHowing paragraph:-\n\n\"There are party factions in many villages in Kovvur Taluk.\n\nTaking advantage of those parties many wealthy persons make attempt to get the opposite party punished either by giving bribes or ma:king recommendations.\n\nTo appoint Magistrates who run after parties for a Taluk like this .... is to betray the public.\n\nIt is tantamount to failure of justice. Will the Collector enquire into the matter and allay the public of their fears?\"\n\n' .\n\n' .\n\n,. .\n\nThe attention of the State Government being drawn to this article, an application was filed by the Advocate.\n\nGeneral of Madras before the High Court on November 14, 1949, under section 2 of the Omtempt of Courts Act (Act XII of\n\n1926) praying that suitable action might be taken against the appellant as well as three other person~ of whom two were respectively the editor and sub-editor of the paper, while the third was the owner of the Press where the paper was printed.\n\nOn receiving notice, the appellant appeared before the High Court and filed an affidavit taking sole responsibility for the article objected to and asserting that the article was published beause of his anxiety to uphold the highest traditions of the judiciary in the land and to create popular .confidence in courts, the duty of which was to dispense justice without fear or favour and without any discrimination of caste, creed or community. It was said that before the article was published, numerous complaints had reached him from various quarters imputing corruption and disreputable conduct to this Magistrate and the only desire of the appellant was to draw the attention of the higher authorities to the state of public opinion in the matter and to invite an enquiry into the truth or otherwise of the allegations which were not asserted as facts but were based only on hearsay.\n\nThe High Court after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the publication in question did amount to contempt of court, as it was calculated to lower the prestige and dignity of courts and bring into disrepute the administration of justice. As the appellant was not prepare8 to substantiate the allegations which he made and which he admitted to be based on hearsay and did not think it proper even to express any regret for what he had done, the court sentenced him :to simple imprisonment for three months.\n\nThe other three respondents, through their counsel, tendered unqualified apology to the courr and the learned Judges considered that no further action against them was necessary.\n\nBathina Ramakrishna Reddy v.\n\nThe State af\n\nMadras.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nBathina Ram~ krishna Reddy\n\nThe Staie of Madras.\n\nMuk herjea /.\n\n' [19521 ! . ' .\n\nThe propriety of the decision of the High Coun. so far as it relates to the appellant has been challenged before us in this appeal and Mr. Sinha, who appeared in support of the same, raised before us a two.fold contention; his first and main contention is that as the. contempt in this case was said to have been comml.tted in respect of a court subordinate to the High Court and the allegations made in the article in question constitute an offence under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of such a case is expressly barred under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The other contention advanced by the learned counsel relates to the merits of the case and it is urged that in publishing the article objected to, the appellant acted in perfect good faith, and as the article amounted to nothing else but a demand for enquiry into the conduct of a particular person who was believed to be guilty of corrupt practices in the discharge of his judicial duties,. there was no contempt of court either intended or committed by the appellant.\n\nSo far as the first point is concerned, the determination of the question raised by the appellant would\n\n.,... .\n\ndepend upon the proper interpretation to be put upon • • section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act which runs as follows :-\n\n\"No High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where s_uch contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code.\"\n\nAccording .to Mr .. Sinha, what the sub-section means is that if the act by which a , party is alleged to have committep contempt of a subordinate court constitutes offence of any description whatsoever punisbable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court is precluded from taking cognizance of it. It is said that in the present case the allegations made in te article in question amount to an offence of defamation as defined by section 499 of the Indian Pelial Code . and consequently the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred.\n\nReliance\n\nis placed in support of this proposition upon the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kz'san Krifhna Ji v.\n\nNagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent de Paul(1).\n\nThis contention, though somewhat plausible at first sight, does not appear to us to be sound. In our opinion, the sub-section referred to above excludes the jurisdiction of High Court only in cases; where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of a subordinate court are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThis would be clear from the language of the sub-section which uses the words \"where such contempt is an offence\" and does not say \"where the act alleged to constitute such contempt is an offence\".\n\nIt is argued that if such was the intention of the Legislature, it could have expressly said that the High Court's jurisdiction will be ousted only when the contempt is punishable as such under the Indian Penal Code. J t seems to us that the reason for not using such language in the sub-section may be that the expression \"contempt of court\" has not been used as description of any offence in the Indian Penal Code, though certain acts, which would be punishable as contempt of court in England, are made offences under it.\n\nIt may be pointed out in this connection that although the powers of the High Courts in India esta blished under the Letters Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superior Courts of Record in punishing contempt of their authority or processes have never been doubted, it was a controversial point prior to the passing of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, as to whether the High Court could, like the Court of King's Bench in England, punish contempt of courts subordinate to it in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.\n\nThe doubt has been removed by Act XII of 1926 which expressly declares the right of the High Court to protect subordinate courtq against contempt, but\n\n(l) (1943) A.LR. 1943 Nag. 334. 5- S C. lndia/71\n\n19.52\n\nBatlzioa Ram11krishna Reddy v.\n\nThe State of Madras.\n\nBathina Ratna- Jtrishna Reddy\n\nThe State of Madras.\n\nsubject to this restriction, that cases of contempt which have already been provided for in the Indian Penal Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High Court.\n\nThis seems to be the principle underlying section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act.\n\nWhat these cases are need not be exhaustively determined for purposes of the present case, but some light is undoubtedly thrown upon this matter by the provision of section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which empowers any civil, criminal or revenue court to punish summarily a person who is found guilty of committing any offence under sections 176, 178, 179, 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code in the view or presence of the court. We are not prepared to say, as has been said by the Patna High Court in /nanendra Pro1ad v. Gopal('), that the only section of the Indian Penal Code which deals with contempt committed against a court of justice or judicial officer is section 228. Offences under sections 175, 178, 179 and 180 may also, as section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code shows, amount to contempt of court if the \"public servant\" referred to in these sections happen& to be a judicial officer in a particular case. It is well known that the aim of the contempt proceeding is \"to deter men from offering any indignities to a court of justice\" and an essential feature of the proceeding is the exercise of a summary power by the court itself in regard to the delinquent. In the cases mentioned in section 480 of the Indian Penal Code, the court has been expressly given summary powers to punish a person who is guilty of offending its dignity in the manner indicated in the section. The court is competent also under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to forward any case of this description to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try it, if it considers that the offender deserves a higher punishment than what can be inflicted under section 480.\n\nAgain, the court is entitled under section 484 to discharge the offender on his submitting an apology, although it has already adjudged him to punishment under acction 480\n\n(I) J.L.R. 12 Pat. l?l.\n\n.. >,\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUJ>REME COURT REPORTS 431\n\nor forwarded his case for trial under section 482.\n\nThe mode of purging contempt by tendering apology is a further characteristic of a contempt proceeding.\n\nIt seems, therefore, that there are offences which are punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate courts can sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of criminal law in mch cases the legislature deemed it proper to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act; but it would not be correct to say that the High Court's jurisdiction is excluded even in cases where the act complained of, which is alleged to constitute contempt, is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThis view has been taken and, in our opinion quite rightly, in a number of decisions by the Calcutta,(1) Patna,(2) Allahabad(3 ) and Lahore(') High Courts. The only authority which Mr. Sinha could cite in support of his contention is the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Ki.ran Krishna Ii v.\n\nNagpur Conference of Society of St.\n\nVincent de Pau/(6). The authority is undoubtedly in his favour as it proceed5 upon the assumption that the idea underlying the provision of section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act is that if a person can be punished by some other tribunal, then the High Court should not entertain any proceeding for contempt.\n\nIt is to be noticed that the learned Judge, who decided this case, himself took the opposite view in the case of Subordinate fudge, First Class, Hoshangabad v. fawaharla/( 8 ) and definitely held that the prohibition contained in section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act refers to offences punishable as contempt of court by the Indian Penal Code and not to offences punishable otherwise than as contempt.\n\nThis decision was neither noticed nor dissented from in the subsequent case, and it is quite possible that\n\n(1) Narayan Chandra v. Panchu Pramanik (A.LR. 1935 Cal. 684); N, msh Kumar v. Umaromal (A.LR. 1951 Cal. 489).\n\n(2) Kaulashia v. Emperor (12 Pat. 1).\n\n(3) State v. Brahma Prakash (A.I.R. 1950 All. 556); Emperor v. fagannatll (A.I.R. 1938 All. 358).\n\n(4) Bennett Coleman v. G. S. Monga (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34),\n\n(5) A.LR. 1943 Nag. 334. ( 6) A.LR. 1940 Nag. 407.\n\nBathina Rama krishna Reddy v. 1' he State of Madras.\n\nMukheriea /.\n\nBathina Ramakrishna R<ddy\n\nTh• Stat• of Madras.\n\nMukh.rj•a /.\n\nthe attention of the learned judge was not drawn to this earlier pronouncement of his, in which case the matter would certain! y have been more fully discussed. We think further that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in V. M. Bason v. A.H. Skone,(') which was the basis of the decision of the learned Judge in the subsequent case does not really support the view taken in it. In the Calcutta case what happened was, that a clerk of the Attorney, who appeared for the respondent decreeholder, went to serve a notice under Order 21, Rule 37 ( 1), of the Civil Procedure Code upon the appellant judgment-debtor. The judgmentdebtor refused to take the notice and abused and assaulted the Attorney's clerk.\n\nUpon that, contempt proceedings were started against him and , Mr. Justice C. C. Ghosh, sitting on the Original Side of the High Court of Calcutta, held the appellant guilty of contempt and fined him Rs. 200. On appeal, this judgement was affirmed by the appellate Bench and there was a general observation made by Chief Justice Sanderson at the close of his judgment that it is not desirable to invoke the special inherent jurisdiction of the High Court by way of proceeding for contempt if ordinary proceedings in a Magistrate's court are sufficient to meet the requirements of a case. This was not a case under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act at all and no question either arose or was decided as to whether if an act is otherwise punishable as an offence under the Indian Penal Code the jurisdiction of the High Court' under that section would be ousted.\n\nUndoubtedly the High Court had jurisdiction in that case and whether such jurisdiction, which is certainly of a special character and is exercised summarily, should be called in to aid in the circumstances of a particular case would depend upon the discretion of the court. This has, however, no bearing on the point that has arisen for consideration before us. We would hold, therefore, that the right view was taken by the learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court in the earlier case and not in the later one.\n\n. ( 1) 1.L.R. 53 Cal. 40 l.\n\n-.. ·.\n\n•.f\n\n~ .\n\n•;.'\n\n.,. .,. '\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE!-.~E COURT REPORTS 433\n\nIt is next urged by Mr. Sinha that even assuming that this view is correct, the language of section 499 of the Indian Penal Code is wide enough to cover a case of contempt of court.\n\nWhat is said is, that if a libel is published against a judge in respect of his judicial functions, that also is defamation within the meaning of section 499 of the Inian Penal Code and as such libel constitutes a contempt of court, it may be said with perfect propriety that libel on a judge is punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code.\n\nWe do not think that this contention can be accepted as sound.\n\nA libellous reflection upon the conduct of a judge in respect of his judicial duties may certainly come under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and it may be open to the judge to take steps against the libeller in the ordinary \\Vay for vindication of his character and personal dignity as a judge; but such libel may or may not amount to contempt of court.\n\nAs the Privy Council observed in Surendra Nath Benerjee v. Tlze Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court(1) \"although contempt may include defamation, yet an offence of contempt is something more than mere defamation and is of a different character.\" When the act of defaming a judge is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law, it would certainly amount to contempt.\n\nThe offence of contemp~ is really a wrong done to the' public by weakening the authority and influence of courts of law which exist for their good.\n\nAs was said by Willmot, C.J.( 2 ) \"attacks upon the judges excite in the minJs of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations ...... and whenever man's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken it is the most fatal and dangc;:rous obstruction of justice and in my opinion calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsover; not for the sake of the judges as private indi1•iduals but because they are the channels by which the King's justice is conveyed to the people\".\n\n(1) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 109 at 131.\n\n(2) Willmot's Opinions page 256: Ro: v. Davies 30 at p. 40-41.\n\nBathina Ramakrishna Reddy\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nBathina Ram•· fc.rishna Reddy\n\nThe State of Madras.\n\nWhat is made punishable in the Indian l'enal Code is the offence of defamation as defamation and not as contempt of court. If the defamation of a subordinate court amounts to contempt of court, proceedings can certainly be taken under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, quite apart from the fact that other remedy may be open to the aggrieved officer under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. But a libd attacking the integrity of a judge may not in the cir: cumstances of a particular case amount to a contempt at all, although it may be the subject-matter of a libel proceeding. This is clear from the observation of the Judicial Committee in the case of The Matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands(').\n\nThe first contention of Mr. Sinha, therefore, fails.\n\nThe second point raised by the learned counsel does not appear to us to have any real substance. The article in question is a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty of a judicial officer.\n\nSpecific instances have been given where the officer is alleged to have aken. bribes or behaved with 'impropriety to the litigants who did not satisfy his clishonest demands.\n\nIf the allegations were true, obviously it would be to the benefit of the public to bring these matters into light. But if they were false, they cannot but undermine the confidence of the public in the administration of justice and bring judiciary into disrepute.\n\nThe appelhnt, though he took sole responsibility regarding the publication of the article, was not in a position to substantiate by evidence any of the allegations made therein.\n\nHe admitted that the statement was based on hearsay.\n\nRumours may have reached him from various sources, but before hr published the article it was incumbent upon him as a reasonable man to attempt to verify the informations he received and ascertain, as far as he could, whether the facts were true or mere concocted lies.\n\nHe does not appear to have made any endeavour in this direction.\n\nAs the appellant did not act with reasonabk care and caution, he cannot be said to have act:erl\n\nCl) fl 8931 A.C. 138.\n\n.. .. ~\n\n... ' .\n\nbona fide, even if good faith can be held to be a defence\n\nat all in a proceeding for contempt.\n\nWhat is more, he did not express any regret for what he had done either in the High Court or before us and his behaviour Joes not show the least trace of contrition. In these circumstances, we think that the appeal cannot succeed and must be dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appelliant : S. Subrahmanyam.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.\n\nKATHI RANING RAWAT\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.,\n\nFAZL ALI, MEHAR CHAND\n\n~1h.IHJAN, MuKERJEA, DAs, CHANDRASEKH., RA\n\nA1Y AR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nSaurasiitra State Public Safety (Third Amendment) Orditzanu (LXVI of 1949), ss. 9, 10, 11-Law empowering State to constitute Special Court,· to try special classe . .- of ofjences-Constittttional 11alidity-Contraventio11 of fundamental rig/it to equal protection of\n\nlaws-Essntiais of valid clas.<ifimtion-I>c:legation of legislative powers--r:omritutio11 of lndia, .1rts. 13, 14.\n\nThe Saurashtra State Public Safety .Measnrcs Ordinance, 19-18, was p~5'ed \"to provide for pul1lic safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra.\" As crimes involving violence such as dacoity and murder were increasing, this Ordinance was amended by the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, which, by secs. 9, JO and 11, empowered the State Government hy notification in the official gazette to constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such ,1rea as may he specified in the notification, to appoint Special fudges to prc, ide over such Conrts and to invest them with jurisdiction to try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government may, by general or special order in writing, direct.\n\nThe procedure laid down by\n\nBathina Ramtt krishna Reddy\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras:.\n\n1952 p,,,. 27.", "total_entities": 129, "entities": [{"text": "425\n\nBATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "425\n\nBATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 178, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. 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J. and and Balakrishna Ayyar J.) dated 10th April, 1950, in Contempt Application No."}}, {"text": "Rajamannar C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2207, "end_char": 2220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and and Balakrishna Ayyar J.) dated 10th April, 1950, in Contempt Application No."}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2232, "end_char": 2249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and and Balakrishna Ayyar J.) dated 10th April, 1950, in Contempt Application No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2395, "end_char": 2406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukheriea /.\n\nS. P. Sinha ( S. S. Prakasam, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. S. Prakasam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2409, "end_char": 2423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukheriea /.\n\nS. P. Sinha ( S. S. Prakasam, with him), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2456, "end_char": 2473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MuKIIERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2560, "end_char": 2570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKIIERJEA J.-This appeal has come up before us on special leave granted by this court on May 23, 1950, and it is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated April 1(}, 1950, by which the learned Judges found the appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to serve simple imprisonment .for three months.", "canonical_name": "MuKIIERJEA"}}, {"text": "Praja. Rajyam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2993, "end_char": 3006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the publisher and managing editor of a Telugu Weekly known as \"Praja."}}, {"text": "Nellore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3041, "end_char": 3048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajyam\" which is edited and published at Nellore in the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajyam\" which is edited and published at Nellore in the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "10th February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3110, "end_char": 3129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the issue of the said paper dated 10th February, 1949, an article appeared under the caption \"Is the Sub-Magistrate, Kovvur, corrupt?\""}}, {"text": "Sub-Magistrate, Kovvur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3177, "end_char": 3199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the issue of the said paper dated 10th February, 1949, an article appeared under the caption \"Is the Sub-Magistrate, Kovvur, corrupt?\""}}, {"text": "Surya Narayan Murthi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3247, "end_char": 3267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The purport of the article was that Surya Narayan Murthi, the stationary Sub-Magistrate of Kovvur, was known to the people of the locality to be a bribe taker and to be in the habit of harassing litigants in various ways."}}, {"text": "Kovvur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3302, "end_char": 3308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The purport of the article was that Surya Narayan Murthi, the stationary Sub-Magistrate of Kovvur, was known to the people of the locality to be a bribe taker and to be in the habit of harassing litigants in various ways."}}, {"text": "Kovvur Taluk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3912, "end_char": 3924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The article, which is a short one, concludes with the foHowing paragraph:-\n\n\"There are party factions in many villages in Kovvur Taluk."}}, {"text": "November 14, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4472, "end_char": 4489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General of Madras before the High Court on November 14, 1949, under section 2 of the Omtempt of Courts Act (Act XII of\n\n1926) praying that suitable action might be taken against the appellant as well as three other person~ of whom two were respectively the editor and sub-editor of the paper, while the third was the owner of the Press where the paper was printed."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4497, "end_char": 4506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bathina Ram~ krishna Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6451, "end_char": 6477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea /.\n\nBathina Ram~ krishna Reddy\n\nThe Staie of Madras.", "canonical_name": "425\n\nBATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6673, "end_char": 6678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "so far as it relates to the appellant has been challenged before us in this appeal and Mr. Sinha, who appeared in support of the same, raised before us a two.fold contention; his first and main contention is that as the."}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6990, "end_char": 7001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7009, "end_char": 7026, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7123, "end_char": 7135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7143, "end_char": 7165, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": 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"Reliance\n\nis placed in support of this proposition upon the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kz'san Krifhna Ji v.\n\nNagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent de Paul(1)."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9118, "end_char": 9135, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9258, "end_char": 9275, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9675, "end_char": 9692, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9875, "end_char": 9892, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9965, "end_char": 9972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J t seems to us that the reason for not using such language in the sub-section may be that the expression \"contempt of court\" has not been used as description of any offence in the Indian Penal Code, though certain acts, which would be punishable as contempt of court in England, are made offences under it."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10091, "end_char": 10096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out in this connection that although the powers of the High Courts in India esta blished under the Letters Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superior Courts of Record in punishing contempt of their authority or processes have never been doubted, it was a controversial point prior to the passing of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, as to whether the High Court could, like the Court of King's Bench in England, punish contempt of courts subordinate to it in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10325, "end_char": 10353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bathina Ratna- Jtrishna Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10784, "end_char": 10813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bathina Ratna- Jtrishna Reddy\n\nThe State of Madras.", "canonical_name": "425\n\nBATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10819, "end_char": 10834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bathina Ratna- Jtrishna Reddy\n\nThe State of Madras.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nMadras"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10933, "end_char": 10950, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11047, "end_char": 11059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of 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"start_char": 11592, "end_char": 11608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not prepared to say, as has been said by the Patna High Court in /nanendra Pro1ad v. 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M. Bason v. A.H. Skone,(') which was the basis of the decision of the learned Judge in the subsequent case does not really support the view taken in it."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15799, "end_char": 15807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Calcutta case what happened was, that a clerk of the Attorney, who appeared for the respondent decreeholder, went to serve a notice under Order 21, Rule 37 ( 1), of the Civil Procedure Code upon the appellant judgment-debtor."}}, {"text": "Order 21, Rule 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15937, "end_char": 15954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. C. Ghosh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16194, "end_char": 16205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon that, contempt proceedings were started against him and , Mr. Justice C. C. Ghosh, sitting on the Original Side of the High Court of Calcutta, held the appellant guilty of contempt and fined him Rs."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16243, "end_char": 16265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon that, contempt proceedings were started against him and , Mr. Justice C. C. Ghosh, sitting on the Original Side of the High Court of Calcutta, held the appellant guilty of contempt and fined him Rs."}}, {"text": "Sanderson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16448, "end_char": 16457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, this judgement was affirmed by the appellate Bench and there was a general observation made by Chief Justice Sanderson at the close of his judgment that it is not desirable to invoke the special inherent jurisdiction of the High Court by way of proceeding for contempt if ordinary proceedings in a Magistrate's court are sufficient to meet the requirements of a case."}}, {"text": "section 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16733, "end_char": 16745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16753, "end_char": 16775, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16899, "end_char": 16916, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17695, "end_char": 17706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17714, "end_char": 17731, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17932, "end_char": 17943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17957, "end_char": 17967, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18115, "end_char": 18132, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18309, "end_char": 18320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18328, "end_char": 18345, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Willmot", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19153, "end_char": 19160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was said by Willmot, C.J.( 2 ) \"attacks upon the judges excite in the minJs of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations ...... and whenever man's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken it is the most fatal and dangc;:rous obstruction of justice and in my opinion calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsover; not for the sake of the judges as private indi1•iduals but because they are the channels by which the King's justice is conveyed to the people\".", "canonical_name": "Willmot"}}, {"text": "Willmot", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19713, "end_char": 19720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Willmot's Opinions page 256: Ro: v. Davies 30 at p. 40-41.", "canonical_name": "Willmot"}}, {"text": "Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19773, "end_char": 19798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras.", "canonical_name": "425\n\nBATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMadras", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19804, "end_char": 19820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nMadras"}}, {"text": "Bathina Ram•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19837, "end_char": 19849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea /.\n\nBathina Ram•· fc.rishna Reddy\n\nThe State of Madras."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19872, "end_char": 19887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea /.\n\nBathina Ram•· fc.rishna Reddy\n\nThe State of Madras."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20125, "end_char": 20134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20142, "end_char": 20164, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20253, "end_char": 20264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20272, "end_char": 20289, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bahama Islands", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20598, "end_char": 20612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is clear from the observation of the Judicial Committee in the case of The Matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands(')."}}, {"text": "S. Subrahmanyam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22415, "end_char": 22430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appelliant : S. Subrahmanyam."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22460, "end_char": 22471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "KATHI RANING RAWAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22474, "end_char": 22492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KATHI RANING RAWAT\n\nti."}}, {"text": "STATE OF SAURASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22503, "end_char": 22522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.,\n\nFAZL ALI, MEHAR CHAND\n\n~1h."}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22550, "end_char": 22558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.,\n\nFAZL ALI, MEHAR CHAND\n\n~1h."}}, {"text": "MEHAR CHAND", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22560, "end_char": 22571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.,\n\nFAZL ALI, MEHAR CHAND\n\n~1h."}}, {"text": "IHJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22577, "end_char": 22582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IHJAN, MuKERJEA, DAs, CHANDRASEKH.,"}}, {"text": "MuKERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22584, "end_char": 22592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IHJAN, MuKERJEA, DAs, CHANDRASEKH.,", "canonical_name": "MuKIIERJEA"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22599, "end_char": 22610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IHJAN, MuKERJEA, DAs, CHANDRASEKH.,"}}, {"text": "RA\n\nA1Y AR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22613, "end_char": 22623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RA\n\nA1Y AR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22628, "end_char": 22639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RA\n\nA1Y AR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Saurasiitra State Public Safety (Third Amendment) Orditzanu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22646, "end_char": 22705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saurasiitra State Public Safety (Third Amendment) Orditzanu (LXVI of 1949), ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 9, 10, 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22722, "end_char": 22735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23032, "end_char": 23042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Saurashtra State Public Safety .Measnrcs Ordinance, 19-18, was p~5'ed \"to provide for pul1lic safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra.\""}}, {"text": "Bathina Ramtt krishna Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23897, "end_char": 23924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The procedure laid down by\n\nBathina Ramtt krishna Reddy\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras:.", "canonical_name": "425\n\nBATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMadras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23930, "end_char": 23946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The procedure laid down by\n\nBathina Ramtt krishna Reddy\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras:."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_435_477_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 435\n\nbona fide, even if good faith can be held to be a defence\n\nat all in a proceeding for contempt.\n\nWhat is more, he did not express any regret for what he had done either in the High Court or before us and his behaviour Joes not show the least trace of contrition. In these circumstances, we think that the appeal cannot succeed and must be dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appelliant : S. Subrahmanyam.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.\n\nKATHI RANING RAWAT\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF SAURASHTRA\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.,\n\nFAZL ALI, MEHAR CHAND\n\n~1h.IHJAN, MuKERJEA, DAs, CHANDRASEKH., RA\n\nA1Y AR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nSaurasiitra State Public Safety (Third Amendment) Orditzanu (LXVI of 1949), ss. 9, 10, 11-Law empowering State to constitute Special Court,· to try special classe . .- of ofjences-Constittttional 11alidity-Contraventio11 of fundamental rig/it to equal protection of\n\nlaws-Essntiais of valid clas.<ifimtion-I>c:legation of legislative powers--r:omritutio11 of lndia, .1rts. 13, 14.\n\nThe Saurashtra State Public Safety .Measnrcs Ordinance, 19-18, was p~5'ed \"to provide for pul1lic safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra.\" As crimes involving violence such as dacoity and murder were increasing, this Ordinance was amended by the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, which, by secs. 9, JO and 11, empowered the State Government hy notification in the official gazette to constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such ,1rea as may he specified in the notification, to appoint Special fudges to prc, ide over such Conrts and to invest them with jurisdiction to try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government may, by general or special order in writing, direct.\n\nThe procedure laid down by\n\nBathina Ramtt krishna Reddy\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras:.\n\n1952 p,,,. 27.\n\nKathi Ran in g Rawat\n\n\"· The State of\n\nSaurasktra.\n\nthe Ordinance for trial before such Courts varied from the normal procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure (-:ode in two material respects, viz., there \\Vas no provision for trial by jury or v, rith the aid of assessors, or for enquiry before con1mitment to sessions.\n\nIn exercise of the po\\vers conferred by this Ordinance the Government, by a notification, constituted a Special Court for certain areas and empowered that Court to try offences under secs. 183, 189, 302, '04, 307, 392 and certain other sections of the Indian Penal Code \\Vhich \\\\'ere specified in the notification.\n\nIt was conten<led on behalf of the appellant who had been convicted by the Special Court under secs. 302, 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code read with sec. 34, that the Ordinance of 1949 and the notification above-mentioned contravened J\\rt. 14 of the Constitution and were therefore ultra vires and void :\n\nHeld, per PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J., FAZL Au, MuKHF.llJEA and D1i.s\n\nJJ.-(:~.1EHR\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, CttANDRASEKnA:n.A A1YA1t and BosE Jj. dissenting)-That the impugned Ordinance in so far as it authorised the State Government to Jirect offences or classes of offences or ch1sses of cases to be tried by the Special Court did not contravene the provisions of Art. 14 and was not ultra vireJ or void.\n\nThe notification isued under the Ordinancr. w::i.s also not void.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-All legislative differentiation is not. nece$sarily di$criminatory.\n\nDiscrimination invol\\'es an element of unfavourable bias, and it is in that sense that the i;:xpression has to he understood in the context.\n\nEqual protection claims under Art. J 4 arc exan1incd 'vi th the presun1ption that the State action is reasonable and justified. 1'hough differing procc-durcs might involve disparity in treatn1cnt of per'.'ons trie<l under then1, such disparity is 11Dt in it<:clf sufficient to out\\\\'eigh this presumption and e::.tahlish discrimination unless the <legree of disparity goes beyond what the reason for its existence demands, ~.g., 'vhen it an1ounts to a denial of a fair and impartial trial. 111.e impugned Ordinance having been passetl to co1nbat the increasing tempo of cert:1.in types of regional crime~ the t\\vo-fold classification on thrlines of type and territory adopted by the said Ordinance read with the notification issued thereunder was reasonabler, and the degree of disparity of treatment involved\n\nW:1.S in no \\vay in excess of \\Vhat the situation den1anded.\n\n\\Vhile on the one hand it cannot be said that any variation of procedure which operates 1naterially to the disadvantage of the accused is discrin1inatory and violates _r\\rt. 14, the other extreme vie\\v that Art. 14 provides no further constitutional protection to personal liberty than \\vhat is afforded by :\\rt. 21 is also wrong.\n\nF'AZL :\\LI J.--r\\ distinction nlust be dra, vn ltwcen \"discri- 1nination \\vithout reason'' and \"discrimination with reason\".\n\n... -,\n\n-.,\n\n' '\n\n.......\n\n,,. '\n\nThe whole doctrine of classification is based on this distinction and on the well-known fact that the circumstances which govern one set of persons or objects may not necessarily be the same .as those governing another set of persons or objects so that the question of unequal treatment does not really arise as between persons governed by different conditions and different ets of circumstances.\n\nThe clear recital of a definite objective in the -earlier Ordinance and the impugned Ordinance which amended it, furnished a tangible and rational basis of classification and the OrJinance and the notification <lid not violate Art. 14. [The Legislature should however have recourse to legislation iikc this only in , ery special circumstances.]\n\n.MuKHERJEA J.-Where the legislative policy is clear and definite and as an effective method of carrying out that policy a. discretion is vested by the statute upon a body of administrators or officers to make selective application of the law to certain classes or groups of persons, the statute itself cannot be condemned as a piece of discriminatory legislation.\n\nIn such cases, the power given to the executive body would import a duty on it to classify the subject matter of legislation in accordance with the: objective indicated in the statute.\n\nIf the administrative body proceeds to classify persons or things on a basis which has no rational relation to the objertiYc of the legislature, its action can certainly be annulled as offending against the equal protection clause.\n\nThe preamble. of the main Ordinance (IX of 1948) taken along with the surrounding circumstances disclosed a definite legislative policy and objective, and the impugned Ordinance cannot therefore he held to be unconstitutional merely because it vested in the Government the authority to constitute Special Courts and to specify the classes of offences to he tried by such courts with a view to achieve that objective.\n\nThe notification issued by the Government was also not void as it did not proceed on any unreasonable or arbitrary basis hut on the other hand there was a reasonable relation between the classification made by the notification and the objective that the legislation had in vie, v.\n\nThough it is a sound and reasonable proposition that when the nature of two offences is intrinsically the same and they are punishable in the same manner, a person accused of one should not he treated differently from a person accused of the other, yet in determining the reach and scope of a particular legislation it is not necessary for the legislature to provide abstract\n\nymrnetr)'. A too rigid insistence on anything like scientific classification is neither practicable nor desirable.\n\n0As J.-The relevant part of sec. 11 properly construed and understood does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government; on the contrary, the power is controlled by the necessity of making a proper classification\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Sattrashtra.\n\nwhich is to be guided by the prc..'lmble in the sense that the classification must have a rational relation to the object of the Ordinance as recited in the preamble.\n\nThe classification effected by the in1pugned Ordinance and the notification thus satisfied the t\\vo conditions necessary for a valid classification! viz., that jt inust not be arbitrary but must be founded on an intelligible diffcrentia, and that differentia rnust have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The Ordinance and the notification did not therefore contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nMAHAJAN ].-Section l l of the Ordinance suggests no rea~ sonable basis for classification either in respect of offences or in respect of cases, nor has it laid down any measure for the grouping either of persons or of cases or of offences, by which tncasure these groups could be distinguished from those outside the purvie\\v of the Ordinance. The \\vords used in the preamble to the n1ain Ordinance and the fact that sec. 9 of the impugned Ordinance provides that the po\\\\'Cr can be exercised for any particular area cannot limit the plain and unambiguous language of sec. 11 j and the said section is therefore unconstitutional.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-Sections 9 and 11 do not lay\n\nJo~'n any classification.\n\nThe preamble to the earlier Ordinance also indicates no classification as the object stated there -is ct general one which has to be kept in vie\\v by every enlightened Government or system of adn1inistration.\n\nThe classification adopted in the notification also is not a rational one.\n\nBosE J .-The differentiation effected by the impugned Ordinance and the notification lssued thereunder travels beyond bou nJs \\Vhich are Jcgithnate and the Ordinance therefore offends Art. 14 and is invalid.\n\nHeld also, per curiam, that the Ordinance was not invalid on the ground that it involved delegation of legislative powers.\n\nThe State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ([l952l S.C.R. 284 ), In re Delhi L<uus Act, 1912, etc. ( [ 1951] S.C.R. 747) and King Emperor v. Bcnoarilnl Sarma [72 I.A. 57] referred to.\n\nCRI1vflNAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDIC'TION : Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1951.\n\nAppeal under Arts. 132(1! and 134(1) (c) of the Constitntion of Inclia agamst the Judgment and Order dated 28th February, 1951, of: the High Court of Saurashtra at Rajkor (Shah C.J. and Chhatpar J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 162 of 1950. The material facts appear in the Judgment.\n\n• ...\n\nS. L. Chibber (amicus curia), for the appellant. -r~ B. Sen, for the respondent.\n\n\" )\" .\n\n195'2.\n\nFebruary 27.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI C.J.-This appeal raises questions under article 14 of the . Const'1tution more or less similar to thos.e dealt with by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 297 of 1951, The State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar('), and it was heard in part along with that appeal but was adjourned to enable the respondent State to file an affidavit explaining the circumstances which led to the enactment of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 (No. XLVI of 1949), here'inafter re. ferred to as the impugned Ordinance.\n\nAs in the West Bengal case, the jurisdiction of the Special Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, which tried and convicted the appellant, was challenged on the ground that the impugned Ordinance, under which the Court was constituted, was discriminatory and void. The objection was overruled by the Special Judge as well as by the High Court of Saurashtra on appeal and the appellant now seeks a decision nf this Court on thl\" point.\n\nThe impugned Ordinance purporti; to amend the Saurashtra State Public Saftey Measures Ordinance (No. IX of 1948) which had been passed \"to provide f:or public safety, maintenance of public urder and pr~ servation of peace and tranqui.lity in the State of Suarashtra\", hv the insertion of sections 7 to 18 whfrh deal with the .establishment of Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction in certain areas to try certain classes of offences in accordance with :i >implified and 5hortenecl procedure.\n\nSection 9 empowers the St:ite by notification to constitute Special Courts for such :ireas as may be specified in the notification and section 10 provides f:or appointment of Special Judges to preside over such courts.\n\nSection 11 enacts tliat the Special Judge shall try \"such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government may, by general or special order in writing, direct''. (I) Since repor~<l as fl 9521 S.C.R. 284.\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C /.\n\n1952 Then follow provisions prescribing the procedure. applicable to the trial . of such offences.\n\nThe Kathi Raning\n\nRaum only variations in such procedure from the normal v. procedure in criminal trials in the State consist of the xi.. s1o1. •! abolition of trial by jury or with the aid of assessors Saumhtra. and the elimination of the inquiry before commitment\n\nP:;;;;: u : in sessicins cases. Even under the normal procedure Saatri b~ J. trial by jury is not compulsory unless the Government so directs (sections 268 and 269 (I)). while_ assessors are not really members of the court and their opinion is not binding on the judge with whom the responsibility for the decision rests. Nor can the commitment proceeding in a sessions case be said to be an essen- ·\n\ntial requirement of a fair and impartial, trial. though its dispensation may involve the deprivation of certain advantages which an accused person may otherwise enjoy. Thus the variations from the normal procedure are by no means calculated to imperil the . chances of a fair and impartial trial. .\n\nIn exercise of th.e power conferred by sections 9, 10 and 11, the Government issued the notification No. H/35-5-C dated 9/11February,1950, directing that a Special Court shall be constituted for certain special areas and -that it shall try certain specified offences which included offences under sections 302, 307 and\n\n- 392 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code\n\n(as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra) for which the appellant was convicted and sentenced.· ..\n\nIt is contended on behalf of the appellant that section 11 and the notification referred to above are discriminatory in that the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant within the specified areas are required to be .tried by the Special Judge. under the special procedure, while any person com- . mitting the same offences outside those areas would be tried by the ordinary courts under the ordinary procedure. It is also urged that sections 9 and 11 by\n\n- empowering the State Government to establish• a Special Court and to direct it to try under_a special procedure such offences as may be notified by the Government, in effect, authorise the Gove!llII!ent tQ\n\namend section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with the Second Schedule (as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra), which provides that \"all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, enquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained\", and that delegation of such power to the executive Government was beyond the competence of a legislature and was, therefore, void.\n\nOn the first point many of the considerations which weighed with me in upholding the constitutionality of section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, which is in identical terms with Section 11 of the impugned Act, apply a fortiori to the present case. The West Bengal case(') arose out of a reference by the State Government of certain individual cases to the Special Court for trial and I there expressed the view that it was wrong to think that classification was someth'ing that must somehow be discoverable in every piece of legislation or it would not be legislation.\n\nThat way of regarding classification, I pointed out, tended only to obscure the real nature of the problems for which we have to find solution. In the present case, however, the State Government referred nor certain individual cases but offences of certain kinds committed in certain areas and so the objection as to discriminatory treatment is more easily answered on the line of reasoning indicated in my\n\njud¥ent in the West Bengal case(1). Again, the vanat1ons from the normal procedure authorised by the impugned Ordinance are less disadvantageous to the persons tried before the Special Court than under the West Bengal Act. It was, however, said that any variation in procedure: which operates materially to the disadvantange of such persons was discriminatory and violative of article 14. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the respondent State that, in the field of personal liberty, the only constitutional safeguards were those specifically provided in artides 20 to 22, and this Court having held in (I) fl952l S.C.R. 28+.\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nKathi Ran in g Rawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nPaianiali Sastri C. ].\n\nGopalan' s case(') that any procedure prescribed by '\" law satisfies the requirements of article 21 (the only article relevant here) the impugned Ordinance which prescribes a special procedure for trial of offences falling within its ambit could not be held to be unconstitutional. Reliance was placed on a decision of a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court (Abdur Rahim and others v. Joseph A. Pinto and others) ( 2) ;, which seems to lend some support to this view. I am, ,,... however, of opinion t.hat neither of these extreme contentions is sound.\n\nAll legislative differentiation is not necessarily discriminatory. In fact, the word \"discrimination\" does not occur in article 14. The expression \"discriminate against\" is used in article 15 ( 1) and article 16 (2), and it means, according to the Oxford Dictionary, \"to make an adverse distinction with regard to; to distinguish unfavourably from others\".\n\nDis.crimination thus involves an element of unfavourable bias and it is in that sense tl1at the expression has to be understood in this context. If such bias is disclosed and is based on any of the grounds mentioned in article 15 and 16, it may well be tl1at the statute will, without more, incur condemnation as violating a specific constitutional prohibition unless it is saved by one or other of ilie provisos to those articles.\n\nBut tl1e position under article 14 is different. Equal protection claims w1der that article are examined with the presumption that the State action is reasonable and justified.\n\nThis presumption of constitutionality stems from the wide power of classification which the legislature must, of necessity, possess in making laws operating differently as regards different groups of persons in order to give effect to its policies. The power of the State to regulate criminal trials by constiruti, ng different cours , with different procedures according to the needs of different parts of its territory is an essential part of its police power- { cf.\n\nMissouri v. Lewis)(3).\n\nThough the differing\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\n(3) 161 U.S. 22.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1951 Hyderabad 11.\n\n\" \\'\n\nprocedures might involve disparity in the treatment of the persons tried under them, such disparity is not by itself sufficient, in my opinion, to outweigh the presumption and establish discrimination unless the degree of disparity goes beyond what the reason for its existence demands as, for instance, when it amounts to a denial of a fair and impartial trial. It is, therefore, not correct to say that article 14 provides no further constitutional protection to personal liberty than what is afforded by article 21.\n\nNotwithstanding that its wide general language is greatly qualified in its practical application by a due recognition of the State's\n\nnecessarily wide powers of legislative classification, article 14 remains an important bulwark( against discriminatory procedural laws.\n\nIn the present case, the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent State by one of its responsible officers states facts and figures relating to an increasing number of incidents of looting, robbery, dacoity, nosecutting and murder by marauding gangs of dacoits in certain areas of the State, and these details support the claim that \"the security of the State and public peace were jeopardised and that it became impossible to deal with the offences that were committed 'in different places in separate courts of law expeditiously.\" The statement concludes by pointing out that the areas specified in the notification were the \"main zones of the activities of the dacoits as mentioned above.\"\n\nThe impugned Ordinance having thus been passed to combat the increas'ing tempo of certain types of regional crime, the two-fold classification on the lines of type and territory adopted in the :impugned Ordinance, read with the notification issued thereunder~ is, in my view, reasonable and valid, and the degree of disparity of treatment involved is in no way in excess of what the situation demanded.\n\nOn the second point, the appellant's learned counsel claimed that the majority view in In re The Delhi Law1\n\nAct, 1912, etc.(1) supported his contention. He attempted to make this out by piecing together certain dicta .... 1\n\n(1) fl95ll S.C.R. 747.\n\nKathi Raninz\n\nRawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nPatanja/i Sastri C. /,\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nPatanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nfound m the several judgments delivered in that case.\n\nWhile undoubtedly certain definite conclusions were reached by the majority of the Judges who took part in the decision in regard to the constitutionality of certain specified enactments, the reasoning in each case was different and it is difficult to say that any particular principle hs been laid down by the majority which can be of assistance in the determination of other cases.\n\nI have there expressed my view that legislatures in this country have plenary authority to delegate their power to make law.< to subordinate agencies of their choice and such delegation, however inexpedient or undesirable politically, is constitutionally competent.\n\nI accordingly reject this contention.\n\nIt follows that the Special Judge had jurisdiction to try the appellant and the persons accused along with him.\n\nAs the majority concur in overruling the preliminary objection the appeal will be heard on the merits.\n\nFAzL Au J.-This is an appeal by one Kathi Raning Rawat, who has been convicted under sections 302, 307 and 392 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death and to seven years' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe appellant was tried by a Special Court constituted under the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinarrce No. LXVI of 1949), which was issued by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on the 2nd November, 1949, and his conviction and sentence were •pheld on appeal by the State High Court. He has preterred an appeal to this Court against the decesion of the High Court.\n\nThe principal question which arises in this appeal is whether the Ordinance to which reference has been made is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution on the ground that it violates the. provisions of article 14. It appears that on the 5th April, 1948, the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra State promulgated an Ordinance called the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Adaptation) Ordiance, 1948 (Ordii1ahce No. xq of\n\n• ' ~\n\n1948), by which \"the Criminal Procedure Code of the Dominion of India as in force in that Dominion on the 1st day of April, 1948\" was made applicable to the State of Saurashtra with certain modifications. In the same month, another Ordinance called the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance (Ordinance No. IX of 1948) was promulgated, which provided among other things for the detention of persons acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety, maintenance of public order and peace and tranquillity in the State.\n\nSubsequently, on the 5th November, 1949, the Ordinance with which we are concerned, namely, the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, was promulgated, which purported to amend the previous Ordinance by inserting in it certain provisions which may be summarised as follws:-\n\nSection 9 of the Ordinance empowers the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute Special Courts of diminal jurisdiction for s, uch area as may be specified in. the notification.\n\nSection 11 provides that a Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the State Government may, by general or special order in writing, direct.\n\nSections 12 to 18 lay down the procedure for the trial of cases by the Special Judge, the special features of which are as follows:-\n\n(1) The Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to his court for trial;\n\n(2) There is to be no trial by jury or with the aid of assessors;\n\n(3) The Special Judge should ordinarily' record a memorandum only of the substance of the evidence of each witness; and\n\n(4) The person convicted has to appeal ro the\n\n~~ High Court within 15 days from the date of the sentence. 6-S S. C: Indial71\n\nKathi Ranint:\n\nRawat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtr11.\n\nFazl Ali f. 1\n\nKathi Ran in g\n\nRilwlll\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nThe Ord'inance further provides that the provisions of sections 491 and 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not apply to any person or case triable by the Special Judge, and the High Court may call for the record of the proceedings of any case tried by a Special Judge and may exercise any of the powers conferred on an appellate court by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 of the Code.\n\nFrom the foregoing summary of the provisions of the Ordinance, it will appear that the difference between the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code and the procedure to be followed by the Special Judge consists mainly in the following matters :- ( 1) Where a case is triable by a court of session, no commitment proceeding is necessary, and the Special Judge may take cognizance without any commitment;\n\n(2) The trial shall not . be by jury or with the aid of assessors;\n\n(3) Only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness is ordinarily to be recorded; ( 4) The period of limitation for appeal to the High Court is curtailed; and\n\n(5) No court has jurisdiction to transfer any case from any Special Judge, or to make an order under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code .\n\n. It appears that pursuant to the provisions contained in sections 9, IO and 11 of the Ordinance, the State Government issued a Notification No. H/35-5-C, dated the 9/llth February, 1951, directing the constitution of a Special Court for certain areas mentioned in a schedule attached to the Notification and empowering such court to try the following offences, namely,\n\noffences under sections 183, 189, 190, 212, 216, 224, 302, 304, 307, 323-335, 341-344, 379-382, 384-389 and 392-402 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra, and most of\n\nthe offences under the Ordinance of 1948. •\n\n.. •\n\nIn•• the course of the hearing, an affidavit was filed by, then •Assistant Secretary in the Home Department of the Saurashtra Government, stat'ing that since the integration of different States in Kathiawar in the beginning of 1948 there had been a series of crimes against public peace and that had led to the promulgation of Ordinance No. IX of 1948, which provided among other things for detention of persons acting in a manner prejudiciial to public safety and maintenance of public order in the State.\n\nNotwithstanding this Ordinance, the cnmes went on increasing and there occurred numer9us cases of dacoity, murder, nosecutting, ear-cutting, etc. for some of which certain notorious gangs were responsible, and hence O!'dinance No. LXVI of 1949 was promulgated to amend the earlier Ordinance and to constitute Special Courts for the speedy trial of cases arisilng1 out of the activities of the dacoits and other criminals guilty of violent crimes.\n\nAs has been already indicated, the main contention advanced before us on behalf of the appellant is that the Ordinance of 1949 voilates the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution, by laying down a procedure which is defferent from and less advantageous to the accused than the ordinary procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code, and thereby discriminating between persons who are to be tried under the special pr<><; edure and those tried under the normal procedure.\n\nIn support of this argument, reliance is placed on the decision of this court in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar and Gajen Mali (Cases Nos. 297 and 298 of 1951) (1), in which certain provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1949, have been held to be unconstitutional on grounds similar to those urged on behalf of the appellant in the present case. A comparison of the provisions of the Ordinance in question with those of the West Bengal Act will show that several of the objectionable features in the latter enactment do not appear in the Ordinance,\n\n..._t\n\n(1) f1952l S.C.R. 284. 58\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali/.\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nS11Urashtra.\n\nbut on the whole, I am inclined to think that that circumstance by itself will not afford justification for upholding the Ordinance.\n\nThere is however one very important difference between the West Bengal Act and the present Ordinance which, in my opinion, does afford such justification, and I shall try to refer to it as briefly as possible.\n\nI th'ink that a distinction should be drawn between \"discrimination without reason\" and \"discrimination with reason\".\n\nThe whole doctrine of classification is based on this distinction and on the well-known fact that the circumstances which govern one set of persons or objects may not necessarily be the same as those governing another set of persons or objects so that the question of unequal treatment does not really arise as\n\nbetween persons governed by different conditions and different 5ets of circumstances.\n\nThe main objection to the West Bengal Act was that it permitted discrimination \"without reason\" or without any rational basis. Having laid down a procedure which was materially different from and less advantageous to the accused than the ordinary procedure, that Act gave uncontrolled and unguided authority to the State Government to put that procedure into operation in the trial of any case or class of cases or any offence or class of offences.\n\nThere was no principle to be found in that Act to control the application of the discriminatory provisions or to correlate those provisions to some fungible and rational objective, in such a way as to enable anyone reading the Act to say:--,-If that is the objective the provisions as to special treatment of the offences seem to be quite suitable and there can be no objection to dealing with a particular type of offences on a special footing.\n\nThe mere mention of speedier trial as the object of the Act did not cure the defect, because the expression \"speedier trial\" standing by itself provided no rational basis of classification.\n\nIt was merely a description of the result sought to be achieved by the application of the special procedure laid down in the Act and afforded no help\n\nin determining what cases required speedier trial.\n\n,,._\n\n....\n\nAs regards the present Ordinance, we can discover a guiding principle within its four corners, which cannot but have the effect of limiting the appl'ication of the special procedure to a particular category of offences only and establish such a nexus (which was missing in the West Bengal Act) between offences of a particular category and the object with wMch the Ordinance was promulgated, as should suffice to repel the charge of discrimination and furnish some justification for the special treatment of those offences.\n\nThe Ordinance as I have already stated, purported to amend another Ordinance, the object of which was to provide for public safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State.\n\nIt was not disputed before us that the preamble of the original Ordinance would govern the amending Ordinance also, and the object of promulgating the subsequent Ordinance was the same as the object of promulgating the original OrdinanGe.\n\nOnce this is appreciated, it is easy to see that there is something in the Ordinance itself to guide the State Government to apply die special procedure not to any and every case but only to those cases or offences which have a rational relation to, or connection with, the main object and purpose of the Ordinance and which for that reason become a class by themselves requiring to be dealt with on a special footing. The clear recital of a definite objective furnishes a tangible and rational basitl of classification to the Stare Government for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Ordinance and for choosing only such offences or cases as affect public safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity.\n\nThus, under section 11, the State Government is expected to select only such offences ot class of offences or class of cases for being tried by the special court in accordance with the special procedure, as are calculated to affect public safety, maintenance of public order, etc., and under section 9, the use of the special procedure must necessarily be confined to only disturbed areas or those areas where adoption of\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali /.\n\nKathi Ran in g Rawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali /.\n\npublic safety measures is necessary.\n\nThat this is how . the Ordinance was intended to be understood and was in fact understood, is confirmed by the Notification issued on the 9/llth February by the State Government in pursuahce of the Ordinance.\n\nThat Notification sets out 49 offences under the Indian Penal Code as adapted and applied to the State and certain other offences punishable under the Ordinance, and one can see at once that all these offences directly affect the maintenance of public order and peace and tranquillity.\n\nThe Notification also specifies certain areas in the State over which only the special court is to exercise jurisdiction.\n\nThere can be no dispute that if the State Legislature finds that fawlessnes5 and crime are rampant and there is a direct threat to peace and tranquillity in certain areas within the State, it is competent to . deal with offences which affect .the maintenance of public order . and preservation of peace, and tranquillity in those areas as a class by themselves and to provide that such offences shall be tried as expeditiously as possible in accord- 1 ance with a special procedure devised for the purpose.\n\nThis, in my opinion, is in plain language the rationale of the Ordinance, and it will be going too far to say that in no case and under no circumstances can a legislature lay down a special procedure for the trial of a particular class of offences, and that recourse to a simplified and less cumbrous procedure for the trial of those offences, even when abnormal conditions prevail, will amount to a violation of article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nI am satisfied that this case is distinguishable from the case relating to the West Bengal Act, but I also feel that the legislatures should have recourse to legislation such as the present only in very special circumstances.\n\nThe question of referring indi~ vidiual cases to the special court does not arise in this appeal, and l do not wish t() express any opinion on it.\n\nCertain other points were urged on behalf of the appellant, namely, that the Ordinance suffers from excessive delegation of legislative authority, and that\n\n• ...\n\n~ ...\n\nthe Rajpramukh had exceeded his powers in amending the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. These contentions were found to be devoid of all force and have to be rejected.\n\nIn the result, I would hold that the Suarashtra State :Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance is not unconstitutional, and accordingly overrule the objection as to clie jurisdiction of the spedal court to try the appellant .\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The principal point for decision in the appeal is whether section 11 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance (No. LXVI), 1949, wllich came into force on 2nd November, 1949, is hit by article 14 of the Constitution inas.\n\nmuch as it mentions no basis for the differential treat~ ment prescribed in the Ordinance for trial of criminals in certain cases and for certain offences. Section 11 of the Ordinance is in these terms:-\n\n\"A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of 9ffences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government of the United State of Saurashtra may, by general or special order in writing, direct.\"\n\nThis section is in identical terms with section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act (Act X of 1950), section 5(1) of that Act provided as follows:-\n\n\"A Special Coun shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may; by general or special order in writing, direct.\"\n\nThe question whether section 5(1) of the West Bengal Act (X of 1950) was hit by art'icle 14 of the Constitution was answered in the affirmative by this court in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Al~ Sarkar etc.(1) In that case I was of the opinion that even if the statute on the face of it was not discriminatory, it was so in its effect and operation inasmuch as it vested in the executive government unregulated official discretion and therefore had to be adjudged unconstitutional. Section 11 of the Ordinance, like section 5(1)\n\n(1) f19521 S.C.R. 284.\n\n' Kathi Raning Rawat_ v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nKathi Ran in g\n\n&wat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nof the West Bengal Act, suggests no reasonable basis or classification either in respect of offences or in respect of cases.\n\nIt has laid down no measure for the grouping either of persons or of cases or of offences by which measure thse groups could be distinguished from those outside the purview of the special Act.\n\nThe State Government can choose a case of a person similarly situate and hand it over to the special tribunal and leave the case of another person in the same circumstances to be tried by the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nIt can direct that the offence of simple hurt be tried by the special tribunal while a more serious offence be tried in the ordinary way.\n\nThe notification m this case fully illustrates the point.\n\nOffence of simple hurt punishable with two years' rigorous imprisonment is included in the list of offences to be tried by the Special Judge, while a more serious offence of the same kind punih able with heavier punishment under section 308 is excluded from the list. It is the mischief of section 11 of the Ordinance that makes such discrimination possible. To my mind, offences falling in the group of section 302 to 308, Indian Penal Code possess common characteristic and the appellant can reasonably complain of hostile discrimination.\n\nI am therefore of the opinion that section 11 of the Ordinance is unconstitutional and the conviction of the appellant under the Ordinance by the special judge is bad and must be quashed. There will be a retrial of the appellant under the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. ' The contention of the learned counsel for the State that the provisions oi. the Ordinance are in some respects distinguishable from the provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act cannot be sustained. Reference was made to section 9 of the Ordinance which is in these terms :-\n\n\"The Government of the United State of\n\n• •\n\nSaurashtra may by notification in the official gazette constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification.\" \"l\"-\"\n\nThis section is in the same terms as section 3 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act. It only empowers the\n\nState Government to constitute Special Courts for any area or for the whole of the State of Saurashtra in the like manner in which section 3 empowered the West Bengal Government to constitute special courts for the whole of the State or any particular area.\n\nIt does not in any way limit or curtail the power conferred on the State Government by the provisions of section 11. Reference was also made to the preamble of the original Orditiance which uses the familiar conventional phraseology.\n\n\"An Ordinance to provide for public safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and trartquillity in the State of Saurashtra.\"\n\nThese words cannot limit the plain and unambiguous language of section 11 of the Ordinance which authorises the State Government to send any case or commit persons guilty of any offence to the special judge for trial by the procedure prescribed in the Ordinance.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-The appellant before us was tried, along with two other persons, by the Special Judge, Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Saurashtra State, on charges of murder, attempted murder and robbery under sections 302, 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 34. By his judgment dated 20th December, 1950, the Special Judge convicted the appellant on all three charges and sentenced him to death under section 302 and to seven years' rigorous imprisonment both under ctions 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code. The c6nviction and sentences were upheld by the High Court of Saurashtra on appeal.\n\nThe appellant has now come to this court on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court under article 132(1) and 134(1) (c) of the Constitution.\n\nThe appeal has not been heard on 'its merits as yet.\n\nIt was set down for hearing on certain preliminary points of law raised by the learned counsel for the appellant attacking the legality of the entire trial on the ground that section 11 of the Saurashtra Public\n\n1!>52\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRawat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtr11.\n\nMahajan f. '\n\nKathi Ranin g\n\n Rawal v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nMukhe?jea /.\n\nSafety Measures Ordinance No. XL VI of 1949 passed by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra as well as the Notification issued by the State Government on 9/llth February, 1951, under which the Special Court was constituted and the trial held, were void and inoperative. The first and themain ground upon which the constitutional validity of the section and the notification has been assailed is that they are in conflict with the provision of article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe other point raised is that the provision of section 11 of the Ordinance is illegal as it amounts to delegation of essential legislative powers by the State Legislature to the Executive.\n\nSo far as the first point is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed great reliance upon the majority decision of this court in two analogous appeals from the Calcutta High Court (being cases Nos. 2'17 and 298 of 1951(1), where a similar questron arose in regard to the validity of section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950.\n\nIn fact, it was because of our pronouncement in the Calcutta appeals that is was considered desirable to have the ptesent case heard on the preliminary points of law. . It is not disputed that the language of section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance, with which we are now concerned, is identically the same as that of section 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act. The wording of the section is as follows:. ''11. Jurisdiction of Special Judges- . A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government of the United State of Saurashtra may, by general or special order in wt'iting, direct.;.' In the West Bengal Act there is a further provision embodied in clause (2) of section 5 which lays down that no such direction as is contemplated by clause (1) could be given in respect of cases pending before ordinary criminal courts at the date when the Act came into force. No such exception has been made in the Saurashtra Ord'inance.\n\nIn the Calcutta cases referred (!) Since reported as [19521 S.C.R. 284.\n\n.....\n\nto above, the notification under section 5(1) of the West Bengal Act directed certain individual cases in which specified persons were involved to be tried by the Special Court and it was held by the High Court of Calcutta that section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special\n\nCourts Act to the extent that it empowers the State Government to direct any case to be tried by Special Courts was void as offending against the provision of the equal protection clause in article 14 of the Constitutt\"on; and this view was affirmed in appeal by a majority of this court.\n\nWith regard to the remaining part of section 5(1), which authorises the State Government to direct, \"offences, classes of offences .. or classes of cases\" for trial by Special Courts, the majority of the Judges of the Calcutta High Court were of opinion that it was not obnoxious to article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIn the present case the notification, that was issued by the Saurashtra State Government on 9/llth February, 1951, did not relate to individual cases.\n\nThe notification constituted in the first place a Special Court in the areas specified in the schedule. It appointed in the next place a judge to preside ovs:r the Special Court and finally gave a list of offences with reference to appropriate sections of the Indian Penal Code which were to l:ie tried by the Special Judge. If the view taken by the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court and the majority of his colleagues is right, such notification and that part of section 11 of the ordinance, under which it was issued, could not be challenged as being in conflict with article 14 of the Constitution. This point did come . up for considera~ tion before us in the appeals against the Calcutta decision with reference to the corresponding part of section 5(1) of the West Bengal Act, but although a majority of this court concurred in dismissmg the appeals, there was no such majority in the pronouncement of any final opinion on this particular point.\n\nIn my judgment in the. Calcutta appeals I was sceptical about the correctness of the view taken upon this point by the learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court and the majority of liis colleagues. The\n\nS\\I .\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRawae ·\n\nThe State <>f\n\nSaurashtra;\n\nMuftheriea f.\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRilwat\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nMuk.herjea /.\n\n' consideration that weighed with me was that as the learned Judges were definitely of opinion that the necessity of speedier trial, as set out in the preamble, was too elusive and uncertain a criterion to form the basis of a proper classification, the authority given by section 5(1) of the Special Courts Act to the State Government to direct any class of cases or offences to be tried by the Special Court would be an unguided authority and the propriety of the classification made by the State Government that is said to be implied in the direction could not be tested with reference to any definite legislative policy or standard.\n\nMr.\n\nSen, appearing for the State of Saurashtra, has argued before us that in this respect the Saurashtra Ordinance stands on a different footing and he has referred in this connection to the preamble to the orig'inal ordinance as well as the circumstances which necessitated the present one. As the question is an important one and is not concluded by our previous decision, it merits in my opinion, a careful consideration.\n\nIt may be stated at the outset that the Ctiminal Procedure Code of India as such has no application to the State of Saurashtra.\n\nAfter the State acceded to the Indian Union, there was an Ordinance promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 5th of April, 1948, which introduced the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of India (Act V of 1898) with certain modifications into the Saurashtra State. Another ordinance, known as the Public Safety Measures Ordinance, was passed on the 2nd of April, 1948, and this ordinance, like similar other public safety measures obtaining in other States, provided -for preventive detention, imposition of collective fines, control of essential supplies and similar other matters.\n\nOn 11th of November, 1949, the present ordinance was passed by way of amendment of the Public Safety Measures Ordinance and inter alia it made provisions for the establishment of special courts. Section 9 of this Ordinance empowers the State Goverment to constitute special courts of criminal jurisdiction for such areas as may be specified in the notification.\n\nSection IO relates to appointment\n\n... ..\n\n....\n\n......\n\nof Special Judges who are to preside over such courts and section 11 lays down that the Special Judge shall try \"such offences or classes of offences ........ or classes of cases as the Government of United State of Saurashtra may, by general or special order in writing, -~Iirect.\" The procedure to be followed by the Special Judges 'is set out in sections 12 to 18 of the Ordinance. In substance the Special Court is given the status of a sessions court, although committal proceedings is eliminated and so also is trial by jury or with the aid of assessors.\n\nThe Special Judge has only to make a memorandum of the evidence and he can refuse to summon any wftness if he is satisfied after examination of the accused that the evidence of such witness would not be material. 'section 16(1) curtails the period of litn.itatiqn within\n\nwhicli an accused convicted by the Special Judge has to file his appeal before the High Court and clause (3) of the section provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to transfer any case .from any Special Judge or make any order under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe ordinance certainly lacks some of the most objectionable features of the West Bengal Act. Thus it has not taken away the High Court's power of revision, nor does it expose the accused to the chance of being convicted of a major offence though he stood charged with a minor one. There is also no provision in the ordinance similar to that in the West Bengal Act which enables the court to proceed with the trial in the absence of the accused. But although the ardinance in certain respects compares favourably with the West Bengal Act, the procedure which it lays down for the Special Judge to follow does differ on material points from the normal procedure prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Code and as these differences abridge the rights of the accused who are to be tried by the Special Court, and deprive them of certain benefits to which they would otherwise have been entitled under the general law, the ordinance prim a f acie makes discrimination and the question has got to be answered whether such discrimination brings it in conflict with article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nKathi Ran in g\n\nRawat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaura1htr11.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\n195.2\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRawat .\n\nTk State of\n\nSaurtuhtra.\n\nMuk._herjea J,\n\nThe nature and scope of the guarantee that is implied in the equal protection clause of our Constitution have been explained and discussed in more than one decision of this court and do not require repetition. It is well settled that a legislature for the purpose of dealing with the complex problems that arise out of an infinite variety of human relations, cannot but proceed upon some sort of selection or classification of persons upon whom . the legislation is 1:9 operate. The consequence of such classification would undoubtedly be to differentiate the persons belonging to that class from others, but that by itself would not make the legislation obnoxious to the equal protection clause.\n\nEquality prescribed by the Constitution would not be violated if the statute operates equally on all persons who are included in the group, and the classification is not arbitrary or capricious, but bears a reasonable relation to the objective which the legislation has in view. The legislature is given the utmost latitude in making the classification and it is only when there is a palpable abuse of power and the differences made have no rational relation to the objectives of the legislation, that necessity of judicial interference arises.\n\nSection 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance so far as it is material for our present purpose lays down that a Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences... or classes of cases as the State Government may ..\n\ndirect\". This part of the section undoubtedly contemplates a classification to be made of offences and cases but no classification appears on the terms of the statute itself which merely gives an authority to the State Government to deterrnine what classes of cases or offences are to be tried by the special tribunal. The question arises at the outset as to whether such statute is not on the face of it discriminatory as it commits to the discretion of an administrative body or officials the: duty of_ making selection or classification for purposes of the legislation; and there is a still further question, namely, by what . tests, if any, is the propriety of the administrative action to be adjudged and what would be the remedy of the aggrieved person if the\n\n' ..\n\nclassification made by the administrative body is arbitrary or capricious?\n\nIt is a doctrine of the American courts which seems to me to be well-founded on principle that the equal protection clause can be invoked not merely where discrimination appears on the express terms of the statute itself, but also when it is the result of improper or prejudiced execution of the law().\n\nBut a statute will not necessarily be condemned as discriminatory, because it does not make the classification itself but, as an effective way of carrying out its policy, vests the authority to do it in certain officers or administrative bodies. Illustrations of one class of such cases are to be found in various regulations in the U. S. A. which are passed by States in exercise of police powers for the purposes of protecting public health or welfare or to regulate trades, buiness and occupations which may become unsafe or dangerous when unrest.rained.\n\nThus there are regulations where discretion is lodged by law irr public officers or boards to grant or withhold licence to keep taverns or sell spirituous liquors(2), or other commodities like milk( 3 ) or cigarettes{').\n\nSimilarly, there are regulations relating to appointment of river pilots(5) and other trained men necessary for particularly difficult jobs and in such cases, ordinarily, conditions are laid down by the statute, on compliance with which a candidate is considered qualified.\n\nBut even then the appointI!lcnt board has got a discretion to exercise and the fact of the candidate for a particular post is submitted to the judgment of the officer or the board as the case may be.\n\nIt is true that these cases are of a somewhat different nature than the one we arc dealing with; but it seems to me that the principle underlying all these cases is the same. The whole problem is one of choosing the method by which the legislative policy is to be eff ectuated.\n\nAs has been observed by Frankfurter J. in (I) Vitle Weaver on Constitutional Law, p. 404. (2-) Crowley v. Christensen, 137 US. 86.\n\n(3) People of the State of New York v. Toh. E. V.rn De C•rr,\n\n199 U.S. 552. ( 4) G11ndlint v. Cliic1110, 177 U.S. 183.\n\n(5) Kotd v. BOlll'tl of Ri\"\" Pon Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552.\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRaU.at\n\nThe State of • Saurashtra.\n\nM u'l(, l1erjea T.\n\n1952 Tinger v. Texas('), \"laws are not abstract propos1t1ons Kathi &ming ·: • bt are expressions of policy arising out of specific Rawfll difficulties addressed to the attainment of specific ends v. by the use of specific remedies.\" In my opinion, if The State of the legislative policy is clear and definite and as an Saurashtra. ., e_ffec~'ve method of carrying out that policy a discre-\n\nMuk,, herjea /. tion 1s vested by the statute upon a body of administrators or officers to make selective application of the law to certain classes or groups of persons, the statute itself cannot be condemned as a piece of discriminatory legislation. After all \"the law does all that Is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy .•• and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far as its means allow(2)''.\n\nIn such cases, the power given to the executive body would inlport a duty on it to classify the subject-matter of legislation in accordance with the objective indicated in the statute. The discretion that is conferred on official agencies in such circumstances is not an unguided discretion; it has to be exercised in conformity with the policy to effectuate which the direction is given and it is in relation to that objective that the propriety of the classification would have to be tested. If the administrative body proceeds to classify persons or things on a basis which has no rational relation to the objective of the legislature, its action can certainly be annulled as offending against the equal protection clause. On the other hand, if the statute itself does not disclose a definite policy or objective and it corifer& authority on another to make selection at its pleasure, the statute would be held on the face of it to be discriminatory irrespective of the way in which it is applied.\n\nThis, it seems to me, is the true principle underlying the decision of the Supreme Court of America in Yick W o\n\nv. Hopkins(').\n\nThe object of the ordinance of the City and County of San Francisco, which came up for consideration in that case, was, as found by the court, not to regulate laundry business in that locality in the interests of the general public ('). The business was\n\n(1) 310 U.S. 141at147.\n\n(2) Vide Buck v. Bell, 214 U.S. 200, 208. (3l 118 u. s. 356. 13 (4 Vide the observations of Field J. in Crowley v. Christensen, 7 u. s. 86, 94.\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nII ..\n\nharmless m itself and useful to the community.\n\nNo policy was indicated or object declared by the legislature, but an uncontrolled discretion was given to the Board of Supervisors who could refuse license at their pleasure to anybody carrying on laundry business in wooden buildings.\n\nThe classification contemplated by the statute was an arbitrary classification depending on the caprice of the Board, and consequently it was condemned as discriminatory on the face of it; its application against the Chinese was a confirmation of the discriminatory character and the really hostile intention of the legislation. I would be inclined to think that the West Bengal case, which we have decided already, comes with'in the purview of this principle, as the desirability of \"speedier trial\", which is hinted at in the preamble to the West Bengal Act, is too vague, elusive and uncertain a thing to amount to an enunciation of a definite policy or objective on the basis of which any proper classification could be made.\n\nThe matter has been left to the. unfettered discretion of the State Government which can classify offences or cases in any way they like without regard to any objective and as such the statute is open to the challenge of making arbitrary discrimination.\n\nThe point that requires consideration 'is, whether the Saurashtra Ordinance presents any distinguishing features or occupies the same position as the West Bengal Act?\n\nAs has been stated already, section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance is worded in exactly the same manner as section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act; and that part of it, with which we are here concerned authorises the State Government to direct any classes of offences or cases to be tried by the special tribunal.\n\nThe State Government, therefore, has got to make a classification of cases or offences before it issues its directions to the Special Court. The question is, on what basis is the classification to be made? If it depends entirely upon the pleasure of the State Government to make any classification it likes, without any guiding principle at all, it cannot certainly be a proper classification, which requires that a reasonable relation must exist\n\n1....:.5 S, C, India /71\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nMuk.herjea f.\n\nKathi Rani111\n\nRawat v.\n\nThe state of Mukherjea /.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nbetween the classification and the objective that the legislation has in view.\n\nOn the other hand if the legislature indicates a definite objective and 'the discretion has been vested in the State Government as a means of ach'ieving that object, the law itself, as I have said above, cannot be held to be discriminatory, though the action of the State Government may be condemned if it offends against the equal protection clause, by making an arbitrary selection.\n\nNow, the earlier ordinance, to which the present one is a subsequent addition by way of amendment, was passed by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on 2nd April, 1948.\n\nIt is described as an ordinance to provide for the security of the State, maintenance of public order and maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community in the State of Saurashtra. The preamble to the ordinance sets out the objective of the ordinance in identical terms.\n\nIt is to be noted that the integration of several States in Kathiawar which now form the State of Saurashtra, was completed some time in February, 1948.\n\nIt appears from the affidavit of an officer of the Horne Government of the Saurashtra State that soon after the integration took place, an alarming state of lawlessness prevailed in some of the districts within the State. There were gangs of dacoits operating at different places and their number began to increase gradually.\n\nAs ordinary law was deemed insufficient to cope with the nefarious activities of those criminal gangs, the Saurashtra Public Safety Measures Ordinance was promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 2nd April, 1948.\n\nThe Ordinance, as stated already, provided principally for preventive detention and imposition of collective fines; and it was hoped that armed with these extraordinary powers the State Government would be able to bring the situation under control.\n\nThese hopes, however, were belied, and the affidavit gives a long list of offences in which murder and nose-cutting figure conspicuously in addition to looting and dacoity, which were committed by the <lacoits during the years 1948 and 1949.\n\nIn view of this ugly situation in . the State, the new ordinance was\n\n. \" (.• -\n\npassed on 11th of November, 1949, and this ordinance provides inter alia for the establishment of Special Courts which are to try offenders under a special procedure. Acting under section 11 of the Ordinance, the Government issued a notification on 9/llth February, 1950, which constituted a Special Court for areas specified in the schedule, and here again the affidavit shows that all these areas are included in the districts of Gohilwad, Madhya Saurashtra and Sorath, where the tribe of marauders principally flourished.\n\nThe object of passing this new ordinance is identically the same for which the earlier ordinance was passed, and the preamble to the latter, taken along with the surroundmg circumstances, discloses a definite legislative policy which has been sought to be effectuated by the different provisions contained in the enactment. If Special Courts were considered necessary to cope with an abnormal situation, it cannot be said that the vesting of authority in the State Government to select offences for trial by such courts is in any way unreasonable ..\n\nIn the light of the principles stated already, I am unable to hold that section 11 of the Ordinance in so far as it authorises the State Government to direct classes of offences or cases to be tried by the Special\n\nCourt offends against the provision of the equal protection clause m our Constitution. If the notification that has been issued by the State Government proceeds on any arbitrary or unreasonable basis, obviously that could be challenged as unconstitutional.\n\nIt is necessary, therefore, to examine the terms of the notification and the list of offences it has prescribed.\n\nThe notification, as said above constitutes a Special Court for the areas mentioned in the Schedule and appoints Mr. P. P. Anand as a Special Judge to preside over the Special Court. The offences triable by the Special Court are then set out with reference to the specific sections of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Chibber attacks the classification of offences made in this Ii.st primarily on the ground that while it mentions offences of a particular character, it excludes at the same time other . offences of a cognate character m reference to\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nKathi Ran in g Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nMuk_herjea /.\n\nwhich no difference in treatment is justifiable. It is pointed out that while section 183 of the Indian Penal Code is mentioned in the list, sections 184, 186 and 188 which deal with similar offences are excluded.\n\nSimilarly the list does not mention section 308, Indian Penal Code, though it mentions section 307.\n\nThe learned counsel relies in this connection upon the decis\\on of the Supreme Court of America in Skinner v.\n\nOklahoma('). In that case the question for consideration related to the constitutionality of a certain statute of Oklahoma which provided for sterilization of certain habitual criminals who were convicted two or more times in any State of felony involving moral turpitude.\n\nThe statute applied to persons guilty of larceny, which was a felony, but not to embezzlement, and it was held that the legislation violated the equal protection clause. It is undoubtedly a sound and reasonable proposition that when the nature of two offences is intrinsically the same and they are punishable in the same manner, a person accused of one should not be treated differently from a person accused of the other, because it is an essential principle unde'rlying the equal protection clause that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.\n\nAt tl1e same time it is to be noted as Douglas J. observed in the very case that in determining the reach and scope of particular legislation it is not necessary for the legilsJature to provide abstract symmetry. \"It may mark and set apart the classes and types of problems according to the needs and as dictated or suggested by experience.\" A too rigid iinsistance therefore on a .thing like scientific classification is neither practicable nor desirable. It is true that the notification mentions section 183 of the Indian Penal Code, though it omits section 184; but I am unable to hold that the two are identically of the same nature. Section 183 deals wlth resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of public servant; while section 184 relates to obstructing sale of property offered for sale\n\n{1) 316 U.S. 535.\n\n> >-\n\n_;. --loby authority of public servant.\n\nSection 186 on the other hand does not relate to the taking of property at all, but is concerned with obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public duties.\n\nThen again I am not sure that it was incumbent upon the State Government to include section 308, Indiian Penal Code, in the list simply because they included section 307.\n\nIt is true that culpable homicide as well as attempt to murder are specified in the list; but an attempt to commit culpable homicide i, s certainly a less heinous offence and the State Government might think it proper, having regard to all the facts known to them, that an offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide does not require a special treatment.\n\nBe that as it may, I do not think that a meticulous examination of the various offences specified in the list with regard to their nature and punishment is necessary for purposes of this case.\n\nThe appellant before us was accused of murder punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no other offence, I believe, described in the Indian Penal Code, which can be placed on an identical footing as murder.\n\nEven culpable homicide not amounting to murder is something less heinous than murder, although it finds a place in the list. In my opinion, the appellant can have no right to complain if he has not been agrieved in any way by any unjust or arbitrary classification.\n\nAs he is accused of murder and dacoity and no offences of a similar nature are excluded from the list, I do not think that it is open to h'im to complain of any violation of equal protection clause in the notification.\n\nThere are quite a number of offences specified in the notification and they are capable of being grouped under various heads.\n\nSimply because certain offences whiieh could have been mentioned along with similiar others in a particular group have been omitted therefrom, it cannot be said that the whole list is bad. The question of inequality on the ground of such omission can be raised only by the person who is directed to be tried under the special\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nMuk_herjea /.\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRat.vat\n\n. v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nprocedure for a certain offence, whereas for commis~ sion of a similar offence not mentioned in the list another person has still the advantages of the ordinary procedure open to him. In my opinion, therefore, the first point raised on . behalf of the appellant cannot succeed.\n\nThe other point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant which relates to the question of delegation of legislative authority by the Rajpramukh to the State Government admits, I think, of a short answer.\n\nIt is conceded by the learned counsel that the facts of this case are identical with those of King Emperor v.\n\nBenoarilal Sarma(') which was decided by the Privy\n\nCouncil. In fact, the language of section 5 of the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance (No. II of 1942) whkh came up for consideration in that case is almost the same as that of section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance.\n\nIt was held by the Privy Council that it was not a case of delegated legislation at all, but merely an example of the not uncommon legislative arrangement by which the local application of the provision of a statute is determined by the judgment of a local administrative body as to its necessity.\n\nIn other words, it was a case of conditional legislation coming within the rule of Queen v. Burah (2). The pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Benoarilal's case(') has been accepted and acted upon by this court in more than one case and it is too late now to question its correctness.\n\nMy conclusion, ltherefore, is that both the preliminary points must be disallowed and the appeal should be heard on its merits.\n\nDAS J.-The appellant before us was tried by a Special Court constituted under the Saurashtra Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance No. LXVI of 1949 for offences alleged to have been committed by him under sections 302, 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code. On December 20, 1950 he was found guilty of the offences charged against . him and was convicted and sentenced to death under section 302,\n\n(I) 72 I.A. 57.\n\n(2) 3 App. Cas. 889.\n\n.. .,\n\n} +· -\n\nIndian, Penal Code, and to seven years' rigorous imprisonment under each of the charges under sections 307 and 392, Indian Penal Code, the sentences of imprisonment running concurrently.\n\nHe appealed to the High Court of Saurashtra but the High Court, by its judgment pronounced on February 28, 1951, rejected h'is appeal and confirmed his conviction and the sentences passed by the Special Court. By its order made on March 21, 1951, however, the High Court granted him a certificate for appeal to this Court both under article 132 and article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution.\n\nThis appeal has accordingly been filed in this Court.\n\nA preliminary point has been raised by learned counsel for the appellant, namely, that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to try this case and the whole trial and conviction .have been illegal and void ab initio and should be quashed in limine. It is necessary, for the disposal of the preliminary objection, to refer to the provisions of the Ordinance and the cfrcumstances in which the Special Court came to be constituted.\n\nIn the beginning of 1948 the different States in Kathiawar were integrated into what is now the State of Saurashtra. About that time different dacoits indulged in lawless activ'ities in Kathiawar and in particular in the area now known as the districts of Gohilwad and Madhya Saurashtra and on the outskirts of Sorath that was formerly a district in Junagadh State.\n\nTheir activities gathered such strength and virulence that the security of the State and the maintenance of public peace became seriously endangered. In order to check their nefarious activities the Rajpramukh of the State of Saurashtra on April 2, 1948, promulgated Ordinance No. IX of 1948. The preamble of the Ordinance recited that it was \"expedient to provide for public safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra.\" That Ordinance gave power to the State Government to make orders, amongst other things, for detaining or restricting the movements or\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRawat\n\n. v. ' The State of Saurashtra. ·\n\nDas/.\n\nK•thi Raning\n\nRawat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaur•shtra.\n\nDas/.\n\nactions of persons and impose collective fines.\n\nThe Rajpramukh on April 5, 1948, promulgated another Ordinance No. XII of 1948 which extended to the State of Saurashtra the provisio1111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) subject to certain adaptations and modifications mentioned in the Schedule thereto.\n\nIt appears from the affidavit of Ramnikrai Bhagwandas Vesavada, Assistant Secretray in the Home Depaitment, Government of Saurashtra, that the Ordinance was not sufliCient to cope with the activities of the gangs of dacoits and that cases of looting, dacoity, robbery, nose-cutting and murder continued as before and indeed increased in number, frequency and vehemence and it became impossible to deal with the offences at different places in separate Courts of law expeditiously. In view of the serious situatibn prevailing in those districts the Stiate of Saurashtra considered , it necessary ' to constitute Special Courts and to provide for a special procedure of trials so as to expedite the disposal of cases in which offences. of certain specified kinds had been committed.\n\nThe Rajpramukh of Saurashtra accordingly, on November 2, 1949, promulgated Ordinance No. LXVI of 1949 called \"The Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949\", whereby it amended the Saurashtra\n\nState Public Safety Measures Ordinance (No. IX of 1948). By section 4 of the Ordinance No. LXVI of 1949 several section were added to Ordinance No. IX -0f 1948.\n\nThree of the sections thus added, which are material for our present purposes, were sections 9, 10 and 11 which run as follows:-\n\n\"9.\n\nSpecial Courts.-The Government of the United State of the Saurashtra may by notification In the Official Gazette constitute Special Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification.\n\n10. Special Judges.-The Government of the\n\nUnited State of Saurashtra may appoimt a Special Judge to preside over a Special Court constituted '\".! under section 9 for any area any person who has been\n\n• -·\n\na Sessions Judge for a period of not less than 2 years under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as applied to the United State of Saurashtra. 11.\n\nJurisdiction of Special Judges.- A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government of the United State of Saurashtra may, by general or special order in writing, direct.\"\n\nPursuant to the provisions of the Ordinance as amended the State of Saurashtra issued a notification, the material part of which is as follows:~\n\n\"No. H/35-5-C-In exercise of the powers conferred bv sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance, 1948, (Ordinance -No. IX of 1948), (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance), Government is pleased to direct-\n\n(i) That a Special Court of a Criminal Jurisdiction, (hereinafter referred to as the said Court) shall be constituted for the areas, mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed, and that the headquarters of the said Court shall be at Rajkot,\n\n(ii) that Mr. P. P. Anand shall be .appointed as a Special Judge to preside over the said Court and\n\n(iii) that the Special Judge hereby appointed shall try the following offences, viz.- ( a) offences under sections 183, 189, 190, 212, 216, 224, 302, 304, 307, 323 to 335, 341 to 344, 379 to 382, 384 to 389 and 392 to 402 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (XLV of 1860), as adapted and applied to the United State of Saurashtra, and\n\n(b) all offences under the said Ordinance, except an offence punishable under sub-section ( 6) of section 2 of the said Ordinance, in. so far as it relates to the contravention of an order made under clause (a) of subsection ( 1) of the said section.\"\n\nThe appellant having been charged with offences included in the Notification he was tried by the Special - tt#· Court with the result I have mentioned.\n\nThe pre-\n\n- liminary objection raised on his behalf is that section\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nDas].\n\nKathi N.aning\n\nRawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nDas/.\n\n11 of the Ordinance is invalid in that (a) it offends against article 14 of our Constitution, and (b) it authorises illegal delegation of legislative power to the State Government.\n\nIn support of the first ground on which the preliminary objection is founded reliance is placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in Case No. 2'Yl of 1951 (The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar). That case was concerned with the validity of the trial of the respondent therein by a Special Court constituted under the provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 (West Bengal Act X of 1950). The preamble to that Act recited that it was \"expedient to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences\".\n\nSections 3, 4 and 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, reproduced substantially, if not verbatim, the provisions of sections 9, IO and 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance of 1948 as subsequently amended.\n\nThe notification issued by the State of West Bengal under that Act was, however, different from the notification issued by the State of Saurashtra in that the West Bengal notification directed certain specific \"cases\" to be tried by the Special Court constituted under the West Bengal Special Courts Act.\n\nThat notification had obviously been issued under that part of section 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act which authorised the State Government to direct particular \"cases\" to be tried by the Special Court. A majority of this court held that at any rate section 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act in so far as it authorised the State to direct \"cases\" to be tried by the Special Court and the notification issued thereunder offended against the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution and as such were void under article 13.\n\nThe Saurashtra notification, however, has been issued quite obviously under that part of section 11 which authorises the State Government to direct \"offences\", \"classes of offences\" or \"classes of cases\" to be tried by the Special Court and the question before us on the present appeal is whether that part of section 11 nnder\n\nwhich the . present notification has been issued offends against the equal protection clause of our Constitution.\n\nIt is contended that the opm1on expressed by the majority of this Court in the West Bengal case on the corresponding part of section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act was not necessary for the purposes of that appeal and requires reconsideration.\n\nAfter referring to our previous decisions m Chiranjit Dal Choudhury v.\n\nThe Union of India and Others(1) and The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara(2), I summarised the meaning, scope and effect of article 14 of our Constitution, as. I understand it, in my judgment in the West Bengal case which I need not repeat but to which I fully . adhere. It 1s now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification fur the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two condi'tions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intel- 'ligible differentia whlch distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.\n\nWhat is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act.\n\nIt will be noticed that section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance like section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, refers to four distinct categories, namely, \"offences\", \"classes of offences\", \"cases\" and \"classes of cases\" and empowers the State Government to direct any one or more of these categories to be tried by the Special Court constituted under the Act.\n\nThe expressions \"offences\", \"classes of offences\" and \"classes of cases\" clearly indicate and obviously imply a process of classification of offences or cases.\n\n( 1) [1950] S. C. R. 869.\n\n(2) A. I. R. (1951) S. C. 318 at p. 326. [1951] S. C.R. 682.\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nDM /.\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nDas/.\n\nPrima facie those word~ do not contemplate any part!- cular offender or any particular accused in any particular case. The emphasis is on '\"offences\", \"classes of offences\" or \"cla.%es of cases.\" The classification of\n\n\"offences\" by itself is not calculated to touch any individual as such, although it may, after the classification is made, affect all individuals who may commit the particular offence.\n\nIn short, the classification implied in this part of the sub-section has no reference to, and is not directed towards, the singling out of any particular person as an object of hostile State action but is concerned only with the grouping of \"offences\",\n\n\"classes of offences': and \"classes of cases\" for the purposes of the particular legislation as recited in its preamble.\n\nAn argument was raised, as in the West Bengal case, that even this part of the section gave an un- . controlled and unguided power of classification which might well be exercised by the State Government capriciously or \"with an evil eye and an unequal hand\" so as to deliberately bring about invidious discrimination between man and man althougli both of them. were situated in exactly the same or similar circumstances. I do not accept this argument as sound, for, the reasons I adopted in my judgment in the West Bengal case in repelling this argument apply with equal, if not with greater, force to the argument directed against the validity of the Saurashtra Ordinance.\n\nIt is obvious that this part of section 11 of the Ordinance which, like the corresponding part 0£ section 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, confers a power on the State Government to make a classification of \"offences\", \"classes of offences\" or \"classes of cases\", makes it the duty of the State government to make a proper classification, that is to say, a classification which must fulfil both conditions, namely that it must be based on some intelligible differentia distinguishing the offences grouped together from other offences and that that differentia must have a reasonable relation to the object of the Act as recited in the preamble.\n\n~ • ..,_ classification on a basis which does not distinguish one offence from another offence or which has no relation to the object of the Act will be wholly arbitrary and may well be hit by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jack Skinner v.\n\nOklahoma(1). On the other hand, as I observed in the West Bell.'Sal case, it is easy to visualise a situation 1 when certain offences, by reason of the frequency of ._. their perpetration or other attending circumstances, may legitimately call for a special treatment in order to check the commission of such offences. Are we not familiar with gruesome crimes of murder, arson, loot and rape committed on a large scale during communal riots in particular localities and are they not really different from a case of a stray murder, arson, loot or rape in another district which may not be affected by • any communal upheaval ? Does not the existence of :r the gangs of dacoits and the concomitant crimes committed on a large scale as mentioned in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State call for prompt and speedier trial for the maintenance of public order and the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State and indeed of the very safety of the community? Do not\n\n1 - those special circumstances add a peculiar quality to the offences or classes of offences specified in the notification so as to distinguish them from stray cases of similar crimes and is it not reasonable and even -\n\nnecessary to the State with power to classify them into a separate group and deal with them promptly?\n\nI have no doubt in my mind that the surrounding circumstances and the special features mentioned in the affidavit referred to above furnish a very cogent and reasonable basis of classification, for they do clearly distinguish these offences from similar or even same pecies of offences committed eLsewhere and under ordinary circumstances. This differentia quite clearly has a reasonable relation to the object sought ' to be achieved by the Act, namely, the maintenance of public order, the preservation of public safety, the peace and tranquillity of the State. Such a classification\n\n(1) 216 U.S. 535; L, Ed. 1655.\n\nKathi Raning'\n\nRawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nDas/.\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nDas].\n\nwill not be repugnant to the equal protection ._ clause of our Constitution, for there will be no discri- .,. mination, for whoever may commit the specified offence in the specified area in the specified circumstances will be treated alike apd sent up before a Special Court for trial under the specia1 procedure.\n\nPersons thus sent up for trial by a Special Court according to the special procedure cannot point their f lingers to the other persons who may be charged be- ..- fore an ordinary Court with similar offences alleged to have been committed by them in a different place and in different circumstances and complain of un- . equal treatment, for those other persons are of a different category and are not their equals.\n\nIn my judgment, this part of the section,· properly construed and understood, does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government.\n\nOn the \" contrary, this power, is controlled by the necessity for • making a proper classification which is to be guided by the preamble in the sense that the classification must have a rational relation to the object of the Act as recited in the preamble. It is, therefore, not an arbitrary power. The Legislature has left it to the State Government to classify offences or classes of offences or classes of cases for the purpose of the Ordinance, for the State Government is in a better position to judge the needs and exigencies of the State and the Court will not lightly interfere with the decision of the State Government.\n\nIf at any time, however, the State Government classifies offences arbitrarily and not on any reasonable basis having a relation to the object of the Act, its action will be either an abuse of its power if it is purposeful, or in excess of its powers even if it done in good faith, and in either case the resulting discrimination will encounter the challenge of the Constitution and the Court will strike down, not the law which is good, but the abuse or misuse or the unconstitutional admillistration of the ' law creating or resulting in unconstitutional discrimination. In this case, however, the facts stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the. Stat~ n_iake i~ bundanrly ~\n\nclear that the situation in certain parts of the State was sufficient to add a particularly sinister quality to certain specified offences committed within those parts and the State Government legitimately grouped them together in the notification. The criticism that the State Government included certain offences but excluded certain cognate offences has been dealt with by my learned brother Mukherjea and I have nothing more to add thereto.\n\nIn my opinion, for reasons given in my judgment in the West Bengal case and referred to above; section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance in so far as it authorises the State Government to direct offences or classes of offences or classes of cases to be tried by the Special Court does not offend against the equal protection clause of our Constitution and the notification which .it has been issued under that part of the section cannot 7 be held to be invalid or ultra vires.\n\nI • -\n\nOn the question of delegation of legislative power the matter appears to be concluded by the decision of the Privy Council in Benoarilal's ca:se(1) and the section may well be regarded as an instance of conditional legislation.\n\nFurther, I would be prepared to say, for reasons stated in my judgment in the President's Reference(2) that there has been no illegal delegation of legislative power.\n\nFor reasons stated above, I agree that the perliminary point should be rejected and the appeal should be heard on its merits.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYER J.-Mr. Sen tried his best to distinguish this case from our decision on the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, The SMte of West Bengal v. Anwari Ali Sarkar and Gajan Mali('). But in my view he has not succeeded in his attempt.\n\nSections 9 and 11 of the Ordinance in qutaion do not lay down any classification in themselves. The preamble to the earlier Ordinance of 1948, which is still intact as the later one is only an amending\n\n(1) L.R. 72 I.A. 57.\n\n(3) Cases Nos. 297 & 298 of 1951. Since\n\n(2) [1951] S.C.R. 747. reported at [1952] S.C.R. 284.\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.\n\nDas].\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nmeasure, merely refers to the need to provide for public safety, maintenance of public order, and the preservation of peace and tranquillity . in the State of Saurashtra. This by itself indicates no classification, as the object is a general one, which has to be kept in view by every enlightened government or system of administration. Every law dealing with the commission and the punishment of offences is based on this need. The notification under which the Special Court was established no doubt deals with \"offences\" as distinguished from \"cases\" or \"groups of cases,\" but here also, there is no rational classification. Offences presenting the same characteristic features, and cognate in this sense, have been separately dealt withi some of them are to go before the Special Court, while others are left to be tried by the ordinary courts. The circumstance that the deviations from normal procedure prescribed in the Ordinance are not so many or vital, as in the Bengal case, does not in my humble opinion, affect the result, as the defect of the absence of a reasonable or rational classification is still there.\n\nThe negation of comlI}ittal proceedings is a matter of much moment to the accused, as it deprives him of the undoubted advantage of knowing the evidence for the prosecution and discrediting it by cross-exammation, leading possibly to his discharge even at that early stage. ·\n\nThe argument for the respondent that there has been no discrimination as against the appellant vis a vis other persons charged with the same offences is unacceptable. Cognate offences have been left over for trial by the ordinary courts.\n\nIt is no answer to the charge by A of discriminatory legislation to say that B & C have also been placed in the same category as himself, when he finds that D, E & F also liable for the same or kindred offences have been left untouched and are to be tried by ordinary. courts under the normal procedure. Much importance cannot be attached to the affidavit of the Assistant Secretary to _the Government. It may be that all the facts stated by him as regards the frequency and locale of the particular\n\nI •\n\n' .\n\noffences are true.\n\nBut no such grounds for the classification are indicated, much less stated, either in the impugned Ordinance or notification.\n\nThis is certainly not a legal requirement; but a wise prudence suggests the need for such incorporation, as otherwise the as- . certainment of the reasons for the classification from extraneous sources may involve the consideration of what may be regarded as after-thoughts by way of explanation or justification.\n\nIn my view, the West Bengal Special Courts Act decision governs this case also, and section 11 is bad.\n\nIt is unnecessary to deal with the other point raised by the learned counsel for the appellants as regards the delegation of legislative powers involved in the pro tanto repeal of some of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, viz., sections 5 and 28 and the Schedule, especially as it seems concluded against him by the decision in King Emperor v.\n\nBenoari Lal Sarma and Others(1).\n\nThe convictions of the appellant and the sentences imposed on him are set aside, and there will be a retrial under the ordinary procedure.\n\nBosE J.-I agree with my brothers Mahajan and Chandrasekhara Aiyer that the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, offends article 14.\n\nAs I explained in my judgment in The State of West Bengal v.\n\nAnwar Ali Sarkar(2), I prefer not to base my decision on the classification test.\n\nFor the reasons given there I am of opinion that the differentiation here travels beyond bounds which are legitimate. It is true the points of differentiation are not as numerous here as in the other case but the ones which remain are, in my judgment, of a substantial character and cut deep enough to attract the equality clauses in article 14.\n\nI would hold the Ordinance invalid.\n\nPreliminary objection overruled.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.\n\n(1) (1945) 72 I.A. 57.\n\n(2) [1952) S.C.'R. 284. + 1' 92\n\nKathi Rani•t\n\nRilwflt\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtr11 •\n\nChandrasek_1'ar•\n\nA.iyl1f' /.", "total_entities": 319, "entities": [{"text": "S. Subrahmanyam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 432, "end_char": 447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appelliant : S. Subrahmanyam."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 477, "end_char": 488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "KATHI RANING RAWAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 491, "end_char": 509, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 516, "end_char": 539, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 542, "end_char": 558, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 567, "end_char": 575, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 611, "end_char": 614, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 645, "end_char": 660, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 9, 10, 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 739, "end_char": 752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1049, "end_char": 1059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Saurashtra State Public Safety .Measnrcs Ordinance, 19-18, was p~5'ed \"to provide for pul1lic safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra.\""}}, {"text": "Bathina Ramtt krishna Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The procedure laid down by\n\nBathina Ramtt krishna Reddy\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras:."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMadras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1947, "end_char": 1963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The procedure laid down by\n\nBathina Ramtt krishna Reddy\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras:."}}, {"text": "Kathi Ran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1983, "end_char": 1992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kathi Ran in g Rawat\n\n\"· The State of\n\nSaurasktra.", "canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nSaurasktra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2012, "end_char": 2032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kathi Ran in g Rawat\n\n\"· The State of\n\nSaurasktra.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2562, "end_char": 2579, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2751, "end_char": 2768, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2779, "end_char": 2786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2946, "end_char": 2962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of the Constitution and were therefore ultra vires and void :\n\nHeld, per PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J., FAZL Au, MuKHF.llJEA and D1i.s\n\nJJ.-(:~.1EHR\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, CttANDRASEKnA:n.A A1YA1t and BosE Jj.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2970, "end_char": 2977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of the Constitution and were therefore ultra vires and void :\n\nHeld, per PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J., FAZL Au, MuKHF.llJEA and D1i.s\n\nJJ.-(:~.1EHR\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, CttANDRASEKnA:n.A A1YA1t and BosE Jj.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "CHAND\n\nMAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3016, "end_char": 3030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of the Constitution and were therefore ultra vires and void :\n\nHeld, per PATANJALI SAsTRI C. 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L. Chibber", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10534, "end_char": 10547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• ...\n\nS. L. Chibber (amicus curia), for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10587, "end_char": 10593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-r~ B. 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"label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11968, "end_char": 11984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12175, "end_char": 12184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12310, "end_char": 12320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12395, "end_char": 12405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12945, "end_char": 12947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saumhtra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13010, "end_char": 13018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "abolition of trial by jury or with the aid of assessors Saumhtra."}}, {"text": "sections 268 and 269", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13217, "end_char": 13237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": 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Pinto and others) ( 2) ;, which seems to lend some support to this view."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17844, "end_char": 17854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17905, "end_char": 17915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17925, "end_char": 17935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18301, "end_char": 18318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18539, "end_char": 18549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19242, "end_char": 19247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19691, "end_char": 19701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19793, "end_char": 19803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19995, "end_char": 20005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21551, "end_char": 21567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri C. /.\n\nfound m the several judgments delivered in that case.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22538, "end_char": 22545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL Au J.-This is an appeal by one Kathi Raning Rawat, who has been convicted under sections 302, 307 and 392 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death and to seven years' rigorous imprisonment.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "Kathi Raning Rawat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22574, "end_char": 22592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL Au J.-This is an appeal by one Kathi Raning Rawat, who has been convicted under sections 302, 307 and 392 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death and to seven years' rigorous imprisonment.", "canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat"}}, {"text": "sections 302, 307 and 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22623, "end_char": 22648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22659, "end_char": 22669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22677, "end_char": 22694, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "2nd November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22988, "end_char": 23006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LXVI of 1949), which was issued by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on the 2nd November, 1949, and his conviction and sentence were •pheld on appeal by the State High Court."}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23292, "end_char": 23305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23376, "end_char": 23386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23411, "end_char": 23426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on the 5th April, 1948, the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra State promulgated an Ordinance called the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Adaptation) Ordiance, 1948 (Ordii1ahce No."}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh of Saurashtra State promulgated an Ordinance called the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23432, "end_char": 23528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st day of April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23693, "end_char": 23715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "xq of\n\n• ' ~\n\n1948), by which \"the Criminal Procedure Code of the Dominion of India as in force in that Dominion on the 1st day of April, 1948\" was made applicable to the State of Saurashtra with certain modifications."}}, {"text": "Ordinance called the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23819, "end_char": 23889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "5th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24137, "end_char": 24155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on the 5th November, 1949, the Ordinance with which we are concerned, namely, the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, was promulgated, which purported to amend the previous Ordinance by inserting in it certain provisions which may be summarised as follws:-\n\nSection 9 of the Ordinance empowers the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute Special Courts of diminal jurisdiction for s, uch area as may be specified in."}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24427, "end_char": 24436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance called the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance called the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24636, "end_char": 24646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance called the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance called the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Sections 12 to 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24836, "end_char": 24853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance called the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance", "statute": "Ordinance called the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Kathi Ranint", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25400, "end_char": 25412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6-S S. C: Indial71\n\nKathi Ranint:\n\nRawat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtr11.", "canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat"}}, {"text": "Rawat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25415, "end_char": 25420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6-S S. C: Indial71\n\nKathi Ranint:\n\nRawat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtr11."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nSaurashtr11", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25426, "end_char": 25447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6-S S. C: Indial71\n\nKathi Ranint:\n\nRawat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtr11.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25516, "end_char": 25524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nThe Ord'inance further provides that the provisions of sections 491 and 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not apply to any person or case triable by the Special Judge, and the High Court may call for the record of the proceedings of any case tried by a Special Judge and may exercise any of the powers conferred on an appellate court by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 of the Code.", "canonical_name": "FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "sections 491 and 526", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25584, "end_char": 25604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25612, "end_char": 25638, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 423, 426, 427 and 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25876, "end_char": 25906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26686, "end_char": 26697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26790, "end_char": 26800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9/llth February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26897, "end_char": 26918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H/35-5-C, dated the 9/llth February, 1951, directing the constitution of a Special Court for certain areas mentioned in a schedule attached to the Notification and empowering such court to try the following offences, namely,\n\noffences under sections 183, 189, 190, 212, 216, 224, 302, 304, 307, 323-335, 341-344, 379-382, 384-389 and 392-402 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra, and most of\n\nthe offences under the Ordinance of 1948. •"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27226, "end_char": 27249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27281, "end_char": 27300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H/35-5-C, dated the 9/llth February, 1951, directing the constitution of a Special Court for certain areas mentioned in a schedule attached to the Notification and empowering such court to try the following offences, namely,\n\noffences under sections 183, 189, 190, 212, 216, 224, 302, 304, 307, 323-335, 341-344, 379-382, 384-389 and 392-402 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra, and most of\n\nthe offences under the Ordinance of 1948. •"}}, {"text": "Saurashtra Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27481, "end_char": 27502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. •\n\nIn•• the course of the hearing, an affidavit was filed by, then •Assistant Secretary in the Home Department of the Saurashtra Government, stat'ing that since the integration of different States in Kathiawar in the beginning of 1948 there had been a series of crimes against public peace and that had led to the promulgation of Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "Kathiawar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27563, "end_char": 27572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. •\n\nIn•• the course of the hearing, an affidavit was filed by, then •Assistant Secretary in the Home Department of the Saurashtra Government, stat'ing that since the integration of different States in Kathiawar in the beginning of 1948 there had been a series of crimes against public peace and that had led to the promulgation of Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28476, "end_char": 28486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29019, "end_char": 29055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29415, "end_char": 29434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.", "canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat"}}, {"text": "S11U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29516, "end_char": 29520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1949", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "is however one very important difference between the West Bengal Act and the present Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29670, "end_char": 29764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33438, "end_char": 33448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33718, "end_char": 33727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33876, "end_char": 33907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali /.\n\nKathi Ran in g Rawat v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali"}}, {"text": "February by the State Government in pursuahce of the Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34160, "end_char": 34222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34274, "end_char": 34291, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35556, "end_char": 35566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36139, "end_char": 36149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain other points were urged on behalf of the appellant, namely, that the Ordinance suffers from excessive delegation of legislative authority, and that\n\n• ...\n\n~ ...\n\nthe Rajpramukh had exceeded his powers in amending the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.", "canonical_name": "Rajpramukh"}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36552, "end_char": 36559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-The principal point for decision in the appeal is whether section 11 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance (No.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36621, "end_char": 36631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36781, "end_char": 36791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36975, "end_char": 36985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of the United State of Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37129, "end_char": 37173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 11 of the Ordinance is in these terms:-\n\n\"A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of 9ffences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government of the United State of Saurashtra may, by general or special order in writing, direct.\""}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37269, "end_char": 37281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37337, "end_char": 37349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37578, "end_char": 37590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38043, "end_char": 38053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38077, "end_char": 38089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kathi Ran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38178, "end_char": 38187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan/.\n\nKathi Ran in g\n\n&wat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.", "canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat"}}, {"text": "section 308", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39230, "end_char": 39241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39291, "end_char": 39301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302 to 308", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39405, "end_char": 39423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39425, "end_char": 39442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39578, "end_char": 39588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39810, "end_char": 39836, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40068, "end_char": 40077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Government of the United State of\n\n• •\n\nSaurashtra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40128, "end_char": 40178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to section 9 of the Ordinance which is in these terms :-\n\n\"The Government of the United State of\n\n• •\n\nSaurashtra may by notification in the official gazette constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification.\" \""}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40374, "end_char": 40383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40576, "end_char": 40585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40600, "end_char": 40622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It only empowers the\n\nState Government to constitute Special Courts for any area or for the whole of the State of Saurashtra in the like manner in which section 3 empowered the West Bengal Government to constitute special courts for the whole of the State or any particular area."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40809, "end_char": 40819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41148, "end_char": 41158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41349, "end_char": 41358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-The appellant before us was tried, along with two other persons, by the Special Judge, Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Saurashtra State, on charges of murder, attempted murder and robbery under sections 302, 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 34.", "canonical_name": "Muk._herjea"}}, {"text": "Special Judge, Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Saurashtra State", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41434, "end_char": 41497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-The appellant before us was tried, along with two other persons, by the Special Judge, Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Saurashtra State, on charges of murder, attempted murder and robbery under sections 302, 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 34."}}, {"text": "sections 302, 307 and 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41556, "end_char": 41581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41589, "end_char": 41606, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41617, "end_char": 41627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20th December, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41651, "end_char": 41670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment dated 20th December, 1950, the Special Judge convicted the appellant on all three charges and sentenced him to death under section 302 and to seven years' rigorous imprisonment both under ctions 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41768, "end_char": 41779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41859, "end_char": 41876, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 132(1) and 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42069, "end_char": 42094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42350, "end_char": 42360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kathi Raning", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42394, "end_char": 42406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was set down for hearing on certain preliminary points of law raised by the learned counsel for the appellant attacking the legality of the entire trial on the ground that section 11 of the Saurashtra Public\n\n1!>52\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRawat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtr11.", "canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42443, "end_char": 42450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan f. '\n\nKathi Ranin g\n\n Rawal v.\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtra.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Safety Measures Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42524, "end_char": 42549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42958, "end_char": 42968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Safety Measures Ordinance", "statute": "Safety Measures Ordinance"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43039, "end_char": 43049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Safety Measures Ordinance", "statute": "Safety Measures Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43361, "end_char": 43380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the first point is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed great reliance upon the majority decision of this court in two analogous appeals from the Calcutta High Court (being cases Nos."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43484, "end_char": 43496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Safety Measures Ordinance", "statute": "Safety Measures Ordinance"}}, {"text": "West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43504, "end_char": 43540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43595, "end_char": 43603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, it was because of our pronouncement in the Calcutta appeals that is was considered desirable to have the ptesent case heard on the preliminary points of law. ."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43752, "end_char": 43762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43860, "end_char": 43869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44281, "end_char": 44290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44656, "end_char": 44668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44823, "end_char": 44845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".....\n\nto above, the notification under section 5(1) of the West Bengal Act directed certain individual cases in which specified persons were involved to be tried by the Special Court and it was held by the High Court of Calcutta that section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special\n\nCourts Act to the extent that it empowers the State Government to direct any case to be tried by Special Courts was void as offending against the provision of the equal protection clause in article 14 of the Constitutt\"on; and this view was affirmed in appeal by a majority of this court."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44851, "end_char": 44863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45082, "end_char": 45092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45219, "end_char": 45231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45465, "end_char": 45475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saurashtra State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45559, "end_char": 45586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case the notification, that was issued by the Saurashtra State Government on 9/llth February, 1951, did not relate to individual cases."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45910, "end_char": 45927, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46121, "end_char": 46131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46227, "end_char": 46237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46403, "end_char": 46415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kathi Raning", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46827, "end_char": 46839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawae ·\n\nThe State <>f\n\nSaurashtra;\n\nMuftheriea f.\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRilwat\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.", "canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46854, "end_char": 46859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawae ·\n\nThe State <>f\n\nSaurashtra;\n\nMuftheriea f.\n\nKathi Raning\n\nRilwat\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.", "canonical_name": "State of"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47228, "end_char": 47240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47598, "end_char": 47601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nSen, appearing for the State of Saurashtra, has argued before us that in this respect the Saurashtra Ordinance stands on a different footing and he has referred in this connection to the preamble to the orig'inal ordinance as well as the circumstances which necessitated the present one."}}, {"text": "5th of April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48250, "end_char": 48268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the State acceded to the Indian Union, there was an Ordinance promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 5th of April, 1948, which introduced the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of India (Act V of 1898) with certain modifications into the Saurashtra State."}}, {"text": "2nd of April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48496, "end_char": 48514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another ordinance, known as the Public Safety Measures Ordinance, was passed on the 2nd of April, 1948, and this ordinance, like similar other public safety measures obtaining in other States, provided -for preventive detention, imposition of collective fines, control of essential supplies and similar other matters."}}, {"text": "11th of November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48734, "end_char": 48756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11th of November, 1949, the present ordinance was passed by way of amendment of the Public Safety Measures Ordinance and inter alia it made provisions 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"label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49927, "end_char": 49940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50225, "end_char": 50236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "is also no provision in the ordinance similar to that in the West Bengal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50558, "end_char": 50634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "although the ardinance in certain respects compares favourably with the West Bengal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50720, "end_char": 50807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51327, "end_char": 51337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But although the ardinance in certain respects compares favourably with the West Bengal Act", "statute": "But although the ardinance in certain respects compares favourably with the West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "Kathi Ran", 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one decision of this court and do not require repetition.", "canonical_name": "Muk._herjea"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52741, "end_char": 52751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U. S. A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54448, "end_char": 54456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Illustrations of one class of such cases are to be found in various regulations in the U. S. A. which are passed by States in exercise of police powers for the purposes of protecting public health or welfare or to regulate trades, buiness and occupations which may become unsafe or dangerous when unrest.rained."}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55675, "end_char": 55686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been observed by Frankfurter J. in (I) Vitle Weaver on Constitutional Law, p. 404. ("}}, {"text": "S. 552", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55851, "end_char": 55857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55894, "end_char": 55900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 552", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55963, "end_char": 55969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of • Saurashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55998, "end_char": 56019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kathi Raning\n\nRaU.at\n\nThe State of • Saurashtra.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 57949, "end_char": 57973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, it seems to me, is the true principle underlying the decision of the Supreme Court of America in Yick W o\n\nv. Hopkins(')."}}, {"text": "San Francisco", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58057, "end_char": 58070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object of the ordinance of the City and County of San Francisco, which came up for consideration in that case, was, as found by the court, not to regulate laundry business in that locality in the interests of the general public (')."}}, {"text": "S. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58268, "end_char": 58274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 200, 208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58311, "end_char": 58322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58335, "end_char": 58341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86, 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58415, "end_char": 58424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59911, "end_char": 59921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59990, "end_char": 60002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kathi Raning Rawat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60683, "end_char": 60701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it depends entirely upon the pleasure of the State Government to make any classification it likes, without any guiding principle at all, it cannot certainly be a proper classification, which requires that a reasonable relation must exist\n\n1....:.5 S, C, India /71\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.", "canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat"}}, {"text": "State of Saurashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60710, "end_char": 60729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it depends entirely upon the pleasure of the State Government to make any classification it likes, without any guiding principle at all, it cannot certainly be a proper classification, which requires that a reasonable relation must exist\n\n1....:.5 S, C, India /71\n\nKathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nSaurashtra.\n\nFazl Ali"}}, {"text": "state of Mukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60776, "end_char": 60794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muk.herjea f.\n\nKathi Rani111\n\nRawat v.\n\nThe state of Mukherjea /.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nbetween the classification and the objective that the legislation has in view."}}, {"text": "2nd April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61424, "end_char": 61439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, the earlier ordinance, to which the present one is a subsequent addition by way of amendment, was passed by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on 2nd April, 1948."}}, {"text": "Horne Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61936, "end_char": 61952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the affidavit of an officer of the Horne Government of the Saurashtra State that soon after the integration took place, an alarming state of lawlessness prevailed in some of the districts within the State."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63172, "end_char": 63182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9/llth February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63241, "end_char": 63262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting under section 11 of the Ordinance, the Government issued a notification on 9/llth February, 1950, which constituted a Special Court for areas specified in the schedule, and here again the affidavit shows that all these areas are included in the districts of Gohilwad, Madhya Saurashtra and Sorath, where the tribe of marauders principally flourished."}}, {"text": "Gohilwad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63424, "end_char": 63432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting under section 11 of the Ordinance, the Government issued a notification on 9/llth February, 1950, which constituted a Special Court for areas specified in the schedule, and here again the affidavit shows that all these areas are included in the districts of Gohilwad, Madhya Saurashtra and Sorath, where the tribe of marauders principally flourished."}}, {"text": "Madhya Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63434, "end_char": 63451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting under section 11 of the Ordinance, the Government issued a notification on 9/llth February, 1950, which constituted a Special Court for areas specified in the schedule, and here again the affidavit shows that all these areas are included in the districts of Gohilwad, Madhya Saurashtra and Sorath, where the tribe of marauders principally flourished."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64141, "end_char": 64151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. P. Anand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64773, "end_char": 64784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification, as said above constitutes a Special Court for the areas mentioned in the Schedule and appoints Mr. P. P. Anand as a Special Judge to preside over the Special Court.", "canonical_name": "P. P. 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"metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 184, 186 and 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65472, "end_char": 65497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 308", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65582, "end_char": 65593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65595, "end_char": 65612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65633, "end_char": 65644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Douglas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66691, "end_char": 66698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At tl1e same time it is to be noted as Douglas J. observed in the very case that in determining the reach and scope of particular legislation it is not necessary for the legilsJature to provide abstract symmetry. \""}}, {"text": "section 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67151, "end_char": 67162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67170, "end_char": 67187, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 184", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67205, "end_char": 67216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67291, "end_char": 67302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 184", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67400, "end_char": 67411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67480, "end_char": 67486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67536, "end_char": 67547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 308", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67791, "end_char": 67802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indiian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67804, "end_char": 67822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67865, "end_char": 67876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indiian Penal Code", "statute": "Indiian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68495, "end_char": 68506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indiian Penal Code", "statute": "Indiian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68514, "end_char": 68531, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68588, "end_char": 68605, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70410, "end_char": 70419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70552, "end_char": 70562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Benoarilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71042, "end_char": 71052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Benoarilal's case(') has been accepted and acted upon by this court in more than one case and it is too late now to question its correctness."}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71314, "end_char": 71317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAS J.-The appellant before us was tried by a Special Court constituted under the Saurashtra Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance No.", "canonical_name": 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71894, "end_char": 71911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "February 28, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72060, "end_char": 72077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He appealed to the High Court of Saurashtra but the High Court, by its judgment pronounced on February 28, 1951, rejected h'is appeal and confirmed his conviction and the sentences passed by the Special Court."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72197, "end_char": 72211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its order made on March 21, 1951, however, the High Court granted him a certificate for appeal to this Court both under article 132 and article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72299, "end_char": 72310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72315, "end_char": 72326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sorath", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 73153, "end_char": 73159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About that time different dacoits indulged in lawless activ'ities in Kathiawar and in particular in the area now known as the districts of Gohilwad and Madhya Saurashtra and on the outskirts of Sorath that was formerly a district in Junagadh State."}}, {"text": "Junagadh State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 73192, "end_char": 73206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About that time different dacoits indulged in lawless activ'ities in Kathiawar and in particular in the area now known as the districts of Gohilwad and Madhya Saurashtra and on the outskirts of Sorath that was formerly a district in Junagadh State."}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh of the State of Saurashtra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73408, "end_char": 73445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to check their nefarious activities the Rajpramukh of the State of Saurashtra on April 2, 1948, promulgated Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "April 2, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73449, "end_char": 73462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to check their nefarious activities the Rajpramukh of the State of Saurashtra on April 2, 1948, promulgated Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "State of", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73916, "end_char": 73924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das/.\n\nK•thi Raning\n\nRawat\n\nThe State of\n\nSaur•shtra.", "canonical_name": "State of"}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73999, "end_char": 74009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rajpramukh on April 5, 1948, promulgated another Ordinance No.", "canonical_name": "Rajpramukh"}}, {"text": "April 5, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74013, "end_char": 74026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rajpramukh on April 5, 1948, promulgated another Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74140, "end_char": 74166, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ramnikrai Bhagwandas Vesavada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74301, "end_char": 74330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the affidavit of Ramnikrai Bhagwandas Vesavada, Assistant Secretray in the Home Depaitment, Government of Saurashtra, that the Ordinance was not sufliCient to cope with the activities of the gangs of dacoits and that cases of looting, dacoity, robbery, nose-cutting and murder continued as before and indeed increased in number, frequency and vehemence and it became impossible to deal with the offences at different places in separate Courts of law expeditiously."}}, {"text": "November 2, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75095, "end_char": 75111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rajpramukh of Saurashtra accordingly, on November 2, 1949, promulgated Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75335, "end_char": 75344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 9, 10 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75521, "end_char": 75542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of the United State of the Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 75592, "end_char": 75640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special Courts.-The Government of the United State of the Saurashtra may by notification In the Official Gazette constitute Special Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification."}}, {"text": "Government of the\n\nUnited State of Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 75816, "end_char": 75861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special Judges.-The Government of the\n\nUnited State of Saurashtra may appoimt a Special Judge to preside over a Special Court constituted '\".!"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75945, "end_char": 75954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76064, "end_char": 76096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "United State of Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 76116, "end_char": 76142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under section 9 for any area any person who has been\n\n• -·\n\na Sessions Judge for a period of not less than 2 years under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as applied to the United State of Saurashtra."}}, {"text": "State of Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 76445, "end_char": 76464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the provisions of the Ordinance as amended the State of Saurashtra issued a notification, the material part of which is as follows:~\n\n\"No."}}, {"text": "sections 9, 10 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76585, "end_char": 76606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76614, "end_char": 76669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 77014, "end_char": 77020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IX of 1948), (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance), Government is pleased to direct-\n\n(i) That a Special Court of a Criminal Jurisdiction, (hereinafter referred to as the said Court) shall be constituted for the areas, mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed, and that the headquarters of the said Court shall be at Rajkot,\n\n(ii) that Mr. P. P. Anand shall be .appointed as a Special Judge to preside over the said Court and\n\n(iii) that the Special Judge hereby appointed shall try the following offences, viz.- ( a) offences under sections 183, 189, 190, 212, 216, 224, 302, 304, 307, 323 to 335, 341 to 344, 379 to 382, 384 to 389 and 392 to 402 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (XLV of 1860), as adapted and applied to the United State of Saurashtra, and\n\n(b) all offences under the said Ordinance, except an offence punishable under sub-section ( 6) of section 2 of the said Ordinance, in."}}, {"text": "P. P. Anand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77037, "end_char": 77048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IX of 1948), (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance), Government is pleased to direct-\n\n(i) That a Special Court of a Criminal Jurisdiction, (hereinafter referred to as the said Court) shall be constituted for the areas, mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed, and that the headquarters of the said Court shall be at Rajkot,\n\n(ii) that Mr. P. P. Anand shall be .appointed as a Special Judge to preside over the said Court and\n\n(iii) that the Special Judge hereby appointed shall try the following offences, viz.- ( a) offences under sections 183, 189, 190, 212, 216, 224, 302, 304, 307, 323 to 335, 341 to 344, 379 to 382, 384 to 389 and 392 to 402 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (XLV of 1860), as adapted and applied to the United State of Saurashtra, and\n\n(b) all offences under the said Ordinance, except an offence punishable under sub-section ( 6) of section 2 of the said Ordinance, in.", "canonical_name": "P. P. Anand"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77353, "end_char": 77375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "United State of Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 77421, "end_char": 77447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IX of 1948), (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance), Government is pleased to direct-\n\n(i) That a Special Court of a Criminal Jurisdiction, (hereinafter referred to as the said Court) shall be constituted for the areas, mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed, and that the headquarters of the said Court shall be at Rajkot,\n\n(ii) that Mr. P. P. Anand shall be .appointed as a Special Judge to preside over the said Court and\n\n(iii) that the Special Judge hereby appointed shall try the following offences, viz.- ( a) offences under sections 183, 189, 190, 212, 216, 224, 302, 304, 307, 323 to 335, 341 to 344, 379 to 382, 384 to 389 and 392 to 402 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (XLV of 1860), as adapted and applied to the United State of Saurashtra, and\n\n(b) all offences under the said Ordinance, except an offence punishable under sub-section ( 6) of section 2 of the said Ordinance, in."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77552, "end_char": 77561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78105, "end_char": 78115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code 1860"}}, {"text": "West Bengal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78639, "end_char": 78654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 3, 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78780, "end_char": 78799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Act", "statute": "West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78811, "end_char": 78847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78910, "end_char": 78920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 79025, "end_char": 79045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification issued by the State of West Bengal under that Act was, however, different from the notification issued by the State of Saurashtra in that the West Bengal notification directed certain specific \"cases\" to be tried by the Special Court constituted under the West Bengal Special Courts Act."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79363, "end_char": 79372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79564, "end_char": 79573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79779, "end_char": 79789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79838, "end_char": 79848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79940, "end_char": 79950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80161, "end_char": 80171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80419, "end_char": 80428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80748, "end_char": 80758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80933, "end_char": 80943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81581, "end_char": 81591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81625, "end_char": 81637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83779, "end_char": 83789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83845, "end_char": 83854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 84631, "end_char": 84665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ • ..,_ classification on a basis which does not distinguish one offence from another offence or which has no relation to the object of the Act will be wholly arbitrary and may well be hit by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jack Skinner v.\n\nOklahoma(1)."}}, {"text": "S. 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86584, "end_char": 86590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89313, "end_char": 89322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The criticism that the State Government included certain offences but excluded certain cognate offences has been dealt with by my learned brother Mukherjea and I have nothing more to add thereto.", "canonical_name": "Muk._herjea"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89459, "end_char": 89469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90370, "end_char": 90390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYER J.-Mr.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Sections 9 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90622, "end_char": 90639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sen tried his best to distinguish this case from our decision on the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950", "statute": "Sen tried his best to distinguish this case from our decision on the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "L.R. 72 I.A. 57", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 90829, "end_char": 90844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91049, "end_char": 91069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar /.\n\nmeasure, merely refers to the need to provide for public safety, maintenance of public order, and the preservation of peace and tranquillity .", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 92045, "end_char": 92051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstance that the deviations from normal procedure prescribed in the Ordinance are not so many or vital, as in the Bengal case, does not in my humble opinion, affect the result, as the defect of the absence of a reasonable or rational classification is still there."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93770, "end_char": 93780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94031, "end_char": 94048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94322, "end_char": 94326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BosE J.-I agree with my brothers Mahajan and Chandrasekhara Aiyer that the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, offends article 14."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94355, "end_char": 94362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BosE J.-I agree with my brothers Mahajan and Chandrasekhara Aiyer that the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, offends article 14.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94367, "end_char": 94387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BosE J.-I agree with my brothers Mahajan and Chandrasekhara Aiyer that the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, offends article 14.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94480, "end_char": 94490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94972, "end_char": 94982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kathi Rani•t", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 95154, "end_char": 95166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "+ 1' 92\n\nKathi Rani•t\n\nRilwflt\n\nThe State of\n\nSaurashtr11 •\n\nChandrasek_1'ar•\n\nA.iyl1f' /.", "canonical_name": "Kathi Raning\n\nRawat"}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_478_490_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "Feb. 22.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nti.\n\nDHIYAN SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nJUGAL KISHORE AND ANOTHER.\n\n[SAIYAD FAZL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\n[1952J\n\nArbitration-Award-\"Malik Mustaqil\", meaning of-Whether conveys absolute estate-Award acted upon-Estoppel against contesting its validity.\n\nS and B were sons of two brothers respectively. S died in 1884 leaving a daughter M, surviving him.\n\nOn the death of S dispute arose between B and M. B claimed the entire estate by survivorship, alleging that S died in a itate of jointness with him and that all the properties were joint family properties and M was entitled only to maintenance.\n\nThe dispute was referred to arbitration and an award was delivered.\n\nUnder it the suit properties were given to M and the rest of the estate then in dispute was given to B.\n\nThe operative part of the award stated inter alia that B, first party, and M, the second party, were held entitled to specified shares in the properties in dispute and each had become permanent owner (Malik Mustaqil) of his or her share.\n\nA division was effected and ever since the date of the award in 1884 each branch continued in possession of the pro perties allotted to it and each had been dealing with them as absolute owner.\n\nThe defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were bound by the award and were in any evc::nt estopped from chal lenging it.\n\nIn 1941 B's grandsons instituted a suit claiming the pro perties allotted to M claiming that on the death of S his daughter M succeeded to a limited estate and reversion opened out on her death in 1929 and the plaintiffs were entitled as next reversioners, as M's son had predeceased her. The defendants {M's grandsons) alleged that the property possessed by M consisted partly of property which belonged to her and partly of property which belonged exclusively to he; r father to which she siua:eeded as daughter.\n\nHld, that the award gave an absolute estate to' M as the words uMalik Mustaqil\" were strong, clear and unambiguous and were not qualified by other words and circumstances appearing in the same document in the present case.\n\nHeld further, that even if the award be assumed to be invalid the plaintiffs' claim was barred by the plea of estoppcl.\n\nThere was estoppcl against B because by his conduct he induced M to believe that the decision of the arbitrator was fair and reasonable and both the parties would be bound by it and he induced her to act greatly to. her detriment and to alter her position by accepting the award and never attempting to go behind it as long\n\n.as he lived; there was estoppel against B's sons because it des- '' cended to them as they stepped into his shoes, and further there was independent estoppel against B's son K by his acts and conduct as evidenced in this case.\n\nThere was estoppel against plaintiffs who claimed_ through their father K.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1951.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated 12th October, 1944, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Allsop and Malik JJ.) in First Appeal No. 374 of 1941 arising out of a Decree dated 31st July, 1941, of the Court of the Civil Judge, Moradabad, in Original Suit No. 9 of 1941. - Bakshi Tek Chand (S. K. Kapoor, with him) for the appellant.\n\nAchhru Ram (/wala Prasad, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1952. February 22. The judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J.-This is a litigation between two branches of a family whose common ancestor was one Megh Raj Singh. The family tree is as follows :\n\nI .\n\nJawahar Singh\n\nMegh Raj Singh\n\nI Shanker Lal (d. 1884)\n\nMada~Singh - I\n\nBrijlaf (d. 1889 or (1890)\n\nI Daughter : Mst. Mohan Dei (d. Oct.1929) Husband: Narain Das\n\nShri Kisan Das (d. March 1929)\n\nI I\n\nI .\n\nMst.Deok• (d. 1894)\n\n h I 1 I. d K1s an La Mahabir Prasa (d. 21-5-1940) (d. 1921)\n\nl I.\n\nI Juga Ki shore Amar Nath\n\nPlff. 1 Plff.2\n\nDhiyan Singh\n\nDeft. l Jai Bhagwan Singh\n\nDeft. 2 I I Obas Ram Onkar Prasad\n\nThe dispute is about property which, according to the plaintiffs, formed part of Shanker Lal's estate.\n\nThe plyaintiffs state that the two branches of the\n\n..1.. 7 family were separate at all material times; that on\n\nand Anotht:r\n\nv. /ugal Kishore,\n\n11nd Another.\n\nDhiyan Singh\n\nand Another\n\nv. fugal Kishore\n\n11nd Another.\n\nBose/.\n\nShanker Lal's death in 1884 his daughter Mst. Mohan Dei (the defendants' grandmother) succeeded to a limited estate.\n\nThe reversion opened out on her death in October 1929 and the plaintiffs are entitled as the next reversioners, for Mt. Mohan Dei's son Shri Kishan Das predeceased her.\n\nThe defendants admit that Shanker Lal was separate from the other branch of the family.\n\nThey divide the property which their grandmother Mst.\n\nMohan Dei possessed into two categories.\n\nFirst, there was property which they say belonged to her.\n\nThese are properties which, according to them, she purchased or obtained under mortgages in her own right.\n\nNext, there were properties which belonged exclusively to her father and to which she succeeded daughter. On Shanker Lal' s death disputes arose between Shanker LaJ's father's brother's son Brijlal (the plaintiffs' grandfather) and the defendants' grandmother Mst.\n\nMohan Dei.\n\nBrijlal claimed the entire estate by survivorship, his allegation being that Shanker Lal died in a state of jointness with him and that all the properties were joint family properties.\n\nThis dispute was referred to arbitration and an award was delivered.\n\nUnder it Mst. Mohan Dei was given the suit properties as absolute owner and the rest of the estate then in dispute was given to Brijlal. A division was effected accordingly and ever since, that is to say, from 21-12-1884, the date of the award, down to 26-3-1941, the date of the suit, each branch has been in separate and uninterrupted possession of the properties respectively allotted to it and each has been dealing with them as absolute owner.\n\nThe defendants claim that the plaintiffs are bound by this award and are in any event estopped.\n\nThe plaintiffs lost in the first Court but won in the High Court. The defendants appeal.\n\nThe first question is about the nature of the award.\n\nThe defendants say that it gave Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute estate.\n\nThe plaintiffs deny this and say she obtained only a limited estate.\n\nIn our opinion, the defendants are right.\n\n... -\n\nThe question at issue tion.\n\nThe award is Ex. runs thus :\n\nis a simple one of construe- 1952\n\nA-1.\n\nThe operative portion Dhiyan Singh\n\nrznd .dnotlier \"Having regard to the specifications given above, Brij Lal, first party, and Musammat Mohan Devi, the deceased's female issue, second party, have been . held entilted to shares, worth Rs. 28,500 and Rs. 42,482-10-0 respectively in the said properties; and accordingly .•. two lots have been made and the first lot is allotted to the first party and the second lot to the second party; and henceforth the parties shall have no claim or liability against each other; and each party has become permanent owner (malik mustaqil) of his or her share; and each party should enter in proprietary possesion and occupation of his or her respective share ...... \"\n\nThe underlining is ours.\n\nWe do not think, the words admit of any doubt, particularly as the words \"malik mustaqil\" have been used: see Ram Gopal v. Nand /.Jal and Others(1) and Bishunath Prasad Singh v.\n\nChandika Prasad Kumari(2). But it was argued that the award must be viewed as a whole and that certain earlier passages show that this could not have been the intention. The passages relied on are these.\n\nFirst, the finding that the properties claimed by Mst. Mohan Dei s her own really belonged to Shanker Lal. He had purchased some and acquired others through mortgages in her name but she was only a benamidar and had no title to them. Second, that some of the properties in dispute were ancestral and the rest self acquired, though whether with the help of ancestral funds or not the arbitrator was unable to determine.\n\nThird, the arbitrator's view of the Hindu law, namely that- \"the brother should be the owner of the 1oznt ancestral property and the daughter who has a male issue should be owner of the self-acquired property.\"\n\nAnd lastly, this passagev. fugal Kislior~\n\nant .dnotlier.\n\nBose/.\n\n..i... (I) [1950] S.C.R. 766 at 778.\n\n(2) (1933) 60 I. A. 56 at 61 & 62.\n\nand Another\n\nv. fugal Kishore\n\nand Another.\n\nJJose /.\n\n\"Furthermore, when the 2nd party (Mohan Dei) has inherited no property from her husband, she, m case of getting this share, will certainly settle down in Amroha and will make her father's haveli as her abode and thus the haveli shall remain abad as heretofore, and in this way the deceased's naine will be perpetuated; and it is positive that, after the Musammat, this property shall devolve on her son, who will be the malik (owner) thereof, and later the descendant of this son will become the owner thereof.\"\n\nWe do not think1 these passages qualify the operative portion of the award and are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court who hold they do. In our opinion, the arbitrator was confused in his mind both as regards the facts well as regards the law.\n\nHis view of the law may have been wrong but the words used are, in our opinion, clear and, m the absence of anything which would unainbiguously qualify tl1em, we must interpret them in their usual sense.\n\nSome cases were cited in which the word \"malik\", and in one case the words \"malik mustaqil\" were held to import a limited estate because of qaulifying circumstances.\n\nWe think it would be pointless to examine them because we are concerned here with the document before us and even if it be conceded that words which would ordinarily mean one thing can be qualified by other words and circumstances appearing in the saine document, we are of op11110n that the passages and circumstances relied on in this case do not qualify the strong, clear and unambiguous words used in this document.\n\nThe learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents had to search diligently for the meaning for which he contended in other passages and had to make several assumptions which do not appear on the face of the award as to what the arbitrator must have thought and must have intended.\n\nWe are not prepared to qualify clear and unambiguous language by phrases of dubious import which can be made to coincide with either view by calling in aid assumptions of fact about whose existence we can only guess.\n\n,..\n\nThe award was attacked on other grounds also.\n\nIt was urged, among other things, that the arbitrator had travelled beyond the terms of his reference in awarding Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute interest.\n\nIt was . also urged that even if Brijlal was bound his son Kishan Lal, who did not claim through him but who had an independent title as reversioner to Shanker Lal, would not be bound, and it was contended that if Kishan Lal was not bound the plaintiffs would not be -either.\n\nBut we need not examine these points because we do not need to proceed on the binding nature of the award. Even if the award be invalid we are of opinion that the plaintiff's claim is completely answer- .ed by the plea of estoppel.\n\nNow it can be conceded that before an estoppel can arise, there must be, first, a representation of an exist- ing fact as distinct from a mere promise de futuro made by one party to the other; second, that the other party, believing it, must have been induced to act on the faith of it; and third, that he must have o\n\nacted to his detriment.\n\nIt will be necessary to deal with this in stages and first we will consider whether there was any estoppel agtainst Brijlal.\n\nIt is beyond dispute that he laid .serious claim to the property in 1884. He claimed that he was joint with Shanker Lal and &, o, on Shanker Lal's death he became entitled to the whole of the •estate and that Mst. Mohan Dei had only a right of maintenance.\n\nWhether he would have had difficulty in establishing such a claim, or indeed whether it would have been impossible for him to do so, is wholly immaterial. The fact remains that he pressed his claim and was serious about it, so much so that he was able to persuade the arbitrator that he had an immediate right to part of the estate.\n\nMst. Mohan Dei, on the other hand, resisted this claim and contended that she was entitled to separate and exclusive possession, and in any event, that she was entitled in .absolute right to a part of the property. On the facts which now emerge it is evident that Brijlal had no .right and that his hopes of one .day succeeding :u\n\nand Another\n\nv • fugal Kishore\n\nand Another.\n\nBose/.\n\nand Another\n\nv. fugal Kishore\n\nand Another.\n\nBose /.\n\nreversioner were remote.\n\nMst. Mohan Dei had a son Shri Kishan Das who was the next presumptive reversioner and as the boy was a good deal younger than Brijlal, Brijlal's chances were slim.\n\nActually, the boy survived Brijlal by nearly forty years. Bnjlal died in 1889 or 1890 and the boy did not die till March 1929.\n\nHad he lived another eight or nine months he would have succeeded and the plaintiffs would have been nowhere. Now this dispute, seriously pressed by both sides, was refered to arbitration.\n\nIt is neither here nor there whether the award was valid, whether the decision fell within the scope of the reference or whether it had any binding character in itself.\n\nEven if it was wholly invalid, it was still open to the parties to say : Never mind whether the arbitrator was right or wrong, his decision is fair and sensible, so instead of wasting further time and money in useless litigation, we will accept it and divide the estate in accordance with His findings.\n\nThat would have been a perfectly right and proper settlement of the dispute, and whether it bound third parties or not it would certainly bind the immediate parties; and that in effect is what they did. By his conduct Brijlal induced Mst. Mohan Dei to believe that this would be the case and on the faith of that representation, namely the acceptance of the award, he induced Mst.\n\nMohan Dei to act greatly to her detriment and to alter her position by accepting the award and parting with an appreciable portion of the estate, and he himself obtained a substantial advantage to which he would not otl1erwise have been entitled and enjoyed the benefit of it for the rest of his life; and to his credit be it said, he never attempted to go behind his decision.\n\nIn any event, we are clear that that created an estoppel as against Brijlal.\n\nIn our opinion, the present case is very similar to the one which their Lordships of the Privy Council decided in Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal('). There also there was a dispute between a limited owner and a person who, but for an unproved claim (adoption) which he\n\n(I) (1919) 45 I.A. 118, .\n\n... +\n\nput forward, had no right to the estate. The dispute was taken to the courts but was compromised and according to the agreement the property was divided between the two rival claimants and the agreement was given effect to and acted on for a period of twenty years.\n\nLater, the succession opened out and the other party to the comprol!lise, who by then had stepped into the reversion, claimed the rest of the estate, which had been assigned to the limited owner, against her personal heirs.\n\nThe Judicial Committee rejected the claim on the ground of estoppel and held that even though the plaintiff claimed in a different character in the suit, namely as reversioner, he having been a party to the compromise and having acted on it and induced the other side to alter her position to her detriment, was estopped.\n\nWe do not think the fact that there was a voluntary compromise, whereas here there was the imposed decision of an arbitrator makes any difference because we are not proceeding on the footing of the award but on the actings of the parties in accepting it :when they need not have don.e so if the present contentions are correct.\n\nIt is true that in one sense a question of title is one of law and it is equally true that there can be no estoppel on a question of law. But every question of law must be grounded on facts and when Brijlal's conduct is analysed it will be found to entail an assertion by him that he admitted and recognised facts which would in law give Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute interest in the lands awarded to her.\n\nIt was because of that assertion of fact, namely his recognition and admission of the existence of facts which would give Mst. Mohan Die an absolute interest, that she was induced to part with about one-third of the property to which Brijlal, on a true estimate of the facts as now known, had no right.\n\nThere can be no doubt that she acted to her detriment and there can, we think, be equally no doubt that she was induced to do so on the faith of Brijlal's statements and conduct which induced her to believe that he accepted all the implications of the\n\nDhiyan Singlt\n\nand Another\n\nv. fugal Kishortt\n\nand Another.\n\nBose/.\n\nDhiyan Singh and Another v. /ugal Kishorc\n\nand A nothcr.\n\nBo,.].\n\naward.\n\nBut in any event, we are clear that Brijlal would have been estopped. The nature of the dispute and the description of it given m the award show that there was considerable doubt, and certainly much dispute, about the true state of affairs. Even if the arbitrator was wholly wrong and even if he had no power to decide as he did, it was open to both sides to accept the decision and by their acceptance recognisr, the existence of facts which would in law give the other an absolute estate in the properties they agreed to divide among themselves and did divide.\n\nThat, in our opinion is a representation of an existing fact or set of facts.\n\nEach would consequently be estopped as against the other and Brijlal in particular would have been estopped from denying the existence of facts which would give Mst. Mohan Dei an absolute interest in the suit property.\n\nWe turn next to his son Kishan Lal. Brijlal died in 1889 or 1890.\n\nAt that date Mst.\n\nMohan Dei's son Shri Kishan Das was alive and was the next presumptive reversioner.\n\nBrijlal's sons therefore had no more right to that portion of his estate which was assigned to Brijlal than Brijlal himself.\n\nBut they took possession and claimed through their father. They dio not claim an independent title in themselves, and, as we know, they had no other title at that date. They were therefore in no better position than Brijlal and as Brijlal would have been estopped, the estoppcl descended to them also because they stepped into his shoes.\n\nThis would be so even if Brijlal had claimed the property independently for himself, which he did not; but much more so as he claimed in joint family rights and evidently acted as karta or manager on behalf of his family.\n\nBut apart from this, there was also an independent estoppel in Kishan Lal.\n\nWe have said, he had no right to this part of , the estate when his father died apart from the award.\n\nBut nevertheless he took possession along with his brother and the two of them treated the property as their own and derived benefit\n\ni( -\n\nfrom it.\n\nThey partitioned the estate between themselves and sold away parts of it to third parties. Kishan Lal knew of the award.\n\nHe knew that mutation had been effected in accordance with . it and possession taken by Brijlal under it and that the rest had been retained by Mst.\n\nMohan Dei. His retention of the property therefore and his continuing to deal with it on the basis of the award. indicated his own acceptance of the award and, therefore, by his acts and conduct, he represented that he also, like his father, admitted the existence of facts which would in law give Mst.\n\nMohan Dei an absolute estate,; and further, he allowed Mst. Mohan Dei to deal with the estate as her own, for she, on her part, also acted on the award and claimed absolute rights in the property assigned to her. She dealt with it on that footing and gifted it in that right to her grandsons, the contesting defendants, on 4th April, 1929.\n\nMutation was effected and Kishan Lal raised no objection.\n\nWe see then that Brijlal retained possession of property to which he was not entitled for a period of five or six years from 1884 to 1889 or 1890\n\nand induced Mst. Mohan Dei to part with it by representing that he accepted the award and her absolute title to the rest, and after him Kishan Lal and his brother between them enjoyed the benefit of it from 1889 or 1890 down to October 1929 when Mst. Mohan Dei died, that is, for a further forty years, and led Mst. Mohan Dei to believe that. they also acknowledged her title to an absolute estate. We have no doubt that down to that time Kisan Lal was also estopped for the reasons given above. Had he questioned the award and reopened the dispute Mst. Mohaµ Dei would at once have sued and would then for forty years have obtained the benefit of property from which she was excluded because of her acceptance of the award on the faith of Brijlal's assertion that he too accepted it.\n\nKishan Lal's inaction over these years with full knowledge of the £acts, as is evident from the deposition of D.W. 2, Dhiyan Singh, whose testimonyis uncontradicted, and his acceptance of the estate with all its consequential benefits, unquestionably creates an estoppel in him. This witness tells us that-\n\nDhiyan Singh\n\nand Anoth\"\n\nv. fugal Kishore\n\nand Another.\n\nBose/.\n\n•nd Anolhcr v. /ugal Kishore\n\nand Another.\n\nBose],\n\n\"Kishanlal always accepted this award and acted upon it.\"\n\nHe qualifies this in cross-examination by saying that Kishan Lal had also objected to it but the witness did not konw whether that was before or after 'Mst. Mohan Dei's death.\n\nThe documents filed show it was after, so there is no reason why the main portion of his statement which is uncontradicted, and which could have been contradicted, should not be accepted.\n\nIn March, 1929, Mst. Mohan Dei's son Shri Kishan Das died and Kishan Lal thereupon became the next presumptive reversioner, and in October, 1929, when the reversion opened out the estate vested in him, or rather would have vested in him but for the estoppel.\n\nThe question therefore is, did he continue to be bound by the estoppel when he assumed a new character on the opening out of the reversion?\n\nWe have no doubt he did. The decision of the Judicial Committee which we have just cited.\n\nKanhai Lal v.\n\nBrzjla/(1), is, we think, clear on that point. Although other reversioners who do not claim through the one who has consented are not bound, the consenting reversioner is estopped.\n\nThis is beyond dispute, when there is an alienation by a limited owner without legal necessity. See Ramgouda Annagouda v.\n\nBhausaheb(') where the ground of decision was- \". . . but Annagouda himself being a party to and benefiting by the transaction evidenced thereby was precluded from questioning any part of it.\"\n\nIn our opinion, the same principles -apply to a case of _ the present kind.\n\nIt was contended, however, on the strength of Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden(8 ) and Mt. Binda Kuer 11. Lalitha Prasad('), that even if Kishan Lal did take possession in 1889 or 1890 on the strength of a title derived from his father, that would not have precluded him from asserting his own rights in a different character when the succession opened\n\n(I) (1918) 45 I.A. 118.\n\n(2) (1927) 54 I.A. 396 at 403.\n\n(3) (1919) 46 I.A. 72.\n\n(4) (1936) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 304 at 308.\n\n\" -\n\nout.\n\nReliance in particular was placed upon page 308 of the latter ruling.\n\nIn our opinion, that decision is to be distinguished.\n\nIn that case the reversion did not fall in till 1916.\n\nLong before that, namely in 1868, the next presumptive reversioners entered into a compromise whereby the grandfather of one Jairam who figured in !hat case obtained a good deal more than he would nave been entitled to in the ordinary way.\n\nBut for the compromise this grandfather would have got only one anna 12 gundas share, whereas due to the compromise he got as much as 2 annas 4 gundas. The actual taking of possesion was however deferred under the compromise till the death of one Anandi Kuer. She died in 1885 and on that date Jairam was entitled to his grandfather's share as both his father and grandfather were dead.\n\nJairam accordingly reaped the benefit of the transaction.\n\nBut it is to be observed that the extra benefit which he derived was only as to a 12 gundas share because he had an absolute and indefeasible right to 1 anna 12 gundas in any event in his own right under a title which did not spring from the compromise.\n\nJairam lost 1 anna 4 gundas to a creditor Munniram and out of the one anna which he had left from the 2 annas 4 gundas he sold 13 gundas to the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs. 500.\n\nNow it is evident that on those facts it is impossible to predicate that the 13 gundas which the plaintiffs purchased came out of the extra 12 gundas which Jairam obtained because of the compromise rather than out of the 1 anna 12 gundas to which he had a good and independent title anyway; and of course unless the plaintiffs' 13 gundas could be assigned with certainty to the 12 gundas it would be impossible to say that they had obtained any benefit from the compromise.\n\nThe Judicial Committee also added that even if it was possible to assign this 13 gundas with certainty to the 12 gundas it by no means followed that the plaintiffs admitted that fact nor would that necessarily have given them a benefit under the compromise. They had the right to contest the\n\nDhiyan Sitttlt\n\nand Anotht:r\n\nv. /ugal Kishore and Another. -- Bose/,\n\nDhiyan Singh\n\nand Another\n\nv. fugal Kishorc and Another\n\nBo,_ J.\n\npos1t10n and gamble on the possibility of being able to prove the contrary. Their Lordships added-\n\n\"Unless the plaintiffs' individual it unjust that they should have a Bajrangi Lal's revers1oners their legal have effect.\"\n\nconduct place rights\n\nmakes among should\n\nIn the other case, Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden('), their Lordships' decision about this matter turned on the same sort of point : see page 87.\n\nThe present case is very different.\n\nWhen Kishan Lal took possession of his father's property he held by virtue of the award and under no other title, and for forty years he continued to derive benefit from it.\n\nAccordingly, he would have been estopped even if he had claimed in a different character as reversioner after the succession opened out.\n\nIt was conceded that if the estoppel against Kishan Lal enured after October 1929, then the plaintiffs, who claim through Kishan Lal, would also be estopped.\n\nThe appeal succeeds. The decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the first Court dismissing the plaintiffs' claim is restored. Costs here and m the High Court will be borne by the plaintiffs-respondents.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellan~ : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondents : Sardar Bahadur Saharya.\n\n{I) (1919) 461.A. 72.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "DHIYAN SINGH AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DHIYAN SINGH AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JUGAL KISHORE AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JUGAL KISHORE AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Malik Mustaqil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under it the suit properties were given to M and the rest of the estate then in dispute was given to B.\n\nThe operative part of the award stated inter alia that B, first party, and M, the second party, were held entitled to specified shares in the properties in dispute and each had become permanent owner (Malik Mustaqil) of his or her share.", "canonical_name": "uMalik Mustaqil"}}, {"text": "uMalik Mustaqil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1934, "end_char": 1949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hld, that the award gave an absolute estate to' M as the words uMalik Mustaqil\" were strong, clear and unambiguous and were not qualified by other words and circumstances appearing in the same document in the present case.", "canonical_name": "uMalik Mustaqil"}}, {"text": "12th October, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2949, "end_char": 2967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated 12th October, 1944, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Allsop and Malik JJ.)"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2976, "end_char": 3013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated 12th October, 1944, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Allsop and Malik JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Allsop", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3015, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated 12th October, 1944, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Allsop and Malik JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Malik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3026, "end_char": 3031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated 12th October, 1944, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Allsop and Malik JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bakshi Tek Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3194, "end_char": 3210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bakshi Tek Chand (S. K. Kapoor, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3212, "end_char": 3224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bakshi Tek Chand (S. K. Kapoor, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3256, "end_char": 3266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram (/wala Prasad, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Megh Raj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3467, "end_char": 3481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J.-This is a litigation between two branches of a family whose common ancestor was one Megh Raj Singh."}}, {"text": "Jawahar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3521, "end_char": 3534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jawahar Singh\n\nMegh Raj Singh\n\nI Shanker Lal (d. 1884)\n\nMada~Singh - I\n\nBrijlaf (d. 1889 or (1890)\n\nI Daughter : Mst."}}, {"text": "Mada~Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3577, "end_char": 3587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jawahar Singh\n\nMegh Raj Singh\n\nI Shanker Lal (d. 1884)\n\nMada~Singh - I\n\nBrijlaf (d. 1889 or (1890)\n\nI Daughter : Mst."}}, {"text": "Kisan Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Dei (d. Oct.1929) Husband: Narain Das\n\nShri Kisan Das (d. March 1929)\n\nI I\n\nI .", "canonical_name": "Kishan Das"}}, {"text": "Dhiyan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Plff.2\n\nDhiyan Singh\n\nDeft.", "canonical_name": "DHIYAN SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Obas Ram Onkar Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3911, "end_char": 3932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 I I Obas Ram Onkar Prasad\n\nThe dispute is about property which, according to the plaintiffs, formed part of Shanker Lal's estate."}}, {"text": "Dhiyan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4199, "end_char": 4211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dhiyan Singh\n\nand Another\n\nv. fugal Kishore\n\n11nd Another.", "canonical_name": "DHIYAN SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "fugal Kishore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dhiyan Singh\n\nand Another\n\nv. fugal Kishore\n\n11nd Another.", "canonical_name": "JUGAL KISHORE AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Bose/.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4259, "end_char": 4265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/.\n\nShanker Lal's death in 1884 his daughter Mst."}}, {"text": "Shanker Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/.\n\nShanker Lal's death in 1884 his daughter Mst.", "canonical_name": "Shanker Lal"}}, {"text": "Mohan Dei", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4505, "end_char": 4514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reversion opened out on her death in October 1929 and the plaintiffs are entitled as the next reversioners, for Mt. Mohan Dei's son Shri Kishan Das predeceased her.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Dei"}}, {"text": "Kishan Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4526, "end_char": 4536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reversion opened out on her death in October 1929 and the plaintiffs are entitled as the next reversioners, for Mt. Mohan Dei's son Shri Kishan Das predeceased her.", "canonical_name": "Kishan Das"}}, {"text": "Shanker LaJ", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5061, "end_char": 5072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Shanker Lal' s death disputes arose between Shanker LaJ's father's brother's son Brijlal (the plaintiffs' grandfather) and the defendants' grandmother Mst.", "canonical_name": "Shanker Lal"}}, {"text": "Brijlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5098, "end_char": 5105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Shanker Lal' s death disputes arose between Shanker LaJ's father's brother's son Brijlal (the plaintiffs' grandfather) and the defendants' grandmother Mst.", "canonical_name": "Brij Lal"}}, {"text": "21-12-1884", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5652, "end_char": 5662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A division was effected accordingly and ever since, that is to say, from 21-12-1884, the date of the award, down to 26-3-1941, the date of the suit, each branch has been in separate and uninterrupted possession of the properties respectively allotted to it and each has been dealing with them as absolute owner."}}, {"text": "26-3-1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5695, "end_char": 5704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A division was effected accordingly and ever since, that is to say, from 21-12-1884, the date of the award, down to 26-3-1941, the date of the suit, each branch has been in separate and uninterrupted possession of the properties respectively allotted to it and each has been dealing with them as absolute owner."}}, {"text": "Brij Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6522, "end_char": 6530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The operative portion Dhiyan Singh\n\nrznd .dnotlier \"Having regard to the specifications given above, Brij Lal, first party, and Musammat Mohan Devi, the deceased's female issue, second party, have been .", "canonical_name": "Brij Lal"}}, {"text": "Musammat Mohan Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6549, "end_char": 6568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The operative portion Dhiyan Singh\n\nrznd .dnotlier \"Having regard to the specifications given above, Brij Lal, first party, and Musammat Mohan Devi, the deceased's female issue, second party, have been ."}}, {"text": "Amroha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8518, "end_char": 8524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JJose /.\n\n\"Furthermore, when the 2nd party (Mohan Dei) has inherited no property from her husband, she, m case of getting this share, will certainly settle down in Amroha and will make her father's haveli as her abode and thus the haveli shall remain abad as heretofore, and in this way the deceased's naine will be perpetuated; and it is positive that, after the Musammat, this property shall devolve on her son, who will be the malik (owner) thereof, and later the descendant of this son will become the owner thereof.\""}}, {"text": "Kishan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10701, "end_char": 10711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "also urged that even if Brijlal was bound his son Kishan Lal, who did not claim through him but who had an independent title as reversioner to Shanker Lal, would not be bound, and it was contended that if Kishan Lal was not bound the plaintiffs would not be -either.", "canonical_name": "Kishan Das"}}, {"text": "Bnjlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12903, "end_char": 12909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bnjlal died in 1889 or 1890 and the boy did not die till March 1929."}}, {"text": "Mohan Die", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16446, "end_char": 16455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Die an absolute interest, that she was induced to part with about one-third of the property to which Brijlal, on a true estimate of the facts as now known, had no right.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Dei"}}, {"text": "Dhiyan Singlt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16876, "end_char": 16889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt that she acted to her detriment and there can, we think, be equally no doubt that she was induced to do so on the faith of Brijlal's statements and conduct which induced her to believe that he accepted all the implications of the\n\nDhiyan Singlt\n\nand Another\n\nv. fugal Kishortt\n\nand Another.", "canonical_name": "DHIYAN SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "4th April, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19969, "end_char": 19984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She dealt with it on that footing and gifted it in that right to her grandsons, the contesting defendants, on 4th April, 1929."}}, {"text": "Kisan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20632, "end_char": 20641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have no doubt that down to that time Kisan Lal was also estopped for the reasons given above.", "canonical_name": "Kishan Das"}}, {"text": "Mohaµ Dei", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20747, "end_char": 20756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohaµ Dei would at once have sued and would then for forty years have obtained the benefit of property from which she was excluded because of her acceptance of the award on the faith of Brijlal's assertion that he too accepted it.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Dei"}}, {"text": "Dhiyan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21097, "end_char": 21109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kishan Lal's inaction over these years with full knowledge of the £acts, as is evident from the deposition of D.W. 2, Dhiyan Singh, whose testimonyis uncontradicted, and his acceptance of the estate with all its consequential benefits, unquestionably creates an estoppel in him."}}, {"text": "Kishanlal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21406, "end_char": 21415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose],\n\n\"Kishanlal always accepted this award and acted upon it.\"", "canonical_name": "Kishan Das"}}, {"text": "Annagouda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22700, "end_char": 22709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but Annagouda himself being a party to and benefiting by the transaction evidenced thereby was precluded from questioning any part of it.\""}}, {"text": "Lalitha Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23025, "end_char": 23039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalitha Prasad('), that even if Kishan Lal did take possession in 1889 or 1890 on the strength of a title derived from his father, that would not have precluded him from asserting his own rights in a different character when the succession opened\n\n(I) (1918) 45 I.A. 118."}}, {"text": "Jairam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23712, "end_char": 23718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Long before that, namely in 1868, the next presumptive reversioners entered into a compromise whereby the grandfather of one Jairam who figured in !"}}, {"text": "Anandi Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24075, "end_char": 24086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The actual taking of possesion was however deferred under the compromise till the death of one Anandi Kuer."}}, {"text": "Munniram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24572, "end_char": 24580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jairam lost 1 anna 4 gundas to a creditor Munniram and out of the one anna which he had left from the 2 annas 4 gundas he sold 13 gundas to the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Dhiyan Sitttlt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25476, "end_char": 25490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had the right to contest the\n\nDhiyan Sitttlt\n\nand Anotht:r\n\nv. /ugal Kishore and Another. --", "canonical_name": "DHIYAN SINGH AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "/ugal Kishore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25509, "end_char": 25522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had the right to contest the\n\nDhiyan Sitttlt\n\nand Anotht:r\n\nv. /ugal Kishore and Another. --", "canonical_name": "JUGAL KISHORE AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "fugal Kishorc", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25577, "end_char": 25590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose/,\n\nDhiyan Singh\n\nand Another\n\nv. fugal Kishorc and Another\n\nBo,_ J.\n\npos1t10n and gamble on the possibility of being able to prove the contrary.", "canonical_name": "JUGAL KISHORE AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Bajrangi Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25782, "end_char": 25794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships added-\n\n\"Unless the plaintiffs' individual it unjust that they should have a Bajrangi Lal's revers1oners their legal have effect.\""}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26801, "end_char": 26811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellan~ : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur Saharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26842, "end_char": 26864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : Sardar Bahadur Saharya."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_491_501_EN", "year": 1952, "text": ",..\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 491\n\nKASHINATH BHASKAR DATAR\n\nti.\n\nBHASKAR VISHWESHW AR KARVE\n\n[SAIYID FAzL ALI and VMAN BosE JJ.]\n\nIndian Registration Act (XVI of 1908), s. 17(l)(b)-Subsequent document varying terms of previous document-Limiting and extinguishing \"interest\" in immoveable property-Equitable doctrine of part performancc-W hether applicable.\n\nA suit to recover money based on two mortgages was resisted by the defendant on the plea that the mortgages were satisfied as the assignor of the mortgages to the plaintiff had executed an agreement in favour of the defendant which proved satisfaction.\n\nThis agreement was not registered and the question for determination was whether it required registration and whether if it did, it could not be used for the collateral purpose of proving full payment of the mortgage amount.\n\nThe agreement contained, inter alia, the following terms: \"(i) I am settling and formulating new terms and I am confirming some very terms which were declared before; (ii) Although the rate of interest mentioned in the mortgage deeds is 14 annas still the actual rate is to be received at the rate of 8 annas and so it is settled between the original parties; (iii) It was agreed that if you pay me Rs. 1,800 in a lump it will be understood that the transaction has been wholly completed and paid up.\n\nAs you have no sufficiency of funds ................ it is settled that you are to pay me Rs. 80 per month; (iv) As mentioned above no interest of any nature\n\nwhatever has remained claimable by me ..... . and in like manner I understand whole of the principal has been fully paid; ( v) If you so wish or if necessity may arise then at any time you may ask for it I shall give you this agreement written out on stamp paper and on being registered.\"\n\nHeld, that the agreement was not exempt from registration because the document itself limited and extinguishecl an \"interest\" in immoveable property in the present within the meaning of s. 17( 1 )(b) of the Indian Registration Act, and it was not exempt under s. 17(2)(v).\n\nHeld, also that the document could not be used under the proviso to s. 49 of the Registration Act as the suit was not for specific performance and no question of part performance arose in the case and also no question of using the document for a collateral transaction arose because the document was to be used to prove the very agreement which it created itself .\n\n., U. Po Thin v. Official Assignee (A.I.R. 1938 Rang. 285) and Tik_aram\n\nv. Deputy Commissioner of Bara Banki (26 I.A. 97), ..,. Mahim Chandra Dey v. Ram Dayal Dutta (A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 170),\n\n2-6 S.C. India/71\n\nFeb. 22.\n\n19)2\n\nKashinatk Bhaskar Datar v.\n\nBhaskar Vishweshwar\n\nKarve.\n\nRam Rar.fn v .. fayantilal (A.LR. 1926 Cal. 906) and Collector of Etan v. Kr.<hon Lal (A.I.R. 1930 All. 721) referred to.\n\nC!V!L\n\nAPPELLATE Ju&1so1CTI0N : Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1951. Appeal from a Judgment and Decree dated 22nd September, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Sen and Bavdekar JJ.) in Appeal No. 41 of 1943 arising out of decree dated 4th September, 1942, of the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Poona in Civil Suit No. 808 of 1941.\n\nRoshan Lal and B. S. Shastri for the appellant.\n\nHardyal Hardy for the respondent.\n\n1952. Februray 22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-This is a defendant's appeal in a suit Oil two mortgages.\n\nThe first was executed on the 7th of April, 1931, by the defendant and his father.\n\nThe second was dated the 17th of December, 1935, and was executed by the defendant alone. The first was for a sum of Rs. 9,500, the second for Rs. 3,500. The same property was mortgaged each time.\n\nThe claim on the two deeds together was for Rs. 20,774-3-0.\n\nThese mortagages were in favour of one Narayan Gopal Sathe. On the 28th of March, 1940, the mortgagee assigned them both to the plaintiff who now sues on them.\n\nThe defence was that both mortgages were satisfied.\n\nThe main evidence on which the defendant relied to prove satisfaction was an agreement dated the 17th of October, 1937, executed by the mortgagee Narayan Gopal Sathe in favour of the defendant. The document has been excluded from evidence by the trial Court as well as by the High Court on appeal on the ground that it required registration.\n\nIf this document is excluded, then there is a concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts that the rest of the evidence is not good enough to prove satisfaction.\n\nThey have disbelieved it and decreed the plaintiff's claim in full.\n\nThe -0nly questions before us are ( 1) whether this document :required registration and (2) whether, if it did,. it\n\ncannot still be used for what the defendant claims is a\n\ncollateral purpose, namely proving full payment of 1952\n\nKflshinath the mortgage amount.\n\nBhaskar Dat/JI' The agreement came about in this fashion.\n\nThe - v. mortgagee, Narayan Sathe, was appointed Receiver of Bhaskar h h Vishweshwar two Cinemas in Poona.\n\nT e Court appointing im Kt1rt1e. required him to produce a surety in the sum of Rs. 10,000.\n\nThe defendant agreed to undertake t~ responsibility and as a consideration for that the mortgagee executed the agreement in question.\n\nThe portions of document relevant for the present purpose are as follows.\n\nThe mortgages are there described as the \"transactions of give and take\".\n\n\"(3) It is extremely necessary to explain beforehand the transaction of give and take outstanding\n\netween both of us ...\n\n(4) Whereas two transactions have been done between you and me ...... Therefore you have agreed to stand surety ... And only for that reason I am executing this agreement and giving it to you in writing and thereunder I am settling and formulating some new terms and I am confirming some very terms which were declared before.\n\n(5) Although in the matter of the transaction relating to the aforesaid mortgage deed~ the rate of interest mentioned in the documents purporting to be the mortgage deeds is 14 annas per mensem per centum, still the actual interest is to he received only at the rate of 8 annas per mensem per centum; so it if settled between you and me and I have also agreed to the same.\n\nAnd even at that rate I have also been receiving the interest and I shall also receive hereafter ....\n\n( 6) As regards the transaction of the second mortgage deed .... if as agreed at tltat time between you and me you pay me Rs. 1,800 in the lump then it will be understood that the transaction of give and take s11bsisting between you and me has been wholly completed rand fully paid up.\n\nAs you have no sufficiency of funds to make up and pay :in full the above sum at once it is settled that you are to pay to me Rt. 80 per\n\nBose /.\n\nKa1hina1h Bhaskar Datar v.\n\nBha1k_ar Vuhweshwar\n\nKarve.\n\nBose /.\n\nmonth and thus you are to make payment in full .... ln accordance with the agreement arrived at between us both subsequent to the document purporting to be the second mortgage deed the said documents and papers . ... and the written receipts in respect of interest given to you by me relating to the payment in full made by you in respect of interest and principal on account of the first transaction dated 7-4-31 have been kept with me ...\n\n• • •\n\n(8) As mentioned above (vide paras 5 and 6 ) no interest of any nature whatever has remained claimable by me from you in accordance with the agreement arrived at between us both from the date of your suretyship onward and prior to it and in like manner I understand that the whole of the principal has been fully paid. • • •\n\n(10) If you so wish or if necessity may arise then at any time you may ask for it and I shall give you this agreement on being written out on stamped paper and on being registere.d.\"\n\nIn our opinion, this is a document which limits and extinguishes interests in immovable pi{operty , fo the present within the meaning of section 17(1) (b) of the Indian Registration Act.\n\nClause ( 4) of the agreement expressly says so.\n\nReferring to the two mortgages it says-\n\n\"! am settling and formulating some new terms.\"\n\nThis speaks from the present. It does not say that this was some past agreement, and that fact is underlined in the next sentence which reads-\n\n\"and I am confirming some very terms which were declared before.\"\n\nAmong the new terms is the following. The rate of interest agreed upon in the two mortgage deeds was 14 annas per cent per month. Clause ( 5) reduces this to 8 annas.\n\nIt is true that according to clause (5) only 8 annas had actuallv been paid all along b11t that hardly\n\nmatters because the question is not what was paid but what was due and what the mortgagee could have enforced under his bond. It is evident from clause ( 4) that it was the agreement embodied in the document which effected the change and therefore it was the document itself which brought the altered terms into being.\n\nThe next question is whether this limits an interest in immovable property.\n\nWe are of opinion it does.\n\nWe agree . with the learned Rangoon Judges in U. Po Thin v. Official Assignee(1) that one part of the\n\n\"interet\" which a mortgagee has in mortgaged property is the right to receive interest at a certain rate when the document provides for interest.\n\nIf that rate is varied, whether to his advantage or otherwise, then, in our judgment, his \"interest\" in the property is affected.\n\nIf the subsequent agreement substitutes a higher rate, then to the extent of the difference it \"creates\" a fresh \"interest\" which was not there before.\n\nIf the rate is lowered, then his original \"interest\" is limited.\n\nThe question of a higher rate was considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Tika Ram v.\n\nDeputy Commissioner of Bara Banki(2).\n\nThere, the mortgagors gave the mortgagees an unregistered rukka or written promise simultaneously with the registered mortgage stipulating that they would pay an extra 6 per cent per annum over and above the 15 per cent entered in the mortgage.\n\nTheir Lordships held that these rukkas could not be used to fetter the equity of redemption.\n\nThey did not decide whether the personal covenant in the rukkas could be enforced because that point had not been raised in the plaint and pleadings, nor did they refer to the Registration Act, but we think the words.\n\n\"an unregistered instrument which the staute declares is not to affect the mortgaged property\"\n\ncan only have reference to that Act.\n\n(I) (1938) R.L.R. 293 : A.LR. 1938 R. 285.\n\n(2) (1899) 26 I.A. 97 at 100.\n\nKashinath Bhaskar Datar v.\n\nBhaskar Vishweshwlll'\n\nKarve.\n\nBose f.\n\n195'!\n\nK6ShiHth lJhuk.Rr D1tlilr ... 1ihasfr,11r Vishweshwu\n\nx..,.u~. .. ,. /.\n\nIt was argued, on the strength of M ahim Chandra Dey v. Ram Dayal Dutttt,(1) Ram Ranian v. Jayanti lal(') and Collector of Etah v. Kishori Lal(\"), that it is always open to a mortgagee to release or remit a part of the debt, aod when he doe.s so he does not limit or extinguish an interest in immovable property any more than when he passes a receipt acknowledging payment of the whole or part of the money. The effect of the payment, or of the release, may be to extinguish the mortgage but in themselves they do not limit the interest.\n\nExtending this, the learned counsel for the defendant contended that when a mortgagee agrees to accept a lower rate of interest he docs no more than release that part of the debt which would be covered by the difference in rate.\n\nWe do not agree. There is a difference between a receipt and a remission or a release.\n\nA receipt is aot the payment, nor does the document in such a case serve to extinguish the mortgage or limit the liability.\n\nIt is the payment of the money which does that and the receipt does no more than evidence the fact. Not ro a release.\n\nThe extinguishment or diminution of liability is in that event effected by the agreement itself and not by something external to it. If the agreement is oral, it is hit by proviso 4 to section 92 of the Evidence Act, for it \"rescinds\" or \"modifies\" the contract o~ mortgage. If it is in writing, it is hit by section 17(1) (b) of the Registration Act, for in that case the writing itself \"limits\" or \"extinguishes\" the liability under the mortgage.\n\nIt is to be observed that when the mortgagor pays money due on the mortgage, in whole or in part, he is\n\ncarrying out the terms of the bond and is not making any alteration in it, and even though the fact of payment may limit or extinguish the mortgagee's interest that is only because the bond is working itself out by the force of its own terms and not by reason of some new agreement which seekls to modify it or limit or extinguish the interest which it creates.\n\nA simple test\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 170.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1930 All. 721 at 725 F.B.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 91J6.\n\n...\n\nis this : see whether the mortgagee can, in the face of the subsequent agreement, enforce the terms of his bond.\n\nIf he cannot, then it is plain that the subsequent undertaking has effected a modification, and if that has the effect of limiting or extinguishing the mortgagee's interest, it is at once hit either by section 17 (1) (b) or section 92 proviso 4.\n\nBut when there is a mere payment of money, that is done under the terms of the bond, for the contract of mortgage postulat'Es that the mortgagor should repay the money borrowed and that when he does so the mortgagee's interest in the property shall be \"limited\" to the extent of the repayment or, when all is repaid, be wholly extinguished ; nor, of course, does a payment !?.ave to be made by a written or registered instrument, or even evidenced by one.\n\nClause (xi) to section 17 (2) of the Registration Act is based on this principal.\n\nIt draws a distinction between a document which, by the force of its terms, effects the extinguishment, or . purports to do so, and one which merely evidences an external fact which brings about that result.\n\nNow apply the test just given to the present case.\n\nUnder the mortgages the mortgagee .is entitled to . interest at 14 annas per cent. per month but the mortgagor says he cannot claim that.\n\nWhy?\n\nBecause, according to him, the subsequent agreement altered the terms of the bond and reduced his liability to only 8 annas. It hardly matters what the agreement is called, whether a release or a remission, nor is it germane to the question that the mortgagee is entitled to remit or release the whole or a part of the debt; the fact remains that his agreement to do so effects an alteration in the original contract and by the force of its terms or extinguishes his interest.\n\nAssume that the mortgagor repaid the whole of the interest at the altered rate and the whole of the principal, would those repayments by themselves effect an extinguishment ef the mortgage?\n\nClearly not, because unless the subsequent agreement is called in aid, more would be due under the terms of the bond on account of the higher rate of interest.\n\nIt is evident then that it is the\n\nKwliinatli Bhaskar DilltW Y, Bliasl(llr VishUJesllwtw\n\nKar11e.\n\nKasliinatlt Bllask_ar Datar v.\n\nBliask_ar Visliwesliwar\n\nK\"rve.\n\nBose f.\n\nagreement which limits the mortgagee's interest and serves to extinguish the mortgage and not mere payment at the reduced rate.\n\nSimilar observations apply to clause ( 6) of tbe agreem.ent.\n\nIt begins by reciting a past agreement in which the mortgagor had promised to pay Rs. 1,800 in a lump sum.\n\nWe are left to infer that this was to extinguish the mortgage. If it was, then it would be hit by either section 92, proviso 4, of the Evidence Act or section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, but that does not matter because the present document varies even that agreement and substitutes a third agreement in its place; namely that payment of Rs. 1,800 by instalments at the rate of Rs. 80 a month will effect \"payment in full\", that is to say, will extinguish the mortgage.\n\nThis speaks from the date of the document, for it says, referring to this agreement, that \"it is settled\" etc.\n\nNext we come to clause(8). That refers us back to clauses (5) and (6) and says that\n\n\"as mentioned there no interest of any nature whatever has remained claimable by me\"\n\nand speaking of the principal says \"and in like manner I understand the whole of the principal has been fully paid\".\n\nWe have already dealt with clauses (5) and (6). Clause (8) carries us no further and merely states that because of clauses (5) and (6) neither interests nor prjncipal is now claimable; and of course if neither interest nor principal is claimable that extinguishes the mortgage, and in this case the extinguishment is brought about, not by mere payment in accordance with the terms of the bond, but because of the. fresh agreement.\n\nClause ( 10) remains for consideration. It was argued that this brings the matter within section 17(2) (v) of. the Registration Act because it gives the defendant the right to obtain another document which will effect the extinguishment.\n\nWe do not agree because clause\n\n(v) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act postulates that the document shall not of itself create, declare,\n\n...\n\nassign, limit, extinguish any right etc., and that it shall merely create a right to obtain another document etc. (The stress is on the words \"itself\" and\n\nmerely\".)\n\nWe agree with Sir Dinsha Mulla at page 86 of the 5th edition of his Indian Registration Act that\n\n\"If the document itself creates an interest in immoveable property, the fact that it contemplates the execution of another document will not exempt it from registration under this clause.\"\n\nAs we have seen, this document of itself limits or -extinguishes certain interests in the mortgaged property.\n\nThe operative words are reasonably clear.\n\nConsequently, the document is not one which merely confers a right to obtain another document. It confers the right only in certain contingencies, namely, \"if you so wish\" or \"if necessity may arise\". Its purport is to effect an immediate alteration in the terms of the two bonds and because of that alteration to effect an immediate extinguishment and limitation. Clause (10) merely confers an additional right, namely the right to obtain anotr document \"if you so wish\" or \"if necessity may arise\".\n\nTherefore, the document in question is not one which merely creates a right to obtain another.\n\nAn agreement to sell, or an agreement to transfer at some future date, is to be distinguished because that sort of document does not 0£ itself purport to effect the -transfer. It merely embodies a present agreement to execute another document in the future which will, when executed, have that effect.\n\nThe document in hand is not of that type.\n\nIt does not postpone the effect of extinguishment or limitation of the mortgages t.o a future date. It does not say that the agreement it embodies shall take effect in the future.\n\nIt purports to limit and extinguish the liabilities on the two mortgages at once by virtue of the document itself and merely adds that \"if it is necessary or should you r.vant another document, I will repeat the present\n\nKashinath Bhaskar Datar v.\n\nBhaskilr VishweshwlZI\n\nKtm1e.\n\nBose f.\n\nK.shinuh lJh•, k•r Datar v.\n\nBh•Jk#!' ViJhW46htVtlr\n\nKMe.\n\nlJoJe /.\n\nagreement in a registered agreement\".\n\nBy implication it means that if it is not necessary, or if the mortgagor does not want a registered instrument, the document itself will have effect. Incidentally, one effect of hold-- ing that this document does not limit or extinguiili the mortgagor's liability would be that there is noagreement to that effect yet in force.\n\nThis may or may not give the mortgagor a right to obtain specific performance of his right to obtain such an agreement but until he does that there would be no bar to the mortgagee's claim in this suit.\n\nHowever, it Is not necessary to go as far as that because we are of opinion that thio document is not exempt from registration under section 17(2)(v), and we so hold.\n\nThe next question is whether the document can beused in evidence under the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act. We are clear it cannot.\n\nThis is not a suit for specific performance nor does any question of part performance under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act arise.\n\nIt remains then to be seen whether the use now sought ro be made of the document is to evidence a collateral transaction not required to be\n\nevidenced by a registered instrument.\n\nBut what is thetransaction sought to be proved but the very :igre<- ment which the document not merely evidence~ but~ by reason of its own force, creates? That is not a-. collateral transaction and even if it were a transactionof that type, it would require a registered instrument_ for the reasons we have already given.\n\nSection 53A of the Transfer of Property Act wa. referred to but it has no application, for the agreement • we are concerned with is not a transfer. There are no\n\nwords of conveyance in it; also the mortgagor is not continuing in possession in part performance of thecontract.\n\nBoth mortgages were simple and the right to possession never resided in the mortgagee. He might\n\nin due course have acquired it by process of law if heobtained a decree and purchased at the sale; on theother hand, a stranger might have purchased and the , right to possession would in that event have passed:_ elsewhere.\n\nBut he had no right to possession at the: \"' \"'\n\ndate of the agreement and having none he could not have transferred it.\n\nThe mortgagor's possession was consequently not referable to the agreement.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent: A. C. Dave.\n\nRUBY GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nti.\n\nPEAREY LAL KUMAR AND ANOTHER.\n\n[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nlt1Jian Arbitration Act (X of 1940), s. 33-Arbitration clause-· Wht'ther\" disputt' \"arises out of agrt't'ment\"-Tests-Plea that agree•\n\n1flt'11t is not applicable and does not subsist-No dispute about the existence or validity or meaning-Jurisdiction of arbitrator-Appli; cation under s. 33-Maintainability.\n\nThe appellant company insured a car belonging to respondent' No. 1 and issued a policy which contained, inter alia, the following_ tcrms:-\"All differences arising out of this policy shall be referred to the decision of an arbitrator to be appointed by the parties •\n\n. . . . . . If the company shall disclaim liability to the insured for any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within twelve calendar months from the date of such disclaimer have been referred to arbitration then the claim shall have been deemed to have been abandoned and shall not be recoverable.\" The car was lost, and the company through its Branch Manager disclaimed liability on three different dates.\n\nThe insured did not take any action in regard to the appointment of an arbitrator until more than twelve months after the last disclaimer by the company.\n\nThe case of the company was that the insured must be deemed to have abandoned his claim by virtue of the contract ef insurance policy while the respondent averred that there was never any valid disclaimer by the company of its liability as the Branch Manager had no authority to disclaim the liability and it could have been disclaimed only by the resolution of the company. The company presented the present application under sec. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act praying for a declaration that the reference to arbitration was illegal and the award if made by the arbitrator would not bind the company.\n\nIt was contended on its behalf that the arbitration clause had ceased to be\n\nKashinath Bhaslr..ar Datar v.\n\nBhaslr,, ar VishweshwM'\n\nKarve.\n\nFe/J. 25,", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "491\n\nKASHINATH BHASKAR DATAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KASHINATH BHASKAR DATAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHASKAR VISHWESHW AR KARVE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHASKAR VISHWESHWAR KARVE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAzL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAIYID FAzL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VMAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 17(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Registration Act", "statute": "Indian Registration Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17( 1 )(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1980, "end_char": 1993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2008, "end_char": 2024, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2054, "end_char": 2065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2136, "end_char": 2141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2149, "end_char": 2165, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3007, "end_char": 3010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a Judgment and Decree dated 22nd September, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Sen and Bavdekar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bavdekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3015, "end_char": 3023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a Judgment and Decree dated 22nd September, 1947, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Sen and Bavdekar JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Roshan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3194, "end_char": 3204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roshan Lal and B. S. Shastri for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. S. Shastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3209, "end_char": 3222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roshan Lal and B. S. Shastri for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Hardyal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3243, "end_char": 3256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardyal Hardy for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3341, "end_char": 3345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-This is a defendant's appeal in a suit Oil two mortgages."}}, {"text": "7th of April, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3438, "end_char": 3456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was executed on the 7th of April, 1931, by the defendant and his father."}}, {"text": "17th of December, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3517, "end_char": 3539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second was dated the 17th of December, 1935, and was executed by the defendant alone."}}, {"text": "Narayan Gopal Sathe", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These mortagages were in favour of one Narayan Gopal Sathe.", "canonical_name": "Narayan Gopal Sathe"}}, {"text": "28th of March, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3818, "end_char": 3837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th of March, 1940, the mortgagee assigned them both to the plaintiff who now sues on them."}}, {"text": "17th of October, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4062, "end_char": 4083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main evidence on which the defendant relied to prove satisfaction was an agreement dated the 17th of October, 1937, executed by the mortgagee Narayan Gopal Sathe in favour of the defendant."}}, {"text": "Narayan Sathe", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4885, "end_char": 4898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The - v. mortgagee, Narayan Sathe, was appointed Receiver of Bhaskar h h Vishweshwar two Cinemas in Poona.", "canonical_name": "Narayan Gopal Sathe"}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4965, "end_char": 4970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The - v. mortgagee, Narayan Sathe, was appointed Receiver of Bhaskar h h Vishweshwar two Cinemas in Poona."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6487, "end_char": 6490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7-4-31", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7185, "end_char": 7191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the written receipts in respect of interest given to you by me relating to the payment in full made by you in respect of interest and principal on account of the first transaction dated 7-4-31 have been kept with me ...\n\n• • •\n\n(8) As mentioned above (vide paras 5 and 6 ) no interest of any nature whatever has remained claimable by me from you in accordance with the agreement arrived at between us both from the date of your suretyship onward and prior to it and in like manner I understand that the whole of the principal has been fully paid. • • •"}}, {"text": "section 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7874, "end_char": 7887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7906, "end_char": 7922, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rangoon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9000, "end_char": 9007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with the learned Rangoon Judges in U. Po Thin v. Official Assignee(1) that one part of the\n\n\"interet\" which a mortgagee has in mortgaged property is the right to receive interest at a certain rate when the document provides for interest."}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10228, "end_char": 10244, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11914, "end_char": 11924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12038, "end_char": 12051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12063, "end_char": 12079, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13075, "end_char": 13085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13097, "end_char": 13107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13592, "end_char": 13602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13614, "end_char": 13630, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15473, "end_char": 15483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15519, "end_char": 15529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15545, "end_char": 15561, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16770, "end_char": 16783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16796, "end_char": 16812, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16978, "end_char": 16988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dinsha Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17257, "end_char": 17269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with Sir Dinsha Mulla at page 86 of the 5th edition of his Indian Registration Act that\n\n\"If the document itself creates an interest in immoveable property, the fact that it contemplates the execution of another document will not exempt it from registration under this clause.\""}}, {"text": "Indian Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17307, "end_char": 17330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 17(2)(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19869, "end_char": 19885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19990, "end_char": 20000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20008, "end_char": 20024, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20143, "end_char": 20154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20162, "end_char": 20186, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20698, "end_char": 20709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20717, "end_char": 20741, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21588, "end_char": 21598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "A. C. Dave", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21627, "end_char": 21637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: A. C. Dave."}}, {"text": "RUBY GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21640, "end_char": 21670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RUBY GENERAL INSURANCE CO."}}, {"text": "PEAREY LAL KUMAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21678, "end_char": 21694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PEAREY LAL KUMAR AND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "SAIYID F AZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21711, "end_char": 21726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]", "canonical_name": "SAIYID FAzL ALI"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21731, "end_char": 21742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Jian Arbitration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21752, "end_char": 21772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21786, "end_char": 21791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jian Arbitration Act", "statute": "Jian Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22033, "end_char": 22038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jian Arbitration Act", "statute": "Jian Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23320, "end_char": 23327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_501_512_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 501\n\ndate of the agreement and having none he could not have transferred it.\n\nThe mortgagor's possession was consequently not referable to the agreement.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent: A. C. Dave.\n\nRUBY GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nti.\n\nPEAREY LAL KUMAR AND ANOTHER.\n\n[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nlt1Jian Arbitration Act (X of 1940), s. 33-Arbitration clause-· Wht'ther\" disputt' \"arises out of agrt't'ment\"-Tests-Plea that agree•\n\n1flt'11t is not applicable and does not subsist-No dispute about the existence or validity or meaning-Jurisdiction of arbitrator-Appli; cation under s. 33-Maintainability.\n\nThe appellant company insured a car belonging to respondent' No. 1 and issued a policy which contained, inter alia, the following_ tcrms:-\"All differences arising out of this policy shall be referred to the decision of an arbitrator to be appointed by the parties •\n\n. . . . . . If the company shall disclaim liability to the insured for any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within twelve calendar months from the date of such disclaimer have been referred to arbitration then the claim shall have been deemed to have been abandoned and shall not be recoverable.\" The car was lost, and the company through its Branch Manager disclaimed liability on three different dates.\n\nThe insured did not take any action in regard to the appointment of an arbitrator until more than twelve months after the last disclaimer by the company.\n\nThe case of the company was that the insured must be deemed to have abandoned his claim by virtue of the contract ef insurance policy while the respondent averred that there was never any valid disclaimer by the company of its liability as the Branch Manager had no authority to disclaim the liability and it could have been disclaimed only by the resolution of the company. The company presented the present application under sec. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act praying for a declaration that the reference to arbitration was illegal and the award if made by the arbitrator would not bind the company.\n\nIt was contended on its behalf that the arbitration clause had ceased to be\n\nKashinath Bhaslr..ar Datar v.\n\nBhaslr,, ar VishweshwM'\n\nKarve.\n\nFe/J. 25,\n\n1Ruby General\n\nInsurance Co. Ltd. v.\n\nPearey Lal\n\nKumar 'llnd Anoth<r.\n\noperative and the question as to the existence and validity of the Arbitration agreement was triable by the court under sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act and not by the arbitrator.\n\nHeld, (i) that the point on which the parties were in dispute was a difference \"arising out of the policy\", because recourse to the contract by which both the parties were bound was necessary for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between them as there was no contention raised in the present case by either of the parties that there was no contract entered into at all or that it was void ab initio, and therefore the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide the matter referred to him. A contention 'that the arbitration agreement has ceaseG to be applicable or that it no longer subsists will not oust the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.\n\n(ii) No question of determining the effect of the arbitration :within the n1eaning of sec. 33 arose because there was no dispute between the parties as to what it meant.\n\nA. M. Mair and Co. v. Gordhandas Sagarmul/ [1950] (S.C.R. '792), Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. ([1941] 1 A.E.R. 337), Mecaura v.\n\nNorthern Assurance Co. ([1925] A.G. 619), Stebbing v. Liverpool, London and Globe Insurance Co. Ltd. ([1917], 2 K. B. 433) referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 163 of 1951.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment dated the 10th April, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla (Kapur J.) in Civil Revision No. 286 of 1950 arising out of Order dated the 24th March, 1950, of the Court of Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Delhi, in an Application under Section 33 of Indian Arbitration Act, X of 1940.\n\nRattan Lal Chawla (K. N. Agarwal, with him) for the appellant.\n\nSom Nath Chopra\n\n1952. February 25. was delivered by\n\nfor the The respondent.\n\nJudgment of the court\n\nFAZL Au J .-This is an appeal by special leave against the i\"udgment of the Punjab High Court upholding the decision of a Subordinate Judge of Delhi relating to a petition filed by th~ 3:ppellant-compny under section 33 of the Indian Arb1trat10n Act against the respondents.\n\n1952 The material facts are these. On the 22nd April, 1947, the appellant company insured a car belonging Ruby General'\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd. to the first respondent and issued a policy which fully sets out the terms and conditions of the agreement relating to the insurance. The first respondent left his car in a garage at Lahore and came away to India on the 31st July, 1947.\n\nSubsequently, he learned about the loss of his car, and sent a legal notice dated the 18th March, 1948, through his advocate Mr.\n\nA. R.\n\nKapur to the Head Office of the company at Calcutta, claiming a sum of Rs. 7,000 for the loss of the car. On the 10th April, 1948, Mr. Kapur received a letter from the Branch Manager of the Company's office at Amritsar asking for information regarding certain matters stated in the letter.\n\nThis information appears to have been supplied on the 30th April, 1948. On the 26th May, 1948, the company's Branch Manager at Amritsar wrote to the first respondent repudiating the liability of the company for the loss of the car on the. ground that the loss was \"due to communal riots. which were going on in the whole of Punjab\" and was not covered by the agreement of insurance. A similar letter was written again by the Branch Manager on the 3rd July, 1948, to the first respondent, and another letter was written by one Mr. Rattan Lal Chawla representing himself to be counsel for the company, to,\n\nMr. A. R. Kapur, on the 1st August, 1948.\n\nOn the. 21st November, 1949, the first respondent wrote a letter to the Branch Secretary of the Company's office at Calcutta, stating that his claim was valid and nominating Mr. T. C. Chopra, Assistant Manager,.\n\nLakshmi Insurance Company Ltd., Delhi, as arbitrator on his behalf and requesting the company to appoint\n\nanother person as arbitrator on its behalf. Thereafter,, the company presented an application on the 29th December, 1949, in the court of the Senior Sub-judge,.\n\nDelhi, under section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act,. against the first respondent and Mr. T. C. Chopra, thearhitrator, who is the second respondent in tliis appeal,.\n\npraying forv.\n\nPearey Lal Kumar and Another~\n\nFazl Ali / ..\n\n; Ruby Generol\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltti.\n\nPear<y Lal\n\nKumllf' .-nJ Another.\n\n( 1) a declaration to the effect that the reference to arbitration 1md the appointment of respondent No. 2 as sole arbitrator was illegal;\n\n(2) a declaration to the effect that if the respondent No. 2 made any award it would not be binding . on the company; and\n\n(3) an injunction restraining the respondents Nos . 1 and 2 from taking any proceeding in the matter and the respondent No. 2 from making any award.\n\nUpon this petition, notice was issued to the respondents, and an injunction was issued directing them not to file any award till the date of the next hearing, which was fixed for 31st January, 1950.\n\nOn the 4th February, 1950, the first respondent wrote to the second respondent (the arbitrator) that since no arbitrator had been appointed by the company and since the company had refused to appoint any arbitraator, he (Mr. Chopra) was to act as the sole arbitrator.\n\nOn the 6th February, 1950, Mr. Chopra wrote to inform the insurance company that he had been appointed sole arbitrator and asked the company to send the • statement of its case and to produce all the evidence ·!>ll the 14th February,\n\n1950. On the 10th February, 1950, the insurance company filed a petition before the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, praying that the responden~ be stopped from proceeding further in the matter so .that its application under section 33 may not become infructuous.\n\nOn the 11th February, the Subordinate Judge issued notice to the respondents fixing the 17th }'ebruary as the date of hearing and passed the fol- 'lowing order:\n\n\"Moreover (till) the decision of this application the arbitrator should not give or pronounce his award bur should continue the proceedings.\"\n\nOn. the 14th February, 1950, the second respondent pronounced his award after making a note to the following effect:-\n\n\"Mr. G. R. Chopra, the counsel of the defendants, , sent a telephonic message at 12 A.M. requesting extenon till ;! P.M.\n\nI agreed and accordingly I waited for\n\n.. .\n\n...\n\nhim and the plaintiff with his counsel also waited up to 1 P.M. Nobody turned up on behalf of the defendants.\n\nI commenced the proceedings and took the statement of the plaintiff and the documents that he had produced.\"\n\nHe made a further note at the end of the award to this effect:-\n\n\"As after the giving of the award a notice was 1erved upon me not to give the award, I have not sent any formal letter to the parties informing them of the award and its costs.\"\n\nOn the 24th March, 1950, the Subordinate Judge pa$sed an order on the company's application under\n\nsection 33, dismissing it and holding that the terms. of clause 7 of the agreement \"were comprehensive enough to include the points of disputes between the parties now and as such are triable by the arbitrator and not by the court\". The Subordinate Judge concluded his order by observing:\n\n\"I, therefore, hold that the reference to the arbitration of the differences is perfectly valid and the points raised by the parties to this application with regard to the abandonment of claim . and its becoming irrecoverable are to be decided by the arbitrator.\"\n\nThe judgment of the Subordinate Judge was upheld in revision by the Punjab High Court and the company has now preferred an .appeal to this court by special leve.\n\nThe points that were . urged on behalf of the appellant in this appeal are these:-\n\n(1) that the arbitration clause had ceased to be operative and the question as to the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement was triable by the court under section 33 of the Arbiration Act and not by the arbitrator; and\n\n(2) that the award was invalid and not binding on the appellant, because it was pronounced in spite of the order of the court dated the 11th February, 1950,\n\ndirecting the arbitrator not to pronounce his award.\n\n19)2\n\nRuby Gent:ral\n\nlnsuranct:\n\nCo. Lttl.\n\nPe11rt:y lAl\n\nKumar ani A.notht:r.\n\nPal Ali /.\n\nRuby Genn-111\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPearey Ltil\n\nKumar 11nd A nothn-\n\nF11zl Ali J.\n\nClause 7 of the policy of insurance runs as follows:-\n\n\"All differences arising out of this policy shall be . rderred to the decision of an arbitrator to be appointed in writing by the parties in difference or if they cannot agree upon a single arbitrator to the decision of two arbitrators one to be appointed in writing by each of the parties within one calendar month after having been required in writing so to dO' by either of the parties or in case the arbitrators do not agree of an umpire appointed in writing by the arbitrators before entering upon the reference.\n\nThe umpire shall sit with the arbitrators and preside at their meeting and the making of an award shall be a condition precedent to any right of action against the company.\n\nIf the company shall disclaim liability to the insured for any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within twelve calender months from the date of such disclaimer have been referred to arbitration under the provisions herein contained then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been aban- . cloned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that this clause provides among other things that if the company disclaimed liability to the insured for any claim under the policy and such claim was not within twelve calendar months from the date of such disclaimer . referred to arbitration, then the claim should be deemed to have been abandoned and was not recoverable.\n\nThe case of the company is that it disclaimed liability for the loss of the car on three successive occasions, namely, on the 26th May, 1948, the 3rd July, 1948, and the 1st August, 1948.\n\nThe first respondent however did not take any action in regard to the appointroent of an arbitrator until the 21st November, 1949, i.e., until more than 12 months after even the last disclairoer by the company. For this reason, the claim put forward by the first respondent must be deemed to have been abandoned and he cannot recover anything from the company.\n\nOn the other hand, the case of the first respondent, which\n\n... .\n\n~ -\n\nis set out m 'his affidavit dated the 17th February, 1950, is that there was never any valid disclaimer by the company of its liability. The position that he took up was that the Branch Manager of the company had no authority to disclaim the liability, and it could have been disclaimed only by a resolution of the company.\n\nNow these being the respective contentions of the parties, the question is whether the point in dispute fell to be decided by the arbitrator or by the court under section 33 of the Arbitration Act.\n\nSection 33 is to the following effect:-\n\n\"Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits :\n\n-Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit.\"\n\nThe question to be decided is whether the point ori which the parties are in dispute is a difference \"arising out of the policy\" in terms of clause 7 of the policy.\n\nThe test for determining such a question has been laid down in a series of cases and is a simple one. The test is whether recourse to the contract by which the parties are bound is necessary for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between them.\n\nIf such recourse to the contract is necessary, then the matter must come within the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.\n\nIn the present case; both thP. p; iries admit the contract and state that they are bound by it. Indeed, the appellant-company, in order to mak-ie good its contention, is obliged to rely and does rely on that part of clause 7 of the policy which states that if the company should disclaim liability and the claim be not refered to arbitration within 12 months of such disclaimer, the claim shall be deemed to have been abandoned.\n\nEvidently, the company cannot succeed without calling m aid this clause and 3-6 S. C. India/71\n\nRuby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v •.\n\nPearcy Lal Kumar and- Another.\n\nFazl - Ali. J.\n\nRuby General\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPeuey Lal Kumar •ntl Another.\n\nF•d Ali f.\n\nrely.ing on it. Agajn, the first respondent does not say that he is not bound by the clause but states that the matter was referred to arbitration before any valid disclaimer was made.\n\nThe position therefore is that one party relying upon the arbitration clause says that there has been a breach of its terms and the other party, also relying on that cla11Se, says that there has been no breach but on the other hand the requirements . of that clause have been fulfilled. Thus, the point in dispute between the parties is one for the decision of which the appellant is compelled to invoke to his aid one of the terms of the insurance agreement. it is thus clear that the difference between the parties is a difference arising out of the policy and the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide it, the parties having made him the sole judge of all differences arising out of the policy. ,\n\nA large number of cases were cited before us on behalf of the parties, but it is unnecessary to refer to them, since the question which arises in this appeal is a simple one and is covered by the statement of law which is to be found in the decision of this Court in\n\nA. M. Mair & Co. v. Gordhandas; Sagarmull('), and in a series of English authorities, some of which only may be referred to.\n\nIn Heyman v. Darwin;, Ltd. (t) the law on the subject has been very clearly stated in the following passage :-\n\n\"An arbitration clause is a written submission, agreed to by the parties to the contract, and, like otha written submissions to arbitration, must be construed according to its language and in the light of the circumstances in which it is made. If the dispute is :u to whether the contract which contains the clause has (!ver been entered into at all, that issue cannot go to arbitration under the clause, for the party who denies that he has ever entered into the contract is thereby denying that he has ever joined in the submission.\n\nSimilarly, if one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void ab initi\"o (because, for example, the making of such a contract is illegal) the arbitration\n\n(I} [19SOJ S.C.R. 792.\n\n(2) [1941) I A. E. R. 337,343.\n\n....\n\ndause cannot operate, for on this view the clause itself\n\nis also void.\n\nIf, however, the parties are at one in asserting that they entered into a binding contract, but a difference has arisen between them as to whether there has been a breach by one side or the other, or as to whether -circumstances have arisen which have discharged one o0r both parties from further performance, such differnces should be regarded as differences which have arisen 'in respect of', or 'with regard to,' or 'under' the contract, and an arbitration clause which uses these, or similar expressions, should be construed .accordingly.''\n\nIn Macaura v.\n\nNorthern Assurance Co.(1), the :41ppellant had insured a large quantity of timber against fire and the greater part of the timber having been destroyed by fire, he sued the insurance company to recover the loss but the action was stayed and the matter was referred to arbitration in pursuance of the conditions contained in the policy.\n\nThe arbitrator held that the claimant had no insurable interest in the -goods insured and disallowed .the claim.\n\nOne of the points raised in the case was that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide the matter, but that contention was rejected by Lord Sumner in these words :-\n\n\"The defendants do not repudiate the policy or dispute its validity as a contract; on the contrary, they rely on it and say that according to its terms, -express and implied, they are relieved from liability :\n\n!CC Stebbing's case(2}, Woodall v. Pearl Assurance c~.e>\n\n.... It is a fallacy to say that they assert the policy to be null and void.\"\n\nIn Stebbing v. Liverpool. and London and Globe Insurance Company Limited(2), to which reference was\n\nmade by Lord Sumner, the policy of insurance contained a clause referring to the decision of an arbitrator \"all differences arising out of this policy\". It also\n\n(I) (1925] A.C. 619.\n\n(3) [1919] l K.B. 593.\n\n(2) [1917] 2 K. B. 433.\n\nRuby General\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nPearey Lal\n\nKumar ond Another.\n\nFazl Ali f.\n\nRuby General\n\nlnsuranc~\n\nCo. Ltd. . v.\n\nPearey Lal Kumar and Another.\n\nFazl Ali f.\n\ncontained a recital that the assured had made a proposal and declaration as the basis of the contract, and a clause to the effect that compliance with the conditions indorsed upon the policy should be a condition precedent to any liability on the part of the insurers •\n\nOne of the conditions provided that if any false declaration should be made or used in support of a claim all benefit under the policy should be forfeited.\n\nIn answer to a claim by the assured, the insurers alleged that statements in the proposal and declaration were false.\n\nWhen the matter came before the arbitrator, the assured objected that this was not a difference in the arbitration and that the arbitrator had no power to determine whether the answers were true or not, or to determine any matters which called in question the validity of the policy. In holding that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide the matter, Viscount Reading C. J. observed as follows : -\n\n\"If the company were seeking to avoid the contract in the true sense they would have to rely upon some matter outside the contract, such as a misrepresentation of some material fact inducing the contract, of which the force and effect are not declared by the contract itself.\n\nIn that case the materiality of the fact and its effect in inducing the contract would have to be tried. In the present case the company are claiming the benefit of a clause in the contract when they . say that the parties have agreed that the statements in question are material and that they 'induced the contract.\n\nIf they succeed in escaping liability that is by reason of one of the clauses in the policy.\n\nIn resisting the claim they are not avoiding the policy but relying on its terms.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, the question whether or not the statement is true is a question arising out of the policy.\"\n\nThe main. contention put forward on behalf of the appellant is that the points in dispute fall outside the jurisdiction: of the artibitrator, firstly because the existence of the arbitration agreement is challenged, and seconaly, because the sole object of the application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act is to have the\n\n... .\n\neffect of the arbitration agreement determined.\n\nIn our opinion, neither of these objections is sound. How can it be held that the existence of the arbitration agreement is challenged, when both parties admit that the clause in the policy which contains that agreement binds them. It is neither party's case that there is no arbitration agreement in the policy.\n\nOn the other hand, both parties admit that such agreement exists, and each of them relies on it to support its case. It is true that the appellant contends that the arbitration agreement has ceased to be applicable, but that contention. cannot be sustained without having recourse to the arbitration agreement.\n\nIt is said that the agreement no longer subsists, but that is very different from saying that the agreement never existed or was void ab initio and therefore is to be treated <!-' non-existent.\n\nAgain, no question of determining the effect of the arbitration agreement arises, because there is no dispute between the parties as to what it means.\n\nThe language of the arbitration clause is quite clear, and both parties construe it in the s:ame way.\n\nThe real question between them is whether the first respondent has or has not compli'ed with the conditions of the agreement.\n\nBut this question does not turn on the effect of the agreement.\n\nThis is the view which has 1ubstantially been taken by the High Court, and in our opinion it is correct.\n\nThe second point urged before us is that the award is invalid, since it was made in spite of the court's injuction directing the arbitrator not to pronounce any award.\n\nThis point however does not, in our opinion fall within the scope of this appeal.\n\nThe application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act, which is the subject of this appeal, was filed before the award was pronounced.\n\nIn that application, there is no reference to the award; nor is there any reference to the circumstances which are now stated to invalidate the award and which happened after the application was filed.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant made an application before us praying for the amendment of the petition under section 33 by introducing certain\n\nRuby General\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Lti.\n\nPearey Lill\n\nKumar anti Another.\n\nFazl Ali /.\n\nRuby General\n\nInsurance Co. Ltd. v.\n\nPearey Lal\n\nKumar and Another.\n\nFazl Ali /.\n\nadditional facts and addiD; g a prayer for declaring the award to be invalid, but it was rejected by us. It should be stated that as early as the 24th March, 1950. the Subordinate Judge in dismissing the appellant's petition under section 33, made the following observations :-\n\n\"During the pendency 0£ the arbitration proceedings the arbitrator pronounced the award .... The award has now been filed in the court of S. Mohinder Singh, Sub Judge, 1st class, Delhi. Any objection against the award can be filed there. In this application in which there is no prayer for setting aside the award, which exists, I do not think it proper to decide the question of the validity of the award.''\n\nIn OUf opinion, the Subordinate Judge correctly indicated the course which it was open to the appellant in law to adopt for the purpose of questioning the validity of the award, but not having taken that course and not having made any application in the courts below for amending the petition under section 33, the company cannot ask this court to go into the validity of the award by widening the scope of the original petition. This court is always in favour of shortening litigation, but it would be a very unusual step to allow the petition under section 33. to be amended now and to decide a question involving investigation of facts without having the benefit of the judgments of .the courts. below.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissecl.\n\nAgent for the appellant G.inpat Rai.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : S. D. Sekhri.", "total_entities": 73, "entities": [{"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 277, "end_char": 287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "A. C. Dave", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 316, "end_char": 326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: A. C. Dave."}}, {"text": "RUBY GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 359, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ruby General\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PEAREY LAL KUMAR AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 367, "end_char": 395, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PEAREY LAL KUMAR AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 420, "end_char": 435, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Jian Arbitration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 441, "end_char": 461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 475, "end_char": 480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jian Arbitration Act", "statute": "Jian Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jian Arbitration Act", "statute": "Jian Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2009, "end_char": 2016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2532, "end_char": 2539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3330, "end_char": 3337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4044, "end_char": 4054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Arbitration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4058, "end_char": 4080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rattan Lal Chawla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4094, "end_char": 4111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rattan Lal Chawla (K. N. Agarwal, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. N. Agarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4113, "end_char": 4126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rattan Lal Chawla (K. N. Agarwal, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Som Nath Chopra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4158, "end_char": 4173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Som Nath Chopra\n\n1952."}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4260, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the court\n\nFAZL Au J .-This is an appeal by special leave against the i\"udgment of the Punjab High Court upholding the decision of a Subordinate Judge of Delhi relating to a petition filed by th~ 3:ppellant-compny under section 33 of the Indian Arb1trat10n Act against the respondents."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4469, "end_char": 4479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Arbitration Act", "statute": "Indian Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "31st July, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4897, "end_char": 4912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent left his car in a garage at Lahore and came away to India on the 31st July, 1947."}}, {"text": "18th March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5001, "end_char": 5017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, he learned about the loss of his car, and sent a legal notice dated the 18th March, 1948, through his advocate Mr.\n\nA. R.\n\nKapur to the Head Office of the company at Calcutta, claiming a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "A. R.\n\nKapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, he learned about the loss of his car, and sent a legal notice dated the 18th March, 1948, through his advocate Mr.\n\nA. R.\n\nKapur to the Head Office of the company at Calcutta, claiming a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "A. R.\n\nKapur"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5095, "end_char": 5103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, he learned about the loss of his car, and sent a legal notice dated the 18th March, 1948, through his advocate Mr.\n\nA. R.\n\nKapur to the Head Office of the company at Calcutta, claiming a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "10th April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5165, "end_char": 5181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th April, 1948, Mr. Kapur received a letter from the Branch Manager of the Company's office at Amritsar asking for information regarding certain matters stated in the letter."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5187, "end_char": 5192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th April, 1948, Mr. Kapur received a letter from the Branch Manager of the Company's office at Amritsar asking for information regarding certain matters stated in the letter."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5262, "end_char": 5270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th April, 1948, Mr. Kapur received a letter from the Branch Manager of the Company's office at Amritsar asking for information regarding certain matters stated in the letter."}}, {"text": "30th April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5397, "end_char": 5413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This information appears to have been supplied on the 30th April, 1948."}}, {"text": "26th May, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5422, "end_char": 5436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th May, 1948, the company's Branch Manager at Amritsar wrote to the first respondent repudiating the liability of the company for the loss of the car on the."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which were going on in the whole of Punjab\" and was not covered by the agreement of insurance."}}, {"text": "3rd July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5790, "end_char": 5804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar letter was written again by the Branch Manager on the 3rd July, 1948, to the first respondent, and another letter was written by one Mr. Rattan Lal Chawla representing himself to be counsel for the company, to,\n\nMr. A. R. Kapur, on the 1st August, 1948."}}, {"text": "A. R. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5952, "end_char": 5963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar letter was written again by the Branch Manager on the 3rd July, 1948, to the first respondent, and another letter was written by one Mr. Rattan Lal Chawla representing himself to be counsel for the company, to,\n\nMr. A. R. Kapur, on the 1st August, 1948.", "canonical_name": "A. R.\n\nKapur"}}, {"text": "1st August, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5972, "end_char": 5988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar letter was written again by the Branch Manager on the 3rd July, 1948, to the first respondent, and another letter was written by one Mr. Rattan Lal Chawla representing himself to be counsel for the company, to,\n\nMr. A. R. Kapur, on the 1st August, 1948."}}, {"text": "21st November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5999, "end_char": 6018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21st November, 1949, the first respondent wrote a letter to the Branch Secretary of the Company's office at Calcutta, stating that his claim was valid and nominating Mr. T. C. Chopra, Assistant Manager,."}}, {"text": "T. C. Chopra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6169, "end_char": 6181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21st November, 1949, the first respondent wrote a letter to the Branch Secretary of the Company's office at Calcutta, stating that his claim was valid and nominating Mr. T. C. Chopra, Assistant Manager,.", "canonical_name": "T. C. Chopra"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6485, "end_char": 6495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T. C. Chopra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6565, "end_char": 6577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "against the first respondent and Mr. T. C. Chopra, thearhitrator, who is the second respondent in tliis appeal,.", "canonical_name": "T. C. Chopra"}}, {"text": "Pearey Lal Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6657, "end_char": 6673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pearey Lal Kumar and Another~\n\nFazl Ali / ..\n\n; Ruby Generol\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltti.", "canonical_name": "PEAREY LAL KUMAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "31st January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7368, "end_char": 7386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon this petition, notice was issued to the respondents, and an injunction was issued directing them not to file any award till the date of the next hearing, which was fixed for 31st January, 1950."}}, {"text": "4th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7396, "end_char": 7414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 4th February, 1950, the first respondent wrote to the second respondent (the arbitrator) that since no arbitrator had been appointed by the company and since the company had refused to appoint any arbitraator, he (Mr. Chopra) was to act as the sole arbitrator."}}, {"text": "Chopra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7614, "end_char": 7620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 4th February, 1950, the first respondent wrote to the second respondent (the arbitrator) that since no arbitrator had been appointed by the company and since the company had refused to appoint any arbitraator, he (Mr. Chopra) was to act as the sole arbitrator."}}, {"text": "6th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7665, "end_char": 7683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th February, 1950, Mr. Chopra wrote to inform the insurance company that he had been appointed sole arbitrator and asked the company to send the • statement of its case and to produce all the evidence ·!"}}, {"text": "10th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7906, "end_char": 7925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th February, 1950, the insurance company filed a petition before the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, praying that the responden~ be stopped from proceeding further in the matter so .that its application under section 33 may not become infructuous."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7977, "end_char": 8001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 10th February, 1950, the insurance company filed a petition before the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, praying that the responden~ be stopped from proceeding further in the matter so .that its application under section 33 may not become infructuous."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8111, "end_char": 8121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8464, "end_char": 8483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 14th February, 1950, the second respondent pronounced his award after making a note to the following effect:-\n\n\"Mr. G. R. Chopra, the counsel of the defendants, , sent a telephonic message at 12 A.M. requesting extenon till ;!"}}, {"text": "G. R. Chopra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8580, "end_char": 8592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 14th February, 1950, the second respondent pronounced his award after making a note to the following effect:-\n\n\"Mr. G. R. Chopra, the counsel of the defendants, , sent a telephonic message at 12 A.M. requesting extenon till ;!"}}, {"text": "24th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9219, "end_char": 9235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th March, 1950, the Subordinate Judge pa$sed an order on the company's application under\n\nsection 33, dismissing it and holding that the terms."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9368, "end_char": 9376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9934, "end_char": 9951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Subordinate Judge was upheld in revision by the Punjab High Court and the company has now preferred an .appeal to this court by special leve."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10282, "end_char": 10292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pal Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10639, "end_char": 10646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pe11rt:y lAl\n\nKumar ani A.notht:r.\n\nPal Ali /.\n\nRuby Genn-111\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPearey Ltil\n\nKumar 11nd A nothn-\n\nF11zl Ali J.\n\nClause 7 of the policy of insurance runs as follows:-\n\n\"All differences arising out of this policy shall be ."}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10735, "end_char": 10743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13307, "end_char": 13317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13343, "end_char": 13353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14022, "end_char": 14030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14647, "end_char": 14655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14957, "end_char": 14988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Evidently, the company cannot succeed without calling m aid this clause and 3-6 S. C. India/71\n\nRuby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v •.\n\nPearcy Lal Kumar and- Another.", "canonical_name": "Ruby General\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Pearcy Lal Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14995, "end_char": 15011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Evidently, the company cannot succeed without calling m aid this clause and 3-6 S. C. India/71\n\nRuby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v •.\n\nPearcy Lal Kumar and- Another.", "canonical_name": "PEAREY LAL KUMAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ruby General\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15043, "end_char": 15076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nRuby General\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPeuey Lal Kumar •ntl Another.", "canonical_name": "Ruby General\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd."}}, {"text": "Peuey Lal Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15078, "end_char": 15093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nRuby General\n\nInsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nPeuey Lal Kumar •ntl Another."}}, {"text": "Agajn", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15137, "end_char": 15142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agajn, the first respondent does not say that he is not bound by the clause but states that the matter was referred to arbitration before any valid disclaimer was made."}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18512, "end_char": 18518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the points raised in the case was that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide the matter, but that contention was rejected by Lord Sumner in these words :-\n\n\"The defendants do not repudiate the policy or dispute its validity as a contract; on the contrary, they rely on it and say that according to its terms, -express and implied, they are relieved from liability :\n\n!"}}, {"text": "CC Stebbing", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18750, "end_char": 18761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CC Stebbing's case(2}, Woodall v. Pearl Assurance c~.e>\n\n.... It is a fallacy to say that they assert the policy to be null and void.\""}}, {"text": "Viscount Reading", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20288, "end_char": 20304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In holding that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide the matter, Viscount Reading C. J. observed as follows : -\n\n\"If the company were seeking to avoid the contract in the true sense they would have to rely upon some matter outside the contract, such as a misrepresentation of some material fact inducing the contract, of which the force and effect are not declared by the contract itself."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21506, "end_char": 21516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23260, "end_char": 23270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23695, "end_char": 23705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24125, "end_char": 24135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Mohinder Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24311, "end_char": 24328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Subordinate Judge in dismissing the appellant's petition under section 33, made the following observations :-\n\n\"During the pendency 0£ the arbitration proceedings the arbitrator pronounced the award .... The award has now been filed in the court of S. Mohinder Singh, Sub Judge, 1st class, Delhi."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24882, "end_char": 24892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25134, "end_char": 25144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G.inpat Rai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25395, "end_char": 25406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant G.inpat Rai."}}, {"text": "S. D. 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{"document_id": "1952_1_513_518_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 513\n\nMAHANT\n\nPRAGDASJI GURU BHAGW ANDASJI 1952\n\nM11rcll 7.\n\nPATEL ISHW ARLALBHAI NARSIBHAI\n\nAND\n\nOTHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and V1vIAN BosE JJ].\n\nCivil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908) s. 92-Religious trust- Allegation of breach of trust not made out-Direction for administration of trust not sought-Decree declaring existence of public trust -Whether legal and proper-Nature of suit under s. 92.\n\nIn a suit under sec. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code alleging that the defendant had been guilty of misconduct and breach of trust as Mahant and praying, inter alia, that the temple and properties in suit be declared as a religious and charitable trust and the defendant be removed from the Gadi and a suitable successor appointed in his place, the District Judge and the High Court held concurrently that the defendant was not guilty of misconduct or breach of trust and dismissed the suit, but made a\n\ndeclaration to the effect that the temple and properties in the possession of defendant belonged to a public trust of a 1eligious and charitable character :\n\nHeld, that a suit under sec. 92, Civil Procedure Code, is a suit of a special character which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character and it can proceed only when there is a breach of such trust or directions from the Court are necessary for the administration thereof and it must pray for one or other of the reliefs that are specifically mentioned in the section; and therefore as the Courts found concurrently that the allegations of breach of trust were not made out and no direction of the Court for proper administration of trust was sought, the very foundation of a suit under sec. 92, Civil Procedure Code, became wanting and the plaintiffs had no cause of action for their suit; and in the circumstances the declaration of the High Court about the existence of a public trust was inconsequential and was no more than an obiter dictum and such declaration must be deleted from the decree dismissing the suit.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRisorcrroN : Civil Appeal No. 99 of 1951.\n\nAppeal from a Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Stone C. J. and Dixit J.) dated 14th July, 1947, in First Appeal No. 128 of 1943 affirming a decree dated 14th October, 1942, of the Court of the District Judge of Kaira at Nadiad in Civil Suit No. 15 of 1928.\n\n'1952\n\n Mahant Pragt!asii\n\nGuru Bhagwant!asji\n\nPatd lshwarlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai and Others.\n\nMufther}ea /.\n\nDaphtary (N. C. Shah, with him) for the appellant.\n\nRajani Patel for the respondent.\n\n1952. March 7.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the defendant and it arises out of a suit, under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, commenced by the plaintiffs who were originally nine in number in the court of the District Judge of Kaira at Nadiad.\n\nOut of the nine plaintiffs, only one is surviving, and he is now the sole respondent in this appeal, all the rest having died pending this protected litigation, which began as early as the year 1928.\n\nThe case of the plaintiffs, in substance, was that Qne Kuberdas, who was a religious teacher and a holy man founded a cult known as Kaivalya or Karunaagar Panth, the principal tenet of which is that the realization of the Infinite is possible only through the medium of a Guru or spiritual preceptor.\n\nKuberdas received money and lands from his followers and disciples and with this fund he built a temple at Sarsa.\n\nKuberdas by will appointed his principal disciple . Narayandas to succeed him on the Gadi and Narayandas built another and a bigger temple wherein he installed an image of Kuberpas, with the images of two staff bearers on two sides.\n\nThe Mahants after Narayandas were Baldevdas, Bhagwandas and Pragdasji, who is the defendant in the suit and each one of them was appointed by a will executed by his predecessor.\n\nThe defendant, it is alleged, had been acting in a manner contrary to the usages of the institution and was guilty of incontinence, mismanagement and improper alienation of trust properties.\n\nOn these allegations the plaintiffs prayed that : ( 1) the properties described in the schedule to the plaint as well as other properties under the manage- . ment of the defendant be declared to be religious and charitable trust properties of the Kaivalya or Karunasagar Panth ;\n\n(2) the defendant be removed from the Gadi and possession of the properties and a suitable successor appointed in his place;\n\n(3) the defendant be called upon to render accounts for the period of his management; and ( 4) a scheme might be framed for proper management of the institution.\n\nThe defendant 'in his written statement traversed all the material allegations m the plaint and contended inter alia , that the suit was not maintainable inasmuch\n\n•s no public trust of a religious and charitable character existed m respect to the suit properties which were the private properties of the defendant himself.\n\nOn these pleadings, a number of issues were framed by the District Judge, of which the two following were tried as preliminary issues, vzz.,\n\n(1) Whether the temple and the properties in suit -.re public charitable properties? and\n\n(2) if not, whether this court has jurisdiction to try the suit?\n\nBy his judgment dated the 18th of July, 1935, the District Judge decided both these issues against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit.\n\nAgainst this decision the plaintiffs took an appeal to the High Court of Bombay. The learned Judges of the High Court, who heard the appeal, took! the view that the -0wnership of the suit properties was so restricted by the obligation to maintain the institution for purposes which only could be described as public charitable purposes, that the suit must be regarded as one coming within section 92, Civil Procedure Code. The result was that the judgment of the trial court was reversed . <Uld the case was remanded to that court in order that it might be heard and disposed of on its merits.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court is dated 24th of January, 1938.\n\nBeing aggrieved by this order, the defendant prayed for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee, but this application was refused. He thereupon filed a petition before the Privy Council, praying for special leave.\n\nMahant Pr11gdflsji\n\nGuru Bhazwcmdasji\n\nPatel Ishwnrlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai and Others.\n\nMuk.herieR /.\n\nMahanl Pragdas; i\n\nGuru Bhagwandasii\n\nPatel lshwarlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai •nd Others.\n\nThe Privy Council also refused to grant leave on the ground that the matter was still then in an interlocutory stage. They, however, said specificaJ.ly that the order of refusal was without prejudice to the presentation of a fresh petition after all the issues were determined. The case then went back to the trial court and on the evidence adduced by the parties, the District Judge came to the conclusion that the allegations of misconduct and breach oE trust made by the plaintiffs were not proved and in this view he dismissed the suit, subject to the declaration already given by the High Court that the temple and the properties in possession of the defendant were public, religious and charitable properties.\n\nThe plaintiffs filed an\n\nappal against this decision to the High Court of Bombay and the High Court by its judgment dated 14th of July, 1947, affirmed the decision of the District Judge and dismissed the appeal.\n\nThe defendant has now come up to this court on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court; and though formally it is an appeal against the final decree made by the High Court on 14th of July, 1947;. in substance it challenges the propriety of the order of remand passed on 24th January, 1938, by which the High Court reversed the decree of dismissal made by the District Judge and remanded the case, being of opinion th:it the properties in dispute did appertain tO> a public trust of a religious and charitable character_\n\nMr. Daphtary appearing in support of the appear has contended before us that on the question as to whether or not a public trust existed in respect of the properties in suit, the view taken by the trial judge was right and that the decision of the High Court is based upon a misappreciation of the evidence on the record.\n\nWe have been taken through the entire evidence by the learned counsel on both sides; but having regard to the view which we propose to take in this case we . deem it unnecessary to record any finding as to whether the properties in suit do or do not appertain to a public charitable trust.\n\nIn our opinion, after the\n\ndecision arrived at concurrently, by both the courts below on the merits of the case, it was beyond the scope of a suit framed under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, to give the plaintiffs a bare declaration of this character and make it a part of tl1e decree, although the suit itself was dismissed.\n\nA suit under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. Such suit can proceed only on the allegation that there is a breach of such trust or that directions from the court are necessary for the administration thereof, and it must pray for one or other of the reliefs that are specifically mentioned in the section. It is only when these conditions are fulfilled that the suit has got to be brought in confirmity with the provision of section 92, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nAs was observed by the Privy Council in Abdur Rahim v. Barkftt Ali(1), a suit for declaration that certain property appertains to a religious trust may lie under the general law but is outside the scope of section 92, Civil Procedure Code. In the case before us, the prayers made in the plaint are undoubtedly appropriate to the terms of section 92 and the suit proceeded on the footing that the defendant, who was alleged to be the trustee in respect of a public trust, was guilty of breach of trust.\n\nThe defendant denied the existence of the trust and denied further that he was guilty of misconduct or breach of trust.\n\nThe denial could not certainly oust the jurisdiction of the court, but when the courts found concurrently, on the evidence adduced by the parties, that the allegations of breach of trust were not made out, and as it was not the case of the plaintiffs, that any direcion of the court was necessary for proper administration of the trust, the very , foundation of a suit under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, became wanting and the plaintiffs had absolutely no cause of action for the suit they instituted.\n\nIn these circumstances, the finding of the High Court about the existence of a public trust was wholly inconsequential and as it was\n\n(I) (1928)55 IA.96\n\n195Z\n\nMahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasii: v.\n\nPatel lshwarlalbhai Narsibhai and Others.\n\nMukherjea l~\n\nMahant Pragdasji\n\nGuru iBhagwanda1ji v.\n\nPatel lshwarlalhhai\n\nNar1ibhai and Other1.\n\nunconnected with the grounds upon which the case was actually disposed of, it could not be made a part of the decree or the final order in the shape of a declaratory relief in favour of the plaintiffs. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that even if the plaintiffs failed to prove the other allegations made in the plaint, they did succeed in proving that the properties were public and charitable trust properties-a fact which the defendant denied. In these circumstances, there was nothing wrong for the court to give the plaintiffs a lesser relief than what they actually claimed. The reply to this is, that in a suit framed under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code the only reliefs which the plaintiff can claim and the court can grant are those enumerated specifically in the different clauses of the section. A relief praying for a declaration thait the properties in suit are trust properties does not come under any of these clauses.\n\nWhen the defendant denies the existence of a trust, a declaration that the trust does exist might be made as ancillary to the main relief claimed under the section if the plaintiff is held entitled to it; but when .the case of the plaintiff fails for want of a cause of action, there is no warrant for giving him a declaratory relief under the provision of section 92, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe finding as to the existence of a public trust in such circumstances would be no more than an obiter dictum and cannot constitute the final decision in the suit.\n\nThe result is that in our opinion the decision of the High Court should stand, but the decree and the concluding portion of the judgment passed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court on appeal shall direct a dismissal of the plaintiff's suit merely without its being made subject to any declaration as to the character of the properties. To this extent the appeal is allowed and .the final decree modified. The order for costs made by the courts below will stand. Each party will bear his own costs in this appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondents: K. f. Kale.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "513\n\nMAHANT\n\nPRAGDASJI GURU BHAGW ANDASJI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHANT PRAGDASJI GURU BHAGW ANDASJI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATEL ISHW ARLALBHAI NARSIBHAI\n\nAND\n\nOTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATEL ISHWARLALBHAI NARSIBHAI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 161, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V1vIAN BosE JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 221, "end_char": 226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426, "end_char": 431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 450, "end_char": 457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1119, "end_char": 1126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1128, "end_char": 1148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1722, "end_char": 1729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1731, "end_char": 1751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRisorcrroN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2056, "end_char": 2085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRisorcrroN : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2159, "end_char": 2193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Stone C. 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defendant in the suit and each one of them was appointed by a will executed by his predecessor."}}, {"text": "Pragdasji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3817, "end_char": 3826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mahants after Narayandas were Baldevdas, Bhagwandas and Pragdasji, who is the defendant in the suit and each one of them was appointed by a will executed by his predecessor."}}, {"text": "Karunasagar Panth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4387, "end_char": 4404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ment of the defendant be declared to be religious and charitable trust properties of the Kaivalya or Karunasagar Panth ;\n\n(2) the defendant be removed from the Gadi and possession of the properties and a suitable successor appointed in his place;\n\n(3) the defendant be called upon to render accounts for the period of his management; and ( 4) a scheme might be framed for proper management of the institution."}}, {"text": "18th of July, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5346, "end_char": 5364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment dated the 18th of July, 1935, the District Judge decided both these issues against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5518, "end_char": 5538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decision the plaintiffs took an appeal to the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5848, "end_char": 5858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5860, "end_char": 5880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "24th of January, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6094, "end_char": 6115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the High Court is dated 24th of January, 1938."}}, {"text": "Mahant Pr11gdflsji\n\nGuru Bhazwcmdasji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6335, "end_char": 6372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Pr11gdflsji\n\nGuru Bhazwcmdasji\n\nPatel Ishwnrlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai and Others."}}, {"text": "Patel Ishwnrlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6374, "end_char": 6404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Pr11gdflsji\n\nGuru Bhazwcmdasji\n\nPatel Ishwnrlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai and Others.", "canonical_name": "Patel Ishwnrlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai"}}, {"text": "Mahanl Pragdas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6433, "end_char": 6447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muk.herieR /.\n\nMahanl Pragdas; i\n\nGuru Bhagwandasii\n\nPatel lshwarlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai •nd Others."}}, {"text": "Patel lshwarlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6471, "end_char": 6501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muk.herieR /.\n\nMahanl Pragdas; i\n\nGuru Bhagwandasii\n\nPatel lshwarlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai •nd Others.", "canonical_name": "Patel Ishwnrlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai"}}, {"text": "14th of July, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7354, "end_char": 7372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs filed an\n\nappal against this decision to the High Court of Bombay and the High Court by its judgment dated 14th of July, 1947, affirmed the decision of the District Judge and dismissed the appeal."}}, {"text": "24th January, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7731, "end_char": 7749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in substance it challenges the propriety of the order of remand passed on 24th January, 1938, by which the High Court reversed the decree of dismissal made by the District Judge and remanded the case, being of opinion th:it the properties in dispute did appertain tO> a public trust of a religious and charitable character_\n\nMr. Daphtary appearing in support of the appear has contended before us that on the question as to whether or not a public trust existed in respect of the properties in suit, the view taken by the trial judge was right and that the decision of the High Court is based upon a misappreciation of the evidence on the record."}}, {"text": "Daphtary", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7986, "end_char": 7994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in substance it challenges the propriety of the order of remand passed on 24th January, 1938, by which the High Court reversed the decree of dismissal made by the District Judge and remanded the case, being of opinion th:it the properties in dispute did appertain tO> a public trust of a religious and charitable character_\n\nMr. Daphtary appearing in support of the appear has contended before us that on the question as to whether or not a public trust existed in respect of the properties in suit, the view taken by the trial judge was right and that the decision of the High Court is based upon a misappreciation of the evidence on the record.", "canonical_name": "Daphtary"}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8756, "end_char": 8766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8768, "end_char": 8788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8939, "end_char": 8949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8951, "end_char": 8971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9471, "end_char": 9481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9483, "end_char": 9503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9712, "end_char": 9722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9724, "end_char": 9744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9844, "end_char": 9854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10505, "end_char": 10515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10517, "end_char": 10537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasii", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10798, "end_char": 10832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, the finding of the High Court about the existence of a public trust was wholly inconsequential and as it was\n\n(I) (1928)55 IA.96\n\n195Z\n\nMahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasii: v.\n\nPatel lshwarlalbhai Narsibhai and Others."}}, {"text": "Patel lshwarlalbhai Narsibhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10838, "end_char": 10867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, the finding of the High Court about the existence of a public trust was wholly inconsequential and as it was\n\n(I) (1928)55 IA.96\n\n195Z\n\nMahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasii: v.\n\nPatel lshwarlalbhai Narsibhai and Others.", "canonical_name": "Patel Ishwnrlalbhai\n\nNarsibhai"}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11641, "end_char": 11651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12311, "end_char": 12321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12323, "end_char": 12343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13082, "end_char": 13092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "K. f. Kale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13122, "end_char": 13132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: K. f. Kale."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_519_525_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nPARRY & CO. LTD.\n\nCOMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION,\n\nMADRAS.\n\n[SAIYAD FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.)\n\nCertiorari-Writ cannot be issued unless there is want of, or error in exercise of, jurisdiction-Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, s. 51-Decision of Labour Commissioner-Finality of.\n\nThe High Court cannot issue a writ of certiorari to quash a decision passed with jurisdiction by a Labour Commissioner under the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, on the mere ground that such decision is erroneous.\n\nUnder s. 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, the Labour Commissioner is the only proper and competent authority to determine the questions . referred to him under that section and the decision of the Labour Commissioner is final and not liable to be challenged in a Court of law.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1smcnoN Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1951. Appeal from a judgment and order of the lst April, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature~ Madras (Rajamannar C.J. and Balakrishna Aiyar J.) in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 1317 of 1949 arising out of Order dated 29th January, 1949, of the Commissioner of Labour, Madras.\n\nS. C. Isaacs (S. N. Mukherjee: with him) for the appellant.\n\nThe respondent was not represented.\n\n1952. April 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated 1st April, 1949, passed in a certiorari proceeding, by which the learned Judges directed the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing a portion of an order made by the Labour Commissiener, Madras J in any enquiry under section 51 of the Madras Shop; and Establishments Act.\n\nApril 10~\n\n/Parry & Co. Ltd.\n\nThe facts material for our present purpose lie within a narrow compass and to appreciate the point that requires consideration in this appeal it will be convenient first of all to advert to a few relevant provisions of the Madras Act referred to above. The Act was passed in 1947 and its object, as stated in the preamble, is to provide for the regulation of conditions of work in shops and other establishments. Section 14(1) of the Act sets a statutory limitation upon the working hours and lays down:\n\nCommercial\n\nEmployees' Association, Madras.\n\nMul{heriea /.\n\n\"Subject to the other provisions of the Act, no person employed in any establishment shall be required or allowed to work for more than 8 hours in any day and 48 hours in any week.\"\n\nA proviso attached to the suh\"ction which by way of exception to the rule enunciated therein allows .employment of a person in any establishment for any period in excess of this statutory limit subject to payment of overtime wages, provided the period of work including overtime work does not exceed 10 hours any day, and in the aggregate 54 hours in any week.\n\nSection 31 provides:\n\n\"Where any person employed in any establishment is required to work overtime, he shall be entitled, in respect of such overtime work, to wages at twice the rate of ordinary rate of wages.\"\n\nSection 50 preserves the existing rights and privileges of an employee in any establishment if these rights and privileges are more favourable to him than those created by the Act.\n\nThe section runs as follows:- \"Nothing contained in this •Act shall affect any tights or privileges whkh any person employed in any .establishment is entitled to on the date on which this Act comes into operation in respect of such establishment under any other law, contract, custom or usage <1pplicable to such establishment if such rights and privileges are more favourable to him than those to ;. which he would be entitled under this Act.\"\n\nThe only other relevant section is section 51 which says:-\n\n\"If any question anses whether all or any of the provisions of this Act apply to an establishment or to a person employed therein or whether section 50 applies to any case or not, it shall be decided by the Commissioner of Labour and his decision thereon shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in a -court of law\".\n\nThe appellant is a limited company carrying on business i:n Madras, while the respondent is an associ- '<ltion of clerical employees including those working under the appellant. On November 10, 1948, the respondent presented an application before the Labour Commissioner, Madras, under section 51 of the Shops and Establishments Act for decision of certain questions referred to in the petition which related to the rights and privileges of the employees of the appellant.\n\nThe Commissioner issued a notice calling upon the appellant to appear and answer the contentions raised\n\non behalf of the employee$. The parties appeared before the Commissioner on 26th November, 1948, and .again on 16th December following when they were represented by lawyers. After hearing the parties and on a consideration of the evidence adduced. by them, the Labour Commissioner made his decision on 29th January, 1949. The question raised by the employees were classified by the Commissioner under six sepa rate issues and two of them, which are material for .our present purpose, are worded as follows:-\n\nlssue No. 5. Whether there has been an increase m working hours from 6 to 6! on week days from 12th October, 1948, and the increase is permissible?\n\nIssue No. 6. Whether overtime wages at twice the ordinary rate8 should not be paid for work done by the employees after the normal working hours?\n\nOn Issue No. 5 the decision of the Commissioner was that the business hours of the company were six ; and half prior to 1st April, 1948, when the Act came into force and they continue to be so even now. It is\n\nParry & Co. Ltd.\n\nCommercial\n\nEmployees' Association,\n\nMadras.\n\nMu~J1erje11 /.\n\nParry & Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommercial\n\nEmployees' Association,\n\nMadras.\n\nMuk hcrjca ].\n\ntrue that a circular was issued which was to take effect from 12th October; 1948, under which the lunch interval was reduced by half an hour, but at the same time it was directed that the office would close for business with the general public at 5 P.M. instead of 5-30 P.M. on all working days so tar as business hours are concerned.\n\nAs regards Issue No. 6 the Labour Commissioner observes first of all that although it is customary in many establishments to fix certain hours of busines• during which business is transacted with the outside public, yet they are not the real hours of employment and as a matter of fact the employees do work outside these business hours, for which they are not entitled to any extra remuneration provided , the statutory .limit of 8 hours a day is not exceeded. In the opinion of the Commis.sioner if the normal hours of work were previously fixed and strictly adhered to, the employees could have acquired a right or privilege to work only for such hours and they would be entitled to seek protection under section 50 of the Act against the imposition of longer hours without a corresponding increase in emoluments. The Commissioner goes on to say that in such cases it would be sufficient if compensatory wages are paid at the ordinary rate calculated according to rule 10 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Rules for work in excess of the normal hours but less than the statutory , hours. But for work of more 'than 8 hours a day or 48 hours a week, wages' at twice the ordinary rates should be paid as required by the proviso to section 14(1) and section 31 of the Act.\n\nThe conclusion reached by the Commissioner with regard to this issue is expressed by him in the following words: 1 1\n\n\"I hold that the c~ of Messrs. Parry and Company's employees falls under the former category and that the employees in this company will be entitled to overtime wages only when the statutory hours are exceeded.\"\n\nThis order, as said above, was made on 29th\" January, 1949, and on 16th of February following the\n\n• ,\n\nrespondent association filed a petition before the High Court at Madras, praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the same.\n\nThis application was heard by a Bench of two Judges and by the judgment dated 1st of April, 1949, the learned Judges allowed the petition in part and quashed the order of 'the Labour Commissioner in so far as it decided that the employees of the appellant will be entitled to overtime wages only when the statutory hours were exceeded. It 1s the propriety of this decision that has been challenged before us in this appeal.\n\nIt is somewhat unfortunate that the respondent remained unrepresented before us and the appeal had to be heard ex parte. Mr. Isaacs, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, has, however, rendered every assistance that he possibly could and has placed before us all the material facts and relevant provisions of law.\n\nHaving given the matter our best consideration, we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court cannot be supported and that this appeal should be allowed.\n\nThe High Court seems to have based its decision on the ground that the Commissioner of Labour failed to answer the question raised by the association as to whether the company was entitled to require the employees to work more than six and half hours a day.\n\nAccording to the learned Judge, the Labour Commissioner was not right in holding that even if the working hours were fixed at six and half hours a day, the employees would be entitled to overtime wages only when the statutory hours are exceeded.\n\nAs has' been pointed out already, the Labour Commissioner did decide that if the normal hours of work were previously fixed and rigidly adhered to, the employees would be entitled to seek protection under Section 50 of the Act against imposition of longer hours on work without a corresponding mcrease m their emoluments.\n\nThe increase in such cases, accordmg to the Labour Commissioner, should be on the scale of compensatory wages allowed under rule IO of 4-6 S. C. India/71\n\nParry & Co. Ltd.\n\nCommercial\n\nEmployees' Association, Madras.\n\nMukherjea f.\n\nP•\"Y 6' Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommercjal\n\nEmployees' Association,\n\nMadras.\n\nMukheriea ].\n\nthe Madras Shops and Establishments Rules. If, however, the increase is more than the statutory period, the employees will be entitled to wages at double rate under Section 31 of the Act. This decision may or may not be right, but it has not been and cannot be suggested that the Labour Commissioner acted without Jurisdiction or in excess of his powers.\n\nUnder Section 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, the Labour Commissioner is the only proper and competent authority to determine the questions referred to it in that section; and there is an express provision in it that the decsion of the Labour Commissioner shall be final and not liable to be challenged in any court of law. It was the respondent who took the matter before tl1e Labour Commissioner in the present case and invited his decision upon the questions raised in the petition. The Commissioner was certainly bound to decide the questions and he did decide them.\n\nAt the worst, he may have come to an erroneous conclusion, but the conclusion is in respect of a matter which lies entirely within the jurisdiction of the Labour Commissioner to decide and it does not relate to anything collateral, an erroneous decision upon which might affect his jurisdiction.\n\nThe records of the case do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the proceeding or any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the Labour Commissioner which goes contrary to the principles of natural justice. Thus there was absolutely no grounds here which would justify a superior court in issuing a writ of certiorari for removal of an order or proceeding of an inferior tribunal\n\nvested with powers to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. What the High Court has done really is to exercise the powers of an appellate court and correct what it considered to be an error in the decision ofi the Labour Commissioner.\n\nThis obviously it cannot do.\n\nThe position might have been different if the Labour Commissioner had omitted to decide a matter which he was bound to decide and in such cases a\n\nmandamus rnight legitimately issue cornrnanding the authority to determine questions which it left\n\n,.. .\n\nundecided (1) ; but no certiorari is available to quash a decision passed with jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal on the mere ground that such decision is erroneous.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court, therefore, in our opinion, is plainly unsustainable. In the view which we have taken, it is unnecessary to express any opinion as to whether certiorari has been taken away -if it can be taken away at all under our Constitution-by the provision of section 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act which lays down that the decision of the Labour Commissioner would be final and incapable of being challenged in any court of law.\n\nIt was conceded by Mr. Isaac that in spite of such statutory provisions the superior court is not absolutely deprived of the power to issue a writ, although it can do so only on the ground of either a manifest defect of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made the order or of a manifest fraud in the party procuring it(2}. The result is, that in our opinion the appeal succeeds and the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Labour Coqlmissioner affirmed.\n\nAs the respondent was absent, we do not think it proper, in the circumstances of this case, to make any order for costs.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. K. Mukherjee.\n\n(1) Vide Boardo/Education:v. Rice andoth6rs, [19il)fA.C.179.\n\n(2) Vide Colonial Bank of Australasia:v. Robert Willan, S P. c. AP peals 417.\n\nPa\"y & Co. Lti.\n\nComm\"cial\n\nEmployees' Association,\n\nMadras.\n\nMukherjea /.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "PARRY & CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PARRY & CO. 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C. Isaacs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1183, "end_char": 1195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Isaacs (S. N. Mukherjee: with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1197, "end_char": 1212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Isaacs (S. N. Mukherjee: with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Labour Commissiener, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1618, "end_char": 1645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated 1st April, 1949, passed in a certiorari proceeding, by which the learned Judges directed the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing a portion of an order made by the Labour Commissiener, Madras J in any enquiry under section 51 of the Madras Shop; and Establishments Act."}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1669, "end_char": 1679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2168, "end_char": 2181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2296, "end_char": 2302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 14(1) of the Act sets a statutory limitation upon the working hours and lays down:\n\nCommercial\n\nEmployees' Association, Madras."}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3077, "end_char": 3087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3740, "end_char": 3750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3906, "end_char": 3916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 10, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4279, "end_char": 4296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 10, 1948, the respondent presented an application before the Labour Commissioner, Madras, under section 51 of the Shops and Establishments Act for decision of certain questions referred to in the petition which related to the rights and privileges of the employees of the appellant."}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4384, "end_char": 4394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th November, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4753, "end_char": 4772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner issued a notice calling upon the appellant to appear and answer the contentions raised\n\non behalf of the employee$. The parties appeared before the Commissioner on 26th November, 1948, and .again on 16th December following when they were represented by lawyers."}}, {"text": "29th January, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by them, the Labour Commissioner made his decision on 29th January, 1949."}}, {"text": "12th October, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5281, "end_char": 5299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on week days from 12th October, 1948, and the increase is permissible?"}}, {"text": "1st April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5602, "end_char": 5617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 the decision of the Commissioner was that the business hours of the company were six ; and half prior to 1st April, 1948, when the Act came into force and they continue to be so even now."}}, {"text": "12th October; 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5916, "end_char": 5934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "true that a circular was issued which was to take effect from 12th October; 1948, under which the lunch interval was reduced by half an hour, but at the same time it was directed that the office would close for business with the general public at 5 P.M. instead of 5-30 P.M. on all working days so tar as business hours are concerned."}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6898, "end_char": 6908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7445, "end_char": 7455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "29th\" January, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7839, "end_char": 7858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order, as said above, was made on 29th\" January, 1949, and on 16th of February following the\n\n• ,\n\nrespondent association filed a petition before the High Court at Madras, praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the same."}}, {"text": "16th of February", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7867, "end_char": 7883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order, as said above, was made on 29th\" January, 1949, and on 16th of February following the\n\n• ,\n\nrespondent association filed a petition before the High Court at Madras, praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the same."}}, {"text": "1st of April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8108, "end_char": 8126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was heard by a Bench of two Judges and by the judgment dated 1st of April, 1949, the learned Judges allowed the petition in part and quashed the order of 'the Labour Commissioner in so far as it decided that the employees of the appellant will be entitled to overtime wages only when the statutory hours were exceeded."}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8580, "end_char": 8586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Isaacs, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, has, however, rendered every assistance that he possibly could and has placed before us all the material facts and relevant provisions of law.", "canonical_name": "Isaacs"}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9648, "end_char": 9658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10244, "end_char": 10254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10441, "end_char": 10451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12689, "end_char": 12699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Isaac", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12898, "end_char": 12903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was conceded by Mr. Isaac that in spite of such statutory provisions the superior court is not absolutely deprived of the power to issue a writ, although it can do so only on the ground of either a manifest defect of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made the order or of a manifest fraud in the party procuring it(2}.", "canonical_name": "Isaacs"}}, {"text": "P. K. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13501, "end_char": 13516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P. K. Mukherjee."}}, {"text": "Vide Boardo/Education", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13523, "end_char": 13544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Vide Boardo/Education:v. Rice andoth6rs, [19il)fA.C.179."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_526_543_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "March-4.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1952}\n\nKASHMIRA SINGH v.\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and v IVIAN BosE, J.J.]\n\nIndian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), ss. 3, 30-Confession of co-Occused-Evidentiary value-Evidence of accomplice--Necessity of corroboration-Confession-Practice of exan1ining magistrate whorecorded the confession.\n\nThe confession of an accused person against a co-accused is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term.\n\nIt does not come within the meaning of evidence contained in sec. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act inasmuch as it is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused and cannot be tested by cross-examination.\n\nIt is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver which is not subject to any of these infirmities.\n\nSuch a confession can only be used to lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first!, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if tt is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction.\n\nIn such an event the judge may call in ald the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept.\n\nBhuboni Sahu v. The King (76 I.A. 147) reiied upon. Emperor\n\nv. Lalit Mohan Chukerbutty (38 _CaL 599 at 588) and In re Periyaswami Moopan (I.L.R. 54 Mad. 75) referred to.\n\nA conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice provided the judge has the rule of caution, which experience dictates, in mind.\n\nRameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [1952] S.C.R. 377 referred to,\n\nThe rule of caution is that save in exceptional circumstances one accomplice cannot be used to corroborate another, nor can he be used to corroborate a persoD. who though not an accomplice is no more liable. than one. ·\n\n. ~. .! ..\n\n...\n\nIt is not proper or desirable for the prosecution to. examine as a witness the magistrate who recorded the confession. ).\n\n' • '\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 1951.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 8th June 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur (Hemeon and Rao JJ.) in Criminal Appeal No. 297 of 1950, arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 11th September 1950 of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge of Bhandara in Session Trial No. 25 of 195(1.\n\nBakshi Tek Chand, (Gopal Singh, with him) for the appellant.\n\nS. K. Kapoor, for the respondent.'\n\n1952. March 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The appellant Kashmira Singh has been convicted of the murder of one Ramesh, a small boy aged five, and has been sentenced to death.\n\nHe was granted special leave to appeal.\n\nThree other persons were tried along with him. They were his brother Gurudayalsingh, his nephew Pritipalsingh (son of Gurudayal), a boy of eleven, and one Gurubachansingh.\n\nGurudayal and Pritipal have been acquitted. Gurubachansingh confessed and was convicted. He was also sentenced to death. He has not appealed here.\n\nThe murder was a particularly cruel and revolting one and for that reason it-will be nececssary to examine the evidence with more than ordinary care lest the shocking nature of the cnme induce an instinctive reaction against a dispassionate judicial scrutiny of the facts and law.\n\nThe prosecution case is this. The deceased Ramesh was the son of P.W. 48 L.P. Tiwari who was the Food Officer at Gondia at the relevant date.\n\nThe appellant Kashmira Singh was an Assistant Food Procurement\n\nInspecor there. On the 1st of July, 1949, Tiwari found the appellant and Harbilas\n\n(P.W. 31) getting rice polished at a certain rice mill. At that date the polishing of iice was prohibited by a State law.\n\nTiwari accordingly reported the matter to the Deputy Commissioner of Bhandara.\n\nHe suspended the\n\nKashmira Singh\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nKashmira Singh\n\nSt•t•. of Madhya\n\nPraduh.\n\nBose /.\n\nappeJlant and latter his services were terminated by an order of the State Government with effect from the 7th of July.\n\nThe orders were communicated on the 17th of November. This embittered the appellant who on at least two occasions was heard to express a determination to be revenged.\n\nIn pursuance of this determination he got into touch with the confessing accused Gurubachansingh and enlisted his services for murdering the boy Ramesh.\n\nOn the 26th of December, 1949, festivities and religious ceremonies were in progress all day in the Sikh Gurudwara at Gandia. The boy Ramesh was there in the morning and from there was enticed to the house of the appellant's brother Gurudayalsingh and was done to death in a shockingly revolting fashion by the appeJlant, with the active assistance of Gurubachansingh, in the middle of the day at about 12 or 12-30. The body was then tied up in a gunny bag and rolled up in a roll of bedding and allowed to lie in Gurudayal's house till about 7 p.m.\n\nAt 7 p.m. the body wrapped as above was carried by Gurubachan on his head to a chowkidar's hut near the Sikh Gurudwara. The appe'lant accompanied him.\n\nThe map, Exhibit P-18A, shows that the distance along the route indicated was about half a mile to three quarters of a mile. It was left there till about midnight.\n\nShortly before midnight the appellant and Gurubachan engaged the services of a rickshaw coolie Shambhu alias Sannatrao, P. W. 14. They took him to the chowkidar's hut, recovered the bundle of bedding and went in the rickshaw to a well which appears from the map, Exhibit P-18A, to be about half a mile distant.\n\nThere the body was thrown into the well. That m brief is the prosecution case.\n\nGurubachan's confession has played an important part .in ipli<lating the appetliant, and the question at once arises, how far and in what way the confession of an accused person can be used against a co-accused?\n\nIt 1s evident that it is not evidence m the ordinary\n\nsense of the term because, as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King(1):-\n\nKashmira Singh \"It does not indeed come within the definition of v. 'evidence' contained in section 3 of the Evidence Act. State of Madhya\n\nIt is not required to be given on oath, nor in the pre- Pradesh.\n\nsence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross- Bose /. examination.\"\n\nTheir Lordships also point out that it is\n\n\"obviously evidence of a very weak type ..... .It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities.\"\n\nThey stated in addition that such a confesision cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in \"support of other evidence.\" In view of these remarks it would be pointless to cover the same ground, but we feel it is necessary to expound this further as misapprehension still exists. The question is, in what way can it be used in support of other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps? Can it be used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a witness who, though not an accomplice, is placed in the same category regarding credibility because the judge refuses to believe him except in so far as he is corroborated?\n\nIn our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan\n\nChuckerbutty(2) where he said that such a confession can only be used to \"lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused\" or, to put it in another way, as Reilly J. did in In re Periyaswami Moopan(3)·-\n\n\"the provision goes no further than this-where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.\"\n\n(I) [1949] 76 I. A. 147 at 155. (3J [1931] J. L. R. 54 Mad. 75 at 77.\n\n(2) [ 19 l l] I. L. R. 38 Cal.559 at 588.\n\nKashmira Singh\n\nv. . State of Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nBose/.\n\nTranslating these observations into concrete terms they come to this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altiogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to act 011 the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the judge may call in ail the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify hi=elf in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept.\n\nThen, as regards its use in the corroboration of accomplices and approvers. A co-accused who confesses is naturally an accomplice and the danger of using the testimony of one accomplice to corroborate another has repeatedly been pointed out. The danger is in no way lessened when the \"evidence\" is not on oath and cannot be tested by cross-examination.\n\nPrudence will dictate the same rule of caution in the case of a witness who though not an accomplice is regarded by the judge as having no greater probative value. But all these are only rules of prudence. So far as the law is concerned, a conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice provided the judge has the rule of caution, which experience dictates, in mind and gives reasons why he thinks it would be safe in a given case to disregard it. Two of us had occasion to examine this recently in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan('). It follows that the testimony of an accomplice can in law be used to corroborate another though it ought not to be so used save in exceptional circumstances and for reasons disclosed. As the Privy Council observe in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King(2):-\n\n\"The tendency to include the innocent with the guJ'.lty is peculiarly preval'ent .in India, as judges have\n\nti) [1952] S.C.Jl.. 377.\n\n(2) [1949] 76 I.A. 147 at 157.\n\n.,,\n\nnoted on innumerable occasions, and it is very difficult for the court to guard against the danger ......•. The -0nly real safeguard against the risk of condemning . the innocent with the guilty lies in insisting on independent evidence which in some measure implicates such accused.\"\n\nTuring now to the facts of the present case. The evidence on which the prosecution relies, apart from the confession, is this:-\n\n(1) Previous association between Gurubachan and the appellant.\n\nThe only evidence about t~ is P.W. 23 Upasrao, a water carrier. He speaks of three meetings and is curiously definite about days of the week and times though he did not know on what day of the week diwali fell nor could he give the names of anybody else he met on those occasions. However, for what it is worth, he says he saw them talkiing (1) three weeks before the murder, (2) on the 24th and (3) on the 25th.\n\nThey SIPoke in Punjabi which he does not understand, . but on the second occasion he heard them mention the name of Ramesh. Two of these meetings, namely the first and the third tally with two of the only three meetings described in the confessiqn. It is proved that the witness did not disclose these facts to the police but despite that the Sessions Judge believed him because of the confession. The High Court appear to have disbelieved him, for in paragraph 37 of the judgment the learned judges point out that he is contradicted by his own statement to the police. There his story was that the three brothers met and not Gurubachan and the appellant. This evidence can therefore be disregarded and consequently the confession cannot be med to prove previous association.\n\nIt was argued however that if it is proved that the appellant helped in disposing of the body after the murder, then their previous asssociation can be inferred because one would hardly seek the assistance of a stranger for a task like that. That has some force but the weakness of that in this case lies on the fact that,\n\nKashmira Singh v • State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nBose].\n\nKashmira Singh\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nBos~/.\n\naccording to the prosecution case, as disclosed in the confession, Gurubachan was a stranger to Gondia.\n\nHe had come there only six weeks before the murder and did not meet the appellant till three weeks later and then only casually. Their second meeting, equally casual, was on the 21st, that is, five days before the murder, and on that date the appellant is said to have disclosed his intention to this stranger whom he had only met once before.\n\nIt is true this stranger knew the appellant's brother, but how? The brother was a travelling ticket inspector on the railway and used to allow Gurubachan to travel without a ticket, presumably because he wa~ also a Sikh. If probabtlities are to be calkd in aid, the story disclosed in the confession has distinct weaknesses, particularly as Gurubachan's assi:stance was wholl~ unnecesisaty). If tlie 1colnfession is true there was a well thought out plot timed with the precision almost o£ a minor military operation.\n\nAt a given moment the newphew Pritipal was to decoy\n\nthe deceased away from his companions and isolate him. Then, after leading him several hundred yards down the road, hand him over to Gurubachan. Gurubachan. was to take him down to point No. 6 on the map well over half a mile from the spot where he took over from Pritipal. In the meanwhile, the appellant w~ to walk another half miEe at right angles to Gurubachah's course to the point No. 15 to hire a cycle. From there he was to cycle dose on a mile to point No. 6 and meet Gurubachan and the boy. As the learned High Court Judges, who made a spot inspection, point out, the route would lie through a crowded bazaar locality. From point No. 6 Gurubachan was to hand over the child to the appellant who _was to cycle with him close on a mile to his brother Gurudayal' s quarters, point No. 16, through this same crowded bazaar. In the meanwhile, Gurubachan was to walk back to his house (No. 17) and pick up a chisel and a piece of wire for the purpose of the murder and rejoin the appellant at Gurudayal's house. As will be seen, the timing would have to be within fairly close tolerances. Then, at the murder itself, what\n\n\\.,\n\nassistance did Gurubachan give ?\n\nNothing which a grown man could not easily have accomplished himself on a small helpless victim of five. The appeUan~ could have accomplished all 1tihis as easily without the assistance of Gurubachan, and equally Gurubachan, a mere hired assassin could have done it all himself without the appellant running the risk of drawing pointed attention to himself as having been last seen in the company of the boy. We hold that previous association of a type which would induce two persons to associate together for the purposes of a murder is not established.\n\n(2) That the deceased Ramesh was in the Gurudwara about 9-30 or 10 in the morning of the 26th.\n\nThis is not disputed.\n\n(3) That Kashmira Singh who had gone to the Gurudwara in the morning was absent between 11 A.M. and 12-45 P.M.\n\nThat the appellant was at the Gurudwara in the morning is not disputed, in fact his case is that he was there the entire day. The evidence to prove that he left it between these hours consists of three persons: P.W. 30 Atmaram, P.W. 35 TiLakchand and P.\\V. 5 Bisan.\n\nThe prosecution story is that the appellant left the Gurudwara about 11 A.M. to go to the shop of P.W. 5 Bisan to hire a cycle. He was first seen by P.W. 35 Tilakchand, a wood stall keeper, at point No. 13, just near the Gurudwara. The witness places the time at about 10-30 or 11 A.M. He says he saw him coming from the direction of the railway station and going past his stall. Fifteen minutes later, he went past his stall again in the opposite direction, that is to say, towards the railway station which lies on his way to the cycle shop.\n\nNext comes P.W. 30 Atmaram. He keeps a bookstall on the broad gauge platform of the Gondia Railway Station. He says he saw the appellant coming from the bridge and going towards the Railway Police\n\nKashmira Singh\n\nState of Madhye1\n\nPradesh.\n\nBose J.\n\n1952 Station of all places m the world. He came near Kashmira Singh enough the witness to wish him good day. He places\n\ny, the time at about 10-30 or 11. The only comment State of Madhya we make on this witness is that he says he used to Pradesh. see the appellant at , the station almost every day and\n\nBose /. they used to greet each other. The possibility that the witness is mixing up this day with one of the other days cannot be excluded. It is certainly a matter for comment that a would be murderer on his way to hire a cycle for the purpose and keep an assignment with his accomplice and victim should go out of his way and either go on to or very near the railway platform to gret; t a person he knows there and then walk away towards the police station of all places where the danger of recognition would be strong.\n\nNext there is P.W. 5 Bisan, the man ii) charge of the cycle shop. He speaks from his register and says the appellant hired a cycle from him on that day at\n\n11-20 A.M. and returned it at 12-45 P.M. The Sess10ns Judge and the High Court lay great stress on this witness.\n\nBut as against this 1s the evidence of , Anupsingh Bedi, D.W. 1, a m; pectable disinterested witness, who is a resident of Nagpur. He says he saw the appellant at the Gurudwara at 11 and agam \"about 11-45 A.M.\" The Sessions Judge thought he was interested because he admits he reported a complaint he had received from Gurudayalsingh, to the effect that the appellant was being harassed by the police and that they threatened to arrest 1adie5 also, to the Inspector General of Police and .the Home Minister. He explained that as head of the Sikh community in that State he felt bound to pass on these complaints to the highest authorities. We are unable to regard this as disclosing interest. There is no suggestion that what he did\n\nwa~ improper and we are of opinion he did nothing more than any man of responsibility in his position would have done. The High Court has not criticised him. The learned Judges merely say that he may be mistaken as to the time; nor of course does he suggest that he is giving more than a mere estimate. All he ~.\n\nsays is that, \"It may have been about 11-45 A.M. by this time.\"\n\nWe do not think there is much in all thisi. Nobody, except P.W. 5 Bisan, pretends to be exact and when one is guessing at the time several days after the event there really is not much discrepancy between 11-20 and 11-45. Even if it was 11-45 there would still have been sufficient time to commit the murder.\n\nAs two Courts have believed the evidence on this point without calling in aid the confession, we are not prepared to depart from our usual rule regarding concurrent findings of fact. We will therefore accept the position that the appellant was absent from the Gurudwara long enough to enable him to commit the murder.\n\nWe will also take into consideration the fact that he made a false statement on this point when he said he was not away at all.\n\n(4) Disposal of the body.\n\nThe rest of the evidence relates to the disposal of the body and the only direct evidence connecting the appellant with this, apart from the confession, is that of Sannatrao P.W. 14, the rickshaw .coolie. He does not bring the appellant into the picture till about midnight. Now this coolie is a very shaky witness. We cannot but note the remarkable series of coincidences which emerge from his testimony. First, he is not a rickshaw coolie at all. He merely happened to hire a rickshaw that night, and he told the police that this was the first time he had ever done that at night after\n\n)'!, a day's work. Next, he knew the appellant because he happened to be a chowkidar in the Food Office at Gondia at the same time that the appellant was there as a Food Inspector.\n\nBut at the date of the incident neither was sitill in service, so by a . somewhat strange :coincidence the appellant happens to hire, for the first time, this old co-worker in the middle of the night who, in his turn, happened to hire, also for the first time at night, a rickshaw for which he had no licence.\n\nN; ext comes a still stranger coincidence. He is taken\n\n...4 to within a few paces of his own house and the body\n\nKashmira Singh v.\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nBose /.\n\nis dumped, in his presence, into a well, a stone's . throw from where he lives.\n\nGurubachan tells us that Kashmira Singh v. earlier in the day, about 7 P.M. he, (Gurubachan) had\n\nState of Madhya carried, unaided, the \"bedding\" on his head for a Pradesh. distance which we know was half to three quarters of\n\nBose /. a mile, namely from Gurudayal's house to the chowkidar's hut. Despite this, the two are sa.id to have engaged this rickshaw coolie to carry it j\\l.5/1: half a mile (, i shorter distance) to the well and there they threw it in in the man's presence; and none of this was disclosed to the police till a month la, ter, namely the 17th of January, though the witness was present when the body was recovered and though he was questioned on three previous occasions.\n\nWe do not doubt that a rickshaw was used because rickshaw tracks were discovered by the well long before anybody had suggested that a rickshaw had been used. But we find it difficult to resist the inference\n\nthat this witness was an accomplice so far as the disposal df •th~ bdy was concdrned. Consequent'J, y, he is in much the same category so far as credibility is concerned. That brings us at once to the rule that save in exceptional circumstances one accomplice can- not be used to corroborate another, nor can he be used to corroborate a person who though not an accomplice is no more reliable than one. We have therefore either to seek corroboration of a kind which will implicate the appellant apart from the confession or find strong reasons for using Gurubachan's confession for that purpose. Of course, against Gurubachan there is no difficulty, but against the appellant the pos, ition is not as easy.\n\nWe will therefore examine the reliability of Gurubachan's confession against the appellant. Now there are some glaring irregularities regarding t'ltls confession and though it was safe for the Se&', ions Judge and the High Court to act on it as against Gurubachan because he adhered to it throughout the sessions\n\ntrial despite his pleader's efforts to show the contrary, a very djffereqt position emerges when we come to the\n\n• ..,\n\nappella11t. ~\n\n1952 The first point which emerges regarding this is that the confession was not made till the 25th of February 1950, that is to say, not until two mo, nths after the murder.\n\nKashmira Sing1'\n\nState of Madbyf!\n\nWe do not know when Gurubachan was first interrogated but P.W. 42 Narayandas tells us that when he was taken to the police station house at Gondia for interrogation about the 1st or 3rd January he saw Gurubachan sitting in the police lock up. We do not know how long he was kept there like this but it is evident that he was not there voluntarily, at any rate\n\ntill the 1st or 3rd, because the Station Officer P.W. 44 says that \"until Gurubachan Singh was arrested he used to be allowed to go home.\" Also he says that Gurubachan was interrogated several times and was confronted with Pritipal.\n\nHowever, eventually Gurubachan was allowed to go away and he went to Balaghat. Then, on the 16th of February the Station Officer P.W. 44 went to Balaghat, brought Gurubachan back with him to Gondia and handed him over to the C.l.D. Inspector Guha. Guha P.W. 50 tells us that from then till the 20th of February, when he was arrested, he was kept under observation but was allowed to . go home at night. He did not confess till the 25th and the Station Officer\n\nP. W. 44 tells us that from the 20th to the 25th he was kept in one of the rooms in Guha's quarters.\n\nThen, after the confession on the 25th he was taken back to Guha's custody for a couple of days and then only was he sent to the magisterial lock up. (See\n\nGuha's evidence). He was kept in this lock up till the conclusion of the committal proceedings, that is, till\n\nthe 30th of June, instead of being sent to jail custody in Bhandara where there is a jail. The other accused including Pritipal who had by then confessed were sent to Bhandara.\n\nNow though Gurubachan was kept in the magisterial lock up the distinction between the magisterial lock up and police custody< 'in Goncfi/a is only\n\nPradesh.\n\nBose J.\n\nKashmira Singh ...\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nBose/.\n\ntheoretical. In practice, it is no better than police custody. Police constable Lalbahadur P.W. 55 tells us that-\n\n\"The Station House Officer Gondia deputes constables for duty m the lock up. The constables m charge take the prisoners out to the latrine and also arrange for their food .... The Head Constable in fact is in charge.\"\n\nAlso, Guha admits that he interrogated Gurubachan in the lock up twice within the ten days which succeeded the confession. This 1S in disregard of the Rules and Orders (Criminal) of the Nagpur High Court which enjoin at page 25, paragraph 84, of the 1948 edition that-\n\n\"After a prisoner has made a confession before a a magistrate he should ordinarily be committed to jail and the magistrate should note on the warrant for the iinformation of the Superintendent of the jail that the prisoner has made a confession.\"\n\nNo explanation has been given why these directions, which were made for good reason, were disregarded in Gurubachan' s case. As we have said, the other prisoners were all committed to jail custody in the usual way, so there was no difficulty about observing th.e rule. All this makes it unsafe to disregard the rule about usmg accomplice testimony as corroboration against a non-confessing accused.\n\nNone of the judges who have handled this case has given any reason why this rule could safely be departed from in this particular case. In the circumstance$, we do not feel that the confession by itself can be used to corroborate the rickshaw coolie Sannatrao, P.W. 14. But there IS other corroboration. It consists of the . san border, and this IS the next point on which the prosecution relies.\n\nThere IS one arugment about this confession advanced on behalf of the appellant with which we shall have to deal. The prosecution were criticised for not calling the magistrate who recorded the confession as a witness.\n\nWe wish to endorse the remarks of their\n\n; .\n\nLordshilps of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad\n\nv. King Emperor (1) regarding the undesirability of such a practice. In our opinion, the magistrate was rightly not called and it would have been improper and undesirable for the prosecution to have acted otherwise.\n\n(5) Sari borders, Articles F, G, and T.\n\nArticles F & G are two pieces of a sari border which were used for tying up the mouth of the gunny bag in which the body was placed. The evidence about that is beyond doubt. Article T is another piece of a sari border which was found in the appellant's houe on the 30th of December, 1949. It is true the appellant was not present at the time but his mother was there and it will be seen di.at it was scized on the same day that the body was discovered. There is strong proof that Articles F and G are a part of the same border as Article T, and as there is a concurrent finding regarding these facts we are not prepared to to take a different view. That therefore affords corroboration of Sannatrao's evidence and the confession can be called in aid to lend assurance to the inference which arises from these facts, namely that the appellant did help to dispose of the body. The High Court and the Sessions Judge were accordingly entitled to act on thils evidnc:e for establishing that panicular fact and we are not prepared to disturb their concurrent conclusions.\n\nBut the matter cannot be carried further because, not only are the sari borders not proved to have had any connection with the crime of murder but the confession shows that they did not.\n\nThe only dondlusJon permible on these facts is tl1at the appellant, at some time which is unknown, subsequent to the murder assisted either actively or passively in tying up the gunny bag in which the corpse was placed and that he then accompanied Gurubachan in the rickshaw from the chowkidar's hut to the well in the middle of the night.\n\n(6) Coat, Article X, and Safa, Article Y.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253 at 258. 5--6 S. c. India/71\n\nKashmira SitJgh\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nBose J.\n\nKa; hmira Singh\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nBose /.\n\nThese were seized on the 20th of January 1950 from a trunk in the house of the appellant's brother Gurudayalsingh. The appellant's house is not in this neighbourhood. It is some distance away in another part of the town. The coat is a uniform coat of the kind worn by a Travelling Ticket Inspector on the Railways. Gurudayal is a travelling Ticket Inspector.\n\nThe appellant is not.\n\nHere again the appellant was not present when the seizures were made.\n\nThis coat and safa were recovered in the fourth search. The first search was on the 30th of December 1949.\n\nThe next on the 10th of January 1950.\n\nThe third on the morning of the 20th and the fourth in the afternoon of the 20th. These Articles were not found in the first three searches.\n\nThe Chemical Examiner reports that there is one minute blood stain on the safa and some (the number is not given), also minute, on the coat. The seizure memo, Ex. P-55, picked out only five. Those stains are not proved to be of human blood.\n\nNow there is next no evidence to connect either the coat or the safa with the appellant. The High Court has relied on the evidence of Sannatrao (P.W. 14), Gokulprasad the Station Officer (P.W. 44) and Tiwari (P.W. 48). Sannatrao does no more than say\n\nthat he noticed the appellant wearing a popat coloured safa and a black coat. But he was not able to describe the clothes of the passenger he had carried immediately before the appellant, nor was he able to describe the appellant's coat i!ri detail. That therefore is no identification of this coat with the one the appellant wore or owns. The Station Officer Gokulprasad said that he had seen the appellant wear this very coat and safa and therefore he identified them as his clothes. In cross-examination he admitted that he had only seen the appellant on three occasions but not to speak to. Consequently, that is not strong evidence of identification. But what in our opinion is almost conclusive against this identification is that Tiwari, P.W. 48, who is clearest on the point and who of course had the best opportunities. for observation,\n\n. l\n\n• ..,,\n\ngives a distinctive feature of the appellant's coat, namely that it had only one button. That is one of his reasons for knowing what the appellant used to wear. But the seizure memo, Ex. P. 55, shows that the coat, Article X, had two buttons. In the circumstances we find it difficult to see how i~ can be the appellant's coat.\n\nThere is another strong point in the appellant's favour which the High Court has not noticed. P.W. 35 the wood stall keeper Tilakchand, who saw him on his way to pick up his victim, is definite that the appellant was not wearing a coat at the time.\n\nIt is difficult to see why he should have donned a coat and got it stained with blood just for murdering a child of five. It our opinion, it would be unsafe to conch1de on this evidence that any connection is established between the coat and the safa and the appellant.\n\nThe furthest point to which this evidence can be pushed is to indicadte that the appellant possessed a coat similar to Article X but which was not Article X.\n\nWe do not ordinarily interfere with a concurrent finding of fact but when the finding omits to notice these two very important points in the accused's favour which, in our opinion, swing the balance the other way, we are unable to let the finding stand. In our opinion, the nexus between the appellant and the coat and the safa is not established.\n\n(7) Motive.\n\nThis is the last piece of evidence on which the prosecution rely. Both courts hold that the motive is established and there is strong evidence to prove it We accordingly accept the finding that the appellant had a motive for enmity against Tiwari and that he had expressed determination to be revenged. The only comment we will make is that other persons who were also dismissed from service had similar motives.\n\nWhat then is the summary of the evidence ? In the appellant's favour there are the facts that there is no proof of his having been last seen in the company of\n\n195Z\n\nKashmira Singh.\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nKaslimira Singh\n\nv;,· State of Madhya\n\nPradesh.\n\nBouf.\n\nthe deceased. The only evidence of the boy's movements is that of Krishna (alias Billa) P.W. 9, a boy of seven years, and all he says is that Pritipal asked him to bring Ramesh with him to the Gurudwara that morning about 9 A.M. The boys played about and had some tea and then Pritipal took Ramesh away in the direction of the prostitute's house. Pritipal later returned without Ramesh. The Sessions Judge thought this witness had been tutored on at least one point. Pritipal's so called confession has been rejected because, in the first place, it is not a confession at all, for it is exculpatory, and, in the next, the High Court was not able to trust it. Therefore, the only evidence of the boy's I~ movements 1s as above.\n\nThe next point in the appellant's favour is that he was seen without a coat shortly before the murder and at a time when he was not in the vicinity of his own house. According to the prosecution, the murderer wore the coat, Article X, and the safa, Article Y.\n\nThe third point is that the appellant was not see11 by anyone in the vicinity of the place of occurrence.\n\nThe fourth point is that if the prosecution case is true, then it i& remarkable that no one saw the appellant and the boy on a cycle through nearly a mile of what the High Court, which made i spot inspection, describes as a crowded locality.\n\nThe points against the appellant are ( 1) that he had a motive and that he said he would be revenged,\n\n(2) that he was absent from the Gurudwara about the time of the murder long enough to enable him to commit it, and denied the fact, (3) that some twelve hours after the crime he assisted m removing the body from a place between half to three quarters of a mile distant from the scene of the crime, and ( 4) that at some unknown point of time he assisted in tying up the month of the gunny bag in which the body was eventually placed.\n\nIn our opinion, it would be unsafe to convict of murder on these facts.\n\n' ,.\n\nA number of rulings were cited, including one of the Privy Council, and it was argued that in those cases persons were convicted of murder on similar facts.\n\nWe do not intend to examine them because no decision can be a guide on facts. Each case has its own special circumstances and must be decided on its own facts. For example, m most of the cases cited the accused was associated with the disposal of the body very on after the occurrence and at the scene of the cnme. Here, twelve hours had elapsed and the first connection proved with the disposal is at a place over half a mile distant from where the boy is said to have been murdered. Next, the points we have shown m favour of the appellant in this case were not present there.\n\nWe allow the appeal on the charges of murder, conspiracy and kidnapping and reverse the findings and sentences on those charges and acquit the appellant of them.\n\nVv e however convict the appellant of an offence under section 201.\n\nIndian Penal Code, and sentence him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge omitted to record a conviction under .section 201 because he was convicting the appellant of murder. He followed a Nagpur decision which holds that in such a case it would be improper to convict in the alternative. We express no opinion about that; the question does not arise as we have acquitted the appellant of the murder and the cognate charges.\n\nThe case now falls in line with that of the Privy Council in Begu v. The King-Emper<>r (1) and the conviction and sentence are confined to section 201.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\n(l) (1925) 52 I.A.191.\n\nKasnmi'ra Singh\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nBose/.", "total_entities": 90, "entities": [{"text": "KASHMIRA SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Kashmira SitJgh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v IVIAN BosE, J.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517, "end_char": 523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 531, "end_char": 550, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Periyaswami Moopan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1759, "end_char": 1777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Emperor\n\nv. Lalit Mohan Chukerbutty (38 _CaL 599 at 588) and In re Periyaswami Moopan (I.L.R. 54 Mad.", "canonical_name": "Periyaswami Moopan(3)·-"}}, {"text": "Hemeon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2586, "end_char": 2592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 8th June 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur (Hemeon and Rao JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2597, "end_char": 2600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 8th June 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur (Hemeon and Rao JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge of Bhandara", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2730, "end_char": 2767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "297 of 1950, arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 11th September 1950 of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge of Bhandara in Session Trial No."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Tek Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2803, "end_char": 2819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bakshi Tek Chand, (Gopal Singh, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2822, "end_char": 2833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bakshi Tek Chand, (Gopal Singh, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapoor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapoor, for the respondent.'"}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2960, "end_char": 2964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The appellant Kashmira Singh has been convicted of the murder of one Ramesh, a small boy aged five, and has been sentenced to death.", "canonical_name": "BosE"}}, {"text": "Kashmira Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2982, "end_char": 2996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The appellant Kashmira Singh has been convicted of the murder of one Ramesh, a small boy aged five, and has been sentenced to death.", "canonical_name": "Kashmira SitJgh"}}, {"text": "Ramesh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3037, "end_char": 3043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The appellant Kashmira Singh has been convicted of the murder of one Ramesh, a small boy aged five, and has been sentenced to death."}}, {"text": "Gurudayalsingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3212, "end_char": 3226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were his brother Gurudayalsingh, his nephew Pritipalsingh (son of Gurudayal), a boy of eleven, and one Gurubachansingh.", "canonical_name": "Gurudayalsingh"}}, {"text": "Pritipalsingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3239, "end_char": 3252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were his brother Gurudayalsingh, his nephew Pritipalsingh (son of Gurudayal), a boy of eleven, and one Gurubachansingh.", "canonical_name": "Pritipalsingh"}}, {"text": "Gurubachansingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3298, "end_char": 3313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were his brother Gurudayalsingh, his nephew Pritipalsingh (son of Gurudayal), a boy of eleven, and one Gurubachansingh.", "canonical_name": "Gurubachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Gurudayal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3316, "end_char": 3325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurudayal and Pritipal have been acquitted.", "canonical_name": "Gurudayalsingh"}}, {"text": "Pritipal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3330, "end_char": 3338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurudayal and Pritipal have been acquitted.", "canonical_name": "Pritipalsingh"}}, {"text": "L.P. Tiwari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3819, "end_char": 3830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased Ramesh was the son of P.W. 48 L.P. Tiwari who was the Food Officer at Gondia at the relevant date."}}, {"text": "Gondia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3859, "end_char": 3865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased Ramesh was the son of P.W. 48 L.P. Tiwari who was the Food Officer at Gondia at the relevant date."}}, {"text": "1st of July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3976, "end_char": 3993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st of July, 1949, Tiwari found the appellant and Harbilas\n\n(P.W. 31) getting rice polished at a certain rice mill."}}, {"text": "Tiwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3995, "end_char": 4001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st of July, 1949, Tiwari found the appellant and Harbilas\n\n(P.W. 31) getting rice polished at a certain rice mill."}}, {"text": "Harbilas", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4026, "end_char": 4034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st of July, 1949, Tiwari found the appellant and Harbilas\n\n(P.W. 31) getting rice polished at a certain rice mill."}}, {"text": "Bhandara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4228, "end_char": 4236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tiwari accordingly reported the matter to the Deputy Commissioner of Bhandara."}}, {"text": "Kashmira Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4257, "end_char": 4271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He suspended the\n\nKashmira Singh\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh.", "canonical_name": "Kashmira SitJgh"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4273, "end_char": 4297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He suspended the\n\nKashmira Singh\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh"}}, {"text": "26th of December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4802, "end_char": 4824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th of December, 1949, festivities and religious ceremonies were in progress all day in the Sikh Gurudwara at Gandia."}}, {"text": "Gandia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4913, "end_char": 4919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th of December, 1949, festivities and religious ceremonies were in progress all day in the Sikh Gurudwara at Gandia."}}, {"text": "Gurubachan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5397, "end_char": 5407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The body was then tied up in a gunny bag and rolled up in a roll of bedding and allowed to lie in Gurudayal's house till about 7 p.m.\n\nAt 7 p.m. the body wrapped as above was carried by Gurubachan on his head to a chowkidar's hut near the Sikh Gurudwara.", "canonical_name": "Gurubachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Shambhu alias Sannatrao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5758, "end_char": 5781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly before midnight the appellant and Gurubachan engaged the services of a rickshaw coolie Shambhu alias Sannatrao, P. W. 14."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6500, "end_char": 6509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6531, "end_char": 6546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madhya\n\nIt is not required to be given on oath, nor in the pre- Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Lawrence Jenkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7626, "end_char": 7642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan\n\nChuckerbutty(2) where he said that such a confession can only be used to \"lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused\" or, to put it in another way, as Reilly J. did in In re Periyaswami Moopan(3)·-\n\n\"the provision goes no further than this-where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.\""}}, {"text": "Reilly", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7832, "end_char": 7838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan\n\nChuckerbutty(2) where he said that such a confession can only be used to \"lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused\" or, to put it in another way, as Reilly J. did in In re Periyaswami Moopan(3)·-\n\n\"the provision goes no further than this-where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.\""}}, {"text": "Periyaswami Moopan(3)·-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7855, "end_char": 7878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan\n\nChuckerbutty(2) where he said that such a confession can only be used to \"lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused\" or, to put it in another way, as Reilly J. did in In re Periyaswami Moopan(3)·-\n\n\"the provision goes no further than this-where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.\"", "canonical_name": "Periyaswami Moopan(3)·-"}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8061, "end_char": 8071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10400, "end_char": 10405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Privy Council observe in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King(2):-\n\n\"The tendency to include the innocent with the guJ'.lty is peculiarly preval'ent .in India, as judges have\n\nti) [1952] S.C.Jl.. 377."}}, {"text": "Upasrao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11003, "end_char": 11010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only evidence about t~ is P.W. 23 Upasrao, a water carrier."}}, {"text": "Punjabi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11394, "end_char": 11401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They SIPoke in Punjabi which he does not understand, ."}}, {"text": "Gondia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12680, "end_char": 12686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bos~/.\n\naccording to the prosecution case, as disclosed in the confession, Gurubachan was a stranger to Gondia."}}, {"text": "Gurubachah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13960, "end_char": 13970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, the appellant w~ to walk another half miEe at right angles to Gurubachah's course to the point No.", "canonical_name": "Gurubachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Atmaram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15778, "end_char": 15785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence to prove that he left it between these hours consists of three persons: P.W. 30 Atmaram, P.W. 35 TiLakchand and P.\\V. 5 Bisan."}}, {"text": "TiLakchand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15795, "end_char": 15805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence to prove that he left it between these hours consists of three persons: P.W. 30 Atmaram, P.W. 35 TiLakchand and P.\\V. 5 Bisan."}}, {"text": "Bisan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15818, "end_char": 15823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence to prove that he left it between these hours consists of three persons: P.W. 30 Atmaram, P.W. 35 TiLakchand and P.\\V. 5 Bisan."}}, {"text": "Tilakchand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15983, "end_char": 15993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was first seen by P.W. 35 Tilakchand, a wood stall keeper, at point No."}}, {"text": "State of Madhye1", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16585, "end_char": 16601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He says he saw the appellant coming from the bridge and going towards the Railway Police\n\nKashmira Singh\n\nState of Madhye1\n\nPradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\n1952 Station of all places m the world."}}, {"text": "Anupsingh Bedi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17761, "end_char": 17775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as against this 1s the evidence of , Anupsingh Bedi, D.W. 1, a m; pectable disinterested witness, who is a resident of Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17843, "end_char": 17849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as against this 1s the evidence of , Anupsingh Bedi, D.W. 1, a m; pectable disinterested witness, who is a resident of Nagpur."}}, {"text": "Sannatrao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19782, "end_char": 19791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rest of the evidence relates to the disposal of the body and the only direct evidence connecting the appellant with this, apart from the confession, is that of Sannatrao P.W. 14, the rickshaw .coolie."}}, {"text": "17th of January", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21511, "end_char": 21526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Despite this, the two are sa.id to have engaged this rickshaw coolie to carry it j\\l.5/1: half a mile (, i shorter distance) to the well and there they threw it in in the man's presence; and none of this was disclosed to the police till a month la, ter, namely the 17th of January, though the witness was present when the body was recovered and though he was questioned on three previous occasions."}}, {"text": "Kashmira Sing1", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23187, "end_char": 23201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kashmira Sing1'\n\nState of Madbyf!", "canonical_name": "Kashmira SitJgh"}}, {"text": "State of Madbyf", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23204, "end_char": 23219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kashmira Sing1'\n\nState of Madbyf!", "canonical_name": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh"}}, {"text": "Narayandas", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23288, "end_char": 23298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not know when Gurubachan was first interrogated but P.W. 42 Narayandas tells us that when he was taken to the police station house at Gondia for interrogation about the 1st or 3rd January he saw Gurubachan sitting in the police lock up."}}, {"text": "Gurubachan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23657, "end_char": 23673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not know how long he was kept there like this but it is evident that he was not there voluntarily, at any rate\n\ntill the 1st or 3rd, because the Station Officer P.W. 44 says that \"until Gurubachan Singh was arrested he used to be allowed to go home.\"", "canonical_name": "Gurubachan Singh"}}, {"text": "Balaghat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23886, "end_char": 23894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, eventually Gurubachan was allowed to go away and he went to Balaghat."}}, {"text": "16th of February", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23909, "end_char": 23925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, on the 16th of February the Station Officer P.W. 44 went to Balaghat, brought Gurubachan back with him to Gondia and handed him over to the C.l."}}, {"text": "Guha. Guha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24059, "end_char": 24069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Inspector Guha."}}, {"text": "20th of February", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24111, "end_char": 24127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Guha P.W. 50 tells us that from then till the 20th of February, when he was arrested, he was kept under observation but was allowed to ."}}, {"text": "Guha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24362, "end_char": 24366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He did not confess till the 25th and the Station Officer\n\nP. W. 44 tells us that from the 20th to the 25th he was kept in one of the rooms in Guha's quarters."}}, {"text": "Guha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24536, "end_char": 24540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See\n\nGuha's evidence)."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24983, "end_char": 24987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nKashmira Singh ...\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh.", "canonical_name": "BosE"}}, {"text": "Kashmira Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24992, "end_char": 25006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nKashmira Singh ...\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh.", "canonical_name": "Kashmira SitJgh"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25012, "end_char": 25036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nKashmira Singh ...\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh."}}, {"text": "Lalbahadur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25127, "end_char": 25137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Police constable Lalbahadur P.W. 55 tells us that-\n\n\"The Station House Officer Gondia deputes constables for duty m the lock up."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25567, "end_char": 25584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This 1S in disregard of the Rules and Orders (Criminal) of the Nagpur High Court which enjoin at page 25, paragraph 84, of the 1948 edition that-\n\n\"After a prisoner has made a confession before a a magistrate he should ordinarily be committed to jail and the magistrate should note on the warrant for the iinformation of the Superintendent of the jail that the prisoner has made a confession.\""}}, {"text": "30th of December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27534, "end_char": 27556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article T is another piece of a sari border which was found in the appellant's houe on the 30th of December, 1949."}}, {"text": "Sannatrao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27958, "end_char": 27967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That therefore affords corroboration of Sannatrao's evidence and the confession can be called in aid to lend assurance to the inference which arises from these facts, namely that the appellant did help to dispose of the body."}}, {"text": "Kashmira SitJgh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28962, "end_char": 28977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5--6 S. c. India/71\n\nKashmira SitJgh\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "Kashmira SitJgh"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28979, "end_char": 29002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5--6 S. c. India/71\n\nKashmira SitJgh\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh"}}, {"text": "30th of December 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29604, "end_char": 29625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first search was on the 30th of December 1949."}}, {"text": "10th of January 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29644, "end_char": 29664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next on the 10th of January 1950."}}, {"text": "Gokulprasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30206, "end_char": 30217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has relied on the evidence of Sannatrao (P.W. 14), Gokulprasad the Station Officer (P.W. 44) and Tiwari (P.W. 48)."}}, {"text": "Tiwari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30252, "end_char": 30258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has relied on the evidence of Sannatrao (P.W. 14), Gokulprasad the Station Officer (P.W. 44) and Tiwari (P.W. 48)."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33131, "end_char": 33155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nKaslimira Singh\n\nv;,· State of Madhya\n\nPradesh."}}, {"text": "Kaslimira Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33166, "end_char": 33181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh\n\nBose J.\n\nKaslimira Singh\n\nv;,· State of Madhya\n\nPradesh."}}, {"text": "Krishna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33288, "end_char": 33295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only evidence of the boy's movements is that of Krishna (alias Billa) P.W. 9, a boy of seven years, and all he says is that Pritipal asked him to bring Ramesh with him to the Gurudwara that morning about 9 A.M. The boys played about and had some tea and then Pritipal took Ramesh away in the direction of the prostitute's house."}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36134, "end_char": 36145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36148, "end_char": 36165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36289, "end_char": 36300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36742, "end_char": 36753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36781, "end_char": 36791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36820, "end_char": 36831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Kasnmi'ra Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36858, "end_char": 36873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kasnmi'ra Singh\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "Kashmira SitJgh"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36875, "end_char": 36898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kasnmi'ra Singh\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh."}}]}
{"document_id": "1952_1_544_566_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "M\"1ch 7.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nPANNALAL AND ANOTHER ..\n\nf),\n\nMST. NARAIN! AND OTHERS.\n\n(SAIYID FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and VrvIAN BosE, JJ.]\n\nHindu law-Debts-Pre-partition debts of father-Sons' !iabi/J'ty '• -Pious liability of son-Nature and extent, and tnode of enforcement-Decree against estate of father in sons' hands as legal representatives-Whether executable against property allotted to sons o-n partition-Civil Proccdur< Code (Act V of 1908), ss. 47, 52, 53.\n\nB, acting as n1anager of a joint Hindu fan1ily, consisting of himself and his sons executed a mortgage deed in favour of the plaintiff, hypothecating certain movables to secure a loon. Subsequently the sons obtained a partition decree against their father and the joint family properties were divi9ed by metes and bounds and separate possession was taken by the father and the sons. Later on, the plaintiff filed a suit against B praying for a decree against the mortgaged property as well as against the joint family.\n\nThe sons applied for being impleaded as defendants stating that the mortgaged properties were allotted to them by the partition decree and B was not the manager of a joint Hindu family.\n\nIn reply the plaintiff gave up the claim for a mortgage decree stating that she would be satisfied with a money decree against B and the plaint was amended accordingly.\n\nB died and his sons were brought on the record as his legal representatives. The sons pleaded, inte1 alia, that the debt was illegal and itnmoral as it related to speculative transactions by the father.\n\nThe parties arrived at a. comprotnise and on the basis thereof a simple money decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff against the estate of B in the hands of his legal representatives.\n\nThe judgment-debtors (sons) disputed their liability 011 three grounds, viz., (i) that under the terms of the cotnpromise decree, the decree-holder could proceed only against the properties of B in the hands of his legal representatives and no property belonging to the sons could be made liable for the decree;\n\n(ii) that, as the decree waS obtained after partition of the joint family properties between the father and his sons, the properties of the sons obtained in partition were not liable under Hindu law for the debt of the father, (iii) that in any event if there was any pious obligation on the part of the sons to pay the father's debt incurred before partition such obligation could be enforced against the sons only in a properly constituted suit and not by way of execution of a decree obtained in a suit which was brought against the father alone during his lifetime and to which the sons were made parties as legal representatives after the father's death:\n\n• •\n\nI ,.\n\nHeld, (repelling the contentions), ( l) that as the decree fulfilled the conditions of sec. 52(1) of the Civil Procedure Code it attracted all the incidents which attach by law to a decree of that character and therefore the decree-holder was entitled to call in aid the provisions of sec. 53 of the Code and if any property in the hands of the sons was liable under the Hindu law to pay the father's debt, such property would be liable in execution of the decree by virtue of the provision of sec. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code; (2) that a son is liable even after partition for the pre-partition debts of his father, which are not immoral or illegal and for the payment of which no arrangement was made at the time of the partition; (3) that a decree passed against the separated sons as legal representatives of the deceased father in respect of a debt incurred before partition can be executed against the shares obtained by such sons at the partition and this can be done in execution proceedings and it is not necessary to bring a separate suit for the purpose.\n\n[Case was remanded to the execution court to determine the question whether the debt was immoral or illegal and whether any arrangement was made at the time of partition for the payment of the debt.]\n\nBankey Lal v. Durga Prasad (I.L.R. 53 All. 868 F.B.) approved.\n\nThe view of the majority in Atul Krishna v.\n\nLala Nandanji (I.L.R. 14 Pat. 732) disapproved. (Case law discussed).\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 57 of 1951. Appeal from a judgment dated 18th May, 1948, of the High Court of East Punjab at Sjmla\n\n(Khosfa and Teja Singh JJ.) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 189 of 1946 arising out 0£ the judgment dated 11th February, 1946, of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala. The facts are set out in the judgment.\n\nGopinath Kunzru (B. C. Misra, with him) for the appellants.\n\nRang Behari Lal (N. C. Sen, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1952. March 7. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the judgment-debtor tn a proceeding for execution of a money decree and it is directed against the judgment of a Letters Patent Bench of the Punjab High Court dated 18th of May, 1949, by which the learned Judges\n\nPannalal and Anothlll'\n\nMst. Naraini and Others.\n\nPanna/a/ ttnd Another\n\nV4;' Mst. Naraini and Others.\n\nMukhcrjea /.\n\naffirmed, in appeal, a decision of a single Judge of that court dated 29th October, 1946. The original order against which the appeal was taken to the High Court was made by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala, in Execution Case No. 18 of 1945 dismissing the objections preferred by the appellants under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nTo appreciate the contentions that have been raised in this appeal, it would be necessary to give a short narrative of the material events in their chronological order. On September 30, 1925, Baldev Das, the father of the appellants, who was, at that time the ffia!lager of a joint Hindu family, consisting of himself and his sons, executed a mortgage bond in favour of Mst. Naraini, the original respondent No. l, and another person named Talok Chand, by which certain movable properties belonging to the joint family were hypothecated to secure a loan of Rs. 16,000.\n\nOn April 16, 1928, the appellants along with a minor brother of theirs named Sumer Chand filed a suit-being Suit No. 23 of 1928-in the Court of the Subordinate\n\nJudge of Shahjahanpur against their father Baldev Das for partition of the joint family properties\\ The suit culminat:ed in a final decree for partition on 20th July, 1928, and the joint family properties were divided by metes and bounds and separate possession was taken by the father and the sons. On 29th September, 1934, Mst. Naraini filed a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala, against Baldev Das for recovery of a sum of R&. 12,500 only on the basis of the mortgage bond referred to above. It was stated in the plaint that the money was borrowed by the defendant as manager of a joint Hindu family and the plaintilf prayed for a decree against the mortgaged propert)i as well as against the joint family. On 18th December, 1934, the appellants made an application before the Subordinate Judge under Order I, Rule 10, and Order XXXIV, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, praying that they might be added as parties defendants to the suit and the points in sue arising therein might be decided in their presence.\n\nIt was asserted in the\n\npetition that Baldev Das was not the manager of a joint family and that the family properties had been partitioned by a decree of the court, as a result of which the properties alleged tlo Pe the subject-matter of the mortgage were allotted to the share of the petitioners.\n\nIn reply to this petition, the plaintiff's counsel stated in court on 7th February, 1935, that his client would give up the claim for a mortgage decree against the properties m suit and would be satisfied only with a money decree against Baldev Das personally. The plaint was amended accordingly, deleting all refetence to the joint family and abandoning the claim against the mortgaged property. Upon this the appellants withdrew their application for being made parties to the suit and reserved their right to take proper legal action if and when necessary. On AprN 17, 1935, Baldev Das died and on 2nd September following the appellants as well as their mother, who figures as respondent No. 5 m this appeal, were brought on the record as legal representatives of Baldev Das. On October 9, 1935, the appellants filed a written statement m which a number of pleas were taken in answer to the plaintiff's claim and it was asserted m paragraph 10 of the written statement that Baldev Das dealt Badri or speculative transacuons, and if any money was due to the plaint iff at all m connection with such transactions the debt was illegal and immoral and not binding on the family property. On the same day the court recorded an order to the effect that as the plaintiff had given up her claim for a mortgage decree, the legal representatives of the deceased could not be allowed to raise pleas relating to the validity or otherwise of the mortgage. On 20th November, 1935, the parties arrived at a compromise and on the basis of the same, a simple money decree was passed in favour ci the plaintiff for the full amount claimed in the suit together with half costs amounting to Rs. 425 annas odd against the estates of Baldev Das m the hands of his legal representatives. After certain attempts at execution of this decree which did not prove successful.\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst. Naraini and Others.\n\nMukheriea /.\n\nPannalal and Another v.\n\nMst, Naraini\n\nand Others.\n\nMukheriea }.\n\nthe present application for execution was filed by the decree-holder on March 13, 1945, in the court of the Senior Subordinate fudge, Ambala, and in accordance with the prayer contained therein, the court directed the attachment of certain immovable properties consisting of a number of shops in possession of the appellants and situated at a place called Abdullapur. On April 23, 1945, the appellants filed objections under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, and they opposed the attachment of the properties substantially on the ground that those properties did not belong to Baldev Das but were the separate and exclusive properties of the objectors which they obtained on partition with their father long before the decree was passed. It was asserted that these properties could not be made liable for the satisfaction of the decretal dues which had to be realised under the terms of the decree itself from the estate left by Baldev Das.\n\nAfter hearing the parties and the evidence adduced by them the Subordinate fudge came to the conclusion , that there was in fact a partition between Baldev Das and his sons in the year 1928 and as a result of the same, the properties, which were attached at the instance of the decreeholder, were allotted to the share of the sons. The decree sought to be executed was obtained after the partition, but it was in respect of a debt which was contracted by the father prior to it.\n\nIt was held m these circumstances that the separate share of the wns which they obtained on partition was liable under the Hindu law for the pre-partition debt of their father if it was not immoral and under section 53 of the Civil Procedure Code the decreeholder was entitled to execute the decree against such properties. As no point was raised by the objectors m their petition alleging that the debt covered by the decree was tainted wi:th immorality, the objections under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, were dismissed.\n\nThe objectors thereupon took an appeal to the High Court of East Punjab which was heard by Rahman J. sitting singly.\n\nThe learned Judge dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Subordinate\n\n' .\n\n' •·\n\nJudge. A further appeal taken to a Division Bench under the Letters Patent was also dismissed and it is the propriety of the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench that has been challenged before us m this appeal.\n\nMr. Kunzru appearmg for the appellants put for-\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst. Naraini\n\nand Others.\n\nward a three-fold contention in support of the appeal.\n\nMttkherjea /.\n\nHe contended m the first place that under the terms of the compromise decree the decreeholder could proceed only against the properties of Baldev Das in the hands of his legal representatives and no property belonging to the appellants could be made liable for the satisfaction of the decree. The second contention put forward is that as the decree in the present case was obtained after particion of the joint fami:ly property between the father and his sons, the separate property of the sons obtained on partition was not liable under Hindu law for the debt of the father.\n\nIt is urged that of all that i!n any event if there was any pious obligation on the part of the sons to pay the father's debt incurred before partition, sudh obli~ gation could be enforced against the sons, only m a properly constituted suit and not by way of execution of a decree obtained m a suit which was brought against the father alone during hi1> lifetime and to which the sons were made parties only as legal representatives after the father's death.\n\nAs regards the first point, the determination of the question raised by Mr. Kunzru depends upon the construction to be put upon the terms of the compromiise decree. The operative portion of the decree as drawn up by the court S, tands as follows:\n\n\"It IS ordered that the parties having compromised, a decree in accordance with the terms of the compronnse be and the same Is hereby passed m favour of the plaintiff against the estate of Baldev Das deceased in poisession of his itel 1reprentarives.\n\nIt is also ordered that'. the defendants do also pay Rs. 425-7-0, half costs of the suit.\"\n\nPannalal •nd Another v; Mst. N 11r<lini and Others.\n\nMuk_herjea /.\n\nThere was no petition of compromise filed by the parties and made part of the decree, but there are on the record two sitatements, one made by Pannalal, the appellant No. 1, on behalf of himself and his mother, and the other by Lala Haraprasad, the special agent of the plaintifl, setting out terms of the compromise.\n\nThe terms are worded much in the same manner as in the decree itself and are to the effect that a decree for the amount in suit together with half costs would be awarded against the property of Baldev Das deceased.\n\nIt is argued by Mr. Kunzru that the expression \"estate of Baldev Das deceased\" occurring in the decree must mean and refer to the property belonging to Baldev Das at the date of his death and could not include any property which the sons obtained on partition with their father during the father's lifetime and in respect of which the latter possessed no interest at the time of his death. Stress is laid by the learned counsel in this connection on the fact that when the appellants were brought on the record as legal representatives of their deceased father in the mortgage suit, they specifically asserted in their written statement that there was a partition between them and thel.r father long before the date of the suit as a result of which the h ypothecated properties were allotted to them. Upon that the plaintiff definitely abandoned her claim to a mortgage decree or to any relief against the joint family and agreed finally to have a money decree executable against the personal assets of Baldev Das in the hands of his heirs.\n\nIn these circumstances, it is urged that if it was the intention of the parties that the decreeholder would be entitled to proceed against the separate property of the sons nothing could have been easier than to insert a provision to that effect in the compromise decree. There is undoubtedly apparent force in this contention but there is another aspect of the question which requires consideration.\n\nThe terms of the decree that was passed in this suit, though based on the consent of the parties, are precisely the same as are contemplated by section 52 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code. It was a decree for money\n\n' ~·\n\npassed against the legal representatives of a deceased debtor and it provided expressly that the decretal amount was to be realised out of the estate of the deceased in the hands of the legal representatives. It is argued on behalf of the respondent, and we think\n\nrightly, that as the decree fulfils the conditions of section 52(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, it would attract all the incidents which attach by law to a decree of that character. Consequently the decreeholder would be entitled to call in aid the provision of section 53 of the Code; and if any property in the hands of the sons other than what they received by inheritance from their father, is liable under the Hindu law to pay the father's debts, such property could be reached by the decreeholder in execution of the decree by virtue of the provision of section 53 of the Civil Procedure Code. Whether the property which the sons obtained on partition during the lifetime of the father is liable for a debt covered by a decree passed after partition and whether section 53 has at all any application to a case of this character are questioru which we have to determine m c'onnection with the second and the third points raised by appellants. Section 53, Civil Procedure Code, it is admitted, being only a rule of procedure, cannot create or take away any substantive right. It is only when the liability of the sons to pay the debts of their father in certain circumstances exists under the Hindu law, is the operation of the section attracted and not otherwise. The only other question that can possibly arise by reason of the decree beiQg_ a compromise decree is, whether the parties iihemselves have, by agreement, excluded the operation of section 53, Ciivil Procedure Code. It is certainly possible for the parties to agree among themselves that the decree should be executed only against a particular property and no other, but when any statutory right is sought to be contracted out, it is necessary that express words of exclusion must be used. Exclusion cannot be inferred merely from the fact that the compromise made no reference to such right. As nothing was said in the compromise decree in the Dresent case about the\n\nPannalaZ and Another\n\nMst. Naraini and Otllers.\n\nMukJ1eriea /.\n\nPanna/al and Another v.\n\nM st. N araini\n\nand Others.\n\nright of the decreeholder to avail herself of other provisions of the Code which might be available to her in law, we cannot say that the plaintiff has by agreement expressly given up thO; Se rights. The first point, therefore, by itself is of no assistance to the appellants.\n\nWe now come to the other two points raised by Mr.\n\nMukhcrica /.\n\nKunzru and as they are inter-connected they can conveniently be taken up together. These points involve consideration of the somewhat vexed questlion relating to the liabifoy of a son under the Hindu law other than that of the Daybhag school to pay the debts of his father, provided they are not tainted with immorality. In the opinion of the Hindu Smriti writers, debt is not merely a legal obligation, but non-payment of debt is a sin, the consequences of which follow the debtor even after his death. A text (1), which is attric buted to Brihaspathi, lays down:\n\n\"He who having received a sum lent or the like does not repay it to the owner, will be born hereafter in the creditor's house a slave, a servant, a woman or a quadruped.\"\n\nThere are other text-' which say that a person in debt goes to hell.\n\nHindu law-givers therefore imposed a pious duty on the descendants of a man including his son, grandson and great grandson to pay off the\n\ndebts of their ancestor and relieve him of the afterdeath torments con$equent on non-payment. In the original texts a difference has been made in regard to the obligation resting upon sons, grandsons and great grandsons in this respect. The son is bound to discharge the ancestral debt as if it was his own, together with interest and irrespective of any assets that he might have received. The liability of the grandson is much the same except that he has not to pay any interest; but in regard to the great grandson the liabi~ lity arises only if he received assets from his ancestor.\n\nIt is now settled by judicial decisions that there is no difference as between son, grandson and great grandson so far as the obligation to pay the debts of the ancestor js, concerned; but none of them has any personal\n\n(1) Vide Co\\ebrooke's Digest I, 228.\n\n• -\n\n. . .\n\n• ..\n\nliability m the matter irrespectve of receiving any assets (1). The position, therefore, is that the son is not personally liable for the debt of his father even if the debt was not incurred for an immoral purpose and the obligation is limited to the assets received by him in his share of the joint family property or to his interest in such property and it does not attach to his self-acquisitions. The duty being religious or moral, it ceases to exist if the debt is tainted with immorality or vice. Acmrding to the text writers, this obligati'on arises normally on the death of the father ; but even during the farher's lifetime the son is obliged to pay his fat!her's debts in certain exceptional cilrcumstances,\n\ne.g., when the father is afflicted with disease or has become insane or too old or has been away from his country .for a long time or has suffered civil death by becoming an anchorite (2). It can now be taken to be fairly well settled that the pious liability of the son to pay the debt.~ of his father exists whether the father is alive, or dead (3). Thus i.t is open to the father, during his lifetime, to effect a transfer of any joint family property including the interests of his sons in the same to pay off an antecedent deb~ not incurred for family necessity or benefit, provided it is not tainted with immorality. It is equally open to the creditor to obtain a decree against the father and in execution of the same put up to sale not merely the father's but also the son's interest in the joint estate. The creditor can make the sons parties to such suit and obtain an adjudication from the court that the debt was a proper debt payable by the sons. But even if the sons are not made parties, they cannot resist the sale unless they succeed in establishing that the debts were contracted for immoral purposes. These propositions can be said to be well recognised and reasonably beyond\n\nthr region of controversy( 4). All of them, however,\n\n(1) Vi de Masitul!ah v. Damodar Prasad, 53 I.A. 204.\n\n(2J Vi de Mayne's Hindu Law, 11th edition, p. 408.\n\n(3) Vide Bnj Narain v. Mang/a Prasad, 51I.A.129.\n\n(4) Vide Girdltarec? Lall v. Kantoo Lall, 1 I.A. 321 : Maddan Tltakoor v.\n\nKmitoo Lall, I I.A. 333; Suraj Bumi v. Sheo Prasad, 6 I.A. 88, Brij Narain v.\n\nMang/a Prasad, 51 I. A. 129.\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst. Naraini\n\nand Others .•\n\nMukher; ea /,\n\nPannaJal an.d Another\n\nMst. Naraini and Others.\n\nMuk_herjea /.\n\nhave reference to the period when the estate remains jomt and there is existence of coparcenership between the father and the son. There is no question that so long as the family remains undivided the father is entitled to alienate, for satisfying his own personal debts not tainted with immorality, the whole of the ancestral estate. A creditor ils also entitled to proceed against the entire estate for recovery of a debt taken by the father. The position is somewhat altered when there is a disruption of the joint family by a partition between the father and the sons. The question then arises, whether the sons remain liable for the debt of the father even after the family is divided; and can the creditor proceed against the shares that the sons obtain on partition for realization of his dues either by way of a suit or in execution of a decree obtained against the father alone? It must be admitted that the law on the subject as developed by judicial decisions has not been always consistent or uniform and the pronouncements of some of the Judges betray a lack of agreement in thefuapproach to the various questions involved in working out the law.\n\nAs regards debts contracted by the father after partition, there $. no dispute that the sons are not liable for such debts. The share which the father receives on partition and which after his death comes to his sons, may certaJcly, at the hands of the 1atQer, be available to the creditors of the father, but the shares allotted on partition to the sons can never be made liable for the post-partition debts of the father (1). The question that material for our present purpose is, whether the sons can be made liable for an unsecured debt of the father incurred before partition, in respect to which the creditor filed his suit and obtained decree after the partition took place. On this point admittedly there is ditvergence of judicial opinion, though the majority of decided cases are in favour of the view that the separated share of a son remains liable even after partition for the pre-partition debts of the father which\n\nII) Vide Mayne's Hindu Law, I !th Edition, 430.\n\n.. .\n\n•• -\n\nare not illegal or immoral(1).\n\nThe reasons given in support of this view by different Judges are not the same and .on the other side there are pronouncements of certain learned Judges, though few in number, expres~\n\nsing the view that once a partition takes place, the obligation of the sons to discharge the debts of their father comes to an end (2).\n\nThe minority view proceeds upon the footing that the pious obligation of the son is only to his father and corresponding to this obligation of the son the father has a right to alienate the entire joint property including the son's interest therein for satisfaction of an antecedent debt not contracted for immoral purposes. What the creditor can do is to avail himself of this right of the father and work it out either by suit or execution proceedings ; in other words, the remedy of a father's simple contract creditor during the father's lifetime rests entirely on the right of the father himself to alienate the entire family property for satisfaction of his personal debts. The father loses this right as soon as partition takes place and after that, the creditor cannot occupy a better position or be alJowed to assert rights which the father himself could not possess .\n\nThe reasoning in support of the other view which has been accepted in the majority of the decided cases is thus expressed by Waller J. in his judgment in the Madras Full Bench case(3) : .\n\n\"On prindple, I can see no reason why a partition should exempt a son's share from liability for a prepartition debt for which it was liable before partition.\n\nThe creditor advances money to the father on the credit of the joint family property. Why should he be deprived of all but a fraction of his security by a trans--\n\naction to which he was not a party and of which he\n\n(I) Vide Subramanya v. Sabapathi. 51 Mad. 361 (F. B.); Annabatv.\n\nSaivappa, 52 Born. 376; Jawahar Singh v. Parduman, I 4 Lah. 399 Atul Krishna v.\n\nLala Nandanji, 14 Pat. 732 (F.B.);· BankeyLalv. Dttrga Pra; ad, 53 All 868 (F.B.); Raghunandan v. Matiram,6 Luck. 497 (F.B.).\n\n(2) Vide Krishnaswamiv. RamasW01f1i, 22 Mad 519, V. P. Venkanna\n\nv. V. S. Deefc.; hatu/u 41 Mad 136 V1dealso the dissemient judgment of Ayyanga J. in Sabramanya v. Sabapathi, 51 Mad. 361 (F.B.).\n\n(3) Vide Suhramanya v. Savapu1h1; 51 Mad. 361at369 (F.B). 6-6 SC India/71\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst. Narainz\n\nand Others.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nPannalal and Another v.\n\nMst. Naraini\n\nand Others.\n\nMukherjea f.\n\nSUi>REME COURT REPORTS [1952]\n\nWas not aware ? and what becomes of the son's pious obligation? It was binding as regards the particular debt before partition ; does it cease to apply to that debt simply because there has been a partition?\"\n\nThe first part of the observation of the learned Judge does not impress us very much. An unsecured creditor, who has lent money to the father, does not acquire any lien or .charge over the family property, and no question of his security being diminished, at all arises. In spite of his having borrowed money the father remains entitled to alienate the property and a mere expectation of the creditor however reasonable it may be, cannot :be guaranteed by law so long as he does not take steps necessary in law to give him adequate protection. The_ extent of the pious obligation referred to in the latter part of the observation of the learned Judge certainly requires careful consideration. We do nat think that it is quite correct to say that the creditor'! claim is based entirely upon the father's power of dealing with the son's interest in the joint . estate. The father's right of alienating the family property for payment of his just debts may be one of the consequences of the pious obligation which the Hindu law imposes upon the sons or one of the_means of enforcing it, but it is certainly not the measure of the entire obligation.\n\nAs we have said already, according to the strict Hindu theory, the obligat1Qn of 'the sons to pay the father's debts normally arises when the father is dead, drsabled or unheard of for a long time. No question of alienation of the family property by the father arises in these events, although it is precisely under these circumstances that the son is obliged to discharge the debts of his father. As was said by Sulaiman A. C. J. in the case of Bankey Lal v. Durga Prasad(') :\n\n\"The Hindu law texts based the liability on the pious obligation itself and not on the father's power to <sell the son's share.\"\n\nIt is thus necessary to see what exactly is the extent of the obligation which is recognised by the Hindu\n\n(I) (1931)\"53 All. 868 at 876 (F.B.).\n\n'j.. •\n\ntexts writers in regard to the payment by the son of the pre-partition debts of his father. Almost all the relevant texts on this point are to be found collected in the ju, dgments of Sulaiman A C.J. and Mukherji J. in the Allahabad Full Bench case referred to above.\n\nA text of Narada recites (1) :\n\n\"What is left after the discharge of the father's ooligation and #ter the paymerit of the 'f:ilther's debts shall be divided by the brothers so that the father may not remain a debtor.\"\n\nKatyan also says (2) :\n\n\"The sons shall pay off the debts and the gifts promised by the father and divide the remaining among themselves.\"\n\nThere is a further passage in Manu (3 ) :\n\n\"After due division of the paternal estate if any •· debt or estate of the father be found out let the brothers equally divide the same among themselves.\"\n\nAccording to Yagnavalka (4) :\n\n\"The sons should divide the wealth and the debts equally.\"\n\nIt is true that the partition contemplated in these passages is one after the death. of_ the father, but whenever the partition might take place, the view of the Hindu law gives undoubtedly is that the binding debts on the family property would have to be satisfied or provided for before the coparceners can divide the property.\n\nIn Sat Naratn v. Das(5), the Judicial Committee pointed out thait when the family ; esta.te iis divided, .it is necessary to take account of both the assets and the debts for which the undivided estatl\\'. is liable. It was argued in that case on behalf of the appellants that the pious obligation of the sons was an obligation not to object to the alienation of the joint estate by the\n\n(I) Narada, 13,32.\n\n(2) Hindu Law in its Sources by Dr. Ganga Nath Jha, Vol. l, p. 202 quotation No. 21 l. .\n\n(3) Chap. 9. v. 218.\n\n(4) J.C. Ghosh's Hindu Law, Vol. II, page 342.\n\n(5) (1936) 63 I A. 384. 72\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst. Naraini and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst. Naraini Rnd Others.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nfather for his antecedent debt unless they were immoral or illegal, but these debts were not a liability on the joint estate for which provision was required\n\nto be made before partition. This contention did not find favour with the Judicj,, J Committee and in their opinion, as they expressed in the judgment, the right thing to do was to make provision for discharge of such liability when there was partition of the joint estate. If there is no such prov1S1on, \"the debts are to be paid severally by all the sons according to their shares of inheritance,\" as enjoined by Vishnu('). In our opinion, this. is the proper view to take regarding the liability of the sons under Hindu law for the prepartition debts of the father. The sons are liable to pay these debts . even after partition unle.<; s there was an arrangement for payment of these debts at the time when the partition took place. This is substantially the view taken by the Allahabad High Court m the Full Bench case referred to above and it seems to us to be perfectly m accord with the principles of equity and justice.\n\nThe question now comes as to what is meant by an arrangement for payment of debts. The expressions \"bona fide\" and \"mala fide\" partition seem to have been frequently used m this connection in vanous . decided cases. The use of such expressions far from being useful does not unoften lead to error and confusion. If by mala fide partition is meant a partition the object of which is to delay and defeat the creditors .who have claims upon the joint family property, obviously this would be a fraudulent transaction not binding in law and it would be open to the creditors to avoid it by appropriate means. So also a mere colourable partition not meant to operate between the parties can be ignored and the creditor can enforce his remedies as if the parties still continued to be joint.\n\nBut a partition need not .be mala fide in the sense that the dominant intention. of the parties was 'to defeat the claims of the creditors; if it makes no arrangement or provision for the payment of the just debts payable\n\n(1) Vishnu, Chap. 6, verse 36.\n\nu..\n\n' .\n\n...\n\n1952 out of the joint fami'ly property, the liability of the sons for payment of the pre-partition debts of the Pannalal father will still remain. We desLre only to point out and Another that an arrangement for payment of debts does not , v. necessarily imply that a separate fund should be set Mst. Naraini apart for payment of these debts before the net assets and Others. are divided, or that some additional property, must be given to the father over and above his legitimate share sufficient to meet the demands of his credit:ors. Whether there is a proper arrangement for payment of the debts or not, would have to be decded on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. We can conceive of cases where the property allotted to the father in his own legitimate share was constdered more than enough for his own necessities and he undertook to pay off all his personal debts and release the sons from their obligation in respect thereof. That may also be considered to be a proper arrangement for payment of the creditor in the circumstances of a particular case.\n\nAfter all the pfiimary liability to pay his debts is upon the father himself and the sons should not be made liable if the property in the hands of the father IS more than adequate for the purpose. If the arrangement made at the time of partition Js reasonable and proper, an unsecured creditor cannot have any reason to complain. The fact that he IS no party to such arrangement is, in our opinion, immaterial. Of course, if the transaction is fraudulent or is not meant to be operative, it could be ignored or set aside ; but otherwise it is the duty of unsecured creditor to be on hi~ guard lest any family property over which he has no charge or lien is diminished for purposes of realization of his dues.\n\nThu~, in our opinion, a son Is liable, even after partition for the pre-partition debts of his father which are not immoral or illegal and for the payment of which no arrangement was made at the date of the partition. The question now is, how Is this liability to be enforted by the creditor, either during the life- >.. time of the father or after his death? It has been held 7-6 S. C, Inda/71 . .\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nPannalal and Another\n\ny; Mst. Naraini\n\nand Others.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nin a la; ge number of cases(' )-all of which recognise the liability of the son to pay the pre-partition debts of the father-that a decree against the father alone obtained after partition in respect of such deht cannot be executed against the property that is allotted to the son on partition. They concur in holding that a separate and independent suit must be instituted against the sons before their shares can be reached.\n\nThe principles underlying these decisions seems to us to be quite sound. After a partition takes place, the father can no longer represent the family and a decree obtained against him alone, cannot he hinding on the separated sons.\n\nIn the second place, the power exercisable by the father of selling the interests of the sons for sati, sl'action of his personal debts comes to an end with partition. As the separated share of the sons cannot be said to belong to the father nor has he any disposing power over it or its profits which he can exercise for his benefit, the provision of section 60 of the .Civil Procedure Code would operate as a bar to the attachment and sale of any such property in execution of a decree against the father. The position has been correctly stated by the Nagpur High Court(2) in the following passages :\n\n\"To say a son is under a pious obligation to pay certain debts is one thing; to say his property can be taken in execution is another. In our view, property can only be attached and sold in execution if it fa1ls within the kind of property that can be attached and sold. What that is, is found by looking at section 60.\n\nWhen one looks at section 60 one finds that the property in question should either belong to the judgment-debtor or he should have a disposing power over it. After partition, the share that goes to the son does not belong to the father and the father has no disposing power over it. Therefore such property does not fall within section\n\n60. . . . . . It by no means follows that a son cannot\n\n(1) Vi de KamesWarammav. Venkatasubba. 38 Mad. 1120; Subramanya\n\nv. Subapathi, 51 Mld. 36l;~Thirumal; Muthuv. Subramania, A.l.R. 1937 Mad. 458; Surajmaf v. Mottram, 1939 .Born. 658, Atul Krishna v. Lala Nandal!fi, 14 Pat. 732; Govindram v. Nathulal, I. J •. R 1938 Nag. 10.\n\n(2) Joi•aray•n v. Sona}f, A.LR. 1938 N•i 24 at 29.\n\n• •\n\n)..\n\n.. -\n\nS.C..lt\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 561\n\nbe made liable. He could be made Ii.able for his father's debts if he had become a surety; he can be made liable under the pious obligation rule. In neither of the cases put, could his liability take the form of having his property seized in execution and sold without any prior proceedings brought against him, leaving him to raise the question whether his liability as surety or under the pious obligation rule precluded him from claiming in execution.\"\n\nIt is not disputed that the provision of section 53 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be extended to a case when the father is still alive.\n\nWe now come to the last and the most controversial point in the case, namely, whether a decree passed against the separated sons as legal represen, t!ati'ves of a deceased debtor in respect of a debt incurred before partition can be executed against the shares obtained by such sons at the partition? As has been said already, the shares of the separated sons in the family property may be made liable for pre-partition debts, provided they are not tainted with immorality and no arrangement for payment of such debts was made at the time of the partition. The question, however, is whether this can be done in execution proceedings or a separate suit has to be brought for this purpose. Mr. Kunzru argues that what could not be done during the lifetime of the father in execution of a decree against him cannot possibly be done after his death simply because the father died during the pendency of the suit and the sons were made parties defendants not in their own right but as representatives of their deceased father. It is pointed out that the appellants in the present case were not allowed to raise any plea whi'ch could not have been raised by their father and they never had any opportunity to show that they were under Hindu law not liable for these debts. It is undoubtedly true that no liability can be enforced against the sons unless they are given an opportunity to show that they are not liable for debts under Hindu law; but this opportunity can certainly be given to\n\nPannalal and Another v.\n\nMst. Naraini and Others.\n\nMuk, herjea /.\n\nPanna/al and Another\n\nv..\n\nMst. Naraini\n\nand Others.\n\nMukheriea /.\n\nthem in execution proceedings as well. A decree against a father alone during his lifetime cannot possibly be executed against his sons as his legal representatives.\n\nAs we have said already, the decree against the father after the partition could not he taken to be a decree against the sons and no attachment and sale of the sons' separated shares would be permissible under section 60, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe position, however, would be materially different if the sons are made parties to the suit as legal representatives of their father and a decree 1s passed against them limited to the assets of the deceased defendant m their hands. A proceeding for execution of such a decree would attract the operation of section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code under which all questions relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives would have to be decided m execution proceedings and not by a separate suit.\n\nSection 52(1), Civil Procedure Code, provides that when a decree 1s against the legal repreocntatives of a dead person and 1s one for recovery of money out of the properties of the deceased, it may be executed by attachment, and sale of any such property. Then comes section 53 which lays down that \"for purposes of section 50 and section 52 property m the hands of a son or other descendants which is liable under Hindu law for payment of the debt of a deceased ancestor m respect of which a decree has been passed, shafl be deemed to be property of the deceased which has come to the hands of the son or other descendant as his legal representative.\" It is to be noted that before the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 came into force, there was a conflict of opinion as to whether the liability of a Hindu son to pay his father's debts could or could not be enforced in execution proceedings. Under the Hindu law an undivided son or other descendant who succeeds to the joint property on the death of his father or other ancestor does so by right of survivorship and not as heir. In the old Code the term \"legal representative\" was not defined and\n\n• >\n\n' •\n\n...\n\n1 '\n\ns.c.it\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nthe question arose as to whether the son could \\, e\n\nregarded as the legal representative of his father m regard to properties which he got by survivorship on the father's death and whether a decree against the father could be enforced in execution against the son or a separate suit would have to be i:tuted for that purpose. It was held by the Madras and the Allahabad High Courts that the liability could not be enforced in execution proceedings, whereas the Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts held otherwise.\n\nSection 53 m a sense gives legislative sanction to the view taken by the Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts.\n\nOne reason for introducing this section may have been or undoubtedly was to enable the decreeholder to proceed in execution against the property that vested in the son by survivorship after the death of the father against whom the decree was obtained; but the section has been worded in such a comprehensive manner that it is wide enough to include all cases where a son 1~ in possession of ancestral property which is liable under the Hindu law to pay the debts of his father; and either the decree has been made against the son as legal representative of the father or the original decree being against the father, it is put into execution against the son as his legal representative under section 50 of the Civil Procedure Code. In both these sets of circumstances the son 1s deemed by a fiction of law to be the legal representative of the deceased debtor in respect of the property which is in his hands and which is liable under the Hindu law to pay the debts of the father, although as a matter of fact he obtained the property not as a legal representative of the father at all.\n\nAs we said have already, section 53 of the Civil Procedure Code being a rule of procedure does not and cannot alter any principle of subtantive law and it does not enlarge or curtail in any manner the obligation which exists under Hindu law regarding the liability of the son to pay his father's debts. It however lays down the\n\ni..,. procedure to be followed in cases coming under this section and if the son is bound under Hindu law to\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst. Naraini\n\nand Oth(rs.\n\nMulc/1erjea /.\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst. Naraini and Others.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\npay the father's debts from any ancestral property in his hands-and the section is not limited to property obtained by survivorship alone-the remedy of the decreeholder against such property lies in the execution proceedings and not by way of a separate suit. The son would certainly be at liberty to show that the property in his hands is for certain reaii<>ns Iiot liable to pay the debts of his father and all these questions would have to be decided by the executing court under section 47, Civil Procedure Code. This seems to us to be the true scope and the meaning of section 53, Civil Procedure Code. In our opinion the correct view on this point was taken by Wort J. in his dissenting judgment in the Full Bench case of Atul Krishna v.\n\nLala Nandanji (1 ) decided by the Patna High Court.\n\nThe majority decision in that case upon which stress is laid by Mr .. Kunzru overlooks the point that section 47, Civil Procedure Code, could have no application when the decree against the father is sought to be executed against the sons during his lifetime and consequently the liability of the latter must have to be established in an independent proceeding.\n\nIn cases coming under sections 50 and 52 of the Civil Procedure Code on the other hand the decree would be capable of being • executed against the sons as legal representatives of their fatl1er and it would only be a matter of procedure whether or not these questions should be allowed to be raised by the sons in execution proceedings under section 47, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nIt remains only to consider what order should be passed in this case having regard to the principles of law discussed above. The High Court, in our opinion, was quite right in holding that the question of liability of the property obtained by the appellants in their share on partition with their father, for the decretal dues is to be determined in the execution proceeding itself and not by a separate suit. It is not disputed before us that the debt which is covered by the decree\n\n. '\n\nin the present case is a pre-partition debt. The sons, .~\n\n (') (1935) 14 Pat. 732.\n\ntherefore, would be liable to pay the decretal amount, provided the debt was not immoral or illegal, and no arrangement was made for payment of this debt at the time when the partition took place. Neither of these questions has been iiwestigaed by the courts below. As regards the immorality of the debts. it is. observed by the High Court that the point was not specifically taken in the objections of the appellants under section 47, Civil Procedure Code. The validity of the partition again was challenged in a way by the decreeholder in his reply to the objections of the appellants, but the courts below did not advert to the real point that requires consideration in such cases. The partition was not held to be invalid as being a fraud on the debtor but the question was not adverted to or considered whether it made any proper arrangement for payment of the just debts of the father. In our opinion, the case should be reheard by the trial judge and both the points referred to above should be properly investigated. The appellants did raise a point regarding their non-liability for the decretal debt, in the suit itself when they were brought on the record as legal representatives after the death of their father. The court, however, did not allow them to raise or substantiate this plea inasmuch as they were held incompetent to put forward any defence which the father himself could not have taken. Having regard to the conflicting judicial decisions on the subject, the appellants cannot properly be blamed for not raising this point again in the execution proceedings. We think that they should now be given an opportunity to do so. The result is that we set aside the judgments of the courts below and direct that the case should be heard de novo by the Subordinate Judge and that the appellants should be given an opportunity to put in a fresh petition of objection under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code raising such points as they are competent to raise. The decreeholder would have the right to reply to the same. The court shall, after hearing such evidence as the parties might choose to adduce, decide 73\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst. Naraini and Otliers.\n\nMukher; ea /.\n\nPllnna/al anll Another\n\nMst. N<Naini and Others.\n\nfirst of all whether the property attached is the ancestral property of the appellants and is liable to pay the just debts of their father. It will consider in this connection whether the debts are illegal or immoral and as such not payable by the sons.\n\nIf this question is answered in favour of the appellants; obviously the execution petition will have to be dismissed. If on the other hand it is found that the sons are liable for this debt, the other question for consideration would be whether there was any proper arrangement made at the time of the partition for payment of the debts of the father. The court below will decide theS:e questions in the light of the principles which we have indicated above and will dispose of the case in accordance with law. In the event of the appellants being held liable for payment of the decretal debt, it would be open to the executing court to make an order that the decreeholder should in the first instance proceed against the separate property of the father which was allotted to him on partition and which after his death devolved upon the sons ; and only if such property is not sufficient for satisfaction of the decree, then the decree could be executed for the balance against the ancestral property in the hands of the appellants. There will be no order for costs up to this stage. Further costs will follow the result.\n\nAgent for the appellants : 1'arachand Brijmohan Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent.9: Mohan Behari Lal.", "total_entities": 128, "entities": [{"text": "PANNALAL AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PANNALAL AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "\n\nMST. NARAIN! AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MST. NARAINI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mttkherjea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VrvIAN BosE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 47, 52, 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 457, "end_char": 471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2818, "end_char": 2828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3016, "end_char": 3023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3225, "end_char": 3232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4182, "end_char": 4187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of East Punjab at Sjmla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment dated 18th May, 1948, of the High Court of East Punjab at Sjmla\n\n(Khosfa and Teja Singh JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Khosfa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4333, "end_char": 4339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment dated 18th May, 1948, of the High Court of East Punjab at Sjmla\n\n(Khosfa and Teja Singh JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Teja Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4344, "end_char": 4354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from a judgment dated 18th May, 1948, of the High Court of East Punjab at Sjmla\n\n(Khosfa and Teja Singh JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Gopinath Kunzru", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4537, "end_char": 4552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopinath Kunzru (B. C. Misra, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4554, "end_char": 4565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopinath Kunzru (B. C. Misra, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rang Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4598, "end_char": 4613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rang Behari Lal (N. C. Sen, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "N. C. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4615, "end_char": 4624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rang Behari Lal (N. C. Sen, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Pannalal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4971, "end_char": 4979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the judgment-debtor tn a proceeding for execution of a money decree and it is directed against the judgment of a Letters Patent Bench of the Punjab High Court dated 18th of May, 1949, by which the learned Judges\n\nPannalal and Anothlll'\n\nMst.", "canonical_name": "Pannalal"}}, {"text": "Naraini", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5000, "end_char": 5007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naraini and Others.", "canonical_name": "Naraini"}}, {"text": "Mukhcrjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5075, "end_char": 5084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhcrjea /.\n\naffirmed, in appeal, a decision of a single Judge of that court dated 29th October, 1946.", "canonical_name": "Mttkherjea"}}, {"text": "29th October, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5159, "end_char": 5177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhcrjea /.\n\naffirmed, in appeal, a decision of a single Judge of that court dated 29th October, 1946."}}, {"text": "Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5267, "end_char": 5299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The original order against which the appeal was taken to the High Court was made by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala, in Execution Case No."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5394, "end_char": 5404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 30, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 30, 1925, Baldev Das, the father of the appellants, who was, at that time the ffia!lager of a joint Hindu family, consisting of himself and his sons, executed a mortgage bond in favour of Mst."}}, {"text": "Baldev Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5627, "end_char": 5637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 30, 1925, Baldev Das, the father of the appellants, who was, at that time the ffia!lager of a joint Hindu family, consisting of himself and his sons, executed a mortgage bond in favour of Mst."}}, {"text": "Talok Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5875, "end_char": 5886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l, and another person named Talok Chand, by which certain movable properties belonging to the joint family were hypothecated to secure a loan of Rs."}}, {"text": "April 16, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 16, 1928, the appellants along with a minor brother of theirs named Sumer Chand filed a suit-being Suit No."}}, {"text": "Sumer Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6082, "end_char": 6093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 16, 1928, the appellants along with a minor brother of theirs named Sumer Chand filed a suit-being Suit No."}}, {"text": "20th July, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6322, "end_char": 6337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23 of 1928-in the Court of the Subordinate\n\nJudge of Shahjahanpur against their father Baldev Das for partition of the joint family properties\\ The suit culminat:ed in a final decree for partition on 20th July, 1928, and the joint family properties were divided by metes and bounds and separate possession was taken by the father and the sons."}}, {"text": "29th September, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6469, "end_char": 6489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 29th September, 1934, Mst."}}, {"text": "Naraini", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6496, "end_char": 6503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naraini filed a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala, against Baldev Das for recovery of a sum of R&.", "canonical_name": "Naraini"}}, {"text": "18th December, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6902, "end_char": 6921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 18th December, 1934, the appellants made an application before the Subordinate Judge under Order I, Rule 10, and Order XXXIV, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, praying that they might be added as parties defendants to the suit and the points in sue arising therein might be decided in their presence."}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7036, "end_char": 7056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "7th February, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to this petition, the plaintiff's counsel stated in court on 7th February, 1935, that his client would give up the claim for a mortgage decree against the properties m suit and would be satisfied only with a money decree against Baldev Das personally."}}, {"text": "AprN 17, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8062, "end_char": 8075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On AprN 17, 1935, Baldev Das died and on 2nd September following the appellants as well as their mother, who figures as respondent No."}}, {"text": "October 9, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8281, "end_char": 8296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 9, 1935, the appellants filed a written statement m which a number of pleas were taken in answer to the plaintiff's claim and it was asserted m paragraph 10 of the written statement that Baldev Das dealt Badri or speculative transacuons, and if any money was due to the plaint iff at all m connection with such transactions the debt was illegal and immoral and not binding on the family property."}}, {"text": "20th November, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8948, "end_char": 8967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20th November, 1935, the parties arrived at a compromise and on the basis of the same, a simple money decree was passed in favour ci the plaintiff for the full amount claimed in the suit together with half costs amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "Naraini", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9378, "end_char": 9385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naraini and Others.", "canonical_name": "Naraini"}}, {"text": "March 13, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9551, "end_char": 9565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the present application for execution was filed by the decree-holder on March 13, 1945, in the court of the Senior Subordinate fudge, Ambala, and in accordance with the prayer contained therein, the court directed the attachment of certain immovable properties consisting of a number of shops in possession of the appellants and situated at a place called Abdullapur."}}, {"text": "Abdullapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9835, "end_char": 9845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the present application for execution was filed by the decree-holder on March 13, 1945, in the court of the Senior Subordinate fudge, Ambala, and in accordance with the prayer contained therein, the court directed the attachment of certain immovable properties consisting of a number of shops in possession of the appellants and situated at a place called Abdullapur."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9850, "end_char": 9864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 23, 1945, the appellants filed objections under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, and they opposed the attachment of the properties substantially on the ground that those properties did not belong to Baldev Das but were the separate and exclusive properties of the objectors which they obtained on partition with their father long before the decree was passed."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9904, "end_char": 9914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9916, "end_char": 9936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11109, "end_char": 11119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11378, "end_char": 11388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11390, "end_char": 11410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of East Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11475, "end_char": 11500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objectors thereupon took an appeal to the High Court of East Punjab which was heard by Rahman J. sitting singly."}}, {"text": "Rahman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11520, "end_char": 11526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objectors thereupon took an appeal to the High Court of East Punjab which was heard by Rahman J. sitting singly."}}, {"text": "Kunzru", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11860, "end_char": 11866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kunzru appearmg for the appellants put for-\n\nPannalal and Another\n\nMst.", "canonical_name": "Kunzru"}}, {"text": "Mttkherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12010, "end_char": 12020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mttkherjea /.\n\nHe contended m the first place that under the terms of the compromise decree the decreeholder could proceed only against the properties of Baldev Das in the hands of his legal representatives and no property belonging to the appellants could be made liable for the satisfaction of the decree.", "canonical_name": "Mttkherjea"}}, {"text": "Lala Haraprasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13951, "end_char": 13966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, on behalf of himself and his mother, and the other by Lala Haraprasad, the special agent of the plaintifl, setting out terms of the compromise."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15846, "end_char": 15856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16242, "end_char": 16255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16451, "end_char": 16461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16749, "end_char": 16759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16957, "end_char": 16967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17137, "end_char": 17147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17149, "end_char": 17169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17639, "end_char": 17649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Ciivil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17651, "end_char": 17672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukhcrica", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18574, "end_char": 18583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We now come to the other two points raised by Mr.\n\nMukhcrica /.\n\nKunzru and as they are inter-connected they can conveniently be taken up together.", "canonical_name": "Mttkherjea"}}, {"text": "Kunzru", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18588, "end_char": 18594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We now come to the other two points raised by Mr.\n\nMukhcrica /.\n\nKunzru and as they are inter-connected they can conveniently be taken up together.", "canonical_name": "Kunzru"}}, {"text": "Brihaspathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19129, "end_char": 19140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A text (1), which is attric buted to Brihaspathi, lays down:\n\n\"He who having received a sum lent or the like does not repay it to the owner, will be born hereafter in the creditor's house a slave, a servant, a woman or a quadruped.\""}}, {"text": "Mukher", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22759, "end_char": 22765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naraini\n\nand Others .•\n\nMukher; ea /,\n\nPannaJal an.d Another\n\nMst.", "canonical_name": "Mttkherjea"}}, {"text": "PannaJal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22774, "end_char": 22782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naraini\n\nand Others .•\n\nMukher; ea /,\n\nPannaJal an.d Another\n\nMst.", "canonical_name": "Pannalal"}}, {"text": "Muk_herjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22823, "end_char": 22833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muk_herjea /.\n\nhave reference to the period when the estate remains jomt and there is existence of coparcenership between the father and the son.", "canonical_name": "Mttkherjea"}}, {"text": "Vide Mayne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24934, "end_char": 24944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this point admittedly there is ditvergence of judicial opinion, though the majority of decided cases are in favour of the view that the separated share of a son remains liable even after partition for the pre-partition debts of the father which\n\nII) Vide Mayne's Hindu Law, I !"}}, {"text": "Waller", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26349, "end_char": 26355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasoning in support of the other view which has been accepted in the majority of the decided cases is thus expressed by Waller J. in his judgment in the Madras Full Bench case(3) : ."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26382, "end_char": 26388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasoning in support of the other view which has been accepted in the majority of the decided cases is thus expressed by Waller J. in his judgment in the Madras Full Bench case(3) : ."}}, {"text": "Vide Krishnaswamiv. RamasW01f1i", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27067, "end_char": 27098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Vide Krishnaswamiv."}}, {"text": "Narainz", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27361, "end_char": 27368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narainz\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Naraini"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27383, "end_char": 27392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea /.\n\nPannalal and Another v.\n\nMst.", "canonical_name": "Mttkherjea"}}, {"text": "Sulaiman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29264, "end_char": 29272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was said by Sulaiman A. C. J. in the case of Bankey Lal v. Durga Prasad(') :\n\n\"The Hindu law texts based the liability on the pious obligation itself and not on the father's power to <sell the son's share.\"", "canonical_name": "Sulaiman A C.J."}}, {"text": "Sulaiman A C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29798, "end_char": 29813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Almost all the relevant texts on this point are to be found collected in the ju, dgments of Sulaiman A C.J. and Mukherji J. in the Allahabad Full Bench case referred to above.", "canonical_name": "Sulaiman A C.J."}}, {"text": "Mukherji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29818, "end_char": 29826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Almost all the relevant texts on this point are to be found collected in the ju, dgments of Sulaiman A C.J. and Mukherji J. in the Allahabad Full Bench case referred to above.", "canonical_name": "Mttkherjea"}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29837, "end_char": 29846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Almost all the relevant texts on this point are to be found collected in the ju, dgments of Sulaiman A C.J. and Mukherji J. in the Allahabad Full Bench case referred to above."}}, {"text": "Narada", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29893, "end_char": 29899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A text of Narada recites (1) :\n\n\"What is left after the discharge of the father's ooligation and ter the paymerit of the 'f:ilther's debts shall be divided by the brothers so that the father may not remain a debtor.\""}}, {"text": "Katyan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30102, "end_char": 30108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Katyan also says (2) :\n\n\"The sons shall pay off the debts and the gifts promised by the father and divide the remaining among themselves.\""}}, {"text": "Manu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30272, "end_char": 30276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a further passage in Manu (3 ) :\n\n\"After due division of the paternal estate if any •· debt or estate of the father be found out let the brothers equally divide the same among themselves.\""}}, {"text": "Yagnavalka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30454, "end_char": 30464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Yagnavalka (4) :\n\n\"The sons should divide the wealth and the debts equally.\""}}, {"text": "Ganga Nath Jha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31306, "end_char": 31320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Hindu Law in its Sources by Dr. Ganga Nath Jha, Vol."}}, {"text": "J.C. Ghosh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31386, "end_char": 31396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) J.C. Ghosh's Hindu Law, Vol."}}, {"text": "Vishnu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32156, "end_char": 32162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If there is no such prov1S1on, \"the debts are to be paid severally by all the sons according to their shares of inheritance,\" as enjoined by Vishnu(')."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32521, "end_char": 32541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is substantially the view taken by the Allahabad High Court m the Full Bench case referred to above and it seems to us to be perfectly m accord with the principles of equity and justice."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35917, "end_char": 35926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea /.\n\nPannalal and Another\n\ny; Mst.", "canonical_name": "Mttkherjea"}}, {"text": "Pannalal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35931, "end_char": 35939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea /.\n\nPannalal and Another\n\ny; Mst.", "canonical_name": "Pannalal"}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37010, "end_char": 37020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37029, "end_char": 37049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court(2", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37212, "end_char": 37231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position has been correctly stated by the Nagpur High Court(2) in the following passages :\n\n\"To say a son is under a pious obligation to pay certain debts is one thing; to say his property can be taken in execution is another."}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37570, "end_char": 37580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37601, "end_char": 37611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section\n\n60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37911, "end_char": 37922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Vi de KamesWarammav", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 37980, "end_char": 37999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It by no means follows that a son cannot\n\n(1) Vi de KamesWarammav."}}, {"text": "Muthuv. 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"section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41296, "end_char": 41306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 52(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41591, "end_char": 41604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41606, "end_char": 41626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41858, "end_char": 41868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41907, "end_char": 41917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41922, 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Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45564, "end_char": 45584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45643, "end_char": 45653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45655, "end_char": 45675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Wort", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45736, "end_char": 45740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion the correct view on this point was taken by Wort J. in his dissenting judgment in the Full Bench case of Atul Krishna v.\n\nLala Nandanji (1 ) decided by the Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45848, "end_char": 45864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion the correct view on this point was taken by Wort J. in his dissenting judgment in the Full 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{"document_id": "1952_1_567_572_EN", "year": 1952, "text": "• •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 567\n\nAMJADKHAN\n\nTHE STATE\n\n[ SAIYID F AZL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nIndian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 97, 102 and 105- Right of private defence-Reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt.\n\nA communal riot broke out in a town between some Sindhi refugees and the local Muslims. The trouble started in a locality where most of the shopkeepers were Sidhis. The goods in the Muslim shops there were scattered and some Muslims lost their lives.\n\nAlarm spread to another locality where the shops of appellant and his brother (both Muslims) were situated and the people there, including the appellant, started closing their shops.\n\nThe family of the appellant's brother had taken shelter in the appellant's portion of the building through a hole in the wall betw_een the two portions of the building in which the two shops were situated.\n\nA mob collected there and approached the appellant's locality and looted his brother's shop and began to beat the doors of his shop with lathis. The appellant fired two shots from his gun which caused the death of one Sindhi and injured three other Sindhis. The question for determination was whether the appellant acted in his right of private defence :\n\nHeld, that the facts of the case afforded a right of private defence o the appellant under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe circumstances in which he was placed were amply sufficient to give him a right of private defence of the body even to the extent of causing death . as the appellant had no time to have recourse to the authorities and had reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused either to himself or to his family. These things could not be weighed in too fine a set of scales or \"in golden scales.\"\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JUR1so1cnoN: Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 1951. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th September, 1950, -of the High Court of Judicature of Nagpur (Hemeon Acting C.J. and Hidayat Ullah J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 251 of 1950 arising out of Judgment dated .the 2nd August, 1950, of the Court of Sessions Judge, Jabaipur, in Sessions Trial No. 32 of 1950.\n\nMarch 20.\n\n195Z\n\nAmiar:I Khan\n\nThe State.\n\nBou /.\n\nS. P. Sinha and M. Y. Sharif, Nuruddin Ahmad and (Shaukat Hussain, with them) for the appellant.\n\nGopal Singh for the respondent.\n\n1952. March 20. The Judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The main question in this case is whether there is a right of private defence. Most of the facts are not in dispute.\n\nA communal riot broke out at Katni on the 5th of March, 1950, between some Sindhi refugees resident in :the town and the local Muslims. The trouble started :in the locality known as Zanda Bazar or Zanda Chowk. Police Con.stable Bharat Singh,\n\nP. W. 17, who made the First Information Report, said that\n\nmost of the shopkeepers in Zanda Bazar are Sindhis.\n\nHe stated that when he was told that trouble had 'broken out there he proceeded to the spot and found that the goods in the Muslim shops in that locality\n\nwere scattered. It is ruro in evidence that some Muslims lost their lives.\n\nFrom this place he went on to Subash Chowk, die locality in which the appellant's shop is situate. It lies to the West of Zanda Bazar. He states that when he got there he found a \"crowd\" there but not a \"mob\". He admitted that he had said in the First Information Report that a gun was fired a minute after he had reached the spot and he said that what he had stated in the First Information Report was true. It is not disputed that this shot was fired by . the appellant, as also a second shot, and that that .caused the death of one man (a Sindhi) and injured tlwee others, also Sindhis.\n\nThe map, Ex. D-4, shows that the shops of the appellant and his brother Za:hid Khan run into each other aed form two sides .of a rectangle, the appellant's house facing north and the brother's house facing .east. Each shop opens out an to a .road.\n\n. t\n\n...\n\nIt is proved that when the rioting broke out in the Zanda Chowk the alarm spread to .the appellant's locality and the people there, including the appellant, started closing their shops.\n\nThe appellant's version is that the mob approached his locality and broke into the portion of the building facing east in which his brother's shop is situate and looted it.\n\nThe High Court holds that this is proved and holds further that this preceded the firing by the appellant.\n\nThere is a hole in the wall between the two portions of the building in which .these two shops are situate and the High Court holds that Zahid's family got into the appellant's portion of the building through this hole and took refuge there. The High Court also holds that the appellant's mother then told the appellant that the crowd had burst into his (appellant's) shop and was looting it. The learned Judges state that what he said was not quite .true because all that the crowd did was to beat the door of the appellant's shop with lathis as they were passing but had not broken into .the shop. But they accept the fact that the crowd was beating the doors of the appellant's shop with their lathis.\n\nIn our opinion, the facts found by the High Court are sufficient to afford a right of private defence.\n\nUnder section 97 of the Indian Penal Code the right extends not only to the defence of one's own body against any offence affecting the human body but also to defending the body of any other person. The right also embraces the protection of property, whether\n\none's own or another person's against certain specified offences, namely theft, robbery, mischief .and criminal trespass. The limitations on this right and its scope are set out in the sections which follow. For one thing, the right does not arise if there is , time to have recourse to the protection of the plililic authorities, and for another, it does not extend to , the infliction of more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence. Another limitation is that when death 1s\n\nAmiad Khan v.\n\nThe State.\n\nBose /.\n\nAmjad Kha\"\n\nTh• State.\n\nB0t• ].\n\ncaused the person exercising the right must be under reasonable apprehension of death, or grievous hurt, to himself or to those whom he is protecting; and in the case of property, the danger to it must be of the kinds specified in section 103. The scope of .the right is further explained in sections 102 and 105 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nNeither the learned High Court Judges nor the Sessions Judge has analysed these provisions. Both Courts appear to be under the impression that actual looting of the appellant's shop was necessary before the right could arise. In that they are wrong. Under section 102 the right of private defence of the body commence!!-\n\n\"As soon as a reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have bce11 committed.\"\n\nExamining the provisions we have set out above, it is evident that the appellant had no .time to have recourse to the authorities. The mob or crowd had already broken into one part of the building and was actually beating on the doors of the other part. It is also evident that the appellant had reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hourt would be caused either to himself or his family. The learned Sessions Judge has eloquently drawn attention to the lamentable consequences of communal frenzy in India and in Katni in particular, and he refers to the indiscriminate looting of Muslim shops in that town. So also the High Court holds that-\n\n\"Looking to the circumstances which had existed in the country before and the fact that the trouble was between the refugees and the local Muslims it cannot be said that there would be no danger to the life of the appellant or at least of grievous hurt if the mob had entered his shop and he prevented it. The apprehension would undoubtedly be reasonable.\"\n\nAnd we know that Muslim shops had already been broken into and looted and Muslims killed in the\n\nl'l.otmg at Zanda Chowk which preceded this, in our opinion, the High Court was wrong in thinking that the appellant had to wait until the mob actually broke into his shop and entered it. They have emphasised this m another part of their judgment also where they say that the shot was fired- J \"when there was no looting at the shop and thus no right of private defence.\"\n\nIt was enough that the mob had actually broken into another part of the house and looted it, that the woman and children of his family fled to the appellant for protection in terror of their lives and that the mob was actually beating at his own doors with their\n\nathis and that Musrim shops had already been looted and Muslims killed in the adjoining locality. It was impossible for him to know whether his shop would or would not suffer the same fate if he waited, and on the findings it was reasonable for him to apprehend death or grievous hurt to himself and his family once they broke in, for he woul'd then have had the right to protest and indeed would have been bound to do what he could to protect his family. The threat to break in was implicit in the conduct of the mob and with it the threat to kill or cause grievo~ hurt to the inmates; indeed .the High Court Judges themselves hold that his own shop was menaced. The circumstances in which he was placed were amply sufficient to give him a right of private defence of the body even to the extent of causing death. These things cannot be weighed in too fine a set of scales or. as\n\nsome learned Judges have expressed it, in golden scales.\n\nWe have next to see whether the appellant used more force than was necessary, and here also we cannot use golden scales. He was entitled to cause death and he did not kill more than one man. He\n\nfired only two shots and, as the learned High Court Judges observe, he obviously aimed low. The High Court holds the mob had moved up to his locality when h~ fired the shots,, so the looting and the beating\n\nAm jail Kh1111\n\nThe State.\n\nBose f.\n\nAmjad Khan v.\n\nThe State.\n\nBoil /,\n\nFeb. 27.\n\non the doors were not the isolated acts of a few scattered individuals. It was the mob that was doing it .and in the High Court's words,\n\n\"The very fact that in the town of Katni two shots should have struck four Sindhis and none else shows that the rival community was on the move in that area.\"\n\nIn our opinion, the appellant did not use than was necessary. Indeed, the firing, acting as a deterrent, spurred them on ransacked and looted the place.\n\nmore force far from and they\n\nWe have confined our attention to the right of private defence of the person though in this case the question about the defence of property happens to be bound up with it.\n\nThe appeal is allowed. The convictions and sentences are set aside and the appellant will be released.\n\nAgent for the appellant: 0. P. Verma.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nMOHAMMAD YASIN\n\nTHE TOWN AREA COMMITTEE,\n\nJALALABAD AND ANOTHER.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEE, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. )\n\nConstitution of India. 1950, Arts. 19(l)(g), 32-U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, ss. 293(1), 298(2) (g)(d)-Municipal byc-laws- Bye-law imposing fee for carrying on wholesale trade in vegetables and fruits within municipal area-Validity-Restraint on fundamental right to carry on trade-Licence and tqx, difference.\n\nThere is a difference between a tax like the income-tax and a licence fee for carrying on an occupation, trade or business.\n\nA licence fee on a business not only takes away the property of the licensee but also operates as a restriction on his fundamental\n\n. '", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "567\n\nAMJADKHAN\n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMJAD KHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 97, 102 and 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sindhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1098, "end_char": 1104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant fired two shots from his gun which caused the death of one Sindhi and injured three other Sindhis."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1349, "end_char": 1366, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature of Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1960, "end_char": 1994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th September, 1950, -of the High Court of Judicature of Nagpur (Hemeon Acting C.J. and Hidayat Ullah J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Hemeon Acting C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1996, "end_char": 2014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th September, 1950, -of the High Court of Judicature of Nagpur (Hemeon Acting C.J. and Hidayat Ullah J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Hidayat Ullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2019, "end_char": 2032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th September, 1950, -of the High Court of Judicature of Nagpur (Hemeon Acting C.J. and Hidayat Ullah J.) in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2237, "end_char": 2242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195Z\n\nAmiar:I Khan\n\nThe State."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2253, "end_char": 2264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bou /.\n\nS. P. Sinha and M. Y. Sharif, Nuruddin Ahmad and (Shaukat Hussain, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. Y. Sharif", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2269, "end_char": 2281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bou /.\n\nS. P. Sinha and M. Y. Sharif, Nuruddin Ahmad and (Shaukat Hussain, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Nuruddin Ahmad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2283, "end_char": 2297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bou /.\n\nS. P. Sinha and M. Y. Sharif, Nuruddin Ahmad and (Shaukat Hussain, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Shaukat Hussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2303, "end_char": 2318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bou /.\n\nS. P. Sinha and M. Y. Sharif, Nuruddin Ahmad and (Shaukat Hussain, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2351, "end_char": 2362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2444, "end_char": 2448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The main question in this case is whether there is a right of private defence."}}, {"text": "Katni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2599, "end_char": 2604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A communal riot broke out at Katni on the 5th of March, 1950, between some Sindhi refugees resident in :the town and the local Muslims."}}, {"text": "5th of March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2612, "end_char": 2630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A communal riot broke out at Katni on the 5th of March, 1950, between some Sindhi refugees resident in :the town and the local Muslims."}}, {"text": "Bharat Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2798, "end_char": 2810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Police Con.stable Bharat Singh,\n\nP. W. 17, who made the First Information Report, said that\n\nmost of the shopkeepers in Zanda Bazar are Sindhis."}}, {"text": "Zahid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4613, "end_char": 4618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a hole in the wall between the two portions of the building in which .these two shops are situate and the High Court holds that Zahid's family got into the appellant's portion of the building through this hole and took refuge there."}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5310, "end_char": 5327, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6334, "end_char": 6345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 102 and 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6395, "end_char": 6415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6423, "end_char": 6440, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6699, "end_char": 6710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7463, "end_char": 7468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sessions Judge has eloquently drawn attention to the lamentable consequences of communal frenzy in India and in Katni in particular, and he refers to the indiscriminate looting of Muslim shops in that town."}}, {"text": "P. 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