S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

SRINIV AS RAM KUMAR

MAHABIR PRASAD AND OTHERS.

[PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA JJ.]

Pleadings-Inconsistent pleas-Plaintiff suing for specific performance alleging that money was paid as price-Defendant pleading th.at money was received as loan-Plaintiff's case not proved-Jl/fhether decree can be given for recovery of money as /oflt* on defendant's plea.

Though the court would not grant relief to the plaintiff on a call¢ for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which

the other side was not called upon or had no opportunity to meet, yet, when the alternative case which the plaintiff could have made

was not only admitt~ by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes.

In such circumstances, when no injusti'ce can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to . drive the plaintiff to a separate suit.

The plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a house alleging that he had paid Rs. 30,000

towards the price and ha, d been put in possession in part performance of the contract, but the defendant pleaded that the amount of Rs. 30,000 was received as a loan and the plaintiff was put in possession only to facilitate payment of interest, and the court found that the defendant's plea was true : Held, that a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of the sum of Rs. 30,000 and interest remaining due under the agreement of loan pleaded by the defendant, even though the plaintiff had not: set up such a case and it was even inconsistent with the allega tions in the plaint.

Babu Raja Mohan Manucha

v. Babu Manzoor (70 I.A. 1) referred to.

C1v1L

APPELLATE JuRismcnoN : Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated '29th August, 1947, in First Appeal No. 13 of 1945, modifying a decree of the Subordinate Omrt of Gaya in O.S. No. 59 of 1943 : Civil Appeal No. 82 of 1949.

1%1

Fcb.9

SritainaJ Ramkumar

Mahabir. Prasad

11na Othtrs.

Mukherj1:r1. J-

S. P. Sinha (C. R. Pattabhi Raman and B. K. Saran with him) for the appellant.

Udai Bhan Chaudhry for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Haris Chandra (N. C. Sen, with him) for respondents Nos. 3 to 7.

1951. February 9.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the plaintiff and it arises out oV a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell a house in the town of Gaya, belonging to the defendants second party who, it is alleged, agreed tc sell the house to the plaintiff but subsequently resiled from the agreement and sold the same to the defendants first party who purchased it with notice of the contract.

The plaintiff's case, in substance, is that in September, 1941, the defendants second party, who owned a house at Gaya, entered into a negotiations for sale of the same, with one J adu Ram, and the title deeds of the property were actually handed over to the latter. These negotiations failed and the second party defendants thereupon approached the plaintiff firm and a contract was entered into by and between them sometime te>- wards the end of October, 1945, under which the former agreed to sell to the latter their house at Gaya for a consideration of Rs. 34,000.

Out of this consideration, a sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid by he plaintiff firm on behalf of the vendors to a creditor of the latter on 28th October, 1941.

The vendors n their turn put the plaintiff in possession of the house agreed to be sold in part performance of the contract and promised to execute a conveyance as soon as the title deeds were returned to them by Jadu Ram and the balance of consideration money amounting to Rs. 4,000 was paid by the plaintiff.

The second party defendants, however, went back on their promise and did not execute the conveyance in favour of the plaintiff even after they got back their title deeds from Jadu Ram; and on the other hand, they sold the house to the defendants fint

party on August 13, 1943.

The plaintiff was thus obliged . to bring this suit, Claiming specific performance of the contract of sale.

The suit wap contested by both sets 0£ defendants.

The second party. defendants contended inter alia that they never agreed to sell their house at Gaya to the plaintiff, and the story of a contract of sale as set up by the plaintiff was entirely false.

They admitted that they were in need of money and hence approached the plaintiff for a loan and the plaintiff did advance to them a sum of Rs. 30,000 carrying interest at 6% per annum.

It was entirely for facilitating payment of interest due on this loan and not in part performance of the contract of sale that the plaintiff was put in possession of the same.

This defence was reiterated by the first party defendants who. further pleaded that they were bona fide purchasers for value having no notice of any contract of sale with the plaintiff.

The Subordinate Judge, who heard the suit, came to the conclusion, on the evidence adduced by the parties, that the story of a contract of sale, as alleged by the plaintiff, was not established and it was not in pursuance of any such contract that the plaintiff was put' in possession of the house.

It was held that the defendants' story was true and that the plaintiff did advance a sum of Rs. 30,000 to the defendants second party, but this was by way of a loan and not as part payment of the consideration money.

So far as the first party defendants were concerned, it was held that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice. In view of these findings, the Subordinate Judge .dismissed the plaintiff's claim . for specific perform- . .ance but as the second party defendants admitted that they had taken an advance 0£ Rs. 30,000 from the plamtiff, a money decree was given to the plaintiff for this sum against these defendants with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the suit till realisation.

Against this _decision, the plainff took an appeal to the High Court at Patna, and the second party

Stinivas Ramkumar v.

Mahabir frasad

and Others.

Mukh•rj•a J.

Srinictu Ramkumat

MahabiT Prasad

. and Others.

MakherjtaJ.

defendants also filed cross-objections challenging the propriety of the money decree that was passed against them. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court who, by their judgment dated August 29, 1947, dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff and allowed the cross-objections preferred by the second party defendants.

The learned Judges held, concurring with the trial court, that no case of concluded contract between the parties was established by the evidence adduced in the case, and the fact of the plaintiff being put in possession of the house could not be regarded

as an act of part performance of any such conract.

The High Court agreed with the trial judge in holding that the sum of Rs. 30,000 was advanced as a loan by the plaintiff to the second party defendants, though the evidence was not very clear regarding payment of interest upon it, and that the first party defendants were purchasers for value without notice.

The High Court held further that even if there was a contract, its terms were vague and indefinite, and as one of the vendors was a minor, no relief in equity by way of specific performance of the contract should be given in this case as it would substantially prejudice the interest of the minor.

In the opinion of the H'igh Court, the money decree granted against the second party defendants was not warranted in law as no case of a loan was made by the plaintiff in the plaint and no relief was claimed on that basis.

The result was that the suit was dismissed 'm its entirety and the decree for recovery of money that was made in favour of the plaintiff by the trial court was set aside.

It is against this judgment that the plaintiff has come up on appeal to this court.

The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends before us that the findings upon wh'1ch the courts below disbelieved the story of the plaintiff and dismissed the claim for specific performance are not proper findings of fact which could be legitimately .inferred from the evidence adduced in tHis case.· In the alternative it is argued that the High .Court was wrong in setting aside the decrc:c for money which was given

against the second party defendants bv the trial judge.

The first contention put foward by the learned counsel appears to us to be plainly unsustainable.

When the courts below have g'1ven concurrent findings on pure questions of fact, this court would not ordinanly interfere with these findings and review the evidence for the third time unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying departure from this normal practfce.

The position may undoubtedly be different if the inference is one of law from facts admitted and proved or where the finding of fact is materially affected by violation of any rule of law or procedure. The practice adopted by this court is similar to what has always been acted upon by the Judicial Committee.

To quote the words of Lord Thankerton in Bibhabati

v. Ramendra Narayan(1), "it is not by any means a cast iron practice"; there may occur cases of unusual nature which might constrain us to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact to avoid miscarr'iage of justice.

The case before us however, has nothing unusual in it and involves a pure question of fact.

There is no document in writing in proof of the agreement upon which the plaintiff's case is based and the decision hinges primarily upon appreciation of the oral evidence that has been adduced by the parties.

The trial judge, who had the witnesses before him, was the best person to weigh and appraise their credibility and the conclusions which he art1ved at, have been affirmed in their entirety by the High Court on appeaL In these circumstances, we see no reason whatsoever to go beyond the facts which have been found against the appellant by both the courts below.

As regards the other point, however, we are of the opinion that the decision of the trial court was right and that the High Court took an undoubtedly rigid md technical view in reversing this part of the decree of the Subordinate Judge.

It is true that it was no tart of the plaintiff's case as made in the plaint that

(I) 51 C. W. N. 98.

Srinitiiu

R.,,,,,._

Maha6ir PrlWill

tlfld Othns.

MuV..-j•a J.

t9!il

Srini"01 Ramkumm

Maha/Jir Prasad

""1'0thm.

Mukktrjta J.

the sum of Rs. 30,000 Was advanced by way of loan to the defendants second party. But it was certainly open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree for money even if the allegations of the money being paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be established by evidence.

The fact that such a prayer would have been inconsistent with the other prayer is not really material.

A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative.

The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the court to give him relief on that basis.

The rule undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet.

But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes.

A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise wheh they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings.

In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, t may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit.

As an illustration of this principle, reference may be made to the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Bab14 Raia Mohan Manucha v. Babu Manzoor (1).

This appeal arose out of a suit commenced by the plaint\ff appellant to enforce, a mortgage security.

The plea of the defendant was that the mortgage was void.

This

(7) (70) I. A. 1.

plea was given effect to by both the lower courts as well as by the Privy Council.

But the Privy Council held that it was open in such circumstances to the plaintiff to repudiate the transaction altogether and claim a relief outside it in the form of rest-itution under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act.

Although no such alternative claim was made in the plaint, the Privy Council allowed it to be advanced and gave a decree on the ground that the respondent could not be prejudiced by such a claim at all and the matter ought not to be left to a separate suit.

It may be noted that this relief was allowed to the appellant even though the appeal was heard ex parte in the absence of the respondent. Mr. Barish Chanra appearing for the second party defendants raised the question of interest in connection with the plaintiff's claim for a money decree.

His contention is that the plaintiff could not claim any interest so long as he was in possession of the house and he could not also claim any interest after that, as his clients made a tender of the sum of Rs. 30,000

by sending a hundi for that amount to the plaintiff by registered post on July 12, 1943, which the plaintiff refused to accept.

The first part of the contention is undoubtedly correct and is not disputed on behalf of the plaintiff.

We feel difficulty, nowever, in accepting the second part of the contention raised by Mr.

Harish Chandra.

The receipt of this hundi was totally denied by the plaintiff both in the plaint as well as in the evidence and it is doubtful whether even if the story was true, it could constitute a valid tender m law.

The defendants undoubtedly had the use of this money all this time and in our opinion the plaintiff is entitled to some interest.

The learned counsel appearing for both the parties, at the close of their arguments, left this question of interest to be determined by us and we think that it would be quite fair if we allow interest on the sum of Rs. 30,000 at the rate of 4% per annum from the beginning of September, 1943.

It is admitted that the plaintiff's possession of the house ceased by the end pf August, 1943.

ll7

19!>1

StiniiJas.

Ramkumar

M ahahir Praiad

and Others.

Mukherjea j.

Srirtiotu 11am1;,,.,,,

Mahabir Prasad

dlld Otlurs.

Muk/urfa• ].

Marcb2

The result is that we allow the appeal in part; th? decree made by the High Court is affirmed in so far as it dismissed the claim for specific performance.

The plaintiff, however, will be entitled to a money decree for the sum of Rs. 30,000 against the defendants second party w'1th interest at 4% per annum from the 1st of September, 1943, to the date of realisation. Each party to this appeal will bear his own costs.

Appeal allowed in part.

Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad.

Agent for respondents : Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal.

D. STEPHENS

NOSIBOLLA.

(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, Munn:RJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAR JJ.]

Criminlll Prot:edure Code, 1898, ss. 417, 439-Revision againll order of ocq11ittal-lnterf<rmce-Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act, XX! of 1923, ss. 25, 26-Supply of seamen-

Constitution of Board by owners of ships and seamen for recruii. ment of seamen-Levy of one rupee from each seaman towanls expenses of B011rd-Whether contrDvenes ss. 25, 26-Giving .of muster card permitting appearance at muster-Whether amounts to

11engaging 01' supplying" seamen.

The rcvisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under s. 417.

It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require intcrfcn:ncc for ):he correction of a manikst illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice.

This jurisdiction is not ordinari!J invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on t1ie

l'CCDrd.

Shipowners had an organisation in Cakntta called the c.1cutta Liners' Confrcncc and the seamen had an organisaliaa

SRINIV AS RAM KUMAR

MAHABIR PRASAD AND OTHERS

PATANJALI SASTRI

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

MuKHERJEA JJ.

High Court of Judicature at Patna

SritainaJ Ramkumar

1%1

Fcb.9

SritainaJ Ramkumar

Mahabir.

S. P. Sinha

C. R. Pattabhi Raman

B. K. Saran

Udai Bhan Chaudhry

Haris Chandra

N. C. Sen

Gaya

J adu Ram

28th October, 1941

Jadu Ram

August 13, 1943

High Court at Patna

Srinictu Ramkumat

MahabiT Prasad

MakherjtaJ.

Patna High Court

August 29, 1947

Thankerton

Srinitiiu

Mukktrjta

section 65

Indian Contract Act

Barish Chanra

July 12, 1943

Harish Chandra

Ramkumar

Mukherjea

Mahabir Prasad

1st of September, 1943

R. C. Prasad

Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal

D. STEPHENS

SAIYID FAZL ALI

CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAR

ss. 417, 439

ss. 25, 26

ss. 25, 26

s. 439

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 417

Cakntta


Srirtiotu 11am1;,,.,,,

Mahabir Prasad

dlld Otlurs.

Muk/urfa• ].

Marcb2

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951)

The result is that we allow the appeal in part; th? decree made by the High Court is affirmed in so far as it dismissed the claim for specific performance.

The plaintiff, however, will be entitled to a money decree for the sum of Rs. 30,000 against the defendants second party w'1th interest at 4% per annum from the 1st of September, 1943, to the date of realisation. Each party to this appeal will bear his own costs.

Appeal allowed in part.

Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad.

Agent for respondents : Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal.

D. STEPHENS

NOSIBOLLA.

(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, Munn:RJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAR JJ.]

Criminlll Prot:edure Code, 1898, ss. 417, 439-Revision againll order of ocq11ittal-lnterf<rmce-Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act, XX! of 1923, ss. 25, 26-Supply of seamen-

Constitution of Board by owners of ships and seamen for recruii. ment of seamen-Levy of one rupee from each seaman towanls expenses of B011rd-Whether contrDvenes ss. 25, 26-Giving .of muster card permitting appearance at muster-Whether amounts to

11engaging 01' supplying" seamen.

The rcvisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under s. 417.

It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require intcrfcn:ncc for ):he correction of a manikst illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice.

This jurisdiction is not ordinari!J invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on t1ie

l'CCDrd.

Shipowners had an organisation in Cakntta called the c.1cutta Liners' Confrcncc and the seamen had an organisaliaa

called the Joint Supply Office. a result <>f a collective agreement between the owners of the ships and the seamen's representatives, the Calcutta Maritime Board which contained an equal number of members representing the Calcutta Liners' Conference and the Joint Supply Office was established.

The seamen presented themselves before this Board and. were given muster cards which permitted them to appear at the musters where the captains of the ships engaged seamen.

For meeting the office expenses of the Board the. owners used to pay Rs. 2 per seaman erlgaged and after engagement each seaman paid Rs. 1 to the owner as his contribution towards these expenses.

The . accused was the secretary of the Liners' Conference and . .an c:r officio honorary joint secretary of the Maritime Board, and a seaman filed a complaint . against him that, as he had collected Re. 1 from him for the issue of a muster card he had committed an offence under s. 26 (2) of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act :

Held, that the seamen to whom the muster cards were given by the Mritime Board were not "engaged or supplied" by the Board or by any of its officers, nor was the sum of Re. 1 which was levied out of the seaman's wages after he signed an agreement of employment, remuneration received for providing the man with . employment, and the accused was not guilty of any offence under s. 25 or s. 26 of the Act.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1950) against the orders of the High Coi, nt • 'of Judicatiire at Calcutta dated 21st January, 1949, and 29th August, 1949, in Criminal Revision Cases Nos. 1007 of 1948 and 527 of 1949.

S. P. Sinh' (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the

appellants~ '

B. Sen f_or the resp11>ndent.

195L , March 2. The judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHANDRASEKHAR& A1YAR J.-This appeal comes up before us on special leave granted by His Majesty's Order in Council and it is directed against orders made by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sm of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, directing a retrial of the appellant D. Stephens, who had been acquitted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of contravening the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Aa.

D. Stepluru

N"iiolla.

C/1anr/rasekha'8

.d!"ar J.

D. Sttfthert,':

Nttsif, olla.

Chantlrasekhara

Aiyar J.

The facts that gave rise to this prosecution are correctly set out in the following two paragraphs which are quoted from the judgment of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate :-

"The owners of the ships. have an orgapisation known as the Calcutta Liners' Conference.

The seamen have an organisation known as the Joint Supply Office.

Since 1940-41 the licensed broker system for engagement of seamen had been abolished.

The Calcutta Maritime Board was established as a result qf a collective agreement between the owners of the ships and seamen's representatives for recruiting seamen.

It .is a joint negotiating machinery between the owners and the seamen for direct engagement of seamen by the owners.

The Joint Supply Office does not supply the seamen.

The Calcutta Maritime Board also does not supply nor engage seamen.

The engagement is made by the Captains of the Ships.

The Calcutta Maritime Board, at the relevant time, was formed of equal members representing the Calcutta Liners' Conference (the owners) and the Joint Supply Office (the seamen).

At the present moment the Government of India have two representatives in the Calcutta Maritime Board.

There are two Joint Chairmen and two joint Secretaries, one each from each group of the owners' and searnens' representatives.

Accused. Stephens is the Secretary of the Calcutta Liners' Conference and is a paid officer.

His salary is paid by his employers, the Calcutta Liners' Conference, with contributions obtained from the owners of the ships whose association the Conference is.

The accused is one of the Joint Secretaries of the Calcutta Maritime Board in his capacity as the Secretary of the Calcutta Liners' Conference.

The Joint Secretaries of the Calcutta Maritime Board hold honorary posts and receive no remuneration."

"The procedure for recruitment now is that the seamen present themselves before the Calcutta Maritime Board.

They are given muster cards which permit them to appear at the musters where the Captal.ns of the ships engage the seamen.

The Board

endeavours to lay down a procedure for the Captains of the ships while engaging seamen.

There is an excess of supply of seamen over the demand.

This had brought in corruption.· To fight out corruption, the Calcutta Maritime Board was conceived to find out a procedure for the owners of the ships for employing seamen by rotation.

For meeting the office expenses of the Calcutta Maritime Board the owners, at the relevant time, used to pay Rs. 2 per seamen engaged.

After signing on, each seamen pays back the owners Re. 1 as his contribution towards office expenses of the Calcutta Maritime Board.

None of the facts stated above was contested for the complainant."

The complainant Nosibolla alleged that the accused as Joint Secretary of the Board collected an illegal charge of Rupee one from him for issue of a muster card and thus contravened section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act and that he was, therefore, guilty of an offence within the meaning of sub-clause

(2) of that section.

The Chief Presidency Magistrate acquitted the accused of the charge but on revision the High Cou.n at Calcutta directed a retrial, holding that the accused clearly contravened the provisions of section 25 of the Act, and that if the complainant was to be believed when he said that the accused received Re. 1 before registration, he was also guilty under section 26 of the Act; and both parties were allowed to adduce additional evidence.

This second trial again ended in an acquittal by the Chief Presidency Magistrate who came to the conclusion that the accused did not supply or engage seamen, that he did not receive any payment of Re. 1 for issuing the . muster card to the complainant and that Re. 1 which is collected from the seamen by the shipowners after employment by way of deduction from wages is paid not as remuneration to the accused or any one else, but is really a contribution towards the expenses of the Joint Supply Office working under the Calcutta Maritime Board.

There was again a revision petition taken to the High Coun against this order of acquittal and it . w.as heard by the same learned Judge as before.

He differed from 54S. C. lndia/68

D. Stepturu

Noribolla.

Ch.mtlraitkhara

A&ar].

D.SHplrenJ

/(tJ.™1olla~

CllantlrO.Sfkl111rd

Aiyc.r1.

the Chief Presidency Magistrate on all the material points and sent the case back again for a fresh trial in a judgment which contains fit1dings almost amounting to a direction to the Chief Presidency "Magistrate to convict the accused.

In the learned Judge's view the issue of a muster card to seamen amounted to the

"supply" of seamen within the meaning of section 25 of the Act. The receipt of Re. 1 was a demand for remuneration within the meaning of section 26, even if it was ultimately spent for expenses of the running of the Joint Supply Office and that a .Jcmand for payment would by itself constitute the offence, whether the money was actually received or not.

It is against this interference in revision that the present appeal was lodged before the Judcial Committee of the Privy Council on the ground that the jurisdiction to direct a retrial was so exercised in the case as to constitute an infringement of the essential principles of justice.

Before entering into a short discussion of the question whether the view taken by the High Court is right or wrong, it would be useful to set out the relevant sections of the Merchant Shipping Act.

"24. (1) The Central Government or any person duly authorised by the Central Government in this behalf may grant to such persons as may be deemed fit licences to engage or supply seamen for merchant ships in British India.

(2) Any such licence shall continue for such period and may be granted and revoked on such terms and conditions as the Central Government thinks proper.

25. ( 1) A person . shall not engage or supply a seaman to be entered on board any ship in British India unless that person either holds a licence under this Act for the purpose, or is the owner or master or mate of the ship, or is bona fide the servant and in the constant employ of the owner, or is a shippingmaster.

(2) A person shall not employ, for the purpose of engaging a seaman to be entered on board any ship

in British India, any person unless that person either holds a licence under this . Act for the purpose, or is the owner or master or mate of the ship, or is bona fide the servant and in the constant employment of the owner, or is a shipping master.

(3) A person shall not receive or accept to be entered on board any ship any seaman if that person knows that the seaman has been engaged or supplied in contravention of this section.

( 4) If a person acts in contravention of this section, he shall for each seaman in respect of whom a, n offence is committed be liable to a fine which may extend to one . hundred . rupees, and, if a licensed person, shall forfeit his licence.

26. ( 1) A person shall not demand or receive direct- . ly or indirectly, from any seaman, or from any person seeking employment as a seaman, or from any person on his behalf, any remuneration whatever for providing him with employment other than the fees authorised by, this Act.

(2) If a person acts in contravention of this section, he shall for each such offence be liable to pay a fine of fifty rupees, and, if a licensed person, shall forfeit his licence."

On the facts as admitted. or proved in the evidence, it is difficult to see what offence the accused has committed.

Neither the Calcutta Maritime Board, nor the Calcutta Liners' Conference supply the seaman.

The registration entitles the seamen to get muster cards which enable them to appear at the musters, and there, the Captains of the ships select and engage the seamen.

It is after th.ts selection and engagement that the body of shipowners, called the Calcutta Liners' Conference, pay Rs. 2. to the Calcutta Maritime Board out of which Re. I is their own contribution and Re. l is the contribution by the. seaman which is deducted from his wages.

There is therefore no supply of a seaman wfthin the meaning of section 25 of the Act.

A number of seamen offer themselves for employment and they are all gathered together at a

D; Stephtns

v. .

Nosibolla.

Chandrasekhara

Atyar :J.

D. St<Phens

Nosihvlla.

CMndrasekhara

A!Jar J.

place, so that the shipowner or Captain of the ship may select whomsoever he pleases.

There is no obligation on the owners of the ships to select any particular person, nor is any such selection made by the Maritime Board either directly or through its servants for the benefit of the owners and for employment under them.

The Calcutta Maritime Board of which the accused is ; m honorary Joint Secretary is an institution that was created in the end of 1947, with the knowledge, if not the approval, of the Government of India as a liaison body or institution to bring the owners and the seamen together, with reference to the engagement of seamen for sh'1ps.

The labour corps is brought into contact with the owners by the Maritime Board through the Joint Supply Office but the seamen are engaged by the shipowners or the Captains.

To a certain extent, the recruitment is regulated by the Maritime Board, but it is a misnomer to sav that the seaman are suppned to the owners by the Board or by any of its officers.

In his written statement found at page 28 of the printed book the accused has stated, and it is not controverted anywhere, that the system of selection of crew through the agency of Serangs was brought to an end owing to the opposition of the seamen themselves, who a!leged that it resulted iµ widespread corruption as the Serangs recruited only those who paid them heavily.

It is fantastic for the prosecution to suggest that Re. 1 levied out of the seaman's wages after he signsthe agreement of employment amounts to remuneration received for providing the man with employment.

The remuneration paid to the accused which is over Rs. 2,000 a month is by way of salary from the Calcutta Liners' Conference under whom he is a paid . Secretary.

The Calcutta Maritime Board receives Re. 1 per seaman from the shipowners' association, but this is by way of contribution towards. the expenses of the Joint Supply Office of the Board.

Thi• is made perfectly clear in the evidence given on commission by Mr. C. P. Srivastava, Officer on Special Duty, Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi, and of

I • ' ,...

-·-~--~--

8.C.R.

SuPREME COURT REPORTS 291

l\fr. Dikken examined on the side of the prosecution who says that the contribution is made to meet the running expenses of the Joint Supply Office and

l\faritime Board. Mr.Goldwell of James.Finlav. &

Co., sixth witness for the defence, has stated that the Calcutta Maritime Board and the Joint Supply Office are financed by the Liners and that the accused has nothing to do witK the engagement of the seamen.

There is also a finding of the Chief Presidency l\fagist rate, which has not been set aside, that the allegation of the complainant that the accused received Re. 1 from him prim to registration of his name in the Joint Supply Office, has not been substantiated._ .. _

It is evident on the facts that the accused does.not . engage or supply any seamen and does not demand or receive directly or indirectly any remuneration for providing any person with employment as a seaman . . The facts leave no room for any doubt that the prosecution has failed to establish its case. . • l\fr. Justice Sen says "I fully realise that, ordinarily this Court ought not to interfere with orders of acouittal. It should do so only on exceptional grounds." It is a matter of some regret tht this realization bv him of the very limited nature of the reviional iurisdiction was not carried in to effect but resulted in an order directing the retrial of a man for a third time for offences which could not be said to have been made out even prima facie. The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High .

Court under. section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private comolainant against an order of acquittal. against which the Governmenthas a right of appeal under section 417. It could be exerci8ed only in exceptional crises where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This iurisdiction is not ordinarilv invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidencf'

.'l~

D.SleplieM

NosiboU~

Chandraaekharo

.A.iyar J~

D. Slephnis

NosiboUa.

Chatulrasthhara

AV'af].

March 5.

on rerord.

As already pointed out, there has been no such error in the present case; on the other hand, it seems to us that. on both the previous occasions, the Chief Presidency Magistrate was right in holding that the accused was not guilt)' of any offence under sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act.

The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Chief Presidency Magistr:tte is restored.

The accused will stand acquitted of the charge.

Order set aside.

Agent for the appellant : P. K. Chatteriee.

Agent for the respondent : l. N. Shroff for P. K.

Bose.

V. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR AND OTHERS

fl.

T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR. [SAIYID FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JI.]

Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (IV of 1938), ss. 7, 19-Joint debtors-Application for scaling down made by some only-Decree for full amount against ex parte defendants and for reduced amount against others-Legality and effect-Indivisibility of debt -Payment of full amount as scaled down-Whether extinguishes decree against all.

Under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938, a mortgage decree can be scaled down in favour of some of the judgment debtors alone, while as regards the others it is kept intact.

In a suit to enforce a mortgage executed by defendant No. 1 on his own behalf and on behalf of defendants Nos. 2 to 7, the defendant No. 1 remained ex parte, and the others contested the suit.

A decree for Rs. 1,08,098 was passed by trial court.

The Madras Agriculturist' Relief Act, 1938, was passed during the pendenry of an appeal and cross appea~ and on the application of defendants Nos. 2 to 7 under the said Act the amount of the decree was scaled down to Rs. 49,255 so far as defendants Nos. 2 to 7 were concerned.

So far as defendant No. 1 was coriccrned the decree for the full amount rcmainCd as it was.

Defendant No. 1 thereupon applied for scaling down, but his

1st of September, 1943

C. Prasad

Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal

D. STEPHENS

NOSIBOLLA

SAIYID FAZL ALI

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

ss. 417, 439

ss. 25, 26

ss. 25, 26

s. 439

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 417

Cakntta

Calcutta Maritime Board

Calcutta Liners' Conference

s. 26

Merchant Shipping Act

s. 25

s. 26

S. P. Sinh

S. N. Mukherjee

B. Sen

CHANDRASEKHAR

Sm

D. Stephens

section 26

Aiyar

Chief Presidency Magistrate

Government of India

Stephens

Nosibolla

section 26

Merchant Shipping Act

High Cou.n at Calcutta

section 25

section 26

D. Stepturu

Ch.mtlraitkhara

D.SHplrenJ

section 25

section 26

Merchant Shipping Act

Central Government

British India

section 25

Nosibolla

Chandrasekhara

D. St<Phens

Nosihvlla

CMndrasekhara

C. P. Srivastava

Thi• is made perfectly clear in the evidence given on commission by Mr. C. P. Srivastava, Officer on Special Duty, Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi, and of

I • ' ,...
·-~--~--

8.C.R.

SuPREME COURT REPORTS 291

l\fr.

Dikken

Goldwell

Sen

section 439

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 417

Chandraaekharo

.A.iyar

D. Slephnis

Chatulrasthhara

sections 25 and 26

Merchant Shipping Act

P. K. Chatteriee

l. N. Shroff

V. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR

T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR

SAIYID FAZL Au

MUKHERJEA

CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR

ss. 7, 19

Relief Act, 1938

Relief Act, 1938


D. Slephnis

NosiboUa.

Chatulrasthhara

AV'af].

March 5.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [.1951]

on rerord.

As already pointed out, there has been no such error in the present case; on the other hand, it seems to us that. on both the previous occasions, the Chief Presidency Magistrate was right in holding that the accused was not guilt)' of any offence under sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act.

The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Chief Presidency Magistr:tte is restored.

The accused will stand acquitted of the charge.

Order set aside.

Agent for the appellant : P. K. Chatteriee.

Agent for the respondent : l. N. Shroff for P. K.

Bose.

V. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR AND OTHERS

fl.

T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR. [SAIYID FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JI.]

Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (IV of 1938), ss. 7, 19-Joint debtors-Application for scaling down made by some only-Decree for full amount against ex parte defendants and for reduced amount against others-Legality and effect-Indivisibility of debt -Payment of full amount as scaled down-Whether extinguishes decree against all.

Under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938, a mortgage decree can be scaled down in favour of some of the judgment debtors alone, while as regards the others it is kept intact.

In a suit to enforce a mortgage executed by defendant No. 1 on his own behalf and on behalf of defendants Nos. 2 to 7, the defendant No. 1 remained ex parte, and the others contested the suit.

A decree for Rs. 1,08,098 was passed by trial court.

The Madras Agriculturist' Relief Act, 1938, was passed during the pendenry of an appeal and cross appea~ and on the application of defendants Nos. 2 to 7 under the said Act the amount of the decree was scaled down to Rs. 49,255 so far as defendants Nos. 2 to 7 were concerned.

So far as defendant No. 1 was coriccrned the decree for the full amount rcmainCd as it was.

Defendant No. 1 thereupon applied for scaling down, but his

application was rejected.

Defendants Nos. 2 to 7 dcopsitcd certain amounts and got their properties released.

Defendant No. 1 deposited the balance of the amount that remained due under the decree as scaled down on the application of defendants Nos. 2 to 7, and prayed that full satisfaction of the decree may be recorded. The Subordinate Judge rejected this application but the High Court, on appeal, held that defendant No. I was entitled to the benefit of the scaling down in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 7, as the mortgage debt was one and indivisible.

On further appeal :

Held, that the ratio dccidendi of the cases in which it was held that a purchaser of mortgaged properties was entitled to the benefit of a decree which has been scaled down, even diough the purchaser himself was not an agriculturist was not applicable to the present case.

According to the plain provisions of the Act, there was no objection to a decree for a reduced amount being passed against an agriculturist debtor, while the same relief is not given to his co-debtors, and defendant No. 1 was not entitled to claim the benefit of the scaling down of the decreC-: debt in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 7.

Judgment of the Madras High Court reversed.

Ramiet v. Srinivasiah [(1940) 2M.L.J. 872] referred.to.

Arunachalam Pillai v. Seetharam [(1941) I M.L.J. 561'!.

Pachigola v.

Karatam

[1242) 1 M.L.J. 506], Subramaniam v.

Ramchandm [ (1946) :?. M.L.J. 429] distinguished.

CIVIL

APPELLATE JuRISDIC'fION: : Appeal (Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1950), from a judgment and order of the J1igh Court of Judicature at Madras dated 5th January, 1948, reversing an order of the District Judge of East Tanjore in aµ application under s. 47 and

0. XXI, r. 2, of the Civil Procedure Cpde.

R. K. Kesava Aiyangar (T. K. Sundal'araman, with him) for the appellants.

S. Ramachandra Aiyar for the respondant.

1951.

March 5.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the decree-holders in a mortgage suit and it is directed against a judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated January 5, 1948, by

v. RamasllHlm

Others

T. N. V.1'ailota

Tvtll'.

Milk!u1j1a J.

Ayyatrgar and

Otleers

v. 7, N. V. Kailtua

Tkevar.

which the learned Judges reversed, on appeal, on order of the District Judge of East Tanjore made in a prc>- ceeding under section 47 and Order 21, . rule 2, of the Civil Procedure Code.

The materials facts are not in controversy and may be briefly stated as follows. The appellants before us are the representatives of three original plaintiffs who, as mortgagees, instituted a suit (being O.S. No. 30 of

1934) in the Court of the District Judge, East Tanjore, for enforcenient of a mortgage, against the present respondent, who was defendant No. 1 in the suit, and six other persons.

The mortgage bond, upon which the suit was' brought, was executed by defendant No. 1 for himself and his minor undivided brother, the defendant No. 2, and also as authorised agent on behalf of defendants 3 to 7 who were interested in a joint family business.

The suit was contested by all the defendants except defendant No. 1, against whom it proceeded ex

parte, and there was a preliminary decree passed on May 15, 1937, by which a sum of Rs. 1,08,098 was directed to be paid by defendant No. l and defendants 3 to 7, in default of which the plaintiffs were declared entitled to apply for a firial decree for sale of the mortgage properties, and the suit was dismissed against defendant No. 2.

Against this decree, two appeals were taken to the Madras High Court, one by defendants 3 to 7-being Appeal No. 48 of 1938-who contended that the mortgage was not binding on them or on their shares in the joint family property; and the other by the plaintiffs-being Appeal No. 248 of 1938-who challenged the propriety of the judgment of the trial judge in so far as it dismissed their claim against defendant No. 2.

During the pendency of these appeals; the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (Act

IV of 1938) came into force and applicat'ions were made by defendants 2 to 7 to the High Court, praying that in the event of a decree being passed against them, the decretal debt might be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

The defendant No. 1, who did not appear at any stage of the proceeding, did not make any such application.

The H1gh Court forwanled

these applications to the lower court for_ enquiry i nro the matrer and for return, with its finding on the question as to whether the applicants were agriculturists, and if so. to what extent, the decretal dues should be scaled down.

The District Judge, after making enquiries, submitteda finding that the applicants were agriculturists and that the debt, if scaled down, would amount to Rs. 49,255 with interest thereupon at 6% per annum from 1st October, 1937, exclusive of costs.

On receipt of this finding, the appeals were set down for final hearing and by their judgment dated -March 25, 1942, the learned Judges of the High Court accepted the finding of the court below and held that defendants 2 to 7 were entitled to have the debts scaled down; but as no application had been made on behalf of defendant No. 1, he was held entitled to no relief under the Act.

A decree was drawn up in accordance with_ the judgment.

The amount due by defendants 2 to 7 was stated to be Rs. 49,255 with interest .thereon at 6% per annum; while, so far as defendant No. 1 was concerned, the decree of the trial judge was affirmed subject to a slight modification regarding - the rate of interest.

The -defendant No. 1 thereupon filed an application in the court of the District Judge, East Tanjore, claiming relief under the Agriculturists' Relief Act alleging that he too wa~ an agriculturists and hence entitled to the benefits of the Act.

The application was dismissed -on February 25, 1943, on the ground that as the decree had already been passed by the High Court definitely negativ'mg his claim to any relief under the Agri<tulturists' Relief Act, such application was not entertainable by the lower court.

The next step taken by the defendant No. 1 was to file on application in the High Court itself, praying for setting aside ex parte decree which excluded him from the benefits of Act IV of

1938. This application was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 1943.

A_s no payment was made in accordam:e with the preliminary decree passed by the High Court, a final decree in terms of the same was passed by the

V. Ramtiswami

Aiyan ""' a•d. • Othrs ,-. -r. N. V. Kail<M!l.

-rhevar.

Ayyangar and

Other.f

T. N. V. Kailasa

Tlu:var.

Mukhnjta J.

. District Judge on September 25, 1943.

Proceedings for execution of' this final decree were started on August 16, 1944, in E. P. 2 of 1945 of the court of the District Judge, East Tanjore.

Two lots of the mortgaged properties were put up to sale and purchased by the decree-holders for a total sum of Rs. 12,005 on July 15, 1946. .The sale was confirmed on August 17, 1946, and part satisfaction of the decree was entered for that amount.

Apparently, certain terms of settlement were thereafter offered by the judgment-debtors.

The estate of the decree-holders was in the hands of the Receivers and from the Receivers' report dated January 10, 1947, it appears that the Receivers agreed with the sanction of the court, to receive Rs. 24,000 only from or on behalf of defendant No. 2 and release him and his share of the mortgaged property from the decretal charge.

Likewise, the Receivers were agreeable to receive Rs. 48,000 from defendants 3 to 7 and to release them and their properties from the decretal debt.

With regard to defendant No. 1, the proposal, which seems to have been accepted by the Receivers, was that th~ amount payable by him under the decree was to be settled at Rs. 37,500 and one Yacob Nadar would pay this amount on his behalf on consideration ofthe decree against defendant No. l being assigned to him by the Receivers excluding the rights of the latter to execute the decree against defendants 2 to 7 as scaled down by the High Court.

The records of the execution case show that on January 20, 1947, a sum of Rs. 24,000 was paid on behalf of defendant No. 2; and his properties, namely, lots 2 and 6 were exonerated from the decree.

On January 27, 1947, a sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid by defendants 3 to 7 and on February 17 following, they paid a further sum of Rs. 18,610-12-0.

These three amounts aggregated to Rs. 72,610-12-0.

Nothing was done towards the payment of the sum of Rs. 37,500 by defendant No. 1 or by Yacob Nadar, but on March 6, 1947, the defendant No. l deposited in court a sum of Rs. 3,215 and put in a petition under section 47 and

Order 21, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, praying that as the amount thu5 deposited together with the payments already made completely wiped off the amount due under the decree as scaled down by the High Court in farnur of defendants 2 to 7, full satisfatcion of the decree might be recorded exonerating the mortgaged properties and also the defendant No. 1 himself from any further liability in respect of. the decretal debt.

The position taken up by defendant No; 1, in substance, was that the:: mortgage debt was one and indivisible and even though different amounts were men tioned as payable by two groups of defendants in the decree, the decree-holders were bound under the terms of the decree to release the entire mortgaged property even on payment of the amount directed to be paid by defendants 2 to 7.

In other words, even though the defendant No. l's application for relief under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act was expressly rejevted and he was held liable for the entire amount of the mortgage debt, he would still be entitled to avail himself of the benefit of the scaling down of the decree in favour of defendants 2 to 7.

This contention was negatived by the District Judge, but was accepted by the High Court on appeal, who allowed the application of defendant No. 1 and directed that the court below should enter up full satisfaction of the motgage decree.

It is against this judgment that the decree-holders have come up on appeal to this court.

The learned Judges.of the High Court observed at the outset that in the working of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act alongside the provisions of the Transfer of Pmperty Act several curious and novel situations had arisen for which it was not possible always to find logical solutions.

They then proceedd to discuss the various decisions of the Madras High Court which had a bearing on this point and the conclusion which they reached may be summed up in their words as follows :-

"It is no , doubt. somewha.t odd /that when a person is declared liable to pay a larger :imount he should on

v. Rama.iwami

Ayyangar tUUl

Othtis

T. N. V. Kaildia

T/ui; ar.

J, ftiklurjta J.

Y. RamtUwansi

~ yyan1or antf

Ollrtrs

T . .N. Y. Kailasa

Thtvar.

Mukhtrj1a J.

payment or tender of a smaller amount get his property exonerated from liability but this is inherent in and arises out of the proposition established by the decisions already dealt with, namely, that by the application of the principle of unity and indivisibility of a mortgage decree a non-agriculturist can indirectly get relief which he cannot directly get".

It seems to us that the High Court's apprach to the case has not been a proper one and the conclusion it has reached cannot be supported in law.

The learned Judges appear to have overlooked the fact that they were sitting onlv as an executing -court and their duty was to give effect to the terms of the decree that was already passed and beyond which they could not go.

It is true that they were to interpret the decree, but under the guise of interpretation th(.y could not make a new decree for the parties.

As said above, the mortgage decree was scaled down by the High Court jn favour of defendants 2 to 7 only and the amended decree directs that the said defendants do pay into court the sum of Rs. 49,255 with certain interest and costs on payment of which the plaintiff was to bring into court all the documents in his power or possession relating to the mortgage and reconvey or retransfer the property if so required.

So far as defendant No. 1 is concerned, the decree states in dear and express terms that he is to pay the sum of Rs. 1,05,000 and odd and 'it is on payment of this sum only that redemption would be allowed of the mortgaged property. If the decision of the High Court is correct, this direction in the decree would be manifestly unmeaning and without any effect: What is said, however, on behalf of the respondent is that he is not claiming any benefit in violation of this clause.

By virtue of the decree against defendants 2 to 7 being satisfied, the entire mortgaged property would, by force of the very decree, be freed from the debt and if the respondent gets any benefit thereby, such benefit would be merely incidental or consequential in its nature.

The High Court agreed in substance with this contention

and based its decision entirely upon the view that by operation of the principle of indivisibility of the mort; gage decree, a non-agriculturist debtor, whose debt has

not been scaled down under the provisions of . the Agriculturists' Relief Act, may ind'irectly get the benefit of the relief which has been granted to his agriculturist co-debtor under the provisions of the Act.

The general law undoubtedly is that _a mortgage decree is one and indivisible and exceptions to this rule are admitted in special circumstances where the in_tegrity of the mortgage has been disrupted at the instance of the mortgagee himself; e.g., when there is severance of the interests of the mortgagors whh the consent of the mortgagee or a portion of the equity of redemption is vested in the latter.

It is to be: noted, however, that the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special statute which aims at giving relief not to debtors 'in general but only to a specified class of debtors, viz., those who are agriculturists as defined in the Act.

To this extent it trenches upon the general law and section 7 of the Act expressly provides that "notwithstanding any law, custom, contract or decree of court to the contrary, all debts payable by an agriculturist at the commencement of this Act shall be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of this chapter". Thus in case of a mortgage debt when the loan has been advanced to more than one person, if one of the debtors happens to be an agriculturist while others are not, the agriculturist debtor would certainly be entitled to have his debts scaled down under the provisions of the Act in spite of the provision of general law which prevents a mortgagor from denying the. liability of the interest which he owns in the mortgaged property to satisfy the entire mortgage debt.

There is, therefore, nothing wrong in law in scafing down a mortgage decree in favour of one of the judgmentdcbtors, while as regards others the decree is kept intact.

The Madras High Court expressly adopted this view in Ramier v. Srinivasiah (1), which is one of the

{I) [1940] 2 M. ; L; J. 872.

0th.rs

T. N. V. Kailasa

Thevar,

MuklierjM J.

Ramaswami .d_yyangM attrl

Olhtr.r

v N. V Kailasa

Thtvar.

11.khtrj•• J.

decisions referred to in the judgment appealed from.

The fact that in that case it was a puisne mortgagee and not a mortgagor whose application for relief under section 19 of the Madras Agriculurists' Relief Act was allowed, does not make any difference in principle.

The puisne mortgageewas made a party defendant in the suit instituted by the first mortgagee to recover his dues and as the puisne mortgagee was liable to pay the debt due to the first mortgagee, he was held to be a debtor and hence entitled to claim the benefit of section 19 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act.

It may be mentioned here that section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act which provides for separation of a debt incurred by a Hindu family,. some members of which are agriculturists while others are not, affords a cle¥ indication that the splitting up of a debt in such circumstances is quite in accordance with the scheme of the Act. ·

. The catena of cases upon which the learned Judges of the High Court relied in support of their decision seems to proceed on a different principle altogether and whether that principle is. right or wrong, it has, in our opinion, no application to a ease like . the present.

In this class of cases, . the mortgagors were agriculturists and hence entitled to have their debts scaled. down under the Agriculturists' Relief Act, but thece were purchasers of the mortgaged property who were not agriculturists, :µid the question arose whether a purchaser could get the benefit of the debt scaled down in favour of the original debtors.

This question was answered in the affirmative.

The reason for taking this view was thus given by the learned Judges in Arunt1ehalam Pillai v. Seetharam(1) where the purchase of the equity of redemption was at an execution sale :-

"When the .12th respondent purchased the propctties in cow; t auction, he took them subjCct, to the burden of the appellant's mortgage and if the burden is by reason of the P.rovisions of s. 8 referred to al:Xwe

reduced without payment, the purchase proves to fhar

(1) [1941] l M. L.J. 561.

extent an a<lvantageous one, and there is nothing in the Act to <leprive him of the fruits of his lucky purchase, even thougli he is not an agriculturist.

He gets the benefit of the scaling down not because the provisions of the Act apply to him, for obviously they do not, but because such benefit is a necessary incident of his purchase w1der the general law and the Act does not deprive him of it."

A somewhat different reason was assigned in Panchigola v. Karatam(1) which however was a case where a portion of the equity of redemption was transferred to a purchaser by a private sale.

It was held that the court by allowing the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage sale . was not conferring on the puchaser, a non-agriculturist, the benefit of the Act, as he would have to . refund to his vendor the purchase money reserved with him which as a result of the scaling down he would not have to pay to the mortgagee.

In both these cases, the question was raised in the proceeding for scaling down of the decree under the provisions of the Agriculturists' Relief Act itself and not at the execution stage.

There is however the case of Subramanian v. Ramachandra( 2 ), where the question arose in course of execution proceedings and a purchaser of a portion of the equity of redemption was held to be entitled to the benefit of the scaled down decree in favour of the mortgagors, although his own application for relief under the Act was refused.

It is not necessary for purposes of this case to . express any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of these decisions.

It is enough to say that the ratio decidendi in all these cases is not applicable to the case before us.

In the present case there is no pur.chaser of the mortgaged property and consequently there is no question of the purchaser, who is not an agriculturist himself, being entitled to the benefit of a decree which has been scaled down in favour of the agriculturist mortgagor.

Here the judgment-debtors are the mortgagors themselves and according to the plain provis1ons of . the Agriculturists' Relief Act there could

(1) [1942] l M. L.J. 506.

(2) [1946] 2 M. L.J. 429.

V. Rama>wami

Others

T. N. Y. /i'ailasa

T1"6ar.

Ayyangar antf

Othlrs

T. N. V. Kailasa

Thtuar.

M•kherjea J.

not be any objection to a decree for reduced amount being passed against an agriculturist debtor, while the same relief is not given to his co-debtors who do not fulfil that description.

Some exception could undoubtedly be taken to the form and wording of the decree that has been passed in the present case.

The decree, in our opinion, should not only have stated the amount payable by defendant No. 1 and that by defendants 2 to 7 separately but .should have expresdy directed that on payment of the amount directed to be paid by defendants 2 to 7 their interest alone in the mortgaged property would not be liable to be sold.

The further direction should have been that in case they did not pay this amount, the whole of the mortgaged property including their interest would be sold for the entirety of the mortgage debt for which defendant No. 1 was made liable.

It is true that the decree contains no such clear directions but reading the decree as a whole and having regard to ' the actual decision in the case, this must be taken to be its plain implications.

The subsequent agreement between the parties arrived at in course of the execution proceedings by which the decree-holders agreed to release the interest of defendant No. 2 and that of defendants 3 to 7 separately on payment of certain specified amounts by them proceeds clearly on the assumption that the mortgage debt and the security have been split up, and in our opinion it is not possible for the defendant No. 1 to contend that the mortgage debt remained indivisible.

Our conclusion is that the view taken by the District Judge was right and should not have been disturbed . .

The result .is that the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court rs set aside and that of. the District Judge restored.

We , make no orner as to costs of this :q>peal. Appeal allowed.

Agent for the appenants : M. S. K. Sastri.

Agent for the respondent : M. S. K. AiY"F

D. Slephnis

Chief Presidency Magistrate

sections 25 and 26

Merchant Shipping Act

P. K. Chatteriee

l. N. Shroff

P. K.

Bose

V. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR AND OTHERS

T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

MUKHERJEA

CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR

ss. 7, 19

Relief Act, 1938

Relief Act, 1938

Madras High Court

s. 47 and

0

R. K. Kesava Aiyangar

T. K. Sundal'araman

S. Ramachandra Aiyar

MuKHERJEA

T. N. V.1'ailota

Ayyatrgar

N. V. Kailtua

Tkevar

section 47

May 15, 1937

25, 1942

February 25, 1943

December 13, 1943

V. Ramtiswami

T. N. V. Kailasa

Mukhnjta

January 10, 1947

Yacob Nadar

January 20, 1947

January 27, 1947

March 6, 1947

section 47

Order 21, rule 2

Civil Procedure Code

Rama.iwami

Ayyangar

T. N. V. Kaildia

Y. RamtUwansi

.N. Y. Kailasa

section 7

section 19

section 19

section 14

s. 8

V. Rama

T. N. Y.

M•kherjea

M. S. K. Sastri

M. S. K. AiY"F


S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

SANTOSH KUMAR JAIN

THE STATE.

UNION OF INDIA-Intervener.

[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI,

and DAs JJ.]

Emntial Supplies (TemP<miry Powers) Act (XXlV of 1946), s. 3-Power to "provide for regulating or prohibiting production,

supply 11nd Ji11ribution" of goods-W heiher includes power to issue directions 111!d orden to particular persons to do specific acts-Order to se11rch 11nd seize goods held by particular company

-V11lidity-Scope -0/ Sflb-ss. (1) & (2) of s. 3-Generality of powers

conferred by sub-s. (!)-Obstruction to officers carr.ying out .. order

for s_eizure-Con11iction under s. 186, l.P.C.-Legality-lndian Penal Code, 1860, s. 186-0ffence under, essentials of.

Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, provided as follows :

( 1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies cif an essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair , prices, may be notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof, and trade and commerce therein.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. ( 1) an order made thereunder may provide ..... .

(j) for any incidental and supplementary matters, including in particular the . entering, and search of premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft, the seizure by a person authorised to make sucht search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to liclieve that a contravention has been, is .being, or is about to be committed ...... "

In exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by cl. (j) of sub-s. (2) of s. (3) of the above said Act, which had been delegated to the Provincial Government in relation to foodstuff!, the Governor of Bihar made an order authorising the District Magistrate, Patna, and the Special Officer in charge of rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by a company of which the appellant was the General Manager and directing the seizure of 5.000 maunds of sugar held in stock by the said company, on the ground that the company was about to commit a contravention of an order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies made under the Sugar aud Sugar Products CQ!ltrol 6--2 S. C. India/68

iuch ~.

Santosh Kamat

Jain

The State

Order, 1947.

The appellant obstructed the officers who went to search and seize the goods and was convicted under s. 186, Indian Penal Code.

Held,

(i) the power "to provide for regulating or prohibiting production, supply and distribution" conferred by the Act on the Central Government included the power tO regulate or prohibit by issuing directions to a particular producer or dealer or by requiring any specific act to be done or foreborne in regard to production, etc., and the order of the Governor was not therefore invalid on the ground that it was not a rule or regulation of general application but an order concerning a pa1ticular company alone;

(ii) sub-section ( 2) of s. 3 conferred no further or other powers than What were conferred by sub-s. (1) and the enumera tion of certain matters in !llUb-s. (2) was merely illustrative, as such enumeration was "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. (!)";

(iii) seizure of an article being within the purview of sub-s. ( l) of s. 3 it was therefore competent to the Central Government, and its delegate the Provincial Government, to make an order for. seizure under sub-s. ( 1) apart from and irrespective of the anticipated contravention of any other order as contemplated in cl. (j) of sub-section (2);

(iv) even assuming that the order of the Chief Controller of Prices .under the Sugar Control Order was incomplete and inoperative and there could be no question of its contravention, the rc::fereni;::e to that order in the order made by the Governor would be a mere redundancy and would not affect the validity of the latter order, and the appellant was rightly convicted under s. 186; Penal Code.

Quaere : Whether for an offence under s. 186, Penal Code, it i.s necessary that the act which was obstructed must be duly authorised and otherwise lawful.

King Emperor v. Sibnath Baneri" [1945] F.C.R. 195 applied.

CRIMINAL

APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1950) from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing a petition to revise an order of the Sessions Judge, Patna, convicting the appellant for an offence under s. 186, Indian Penal Code : The facts of the case appear in \he judgment.

N. C. Chatterjee (Rameshwar Nath, with him) for the appellant.

S. K. Mitra (K. Daval, with him) for the respondant.

S. M. _Sikri for the Intervener.

1951. March 5.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing a revision petition against the conviction of the appellant for an offence under s. 186 of the Indian Penal Code.

The appellant was at all material times the General Manager of the Jagdishpur Zamindary Company (hereinafter reterred to as the company) whc were the lessees of a sugar factory referred to in -these proceedings as the Bhita Sugar Factory.

He was prosecuted for obstructing the then District Magistrate and the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, in the discharge of their official functions when they went to the factory on 6th December, 1947, to remove 5,000 maunds of sugar which had been seized out of the stock held by the company pursuant to an order of the Government of Bihar, dated 5th December, 1947. The case for the prosecution was as follows : The company had deliberately failed to comply with the orders for . supply of sugar issued from time to time under the provisions of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, by officers of the Government duly authorised in that behalf, and in consequence, the Government made the following order on 5th December, 1947 :-

"In exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by cl. (j) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which have been delegated to the Provincial Government in relation to foodstuffs in the notification of the Government of India, Department of Food, No. PY" 603 (2)-1, dated 21st October, 1946, the Governor of Bihar is pleased :-

( 1) to authorise the District Magistrate, Patna, and/or the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by Messrs.

Jagdishpur Zamindary Company, Bhita, in the District of Patna, which is about to commit a contraventiqn of

Sanlo:Sh Krunai'

Jaiti

Vo The State

Patanjali

Sastrij.

1951 ---- ]ad

T/uSIDI•

the. order . .of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies, Bihar, made under cl. 7(1) (ii) of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, and issued in order No. 1613-P.C.R., dated 27th September, 1947, in so far as the said order relates to the said Company, and

(2) to direct that 5,000 maunds of sugar held in stock by the said Company shall be seized.

By order of the Governor of Bihar,

Sd. T. P. SINGH, Secretary to Government."

On the 6th Decembc;.r, 1947, when the officers named went to the factory to carry out the aforesaid order, they were told by the appellant that he would do everything possible to obstruct the removal of the sugar-, and accordingly it. was found that the sugar godowns had been locked and the road leading to them blocked by heaps of coal, firewood and tins placed across, so as to make vehicular traffic impossible. A railway siding leading to the godowns had also been rendered unserviceable by the removal of some - of the rails and fishplates.

As . a result of such obstruction, the officers had to seek the aid of armed police to break open the locks, repair the railway line and clear the road block .before the sugar. could be removed from the factory.

The appellant's main defence was that on a proper construction of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) it was not competent for the Government to pass

the order of 5th December, 1947, which was consequently illegal and void, and that obstruction to the exccutien of that order could not constitute an offence under s. 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The contention was rejected and the appellant was convicte<l and sentenced to simple imprisonment for a term of three weeks.

On appeal, the Sessions Judge, Patna, confirmed the conviction and sentence, agreeing with the findings of the trial court, and a Revision Petition preib; red by the appellant was rejected by the High Court,

which, however,. granted a certificate under article 134

(1) ( c) of the Constitution that the case was a fit one for appeal to this court as it involved a point of "sufficient public importance" as to the interpretation of section 3 of the Act.

Section 3, so far as it is material here, runs as follows :-

"3: (1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for n-.aintairiing or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, may, by notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof; and trade and commerce therein.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), an order made thereunder may provide-

(j) for any incidental and supplementary matters, including in particular the entering. and search of premises, vehicles, vessds and aircraft, the seizure by a person authorised to make such search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to believe that a contravention of the order has been, is being, or is about to be committed, the grant or issue of licences, permits or other documents, and the charging of fees therefor." ·

It was contended that an order under sub-section (1) should be in the nature of a rule or regulation of general application, like the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, issued by the Central Government on 4th August, 1947. as the suJHection confers on the Central Gl)Vc:rnment only the power to "provide for regulating

ar vrohibiting" the production, supply, distributfon, etc., of essential commodities, and d<>es not authorise the making of . ad hoc or speeial orders with respect to any particular person or thing.

We see no reason to place such a restricted construction on the scope of the power conferred on the Central Government. The term "notified order" which is defined as meaning "an . .f-0

SantosliKIUIMIT

]Qin

The State

Patanjal; SastriJ.

Santosla K11ma'

Jain v.

Th~Stalt!

Palanjali

Sastri].

order notified in the official Gazette" is wide enough to cover special as well as general orders .relating to the matters specified in section 3.

The power to provide for regulating or prohibiting production, distribution and supply conferred on an executive body may well include the power to regulate or prohibit by issuing directions to a particular producer or dealer or by requiring any specific act to be done or forborne in regard to production, etc., and the provisions of section 4 lend support to that view. The Central Government is empowered under the latter section to delegate its . power to make order under section 3, subject to conditions to be specified, to any officer or subordinate authority either of the Central or a Provincial Government. It would be strange if, as contended for the appellant, a subordinate officer in charge, say, of a small area, should, by delegation, exercise powers of a legislative character in relation to the matters specified in section 3, but should not have the power of issuing special orders concerning specific individuals or things. We do not think that such a situation could have been contemplated. The power delegated under section 4 must, in our opinion, include the power of issuing directions to any producer or dealer in relation to production, etc., of any specified essential commodity. If so, the delegating authority itself must

posess such power under section 3. For instance, secl:Ion 7. of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, made by the Central Government empowers the "Controller" "to issue directions to any producer or dealer to supply sugar or sugar products" to specified areas, persons or organisations.

This delegation is expressed .to be made "in exercise of the

powers -onferred by section 3 and 4" of the Act, but unless the Central Government itself had the power of issuing such directions under section 3, it could not delegate that power to the Controller under section 4.

This view is reinforced by the language of section 15, which. contemplaes orders under section 3 being made _ agamst a part:Icular person, for it speaks of "an order made under section 3 which prohibits him (that

is, the person prosecuted for its contravention) from doing any act or being in possession of a thing without lawful authoritv, etc." The restricted construction of section 3 contended for by the appellant's counsel would render the scheme of the Act largely unworkable, and we have no hesitation in rejecting it.

Even so, it was argued, an order for seizure could be made only subject to the conditions and limitations specified in clause (j) of sub-section (2) of section 3, that is to say, only where the person authorised in that behalf "has reason. to believe that a contravention of the order [an order made under sub-section ( 1)] has been, is being, or is about to be committed". In the present case, the order of 5th December 1947, directing. the seizure of 5,000 maunds of the company's sugar J.n the execution of which the appellant has been found to have obstructed the officers of the Provincial Government, recited that the company was "about to commit a contravention of the order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies, Bihar, made under cl. 7(15 (ii) of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947,' and issued in order No. 1613 P.C.~, dated 27th September, 1947, in so fur as the said order relates to the said company".

The latter order, while it directed the company, among others, "to supply sugar at the prices fixed t.o the approved dealers of certain Districts'', left it to the District or Sub-divisional Officer to fix quotas for the approved dealers of his District or Sub-division from the District or Sub-divisional allotment and to inform the company when and where the supplies are to be made. It has been found by the courts below that the total quantity of sugar which the order required to be supplied was varied from .time to time, and no quotas to approved dealers were ever fixed nor information sent to the company as to when and where supplies were to be made. The order of the 27th September, 1947, having thus remained inchoate and incomplete and so incapable of being carried out or contravened till the.5th December, 1947, it was submitted that no seizure and removal could be lawfully ordered on the basis of an anticipated contravention .

SantoshKumm

Jain v.

Th1Stat1

Patanjali

SastriJ

S•Usi KllMCt

]"in

TheSe.te

Polm!iali

SttslriJ.

of such an order, and that the officers concerned in the illegal and unauthorised removal of the sugar were not acting in the discharge of their public func tions. Reference was made in this connection to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Lilla Singli

v. Queen Empress(') and Queen Empress v. Jogendra Nath Mukherjee( 2 ) where it was held that the public function in the discharge of which a public servant was obstructed must . be a legal or legitimately authorised function, in order that the obstruction might constitute an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code.

On the other hand, counsel for the respondent maintained that for an offence under that section it was not necessary that the act which was Obstructed must be duly authorised and otherwise lawful if it was being done or was sought to be done by a public servant honestly and in good faith believing that it was part of his public functions, and reliance was placed in support of this view on the decisions of the Madras High Court in Queen Empress v. Poomatai

Udayan( 8 ), Public Prosecutor v.

Madava Bhonjo Santos(') and Peer Masthan Rowther v. Emperor(").

We think it is unnecessary for the purpose of this appeal to pronounce on tbe true scope of section 186 of the Indian Penal Code as we are of opinion that the appellant's argument must fail on another ground.

It is manifest that sub-section (2) of section 3 confers no further or other powers on the Central Government than what are conferred under sub-section (1), for it is "an order made thereunder" that may provide for one or the other of the matters specifically enumerated in sub-section (2) which are only illustrative, as such enumerarion is "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section ( l) ".

Seizure of an article being thus shown to fall within the purview of sub-section (1), it must be competent for the Central Government or its delegate, the Provincial Government, to make an order for seizure under

(1) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 286.

(4) 31 M.L.J. 505.

(2) I.J..R. 24 Cal.'320.

(5) 1938 M.W.N. 418.

(3) I.L.R. 2 I Mad. 296.

that sub-section apart from and irrespective of the anticipated contravention of any other order as contemplated in clause (j) of sub-section (2). The order of 5th December, 1947, must, therefore, be held to be a valid order, notwithstanding its reference to the order of the 27th September, 1947, as being about to be contravened.

If the latter order was incomplete and inoperative and consequently there could be no question of its contravention, as contended for the appellant, the reference to it in the order dated the. 5th December, 1947, would be an immaterial redundancy and could not affect the validity of the latter order.

The seizure of the company's sugar must, therefore, be regarded as duly authorised and lawful, and the appellant by obstructing its removal, committed an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code even on the stricter construction placed on that provision by the Calcutta High Court.

The view we have expressed above receives support from the decision of the Privy Council in Sibnath Baneriu's case(1). Section 2(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, as amended by section 2 of the Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1940, empowered the Central Government to make rules for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, etc., and sub-section (2) enacted "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the rules may provide for all or any of the following matt.!rs ...... ". Among such matters was the detention of any person "reasonably suspected" of having acted etc. in a manner prejudicial to the public safety etc. [clause

(x) ].

Rule 26 of the Rules made under the section, however, authorised the Government to detain a person "if it is satisfied" that it was necessary ro detain him with a view to prevent . him from acting prejudicially ....... .

The Federal Court held (9) that this rule was ultr•

vires as it went beyond the . scope of clause (x) in that it left it to the satisfaction of the Government to decide whether or not it was necessary to detain :a

(1) [19+5] F.C.R. 195; 72 I.A. 241, 248. (2) (19+4] p; c,

Stm"1SllK11111.,

Jain v.

Tiii Stat•

Patanjali

Sastri; l.

Santosh .Kumar

Jain ...

Th1Stal1

P111anjali

SastriJ.

1'51

Muabl9.

person. The decision was reversed and Lord Thankerton, delivering the judgment of the Board, observed : "In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of subsection (2) is merely an illustrative one; the rule-making power is conferred by sub-section (1), and "the rules" which are referred to in the opening sentence of subsection (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub-section ( 1) ; the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section (1), as, indeed is expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)". "There can be no doubt-as the learned Judge himself appears to have thought-that the general language of sub-section (1) amply justifies the terms of rule 26, and avoids any of the criticisms which the learned Judge expressed in relation to subsection (2) ".

This accords with our view of the effect of subsections (l) and (2) of section 3 of the Act.

The appeal is dismissed. The appellant's bail bond is cancelled and he is ordered to surrender.

Appeal dismissed.

Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain.

Agent for respondent and Intervener: P. A. Mehta.

R.R. CHARI

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

[SHIU Rum.AL KANIA C.J, PATANJALI SASTRI

and DAS JJ.)

Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860),

SI. 161. 165-Criminal l'rocedure Code, 1898, ss. 190, 197-Preveniion of Corruption Act

(II of 1947), ss. 3, 6-0fjence under ss. 161 and 165, l.P.C.-Warra.nt issued by Magistrate during investigation by police-Sanction under s. 197, Cr. P. C., not obtained before iS1uing warrant- Le11ality of trial-When Magistrate takes "cognisance" of offence.

Un"r •· of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, an offcnc:c pllnishable under •· 161 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code

SANTOSH KUMAR JAIN

THE STATE

SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.

PATANJALI SASTRI

DAs JJ.

s. 3

s. 3

s. 186

Legality-lndian Penal Code, 1860

s. 186

Section 3

Central Government

Bihar

Patna

Santosh Kamat

Jain

s. 186

Indian Penal Code

s. 3

s. 3

s. 186

Penal Code

s. 186

Penal Code

[1945] F.C.R. 195

High Court of Judicature at Patna

s. 186

Indian Penal Code

N. C. Chatterjee

Rameshwar Nath

S. K. Mitra

K. Daval

S. M. _Sikri

s. 186

Indian Penal Code

Jagdishpur Zamindary Company

Rationing

6th December, 1947

Government of Bihar

5th December, 1947

section 3

Government of India

21st October, 1946

District Magistrate, Patna

Jagdishpur Zamindary Company, Bhita

cl. 7(1)

T. P. SINGH

6th Decembc;.r, 1947

s. 3

s. 186

Indian Penal Code

Sessions Judge, Patna

article 134

section 3

Section 3

4th August, 1947

section 3

section 4

section 3

Central

section 3

section 4

section 3

section 3 and 4

section 3

section 4

section 15

section 3

section 3

section 3

section 3

5th December 1947

cl. 7(15 (ii)

27th September, 1947

Calcutta High Court

section 186

Indian Penal Code

Madras High Court

section 186

Indian Penal Code

section 3

section 186

Indian Penal Code

Sibnath Baneriu

Section 2(1)

Defence of India Act, 1939

section 2

Santosh .Kumar

Thankerton

section 3

Rajinder Narain

P. A. Mehta

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

SHIU Rum.AL KANIA

Indian Penal Code

ss. 190, 197

Preveniion of Corruption Act

ss. 3, 6

ss. 161 and 165

s. 197

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

s. 165

Indian Penal Code