{"document_id": "1951_1_1125_1147_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1125\n\n\"provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State,\" is ultra vires the Indian Parliament which passed the Act.\n\nAgent for the President of India, the State of \"Bombay, the State of Madras and the State of Mysore : P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the State of Uttar Pradesh: C. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for Capt. Deep Chand and Pt. Amarnath Bhardwaj : R. S. N arula.\n\nAgent for the Ajmer Electric Supply Co. Ltd. : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for the Municipal Committee of Ajmer, the Maiden's Hotel and Runglal Nasirabad Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for Shri Munshi Lal and others : Shankar Das.\n\nANGURBALA MULLICK\n\nti •\n\n. DE BAB RAT A MULLICK.\n\n[SA1Ym FAzL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA AND CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nHindu Women's Rights to Property Act (XVIII of 1937), s. 3- <, Right to shebaitship-Whether \"property\"-Applicability of Act- Widow's right to joint shebaitship with son-Construction of deeds -\"Heirs of A,\" meaning of.\n\nThe word \"property\" as used in s. 3 (l) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, includes shebaitship which is a recognised form of property under Hindu law, and there is nothing in any of the provisions of the said Act which excludes from the y scope and operation of the Act succession to shebaitship.\n\nEven assuming that the word \"property\" in Act XVIII of 1937 is to be interpreted in a narrower sense, inasmuch as succession to shebaitship follows succession to property in its ordinary or secular sense and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act,\n\n111 re The Delhi Larva A.ct, 1912,. etc.\n\n./Jose J.\n\n.Angurba/a Mullick•· Debabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n1937, fays down th~ law of. succession to property in general, the devolution of shcba1tsh1p will also be governed by the said Ate .\n\nUmayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi [1945] upon. Suryanarayanacharyulu v. Seshamma\n\n103) approved.\n\nF.C.R. I, commented\n\n(A.LR. 1950 Mad.\n\nA deed of dedication of properties to a deity provided that the scttlor shall during her life-time be the shebait of the said deity and that after her death, her son M shall be the shebait. It provided further that after M's death, M's wife K and after K's death, the heirs of M shall be the shebaits. If M died without any issue or without giving authority to his wife to adopt, M shall be competent to appoint a shebait by will, but in case M died without any issue, the shebaitship shall, after the death of his wife devolve upon his heirs under the Hindu law. M died in 1942 leaving a son by his first wife K, and a second wife.\n\nIn a suit by the second wife for a declaration that she was entitled to the shebaitship as sole shebait or in any event as a j\"oint shcbait with her step-son :\n\nHeld, that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, was applicable to the case and the plaintiff was entitled to oint shebaitship with her step-son.\n\nHeld also, on the construction of the deed, (i) that the words uheirs of the said M\" occurring in the deed were not words -.>£ gift but only words regulating devolution; and (ii) that heirs oi M did not mean issue of M but his legal heirs and there was nothing in the deed to show that the son of M had i right to succeed in\n\npreference to the widow. ,...\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1951.\n\nAppeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 19th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J ..• and Sinha J.) in Appeal No. 29 of 1950 arising out of a decree dated 9th February, 1949, in Sit No. 2481 of 1947.\n\nBakshi Tek Chand (S. Banerji, with him) for the appellant. -\n\nS. Bannerjee (B. Sen and S. C. Roy, with him}, for the respondent.\n\n1951. May 3. The Judgment of Fazal Ali, Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ. was delivered by Mukhcrjca J.\n\nChandrasckhara Aiyar J. delivered a separate but concurring judgment.\n\nMuKHEKJEA J.-This appeal is directe.d against an appellate judgment of the Calcutta High C.Ourt, dated the 19th May, 1950, which affirmed the judgment of a single Judge of the Original Side of at C.Ourt passed on 9th February, 1949, in Suit No. 2481 of 1947.\n\nThe plaintiff, who is the appellant before us, is the widow of one Mrityunjoy Mullick, a wealthy Hindu resident of Calcutta, while the defendant, who is still an infant, is the only son of Mrityunjoy born of his first wife Kiranbala, who died during the lifetime of her husband. The controversy between the parties centres round the short point as to whether the plaintiff is entitled, after the death of her husband, to act as shebait of an idol named Sree Sree Nitto Gopal Jew founded by Mrityunjoy and his mother either solely or jointly with the defendant, her step-son.\n\nTo appreciate the points that have been canvassed before us in this appeal , it will be necessary to narrate a few antecedent facts about which there is no dispute between the parties.\n\nIt may be stated her$:! that neither side adduced any evidence before the trial judge during the hearing of the case and the questions\n\nraised in the suit were argued as questions of law turning on the construction of the indenture which created the endowment as well as of the provisions . of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act (Act XVUI of 1937 as amended by Act XI of 1938).\n\nIt appears that one Dhananjoy Mullick, who was the adoptive father of Mrityunjoy, died on 28th of August, 1907, leaving behind him, his widow Nitto\n\nSundari and the adopted son Mrityunjoy who was then a minor.\n\nOn February 11, 1 910, Nitto Sundari obtained letters of administration to the estate of the deceased Dhananjoy limited during the minority of the adopted son. On June 13, 1920, the widow purchased a house property in the city of Calcuttabeing premises No. 14, Syakrapara Lane-Qut of the monies belonging to the estate of her hunsoand, and on October 10, 1934, she conveyed the said property to Mrityunjoy who had by that time attained majority.\n\nAngurbala Mullick v.\n\nDebabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n19Sl\n\nAngorbala Mullick v. .Debabrota\n\nMulliclc\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nOn the very same day that this property was conveyed to Mrityunjoy, Nitto Sundari and Mrityunjoy together executed an indenture, by which certain properties described in Schedules A and B of the document and including premises No. 14, Syakrapara Lane, were dedicated to deity Nitto Gopal Jew. The indenture recites that Nitto Sundari had, with the consent and concurrence of her son, established and consecrated the said idol and located it in premises No. 14 Syakrapara Lane, and that she had been performing the worship and periodical festivals of the deity according to Hindu rites. The document lays down in detail the various rites, ceremonies and festivals of the idol that are to be performed daily or at specific periods, and the way in which the expenses necessary for these purposes are to be met from the income of the dedicated properties.\n\nA remuneration of 25 per cent. of the net income of the debutter property has also been provided for the shebait or shebaits for the time being.\n\nAfter declaring the various trusts, the indenture proceeds to provide for appointment of shebaits and for devolution of shebaitship in the following manner :-\n\n\"That the said Sm. Nitto Sundari Dassi doth thereby constitute and appoint herself the shebait of the said Thakur for and during the term of her natural life and doth hereby declare that after her death her son the said Mrityunjoy Mullick shall become the shebait of the said Thakur and after his death his wife Sm. Kiranbala Dassi and after her death the heirs of the said Mrityunjoy Mullick shall be and act as the shebait or shebaits of the said Thakur and she doth hereby declare him or them such shebait or shebaits accordingly and doth hereby direct and declare that the daily worship and other periodical festivals and ceremonies of the said Thakur should be performed by such shebait or shebaits.\n\nProvided however that in case the said Mrityunjoy Mullick . shall happen to die without any issue or without giving any authority to \"' his wife him surviving, to adopt, then in such case it shall be competent for the said Mrityunjoy Mullick to appoint by will or otherwise a shebait who would act\n\nas such after the death of his sai'd wife as aforesaid hut in case the said Mrityunjoy Mullick shall happen to die without any issue the shebaitship . of the said Thakur after the death of his wife shall devolve upon his heirs under the Hindu Law.\"\n\nIt is not disputed that Nitto Sundari acted as she. bait till her death in 1938 and that after her death Mrityunjoy become the shebait. Kiranbala, the first wife of Mrityunjoy, who is referred to in the indenture .as stated above, died on l4th January, 1942, leaving her infant son Debabrata, who is the defendant in the suit.\n\nSoon after her death, Mrityunjoy married the plaintiff Angurbala as his second wife and within five months after this marriage Mrityunjoy died on the 4th of July, 1942. The present suit was filed in the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court on 29th August, 1947, by Angurbala and she prayed for a declaration that she was the sole shebait of the deity under the terms of the indenture or, in the alternative, was entitled to shebaitship jointly with the defendant, she being a co-heir of her stepson under the provisions of the Hindu Wowen's Rights to Property Act. There was a further prayer claiming a right of residence in premises No. 14. Syakrapara Lane.\n\nThe written statement that was filed on behalf of the defendant denied the plaintiff's claim of shebaiti right, either exclusively in herself or jointly with the defendant, and asserted that the defendant was the sole shebait under the terms of the deed of endowment as well as under law. The defendant also . contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to any, right of resi4ence in the premises mentioned above.\n\nThe learned trial Judge by his judgment dated 9th of February, 1949, held that the plaintiff was neither the sole shebait of the deity nor was she entitled to claim shebaiti rights jointly with the defendant and that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act was inapplicable to devaluation of shebaiti, rights at all. It was held further that as the plaintiff was not in law the natural guardian of the defendant, she could not\n\nA.ng11rbalo Mullick v.\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nAngur/Jala\n\nMullick\n\nDebab11t1ta\n\nMullick\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nclaim to exercise the rights of a shebait on behalf of the defendant as his natural guardian so long as the defendent remained a minor.\n\nThe learned Judge held, however, that the plaintiff's claim to a right of residence in premises No. 14, Syakrapara Lane, was wellfounded and she was held entitled to relief in that respect.\n\nThe result was that save and except givmg the plaintiff a declaration of her right of residence in premises No. 14, Syakrapara Lane, all the other prayers of the plaintiff were dismissed.\n\nAgainst this decision the plaintiff preferred an appeal which came up for hearing before an appeal Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of Sir Trevor Harries C.J. and Sinha J.\n\nThe learned counsel appearing in support of the appeal did not seriously challenge that part of the decision of the trial Judge which negatived the plaintiff's claim to act as a sole shebait either under the terms of the indenture of endowment. or as a guardian of the defendant during the period of his minority.\n\nThe only question pressed was whether the plaintiff was entitled to be a joint shebait with the defendant.\n\nThe learned Judges rejected this contention of the appellant primarily on the ground that the identical point was raised and considered by the Federal Court in Umayal Ac!zi v. Lakshmi Achi(1) and it was held there that succession to shebaitship was not in any way altered or affected by the provisions of the Hindu \\Vomen's Rights to Property Act. The appeal was thus dismissed and the plaintiff having obtained a certificate under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution has now come up in appeal to this Court.\n\nThe substantial contention raisc; d by Mr. Tek Chand, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, is that under the clause in the indenture relating to devolution of shebaitship, the shebaitship is to go to Kiranbala after the death of Mrityunjoy and after her death it is to vest in the heirs of. Mrityunjoy. As Kiranbala died during the life-time of Mrityunjoy, the grant of the shebaiti right in her favour lapsed and the heirs of Mrityunjoy arc, therefore, entitled to come in as the\n\n(I) [1945] F, C.R.1.\n\nnext shebaits after Mrityunjoys death.\n\nWho these heirs are has. got to be determined according to the law in force at the time when the succession opened and under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, which came into force in the year 1937, the widow of a propositus, who dies intestate, would rank as an heir along with the son and would be entitled to the same share as a son gets in the property of the deceased; It is said that as shebaitship is property, it wouW devolve under section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act upon both the plaintiff and the defeadant jointly.\n\nAssuming, however, for argument's sake, that the expression \"property\", as used in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, tloes not include shebaiti right, it is argued by the learned counsel that it is a well-established proposition of law that succession to shebaitship is governed by the ordinary rules of inheritance in respect to secular property under the Hindu law, and as the Hindu women'.s Rights to Property Act has amended the general law of inheritance in certain matters, the same, alterations must be recognised in regard to succession to shebaitship as well. A point was also raised by Mr. Tek Chand-though it was not pressed seriously...:...that the language of the indenture would go to suggest that in the matter of succession to . shebaitship the wife of Mrityunjoy would have priority over other heirs.\n\ni.~ true that the document spe3ks only of Kiranbala, the wife of Mrityunjoy who is to. come as shebait after . his death; . but it is argued that the . word \"Kiranbala\" is merely descriptive of the word \"Wife'' and whoever would happen to be the wife of Mrityunjoy at the date of his death, would be entitled to succeed to his shebaiti rights.\n\nMr. Shankar Banerjee appearing for the respondent stated at the outset that he would not dispute as a proposition of law that shebaitship is property of\n\n~ some kind the devolution of which is governed, in the absence of any direction to the contrary given by the founder, by the ordinary rule of succession under the Hindu law.\n\nHe contended however, that the Hindu 26-3 S.C.India/68\n\nt9Sl\n\nA!fgurbala\n\nMullick v.\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukhetjea J.\n\nMullick v.\n\nDbabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMiJcher}ttl I.\n\nWomen's Rights to Property Act, which is a piece of special legislation enacted for a special purpose, does not use the expression \"property\" in a wide and unlimited sense; and it would appear clear from the provisions of the different sections of the Act that it could not have had in contemplation, and does not purport to affect, the rules of succession relating to the special and somewhat anomalous type of property which shebaitship admittedly is.\n\nThe learned counsel referred in this connection to the provisions of sections 3 and 5 of the Act as well as to the preamble which sets out its object, and considerable stress was laid upon the pronouncement of the Federal Court in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi('). The other contention put forward by the learned counsel turns upon the construction of the relevant clause in the indenture referred to above which lay down the mode of devolution of the shebaitship, and his argument was that reading the clauses as a whole, it would be clear that the intention of the executants of the deed was that the \"issue\" of Mrityunjoy would succeed to him as shebaits in the first instance and that no other heir of Mrityunjoy basing his claim either upon general law or any special enactment would be entitled to become shebait so long as any issue of Mrityunjoy was alive. A further question relating to the construction of the deed, raised by Mr. Banerjee, was that the words \"heirs of the said Mrityun; oy\" occurring in the deed arc to be construed not as words of devolution but of direct gift to the heirs under the deed and consequently the expression \"heirs\" must mean those who could legally claim :is heirs at the time when the grant was made : and any subsequent change in the law could not affect the position.\n\nWe will first advert to and examine the prov1s1on• of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act and see whether the Act includes within its scope a property of such character as shebaitship is.\n\nThe exact legal position of a shebait may not be capable of precise definition but its implications are\n\n(I) [194.5) F.C.R. 1.\n\nfairly well established. It is settled by the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Vidya Varuti v.\n\nBal usami (1) that the relation of a shebait in regard to debutter property is not that of a trustee to trust property under the English law. In English law the legal estate in the trust property vests in the trustee who holds it for the benefit of cestui que trust. In a Hindu religious endowment on the other hand the entire ownership of the dedicated property is transferred to the diety or the institution itself as a juristic person and the shebait or mahant is a mere manager. But though a shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical sense, it would not be correct to describe the shebaitship as a mere office. The shebait has not only duties to discharge in connection with the endowment, but he has a beneficial interest in the debutter pro- . perty.\n\nAs the Judicial Committee observed in the above case, in almost all such endowments the shebait has a share in the usufruct of the debutter property which depends upon the terms of the grant or upon custom or usage.\n\nEven where no emoluments are attached to the office of the shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which partially at least has the character of a proprietary\n\nright;.\n\nThus, in the conception of shebaiti both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together; and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is the presence of this personal or beneficial interest in the endowed property which invests shebaitship with the character of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal incidents of property.\n\nThis was elaborately discussed by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Manohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji(2 ) and this decision of the Full Bench was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v.\n\nLal Behary(8) and again in Bhabatarii v. Ashalata(4 ), The effect of the first two decisions, as the Privy Couru:il pointed out in the last case, was to emphasize\n\n(I) 48 I.A. 302.\n\n(3) 63 I. A. 448.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 60 CaL 4S2.\n\n27-3 S.C.lndia/68\n\n(4) 70 I.A. 57.\n\nAng_urb11la Mullick v.\n\nDebabrata Mullick ·\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nMu//ickv. Dehahrata Mullick\n\nMukhtrj.a J.\n\nthe proprietary element in the shehaiti right, and to show that though in some respects anomalous, it was ( an anomaly to be accepted as having been admitted into Hindu law from an early date. \"According to Hindu law,\" observed Lord Hobhouse in Gossamee Sree Greedharreejjee v.\n\nRumanlolljee Gossamee('), 'when the worship of a Thakoor has been founded, the shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of the !- founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or some circumstances to show a different mode of devolution.\" Unless, therefore, the founder has disposed of the shebaitship in any. particular manner-and this right of disposition is inherent in the founder-or except when usage or custom of a different nature is proved to exist, shebaitship like any other species of heritable property follows the line of r inheritance from the founder.\n\nTurning now to the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, it will be seen that the object of the Act, as set out in the preamble, is to give better rights to women in respect of property. Section 2 lays down :-\n\n\"Notwithstanding any rule of Hindu law or custom to the contrary, the provisions of section 3 shall apply where a Hindu dies intestate.\"\n\nSection 3( 1) then provides :- \"When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law dies intestate leaving any property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school\n\nof Hindu law ...... dies intestate leaving separate pro- perty, his widow, or if there is more than one widow all his widows together, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section ( 3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son:\n\nProvided that the widow of a predeceased son shall --. inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and shall inherit in\n\n(I) 161.A. 137.\n\nlike manner as a son's son if there is surviving a son or son's son of such predeceased son;\n\nProvided further that the same provts1on shall apply mutatis mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son.\"\n\n\\ Sub-sections (2) and ( 4) of section 3 ate not material\n\nfor our present purpose. Sub-section (3) lays down :- .\n\n\"Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate .......... \"\n\nSection 4 lays down. that the •Act is . not to operate retrospectively.\n\nThe only other section in the Act which has been referred to in the course of arguments is .section 5 which runs as follows :-\n\n\"For the purposes of this Act a person shall be. deemed to die intestate in respect of all property ot which he has not made a testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect.\"\n\nIt will be seen that section 3(1) abrogates the general rule of Hindu law according to which a widow succeeds to her deceased husband's property only in default of male issue and she is now entitled to the . same share as a son along with or in default of male issue. Similar rights have been given by the two provisos attached . to section 3 ( 1) to the widow of a predeceased son and also to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. Section 3(1) speaks of \"any property\". The expression prima facie includes, unless something to the contrary can be spelt out from the other provisions of the Act, all forms or types of interest answering to the description of \"property\" in law.\n\nOf course, the property must be heritable pre>- perty in respect to which alone. the question of succession may legitimately arise.\n\nReliance has been placed f:iy Mr. Banerjee, first of all, upon the object or purpose for which the statute was passed.\n\nThe object, as set out in the preamble, is to give better rights to women in respect to property; in other words, the object of the legislation is to confer\n\nAngurbala\n\nMullick\n\nV.· Debabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukherjea i.\n\nMul/itlt\n\nDebabrata\n\nMuJ//clt\n\nMuk/rerfea J.\n\n1136 SUPREME COURT Rfil'ORTS [1951!\n\nlarger rights upon women in comparison to what they enjoyed under the ordinary Hindu law.\n\nIn our opinion, the preamble does not throw any light on the question as to whether the Act does or does not include within its ambit rights and interest of a shebait.\n\nMr. Banerjee' next invokes in support of his conten tion the provisions of sub.section (3) of section 3, which lays down that the interest devolving upon a widow under the provisions of the Act will be the limited interest known as the \"Hindu women's estate''.\n\nIt is argued that this distinction between the Hindu woman's estate and the unrestricted rights of a male heir can be predicated only of ordinary secular pre>- perty, but this distinction is unmeaning when applied to shebaiti right, for the nature of the interest enjoyed by a. male or a female shebait is exactly the same.\n\nThis argument does not appear to us to be at all convincing. Precise! y the same thing happens when the shebaiti right devolves upon a female heir under the ordinary law of inheritance. If a shebait dies leaving behind him a widow and no male issue, the widow would succeed to shebaitship under ordinary law but her rights in respect oi the shebaiti would be restricted in the same manner as they would have been if the successor was the son.\n\nThis is because there are certain limitations and restrictions attached to and inherent in the shebaiti right itself and they exist irrespective of the fact as to whether the shebaitship devolves upon a male or a female heir. But although as regards powers of alienation the disability of the male and the female shebaits may be identical, then: is yet a distinction between them as regards the other limitation or characteristic of a Hindu women's estate.\n\nWhen a Hindu female heir succeeds to the property of a male propositus, she cannot transmit the interest which she inherits, to her own heirs upon her death.\n\nThe property goes after her death not to her heirs but to the heirs of the last male owner. This rule applies even when the right which devolves upon a widow is the right of a shebait. After her death the shblliti right would not pass to her stridhana heirs but would\n\ngo to heirs of the last shebait(1). Sub-section (3) of section 3, therefore, is of no assistance to Mr. Banerjee's client.\n\nMr. Banerjee then contends that section . 5 of the Hindu Woman's Rights to Property Act affords a clear indication that the Act is intended to be applicable only to property in respect to which a testamentary disposition is possible.\n\nThis section, it may be noted was added by the amending Act XI of 1938 and the object apparently was to explain what is meant by \"dying intestate\". It says that for the purposes of the Act -a person shall be deemed to die intestate in respect of all property of which he has not made a festamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect.\n\nMr. Banerjee would read the section as qualifying the meaning of the word \"property\" as used in section 3(1) or rather as engrafting a limitation upon it. What he says is, that the language of the section would be wholly inappropriate if the Act is applicable to properties in respect to which, as in the case of shebaitship, no testamentary disposition is possible.\n\nThis argument, in our opinion, cannot be accepted as sound.\n\nSection 2 of the Act which has been referred to above makes the provisions of section 3 applicable only when a Hindu dies intestate. A person is ordinarily regarded as dying intestate when he has left no will dispos.- 'ing of his properties.\n\nA doubt might arise as to whether this Act would apply when a will was actually executed by a deceased, but for some reason or other it was incapable of taking effect and it was for the purpose of removing such doubt that this section was added by the amending Act of 1938. The language of section 5 of the Act is exactly the same as that of section 30 of the Indian Succession Act and the object underlying both these provisions appears to be identical. Mere execution of a will is not enough to exclude the operation of the Act. The will must be an operative will and if the will is void or incapable of taking effect, it would be deemed that the testator has died intestate.\n\nIf the property is \"non-testamentable\", as:\n\n(I} Anurtlgi kuer v. Part1111a111md. t\\ .. I. R. 1939 Pat. 1.\n\nA._ngurbala\n\nMullicki v.\n\nDebabrata1 Mullick ·\n\nMukherjea 1.\n\nMullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMul/ic/o\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nMr. Banerjee puts it, no testamentary disposition of such property is possible or could take effect in law and the testator must in such circumstances be deemed to have died intestate in respect of such property.\n\nThus, there is nothing in any of the provisions of the Act from which an inference could be drawn that the expression \"property\" as used in section 3( l) has a limited or restricted interpretation and is not applicable to shebaitship, which is recognised as property in Hindu law.\n\nReference may now be made to the decision of the Federal Court in Umayal Achi v. Llkshmi Achi('), upon which the learned appellate Judges of the High Court practically based their decision.\n\nThe facts of ) that case stripped of unnecessary details are that one Arunachalam Chettiar who was a resident of Madras and owned considerable properties, moveable and immoveable, both within and outside British India, died leaving behind him two widows and the widow of a predeceased son.\n\nThe deceased had left a will but the legacies given by the same exhausted only a small portion of his estate so that with regard to the r rest which was of considerable value he died intestate.\n\nThe deceased was in possession of several trust properties in regard to which there were certain religious and charitable trusts and the direction in the will was that the management of these trusts should devolve upon his heirs.\n\nThe son's widow instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Devakottai for administration of the estate and for partition and ,_ separate possession of a half share of the same, basing her claim upon the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. The suit was resisted by the two widows as well as by the executqrs appointed under the will of the deceased and it was pleaded, intra alia, that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act was ultra vi res the legislature and that in any event it was not applicable as the propositus did not die intestate.\n\nThe trial court held first that the Act was not ultra vires and was operative on all properties with the exception of\n\n(I} [1945J F. C.R. I. ' . '\n\nagricultural lands and this finding was affirmed by the High Court on appeal and also on further appeal to the Federal Court by the majority of the Judges of the Court.\n\nThe second finding of the trial Judge was that the deceased died intestate with regard to a considerable amount of property and consequently the plaintiff was entitled to a half share thereof. The High Court affirmed this finding with this variation that her claim to moveable situated outside British India was not allowed but the Federal Court reversed the decision of the High Court on this point and restored that of the trial Judge. The other point and that is the point with which we are concerned in the present case, related to the devolution of the trust estates which were held by the testator. Both the courts\n\n~ below concurred in holding that these trusts should go\n\n to the heirs of the deceased under the ordinary Hindu law and that the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act were not attracted to the trusts.\n\nThis decision was upheld by the majority of the Judges in the Federal Court and the point was actually dealt with by Varadachariar J. in his judgment.\n\nThe view expressed by the learned Judge is that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act was intended to apply only to properties beneficially owned by the propositus and it was not applicable to rights in the nature of trusteeship. It seems to us that, properly construed, this decision does not stand in the way of the appellant.\n\nIn the first place, we do not know at all what the nature of these trusts was. The 'ilearned Judge observed himself in his judgment . that there was little or no evidence as to the terms of the foundations in respect of any of the trusts \"managed\" by the deceased.\n\nThis observation, taken along with the terms of the documents referred to in the judgment, would go to show that the deceased was a mere\n\nmanger of the trusts and in respect of some of them\n\n~ at least he was. the manager jointly with other persons.\n\nIn the High Court, Sir Lionel Leach C. J. expressly held that in no sense could the trust properties be regarded as the separate property of the testator and\n\nAngurbala Mullick v.\n\nDebabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMu/liclo\n\nDebahrata\n\nMullick\n\nMulcherjea J.\n\nconsequentfy Act XVIII of 1937 could not apply to such a case. V aradachariar J. observed with reference to the documents relied upon by the . learned counsel for the appellant that they only provided for \"management by his heirs.\" At any rate, we have no materials to hold that in regard to the trusts that formed the subject-matter of that suit the trustees had any beneficial or personal interest in the trust properties. the indications, on the other hand, are clearly in the opposite direction. In these circumstances, no question arises in the present case of controverting the proposition of law that V aradachariar J. purported to lay down, namely, that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act could not govern succession to property in respect to which the propositus had no beneficial enjoyment.\n\nIt is not possible, however, to enunciate on the basis of this decision, a broad rule of law that succession to shebaitship, in which an element of beneficial or personal interest is normally involved would not be governed by the provisions of the Act.\n\nThere are indeed one or two observations of the learned Judge in his judgment, not very definitely expressed, from which it is not impossible to draw an inference in favour of the respondent, but we think that they should be construed in the light of the facts and the actual decision in the case.\n\nThe observation that Hindu law regards trusteeship as property for certain purposes is of a most general character and it has to be noted that not only the word \"shebaitship\" has not been used by the learned Judge but he does not even confine his remarks even to religious trusts.\n\nMorever, .;. trusteeship is not certainly equivalent to shebaitship.\n\nOn the other hand, the reference made by the learned Judge to the limited objective of the Act affords an indication that he had in mind a trust of such a character where the trustee had no personal interest in the trust property.\n\nThe object of the Act as stated above, is to give better rights to women in respect of \"- property. If a trusteeship, evc;_n if it is regarded as P.roP<:rty, carries with it no emoluments or any beneficial interest for the trustee and consists of nothing else\n\nbut a bundle of obligations and duties, it might possibly be said that the giving of a share iDsuch rights to a Hindu widow would not in any way improve her position. But the position would be obviously differen.t if there is a beneficial interest of a substantial kind inseparably connected with the duties of a particular office. Then again, the learned Judge possibly used the expression \"private property\" in a somewhat loose sense as meaning personal property in respect to which the proprietor has a beneficial interest of his own.· The reference to section 3(3) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Ast is, as we have indicated already, not much helpful for the purpose of construing the Act.\n\nAfter all, we must take the decision as it stands and it is not right to call into aid a particulaI1 reason assigned by the learned Judge, for the purpose of carrying the decision beyond what it actually purports to. lay down.\n\nWe think that a very proper view of the effect of this decision of the Federal Court has been taken by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in P. Suryanarayanacharyulu v. P. Seshamma(1).\n\nThere the question arose in connection with the rights associated with the office of archakatavam, which is a hereditary religious office and the holder or holders of it for the time being are beneficially entitled to enjoy the income of the endowed property. It was held that the principle laid down by the Federal Court in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi(2) has no application to a case relating to the office of archak_atvan.\n\nIt is pointed out by the Madras High Court that though the observations of the learned Judge in the Federal Court are wide, the decision proceeded only . on the main ground that the Act governs succession to property beneficially owned by the propositus.\n\nIn our opinion, the same reasons apply to the case of a hereditary shebait of a private debutter, particularly where, as in the present case, 25 per cent. of the net income of the endowed properties has been given to the shebait or shebaits for the time being as their remunration.\n\nOur conclusion, therefore, • is that there is nothing in\n\n1(1) A.I .. 9SOMad. 103.\n\n(2) [1945] F.C.R. I.\n\nAngurbala Mullick v.\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n19Sl\n\nMui/kl<\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nany of the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act which excludes from the. sope a_nd operation of the Act succession to shebaitship which is a recognized form of property in Hindu law.\n\nAssuming that the word \"property\" in Act XVIII of 1937 is to be interpreted to mean property in its common and ordinarily accepted sense and is not to be extended to any special or peculiar type of property, even then we think that the other contention of Mr. Tek Chand is perfectly sound.\n\nSuccession to shebaitship, even though there is an ingredient of office in it, follows succession to ordinary or secular property.\n\nIt is the general law of succession that governs succession to shebaitship as well.\n\nWhile the general law has now been changed hy reason of Act XVIII of 1937, there does not appear to be any cogent reason why the law as it stands at present should not be made applicable in the case of devolution of shebaitship.\n\nThe last contention of Mr. Tek Chand that under the indenture itself the wife of Mrityunjoy and not Kiranbala particularly has been given rights of succession to shebaitship prior to any issue of Mrityunjoy is manifestly untenable and as the learned counsel was not at all serious in pressing this point, we consider it unnecessary to discuss it any further.\n\nIt remains for us now to advert to and consider the other contentions raised by Mr. B; merjee wi}ich depend upon the construction of the refevant clauses in the indenture.\n\nIt may be stated at the outset that we are not at all impressed by the argument of the learned counsel that the words \"heirs of the said Mrityunjoy\" occurring in the document are to be construed as words not of inheritance but of grant. Such construction would be against the language and the whole tenor of the document.\n\nIt is to be noted that Mrityunjoy was the owner of the dedicated properties and the real founder of the endowment. The mother was associated with him in the act of dedication because it was she who consecrated and established the diety and was looking after its worship and service since it was installed. It was in the fitness of things therefore that\n\nMrityunjoy should request his mother to become the }' fi'rst shebait and this is exactly what is recited in the indenture.\n\nAfter the death of Nitto Sundari, Mrityunjoy, the founder, himself, was to be the shebaii: and save and except the provision made in favour of Kiranbala, his existing wife, the devolution of shebaitship has been directed to be in the line of heirs of the r founder. There is no indication of any intention to treat the heirs as the objects of an independent gift.\n\nIt may be noted that this identical point was raised before the Federal Court in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi(1) with regard to the devolution of trust estates.\n\nThe direction in the will in that case was that they should go to the heirs. It was held by Varadachariar J. that it was not reasonable to construe such words as words of gift and not of devolution.\n\nOn the question of construction Mr.\n\nBnerjee's main argument is that if the relevant provisions of the indenture dealing with devolution of shebaitship are read as a whole, it. will be manifest that the executants of the deed intended that the issue of Mrityunjoy were to have preference over other heirs in the matter of succession to shebaitship; and that an heir who is not an issue could not come in . so long as an issue remained alive.\n\nThe relevant portion of the document has been set out already and it provides in the first place that after the death of Nitto Sundari, her son the said Mrityunjoy Mullick, shall become the shebait, after him his wife Smt. Kiranbala Dassi, and after her death, the heirs of the said Mrityunjoy Mullick shall be and act as shebaits.\n\nThen there is a proviso to the effect that if the said Mrityunjoy shall happen to die witheut any issue or without giving any authority to his wife; him surviving, to adopt, then in such case it shall be competent for Mrityunjoy to appoint by will or otherwise a shebait who would act as such after the death of the said wife; but in case the said Mrityunjoy Mullick shall happen to die without any issue, the shebaitship of the said Thakur after the death of his wife shall devolve upon his heirs undet\n\n(1) [1945] F.C.R. 1.\n\n~19Sl\n\nAngurbala Mu/lick v.\n\nDebahrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukherjea I.\n\n19SI\n\nAngurhala Mullick\n\nDebabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nHindu law.\n\nMr. Banerjee lays stress upon the proviso, particularly the last portion of it and it contains, according to him, a clear direction that it is only on the failure of issue that the heirs of Mrityunjoy can come in as shebaits.\n\nIn order that the proviso may be reconciled with the clause that precedes it, Mr. Banerjee invites us to hold that the word \"heirs\" in the previous clause should be taken to mean only the issue of Mrityunjoy.\n\nWe do not think that the interpretation suggested by the learned consel is the proper one. A proviso is normally an excepting or a qualifying clause and the effect of it is to except out of the preceding clause upon which it is engrafted something which but for the proviso would be within it. The word \"heirs\" cannot normally be limited to issue only. It must mean all persons who are entitled to the property of another under the law of inheritance.\n\nSo far as the main pr<>- vision is concerned there is nothing in the language or in the context to suggest that the word \"heirs\" has not been used in its ordinary or natural sense.\n\nMr.\n\nBanerjee argues that the proviso in that case would be wholly inexplicable whereas it is a sound canon of construction that all the parts of a document should be read together and no portion is to be omitted.\n\nIn our opinion, the clause that precedes the proviso lays down the general rule relating to devolution of shebaitship. The expression \"heirs\" has not been used in any restricted or limited sense and extends to all persons who are entitled to succeed under the law. The proviso engrafts an exception upon the general rule.\n\nWhat it does is to give a power to Mrityunjoy to appoint a shebait, who would come as such after his death in the contingency of his dying without any issue and without giving any' authority to his wife to .adopt a son. It may be noted that the word \"issue\" includes both son and daughter and the power of appointment cannot be exerised by Mrityunjoy even if he has a daughter living.\n\nThe proviso thus qualifies the main provision to this extent that if the particular contingency . that is mentioned here is fulfilled, Mrityunjoy\n\nwould be entitled to appoint a shebait, although no such power can be deduced from the general clause.\n\nIn case the contingency does happen l:iut the wife is not given any power of adoption and no appointment is also made by Mrityunjoy, the consequence woul_d certainly be that the other heirs of Mrityunjoy woul(l succeed as shebaits and this is what is laid down in the concluding portion of the proviso. The expression \"his heirs\" at the end of the proviso would certainly mean heirs other than the son and daughter of Mrity- unjoy. As Mrityunjoy actually left a son, the contingency contemplated by the proviso did not arise at all and in these circumstances the proviso is to be ignored altogether for purposes of construction and it is not proper to attempt to spell, out of it, by implication, something which is not only not in the main provisions but is contradictory to it.\n\nWe think, therefore, that this contention of Mr. Banerjee also must fail.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that, in our opinion, the appeal succeeds. The judgment and decree of both the courts below are set aside except the declaration of the right of residence of the plaintiff which was given by the trial court and not disturbed in appeal.\n\nIn addition to that, it will be decalred _that the plaintiff is entitled to joint shebaitship with the defendant in respect of the debutter created by the indenture of October 10, 1934.\n\nWe direct the taxed c0st.S of both the parties in all the courts to be paid out of the debuttar estate.\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR J.-1 agree with the conclusion reached by my thi:ee learned brothers in the judgment just now pronounced, but I would like to add a few words on two points on which I do not sec eye to eye with them fully.\n\nIn support of his contention that the word \"property\" in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act cannot be construed so comprehensively as to include a shebai~ right, Mr. Bannerjee referred to sub-clause (3) of secnon 3, which speaks of \"any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section\n\nMullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nAngurbala Mullick ...\n\nDehabrata Mullick\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi'yar J.\n\nshall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate\"; and he urged that the conception of such an estate as distinguished from an absolute interest is inapplicable to such a right of property. This is a point that deserves some attention.\n\nIn dealing with it, we are not thinking of any property endowed to the Thakur or the deity and its intrinsic legal characteristics as constituting a religious endowment.\n\nWe have in mind the shebaitship itself as a species of property.\n\nCan it be postulated with reference to the shebaitship that a Hindu widow succeeding to the office has only what is known as a \"Hindu women's estate\" as contrasted with a full or absolute estate taken by a male heir? Does a male heir get higher rights than a Hindu widow? and if so, what are they? So far as a shebaitship is concerned, the office does not enure beyond the lifetime of the holder, whether male or female, and is generally inalienable.\n\nIt is res extra commercium.\n\nA male heir cannot alienate it any more than a female heir.\n\nWhat limitations exist or are imposed on alienability arises out of the nature of the property and not out of the nature of the estate taken by the heir.\n\nIn the very nature of things, there can be no alienation for necessity, surrender, acceleration of the estate in favour of the next in succession, etc. Plausible and attractive is this line of reasoning, and it lends support to the view taken in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi(') by Sir Varadachariar, where, referring to sub-clause (3) of section 3, he observes :-\n\n\"This provision will be appropriate enough in relation to private property where the woman's estate is different from the interest taken by a male heir. But in respect of trusteeship or other similar office the law makes no difference between the interest taken by a male heir and the interest taken by a female heir.\"\n\nBut it does not decisively outweigh the several considerations set forth in the judgment just now delivered\n\n.. '\n\nby my learned brother Mukherjea J. for construing the \"'c word \"property\" in a wider serue so as to include the shebaiti right also. If there is no legal objection to a\n\n(1) [1945] F.C.R. !.\n\nwoman being a shebait under Hindu law, there is no particular reason why she should be excl?de~ from succeeding to the same under an Act which llllposes no restriction or prohibition either in express terms, or by necessary implication.\n\nThe next point relates to the construction of the deed of indenture executed by Nittamony Dasi and Mrityunjoy.\n\nI am of the opinion that the technica~ rules of interpretation of provisos and exceptions, witfi reference to their scope and legal effect, adopted in construing statutes should. not ordinarily be imported in interpreting deeds and documents executed by laymen.\n\nIn ordinary deeds, a proviso may sometimes be in the nature of an explanation of the main clause or provision; and we must look not merely at the form of the language but its substarn; e, the governing idea or purpose of the deed, the context and the surrounding circumstances together the real meaning or intention of the executant. Judged in thislight and adopting a broad construction, it appes to ine that what Mrityunjoy had in mind when he executed the indenture was, as made clear in the proviso, that his issue (born of his loins) or any person whom his wife may adopt on his authority, .should succeed to the shebaiti in the lint instance; and secondly, in default-of such contingency, the shebaitship should go to any person who may be nominated in this behalf by his will; and thirdly in default of issue (born or adopted) and in default of nomination by will (which is necessarily implied), the right was to devolve . upon his heirs under the Hindu law. In other words, the proviso explains what he means by his heirs in the preceding clause.\n\nIn this view, the respondent will succeed to the office in preference to the_ appellant.\n\nBut the construction placed on the indenture by my learned brothers is also a possible one and I do not desire to express any dissent from the result, they have reached.\n\nAppeal. al.lowed.\n\nAgent for appellant : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for respondent : P. K. Bose.\n\nMullick\n\ny,; .\n\nDebabrata Mullick\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nA.; yar I.", "total_entities": 132, "entities": [{"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 392, "end_char": 403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the President of India, the State of \"Bombay, the State of Madras and the State of Mysore : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the State of Uttar Pradesh: C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "Deep Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 472, "end_char": 482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deep Chand and Pt."}}, {"text": "Amarnath Bhardwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 491, "end_char": 508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarnath Bhardwaj : R. S. N arula."}}, {"text": "R. S. N arula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 511, "end_char": 524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarnath Bhardwaj : R. S. N arula."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 574, "end_char": 589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Ajmer Electric Supply Co. Ltd. : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "Shankar Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 734, "end_char": 745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for Shri Munshi Lal and others : Shankar Das."}}, {"text": "ANGURBALA MULLICK", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 748, "end_char": 765, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANGURBALA MULLICK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DE BAB RAT A MULLICK", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 795, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEBABRATA MULLICK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 814, "end_char": 833, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 836, "end_char": 845, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mulcherjea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 850, "end_char": 874, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 891, "end_char": 913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 931, "end_char": 935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1127, "end_char": 1131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1157, "end_char": 1185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1637, "end_char": 1659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Debabrata Mullick", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "./Jose J.\n\n.Angurba/a Mullick•· Debabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n1937, fays down th~ law of.", "canonical_name": "Debabrata Mullick"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1755, "end_char": 1764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "./Jose J.\n\n.Angurba/a Mullick•· Debabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n1937, fays down th~ law of.", "canonical_name": "Mulcherjea"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3478, "end_char": 3514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 19th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J ..• and Sinha J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3516, "end_char": 3523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 19th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J ..• and Sinha J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3536, "end_char": 3541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 19th May, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C.J ..• and Sinha J.) in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Tek Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3647, "end_char": 3663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bakshi Tek Chand (S. Banerji, with him) for the appellant. -"}}, {"text": "S. Banerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3665, "end_char": 3675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bakshi Tek Chand (S. Banerji, with him) for the appellant. -", "canonical_name": "S. Bannerjee"}}, {"text": "S. Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3709, "end_char": 3721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Bannerjee (B. Sen and S. C. Roy, with him}, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "S. Bannerjee"}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3723, "end_char": 3729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Bannerjee (B. Sen and S. C. Roy, with him}, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. C. Roy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Bannerjee (B. Sen and S. C. Roy, with him}, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Fazal Ali, Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3817, "end_char": 3824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Fazal Ali, Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ."}}, {"text": "Mukhcrjca", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3860, "end_char": 3869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Mukhcrjca J.\n\nChandrasckhara Aiyar J. delivered a separate but concurring judgment.", "canonical_name": "Mulcherjea"}}, {"text": "Chandrasckhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3874, "end_char": 3894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Mukhcrjca J.\n\nChandrasckhara Aiyar J. delivered a separate but concurring judgment.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "MuKHEKJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHEKJEA J.-This appeal is directe.d against an appellate judgment of the Calcutta High C.Ourt, dated the 19th May, 1950, which affirmed the judgment of a single Judge of the Original Side of at C.Ourt passed on 9th February, 1949, in Suit No.", "canonical_name": "Mulcherjea"}}, {"text": "9th February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4158, "end_char": 4176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHEKJEA J.-This appeal is directe.d against an appellate judgment of the Calcutta High C.Ourt, dated the 19th May, 1950, which affirmed the judgment of a single Judge of the Original Side of at C.Ourt passed on 9th February, 1949, in Suit No."}}, {"text": "Mrityunjoy Mullick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4272, "end_char": 4290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, who is the appellant before us, is the widow of one Mrityunjoy Mullick, a wealthy Hindu resident of Calcutta, while the defendant, who is still an infant, is the only son of Mrityunjoy born of his first wife Kiranbala, who died during the lifetime of her husband.", "canonical_name": "Mrityunjoy Mullick"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4320, "end_char": 4328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, who is the appellant before us, is the widow of one Mrityunjoy Mullick, a wealthy Hindu resident of Calcutta, while the defendant, who is still an infant, is the only son of Mrityunjoy born of his first wife Kiranbala, who died during the lifetime of her husband."}}, {"text": "Kiranbala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4428, "end_char": 4437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, who is the appellant before us, is the widow of one Mrityunjoy Mullick, a wealthy Hindu resident of Calcutta, while the defendant, who is still an infant, is the only son of Mrityunjoy born of his first wife Kiranbala, who died during the lifetime of her husband.", "canonical_name": "Kiranbala Dassi"}}, {"text": "Sree Sree Nitto Gopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4658, "end_char": 4679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The controversy between the parties centres round the short point as to whether the plaintiff is entitled, after the death of her husband, to act as shebait of an idol named Sree Sree Nitto Gopal Jew founded by Mrityunjoy and his mother either solely or jointly with the defendant, her step-son."}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5279, "end_char": 5301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dhananjoy Mullick", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5372, "end_char": 5389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one Dhananjoy Mullick, who was the adoptive father of Mrityunjoy, died on 28th of August, 1907, leaving behind him, his widow Nitto\n\nSundari and the adopted son Mrityunjoy who was then a minor.", "canonical_name": "Dhananjoy Mullick"}}, {"text": "28th of August, 1907", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5442, "end_char": 5462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one Dhananjoy Mullick, who was the adoptive father of Mrityunjoy, died on 28th of August, 1907, leaving behind him, his widow Nitto\n\nSundari and the adopted son Mrityunjoy who was then a minor."}}, {"text": "Nitto\n\nSundari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5494, "end_char": 5508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one Dhananjoy Mullick, who was the adoptive father of Mrityunjoy, died on 28th of August, 1907, leaving behind him, his widow Nitto\n\nSundari and the adopted son Mrityunjoy who was then a minor.", "canonical_name": "Nitto Sundari Dassi"}}, {"text": "February 11, 1 910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5566, "end_char": 5584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 11, 1 910, Nitto Sundari obtained letters of administration to the estate of the deceased Dhananjoy limited during the minority of the adopted son."}}, {"text": "Nitto Sundari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5586, "end_char": 5599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 11, 1 910, Nitto Sundari obtained letters of administration to the estate of the deceased Dhananjoy limited during the minority of the adopted son.", "canonical_name": "Nitto Sundari Dassi"}}, {"text": "Dhananjoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 11, 1 910, Nitto Sundari obtained letters of administration to the estate of the deceased Dhananjoy limited during the minority of the adopted son.", "canonical_name": "Dhananjoy Mullick"}}, {"text": "June 13, 1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5726, "end_char": 5739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 13, 1920, the widow purchased a house property in the city of Calcuttabeing premises No."}}, {"text": "October 10, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5906, "end_char": 5922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14, Syakrapara Lane-Qut of the monies belonging to the estate of her hunsoand, and on October 10, 1934, she conveyed the said property to Mrityunjoy who had by that time attained majority."}}, {"text": "Nitto Sundari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6196, "end_char": 6209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Angurbala Mullick v.\n\nDebabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n19Sl\n\nAngorbala Mullick v. .Debabrota\n\nMulliclc\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nOn the very same day that this property was conveyed to Mrityunjoy, Nitto Sundari and Mrityunjoy together executed an indenture, by which certain properties described in Schedules A and B of the document and including premises No.", "canonical_name": "Nitto Sundari Dassi"}}, {"text": "Nitto Gopal Jew", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6404, "end_char": 6419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14, Syakrapara Lane, were dedicated to deity Nitto Gopal Jew."}}, {"text": "Nitto Sundari Dassi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7306, "end_char": 7325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nitto Sundari Dassi doth thereby constitute and appoint herself the shebait of the said Thakur for and during the term of her natural life and doth hereby declare that after her death her son the said Mrityunjoy Mullick shall become the shebait of the said Thakur and after his death his wife Sm.", "canonical_name": "Nitto Sundari Dassi"}}, {"text": "Kiranbala Dassi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7603, "end_char": 7618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kiranbala Dassi and after her death the heirs of the said Mrityunjoy Mullick shall be and act as the shebait or shebaits of the said Thakur and she doth hereby declare him or them such shebait or shebaits accordingly and doth hereby direct and declare that the daily worship and other periodical festivals and ceremonies of the said Thakur should be performed by such shebait or shebaits.", "canonical_name": "Kiranbala Dassi"}}, {"text": "Debabrata", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8824, "end_char": 8833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kiranbala, the first wife of Mrityunjoy, who is referred to in the indenture .as stated above, died on l4th January, 1942, leaving her infant son Debabrata, who is the defendant in the suit.", "canonical_name": "Debabrata Mullick"}}, {"text": "Angurbala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8925, "end_char": 8934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after her death, Mrityunjoy married the plaintiff Angurbala as his second wife and within five months after this marriage Mrityunjoy died on the 4th of July, 1942.", "canonical_name": "ANGURBALA MULLICK"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9094, "end_char": 9113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was filed in the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court on 29th August, 1947, by Angurbala and she prayed for a declaration that she was the sole shebait of the deity under the terms of the indenture or, in the alternative, was entitled to shebaitship jointly with the defendant, she being a co-heir of her stepson under the provisions of the Hindu Wowen's Rights to Property Act."}}, {"text": "29th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9117, "end_char": 9134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was filed in the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court on 29th August, 1947, by Angurbala and she prayed for a declaration that she was the sole shebait of the deity under the terms of the indenture or, in the alternative, was entitled to shebaitship jointly with the defendant, she being a co-heir of her stepson under the provisions of the Hindu Wowen's Rights to Property Act."}}, {"text": "Angurbala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9139, "end_char": 9148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was filed in the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court on 29th August, 1947, by Angurbala and she prayed for a declaration that she was the sole shebait of the deity under the terms of the indenture or, in the alternative, was entitled to shebaitship jointly with the defendant, she being a co-heir of her stepson under the provisions of the Hindu Wowen's Rights to Property Act.", "canonical_name": "ANGURBALA MULLICK"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9415, "end_char": 9437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "9th of February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9997, "end_char": 10018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned trial Judge by his judgment dated 9th of February, 1949, held that the plaintiff was neither the sole shebait of the deity nor was she entitled to claim shebaiti rights jointly with the defendant and that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act was inapplicable to devaluation of shebaiti, rights at all."}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10186, "end_char": 10208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sir Trevor Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11158, "end_char": 11176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decision the plaintiff preferred an appeal which came up for hearing before an appeal Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of Sir Trevor Harries C.J. and Sinha J.\n\nThe learned counsel appearing in support of the appeal did not seriously challenge that part of the decision of the trial Judge which negatived the plaintiff's claim to act as a sole shebait either under the terms of the indenture of endowment."}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11943, "end_char": 11965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 133(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12051, "end_char": 12068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "Tek Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12174, "end_char": 12183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substantial contention raisc; d by Mr. Tek Chand, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, is that under the clause in the indenture relating to devolution of shebaitship, the shebaitship is to go to Kiranbala after the death of Mrityunjoy and after her death it is to vest in the heirs of."}}, {"text": "Mrityunjoys", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12669, "end_char": 12680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "next shebaits after Mrityunjoys death.", "canonical_name": "Mrityunjoy Mullick"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12832, "end_char": 12854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13137, "end_char": 13146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13168, "end_char": 13190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13344, "end_char": 13366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13645, "end_char": 13667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shankar Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14419, "end_char": 14435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shankar Banerjee appearing for the respondent stated at the outset that he would not dispute as a proposition of law that shebaitship is property of\n\n~ some kind the devolution of which is governed, in the absence of any direction to the contrary given by the founder, by the ordinary rule of succession under the Hindu law."}}, {"text": "Mukhetjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14851, "end_char": 14860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He contended however, that the Hindu 26-3 S.C.India/68\n\nt9Sl\n\nA!fgurbala\n\nMullick v.\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukhetjea J.\n\nMullick v.\n\nDbabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMiJcher}ttl I.\n\nWomen's Rights to Property Act, which is a piece of special legislation enacted for a special purpose, does not use the expression \"property\" in a wide and unlimited sense; and it would appear clear from the provisions of the different sections of the Act that it could not have had in contemplation, and does not purport to affect, the rules of succession relating to the special and somewhat anomalous type of property which shebaitship admittedly is.", "canonical_name": "Mulcherjea"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14920, "end_char": 14942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15436, "end_char": 15452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16305, "end_char": 16313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A further question relating to the construction of the deed, raised by Mr. Banerjee, was that the words \"heirs of the said Mrityun; oy\" occurring in the deed arc to be construed not as words of devolution but of direct gift to the heirs under the deed and consequently the expression \"heirs\" must mean those who could legally claim :is heirs at the time when the grant was made : and any subsequent change in the law could not affect the position.", "canonical_name": "S. Bannerjee"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act and see whether the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16751, "end_char": 16797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hobhouse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19533, "end_char": 19541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Hindu law,\" observed Lord Hobhouse in Gossamee Sree Greedharreejjee v.\n\nRumanlolljee Gossamee('), 'when the worship of a Thakoor has been founded, the shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of the !-"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20258, "end_char": 20280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20412, "end_char": 20421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20520, "end_char": 20529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20574, "end_char": 20587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21473, "end_char": 21482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21712, "end_char": 21721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21877, "end_char": 21886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22123, "end_char": 22135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22435, "end_char": 22444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22549, "end_char": 22561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Angurbala\n\nMullick\n\nV.· Debabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23207, "end_char": 23260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object, as set out in the preamble, is to give better rights to women in respect to property; in other words, the object of the legislation is to confer\n\nAngurbala\n\nMullick\n\nV.· Debabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukherjea i.\n\nMul/itlt\n\nDebabrata\n\nMuJ//clt\n\nMuk/rerfea J.\n\n1136 SUPREME COURT Rfil'ORTS [1951!"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23702, "end_char": 23711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25580, "end_char": 25589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act affords a clear indication that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25714, "end_char": 25776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26327, "end_char": 26339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act affords a clear indication that the Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act affords a clear indication that the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26660, "end_char": 26669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act affords a clear indication that the Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act affords a clear indication that the Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26738, "end_char": 26747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act affords a clear indication that the Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act affords a clear indication that the Act"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27193, "end_char": 27202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27245, "end_char": 27255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27263, "end_char": 27284, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mullick", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27752, "end_char": 27759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMul/ic/o\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nMr. Banerjee puts it, no testamentary disposition of such property is possible or could take effect in law and the testator must in such circumstances be deemed to have died intestate in respect of such property."}}, {"text": "section 3( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28150, "end_char": 28163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arunachalam Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28553, "end_char": 28573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of ) that case stripped of unnecessary details are that one Arunachalam Chettiar who was a resident of Madras and owned considerable properties, moveable and immoveable, both within and outside British India, died leaving behind him two widows and the widow of a predeceased son."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28596, "end_char": 28602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of ) that case stripped of unnecessary details are that one Arunachalam Chettiar who was a resident of Madras and owned considerable properties, moveable and immoveable, both within and outside British India, died leaving behind him two widows and the widow of a predeceased son."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28687, "end_char": 28700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of ) that case stripped of unnecessary details are that one Arunachalam Chettiar who was a resident of Madras and owned considerable properties, moveable and immoveable, both within and outside British India, died leaving behind him two widows and the widow of a predeceased son."}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge at Devakottai", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29241, "end_char": 29285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The son's widow instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Devakottai for administration of the estate and for partition and ,_ separate possession of a half share of the same, basing her claim upon the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act."}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29433, "end_char": 29455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29621, "end_char": 29643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30383, "end_char": 30388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court affirmed this finding with this variation that her claim to moveable situated outside British India was not allowed but the Federal Court reversed the decision of the High Court on this point and restored that of the trial Judge."}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30865, "end_char": 30887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31040, "end_char": 31053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was upheld by the majority of the Judges in the Federal Court and the point was actually dealt with by Varadachariar J. in his judgment.", "canonical_name": "V aradachariar"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31141, "end_char": 31163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lionel Leach", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31948, "end_char": 31960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the High Court, Sir Lionel Leach C. J. expressly held that in no sense could the trust properties be regarded as the separate property of the testator and\n\nAngurbala Mullick v.\n\nDebabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMu/liclo\n\nDebahrata\n\nMullick\n\nMulcherjea J.\n\nconsequentfy Act XVIII of 1937 could not apply to such a case."}}, {"text": "Mulcherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32169, "end_char": 32179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the High Court, Sir Lionel Leach C. J. expressly held that in no sense could the trust properties be regarded as the separate property of the testator and\n\nAngurbala Mullick v.\n\nDebabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMu/liclo\n\nDebahrata\n\nMullick\n\nMulcherjea J.\n\nconsequentfy Act XVIII of 1937 could not apply to such a case.", "canonical_name": "Mulcherjea"}}, {"text": "V aradachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32247, "end_char": 32261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V aradachariar J. observed with reference to the documents relied upon by the .", "canonical_name": "V aradachariar"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32864, "end_char": 32886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34946, "end_char": 34958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35449, "end_char": 35466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think that a very proper view of the effect of this decision of the Federal Court has been taken by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in P. Suryanarayanacharyulu v. P. Seshamma(1)."}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36734, "end_char": 36756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bnerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39728, "end_char": 39735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question of construction Mr.\n\nBnerjee's main argument is that if the relevant provisions of the indenture dealing with devolution of shebaitship are read as a whole, it.", "canonical_name": "S. Bannerjee"}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 40976, "end_char": 40991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Debabrata Mullick", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41082, "end_char": 41099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~19Sl\n\nAngurbala Mu/lick v.\n\nDebahrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukherjea I.\n\n19SI\n\nAngurhala Mullick\n\nDebabrata Mullick\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nHindu law.", "canonical_name": "Debabrata Mullick"}}, {"text": "Mrity- unjoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43792, "end_char": 43804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression \"his heirs\" at the end of the proviso would certainly mean heirs other than the son and daughter of Mrity- unjoy.", "canonical_name": "Mrityunjoy Mullick"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44785, "end_char": 44805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR J.-1 agree with the conclusion reached by my thi:ee learned brothers in the judgment just now pronounced, but I would like to add a few words on two points on which I do not sec eye to eye with them fully.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45088, "end_char": 45110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 45185, "end_char": 45194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention that the word \"property\" in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act cannot be construed so comprehensively as to include a shebai~ right, Mr. Bannerjee referred to sub-clause (3) of secnon 3, which speaks of \"any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section\n\nMullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nAngurbala Mullick ...\n\nDehabrata Mullick\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi'yar J.\n\nshall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate\"; and he urged that the conception of such an estate as distinguished from an absolute interest is inapplicable to such a right of property.", "canonical_name": "S. Bannerjee"}}, {"text": "Mullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukher}ea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45330, "end_char": 45368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention that the word \"property\" in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act cannot be construed so comprehensively as to include a shebai~ right, Mr. Bannerjee referred to sub-clause (3) of secnon 3, which speaks of \"any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section\n\nMullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nAngurbala Mullick ...\n\nDehabrata Mullick\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi'yar J.\n\nshall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate\"; and he urged that the conception of such an estate as distinguished from an absolute interest is inapplicable to such a right of property."}}, {"text": "Angurbala Mullick", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45373, "end_char": 45390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention that the word \"property\" in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act cannot be construed so comprehensively as to include a shebai~ right, Mr. Bannerjee referred to sub-clause (3) of secnon 3, which speaks of \"any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section\n\nMullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nAngurbala Mullick ...\n\nDehabrata Mullick\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi'yar J.\n\nshall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate\"; and he urged that the conception of such an estate as distinguished from an absolute interest is inapplicable to such a right of property.", "canonical_name": "ANGURBALA MULLICK"}}, {"text": "Dehabrata Mullick", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45396, "end_char": 45413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention that the word \"property\" in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act cannot be construed so comprehensively as to include a shebai~ right, Mr. Bannerjee referred to sub-clause (3) of secnon 3, which speaks of \"any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section\n\nMullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nAngurbala Mullick ...\n\nDehabrata Mullick\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi'yar J.\n\nshall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate\"; and he urged that the conception of such an estate as distinguished from an absolute interest is inapplicable to such a right of property.", "canonical_name": "Debabrata Mullick"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45415, "end_char": 45429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention that the word \"property\" in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act cannot be construed so comprehensively as to include a shebai~ right, Mr. Bannerjee referred to sub-clause (3) of secnon 3, which speaks of \"any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section\n\nMullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nAngurbala Mullick ...\n\nDehabrata Mullick\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi'yar J.\n\nshall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate\"; and he urged that the conception of such an estate as distinguished from an absolute interest is inapplicable to such a right of property.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Ai'yar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45431, "end_char": 45437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention that the word \"property\" in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act cannot be construed so comprehensively as to include a shebai~ right, Mr. Bannerjee referred to sub-clause (3) of secnon 3, which speaks of \"any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section\n\nMullick\n\nDebabrata\n\nMullick\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nAngurbala Mullick ...\n\nDehabrata Mullick\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAi'yar J.\n\nshall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate\"; and he urged that the conception of such an estate as distinguished from an absolute interest is inapplicable to such a right of property."}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46910, "end_char": 46923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Plausible and attractive is this line of reasoning, and it lends support to the view taken in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi(') by Sir Varadachariar, where, referring to sub-clause (3) of section 3, he observes :-\n\n\"This provision will be appropriate enough in relation to private property where the woman's estate is different from the interest taken by a male heir.", "canonical_name": "V aradachariar"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46963, "end_char": 46972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nittamony Dasi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47935, "end_char": 47949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next point relates to the construction of the deed of indenture executed by Nittamony Dasi and Mrityunjoy."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49588, "end_char": 49598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for appellant : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49624, "end_char": 49634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondent : P. K. Bose."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_128_137_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "RAMJILAL\n\nINCOME-TAX OFFICER, MOHINDARGARH\n\n[SHR1 HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL. Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 14, 31 (1), 32, 265-Patiala and East Puniab States Union General Provisions (Administration) Ordinance (XVI of 2005)-Union of States-Law relating to Income-tax-Uniform law introduced in all States from August 20, 1948-Provision that pending proceedings shall be governed by existing law-Assessment at different rates in different States- Equality of law-Infringement of fundamental right-Assessment\n\nt>f income which accrued before August 20, 1948-Legality- Fundamental right not to be deprived of property save under authority of law-Whether applies to taxation-Scope of Arts. 31 (1) and 265-Application under Art. 32 for protection against tax laws-Maintainability.\n\nSection 3 (1) of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Provsions (Administration) Ordinance (No. XVI of 2005) which came into force on February 2, 1949, and re-enacted s. 3 of an earlier Ordinance which was in force from August 20, 1948, provided that as from the appointed day (i.e., August 2Q, 1948) all laws in force in the Patiala State shall apply mutatis mutandis to the territories of the said Union, provided that all proceedings pending before courts and other authorities of any of the Covenanting States shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws governing such proceedings in force in such Covenanting State immediately before August 20, 1948.\n\nIn one of the Covenanting States, viz., Kapurthala, there was a law of income-tax in force on the said date, the rate of tax payable under which was lower than that payable under the Patiala Income-tax Act, and in another Covenanting State, Nabha, there was no law of income-tax at all.\n\nFor the accounting year ending April 12, 1948, assessees of Kapurthala State were assessed at the lower rates fixed by the Kapurthala Income-tax Act, in accordance with the proviso in s. 3 of the Ordinance .relating to pending proceedings, and the asse9sccs of Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act as there was no income-tax law in Nabha on August\n\nJan. 12\n\nJncamt•tax\n\nOfficer, Mohit'lt!argarh.\n\n20, 1948, and no income-tax proceedings were therefore pending in Nabha.\n\nThe petitioner who was an asscssee residing in Nabha and who was assessed under the Patiala Act applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari quashing the assessment on the ground (i) that he hlld been denied the fundamental right of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as he was assessed at a higher rato than that at which asscssces of Kapurthala were assessed, (ii) that, as the Ordinance bringing the Patiala Income-tax Act into force in Nabha was enacted only on August 20, 1948, it cannot operate retrospectively and authorise the levy of tax on income which had accrued in the year ending April 12, 1948, and therefore he was threatened with infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 31 (1) of the Constitution that no one shall be deprived of his property save under autt.>rity of law :\n\nHeld, (i) that the discrimination, if any, between the assessecs of Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance but by the circumst'Ulcc that there was no incomcta.X law in Nab ha and consequently there was no case of assessment pending against any Nabha assessces; and in any case the provision that pending proceedings should be concluded according to the law applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities accrued and the proceedings commenced, was a reasonable law founded upon a reasonable classification of the assessees which is permissible under the equal protection clause;\n\n(ii) that, as there is a special provision in Art. 265 of the Constitution that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law, cl. (1) of Art. 31 must, be regarded as conocrned with deprivation of property otherwise than by the imposition or collection of tax, and inasmuch as the right conferred by Art. 265 is not a right conferred by Part III of the Constitution, it could not be cnforoed under Art. 32.\n\nORIGINAL JUlllso1cnoN: Petition No. 135 of 1950.\n\nApplication under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari and prohibition.\n\nDr. Tek Chand (Hardayal Hardy and findra Lal, with him) for the petitioner.\n\nM. C. SetalvaJ, Attorney-General for India\n\n(S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1951. January 12. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution for appropriate orders for the protection of what the petitioner claims to be his fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 14 and 31. This is said to be a test case, for on its decision, we are told, depend the rights of numerous other persons whose interests are similar to those of the petitioner.\n\nThere is no serious controversy as to the facts material for the purposes of this application. They are shortly as follows : On May 5, 1948, the then Rulers of eight Punjab States including Patiala and Nabha with the concurrence and guarantee of the Government of India entered into a convenant agreeing to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a commori executive, legislature and judiciary by the name of Patiala and East Punjab States Union hereinafter competidiously referred to as the Pepsu.\n\nBy article III (6) of the covenant the then Ruler of Patiala became the first President or Raj Pramukh of the Council of Rulers and he is to hold the office during his lifetime. Article VI of the covenant is as follows :-\n\n\" (1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall, as soon as may be practicable, and in any event not later than the 20th of August, 1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh, and thereupon,\n\n(a) all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain, or are incidental to the Government of the Convenanting State shall vest in\n\nv. /ncome•tax\n\nOfficer, Mohindargarh • .\n\nDas]\n\nRaJJ!iilal v.\n\nIncome.tu\n\nOfficer, Mohindargarh.\n\nDas].\n\nthe Union and shall thereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder ;\n\n(b) all duties and obligations of the Ruler pertaining or incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State shall devolve on the Union and shall be discharged by it ; ( c) all the assets and liabilities of the Covenanting State shall be the assets and liabilities of the Union, and ( d) the military forces, if any, of the Covenanting State shall become the military forces of the Union.\"\n\nArticle X provides for the formation of a Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution of a unitary type for the Union within the framework of the Covenant and the Constitution of India.\n\nThis Constituent Assembly was also to function as the interim Legislature of the Union until an elected legislature came into being. The proviso to clause (2) of that Article runs as follows :-\n\n\"Provided that until a Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly comes into operation after receiving the assent of the Raj Pramukh, the Raj Pramukh shall have power to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of the Union or any part thereof, and any Ordinances so made shall, for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Constituent Assembly ; but any such Ordinance may be controlled or superseded by any such Act\"\n\nThis Union was inaugurated on July 15, 1948, and the Raj Pramukh thereafter took over the administration of the different Covenanting States.\n\nThe Administration of Nabha State was taken over by the Raj Pramukh on August 20, 1948.\n\nOn the same day the Raj Pramukh, in exercise of the powers vested in him, promulgated an Ordinance (No. 1 of 2005) called the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (Administration)\n\nOrdinance, 2005.\n\nThe following provisions of this Ordinance are relevant for our purpose :\n\n\"1. (2) It shall extend to the territories included in the Covenanting States on and from the date on which the administration of any of the said State or States has been or is made over to the Raj Pramukh.\n\n3. As soon as the administration of any Covenanting State has been taken over by the Raj Pramukh as aforesaid, all laws, Ordinances, Acts, Rules, Regulations, Notifications, Hidayats and Hirmans-i-Shahi having fore of law in Patiala State on • the date of commencement of this Ordinance shall apply mutatis\n\nmutandis to the territories of the said State and with effect from that date all laws in force in such covenanting State immediately before that dat~ shall be repealed : Provided that proceedings of any nature whatsoever pending on such date in the Courts or offices of any such Covenanting State shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other Ordinance, be disposed of in accordance with the laws\n\nGoverning such proceedings in force for the time being in any such Covenanting State.\"\n\nSection 6 provides for the adaptation of the laws etc. enforced under section 3 and, amongst other things, any reference in these laws, etc., to the Patia!a State and the like was to be construed as a reference to the State of the Union.\n\nA notification (No. 35, dated 27-5-05/11-9-1948) was issued over the signature of the Revenue Secretary notifying that the Patiala Income-tax Act of 2001 and the Rules thereunder had come into force in the various Covenanting States from August 20, 1948, thereby repealing the law or laws in force in that behalf in those States before that date, except :&s to pending proceedings. It may be mentioned here that prior to that date there was no law in the Nabha State imposing income-tax on the subjects of that State. On November 14, 1948, the Commissioner of In.-ome-tax issued a Notification (No. 4, dated\n\nv, lncom•-IOJ<\n\nOjfieer, Mohindargarh,\n\nDas:J.\n\n!951\n\nRamjilal v.\n\nJncoffle-tax\n\nOfficer, Mohindargarh.\n\nDas],\n\n29-7-2005) intimating that persons belonging to the Covenanting States of Nabha and Nalagarh would be assessed to income-tax under the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001. It was mentioned that persons of those States whose income reached the taxable limit \"should\n\nhenceforward keep regular and proper accounts for purposes of audit by the Income Tax Department.\"\n\nOn February 2, 1949, Ordinance 1 of 2005 was repealed and replaced by Ordinance No. XVI of 2005 promulgated by the Raj Pramukh and called the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Provisions (Administration) Ordinance, 2006.\n\nSection 3 (1) runs as follows:\n\n\"3. (I) As from the appointed day, all laws and rules, regulations, bye-laws and notifications made thereunder, and all other provisions having the force of law, in Patiala State on the said day shall apply mutaJis matandis to the territories of the Union and all laws in force in the other Covenanting States immediately before that day shall cease to have effect;\n\nProvided that all suits, appeals, revisions, applications, reviews, executions and other proceedings, or any of them, whether Civil or Criminal or Revenue, pending in the Courts and before authorities of any Covenanting States shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance, be disposed of in accordance with the laws governing such proceedings in force in any such Covenanting State immediately before the appointed day.\"\n\nBy section (2) (a) the \"appointed day\" was defined as meaning the 5th day of Bhadon, 2005, corresponding to August 20, 1948. There was a section providing for adaptation similar to section 6 of the Ordinance 1 of\n\n2005. There was another Ordinance to which reference has to be made, namely, Ordinance No. 1 of 2006 called the Finance Ordinance promulgated on April 13, 1949, which came into force on that very date. Section 5 of that Ordinance introduced several amendments to the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001. It recast\n\nsections 3 and 34 of that Act and introduced a new section as section 23B.\n\nSection 6 of that Ordinance runs thus :\n\n\"6. For the assessment year beginning on the 1st day of Baisakh, 2006, that is to say, in respect of the accounting the income, profits and gains of the previous year ending on the last day of Chet, 2005,-\n\n(a) income-tax shall be charged at the rates specified in Part I of the , Second Schedule to this Ordinance, and\n\n(b) rates of super tax shall, for the purposes of section 55 of the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001, be specified in Part II of the Second Schedule to this Ordinance.\"\n\nIt is in this setting that the facts leading to the present petition have to be considered.\n\nThe petitioner is a resident of Ateli in the district of Mohindargarh now in Pepsu but which formerly formed part of the Nabha State. The petitioner has been carrying on his business at Ateli for a number of years under the name and style of Raghunath Rai Ram Parshad.\n\nHe never paid any income-tax as no such tax was imposed by any law in the Nabha State.\n\nOn October 20, 1949, the petitioner was served with a notice under sections 22(2) and 38 of the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001, requiring him to submit a return for the Income Tax year 2006 (13-4-1949 to 12-4-1950) disclosing his income during the previous year (13-4-1948 to 12-4-1949).\n\nThe petitioner, on December 4, 1949, filed his return for the year 2006 and on February 14, 1950, he was assessed to income-tax. On May 23, 1950, the petitioner received a notice under section 34 calling upon him to file his return for the year ending the last day of Chet 2005, i.e., for the year 13-4-1948 to 12-4-1949.\n\nIn this return he had to specify his income of the previous year, namely, 2004 (i.e., 13-4-1947 to 12-4-1948).\n\nIt appears that the petitioner along with other assessees of Ateli and Kanina submitted a petition before the Income Tax Officer on July 9, 1950, asking him not to\n\n<J Income-tait\n\nOjfieer, Mohintlargark.\n\nDas J.\n\n)951\n\nRoniiilal\n\nv lntom1-taJt\n\nOffien, .Mohindargarh.\n\nDas J.\n\nproceed with the assessment for the year 2005 but on July 13, 1950, the Income Tax Officer assessed him to\n\nthe best of his judgment under section 34 ( 4) read with section 22 ( 4) of the Income Tax Act. The petitioner along with other assessees similarly situated moved the Income Tax Commissioner and the Central Board of Revenue, New Delhi, but without any success. No formal appeal under the Patiala Income Tax Act appears to have been filed by the petitioner against assessments for either of the two years 2005 and 2006.\n\nOn August IO, 1950, the petitioner filec\"I his present petition before this Court under article 32 of the Constitution praying that a writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari be issued for quashing the assessments of the petitioner's income accrued in the years 2004 and 2005 and other ancillary reliefs.\n\nDuring the pendency of this petition the income-tax authorities have issued a notice under section 46 intimating that penalty will be imposed if the tax was not paid up.\n\nThe contention of the petitioner in the first place is that he has been denied the fundamental right of equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to him by article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nHis grievances are formulated in paragraphs IO and 11 of his petition It is said that while the people of Kapurthala which is included in Pepsu have been asked to pay income-tax for the period prior to August 20,\n\n1948, at the old rate fixed by the Kapurthala Income Tax Act which was lower than die rate fixed by the\n\nPatiala Income Tax Act, 2001, the people of Nabha who had not to pay any income-tax prior to August 20, 1948, at all have been made liable to pay at the higher Patiala rate and that such discrimination offends against the provisions of article 14.\n\nThis charge is refuted by paragraph 10 of the affidavit of Sardar Gurbax Singh, the Additional Director of Inspection (Income Tax), New Delhi, who was.formerly the Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab and Pepsu, which ha' been filed in opposition to the present petition. It is there stated that for the assessment year 2005, in Kapurthala the asessees whose cases were pending on\n\nAugust 20, 1948, were assesssed under the Kapurthala Income Tax Act at rates fixed thereunder but that for the assessment year 2006 the provisions of the Patiala Income Tax Act and the rates prescribed thereunder were uniformly applied in all areas of the Pepsu, including Kapurthala. This allegation which is not denied in the affidavit filed by the petitioner in reply must be taken as correct. The assessment of Kapurthala assessees for the year 2005 at the old Kapurthala rate was obviously made under the proviso to section 3 of Ordinance. No. 1 of 2005, which was reproduced in the proviso to section 3(1) of the Ordinance No. XVI of 2006 and both of which required all pending proceedings to be completed according to the law applicable to those proceedings when they were initiated. No case of assessment was pending as against any bha assessee on August 20, 1948, for there was no Income Tax Act in Nabha prior to that date and, therefore, there could be no occasion for completing any pending proceedings against any of such assessees.\n\nIn the premises, there can be no grievance by them on the score of discrimination.\n\nThe discrimination, if any, was not brought about by the two Ordinances, but by the circumstance that there was no Income Tax Act in Nabha and consequently there was no case of assessment pending against any Nabha assessees. In any case the provisions that pending proceedings should be concluded according to the law applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities 'accrued and the proceeding commenced is a reasonable law founded upon a reasonable classification of the assessees which is permissible under the equal protection clause and to which no exception can be taken.\n\nIn our opinion the grievance of the alleged infringement of fundamental right under Article 14 is not well-founded at all.\n\nDr. Tek . Chand appearing in support of the petition next contends that the administration of Nabha State having be.en taken over by the Raj Pramukh onty on August 20, 1948, and the Patiala law including the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001, having been brought\n\nBlllnjilal\n\nv. l111:om1-l1U1\n\nO.ffic11 Mo4illtlar1111ll,\n\nD111:J.\n\nJ95J\n\nR\"Jlfii/ol\n\nv. lncomtt0%\n\nOffien, Mdintlargarb.\n\nDru].\n\ninto operation on and from August 20, 1948, the assessment of the tax on the petitioner's income which accrued prior to August 20, 1948, was wholly illegal and not authorised by the said Ordinances and the State by insisting on collecting the tax so illegally assessed was threatening to invade the petitioner's fundamental right to property guaranteed by article 31 (1) of the the Constitution.\n\nArticle 31 (1) runs as follows:\n\n\"(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that clause (1) reproduces subsection ( 1) of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, without the words \"in British India\".\n\nReference has next to be made to article 265 which is in Part XII, Chapter I, dealing with \"Finance\".\n\nThat article provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.\n\nThere was no similar provision in the corresponding chapter of the Government of Indian Act, 1935.\n\nIf collection of taxes amounts to deprivation of property within the meaning of article 31 (1), then there was no point in making a separate provision again as has been made in article 265.\n\nIt, therefore, follows that clause (1) of article 31 must be regarded as concerned with deprivation of property otherwise than by the imposition or collection of tax, for otherwise arttcle 265 becomes wholly redundant. In the United States of America the power of taxation is regarded as distinct from the exercise of police power or eminent domain.\n\nOur Constitution evidently has also treated taxation as distinct from compulsory acquisition of property and has made inde pendent provision giving protection against taxation save by authority of law. When Dr. Tek Chand was asked if that was not the correct position, he did not advance any cogent or convincing answer to refute the conclusion put to him. In our opinion, the protection against imposition and collection of taxes save by authority of law directly comes from article 265, and is not secured by clause (1) of article 31. Article 265,\n\n' <\n\n__,,\n\nnot being in Chapter III of the Constitution, its protection is not a fundamental right which can be enforced by an application to this court under article 32.\n\nIt is not our purpose to say that the right secured by article 265 may not be enforced.\n\nIt may certainly be enforced by adopting proper proceedings.\n\nAll that we wish to state is that this application in so far as it purports to be foundc::d on article 32 read with article 31 (1) to this Court is misconceived and must fail.\n\nThe whole of Dr. Tek Chand's argument was founded on the basis that protection against iposition and collection of taxes save by authority of law was guaranteed by article 31 (1) and his endeavour was to establish that the Pepsu Ordinances could not, in law, and did not, on a correct interpretation of them. impose any income-tax retrospectively, that the Jn. come Tax Officer on an erroneous view of the law had wrongly assessed the tax on income accruea prior . to August 20, 1948, and that consequently the petitioner was being threatend with deprivation of property otherwise than by authority of law. In the view we have taken, namely, that the protection against imposition or collection of taxes save by authority of law is secured by article 265 and not by article 31 (1), the questions urged by Dr. Tek Chand do not really arise and it is not necessary to express any opinion on them on this application. Those questions can only arise in appropriate proceedings and not on .an application under article 32. In our judgment this application fails on the simple ground that no fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed either under article 14 or under article 31 (1) and we accordingly dismiss the petition with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Naunit Lal.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta. ·\n\nRamjilal v. /a<ome-taJt\n\nOjfieer, Mohindargarj.\n\nDas].", "total_entities": 126, "entities": [{"text": "RAMJILAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 8, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMJILAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, MOHINDARGARH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, MOHINDARGARH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHR1 HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 731, "end_char": 739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 828, "end_char": 837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "February 2, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 974, "end_char": 990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVI of 2005) which came into force on February 2, 1949, and re-enacted s. 3 of an earlier Ordinance which was in force from August 20, 1948, provided that as from the appointed day (i.e., August 2Q, 1948) all laws in force in the Patiala State shall apply mutatis mutandis to the territories of the said Union, provided that all proceedings pending before courts and other authorities of any of the Covenanting States shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws governing such proceedings in force in such Covenanting State immediately before August 20, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1007, "end_char": 1011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August 20, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1060, "end_char": 1075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVI of 2005) which came into force on February 2, 1949, and re-enacted s. 3 of an earlier Ordinance which was in force from August 20, 1948, provided that as from the appointed day (i.e., August 2Q, 1948) all laws in force in the Patiala State shall apply mutatis mutandis to the territories of the said Union, provided that all proceedings pending before courts and other authorities of any of the Covenanting States shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws governing such proceedings in force in such Covenanting State immediately before August 20, 1948."}}, {"text": "August 2Q, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1124, "end_char": 1139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVI of 2005) which came into force on February 2, 1949, and re-enacted s. 3 of an earlier Ordinance which was in force from August 20, 1948, provided that as from the appointed day (i.e., August 2Q, 1948) all laws in force in the Patiala State shall apply mutatis mutandis to the territories of the said Union, provided that all proceedings pending before courts and other authorities of any of the Covenanting States shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws governing such proceedings in force in such Covenanting State immediately before August 20, 1948."}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1166, "end_char": 1173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVI of 2005) which came into force on February 2, 1949, and re-enacted s. 3 of an earlier Ordinance which was in force from August 20, 1948, provided that as from the appointed day (i.e., August 2Q, 1948) all laws in force in the Patiala State shall apply mutatis mutandis to the territories of the said Union, provided that all proceedings pending before courts and other authorities of any of the Covenanting States shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws governing such proceedings in force in such Covenanting State immediately before August 20, 1948."}}, {"text": "Kapurthala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1542, "end_char": 1552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapurthala, there was a law of income-tax in force on the said date, the rate of tax payable under which was lower than that payable under the Patiala Income-tax Act, and in another Covenanting State, Nabha, there was no law of income-tax at all."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1693, "end_char": 1707, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nabha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1743, "end_char": 1748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapurthala, there was a law of income-tax in force on the said date, the rate of tax payable under which was lower than that payable under the Patiala Income-tax Act, and in another Covenanting State, Nabha, there was no law of income-tax at all."}}, {"text": "April 12, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1821, "end_char": 1835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the accounting year ending April 12, 1948, assessees of Kapurthala State were assessed at the lower rates fixed by the Kapurthala Income-tax Act, in accordance with the proviso in s. 3 of the Ordinance .relating to pending proceedings, and the asse9sccs of Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act as there was no income-tax law in Nabha on August\n\nJan. 12\n\nJncamt•tax\n\nOfficer, Mohit'lt!argarh."}}, {"text": "Kapurthala State were assessed at the lower rates fixed by the Kapurthala Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1850, "end_char": 1938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1974, "end_char": 1978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kapurthala State were assessed at the lower rates fixed by the Kapurthala Income-tax Act", "statute": "Kapurthala State were assessed at the lower rates fixed by the Kapurthala Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2051, "end_char": 2115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2399, "end_char": 2406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act", "statute": "Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2639, "end_char": 2646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act", "statute": "Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2819, "end_char": 2833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3107, "end_char": 3114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act", "statute": "Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act"}}, {"text": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3285, "end_char": 3344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3870, "end_char": 3878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance", "statute": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3979, "end_char": 3986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance", "statute": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Art. 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4141, "end_char": 4149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance", "statute": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance", "statute": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4317, "end_char": 4324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance", "statute": "Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Tek Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4416, "end_char": 4425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Tek Chand (Hardayal Hardy and findra Lal, with him) for the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Tek . Chand"}}, {"text": "Hardayal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4427, "end_char": 4441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Tek Chand (Hardayal Hardy and findra Lal, with him) for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "findra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4446, "end_char": 4456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Tek Chand (Hardayal Hardy and findra Lal, with him) for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. C. SetalvaJ", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. SetalvaJ, Attorney-General for India\n\n(S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. M.\n\nSikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4534, "end_char": 4546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. SetalvaJ, Attorney-General for India\n\n(S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4677, "end_char": 4687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4823, "end_char": 4841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 5, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5138, "end_char": 5149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are shortly as follows : On May 5, 1948, the then Rulers of eight Punjab States including Patiala and Nabha with the concurrence and guarantee of the Government of India entered into a convenant agreeing to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a commori executive, legislature and judiciary by the name of Patiala and East Punjab States Union hereinafter competidiously referred to as the Pepsu."}}, {"text": "Nabha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5212, "end_char": 5217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are shortly as follows : On May 5, 1948, the then Rulers of eight Punjab States including Patiala and Nabha with the concurrence and guarantee of the Government of India entered into a convenant agreeing to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a commori executive, legislature and judiciary by the name of Patiala and East Punjab States Union hereinafter competidiously referred to as the Pepsu."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5260, "end_char": 5279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are shortly as follows : On May 5, 1948, the then Rulers of eight Punjab States including Patiala and Nabha with the concurrence and guarantee of the Government of India entered into a convenant agreeing to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a commori executive, legislature and judiciary by the name of Patiala and East Punjab States Union hereinafter competidiously referred to as the Pepsu."}}, {"text": "East Punjab States Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5447, "end_char": 5471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are shortly as follows : On May 5, 1948, the then Rulers of eight Punjab States including Patiala and Nabha with the concurrence and guarantee of the Government of India entered into a convenant agreeing to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a commori executive, legislature and judiciary by the name of Patiala and East Punjab States Union hereinafter competidiously referred to as the Pepsu."}}, {"text": "Ruler of Patiala became the first President or Raj Pramukh of the Council of Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5570, "end_char": 5651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20th of August, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5865, "end_char": 5885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article VI of the covenant is as follows :-\n\n\" (1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall, as soon as may be practicable, and in any event not later than the 20th of August, 1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh, and thereupon,\n\n(a) all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain, or are incidental to the Government of the Convenanting State shall vest in\n\nv. /ncome•tax\n\nOfficer, Mohindargarh • ."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6918, "end_char": 6939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 15, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7686, "end_char": 7699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proviso to clause (2) of that Article runs as follows :-\n\n\"Provided that until a Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly comes into operation after receiving the assent of the Raj Pramukh, the Raj Pramukh shall have power to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of the Union or any part thereof, and any Ordinances so made shall, for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Constituent Assembly ; but any such Ordinance may be controlled or superseded by any such Act\"\n\nThis Union was inaugurated on July 15, 1948, and the Raj Pramukh thereafter took over the administration of the different Covenanting States."}}, {"text": "Nabha State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7821, "end_char": 7832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Administration of Nabha State was taken over by the Raj Pramukh on August 20, 1948."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9191, "end_char": 9200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9261, "end_char": 9270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27-5-05/11-9-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9460, "end_char": 9477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "35, dated 27-5-05/11-9-1948) was issued over the signature of the Revenue Secretary notifying that the Patiala Income-tax Act of 2001 and the Rules thereunder had come into force in the various Covenanting States from August 20, 1948, thereby repealing the law or laws in force in that behalf in those States before that date, except :&s to pending proceedings."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9561, "end_char": 9575, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November 14, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9951, "end_char": 9968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 14, 1948, the Commissioner of In.-ome-tax issued a Notification (No."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10743, "end_char": 10752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Covenanting States of Nabha and Nalagarh would be assessed to income-tax under the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "statute": "the Covenanting States of Nabha and Nalagarh would be assessed to income-tax under the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11760, "end_char": 11769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 13, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11938, "end_char": 11952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 2006 called the Finance Ordinance promulgated on April 13, 1949, which came into force on that very date."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11995, "end_char": 12004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ordinance introduced several amendments to the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12013, "end_char": 12088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12101, "end_char": 12118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance introduced several amendments to the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "statute": "Ordinance introduced several amendments to the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001"}}, {"text": "section 23B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12163, "end_char": 12174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance introduced several amendments to the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "statute": "Ordinance introduced several amendments to the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12177, "end_char": 12186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance introduced several amendments to the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "statute": "Ordinance introduced several amendments to the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule to this Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12499, "end_char": 12532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12589, "end_char": 12599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Second Schedule to this Ordinance", "statute": "Second Schedule to this Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12607, "end_char": 12635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part II of the Second Schedule to this Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12653, "end_char": 12701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ateli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12830, "end_char": 12835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner is a resident of Ateli in the district of Mohindargarh now in Pepsu but which formerly formed part of the Nabha State."}}, {"text": "Mohindargarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12855, "end_char": 12867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner is a resident of Ateli in the district of Mohindargarh now in Pepsu but which formerly formed part of the Nabha State."}}, {"text": "Pepsu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12875, "end_char": 12880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner is a resident of Ateli in the district of Mohindargarh now in Pepsu but which formerly formed part of the Nabha State."}}, {"text": "Raghunath Rai Ram Parshad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13040, "end_char": 13065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner has been carrying on his business at Ateli for a number of years under the name and style of Raghunath Rai Ram Parshad."}}, {"text": "October 20, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13159, "end_char": 13175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 20, 1949, the petitioner was served with a notice under sections 22(2) and 38 of the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001, requiring him to submit a return for the Income Tax year 2006 (13-4-1949 to 12-4-1950) disclosing his income during the previous year (13-4-1948 to 12-4-1949)."}}, {"text": "sections 22(2) and 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13223, "end_char": 13244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Second Schedule to this Ordinance", "statute": "Part II of the Second Schedule to this Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13252, "end_char": 13280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12-4-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13358, "end_char": 13367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 20, 1949, the petitioner was served with a notice under sections 22(2) and 38 of the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001, requiring him to submit a return for the Income Tax year 2006 (13-4-1949 to 12-4-1950) disclosing his income during the previous year (13-4-1948 to 12-4-1949)."}}, {"text": "December 4, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13462, "end_char": 13478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, on December 4, 1949, filed his return for the year 2006 and on February 14, 1950, he was assessed to income-tax."}}, {"text": "May 23, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13575, "end_char": 13587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1950, the petitioner received a notice under section 34 calling upon him to file his return for the year ending the last day of Chet 2005, i.e., for the year 13-4-1948 to 12-4-1949."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13628, "end_char": 13638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "statute": "the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001"}}, {"text": "Ateli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13939, "end_char": 13944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the petitioner along with other assessees of Ateli and Kanina submitted a petition before the Income Tax Officer on July 9, 1950, asking him not to\n\n<J Income-tait\n\nOjfieer, Mohintlargark."}}, {"text": "Kanina", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13949, "end_char": 13955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the petitioner along with other assessees of Ateli and Kanina submitted a petition before the Income Tax Officer on July 9, 1950, asking him not to\n\n<J Income-tait\n\nOjfieer, Mohintlargark."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14084, "end_char": 14087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\n)951\n\nRoniiilal\n\nv lntom1-taJt\n\nOffien, .Mohindargarh."}}, {"text": "Roniiilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14098, "end_char": 14107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\n)951\n\nRoniiilal\n\nv lntom1-taJt\n\nOffien, .Mohindargarh."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14295, "end_char": 14305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14321, "end_char": 14331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "No formal appeal under the Patiala Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14525, "end_char": 14574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August IO, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14687, "end_char": 14702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August IO, 1950, the petitioner filec\"I his present petition before this Court under article 32 of the Constitution praying that a writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari be issued for quashing the assessments of the petitioner's income accrued in the years 2004 and 2005 and other ancillary reliefs."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14772, "end_char": 14782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No formal appeal under the Patiala Income Tax Act", "statute": "No formal appeal under the Patiala Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15083, "end_char": 15093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No formal appeal under the Patiala Income Tax Act", "statute": "No formal appeal under the Patiala Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15349, "end_char": 15359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No formal appeal under the Patiala Income Tax Act", "statute": "No formal appeal under the Patiala Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "August 20,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15584, "end_char": 15600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His grievances are formulated in paragraphs IO and 11 of his petition It is said that while the people of Kapurthala which is included in Pepsu have been asked to pay income-tax for the period prior to August 20,\n\n1948, at the old rate fixed by the Kapurthala Income Tax Act which was lower than die rate fixed by the\n\nPatiala Income Tax Act, 2001, the people of Nabha who had not to pay any income-tax prior to August 20, 1948, at all have been made liable to pay at the higher Patiala rate and that such discrimination offends against the provisions of article 14."}}, {"text": "Kapurthala Income Tax Act which was lower than die rate fixed by the", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15631, "end_char": 15699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15937, "end_char": 15947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kapurthala Income Tax Act which was lower than die rate fixed by the\n\nPatiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "statute": "the Kapurthala Income Tax Act which was lower than die rate fixed by the\n\nPatiala Income Tax Act, 2001"}}, {"text": "Sardar Gurbax Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16009, "end_char": 16028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This charge is refuted by paragraph 10 of the affidavit of Sardar Gurbax Singh, the Additional Director of Inspection (Income Tax), New Delhi, who was.formerly the Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab and Pepsu, which ha' been filed in opposition to the present petition."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16082, "end_char": 16091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This charge is refuted by paragraph 10 of the affidavit of Sardar Gurbax Singh, the Additional Director of Inspection (Income Tax), New Delhi, who was.formerly the Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab and Pepsu, which ha' been filed in opposition to the present petition."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16851, "end_char": 16860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16929, "end_char": 16941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17220, "end_char": 17234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17576, "end_char": 17590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18129, "end_char": 18139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act", "statute": "Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Tek . Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18173, "end_char": 18184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Tek .", "canonical_name": "Tek . Chand"}}, {"text": "Patiala law including the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18351, "end_char": 18405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18913, "end_char": 18923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Patiala law including the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "statute": "the Patiala law including the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18954, "end_char": 18964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Patiala law including the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "statute": "the Patiala law including the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001"}}, {"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19129, "end_char": 19140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Patiala law including the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001", "statute": "the Patiala law including the Patiala Income Tax Act, 2001"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19148, "end_char": 19177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19251, "end_char": 19262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "was no similar provision in the corresponding chapter of the Government of Indian Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19419, "end_char": 19510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19593, "end_char": 19603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no similar provision in the corresponding chapter of the Government of Indian Act, 1935", "statute": "There was no similar provision in the corresponding chapter of the Government of Indian Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19690, "end_char": 19701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no similar provision in the corresponding chapter of the Government of Indian Act, 1935", "statute": "There was no similar provision in the corresponding chapter of the Government of Indian Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19746, "end_char": 19756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There was no similar provision in the corresponding chapter of the Government of Indian Act, 1935", "statute": "There was no similar provision in the corresponding chapter of the Government of Indian Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19930, "end_char": 19954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States of America the power of taxation is regarded as distinct from the exercise of police power or eminent domain."}}, {"text": "Tek Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20266, "end_char": 20275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Dr. Tek Chand was asked if that was not the correct position, he did not advance any cogent or convincing answer to refute the conclusion put to him.", "canonical_name": "Tek . Chand"}}, {"text": "article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20531, "end_char": 20542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20580, "end_char": 20590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20592, "end_char": 20603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20765, "end_char": 20775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20833, "end_char": 20844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21024, "end_char": 21034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21045, "end_char": 21055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21270, "end_char": 21280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21849, "end_char": 21860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21872, "end_char": 21882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22112, "end_char": 22122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22260, "end_char": 22270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22280, "end_char": 22290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22394, "end_char": 22404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22434, "end_char": 22445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta. ·"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_138_145_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "Jan.12\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nRAMNANDAN PRASAD NARAYAN SINGH\n\nMAHANTH KAPILDEO RAM JEE AND\n\nANOTHER (and 3 other appeals)\n\n[SHiil H.un.u. KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTIU\n\nand CHANDRASJ!XHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nBihar Money.lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Aa (Vil of 1939), s. 7-Ereculion of fresh document for amount remaining due on loan under eariler document-Suit on later document-Interest before date of suit-Mazimum amount that could be decreed-\n\nW hether to be calct1!ated on basis of earlier or later doctm1ent- \"A1\"ount of loan mentioned in, or evidenced by, such document'' meaning of.\n\nWhere a fresh document is executed for the amount remaining due on account of principal and interest under a loan advanced on a prior document, aud a suit is brought for recovery of the amount due under the 1atcr document with interest due thereunder, \"the amount of loan mentioned in, or evidenced by, such document\" for the purpmcs of s. 7 of the Bihar Money-Lenders\n\n(Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939, is the amount mentioned or evidenced by the later document and not that mentioned in the original document which was renewed and the court can pass a decree for an amount of interest for the period prc..:::::ding the institution of the suit, \\vhich together with any amount realise as interest after the date of the later document, is not greater than the amount of loan mentioned in the later document.\n\nThe maximum amount that can be: so dccrccd is not the amount \\vhich together with the interest realised from the date of the original loan docs not exceed the original loan.\n\nSingheswar Singh and Others v. Nadni Prasad Singh and Others (A.I.R. 1940 Pat. 65). UJl Singh v. Ramnarain Ram and Others (A.LR. 1942 Pat. 138), Madho Prasad Singh v. Mu/cutdheri Singh and Others {193 I. C. 661), Deo Nandan Prasad v. Ram Prasad (I.L.R. 23 Pat. 618), Ram Nandan Prasad Narain Singh v. K11lpati Shri Mahanth Goswami Madhwanand Ramp ((1940] F.C.R. 1).\n\nSurendra Prasad Narain Singh v. Sri Gajadhar Prasad Saht1 Trust Estate and Others ( [ 1940) F.C.R. 39) referred to •\n\n.APPELLATE JU!USDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 98, 99, 100 and 101 of 1950.\n\nAppeals from the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lall and Imam JJ.) in Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 108 to 111 of 1948.\n\nShambhu Barmeswar Prasad and Ramanugrah Prasad for the appellants.\n\nH. /. Umrigar for the respondents.\n\n1951. January 12.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-The decision of these four appeals, which are connected with each other and which have arisen out of orders made by the High Court of Patna in four Miscellaneous Appeals, depends on the interpretation of section 7 of the Bihar Moneylenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939.\n\nThe facts which have led to the appeals are found briefly stated in the petition filed by the Present appellants in the 3td Court of Sub-Judge, Patna, and\n\nmay be re-stated here for convenient reference :-\n\n\"The father of the petitioners borrowed Rs. 40,000 from the guru (ancestor) of the decree-holder under mortgage bond, dated 11-1-1893.\n\nOut of Rs. 40,370-7-6 interest and compound interest up to 4-1-1910, Rs. 32,370-7-6 was paid in cash and for the balance Rs. 8,000 interest and Rs. 40,000 principal, i.e., for Rs. 48,000 a Mortgage Suit No. 14 of 1910 was filed in 1st Court of the Sub-Judge, Patna, and in lieu of the claim and cost of the said suit two fresh mortagage bonds were executed on 11-7-1910, viz., one for Rs. 40,000 and the other for Rs. 9,488 and the lattei: bond was satisfied by payment of Rs. 15,835 in cash.\n\nWith respect to the above bond of Rs. 40,000 dated 11-7-1910 the petitioners paid Rs. 38,530-13-6.\n\nMortgage Suit No. 110 of 1927 was brought in the 3rd Court> of the Sub-Judge, Patna, and a decree for Rs. 58,012-2-0 was passed on 9-7-1929.\n\nOut of this Rs. 5,000 was paid in cash and for the balance of Rs. 53,012-12-0 one mortgage bond dated 6-10-1931 was executed for Rs. 42,000 and on the same date two 2-1 S. C. Tndia/68\n\nR4mnaadan Prasad NarayaR\n\nSingh\n\nMalumtft Kapild<o Ram ]It and Anothlf.\n\nChandrasekhar11\n\nAiya1J.\n\nSingh\n\nMahantil Kapil.Uo Ram Jet and Another. -- Chantltasehara\n\nA(rar J.\n\nhand-notes were executed, viz., rme for Rs. 5,000 and one for Rs. 6,012-Ul.\n\nOne Suit No. 14 of 1933 for both the hand-notes was brought in 3rd Court of the Sub-Judge and a decree for Rs. 15,008-2-0 was passed on 28-2-1935.\n\nT.his decree is under execution.\"\n\nWhen the decree-holder sought to execute the money decree by attachment and sale of the judgmentdebtors' properties stating that they were subject to a mortgage lien of Rs. 62,272-13-0 under the mortgage bond dated 6-10-1931, the two judgment-debtors, who are brothers, filed objections under sections 11 and 16 of the earlier Bihar Money-lenders Act III of 1938 and section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe petitions (two by each of them) were filed separately by the brothers.\n\nThey urged that on a proper calculation under section 11 no lien was subsisting onthe properties owing to payments made towards the mortgage debt amounting to Rs. 92,394-2-0. The Subordinate Judge held that this plea of the judgment-debtors could not be entertained in the Miscellaneous case before him relating to the execution and all that could be done was to notify the mortgage incumbrance without deciding anything as to the correctness of the amount claimed to be due under it ; and this conclusion was partly based on the fact that section 16 of the Act had been declared by the High Court void.\n\nAppeals taken to the High Court were dismissed.\n\nThe judgment-debtors thereupon preferred an appeal to the Federal Court, contending that section 7 and 13 of the new Act ( corresponding to sections 7 and 11 of the old Act) were applicable and that it was the duty of the court to estimate the value of the property after making the\n\nnecssary calculations under section 7 with reference to the lien. The decision of the Federal Court is reported in Ramnandan Prasad Narain Singh and Another v.\n\nKulpati Shri Mahanth Goshwami Madhwanand Ramji('). The case was remitted back to the High\n\n(!) [1940] F.C.R. I.\n\nCourt, giving liberty to the appellants to file an application under section 13.\n\nIn answer to a fresh application for execution dated 2-7-1942, the two brothers filed the same objections as before. Miscellaneous Cases Nos. 45 and 46 of 1942 related to sections 7 and 13 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act and Miscellaneous Cases Nos. 50 and 52 of 1942 related to the objections under section 47 of the Code of; Civil Procedure.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge held that the amount of the loan should be taken as the amount mentioned in the mortgage deed of 1931 and not the amount advanced in 1893 and that a sum of Rs. 70,840 was still due on the bond.\n\nHe determined the market value of the several properties given as security, adopting 16 times the net income as the basis.\n\nAppeals to the High Court were numbered .as M. A. 108 to 111 of 1943 and they were heard by Manohar Lall and Imam JJ. They modified the order of the lower Court in certain respects.\n\nEven accoriling to them the amount of the loan was what was mentioned in the mortgage bond of 6-10-1931, but as a sum of Rs. 11,855-3-0 had been repaid expressly towards the principal amount after the date of the bond, . that amount became reduced to Rs. 28,150.\n\nAdding an equal sum by way of interest which according to them was the maximum amount, permitted to be allowed under section 7 of the Act, the total liability was stated to be Rs. 56,300 and a charge was declared on the property for this amount. They also directed that the valuation of the property should be fixed at twenty times the net income and not sixteen times. It is from this order that the present appeals have been preferred.\n\nTwo points were urged on behalf of the appellants, namely\n\n(a) that the decree-holder was barred by constructive res-judicata from contending that the construction placed upon section 7 by the judgmentdebtors was wrong ; and (b) that in applying section 7, we must consider the original amount of loan of Rs. 40,000 given in the year 1893 and allow the claim\n\nSingh\n\nMahanth Kapjldto Ram ]It and Anoth<T,\n\nChandrasekhar a Aiyar ].\n\nRamnarztfan Prasad Narayan\n\nSingh\n\nMnhaoth Kapildeo Ram Jee and Anothtr\n\nChandrasekhar\n\nA(yar J\n\nof interest only for that maximum sum, after taking into account all sums paid by the appellants and their predecessors towards interest since 1893.\n\nThe first point is entirely without substance.\n\nWhen the decree-holder contended that section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938, was declared void and ultra vires and that therefore section 7 of the new Act which corresponded to section 11 was also inapplicable, the judgment-debtors pleaded that they were entitled to the benefit of section 7 of the new Act.\n\nThe Federal Court held in Ramnandan Prasad Narain Singh and Another v. Kulpathi Shri Mah'anth Goshwami Madhwanand Ramji(') that the judgment-debtors (present appellants) were entitled to claim the benefit of the provisions of the new Act when the executing court proceeded under section 13 to determine the value of the properties to be sold. The correct interpretation of section 7 was not in question between the parties.\n\nTo say that the appellants were entitled to take advantage of the provisions of section 7 is entirely different from the contention that the interpretation sought to be put by them on section 7 was the right one.\n\nThe Federal Court was not dealing with any question of interpretation at all.\n\nIt is impossible to see where the doctrine of constructive res-judicata comes in, so as to be of help to the appellants.\n\nThe second question raised on their behalf relates to the true meaning of section 7 of the Bihar Moneylenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act VII of 1939, which is in these terms :-\n\n\"7. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or in anything having the force of law or in any agreement, no Court shall, in any suit brought by a money-lender before or after the commencement of this Act in respect of a loan advanced before or after the commencement of this Act or in any appeal or proceedings in revision arising out oE such suit, pass a decree for an amount of interest for the period preceding the institution of the suit,\n\n(1) [1940] F.C.R. I.\n\nwhich together with any amount already realised as interest through the court or otherwise, is greater than the amount of loan advanced, or, if the loan is based on a document, the amount of loan mentioned in, or evidenced by, such document.\"\n\nIn the present case, the original loan of Rs. 40,000 was advanced as early as 11-1-1893.\n\nThe appellants contend that for the purposes of calculating the interest to be decreed prior to the date of the suit the loan advanced must be taken to be the original sum and that if an account is taken of all the sums received by the creditor as interest from that date up to the date of the suit, there would be nothing due for interest.\n\nOn the other hand, the decree-holder urges that having regard to the latter part of the section, the loan must be taken to be the amount mentioned in the mortgage bond dated 6-10-1931, namely Rs. 42,000.\n\nWhichever method of calculation is adopted, it must be remembered that it has . to be . made not for the purposes of passing any decree on the mortgage loan, but for estimating under section 13 of the Act the value of the properties to be brought. to sale in execution of the money decree against the appellants.\n\nAs pointed out by Sir Maurice Gwyer C.J. in Surendra Prasad Narain . Singh v.\n\nSri Gajadhar Prasad Sahu Trust Estate and Others(1), \"Section 7 of the Act of 1937 is no doubt extremely obscure and illdrawn.\" The true intention . of the framers of the Act is somewhat difficult to gather. But the Patna High Court has been consistently placing . upon the section an interpretation which is opposed to the · contention of the appellant in these proceedings.\n\nThe point came up expressly for decision in Singheshwp Sibgh and Others v. Madni Prasad Singh and Others(2) where a mortgage bond was executed on 31-8-1922 for a sum of Rs. 2,000 which was the balance of the priQcipal and interest due under a mottgage bond of the 11th of October, 1912, for\n\n(1) [19.fOJ F.c.R. 39.:\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1940 Pat. 65. 19 . .\n\n&mnaadim PrtJJad Narayan\n\nSingh v.\n\nMahanth l(apj/deo Ram Jae and A not ha.\n\nCluznartJJekhora\n\nAiyar ].\n\nJ95J\n\nRanmandax Prasad\n\nNarr.yan Singh v.\n\nAfahanth f(apilr/to\n\nR.arr Jee and\n\nAnother,\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAbar J.\n\nRs. 1,391.\n\nThe judgment-debtors raised the plea that the court should go back to the earlier bond of 1912 and that as a sum of Rs. 1,512 had been paid as and by way of interest towards that bond, no decree could be passed against them for more than the principal sum of Rs. 1,391.\n\nThe learned Judges rejected this contention and took the amount stated in the document of 1922, namely Rs. 2,000, as the loan and they held that the plaintiffs were entitled to get a decree for interest for a sum not larger than Rs. 2,000 as no payment had been proved to have been made after the execution of the bond. The same view was taken in Lal Singh v. Ramnarain Ram and Others(') and the plaintiffs were warded a decree on the basis that the loan was to be taken as Rs. 2,909-8-0 which was the amount for which the hand-note sued upon was executed and not Rs. 1,000 which was the original amount advanced upon an earlier hand-note of the year 1924.\n\nThe case reported in Madho Prasad Singh\n\nv. Mukutdhari Singh and Others(') lays down the same position.\n\nThe Full Bench decision in Deo Nandan Prasad v. R'am Prasad(') reiterates the same view, pointing out the distinction between sections 7 and 8 of the Act and stating that while under section 8 we can go to the original loan in spite of a later document under section 7, the loan must relate to the document on which the suit is based, that is, the final document and not the original one. In each ne of these cases, the question of the true meaning of section 7 was pointedly considered. This construction no dciubt enables a creditor to circumvent the beneficient provisions of the Act by taking a document for the interest due anil adding it to the principal amount. Gwayer C. J. points out this difficulty at p_age 59 in the case Surendra Prasad Narain Singh v. Sri Gaiadhar Prasad Sahu Trust Estate and Others('). If the interpretation does not carry out the intentions of the framers of the Act by reason of unhappy or ambiguous phrasing, it is for the Legislature to intervene. But far from doing so, it has\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1942 Pat. 138, 139.\n\n(2) (1941) 193 I.C. 661.\n\n(3) I.L.R. 23 Patna 618.\n\n(4) [1940] F.C.R. 39.\n\nacquiesced, during all these years in the construction which the Patna High Court has been placing upon the section from the very next year after the enactment of the statute.\n\nHaving regard to the great obscurity in the language employed in the relevant provisions and the inaction of the Legislature, it is, in our opinion, legitimate to infer that the view expressed by the Patna High Court is in accord with the intention of the Legislature.\n\nThe appeals fail and are dismissed with costs, only one set in all of them together.\n\nAppeals dismissed Agent for the appellants: Tarachand Brij Mohanlal.\n\nAgent for the respondent : R. C. Prasad.\n\nRAI BRIJ RAJ KRISHNA AND ANOTHER\n\nS. K. SHAW AND BROTHERS.\n\n(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nBihar Buildings (J..rau-, Rent and Eviction) Co11:trol Act (Ill of 1947), s., 11-0rder of Controller for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent- Suit to set aside order-Jurisdiction of civil cour:-Q11estion rtihc:her there was non-payment-Finai1ty of Controller' 1 tleeision.\n\nSection 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, has entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether there is non-payment of rent or not, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there is nor.-payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant. Therefore, even if a Controller has wrongly decided the question whether there has been non-payment of rent, his order for eviction on the ground that there has been non-payment of rent cannot be questioned in a civil court.\n\nQueen v. Comm_iuroners for Special Purposes of IncomeTo1t (21 Q.B, D. 313) and Colonial Bank of Australasia v.\n\nW1'llah (L.R.\n\nS P.C. 417) relied on.\n\nRamananitan Prasal\n\nNarayan Singh\n\nV• Mahanth Kapildeo RamJeeaud Another\n\nChandrasekhara.\n\nAiyar J.\n\ni95I\n\nFeb. 2.", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "Jan.12", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 6, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jan.12\n\nRAMNANDAN PRASAD NARAYAN SINGH\n\nMAHANTH KAPILDEO RAM JEE AND\n\nANOTHER (and 3 other appeals)\n\n[SHiil H.un.u."}}, {"text": "RAMNANDAN PRASAD NARAYAN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMNANDAN PRASAD NARAYAN SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHANTH KAPILDEO RAM JEE AND\n\nANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHANTH KAPILDEO RAM JEE AND\n\nANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHiil H.un.u. KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASJ!XHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 180, "end_char": 205, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASJ!XHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275, "end_char": 279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 936, "end_char": 940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1940] F.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1937, "end_char": 1952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1940) F.C.R. 39", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2042, "end_char": 2057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Manohar Lall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2215, "end_char": 2227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lall and Imam JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2232, "end_char": 2236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the orders of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lall and Imam JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Shambhu Barmeswar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2293, "end_char": 2317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shambhu Barmeswar Prasad and Ramanugrah Prasad for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Ramanugrah Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2322, "end_char": 2339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shambhu Barmeswar Prasad and Ramanugrah Prasad for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2367, "end_char": 2374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. /. Umrigar for the respondents."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2460, "end_char": 2480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-The decision of these four appeals, which are connected with each other and which have arisen out of orders made by the High Court of Patna in four Miscellaneous Appeals, depends on the interpretation of section 7 of the Bihar Moneylenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASJ!XHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2604, "end_char": 2623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-The decision of these four appeals, which are connected with each other and which have arisen out of orders made by the High Court of Patna in four Miscellaneous Appeals, depends on the interpretation of section 7 of the Bihar Moneylenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2688, "end_char": 2697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3td Court of Sub-Judge, Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2885, "end_char": 2914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts which have led to the appeals are found briefly stated in the petition filed by the Present appellants in the 3td Court of Sub-Judge, Patna, and\n\nmay be re-stated here for convenient reference :-\n\n\"The father of the petitioners borrowed Rs."}}, {"text": "11-1-1893", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3096, "end_char": 3105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40,000 from the guru (ancestor) of the decree-holder under mortgage bond, dated 11-1-1893."}}, {"text": "4-1-1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3167, "end_char": 3175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40,370-7-6 interest and compound interest up to 4-1-1910, Rs."}}, {"text": "1st Court of the Sub-Judge, Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3339, "end_char": 3372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of 1910 was filed in 1st Court of the Sub-Judge, Patna, and in lieu of the claim and cost of the said suit two fresh mortagage bonds were executed on 11-7-1910, viz.,"}}, {"text": "11-7-1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3468, "end_char": 3477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of 1910 was filed in 1st Court of the Sub-Judge, Patna, and in lieu of the claim and cost of the said suit two fresh mortagage bonds were executed on 11-7-1910, viz.,"}}, {"text": "3rd Court> of the Sub-Judge, Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3751, "end_char": 3785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "110 of 1927 was brought in the 3rd Court> of the Sub-Judge, Patna, and a decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "9-7-1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3833, "end_char": 3841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58,012-2-0 was passed on 9-7-1929."}}, {"text": "6-10-1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3946, "end_char": 3955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "53,012-12-0 one mortgage bond dated 6-10-1931 was executed for Rs."}}, {"text": "R4mnaadan Prasad NarayaR\n\nSingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4029, "end_char": 4060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42,000 and on the same date two 2-1 S. C. Tndia/68\n\nR4mnaadan Prasad NarayaR\n\nSingh\n\nMalumtft Kapild<o Ram ]It and Anothlf."}}, {"text": "Mahantil Kapil", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhar11\n\nAiya1J.\n\nSingh\n\nMahantil Kapil."}}, {"text": "sections 11 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4756, "end_char": 4774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Money-lenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4790, "end_char": 4813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4830, "end_char": 4840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Money-lenders Act", "statute": "Bihar Money-lenders Act"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4993, "end_char": 5003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Money-lenders Act", "statute": "Bihar Money-lenders Act"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5487, "end_char": 5497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Money-lenders Act", "statute": "Bihar Money-lenders Act"}}, {"text": "section 7 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5690, "end_char": 5706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Money-lenders Act", "statute": "Bihar Money-lenders Act"}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5741, "end_char": 5758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Money-lenders Act", "statute": "Bihar Money-lenders Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5913, "end_char": 5922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High\n\n(!) [1940] F.C.R. I.\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6131, "end_char": 6164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was remitted back to the High\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6228, "end_char": 6238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2-7-1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6294, "end_char": 6302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to a fresh application for execution dated 2-7-1942, the two brothers filed the same objections as before."}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6412, "end_char": 6429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6540, "end_char": 6550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7490, "end_char": 7499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7988, "end_char": 7997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8058, "end_char": 8067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8218, "end_char": 8231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40,000 given in the year 1893 and allow the claim\n\nSingh\n\nMahanth Kapjldto Ram ]It and Anoth<T,\n\nChandrasekhar a Aiyar ].", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASJ!XHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Ramnarztfan Prasad Narayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8244, "end_char": 8270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramnarztfan Prasad Narayan\n\nSingh\n\nMnhaoth Kapildeo Ram Jee and Anothtr\n\nChandrasekhar\n\nA(yar J\n\nof interest only for that maximum sum, after taking into account all sums paid by the appellants and their predecessors towards interest since 1893."}}, {"text": "Mnhaoth Kapildeo Ram Jee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8279, "end_char": 8303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramnarztfan Prasad Narayan\n\nSingh\n\nMnhaoth Kapildeo Ram Jee and Anothtr\n\nChandrasekhar\n\nA(yar J\n\nof interest only for that maximum sum, after taking into account all sums paid by the appellants and their predecessors towards interest since 1893."}}, {"text": "Anothtr\n\nChandrasekhar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8308, "end_char": 8330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramnarztfan Prasad Narayan\n\nSingh\n\nMnhaoth Kapildeo Ram Jee and Anothtr\n\nChandrasekhar\n\nA(yar J\n\nof interest only for that maximum sum, after taking into account all sums paid by the appellants and their predecessors towards interest since 1893."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8577, "end_char": 8587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8595, "end_char": 8624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8679, "end_char": 8688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8726, "end_char": 8736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8831, "end_char": 8840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9137, "end_char": 9147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9231, "end_char": 9240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9363, "end_char": 9372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9467, "end_char": 9476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9772, "end_char": 9781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11439, "end_char": 11449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sir Maurice Gwyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11588, "end_char": 11605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Sir Maurice Gwyer C.J. in Surendra Prasad Narain ."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11703, "end_char": 11712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11865, "end_char": 11881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the Patna High Court has been consistently placing ."}}, {"text": "31-8-1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12172, "end_char": 12181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point came up expressly for decision in Singheshwp Sibgh and Others v. Madni Prasad Singh and Others(2) where a mortgage bond was executed on 31-8-1922 for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12402, "end_char": 12407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "&mnaadim PrtJJad Narayan\n\nSingh v.\n\nMahanth l(apj/deo Ram Jae and A not ha."}}, {"text": "Mahanth", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12412, "end_char": 12419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "&mnaadim PrtJJad Narayan\n\nSingh v.\n\nMahanth l(apj/deo Ram Jae and A not ha."}}, {"text": "Ranmandax Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12487, "end_char": 12503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J95J\n\nRanmandax Prasad\n\nNarr.yan Singh v.\n\nAfahanth f(apilr/to\n\nR.arr Jee and\n\nAnother,\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAbar J.\n\nRs."}}, {"text": "Afahanth", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12524, "end_char": 12532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J95J\n\nRanmandax Prasad\n\nNarr.yan Singh v.\n\nAfahanth f(apilr/to\n\nR.arr Jee and\n\nAnother,\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAbar J.\n\nRs."}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13767, "end_char": 13783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13824, "end_char": 13833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13900, "end_char": 13909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14093, "end_char": 14102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gwayer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14310, "end_char": 14316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gwayer C. J. points out this difficulty at p_age 59 in the case Surendra Prasad Narain Singh v. Sri Gaiadhar Prasad Sahu Trust Estate and Others(')."}}, {"text": "[1940] F.C.R. 39", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14744, "end_char": 14760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tarachand Brij Mohanlal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15340, "end_char": 15363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed Agent for the appellants: Tarachand Brij Mohanlal."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15393, "end_char": 15405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "RAI BRIJ RAJ KRISHNA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15408, "end_char": 15428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAI BRIJ RAJ KRISHNA AND ANOTHER\n\nS. K. SHAW AND BROTHERS."}}, {"text": "S. K. SHAW", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15442, "end_char": 15452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAI BRIJ RAJ KRISHNA AND ANOTHER\n\nS. K. SHAW AND BROTHERS."}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15469, "end_char": 15484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nBihar Buildings (J..rau-, Rent and Eviction) Co11:trol Act (Ill of 1947), s., 11-0rder of Controller for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent- Suit to set aside order-Jurisdiction of civil cour:-Q11estion rtihc:her there was non-payment-Finai1ty of Controller' 1 tleeision."}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15486, "end_char": 15505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nBihar Buildings (J..rau-, Rent and Eviction) Co11:trol Act (Ill of 1947), s., 11-0rder of Controller for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent- Suit to set aside order-Jurisdiction of civil cour:-Q11estion rtihc:her there was non-payment-Finai1ty of Controller' 1 tleeision."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15508, "end_char": 15517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nBihar Buildings (J..rau-, Rent and Eviction) Co11:trol Act (Ill of 1947), s., 11-0rder of Controller for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent- Suit to set aside order-Jurisdiction of civil cour:-Q11estion rtihc:her there was non-payment-Finai1ty of Controller' 1 tleeision."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15522, "end_char": 15542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nBihar Buildings (J..rau-, Rent and Eviction) Co11:trol Act (Ill of 1947), s., 11-0rder of Controller for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent- Suit to set aside order-Jurisdiction of civil cour:-Q11estion rtihc:her there was non-payment-Finai1ty of Controller' 1 tleeision.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASJ!XHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15833, "end_char": 15843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15894, "end_char": 15911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramananitan Prasal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16537, "end_char": 16555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramananitan Prasal\n\nNarayan Singh\n\nV• Mahanth Kapildeo RamJeeaud Another\n\nChandrasekhara."}}, {"text": "Mahanth Kapildeo RamJeeaud", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16575, "end_char": 16601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramananitan Prasal\n\nNarayan Singh\n\nV• Mahanth Kapildeo RamJeeaud Another\n\nChandrasekhara.", "canonical_name": "MAHANTH KAPILDEO RAM JEE AND\n\nANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16628, "end_char": 16633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aiyar J.\n\ni95I\n\nFeb. 2."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_145_153_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 145\n\nacquiesced, during all these years in the construction which the Patna High Court has been placing upon the section from the very next year after the enactment of the statute.\n\nHaving regard to the great obscurity in the language employed in the relevant provisions and the inaction of the Legislature, it is, in our opinion, legitimate to infer that the view expressed by the Patna High Court is in accord with the intention of the Legislature.\n\nThe appeals fail and are dismissed with costs, only one set in all of them together.\n\nAppeals dismissed Agent for the appellants: Tarachand Brij Mohanlal.\n\nAgent for the respondent : R. C. Prasad.\n\nRAI BRIJ RAJ KRISHNA AND ANOTHER\n\nS. K. SHAW AND BROTHERS.\n\n(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nBihar Buildings (J..rau-, Rent and Eviction) Co11:trol Act (Ill of 1947), s., 11-0rder of Controller for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent- Suit to set aside order-Jurisdiction of civil cour:-Q11estion rtihc:her there was non-payment-Finai1ty of Controller' 1 tleeision.\n\nSection 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, has entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether there is non-payment of rent or not, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there is nor.-payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant. Therefore, even if a Controller has wrongly decided the question whether there has been non-payment of rent, his order for eviction on the ground that there has been non-payment of rent cannot be questioned in a civil court.\n\nQueen v. Comm_iuroners for Special Purposes of IncomeTo1t (21 Q.B, D. 313) and Colonial Bank of Australasia v.\n\nW1'llah (L.R.\n\nS P.C. 417) relied on.\n\nRamananitan Prasal\n\nNarayan Singh\n\nV• Mahanth Kapildeo RamJeeaud Another\n\nChandrasekhara.\n\nAiyar J.\n\ni95I\n\nFeb. 2.\n\nRaiBrij Baj\n\nKris/1110 aRd\n\nAnothtr ... .S. K. Shaw .and Broth111.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE )UR1so1cnoN: Appeal from a judgment and decree of the Patna High Court dated 25th March, 1949, in A.S. 2280 of 1948 reversing an appeallate decree of the Subordinate Judge ip Suit No. 62 of 1948 .\n\nBaldev Sahay (T. K. Prasad, with him) for the appellant.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (H. f. Umrigar, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1951. February 2.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna reversing the appellate decree of a Subordinate Judge in a suit instituted by the respondents. The facts of the case are briefly these. The respondents have been in oceupation as a monthly tenant of several blocks of premises belonging to the api)cllants at a monthly rental of Rs. 112. The tent for the months of March, ApriJ and May, 1942, having £alien into arrears, they remitted it along with the rent for June, on 28th June, 1947, by means of two cheques. As the aJ?Pellants did not accept the cheques, on 4th August, 1947, the respondents remitted the amount subsequently by postal money order. On 12th August, 1947, the appellants, maintaining that there was non-payment of rent and hence the respondents were liable to be evicted, under section 11 ( 1) (a) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Bihar Act III of 1947), applied to the House Controller for the eviction of the respondents from the prqniscs.\n\nSection 11 (l)(a) of the Act run& as follows :----.\n\n''Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the contrary and subject to the provisions of section 12, where a tenant is in possession Qf any building, he shall not be liable to be evicted therefrom, whether in execution of .a decree or otherwise, except-\n\n(a) in the case of a month to month tenant, for non-payment of rent or breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for subletting the building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlod, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building .as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment;\"\n\nOn 30th August, 1947, the. respondents, whose money had in the meantime been returned by the, appellants, deposited the rent up to the month of June in the Office of the House Controller. Notwith- standing this deposit, the House Controller passed an <>rder on the 10th November, directing the eviction of the respondents by 10th May, 1948, and holding that they had made themselves liable to eviction by reason of non-payment of rent. The order of the House Controller was upheld by the Commissioner on appeal on the 27th April, 1948, and thereupon the respondents filed the present suit in the Patna Munsif's Court for a declaration that the order of the Controller dated the 10th November, 1947, was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction.\n\nThe suit was dismissed by the ·. Munsif and his decree was upheld on appeal, but the High Court decred the suit holding that the order of the Rent Controller was without jurisdiction.\n\nThe appellants were thereafter granted leave to appeal by the High Court, and they havi: accordingly preferred this appeal.\n\nThe High Court has delivered a somewhat elaborate judgment in the case, but it seems to us that the point arising in this appeal is a simple one.\n\nThe main ground on which the respondents have attacked. the order of eviction passed by the House Controller is that in fact there was no non-payment of rent, and, since no eviction can be ordered under the Bihar Act unless non-payment is established, the House Controller had no jurisdiction to order eviction.\n\nOn _ ihe other hand, one of the contentions put forward on behalf of the appellants is that there was non; payment of rent within the meaning of that expression as used in the Act, since the rent was not paid as and when it\n\nRai Brij /lJJj\n\nErunnaaad\n\nAnothlr\n\nS. K. ShllllJ and Brotn1ts •\n\n!Faz; l Ali].\n\nRai Brif Raj\n\nAnother\n\nS. Jr. Shaw and Brothers1\n\nFad Ali].\n\nfell due.\n\nIt was pointed out that the rent for the month of March became due in April and the rent for April became due in May, but no step was taken by the respondents to pay the arrears until the 28th June, 1947.\n\nIt appears that at the inception of the tenancy, the respondents had paid one month's rent in advance, and it had been agreed between them and the appellants that the advance rent would be adjusted whenever there was default in payment of rent for full one month. It was however p_ointed out that the advance payment could be adjusted only for one month's rent, but, in the present case, the rent for three months had become due, and since in a monthly tenancy the rent is payable for month to month, the rent for each month becoming due in the subsequent month, non-payment of that rent at the proper time was sufficient to attract the provisions of section 11 (1)\n\n(a) of the Act. The appellants also raised a second contention, namely, that having regard to the scheme of the Act, the House Controller was fully competent to deciae whether the condition precedent to eviction had been satisfied, and once that decision had been arrived at, it could not be questioned in . a civil court.\n\nThis contention was accepted by the first two courts, and the first appellate court dealing with it observed as follows :-\n\n\"But the Buildings Countrol Act has authorised the Controller to decide whether or not there is nonpayment of rent and it is only when he is satisfied that there has been non-payment of rent that he assumes jurisdiction. If the question of jurisdiction depends upon the decision of some fact or point of law, and if the court is called upon to decide such question, then such decision cannot be collaterally impeached ( vide 12 Patna 117). In my opinion when the Controller assumed the jurisdiction on being satisfied that there was non-payment of rent and proceeded to pass an order of eviction. I think the Civil Court can have no jurisdiction to challenge the validity of such order.\"\n\nThe High Court did not however accepted this view and after refering to section 111 of the T ra:nsfer of\n\nProperty Act, proceeded to propound its own view in these words :-\n\n\"Regard being had to the circumstances in which the Act under consideration was enacted and its object, as stated in the preamble as being 'to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants' from buildings, it would seem that the expression 'non-payment of rent in section 11 in the context in which it is used must be given an interpretation which would have the effect of enlarging the protection against determination of a tenancy enjoyed by a tenant under the ordinary law.\n\nThe Legislature, therefore, by enacting that a tenant shall not be liable to be evicted 'except for nonpayment of rent' should be held to have intended to protect a tenant from being evicted from a building in his possession for being a defaulter in payment of rent, if he brings into Court all the rent due from him before the order of his eviction comes to be passed ..... .\n\nIf, as contended for on behalf of the respondents, section 11 of the Act were to be construed as entitling a landlord to apply for eviction of a tenant on the ground of irregular payment of rent amounting to 'non-payment' of rent and as empowering the Controller to determine as to whether irregular payment of rent amounts to non-payment of rent within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 11, and subsection (3) of section 18 were to be construed as making the decision of the Controller on thi~ question of law a final one, it will appear that not only this Act will have conferred a right upon the landlord very much in excess of the right that he enjoys under the ordinary law in the matter of determination of tenancies, but that it will have conferred very much larger power on the Controller than that possessed by the Civil Courts under the ordinary law in the matter of passing decrees for eviction of tenants.\n\nThe principle of law and equity on which relief against forfeiture for 'non-payment of rent' is based, will have been completely abrogated, and the protection of a tenant in possession of a building instead of being enlarged will\n\n!95!\n\nRaiBrij Raj Krishna and Another v.\n\nS. K. Shaw and Brothers.\n\nFa:r.1 Ali].\n\n195!\n\nRaiBrijRoj Krishna alCd\n\n.Another\n\nS. Jr.Shau! and Brother1.\n\nFad Ali].\n\nhave been very much cunailcd.\n\nA construction of these provisions, which is calcul_ated to . bring about these consequences,· cannot and is not in accordance with the circumstances to which this Act was intended to apply and indeed cannot be accepted. The contention of Mr. Lalnarain Sinha on behalf of the respondent that the circumstances disclosed in the petition raised the question for determination by the Controller whether a case of non-payment of rent in law was established, and his decision of that question, even if wrong in law, is not liable to be questioned in the\n\nCivil Court must be over-ruled.\"\n\nIt seems to us that the view taken by the High Court is not correct. Section 11 begins with the words \"Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to be contrary,\" and hence any attempt to import the provisions relating to the law of transfer of property for the interpretation of the section would seem to be out of place. Section 11 is a self-contained section, and it is wholly unnecessary to go outsiae the Act for determining whether a tenant is liable to be evicted or not, and under what conditions he can be evicted. It clearly provides that a tenant is not liable to be evicted except on certain conditions, and one of the conditions laid down for the eviction of a month to month tenant is non-payment of rent.\n\nSub-section\n\n(3) (b) of section 11 provides that the \"Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building\" and if he is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application. Section 16 empowers the Controller to make enquiries and inspections and to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel the production of documents in the same manner as is provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 18 provides that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may within 15 days of the receipt of such order by him, prefer an appeal to the Commissioner of the Division, and it also prescribes the procedure for the hearing of the appeal. Sub-section (3)\n\nof this section st; ltes that \"the decision of the Commissioner and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final, and shall not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding by way of appeal or revision.\" The Act thus sets. up a complete machinery for investigation of those matters upon which the jurisdiction of the Controller to order eviction of a tenant depends, and it expressly makes his order final and\n\nsubjec~ only to the decision of the Commissioner. The Act empowers the Controller alone to decide whether or not there is non-payment of rent, and his decision on that question is essential before an order can be passed by him under section 11.\n\nSuch being the provisions of the Act, we have to see whether it is at all possible to question the decision of the Controller on a matter which the Act clearly empowers him to decide.\n\nThe law on. this subject has been very lucidly stated by Lord Esher M._ R. in The Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the lncome-Tax(1), in these words:-\n\n\"When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise.\n\nThere it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction.\n\nBut there is another state of things which may exist.\n\nThe legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do\n\n(I) 21Q.B.D.313, at319.\n\nRaiBrjj Raj Krishna on4\n\n.4.Nothlr\n\nS.K.S/uzaJ ant! Brotlu, s.\n\nFa1:l .4.li].\n\n!95!\n\n.dnothu\n\nS.K.S/i4W , and Brotlurs.\n\nFazlAliJ.\n\nsomething more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none.\n\nIn the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends ; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.\"\n\nOn the same lines are the following observations of Sir James Colville in The Colonial Bank of Australasia\n\nv. Willan(1), which is a case dealing with the principles on which a writ of certiorari may be issued :-\n\n\"Accordingly, the authorities .... establish that an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject-matter is, if no defect appears on the face of it, to be taken as conl:!usive of the facts stated therein ; and that the Court of Queen's Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however essential, has been erroneously found.\"\n\nThere can be no doubt that the present case falls within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, because here the Act has entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether there is non-payment of rent or not, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there is nonpayment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant. Therefore, even if the Controller may be assumed to have wrongly decided the question of non-payment of rent, which by no means is clear, his order cannot be questioned in a civil court.\n\nIt seems to us that on this short ground this appeal must succeed, and we\n\n(!)SP. C. 417, at P 443.\n\naccordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree of the courts below. The appellants will be entitled to costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for the respondent : S. P. Varma.\n\nBADRI NARAIN JHA AND OTHERS\n\nRAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH AND OTHERS.\n\nrsAIYID FAZL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]\n\nLandlord and tenant-Merger-One of several ioint holders of mokarrari interest acquiring portion of lakhra; interest-No merger-Partition amongst lessees inter sc--lntegrity of lease, qua lessor, not affected.\n\nIf a lessor purchases the whole of the lessee's interest, the lease is extinguished by merger, but there can be no merger or extinction where one of several joint holders of the mokarrari interest purchases portion of the lakhraj interest.\n\nA partition inter se amongst several mokarraridars does not in any way affect the integrity of the tenancy or make each\n\nholder of an interest in it a separate holder of a different tenancy, and notwithstanding such partition the mokarraridars remain liable qua the lessor or the payment of the whole rent as one tenant.\n\nWhite v. Tyndall (13 App. Cas. 263) referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRismcnoN : Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 14th February, 1946, in Appeal from Original Decree No. 117 of 1942 arising out of Title Suit No. 9 -0f 1939 : Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1950.\n\nS. C. Misra for the appellant.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (P. B. Gangoli, with him) for the respondent.\n\nAnother\n\nS.K. Shaw' and BrolhlTs.\n\n19~1\n\nFeb. 5.", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "acquiesced, during all these years in the construction which the Patna High Court has been placing upon the section from the very next year after the enactment of the statute."}}, {"text": "Tarachand Brij Mohanlal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 612, "end_char": 635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed Agent for the appellants: Tarachand Brij Mohanlal."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 665, "end_char": 677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "RAI BRIJ RAJ KRISHNA AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 712, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAI BRIJ RAJ KRISHNA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. SHAW AND BROTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 714, "end_char": 737, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. SHAW AND BROTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 741, "end_char": 756, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 758, "end_char": 777, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 780, "end_char": 789, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1105, "end_char": 1115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1166, "end_char": 1183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramananitan Prasal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1809, "end_char": 1827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramananitan Prasal\n\nNarayan Singh\n\nV• Mahanth Kapildeo RamJeeaud Another\n\nChandrasekhara."}}, {"text": "Narayan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1829, "end_char": 1842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramananitan Prasal\n\nNarayan Singh\n\nV• Mahanth Kapildeo RamJeeaud Another\n\nChandrasekhara."}}, {"text": "Mahanth Kapildeo RamJeeaud", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramananitan Prasal\n\nNarayan Singh\n\nV• Mahanth Kapildeo RamJeeaud Another\n\nChandrasekhara."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1900, "end_char": 1905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aiyar J.\n\ni95I\n\nFeb. 2."}}, {"text": "RaiBrij Baj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1925, "end_char": 1936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RaiBrij Baj\n\nKris/1110 aRd\n\nAnothtr ... .S. K. Shaw .and Broth111."}}, {"text": "S. 2280", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2110, "end_char": 2117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Baldev Sahay", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2208, "end_char": 2220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baldev Sahay (T. K. Prasad, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T. K. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2222, "end_char": 2234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baldev Sahay (T. K. Prasad, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2266, "end_char": 2282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (H. f. Umrigar, with him) for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "H. f. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2284, "end_char": 2297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (H. f. Umrigar, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2393, "end_char": 2400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna reversing the appellate decree of a Subordinate Judge in a suit instituted by the respondents."}}, {"text": "Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2461, "end_char": 2489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna reversing the appellate decree of a Subordinate Judge in a suit instituted by the respondents."}}, {"text": "28th June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tent for the months of March, ApriJ and May, 1942, having £alien into arrears, they remitted it along with the rent for June, on 28th June, 1947, by means of two cheques."}}, {"text": "4th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3002, "end_char": 3018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the aJ?Pellants did not accept the cheques, on 4th August, 1947, the respondents remitted the amount subsequently by postal money order."}}, {"text": "12th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3095, "end_char": 3112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12th August, 1947, the appellants, maintaining that there was non-payment of rent and hence the respondents were liable to be evicted, under section 11 ( 1) (a) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Bihar Act III of 1947), applied to the House Controller for the eviction of the respondents from the prqniscs."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3236, "end_char": 3246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3306, "end_char": 3323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Act III of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3325, "end_char": 3346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3437, "end_char": 3447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act III of 1947", "statute": "Bihar Act III of 1947"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3600, "end_char": 3610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act III of 1947", "statute": "Bihar Act III of 1947"}}, {"text": "30th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4094, "end_char": 4111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "''Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the contrary and subject to the provisions of section 12, where a tenant is in possession Qf any building, he shall not be liable to be evicted therefrom, whether in execution of .a decree or otherwise, except-\n\n(a) in the case of a month to month tenant, for non-payment of rent or breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for subletting the building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlod, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building .as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment;\"\n\nOn 30th August, 1947, the."}}, {"text": "27th April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4609, "end_char": 4625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the House Controller was upheld by the Commissioner on appeal on the 27th April, 1948, and thereupon the respondents filed the present suit in the Patna Munsif's Court for a declaration that the order of the Controller dated the 10th November, 1947, was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Patna Munsif", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4687, "end_char": 4699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the House Controller was upheld by the Commissioner on appeal on the 27th April, 1948, and thereupon the respondents filed the present suit in the Patna Munsif's Court for a declaration that the order of the Controller dated the 10th November, 1947, was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "10th November, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4769, "end_char": 4788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the House Controller was upheld by the Commissioner on appeal on the 27th April, 1948, and thereupon the respondents filed the present suit in the Patna Munsif's Court for a declaration that the order of the Controller dated the 10th November, 1947, was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Munsif", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4875, "end_char": 4881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Munsif and his decree was upheld on appeal, but the High Court decred the suit holding that the order of the Rent Controller was without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Rai Brij /lJJj\n\nErunnaaad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5837, "end_char": 5862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On _ ihe other hand, one of the contentions put forward on behalf of the appellants is that there was non; payment of rent within the meaning of that expression as used in the Act, since the rent was not paid as and when it\n\nRai Brij /lJJj\n\nErunnaaad\n\nAnothlr\n\nS. K. ShllllJ and Brotn1ts •\n\n!"}}, {"text": "S. K. ShllllJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5873, "end_char": 5886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On _ ihe other hand, one of the contentions put forward on behalf of the appellants is that there was non; payment of rent within the meaning of that expression as used in the Act, since the rent was not paid as and when it\n\nRai Brij /lJJj\n\nErunnaaad\n\nAnothlr\n\nS. K. ShllllJ and Brotn1ts •\n\n!"}}, {"text": "S. Jr. Shaw", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5941, "end_char": 5952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rai Brif Raj\n\nAnother\n\nS. Jr. Shaw and Brothers1\n\nFad Ali]."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6847, "end_char": 6857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Buildings Countrol Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7320, "end_char": 7342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12 Patna 117", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7736, "end_char": 7748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the question of jurisdiction depends upon the decision of some fact or point of law, and if the court is called upon to decide such question, then such decision cannot be collaterally impeached ( vide 12 Patna 117)."}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8072, "end_char": 8083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the Buildings Countrol Act", "statute": "But the Buildings Countrol Act"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8433, "end_char": 8443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9076, "end_char": 9086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9413, "end_char": 9423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9447, "end_char": 9457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RaiBrijRoj Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10271, "end_char": 10289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RaiBrijRoj Krishna alCd\n\n.Another\n\nS. Jr.Shau!"}}, {"text": "Lalnarain Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10618, "end_char": 10633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of Mr. Lalnarain Sinha on behalf of the respondent that the circumstances disclosed in the petition raised the question for determination by the Controller whether a case of non-payment of rent in law was established, and his decision of that question, even if wrong in law, is not liable to be questioned in the\n\nCivil Court must be over-ruled.\""}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11028, "end_char": 11038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11298, "end_char": 11308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11720, "end_char": 11730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11998, "end_char": 12008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12197, "end_char": 12224, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12226, "end_char": 12236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13216, "end_char": 13226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Esher M._ R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13476, "end_char": 13488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this subject has been very lucidly stated by Lord Esher M._ R. in The Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the lncome-Tax(1), in these words:-\n\n\"When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13707, "end_char": 13717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this subject has been very lucidly stated by Lord Esher M._ R. in The Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the lncome-Tax(1), in these words:-\n\n\"When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body."}}, {"text": "RaiBrjj Raj Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14574, "end_char": 14593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RaiBrjj Raj Krishna on4\n\n.4.Nothlr\n\nS.K.S/uzaJ ant!"}}, {"text": ".4.Nothlr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14599, "end_char": 14608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RaiBrjj Raj Krishna on4\n\n.4.Nothlr\n\nS.K.S/uzaJ ant!"}}, {"text": "James Colville", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15553, "end_char": 15567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same lines are the following observations of Sir James Colville in The Colonial Bank of Australasia\n\nv. Willan(1), which is a case dealing with the principles on which a writ of certiorari may be issued :-\n\n\"Accordingly, the authorities .... establish that an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject-matter is, if no defect appears on the face of it, to be taken as conl:!usive of the facts stated therein ; and that the Court of Queen's Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however essential, has been erroneously found.\""}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16197, "end_char": 16202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt that the present case falls within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, because here the Act has entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether there is non-payment of rent or not, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there is nonpayment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17024, "end_char": 17035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "BADRI NARAIN JHA", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17038, "end_char": 17054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BADRI NARAIN JHA AND OTHERS\n\nRAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "RAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17067, "end_char": 17088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BADRI NARAIN JHA AND OTHERS\n\nRAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "rsAIYID FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17102, "end_char": 17117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rsAIYID FAZL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]", "canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17119, "end_char": 17138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rsAIYID FAZL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17154, "end_char": 17174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rsAIYID FAZL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18074, "end_char": 18107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRismcnoN : Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 14th February, 1946, in Appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18255, "end_char": 18266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Misra for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18287, "end_char": 18303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (P. B. Gangoli, with him) for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "P. B. Gangoli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18305, "end_char": 18318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (P. B. Gangoli, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S.K. Shaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18360, "end_char": 18369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another\n\nS.K. Shaw' and BrolhlTs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_153_160_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 153\n\naccordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree of the courts below. The appellants will be entitled to costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for the respondent : S. P. Varma.\n\nBADRI NARAIN JHA AND OTHERS\n\nRAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH AND OTHERS.\n\nrsAIYID FAZL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.]\n\nLandlord and tenant-Merger-One of several ioint holders of mokarrari interest acquiring portion of lakhra; interest-No merger-Partition amongst lessees inter sc--lntegrity of lease, qua lessor, not affected.\n\nIf a lessor purchases the whole of the lessee's interest, the lease is extinguished by merger, but there can be no merger or extinction where one of several joint holders of the mokarrari interest purchases portion of the lakhraj interest.\n\nA partition inter se amongst several mokarraridars does not in any way affect the integrity of the tenancy or make each\n\nholder of an interest in it a separate holder of a different tenancy, and notwithstanding such partition the mokarraridars remain liable qua the lessor or the payment of the whole rent as one tenant.\n\nWhite v. Tyndall (13 App. Cas. 263) referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRismcnoN : Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 14th February, 1946, in Appeal from Original Decree No. 117 of 1942 arising out of Title Suit No. 9 -0f 1939 : Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1950.\n\nS. C. Misra for the appellant.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (P. B. Gangoli, with him) for the respondent.\n\nRai Brij Raj\n\nKrishna and\n\nAnother\n\nS.K. Shaw' and BrolhlTs.\n\n19~1\n\nFeb. 5.\n\nBodri Natayan .. lo,,,.,,\n\nRamesluo01 Dayal Singh arul 01/urs.\n\nMahajan].\n\n1951. February 5. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-Th.is appeal arises out of Suit No. 9 of 1939 instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Palamau by the appellants against the respondents for a number of declarations in respect to the title to certain lands and for an injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding with a rent suit.\n\nThe suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge but on appeal this decision was reversed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna and the appellants' suit was dismissed.\n\nThe salient facts of the case are as follows : Village Darha belonged to a family of Pathaks as their ancestral lakhraj.\n\nOver a hundred years ago the Pathaks granted the entire village in mokarrari to the ancestors of the family of Singhas (defendants' first and second parties) at an annual jama of Rs. 24.\n\nThe mokarrari interest eventually devolved on three branches of the Singha family, each branch getting in the following proportions : Parameshwar Dayal and others, defendants' first party, to the extent of six annas ; Bisheswar Dayal Singh, defendants' second party, to the extent of eight annas; and Madho Saran Singh, to the extent of two annas.\n\nSubsequently, the two annas share of Madho Saran Singh was purchased by Hiranand Jha, father of the plaintiffs, jointly with Durganand Jha, and Dharam Dayal. Dharam Dayal was a mere benamidar for Hiranand Jha.\n\nOn the 5th June, 1916, Bisheshwar Dayal Singh purchased six anna share in the lakhraj interest from Deolal Pathak and others and on the 9th February, 1917, he purchased another two anna share from Mandi! Pathak.\n\nBy virtue of these purchases he came to own the lakhraj interest to the extent of eight anna share.\n\nHe already held the mokarrari interest to the same extent which had devolved on him by inheritance.\n\nSome time in the year 1917 or 1918 Hiranand Jha and Durganand Jha, who had acquired by purchase two anna mokarrari interest of Madho Saran Singh\n\npurchased in aecution of a rent decree the raiyati interest in the whole village and came into possession of it.\n\nThey thus became mokarraridars of two anna share and raiyats of sixteen annas of the village lands.\n\nIn the year 1918, Title Suit No. 59 of 1918 was instituted in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Palamau for partition of the lands situate in several villages and belonging to the family of the defendants' first and second parties.\n\nThe Jhas were impleaded as defendants in the suit, being co-sharers in part of the property in suit.\n\nThis suit was decreed in the year 1921, and in the final partition an allotment of two annas share in Darha village was made in their favour.\n\nThe remaining fourteen anna share excluding khatian 1, 3 and 6 was allotted to the defendants' first party. These three khatians were allotted to Bisheshwar Dayal Singh and in exchap.ge for the remaining portions of his interest in that village he was given some property in village Holeya.\n\nThe result of the partition proceedings was that the defendants' first party came to hold fourteen anna mokarrari interest in village Darha, Bisheshwar Dayal Singh's interest was limited to three khatians only, and the Jhas got a separate allotment for their two anna share in the mokarrari.\n\nIt appears that some time about the year 1926 the lakhraj interest holders, i.e., the Pathaks and Bisheshwar Dayal Singh, were in default in payment of the cess due to Government. On the 17th August, 1926, proceedings were taken against them for recovery of the cess and their interest was sold in execution of a certificate on the 18th October, 1927, to one Bijainandan Sahay. The sale obviously was of the lakhraj interest.\n\nThis was confirmed on the 19th December, 1927; and a sale certificate was issued on the 10th March, 1928.\n\nThis was followed by delivery of possession on 15th July, 1928.\n\nPossession was obtained by one Kamta Prasad who had acquired this interest from Bijainandan Sahay on the 20th April, 1928.\n\nOn the 1st May, 1933, Kamta Prasad transferred his interest in the village to the plaintiffs who thus became proprietors of sixteen anna share in the village and mokarraridars as to two anna\n\n3-1 S.C. India/68\n\n!951\n\nBadri Naral•\n\n' :Jha and Oth\"s\n\nRameslrwar DayalSingi alid Olhlrs.\n\nMahajan].\n\n!95!\n\nBatfri Naraiw.\n\n]ha and Others\n\nRamtshwar Dayal Singh\n\nand Others.\n\nMallajanJ.\n\nshare and raiyats of the entire sixteen annas in the whole village.\n\nOn the 21st September, 1934, the defendants' first party as mokarraridars brought a suit against the plaintiffs for arrears of raiyati rent for the years 1338- 39 F. to the extent of six annas share and for the years\n\n1340-41 F. to the extent of fourteen anna share claiming that under the partition decree they got . a fourteen anna share in the mokarrari interest in the village.\n\nPlaintiffs contested the suit alleging that Bisheshwar's mokarrari interest had merged in the lakhraj interest that was purchased by him from the Pathaks in the years 1916-17, and that by the sale under the Government's certificate his whole eight anna interest in the village including both the lakhraj and the mokarrari, had passed on to the plaintiffs and that the defendants' first party could only claim rent from them to the extent of the six anna share in the mokarrari.\n\nThis plea was disallowed and the defendants' first party's claim for rent was decreed in full. The decree was upheld on appeal and second appeal. The question of title was, however, left open. In the year 1938 another suit for rent was filed by the defendants' first party as mokarraridars to recover fourteen anna share of the rent for the years subsequent to fasli 1341. As a result of this suit, the plaintiffs brought the present suit for declaration and injunction on the allegation that the eight anna mokarrari interest of Bisheshwar Dayal\n\nSingh had merged in his lakhraj interest, that by the certificate sale Bisheshwar Dayal Singh lost all his interest in the village both lakhraj and mokarrari by reason of merger, that the partition decree of the year 1921 was illegal and in any case, under that decree the defendants' first party got only six anna mokarrari interest and were entitled to realize rents from the tenants only to that extent. An injunction was also claimed restraining the defendants from proceeding with the rent suit.\n\nIn the plaint, it was alleged that there was a private partition between the mokarraridars by virtue of which the lands of village Darha were divided between the three sets of mokarraridars, each set being\n\nin separate possession of its own separate and defined shares. It was also pleaded that there was another partition between the proprietors of the lakhraj interest, that is, between Bisheshwar Dayal Singh, on the one hand and Deolal Pathak, Neman Pathak and Surajnath Pathak on the other, by virtue of which the lands that were in mokarrari patties of Parmeshwar Dayal Singh and others and Hiranand Jha and Durganand Jha fell in the patti of Dcolal Pathak and others, while the lands that were in the mokarrari patti of the defendants' second party fell in his proprietary lakhraj patti and that as a result of these partitions the mokarrari interest of the defendants' second party merged in his lakhraj interest and under a certificate sale the whole of his interest passed to the plaintiffs.\n\nThe trial Judge held that both the partitions alleged by the plaintiffs in paragraphs 5 and 8 of their plaint were proved and that the mokarrari interest of Bisheshwar Dayal Singh merged in his lakhraj interest and that at the certificate sale the purchaser acquired his complete interest both lakhraj and mokarrari along with the eight anha lakhraj interest of the Pathaks and that the defendants' first party were mokarraridars of six anna interest in the village and to that extent were entitled to a decree in their rent suit and could not claim a decree for rent to the extent of fourteen anna share. The High Court in api>cal held that none of the partitions alleged by the plaintiffs were proved and that the mokarrari interest of eight annas could not merge in the lakhraj interest of sixteen annas held jointly by Bisheshwar Dayal Singh with the Pathaks. As a result of this decision the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed.\n\nIn this appeal it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the High Coiirt had erroneously held that the two partitions set up by the plaintiffs in paragraphs 5 and 8 had not been proved.\n\nIt was argued that the evidence on the record, both documentary and oral, fully established the fact of the two partitions and that in view of these partitions it should have been held that Bisheshwar Dayal Singh\n\nBa4ri Narain\n\nJha au Ollitrs\n\nRmn11hwar Dayal Singh\n\nand Othm.\n\nMahajan].\n\nJ95J\n\nBabi Narain\n\n]ha and Others\n\nv. &im1thwa1 Dayal si., h - 01/wr1,\n\nMafuiiaa].\n\nbecame separate owner of eight anna lakhraj interest and in that interest his mokarrari interest of eight annas merged, and that under the certificate sale the whole of this interest passed on to .the purchaser in execution and that being so, the defendants' first party could oniy maintain a suit for recovery, of rent from the raiyats to the extent of their six anna mokarrari interest.\n\nIn our opinion, this appeal can be disposed of on a short point without taking into consideration the respective contentions of the parties raised before us or urged in the two courts below.\n\nThe plaintiffs' case rests solely on the allegation of merger of the eight anna lakhraj interest of Bisheshwar Dayal Singh with his mokarrari interest to the same extent. It, however, seems to us that there was no scope for the application of the doctrine of merger to the facts disclosed by the plaintiffs in their plaint. If the lessor purchases the lessee's interest, the lease no doubt is extinguished as the same man cannot at the same time be both a landlord and a tenant, but there is no extinction of the lease . if one of the several lcssccs purchases only a part of the lessor's interest. In such a case the leasehold and the reversion cannot be said to coincide.\n\nIt was the plaintiff's case that mauza Darha was originally granted in mokarrari under a single contract of lease and it was by inheritance that the lessee's interest devolved on three branches of the family, Bisheshwar Dayal Singh getting an interest of eight annas in the whole of the leasehold .. He then purchased a six anna interest in the entire J'C11ersion in the year 1916 and another two anna interest in it in the year 1917.\n\nBy these purchases he became a joint owner in the entire lakhraj . holding to the extent of a moiety. He, however, never came to own the entire lakhraj interest in the village or the entire mokarrari interest therein.\n\nThere was thus no coalescence of the interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the estate which was subject to lakhraj and mokarrari interests and that being so, the mok:irrari interest of Bishcshwar Dayal Singh did not merge in his lakhraj interest.\n\nMere purchase by Bisheshwar Dayal Singh of portions of the lakhraj interest could not bring about an extinction of the lease or break its integrity as he was only one of the several joint holders of the mokarrari interest. An inter se partition of the mokarrari interest amongst the mokarraridars as alleged by the plaintiffs could not affect their liability qua the lessor for the payment of the whole rent, as several tenants of a tenancy in law constitute , but a single tenant, and qua the landlord they constitute one person, each constituent part of whic_h possesses certain common rights in the whole and is liable to discharge common obligations in its entirety.\n\nIn the words of Lord Halsbury in White v.\n\nTyndal/(1), the parties to whom a demise is made hold as tenants in common but what they covenant to pay is one rent, not two rents and not each to pay half a rent but one rent.\n\nThere 'is a privity of the estate between the tenant and the landlord in the whole of the leasehold and he is liable for all the covenants running with the land. In law, therefore an inter se partition of the mokarrari interest could not affect the integrity of the lease and it could not be said that Bisheshwar Dayal Singh under the alleged partition became a mokarraridar wider another contract of lease.\n\nSuch partitions amongst several lessees inter se are usually made for convenience of enjoyment of the leasehold but they do not in any way affect the integrity of the tenancy or make each holder of an interest in it as a separate holder of a different tenancy.\n\nIn the present case there was not even an allegation that the tenancy was severed and the several tenancies came into existence as a result of the partition qua the landlord.\n\nSimilarly the allegation of partition inter se among the several owners of the lakhraj holding could not in any way affect the integrity of the lease in the absence of an allegation of a fresh contract between the split up owners of the holding and the different owners in the mokarrari interest.\n\nThe lakhraj holding in the village still remains a single holding and it was not alleged that it was split up in different holdings.\n\nAll owners\n\n(I) 13 App. Cas. 263. 21\n\n!951\n\n.Badri Narain\n\nJlia and Others\n\nRameshwar Dayal Singh and Others.\n\nMahajan].\n\n195!\n\nBadri Natain\n\nJh• and Othm\n\nRameshwar Dayal Singh and Oth1r1.\n\nMahajan].\n\nof the lakhraj interest are jointly responsible for payment of the cess to Government and it was because of their default in payment of the cess that the whole lakhraj interest was sold in the certificate sale. In this situation none of the conditions necessary for the application of the doctrine of merger can be said to have been made out by the allegations made m the plaint. On the plaintiffs' own case the lease is still a live one in respect of the six arma interest of the defendants' first party and in these circumstances it is riot possible to hold that it has become extinct to the extent of eight anna interest of- Bisheshwar Dayal Singh in the absence of any allegation that any fresh contract, express or implied, was arrived at between the parties. The leasehold has not in any way been drowned in the rexersion and both lakhraj and mokarrari interest are still intact.\n\nFor the reasons given above we agree with the decision of the High Court that Bisheshwar Dayal Singh' s interest in the mokarrari did not merge in his lakhraj interest and that under the certificate sale it did not pass to the execution purchaser; on the other hand, it vested in the defendants' first party by reason of the family partition and they became entitled as mokarraridars to recover rent from the plaintiffs' raiyats to the extent of fourteen annas share.\n\nAll that passed at the certificate sale to the execution purchaser and subsequently to the plaintiffs was merely the lakhraj interest of_ the Pathaks and of Bisheshwar Dayal Singh and it could not be that at this sale qua one judgment-debtor a larger interest passed - to the execution purchaser than in respect of the other debtor.\n\nIn view of our decision that the doctrine of merger has no application to the facts of the case, the plaintiffs' case is bound to fail.\n\nWe accordingly hold that there is no substance in this appeal and we dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the. appellant : S. P. Varma. ' Agent for the respondent : P. K. Chatteriee.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 258, "end_char": 270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 300, "end_char": 311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : S. P. Varma."}}, {"text": "BADRI NARAIN JHA AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 314, "end_char": 341, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BADRI NARAIN JHA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 343, "end_char": 375, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 395, "end_char": 414, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 416, "end_char": 425, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1531, "end_char": 1542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Misra for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1563, "end_char": 1579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (P. B. Gangoli, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. B. Gangoli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1581, "end_char": 1594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (P. B. Gangoli, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rai Brij Raj\n\nKrishna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1627, "end_char": 1648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rai Brij Raj\n\nKrishna and\n\nAnother\n\nS.K. Shaw' and BrolhlTs."}}, {"text": "S.K. Shaw", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1663, "end_char": 1672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rai Brij Raj\n\nKrishna and\n\nAnother\n\nS.K. Shaw' and BrolhlTs."}}, {"text": "Bodri Natayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1704, "end_char": 1717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bodri Natayan .. lo,,,.,,"}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1841, "end_char": 1848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-Th.is appeal arises out of Suit No.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2249, "end_char": 2282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge but on appeal this decision was reversed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna and the appellants' suit was dismissed."}}, {"text": "Darha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2379, "end_char": 2384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The salient facts of the case are as follows : Village Darha belonged to a family of Pathaks as their ancestral lakhraj."}}, {"text": "Parameshwar Dayal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2768, "end_char": 2785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mokarrari interest eventually devolved on three branches of the Singha family, each branch getting in the following proportions : Parameshwar Dayal and others, defendants' first party, to the extent of six annas ; Bisheswar Dayal Singh, defendants' second party, to the extent of eight annas; and Madho Saran Singh, to the extent of two annas."}}, {"text": "Bisheswar Dayal Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2852, "end_char": 2873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mokarrari interest eventually devolved on three branches of the Singha family, each branch getting in the following proportions : Parameshwar Dayal and others, defendants' first party, to the extent of six annas ; Bisheswar Dayal Singh, defendants' second party, to the extent of eight annas; and Madho Saran Singh, to the extent of two annas.", "canonical_name": "Bisheshwar Dayal\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Madho Saran Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2935, "end_char": 2952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mokarrari interest eventually devolved on three branches of the Singha family, each branch getting in the following proportions : Parameshwar Dayal and others, defendants' first party, to the extent of six annas ; Bisheswar Dayal Singh, defendants' second party, to the extent of eight annas; and Madho Saran Singh, to the extent of two annas.", "canonical_name": "Madho Saran Singh"}}, {"text": "Madho Saran Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3020, "end_char": 3037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the two annas share of Madho Saran Singh was purchased by Hiranand Jha, father of the plaintiffs, jointly with Durganand Jha, and Dharam Dayal.", "canonical_name": "Madho Saran Singh"}}, {"text": "Hiranand Jha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3055, "end_char": 3067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the two annas share of Madho Saran Singh was purchased by Hiranand Jha, father of the plaintiffs, jointly with Durganand Jha, and Dharam Dayal."}}, {"text": "Durganand Jha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3108, "end_char": 3121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the two annas share of Madho Saran Singh was purchased by Hiranand Jha, father of the plaintiffs, jointly with Durganand Jha, and Dharam Dayal."}}, {"text": "Dharam Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3127, "end_char": 3139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the two annas share of Madho Saran Singh was purchased by Hiranand Jha, father of the plaintiffs, jointly with Durganand Jha, and Dharam Dayal."}}, {"text": "5th June, 1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3201, "end_char": 3215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th June, 1916, Bisheshwar Dayal Singh purchased six anna share in the lakhraj interest from Deolal Pathak and others and on the 9th February, 1917, he purchased another two anna share from Mandi!"}}, {"text": "Bisheshwar Dayal Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3217, "end_char": 3239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th June, 1916, Bisheshwar Dayal Singh purchased six anna share in the lakhraj interest from Deolal Pathak and others and on the 9th February, 1917, he purchased another two anna share from Mandi!", "canonical_name": "Bisheshwar Dayal\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Deolal Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3294, "end_char": 3307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th June, 1916, Bisheshwar Dayal Singh purchased six anna share in the lakhraj interest from Deolal Pathak and others and on the 9th February, 1917, he purchased another two anna share from Mandi!", "canonical_name": "Deolal Pathak"}}, {"text": "9th February, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3330, "end_char": 3348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th June, 1916, Bisheshwar Dayal Singh purchased six anna share in the lakhraj interest from Deolal Pathak and others and on the 9th February, 1917, he purchased another two anna share from Mandi!"}}, {"text": "Mandi! Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3391, "end_char": 3404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th June, 1916, Bisheshwar Dayal Singh purchased six anna share in the lakhraj interest from Deolal Pathak and others and on the 9th February, 1917, he purchased another two anna share from Mandi!"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Palamau", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4049, "end_char": 4077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "59 of 1918 was instituted in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Palamau for partition of the lands situate in several villages and belonging to the family of the defendants' first and second parties."}}, {"text": "Darha village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4411, "end_char": 4424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suit was decreed in the year 1921, and in the final partition an allotment of two annas share in Darha village was made in their favour."}}, {"text": "Holeya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4735, "end_char": 4741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These three khatians were allotted to Bisheshwar Dayal Singh and in exchap.ge for the remaining portions of his interest in that village he was given some property in village Holeya."}}, {"text": "Pathaks", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that some time about the year 1926 the lakhraj interest holders, i.e., the Pathaks and Bisheshwar Dayal Singh, were in default in payment of the cess due to Government.", "canonical_name": "Pathaks"}}, {"text": "17th August, 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5224, "end_char": 5241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th August, 1926, proceedings were taken against them for recovery of the cess and their interest was sold in execution of a certificate on the 18th October, 1927, to one Bijainandan Sahay."}}, {"text": "18th October, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5369, "end_char": 5387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th August, 1926, proceedings were taken against them for recovery of the cess and their interest was sold in execution of a certificate on the 18th October, 1927, to one Bijainandan Sahay."}}, {"text": "Bijainandan Sahay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5396, "end_char": 5413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th August, 1926, proceedings were taken against them for recovery of the cess and their interest was sold in execution of a certificate on the 18th October, 1927, to one Bijainandan Sahay."}}, {"text": "19th December, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5490, "end_char": 5509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was confirmed on the 19th December, 1927; and a sale certificate was issued on the 10th March, 1928."}}, {"text": "10th March, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5552, "end_char": 5568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was confirmed on the 19th December, 1927; and a sale certificate was issued on the 10th March, 1928."}}, {"text": "15th July, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5618, "end_char": 5633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by delivery of possession on 15th July, 1928."}}, {"text": "Kamta Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Possession was obtained by one Kamta Prasad who had acquired this interest from Bijainandan Sahay on the 20th April, 1928."}}, {"text": "20th April, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5741, "end_char": 5757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Possession was obtained by one Kamta Prasad who had acquired this interest from Bijainandan Sahay on the 20th April, 1928."}}, {"text": "1st May, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5767, "end_char": 5780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st May, 1933, Kamta Prasad transferred his interest in the village to the plaintiffs who thus became proprietors of sixteen anna share in the village and mokarraridars as to two anna\n\n3-1 S.C. India/68\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Rameslrwar DayalSingi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6009, "end_char": 6030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "951\n\nBadri Naral•\n\n' :Jha and Oth\"s\n\nRameslrwar DayalSingi alid Olhlrs."}}, {"text": "Ramtshwar Dayal Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6094, "end_char": 6115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "]ha and Others\n\nRamtshwar Dayal Singh\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "RAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "21st September, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6218, "end_char": 6238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 21st September, 1934, the defendants' first party as mokarraridars brought a suit against the plaintiffs for arrears of raiyati rent for the years 1338- 39 F. to the extent of six annas share and for the years\n\n1340-41 F. to the extent of fourteen anna share claiming that under the partition decree they got ."}}, {"text": "Bisheshwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6638, "end_char": 6648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Plaintiffs contested the suit alleging that Bisheshwar's mokarrari interest had merged in the lakhraj interest that was purchased by him from the Pathaks in the years 1916-17, and that by the sale under the Government's certificate his whole eight anna interest in the village including both the lakhraj and the mokarrari, had passed on to the plaintiffs and that the defendants' first party could only claim rent from them to the extent of the six anna share in the mokarrari."}}, {"text": "Bisheshwar Dayal\n\nSingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7603, "end_char": 7626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of this suit, the plaintiffs brought the present suit for declaration and injunction on the allegation that the eight anna mokarrari interest of Bisheshwar Dayal\n\nSingh had merged in his lakhraj interest, that by the certificate sale Bisheshwar Dayal Singh lost all his interest in the village both lakhraj and mokarrari by reason of merger, that the partition decree of the year 1921 was illegal and in any case, under that decree the defendants' first party got only six anna mokarrari interest and were entitled to realize rents from the tenants only to that extent.", "canonical_name": "Bisheshwar Dayal\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Neman Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8571, "end_char": 8583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also pleaded that there was another partition between the proprietors of the lakhraj interest, that is, between Bisheshwar Dayal Singh, on the one hand and Deolal Pathak, Neman Pathak and Surajnath Pathak on the other, by virtue of which the lands that were in mokarrari patties of Parmeshwar Dayal Singh and others and Hiranand Jha and Durganand Jha fell in the patti of Dcolal Pathak and others, while the lands that were in the mokarrari patti of the defendants' second party fell in his proprietary lakhraj patti and that as a result of these partitions the mokarrari interest of the defendants' second party merged in his lakhraj interest and under a certificate sale the whole of his interest passed to the plaintiffs."}}, {"text": "Surajnath Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8588, "end_char": 8604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also pleaded that there was another partition between the proprietors of the lakhraj interest, that is, between Bisheshwar Dayal Singh, on the one hand and Deolal Pathak, Neman Pathak and Surajnath Pathak on the other, by virtue of which the lands that were in mokarrari patties of Parmeshwar Dayal Singh and others and Hiranand Jha and Durganand Jha fell in the patti of Dcolal Pathak and others, while the lands that were in the mokarrari patti of the defendants' second party fell in his proprietary lakhraj patti and that as a result of these partitions the mokarrari interest of the defendants' second party merged in his lakhraj interest and under a certificate sale the whole of his interest passed to the plaintiffs."}}, {"text": "Parmeshwar Dayal Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8682, "end_char": 8704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also pleaded that there was another partition between the proprietors of the lakhraj interest, that is, between Bisheshwar Dayal Singh, on the one hand and Deolal Pathak, Neman Pathak and Surajnath Pathak on the other, by virtue of which the lands that were in mokarrari patties of Parmeshwar Dayal Singh and others and Hiranand Jha and Durganand Jha fell in the patti of Dcolal Pathak and others, while the lands that were in the mokarrari patti of the defendants' second party fell in his proprietary lakhraj patti and that as a result of these partitions the mokarrari interest of the defendants' second party merged in his lakhraj interest and under a certificate sale the whole of his interest passed to the plaintiffs.", "canonical_name": "RAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Dcolal Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8772, "end_char": 8785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also pleaded that there was another partition between the proprietors of the lakhraj interest, that is, between Bisheshwar Dayal Singh, on the one hand and Deolal Pathak, Neman Pathak and Surajnath Pathak on the other, by virtue of which the lands that were in mokarrari patties of Parmeshwar Dayal Singh and others and Hiranand Jha and Durganand Jha fell in the patti of Dcolal Pathak and others, while the lands that were in the mokarrari patti of the defendants' second party fell in his proprietary lakhraj patti and that as a result of these partitions the mokarrari interest of the defendants' second party merged in his lakhraj interest and under a certificate sale the whole of his interest passed to the plaintiffs.", "canonical_name": "Deolal Pathak"}}, {"text": "Pathaks", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9981, "end_char": 9988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court in api>cal held that none of the partitions alleged by the plaintiffs were proved and that the mokarrari interest of eight annas could not merge in the lakhraj interest of sixteen annas held jointly by Bisheshwar Dayal Singh with the Pathaks.", "canonical_name": "Pathaks"}}, {"text": "Babi Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10560, "end_char": 10571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J95J\n\nBabi Narain\n\n]ha and Others\n\nv. &im1thwa1 Dayal si.,"}}, {"text": "Dayal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10602, "end_char": 10607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J95J\n\nBabi Narain\n\n]ha and Others\n\nv. &im1thwa1 Dayal si.,"}}, {"text": "Bishcshwar Dayal Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12751, "end_char": 12773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was thus no coalescence of the interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the estate which was subject to lakhraj and mokarrari interests and that being so, the mok:irrari interest of Bishcshwar Dayal Singh did not merge in his lakhraj interest.", "canonical_name": "Bisheshwar Dayal\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13507, "end_char": 13515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Lord Halsbury in White v.\n\nTyndal/(1), the parties to whom a demise is made hold as tenants in common but what they covenant to pay is one rent, not two rents and not each to pay half a rent but one rent."}}, {"text": ".Badri Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15031, "end_char": 15044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "951\n\n.Badri Narain\n\nJlia and Others\n\nRameshwar Dayal Singh and Others.", "canonical_name": ".Badri Narain"}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Dayal Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15063, "end_char": 15084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "951\n\n.Badri Narain\n\nJlia and Others\n\nRameshwar Dayal Singh and Others.", "canonical_name": "RAMESHWAR DAYAL SINGH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15098, "end_char": 15105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan].", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Badri Natain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15115, "end_char": 15127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badri Natain\n\nJh• and Othm\n\nRameshwar Dayal Singh and Oth1r1.", "canonical_name": ".Badri Narain"}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatteriee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17197, "end_char": 17213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : P. K. Chatteriee."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_161_167_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nCOL. D.I. MAc PHER:SON\n\nti.\n\nM. N. APPANNA AND ANOTHER.\n\nfSAIYID FAZL ALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHA.NDRASEKHAllA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nContract-OOer and acceptanctatement of lowest price and counter-offer disting1111hell.\n\nOn receiving an offer from A for the purchase of a house belonging to B, Y w!Jo was looking after . the house c.abled to B that there was an offer of Rs. 6,000 for the house. B sent a cable in reply on the 5th August, 1944, that he would not accept less than Rs. 10,000.\n\nY conveyed this informatio_n to A on the 9th and on the 14th A wrote a letter to Y stating that he thereby confirmed the oral offer of Rs. 10,000 that he had made to Y on the 11th. On the :6:h Y cabled to B as follows : \"Offered Rs. 10,000. May I sell\". On the same day, W, another frienJ of B, with whom also B was in correspondence, sent an offer for Rs. 11,000 and B accepted it.\n\nA sued for specific performance alleging that B's cable of the 5th was a counter-offer anJ as he had accepted it on the 14th, there was a concluded contract for sale in his favour on that day.\n\nHeld, that the table sent 1>y B on the 5th was a men: statement of the lowest price at . which he would sell and contained no implied contract to sell at that price. A's letter of the 14th was under the circumstances only a fresh offer; and as B had not accepted it ere was no concluded contract in favour of A.\n\nHaruey v. Faeey l1893 J A.C. 552 applied.\n\nCML\n\nAPPELLATE JURiso1CT10N.\n\nAppeal from a judgment and decree of the Judicial Commissioner of Coorg, dated 1st April, 1946, in Original Suit No. 1 of 1945.\n\nC.R. Pattabhi Raman, for the appellant..\n\nJindra Lal, for the respondent.\n\n195L February 9.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n!95!\n\nFeb.9\n\nFAZL ALI J.--This is an appeal from a judgment Fad ~Ii]~ of the Judicial Commissioner of Coorg in a suit filed bv the first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) against the appellant (hereinafter referred to as . the first defendant) and the second respondent\n\n195!\n\nCol. D.I.\n\nMae Pherso•\n\nM. N. APP.•••\n\nand amJther.\n\nFa<l Ali].\n\n(hereinafter referred to as the second defendant), for the specific performance of a contract.\n\nThe first defendant owned a bungalow in Mercara known as \"Morvern Lodge\".\n\nThe suit which has given rise to this appeal was instituted by the plaintiff for the specific performance of an alleged contract of sale in respect of this bungalow.\n\nIt appears that the first defendant owned certain estates in Mercara, and one Mr. White was an alternative director in one of the estates, and Youngman was the manager of another estate also belonging to the first defendant and was looking after \"Morvern Lodge\" during his absence.\n\nIt seems that about the middle of 1944, the plaintiff asked White if he would cable to the first defendant his offer of Rs. 4,000 for the bungalow, and, on the 1st June, 1944, White sent a cable to the first defendant to the following effect :-\n\n\"Have enquiries Mercara bungalow if for sale, wire lowest figure.\"\n\nOn the 24th July, 1944, the plaintiff wrote to the first defendant that he was prepared to purchase the bungalow for Rs. 5,000 and if the offer was acceptable to him, he (the first defendant) should inform the plaintiff to which bank he should issue a cheque in payment of the price. This letter was followed up by a cable from Youngman to the first defendant to the following effect :-\n\n\"Have had offer Morvern Lodge rupees ix thousand for immediate possession.\"\n\nOn the 8th August, 1944, Youngman received a cable from the first defendant saying : \"Won't accept\n\nJes~ than rupees ten thousand\". On the 7th August, 1944, the plaintiff wrote to Youngman asking him whether his offer had been accepted, and saying that he was prepared to accept any higher price if found reasonable. Meanwhile, on the 8th August, the first defendant sent an airgraph to Youngman, which states inter alia :-\n\n\"I got a cable from you a few days ago saying you had had an offer of Rs. 6,000 for Morvern Lodge.\n\nAt the same time I got one from White saying value of Bungalow was Rs. 10,000.\n\nSo wired you-'W on't accept less than Rs. 10,000'.\" On the 9th August, 1944, Youngman, wrote to the plaintiff as follows :-\n\n\"In reply to your letter, dated 7th August, I received yesterday a cable from Col.\n\nMacPherson regarding your offer of Rs. 6,000, which reads as follows:-\n\n'Won't accept less than rupees ten thousand' MacPherson.\"\n\nThe plaintiff has stated in his plaint that this letter of Youngman was received by him on the 14th August, 1944, and he immediately accepted the \"counter-offer made by the first defendant'', and confirmed it ' in writing in a letter addressed to Youngman. In his evidence, however, the plaintiff has stated that he met Youngman on the 11th August after receiving his letter and told him personally that he would. pay Rs. 10,000 for the bungalow and will require immediate delivery.\n\nThere was also some talk about the con..,, veyance charges, and ultimately the plaintiff agreed to bear those charges. - Afterwards, he wrote to Youngman a letter on the 14th August in which after refering to the conversation he had with the latter he stated as follows :-\n\n\"I hereby confirm my oral offer of ten thousand for the bungalow.\n\nI shall be grateful if you will kindly hurry up with consultation with your lawyersat Madras and make arrangements to receive the money and hand over the bungalow as early as pJacticable.\"\n\nIt appears that three days later, i.e., on the 17th August, one Subbayya wrote to Youngman stating that \"he confirmeC:! his offer of Rs. 10,500 made to him (Youngman) the previous day for the purchase of the bungalow\", and he expected that the latter had cabled to the first defendant communicating the offer _as promised.\n\nIt seems that Youngman did not communicate Subbayya's offer to the first defendant, but sent a cable to him on the 26th August to the following effect:-\n\nt95t\n\nCol. D. I.\n\nMa& Pherson\n\nM. N. Appanno and Another.\n\nFal Ali].\n\nCol. D. J.\n\nMae Ph1rson\n\nM. N. Appanna and Lf.notlur.\n\nFad Ali J.\n\n\"Offered ten thousand Morvern Lodge immediate possession, May I sell.\" On the same day, White cable to tho first defendant in the followng terms :-\n\n\"'Hold offer for Morvern Bungalow rupees eleven thousand cash subject immediately acceptance and occupation. Strongly recommended acceptance.\"\n\nOn the 29th August, Youngman sent an airgraph to the first derendant in which he wrote as follows :-\n\n\"Thank you for your airgraph letter of 8th August which reached me on 24th instant.\n\nI cabled you on Saturday an offer of Rs. 10,000 for Morvern Lodge from the would be purchaser who previously had offered Rs. 6,000, but I had a call from White a day or two ago and he tells me that he cabled an offer on the same day of Rs. 11,000. I except you will have answered these and will have accepted White's offer.\n\nIf you have decided will you please arrange for a Power-of-Attorney to be prepared as soon as possible.\"\n\n'• In the meantime, the first defendant sent a cable to White to the following effect :-\n\n\"Accept rupees eleven thousand MorVern Lodge occupation permitted when full amount deposited my account Mercantile Bank Madras inform Youngman.\"\n\nThereafter, the second defendant paid the amount of Rs. 11,000 and occupied the bungalow.\n\nThe question to be decided in this case is whether in view _of the correspondence which has been reprc>· duced, it could be held that there was a concluded contract for the sale \"Morvern Lodge\" in favour of the plaintiff on the 14th August, as stated by him in the plaint.\n\nThe Judicial Commissioner of Coorg who tried the suit held that there was a concluded contract, but, instead of giving to the plaintiff a decree for specific performance, awarded a sum of Rs. 3,000 as compensation to him. Against this decree, the first defendant alone has appealed, after obtaining a certificate under section 109(c) of the Civil Procedure Code from the Judicial Commissioner.\n\nThe plaintiff has not preferred any appeal.\n\nThe plaintiff's case is that the cable sent by the first defendant on the 5th Augus~, and received by Young- . man on the 8th, to the effect that he would not accept less than Rs. 10,000, was a counter-offer made by him through Youngman to the plaintiff, and the contract was completed as soon as he accepted it. We however find it difficult to hold on the entire facts of the case that there was any concluded contract on the 14th August, 1944, and we are supported in this view by the well-known case of Harvey v. Facey(1), in which the facts were somewhat similar to those of the present case.\n\nIn: that case, the appellants had telegraphed to the respondents \"Will you sell us B.H.P.?\n\nTelegraph lowest cash price\", and the respondents had telegraphed in reply, \"Lowest price for B.H.P. £900,\" and then the appellants telegraphed, \"We agree to buy B.H.P. for £900 asked by you. Please send us your title-deed in order that we may get early possession,\" but received no reply. On these facts, the Privy Council held that there was no contract, and Lord Norris, who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed as follows :-\n\n\"The third telegram from the appellants treats the answer of L.M. Facey stating his lowest price as an unconditional offer to sell to them at the price named.\n\nTheir Lordships cannot treat the telegram from L. M. Facey as binding him in any respect, except to the extent it does by its terms, viz., the lowest price.\n\nEverything else is left open, and the reply telegram from the appellants cannot be treated as an acceptance of an offer to sell them; it is an offer that required to be accepted by L.M. Facey. The contract could only be completed if L.M. Facey had accepted the appellant's last telegram.\n\nIt has been contended for the appellants that L.M. Facey's telegram should be read as saying 'yes' to the first question put in the appellant's telegram, but there is nothing to support that contention. L.M. Facey's telegram gives a precise answer to a precise question, viz., the price. The Contract must appear by the telegrams, whereas the\n\n(I) (1893) A. C. SS2.\n\nCol. D. I.\n\nMlll: Phmon\n\nM. N. Apparuuz\n\nand Anotlwr\n\nFar.l Ali].\n\nC.I. D. I.\n\nMae PIITTun\n\nJI. N A/\"'4nna\n\nand Anoti\\er.\n\nappellants are obliged to contend that an acceptance of the first question is to be implied.\n\nTheir Lordships are of opinion that the mere statement of the lowest price at which the vendor would sell contains no implied contract to sell at that price to the persons making the inquiry.\"\n\nThe conclusion at which we have arrived is strengthened by certain facts which emerge from the correspondence between the parties. The real question is whether the first defendartt had made a counter-offer in his cable of the 5th August or he was merely inviting offers.\n\nThe plaintiff in his letter of the 14th August addressed to Youngman, stated that he confirmed his oral offer of ten thousand for the bungalow, and he did not say in so many words that he accepted the 'counter-offer' of the first defendant. Similarly, in the cable which Youngman sent to the first defendant on the 28th August, he did not state that the latter's offer had, been accepted, but stated that he had been offered Rs. 10,000 for the bungalow and concluded with the words \"May I sell?\" Neither party thus treated the first defendant's cable as containing a counter-offer.\n\nOn the other hand, they proceeded on the footing that the plaintiff had made an offer of Rs. 10,000 which was subject to acceptance by the first defendant.\n\nApparently, the first defendant was in communication not only with Youngman but also White, and both of them rightly thought that no transaction could be concluded without obtaining the first defendant's express assent to it.\n\nMr. Jindra Lal, counsel for the plaintiff, who pressed his points with force and ability, contended that by the 26th August, 1944, Youngman had come under the influence of the rival bidder or at least that of White who was supporting him, and the cable to the first defendant was deliberately framed by Youngman in such a way as to prejudice the plaintiff. There is however nothing in the evidence to support such an extreme conclusion. On the other hand, Youngman has frankly stated in his evidence that he felt it improper to entertain Subbayya' s higher offer and did\n\nnot communicate it to the first defendant. This statement is supported by the cable of the 26th August and, if Youngman can be said to have had any leaning at all, it was certainly in favour of the plaintiff. In these circumstances, it would be difficult to hold that Youngman had deliberately misdescribed the plaintiff's acceptance of the counter-offer as his offer in the cable which he sent on the 26th August to the first defendant.\n\nIt seems to us that the view taken by the Judicial Commissioner is not correct, and, as there was no concluded contract, the decree passed by him awarding .\n\ncompensation to the plaintiff for breach of contract cannot be sustained. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and dtcree of the Judicial Commissioner and dismiss the plaintiff's suit.\n\nHaving regard to the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for the respondent: Rajinder Narain.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)\n\nConstitution of fodia, Arts. 21, 22 (5)-Preventive detention -Duty to communicate grounds and to afford opportunity to make representation-Whether distinct rights-Ground supplied vague -Non-supply of particulars or supply of particulars at later st.7ge -Whether vitiates dttention-furisdiction of court to consider sufficiency of grounds-Preventive Detention A.ct (IV of 1950), s. 3.\n\nThe respondent was arrested on the 21st of April, 195(), under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of\n\n19Sl\n\nCol. D. I.\n\nMil() Phersott\n\nM. N. APflanM\n\nand ANJtlrer.\n\nFazl Ali].\n\n1951 Jan. 25.", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "COL. D.I. MAc PHER:SON", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COL. D.I. MAc PHERSON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. N. APPANNA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. N. APPANNA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "fSAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHA.NDRASEKHAllA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "5th August, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B sent a cable in reply on the 5th August, 1944, that he would not accept less than Rs."}}, {"text": "C.R. Pattabhi Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1603, "end_char": 1622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.R. Pattabhi Raman, for the appellant..\n\nJindra Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1645, "end_char": 1655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.R. Pattabhi Raman, for the appellant..\n\nJindra Lal, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Jindra Lal"}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1753, "end_char": 1761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Feb.9\n\nFAZL ALI J.--This is an appeal from a judgment Fad ~Ii]~ of the Judicial Commissioner of Coorg in a suit filed bv the first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) against the appellant (hereinafter referred to as ."}}, {"text": "Mercara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2501, "end_char": 2508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the first defendant owned certain estates in Mercara, and one Mr. White was an alternative director in one of the estates, and Youngman was the manager of another estate also belonging to the first defendant and was looking after \"Morvern Lodge\" during his absence."}}, {"text": "White", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2522, "end_char": 2527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the first defendant owned certain estates in Mercara, and one Mr. White was an alternative director in one of the estates, and Youngman was the manager of another estate also belonging to the first defendant and was looking after \"Morvern Lodge\" during his absence."}}, {"text": "Youngman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the first defendant owned certain estates in Mercara, and one Mr. White was an alternative director in one of the estates, and Youngman was the manager of another estate also belonging to the first defendant and was looking after \"Morvern Lodge\" during his absence."}}, {"text": "1st June, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2883, "end_char": 2897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,000 for the bungalow, and, on the 1st June, 1944, White sent a cable to the first defendant to the following effect :-\n\n\"Have enquiries Mercara bungalow if for sale, wire lowest figure.\""}}, {"text": "24th July, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3044, "end_char": 3059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th July, 1944, the plaintiff wrote to the first defendant that he was prepared to purchase the bungalow for Rs."}}, {"text": "8th August, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3509, "end_char": 3525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th August, 1944, Youngman received a cable from the first defendant saying : \"Won't accept\n\nJes~ than rupees ten thousand\"."}}, {"text": "7th August, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3641, "end_char": 3657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 7th August, 1944, the plaintiff wrote to Youngman asking him whether his offer had been accepted, and saying that he was prepared to accept any higher price if found reasonable."}}, {"text": "MacPherson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4316, "end_char": 4326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MacPherson regarding your offer of Rs."}}, {"text": "14th August, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4542, "end_char": 4559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff has stated in his plaint that this letter of Youngman was received by him on the 14th August, 1944, and he immediately accepted the \"counter-offer made by the first defendant'', and confirmed it ' in writing in a letter addressed to Youngman."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5358, "end_char": 5364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I shall be grateful if you will kindly hurry up with consultation with your lawyersat Madras and make arrangements to receive the money and hand over the bungalow as early as pJacticable.\""}}, {"text": "Subbayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5526, "end_char": 5534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that three days later, i.e., on the 17th August, one Subbayya wrote to Youngman stating that \"he confirmeC:!"}}, {"text": "M. N. Appanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6035, "end_char": 6048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. J.\n\nMae Ph1rson\n\nM. N. Appanna and Lf.notlur.", "canonical_name": "M. N. APPANNA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Fad Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6065, "end_char": 6072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fad Ali J.\n\n\"Offered ten thousand Morvern Lodge immediate possession, May I sell.\""}}, {"text": "Coorg", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7618, "end_char": 7623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judicial Commissioner of Coorg who tried the suit held that there was a concluded contract, but, instead of giving to the plaintiff a decree for specific performance, awarded a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 109(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7908, "end_char": 7922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Norris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9085, "end_char": 9091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these facts, the Privy Council held that there was no contract, and Lord Norris, who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed as follows :-\n\n\"The third telegram from the appellants treats the answer of L.M. Facey stating his lowest price as an unconditional offer to sell to them at the price named."}}, {"text": "L.M. Facey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9219, "end_char": 9229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these facts, the Privy Council held that there was no contract, and Lord Norris, who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed as follows :-\n\n\"The third telegram from the appellants treats the answer of L.M. Facey stating his lowest price as an unconditional offer to sell to them at the price named.", "canonical_name": "L. M. Facey"}}, {"text": "L. M. Facey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9365, "end_char": 9376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships cannot treat the telegram from L. M. Facey as binding him in any respect, except to the extent it does by its terms, viz.,", "canonical_name": "L. M. Facey"}}, {"text": "SS2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10126, "end_char": 10129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. N. Apparuuz", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10157, "end_char": 10171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. I.\n\nMlll: Phmon\n\nM. N. Apparuuz\n\nand Anotlwr\n\nFar.l Ali]."}}, {"text": "Mae PIITTun", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10211, "end_char": 10222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.I. D. I.\n\nMae PIITTun\n\nJI."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11786, "end_char": 11796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Jindra Lal, counsel for the plaintiff, who pressed his points with force and ability, contended that by the 26th August, 1944, Youngman had come under the influence of the rival bidder or at least that of White who was supporting him, and the cable to the first defendant was deliberately framed by Youngman in such a way as to prejudice the plaintiff.", "canonical_name": "Jindra Lal"}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13276, "end_char": 13291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13320, "end_char": 13335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13342, "end_char": 13357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13359, "end_char": 13382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13390, "end_char": 13403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13410, "end_char": 13425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13427, "end_char": 13443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13465, "end_char": 13485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Arts. 21, 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13515, "end_char": 13527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13870, "end_char": 13874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13944, "end_char": 13974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29th of\n\n19Sl", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13987, "end_char": 14000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was arrested on the 21st of April, 195(), under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of\n\n19Sl\n\nCol."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_167_212_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 167\n\nnot communicate it to the first defendant. This statement is supported by the cable of the 26th August and, if Youngman can be said to have had any leaning at all, it was certainly in favour of the plaintiff. In these circumstances, it would be difficult to hold that Youngman had deliberately misdescribed the plaintiff's acceptance of the counter-offer as his offer in the cable which he sent on the 26th August to the first defendant.\n\nIt seems to us that the view taken by the Judicial Commissioner is not correct, and, as there was no concluded contract, the decree passed by him awarding .\n\ncompensation to the plaintiff for breach of contract cannot be sustained. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and dtcree of the Judicial Commissioner and dismiss the plaintiff's suit.\n\nHaving regard to the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for the respondent: Rajinder Narain.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)\n\nConstitution of fodia, Arts. 21, 22 (5)-Preventive detention -Duty to communicate grounds and to afford opportunity to make representation-Whether distinct rights-Ground supplied vague -Non-supply of particulars or supply of particulars at later st.7ge -Whether vitiates dttention-furisdiction of court to consider sufficiency of grounds-Preventive Detention A.ct (IV of 1950), s. 3.\n\nThe respondent was arrested on the 21st of April, 195(), under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of\n\n19Sl\n\nCol. D. I.\n\nMil() Phersott\n\nM. N. APflanM\n\nand ANJtlrer.\n\nFazl Ali].\n\n1951 Jan. 25.\n\nStat• qf B0111bay\n\nv. .Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nApril, 1950, he was mpplied with the ground for his detention which. was as iollos ; \"That you are engaged and are likely to he cng:iged in pron1oting: acts of sabotage on railway and r:tihvay property . in Greater Bombay.\" The respondent filed a habsas corpus petition contending that the ground supplied was vague as it did not 1ncntion the time, place or nature of the sbotage or how the respondent promoted it and that as the ground gave nc particulars, his detention was illegal.\n\nPending the_ disposal of the petition, the Con1missioner of Police sent a comn1unica<:ion to the respondent giving these further particulars, viz., that the activities 1nentioned in the grounds supplied to him ·.vcre being tarried on by }; im in Greater Bombay between January, 19S(J, and the d.tte of hs detention and that he will in all probability continue to do so. The High Court of Bombay held th•t if the,; e particulars had been furnished at the time when the grounds were furnished on the 29th of April, 1950, very likely they would have come to the conclusion that the grounds were such as would have led the <letenue to know exactly what he was charged with and to 1nake a proper representation, but released the respondent holding th:n the only grounds which were furnished in the purported compliance of Art. 22 (5) were the grounJs furnisO.ed on the 29th of April, 1950, and as these grounds were not such as. to enable the dctcnue to make a proper representation, there was a violation of a fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions and this violation cannot be set right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the grounds already given :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL Au, PAT.\\NJALI\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHA!\"!'DRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ).- Under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government., as the case may be, that is necessary, and if the grounds on wbich it is stated that the Central Government or the State Government :ire satisfied have a rational connection with the: ohiccts which were to be prevented from being attained, the quetion of satisf.action cannot be challenged in a court of law except on the ground of ma/a frdes. ,\n\nHeld also per\n\nKANIA\n\nCJ., FAzL\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and CttANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.,\n\n(PATANJALI . SASTRI and\n\nDAS JJ. dissenting).-Clause\n\n(5) of Art. 22 confers two rights on the detenue, namely, first, 3 right to be informed of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and secondly, to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order; 2n<l though these rights are linked together they arc two distinct rights.\n\nIf grounds which have a ration01l connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3 are supplied, the first condition is complied with.\n\nBut the right to make a re presentation implies that the detenue should have information so as to enable him to make a representation: and if r.he grounds\n\nsupplied are not sufficient to enable the detenue to make a repmentation, he can rely on the sec0nd. right: He may if he likes ask. for further particulars which will enable _him to make a representation.\n\nOn an infringement of either of these two rights the detained person has a right to approach the court, and even if an infringement of the second right under Art. 22 (5) is alone established he is cntilcd to be rcleaSed.\n\nPer l>ATANJAU SAsTa! and DAs JJ.-As the power to issue a detention order depends upon the existence of a state of mind in the detaining authority, that is,. its satisfaction, which is purely a subjective condition and judicial enquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds to justify ilie detention . is thus excluded, it would be wholly inconsistent with the scheme to hold that it is open to the court to examine tho sufficiency of the same grounds to enable the person detained to make a representation, for, the grounds to be communicated to the person detained are the grounds on which the order has been made. There is further nothing in Art. 22, cl. (5), to warrant the view that the grounds on which the order of detention has been made must be such, that when communicated to the person they are found by a cour: of law to be sufficient to enable him to make what the court considers to be an adequate representation, or that the latter part of cl. ( 5) confers a distinct right on the detenue or an independent obligation on . the detaining authority to furniSh the detcnue with sufficient particulars and details to enable him to make an effective representation. ·\n\nHeld by the Full Court (KANIA , C.J., FAzL Au, PATANJAU\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ.)- ln any view, on the facts of the case there was no infringement of any fundamental right of the respondent or contravention of any constitutional provision as he had been s, upplicd with sufficient particulars as soon as he raised the objection that the grounds supplied were vague and the respondent was not, therefore, entitled to be released.\n\nPer (KANIA C.J., FAzL Au, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.)-The \"grounds for making the order which have to be communicated to the person detained .1s soon as may be arc conclusions of facts and not a complete recita! of all the facts. These grounds must be in existence when the order is made.\n\nNo part of the grounds can be held back, and after they have been once conveyed there can be no addition to the grounds.\n\nAll facts leading to the conclusion constituting the ground need not, however, be conveyed at the same time.\n\nIf a second communication contains no further conclusion of fact but only furnishes some of the facts on which the first mentioned conclusion was founded it does not amount to a fresh ground.\n\nThe test threforc is whether what is conveyed in the second communication is a statement of facts or events, which facts or\n\nStot1 qf Bombay\n\nAtma Ram SriJAar Vaidya.\n\nJ95J\n\nStaie qf Bomba7\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nEaniaC. ].\n\nevents were already taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion constituting the ground already supplied.\n\nSo long as the later communications do not make out a new ground, their contents are no infringement of the two procedural rights of the <letenue 1nentioned in Art. 22, cl. (5). They n1ay consist of a narration of f:icts or particulars relating to the grounds already supplieJ.\n\nBut in doing so the timC\" factor in respect of second duty, viz., to give the detained person the earlitc; t oppor~ tunity to make a representation, cannot be overlooked.\n\nIf on reading the ground furnished it is capable of being intellWenrly understood and is sufficiently definite to furnish materials to enable the detained person to make a representation against the order it cannot be said to be \"vague\".\n\nThe question whether the vagueness or indefinite nature of the statement furnished to the detained person is such that he was not given the earliest opportunity to make a repr; esentation is a matter within the jurisdiction of the court's inquiry and subject to the court's decision.\n\nCruMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Case No. 22 of 1950.\n\nAppeal under Art. 132(1) of the. Constitution against a judgment and order of the Bombay High Court dated. 1st September, 1950, in Criminal Application No. 807 of 1950. The facts and arguments of counsel are set out in the judgment.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attarney-General, ( G. N. foshi, with him) f<;>r the appellant.\n\nA. S. R. Chari and Bava Shiv Charan Singh for the respondent.\n\n1951. Jan. 25.\n\nThe judgment of Kania C.J., Faz!\n\nAli, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. was delivered by Kania C.J. Patanjali Sastri and Dass JT. delivered separate judgments.\n\nKANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from.a judgment of the High Court at Bombay, ordering the release of the respondent who was detained in custody under a detention order made under the Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950). The respondent was first arrested on the 18th December, 1948, under the Bombay\n\nPublic Security Measures Act, 1948 (Bombay Act IV of 1947), but was released on the 11th of November, 1949.\n\nHe was arrested again on the 21st of April, 1950, under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of April, 1950, grounds for his detention were supplied to him. They were in the following terms : \"That you are engaged and are likely to be engaged in promoting acts of sabotage ori railway and railway property in Greater Bombay.\" The respondent. filed a habeas corpus petition on the 31st of July, 1950, in which, after reciting his previous arrest and release, in paragraphs 6 and 7 he mentioned as follows:-\n\n\"(6) On his release the applicant left Bombay and stayed out of Bombay, that is, in Ratlam and in Delhi.\n\n(7) On the 20th April, 1950, he returned to Bombay and was immediately arrested as stated above.\"\n\nHe contended that the sole aim of the Government in ordering his detention was not the preservation of public order or the security of the State, but the locking-up of active trade unionists who belonged to the All-India Trade Union Congress.\n\nHe contended that the ground is \"delightfully vague and does not mention when, where or what kind of sabotage or how the applicant promoted it.\" He further urged that the ground gave no particulars and therefore was not a ground as required to be furnished under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.\n\nHe stated that the present appellant acted mala fide, for a collateral purpose, - outside the scope of the Act, and that the applicant's detention in any event was illegal and mala fide.\n\nWhen this petition was presented to the Court on the 9th of August, 1950, it directed the issue of a notice to the Commissioner of Police.\n\nPending the disposal of the Rule, on the 26th August, 1950, the Commissioner of Police sent a communication .to the respondent as follows:\n\n\"In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), and in continuation of my communication No. 227 dated the 29th April,\n\n4-1 S. C. India/68\n\nt95J\n\n$tale qf Bom6ay\n\nAtma Ram SritllitW V aitfyo.\n\nKanioC. J1\n\nStoi.~ Bom6ay\n\nAbrut Ram Sridhar Yaidy•.\n\nKaaiaC.J.\n\n1950, the following further particulars arc hereby communicated to you in connection with the grounds on which a detention order has been made against you under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the said Act:-\n\nThat the activities mentioned in the grounds furnished to . you were being carried on by you in Greater Bombay between January 1950 and the date of your detention; and In all probability you will continue to do so.\n\n2. If, in view of the particulars now supplied, you wish to make a further representation against the order under which you are detained, you should address it to the Government of :SOmbay and forward it through the Superintendent of Arthur Road Prison, Bombay.\"\n\nOn the 30th of August, 1950, the Commissioner of Police filed an affidavit against the petition of the respondent in which it was stated that the objectionable activities were carried on by the applicant between the months of January, 1950, and the date of detention. It further stated that in or about the month of January, 1950, there was a move for a total strike on the railways in India in the month of March, 1950, and the applicant was taken prominent part to sec that the strike was brought about and was successful.\n\nAs a means to make the strike successful and bring about total cessation of work on all railways, the applicant and his associates were advocating sabotage on railways and railway property in Greater Bombay. He further stated that reliable materials were put before him of the respondent being engaged in such activities by experienced police officers.\n\nHe added that although the railway strike in the month of March did not materialise, the idea of bringing about such strike as soon as convenient continued to be entertained and the present respondent was actively engaged in bringing about sucha strike in the near future.\n\nHe then stated that the disclosure of further facts relating to the activities of the dctcnuc was against public \"interest.\n\nIn para. 6 there was a specific denial that\n\nthe respondent, after his release in Novcrnber, 1949, and till 20th April, 1950, was out of Bombay.\n\nIt was stated that he used to go out of Bombay at times but during the major part of the period he was in the city of Bombay.\n\nWhen the matter came up before a Bench of the High Court the respondent's petition was granted. In the judgment of the Court, Chagla C. J. observed: \"It is clear by reason of the view we have taken in several cases under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, that this is not a ground which would enable the detenue to make a representation to which he is entitled both under the Act and under the Constitution.\" After noticing the affidavit of the Commissioner of Police, it was further observed : \"We appreciate the fact that, after our decision was given, Government decided to place all the materials before us so that we should be satisfied that what influenced the detaining authority in making the order was not any ulterior motive but that ample materials were at the disposal of the detaining authority which would justify the applicant's detention.\n\nWe have looked at this affidavit and we have also looked at the particulars furnished to us by Mr. Chudasama. If these particulars had been furnished at the time when the grounds were furnished on the 29th of April, 1950, very likely we would have come to the conclusion that the grounds were such as would have led the detenue to know exactly what he was charged with and to make a proper representation.\" The judgment is however based on the following observation of the Chief Justice : \"A new and important question arises for our consideration; and that is whether it is permissible to the detaining authority to justify the detention by amplifying and improving the grounds originally furnished ........ The only grounds which we have to consider and which were furnished in the purported compliance of article 22(5) were the grounds furnished to the detenue on the 29th of April, 1950; and if these grounds were not such as to enable the detenue to make a proper representation, then there was a\n\nSlate ef B11111t•.1\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Y 11;,/ya.\n\nXallill C.].\n\nSttdt ef Bomhay\n\nAtma Ram Srfr!krzr Jl nU!ya.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nviolation of the fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions. That violation and that contravention cannot be set right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the grounds already given.\n\nAs we said before, the point of time at which we have to decide whether there was a compliance or not with the provisions of article 22(5) is the 29th of April, 1950, when the grounds were furnished, and not when further and better particulars were given on the 26th of August 1950.\" The learned Attorney-General, appearing for the appellant, has strenuously objected to this line of approach.\n\nAs the question of vagueness of grounds for the order of detention and the question whether supplementary grounds could be furnished after the grounds were first given to the detenue have arisen in various High Courts,' we think it right that the general principles should be properly appreciated.\n\nThe Constitution of India has given legislative powers to the States and the Central Government to pass laws permitting preventive detention. In order that a legislation permitting preventive detention may not be contended to be an inJlringement of the Fundamental Rights provided in Part III of the Constitution, article 22 lays down the permissible limits of legislation empowering preventive detention.\n\nArticle 22 prescribes the minimum procedure that must be included in any law permitting preventive detention and as and when such requirements are not observed the detention, even if valid ab initio, ceases to be \"in accordance with procedure established by law\" and infringes the fundamental right of the detenue guaranteed under articles 21 and 22(5) of the Constitution. In that way the subject of preventive detention has been brought into the chapter on Fundamental Rights.\n\nIn the present case we are concerned only with clauses (5) and ( 6) of article 22 which run as follows :-\n\n22. \"(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall,\n\nas soon as may be, communicate to such person the ground on which the order has lx; en made an~ shall\n\nafford him the earliest opporturuty of making a representation against the order.\n\n( 6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.\"\n\nIt has to be borne in mind that the legislation in question is not an emergency legislation.\n\nThe powers of preventive detention under this Act of 1950 are in addition to those contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, where preventive detention is followed by an inquiry or trial.\n\nBy its very nature, preventive detention is aimed at preventing the commission of an offence or preventing the detained person from achieving a certain end. The authority making the order therefore cannot always be in possession of full detailed information when it passes the order and the information in its possession may fall far short of legal proof of any specific offence, although it may be indicative of a strong probability of the impending commission of a prejudicial act.\n\nSection 3 of the Preventive Detention Act therefore requires that the Central Government or the State Government must be satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to ( 1) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the 1 security of India, or\n\n(2) the security of the state or the maintenance of public order, or (3) the maintenance of supplies of and services essential to the community .......... it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.\n\nAccording to the wording of section 3 therefore before the Government can pass an order of preventive detention it must be satisfied with respect to the individual person that his activities arc directed against one or other of the three objects mentioned in the section, and that the detaining authority was satisfied that it . was necessary to prevent him from\n\nState qf Bombay\n\nAtmaRawa Sridhar Yail/ya.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nSt\"1e qf BDmbay\n\n\"· Atmallam Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nacting in such a manner.\n\nThe wording of the section thus clearly shows that it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government on the point which alo'ne is necessary to be established.\n\nIt is significant that while the objects intended to be defeated are mentioned, the different methods, acts or omissions by which that can be done are not mentioned. as it is not humanly possible to give such a~ exhaustive list. The satisfaction of the Government however must be based on some grounds.\n\nThere can be no satisfaction if there are no grounds for the same.\n\nThere may be a divergence of opinion as to whether certain grounds are sufficient to bring about the satisfaction required by the section.\n\nOne person may think one way, another the other way.\n\nIf, therefore, the grounds on which it is stated that the Central Government or the State Government was satisfied are such as a rational human being can consider connected in some manner with the objects which were to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fides cannot be challenged in a court.\n\nWhether in a particular case\n\nthe grounds are sufficient or not, according to the opinion of any person or body other than the Central Government or the State Government, is ruled out by the wording of the section.\n\nIt is not for the court to sit in the place of the Central Government or the State Government and try to determine if it would have come to the same conclusion as the Central or the State Government. As has been generally obsened. this is a matter for the subjective decision of the Government and that cannot be substituted by an objective test in a court of law. Such detention orden are passed on information and materials which may not be strictly admissible as evidence under the Evidence Act in a court, but which the law, taking into consideration the needs and exigencies of administration, has allowed to be considered sufficient for the subjective decision of the Government.\n\nAn order having been so permitted to e made, the next step to be considered is, has the detamed person\n\nany say in the matter?\n\nIn the chapter on Fundamental Rights, the Constitution of India, having given every citizen a right of freedom of movement, speech, etc., with their relative limitations prescribed in the different articles in Part III, has considered the position of a person detained under an order made under a Preventive Detention A1=t. Three things are expressly considered. In article 22(5) it is first considered that the man so detained has a right to be given as soon as may be the grounds on which the order has been made.\n\nHe may otherwise remain in custody without having the least idea as to why his liberty has been taken away. This is considered an elementary right in a free democratic State, Having received the grounds for the order of detention, the next point which is considered is, 'but that is not enough; what is the good of the man merely knowing grounds for his detention if he cannot take steps to redress a wrong which I1e thinks has been committed either in belief in the grounds or in making the order.\" The clause therefore further provides that the detained person should have the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.\n\nThe representation has to be against the order of detention because the grounds are only steps for the satisfaction of the Government on which satisfaction the order of detention has been made. The third thing provided is in clause (6).\n\nIt appears to have been thought that in conveying the information to the detained person there may be facts which cannot be disclosed in the public interest. The authorities are therefore left with a discretion in that connection under clause (6). The grounds which form the basis of satisfaction when formulated are bound to contain certain facts, but mostly they are themselvea deductions of facts from facts.\n\nThat is the general structure of article 22, clauses (5) and (6), of the Constitution.\n\nThe question arising for discussion is what should be stated in the grounds. It is argued that whatever may be stated or omitted to be stated, the ground c.'\\Illlot be vague; that the Constitution envisages the\n\n195{\n\nState of Bomba.1\n\nAtt114 Ra• Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nKaniaC. J.\n\n195!\n\nStat< ef Bom••.1\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nEaniaC.j.\n\nSUPRF.ME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nfurnishing of the grounds once and therefore there . is no occasion for furnishing particulars or supplemental grounds at a later stage;. and that article 22(5) does not give the detained person a right to ask for particulars, nor does it give the authorities any right to supplement the grounds, once they have furnished the same.\n\nIn our opinion much of the controversy is based on a somewhat loose appreciation of the meaning of the words used in the discussion. We think that the position will be clarified if it is appreciated in the first instance what are the rights given by article 22 (5).\n\nThe first pan of article 22, clause (5), gives a right to the detained person to be furnished with \"the grounds on which the order has been made\" and that has to be done \"as soon as may be.\" The second right given to such persons is of being afforded \"the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.\" It is obvious that the grounds for making the order as mentioned above, are the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied . that it was necessary to make the order. These grounds therefore must be in existence when the order is made. By their very nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete detailed recital of all the facts. The conclusions drawn from the available facts will show in which of the three categories of prejudical acts the suspected activity of the particular person is considered to fall. These conclusions are the \"grounds\" and they must be supplied.\n\nNo part of such \"grounds\" can be held back nor can any more \"grounds\" be added thereto.\n\nWhat must be supplied are the \"grounds on which the order has been made\" and nothing less.\n\nThe second right of being afforded the \"earliest opponunity of making a representation against the order\" is not confined to only a physical opportunity by supplying paper and pen only.\n\nIn order that a representation can be made the person detained must first have knowledge of the grounds on which the authorities conveyed that they were satisfied about the necessity of making the detention order. It is therefore clear that if the representation has to be intelligible to meet the charges\n\ncontained in the grounds, the information conveyed to the detained person must be sufficient to attain that object.\n\nOrdinarily, the \"grounds\" in the sense of conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenue is suspected of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him.\n\nOf course if the detenue is told about the details of facts besides the grounds he will certainly be in a better position to deal with the same. It is significant that the clause does not say that the \"grounds\" as well as details of facts on which they are based must be furnished or furnished at one time.\n\nThe law does not prescribe within what time after the grounds are furnished the representation could be made.\n\nThe time in each case appears deliberately unprovided for expressly, because circumstances vary in each case and make it impossible to fix a particular time for the exercise of each of these two rights.\n\nIt thus appears clear that although both these rights are separate and are to be exercised . at different times, they are still connected with each other.\n\nWithout getting information sufficient to make a representation against the order of detention it is not possible for the man to make the representation. Indeed the right will be only illusory but not a real right at all.\n\nThe right to receive the grounds is independent but it is thus intentionally bound up and connected with the right t<> make the representation.\n\nAlthough these two rights are thus linked up, the contingency of further communication between the furnishing of the grounds on which the order is made and the exercise of the right of representation granted by the second part of that clause is not altogether excluded.\n\nOne thing is clear from the wording of this clause and that is that after the grounds are once conveyed to the detenue there can be no addition to the grounds.\n\nThe grounds being the heads, from which the Government was satisfied that it was necessary to pass the order of detention, there can be no addition to those\n\nState of Bombay v.\n\nAtma Ram Sriihar Y aitlya,\n\nKa11iaC.J.\n\nState of Bombay\n\nAtma RIJln Sridhar Vait(ya.\n\n.Kania C. ].\n\ngrounds because such additional grounds will be either the grounds which were not elements to bring about the satisfaction of the Government or if thev were such grounds there has been a breach of the provision of the first part of article 22(5), as those grounds for the order of detention were not conveyed to the detained person \"as soon as may be.\"\n\nThis however does not mean that all facts leading to the conclusion mentioned in the grounds must be conveyed to the detained person at the same time the grounds are conveyed to him.\n\nThe facts on which the conclusion mentioned in the grounds are based must be available to the Government, but there may be cases where there is delay or difficulty in collecting the exact data or it may not be convenient to set out all the facts in the first communieation. If the second communication contains no further conclusion of fact from facts, but only furnishes all or some of the facts on which the first mentioned conclusion was founded it is obvious that no fresh ground for which the order of detention was made is being furnished to the detained person by the second communication which follows some time after the first communication. As regards the contents of that communication therefore the test appears to be whether what is conveyed in the second communication is a statement of facts or events, which facts or events were already taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion included in the ground already supplied.\n\nIf the later communication contains facts leading to a conclusion which is outside the ground first supplied, the same cannot be looked into as supporting the order of detention and therefore those grounds arc \"new\" grounds.\n\nIn our opinion that is the more appropriate expression to be used.\n\nThe expression \"additional grounds\" seems likely to lead to confusion of thought.\n\nThe next point to be considered is the time factor.\n\nIf a second communication becomes necessary, when should it be made?\n\nClause 22 (5) lays down two time factors.\n\nThe first is that the grounds should be supplied \"as soon as may be\" This allows the\n\nauthorities reasonable time to formulate the grounds on the materials in their possession. The time element is necessarily left indeterminate because actiities of individuals tending to bring about a certain result may be spread over a l<mg or a short period, or a larcrer or smaller area, or may be in connection with a fw or numerous individuals. The time required to formulate t'he proper grounds of detention, on information received, is bound to vary in individual cases.\n\nThere is no doubt that no express words are used to suggest a second communication from the authority to the detained person.\n\nBut having regard to the structure of the clause dealing with the two rights connected by the word \"and'', and the use of the words \"as soon as may be and \"earliest opportunity\" separately, indicating two distinct time factors, one in respect of the furnishing of grounds and the other in respect of the making of the representation, the contingency of a second communication after the grounds are furnished, is not excluded.\n\nHowever, the second communication should not be liable to be charged as not being within the measure \"as soon as may be\". Secondly, it must not create a new ground on which satisfaction of the Government could be\n\nsuggestd to have been arrived at.\n\nIn our opinion, if these two conditions are fulfilled, che objection against a later communication of details or facts is not sufficient to cause an infringement of the provision made in article 22(5).\n\nThe question has to be approached from another point of view also.\n\nAs mentioned above, the object of furnishing grounds for the order of detention is to enable the detenue to make a representation, i.e., to give him an opportunity to put forth his objections against the order of detention.\n\nMoreover, \"the earliest opportunity\" has to be given to him to do that. While the grounds of detention are thus the main factors on which the subjective decision of the Government is based, other materials on which the conclusions in the grounds are founded could and should equally be conveyed to the detained person to enable him to make out his objections against the\n\nStat• qf Bombay\n\nAtmaRiim Sridlun' Y aidya.\n\nEaniaC.J.\n\nt95t\n\nStale qf Bombay\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaid, a.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\norder. To put it in other words, the dctainirig authority has made its decision and passed its order. The detained person is then given an opportunity to urge his objections which in cases of preventive detention comes always at a later stage.\n\nThe grounds may have been considered sufficient by the Government to pass its judgment.\n\nBut to enable the detained person to make his representation against the oraer, further details may be furnished to him.\n\nIn our opinion, this appears to be the true measure of the procedural rights of the detained person under article 22(5).\n\nIt was argued that under article 22(6) the authorities .are permitted to withhold facts which they consider not desirable to be disclosed in the public interest.\n\nIt was argued that therefore all other facts must be disclosed.\n\nIn our opinion that is not the necessary conclusion from the wording of article 22(6).\n\nIt gives a right to the 1 detaining authority not to disclose such facts, but from that it does not follow that what is not stated or considered to be withheld on that ground must be disclosed and if not disclosed, there is a breach of a fundamental right. A wide latitude is left to the authorities in the matter of disclosure.\n\nThey are given a special privilege in respect of facts which are considered not desirable to be disclosed in public interest.\n\nAs regards the rest, their duty is to disclose facts so as to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent, it was argued that if the grounds of detention are vague or insufficiently clear there will result a failure to give him the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention and that defect in its turn must affect the. satisfaction on which the order of detention was made. It was argued that just as a ground which is completely irrelevant, and therefore, in law is no ground at all, could not satisfy any rational person about the necessity for the order, a vague ground\n\nwhich is insufficient to enable the detenue to make a representation would similarly make the order of detention based on it, void. In our opinion, this argument is unsound. Although the ground may be good there may be a cenain indefiniteness in its statement. Proceeding on the footing that there is some connection, i.e., the ground by itself is not so\n\nconvincingly irrelevant and incapable of bringing about satisfaction in any rational person, the question whether such ground can give rise to the satisfaction required for making the order is outside the scope of the inquiry of the court. On the other hand, the question whether the vagueness or indefinite nature of the statements furnished to the detained person is such as to give him the earliest opportunity to make a representation to the authority is a matter within the jurisdiction of the court's inquiry and subject to the coun's decision. The analogy sought to be drawn between a ground which can have no connection whatsoever with the order and a ground which on its face has connection with the order but is not definite in its statement) is clearly faulty.\n\nThe extreme position, on the other hand, that there is no connection between the ground to be furnished and the representation -to be 'made by the detained person under\n\nanicle 22(5) is equally unsound, when the object in furnishing the ground is kept in mind. The conferment of the right to make a representation necessarily carries with it the obligation on the pan of the detaining authority to furnish the grounds, i.e., materials on which the detention order was made. In our opinion, it is therefore clear that while there is a connection between the obligation on the part of the detaining authority to furnish grounds and the right given to the detained person to. have an earliest opportunity to make the representation, the test to be applied in respect of the contents of the grounds for the two purposes is quite different. As already pointed out, for the first, the test is whether it is sufficient to satisfy the authority. For the second, the test is,\n\nJ951\n\nState qf Bombay\n\nAtma Ram Sritihar Vail/ya.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nJ951\n\nStateW BombtfJ ... . l!m'lRam SrUlhor Y aid f a\n\nJron; aC.J.\n\nwhether it is sufficient to enable the detained person to make the representation at the earliest opportunity.\n\nThe arugument advanced on behalf of the respondent mixes up the two rights given under article 22(5) and converts it into one indivisible right. We are unable to read article 22(5) in that way. As pointed out above, the two rights are connected by the word \"and\".\n\nFurthermore, the use of the words, \"as soon as may be\" with the obligation to furnish the grounds of the order of detention, and the fixing of another time limit, viz., the earliest opportunity, for making the representation, makes the two rights distinct. The second right, as it is a right of objection, has to depend first on the service of the grounds on which the conclusion, i.e., satisfaction of the Government about the necessity of making the order, is based.\n\nTo that extent, and that extent alone, the two are connected.\n\nBut when grounds which have a rational connection with the ends mentioned in section 3 of the Act are supplied, the first condition is satisfied. If the grounds are not sufficient to enable the detenue to make a representation, the detention can rely on his second right and if he likes may ask for particulars which will enable him to make the representation. On an infringement of either of these two rights the detained person has a right to approach. the court and complain that there has been an infringement of his fundamental right and even if the infringement of the second part of the right under article 22(5) is established he is bound to be released by the court. To treat the two rights mentioned in article 22(5) as one is neither proper according to the language used, nor according to the purpose for which the rights are given.\n\nThe contention that the grounds are vague requires some clarification. . What is meant by vague? Vague can be considered as the antonym of 'definite'. 1£ the ground which is supplied is incapable of being understood or defined with sufficient certainty it can be called vague.\n\nIt is not possible to state affirmatively more on the question of what is vague.\n\nIt must vary according to the circumstances of each case.\n\nIt is\n\nhowever improper to contend that a ground is necessarily vague if the only answer of. the detained person can be to deny it.\n\nThat is a matter of detail which has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of each case. If on reading the ground furnished it is capable of being intelligently understood and is sufficientlv definite to furnish materials to enable the detained person to make a representation against the order of detention it cannot be called vague.\n\nThe only argument which could be urged is that the langu:ige med in specifying the ground is so general that it does not permit the detained person to legitimately meet the charge against him because the only 2nswer which he can make is to say that he did not aCl as generally suggested.\n\nIn certain cases that argument may support the contention that having regard to the general language used in the ground he has not been given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention. 1t cannot be disputed that the representation mentioned in the second part of article 22(5) must be one which on being considered may give relief to the detained person.\n\nThe argument that supplementary grounds cannot be given after the grounds are first given to the detenue, similarly requires a closer examination.\n\nThe adjective \"supplementary\" is capable of covering cases of adding new grounds to the original grounds, as also giving particulars of the facts which are already mentioned, or of giving facts in addition to the fact.s mentioned in the ground 'to lead to the conclusion of fact contained in the ground originally furnished.\n\nIt is clear that if by supplementary grounds\" is meant addz'tional grounds, i.e., conclusions of fact required to b1ing about the satisfaction of, the Government, the furni3hing of any such additional grounds at a later stage . will amount to an infringement of the first mentioned right in article 22(5) as the grounds for the order of detention must be before the Government before it is satisfied about the necessity for making the order and all such grounds have to be furnished\n\nStOI• qf Bombay\n\nv. &mallaa Sridhar y aitlyc.\n\nIrotli• c. J.\n\nSiatt .J' Bombay\n\nAhnaRam Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\nas soon as may be. The other aspects, viz., the second communication (described as supplemental grounds) being only particulars of the facts mentioned or indicated in the grounds first supplied, or being additional incidents which taken along with the facts mentioned or indicated in the ground already conveyed lead to the same conclusion of fact, (which is the ground furnished in the first instance) stand on 2 different footing. These are not new grounds within the meaning of the first part of article 22(5).\n\nThus, while the first mentioned type of \"additional\" grounds cannot be . given after the grounds are furnished in the first instance, the other types even if furnished after the grounds arc furnished as soon as may be, but provided they are furnished so as not to come in conflict with giving the earliest opportunity to the detained person to make a representation, will not be considered an infringement of either of the rights mentioned in article 22(5) of the Constitution.\n\nThis detained examination shows that preventive detention is not by itself considered an infringement of any of the fundamental rights mentioned in Part III of the Constitution. This is, of course, subject to the limitations prescribed in clause (5) of article 22. That clallse, ::ts noticed above, requires two things to be done for the person against whom the order is made.\n\nBy reason of the fact that clause (5) forms part of Part III of the Constitution, its provisions have the same force and sanctity as any other provision relating to fundamental rights.\n\nAs the clause prescribes two\n\nrequiremnts, the time factor in each case is necessarily left iluid. While there is the duty on the part of the detaining authority to furnish grounds . and the duty to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation, wlllch obligations, as shown above, are correlated; there exists no express provision contemplating a second communication from the cetaining authority to the person detained. Tills is because in several cases a second communication may not be necessary ar all. The only tlllng which emerges fiom the discussion is that while the authorities must\n\ndischarge the duty in furnishing grounds for the order of detention \"as soon as may be'.' and also provide \"the earliest opportunity to the detained person to make the representation\", the number of communications from the detaining authority to the detenue may be one or more and they may be made at intervals, provided the two parts of the aforesaid duty are dischargeed in accordance with the wording of clause C5). So long as the later communications do not make out a new ground, their contents are no infringement of the two procedural rights of the detenue mentioned in the clause.\n\nThey may consist of a narration of facts or particulars relating to the grounds already supplied.\n\nBut in doing so the time factor in respect of the second duty, viz., to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation, cannot be overlooked.\n\nThat appears to us to be the result of clause\n\n(5) of article 22.\n\nIn numerous cases that have been brought to our notice, we have found that there has been quite an unnecessary obscurity on the part of the detaining authority in stating the grounds for the order. Instead of giving the information with reasonable details, there is a deliberate attempt to use the minimum number of word~ in the communication conveying the grounds of detention.\n\nIn our opinion, this attitude is quite deplorable. We agree with the High Court of Bombay in its observation when it says : \"I11 all the matters which have come up before us we have been distressed to find how vague and unsatisfactory the grounds are which the detaining authority furnished to the detenue; and we are compelled to say that in almost every case we have felt that the grounds could have been ampler and fuller without any detriment to public interest.\" While the Constitution gives the Government the privilege of not disclosing in public interest facts which it considers undesirable to disclose, by the words used in article 22(5) there is a clear obligation to convey to the detained person materials (and the disclosure of which .is not necessary to be withheld) which will enable )um to make a representation.\n\nIt may be 5-1 ~. C. India/68\n\nState of Bombay v.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\n. Kania C.J.\n\nStale qf Bomhay.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nm1ticed that the Preventive Detention Act may not even contain machinery to have the representation looked into by an independent authority or an advisory board. Under these circumstances, it is but right to emphasize that the communication made to the detained person to enable him to make the representation should, consistently with the privilege not to disclose facts which are not desirable to be disclosed in public intere; t, be as full and adequate as the circumstances permit and should be made as soon as it can be done.\n\nAny deviation from this rule is a deviation from the intention underlying article 22(5) of the Constitution. The result of this attitude of some detaining authorities has been that, applying the tests mentioned above, several communications to the detained persons have been found wanting and the orders of detention are pronounced to be invalid.\n\nHaving regard to the principles mentioned above, we have to consider whether the judgment of the High Court is correct. We have already pointed out that the summary rejection by the High Court of the later communication solely on the ground that all materials in all circumstances must be furnished to the detenue when the grounds are first communicated, is not sound.\n\nWe have indicated the circumstances and conditions under which the later communication may or may not be considered as falling within the purview of article 22(5) of the Constitution.\n\nIn dealing with the position when the grounds were first communicated, the High Court held as follows :\n\n\"This is not a ground which would enable the detenue to make a representation to which he is entitled both under the Act and under the Constitution.\" In this case the later communication of the 26th August, 1950, was made after the respondent filed his petition and it appears to have been made to controvert his allegation that he was never in Bombay between January and ApriL 1950, as alleged in his affidavit. After takinsr into consideration this communication it was observed by Chagla C.J. that if these particulars had been furnished on 29th April, 1950, very likely the\n\ncourt would have rejected the petition.\n\nThe court set the respondent free only because of its view that after 29th April no further communication was permissible.\n\nIn our opinion, this view is erroneous. We think that on the facts of the present case therefore the respondent's petition should have been dismissed. We therefore allow the appeal.\n\nPA1ANJALI SASTRI J.-While I concur in the order proposed by my Lord that this appeal should be allowed, I regret I find myself unable to agree with him on the true meaning and effect of article 22, clause (5), which is reproduced in section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as - \"the Act\"). Put shortly, the question that falls to be decided is : Is it within the competence of the court to examine the grounds communicated to a person detained under the Act, with a view to see if they are sufficient in its opinion to enable pim to make a representation to the detaining authority against the order, and if they are not, to direct his release?\n\nIt is now settled by the decision of the majority in Gopalan's case(1) that article 21 is applicable to preventive detention except in so far as the provisions of article 22(4) to (7) either expressly Qr_ by necessary implication exclude its application, with the result that a person canno~ be deprived of this personal liberty, even for preventive purposes, \"except according to procedure established by law.\" Part of such procedure is provided by the Constitution itself in clauses (5) and\n\n(6) of article 22 which read as follows:\n\n\"(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.\n\n(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause\n\n(1) [1950J S.C.R. 88.\n\nState of Bombay v.\n\nAtm Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri ].\n\nJ95t\n\nStat1 ef Bomba7.\n\nv . .A:ema Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nPatanj12li Sastri .].\n\nto disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.\n\nIf this procedure is not complied with, detention under the Act may well be held to be unlawful, as it would then be deprivation of personal liberty which is not in accordance with the procedure established by law. The question accordingly arises as_ to what are the requirements of article 22(5) and whether they have been complied with in the present case?\n\nOn behalf of the respondent it is urged that the clause provides two safeguards for the person ordered to be detained, namely, that (1) the grounds of his detention sho11ld be communicated to him as soon as may be, and (2) he should be given the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.\n\nAs there is to be no trial in such cases, the right of making a representation affords, it is said, the only opportunity to the person detained to repell the accusation brought against him and establish his innocence.\n\nIt is the communication of the grounds of detention that is expected to give him notice of what he is to meet by making a representation. The grounds must therefore, it is submitted, give sufficient indication of the nature and. extent of the information on which action has been taken against him and must contain sufficient particulars of the time and place of the acts charged, so as to enable him to make his representation effective as far as it is in his power to do so. If the grounds are vague and do not disclose the substance of the information on which the detention has been based, there would be no real compliance with the procedure prescribed by article 22 (5), and the detention must, it is claimed, be unlawful. In other words, the sufficiency of the grounds for the purpose of enabling the person detained to make an effective representation against the order of detention is, in every case, a justiciable issue.\n\nIt must now be taken as settled by the decision of this Court in Gopalan's case('), which on this point was\n\n(!) [1950] S.C.R. SS.\n\nunanimous, that section 3 of the Act is constitutional and valid notwithstanding that it leaves it to the \"satisfaction\" of the executive government to decide whether action under the Act is to be taken or not against any particular person or persons.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice pointed out (at p. 121) that action by way of preventive detention must be based largely on suspicion, and quoted the remark of Lord Finlay in Rex v. Halliday(1), that a court is the least appropriate tribunal to investigate the question whether circumstances of suspicion exist warranting the restraint on a person.\n\nDealing with a similarly worded provision of the Central Provinces and Berar Public Safety Act, 1948, the Federal Court declared in another unanimous judgment, that \"The language clearly shows that the responsibility for making a detention order rests upon the provincial executives as they alone are entrusted with the duty of maintaining public peace; and it would be a serious derogation from that responsibility if the court were to substitute its judgment for the satisfaction of the executive authority and, to that end, undertake an investigation of the sufficiency of the materials on which such . satisfac.tion was grounded ........ The court can, however, examine the grounds disclosed by the Government to see if they are relevant to the object which the legislation has in view, namely, the prevention of acts prejudicial to public safety and tranquility, for \"satisfaction\" in this connection must be grounded on material which is of rationally probative value\"- Machindar Shivaji Mahar v. The King(2).\n\nThese decisions clearly establish, what indeed is plain from the nature of the measure, that preventive detention is a form of precautionary police action, to be employed on the sole responsibility of the executive government whose discretion is final, no recourse being permitted to a court of law by way of review or justification of such action except on allegations of mala fides or irration:il conduct.\n\n(1) [1917] A.C. 260. 269.\n\n(2) [1949-50] F.C.R. 827, 831-32.\n\nSta11 qf Bombay.\n\n\"' Atma Ram Sridhar Yaiiiya,\n\nPatanjali Sastri].\n\nJ95J\n\nSJaJe ef Bombay.\n\nAttna 1\"mt Sritfhar YaUi'Ja.\n\nPat<mjali\n\nSastTi].\n\nWhen the power to issue a detention order has thus been made to depend upon the existence of state of mind in the detaining authority, that is, its \"satisfaction\"', which is a purely subjective condition, so as to exclude a judicial enquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds to justify the detention, it seems to me to be wholly inconsistent with that scheme to hold that it is open to the court to examine the sufficiency of tl; ie same grounds to enable the person detained to make a representation, for, be it noted, the grounds to be communicated to the person detained are the \"grounds on which the order has been made.\" Indeed, the logical result of the argument advanced by the respondent's counsel would be to invalidate section 3 of the Act in so far as it purports to make the satisfaction of the government the sole condition of a lawful detention, for, if clause (5) of article 22 were to be construed as impliedly authorising a judicial review bf the grounds of detention to see if they contain sufficient particulars for making a representation, then, the subjective condition prescribed in section 3 would be inconsistent with that clause and therefore void.\n\nWhen this was pointed out to counsel he submitted that the decision in Gopalan' s case(') as to the constitutionality of section 3 required reconsideration in the light of his arguments based on article 22, clause (5). Although the clause was not then considered from this paint of view, it came in for a good deal of discussion in connection with section 14 of the Act, and the present argument must, in my opinion, be rejected because it runs counter to that decision.\n\nApart from this aspect of the matter, I am not much impressed with th~ merits of the argument.\n\nWhile gqnting, in view of the structure and wording of clause . (5), that the grounds communicated to the pe.rson detained are to form the basis of his representation against the order, I am unable to agree with what appears to be the. major premise of the argument namely, that clause (5) contemplates an inquiry where the person detained is to be formally charged with\n\n(!) [19~0] S:C.R. 88.\n\nspecific acts. or omissions of a culpable nature and called upon to (lllswcr them. As pointed out by Lord\n\nAtkinson in Rex v. Halliday(1), preventive detention being a precautionary measure, \"it must necessarily proceed in all cases to some extent on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof\", and it must be capable of being employed by the executive government in sudden emergencies on unverified information supplied to them by their police or intelligence officers.\n\nIf the Government, acting honestly and in good faith make an order being \"satisfied\" on such information, however lacking in particulars, that a person should be detained in the public interest, as they have been empowered by Parliament to do, then all that article 22(5) requires of them is to communicate as soon as may be the grounds which led to the making of the order, to the person concerned, and to give him the earliest opportunity of making any representation which l1e may wish to make on the basis of what is communicated to him. If such communication is made and such opportunity is given the detaining authority will have complied with the procedure prescribed by the Constitution, and the person under detention cannot complain, that he has been deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with the\n\nproceure established by law.\n\nI can find nothing in article 22, clause (5), to warrant the view that the grounds on which the order of detention has been made must be such that, when communicated to the person detained they are founded by a court of law to be sufficient to enable him to make what the co\\irt considers to be an adequate representation; The right to be produced before a Magistrate and to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner is expressly denied by the Constitution itsdf to a person under preventive detention [vide article 22(1),\n\n(2) and (3)] and this Court held in Gopalan's case(2) that there was nothing in the Constitution to entitle him to a hearing even before tht: detaining authority. All this underlines the executive character of the function exercised by\n\n(1) [1917] A.C. 260, 2i5.\n\n(2) [1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\nStllli qf Boabay\n\nAtma a,..\n\nSridllar J' llidya.\n\nPata,,; ali Sas1ri ].\n\nStBl1 qf Bomba, Y v.\n\nAtma Ram Sridka Vaidya,\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\nthe authority which does not in any 'J:ay embark on a judicial or quasj-judicial inquiry.\n\nIn such circumstances the representation which the person detained is allowed to make to the Government, which is constituted the judge in its own cause, cannot be assumed to be similar in scope or purpose to a defence against a formulated charge in a court of law. The argument, therefore, that the right of making a representation should be made effective in the sense that such person should be enabled to defend himself successfully if possible, and, for that purpose, the detaining authority should communicate to him the necessary particulars on pain of having the order quashed if such particulars are not furnished, proceeds on a misconception of the true position.\n\nPerhaps the most cogent reason for rejecting the argument is to be found in the language and provision of clause (6) of article 22. \"Nothing in clause (5)\", that is to say, neither the right to be informed of the \"grounds\" of detention nor the right to make a \"representation\" shall \"require\" the detaining authority to disclose facts which the authority \"considers\" should not be disclosed in the public interest. In other words, clause (5) should not be taken to import an obligat1011 to provide particulars which the authority is given an absolute discretion to furnish or withhold.\n\nI cannot understand how it can be claimed, in the face of clause ( 6), that it is incumbent on the executive government to communicate particulars which a court of law considers necessary to enable the the person detained to make a representation. ft cannot be compulsory to furnish what the authority is given an uncontrolled power to decide to give or to refuse. The combined\n\neffect of clauses (5) and ( 6) is, to my mind, to require the detaining authority, to communicate to the person affected only such particulars as that authority and not a court of law, considers sufficient to enable the said person to make a representation.\n\nIt is worthy of note that in the well-known English case of Liversidge v. Anderson('), the existence of a\n\n(I) [1942] A. C. 206.\n\nsimilar privilege was regarded as a \"very cogent reason\" for holding that the words \"H the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe\" did not raise a justiciable issue as to the existence of such cause as an objective fact.\n\nViscount Maugham observed \"It is beyond dispute that he can decline to disclose the information on which he has acted on the ground that to do so wowd be contrary to the public interest, and that this privilege of the Crown cannot be disputed.\n\nIt is not adrem on the question of construction to say in reply to this argument that there are cases in which the Secretary of State could answer the attack on the validity of the order for detention without raising the point of privilege.\n\nIt is sufficient to say that there must be a large number of cases in which the information on which the Secretary of State is likely to act will be of a very confidential nature. That must have been plain to those responsible in advising His Majesty in regard to the Order in Council, and it constitutes, in my opinion, a very cogent reason . for thinking that the words under discussion cannot be read as meaning that the existence of 'reasonable cause; is one which may be discussed in a court which has not the power of eliciting the facts which in the opinion of the Secretary of State amount to 'reasonble cause'.\"\n\nThere was considerable disc11ssion as to the meaning of the words \"grounds\" and \"representation\" used in clause (5). These are words of very wide connotation and, in the view I have expressed, it is unnecessary to define them.\n\nIt may, however, be noted that clauses\n\n(5) and (6) are not mutually exqlusive in the sense that, when clause (6) is invoked, clause (5) ceases to be applicable. When, therefore, the detaining authority withholds the material facts under clause (6) and communicates to the person detained tlie grounds of detention, which in that case must be necessarily vague, it would still be communicating to him the \"grounds\" on which the order has been made, and such representation as the person may wish to make on the basis of that communication would\n\nSidi efB_.,\n\nAllllDR..\n\nVridllar Yaillya,\n\nP4talfiali SastiiJ.\n\nSlale ef Bomba.1\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Yai(, a.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastriJ.\n\nstill be a \"representation'', within the meaning of clause (5). This shows that no precise connotation can be attributed to the terms \"grounds\" and \"refresentation\" as used in clause (5), for in certain cases at least, the one can be vague and the other inadequate from the point of view of the person detained and on a question of construction they need not be different in other cases.\n\nIt was suggested in the course of the argument that clause (5) dealt with two distinct and independent matters, namely, (1) the communication of the grounds of detention, and (2) the affording of an opportunity to make a representation against the detention, and that the grounds communicated need not have any necessary relation to the representation provided for.\n\nThe right to make a representation, it was said, imported by implication and independent obligation on the part of the authority to furnish the person detained with sufficient particulars and details of the accusation against him apart from and in addition to the obligation expressly imposed on the authority to communicate the grounds on which the order has been made, for the reason that without such particulars no adequate or effective representation could be made against the order, and though the sufhciency of the grounds on which the order was based had Deen held not to be open to judicial examination, there was no reason why the sufficiency of the further communication implied in the provision for representation should not be justiciable. The different time-limits fixed for the performance of the duties imposed by clause (5) on the detaining authority are said to support this argument.\n\nThe construction suggested is, in my opinion, strained and artificial and cannot be accepted.\n\nThe collocation in the same clause of the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to make a representation against it indicate, to my mind, that the grounds communicated are to 'form the basis of the representation and, indeed, are intended mainly, if not solely, for that purpose.\n\nTo suggest that, apart from those grounds, and right of making a representation imports, by necessary implication, a further obligation to give such . details and particulars would render that right effective is, in my opinion, not to construe the clause in its natural meaning but to stretch it by the process of implication, so as to square with one's preconceived notions of justice and £airplay.\n\nNo support for this construction can be derived from the provision of distinct time limits for the communication of the grounds and the affording of opportunity for representation, as that can be explained by the different degrees of urgency required in the two cases.\n\nThe grounds are to be communicated \"as soon as may be\" which means as soon as possible and imports a much higher degree of urgency than what is implied in affording the . \"earliest opportunity\" which, I take it, means affording writing and communication facilities to the person under detention as soon as he is ready and desires to make the representation.\n\nWhile clause (5) does not allow the authority, after making the order of detention and communicating the grounds of such order, to put forward fresh grounds in justification of that order, I can find nothing in that clause to preclude the authority furnishing particulars or details relating to the grounds originally communicated, or the person under detention availing himself of such particulars and making a better or a further representation.\n\nNor is there anything to prevent such person from asking for, or the authority from providing, further and better particulars of those grounds where it is in a position to do so. But the attempt in these and similar proceedings has always been not to secure the necessary particulars hut to shift the arena of the contest to the court which, as Lord Finlay remarked in the case already referred to, is the least appropriate tribunal for investigating what must largely be matters of suspicion and not proof and which, for that very reason, might afford the relief hoped for . without being in possession of all the facts.\n\nReference was made to the decisions of several High Courts dealing with the necessity of furnishing particulars of the grounds of detention. But those decisions\n\nStale ef Bo111ioy.\n\nv • ..41maRlllll Sridha'I Yaitlya.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSMrl].\n\nStat1 qf Bo.,6ay.\n\nAtma Ratio Srii/Jvu l'ali/ya,\n\nPatanjali\n\nSasviJ.\n\nturned on the provisions of the various Provincial Public Safety Acts which were passed before the commencement of the Constitution and which, in most cases specifically provided for the communication of particulars.\n\nThose decisions are of no assistance to the respondent as neither in article 22 nor in the Act is there any express provision that particulars of the grounds of detention should be given to the person detained.\n\nOur attention was called to the decision of this court in lshwar Das v. The State(') as an instance where this court considered the grounds of detention to be vague and directed the release of the petitioner in that case from detention under the Act.\n\nAs pointed out in the brief judgment in that case, no arguments were addressed on the point and the case was disposed of on the view prima facie supported by the decisions already referred to that, if the grounds were too general and vague to enable the person under detention to make a representation, he was entitled to be released.\n\nNo value can therefore be attached to that decision as a precedent.\n\nIn the course of the debate it was repeatedly urged that this court should be jealous in upholding the liberty of the subject which the Constitution has guaranteed as a fundamental right and must not adopt a construction of article 22(5) which would rob the safeguards provided therein of all their efficacy. I am profoundly conscious of the sanctity which the Constitution attaches to personal liberty and other fundamental rights and of the duty of this court to guard against inroads on them by the legislature or the executive.\n\nBut when, as has been stated, the Constitution itself has authorised preventive detention and denied to the subject the right of trial before a court of law and of consulting or being defended by a legal practitioner of his choice, providing only certain procedural . safeguards, the court could do no more than construe the words used in that behalf in their natural sense consistently with the nature, purpose and scheme of the measure thus authorised, to ascertain what\n\n(1) Not reported.\n\npowers are still left to the court in the matter.\n\nIt is in this light that I have endeavoured to . construe clause (5) and, for the reasons indicated above, I have come to the conclusion that it is not the province of the court to examine the sufficiency of the grounds for the purpose of making a representation, a matter left entirely to the discretion of the executive authority. An argument in support of the liberty of the subject has always a powerful appeal but the court should, in my opinion, resist the temptation of extending its jurisdiction beyond its legitimate bounds.\n\nDAs J.-This appeal from a decision of the Bombay High Court raises a very important question as to the sufficiency of the grounds of an order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.\n\nThe question depends, for its answer, on a correct interpretation of clauses (5) and (6) of article 22 of our Constitution which have been reproduced in section 7 of the Act.\n\nA similar question has also been raised in another appeal filed in this court by one hundred detenus from the decision of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court, being Case No. 24 of 1950 (Tarapada and Others v. The State of West Bengal)(1). As the view I have taken as to the true meaning and effect of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and of the Act has not commended itself to the majority of my colleagues, I express it with a certain amount of diffidence arising out of the high regard I have for their opinions.\n\nUnder section 3 (1) (a) of the Act the authority concerned can make an order of detention only if he is satisfied that, with a view to preventing a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to one or more of the matters referred to in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (a), ari order should be made. What materials will engender in the mind of the authority the requisite satisfaction under section 3 ( 1) of the Act will depend. on the training and temperament and the habitual mental approach of the person who is the authority t()\n\n( l) Reported infra at p. 212.\n\nState qf Boin6ay\n\n• v.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaid.Ya•\n\nDas].\n\nStott ef Bomba7\n\nv .• A.tma Ram Srldhar Y aitfya.\n\nDas].\n\nmake the detention order. The authority concerned may be a person who will not derive the requisite satisfaction except on very precise and full information amounting almost to legal proof or he may be a person equally honest who will ' be so satisfied on meagre information which may appear to others to be very vague or even nebulous.\n\nIf the authority is a person on the first mentioned type, then the \"grounds\" on which he will make the order will necessarily be more precise and fuller in particulars than the \"grounds\" on which an order may be made by the authority who is a person of the second mentioned type. The \"grounds\" on which the authority who is a person of the first mentioned type makes an order of detention create no difficulty for such grounds are quite precise and ample, and, when communicated to the detenu, will clearly enable him to appreciate the reasons for his detention and to make his representation. We are, however, concerned with the \"grounds\" on which an order of detention may be made by the authority who is a person of the second mentioned type who may derive the requiste satisfaction from the conclusions which he may draw from the available information, which may not be precise or ample but. on which, having regard to his source of information, the authority may honestly feel safe to rely and to act. This last mentioned type of \"grounds\" will, in the following discussion, be referred to as \"vague grounds\". The question for our decision is whether an order of detention made in good faith on such \"vague grounds\" is valid when it is made and whether if valid when made, becomes invalid because these very grounds, when communicated to the detenue, arc found to be insufficient to enable him to make a representation.\n\nThe first question urged by the learned counsel for the detenu is that an order of detention made upon grounds which are too vague to enable the detenu to make a representation against the order is bad ab initio. The argument is thus formulated.\n\nArticle 22\n\n(5) requires two things, namely first, that the authority\n\nmaking the order of detention shall, as soon as may be, communicate to the_ detenu the grounds on which the order has been made -and, secondly, that the authority shall afford him the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order.\n\nThe two requirements are correlated. The object of the communication of the grounds, according to the argument, is to enable the detenu to make a representation against the order of detention and the combined effect of the two constitutional requirements is that the grounds on which the order is made must be such as will, when communicated to the detenu, enable him to make a representation. li the grounds communicated are too vague being devoid of particulars, then no representation can be made on the basis of them and if no representation can be made on the basis of these grounds, no order of detention could properly have been made on_ those grounds, for it is the grounds on which the order had been made that have to be communicated to the detenu so as to enable him to make a representation.\n\nThe argument shortly put, is that the implied requirement that the grounds must be such as will enable the detenu to make a representation also indicates the quality or attribute of the grounds on which the order of detention may be made.\n\nWhether the grounds satisfy the requirements of article 22(5) is not left to the subjective opinion of the authority which makes the order of detention but an objective test is indicated, namely, that the grounds - must be such as will enable the detenu to make a representation which quite clearly makes the matter justiciable. If the court finds that no representation may be made on account of the vagueness of the grounds, the court must also hold that the order made on such vague grounds cannot be sustained. The next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), which was passed after the Constitution came into effect must be read in the light of article 22(5) as construed above. So read, the satisfaction of the authority referred to in section 3 of the Act cannot be the subjective satisfaction of the\n\n!95!\n\nStale of Bomba;·.\n\nAhlla Ram Sridhar Vaitf; o.\n\nDas].\n\n!95!\n\nState ef B\"\"\"'•:1 v.\n\nAtma ROWJ Sridhar Y aid70,\n\nDas].\n\nauthority, for the satisfaction must be founded on grounds which, when communicated later on, will enable the detenu to make a representation which postulates an objective test. This involves that section 3 ( 1) (a) of the Act should be read as if the words \"on grounds which, when communicated to him, will enable hi11J. to make a representlation such as is mentioned in section 7 of this Ad\" occurred after the words \"if satisfied with respect to any person\" and before the words \"that with a view\". If such interpolation of words be not permissible according to accepted canons of construction, then it must be held that in so far as section 3 of the Act makes an order of detention dependent on the subjective satisfaction of the authority, the section is unconstitutional, being repugnant to the provisions of article 22 (5) and the necessary intendment thereof.\n\nThe argument so formulated is attractive but on closer scrutiny will be found to be unsound.\n\nBefore the Constitution came into force there were laws for the maintenance of public security in almost all the provinces and in those laws there were provisions similar to the provisions of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.\n\nIt was held in many cases that in the absence of bad faith, and provided the grounds on which the authority founded its satisfaction had a reasonable relation or relevancy to the object which the legislation in question had in view, the satisfaction of the authority was purely subjective and could not be questioned in any court of law.\n\nThe decision of the Federal Court in Machindar Shiva# Mahar v. The King<') is one of such decisions.\n\nVagueness of the grounds on which satisfaction of the authority is founded cannot be treated as on the same footing as the irrelevancy of the grounds, unless the vagueness be such as may by itself, be cogent evidence in proof of bad faitli.\n\nIf the grounds are relevant to the objects of the legislation and if there is no proof of bad faith, then mere vagueness of the grounds cannot vitiate the satisfaction founded on them.\n\nThe satisfaction being. subjective, the court\n\n(I) [1949-50] E.C.R. 827 at p; 831.\n\ncannot arrogate to itself the responsibility M judging the sufficiency or otherwise of the grounds. It is true that at the time those. decisions were given the Constitution had not come into force and there were no fundamental rights, bu, t these well established principles were recognised and adopted by all members of this court in Gopalan's case(1) which came up for consideration after the Constitution had come into force.\n\nIn that case it was held unanimously that under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, . 1950, the satisfaction of the authority was purely subjective and could not, in the absence of proof of bad faith, be questioned at all and that section 3 was not unconstitutional.\n\nIt is true that the arguments now advanceed were not advanced in exactly the same form on that occasion but. that fact makes no difference, for the arguments have no force as they are founded on the assumption that the grounds on which an order may be made must be such as will, when communicated, be sufficiently full and precise so as to enable the detenu to make a representation.\n\nI find no warrant for such an assumption.\n\nIndeed, the fact that this court has held that section 3 of the Act which makes the satisfaction of the authority a purely subjective matter is not unconstitutional clearly destroys the cogency of the argument formulated as hereinbefore stated. The decision in Gopalan's case(1) as to the validity of section 3 of the Act makes it impossible to accept this argument.\n\nIt is next urged that even if the initial order was not invalid when made because satisfaction was a purely subjective matter for the authority alone and the court cannot consider or pronounce upon the sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction was based, nevertheless, the continuance of the detention becomes unlawful if the same grounds when communicated, be found to be vague and devoid of particulars so as to render the making of a representation by the detenu somewhat difficult.\n\nThe argument is that although the vagueness of the grounds is not\n\n(1) [1950) S.C.R. 88. 6-1 S. C. India/68\n\n195!\n\nState ef Bombay v.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya;\n\nDas].\n\n195!\n\nStntr. oj' Rombr:_v\n\nAtma ltu11!\n\n.~1idlw1 Vai4y..1.\n\nD ... j.\n\njusticiable t the initial. stage when the order is made and so the order cannot be said to be invalid ab initio, the same Y'1gueness of the grqund is nevertheless justiciable at the later stage when they are communicated, so that if vagueness renders the making of a representation difficult the continuance of the detention at once becomes illegal. Under article 21 no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.\n\nAs explained in Gopalan' s case(') procedure established by law means procedure enacted by the Legislature, i.e.\n\nState-made procedural law and not any rule of natural justice.\n\nIt was pointed out that the implication of that article was that a person could be deprived of his life or personal liberty provided such deprivation was brought about in accordance with procedure enacted by the appropriate Legislature.\n\nHaving so provided in article 21, the framers of our Constitution proceeded to lay down certain procedural requirements which, as a matter of constitutional necessity, must be adopted and included in any procedure that may be enactx:d by the Legislature and in accordance with which a person may be deprived .of his life or personal liberty.\n\nThose requirements are set forth in article 22 of the Constitution.\n\nA. perusal of the several clauses of that article will show that the constitutional requirements of procedure which must be incorporated in any law for preventive detention relate to a stage after the order of detention is made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The order of detention being thus in accordance with procedure enacted by law which is not inconsistent with any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution applicable to that stage, the order of detention cannot be questioned unless there is proof of bad faith, either direct or indirect.\n\nWe have, therefore, to consider whether the detention validly brought about becomes unlawful by reason of subsequent non-compliance with the procedural requirements laid down in clause (5) of article 22, for if there is such non-compliance, the\n\n(I)° [ 1950) S.C.R. 88.\n\ndetenu from that moment must be held to be deprived of his liberty otherwise . than in accordance with\n\nprocdure established by law and will, therefore. be entitled to be released.\n\nI am preparoo to concede that there is some correlation between the two parts of article 22 (5), namely, the communication of the grounds on which the order has been made and the making of the representation by the detained person. The Constitution insists on the communication of the grounds on which the detention order . ha~ been made for some puqiose. That purpose obviously is to appraise the detenu of the reasons for the order of his detention.\n\nThe communication of the grounds will necessarily enable him, first, to sec whether the grounds are at all relevant to the object sought to be secured by the Act. If they are not, then they were no grounds at all and no satisfaction could be founded on them.\n\nThe very irrelevancy of the grounds will be a cogent proof of bad faith on the part of the authority so as to make the order itself invalid. In the next place, the disclosure of the grounds will tell the detenu in which chss his suspected activities have been placed and whether he is entitled to the benefit of having his case scrutinised by the Advisory Board.\n\nFinally, the communication of the grounds on which the order has been made will tell him generally the reasons for his detention, and will, therefore, be helpful to the detained person in making his representation which is also provided for in the latter part of clause (5). The fact that there is correlation between the two parts of clause (5) does not, however, carry us any further.\n\nThere is no warrant for assuming that the grounds to be communicated to the detenu are to be a formal indictment or a formal pleading setting forth a charge or a case with meticulous particularity nor is there any warrant. for the assumption that the representation has to be in the nature of a defence or written statement specifically dealing with the charge or the case.\n\nIndeed, the idea of a trial is foreign to the law of preventive detention.\n\nThe very fact that the provisions of clauses (1) and (2) of article\n\nStc.fe qf 1'oni6ay\n\nv •.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nDas].\n\n(951\n\nSlaJ1 ef Bombay\n\nv • .Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nDas j.\n\n22 do not apply to preventive detention clearly excludes the idea of a trial before a tribunal. As I have said, the grounds will generally indicate the conclusions drawn by the appropriate authority with respect to the suspected activities of any particular person and those grounds, when communicated, will enable the detenu to make a representation, for he can easily rfer to and set forth his real activities and represent that all his activities are innocent and cannot possibly give rise to the suspicion indicated in the grounds. To say that clause (5) itself indicates that the grounds must be such as well enable the detenu to make a representation is to read into clause (5) something which is not there.\n\nIt is a re-statement of the first argument in a new form and is fallacious. In the first place clause (5) does not in terms say that the authorities shall communicate such grounds as will enable the detenu to make a representation.\n\nIn the second place, the decision in Gopalan' s case(') militates against this argument, for if the sufficiency of the grounds is not justiciable at the initial stage when the order is made, as held in that case, it is wholly illogical to say that the intention of the Constitution is to make the sufficiency of the same grounds justiciable as soon as they are communicated to the detenu. As already stated, in order made upon satisfaction founded on a vague grounds is quite valid, if the vagueness is not proof of bad faitll. Under clause\n\n(5) the authority is to communicate the grounds on which the order has been made.\n\nThis will let the detenu know what operated on the mind of the authority when it made the order. If the grounds were vague it is the vague grounds that must be communicated, for it was upon thost vague grounds that the order had been made.\n\nThat is the express provision of the first part of clause (5). This being the express requirement, the implication that the grounds communicated must be sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation cannot be read iii.to the clause, for that will militate against the express requirement.\n\nIf the order had hee11 made on vague grounds but\n\n(I) [1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\nthe authority 1s to communicate precise and well formulated grounds which will be sufficient for the detenu to make a representation, then the communication will not be of grounds on which the order was made but of something more than what is expressly required.\n\nThe express provision must exclude such an inconsistent implied provision.\n\nAgain, clause (6) of article 22 gives the authority the right to daim privilege against disclosure of facts in public interest.\n\nNon-disclosure of facts will necessarily make the grounds, as communicated, extremely vague and devoid of particulars.\n\nIf the construction of clause (5) which is contended for by the detenu's . counsel were correct, then the vagueness of the grounds resulting from. the non-disclosure of facts under clause\n\n(6) will entitle the detenu to be released, for that vagueness also will render the making of a representation impossible or difficult.\n\nThat will mean that the claim of privilege given to the authority by clause (6) of article 22 is wholly meaningless and ineffective, and will defeat its very purpose, for the privilege cannot be claimed except at the peril of releasing the detenu.\n\nObviously that cannot be the intention.\n\nIt must, therefore, be held that the vagueness of grounds resulting from non-disclosure of facts under clause ( 6) will not invalidate the order of detention, which was initially valid, on the ground that no representation can be made on the basis of such vague grounds.\n\nIn that case by claiming privilege under clause ( 6) the authority can frustrate the claim of justiciability \"f the sufficiency of grounds.\n\nFurther, why should the vagueness of grounds otherwise brought about stand on a different footing ? Clause (5) cannot mean one thing when the privilege is claimed and mean quite the opposite thing when no such privilege is claimed under clause (6).\n\nThe initial order is not justiciable. The claim of privilege is not justiciable.\n\nWhy should it be assumed that the sufficiency of grounds for the purpose of making a representation was intended to be justiciable ? I see no logical reason\n\n!951\n\nStale qf Bombay •• Atma Rom Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nDasj.\n\nStaUqfBombay\n\n\"\" AW\"llmn Sri4har Yaid;•a.\n\nDas].\n\nfor making an assumption which will objective test in a matter which is intended to be purely subjective.\n\nintroduce an\n\nprima facie\n\nThe argument is then re-stated in the following further modified form. Clause (5) of article 22 imposes two obligations on the authority making an order of detention, namely (i) that the authority shall, as. soon as may be, communicate the grounds on which the order has been made, and (ii) that the authority shall afford the earliest opportunity to the detenu to make a representation against the order.\n\nIf the order was made as a result of satisfaction derived in good faith but upon grounds which may be vague, the order will be perfectly good and cannot be challenged in any court.\n\nCommunication of such grounds, even if they are vague, will satisfy the first obligation imposed upon the authority. Under the latter part of clause\n\n(5) the authority is also under the obligation to afford the earliest opportunity to the detenu to make a representation. If the grounds on which the order has been made were vague, then the second part of clause (5), independently and without reference to the first part of clause (5), impliedly imposes on the authority an obligation to rectify the defect of vagueness by supplying particulars so as to enable the detenu to make a representation. Supplying of particulars, the argument concludes, is implicit in the second part of clause (5), for without such particulars the detenu is not afforded the opportunity to make a representation.\n\nI am unable to accept this line of argument. Under the first part of clause (5) the grounds on which the order has been made have to be supplied 'as soon as may be.' The measure of time indicated by the words 'as soon as may be' must obviously run from the date of detention. Likewise, the latter part of clause (5) requires affording the detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation. From what terminus a quo is the period indicated by the phrase \"earliest opportunity\" to begin to run ?\n\nIf that is also to run from the date of the detention,\n\nthen the two periods under the two parts of clause (5),\n\nmust nece54arily coincide and, therefore, the question of supplying further particulars after the grounds are supplied cannot arise.\n\nOn the other hand, the natural meaning of the words of the latter part of clause (5) to my mind, is that the period connoted by the phrase the \"earliest opportunity\" . begins to run from the time the detenu expresses his desire or intention to make a representation. The making of a representation is the right of the detenu. To make or not to make a representation is his choice.\n\nTherefore, it is only when he decides to make a representation and expresses his desire or intention to make a representation that the earliest opportunity is to be afforded to him to make the desired or intended representation.\n\nNow, if the time is to run after the expression of desire or intention on the part of the detenu to make a representation, t!1en the earliest opportunity to be afforded to the detenu can only mean affording him all physical facilities to carry out his desire or intention, for the detenu has decided to make his representation without any further particulars.\n\nAccording to the language used in the latter part of clause (5), there is no express provision for supplying particulars.\n\nSuppose the grounds on which the order was made and which were communicated to the detenu under the first part were quite precise and sufficient to enable the detcnu to make a representation, then affording him the earliest opportunity to make the representation can only mean giving him all physical facilities to do so, e.g., by supplying him with paper, pen and ink and when the representation has been drown up by him, by forwarding the same with due despatch. In such a case there is no question of supplying further and better particulars. Suppose, again, that the grounds on which the ord<:r has been made and which have been communicated to the: detenu are regarded by the authority to be quite precise and sufficient for making a representation, is\n\nthe authority to anticipate that the detenu may find these grounds insufficient or that being moved in that behalf the Court may consider them insufficient and\n\nJ951\n\nState ef Bomba' •• Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la\n\nDas].\n\n195!\n\nStatt qf Bombay v.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\nDas].\n\nthen, as soon as the detenu expresses his desire or inteI1tion to make a representation, is the authority to keep quiet and take the risk of the court releasing the detenu for the vaguenes~ of the grounds or is he to tell the detenu \"just wait a little; I think the grounds which I have communicated to you are quite precise and sufficient ; lest you or the court find the grounds insufficient for making a representation, I shall supply you with further and better particulars so as to enable you to make the representation ?\" The position thus stated is unreal on the face of it. In my opinion, on a plain reading of clause (5) there is no justification for assuming that a second communic;; nion of particulars is contemplated either under the first part or under the second part of clause (5). This does not, however, mean that the authority may not suppfy particulars either suo motu or on the application of the detenu.\n\nAll that I say is that clause (5) imposes no constitutional obligation on the authority to supply particulars so as to remove the vagueness of the grounds or to enable the detenu to make a representation, and non-supply of further particulars does not constitute an infraction of any fundamental right.\n\nIt is said that clause (5) of article 22 construed in the way suggested above, would render that clause nugatory for it will then really guarantee no fundamental right at all. I respectfully differ from this view for the criticism does not appear to me to be wdl founded.\n\nCommunication of the grounds, even if vague, will none the less be helpful to the detenu in the several ways I have already mentioned and, therefore the right to have the grounds on which the order has been made communicated to him is a valuable right which has been recognised as a fundamental right.\n\nLikewise, the right to make a representation is a valuable right which is guaranteed by the Constitution.\n\nThese rights remain unaffected.\n\nIf the the provisions of clause (5) of article 22 of our Constitution on a correct interpretation thereof are found to be inadequate for the protection of the liberty of\n\nthe detenus it is their misfortune.\n\nThe: Constitution which the people have given unto themselves is the supreme law and must be .upheld and obeyed whether or not one lilaes its provisions, inhibitions afld necessary implications.\n\nThe court can only draw the attention of the Parliament to the lacuna or defect, if any, in the Constitution and in the Act so that the lacuna may be supplied or the defect reroedied in the constitutional way.\n\nOur attention has been drawn to a number of cases where under various provincial laws and before the Constitution the different High Courts have directed the .release of the detcnu on th, e basis of the vagueness of the grounds.\n\nThose decisions arc, however, distinguishable because they were based . on legislation which required the communication not only of grounds but also of particulars. The . omission from our Constitution of the provision for communicating the particulars in addition . to the grounds which were to be found in those laws is significant, for it may be deliberate. Apart from this, however, those decisions do not appt; ar to me to have any bearing on the correct interpretation of our Constitution or of the Preventive Detention Act. It. lswar Das v. The State(1) the question was not raised or argued as it was made clear in the judgment itself.\n\nIn view of what I have stated above, I am of the opinion that as the grounds originally communicated to the detenu were relevant to the objects whi\"h the Act had in view and as there is no proof of mala /ides the obligations cast upon the authorities under article 22(5) which have been reproduced in section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act have been fully complied with.\n\nEven according to the views expressed by the majority of my colleagues I would be prepared to hold that . the particulars subsequently supplied along with the grounds originally supplied fully enable the detenu to make his representation.\n\nIn my opinion there has been no contravention of the\n\nfudamental rights .of the detenu.\n\nI would, therefore, {I) Not reported.\n\nJ95J\n\nState qf Bomhy\n\nv • .dtma Ram Sri dhar Vaidya.\n\nDai].\n\nJ95J\n\nStall of Bombay\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\n1951 Jan. 25.\n\nallow this appeal and reverse the . decision of the Bombay High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the respondent: V. P. K. Nambiyar.\n\nTARAPADA DE AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.l\n\nConstitution of lndia, 1950, Art. 22 (5)-Preventive detention- Duty to contmunicate grounds of detention as soon as n1ay be- Duty to gii1e earliest opportunity to make t-cpresentation-Grounds fttrnished after 15 days-\"Supplementary grounds 11 furnished after 4 months-Ugality of detentt'on-Vague grounds and irrelevant grounds distinguished-Supply of grounds first and details later-Legality-Serving printed orders on same date on several persons-Bona fides of detention.\n\nA large number of persons were detained under the Bengal Criminal Law An1endrnent Act, 1930~ The validity of this ~.\\ct was being c.hallenged in the High Court. Meanwhile, the Prcven\n\ntive Detention Act of 1950 was passed on 26th February, 1950, and on the same date detention orders under this J\\-:t \\Vere served on them.\n\nThe grounds of detention were served on them on the 14th of l\\farch, and on the 16th of July the Government served on them \"'Supplementary grounds\" in continuation of the grounds already furnished on the 14th of March. A secnd set of grounds were communicated to the appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July. They applied to the High Court of Calcutta for writs of habeas corpus contending that the orders of detention were invalid on various ground~. The High Court rejected these applications and they appealed to the Supreme Court.\n\nHeld per KANIA C.J., FAzI.\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-(i) that-in the particular circumstances of the case, cSpccial!y in view of the fact that a large nnn1ber _of cases had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preventive Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the grounds \\Vt.re not communicated to the appellants \"as soon as may be\" within the meaning of Art. 22 (5);", "total_entities": 223, "entities": [{"text": "Youngman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This statement is supported by the cable of the 26th August and, if Youngman can be said to have had any leaning at all, it was certainly in favour of the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Agent for the appellant : M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 931, "end_char": 972, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1001, "end_char": 1016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1019, "end_char": 1038, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1040, "end_char": 1063, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1066, "end_char": 1089, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1091, "end_char": 1106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1137, "end_char": 1140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Dass", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1146, "end_char": 1170, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 21, 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1196, "end_char": 1208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1551, "end_char": 1555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1625, "end_char": 1655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29th of\n\n19Sl", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1668, "end_char": 1681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was arrested on the 21st of April, 195(), under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of\n\n19Sl\n\nCol."}}, {"text": "D. I.\n\nMil() Phersott", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1688, "end_char": 1709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. I.\n\nMil() Phersott\n\nM. N. APflanM\n\nand ANJtlrer."}}, {"text": ".Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1790, "end_char": 1814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stat• qf B0111bay\n\nv. .Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2032, "end_char": 2038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Greater Bombay.\""}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2677, "end_char": 2697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay held th•t if the,; e particulars had been furnished at the time when the grounds were furnished on the 29th of April, 1950, very likely they would have come to the conclusion that the grounds were such as would have led the <letenue to know exactly what he was charged with and to 1nake a proper representation, but released the respondent holding th:n the only grounds which were furnished in the purported compliance of Art."}}, {"text": "29th of April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2801, "end_char": 2820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay held th•t if the,; e particulars had been furnished at the time when the grounds were furnished on the 29th of April, 1950, very likely they would have come to the conclusion that the grounds were such as would have led the <letenue to know exactly what he was charged with and to 1nake a proper representation, but released the respondent holding th:n the only grounds which were furnished in the purported compliance of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3120, "end_char": 3127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3521, "end_char": 3531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to enable the dctcnue to make a proper representation, there was a violation of a fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions and this violation cannot be set right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the grounds already given :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL Au, PAT.\\NJALI\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHA!\"!'DRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ).- Under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government.,", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3533, "end_char": 3540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to enable the dctcnue to make a proper representation, there was a violation of a fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions and this violation cannot be set right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the grounds already given :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL Au, PAT.\\NJALI\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHA!\"!'DRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ).- Under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government.,", "canonical_name": "FAZL Au"}}, {"text": "PAT.\\NJALI\n\nSASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to enable the dctcnue to make a proper representation, there was a violation of a fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions and this violation cannot be set right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the grounds already given :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL Au, PAT.\\NJALI\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHA!\"!'DRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ).- Under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government.,"}}, {"text": "CHA!\"!'DRASEKHARA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3582, "end_char": 3599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to enable the dctcnue to make a proper representation, there was a violation of a fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions and this violation cannot be set right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the grounds already given :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL Au, PAT.\\NJALI\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHA!\"!'DRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ).- Under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government.,", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "A1YYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3601, "end_char": 3607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to enable the dctcnue to make a proper representation, there was a violation of a fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions and this violation cannot be set right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the grounds already given :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL Au, PAT.\\NJALI\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHA!\"!'DRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ).- Under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government.,"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3620, "end_char": 3624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3632, "end_char": 3662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3694, "end_char": 3712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to enable the dctcnue to make a proper representation, there was a violation of a fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions and this violation cannot be set right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the grounds already given :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL Au, PAT.\\NJALI\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHA!\"!'DRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ).- Under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government.,"}}, {"text": "KANIA\n\nCJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4101, "end_char": 4110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also per\n\nKANIA\n\nCJ.,", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "FAzL\n\nALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4113, "end_char": 4122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and CttANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.,", "canonical_name": "FAzL\n\nALI"}}, {"text": "CttANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4138, "end_char": 4160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAzL\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and CttANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.,"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI . SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4168, "end_char": 4186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(PATANJALI .", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI . SASTRI"}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4192, "end_char": 4195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SASTRI and\n\nDAS JJ.", "canonical_name": "Dass"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4228, "end_char": 4235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4620, "end_char": 4624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "sec0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4927, "end_char": 4931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5198, "end_char": 5205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ATANJAU SAsTa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5268, "end_char": 5281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per l>ATANJAU SAsTa!"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5904, "end_char": 5911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held by the Full Court (KANIA , C.J., FAzL Au, PATANJAU\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ.)- ln any view, on the facts of the case there was no infringement of any fundamental right of the respondent or contravention of any constitutional provision as he had been s, upplicd with sufficient particulars as soon as he raised the objection that the grounds supplied were vague and the respondent was not, therefore, entitled to be released.", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6476, "end_char": 6483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held by the Full Court (KANIA , C.J., FAzL Au, PATANJAU\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ.)- ln any view, on the facts of the case there was no infringement of any fundamental right of the respondent or contravention of any constitutional provision as he had been s, upplicd with sufficient particulars as soon as he raised the objection that the grounds supplied were vague and the respondent was not, therefore, entitled to be released.", "canonical_name": "FAZL Au"}}, {"text": "PATANJAU\n\nSASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6485, "end_char": 6501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held by the Full Court (KANIA , C.J., FAzL Au, PATANJAU\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ.)- ln any view, on the facts of the case there was no infringement of any fundamental right of the respondent or contravention of any constitutional provision as he had been s, upplicd with sufficient particulars as soon as he raised the objection that the grounds supplied were vague and the respondent was not, therefore, entitled to be released."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6503, "end_char": 6516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held by the Full Court (KANIA , C.J., FAzL Au, PATANJAU\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ.)- ln any view, on the facts of the case there was no infringement of any fundamental right of the respondent or contravention of any constitutional provision as he had been s, upplicd with sufficient particulars as soon as he raised the objection that the grounds supplied were vague and the respondent was not, therefore, entitled to be released.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA DAs"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6522, "end_char": 6536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held by the Full Court (KANIA , C.J., FAzL Au, PATANJAU\n\nSASTRI, MuKHERJEA DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nA1YYAR JJ.)- ln any view, on the facts of the case there was no infringement of any fundamental right of the respondent or contravention of any constitutional provision as he had been s, upplicd with sufficient particulars as soon as he raised the objection that the grounds supplied were vague and the respondent was not, therefore, entitled to be released.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6938, "end_char": 6958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per (KANIA C.J., FAzL Au, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.)-The \"grounds for making the order which have to be communicated to the person detained .1s soon as may be arc conclusions of facts and not a complete recita!", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7816, "end_char": 7839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J95J\n\nStaie qf Bomba7\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8132, "end_char": 8139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9016, "end_char": 9027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9085, "end_char": 9102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitution against a judgment and order of the Bombay High Court dated."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9237, "end_char": 9251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attarney-General, ( G. N. foshi, with him) f<;>r the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. N. foshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9273, "end_char": 9284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attarney-General, ( G. N. foshi, with him) f<;>r the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9318, "end_char": 9332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and Bava Shiv Charan Singh for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bava Shiv Charan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9337, "end_char": 9359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari and Bava Shiv Charan Singh for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kania C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9413, "end_char": 9423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C.J., Faz!", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "Faz!\n\nAli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9425, "end_char": 9434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C.J., Faz!", "canonical_name": "FAzL\n\nALI"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9436, "end_char": 9445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA DAs"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9450, "end_char": 9470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Kania C.J. Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9492, "end_char": 9519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Kania C.J. Patanjali Sastri and Dass JT."}}, {"text": "Dass", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9524, "end_char": 9528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Kania C.J. Patanjali Sastri and Dass JT.", "canonical_name": "Dass"}}, {"text": "Public Security Measures Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act IV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9900, "end_char": 9921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "21st of April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10002, "end_char": 10021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was arrested again on the 21st of April, 1950, under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of April, 1950, grounds for his detention were supplied to him."}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10033, "end_char": 10063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st of July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10368, "end_char": 10386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed a habeas corpus petition on the 31st of July, 1950, in which, after reciting his previous arrest and release, in paragraphs 6 and 7 he mentioned as follows:-\n\n\"(6) On his release the applicant left Bombay and stayed out of Bombay, that is, in Ratlam and in Delhi."}}, {"text": "Ratlam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10579, "end_char": 10585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed a habeas corpus petition on the 31st of July, 1950, in which, after reciting his previous arrest and release, in paragraphs 6 and 7 he mentioned as follows:-\n\n\"(6) On his release the applicant left Bombay and stayed out of Bombay, that is, in Ratlam and in Delhi."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10593, "end_char": 10598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed a habeas corpus petition on the 31st of July, 1950, in which, after reciting his previous arrest and release, in paragraphs 6 and 7 he mentioned as follows:-\n\n\"(6) On his release the applicant left Bombay and stayed out of Bombay, that is, in Ratlam and in Delhi."}}, {"text": "20th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10612, "end_char": 10628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(7) On the 20th April, 1950, he returned to Bombay and was immediately arrested as stated above.\""}}, {"text": "All-India Trade Union Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10911, "end_char": 10941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He contended that the sole aim of the Government in ordering his detention was not the preservation of public order or the security of the State, but the locking-up of active trade unionists who belonged to the All-India Trade Union Congress."}}, {"text": "9th of August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11485, "end_char": 11504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When this petition was presented to the Court on the 9th of August, 1950, it directed the issue of a notice to the Commissioner of Police."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11729, "end_char": 11738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He further urged that the ground gave no particulars and therefore was not a ground as required to be furnished under the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "He further urged that the ground gave no particulars and therefore was not a ground as required to be furnished under the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11746, "end_char": 11776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Atma Ram SritllitW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11909, "end_char": 11927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 dated the 29th April,\n\n4-1 S. C. India/68\n\nt95J\n\n$tale qf Bom6ay\n\nAtma Ram SritllitW V aitfyo."}}, {"text": "Abrut Ram Sridhar Yaidy•.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11966, "end_char": 11991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KanioC. J1\n\nStoi.~ Bom6ay\n\nAbrut Ram Sridhar Yaidy•.\n\nKaaiaC.J.\n\n1950, the following further particulars arc hereby communicated to you in connection with the grounds on which a detention order has been made against you under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the said Act:-\n\nThat the activities mentioned in the grounds furnished to ."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12184, "end_char": 12193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Government of :SOmbay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12596, "end_char": 12617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, in view of the particulars now supplied, you wish to make a further representation against the order under which you are detained, you should address it to the Government of :SOmbay and forward it through the Superintendent of Arthur Road Prison, Bombay.\""}}, {"text": "30th of August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12700, "end_char": 12720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th of August, 1950, the Commissioner of Police filed an affidavit against the petition of the respondent in which it was stated that the objectionable activities were carried on by the applicant between the months of January, 1950, and the date of detention."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13079, "end_char": 13084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further stated that in or about the month of January, 1950, there was a move for a total strike on the railways in India in the month of March, 1950, and the applicant was taken prominent part to sec that the strike was brought about and was successful."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14371, "end_char": 14377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the judgment of the Court, Chagla C. J. observed: \"It is clear by reason of the view we have taken in several cases under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, that this is not a ground which would enable the detenue to make a representation to which he is entitled both under the Act and under the Constitution.\""}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14466, "end_char": 14477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chudasama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15210, "end_char": 15219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have looked at this affidavit and we have also looked at the particulars furnished to us by Mr. Chudasama."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15919, "end_char": 15932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridhar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16135, "end_char": 16151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment is however based on the following observation of the Chief Justice : \"A new and important question arises for our consideration; and that is whether it is permissible to the detaining authority to justify the detention by amplifying and improving the grounds originally furnished ........ The only grounds which we have to consider and which were furnished in the purported compliance of article 22(5) were the grounds furnished to the detenue on the 29th of April, 1950; and if these grounds were not such as to enable the detenue to make a proper representation, then there was a\n\nSlate ef B11111t•.1\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Y 11;,/ya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "Atma Ram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16195, "end_char": 16203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sttdt ef Bomhay\n\nAtma Ram Srfr!krzr Jl nU!ya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16225, "end_char": 16230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C. J.\n\nviolation of the fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions.", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16587, "end_char": 16600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th of August 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16724, "end_char": 16743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we said before, the point of time at which we have to decide whether there was a compliance or not with the provisions of article 22(5) is the 29th of April, 1950, when the grounds were furnished, and not when further and better particulars were given on the 26th of August 1950.\""}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17160, "end_char": 17181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17470, "end_char": 17480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17563, "end_char": 17573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17894, "end_char": 17915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18114, "end_char": 18124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19468, "end_char": 19477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20069, "end_char": 20078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AtmaRawa Sridhar Yail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20422, "end_char": 20443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was necessary to prevent him from\n\nState qf Bombay\n\nAtmaRawa Sridhar Yail/ya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "Atmallam Sridhar Vaidya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20481, "end_char": 20504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C.J.\n\nSt\"1e qf BDmbay\n\n\"· Atmallam Sridhar Vaidya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "Central", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21911, "end_char": 21918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not for the court to sit in the place of the Central Government or the State Government and try to determine if it would have come to the same conclusion as the Central or the State Government."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22717, "end_char": 22738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23041, "end_char": 23054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24523, "end_char": 24533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bomba.1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24796, "end_char": 24812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is argued that whatever may be stated or omitted to be stated, the ground c.'\\Illlot be vague; that the Constitution envisages the\n\n195{\n\nState of Bomba.1\n\nAtt114 Ra• Sridhar Vaidya."}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24878, "end_char": 24901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stat< ef Bom••.1\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25093, "end_char": 25106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25529, "end_char": 25539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25563, "end_char": 25573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29661, "end_char": 29674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Clause 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31417, "end_char": 31426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33014, "end_char": 33027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "AtmaRiim Sridlun", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33712, "end_char": 33728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the grounds of detention are thus the main factors on which the subjective decision of the Government is based, other materials on which the conclusions in the grounds are founded could and should equally be conveyed to the detained person to enable him to make out his objections against the\n\nStat• qf Bombay\n\nAtmaRiim Sridlun' Y aidya."}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridhar Vaid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33774, "end_char": 33795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "EaniaC.J.\n\nt95t\n\nStale qf Bombay\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaid, a.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\norder.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34374, "end_char": 34387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34415, "end_char": 34428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34690, "end_char": 34703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "StateW BombtfJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38029, "end_char": 38043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KaniaC.J.\n\nJ951\n\nStateW BombtfJ ... ."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38290, "end_char": 38303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38370, "end_char": 38383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39078, "end_char": 39087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39607, "end_char": 39620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39714, "end_char": 39727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41337, "end_char": 41350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42195, "end_char": 42208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "mallaa Sridhar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42409, "end_char": 42423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "will amount to an infringement of the first mentioned right in article 22(5) as the grounds for the order of detention must be before the Government before it is satisfied about the necessity for making the order and all such grounds have to be furnished\n\nStOI• qf Bombay\n\nv. &mallaa Sridhar y aitlyc."}}, {"text": "AhnaRam Sridhar Vaidya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42468, "end_char": 42490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Irotli• c. J.\n\nSiatt .J' Bombay\n\nAhnaRam Sridhar Vaidya."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43003, "end_char": 43016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43462, "end_char": 43475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43751, "end_char": 43761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45599, "end_char": 45609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46626, "end_char": 46639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47575, "end_char": 47588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48368, "end_char": 48381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48703, "end_char": 48720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case the later communication of the 26th August, 1950, was made after the respondent filed his petition and it appears to have been made to controvert his allegation that he was never in Bombay between January and ApriL 1950, as alleged in his affidavit."}}, {"text": "29th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49053, "end_char": 49069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After takinsr into consideration this communication it was observed by Chagla C.J. that if these particulars had been furnished on 29th April, 1950, very likely the\n\ncourt would have rejected the petition."}}, {"text": "PA1ANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49436, "end_char": 49452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PA1ANJALI SASTRI J.-While I concur in the order proposed by my Lord that this appeal should be allowed, I regret I find myself unable to agree with him on the true meaning and effect of article 22, clause (5), which is reproduced in section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as - \"the Act\").", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI . SASTRI"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49622, "end_char": 49632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49669, "end_char": 49678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49686, "end_char": 49716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50169, "end_char": 50176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is now settled by the decision of the majority in Gopalan's case(1) that article 21 is applicable to preventive detention except in so far as the provisions of article 22(4) to (7) either expressly Qr_ by necessary implication exclude its application, with the result that a person canno~ be deprived of this personal liberty, even for preventive purposes, \"except according to procedure established by law.\""}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50192, "end_char": 50202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50279, "end_char": 50292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50617, "end_char": 50627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": ":ema Ram Sridhar Vaidya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51217, "end_char": 51240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".A:ema Ram Sridhar Vaidya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51646, "end_char": 51659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52917, "end_char": 52927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53336, "end_char": 53345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finlay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53732, "end_char": 53738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice pointed out (at p. 121) that action by way of preventive detention must be based largely on suspicion, and quoted the remark of Lord Finlay in Rex v. Halliday(1), that a court is the least appropriate tribunal to investigate the question whether circumstances of suspicion exist warranting the restraint on a person."}}, {"text": "Dealing with a similarly worded provision of the Central Provinces and Berar Public Safety Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53917, "end_char": 54017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridhar Yaiiiya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55426, "end_char": 55450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"' Atma Ram Sridhar Yaiiiya,\n\nPatanjali Sastri].", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56279, "end_char": 56288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56432, "end_char": 56442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56655, "end_char": 56664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56846, "end_char": 56855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56920, "end_char": 56930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57073, "end_char": 57083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atkinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57795, "end_char": 57803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Lord\n\nAtkinson in Rex v. Halliday(1), preventive detention being a precautionary measure, \"it must necessarily proceed in all cases to some extent on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof\", and it must be capable of being employed by the executive government in sudden emergencies on unverified information supplied to them by their police or intelligence officers."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58393, "end_char": 58403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Government, acting honestly and in good faith make an order being \"satisfied\" on such information, however lacking in particulars, that a person should be detained in the public interest, as they have been empowered by Parliament to do, then all that article 22(5) requires of them is to communicate as soon as may be the grounds which led to the making of the order, to the person concerned, and to give him the earliest opportunity of making any representation which l1e may wish to make on the basis of what is communicated to him."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58425, "end_char": 58438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59052, "end_char": 59062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59544, "end_char": 59557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridka Vaidya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59942, "end_char": 59964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "StBl1 qf Bomba, Y v.\n\nAtma Ram Sridka Vaidya,\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\nthe authority which does not in any 'J:ay embark on a judicial or quasj-judicial inquiry.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60875, "end_char": 60885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Viscount Maugham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62344, "end_char": 62360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscount Maugham observed \"It is beyond dispute that he can decline to disclose the information on which he has acted on the ground that to do so wowd be contrary to the public interest, and that this privilege of the Crown cannot be disputed."}}, {"text": "Vridllar Yaillya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64251, "end_char": 64267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AllllDR..\n\nVridllar Yaillya,\n\nP4talfiali SastiiJ.\n\nSlale ef Bomba.1\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Yai(, a.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastriJ.\n\nstill be a \"representation'', within the meaning of clause (5)."}}, {"text": "P4talfiali SastiiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64270, "end_char": 64289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AllllDR..\n\nVridllar Yaillya,\n\nP4talfiali SastiiJ.\n\nSlale ef Bomba.1\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Yai(, a.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastriJ.\n\nstill be a \"representation'', within the meaning of clause (5)."}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridhar Yai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64309, "end_char": 64329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AllllDR..\n\nVridllar Yaillya,\n\nP4talfiali SastiiJ.\n\nSlale ef Bomba.1\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Yai(, a.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastriJ.\n\nstill be a \"representation'', within the meaning of clause (5).", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "Provincial Public Safety Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68867, "end_char": 68895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69114, "end_char": 69124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Public Safety Act", "statute": "Provincial Public Safety Act"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70138, "end_char": 70151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71816, "end_char": 71826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71877, "end_char": 71886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 72037, "end_char": 72056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar question has also been raised in another appeal filed in this court by one hundred detenus from the decision of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court, being Case No."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72432, "end_char": 72441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72826, "end_char": 72835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 73002, "end_char": 73007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State qf Boin6ay\n\n• v.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaid."}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridhar Vaid", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73026, "end_char": 73047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State qf Boin6ay\n\n• v.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaid.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "A.tma Ram Srldhar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73082, "end_char": 73099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stott ef Bomba7\n\nv .• A.tma Ram Srldhar Y aitfya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75129, "end_char": 75139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76543, "end_char": 76556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77014, "end_char": 77100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77205, "end_char": 77218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77297, "end_char": 77306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Ahlla Ram Sridhar Vaitf", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77389, "end_char": 77412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ahlla Ram Sridhar Vaitf; o.\n\nDas]."}}, {"text": "Atma ROWJ Sridhar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77453, "end_char": 77470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State ef B\"\"\"'•:1 v.\n\nAtma ROWJ Sridhar Y aid70,\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77685, "end_char": 77694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77860, "end_char": 77869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The next step in the argument is that the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78125, "end_char": 78134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78303, "end_char": 78313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78643, "end_char": 78652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78660, "end_char": 78690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80124, "end_char": 80133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80314, "end_char": 80323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80826, "end_char": 80835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81080, "end_char": 81089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82239, "end_char": 82249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82797, "end_char": 82807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83154, "end_char": 83164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83421, "end_char": 83430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83438, "end_char": 83468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83959, "end_char": 83969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "detenu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 84038, "end_char": 84044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "detenu from that moment must be held to be deprived of his liberty otherwise ."}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84301, "end_char": 84311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 86231, "end_char": 86254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The very fact that the provisions of clauses (1) and (2) of article\n\nStc.fe qf 1'oni6ay\n\nv •.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88875, "end_char": 88885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89512, "end_char": 89522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atma Rom Sridhar Vaidya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90647, "end_char": 90670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "951\n\nStale qf Bombay •• Atma Rom Sridhar Vaidya.", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90949, "end_char": 90959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95037, "end_char": 95062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suppose, again, that the grounds on which the ord<:r has been made and which have been communicated to the: detenu are regarded by the authority to be quite precise and sufficient for making a representation, is\n\nthe authority to anticipate that the detenu may find these grounds insufficient or that being moved in that behalf the Court may consider them insufficient and\n\nJ951\n\nState ef Bomba' •• Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "Atma Ram Srir!har Vaid)la"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96391, "end_char": 96401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97116, "end_char": 97126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution or of the Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 98404, "end_char": 98451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98824, "end_char": 98837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution or of the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Constitution or of the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98868, "end_char": 98877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution or of the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "Constitution or of the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 99550, "end_char": 99561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "V. P. K. Nambiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 99590, "end_char": 99607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: V. P. K. Nambiyar."}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 99638, "end_char": 99658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.l"}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99661, "end_char": 99679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.l", "canonical_name": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99686, "end_char": 99700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.l", "canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99703, "end_char": 99719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.l", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI . SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99797, "end_char": 99804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "22nd or 23rd of July", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 100850, "end_char": 100870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A secnd set of grounds were communicated to the appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 100892, "end_char": 100914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They applied to the High Court of Calcutta for writs of habeas corpus contending that the orders of detention were invalid on various ground~. The High Court rejected these applications and they appealed to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 101083, "end_char": 101096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They applied to the High Court of Calcutta for writs of habeas corpus contending that the orders of detention were invalid on various ground~. The High Court rejected these applications and they appealed to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101127, "end_char": 101130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA C.J., FAzI.\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-(i) that-in the particular circumstances of the case, cSpccial!y in view of the fact that a large nnn1ber _of cases had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preventive Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the grounds \\Vt.re not communicated to the appellants \"as soon as may be\" within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "CHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101147, "end_char": 101169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA C.J., FAzI.\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-(i) that-in the particular circumstances of the case, cSpccial!y in view of the fact that a large nnn1ber _of cases had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preventive Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the grounds \\Vt.re not communicated to the appellants \"as soon as may be\" within the meaning of Art.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101496, "end_char": 101503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_212_220_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "J95J\n\nStall of Bombay\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.\n\n1951 Jan. 25.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nallow this appeal and reverse the . decision of the Bombay High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the respondent: V. P. K. Nambiyar.\n\nTARAPADA DE AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.l\n\nConstitution of lndia, 1950, Art. 22 (5)-Preventive detention- Duty to contmunicate grounds of detention as soon as n1ay be- Duty to gii1e earliest opportunity to make t-cpresentation-Grounds fttrnished after 15 days-\"Supplementary grounds 11 furnished after 4 months-Ugality of detentt'on-Vague grounds and irrelevant grounds distinguished-Supply of grounds first and details later-Legality-Serving printed orders on same date on several persons-Bona fides of detention.\n\nA large number of persons were detained under the Bengal Criminal Law An1endrnent Act, 1930~ The validity of this ~.\\ct was being c.hallenged in the High Court. Meanwhile, the Prcven\n\ntive Detention Act of 1950 was passed on 26th February, 1950, and on the same date detention orders under this J\\-:t \\Vere served on them.\n\nThe grounds of detention were served on them on the 14th of l\\farch, and on the 16th of July the Government served on them \"'Supplementary grounds\" in continuation of the grounds already furnished on the 14th of March. A secnd set of grounds were communicated to the appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July. They applied to the High Court of Calcutta for writs of habeas corpus contending that the orders of detention were invalid on various ground~. The High Court rejected these applications and they appealed to the Supreme Court.\n\nHeld per KANIA C.J., FAzI.\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-(i) that-in the particular circumstances of the case, cSpccial!y in view of the fact that a large nnn1ber _of cases had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preventive Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the grounds \\Vt.re not communicated to the appellants \"as soon as may be\" within the meaning of Art. 22 (5);\n\n(ii) it cannot be held that the appellants were not given the \"earliest opportunity\" to make a representation, as required by Art. 22(5), merely because further details and facts were communicated to the appellants on the 16th July and 22nd July as these later communications did not contain any new or addition,! grounds (though they were described as \"supplementary grounds\") but only furnished details of the heads of grounds furnished on the 14th March;\n\n(iii) merely because a ground is vague it cannot be considered that it is no ground at all and therefore cannot be sufficient to 'satisfy' the authorities; a 'vague' ground does not stand on the same footing as an irrelevant ground, which can have no connectioil at all with the satisfaction of the Government;\n\n(iv) the sufficiency of the grounds for the purposes of satisfaction . of the Government is not a matter for examination by the court; their suflidency to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation can be examined by the court, but only from that point of view.\n\nHeld also, per DAs J.-The fact that a large number of fresh orders of detention were made overnight did not necessarily indicate bad fait.\\ on the part of the authorities in the circumstances of these cases as the authorities had already applied their minds to the suspcted activities .of each of the detenues and were satisfied that with a view to prevent them from doing some prejudicial :; ct, it was necessary to detain them.\n\nThe State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya supra p. 167 followed.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: (Case No. 24 of 1950).\n\nAppeal under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution of India, against the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 361 of 1950.\n\nA. C.\n\nGupta and Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and S. N. Mukherjee, with them) for the appellants.\n\nM. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General, (B. Sen, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1951. Jan. 25.\n\nThe Judgment of Kania C. J., Fazl Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar\n\nJ.J., was delivered by Kania C. J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ. delivered separate judgments.\n\nKANIA C. J.-This is an of the Constitution of India appeal under article 132 from the judgment of the\n\n)951\n\nTarapatfti DI.\n\nartd Otlwr1\n\nv The State qf West Bengill.\n\nKania C. ].\n\n195!\n\nTarapat!a De\n\nO'lld Others\n\nThi State ef Wist Bengal.\n\nKaniaC.].\n\nHigh Court at Calcutta, which rejected the hebea: corpus petitions of the appellants.\n\nThe detention orders under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, in all cases were served on the appellants on the 26th February, 1950, and the grounds for the detention were served on the 14th March, 1950.\n\nBy way of specimen we quote one of them :\n\n\"You are being detained in pursuance of a detention order made under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section ( 1) of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, (Act IV of 1950), on the following grounds:- ( 1) That you have been assisting . the operations of the Communist Party of India, which along with its volunteer organisations has been declared unlawful by Government under section 16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act (Act XIV of 1908), and which has for its object commission of rioting with deadly weapons, robbery, dacoity, arson and murder and .possession and use of arms and ammunitions and explosives and thus acting in a manner prejudidal to the maintenance of public order and tbat it is necessary to prevent you from acting in such manner.\n\n(2) That as a member of the C.P.I. on its Kishan front, you have fomented trouble amongst the peasants of Howrah District and incited them to acts of lawlessness and violence : and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order : That as a worker of the C.P.I. you have tried to foment trouble amongst the tramways men and other workers at Calcutta and in speeches which you delivered at the University Hall and other places you actually incited them to resort to acts of violence and lawlessness ; and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\"\n\nOn the 16th of July, 1950, the Government of West Bengal served on the appellants \"in continuation of the grounds already furnished on the 14th of March, 1950, supplementary grounds\" for their detention a specimen of which is in the following terms :-\n\n\"In continuation of the grounds already furnished under order No. 6163 H. S. dated 14th March, 1950, you are being informed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are as follows :- you as the Secretary of the Bengal Chatkar Mazdoor Union, as a member of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Mercantile Empolyees' Union, as the honorary reporter of the 'Khabar' newspaper (C. P. I. organ) carried on the disruptive programme of the C. P. I. On the 29th July, 1948, you along with others led a procession at Howrah. preaching discontent against Government and have been thus acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\"\n\nAs in the case of the first grounds, these \"supplementary grounds\" were also served on each appellant separately. The appellants applied for a Rule of habeas corpus separately wider section 491 of the\" Criminal Procedure Code and on the 21st July, 1950, the High Court issued a Rule in each case on the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal. A second set of grounds were communicated to the appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July, 1950. A specimer of one is in the following terms :-\n\n\"In continuation of the grounds alreadv furnished under order No. 12820 dated 14th July, 1950, you are being informed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are as follows :-\n\n1. That in a meeting held at the University Institute on the 19th March, 1947, under the auspices of the Calcutta Tramway Workers' Union, you held out the threat that any attempt to take out tram cars on the 20th March, 1947, would be inviting disaster and you further said that if the authorities tried to resume the tram service you and your friends would not hesitate to remove the tram lines and cut the wires.\n\n2. Tha:t on the 13th f une, 1948, you presided over a meeting under the auspices of the Students' Federation (C. P. I. controlled) aad delivered speech\n\n!951\n\nTarapadtl De\n\nanti Otlters\n\nThe Stale ef w ISi B•ftgal.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nTarapodaDe\n\nand Others v.\n\nThe SlaJ1 qf W 1st Bengal.\n\nKoni.tJC.J.\n\nadvocating withdrawal of ban on the Communist Party of India and its. organ Swadhinta.\"\n\nThe High Court after considering the whole matter rejected the petitions of the appellants and the appellants have thereupon come in appeal before us.\n\nIn the High Court, it was first contended on behalf of the . appellants that the communication of the grounds dated the 14th March was not a compliance with article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, as those grounds were not communicated \"as soon as may be.\" The High Court rejected this contention.\n\nUnder the circumstances of the case, we agree with the High Court and are unable to hold that in furnishing the grounds dated the 14th March, 1950, the authorities had failed to act in accordar\\ce with the procedure laid down in article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, a very large number of persons were detained.\n\nThe validity of that Act was being challenged in the High Court and the judgment was expected to be delivered towards the end of February, 1950.\n\nThe Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was passed by the Parliament of India in the last week of February, 1950, and these orders on all those detenus were served ou the 26th of February,\n\n1950.\n\nHaving regard to the fact that Provincial Government had thus sudden I y to deal with a large number of cases on one day, we are unable to accept this contention of the appellants.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants it was next urged that there has been a non-compliance with the procedure laid down in article 22 (5) of the Constitution and section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act in the manner. of supplying grounds to the appellants resulting in not providing to the appellants the earliest opportunity to make a representation, which they had a right to make.\n\nIn the judgment delivered today in Case No. 22 of 1950(') we have discussed in detail the nature of the two rights conferred under article 22(5).\n\nWe have to apply those principles to the facts of this appeal for its decision.\n\n(I) Supra, p 167,\n\nWhen the authorities sent their second communication dated 16th July, 1950, to the appelants they described it as \"in continuation of the grounds already furnished\" and as the \"supplementary grounds for your detention\".\n\nRelying on the wording of this communication it was argued that these were additional grounds which were furnished to the detenu and therefore the procedure prescribed under article 22(5) had not been followed. It was argued that the obligation to communicate grounds \"as soon as may be\" was absolute.\n\nThe grounds for detention must be before the Provincial Government before they could be satisfied about the necessity for malCing the detention order.\n\nIf the grounds before the detaining authorities on the 26th of February, 1950, were only those which they communicated on the 14th of March, they cannot support the detention on additional grounds which were not before them on that day and which the;• et out in the second communication four months later.\n\nIt was also contended that the fact of this communication showed that the authorities were not satisfied on the original grounds and had therefore put forth these supplementary grounds as an afterthought.\n\nIn our opinion these arguments cannot be accepted.\n\nA description of the contents of the second communication as \"supplementary grounds\" does not neces.- sarily make them additional or new grounds. One has to Jook at the contents to find out whether they are new grounds as explained in our judgment in Case No. 22 of 1950(1). Examining the contents of the later communicat.ion in that way we find that they only furnished details of the second heads of the groW1ds furnished to the appropriate appellant on 14th March, 1950, in respect of his activities.\n\nWe are unable to treat them as new grounds and we agree with the High Court in its conclusion that these are not fresh or new grounds.\n\nWe dp not think it proper to consider the true effect of the communication only by reading its opening words.\n\nThe whole of it must be read and considered together.\n\nThe contention that the authorities were not satisfied on the original\n\n0) Supr'a. p. 167\n\nTaraplJl/a D•\n\nand Others\n\nTlzeState qf West Beng\"l.\n\nJrniaC.j.\n\n[95[\n\nT arafHJt/a De and Others\n\nThe State ef West Bengal.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\ngrounds and therefore put forth this communication as the supplemental grounds is again unsound. The fact that these details were communicated later does not necessarily show that they were not within the knowledge of the authorities when they sent the communication dated the 14th of March.\n\nThe contention that this communication of the 16th July, 1950, was not \"as soon as may be\", has to be rejected having regard to the principles set out in our judgment in Case No. 22 of 1950. The facts in each case have to be taken into consideration and if the detained person contends that this part of the procedure prescribed in article 22(5) was not complied with, the authorities will have to place materials before the court t~ refute that contention.\n\nIn the present case the High Court has considered that there has been no infringement of this procedural law and we see no reason to come to a different conclusion.\n\nIt was next argued that the grounds being vague, they could not be considered as grounds at all and therefore they could not be sufficient \"to satisfy\" the authorities.\n\nOn this point we have nothing to add to what we have stated in our juagment in Case No. 22 of 1950.\n\nWe are unable to accept the contention that \"vague grounds\" stand on the same footing as \"irrelevarit grounds\". An irrelevant ground has no connection at all with the satisfaction of the Provincial Government which makes the erder of detention.\n\nFor the reasons stated in that judgment we are also unable to accept the contention that if the grounds are vague and no representation is possible there can be no satisfaction of the authority as required under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act.\n\nThis argument mixes up two objects. The sufficiency of the grounds, which gives rise to the satisfaction of the Provincial Government, is not a matter for examination by the court. The sufficiency of the grounds to give the detained person the' earliest opportunity to make a representation can be examined by the court, but only from that point of view.\n\nWe are therefore unable to accept the contention that the quality and characteristic of\n\nthe grounds should be the same for both tests. On the question of satisfaction, as has been often stated, one person may be, but another may not be, satisfied on the same grounds. That aspect however is not for the determination of the court, having regard to the words used in the Act. . The second part of the enquiry is clearly open to the court under article 22(5). We are therefore unable to accept the argument that if the grounds are not sufficient or adequate for making the representation the grounds canriot be sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the authority.\n\nAs regards the grounds furnished by the Government in each case in its hrst communication, it is sufficient to notice that while the first ground is common to all the appellants, the second ground is different in most cases. The High Court has considered the case of each appellant in respect of the communication dated the 14th of March, 1950, sent to him. In their opinion those grounds are not vague. They have held that the procedural requirement to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation has not beeen infringed by the communication of the grounds of the 14th of March and by the subsequent communication made to the appellants in July. This point was not seriously pressed before us. After hearing counsel for the appellant we sec no reason to differ from the conclusion of the High Court on this point. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nPATANJAU SASm J.-This appeal was heard along with Ca5¢ No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v.\n\nAtma Ram Sridhar Vaidya) (1). as the main question involved was the same. In the view I have expressed on that question in my judgment delivered today in that case, this appeal cannot succeed and I agree that it should be dismissed.\n\nDAS J.-The same important questions have been raised in this appeal by 100 detenus against an order of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court as were raised\n\n(I) Supra, p. 167. 7-1 S.O laclia/68\n\nTarapaJaDe and Other1\n\nThe State qf Wen Ben.ta/,\n\nKania C.J.\n\nPatanj11li Sastrial J.\n\nD111J.\n\nT 41'opado DI\n\nand Othm\n\nTA•Slot• ef\n\nWest Bt111ol.\n\nby the detenu in the appeal of the State of Bombay in which judgment has just been delivered.\n\nOne additional point raised in this appeal was that the fact that a large n!Jlllber of fresh orders of detention were made \"overnight\" indicates bad faith on the part of the authorities, for the authorities could not have applied their minds to each individual case. 1 am unable to accept this contention as correct. The authorities had already applied their minds to the suspected activities of each of . the dctcnus and were satisfied that with a view to prevent them from doing some prejudicial act of a p; rticular kind it was necessary to m; ike an order of detention against them under the local Acts. There being doubt as to the validity of the local Acts and the Preventiv: Detention Act having been passed in the meantime the question was to make a fresh order under the new Act. The minds of the authorities having already been made up as to the expediency of making an order of detention against them, an elaborate application of mind, such as is now suggested, does not appear to me to be necessary at all. I do not think there was any failure of duty on the part of the authorities which will establish bad faith on their part.\n\nIn my view, for reasons stated in my judgment in the other appeal, there being no proof of any mala {ides on the part of the authorities, no fundamental rights of the petitioners have been infringed.\n\nIn the case of each of the detenus, apart from the common ground, there were one or more specilic grounds of detention which arc quite sufficient to enable the detenu Concerned to make his representation.\n\nTherefore, the question of supplementary particulars does not arise at all. In my opinion the conclusions arrived at by Roxburgh J. were correct and well-founded, and, therefore, this appeal should be dismissed.\n\nA ppettl dismisseil.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P. K. Bose.", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "V. P. K. Nambiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 249, "end_char": 266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: V. P. K. Nambiyar."}}, {"text": "TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 269, "end_char": 291, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 317, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 320, "end_char": 343, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 362, "end_char": 378, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 380, "end_char": 389, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 394, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 456, "end_char": 463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "22nd or 23rd of July", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1509, "end_char": 1529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A secnd set of grounds were communicated to the appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1551, "end_char": 1573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They applied to the High Court of Calcutta for writs of habeas corpus contending that the orders of detention were invalid on various ground~. The High Court rejected these applications and they appealed to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1742, "end_char": 1755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They applied to the High Court of Calcutta for writs of habeas corpus contending that the orders of detention were invalid on various ground~. The High Court rejected these applications and they appealed to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA C.J., FAzI.\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-(i) that-in the particular circumstances of the case, cSpccial!y in view of the fact that a large nnn1ber _of cases had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preventive Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the grounds \\Vt.re not communicated to the appellants \"as soon as may be\" within the meaning of Art.", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "FAzI.\n\nALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1779, "end_char": 1789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA C.J., FAzI.\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-(i) that-in the particular circumstances of the case, cSpccial!y in view of the fact that a large nnn1ber _of cases had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preventive Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the grounds \\Vt.re not communicated to the appellants \"as soon as may be\" within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "CHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1806, "end_char": 1828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per KANIA C.J., FAzI.\n\nALI, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-(i) that-in the particular circumstances of the case, cSpccial!y in view of the fact that a large nnn1ber _of cases had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preventive Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the grounds \\Vt.re not communicated to the appellants \"as soon as may be\" within the meaning of Art.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2295, "end_char": 2305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "16th July and 22nd July", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2391, "end_char": 2414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22(5), merely because further details and facts were communicated to the appellants on the 16th July and 22nd July as these later communications did not contain any new or addition,!"}}, {"text": "Art. 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3808, "end_char": 3819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3888, "end_char": 3924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) of the Constitution of India, against the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No."}}, {"text": "A. C.\n\nGupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3974, "end_char": 3986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. C.\n\nGupta and Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and S. N. Mukherjee, with them) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3991, "end_char": 4016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. C.\n\nGupta and Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and S. N. Mukherjee, with them) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Arun Kumar Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4018, "end_char": 4034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. C.\n\nGupta and Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and S. N. Mukherjee, with them) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4039, "end_char": 4054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. C.\n\nGupta and Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee (Arun Kumar Dutta and S. N. Mukherjee, with them) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4088, "end_char": 4103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General, (B. Sen, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4124, "end_char": 4130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C.\n\nSetalvad, Attorney-General, (B. Sen, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kania C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4195, "end_char": 4203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Kania C. J., Fazl Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar\n\nJ.J., was delivered by Kania C. J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ.", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4208, "end_char": 4216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Kania C. J., Fazl Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar\n\nJ.J., was delivered by Kania C. J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4218, "end_char": 4227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Kania C. J., Fazl Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar\n\nJ.J., was delivered by Kania C. J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Kania C. J., Fazl Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar\n\nJ.J., was delivered by Kania C. J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRA\n\nSEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "Kania C. J. Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4277, "end_char": 4305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Kania C. J., Fazl Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar\n\nJ.J., was delivered by Kania C. J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4310, "end_char": 4313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Kania C. J., Fazl Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar\n\nJ.J., was delivered by Kania C. J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4349, "end_char": 4354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANIA C. J.-This is an of the Constitution of India appeal under article 132 from the judgment of the\n\n)951\n\nTarapatfti DI.", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4379, "end_char": 4400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4414, "end_char": 4425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State qf West Bengill.\n\nKania C. ].\n\n195!", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4493, "end_char": 4534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "artd Otlwr1\n\nv The State qf West Bengill."}}, {"text": "Tarapat!a De", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4536, "end_char": 4548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tarapat!a De\n\nO'lld Others\n\nThi State ef Wist Bengal.", "canonical_name": "Tarapat!a De"}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court at Calcutta, which rejected the hebea: corpus petitions of the appellants."}}, {"text": "detention orders under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4693, "end_char": 4750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4881, "end_char": 4892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detention orders under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, in all cases were served on the appellants on the 26th February, 1950, and the grounds for the detention were served on the 14th March, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5060, "end_char": 5069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The detention orders under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The detention orders under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5077, "end_char": 5107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Communist Party of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5212, "end_char": 5236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the operations of the Communist Party of India, which along with its volunteer organisations has been declared unlawful by Government under section 16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act (Act XIV of 1908), and which has for its object commission of rioting with deadly weapons, robbery, dacoity, arson and murder and .possession and use of arms and ammunitions and explosives and thus acting in a manner prejudidal to the maintenance of public order and tbat it is necessary to prevent you from acting in such manner."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5330, "end_char": 5340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5348, "end_char": 5381, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C.P.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5742, "end_char": 5748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) That as a member of the C.P.I. on its Kishan front, you have fomented trouble amongst the peasants of Howrah District and incited them to acts of lawlessness and violence : and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order : That as a worker of the C.P.I. you have tried to foment trouble amongst the tramways men and other workers at Calcutta and in speeches which you delivered at the University Hall and other places you actually incited them to resort to acts of violence and lawlessness ; and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\""}}, {"text": "Howrah District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5820, "end_char": 5835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) That as a member of the C.P.I. on its Kishan front, you have fomented trouble amongst the peasants of Howrah District and incited them to acts of lawlessness and violence : and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order : That as a worker of the C.P.I. you have tried to foment trouble amongst the tramways men and other workers at Calcutta and in speeches which you delivered at the University Hall and other places you actually incited them to resort to acts of violence and lawlessness ; and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\""}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6085, "end_char": 6093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) That as a member of the C.P.I. on its Kishan front, you have fomented trouble amongst the peasants of Howrah District and incited them to acts of lawlessness and violence : and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order : That as a worker of the C.P.I. you have tried to foment trouble amongst the tramways men and other workers at Calcutta and in speeches which you delivered at the University Hall and other places you actually incited them to resort to acts of violence and lawlessness ; and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\""}}, {"text": "16th of July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6336, "end_char": 6354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 16th of July, 1950, the Government of West Bengal served on the appellants \"in continuation of the grounds already furnished on the 14th of March, 1950, supplementary grounds\" for their detention a specimen of which is in the following terms :-\n\n\"In continuation of the grounds already furnished under order No."}}, {"text": "Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6360, "end_char": 6385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 16th of July, 1950, the Government of West Bengal served on the appellants \"in continuation of the grounds already furnished on the 14th of March, 1950, supplementary grounds\" for their detention a specimen of which is in the following terms :-\n\n\"In continuation of the grounds already furnished under order No."}}, {"text": "Bengal Chatkar Mazdoor Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6806, "end_char": 6834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6163 H. S. dated 14th March, 1950, you are being informed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are as follows :- you as the Secretary of the Bengal Chatkar Mazdoor Union, as a member of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Mercantile Empolyees' Union, as the honorary reporter of the 'Khabar' newspaper (C. P. I. organ) carried on the disruptive programme of the C. P. I. On the 29th July, 1948, you along with others led a procession at Howrah."}}, {"text": "Federation of Mercantile Empolyees' Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6882, "end_char": 6923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6163 H. S. dated 14th March, 1950, you are being informed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are as follows :- you as the Secretary of the Bengal Chatkar Mazdoor Union, as a member of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Mercantile Empolyees' Union, as the honorary reporter of the 'Khabar' newspaper (C. P. I. organ) carried on the disruptive programme of the C. P. I. On the 29th July, 1948, you along with others led a procession at Howrah."}}, {"text": "29th July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7052, "end_char": 7067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6163 H. S. dated 14th March, 1950, you are being informed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are as follows :- you as the Secretary of the Bengal Chatkar Mazdoor Union, as a member of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Mercantile Empolyees' Union, as the honorary reporter of the 'Khabar' newspaper (C. P. I. organ) carried on the disruptive programme of the C. P. I. On the 29th July, 1948, you along with others led a procession at Howrah."}}, {"text": "Howrah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7111, "end_char": 7117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6163 H. S. dated 14th March, 1950, you are being informed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are as follows :- you as the Secretary of the Bengal Chatkar Mazdoor Union, as a member of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Mercantile Empolyees' Union, as the honorary reporter of the 'Khabar' newspaper (C. P. I. organ) carried on the disruptive programme of the C. P. I. On the 29th July, 1948, you along with others led a procession at Howrah."}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7429, "end_char": 7440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7449, "end_char": 7472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "21st July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7484, "end_char": 7499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants applied for a Rule of habeas corpus separately wider section 491 of the\" Criminal Procedure Code and on the 21st July, 1950, the High Court issued a Rule in each case on the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7587, "end_char": 7598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants applied for a Rule of habeas corpus separately wider section 491 of the\" Criminal Procedure Code and on the 21st July, 1950, the High Court issued a Rule in each case on the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "22nd or 23rd of July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7667, "end_char": 7693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second set of grounds were communicated to the appellants on the 22nd or 23rd of July, 1950."}}, {"text": "14th July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7821, "end_char": 7836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12820 dated 14th July, 1950, you are being informed of the supplementary grounds for your detention which are as follows :-\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Tramway Workers' Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8039, "end_char": 8070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That in a meeting held at the University Institute on the 19th March, 1947, under the auspices of the Calcutta Tramway Workers' Union, you held out the threat that any attempt to take out tram cars on the 20th March, 1947, would be inviting disaster and you further said that if the authorities tried to resume the tram service you and your friends would not hesitate to remove the tram lines and cut the wires."}}, {"text": "13th f une, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8366, "end_char": 8382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tha:t on the 13th f une, 1948, you presided over a meeting under the auspices of the Students' Federation (C. P. I. controlled) aad delivered speech\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8566, "end_char": 8571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C.J.\n\nTarapodaDe\n\nand Others v.\n\nThe SlaJ1 qf W 1st Bengal.", "canonical_name": "KANIA C.J."}}, {"text": "TarapodaDe", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8578, "end_char": 8588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C.J.\n\nTarapodaDe\n\nand Others v.\n\nThe SlaJ1 qf W 1st Bengal."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9044, "end_char": 9057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9065, "end_char": 9086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "14th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9320, "end_char": 9336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the circumstances of the case, we agree with the High Court and are unable to hold that in furnishing the grounds dated the 14th March, 1950, the authorities had failed to act in accordar\\ce with the procedure laid down in article 22 (5) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9419, "end_char": 9429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9465, "end_char": 9504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9703, "end_char": 9733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9753, "end_char": 9772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was passed by the Parliament of India in the last week of February, 1950, and these orders on all those detenus were served ou the 26th of February,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "26th of February,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9866, "end_char": 9889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was passed by the Parliament of India in the last week of February, 1950, and these orders on all those detenus were served ou the 26th of February,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10189, "end_char": 10199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10228, "end_char": 10237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10584, "end_char": 10597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "The Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "16th July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10759, "end_char": 10774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) Supra, p 167,\n\nWhen the authorities sent their second communication dated 16th July, 1950, to the appelants they described it as \"in continuation of the grounds already furnished\" and as the \"supplementary grounds for your detention\"."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11095, "end_char": 11108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th of February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11431, "end_char": 11453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the grounds before the detaining authorities on the 26th of February, 1950, were only those which they communicated on the 14th of March, they cannot support the detention on additional grounds which were not before them on that day and which the;• et out in the second communication four months later."}}, {"text": "14th of March", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11502, "end_char": 11515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the grounds before the detaining authorities on the 26th of February, 1950, were only those which they communicated on the 14th of March, they cannot support the detention on additional grounds which were not before them on that day and which the;• et out in the second communication four months later."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13600, "end_char": 13613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14622, "end_char": 14631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15466, "end_char": 15479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "14th of March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16018, "end_char": 16037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has considered the case of each appellant in respect of the communication dated the 14th of March, 1950, sent to him."}}, {"text": "PATANJAU SASm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16595, "end_char": 16608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJAU SASm J.-This appeal was heard along with Ca5¢ No.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16924, "end_char": 16927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAS J.-The same important questions have been raised in this appeal by 100 detenus against an order of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court as were raised\n\n(I) Supra, p. 167.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "TarapaJaDe", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17116, "end_char": 17126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-1 S.O laclia/68\n\nTarapaJaDe and Other1\n\nThe State qf Wen Ben.ta/,\n\nKania C.J.\n\nPatanj11li Sastrial J.\n\nD111J.\n\nT 41'opado DI\n\nand Othm\n\nTA•Slot• ef\n\nWest Bt111ol.", "canonical_name": "Tarapat!a De"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17143, "end_char": 17148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-1 S.O laclia/68\n\nTarapaJaDe and Other1\n\nThe State qf Wen Ben.ta/,\n\nKania C.J.\n\nPatanj11li Sastrial J.\n\nD111J.\n\nT 41'opado DI\n\nand Othm\n\nTA•Slot• ef\n\nWest Bt111ol."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17298, "end_char": 17313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the detenu in the appeal of the State of Bombay in which judgment has just been delivered."}}, {"text": "Roxburgh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19027, "end_char": 19035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion the conclusions arrived at by Roxburgh J. were correct and well-founded, and, therefore, this appeal should be dismissed."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19168, "end_char": 19184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19214, "end_char": 19224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : P. K. Bose."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_221_227_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 221\n\nCHANDRASINGH MANIBHAI AND OTHERS\n\nSURJIT LAL LADHAMAL CHHABDA\n\nAND OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SAsTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA JJ.]\n\nBombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control AN (LV/l of 1947), ss. 12, Sri-Application of Act to appealr pending when Act came into force-Retrospec/ive operation of Act, ertent of-Construction of ss, 12 and 50.\n\nThe Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, LVII of 1947, which came into force on the 13th February, 1948, has no application to appeals which were pending at the time when the Act came into force.\n\nIts retrospective effect is limited to cases mentioned in s. 50 of the Act, that is to say to suits and proceedings which were transferred under the provi sions of the said section to the courts having purisdiction under the Act.\n\nSection 12 of the said Act is in terms prospective and not retrospective in effect.\n\nSub-section (2) relates to suits which may be instituted after the Act comes into force and sub-s. (3) also only applies to such suits.\n\nNilkanth v. Rasiklal (A.I.R. 1949 Born. 210) approved.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1sD1cnoN: Appeal <Civil Appeal No. 57 of 1950) from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 1st April, 1948, in Appeal No. 365 of 1947 reversing a judgment of the Joint Civil fudge at Ahmedabad, dated 14th October, 1947, in Suit No. 174 of 1945.\n\nSomaya (lindra Lal, with him) for the appellants.\n\nC. K. Daphtary (Sri Narain Andley, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1951. February 23.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The appellants are owners of aproperty known as \"Bharat Bhuvan Theatre\" at Ahmcdabad. The respondents are the lessees of the said theatre.\n\nTh(' term of the lease was to expire on the 2nd\n\nFeb. 230\n\nt95!\n\nC/ifJwdrasingh Manibhai and\n\nOth1rs\n\nSurjit Lal Ladhamal Chhabda and\n\nOtlrtrt.\n\nMahajan].\n\nDecember, 1945, unless the lessees gave to the landlords three months previous notice in writing of their intention of exercising their option of renewal of the lease for a further period of two years.\n\nOn the 13th December, 1945, the appellants filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for ejectment of the respondent• and for recovery of certain amounts. This suit was decreed on the 14th October, 1947, on the following findings : (1) that the respondents had not exercised the option of the renewal of the lease according to the stipulations contained in the lease, (2) that they had committed breaches of the terms of the lease, and (3) that they were not protected by the Rent Restriction Act.\n\nAn enquiry was directed into the amount of mesne profits.\n\nThe respondents filed an appeal in the High Court against the decree of the Joint Civil Judge on the 10th November, 1947. The appeal was heard by a Bench of the High Court (Weston and Dixit JJ.) on the 26th February, 1948, and was decided on the 1st April, 1948.\n\nThe judgment and decree of the Joint Civil Judge were reversed and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The High Court affirmed the finding of the trial court on the first point and held in agreement with it that the respondents had not proved that they gave three months previous notice in writing to the appellants for renewal of the lease as required by clause 4(2) of the lease. It reversed the finding of the trial Judge on the point that the respondents had committed breaches of the terms contained in clause 2\n\n(20) of the lease. Finally, it reached the conclusion that although the decree appeakd from was right on the date it was made, yet in view of the altered circumstances created by reason of coming 'into operation of Act L V_II of 1947 the appellants were not entitled to recovery of possession of the suit premises.\n\nBeing aggrievea by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants obtained a certificate and filed an appeal in this court on the 7th March, 1949, and it is now before us for decision.\n\nIt was contended before the High Court that the appeal being in the nature of a rehearing, it should be\n\ndecided in accordance with the provisions of Act LVII of 1947 which came into force on the 13th February, 1948, and not. in accordance with the provisions of the Act in force at the time when the decree was passed by\n\nthe trial court. In other words, the contention was that there having been a change in the law after the date of the decree passed by the trial Judge. and before the appeal was heard, the rights of the parties should be determined in accordance with the law as it stood on the date of the hearing of the appeal. The High Court gave effect to this contention and set aside the decree made for ejectment of the respondents.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants challenged the decision of the High Court before us on tliree grounds :\n\n(1) that assuming that the appeal had to be decided by the High Court in accordance with the provisions of Act L VII of 1947, the provisions of that Act had no ap.elication to pending appeals which had been excluded from its ambit ; (2) that Act L VII of 1947 had been amended by Bombay Act - III of 1949 and that the appeal pending in this court should be decided in accordance with the provisions of the amended Act which excluded pending appeals from the purview of Act LVII of 1947 ; and (3) that the High Court wrongly reversed the trial court's finding that the respondents had committed oreaches of the terms contained in clause 2(20) of the lease.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondents besides controverting the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants conended that both . the courts had erred in holding that the respondents had not proved that they exercised the option of renewal of the lease ac.cording to the stipulations contained therein.\n\nIn our opinion the decision of the a!Jpeal depends solely on the construction of sections 12 and 50 of Act L VII of 1947. The question to decide is whether the Bombay Rents.\n\nHotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, L VII of 1947, which was enacted on the 19th January, 1948, and which came into force on the 13th February, 1948, 11as. application to\n\n1951 -~ Chandrosingh Manibhai anti\n\nOthers\n\n.v.\n\nSarjit Lot Ladha111al Chhabda on4 .othm.\n\nChandrasingla Manibhai and\n\nOt hm\n\nSurjit Loi Lodh4mal Chha6da anti\n\nOth111.\n\nMahajan].\n\n...\n\npending appeals or whether its retrospective effect is limited to cases mentioned in section 50 of the Act.\n\nThe point whether the option of renewal was exercised according to the covenants of the lease is concluded by a concurrent finding of fact and nothing that Mr. Daphthary said in support of his contention in ariy way shake that finding.\n\nThe case must therefore be decided on the assumption that the respondents did not exercise the option given to them under the lease for its renewal.\n\nWe are also not impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court wrongly reversed ):he finding of the trial Judge on the point that the respondents committed breaches of the terms of the lease.\n\nWe should not however be taken to concur in all the reasons given by the High Court for reversing that finding.\n\nWhether the High Court was right in holding that the provisions of Act L VII of 1947 have application to appeals pending at the time when that Act came into force; the answer to this question depends on the construction to be placed on sections 12 and 50 of Act L VII of 1947. Section 12 of the Act is in these terms :\n\n\"(1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they arc consistent with the provisions of this Act.\n\n(2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.\n\n(3) No decree for eviction shall be passed in any such •suit if, at the hearing of the suit, the tenant pays or tenders in court the standard rent or permitted increases then due together with the costs of the suit.\n\nExplanation-In any case where there is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if, before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an app1ication to the court under sub-section (3) of section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount or rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the court.\"\n\nThis is the substantive section giving protection to the tenant against ejectment.\n\nSection 50 which occurs in Pait IV dealing with miscellaneous matters is the repeal section.\n\nIt repeals the Act of 1939 and the Act of 1944, and while repealing these statutes it provides as follows:-\n\n\"Provided that all suits and proceedings (other than execution proceedings and appeals) between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery or fixing of rent or possession of any premises to which the provisions of Part II apply and all suits and proceedings by a manager of a hotel or an owner of a lodging house against a lodger for the recovery of chacges for, or . possession of, the accommodation provided in a hotel or lodging house situate in an area to which Part III applies, which are pending in any Court, shall he transferred to and continued hefor.e the courts which would have jurisdiction to try such suits or proceedings under this Act; and thereupon all the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply to all such suits and proceedigs.\n\n Provided further that-\n\n( a) every order passed or act done by the Controllers under Part IV of the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1944, and every order O! act deemed llo have been passed or done under that Part shall be deemed to have been passed or done under this Act; and\n\n(b) all proceedings pending before the Controllers under Part IV of that Act shall be transferred to and continued before the Controllers appointe4 under this\n\n19~1\n\nCh•ntlrasavli Manibliai an'\n\nOthirs.\n\nSurjit Lal Ladhamal Chha6da and\n\nOthers.\n\nMahajan].\n\nChantlrasingh\n\nManibhai and\n\nOthlrs\n\nSuriit Lal Ladhamal Chhabda ana\n\nOthers.\n\nMahajan].\n\nAct :is if they were proceedings instituted before the Controllers under this Act\".\n\n The High Court held that section 50 merely provided for transfer of pending suits and proceedings to courts given jurisdiction under the Act to hear them and that from its ambit execution proceedings and appeals were excluded because no question could arise of the, ir being transferred from one court to another and that an appeal being a continuation of the suit and in the nature of a re-hearing, the provisions of section 12 should be applied to pending appeals. The opinion expressed by the Division Bench on the construction of sections 12 and 50 of the Act was questioned in Nilkanth v. Rasiklal('), and the matter was referred to a full Bench.\n\nThe Full Bench overruled the decision reached by the Division Bench on the construction of section 50 and observed that it was clear that in terms the provisions of the new Act and the rules made thereunder are made to app1y only to such suits and proceedings which are transferred under the provisions of this section and that its retrospective effect is confined to what is expressly stated in section 50 of •the Act. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Full Bench.\n\nOn a plain reading cf the language of sections 12 and 50 it seems clear to us that the Act was given retrospective operation only to a limited extent and execution proceedings and appeals were exclnded from this effect and were to be governed by the provisions of the law in force at the time when the decrees were passed.\n\nThe concluding words of section 50 \"and thereupon all the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shall apply to all such suits and proceedings\" fully bear out this construction.\n\nMr. Daphthary contended that the whole object of section 50 was to make provision for transfer of pending cases to courts which were given jurisdiction under the Act to hear them and the section did not concern itself with the extent of the retrospective operation of the Act, and that section 12 of the Act which gives protection to tenants should en A. 1. R. 1949 Dom. 210.\n\nbe construed as having retrospective effect.\n\nIn our opinion this contention is not sound.\n\nSection 50 cannot be described as a section providing merely for transfer of pending cases to courts having jurisdiction to deal with them. It is on the other hand a \"repeal\" section in the new statute.\n\nIt repeals the two earlier statutes, and while repealing them it provides that the repeal shall not affect \"executions and appeals\" and that the provisions of the Act shall apply to all pending suits which shall be transferred to the courts having jursdiction to hear them under section 28 of the Act.\n\nWe are also inclined to agree with the view of the Full Bench that section 12 is in terms prospective and not retrospective.\n\nSub-section (2) clearly relates to suits which may be instituted after the Act comes into force.\n\nIt cannot apply to suits which were already pending when the Act was put on the statute book.\n\nSub-section (3) which gives the right to the tenant to pay or tender the rent at the hearing of the suit only applies to those suits which may be instituted after the Act comes into operation because it in terms states \"in such suit\" and not \"in any suit\". \"Such suit\" can only be a suit referred to in subsections (2) and (3) of section 12.\n\nThe result therefore is that, in our opinion, the High Court erroneously applied the provisions of Act L VII of 1947 to the appeal in this case and was wrorig in allowing it on that basis. In this view of the case it is unnecessary to deal with the alternative argument of the learned counsel that this appeal should be decided in accordance with the provisions of Act III of 1949. We accordingly set aside the decree of the High Court dismissing the plaintiff's suit and restore the decree of the trial Judge decreeing the plaintiff's suit with costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: /l[aunit Lal~\n\nAgent or the respondants: Ra; inder Narain.\n\nChandrasingh M anibhai and Otlurs\n\nSurjit Lal\n\nLatlhamal Chhabtla and\n\nOthers,\n\nMahajan].", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "221\n\nCHANDRASINGH MANIBHAI AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASINGH MANIBHAI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SURJIT LAL LADHAMAL CHHABDA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURJIT LAL LADHAMAL CHHABDA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240, "end_char": 246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sri-Application of Act to appealr pending when Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 248, "end_char": 298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 407, "end_char": 448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "13th February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 493, "end_char": 512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, LVII of 1947, which came into force on the 13th February, 1948, has no application to appeals which were pending at the time when the Act came into force."}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 664, "end_char": 669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 837, "end_char": 847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1463, "end_char": 1477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (Sri Narain Andley, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Narain Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1483, "end_char": 1496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary (Sri Narain Andley, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1594, "end_char": 1601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The appellants are owners of aproperty known as \"Bharat Bhuvan Theatre\" at Ahmcdabad.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Surjit Lal Ladhamal Chhabda", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C/ifJwdrasingh Manibhai and\n\nOth1rs\n\nSurjit Lal Ladhamal Chhabda and\n\nOtlrtrt.", "canonical_name": "SURJIT LAL LADHAMAL CHHABDA"}}, {"text": "14th October, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2293, "end_char": 2311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suit was decreed on the 14th October, 1947, on the following findings : (1) that the respondents had not exercised the option of the renewal of the lease according to the stipulations contained in the lease, (2) that they had committed breaches of the terms of the lease, and (3) that they were not protected by the Rent Restriction Act."}}, {"text": "10th November, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2768, "end_char": 2787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents filed an appeal in the High Court against the decree of the Joint Civil Judge on the 10th November, 1947."}}, {"text": "Weston", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2840, "end_char": 2846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard by a Bench of the High Court (Weston and Dixit JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2851, "end_char": 2856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard by a Bench of the High Court (Weston and Dixit JJ.)"}}, {"text": "26th February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2869, "end_char": 2888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the 26th February, 1948, and was decided on the 1st April, 1948."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2913, "end_char": 2928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the 26th February, 1948, and was decided on the 1st April, 1948."}}, {"text": "clause 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3439, "end_char": 3447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7th March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3895, "end_char": 3910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being aggrievea by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants obtained a certificate and filed an appeal in this court on the 7th March, 1949, and it is now before us for decision."}}, {"text": "clause 2(20)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5434, "end_char": 5446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5851, "end_char": 5869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5945, "end_char": 5986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrosingh Manibhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "application to\n\n1951 -~ Chandrosingh Manibhai anti\n\nOthers\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasingla Manibhai"}}, {"text": "Sarjit Lot Ladha111al Chhabda", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6173, "end_char": 6202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjit Lot Ladha111al Chhabda on4 .othm."}}, {"text": "Chandrasingla Manibhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6215, "end_char": 6237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasingla Manibhai and\n\nOt hm\n\nSurjit Loi Lodh4mal Chha6da anti\n\nOth111.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasingla Manibhai"}}, {"text": "Surjit Loi Lodh4mal Chha6da", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6250, "end_char": 6277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasingla Manibhai and\n\nOt hm\n\nSurjit Loi Lodh4mal Chha6da anti\n\nOth111."}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "Daphthary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6578, "end_char": 6587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point whether the option of renewal was exercised according to the covenants of the lease is concluded by a concurrent finding of fact and nothing that Mr. Daphthary said in support of his contention in ariy way shake that finding."}}, {"text": "Whether the High Court was right in holding that the provisions of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7154, "end_char": 7224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7390, "end_char": 7408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the High Court was right in holding that the provisions of Act", "statute": "Whether the High Court was right in holding that the provisions of Act"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7431, "end_char": 7441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the High Court was right in holding that the provisions of Act", "statute": "Whether the High Court was right in holding that the provisions of Act"}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8160, "end_char": 8171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the High Court was right in holding that the provisions of Act", "statute": "Whether the High Court was right in holding that the provisions of Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8179, "end_char": 8209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8788, "end_char": 8798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9000, "end_char": 9010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Ch•ntlrasavli Manibliai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "act deemed llo have been passed or done under that Part shall be deemed to have been passed or done under this Act; and\n\n(b) all proceedings pending before the Controllers under Part IV of that Act shall be transferred to and continued before the Controllers appointe4 under this\n\n19~1\n\nCh•ntlrasavli Manibliai an'\n\nOthirs."}}, {"text": "Surjit Lal Ladhamal Chha6da", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10499, "end_char": 10526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surjit Lal Ladhamal Chha6da and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "SURJIT LAL LADHAMAL CHHABDA"}}, {"text": "Suriit Lal Ladhamal Chhabda", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10589, "end_char": 10616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chantlrasingh\n\nManibhai and\n\nOthlrs\n\nSuriit Lal Ladhamal Chhabda ana\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "SURJIT LAL LADHAMAL CHHABDA"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10631, "end_char": 10638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan].", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10753, "end_char": 10763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11146, "end_char": 11156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11262, "end_char": 11280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11472, "end_char": 11482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11777, "end_char": 11787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11914, "end_char": 11932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12224, "end_char": 12234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12442, "end_char": 12452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12679, "end_char": 12689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12862, "end_char": 12872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13345, "end_char": 13355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13436, "end_char": 13446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14018, "end_char": 14028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrasingh M anibhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14688, "end_char": 14710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasingh M anibhai and Otlurs\n\nSurjit Lal\n\nLatlhamal Chhabtla and\n\nOthers,\n\nMahajan].", "canonical_name": "Chandrasingla Manibhai"}}, {"text": "Surjit Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14723, "end_char": 14733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasingh M anibhai and Otlurs\n\nSurjit Lal\n\nLatlhamal Chhabtla and\n\nOthers,\n\nMahajan]."}}, {"text": "Latlhamal Chhabtla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14735, "end_char": 14753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasingh M anibhai and Otlurs\n\nSurjit Lal\n\nLatlhamal Chhabtla and\n\nOthers,\n\nMahajan]."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_228_258_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "J ... 22\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nKESHAVAN MADHAVA MENON\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\n[Smu HAru1.AL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHEJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Art. 13 (!)-Whether retrospective Prosecution for contravention of lndi'an Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, ss. 15, IS-Constitution passed during pendency of prosecution-Laws inconsistent with fundamental rights declared void-Whether prosecution can be continued- A.bsence of provision saving pending proceedi1lgs-Effect a/- Expiry of temporary laws or repeal of laws, and laws becoming void by statutory declaration.-Difference-Interpretation- Spirit of the Constitution.\n\nHeld by the Court\n\n(KANIA C.J.,\n\nPATANJALI\n\nSASTRI, MElD.\n\nCHAND\n\nMAHAJAN, DAs and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.-FAzL Au and MuKHERJEA fl., dissenting) .. . Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution docs not make existing laws which are inconsistent with fundamental rights void ab inito, but only renders such laws ineffectual and Void with respect to the exercise of fundamental rights on and after the date of the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nIt has no retrospective effect, and if therefore an act was done before the commencement of the new Constitution in contravention of the provisions of any la\\\\' which was a valid law at the - time of the commission of the act, a prosecution for such an act, which was commenced before the Constitution can1e into force can be proceeded with and the accused punished according to that law, even after the commencement of the new Constitution.\n\nOn the expiry of a temporary statute no further proceedings can be taken under it unless the statute itself saved pending proceedings and if an offence had been committed under a tern~ porary statute and proceedings were initiated but the offender had not been prosecuted and punished before the expiry of the statute, then in the absence of a saving clause the pending prose~ cution -cannot be proceededwith after the expiiy of the statute by effiux of time. The effect of Art. 13(1) is quite different from that of the expiry of a temporary statute or the repeal of a statute by a subsequent statute.\n\nA court of law has to gather the spirit of the Constitution from the language of the Constitution.\n\nWhat one may believe or wish to be the spirit of the Constitution cannot prevail if the language of. the Co.nstitution OOe. not support that view.\n\nPer FAzL ALI and MuKHERJEA JJ. (contra)-Though Art. 13(1) has no retrospective operation, and transacclons which arc past and closed and rights which have already vested will remain unt0uchcd, with regard to inchoate matters which were still not determined when. the. Constitution came into force, and as regar.ds proceedings which were pending at the time of the enforcement of the Constitution and not yet prosecuted to a final judgment, a law which has become void under Art 13( 1) of the Constitution cannot be applied.\n\nWhat has to be looked at is the tate of the law at the time when the question arises as to whether a person has committed an offence, and if it is found that the law which made the act an offence has become completely ineffectual and nugatory, then neither can a charne be framed nor can the accused person be convicted.\n\nJudgment of the Bombay High Court affirmed.\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Appeal under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution from a judgment and order dated 12th April, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature _at Bombay (Chagla\n\nC.J., Bavdekar and Shah\n\nJJ.) Case no. IX of 1950.\n\nA. S. R .. Chari, for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad. Attorney General for India (G.\n\nN. Joshi, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1951. Jan. 22. The judgment of Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri J. Das J. and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. was delivered by Das J. Mahajan J. and Fazl Ali J. delivered separate judgments. Mukherjea J. agreed with Fazl Ali J.\n\nEiiluzuan MadhaaM-·\n\n•• Thltateqf\n\nBOfllba,\n\nDAs J.-At all material times the petitioner, who is Du J the appellant before us, was the Secretary of People's Publishing House, Ltd., a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act with its registered office at 190-B, Khedwadi Main Road in Bombay. In September, 1949, a pamphlet entitled \"Railway Mazdovron ke khilaf Nai Zazish\" is alleged to have been published in Bombay by the petitioner as the secretary of that company.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner states that the pamphlet was published as a \"book\" within the meaning of section 1 of the Press and Registration of Books Act (XXV of 1867) and that the provisions of that Act had been duly complied\n\nX•ihautJtJ MadlulvaMIM#\n\n'\" Thi Slat.• of\n\n&mbay.\n\nDas J,\n\nwith.\n\nThe Bombay Government authorities, however, took the view that the pamphlet was a \"news sheet\" within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and that as it had been published without authority reqwreed by section 15(1) of that Act, the petitioner had committed an offence punishable under section 18(1) of the same Act. A prosecution under that Act w:u\n\naccordingly started against the petitioner in the Court decided that question of law.\n\nThis was followed and was registered as Case No. 1102/P of 1949.\n\nDuring the pendency of the proceedings the Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950.\n\nOn March 3, 1950, the petitioner filed a written statement submitting, inter alia, that the definition of \"news sheet\" as given in section 2(6) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and sections 15 and 18 thereof were ultra vires and void in view of article 19(1) (a) read with article 13 and that the hearing of the case should be stayed till the High Court dtcided that question of law. This was followed up by a petition filed in the High Court on March 7, 1950, under article 228 of the Constitution, praying that the record of Case No. 1102/P of 1949 be sent for, that it be declared that sections 15 and 18 read with section 2(6) and (10), in so far as they create liability for restrictive measure for a citizen, are ultra vires of article 19(1) (a) and are, therefore, void and inoperative and that the petitioner be ordered to be acquitted. During the pendency of this petition the Chief Presidency Magistrate on March 23, 1950, framed a charge against the petitioner under section 18 of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931.\n\nThe petition under article 228 was heard on April 12, 1950, by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla C.J. and Bavdekar and Shah JJ.\n\nTwo questions were raised before the Bench, namelythe the\n\n(1) Whether sections 15(1) and 18(1) read with definitions contained in section 2(6) and 2(10) of Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, were\n\ninconsistent with article 19(1) (a) read with clause (2) ot that article? and\n\n(2>' Assuming that they were inconsistent, whether the proceedings commenced under section 18(1) of that Act before the commencement of the Constitution could nevertheless be proceeded with?\n\nThe High Court considered it unnecessary to deal with rr decide the first question and disposed of the. application only on the second question.\n\nThe High Court took the view that the word \"void\" was used in article 13(1) in the sense of \"repealed\" and that conseqn<\"ntly it attracted section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which Act by article 367 was made applicable for the interpretation of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court, therefore, reached the conclusion that proceedings under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, which were pending at the date of the commencement of the Constitution were not affected, even if the Act were inconsistent with the fundamental rights conferred by article 19(1) (a) and as such became void under article 13(1) of the Constitution after January 26, 1950. The High Court accordir.gly answered the second question in the affirmative and dismissed the petitioner's application.\n\nThe petitio:-ier has now come up on appeal before us on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court under article 132(1) of the Constitution.\n\nLearned counsel appearing in support of this appeal urged that the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, was one of the many repressive laws enacted by an alien Government with a view to stifle the liberty of the Indian subjects and particularly of the Indian Press; that with the advent of independence the people of India began to breathe freely and bv the Constitution which they gave unto themselves. they took care to guarantee to themselves the fundamental rights d free citizens of a democratic republic and that article 13(1) of that Constitution brushed aside all vestiges of subordination which the tyranny of the alien rulers had imposed upon them and declared all\n\nEeshavan Madhava Minon\n\nTh1Stal1 ef\n\nB0111ba;1.\n\nDas].\n\n1~51\n\nKukavan Madllava Mcwm\n\nTlwSlal• of\n\nBombay.\n\n])(u J. \"\n\n. \\\n\nlaws inconsistent with the fundamental rights to be . void as if they had never been passed and had never . existed. It was, therefore; against the spirit of the\n\n Constitution, argued the learned counsel, that a free citizen of India should still continue to be persecuted under such a retrograde law which, being inconsistent. with the fundamental rights, must be declared to be void. Learned counsel urged that it 'Yas not necessary '- for him to contend that such inconsistent laws became void ab inito or that all past and closed transactions could be reopened but he contended that on and from January 26, 1950, when the Constitution cam!l into . force such inconsistent laws which became void could . not be lC?Oked at for any purpose\" and far less-could they be utilised for the purpose of framing a charge or punishing a free citizen.. As the void law cannot be · • i:tilised any longer' the pending prosecutions, accord:.\n\nmg to learned counsel, must fall tp the ground.\n\nT<; i permit pending , proceedings under a law which, after the co=encement of the Constitution had become .• void, to proceed further,· after the Constitution has '- taken clffect, is to prolong the efficacy .of the law notwithstanding that it has become void on and from the •date the Constitution came into force and that is against th~ spirit of the Constitution .\n\nAn argument founded on what is claimed to be the. .., . spirit of the Constitution is always attractive, for it has a powerful appeal to sentiment and. emotion; but .. a court of law has to gather the.spirit of the Constitu- .ft.ion from the language of the ConstitutioJ.l. . What one may believe or think to_ be.'the spirit of the Con§titution cannot prevail if the langmtge of the Constitution does not support that view.\n\nArticle 372 (2) gives power to the, President to adapt and modify existing laws by way of repealor amendment. There is noth-. ing to prevent the President, in exercise of the powers conferred on. him by that article, from repealing say_ the whole or any part of the Indian Press (Emergency \"' Powers) Act, 1931. If the President does so, then such repeal will at once attract . section 6 of the General - f '.Clauses Act. In such a situation all prosecutions under\n\nthe Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, which were 1Jending at the date of its repeal by the President would be saved and must be proceeded with notwithstanding the repeal of that Act unless an express provision was otherwise made in the repealing Act. It is therefore clear that the idea of the preservation of past inchoate rights or liabilities and pending proceedings to enforce the same is not foreign or abhorrent to the Constitution of India.\n\nWe are, therefore, unable to accept the contention about the spirit of the Constitution as invoked by the learned counsel in aid of his plea that pending proceedings under a law which has become void cannot be proceeded with. Further, if it is against the spirit of the Constitution to continue the pending prosecutions under such a void law, surely it should be equally repugnant to that spirit that men who have already been convicted under such repressive law before the Constitution of India came into force should continue to rot in jail.\n\nIt is, therefore, quite clear that the court should construe the language or article 13(1) according to the established rules of interpretation and arrive at its true meaning uninfluenced by an assumed spirit of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 13(1) with which we are concerned for the purposes of this application is in these terms :-\n\n\"All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent withthe provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency be void.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that all that this clause declares\n\ni.:; that all existing laws, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. Every statute is prima f tzcic r-rospective unless it is expressly or by necessary\n\nimplicatiom made to have retrospective operation.\n\nThere is no reason why this rule of interpretation\n\nsoukl not be applied for the purpose of interpreting our Constitution.\n\nWe find nothing in the language of article 13(1) which. may be read as indicating an.\n\n195l\n\nIi' eslt{utltll\n\nMa4/lllliaMt11JJ.\n\n'l'f TheStal'ef\n\nBom/loJ• -- DuJ.\n\nJli~ ~MelltR\n\nT lrl Slat. qf\n\n&m6q. - IJ4'j.\n\nintention to give it retrospective operation. On the contrary, the language clearly points the other way.\n\nThe provisions of Part III guarantee what are called fundamental rights.\n\nIndeed, the heading of Part III is \"Fundamental Rights\".\n\nThese rights are given, for the first time. by and under our Constitution. Before the constitution cam~ into force there was no such thing as fundamental right. What article 13(1) provides i> that all existing laws which clash with the exercise of the fundamental rights (which are for the first time created by the Constitution) shall to that extent be void.\n\nAs the fundamental rights became operative only on and from the date of the Constitution the que>tion of the inconsistency of the existing laws with those rights must necessarily arise on and from the date those rights came into being. It must follow, therdore, that article 13(1) can have no retrospective effect but is wholly prospective in its operation. After this first point is noted, it should further be seen that article B ( 1) does not in terms make the existing laws which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights void ab initio or for all purposes. On the contrary, it provides that all existing laws, in so far as they are inconsi.ient with the fundamental rights, shall be void to the extent of their inconsistency. They are not void for all purposes but they are void only to the .:xtcnt they come into conflict with the fundamental rights.\n\nIn other words, on and after the commencement of the Constitution no existing law will be permitted to stand in the way of the exercise of any of the fundamental rights. Therefore, the vcridness of the existing law is limited to the future exercise of the fundamental rights.\n\nArticle 13(1) cannot be read as obliterating the entire operation of the inconsistent laws, c.r to wipe them out altogether from the statute book, for to do so will be to give them retrospective effect which, we have said, they do not possess.\n\nSuch laws exist for all past transactions and for enforcing all rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to articles 249(3), 250, 357, 358\n\nand 369 where express provision has been made for \"lo-aving things done under the laws which expired. It will be noticed that each of those articles was concerned with expiry of temporary statutes.\n\nIt is well known that on the expiry of a temporary statute no further proceedings can be taken under it, unless the statute itsdf saved pending proceedings. If, therefore, an offence had been committed under a temporary statute and the proceedings were initiated but the offender had not been prosecuted and punished before t11e expiry of the statute, then, in the absence of any saving clause, the pending prosecution could not be proceeded with after the expiry of the statute by efflux of time. It was on this principle that express provision was made in the several articles noted abovel for saving things done or omitted to be done uriJer the expiring laws referred to therein.\n\nAs explained above, article 13(1) is entirely prospective in its operation and as it was not intended to have any retrospective effect there was no necessity at all for inserting in that article any such saving clause.\n\nThe effect of article 13 ( 1) is quite different from the effect of the expiry of a temporary statute or the repeal of a statute by a subsequent statute. As already explained; article 13(1) only has the effect of nullifying or rendering all inconsistent existing laws ineffectual or nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect only with respect to the exercise of fundamenta1 rights on and after the date of the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nIt has no retrospectjv.e effect and if, therefore, an act was done before the commencement of the Constitution in contravention of the provisions of any law which, after the Constitution, becomes void with respect to the exercise of any of the fundamental rights, the inconsistent law is not wiped out so far as the past act is concerned for, to say that it is, will be to give the law retrospective effect. There is\n\nn;> fundamental right that a person shall not be prosecuted a.nd punished for an offence committed before the Constitution came into force.\n\nSo far as the past acts\n\n19!il\n\nl{Aslrtuum Mailhava MNton\n\nv. r&.'<itautf\n\nBoriiba,,.\n\nDas].\n\n1951 '\"'hara Mad,,,,,,,, nM- ,...\n\nThtSJott I/\n\nB11169.\n\nFazl Ali. J.\n\nare concerned the law exists, notwithstanding that it :does not exist with respect to the future exercise of fundamenal rights.\n\nWe, therefore, agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court on the second question, although on different grounds. In view of that conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to examine the reasons of the High Court for its conclusion. In our opinion, therefore, this appeal fails, and is dismissed.\n\nFAZL Au J.-I regret that I cannot agree with the view which the majority of my colleagues arc inclined to take in this case.\n\nThe. facts of the case are simple and will bring out the point to be decided. On the 9th December, 1949, the appellant was arrested and a prosecutioh.t was started against him under section 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXIII of 1931) in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay for publishing a pamphlet in Urdu entitled \"Railway Mazdoorun Ke Khilaf Nai Sazish\".\n\nThe prosecution case was that the pamphlet was a news-sheet within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Act and that since it had been published without the authority required by section 15(1) of the Act, the appellant had committed an offence punishable under section 18( 1) of the Act.\n\nWhile the prosecution was pending, the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January. 1950, and thereafter the appellant raised the contention that sections 2(6), 15 and 18 of the Act were void, being inconsistent with article 19( 1) (a) of the Constitution al)d therefore the case against him could not proceed. Having raised this contention, the appellant filed a petition in the High Court at Bombay under article 228 of the Constitution asking the High Court to send for the record of the case .and declare that sections 15 and 18 of the Indtan Press (Emergency Powers) Act read with section 2(6) and (10) thereof -were void and inoperative and the petitioner should be ordered to be acquitted.\n\nThe petition, was heard by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Courr. and the learned Judges constituting the Bench, in\n\ndeciding the point raised, assumed that the provmons of the Act impugned by the appellant were inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, and held that article 13(1) had virtually the effect of repealing such provisions of existing laws as were inconsistent with any of the fundamental rights and that consequently under section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which is made applicable for the interpretation of the Constitution by article 367, pending proceedings were not affected.\n\nThe appellant's petition to the High Court having been dismissed, he preferred this appeal in the Supreme Court.\n\nOne of the points discussed elaborately by the learned counsel appearing for the parties in the course of their arguments was as to what was the effect upon pending proceedings when an Act was repealed or when a temporary Act expired. In Craies on Statute Law, the effect of the expiry of a temporary Act is stated to be as follows :-\n\n\"As a general rule, and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired no proceedings can be taken upon it, and it ceases to have any further effect. Therefore, offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires, and as soon as the Act expires any proceedings which are being taken against a person will ipso facto terrr.inate.\" (4th Ed., pp. 347-348).\n\nThis statement of law by Craies was referred to with approval and adopted by the Federal Court in J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., (Rampur) Ltd., and Others v. King Emperor(1) As to the effect of the repeal of an Act, the following passage from Craies' book seems to sum up the legal position as it obtained in England before the enactment of the Interpretation Act of 1889 :-\n\n\"When an Act of Parliament is repealed,\" said Lord Tenterden in Surtees v. Ellison(2) \"it must be\n\n(I) [1947] FC.R. 141 at 166\n\n(2) (1829) 9 JJ, & C. 152.\n\nKeshal/011 Modhava M.,...\n\n'\" TIY Slatt ef\n\nBomba;1.\n\nFad .A.Ii],\n\n.K'eshavan Madhavan Mmon\n\nThe State ef\n\nBombay.\n\nFa, l Ali].\n\nconsidered (except as to transactions past and closed) as if it had never existed.\n\nThat is the general rule.\" TinJal C.J. states the exception more widely. He says (in Kay v.\n\nGoodwin)(') : \"The effect of repealing a statute is to obliterate it as completely from the records of the Parliament as if lt had never been passed; and it. must be considered as a law that never existed except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law.\" (P. 350).\n\nAgain, Crawford in his book on, \"Statutory Construction\" dealing with the general effect of the repeal of an Act states the law in America to be as follows :- \"A repeal will generally, therefore, divest all inchoate rights which have arisen under the repealed statute, and destroy all accrued causes of action based thereon.\n\nAs a result, such a repeal, without a saving clause, will destroy any proceedings whether not yet begun, or whether pending at the time of the enactment of the repealing Act, and not already prosecuted to a final judgment so as to create a vested right.\" (Pp. 599-600).\n\nIn a footnote relang to the cases which the !craned author cites in support of the above proposition, he adds:-\n\n\"See Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Mumford (Ind.) (2) where the repeal of a statute during the trial prevented a judgment from being rendered. Similarly, there can be no legal conviction for an offence, unless the act be contrary to law at the time it is committed; nor can there be a judgment, unless the law is in force at the time of the indictment and judgment. If the law ceases to operate, by its own limitation or by a repeal at any time before judgment, no judgment can be given. Hence, it is usual in every repealing law to make it operate prospectively only, and to insert a saving clause, preventing the retroactive operation of the repeal and continuing the repealed law in force as to all pending prosecutions, and often as to all TI.olations of the existing law already committed.\"\n\n(I) (1830) 6 Bing. 576.\n\n(2) 197 N.E.826.\n\nThe author then proceeds to quote the following passage from Wall v .. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., Company(1) :-\n\n\"It is well settled that if a statute giving a special remedy is repealed without a saving clause in favour of penJing suits all suits must stop where the repeal finds rhem. If final relief has not been granted before •\n\nthe rept\"al went into effect, it cannot be after. If a case: is appealed, and pending the appeal the law is changed, the appellate court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision was rendered.\n\nThe effect of the repeal is to obliterate the statute: repealed a~ completely as if it had never been passed, and it must be considered as a law which never existed, except for the purposes of those actions or\n\nsuits which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was an existing law. Pending judicial proceedings based upon a statute cannot proceed after it.s repeal. This rule holds true until the proceedings have reached a final judgment in the court of latt\n\nresort, for that court, when it cotnes to announce iu decision, conforms it to the law when existing, and may therefore reverse a judgment which w.a~ correct when pronounced in the subordinate tribtinal from whence the appeal was taken, if it appears that pending the appeal a statute which was necessary to support the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal.\" (P. 601).-\"~\n\n. It is well known that formerly the practice in England used to be to insert in most ofthe repealing statutes a clause saving anything duly done or suffered under the repealed statutes and any pending legal proceeding or investigations. Ultimately, to dispense with the necessity of having to insert a saving clause in almost every repealing Act, section 38(2) was inserted in the Interpretation Act, 1889, which provides that a repeal, unless the contrary intention appears, does not affect the previous operation of the\n\nrepcale~ enactment or anything duly done or suffered under it, and any investigations, legal proceedings or\n\n(I} 125 N. B. 20. 2-2 S. C. India/68\n\nKesltilo•n Marlhaoa Mtnrto\n\ny, Thi Slate of\n\nBombay.\n\nFaz.al Ali J.\n\nK'tslaavart Madhaoa Mtnnn\n\nTiii Stott ef\n\nBombay.\n\nremedies ma)' be instituted, continued or enforced in respect of rights, liabilities and penalties under the repealed Act, as if the repealing Act had not been passed.\n\nCrawford in his book to which I have referred adverts in these words to a similar. difficulty which 1 wa~ experienced in America and to the manner in which\n\nit has been met>-\n\n\"Due to the numerous troublesome problems which constantly arose with the repeal of statutes, as well as to the numerous cases where hardship was caused, statutes have been enacted in several States expressly providing that the repeal of a statute shall not affect any rights, causes of action, penalties, forfeitures, and pending suits, accrued or instituted under the repealed statute.\"\n\nIn India, the earliest attempt that was made to guard against the normal legal effect of a repeal is to be found in sectioh 6 of Act I of 1868.\n\nThis provision was further elaborated by section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897 which is on the same lines as section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act of England. 1he position therefore now in India as well as in England is that a repeal has not the drastic effect which it used to have before the enactment of the Interpretation Act in England or the General Clauses Act in this country.\n\nBut this is due entirely to the fact that an express provision has been made in those enactments to counteract that effect.\n\nHence, in those cases which are not covered by the language of the General Clauses Act, the principle already enunciated will continue to operate.\n\nThe learned Attomey- General had to concede that it was doubtful whether section 6 of the Act is applicable where there is a repeal by implication, and there can be no doubt that the law as to the effect of the expiry of a temporary statute still remains as stated in the books, because section 6 of the General Clauses Act and section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act have no application except where an Act is repealed.\n\nIt should be remembered\n\nthat the soundness of the law which has been consistently applied to cases governed by statutes which have ceased to be in force, by reason of having been repealed or having expired; has never been questioned, and it cannot be brushed aside as if it embodied some archaic or obsolete rule peculiar only to the common law of England. It is the law which has been enunciated by eminent Judges both in England and in America and is based on good sense and reason.\n\nI shall now proceed to consider what would be the correct legal position, when a provision of an existing law is held to be void under article 13(1) of the Constitution.\n\nFrom the earlier proceedings before the Constituent Assembly, it appears that in the original draft of the Constitution, the words \"shall stand abrogated\" were used instead of \"shall be void,\" in article 13(1), and one of the questions directly before the Assembly was what would be the effect of the use of those words upon pending proceedings and anything duly done or suffered under the existing law.\n\nUltimately, the article emcrged in the form rin which it stands at present, and the words \"shall stand abrogated\" were replaced by the words \"shall be void.\" If the words \"stand abrogated\" had been there, it would have been possible to argue, that those words would have the same effect as repeal and would attract section 6 of the General Clauses A.ct, bµt those words\n\nave been abdoned and a Vf!J' strong expression mdeed the: strongest expression which could be used,\n\nhas been used in their place. The meaning of the word \"void\" is stated in Black's Law Dictionary (3rd Edn.) to be as follows:-\n\n\"null and void; ineffectual; nugatory; having no legal force or binding effect; unable in law to support the purpose for which it was intended; nugatory and ineffectual so that nothing can cure it; not valid.\"\n\nA reference to the Constitution will show that the framers thereof have used the word \"repeal\" wherever ncceswy (see articles 252, 254, 357, 372 and 395) They have also used such words as \"invalid\" (sec\n\nKtshaz•an Madhava MenM\n\nThe S1a11qf\n\nBombay.\n\nFazal AliJ.\n\n19il\n\n1:11.U..u ld•i4aa• Jt1u11\n\nT/,. Slal1 .!\n\nB1m•ay.\n\n/1'0<•1 Ali].\n\narticles 245, 255 and 276), \"cease to have effect\" (see articles 358 and 372), \"shall be inoperative\", etc. They have used the word \"void\" only in two articles, these being article 13(1) and article 154, and both these articles deal with cases where a certain law is repugnant to another law to which greater sanctity is attached.\n\nIt further appears that where they wanted to save things done or omitted to be done under the existing law, they have used apt language for the purpose; r, ce for example articles 249, 250, 357, 358 and 369. The thoroughness and precision which the framers of the Constitution have observed in the matters to which referc; nce has been made, disinclines me to read into artide 13(1) a saving provision of the kind which we are asked to read into it. Nor can I be persuaded to hold that treating an Act as void under article 13(1) should have a milder effect upon transactions not past and closed than the repeal of an Act or its expiry in due course of time. In my opinion, the strong sense in which the word \"void\" is normally used and the context in which it has been used are not to be completely ignored. Evidently; the framers of the Constitution did not approve of the laws w.hich are in conflict with .the fundamental rights, and, in my judgment, it would not be giving full effect to their intention to hold that even after the Constitution has come into force, the laws which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights will continue to be treated as good and effectual laws in regard to certain matters, as if the Constitution had never been passed. How such a meaning can be read into the words used in article 13 ( 1), it is difficult for me to understand. There can be no doubt that article 13(1) will have no retrospective operation, and transactions which are past and closed, and rights which have already vested, will remain untouched.\n\nBut with regard to inchoate matters which were still not determined when the Constitution came into force, and as regards proceedings whether not yet begun, or pending at the time of enforcement of the Constitotion and not yet prosecilted to a final judgtPent, the YCI\"'\\' serious question arises as to whether a law which\n\nhas been declared by the Constitution to be completely ineffectual can yet be applied.\n\nOn principle and on good authority, the answer to this question would -appear to me to be that the law having ceased to be effectual can no longer be applied. In R. v. Mawgan (Inhabitants) (1) a presentment as to the non-repair of a highway had been made under 13 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 24, but before the case came on to be tried, the Act was repealed.\n\nIn that case, Lord Denman C.J. said: \"li the question had related merely to the presentment, that no doubt is complete. But dum loquimur, we have lost the power of . giving effect to anything that takes place under that proceeding.\" And Littledale J. added : \"I do not say that what is already done has\n\nbecome bad, but that no more can be done.\" In my opinion, this is precisely the way in which we should deal with the present case.\n\nIt was argued at the Bar that the logical outcome of such a view would be to hold that all the convictions already recorded and all the transactions which are closed, should be reopened, but, in my opinion, to argue on these lines is to overlook what has been the accc:pted law for centuries, namely, that when a law is treated as dead, transactions which are past and closed cannot be revived and actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst the law was operative cannot be reopened.\n\nIn the course of the arguments, a doubt was also raised as to what would be the effect in the case of an appeal pending when the Constitution came into force, from a conviction already recorded before the 26th January, 1950. The law applicable to such a situation is well-known and has been correctly summed up by Crawford in these words : - \"Pending judicial proceedings based upon a statute cannot proceed after its repeal.\n\nThe. rule holds true until the proceedin~ have reached a final judgment in the coun of last resort, for that court; when it comes to announce its decision, conforms it to the law then existing, and may therefore reverse a judgment which was\n\n(I} (1888) 8 A. & E. 496.\n\n1(11/ra.aa Madhavatt Me•••\n\nT Iii Stoll q/\n\nBO#lbay.\n\n/fa.cal Ali].\n\nKeshaoiia Madhaoa Menon\n\n•• The Stale qf\n\nBomba7.\n\nFazal Ali].\n\ncorrect when pronounced 'in the subordinate tribunal frorri whence the appeal was taken, if it appears that pending the . appeal a statute which was necessary to support the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal.\"\n\nI think I should at this stage deal briefly with two points which were raised in the course of the arguments in support of the opposite view. It was urged in the first place that without there being a saving clause to govern article 13(1), it can be so construed as to permit offences committed prior to the 26th January, 1950, to be punished. The argument has been put forward more or less in the following form. The law which is said to be in conflict with the fundamental rights was a good law until the 25th January, and, since article 13(1) is to be construed prospectively, and not retr<>&pectivcly, every la.ct constituting an offence under the old law remains an offence and can be punished even after the 26th January.\n\nIt seems to me that the same argument could . be urged with reference to matters which constituted offences under a repealed Act or a temporary Act which has ex pired. But such an argument has nc; ver succeeded.\n\nThe real question is whether a person who has not been convicted before the Act has ceased to exist or ceased to be effectual can still be prosecuted under such an Ar.t.\n\nThe answer to this question has always been in the negative, and I do not see why a different answer should be given in the case of an Act which has become void, i.e., which has become so ineffectual that it cannot be cured.\n\nThe second argument which also has failed to im- . press me is that if section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not in terms apply, the principle underlying that section should be applied.\n\nThe answer to this argument is that the Legislature in its wisdom has confined that section to a very definite siruation, and, though it was open to it to make the section more comprehen-. sive and general, it has not done so. It is well-known that situations similar to those which arise by reason of the repeal of an Act have arisen in regard to Acts\n\nwhich have expire.cl or Acts which have been declared to be void, and, though such situations must have been well-known to the Legislature, they have not been provided for. In these circumstances, I do not sec how the very clear and definite provision can be enlarged in the manner in which it is attempted to be enlarged.\n\nBesides, I have not come across any c.ase in which the principle underlying section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act or section 6 of the General Clauses Act has been invoked or applied.\n\nIn the present case, we have to look at the state of the law at the time when the question arises as to whether a person has committed any offence. If we find that the law which made the act an offence has become completely ineffectual and nugatory, then neither can a charge be framed nor can the accused person be convicted. In my opinion, if the assumption on which the High Court has proceeded is correct, the appellant is entitled to a declaration that he cannot be convicted for the offence of which he is accused.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The appellant is the secretary of the People's Publishing House, Ltd., Bombay.\n\nIn September, 1949, he published, a pamphlet entitled \"Railway\n\nMazdoorum Ke Khilaf Nai Sazish.\" On the 9th December, 1949, he was arrested and a prosecution was launched against him under section 18 ( 1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXIII of 1931) in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay in respect of this pamphlet, as it had been published without any authority as required under section 16 of the said Act.\n\nOn the 8th March, 1950, an application was made on his behalf in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under article 228 of the Constitution of India for quashing the proceedings started against him and it was contended that sections 16 and 18 of Act XXIII of 1931 were ultra vire; of Part III of the Constitution of India and were thus void and had no effect whatsoever and no prosecution launched under these sections could be proceeded with after the conling into force of the Constitution. The High Court refused this\n\nKeshavan Madhatia Menon\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nFaziil Ali :J\n\nMaiit1Ja11J\n\nEesAavt111 Matiha•a MetW11\n\nThe State ef\n\nBom/Jaj.\n\nM•hai••J\n\napplication and held that the proceedings instirutcd against the appellant before the commencement of the Constitution could not be affected by the provisiom of the Constitution that came into force on the 26th January, 1950.\n\nDissatisfied with this decision, the appellant has preferred the present appeal to this court.\n\nThe sole pi>int to decide in the appeal is whether proceedings instiruted under section 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, XXIII of 1931, before the commencement of the Constitution of India are affected by its provisions. The High Court has answered this question in the negative and, in my opinion, rightly.\n\nI am in respectful agreemenr with the observations of the learned Chief Justice of Bombay that it is di.Iiicult to believe that the Constituent Assembly contemplated that with regard to the laws which it Wal declaring to be void under article 13 all vested rights and all proceedings taken should be disturbed and affected by particular laws ceasing to be in force as a result of inconsistencies with the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens. It is not arguable and was not argued that Part III of the Constitution has any retrospective operation.\n\nThe appellant was not possessed of any fundamental rights in September, 1949, when he published the pamphlet in question and his act clearly came within the mischief of the provisions of section 18 of Act XXIII of 1931 and he thus became liable to the penalties prescribed therein.\n\nIt was, however, contended by Mr. Chari, the learned counsel for the appellant, that the effect of the language employed in article 13( 1) of the Constitution was that the proceedings commenced before the coming into force of the Constirution could not be continued after its commencement under the laws that became inconsistent with its provisions.\n\nFor this proposition he placed reliance on the rule of construction stated in Maxwell on \"Interpretation of Statutes\", p. 404, which is to the following effect :-\n\n\"Where an Act expired or was repealed, it was formerly regarded, in the absence of provision to the contrary, as having never existed, except as to matters and transactions passed and closed. Where, therefore, a penal law was broken, the offender could not be punished under it if it expired before he was convicted, although the prosecution was began while the Act was still in force.\" This rule seems to be based on a statement of Tindal C.J. in Kay v. Goodwin(1). The learned Chief Justice made the following observations :-\n\n\"I take the effect of repealing a statute to be, to obliterate it as completely from the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed; and it must be considered as a law that never existed except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law\".\n\nThis was the rule of the English common law which was applied in cases of statutes which were repealed and under this rule all pending actions and prosecutions could not be proceeded with after the repeal of the law under which they were started. This rule was however changed by the Interpretation Act of 1889, section 38. Therein it was enacted that unless the cont rary intention appears, no repeal is to affect any investigation, legal proceeding, including the initiation of eFiminal proceedings, or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment and any such investigation, legal\n\nproceeding or remedy may be instuted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed.\n\nA similar provision exists in India in section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1868 and 1897.\n\nThe High Court held that the provisions of article 13(1) were analogous to the repeal of a. statute and therefore 3ection 6 of the General Clauses Act had applica tion to the construction of these provisions and that being so, the coming into force of the Constitution. did\n\n;(I) ISO E.R. 1403; (1830) 6 Bing. 576.\n\n1:151\n\nKuluzoaa\n\nMliaH.M1u11\n\nTluStaH 41\"\n\n&ltfJay.\n\nMa/ilfi1111 ].\n\nKesha111•n MadhtJ•a Menon\n\nTM State tf\n\nBomba7.\n\nMahajan].\n\nnot in any way affect the continuance of the proceedings that had been commenced against the appellant under the law thar was in force at the time of the publication of the pamphlet. Mr. Chari contended that the High Court was in error in applying the provisions of wction 6 of the General Clauses Act to the interpreta, tion of article 13( 1) of the Constitution inasmuch as the provisions of this article were not analogous to repeal and did not amount to a repeal of the existing law. He contended that a repeal of the law could only be by the legislature but that under article 13 power had been given to the court to declare any law inconsistent with the Constitution to be void; in other words, the power given was larger in scope and effect than the power of repeal and the effect of the declaration that a certain statute was void as it was repugnant to the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution was to wipe out the statute altogether from the date of the coming into force _of the Constitution and that nothing could be done under that statute with effect from the 26th January, 1950, and therefore the court could not frame a charge under the law that was declared void, or pass a judgment of conviction against a person under a law that had been declared void, Mr. Chari went to the length of saying that a statute which was inconsistent with the Constitution became dead on the coming into force of the Constitution and under a dead statute no action could be taken whatsoever.\n\nHe emphasised his contention by stressing the fact that freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution could not be tainted by keeping alive prosecutions and actions under laws framed by a foreign government which were inconsistent with those freedoms.\n\nIt was said that some of the laws which the Constitution intended to be declared void by the court because of their repugnancy to the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution were those which a foreign government had enacted to keep the people of this country under its domination and that to continue prosecutions under these laws after the coming into force of the Constitution would be wholly contrary and\n\nrepugnant not only to the letter of the Constitution but also to its spirit.\n\nIt was conceded that_ transactions finally dosed under such laws could not be reopened but that prosecutions and actions which were still continuing should be stopped and further action concerning them would become illegal and would be coµtrary to the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.\n\nReference was made to articles 249, 250, 357, 358, and 369 to show that the scheme of the Constitution was that wherever it intended that the proceedings commenced under existing laws which became inoperative o, n the 26th January, 1950, were to continue after that date, apt phraseology had been used to indicate that intention but that in article 13 no such saving words were used and therefore it must be presumed that the Constituent Assembly did not intend that proceedings taken under such laws were to be continued after the 26th January, 1950.\n\nArti, cle 13(1) of the Constitution is in these terms:-\n\n\"All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.\"\n\nThe freedom guaranteed to the citizen which has application to the case of the appellant is in article 19\n\n(1) (a) and this article is in these tms :-\n\n\"All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression.\"\n\nIt is admitted that after the 26th January, 1950, there has been no infringement of the appellant's right of freedom of speech or expression. In September, J949, he did not enjoy either complete freedom of speech or full freedom of exvression.\n\nIt is in . relation to the freedom guaranteed in article 19(1) of the Constitution to the citizen that he provisions of article 13(1) come into play. This article does not declare any law void independently of the existence of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III.\n\nA citizen must be possessed\n\nKeslis•<1n Madhaaa Menon\n\nThe State qf s .... hay,\n\n!tlaAai<1n.J.\n\nKtshaiu Madhat1a Menon v.\n\nTfu Stat• of\n\nBombay.\n\nMahajanj.\n\nof a fundamental right before he can ask the court to declare a law which is inconsistent with it void; but if a citizen is not possessed of the right, he cannot claim this relief. The appellant in the present case was not possessed of any fundamental right on the day that he published the pamphlet and in these circumstances th~ question is whether he can claim protection under the rights guaranteed to him on 26th January, 1950, . for escaping the consequence of his act on any principles of construction of statutes.\n\nAccording to the conten tion of the learned counsel, the principles applicable to repealed statutes are not in terms applicable to such a case, whether they are to be found in the rules of the common law of England or whether they are contained in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act.\n\nThose rules are applicable to cases either of repeal or to cases of a statute dying a natural death by effiux of time.\n\nNone of those however have any application to the construction of statutes framed in languages like the one contained in article 13(1) of the Constitution, Besides the rule of construction which applies to repealed statutes or to temporary statutes our attention was not drawn to any other rule of construction under which a person who commits an offence against an Act during its existence as a law becomes unpunishable on its termination. Both on considerations of convenience and also on grounds of justice and reason I am inclined to think that penalties incurred under a law in force at the time when the act was committed would survive its extinction so that persons who violate its provisions might afterwards be punished. Persons who during the continuance of a statute have obtained rights under it cannot be affected by a declaration that the statute with effect from a certain date will be. come an inoperative statute.\n\nWhen in the case of repeal of a statute, which according to Tindal C.J. obliterates it completely from .the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed, the common law rule hat been abrogated by statute, it is difficult to apply th:it rule on any sentimental grounds at this date to the case qf statutes which are declared void or declared to han\n\nno effect whatsoever after. a certain date only. The cxpre&rion \"void\" has no larger effect on the statute so declared than the word \"repea1\" The expression \"repeal\" according to common law rule obliterates . a starute completely as if. it had never been passed and thus operates retrospectively on past transactions in the ab- 5ence of a saving clause or in the absence of provisions such as are contained in the Interpretation Act, 1889, or in the General Clauses Act, 1897, while a provision in a statute that with effect from a partlcular date an existing law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy has . no such retrospective operation and. cannot affect pending prosecutions or actions taken under such laws. There is in such a situation no necessity of introducing a saving clause and it does not need the aid of a legislative provision of the nature contained in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act. To hold that a prospective declaration that a statalte is void affects pending cases is to give it indirectly retrospective operation and that result is repugnant to the clear phraseology employed in the various articles in Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe contention of the learned Attorney-General that the phraseology employed in article 13( 1) of the Constitution clearly indicates that there was no intention to give any retrospective operation to the provisions _of Part III of the Constitution and that the declaration that laws repugnant to Part III of the Constitution are void only operates from 26th January, 1950, has, in my opinion, force. It seems clear that an existing statute in spite of a declaration by court that it is void remains in force till the 25th January, 1950, and continues to remain on the statute book even after the 26th Janu- .ary, 1950, except that nq effect can be given to any of its provisions which are repugnant to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The effect of articles 13(1) is only prospective and it operates in respect to the freedoms which are infringed by the\n\nState subsequent to the coming into force of the Constitution but the past acts of a person which came within the mischief of the law then in force are not affected\n\n}/l11hao4n MaShava Mtv.\n\nTlllStatuf\n\nBottillay.\n\nMouj•11].\n\nK1shavan Madhava Mttwn\n\n1hiStatt of Bombay.\n\nMahajan).\n\nby Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe reference rnade by Mr. Chari to different articles of the Constitution where saving clauses have been inserted to save pending proceedings or acts is not very helpful inasmuch as where a certain provision has a. retrospective effect, then it is necessary to introduce a saving clause if\n\nthings done in the past have to be saved from the retrospective . effect of the statute; but where the provision is clearly not intended to be retrospective, then the necessity of saving clause does not arise.\n\nThe provisions of the Constitution to which Mr. Chari made reference were of the nature that but for the saving clause the effect of them would be retrospective in character under the accepted canons of construction of statutes.\n\nMr. Chari's argument that it could not have been intended by the Constitution makers that prosecutions started under laws passed by a foreign power and which affect the freedoms guaranteed to the dtiun under the Constitution in Part III were to be continued after the dawn of independence and after India had become a democratic republic to a certain extent seems to me to be plausible; but on further thought I have come to the conclusion that this argument appeals more to the heart than to the head and is not based on any sound principle of construction of statutes.\n\nUnder the accepted canons of construction of statutes, if a law has no retrospective operation of any kind whatsoever, then such a law cannot affect pending prosecutions or actions and the Constitution not being retrospective in its operation could not therefore in any way affect prosecutions started for offences that were complete under the law in force at the time they were committed.\n\nThe cure for such an incongruous state of affairs and the relief for such situation lies with the Government and the legislature and not with the cou.rts. If a case of sedition against an alien government is continued after the coming into force of the Constitution, the court cannot decline to proceed with it and to pass some sentence howsoever lenient, against an accused by pl.acing a construction on the Constitution\n\nwhich gives it retrospective operation, but the government of the republic or its legislature can always by executive or legislative action bring to a close all such distasteful proceedings and not only can it do so in the case of pending prosecutions but it can give relief also to persons who have suffered under laws of sedition against an alien government and are suffering terms of imprisonment in the jails of the Republic. If punis~< ment ror contravention of such laws cannot be given to offenders because decision in their case has been delayed beyond the 26th January, 1950, it will be highly unreasonable not to give relief and to let punishments continue in case of persons, the sentence against whom have already been passed under laws which were solely enacted to maintain the alien rule. Both cases, in my opinion, stand on the same footing and relief in those cases lies not with courts but with the executive government of the Republic.\n\nIf Mr. Chari's argument that on the commencement of the Constitution on 26th January, 1950, all proceedings started under laws that became repugnant and inconsistent with the Constitution were to be stopped was accepted, it would lead to very strange results, and Mr.- Chari had to concede that it would be so. Suppose a person was convicted of the offence of sedition or of an offence under one of the safety Acts, the provisions of which are repugnant to the Constitution, but his appeal was pending in the High Court against his conviction, then, according to the contention of Mr. Chari, the court has no power to hear the appeal because the law being void, no further action could be taken in the matter. The result would be that the Court would not be able to hear an appeal and to give relief to the accused if he had been erroneously convicted. If a court cannot frame a charge or convict a person under a law that is repugnant to the Constitution equally it would not be entitled to continue any proceeding for the benefit of the accused under cover of such a law.\n\nGreat deal of emphasis was laid during the course of the argument on the meaning to be given to the word \"void\" and it \\_'Vas said that this word in its widest\n\nEeshavan Maahava Menon\n\nThe State qf\n\nBombay.\n\nMahajan].\n\n1\"1\n\n/Ou,__ Mu-M• .. • v.\n\nTl•St•ll ef\n\nB,,.ba7.\n\nM•hi•a]•\n\nsense meant that the law declared void was void ab initio, i.e., from the very inception of the law it was bad.\n\nIf that meaning was given to this word, then it would mean that all laws existing on the 26th January, 1950, and which were declared void by article 13( 1) because of their being repugnant to the Constitution were bad when they were passed by the legislature, though at the same time the subject enjoyed no fundamenral right.\n\nIt was sought to give to this word \"void\" the same wide meaning as was given to the word \"repeal\" by Tindal C.J. in the case above mentioned.\n\nWith every respect to the great Judges who administered the common law in England during the earlier period of British history and in all humility I venture to say that the rule evolved by them qua \"repeal\" was of an artificial nature. The dictum of the learned Chief Justice that a repeal of a statute obliter ates it completely from the records of Parliament a1 if it had never been passed is to my mind based on an extended meaning of that expression than its ordinary dictionary sense. When a statute has bcen in operation, say for a period of fifty years, people have suffered penalties wider it or have acquired rights thereunder and the law has been eqforced by courts for such a long period, then to say that when it is repealed it is completely obliterated and that it never had any existence and was never passed by Parliament, is rather saying too much and is ignoring hard real facts and amounts to shutting one's eyes to the actualities of the situation.\n\nIt would be more consonant with reason and justice to say that the law existed and was good at the time when it was passed but that since the date of its repeal it has no longer any effect whatsoever. The Parliament may however say in the repealing statute that it will have retrospective operation and it may also prescribe the limits of its retrospectivity and. to that extent past transactions may be affected by ir.\n\nBecause the rule of common law evolved by the English Judges w; is not incomonance with reason and justice, a legislative practice was evolved under which each repealing statute contained a saving clause under\n\nwhich past transactions were not allowed to be affected by the repeal. Eventually the rule of common law was completely abrogated by the enactment of the Inter- . pretation Act, 1889, In India in tqe year 1868, section 6 of the General Clauses Act enacted what was later on enacted in England in the Interpretation Act and for. over eighty years it is this rule of construc- .tion that has been adopted in this country, the rule being that past transactions, whether closed or inchoate cannot be affected _by the repeal of an earlier statute or by the coming into effect of a new one.\n\nIn my opinion, the rule contained ln the General Clauses Act and in the English Interpretation Act is more in consonance with reason and justice and is also a rule of convenience and should be followed in this country, in preference to the rule evolved by the English Judges in the earlier part of English legal history.\n\nBe that a~ It may, it is unnecessary in this case to have resort either to the rule of comµion law or to th, e General Clauses Act as the language of article 13 itself furnishes a solution to the problem.\n\nReference was also made to the rule of construction applicable to temporary statutes.\n\nIn the case of such statutes, the rule of English law is that after the expiry of the life of the statute no action can be taken under the expired statute unless an intention can be gathered from its provisions to the contrary, but transactions already completed during the period that these statutes had the force of law are not in any way affected.\n\nThat rule seems to be quite logical and is consonant with reason and justice.\n\nWhen the life of a statute is limited and it dies a natural death, then no question. either of its retrospective or of prospective nature arises.\n\nIf the intention of the statute was that anything done under it has to continue, then it will be allowed to continue; otherwise nothing done under it will be continued after its natural death.\n\nAny rule applicable to construction of such a statute has no application to the interpretation of the Constitution of India and the reference to this rule, in my opinion, 1s not relevant for the decision of this matter. 3 -2 SC India/68\n\nKIS!iflllan M•tilllJIJ4 Meiwn\n\nT/11 Sl4lt qf\n\n.Bowhay.\n\nKtshavan Madhava M,;,,;•\n\nTiii Stat< if\n\nBombay.\n\n-MalitdanJ.\n\nReference was also made to the rule of construction laid down by the American courts in respect of statutes declared void because of their being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States of America.\n\nIt is obvious that if a statute has been enacted and is repugnant to the Constitution, the statute is void since its very birth and anything done under it is also void and illegal.\n\nThe courts in America have followed the logical result of this rule and even convictions made under such an unconstitutional statute have been set aside by issuing appropriate writs.\n\nIf a statute is void from its very birth then anything done under it, whether closed, completed, or inchoate, will be wholly illegal and relief in one shape or another has to be given to the person affected by such an unconstitutional law.\n\nThis rule, however, is not applicable in regard to laws which were existing and were constitutional according to the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nOf course, if ap.y law is made after the 25th January, 1950, which is repugnant to the Constitution, then the same rule will have to be followed by courts in India as is followed in America and even convictions made under such an unconstitutional law will have to be set aside by resort to exercise of powers given to this court by the Constitution.\n\nThe only rule of construction applicable to the interpretation of article 13 of the Constitution is the one that concerns the determination of the question whether a statute is intended to have any retrospcc. tive operation.\n\nIf the well-known canons of construction on this point are applied, then it has to be held that article 13 was nnt intended to have any retrospective effect whatever; on the other hand, its language denotes that it recognized the validity of the existing laws up to the date of the commencement of the Constitution and even after its commencement except to the extent of their repugnancy to any provisions of Part III of the Constitution.\n\nOn this construction of article 13 it cannot affect any past transactions, whether closed or inchoate.\n\nReference in thls connection may be made to the provisions of\n\narticle 372(2) of the Constitution. Under this article the President has been given power to adapt existing laws .and to bring them in accordance with the articles of . the Constitution by a process of amendment, repeal or adaptation.\n\nThe President could have repealed the Press (Emergency Powers) Act and brought the law in accordance with the provisions of Part III of the ConstitUtion and if he had used the powers of repeal given to him by this article, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would have been immediately attracted to that situation and the pending prosecution of the appellant would have to be continued in view of those provisions.\n\nIf in that situation the Constitution contemplates the continuance of pending proceedings under existing laws, 1t becomes difficult to place a different interpretation on the phraseology employed in article 13 (1) of the Constitution, than the one that is in accord with that situation.\n\nBy the construction that I have placed on this article that incongruous result is avoided.\n\nIn view of the decision above arrived at it seems unnecessary to pronounce on the alternative argument of the learned Attorney-General to the effect that the expression \"void'', used in article 13 of the Constitution is synonymous with the word \"repeal\" and that it was an apt word used in the context to indicate the same intention.\n\nIt was said that the word \"repeal\" was not used in the article but instead the expression \"void\" was employed therein by the draftsmen in order to include within its ambit cases of custom and usage where such custom and usage were also repugnant to the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.\n\nIt was also urged that by article 13 ( 1) the Constitution in express terms repealed all laws inconsistent with its provisions and that the only power given to the court was to find out which of these laws was inconsistent with the provisions of Part III.\n\nThe declaration that these laws were void or repealed was by the force of the provisions of article 13 itself and did not result from the decision of the courts.\n\nIt is also unnecessary to examine the further argument of the learned\n\nL95J\n\n!Leshatian Madhaoa.M1n#ll\n\nv • The State of Bombaj.\n\nMaliajanJ,\n\nJC'nh•so .\n\nMadh11ut1 Menon v.\n\nTiu Stst1 of\n\nBombay.\n\n19il\n\nAttorney-General that in any case since 1868 in this countrv the rule of construction of statutes is 'the one laid down by section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1868, and that though in express terms that statute may not be applicable to the construction of article 13 ( 1) of the Consmution, yet that rule is a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and has become a rule of common law in this country and should be applied even to cases where statutes become void by reason of their being repugnant to the Constitution.\n\nFor .the reasons given above I see no force in this appeal and I would accordingly dismiss It.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-I am in ·entire agreement with the view taken by my learned brother Faz! Ali J. in his judgment and I concur both in his reasons and his conclusion.\n\nAppeal, dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. G. Gokha/, e.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P.A. Mehlil.\n\nARJUN SINGH alias PURAN\n\nKARTAR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nCivil Procedure Code, 1908, 0. XLl. r. 27-Additional evidence -Improper admission-Finding based on such evidence-Whether conclusive-lnterference-Puniah Custom Act (II of 1920}, s. 7- Suit to contest alienation of non-ancestral pr.operty-MOintai\"- ability.\n\nThe discretion to receive and admit additional evidence iP appeal is not an arbitrarv one but is a judicial one circumcribed bv the limitatiQJll> specified in 0. XL!, r. 27, of Civil Pr<>- ccdure Code, and if additional evic!encc was allowed to be adduced contrarv to the principles gQverning the reception of . such evidence. it would be a case of improper exercise of discretion.\n\nand the additional evidence so brought on the rcOOrd will in be ignored and the case decided as if it was non.existent.", "total_entities": 240, "entities": [{"text": "KESHAVAN MADHAVA MENON", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Keshaoiia Madhaoa Menon", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Smu HAru1.AL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Das J", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 185, "end_char": 209, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 212, "end_char": 233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 241, "end_char": 248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352, "end_char": 358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 840, "end_char": 849, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 872, "end_char": 885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2083, "end_char": 2093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "FAzL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2465, "end_char": 2473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per FAzL ALI and MuKHERJEA JJ. (", "canonical_name": "Faz.al Ali"}}, {"text": "Art. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 13( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2935, "end_char": 2945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3390, "end_char": 3401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature _at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3479, "end_char": 3514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) of the Constitution from a judgment and order dated 12th April, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature _at Bombay (Chagla\n\nC.J., Bavdekar and Shah\n\nJJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bavdekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3530, "end_char": 3538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) of the Constitution from a judgment and order dated 12th April, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature _at Bombay (Chagla\n\nC.J., Bavdekar and Shah\n\nJJ.)"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3543, "end_char": 3547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132(1) of the Constitution from a judgment and order dated 12th April, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature _at Bombay (Chagla\n\nC.J., Bavdekar and Shah\n\nJJ.)"}}, {"text": "A. S. R .. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R .. Chari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3614, "end_char": 3628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad."}}, {"text": "G.\n\nN. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3658, "end_char": 3670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attorney General for India (G.\n\nN. Joshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri J. Das J. and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. was delivered by Das J. Mahajan J. and Fazl Ali J. delivered separate judgments."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3746, "end_char": 3762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri J. Das J. and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. was delivered by Das J. Mahajan J. and Fazl Ali J. delivered separate judgments.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3777, "end_char": 3797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri J. Das J. and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. was delivered by Das J. Mahajan J. and Fazl Ali J. delivered separate judgments.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Das J. Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3818, "end_char": 3832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri J. Das J. and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. was delivered by Das J. Mahajan J. and Fazl Ali J. delivered separate judgments."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3840, "end_char": 3848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri J. Das J. and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. was delivered by Das J. Mahajan J. and Fazl Ali J. delivered separate judgments.", "canonical_name": "Faz.al Ali"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3882, "end_char": 3891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J. agreed with Fazl Ali J.\n\nEiiluzuan MadhaaM-·\n\n•• Thltateqf\n\nBOfllba,\n\nDAs J.-At all material times the petitioner, who is Du J the appellant before us, was the Secretary of People's Publishing House, Ltd., a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act with its registered office at 190-B, Khedwadi Main Road in Bombay.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Eiiluzuan MadhaaM-", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3920, "end_char": 3938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J. agreed with Fazl Ali J.\n\nEiiluzuan MadhaaM-·\n\n•• Thltateqf\n\nBOfllba,\n\nDAs J.-At all material times the petitioner, who is Du J the appellant before us, was the Secretary of People's Publishing House, Ltd., a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act with its registered office at 190-B, Khedwadi Main Road in Bombay."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4141, "end_char": 4154, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4214, "end_char": 4220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J. agreed with Fazl Ali J.\n\nEiiluzuan MadhaaM-·\n\n•• Thltateqf\n\nBOfllba,\n\nDAs J.-At all material times the petitioner, who is Du J the appellant before us, was the Secretary of People's Publishing House, Ltd., a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act with its registered office at 190-B, Khedwadi Main Road in Bombay."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Press and Registration of Books Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4525, "end_char": 4560, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Das J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4686, "end_char": 4691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J,\n\nwith.", "canonical_name": "Das J"}}, {"text": "section 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4818, "end_char": 4830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4945, "end_char": 4958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5029, "end_char": 5042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5290, "end_char": 5311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5331, "end_char": 5347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the proceedings the Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "March 3, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5353, "end_char": 5366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 3, 1950, the petitioner filed a written statement submitting, inter alia, that the definition of \"news sheet\" as given in section 2(6) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and sections 15 and 18 thereof were ultra vires and void in view of article 19(1) (a) read with article 13 and that the hearing of the case should be stayed till the High Court dtcided that question of law."}}, {"text": "section 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5481, "end_char": 5493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5612, "end_char": 5625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5640, "end_char": 5650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed up by a petition filed in the High Court on March 7, 1950, under article 228 of the Constitution, praying that the record of Case No."}}, {"text": "article 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5834, "end_char": 5845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5956, "end_char": 5974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 5997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6101, "end_char": 6114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6253, "end_char": 6280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of this petition the Chief Presidency Magistrate on March 23, 1950, framed a charge against the petitioner under section 18 of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931."}}, {"text": "March 23, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6284, "end_char": 6298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of this petition the Chief Presidency Magistrate on March 23, 1950, framed a charge against the petitioner under section 18 of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6345, "end_char": 6355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6419, "end_char": 6430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 12, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition under article 228 was heard on April 12, 1950, by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla C.J. and Bavdekar and Shah JJ."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6478, "end_char": 6495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition under article 228 was heard on April 12, 1950, by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla C.J. and Bavdekar and Shah JJ."}}, {"text": "Chagla C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition under article 228 was heard on April 12, 1950, by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla C.J. and Bavdekar and Shah JJ."}}, {"text": "sections 15(1) and 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6620, "end_char": 6644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(6) and 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6680, "end_char": 6702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6773, "end_char": 6786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6917, "end_char": 6930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7234, "end_char": 7247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7311, "end_char": 7320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7328, "end_char": 7347, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7362, "end_char": 7373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7724, "end_char": 7737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7772, "end_char": 7785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8069, "end_char": 8083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8173, "end_char": 8178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal urged that the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, was one of the many repressive laws enacted by an alien Government with a view to stifle the liberty of the Indian subjects and particularly of the Indian Press; that with the advent of independence the people of India began to breathe freely and bv the Constitution which they gave unto themselves."}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8631, "end_char": 8644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Eeshavan Madhava Minon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8788, "end_char": 8810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "they took care to guarantee to themselves the fundamental rights d free citizens of a democratic republic and that article 13(1) of that Constitution brushed aside all vestiges of subordination which the tyranny of the alien rulers had imposed upon them and declared all\n\nEeshavan Madhava Minon\n\nTh1Stal1 ef\n\nB0111ba;1.", "canonical_name": "Keshaoiia Madhaoa Menon"}}, {"text": "Kukavan Madllava Mcwm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8850, "end_char": 8871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1~51\n\nKukavan Madllava Mcwm\n\nTlwSlal• of\n\nBombay."}}, {"text": "Article 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10688, "end_char": 10699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11066, "end_char": 11075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11588, "end_char": 11609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12086, "end_char": 12107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12234, "end_char": 12247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12388, "end_char": 12401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13212, "end_char": 13225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13792, "end_char": 13805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14254, "end_char": 14267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15125, "end_char": 15138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 249(3), 250, 357, 358\n\nand 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15563, "end_char": 15602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16498, "end_char": 16511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16712, "end_char": 16722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16874, "end_char": 16887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Boriiba", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17792, "end_char": 17799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the past acts\n\n19!il\n\nl{Aslrtuum Mailhava MNton\n\nv. r&.'<itautf\n\nBoriiba,,."}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18322, "end_char": 18329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL Au J.-I regret that I cannot agree with the view which the majority of my colleagues arc inclined to take in this case.", "canonical_name": "Faz.al Ali"}}, {"text": "9th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18533, "end_char": 18551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th December, 1949, the appellant was arrested and a prosecutioh.t was started against him under section 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXIII of 1931) in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay for publishing a pamphlet in Urdu entitled \"Railway Mazdoorun Ke Khilaf Nai Sazish\"."}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18630, "end_char": 18643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18723, "end_char": 18760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th December, 1949, the appellant was arrested and a prosecutioh.t was started against him under section 18(1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXIII of 1931) in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay for publishing a pamphlet in Urdu entitled \"Railway Mazdoorun Ke Khilaf Nai Sazish\"."}}, {"text": "section 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18929, "end_char": 18941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19024, "end_char": 19037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19106, "end_char": 19120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19173, "end_char": 19194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th January. 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19218, "end_char": 19236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the prosecution was pending, the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January."}}, {"text": "sections 2(6), 15 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19294, "end_char": 19318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19365, "end_char": 19379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19528, "end_char": 19548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having raised this contention, the appellant filed a petition in the High Court at Bombay under article 228 of the Constitution asking the High Court to send for the record of the case .and declare that sections 15 and 18 of the Indtan Press (Emergency Powers) Act read with section 2(6) and (10) thereof -were void and inoperative and the petitioner should be ordered to be acquitted."}}, {"text": "article 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19555, "end_char": 19566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19662, "end_char": 19680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19734, "end_char": 19746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Courr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19893, "end_char": 19910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition, was heard by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Courr."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20112, "end_char": 20128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": 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"ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's petition to the High Court having been dismissed, he preferred this appeal in the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Craies", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21425, "end_char": 21431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This statement of law by Craies was referred to with approval and adopted by the Federal Court in J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., (Rampur) Ltd., and Others v. King Emperor(1) As to the effect of the repeal of an Act, the following passage from Craies' book seems to sum up the legal position as it obtained in England before the enactment of the Interpretation Act of 1889 :-\n\n\"When an Act of Parliament is repealed,\" said Lord Tenterden in Surtees v. Ellison(2) \"it must be\n\n(I) [1947] FC.R. 141 at 166\n\n(2) (1829) 9 JJ, & C. 152."}}, {"text": "England before the enactment of the Interpretation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21713, "end_char": 21767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tenterden", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21831, "end_char": 21840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This statement of law by Craies was referred to with approval and adopted by the Federal Court in J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., (Rampur) Ltd., and Others v. King Emperor(1) As to the effect of the repeal of an Act, the following passage from Craies' book seems to sum up the legal position as it obtained in England before the enactment of the Interpretation Act of 1889 :-\n\n\"When an Act of Parliament is repealed,\" said Lord Tenterden in Surtees v. 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"end_char": 33416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And Littledale J. added : \"I do not say that what is already done has\n\nbecome bad, but that no more can be done.\""}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34313, "end_char": 34331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of the arguments, a doubt was also raised as to what would be the effect in the case of an appeal pending when the Constitution came into force, from a conviction already recorded before the 26th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "Keshaoiia Madhaoa Menon", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34873, "end_char": 34896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Keshaoiia Madhaoa Menon\n\n•• The Stale qf\n\nBomba7.", "canonical_name": "Keshaoiia Madhaoa Menon"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34924, "end_char": 34933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazal Ali].", "canonical_name": "Faz.al Ali"}}, {"text": "article 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41215, "end_char": 41222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this proposition he placed reliance on the rule of construction stated in Maxwell on \"Interpretation of Statutes\", p. 404, which is to the following effect :-\n\n\"Where an Act expired or was repealed, it was formerly regarded, in the absence of provision to the contrary, as having never existed, except as to matters and transactions passed and closed."}}, {"text": "Tindal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41734, "end_char": 41740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule seems to be based on a statement of Tindal C.J. in Kay v. 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"1:151\n\nKuluzoaa\n\nMliaH.M1u11\n\nTluStaH 41\"\n\n&ltfJay."}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43471, "end_char": 43476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kesha111•n MadhtJ•a Menon\n\nTM State tf\n\nBomba7.", "canonical_name": "State"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43490, "end_char": 43497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan].", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43783, "end_char": 43802, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 13( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43830, "end_char": 43844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44075, "end_char": 44085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of 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{"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England or whether they are contained in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48518, "end_char": 48608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48852, "end_char": 48865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "England or whether they are contained in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act", "statute": "England or whether they are contained in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Interpretation Act, 1889", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50434, "end_char": 50458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50470, "end_char": 50495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50928, "end_char": 50947, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 13( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51284, "end_char": 51298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "25th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51721, "end_char": 51739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems clear that an existing statute in spite of a declaration by court that it is void remains in force till the 25th January, 1950, and continues to remain on the statute book even after the 26th Janu- .ary, 1950, except that nq effect can be given to any of its provisions which are repugnant to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution."}}, {"text": "26th Janu- .ary, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51800, "end_char": 51821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems clear that an existing statute in spite of a declaration by court that it is void remains in force till the 25th January, 1950, and continues to remain on the statute book even after the 26th Janu- .ary, 1950, except that nq effect can be given to any of its provisions which are repugnant to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution."}}, {"text": "articles 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51975, "end_char": 51989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K1shavan Madhava Mttwn", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52307, "end_char": 52329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K1shavan Madhava Mttwn\n\n1hiStatt of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Eeshavan Maahava Menon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 56707, "end_char": 56729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Great deal of emphasis was laid during the course of the argument on the meaning to be given to the word \"void\" and it \\_'Vas said that this word in its widest\n\nEeshavan Maahava Menon\n\nThe State qf\n\nBombay.", "canonical_name": "Keshaoiia Madhaoa Menon"}}, {"text": "article 13( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57079, "end_char": 57093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59220, "end_char": 59229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59237, "end_char": 59256, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59636, "end_char": 59655, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60028, "end_char": 60047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60067, "end_char": 60077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61084, "end_char": 61105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "KIS!iflllan M•tilllJIJ4 Meiwn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61220, "end_char": 61249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 -2 SC India/68\n\nKIS!iflllan M•tilllJIJ4 Meiwn\n\nT/11 Sl4lt qf\n\n.Bowhay."}}, {"text": "Ktshavan Madhava M,;,,;•", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 61276, "end_char": 61300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ktshavan Madhava M,;,,;•\n\nTiii Stat< if\n\nBombay."}}, {"text": "MalitdanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61327, "end_char": 61337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MalitdanJ.\n\nReference was also made to the rule of construction laid down by the American courts in respect of statutes declared void because of their being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States of America."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 61521, "end_char": 61545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MalitdanJ.\n\nReference was also made to the rule of construction laid down by the American courts in respect of statutes declared void because of their being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States of America."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62272, "end_char": 62301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62721, "end_char": 62731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62977, "end_char": 62987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63345, "end_char": 63355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63488, "end_char": 63502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63969, "end_char": 63988, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64346, "end_char": 64356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64713, "end_char": 64723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65186, "end_char": 65196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65509, "end_char": 65519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Leshatian Madhaoa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 65658, "end_char": 65675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Leshatian Madhaoa."}}, {"text": "State of Bombaj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65692, "end_char": 65707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M1nll\n\nv • The State of Bombaj.", "canonical_name": "State of Bombay"}}, {"text": "MaliajanJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65710, "end_char": 65719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MaliajanJ,\n\nJC'nh•so ."}}, {"text": "19il", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65777, "end_char": 65781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19il\n\nAttorney-General that in any case since 1868 in this countrv the rule of construction of statutes is 'the one laid down by section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1868, and that though in express terms that statute may not be applicable to the construction of article 13 ( 1) of the Consmution, yet that rule is a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and has become a rule of common law in this country and should be applied even to cases where statutes become void by reason of their being repugnant to the Constitution."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65906, "end_char": 65915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1868", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65923, "end_char": 65948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66041, "end_char": 66051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1868", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1868"}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66488, "end_char": 66496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-I am in ·entire agreement with the view taken by my learned brother Faz!"}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokha/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 66616, "end_char": 66628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P. G. Gokha/, e.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P.A. Mehlil."}}, {"text": "P.A. Mehlil", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 66661, "end_char": 66672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P. G. Gokha/, e.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P.A. Mehlil."}}, {"text": "ARJUN SINGH alias PURAN\n\nKARTAR SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 66675, "end_char": 66712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ARJUN SINGH alias PURAN\n\nKARTAR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nCivil Procedure Code, 1908, 0."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66757, "end_char": 66777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ARJUN SINGH alias PURAN\n\nKARTAR SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J\n\nCivil Procedure Code, 1908, 0.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66784, "end_char": 66810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66961, "end_char": 66965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Additional evidence -Improper admission-Finding based on such evidence-Whether conclusive-lnterference-Puniah Custom Act", "statute": "Additional evidence -Improper admission-Finding based on such evidence-Whether conclusive-lnterference-Puniah Custom Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_266_276_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "ll\n\nAri• S>atli v, x., •• , $in(jh\n\nONIQl!wr1.\n\nMorell 2.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951)\n\nthat the common ancestor owned the land and that his sons got it from him ht inheritance in equal shares.\n\nThe District Judge was obviously wrong when he decreed the plaintiff's suit even with reference to the lands in Kadduwal conceded to be non-ancestral and the land in Khasra No. 2408 measuring 4 bighas and 16 biswas, which was not in the possession of the two sons Jodha Singh and Jai Singh.\n\nHe was equally wrong in holding tHat the customary law which governed the parties did not permit the owner to will away ':my portion of the property, whether ancestral or self-acquired ; this is contrary to section 7 of Punjab Act II of 1920, which is in these terms :\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 5, Pqniab Laws Act, . 1872, no person shall contest any alienation of non-ancestral immovable property or any appointment of an heir to such property on the ground that such alienation or appointment is contrary to custom.\"\n\nNo other point arises in this appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs. in all the courts.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondents : S. P. -Verma.\n\nFATMA HAJI ALI MOHAMMAD HAJI\n\nAND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY. [SAmo FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.] Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, s. 48-Rules under the Code, r. 92-Agricultural land used for other purposes-CoUectOf\"• d•IY to alter assessment-Mere confirmation of Co/lecwr's tmltr\n\nrt'fusing to re-assess-Whether amounts to direction \"' Ml otltnwist!-Rig/, t to re4Jsess•nt.\n\nllule 92 of the rulcis issued under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, provided that when land assessed for purposes of agriculture only is subsequently used for any purpose unconnected with agriculture, the assessment upon the land so used shall unless otherwise directed by the Government be altered under s. 48 (2) by the Collector in accordance with rr. 81 to 87 : Held, that as the rule imposes an imperative duty on the Collector to alter the assessment, the power which has been given to the governmeni to give directions to the Collector . not to act in accordance with the imperative pr<.>visions of the rule has to be exercised in clear and unambiguous terms as it affects civil rights of the persons concerncc.i and the decision that the power has been exercised must be notified in the usual manner.\n\nWhere the Government .did not pass any resolution or issue any directions to that effect but merely ccinfirmed on appeal an order of the C<.>llector rejecting an application to assess nonagricultural assessment on agricultural lands which had been used for building purposes : Held, that the confirmation of the Collector's order by the Government did not amount to a direction te act otherwise within the mcaninJi: of r. 92 and the applicant was entitled to have the assessment on the lands altered under s. 48 (2) in accordance with fr. 81 to 87 as laid down in r. 92.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuR1so1cnoN Appeal (Civil Appeal No. 28 of 1950) from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judkature at Bombay dated. 19th March, 1945, in Appeals Nos. 68 and 190 of 1942.\n\nH. D. Banaji (V. R. Desai, with him) for the appellants.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1951. February 5.\n\nThe judgment o£ the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal from a judJtment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay modifying the decree of the trial court and decreeing partially the plaintiff's suit.\n\nThe appellants are the legal representatives of the original plaintiff Haii Ali Mohamed Haji Cassum.\n\nThe State of Bombay is the respondent. ·\n\nThe facts giving rise to this controversy, brieflv stated, are as follows :-\n\n19!H -·- Fa1ma H4it .lfli Moh-'\n\nand Others\n\nTh• 8141# of\n\nBtm6izy.\n\nMahaja~ j.\n\nFatmaHaj;\n\nAliMoham•d\n\n.tmd Othtrt\n\nTh1StaJ1 qf\n\nBornllaJ\n\nMahoj .. J.\n\nVillage Dahisar originally formed part of the Malad Estate comprising in all eight villages. The said estate was conveyed by the East India Company to two Dady brothers for valuable consideration by a deed of indenture dated the 25th January, 1819.\n\nBy that conveyance all the lands in the eight villages were conveyed absolutely to the said purchasers and it was covenanted by the Company that the purchasers, their heirs and assigns shall peaceably and quietly enjoy the said villages and receive and take the rents and profits thereof without any hindrance or interruption from the said Company.\n\nBy a sale deed dated the 13th December, 1900, Haji Ca.ssum, father of the plaintiff, purchased the village of Dahisar from its proprietors for a price of Rs. 1,30,000 and after his death the plaintiff became the proprietor thereof and as such received rents and assessment from the tenants and holders of the lands in the village according to the rights prevailing der the . survey settlement which. hadtaken place in the village about the year 1864-65.\n\nIn the year 1879 the . Bombay Land. Revenue Code was enacted.\n\nSection 48 of the Code is in these terms :-\n\n\"48. ( 1) The land revenue leviable on any land under the provisions of this Act shall be assessed, or shall be deemed to have been assessed, as the case may be, with reference to the , use of the land- ( a) .for the , purpose of agriculture,\n\n(b) for the purpose of building, and ( c) for a purpose other th'an agriculture or building.\n\n(2) Where land assessed for use for any purpose is used for any other purpose, the assessment fixd under the provisions of this Act upon such land shall, notwithstanding that the term for which such assessment may have been fixed has not expired, be liable to be altered and fixed at a different rate by such authority and subject to such rules as the Provincial Government may prescribe in this behalf .............. \"\n\nS; Ci:.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 269\n\nAfter the Act came . into force, the Government drafted rules under the provisions of section 214 for promulgation.\n\nThe inamdars represented to the Government that the rules should be so framed as not to prejudice their rights under the conveyances executed by the Company in their favour. . The draft rules were promulgated by a notification issued on the 5th June, 1907.\n\nOn that date, the Government adopted a resolution ordering that the rules be promulgated and also giving an assurance to the inamdars to the following effect :-\n\n\"Government will, however, be prepared to amend or abrogate these rules if they are found to be detrimental in any material respects to the interests of the inamdars.\"\n\nRule 92 is one of the rules promulgated under the provisions of the Act and it runs thus :-\n\n\"When land assessed for purposes of agriculture only is subsequently used for any purpose unconnected with agriculture the assessment upon the land so used shall, unless otherwise directed by Government, be altered under sub-section (2) of section 48 by the collector in accordance with rules 81 to 87 inclu, sive.\" ·\n\nOn the 25th July, 1923, the plaintiff requested the Commissioner of Bombay, Suburban District, for a revision of the survey of Dahisar village.\n\nHe executed an agreement under the provisions of section 216 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and made a formal application in that behalf as required by the Code and the rules made thereunder.\n\nThe Commissioner by his letter dated the 14th March, 1925, authorised the . extension of the provisions of chapters 8 and 9 of the Land Revenue Code to the village in question.\n\nThe plaintiff also deposited the necessary expenses required for the revision of the survey.\n\nThe revision was made by. the Superintendent of the Land Records who submitted his report to the Commissioner on the 15th December, 1926.\n\nThis report was sanctioned by Government.\n\nThe .order sanctioning the revised\n\nurvey was communicated to the plaintiff on the 23rd\n\nFattna Hafi\n\nA.Ii Moluzmltl\n\nair40tlin1\n\nv. .Tiu Stall qf .\n\nBombay, r- Mahqjanj.\n\n/t...,.H'lfi AliM•'-.•d au ()ths\n\nV, Tiu Stal• qf\n\n. BooU<y. - MaltajaoJ.\n\nDecember, 1927.\n\nUnder the revised survey the assessment of Rs. 4,217 on the village lands was increased to Rs. 6,057-3-2, and the plaintiff from that date started recovering the increased assessment from the tenants of the lands in the village .\n\nAt the time of the revision of the survey it was found that nine plots of land comprised in eleven field numbers which were formerly agricultural had been built . upon and these were being used for non-agricultural purposes.\n\nThe survey offi<:cr formed them into a separate group and howed them as kharaba and no assessment, either agricultural ot non-agricultural, was levied on these nine plots and the plaintiff could not therefore recover any assessment in respect of these plots after 1926.\n\nOn the 30th Apri~ 1934, he requested the Collector to assess non-agricultural assessment on these plots.\n\nThis request was refused by the Collector on the 17th July, 1935, in these terms :- . \"With reference to your letter dated 30-4-1934, I have the honour to state that I regret your request\n\nannot be granted.\" ·\n\nIt has to be observed that this refusal was in con~ µ-avention of the provisions of rule 92 which imposes on the Collector a duty to make alteration in the assessment, unless he has been directed to the contrary by Government.\n\nIt was not denied that by the 17th July, 1935, no such direction had been given to the Collector by Government.\n\nIf the Collector had done his duty as enjoined by rule 92, thjs lengthy and 'Unnecessary litigation might well have been avoided.\n\nAgainst the order <>f the Collector the plaintiff appealed to the Commissioner.\n\nIn hJs appeal he pointed out that certain additional lands in the village had been converted to non-agricultural uses subsequent to the revision of the survey in 1926.\n\nThe Commissioner declined to interfere.\n\nThis iiiformation was conveyed by the Collector to the counsel for the plaintiff on the 22nd May, 1937.\n\nAgainst tlie Commissioner's decision the plaintifi appealed to the Governor in Council and\n\non the 20th December, 1937, he received a copy of the follomng communication from Government to the Commissioner :-\n\n\"The undersigned presents compliments to the Commissioner, Northern Division, and with reference to his letter, No. L. N. D. 3124, dated 20th April; 1936, on the subject noted above, is directed to invite his attention, to the orders issued in Government Resolution, No. 5235/33, dated 8th March, 1937, and to state that Government confirm the action of the Collector, Bombay Suburban District, in refusing the Khot' s request for the levy of nonagricultural assessment in the village of Dahisar.\n\nBy order of the Governor in Council, for Under Secretary to the Government of Bombay.\"\n\nIn order to find out whether there was any resolution of the Government as mentioned in the above communication, during the pendency of the suit the plaintiff issued the following interrogatory to the Government of the State of Bombay :-\n\n\"When was the decision, not to assess the lands mentioned in Schedule II of the plaint and other lands\n\nunder rule 92, referred to in para. 8 of their written statement arrived at by the Government ?\n\nProduce a copy of the said decision which may have been embodied in a Government resolution along with the opinion of the Government officers with which Government may have concurred.\"\n\nThe answer given on behalf of the State Government\n\n~. to this question was as follows :-\n\n\" (8) Government Memorandum, Revenue Department, No. 5235-B/33, dated the 8th March, 1937, confirmed the Collector's action in refusing the proprietor's request for the levy of non-agricultural assessment.\"\n\nThis answer indicates that the Government acting under rule 92, neither adopted any resolution nor issued any notification giving any directions to the Collector contrary to the provisions contained in that 4-l! S. C. India/68\n\nFtitmaHtiji Ali Mohamed\n\nand Others v.\n\nThe Sta\"qf\n\nBombay.\n\nMahajan].\n\nFaz,,.aHaji\n\nAli Mohamed\n\n•nd 01/wrr v.\n\nThiS<ate ef\n\nBombay.\n\nAfa/laja•J.\n\nrule.\n\nAll that it did was to confirm the Collectcx'~ order rejecting the request of the plaintiff for making the assessment of non-agricultural lands in the village.\n\nDuring the interval between 1927-37 a large number of plots of land mentioned in schedule II were put to non-agricultural uses by the tenants in possession of them and a . number of buildings were constructed thereupon.\n\nThe plaintiff having failed in persuading the Government to make an assessment under rule 92 of such lands, after service of notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, instituted the present suit,\n\n(a) for a declaration that he was entitled to have nonagricultural assessment made on all lands in the village of Dahisar which were used or which may thereafter be brought into use for purposes other than agricultural and (b) for an order that the Collector of Bombay, Suburban District be directed to determine the amount of non-agricultural assessment on the lands mentioned in schedules I and II of the plaint and to levy the same under clause 2 of rule 96 and pay it to the plaintiff, or in the alternative, to dire.ct the defendant to issue a commission to the plaintiff under section 88 of the Land Revenue Code. Schedule I gave details of the nine plots of land that had been converted into non-agricultural use before the survey of 1926, while schedule II gave details of those lands which since 1926 up to the date of the suit had been converted to such use.\n\nThe plaintiff also claimed damages to the extent of Rs. 120 as compensation fo, r loss of agricultural assessment for six years in respect of lands mentioned in schedule I and he claimed similar dama,. ges to the extent of Rs. 300 for loss of non-agricultural assessment in respect of the other lands.\n\nHe also claimed future damages and costs.\n\nThe suit was resisted by the State Government .on a number of grounds.\n\nIt was contended that it was barred under section 4 ( c) of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act and under article 14 of the Indian Limitation Act.\n\nOn the merits it was pleaded that the action of the wrvey officer and the Collector in refusing to levy non-agricultural :issessment on lands contained in the\n\ntwo schedules was lawful and proper and t; hat the dvil court could not question the discretion of the Government in such matters.\n\nThe trial Judge negatived all the technical objections raised by the defendant and on the merits held that the Collector's action in refusing to levy nonagricultural assessment on the lands in question was wrongful.\n\nHe, therefore, granted the declaration prayed for.\n\nHe, however, refused to give further relief to the plaintiff and disallowed the prayer for a . direction for levying non-agricultural assessment on the lands given in the two schedules and for paying it to the plaintllf.\n\nHe observed that the Government would be well advised if it levied such assessment and paid it to the plaintiff.\n\nTwo appeals were taken to the High Court against the decree of the trial Judge. That Court modified this decree and granted a declaration to the plaintiff that he was entitled to receive non-agricultural asses~ ment on all lands which are and which may hereafter be used for non-agricultural purposes.\n\nIt ordered the defendant to levy such altered assessment on the lal}ds mentioned in schedule I and decreed consequential damages to the plaintiff in respect to these lands.\n\nAs regards the lands in schedule II, the plaintiff's suit for a direction to assess and levy non-agricultural assessment on them was dismissed.\n\nThe court drew a distinction between lands that had been converted to non-agricultural use before the survey of 1926 and\n\nthos~ which had since then been converted to such use.\n\nAs regards the former, it was held that the survey officer had erroneously declined to make non-agricultural assessment on those lands and his action was ultra vires.\n\nRelief was given to the plaintiff regarding those lands as prayed for.\n\nAs regards the latter it was held that it was within the discretion of the Government to order an alteration of the assessment on such lands and this discretion could not be questioned in a court of law.\n\nThe plaintiff being dissatis.- fied with this part of the decision made application for leave. to appeal to the Privy Council on the 15th\n\nFattna Haft .Ali Mohamtd\n\na11d Othtr3\n\nThe Statt ef\n\nBomba,;.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nP'atma Hji AliM1Mmed\n\ncm/ Others\n\nThe State -.f\n\nBtnnba)•.\n\nMahajan].\n\nSeptember, 1945.\n\nDuring the pendency ot the application the plaintiff died and his heirs and executors were impleaded as his legal representatives.\n\nA certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was granted on the 10th February; 1947, and the appeal preferred under the certificate is now before us for decision.\n\nThere is no conrtoversy in this appeal as regards the reliefs that have been given to the plaintiff by the High Court.\n\nThe appeal concerns the further relief refused to the plaintiff in respect to the lands mentioned in schedule II.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellant that under the terms of the conveyance dated 25th January, 1819, and of the covenants contained therein it was not open to the Government or the Collector to refuse the alteration of the assessment claimed by the plaintiff and that the Government could not give any direction under rule 92 which would be contrary to these covenants and assurances.\n\nIt was said that the Government was bound to use its power to levy assessment as trustee for the transferee and that the exercise of this power could not be arbitrarily refused by it.\n\nIt was urged that the Government Resolution dated 5th June, 1907, clearly indicated that the rules framed under the Land Revenue Code were not intended to affect adversely the owners of alienated lands and the Collector was bound to make an assessment as required by the plaintiff.\n\nLastly, it was argued that as a matter of fact Government never exercised its power under rule 92 and never .gave a direction to the Collector to a contrary effect and that the mere affirmatfon of the erroneous order of the Collector by Government did not amount to a direction contemplated by the provisiom of rule 92.\n\nHaving considered this case in all its aspects, we have reached the decision that the High Court's decision in so far as it refused relief to the plaintiff in respect to the lands mentioned in schedule II should be reversed.\n\nRule 92 cited in the earlier part of this judgment in imperative terms directs the Collector to alter the assessment in case agricultural lands are converted to non-agricultural use.\n\nThe Collector. hat\n\n- ...\n\nno option in the matter and as soon as an application is made to him he should proceed to make an assessment and levy it on the non-agricultural lands.\n\nWhen the Collector declined to accede to the request of the plaintiff he acted in contravention of the clear provisions of the rule, because admittedly at that time no \"directions to the contrary\" had been given to hlni by the Government.\n\nThere was no resolution of the Government in existence and no notification had been issued under the provisions of rule 92 directing the Collector not to make an alteration in the assessment when requhed to do so.\n\nTh.e Commissioner, in dismissing the plaiD.tiff's appeal, also contravened the provisions of rule 92.\n\nWhen the matter went up in appeal to the Governor in Council, no decision was taken under the provisions of rule 92.\n\nThe High Court assumed that the confirmation of the action of the Collector by the Government amounted to a direction by the Government to the contrary in respect of the lands in question.\n\nWe are unable to agree with this conclusion.\n\nWhen Government has been given the power to give directions to the _ Collector not to act in accordance with the imperative provisions of a rule which enjoin upon him to make the altered assessment, that power has to be exercised in clear and unambiguous terms as it affects civil rights of the persons concerned and the decisions that the power has been exercised should be notified in the usual manner in which such decisions are made known to the public.\n\nIt was conceded by Mr. Joshi that no such -decision was taken by Government and no direction was issued by Government under rule 92.\n\nDismissal by the Government of the plaintiff's appeal and affirmation by it of an erroneous order of the Collector could not be held to amount to action under the provisions of rule 92. _ In these circumstances, the plaintiff was clearly entitled to further relief in respect to lands mentioned in schedule II and a direction should have been issued to the State Govrenmcnt for making altered assessment on non-agricultural land. and levy it on them and pay 'it to the plaintiff.\n\nFalma Haji Ali Mohamtti\n\nanti Othtrs\n\nThe State qf\n\nBombay.\n\nltfahajan j.\n\nJfatma Haji Ali MohtJmtd\n\nnd Others.\n\nThe State ef\n\nBombay.\n\nMahajan].\n\nMr. Joshi contended that the true effect of the pr<>- visions contained in section 48 (2) an:d rule 92 was that the Government was not bound to levy altered assessment on lands converted to non-agricultural use, that the section merely provided that the persons in possession of land were liable for such assessment but it did not say that it was obligatory on the Government to make it and that the court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion of the Government in the matter.\n\nWe think that when a liability is imposed by a statute, that liability cannot be defeated by the exercise of any discretion by Govrnment or by making rules wh'ich may negative that liability, but it is not necessary in this case to finally decide the point as the appeal stands decided otherwise.\n\nIt is also unnecessary to express an opinion as to the precise scope of the power conferred on Government by the language of rule 92.\n\nThe plaintiff's learned counsel very properly did not press his appeal in respect to the claim of damages concerning lands mentioned in schedule II.\n\nPlaintiff's suit to that extent fails.\n\nFor the reasons given above the appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit is decreed with costs except in regard to the claim for damages in respect to the lands mentioned \"in schedule II. The defendant is directed to make an assessment on lands mentioned in schedule II in the same way as in respect of the lands mentioned in schedule I and levy the same and pay it to the plaintiff.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : K. ]. Kale.\n\nAgent for the respondent : P. A. Mehla.", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "Kadduwal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 308, "end_char": 316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Judge was obviously wrong when he decreed the plaintiff's suit even with reference to the lands in Kadduwal conceded to be non-ancestral and the land in Khasra No."}}, {"text": "Jodha Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 460, "end_char": 471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2408 measuring 4 bighas and 16 biswas, which was not in the possession of the two sons Jodha Singh and Jai Singh."}}, {"text": "Jai Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 476, "end_char": 485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2408 measuring 4 bighas and 16 biswas, which was not in the possession of the two sons Jodha Singh and Jai Singh."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Act II of 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 708, "end_char": 729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 813, "end_char": 822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act II of 1920", "statute": "Punjab Act II of 1920"}}, {"text": "Pqniab Laws Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 824, "end_char": 839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1189, "end_char": 1199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "S. P. -Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1230, "end_char": 1242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : S. P. -Verma."}}, {"text": "FATMA HAJI ALI MOHAMMAD HAJI\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1245, "end_char": 1285, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FATMA HAJI ALI MOHAMMAD HAJI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1287, "end_char": 1306, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1324, "end_char": 1342, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1344, "end_char": 1353, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1358, "end_char": 1382, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1384, "end_char": 1414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1416, "end_char": 1421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1701, "end_char": 1731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1970, "end_char": 1975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judkature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28 of 1950) from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judkature at Bombay dated."}}, {"text": "H. D. Banaji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3243, "end_char": 3255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. D. Banaji (V. R. Desai, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "V. R. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3257, "end_char": 3268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. D. Banaji (V. R. Desai, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3301, "end_char": 3315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3345, "end_char": 3357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3453, "end_char": 3460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment o£ the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal from a judJtment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay modifying the decree of the trial court and decreeing partially the plaintiff's suit."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3506, "end_char": 3540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment o£ the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal from a judJtment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay modifying the decree of the trial court and decreeing partially the plaintiff's suit."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bombay is the respondent. ·"}}, {"text": "13th December, 1900", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4628, "end_char": 4647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a sale deed dated the 13th December, 1900, Haji Ca.ssum, father of the plaintiff, purchased the village of Dahisar from its proprietors for a price of Rs."}}, {"text": "Haji Ca.ssum", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4649, "end_char": 4661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a sale deed dated the 13th December, 1900, Haji Ca.ssum, father of the plaintiff, purchased the village of Dahisar from its proprietors for a price of Rs."}}, {"text": "Dahisar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a sale deed dated the 13th December, 1900, Haji Ca.ssum, father of the plaintiff, purchased the village of Dahisar from its proprietors for a price of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5121, "end_char": 5131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6049, "end_char": 6060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th June, 1907", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6321, "end_char": 6335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The draft rules were promulgated by a notification issued on the 5th June, 1907."}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7002, "end_char": 7012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "25th July, 1923", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7088, "end_char": 7103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th July, 1923, the plaintiff requested the Commissioner of Bombay, Suburban District, for a revision of the survey of Dahisar village."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7149, "end_char": 7155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th July, 1923, the plaintiff requested the Commissioner of Bombay, Suburban District, for a revision of the survey of Dahisar village."}}, {"text": "Suburban District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7157, "end_char": 7174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th July, 1923, the plaintiff requested the Commissioner of Bombay, Suburban District, for a revision of the survey of Dahisar village."}}, {"text": "Dahisar village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7208, "end_char": 7223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th July, 1923, the plaintiff requested the Commissioner of Bombay, Suburban District, for a revision of the survey of Dahisar village."}}, {"text": "section 216", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7275, "end_char": 7286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th March, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7461, "end_char": 7477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner by his letter dated the 14th March, 1925, authorised the ."}}, {"text": "15th December, 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7809, "end_char": 7828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Superintendent of the Land Records who submitted his report to the Commissioner on the 15th December, 1926."}}, {"text": "MaltajaoJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8109, "end_char": 8119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BooU<y. - MaltajaoJ.\n\nDecember, 1927."}}, {"text": "30th Apri~ 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8873, "end_char": 8888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th Apri~ 1934, he requested the Collector to assess non-agricultural assessment on these plots."}}, {"text": "17th July, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9021, "end_char": 9036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This request was refused by the Collector on the 17th July, 1935, in these terms :- . \""}}, {"text": "30-4-1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9095, "end_char": 9104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With reference to your letter dated 30-4-1934, I have the honour to state that I regret your request\n\nannot be granted.\" ·"}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10034, "end_char": 10048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This iiiformation was conveyed by the Collector to the counsel for the plaintiff on the 22nd May, 1937."}}, {"text": "20th December, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10150, "end_char": 10169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against tlie Commissioner's decision the plaintifi appealed to the Governor in Council and\n\non the 20th December, 1937, he received a copy of the follomng communication from Government to the Commissioner :-\n\n\"The undersigned presents compliments to the Commissioner, Northern Division, and with reference to his letter, No."}}, {"text": "Bombay Suburban District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10629, "end_char": 10653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5235/33, dated 8th March, 1937, and to state that Government confirm the action of the Collector, Bombay Suburban District, in refusing the Khot' s request for the levy of nonagricultural assessment in the village of Dahisar."}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11047, "end_char": 11080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to find out whether there was any resolution of the Government as mentioned in the above communication, during the pendency of the suit the plaintiff issued the following interrogatory to the Government of the State of Bombay :-\n\n\"When was the decision, not to assess the lands mentioned in Schedule II of the plaint and other lands\n\nunder rule 92, referred to in para."}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11146, "end_char": 11157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12674, "end_char": 12684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12688, "end_char": 12715, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13188, "end_char": 13196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13330, "end_char": 13340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13367, "end_char": 13377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14077, "end_char": 14086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14134, "end_char": 14144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14159, "end_char": 14173, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16569, "end_char": 16574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MahajanJ.\n\nP'atma Hji AliM1Mmed\n\ncm/ Others\n\nThe State -.f\n\nBtnnba)•.\n\nMahajan]."}}, {"text": "25th January, 1819", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17250, "end_char": 17268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on behalf of the appellant that under the terms of the conveyance dated 25th January, 1819, and of the covenants contained therein it was not open to the Government or the Collector to refuse the alteration of the assessment claimed by the plaintiff and that the Government could not give any direction under rule 92 which would be contrary to these covenants and assurances."}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20328, "end_char": 20333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was conceded by Mr. Joshi that no such -decision was taken by Government and no direction was issued by Government under rule 92."}}, {"text": "Falma Haji Ali Mohamtti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20920, "end_char": 20943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Falma Haji Ali Mohamtti\n\nanti Othtrs\n\nThe State qf\n\nBombay."}}, {"text": "Jfatma Haji Ali MohtJmtd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20995, "end_char": 21019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ltfahajan j.\n\nJfatma Haji Ali MohtJmtd\n\nnd Others."}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21142, "end_char": 21152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. ]. Kale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22614, "end_char": 22624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : K. ]."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22654, "end_char": 22665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehla."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_277_284_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSRINIV AS RAM KUMAR\n\nMAHABIR PRASAD AND OTHERS.\n\n[PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and MuKHERJEA JJ.]\n\nPleadings-Inconsistent pleas-Plaintiff suing for specific performance alleging that money was paid as price-Defendant pleading th.at money was received as loan-Plaintiff's case not proved-Jl/fhether decree can be given for recovery of money as /oflt* on defendant's plea.\n\nThough the court would not grant relief to the plaintiff on a call¢ for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which\n\nthe other side was not called upon or had no opportunity to meet, yet, when the alternative case which the plaintiff could have made\n\nwas not only admitt~ by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes.\n\nIn such circumstances, when no injusti'ce can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to . drive the plaintiff to a separate suit.\n\nThe plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a house alleging that he had paid Rs. 30,000\n\ntowards the price and ha, d been put in possession in part performance of the contract, but the defendant pleaded that the amount of Rs. 30,000 was received as a loan and the plaintiff was put in possession only to facilitate payment of interest, and the court found that the defendant's plea was true : Held, that a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of the sum of Rs. 30,000 and interest remaining due under the agreement of loan pleaded by the defendant, even though the plaintiff had not: set up such a case and it was even inconsistent with the allega tions in the plaint.\n\nBabu Raja Mohan Manucha\n\nv. Babu Manzoor (70 I.A. 1) referred to.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuRismcnoN : Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated '29th August, 1947, in First Appeal No. 13 of 1945, modifying a decree of the Subordinate Omrt of Gaya in O.S. No. 59 of 1943 : Civil Appeal No. 82 of 1949.\n\n1%1\n\nFcb.9\n\nSritainaJ Ramkumar\n\nMahabir. Prasad\n\n11na Othtrs.\n\nMukherj1:r1. J-\n\nS. P. Sinha (C. R. Pattabhi Raman and B. K. Saran with him) for the appellant.\n\nUdai Bhan Chaudhry for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nHaris Chandra (N. C. Sen, with him) for respondents Nos. 3 to 7.\n\n1951. February 9.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the plaintiff and it arises out oV a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell a house in the town of Gaya, belonging to the defendants second party who, it is alleged, agreed tc sell the house to the plaintiff but subsequently resiled from the agreement and sold the same to the defendants first party who purchased it with notice of the contract.\n\nThe plaintiff's case, in substance, is that in September, 1941, the defendants second party, who owned a house at Gaya, entered into a negotiations for sale of the same, with one J adu Ram, and the title deeds of the property were actually handed over to the latter. These negotiations failed and the second party defendants thereupon approached the plaintiff firm and a contract was entered into by and between them sometime te>- wards the end of October, 1945, under which the former agreed to sell to the latter their house at Gaya for a consideration of Rs. 34,000.\n\nOut of this consideration, a sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid by he plaintiff firm on behalf of the vendors to a creditor of the latter on 28th October, 1941.\n\nThe vendors n their turn put the plaintiff in possession of the house agreed to be sold in part performance of the contract and promised to execute a conveyance as soon as the title deeds were returned to them by Jadu Ram and the balance of consideration money amounting to Rs. 4,000 was paid by the plaintiff.\n\nThe second party defendants, however, went back on their promise and did not execute the conveyance in favour of the plaintiff even after they got back their title deeds from Jadu Ram; and on the other hand, they sold the house to the defendants fint\n\nparty on August 13, 1943.\n\nThe plaintiff was thus obliged . to bring this suit, Claiming specific performance of the contract of sale.\n\nThe suit wap contested by both sets 0£ defendants.\n\nThe second party. defendants contended inter alia that they never agreed to sell their house at Gaya to the plaintiff, and the story of a contract of sale as set up by the plaintiff was entirely false.\n\nThey admitted that they were in need of money and hence approached the plaintiff for a loan and the plaintiff did advance to them a sum of Rs. 30,000 carrying interest at 6% per annum.\n\nIt was entirely for facilitating payment of interest due on this loan and not in part performance of the contract of sale that the plaintiff was put in possession of the same.\n\nThis defence was reiterated by the first party defendants who. further pleaded that they were bona fide purchasers for value having no notice of any contract of sale with the plaintiff.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge, who heard the suit, came to the conclusion, on the evidence adduced by the parties, that the story of a contract of sale, as alleged by the plaintiff, was not established and it was not in pursuance of any such contract that the plaintiff was put' in possession of the house.\n\nIt was held that the defendants' story was true and that the plaintiff did advance a sum of Rs. 30,000 to the defendants second party, but this was by way of a loan and not as part payment of the consideration money.\n\nSo far as the first party defendants were concerned, it was held that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice. In view of these findings, the Subordinate Judge .dismissed the plaintiff's claim . for specific perform- . .ance but as the second party defendants admitted that they had taken an advance 0£ Rs. 30,000 from the plamtiff, a money decree was given to the plaintiff for this sum against these defendants with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the suit till realisation.\n\nAgainst this _decision, the plainff took an appeal to the High Court at Patna, and the second party\n\nStinivas Ramkumar v.\n\nMahabir frasad\n\nand Others.\n\nMukh•rj•a J.\n\nSrinictu Ramkumat\n\nMahabiT Prasad\n\n. and Others.\n\nMakherjtaJ.\n\ndefendants also filed cross-objections challenging the propriety of the money decree that was passed against them. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court who, by their judgment dated August 29, 1947, dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff and allowed the cross-objections preferred by the second party defendants.\n\nThe learned Judges held, concurring with the trial court, that no case of concluded contract between the parties was established by the evidence adduced in the case, and the fact of the plaintiff being put in possession of the house could not be regarded\n\nas an act of part performance of any such conract.\n\nThe High Court agreed with the trial judge in holding that the sum of Rs. 30,000 was advanced as a loan by the plaintiff to the second party defendants, though the evidence was not very clear regarding payment of interest upon it, and that the first party defendants were purchasers for value without notice.\n\nThe High Court held further that even if there was a contract, its terms were vague and indefinite, and as one of the vendors was a minor, no relief in equity by way of specific performance of the contract should be given in this case as it would substantially prejudice the interest of the minor.\n\nIn the opinion of the H'igh Court, the money decree granted against the second party defendants was not warranted in law as no case of a loan was made by the plaintiff in the plaint and no relief was claimed on that basis.\n\nThe result was that the suit was dismissed 'm its entirety and the decree for recovery of money that was made in favour of the plaintiff by the trial court was set aside.\n\nIt is against this judgment that the plaintiff has come up on appeal to this court.\n\nThe learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends before us that the findings upon wh'1ch the courts below disbelieved the story of the plaintiff and dismissed the claim for specific performance are not proper findings of fact which could be legitimately .inferred from the evidence adduced in tHis case.· In the alternative it is argued that the High .Court was wrong in setting aside the decrc:c for money which was given\n\nagainst the second party defendants bv the trial judge.\n\nThe first contention put foward by the learned counsel appears to us to be plainly unsustainable.\n\nWhen the courts below have g'1ven concurrent findings on pure questions of fact, this court would not ordinanly interfere with these findings and review the evidence for the third time unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying departure from this normal practfce.\n\nThe position may undoubtedly be different if the inference is one of law from facts admitted and proved or where the finding of fact is materially affected by violation of any rule of law or procedure. The practice adopted by this court is similar to what has always been acted upon by the Judicial Committee.\n\nTo quote the words of Lord Thankerton in Bibhabati\n\nv. Ramendra Narayan(1), \"it is not by any means a cast iron practice\"; there may occur cases of unusual nature which might constrain us to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact to avoid miscarr'iage of justice.\n\nThe case before us however, has nothing unusual in it and involves a pure question of fact.\n\nThere is no document in writing in proof of the agreement upon which the plaintiff's case is based and the decision hinges primarily upon appreciation of the oral evidence that has been adduced by the parties.\n\nThe trial judge, who had the witnesses before him, was the best person to weigh and appraise their credibility and the conclusions which he art1ved at, have been affirmed in their entirety by the High Court on appeaL In these circumstances, we see no reason whatsoever to go beyond the facts which have been found against the appellant by both the courts below.\n\nAs regards the other point, however, we are of the opinion that the decision of the trial court was right and that the High Court took an undoubtedly rigid md technical view in reversing this part of the decree of the Subordinate Judge.\n\nIt is true that it was no tart of the plaintiff's case as made in the plaint that\n\n(I) 51 C. W. N. 98.\n\nSrinitiiu\n\nR.,,,,,._\n\nMaha6ir PrlWill\n\ntlfld Othns.\n\nMuV..-j•a J.\n\nt9!il\n\nSrini\"01 Ramkumm\n\nMaha/Jir Prasad\n\n\"\"1'0thm.\n\nMukktrjta J.\n\nthe sum of Rs. 30,000 Was advanced by way of loan to the defendants second party. But it was certainly open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree for money even if the allegations of the money being paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be established by evidence.\n\nThe fact that such a prayer would have been inconsistent with the other prayer is not really material.\n\nA plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative.\n\nThe question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the court to give him relief on that basis.\n\nThe rule undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet.\n\nBut when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes.\n\nA demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise wheh they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings.\n\nIn such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, t may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit.\n\nAs an illustration of this principle, reference may be made to the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Bab14 Raia Mohan Manucha v. Babu Manzoor (1).\n\nThis appeal arose out of a suit commenced by the plaint\\ff appellant to enforce, a mortgage security.\n\nThe plea of the defendant was that the mortgage was void.\n\nThis\n\n(7) (70) I. A. 1.\n\nplea was given effect to by both the lower courts as well as by the Privy Council.\n\nBut the Privy Council held that it was open in such circumstances to the plaintiff to repudiate the transaction altogether and claim a relief outside it in the form of rest-itution under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act.\n\nAlthough no such alternative claim was made in the plaint, the Privy Council allowed it to be advanced and gave a decree on the ground that the respondent could not be prejudiced by such a claim at all and the matter ought not to be left to a separate suit.\n\nIt may be noted that this relief was allowed to the appellant even though the appeal was heard ex parte in the absence of the respondent. Mr. Barish Chanra appearing for the second party defendants raised the question of interest in connection with the plaintiff's claim for a money decree.\n\nHis contention is that the plaintiff could not claim any interest so long as he was in possession of the house and he could not also claim any interest after that, as his clients made a tender of the sum of Rs. 30,000\n\nby sending a hundi for that amount to the plaintiff by registered post on July 12, 1943, which the plaintiff refused to accept.\n\nThe first part of the contention is undoubtedly correct and is not disputed on behalf of the plaintiff.\n\nWe feel difficulty, nowever, in accepting the second part of the contention raised by Mr.\n\nHarish Chandra.\n\nThe receipt of this hundi was totally denied by the plaintiff both in the plaint as well as in the evidence and it is doubtful whether even if the story was true, it could constitute a valid tender m law.\n\nThe defendants undoubtedly had the use of this money all this time and in our opinion the plaintiff is entitled to some interest.\n\nThe learned counsel appearing for both the parties, at the close of their arguments, left this question of interest to be determined by us and we think that it would be quite fair if we allow interest on the sum of Rs. 30,000 at the rate of 4% per annum from the beginning of September, 1943.\n\nIt is admitted that the plaintiff's possession of the house ceased by the end pf August, 1943.\n\nll7\n\n19!>1\n\nStiniiJas.\n\nRamkumar\n\nM ahahir Praiad\n\nand Others.\n\nMukherjea j.\n\nSrirtiotu 11am1;,,.,,,\n\nMahabir Prasad\n\ndlld Otlurs.\n\nMuk/urfa• ].\n\nMarcb2\n\nThe result is that we allow the appeal in part; th? decree made by the High Court is affirmed in so far as it dismissed the claim for specific performance.\n\nThe plaintiff, however, will be entitled to a money decree for the sum of Rs. 30,000 against the defendants second party w'1th interest at 4% per annum from the 1st of September, 1943, to the date of realisation. Each party to this appeal will bear his own costs.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for respondents : Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal.\n\nD. STEPHENS\n\nNOSIBOLLA.\n\n(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, Munn:RJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAR JJ.]\n\nCriminlll Prot:edure Code, 1898, ss. 417, 439-Revision againll order of ocq11ittal-lnterf<rmce-Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act, XX! of 1923, ss. 25, 26-Supply of seamen-\n\nConstitution of Board by owners of ships and seamen for recruii. ment of seamen-Levy of one rupee from each seaman towanls expenses of B011rd-Whether contrDvenes ss. 25, 26-Giving .of muster card permitting appearance at muster-Whether amounts to\n\n11engaging 01' supplying\" seamen.\n\nThe rcvisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under s. 417.\n\nIt could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require intcrfcn:ncc for ):he correction of a manikst illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice.\n\nThis jurisdiction is not ordinari!J invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on t1ie\n\nl'CCDrd.\n\nShipowners had an organisation in Cakntta called the c.1cutta Liners' Confrcncc and the seamen had an organisaliaa", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "SRINIV AS RAM KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SRINIV AS RAM KUMAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHABIR PRASAD AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHABIR PRASAD AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1963, "end_char": 1996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuRismcnoN : Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated '29th August, 1947, in First Appeal No."}}, {"text": "SritainaJ Ramkumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2173, "end_char": 2191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1%1\n\nFcb.9\n\nSritainaJ Ramkumar\n\nMahabir."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2241, "end_char": 2252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J-\n\nS. P. Sinha (C. R. Pattabhi Raman and B. K. Saran with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. R. Pattabhi Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2254, "end_char": 2274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J-\n\nS. P. Sinha (C. R. Pattabhi Raman and B. K. Saran with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. K. Saran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2279, "end_char": 2290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J-\n\nS. P. Sinha (C. R. Pattabhi Raman and B. K. Saran with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Udai Bhan Chaudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2321, "end_char": 2339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Udai Bhan Chaudhry for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Haris Chandra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haris Chandra (N. C. Sen, with him) for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "Harish Chandra"}}, {"text": "N. C. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2386, "end_char": 2395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haris Chandra (N. C. Sen, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Gaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2653, "end_char": 2657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the plaintiff and it arises out oV a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell a house in the town of Gaya, belonging to the defendants second party who, it is alleged, agreed tc sell the house to the plaintiff but subsequently resiled from the agreement and sold the same to the defendants first party who purchased it with notice of the contract."}}, {"text": "J adu Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3080, "end_char": 3089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff's case, in substance, is that in September, 1941, the defendants second party, who owned a house at Gaya, entered into a negotiations for sale of the same, with one J adu Ram, and the title deeds of the property were actually handed over to the latter."}}, {"text": "28th October, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30,000 was paid by he plaintiff firm on behalf of the vendors to a creditor of the latter on 28th October, 1941."}}, {"text": "Jadu Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3839, "end_char": 3847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The vendors n their turn put the plaintiff in possession of the house agreed to be sold in part performance of the contract and promised to execute a conveyance as soon as the title deeds were returned to them by Jadu Ram and the balance of consideration money amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "August 13, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4199, "end_char": 4214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second party defendants, however, went back on their promise and did not execute the conveyance in favour of the plaintiff even after they got back their title deeds from Jadu Ram; and on the other hand, they sold the house to the defendants fint\n\nparty on August 13, 1943."}}, {"text": "High Court at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6211, "end_char": 6230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this _decision, the plainff took an appeal to the High Court at Patna, and the second party\n\nStinivas Ramkumar v.\n\nMahabir frasad\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Srinictu Ramkumat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6319, "end_char": 6336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukh•rj•a J.\n\nSrinictu Ramkumat\n\nMahabiT Prasad\n\n."}}, {"text": "MahabiT Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6338, "end_char": 6352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukh•rj•a J.\n\nSrinictu Ramkumat\n\nMahabiT Prasad\n\n.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR PRASAD AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "MakherjtaJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6369, "end_char": 6380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MakherjtaJ.\n\ndefendants also filed cross-objections challenging the propriety of the money decree that was passed against them."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6545, "end_char": 6561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court who, by their judgment dated August 29, 1947, dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff and allowed the cross-objections preferred by the second party defendants."}}, {"text": "August 29, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6591, "end_char": 6606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court who, by their judgment dated August 29, 1947, dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff and allowed the cross-objections preferred by the second party defendants."}}, {"text": "Thankerton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9323, "end_char": 9333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To quote the words of Lord Thankerton in Bibhabati\n\nv. Ramendra Narayan(1), \"it is not by any means a cast iron practice\"; there may occur cases of unusual nature which might constrain us to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact to avoid miscarr'iage of justice."}}, {"text": "art1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10013, "end_char": 10017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Srinitiiu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10578, "end_char": 10587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Srinitiiu\n\nR.,,,,,._"}}, {"text": "Mukktrjta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10698, "end_char": 10707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukktrjta J.\n\nthe sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13119, "end_char": 13129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13137, "end_char": 13156, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Barish Chanra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13560, "end_char": 13573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Barish Chanra appearing for the second party defendants raised the question of interest in connection with the plaintiff's claim for a money decree."}}, {"text": "July 12, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14003, "end_char": 14016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30,000\n\nby sending a hundi for that amount to the plaintiff by registered post on July 12, 1943, which the plaintiff refused to accept."}}, {"text": "Harish Chandra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14254, "end_char": 14268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We feel difficulty, nowever, in accepting the second part of the contention raised by Mr.\n\nHarish Chandra.", "canonical_name": "Harish Chandra"}}, {"text": "Ramkumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15022, "end_char": 15030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramkumar\n\nM ahahir Praiad\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15062, "end_char": 15071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea j.\n\nSrirtiotu 11am1;,,.,,,", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA JJ."}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15100, "end_char": 15114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad\n\ndlld Otlurs.", "canonical_name": "MAHABIR PRASAD AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "1st of September, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15470, "end_char": 15492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30,000 against the defendants second party w'1th interest at 4% per annum from the 1st of September, 1943, to the date of realisation."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15625, "end_char": 15637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15664, "end_char": 15688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondents : Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal."}}, {"text": "D. STEPHENS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15691, "end_char": 15702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. STEPHENS\n\nNOSIBOLLA."}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15717, "end_char": 15732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, Munn:RJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15768, "end_char": 15788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, Munn:RJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "ss. 417, 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15828, "end_char": 15840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15890, "end_char": 15937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 25, 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15952, "end_char": 15962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "statute": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 25, 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16144, "end_char": 16154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "statute": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act"}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16327, "end_char": 16333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "statute": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16341, "end_char": 16367, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16531, "end_char": 16537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "statute": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act"}}, {"text": "Cakntta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16946, "end_char": 16953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shipowners had an organisation in Cakntta called the c.1cutta Liners' Confrcncc and the seamen had an organisaliaa"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_284_292_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "Srirtiotu 11am1;,,.,,,\n\nMahabir Prasad\n\ndlld Otlurs.\n\nMuk/urfa• ].\n\nMarcb2\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951)\n\nThe result is that we allow the appeal in part; th? decree made by the High Court is affirmed in so far as it dismissed the claim for specific performance.\n\nThe plaintiff, however, will be entitled to a money decree for the sum of Rs. 30,000 against the defendants second party w'1th interest at 4% per annum from the 1st of September, 1943, to the date of realisation. Each party to this appeal will bear his own costs.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for respondents : Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal.\n\nD. STEPHENS\n\nNOSIBOLLA.\n\n(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, Munn:RJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAR JJ.]\n\nCriminlll Prot:edure Code, 1898, ss. 417, 439-Revision againll order of ocq11ittal-lnterf<rmce-Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act, XX! of 1923, ss. 25, 26-Supply of seamen-\n\nConstitution of Board by owners of ships and seamen for recruii. ment of seamen-Levy of one rupee from each seaman towanls expenses of B011rd-Whether contrDvenes ss. 25, 26-Giving .of muster card permitting appearance at muster-Whether amounts to\n\n11engaging 01' supplying\" seamen.\n\nThe rcvisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under s. 417.\n\nIt could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require intcrfcn:ncc for ):he correction of a manikst illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice.\n\nThis jurisdiction is not ordinari!J invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on t1ie\n\nl'CCDrd.\n\nShipowners had an organisation in Cakntta called the c.1cutta Liners' Confrcncc and the seamen had an organisaliaa\n\ncalled the Joint Supply Office. a result <>f a collective agreement between the owners of the ships and the seamen's representatives, the Calcutta Maritime Board which contained an equal number of members representing the Calcutta Liners' Conference and the Joint Supply Office was established.\n\nThe seamen presented themselves before this Board and. were given muster cards which permitted them to appear at the musters where the captains of the ships engaged seamen.\n\nFor meeting the office expenses of the Board the. owners used to pay Rs. 2 per seaman erlgaged and after engagement each seaman paid Rs. 1 to the owner as his contribution towards these expenses.\n\nThe . accused was the secretary of the Liners' Conference and . .an c:r officio honorary joint secretary of the Maritime Board, and a seaman filed a complaint . against him that, as he had collected Re. 1 from him for the issue of a muster card he had committed an offence under s. 26 (2) of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act :\n\nHeld, that the seamen to whom the muster cards were given by the Mritime Board were not \"engaged or supplied\" by the Board or by any of its officers, nor was the sum of Re. 1 which was levied out of the seaman's wages after he signed an agreement of employment, remuneration received for providing the man with . employment, and the accused was not guilty of any offence under s. 25 or s. 26 of the Act.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1950) against the orders of the High Coi, nt • 'of Judicatiire at Calcutta dated 21st January, 1949, and 29th August, 1949, in Criminal Revision Cases Nos. 1007 of 1948 and 527 of 1949.\n\nS. P. Sinh' (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the\n\nappellants~ '\n\nB. Sen f_or the resp11>ndent.\n\n195L , March 2. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR& A1YAR J.-This appeal comes up before us on special leave granted by His Majesty's Order in Council and it is directed against orders made by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sm of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, directing a retrial of the appellant D. Stephens, who had been acquitted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of contravening the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Aa.\n\nD. Stepluru\n\nN\"iiolla.\n\nC/1anr/rasekha'8\n\n.d!\"ar J.\n\nD. Sttfthert,':\n\nNttsif, olla.\n\nChantlrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nThe facts that gave rise to this prosecution are correctly set out in the following two paragraphs which are quoted from the judgment of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate :-\n\n\"The owners of the ships. have an orgapisation known as the Calcutta Liners' Conference.\n\nThe seamen have an organisation known as the Joint Supply Office.\n\nSince 1940-41 the licensed broker system for engagement of seamen had been abolished.\n\nThe Calcutta Maritime Board was established as a result qf a collective agreement between the owners of the ships and seamen's representatives for recruiting seamen.\n\nIt .is a joint negotiating machinery between the owners and the seamen for direct engagement of seamen by the owners.\n\nThe Joint Supply Office does not supply the seamen.\n\nThe Calcutta Maritime Board also does not supply nor engage seamen.\n\nThe engagement is made by the Captains of the Ships.\n\nThe Calcutta Maritime Board, at the relevant time, was formed of equal members representing the Calcutta Liners' Conference (the owners) and the Joint Supply Office (the seamen).\n\nAt the present moment the Government of India have two representatives in the Calcutta Maritime Board.\n\nThere are two Joint Chairmen and two joint Secretaries, one each from each group of the owners' and searnens' representatives.\n\nAccused. Stephens is the Secretary of the Calcutta Liners' Conference and is a paid officer.\n\nHis salary is paid by his employers, the Calcutta Liners' Conference, with contributions obtained from the owners of the ships whose association the Conference is.\n\nThe accused is one of the Joint Secretaries of the Calcutta Maritime Board in his capacity as the Secretary of the Calcutta Liners' Conference.\n\nThe Joint Secretaries of the Calcutta Maritime Board hold honorary posts and receive no remuneration.\"\n\n\"The procedure for recruitment now is that the seamen present themselves before the Calcutta Maritime Board.\n\nThey are given muster cards which permit them to appear at the musters where the Captal.ns of the ships engage the seamen.\n\nThe Board\n\nendeavours to lay down a procedure for the Captains of the ships while engaging seamen.\n\nThere is an excess of supply of seamen over the demand.\n\nThis had brought in corruption.· To fight out corruption, the Calcutta Maritime Board was conceived to find out a procedure for the owners of the ships for employing seamen by rotation.\n\nFor meeting the office expenses of the Calcutta Maritime Board the owners, at the relevant time, used to pay Rs. 2 per seamen engaged.\n\nAfter signing on, each seamen pays back the owners Re. 1 as his contribution towards office expenses of the Calcutta Maritime Board.\n\nNone of the facts stated above was contested for the complainant.\"\n\nThe complainant Nosibolla alleged that the accused as Joint Secretary of the Board collected an illegal charge of Rupee one from him for issue of a muster card and thus contravened section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act and that he was, therefore, guilty of an offence within the meaning of sub-clause\n\n(2) of that section.\n\nThe Chief Presidency Magistrate acquitted the accused of the charge but on revision the High Cou.n at Calcutta directed a retrial, holding that the accused clearly contravened the provisions of section 25 of the Act, and that if the complainant was to be believed when he said that the accused received Re. 1 before registration, he was also guilty under section 26 of the Act; and both parties were allowed to adduce additional evidence.\n\nThis second trial again ended in an acquittal by the Chief Presidency Magistrate who came to the conclusion that the accused did not supply or engage seamen, that he did not receive any payment of Re. 1 for issuing the . muster card to the complainant and that Re. 1 which is collected from the seamen by the shipowners after employment by way of deduction from wages is paid not as remuneration to the accused or any one else, but is really a contribution towards the expenses of the Joint Supply Office working under the Calcutta Maritime Board.\n\nThere was again a revision petition taken to the High Coun against this order of acquittal and it . w.as heard by the same learned Judge as before.\n\nHe differed from 54S. C. lndia/68\n\nD. Stepturu\n\nNoribolla.\n\nCh.mtlraitkhara\n\nA&ar].\n\nD.SHplrenJ\n\n/(tJ.™1olla~\n\nCllantlrO.Sfkl111rd\n\nAiyc.r1.\n\nthe Chief Presidency Magistrate on all the material points and sent the case back again for a fresh trial in a judgment which contains fit1dings almost amounting to a direction to the Chief Presidency \"Magistrate to convict the accused.\n\nIn the learned Judge's view the issue of a muster card to seamen amounted to the\n\n\"supply\" of seamen within the meaning of section 25 of the Act. The receipt of Re. 1 was a demand for remuneration within the meaning of section 26, even if it was ultimately spent for expenses of the running of the Joint Supply Office and that a .Jcmand for payment would by itself constitute the offence, whether the money was actually received or not.\n\nIt is against this interference in revision that the present appeal was lodged before the Judcial Committee of the Privy Council on the ground that the jurisdiction to direct a retrial was so exercised in the case as to constitute an infringement of the essential principles of justice.\n\nBefore entering into a short discussion of the question whether the view taken by the High Court is right or wrong, it would be useful to set out the relevant sections of the Merchant Shipping Act.\n\n\"24. (1) The Central Government or any person duly authorised by the Central Government in this behalf may grant to such persons as may be deemed fit licences to engage or supply seamen for merchant ships in British India.\n\n(2) Any such licence shall continue for such period and may be granted and revoked on such terms and conditions as the Central Government thinks proper.\n\n25. ( 1) A person . shall not engage or supply a seaman to be entered on board any ship in British India unless that person either holds a licence under this Act for the purpose, or is the owner or master or mate of the ship, or is bona fide the servant and in the constant employ of the owner, or is a shippingmaster.\n\n(2) A person shall not employ, for the purpose of engaging a seaman to be entered on board any ship\n\nin British India, any person unless that person either holds a licence under this . Act for the purpose, or is the owner or master or mate of the ship, or is bona fide the servant and in the constant employment of the owner, or is a shipping master.\n\n(3) A person shall not receive or accept to be entered on board any ship any seaman if that person knows that the seaman has been engaged or supplied in contravention of this section.\n\n( 4) If a person acts in contravention of this section, he shall for each seaman in respect of whom a, n offence is committed be liable to a fine which may extend to one . hundred . rupees, and, if a licensed person, shall forfeit his licence.\n\n26. ( 1) A person shall not demand or receive direct- . ly or indirectly, from any seaman, or from any person seeking employment as a seaman, or from any person on his behalf, any remuneration whatever for providing him with employment other than the fees authorised by, this Act.\n\n(2) If a person acts in contravention of this section, he shall for each such offence be liable to pay a fine of fifty rupees, and, if a licensed person, shall forfeit his licence.\"\n\nOn the facts as admitted. or proved in the evidence, it is difficult to see what offence the accused has committed.\n\nNeither the Calcutta Maritime Board, nor the Calcutta Liners' Conference supply the seaman.\n\nThe registration entitles the seamen to get muster cards which enable them to appear at the musters, and there, the Captains of the ships select and engage the seamen.\n\nIt is after th.ts selection and engagement that the body of shipowners, called the Calcutta Liners' Conference, pay Rs. 2. to the Calcutta Maritime Board out of which Re. I is their own contribution and Re. l is the contribution by the. seaman which is deducted from his wages.\n\nThere is therefore no supply of a seaman wfthin the meaning of section 25 of the Act.\n\nA number of seamen offer themselves for employment and they are all gathered together at a\n\nD; Stephtns\n\nv. .\n\nNosibolla.\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAtyar :J.\n\nD. St<Phens\n\nNosihvlla.\n\nCMndrasekhara\n\nA!Jar J.\n\nplace, so that the shipowner or Captain of the ship may select whomsoever he pleases.\n\nThere is no obligation on the owners of the ships to select any particular person, nor is any such selection made by the Maritime Board either directly or through its servants for the benefit of the owners and for employment under them.\n\nThe Calcutta Maritime Board of which the accused is ; m honorary Joint Secretary is an institution that was created in the end of 1947, with the knowledge, if not the approval, of the Government of India as a liaison body or institution to bring the owners and the seamen together, with reference to the engagement of seamen for sh'1ps.\n\nThe labour corps is brought into contact with the owners by the Maritime Board through the Joint Supply Office but the seamen are engaged by the shipowners or the Captains.\n\nTo a certain extent, the recruitment is regulated by the Maritime Board, but it is a misnomer to sav that the seaman are suppned to the owners by the Board or by any of its officers.\n\nIn his written statement found at page 28 of the printed book the accused has stated, and it is not controverted anywhere, that the system of selection of crew through the agency of Serangs was brought to an end owing to the opposition of the seamen themselves, who a!leged that it resulted iµ widespread corruption as the Serangs recruited only those who paid them heavily.\n\nIt is fantastic for the prosecution to suggest that Re. 1 levied out of the seaman's wages after he signsthe agreement of employment amounts to remuneration received for providing the man with employment.\n\nThe remuneration paid to the accused which is over Rs. 2,000 a month is by way of salary from the Calcutta Liners' Conference under whom he is a paid . Secretary.\n\nThe Calcutta Maritime Board receives Re. 1 per seaman from the shipowners' association, but this is by way of contribution towards. the expenses of the Joint Supply Office of the Board.\n\nThi• is made perfectly clear in the evidence given on commission by Mr. C. P. Srivastava, Officer on Special Duty, Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi, and of\n\nI • ' ,...\n\n-·-~--~--\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 291\n\nl\\fr. Dikken examined on the side of the prosecution who says that the contribution is made to meet the running expenses of the Joint Supply Office and\n\nl\\faritime Board. Mr.Goldwell of James.Finlav. &\n\nCo., sixth witness for the defence, has stated that the Calcutta Maritime Board and the Joint Supply Office are financed by the Liners and that the accused has nothing to do witK the engagement of the seamen.\n\nThere is also a finding of the Chief Presidency l\\fagist rate, which has not been set aside, that the allegation of the complainant that the accused received Re. 1 from him prim to registration of his name in the Joint Supply Office, has not been substantiated._ .. _\n\nIt is evident on the facts that the accused does.not . engage or supply any seamen and does not demand or receive directly or indirectly any remuneration for providing any person with employment as a seaman . . The facts leave no room for any doubt that the prosecution has failed to establish its case. . • l\\fr. Justice Sen says \"I fully realise that, ordinarily this Court ought not to interfere with orders of acouittal. It should do so only on exceptional grounds.\" It is a matter of some regret tht this realization bv him of the very limited nature of the reviional iurisdiction was not carried in to effect but resulted in an order directing the retrial of a man for a third time for offences which could not be said to have been made out even prima facie. The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High .\n\nCourt under. section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private comolainant against an order of acquittal. against which the Governmenthas a right of appeal under section 417. It could be exerci8ed only in exceptional crises where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This iurisdiction is not ordinarilv invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidencf'\n\n.'l~\n\nD.SleplieM\n\nNosiboU~\n\nChandraaekharo\n\n.A.iyar J~\n\nD. Slephnis\n\nNosiboUa.\n\nChatulrasthhara\n\nAV'af].\n\nMarch 5.\n\non rerord.\n\nAs already pointed out, there has been no such error in the present case; on the other hand, it seems to us that. on both the previous occasions, the Chief Presidency Magistrate was right in holding that the accused was not guilt)' of any offence under sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act.\n\nThe order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Chief Presidency Magistr:tte is restored.\n\nThe accused will stand acquitted of the charge.\n\nOrder set aside.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. K. Chatteriee.\n\nAgent for the respondent : l. N. Shroff for P. K.\n\nBose.\n\nV. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR AND OTHERS\n\nfl.\n\nT. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR. [SAIYID FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JI.]\n\nMadras Agriculturists' Relief Act (IV of 1938), ss. 7, 19-Joint debtors-Application for scaling down made by some only-Decree for full amount against ex parte defendants and for reduced amount against others-Legality and effect-Indivisibility of debt -Payment of full amount as scaled down-Whether extinguishes decree against all.\n\nUnder the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938, a mortgage decree can be scaled down in favour of some of the judgment debtors alone, while as regards the others it is kept intact.\n\nIn a suit to enforce a mortgage executed by defendant No. 1 on his own behalf and on behalf of defendants Nos. 2 to 7, the defendant No. 1 remained ex parte, and the others contested the suit.\n\nA decree for Rs. 1,08,098 was passed by trial court.\n\nThe Madras Agriculturist' Relief Act, 1938, was passed during the pendenry of an appeal and cross appea~ and on the application of defendants Nos. 2 to 7 under the said Act the amount of the decree was scaled down to Rs. 49,255 so far as defendants Nos. 2 to 7 were concerned.\n\nSo far as defendant No. 1 was coriccrned the decree for the full amount rcmainCd as it was.\n\nDefendant No. 1 thereupon applied for scaling down, but his", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "1st of September, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 424, "end_char": 446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30,000 against the defendants second party w'1th interest at 4% per annum from the 1st of September, 1943, to the date of realisation."}}, {"text": "C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 582, "end_char": 591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 618, "end_char": 642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondents : Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal."}}, {"text": "D. STEPHENS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 645, "end_char": 656, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. STEPHENS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NOSIBOLLA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 658, "end_char": 667, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NOSIBOLLA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 671, "end_char": 686, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 688, "end_char": 706, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 417, 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 844, "end_char": 891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 25, 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 906, "end_char": 916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "statute": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 25, 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1098, "end_char": 1108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "statute": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act"}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1281, "end_char": 1287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "statute": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1295, "end_char": 1321, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1485, "end_char": 1491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act", "statute": "Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act"}}, {"text": "Cakntta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1900, "end_char": 1907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shipowners had an organisation in Cakntta called the c.1cutta Liners' Confrcncc and the seamen had an organisaliaa\n\ncalled the Joint Supply Office."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Maritime Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2120, "end_char": 2143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a result <>f a collective agreement between the owners of the ships and the seamen's representatives, the Calcutta Maritime Board which contained an equal number of members representing the Calcutta Liners' Conference and the Joint Supply Office was established."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Liners' Conference", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2204, "end_char": 2231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a result <>f a collective agreement between the owners of the ships and the seamen's representatives, the Calcutta Maritime Board which contained an equal number of members representing the Calcutta Liners' Conference and the Joint Supply Office was established."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2928, "end_char": 2933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Merchant Shipping Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2952, "end_char": 2973, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3363, "end_char": 3368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinh' (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the\n\nappellants~ '\n\nB. Sen f_or the resp11>ndent."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3648, "end_char": 3663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinh' (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the\n\nappellants~ '\n\nB. Sen f_or the resp11>ndent."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3699, "end_char": 3705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinh' (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the\n\nappellants~ '\n\nB. Sen f_or the resp11>ndent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR& A1YAR J.-This appeal comes up before us on special leave granted by His Majesty's Order in Council and it is directed against orders made by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sm of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, directing a retrial of the appellant D. Stephens, who had been acquitted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of contravening the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Aa.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "A1YAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3805, "end_char": 3810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR& A1YAR J.-This appeal comes up before us on special leave granted by His Majesty's Order in Council and it is directed against orders made by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sm of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, directing a retrial of the appellant D. Stephens, who had been acquitted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of contravening the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Aa."}}, {"text": "Sm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3970, "end_char": 3972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR& A1YAR J.-This appeal comes up before us on special leave granted by His Majesty's Order in Council and it is directed against orders made by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sm of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, directing a retrial of the appellant D. Stephens, who had been acquitted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of contravening the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Aa."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3980, "end_char": 4030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR& A1YAR J.-This appeal comes up before us on special leave granted by His Majesty's Order in Council and it is directed against orders made by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sm of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, directing a retrial of the appellant D. Stephens, who had been acquitted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of contravening the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Aa."}}, {"text": "D. Stephens", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4069, "end_char": 4080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHAR& A1YAR J.-This appeal comes up before us on special leave granted by His Majesty's Order in Council and it is directed against orders made by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sm of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, directing a retrial of the appellant D. Stephens, who had been acquitted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of contravening the provisions of section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Aa.", "canonical_name": "D. STEPHENS"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4174, "end_char": 4184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4324, "end_char": 4329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chantlrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nThe facts that gave rise to this prosecution are correctly set out in the following two paragraphs which are quoted from the judgment of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate :-\n\n\"The owners of the ships.", "canonical_name": ".A.iyar"}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4483, "end_char": 4510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chantlrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nThe facts that gave rise to this prosecution are correctly set out in the following two paragraphs which are quoted from the judgment of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate :-\n\n\"The owners of the ships."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5427, "end_char": 5446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the present moment the Government of India have two representatives in the Calcutta Maritime Board."}}, {"text": "Stephens", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5642, "end_char": 5650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stephens is the Secretary of the Calcutta Liners' Conference and is a paid officer.", "canonical_name": "D. STEPHENS"}}, {"text": "Nosibolla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7073, "end_char": 7082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complainant Nosibolla alleged that the accused as Joint Secretary of the Board collected an illegal charge of Rupee one from him for issue of a muster card and thus contravened section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act and that he was, therefore, guilty of an offence within the meaning of sub-clause\n\n(2) of that section.", "canonical_name": "NOSIBOLLA"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7238, "end_char": 7248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Merchant Shipping Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7263, "end_char": 7284, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Cou.n at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7478, "end_char": 7500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Presidency Magistrate acquitted the accused of the charge but on revision the High Cou.n at Calcutta directed a retrial, holding that the accused clearly contravened the provisions of section 25 of the Act, and that if the complainant was to be believed when he said that the accused received Re."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7584, "end_char": 7594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7745, "end_char": 7755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. Stepturu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8563, "end_char": 8574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He differed from 54S. C. lndia/68\n\nD. Stepturu\n\nNoribolla."}}, {"text": "Ch.mtlraitkhara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8588, "end_char": 8603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ch.mtlraitkhara\n\nA&ar]."}}, {"text": "D.SHplrenJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8613, "end_char": 8623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.SHplrenJ\n\n/(tJ.™1olla~\n\nCllantlrO.Sfkl111rd\n\nAiyc.r1."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9031, "end_char": 9041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9127, "end_char": 9137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Merchant Shipping Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9809, "end_char": 9830, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9846, "end_char": 9864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) The Central Government or any person duly authorised by the Central Government in this behalf may grant to such persons as may be deemed fit licences to engage or supply seamen for merchant ships in British India."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10041, "end_char": 10054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) The Central Government or any person duly authorised by the Central Government in this behalf may grant to such persons as may be deemed fit licences to engage or supply seamen for merchant ships in British India."}}, {"text": "British India unless that person either holds a licence under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10302, "end_char": 10372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12499, "end_char": 12509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nosibolla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12634, "end_char": 12643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nosibolla.", "canonical_name": "NOSIBOLLA"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12646, "end_char": 12660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAtyar :J.\n\nD. St<Phens\n\nNosihvlla.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "D. St<Phens\n\nNosihvlla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12673, "end_char": 12695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAtyar :J.\n\nD. St<Phens\n\nNosihvlla."}}, {"text": "CMndrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12698, "end_char": 12711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CMndrasekhara\n\nA!Jar J.\n\nplace, so that the shipowner or Captain of the ship may select whomsoever he pleases."}}, {"text": "C. P. Srivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14749, "end_char": 14765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi• is made perfectly clear in the evidence given on commission by Mr. C. P. Srivastava, Officer on Special Duty, Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi, and of\n\nI • ' ,...\n·-~--~--\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 291\n\nl\\fr."}}, {"text": "Dikken", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14897, "end_char": 14903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dikken examined on the side of the prosecution who says that the contribution is made to meet the running expenses of the Joint Supply Office and\n\nl\\faritime Board."}}, {"text": "Goldwell", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15065, "end_char": 15073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.Goldwell of James."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15895, "end_char": 15898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Sen says \"I fully realise that, ordinarily this Court ought not to interfere with orders of acouittal."}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16404, "end_char": 16415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16423, "end_char": 16449, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandraaekharo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17010, "end_char": 17024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This iurisdiction is not ordinarilv invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidencf'\n\n.'l~\n\nD.SleplieM\n\nNosiboU~\n\nChandraaekharo\n\n.A.iyar J~\n\nD. Slephnis\n\nNosiboUa.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": ".A.iyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17026, "end_char": 17033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This iurisdiction is not ordinarilv invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidencf'\n\n.'l~\n\nD.SleplieM\n\nNosiboU~\n\nChandraaekharo\n\n.A.iyar J~\n\nD. Slephnis\n\nNosiboUa.", "canonical_name": ".A.iyar"}}, {"text": "D. Slephnis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17038, "end_char": 17049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This iurisdiction is not ordinarilv invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidencf'\n\n.'l~\n\nD.SleplieM\n\nNosiboU~\n\nChandraaekharo\n\n.A.iyar J~\n\nD. Slephnis\n\nNosiboUa.", "canonical_name": "D. STEPHENS"}}, {"text": "Chatulrasthhara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17062, "end_char": 17077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatulrasthhara\n\nAV'af]."}}, {"text": "sections 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17363, "end_char": 17381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Merchant Shipping Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17396, "end_char": 17417, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatteriee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17613, "end_char": 17629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P. K. Chatteriee."}}, {"text": "l. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17659, "end_char": 17671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : l. N. Shroff for P. K.\n\nBose."}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17690, "end_char": 17711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR AND OTHERS\n\nfl."}}, {"text": "T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17729, "end_char": 17752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR. ["}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17755, "end_char": 17769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAIYID FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JI.]", "canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17791, "end_char": 17800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAIYID FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JI.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17805, "end_char": 17825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAIYID FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JI.]", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR"}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17880, "end_char": 17889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18197, "end_char": 18213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18623, "end_char": 18639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_292_302_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "D. Slephnis\n\nNosiboUa.\n\nChatulrasthhara\n\nAV'af].\n\nMarch 5.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [.1951]\n\non rerord.\n\nAs already pointed out, there has been no such error in the present case; on the other hand, it seems to us that. on both the previous occasions, the Chief Presidency Magistrate was right in holding that the accused was not guilt)' of any offence under sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act.\n\nThe order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Chief Presidency Magistr:tte is restored.\n\nThe accused will stand acquitted of the charge.\n\nOrder set aside.\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. K. Chatteriee.\n\nAgent for the respondent : l. N. Shroff for P. K.\n\nBose.\n\nV. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR AND OTHERS\n\nfl.\n\nT. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR. [SAIYID FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JI.]\n\nMadras Agriculturists' Relief Act (IV of 1938), ss. 7, 19-Joint debtors-Application for scaling down made by some only-Decree for full amount against ex parte defendants and for reduced amount against others-Legality and effect-Indivisibility of debt -Payment of full amount as scaled down-Whether extinguishes decree against all.\n\nUnder the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938, a mortgage decree can be scaled down in favour of some of the judgment debtors alone, while as regards the others it is kept intact.\n\nIn a suit to enforce a mortgage executed by defendant No. 1 on his own behalf and on behalf of defendants Nos. 2 to 7, the defendant No. 1 remained ex parte, and the others contested the suit.\n\nA decree for Rs. 1,08,098 was passed by trial court.\n\nThe Madras Agriculturist' Relief Act, 1938, was passed during the pendenry of an appeal and cross appea~ and on the application of defendants Nos. 2 to 7 under the said Act the amount of the decree was scaled down to Rs. 49,255 so far as defendants Nos. 2 to 7 were concerned.\n\nSo far as defendant No. 1 was coriccrned the decree for the full amount rcmainCd as it was.\n\nDefendant No. 1 thereupon applied for scaling down, but his\n\napplication was rejected.\n\nDefendants Nos. 2 to 7 dcopsitcd certain amounts and got their properties released.\n\nDefendant No. 1 deposited the balance of the amount that remained due under the decree as scaled down on the application of defendants Nos. 2 to 7, and prayed that full satisfaction of the decree may be recorded. The Subordinate Judge rejected this application but the High Court, on appeal, held that defendant No. I was entitled to the benefit of the scaling down in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 7, as the mortgage debt was one and indivisible.\n\nOn further appeal :\n\nHeld, that the ratio dccidendi of the cases in which it was held that a purchaser of mortgaged properties was entitled to the benefit of a decree which has been scaled down, even diough the purchaser himself was not an agriculturist was not applicable to the present case.\n\nAccording to the plain provisions of the Act, there was no objection to a decree for a reduced amount being passed against an agriculturist debtor, while the same relief is not given to his co-debtors, and defendant No. 1 was not entitled to claim the benefit of the scaling down of the decreC-: debt in favour of defendants Nos. 2 to 7.\n\nJudgment of the Madras High Court reversed.\n\nRamiet v. Srinivasiah [(1940) 2M.L.J. 872] referred.to.\n\nArunachalam Pillai v. Seetharam [(1941) I M.L.J. 561'!.\n\nPachigola v.\n\nKaratam\n\n[1242) 1 M.L.J. 506], Subramaniam v.\n\nRamchandm [ (1946) :?. M.L.J. 429] distinguished.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDIC'fION: : Appeal (Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1950), from a judgment and order of the J1igh Court of Judicature at Madras dated 5th January, 1948, reversing an order of the District Judge of East Tanjore in aµ application under s. 47 and\n\n0. XXI, r. 2, of the Civil Procedure Cpde.\n\nR. K. Kesava Aiyangar (T. K. Sundal'araman, with him) for the appellants.\n\nS. Ramachandra Aiyar for the respondant.\n\n1951.\n\nMarch 5.\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the decree-holders in a mortgage suit and it is directed against a judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated January 5, 1948, by\n\nv. RamasllHlm\n\nOthers\n\nT. N. V.1'ailota\n\nTvtll'.\n\nMilk!u1j1a J.\n\nAyyatrgar and\n\nOtleers\n\nv. 7, N. V. Kailtua\n\nTkevar.\n\nwhich the learned Judges reversed, on appeal, on order of the District Judge of East Tanjore made in a prc>- ceeding under section 47 and Order 21, . rule 2, of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe materials facts are not in controversy and may be briefly stated as follows. The appellants before us are the representatives of three original plaintiffs who, as mortgagees, instituted a suit (being O.S. No. 30 of\n\n1934) in the Court of the District Judge, East Tanjore, for enforcenient of a mortgage, against the present respondent, who was defendant No. 1 in the suit, and six other persons.\n\nThe mortgage bond, upon which the suit was' brought, was executed by defendant No. 1 for himself and his minor undivided brother, the defendant No. 2, and also as authorised agent on behalf of defendants 3 to 7 who were interested in a joint family business.\n\nThe suit was contested by all the defendants except defendant No. 1, against whom it proceeded ex\n\nparte, and there was a preliminary decree passed on May 15, 1937, by which a sum of Rs. 1,08,098 was directed to be paid by defendant No. l and defendants 3 to 7, in default of which the plaintiffs were declared entitled to apply for a firial decree for sale of the mortgage properties, and the suit was dismissed against defendant No. 2.\n\nAgainst this decree, two appeals were taken to the Madras High Court, one by defendants 3 to 7-being Appeal No. 48 of 1938-who contended that the mortgage was not binding on them or on their shares in the joint family property; and the other by the plaintiffs-being Appeal No. 248 of 1938-who challenged the propriety of the judgment of the trial judge in so far as it dismissed their claim against defendant No. 2.\n\nDuring the pendency of these appeals; the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (Act\n\nIV of 1938) came into force and applicat'ions were made by defendants 2 to 7 to the High Court, praying that in the event of a decree being passed against them, the decretal debt might be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe defendant No. 1, who did not appear at any stage of the proceeding, did not make any such application.\n\nThe H1gh Court forwanled\n\nthese applications to the lower court for_ enquiry i nro the matrer and for return, with its finding on the question as to whether the applicants were agriculturists, and if so. to what extent, the decretal dues should be scaled down.\n\nThe District Judge, after making enquiries, submitteda finding that the applicants were agriculturists and that the debt, if scaled down, would amount to Rs. 49,255 with interest thereupon at 6% per annum from 1st October, 1937, exclusive of costs.\n\nOn receipt of this finding, the appeals were set down for final hearing and by their judgment dated -March 25, 1942, the learned Judges of the High Court accepted the finding of the court below and held that defendants 2 to 7 were entitled to have the debts scaled down; but as no application had been made on behalf of defendant No. 1, he was held entitled to no relief under the Act.\n\nA decree was drawn up in accordance with_ the judgment.\n\nThe amount due by defendants 2 to 7 was stated to be Rs. 49,255 with interest .thereon at 6% per annum; while, so far as defendant No. 1 was concerned, the decree of the trial judge was affirmed subject to a slight modification regarding - the rate of interest.\n\nThe -defendant No. 1 thereupon filed an application in the court of the District Judge, East Tanjore, claiming relief under the Agriculturists' Relief Act alleging that he too wa~ an agriculturists and hence entitled to the benefits of the Act.\n\nThe application was dismissed -on February 25, 1943, on the ground that as the decree had already been passed by the High Court definitely negativ'mg his claim to any relief under the Agri<tulturists' Relief Act, such application was not entertainable by the lower court.\n\nThe next step taken by the defendant No. 1 was to file on application in the High Court itself, praying for setting aside ex parte decree which excluded him from the benefits of Act IV of\n\n1938. This application was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 1943.\n\nA_s no payment was made in accordam:e with the preliminary decree passed by the High Court, a final decree in terms of the same was passed by the\n\nV. Ramtiswami\n\nAiyan \"\"' a•d. • Othrs ,-. -r. N. V. Kail<M!l.\n\n-rhevar.\n\nAyyangar and\n\nOther.f\n\nT. N. V. Kailasa\n\nTlu:var.\n\nMukhnjta J.\n\n. District Judge on September 25, 1943.\n\nProceedings for execution of' this final decree were started on August 16, 1944, in E. P. 2 of 1945 of the court of the District Judge, East Tanjore.\n\nTwo lots of the mortgaged properties were put up to sale and purchased by the decree-holders for a total sum of Rs. 12,005 on July 15, 1946. .The sale was confirmed on August 17, 1946, and part satisfaction of the decree was entered for that amount.\n\nApparently, certain terms of settlement were thereafter offered by the judgment-debtors.\n\nThe estate of the decree-holders was in the hands of the Receivers and from the Receivers' report dated January 10, 1947, it appears that the Receivers agreed with the sanction of the court, to receive Rs. 24,000 only from or on behalf of defendant No. 2 and release him and his share of the mortgaged property from the decretal charge.\n\nLikewise, the Receivers were agreeable to receive Rs. 48,000 from defendants 3 to 7 and to release them and their properties from the decretal debt.\n\nWith regard to defendant No. 1, the proposal, which seems to have been accepted by the Receivers, was that th~ amount payable by him under the decree was to be settled at Rs. 37,500 and one Yacob Nadar would pay this amount on his behalf on consideration ofthe decree against defendant No. l being assigned to him by the Receivers excluding the rights of the latter to execute the decree against defendants 2 to 7 as scaled down by the High Court.\n\nThe records of the execution case show that on January 20, 1947, a sum of Rs. 24,000 was paid on behalf of defendant No. 2; and his properties, namely, lots 2 and 6 were exonerated from the decree.\n\nOn January 27, 1947, a sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid by defendants 3 to 7 and on February 17 following, they paid a further sum of Rs. 18,610-12-0.\n\nThese three amounts aggregated to Rs. 72,610-12-0.\n\nNothing was done towards the payment of the sum of Rs. 37,500 by defendant No. 1 or by Yacob Nadar, but on March 6, 1947, the defendant No. l deposited in court a sum of Rs. 3,215 and put in a petition under section 47 and\n\nOrder 21, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, praying that as the amount thu5 deposited together with the payments already made completely wiped off the amount due under the decree as scaled down by the High Court in farnur of defendants 2 to 7, full satisfatcion of the decree might be recorded exonerating the mortgaged properties and also the defendant No. 1 himself from any further liability in respect of. the decretal debt.\n\nThe position taken up by defendant No; 1, in substance, was that the:: mortgage debt was one and indivisible and even though different amounts were men tioned as payable by two groups of defendants in the decree, the decree-holders were bound under the terms of the decree to release the entire mortgaged property even on payment of the amount directed to be paid by defendants 2 to 7.\n\nIn other words, even though the defendant No. l's application for relief under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act was expressly rejevted and he was held liable for the entire amount of the mortgage debt, he would still be entitled to avail himself of the benefit of the scaling down of the decree in favour of defendants 2 to 7.\n\nThis contention was negatived by the District Judge, but was accepted by the High Court on appeal, who allowed the application of defendant No. 1 and directed that the court below should enter up full satisfaction of the motgage decree.\n\nIt is against this judgment that the decree-holders have come up on appeal to this court.\n\nThe learned Judges.of the High Court observed at the outset that in the working of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act alongside the provisions of the Transfer of Pmperty Act several curious and novel situations had arisen for which it was not possible always to find logical solutions.\n\nThey then proceedd to discuss the various decisions of the Madras High Court which had a bearing on this point and the conclusion which they reached may be summed up in their words as follows :-\n\n\"It is no , doubt. somewha.t odd /that when a person is declared liable to pay a larger :imount he should on\n\nv. Rama.iwami\n\nAyyangar tUUl\n\nOthtis\n\nT. N. V. Kaildia\n\nT/ui; ar.\n\nJ, ftiklurjta J.\n\nY. RamtUwansi\n\n~ yyan1or antf\n\nOllrtrs\n\nT . .N. Y. Kailasa\n\nThtvar.\n\nMukhtrj1a J.\n\npayment or tender of a smaller amount get his property exonerated from liability but this is inherent in and arises out of the proposition established by the decisions already dealt with, namely, that by the application of the principle of unity and indivisibility of a mortgage decree a non-agriculturist can indirectly get relief which he cannot directly get\".\n\nIt seems to us that the High Court's apprach to the case has not been a proper one and the conclusion it has reached cannot be supported in law.\n\nThe learned Judges appear to have overlooked the fact that they were sitting onlv as an executing -court and their duty was to give effect to the terms of the decree that was already passed and beyond which they could not go.\n\nIt is true that they were to interpret the decree, but under the guise of interpretation th(.y could not make a new decree for the parties.\n\nAs said above, the mortgage decree was scaled down by the High Court jn favour of defendants 2 to 7 only and the amended decree directs that the said defendants do pay into court the sum of Rs. 49,255 with certain interest and costs on payment of which the plaintiff was to bring into court all the documents in his power or possession relating to the mortgage and reconvey or retransfer the property if so required.\n\nSo far as defendant No. 1 is concerned, the decree states in dear and express terms that he is to pay the sum of Rs. 1,05,000 and odd and 'it is on payment of this sum only that redemption would be allowed of the mortgaged property. If the decision of the High Court is correct, this direction in the decree would be manifestly unmeaning and without any effect: What is said, however, on behalf of the respondent is that he is not claiming any benefit in violation of this clause.\n\nBy virtue of the decree against defendants 2 to 7 being satisfied, the entire mortgaged property would, by force of the very decree, be freed from the debt and if the respondent gets any benefit thereby, such benefit would be merely incidental or consequential in its nature.\n\nThe High Court agreed in substance with this contention\n\nand based its decision entirely upon the view that by operation of the principle of indivisibility of the mort; gage decree, a non-agriculturist debtor, whose debt has\n\nnot been scaled down under the provisions of . the Agriculturists' Relief Act, may ind'irectly get the benefit of the relief which has been granted to his agriculturist co-debtor under the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe general law undoubtedly is that _a mortgage decree is one and indivisible and exceptions to this rule are admitted in special circumstances where the in_tegrity of the mortgage has been disrupted at the instance of the mortgagee himself; e.g., when there is severance of the interests of the mortgagors whh the consent of the mortgagee or a portion of the equity of redemption is vested in the latter.\n\nIt is to be: noted, however, that the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special statute which aims at giving relief not to debtors 'in general but only to a specified class of debtors, viz., those who are agriculturists as defined in the Act.\n\nTo this extent it trenches upon the general law and section 7 of the Act expressly provides that \"notwithstanding any law, custom, contract or decree of court to the contrary, all debts payable by an agriculturist at the commencement of this Act shall be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of this chapter\". Thus in case of a mortgage debt when the loan has been advanced to more than one person, if one of the debtors happens to be an agriculturist while others are not, the agriculturist debtor would certainly be entitled to have his debts scaled down under the provisions of the Act in spite of the provision of general law which prevents a mortgagor from denying the. liability of the interest which he owns in the mortgaged property to satisfy the entire mortgage debt.\n\nThere is, therefore, nothing wrong in law in scafing down a mortgage decree in favour of one of the judgmentdcbtors, while as regards others the decree is kept intact.\n\nThe Madras High Court expressly adopted this view in Ramier v. Srinivasiah (1), which is one of the\n\n{I) [1940] 2 M. ; L; J. 872.\n\n0th.rs\n\nT. N. V. Kailasa\n\nThevar,\n\nMuklierjM J.\n\nRamaswami .d_yyangM attrl\n\nOlhtr.r\n\nv N. V Kailasa\n\nThtvar.\n\n11.khtrj•• J.\n\ndecisions referred to in the judgment appealed from.\n\nThe fact that in that case it was a puisne mortgagee and not a mortgagor whose application for relief under section 19 of the Madras Agriculurists' Relief Act was allowed, does not make any difference in principle.\n\nThe puisne mortgageewas made a party defendant in the suit instituted by the first mortgagee to recover his dues and as the puisne mortgagee was liable to pay the debt due to the first mortgagee, he was held to be a debtor and hence entitled to claim the benefit of section 19 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act.\n\nIt may be mentioned here that section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act which provides for separation of a debt incurred by a Hindu family,. some members of which are agriculturists while others are not, affords a cle¥ indication that the splitting up of a debt in such circumstances is quite in accordance with the scheme of the Act. ·\n\n. The catena of cases upon which the learned Judges of the High Court relied in support of their decision seems to proceed on a different principle altogether and whether that principle is. right or wrong, it has, in our opinion, no application to a ease like . the present.\n\nIn this class of cases, . the mortgagors were agriculturists and hence entitled to have their debts scaled. down under the Agriculturists' Relief Act, but thece were purchasers of the mortgaged property who were not agriculturists, :µid the question arose whether a purchaser could get the benefit of the debt scaled down in favour of the original debtors.\n\nThis question was answered in the affirmative.\n\nThe reason for taking this view was thus given by the learned Judges in Arunt1ehalam Pillai v. Seetharam(1) where the purchase of the equity of redemption was at an execution sale :-\n\n\"When the .12th respondent purchased the propctties in cow; t auction, he took them subjCct, to the burden of the appellant's mortgage and if the burden is by reason of the P.rovisions of s. 8 referred to al:Xwe\n\nreduced without payment, the purchase proves to fhar\n\n(1) [1941] l M. L.J. 561.\n\nextent an a<lvantageous one, and there is nothing in the Act to <leprive him of the fruits of his lucky purchase, even thougli he is not an agriculturist.\n\nHe gets the benefit of the scaling down not because the provisions of the Act apply to him, for obviously they do not, but because such benefit is a necessary incident of his purchase w1der the general law and the Act does not deprive him of it.\"\n\nA somewhat different reason was assigned in Panchigola v. Karatam(1) which however was a case where a portion of the equity of redemption was transferred to a purchaser by a private sale.\n\nIt was held that the court by allowing the mortgagor to redeem the mortgage sale . was not conferring on the puchaser, a non-agriculturist, the benefit of the Act, as he would have to . refund to his vendor the purchase money reserved with him which as a result of the scaling down he would not have to pay to the mortgagee.\n\nIn both these cases, the question was raised in the proceeding for scaling down of the decree under the provisions of the Agriculturists' Relief Act itself and not at the execution stage.\n\nThere is however the case of Subramanian v. Ramachandra( 2 ), where the question arose in course of execution proceedings and a purchaser of a portion of the equity of redemption was held to be entitled to the benefit of the scaled down decree in favour of the mortgagors, although his own application for relief under the Act was refused.\n\nIt is not necessary for purposes of this case to . express any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of these decisions.\n\nIt is enough to say that the ratio decidendi in all these cases is not applicable to the case before us.\n\nIn the present case there is no pur.chaser of the mortgaged property and consequently there is no question of the purchaser, who is not an agriculturist himself, being entitled to the benefit of a decree which has been scaled down in favour of the agriculturist mortgagor.\n\nHere the judgment-debtors are the mortgagors themselves and according to the plain provis1ons of . the Agriculturists' Relief Act there could\n\n(1) [1942] l M. L.J. 506.\n\n(2) [1946] 2 M. L.J. 429.\n\nV. Rama>wami\n\nOthers\n\nT. N. Y. /i'ailasa\n\nT1\"6ar.\n\nAyyangar antf\n\nOthlrs\n\nT. N. V. Kailasa\n\nThtuar.\n\nM•kherjea J.\n\nnot be any objection to a decree for reduced amount being passed against an agriculturist debtor, while the same relief is not given to his co-debtors who do not fulfil that description.\n\nSome exception could undoubtedly be taken to the form and wording of the decree that has been passed in the present case.\n\nThe decree, in our opinion, should not only have stated the amount payable by defendant No. 1 and that by defendants 2 to 7 separately but .should have expresdy directed that on payment of the amount directed to be paid by defendants 2 to 7 their interest alone in the mortgaged property would not be liable to be sold.\n\nThe further direction should have been that in case they did not pay this amount, the whole of the mortgaged property including their interest would be sold for the entirety of the mortgage debt for which defendant No. 1 was made liable.\n\nIt is true that the decree contains no such clear directions but reading the decree as a whole and having regard to ' the actual decision in the case, this must be taken to be its plain implications.\n\nThe subsequent agreement between the parties arrived at in course of the execution proceedings by which the decree-holders agreed to release the interest of defendant No. 2 and that of defendants 3 to 7 separately on payment of certain specified amounts by them proceeds clearly on the assumption that the mortgage debt and the security have been split up, and in our opinion it is not possible for the defendant No. 1 to contend that the mortgage debt remained indivisible.\n\nOur conclusion is that the view taken by the District Judge was right and should not have been disturbed . .\n\nThe result .is that the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court rs set aside and that of. the District Judge restored.\n\nWe , make no orner as to costs of this :q>peal. Appeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appenants : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for the respondent : M. S. K. AiY\"F", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "D. Slephnis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Slephnis\n\nNosiboUa."}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 253, "end_char": 280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on both the previous occasions, the Chief Presidency Magistrate was right in holding that the accused was not guilt)' of any offence under sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act."}}, {"text": "sections 25 and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356, "end_char": 374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Merchant Shipping Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 389, "end_char": 410, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatteriee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 606, "end_char": 622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : P. K. Chatteriee."}}, {"text": "l. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 652, "end_char": 664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : l. N. Shroff for P. K.\n\nBose."}}, {"text": "P. K.\n\nBose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : l. N. Shroff for P. K.\n\nBose."}}, {"text": "V. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 683, "end_char": 715, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 745, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T. N. V. 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CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 873, "end_char": 882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1190, "end_char": 1206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1616, "end_char": 1632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3234, "end_char": 3251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Madras High Court reversed."}}, {"text": "s. 47 and\n\n0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3736, "end_char": 3748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. K. Kesava Aiyangar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3791, "end_char": 3812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Kesava Aiyangar (T. K. Sundal'araman, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "T. K. Sundal'araman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3814, "end_char": 3833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Kesava Aiyangar (T. K. Sundal'araman, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. Ramachandra Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3866, "end_char": 3886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Ramachandra Aiyar for the respondant."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3969, "end_char": 3978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the decree-holders in a mortgage suit and it is directed against a judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated January 5, 1948, by\n\nv. RamasllHlm\n\nOthers\n\nT. N. V.1'ailota\n\nTvtll'.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "T. N. V.1'ailota", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4191, "end_char": 4207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the decree-holders in a mortgage suit and it is directed against a judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated January 5, 1948, by\n\nv. RamasllHlm\n\nOthers\n\nT. N. V.1'ailota\n\nTvtll'.", "canonical_name": "T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR"}}, {"text": "Ayyatrgar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Milk!u1j1a J.\n\nAyyatrgar and\n\nOtleers\n\nv. 7, N. V. Kailtua\n\nTkevar."}}, {"text": "N. V. Kailtua\n\nTkevar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4263, "end_char": 4284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Milk!u1j1a J.\n\nAyyatrgar and\n\nOtleers\n\nv. 7, N. V. Kailtua\n\nTkevar."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4410, "end_char": 4420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 15, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5287, "end_char": 5299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, against whom it proceeded ex\n\nparte, and there was a preliminary decree passed on May 15, 1937, by which a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "25, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt of this finding, the appeals were set down for final hearing and by their judgment dated -March 25, 1942, the learned Judges of the High Court accepted the finding of the court below and held that defendants 2 to 7 were entitled to have the debts scaled down; but as no application had been made on behalf of defendant No."}}, {"text": "February 25, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7928, "end_char": 7945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was dismissed -on February 25, 1943, on the ground that as the decree had already been passed by the High Court definitely negativ'mg his claim to any relief under the Agri<tulturists' Relief Act, such application was not entertainable by the lower court."}}, {"text": "December 13, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8413, "end_char": 8430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 1943."}}, {"text": "V. Ramtiswami", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8580, "end_char": 8593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A_s no payment was made in accordam:e with the preliminary decree passed by the High Court, a final decree in terms of the same was passed by the\n\nV. Ramtiswami\n\nAiyan \"\"' a•d. •", "canonical_name": "V. Ramtiswami"}}, {"text": "T. N. V. Kailasa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8676, "end_char": 8692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyangar and\n\nOther.f\n\nT. N. V. Kailasa\n\nTlu:var.", "canonical_name": "T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR"}}, {"text": "Mukhnjta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8704, "end_char": 8712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhnjta J.\n\n."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9354, "end_char": 9370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The estate of the decree-holders was in the hands of the Receivers and from the Receivers' report dated January 10, 1947, it appears that the Receivers agreed with the sanction of the court, to receive Rs."}}, {"text": "Yacob Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9928, "end_char": 9939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "37,500 and one Yacob Nadar would pay this amount on his behalf on consideration ofthe decree against defendant No."}}, {"text": "January 20, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10234, "end_char": 10250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The records of the execution case show that on January 20, 1947, a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "January 27, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10389, "end_char": 10405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 27, 1947, a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 6, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10691, "end_char": 10704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 or by Yacob Nadar, but on March 6, 1947, the defendant No."}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10792, "end_char": 10802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 21, rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10808, "end_char": 10824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10826, "end_char": 10846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Relief Act alongside the provisions of the Transfer of Pmperty Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12393, "end_char": 12459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rama.iwami\n\nAyyangar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12882, "end_char": 12902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "somewha.t odd /that when a person is declared liable to pay a larger :imount he should on\n\nv. Rama.iwami\n\nAyyangar tUUl\n\nOthtis\n\nT. N. V. Kaildia\n\nT/ui; ar."}}, {"text": "T. N. V. Kaildia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12917, "end_char": 12933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "somewha.t odd /that when a person is declared liable to pay a larger :imount he should on\n\nv. Rama.iwami\n\nAyyangar tUUl\n\nOthtis\n\nT. N. V. Kaildia\n\nT/ui; ar.", "canonical_name": "T. N. V. KAILASA THEVAR"}}, {"text": "Y. RamtUwansi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12964, "end_char": 12977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, ftiklurjta J.\n\nY. RamtUwansi\n\n~ yyan1or antf\n\nOllrtrs\n\nT ."}}, {"text": ".N. Y. Kailasa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13008, "end_char": 13022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".N. Y. Kailasa\n\nThtvar."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16249, "end_char": 16258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17572, "end_char": 17582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17946, "end_char": 17956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18023, "end_char": 18033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19395, "end_char": 19399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. Rama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21654, "end_char": 21661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Rama>wami\n\nOthers\n\nT. N. Y. /i'ailasa\n\nT1\"6ar.", "canonical_name": "V. Ramtiswami"}}, {"text": "T. N. Y.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21676, "end_char": 21684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Rama>wami\n\nOthers\n\nT. N. Y. /i'ailasa\n\nT1\"6ar."}}, {"text": "M•kherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21755, "end_char": 21764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M•kherjea J.\n\nnot be any objection to a decree for reduced amount being passed against an agriculturist debtor, while the same relief is not given to his co-debtors who do not fulfil that description.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23645, "end_char": 23660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appenants : M. S. K. Sastri.", "canonical_name": "M. S. K. Sastri"}}, {"text": "M. S. K. AiY\"F", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23690, "end_char": 23704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : M. S. K. AiY\"F", "canonical_name": "M. S. K. Sastri"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_303_312_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSANTOSH KUMAR JAIN\n\nTHE STATE.\n\nUNION OF INDIA-Intervener.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nand DAs JJ.]\n\nEmntial Supplies (TemP<miry Powers) Act (XXlV of 1946), s. 3-Power to \"provide for regulating or prohibiting production,\n\nsupply 11nd Ji11ribution\" of goods-W heiher includes power to issue directions 111!d orden to particular persons to do specific acts-Order to se11rch 11nd seize goods held by particular company\n\n-V11lidity-Scope -0/ Sflb-ss. (1) & (2) of s. 3-Generality of powers\n\nconferred by sub-s. (!)-Obstruction to officers carr.ying out .. order\n\nfor s_eizure-Con11iction under s. 186, l.P.C.-Legality-lndian Penal Code, 1860, s. 186-0ffence under, essentials of.\n\nSection 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, provided as follows :\n\n( 1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies cif an essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair , prices, may be notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof, and trade and commerce therein.\n\n(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. ( 1) an order made thereunder may provide ..... .\n\n(j) for any incidental and supplementary matters, including in particular the . entering, and search of premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft, the seizure by a person authorised to make sucht search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to liclieve that a contravention has been, is .being, or is about to be committed ...... \"\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by cl. (j) of sub-s. (2) of s. (3) of the above said Act, which had been delegated to the Provincial Government in relation to foodstuff!, the Governor of Bihar made an order authorising the District Magistrate, Patna, and the Special Officer in charge of rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by a company of which the appellant was the General Manager and directing the seizure of 5.000 maunds of sugar held in stock by the said company, on the ground that the company was about to commit a contravention of an order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies made under the Sugar aud Sugar Products CQ!ltrol 6--2 S. C. India/68\n\niuch ~.\n\nSantosh Kamat\n\nJain\n\nThe State\n\nOrder, 1947.\n\nThe appellant obstructed the officers who went to search and seize the goods and was convicted under s. 186, Indian Penal Code.\n\nHeld,\n\n(i) the power \"to provide for regulating or prohibiting production, supply and distribution\" conferred by the Act on the Central Government included the power tO regulate or prohibit by issuing directions to a particular producer or dealer or by requiring any specific act to be done or foreborne in regard to production, etc., and the order of the Governor was not therefore invalid on the ground that it was not a rule or regulation of general application but an order concerning a pa1ticular company alone;\n\n(ii) sub-section ( 2) of s. 3 conferred no further or other powers than What were conferred by sub-s. (1) and the enumera tion of certain matters in !llUb-s. (2) was merely illustrative, as such enumeration was \"without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. (!)\";\n\n(iii) seizure of an article being within the purview of sub-s. ( l) of s. 3 it was therefore competent to the Central Government, and its delegate the Provincial Government, to make an order for. seizure under sub-s. ( 1) apart from and irrespective of the anticipated contravention of any other order as contemplated in cl. (j) of sub-section (2);\n\n(iv) even assuming that the order of the Chief Controller of Prices .under the Sugar Control Order was incomplete and inoperative and there could be no question of its contravention, the rc::fereni;::e to that order in the order made by the Governor would be a mere redundancy and would not affect the validity of the latter order, and the appellant was rightly convicted under s. 186; Penal Code.\n\nQuaere : Whether for an offence under s. 186, Penal Code, it i.s necessary that the act which was obstructed must be duly authorised and otherwise lawful.\n\nKing Emperor v. Sibnath Baneri\" [1945] F.C.R. 195 applied.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1950) from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing a petition to revise an order of the Sessions Judge, Patna, convicting the appellant for an offence under s. 186, Indian Penal Code : The facts of the case appear in \\he judgment.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (Rameshwar Nath, with him) for the appellant.\n\nS. K. Mitra (K. Daval, with him) for the respondant.\n\nS. M. _Sikri for the Intervener.\n\n1951. March 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing a revision petition against the conviction of the appellant for an offence under s. 186 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe appellant was at all material times the General Manager of the Jagdishpur Zamindary Company (hereinafter reterred to as the company) whc were the lessees of a sugar factory referred to in -these proceedings as the Bhita Sugar Factory.\n\nHe was prosecuted for obstructing the then District Magistrate and the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, in the discharge of their official functions when they went to the factory on 6th December, 1947, to remove 5,000 maunds of sugar which had been seized out of the stock held by the company pursuant to an order of the Government of Bihar, dated 5th December, 1947. The case for the prosecution was as follows : The company had deliberately failed to comply with the orders for . supply of sugar issued from time to time under the provisions of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, by officers of the Government duly authorised in that behalf, and in consequence, the Government made the following order on 5th December, 1947 :-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by cl. (j) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which have been delegated to the Provincial Government in relation to foodstuffs in the notification of the Government of India, Department of Food, No. PY\" 603 (2)-1, dated 21st October, 1946, the Governor of Bihar is pleased :-\n\n( 1) to authorise the District Magistrate, Patna, and/or the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by Messrs.\n\nJagdishpur Zamindary Company, Bhita, in the District of Patna, which is about to commit a contraventiqn of\n\nSanlo:Sh Krunai'\n\nJaiti\n\nVo The State\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastrij.\n\n1951 ---- ]ad\n\nT/uSIDI•\n\nthe. order . .of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies, Bihar, made under cl. 7(1) (ii) of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, and issued in order No. 1613-P.C.R., dated 27th September, 1947, in so far as the said order relates to the said Company, and\n\n(2) to direct that 5,000 maunds of sugar held in stock by the said Company shall be seized.\n\nBy order of the Governor of Bihar,\n\nSd. T. P. SINGH, Secretary to Government.\"\n\nOn the 6th Decembc;.r, 1947, when the officers named went to the factory to carry out the aforesaid order, they were told by the appellant that he would do everything possible to obstruct the removal of the sugar-, and accordingly it. was found that the sugar godowns had been locked and the road leading to them blocked by heaps of coal, firewood and tins placed across, so as to make vehicular traffic impossible. A railway siding leading to the godowns had also been rendered unserviceable by the removal of some - of the rails and fishplates.\n\nAs . a result of such obstruction, the officers had to seek the aid of armed police to break open the locks, repair the railway line and clear the road block .before the sugar. could be removed from the factory.\n\nThe appellant's main defence was that on a proper construction of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) it was not competent for the Government to pass\n\nthe order of 5th December, 1947, which was consequently illegal and void, and that obstruction to the exccutien of that order could not constitute an offence under s. 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The contention was rejected and the appellant was convicte<l and sentenced to simple imprisonment for a term of three weeks.\n\nOn appeal, the Sessions Judge, Patna, confirmed the conviction and sentence, agreeing with the findings of the trial court, and a Revision Petition preib; red by the appellant was rejected by the High Court,\n\nwhich, however,. granted a certificate under article 134\n\n(1) ( c) of the Constitution that the case was a fit one for appeal to this court as it involved a point of \"sufficient public importance\" as to the interpretation of section 3 of the Act.\n\nSection 3, so far as it is material here, runs as follows :-\n\n\"3: (1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for n-.aintairiing or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, may, by notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof; and trade and commerce therein.\n\n(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), an order made thereunder may provide-\n\n(j) for any incidental and supplementary matters, including in particular the entering. and search of premises, vehicles, vessds and aircraft, the seizure by a person authorised to make such search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to believe that a contravention of the order has been, is being, or is about to be committed, the grant or issue of licences, permits or other documents, and the charging of fees therefor.\" ·\n\nIt was contended that an order under sub-section (1) should be in the nature of a rule or regulation of general application, like the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, issued by the Central Government on 4th August, 1947. as the suJHection confers on the Central Gl)Vc:rnment only the power to \"provide for regulating\n\nar vrohibiting\" the production, supply, distributfon, etc., of essential commodities, and d<>es not authorise the making of . ad hoc or speeial orders with respect to any particular person or thing.\n\nWe see no reason to place such a restricted construction on the scope of the power conferred on the Central Government. The term \"notified order\" which is defined as meaning \"an . .f-0\n\nSantosliKIUIMIT\n\n]Qin\n\nThe State\n\nPatanjal; SastriJ.\n\nSantosla K11ma'\n\nJain v.\n\nTh~Stalt!\n\nPalanjali\n\nSastri].\n\norder notified in the official Gazette\" is wide enough to cover special as well as general orders .relating to the matters specified in section 3.\n\nThe power to provide for regulating or prohibiting production, distribution and supply conferred on an executive body may well include the power to regulate or prohibit by issuing directions to a particular producer or dealer or by requiring any specific act to be done or forborne in regard to production, etc., and the provisions of section 4 lend support to that view. The Central Government is empowered under the latter section to delegate its . power to make order under section 3, subject to conditions to be specified, to any officer or subordinate authority either of the Central or a Provincial Government. It would be strange if, as contended for the appellant, a subordinate officer in charge, say, of a small area, should, by delegation, exercise powers of a legislative character in relation to the matters specified in section 3, but should not have the power of issuing special orders concerning specific individuals or things. We do not think that such a situation could have been contemplated. The power delegated under section 4 must, in our opinion, include the power of issuing directions to any producer or dealer in relation to production, etc., of any specified essential commodity. If so, the delegating authority itself must\n\nposess such power under section 3. For instance, secl:Ion 7. of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, made by the Central Government empowers the \"Controller\" \"to issue directions to any producer or dealer to supply sugar or sugar products\" to specified areas, persons or organisations.\n\nThis delegation is expressed .to be made \"in exercise of the\n\npowers -onferred by section 3 and 4\" of the Act, but unless the Central Government itself had the power of issuing such directions under section 3, it could not delegate that power to the Controller under section 4.\n\nThis view is reinforced by the language of section 15, which. contemplaes orders under section 3 being made _ agamst a part:Icular person, for it speaks of \"an order made under section 3 which prohibits him (that\n\nis, the person prosecuted for its contravention) from doing any act or being in possession of a thing without lawful authoritv, etc.\" The restricted construction of section 3 contended for by the appellant's counsel would render the scheme of the Act largely unworkable, and we have no hesitation in rejecting it.\n\nEven so, it was argued, an order for seizure could be made only subject to the conditions and limitations specified in clause (j) of sub-section (2) of section 3, that is to say, only where the person authorised in that behalf \"has reason. to believe that a contravention of the order [an order made under sub-section ( 1)] has been, is being, or is about to be committed\". In the present case, the order of 5th December 1947, directing. the seizure of 5,000 maunds of the company's sugar J.n the execution of which the appellant has been found to have obstructed the officers of the Provincial Government, recited that the company was \"about to commit a contravention of the order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies, Bihar, made under cl. 7(15 (ii) of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947,' and issued in order No. 1613 P.C.~, dated 27th September, 1947, in so fur as the said order relates to the said company\".\n\nThe latter order, while it directed the company, among others, \"to supply sugar at the prices fixed t.o the approved dealers of certain Districts'', left it to the District or Sub-divisional Officer to fix quotas for the approved dealers of his District or Sub-division from the District or Sub-divisional allotment and to inform the company when and where the supplies are to be made. It has been found by the courts below that the total quantity of sugar which the order required to be supplied was varied from .time to time, and no quotas to approved dealers were ever fixed nor information sent to the company as to when and where supplies were to be made. The order of the 27th September, 1947, having thus remained inchoate and incomplete and so incapable of being carried out or contravened till the.5th December, 1947, it was submitted that no seizure and removal could be lawfully ordered on the basis of an anticipated contravention .\n\nSantoshKumm\n\nJain v.\n\nTh1Stat1\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastriJ\n\nS•Usi KllMCt\n\n]\"in\n\nTheSe.te\n\nPolm!iali\n\nSttslriJ.\n\nof such an order, and that the officers concerned in the illegal and unauthorised removal of the sugar were not acting in the discharge of their public func tions. Reference was made in this connection to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Lilla Singli\n\nv. Queen Empress(') and Queen Empress v. Jogendra Nath Mukherjee( 2 ) where it was held that the public function in the discharge of which a public servant was obstructed must . be a legal or legitimately authorised function, in order that the obstruction might constitute an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nOn the other hand, counsel for the respondent maintained that for an offence under that section it was not necessary that the act which was Obstructed must be duly authorised and otherwise lawful if it was being done or was sought to be done by a public servant honestly and in good faith believing that it was part of his public functions, and reliance was placed in support of this view on the decisions of the Madras High Court in Queen Empress v. Poomatai\n\nUdayan( 8 ), Public Prosecutor v.\n\nMadava Bhonjo Santos(') and Peer Masthan Rowther v. Emperor(\").\n\nWe think it is unnecessary for the purpose of this appeal to pronounce on tbe true scope of section 186 of the Indian Penal Code as we are of opinion that the appellant's argument must fail on another ground.\n\nIt is manifest that sub-section (2) of section 3 confers no further or other powers on the Central Government than what are conferred under sub-section (1), for it is \"an order made thereunder\" that may provide for one or the other of the matters specifically enumerated in sub-section (2) which are only illustrative, as such enumerarion is \"without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section ( l) \".\n\nSeizure of an article being thus shown to fall within the purview of sub-section (1), it must be competent for the Central Government or its delegate, the Provincial Government, to make an order for seizure under\n\n(1) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 286.\n\n(4) 31 M.L.J. 505.\n\n(2) I.J..R. 24 Cal.'320.\n\n(5) 1938 M.W.N. 418.\n\n(3) I.L.R. 2 I Mad. 296.\n\nthat sub-section apart from and irrespective of the anticipated contravention of any other order as contemplated in clause (j) of sub-section (2). The order of 5th December, 1947, must, therefore, be held to be a valid order, notwithstanding its reference to the order of the 27th September, 1947, as being about to be contravened.\n\nIf the latter order was incomplete and inoperative and consequently there could be no question of its contravention, as contended for the appellant, the reference to it in the order dated the. 5th December, 1947, would be an immaterial redundancy and could not affect the validity of the latter order.\n\nThe seizure of the company's sugar must, therefore, be regarded as duly authorised and lawful, and the appellant by obstructing its removal, committed an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code even on the stricter construction placed on that provision by the Calcutta High Court.\n\nThe view we have expressed above receives support from the decision of the Privy Council in Sibnath Baneriu's case(1). Section 2(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, as amended by section 2 of the Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1940, empowered the Central Government to make rules for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, etc., and sub-section (2) enacted \"without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the rules may provide for all or any of the following matt.!rs ...... \". Among such matters was the detention of any person \"reasonably suspected\" of having acted etc. in a manner prejudicial to the public safety etc. [clause\n\n(x) ].\n\nRule 26 of the Rules made under the section, however, authorised the Government to detain a person \"if it is satisfied\" that it was necessary ro detain him with a view to prevent . him from acting prejudicially ....... .\n\nThe Federal Court held (9) that this rule was ultr•\n\nvires as it went beyond the . scope of clause (x) in that it left it to the satisfaction of the Government to decide whether or not it was necessary to detain :a\n\n(1) [19+5] F.C.R. 195; 72 I.A. 241, 248. (2) (19+4] p; c,\n\nStm\"1SllK11111.,\n\nJain v.\n\nTiii Stat•\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri; l.\n\nSantosh .Kumar\n\nJain ...\n\nTh1Stal1\n\nP111anjali\n\nSastriJ.\n\n1'51\n\nMuabl9.\n\nperson. The decision was reversed and Lord Thankerton, delivering the judgment of the Board, observed : \"In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of subsection (2) is merely an illustrative one; the rule-making power is conferred by sub-section (1), and \"the rules\" which are referred to in the opening sentence of subsection (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub-section ( 1) ; the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section (1), as, indeed is expressly stated by the words \"without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)\". \"There can be no doubt-as the learned Judge himself appears to have thought-that the general language of sub-section (1) amply justifies the terms of rule 26, and avoids any of the criticisms which the learned Judge expressed in relation to subsection (2) \".\n\nThis accords with our view of the effect of subsections (l) and (2) of section 3 of the Act.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed. The appellant's bail bond is cancelled and he is ordered to surrender.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for respondent and Intervener: P. A. Mehta.\n\nR.R. CHARI\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n[SHIU Rum.AL KANIA C.J, PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.)\n\nIndian Penal Code (XLV of 1860),\n\nSI. 161. 165-Criminal l'rocedure Code, 1898, ss. 190, 197-Preveniion of Corruption Act\n\n(II of 1947), ss. 3, 6-0fjence under ss. 161 and 165, l.P.C.-Warra.nt issued by Magistrate during investigation by police-Sanction under s. 197, Cr. P. C., not obtained before iS1uing warrant- Le11ality of trial-When Magistrate takes \"cognisance\" of offence.\n\nUn\"r •· of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, an offcnc:c pllnishable under •· 161 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code", "total_entities": 103, "entities": [{"text": "SANTOSH KUMAR JAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SANTOSH KUMAR JAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 206, "end_char": 210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510, "end_char": 514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 640, "end_char": 646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Legality-lndian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 655, "end_char": 687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 689, "end_char": 695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legality-lndian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Legality-lndian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 727, "end_char": 736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legality-lndian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Legality-lndian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1712, "end_char": 1730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "entering, and search of premises, vehicles, vessels and aircraft, the seizure by a person authorised to make sucht search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to liclieve that a contravention has been, is .being, or is about to be committed ...... \"\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by cl. ("}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1886, "end_char": 1891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Governor of Bihar made an order authorising the District Magistrate, Patna, and the Special Officer in charge of rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by a company of which the appellant was the General Manager and directing the seizure of 5.000 maunds of sugar held in stock by the said company, on the ground that the company was about to commit a contravention of an order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies made under the Sugar aud Sugar Products CQ!ltrol 6--2 S. C. India/68\n\niuch ~.\n\nSantosh Kamat\n\nJain\n\nThe State\n\nOrder, 1947."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1943, "end_char": 1948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Governor of Bihar made an order authorising the District Magistrate, Patna, and the Special Officer in charge of rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by a company of which the appellant was the General Manager and directing the seizure of 5.000 maunds of sugar held in stock by the said company, on the ground that the company was about to commit a contravention of an order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies made under the Sugar aud Sugar Products CQ!ltrol 6--2 S. C. India/68\n\niuch ~.\n\nSantosh Kamat\n\nJain\n\nThe State\n\nOrder, 1947."}}, {"text": "Santosh Kamat\n\nJain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2390, "end_char": 2409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Governor of Bihar made an order authorising the District Magistrate, Patna, and the Special Officer in charge of rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by a company of which the appellant was the General Manager and directing the seizure of 5.000 maunds of sugar held in stock by the said company, on the ground that the company was about to commit a contravention of an order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies made under the Sugar aud Sugar Products CQ!ltrol 6--2 S. C. India/68\n\niuch ~.\n\nSantosh Kamat\n\nJain\n\nThe State\n\nOrder, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2537, "end_char": 2543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2545, "end_char": 2562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3108, "end_char": 3112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3443, "end_char": 3447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4100, "end_char": 4106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4118, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4159, "end_char": 4165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4167, "end_char": 4177, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 195", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4309, "end_char": 4326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4434, "end_char": 4467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of 1950) from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing a petition to revise an order of the Sessions Judge, Patna, convicting the appellant for an offence under s. 186, Indian Penal Code : The facts of the case appear in \\he judgment."}}, {"text": "s. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4585, "end_char": 4591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (Rameshwar Nath, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4678, "end_char": 4692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee (Rameshwar Nath, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4724, "end_char": 4735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra (K. Daval, with him) for the respondant."}}, {"text": "K. Daval", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4737, "end_char": 4745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mitra (K. Daval, with him) for the respondant."}}, {"text": "S. M. _Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4778, "end_char": 4790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. _Sikri for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "s. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5059, "end_char": 5065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5073, "end_char": 5090, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jagdishpur Zamindary Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5160, "end_char": 5188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was at all material times the General Manager of the Jagdishpur Zamindary Company (hereinafter reterred to as the company) whc were the lessees of a sugar factory referred to in -these proceedings as the Bhita Sugar Factory."}}, {"text": "Rationing", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was prosecuted for obstructing the then District Magistrate and the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, in the discharge of their official functions when they went to the factory on 6th December, 1947, to remove 5,000 maunds of sugar which had been seized out of the stock held by the company pursuant to an order of the Government of Bihar, dated 5th December, 1947."}}, {"text": "6th December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5529, "end_char": 5547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was prosecuted for obstructing the then District Magistrate and the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, in the discharge of their official functions when they went to the factory on 6th December, 1947, to remove 5,000 maunds of sugar which had been seized out of the stock held by the company pursuant to an order of the Government of Bihar, dated 5th December, 1947."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5668, "end_char": 5687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was prosecuted for obstructing the then District Magistrate and the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, in the discharge of their official functions when they went to the factory on 6th December, 1947, to remove 5,000 maunds of sugar which had been seized out of the stock held by the company pursuant to an order of the Government of Bihar, dated 5th December, 1947."}}, {"text": "5th December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5695, "end_char": 5713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was prosecuted for obstructing the then District Magistrate and the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, in the discharge of their official functions when they went to the factory on 6th December, 1947, to remove 5,000 maunds of sugar which had been seized out of the stock held by the company pursuant to an order of the Government of Bihar, dated 5th December, 1947."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6188, "end_char": 6197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6362, "end_char": 6381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which have been delegated to the Provincial Government in relation to foodstuffs in the notification of the Government of India, Department of Food, No."}}, {"text": "21st October, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6428, "end_char": 6446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PY\" 603 (2)-1, dated 21st October, 1946, the Governor of Bihar is pleased :-\n\n( 1) to authorise the District Magistrate, Patna, and/or the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by Messrs.\n\nJagdishpur Zamindary Company, Bhita, in the District of Patna, which is about to commit a contraventiqn of\n\nSanlo:Sh Krunai'\n\nJaiti\n\nVo The State\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastrij."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Patna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6507, "end_char": 6533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PY\" 603 (2)-1, dated 21st October, 1946, the Governor of Bihar is pleased :-\n\n( 1) to authorise the District Magistrate, Patna, and/or the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by Messrs.\n\nJagdishpur Zamindary Company, Bhita, in the District of Patna, which is about to commit a contraventiqn of\n\nSanlo:Sh Krunai'\n\nJaiti\n\nVo The State\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastrij."}}, {"text": "Jagdishpur Zamindary Company, Bhita", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6639, "end_char": 6674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PY\" 603 (2)-1, dated 21st October, 1946, the Governor of Bihar is pleased :-\n\n( 1) to authorise the District Magistrate, Patna, and/or the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by Messrs.\n\nJagdishpur Zamindary Company, Bhita, in the District of Patna, which is about to commit a contraventiqn of\n\nSanlo:Sh Krunai'\n\nJaiti\n\nVo The State\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastrij."}}, {"text": "cl. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6912, "end_char": 6920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T. P. SINGH", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7239, "end_char": 7250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. P. SINGH, Secretary to Government.\""}}, {"text": "6th Decembc;.r, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7286, "end_char": 7306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 6th Decembc;.r, 1947, when the officers named went to the factory to carry out the aforesaid order, they were told by the appellant that he would do everything possible to obstruct the removal of the sugar-, and accordingly it."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8106, "end_char": 8110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8417, "end_char": 8423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8431, "end_char": 8448, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8591, "end_char": 8612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the Sessions Judge, Patna, confirmed the conviction and sentence, agreeing with the findings of the trial court, and a Revision Petition preib; red by the appellant was rejected by the High Court,\n\nwhich, however,."}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8830, "end_char": 8841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9010, "end_char": 9019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9033, "end_char": 9042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10264, "end_char": 10280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that an order under sub-section (1) should be in the nature of a rule or regulation of general application, like the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, issued by the Central Government on 4th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "Santosla K11ma'\n\nJain v.\n\nTh~Stalt!\n\nPalanjali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10819, "end_char": 10865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".f-0\n\nSantosliKIUIMIT\n\n]Qin\n\nThe State\n\nPatanjal; SastriJ.\n\nSantosla K11ma'\n\nJain v.\n\nTh~Stalt!"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11013, "end_char": 11022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11360, "end_char": 11369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11502, "end_char": 11511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11606, "end_char": 11613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "power to make order under section 3, subject to conditions to be specified, to any officer or subordinate authority either of the Central or a Provincial Government."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11859, "end_char": 11868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12063, "end_char": 12072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12301, "end_char": 12310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12659, "end_char": 12674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12776, "end_char": 12785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12844, "end_char": 12853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12899, "end_char": 12909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12943, "end_char": 12952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13033, "end_char": 13042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13235, "end_char": 13244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13537, "end_char": 13546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th December 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13793, "end_char": 13810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, the order of 5th December 1947, directing."}}, {"text": "cl. 7(15 (ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14133, "end_char": 14146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th September, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14243, "end_char": 14263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1613 P.C.~, dated 27th September, 1947, in so fur as the said order relates to the said company\"."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15600, "end_char": 15619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made in this connection to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Lilla Singli\n\nv. Queen Empress(') and Queen Empress v. Jogendra Nath Mukherjee( 2 ) where it was held that the public function in the discharge of which a public servant was obstructed must ."}}, {"text": "section 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15927, "end_char": 15938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15946, "end_char": 15963, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16379, "end_char": 16396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, counsel for the respondent maintained that for an offence under that section it was not necessary that the act which was Obstructed must be duly authorised and otherwise lawful if it was being done or was sought to be done by a public servant honestly and in good faith believing that it was part of his public functions, and reliance was placed in support of this view on the decisions of the Madras High Court in Queen Empress v. Poomatai\n\nUdayan( 8 ), Public Prosecutor v.\n\nMadava Bhonjo Santos(') and Peer Masthan Rowther v. Emperor(\")."}}, {"text": "section 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16619, "end_char": 16630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16638, "end_char": 16655, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16776, "end_char": 16785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18301, "end_char": 18312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18320, "end_char": 18337, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sibnath Baneriu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18518, "end_char": 18533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view we have expressed above receives support from the decision of the Privy Council in Sibnath Baneriu's case(1)."}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18545, "end_char": 18557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18565, "end_char": 18591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18607, "end_char": 18616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act, 1939", "statute": "the Defence of India Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Santosh .Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19715, "end_char": 19729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jain v.\n\nTiii Stat•\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri; l.\n\nSantosh .Kumar\n\nJain ...\n\nTh1Stal1\n\nP111anjali\n\nSastriJ.\n\n1'51\n\nMuabl9.", "canonical_name": "SANTOSH KUMAR JAIN"}}, {"text": "Thankerton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19831, "end_char": 19841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision was reversed and Lord Thankerton, delivering the judgment of the Board, observed : \"In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of subsection (2) is merely an illustrative one; the rule-making power is conferred by sub-section (1), and \"the rules\" which are referred to in the opening sentence of subsection (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub-section ( 1) ; the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section (1), as, indeed is expressly stated by the words \"without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)\". \""}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20730, "end_char": 20739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20894, "end_char": 20909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20949, "end_char": 20960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondent and Intervener: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20979, "end_char": 21001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.R. CHARI\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n[SHIU Rum."}}, {"text": "SHIU Rum.AL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21004, "end_char": 21021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.R. CHARI\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n[SHIU Rum."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21059, "end_char": 21076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 190, 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21138, "end_char": 21150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Preveniion of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21151, "end_char": 21179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21195, "end_char": 21203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preveniion of Corruption Act", "statute": "Preveniion of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 161 and 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21218, "end_char": 21233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preveniion of Corruption Act", "statute": "Preveniion of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21318, "end_char": 21324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preveniion of Corruption Act", "statute": "Preveniion of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21456, "end_char": 21490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21532, "end_char": 21538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21546, "end_char": 21563, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_312_321_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "Santosh .Kumar\n\nJain ...\n\nTh1Stal1\n\nP111anjali\n\nSastriJ.\n\n1'51\n\nMuabl9.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nperson. The decision was reversed and Lord Thankerton, delivering the judgment of the Board, observed : \"In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of subsection (2) is merely an illustrative one; the rule-making power is conferred by sub-section (1), and \"the rules\" which are referred to in the opening sentence of subsection (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub-section ( 1) ; the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section (1), as, indeed is expressly stated by the words \"without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)\". \"There can be no doubt-as the learned Judge himself appears to have thought-that the general language of sub-section (1) amply justifies the terms of rule 26, and avoids any of the criticisms which the learned Judge expressed in relation to subsection (2) \".\n\nThis accords with our view of the effect of subsections (l) and (2) of section 3 of the Act.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed. The appellant's bail bond is cancelled and he is ordered to surrender.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for respondent and Intervener: P. A. Mehta.\n\nR.R. CHARI\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n[SHIU Rum.AL KANIA C.J, PATANJALI SASTRI\n\nand DAS JJ.)\n\nIndian Penal Code (XLV of 1860),\n\nSI. 161. 165-Criminal l'rocedure Code, 1898, ss. 190, 197-Preveniion of Corruption Act\n\n(II of 1947), ss. 3, 6-0fjence under ss. 161 and 165, l.P.C.-Warra.nt issued by Magistrate during investigation by police-Sanction under s. 197, Cr. P. C., not obtained before iS1uing warrant- Le11ality of trial-When Magistrate takes \"cognisance\" of offence.\n\nUn\"r •· of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, an offcnc:c pllnishable under •· 161 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code\n\nis a cognisable offence for the purposes of the Crimnial Procedure Code subject to the condition that the police shall not investigate without an order of .a magistrate of the first class or make an ar'rest without a warrant; and when the police apply for a warrant of arrest during investigation under s. 3 of the said Act and the magistrate issues a warrant, he is not deemed to have taken cognisance of the case under s. 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the fact that sanction of the Government under s. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code had not been obtained before the warrant wa:s issued would not vitiate the trial.\n\nHaving regard to the wording of s. 3 of the said Act the view that the magistrate can issue a warrant only after taking cognisance of the offence under s. 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is unsound.\n\nBefore it can be said that a . magistrate has taken . cognisance of an offence under s. 190 (l)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to rhie contents of the petition but have done so for the purpose of proceeding under s. 200 and the subsequent provisions of the Code.\n\nWhere he applied his mind only for ordering investigation or issuing a warrant for purposes of investigation he cannot be said to have taken cognisance of the offence.\n\nEmperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckel'butty (I.L.R. 37 Cal. '412) clistinguished.\n\nObservations of Das Gupta J. in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar\n\nBan'er; ee (A.LR. 1950 Cal. 4.37) approved.\n\nGopal Mandari v. Emperor (A.LR. 1943 Pat. 245) referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Appeal {Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1950) by special leave from an order of the High Court of Allahabad.\n\nN. P. Asthana and N. C. Chatterjee (K. B. Asthana, with them) for the appellant.\n\nP. L.\n\nBanerjee ' (Shri Ram, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1951. March 19. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKANIA C.J.-This 1s an appeal by special leave ctgainst an order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the revision petition of the appellant against the order of the Special Magistrate refusing to quash the proceedings on the ground that the prosecution of the appellant inter alia under sections 161 and 165 of\n\nTht Stott ef Uttar .Pradesh.\n\n....... c.3.\n\n1951\n\nR. l!. Ck'!fi\n\nThs Stateqf Ultu PT..Ush,\n\nlr•nic C.J.\n\nthe Indian Penal Code was illegal and without jurisdiction in the absence of the sanction of the Government under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure\n\nCode and section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), hereafter referred to as the Act. The material facts are these.\n\nIn 1947 the appellant held tjie office of Regional Deputy Iron and Steel Controller, Kanpur Circle, U.P., and was a public servant.\n\nThe police having suspected the appellant to be guilty of the offences mentioned above applied to the Deputy Magistrate, Kanpur, for a warrant of his arrest on the 22nd of October, 1947, and the warrant was issued on the next day.\n\nThe appellant was arrested on the 27th of October, 1947, but was granted . ball.\n\nOn the 26th of November, 1947, the District Magistrate cancelled his bail as the Magistrate considered that the sureties were not proper.\n\nOn the 1st of December, 1947, the Government appointed a Special Magistrate to try offences under the Act and on the 1st December, 1947, the appellant was produced before the Special Magistrate and was granted bail. The police continued their investigation.\n\nOn the 6th of December, 1948, sanction was granted by the Provincial Government to prosecute the appellant inter alia under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nOn the 31st January, 1949, sanction in the saine terms was granted by the Central Government. In the meantime as a result of an appeal made by the appellant to the High Court of Allahabad the amount of his bail was reduced and on the 25th of March, 1949, the appellant was ordered to be put up before the Magistrate to answer the chargcsheet submitted by the prosecution.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it is argued that when the warrant for his arrest was issued by the Magistrate on the ~2nd of October, 1947, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and, as no sanction of the Government had been obtained before that day, the initiation of the proceedings against him, which began on that day without the sanction of the Government, was illegal.\n\nIt is argued that the saine proceedings arc continuing against him and thercfofe the notice to\n\nappear before the Magistrate issued on 25th March, 1949, is also illegal. In suppon of his contention that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences on 22nd March, 1947, .he relies principally on certain observations in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty(1).\n\nIt is therefore necessary to determine when the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. The relevant part of section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code runs as follows :-\n\n190. ( 1) \"Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence--\n\n(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;\n\n(b) upon a repori: in writing of such facts made by :any police officer;\n\n(c) upon information received from any. person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed ... \"\n\nIt is clear from the wording of the section that the initiation of the proceedings against a person commences on the cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate under one of the three contingencies mentioned in the section. The first contingency evidently is in respect of non-cogQizable offences as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code on the complaint of an aggrieved person. . The second is on a police report, which evidently is the case of a cognizable offence when the police have completed their investigation and -come to the Magistrate for the issue of a process. . The . third is when the Magistrate himself takes notice of an\n\n-0ff ence and issues the process. It is important to remember that in respect of any cognizable . offence, the police, at the initial stage when they arc investigating the . matter, can arrest a person without obtaining an (ll J, L.R, 37 Cal. 412.\n\nTA• State ef Uttar Pr11t/esh.\n\nKaaia C.J.\n\nR.R.Cltmi\n\nTAIStattqf Ut1ar Pradesh.\n\nK'ania C.j.\n\norder from the Magistrat.e.\n\nUnder section 167(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code the police have of courte to put -up the person so arrested before a Magistrate within 24 hours and obtain an order of remand to police custody for the purpose of further investigation, if they so desire. But they have the power to arrest a person for the purpose of investigation without approaching the Magistrat.e first.\n\nTherefore in cases of cognizable offence before proceedings arc initiated and while the matter is under investigation by the police tht suspected person is liable to be arrested by the police without an order by the Magistrat.e. It may also be noticed that the Magistrate who makes the order of remand may be one who has no jurisdiction to try the case.\n\nThe offences for which the appellant is charged are under the Criminal Procedure Code non-Cognizable and therefore -if the matter fell to be determined only on the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code the appellant tould not be arrested without an order of the Magistrate.\n\nThe position however is materially altered because of section 3 of the Act which runs as follows:-\n\n3. \"An offence punishable under section 161 or section l65 of the Indian Penal Code shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained therein.\n\nProvided that a police officer bClow the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police shall not investigate any such offence without the order of a Magistrate of the first class or make any arrest therefor without a warrant.\"\n\nJt therefore follows ·.that for the Prevention of Corruption Act, offences under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code become cognizable, notwithstanding what is provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. The proviso to section 3 of the Act puts only two limitations on the powers of the police in connection with the investigation relating to those offences\n\nunder the Act. They are: ( l) that the investigation\n\n\\ •\n\nshould be conducted by an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police unless a Magistrate of the first class otherwise orders; and (2) if an arrest has to be made an order of the Magistrate has to be obtained. The important p9int to be borne in mind is that the order of the Magistrate; which has to be obtained, is during. the time the police is investigating the case and not when they have completed their investigation and are initiating the proceedings against the suspected person under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The order which may be applied for and made during the police investigation by virtue of section 3 of the Act is therefore before the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence under section 6 of the Act or section 190 of the Criminal pr<>- cedure Code.\n\nThat appears to us to be the result of reading sections 3 and 6 of Act II of 1947 and section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with the definition of cognizable offence in the Code.\n\nThe argument of the . appellant is that when the Magistrate issued the warrant in October, 1947, he did so on taking cognizance of the offence under section 161 or 165 of the Indian Penal Code under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was contended that without such cognizance the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue any process as that was the only section which permitted the Magistrate to issue a process. against a person suspected of having committed an offence. In our opinion having regard to the wording of section 3 of the Act the assumption that the Magistrate can issue a warrant only after taking cognizance of an offence under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code is unsound.. The proviso to section 3 of the Act expressly covers the case of a Magistrate issuing a warrant for the arrest of a person in the course of investigation only and on the footing that it is a cognizable offence. Section 3 . of the Act which makes an offence under section 161 or 165 of the Indian\n\nt Penal Coae cognizable has provided the two safe.· guards as the proceedings are contemplated against a public servant.\n\nBut because of these safeguards it\n\nR.R.ChMi\n\nTh• Stat1 of Ultar PrllUs/i.\n\nKanio.C.j.\n\nlf, R; C~ •.\n\nTl• S1.t1qf UtN1 Pi-ad, s4.\n\nKai• C.j.\n\ndoes not follow that the warrant issued by the Magistrate under section 3 of the Act is after cognizance of the offence, and not during the course of investigation by the police in respect of a cognizable offence.\n\nThe only effect of that proviso is that instead of the police officer arresting on his own motion he has got to obtain an order of the Magistrate for the arrest.\n\nIn our opinion, it is w.rong from this featblre of section 3 of the Act alone to contend that because the warrant i.j issued it must be after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of it and the Magistrate's action can 'be only under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe mateaa1 part of section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that where. any public servant who is not removable from his office save with the sanction of Government is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or pur~ porting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government.\n\nThis section read as following section 190 shows that the word 'cognizance' in this sect-ion indicates the stage of initation of proceedings against a public servant.\n\nSections 190 to 199-B of the Criminal Procedure Code are grouped together under the caption \"Initiation of proceedings\". The sections dealing with the' . stage of investigation by the police in the case of cognizable offences are quite, different. T bder section 6 of the Act it is provided that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 or 165 of the Indian Penal Code .... alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government. Reading sections 197 and 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 6 o{ the . Act in the light of the wording of the proviso to section 3, it is therefore clear that the stage at. which a warrant is asked for under the proviso to section 3 of the Act is not on cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate as contemplated .by the other three sections.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant relied on some observations in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty(1 ), in respect of the interpretation of the word 'cognizance'. In that case, on the 24th April, 1909, a dacoity took place at N and on the same day the police sent up a report of the occurrence to the Sub-divisional officer of Diamond Harbour.\n\nOn the 2nd September one of the accused was arrested and he made a confession on the 18th October. The case was subsequently transferred by the District Magistrate of Alipore to his own file and on the 20th January, 1910, an order under section 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of 1908) was issued in the following terms :-\n\n\"Whereas the District Magistrate of the 24-Parganas has taken cognizance of offences under ss. 395 and 3<Jl, r. P. C., alleged to have been committed by the persons accused in the case of Emperor v. La/it Mohan Chttkerbutty and others_. .... and whereas it appears to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. ... the provisions of Part 1 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act should be made to apply to the proceedings in respect of the said offences, now, therefore, the Lieutenant-Governor. . . directs ... that the provisions of the said\n\nPart shall apply to the said case.\" S surrendered on the 24th of January and was arrest.cd by the police and put before the Joint Magistrate of Alipore who remanded him to Jail. Applications for bail on his behalf were made but they were dismissed. The Sessions Judge was next moved unsuccessfully for bail under section 498 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nS then moved the High Court for a Rule calling upon the District Magistrate to show cause why bail should not be granted on the grounds (1) that no order had been made applying Act XIV of 1908 and (2) that there did not appear any sufficient cause for further inquiry into the guilt of S.\n\nThe first contention rested on the assertion that the Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence of dacoity on the 20th of January.\n\nThe learned Judges pointed out that the argument was advanced because .the legal adviser of S had (l} I. L. R. 37 Cal. +12.\n\nR.R. Cliari\n\nTh1St11t1 ef Uttar Pradesh.\n\nE1mic C.J.\n\nTMS1attof Uttar PtadelfJ,\n\nK'Onia C. J.\n\nno opportunity to see the record of the case. On the facts . it was clear that tl1e Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence on the 20th of January.\n\nThe observations \"taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a magistrate as such applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence\" have to be read in the light of these facts.\n\nAs noticed above, the magistrate had expressly recorded that he had taken cognizance of the case and thereupon the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act were m:.de applicable to the case. The question argued before the High Court was in respect of the power of the High Court to grant bail after the provisionsof the Criminal Law Amendment Act were applied to the case. In our opinion therefore that decision and the observations therein do not help the appellant.\n\nIn Gopal Marwari v. Emperor('), it was observed that the word 'cognizance' is ustd in the Code to indicate the point when the Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is a differ- . ent thing from the initiation of proceedings.\n\nIt is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate. The court noticed that the word 'cognizance' is a word of somewhat indefinite import and it is perhaps not always used in exactly the same sense.\n\nAfter referring to the observations in Emperor v.\n\nSourir.dra Mohan Chulcerbutty(2}, it was stated by Das Gupta J. in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kum11r Banerjee(\") as follows :-''What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attc!npt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under section 190(1) ta), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose\n\n(1) A.LR.1943!'at.245,\n\n(3) A.I.R.1950 Cal.437.\n\n(2) I. L. R. 37 Cal.412;\n\nof proceeding in a partieular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter-proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under section 202. When the magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.\" In our opinion that is the correct approach to the question before the court.\n\nMoreover, in the present case on the 25th March, 1949, the Magistrate issued a notice under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the appellant and made it returnable on the 2nd of May, 1949. That clearly shows that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence only on that day and acted under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On the returnable date the appellant contended that the sanction of the Central Government was void because it was not given by the Government of the State. On the decision going against 1iim he appealed to the High Court and to the Privy Council. The appellant's contention having thus failed, the Magistrate proceeded with the trial on the 26th of November, 1949.\n\nThe only question which is now presented for our decision therefore is whether there was any sanction granted by the Government before the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued the notice under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure C.odc on the 25th March, 1949. To that the clear answer is that the Government had given its sanction for the prosecution of the appellant before that date. It seems to us therefore that the appellant's contention that the Magistrate had to take cognizance of the offences without the previous sanction of the Government is untenable and the appeal fails.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: S. S. Shukla.\n\nAgent for the respondent: C. P. Lal.\n\nTkeStateof Uttar Pradesh.\n\nFiania C.J.", "total_entities": 126, "entities": [{"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1045, "end_char": 1054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1209, "end_char": 1224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1264, "end_char": 1275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondent and Intervener: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "R.R. CHARI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1278, "end_char": 1288, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.R. 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J.\n\nno opportunity to see the record of the case."}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17562, "end_char": 17588, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17753, "end_char": 17779, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18610, "end_char": 18687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 190(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18853, "end_char": 18867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18873, "end_char": 18896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19195, "end_char": 19206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19262, "end_char": 19273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 156(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19470, "end_char": 19484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19783, "end_char": 19794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "2nd of May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19878, "end_char": 19894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, in the present case on the 25th March, 1949, the Magistrate issued a notice under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the appellant and made it returnable on the 2nd of May, 1949."}}, {"text": "section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19999, "end_char": 20010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th of November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20385, "end_char": 20407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's contention having thus failed, the Magistrate proceeded with the trial on the 26th of November, 1949."}}, {"text": "section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20619, "end_char": 20630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21058, "end_char": 21070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: S. S. Shukla."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21099, "end_char": 21108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "Fiania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21138, "end_char": 21144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fiania C.J."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_322_332_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "Ma1'Ch 19,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [h)51]\n\nRAVULA HARIPRASADA RAO\n\n11.\n\nTHE STATE.\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA, and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nCriminal law-Mens rea-'-M otor Spirit Rationing Order, 1.941, els. 22, 25, '1:1-Defence of India Rules, 1939, r. 81 (4)-Supply of petrol without coupons-Omission to make prescribed entries in coupons-Liability of employer for acts of employees-C onstrudion of statutes.\n\nUnless a statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent part of the crime, a person should not be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty mind.\n\nClauses 22 and 25 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, read with the Defence of India Rules, 1939, do not rule out the necessity of mens rea. Therefore, where the employees of the licensee of a petrol filling station supply petrol to a car-owner without taking coupons and thus act in contravention of the provisions of the said clauses, the licensee, who was not present when the wrongful act was done and had no knowledge of it, could not be convicted for contravention of the said clauses under r. 81 (4) of the Defence of India Rules, 1939.\n\nClause Z1 of the said Order is however differently worded aud imposes a duty on the supplier to endorse or cause to be endorsed the registration or other identifying mark of the vehicle to which petrol is furnished and if these particulars are not endorsed by his employees on the petrol coupons against which petrol is supplied the supplier would be liable even if he had no knowledge of the wrongful act of his employees.\n\nSrinivas Mall Bairolia v. King Emperor (l.L.R. 26 Pat. 46, P.C.) and Isak Solomon Macmull v. Emperor (A.l.R. 1948 Born.\n\n364) referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1950) from a judgment and order of the High Court of Madras dated 19th August, 1947. in Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 1017 and 1018 of\n\n1946 rejecting an application to set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Sessions Judge of Guntur under clauses 22 and 27 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941.\n\nSpecial leave was\n\ngranted by the Privy Council and the, appeal was originally registered as Privy Council Appeal No. 14 of 1949. The case was subsequently transferred to the Supreme Court.\n\nK. Bhimasankaran (Durga Bai, with him) for the appellant.\n\nR. GanapathiIyer, for the respondent.\n\n1951. March 19, The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL ALI J.-This appeal, whic~ has been preferred after obtaining special leave to appeal from the Privy Council, is confined to the single question whether mells rea is necessary to constitute an offence under section 81 of the Defence of India Rules.\n\nThe facts of the case are briefly these. The appellant is the licensee of two petrol filling stations Nos. 552 and 276 at Guntur but is a resident of Chirala, 40 miles away. He is a Presidency First Class Bench Magistrate at Chirala and manages what has been described as a vast business at several places. Ch. Venkatarayudu and Dadda Pichayya, his employees, were respectively in charge of the aforesaid filling stations.\n\nIn 1946, the appellant and his two employees were tried before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Guntur in respect of offences under the Motor Spirit Rationing\n\nOrder, 1941, and were convicted in each of the cases on the 18th July, 1946. In the first case, the charges against the appellant and the employee in charge of the pump in question therein were that they on the 27th June, 1945, at Guntur, supplied petrol to 3 cars without taking coupons, in contravention of clause 22 read with clause 5 of the said Order promulgated under rule 81 (2) of the Defence of India Rules and that they, on the same day and atthe same place, accepted coupons relating to two other cars in advance without supplying petrol, in contravention of clause 27 of the Order. The charges in the second cas.e were that the appellant and the employee in the second pump similarly supplied during the period of 24 hours from 6 a. m. of the 28th June, 1945, petrol to 4 motor vehicles\n\nTheS\"m.\n\nFail Ali J.\n\nHari, pf'a8ada\n\nRao v. 'l'he State.\n\nl!'azt Ali J.\n\nwithout taking coupons, in contravention of clause 22 read with clause 5, accepted coupons of three other vehicles in advance without issuing petrol, in contravention of clause 27, and supplied petrol to two other vehicles against coupons but without making necessary endorsements and particulars on the reverse of the coupons infringing thereby clause 27 A of the said Order. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Guntur, found the appellant and the employee concerned in each case guilty of the charges brought against them and sentenced the appellant (with whose case alone we are now concerned) to a fine of Rs. 30 on the first count and Ks. 20 .on the second in the first case with simple imprisonment for one week in default, and to a fine of Rs. 20 on each of the three counts in the second case with one week's imprisonment in default. The plea of the appellant before the Magistrate was that he was the presiding 1st Class Bench Magistrate at Chirala, that he was carrying on business in petrol at various centres through servants and he had issued instructions to them not to deviate from the rules under any circumstances and that he could not be made liable for transgression of the rules committed by his employees. The Magistrate however overruled the plea and convicted the appellant as stated above. The appellant thereafter preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge at Guntur, who, while setting aside the conviction of the appellant on the second count in each case, confirmed the conviction and sentence in respect of the other charges, on the 9th September, 1946. This was confirmed in revision by the High Court at Madras on the 19th August, 1947. Thereupon, the appellant applied to the .Privy Council for special leave which was granted on the 9th July, 1948, limited to the single question whether mens rea is necessary to constitute an offence under rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules.\n\nThe question to be decided in this appeal arises upon the plea taken by the appellant, which has been already referred to, and the assumption on which the courts below have proceeded in dealing with the case . . The plea of the appellant that he was not present at\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURt REPORTS 325\n\nGuntur when the alleged offences were committed has not been negatived by the lower courts, but they have held that he was nevertheless liable, as the question of mens rea was not relevant to the offences with which the appellant was charged. This view is set out very clearly in the following passage which may be quoted from the judgment of the trial Magistrate : -\n\n\" It is argued on behalf of accused 1 that he is not a resident of Guntur and that he has no knowledge of any infringement committed by accused 2. If any breach of the rules is committed by either proprietor or his servant, both are guilty whether they had the knowledge of the breach or not. The question of mens rea will, of course, affect the measure of punishment but it cannot affect the conviction (vide 1943, M.L.J. 38).\" . .\n\nBefore deciding the question ?-S to how far mens rea is material to conviction for the offences with which the appellant is charged, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Defence of India Rules and the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941. Rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules empowers the Central or the Provincial Government to provide by order, in certain circumstances, for regulating amongst other matters, distribution, disposal, use or consumption of articles or things and for requiring articles or things kept for sale to be sold either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances, The Central Government in pursuance of the authority thus conferred made the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, for ''securing the defence of British India, the efficient prosecution of the war and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.\" Clause 2(d) of the Order defines \" dealer \" as meaning a supplier carrying on the business of supplying motor spirit as a retail business and includes a person having charge of a supply of motor spirit controlled by Government from which any person is furnished with motor spirit for private use. Sub-clause (m) defines \" supplier\" as meaning a person carrying on the business of supplying motor\n\nRavtda Hariprmada\n\nRao\n\nThe Swte.\n\nFa.ZAUJ.\n\nBavula Haripraaada\n\nRao v.\n\nThe State.\n\nFaz! Ali J.\n\nspirit .. Clause 5, which is the next relevant provision, runs thus:-\n\n\" Motor spirit required for any vehicle not covered by clause 3 or clause 4 shall be furnished or acquired only against the surrender to a supplier at the time of supply of valid ordinary coupons or of a valid supple. mentary coupon and only in accordance with any conditions or instructions appearing on or attached to the coupons.\"\n\nClause 22 lays down :\n\n\"No person shall furnish or acquire a supply of motor spirit otherwise than in accordance with the provisions contained in this order.\"\n\nClause 27 is to the following effect:-\n\n\" No person shall surrender to a supplier and no supplier shall accept special receipts or coupons at a time other than the time at which the supply of motor spirit authorised by the special receipts or coupons or acknowledged by the receipts is furnished.\"\n\nClause 27A runs as follows:-\n\n\" When motor spirit is furnished against the surrender of one or more coupons, the supplier shall immediately endorse,, or cause to be endorsed, on each coupon so surrendered the registration or other identifying mark of the vehicle to which the motor spirit is furnished.\"\n\nRule 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules, which provides for the imposition of a penalty, says that \" if any person contravenes any order made under this rule, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or both.\"\n\nIt is contended on behalf of the respondent that though ordinarily a person should not be held liable for the criminal acts of another and no person can be charged with the commission of an offence unless a particular intent or knowledge is found to be present, mens rea is not of the essence of the offences with which we are concerned in this case and the appellant must be held liable for the acts of his employees. The question raised in this appeal was considered by the Privy\n\nCouncil in Srinivas Mall Bairolia v. King EmperorP).\n\nIn that case, the appellants before the Privy\n\nCouncil were convicted under the Defence of India Rules relating to the control of prices and were sentenced to terms of i1:nprisonment. The 1st appellant was acting as Salt Agent for part of the district of :Oarbhanga. He had been appointed to this office by the District Magistrate, and it was his duty to sell to licensed retail dealers the~ supplies of salt which were allocated by the Central Government to his part of Dharbang~ district. The second appellant was employed by the first. appellant and had been entrusted with the duty of allotting the appropriate quantity of salt to each retail dealer, and noting on the buyer's licence the quantity which he had bought and received.\n\nBy rule 81 (2) of the Defence of India Rules, the Provincial Governments were empowered to make orders to provide for controlling the prices at which articles or things of any description whatsoever might be sold.\n\nThe Defence of India Act, 1939, under which the rules were framed, empowered the Provincial Governments to delegate the exercise of their powers to certain officers, and the power to provide by order for controlling the prices at which various articles (among them salt) might be sold, had been delegated to the District Magistrates. Rule 81 (4) of the Rules provided for the punishment of persons guilty of contravening any such orders. Both the appellants were jointly charged with having sold salt on 3 days in July, 1943, to three named traders, in each case at a price exceeding the maximum price which had been fixed by order of the District Magistrate. The 1st appellant was also separately charged, in respect of the same sales, with having abetted the 2nd appellant's contravention of the order.\n\nThe trial Magistrate acquitted the 1st appellant of the substantive offences but convicted him on the 3 charges of abetting. The Sessions Judge and the High Court\n\nin revision confirmed the convictions.\n\nThe Privy Council ultimately upheld the conviction of the appellants on the merits but with regard to the view taken\n\nby the High Court that even if 'the first appellant was\n\n(1) I.L.R. 26 Pai. 48.\n\n.Ravula Haripro\"lda\n\nRao\n\nv. 7'/&e Slate.\n\nFazl .Ali J.\n\nRawla Bari~\n\nBaa\n\nThe State.\n\nFazl AUJ,\n\nnot proved to have known of the unlawful acts of the second appellant, he was still liable on the ground that \"where there is an absolute prohibition and no question of mens rea arises, the master is criminally liable for the acts of the servant\", their Lordships observed as follows:-\n\n\"With due respect to the High Court, their Lordships think it necessary to express their dissent from this view. They see no ground for saying that offences against those of the Defence of India Rules here in question are within the limited and exceptional class of offences which can be held to be committed without a guilty mind. See th~ judgment of Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen('). Offences which are within that class are usually of a comparatively minor character, and it would be a surprising result of this delegated legislation if a person who was morally innocent of blame could be held vicariously liable for a servant's crime and so punishable • with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years.' Their Lordships agree with the view which was recently expressed by the Lord Chief Justice of England, when he said: •It is in my opinion of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a court should always bear in mind that, unless the statute, either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, a defendant should not be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty mind: Brend v. Wood(•)'.'' .\n\nIn our opinion, the view of the law as propounded by the Privy Council is the correct view, and, applying it to the present case, it is difficult to hold the appellant guilty of the offence under clause 22 read with clause 5 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941.\n\nThe language of clause 22 does not lend support to the contention that even an innocent master will be criminally liable for an act of his servant. This clause has already been quoted, but, to make the point clear, it may be stated that it provides that no person shall furnish ...... motor spirit otherwise than in accordance\n\n{11 [18V6] l Q.B. 918, V21,\n\n1~1 {1946) 110 J.P. 817, 818.\n\nwith the provisions contained in the Order.\n\nThe clause is not aimed specifically against a supplier, but is general in its language, and will hit the individual person, whether he be the supplier or not, who contravenes the provision. The language of the clause also suggests that only the person who furnishes motor spirit contrary to the provisions of the Order\n\nwill be affected by the contravention.\n\nIn the course of the arguments, reference was made on behalf of the appellant to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Isak Solomon Macmull v. Emperor(1) which is a case relating to the contravention of clause 22 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order. In that case, the learned Chief Justice, who delivered the judgment, referred to the well established rule that unless a statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, the defendant should not be held guilty of an offence . under the cri!llinal Jaw unless he has a guilty mind . . Relying upon this rule, he held that where a servant sells petrol to a bogus customer in the absence of coupons in contravention of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, and the master is not present at the time nor has he any knowledge of the supply of petrol by the servants to the bogus customer, the master cannot be held to be vicariously liable for the act of the servant. In our opinion, this decision is correct and is directly applicable to the present case.\n\nWe have yet to deal with the third charge in the second case, which relates to the infringement of clause 27 A of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order. That clause, as already stated, makes it incumbent upon the supplier to endorse, or cause to be endorsed, the registration or other identifying mark of the vehicle to which the motor spirit is furnished. The substance of the charge on which the appellant has been convicted is that these particulars were not endorsed on several coupons against which petrol had been supplied. Here again, the main contention put forward on behalf of the\n\n{I) A.I, R. 1948 Bom, 864,\n\nRa vu la H ariprasada\n\nRao v.\n\nThe Stat•.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nR.avula Haf'ipramda\n\nRao\n\nThe State.\n\nFa.I Ali J.\n\nappellant was that the appellant cannot be held guilty inasmuch as the default in question was committed not by him personally, but by his servants. Having regard to the language of the clause, however, this contention cannot be accepted. Clause 27A, as we have already seen, throws the responsibility for making the necessary endorsement on the supplier. The definition of the word 'supplier' in the Act has already been quoted, and there can be no doubt that if clause 27A is contravened, a person who comes within the definition of the word 'supplier' must be held guilty of the contravention. The object of this clause clearly is that the supplier of petrol should set up a complete machinery to ensure that the necessary endorsements are made on the coupons against which petrol is supplied. It is conceivable that in many cases the default will be committed by the servants of the supplier, who are in charge of the petrol pump, but that fact by itself will not exonerate the supplier from liability.\n\nIn Mousell Brothers v. London and North-Western Railway('), Viscount Reading C.J., dealing with a case under the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, observed as follows:-\n\n\" Prima facie, then, a master is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servant to which the master is not a party. But it may be the intention of the Legislature, in order to guard against the happening of the forbidden thing, to impose a liabjlity upon a principal even though he does not know of, and is not party to, the forbidden act done by his servant. Many statutes are passed with this object.\n\nActs done by the servant of the licensed holder of licensed premises render the licensed holder in some instances liable, even though the act was done by his servant without the knowledge of the master. Under the Food and Drugs Acts there are again instances well known in these Courts where the master is made responsible, even though he knows nothing of the act done by his servant, and he may be fined or rendered amenable to the penalty enjoined by the law. In those\n\n(1) Cl9lf] II :tt.B.D. 838 ol 84',\n\ncases the Legislature absolutely forbids the act and makes the principal liable without a mens rea.\"\n\nIn the same case, Atkin J. expressed the same view in these words :-\n\n\" I think that the authorities cited by my Lord make it plain that while prima faci.e a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the prohibition or the duty absolute ; in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants. To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person uPon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would m ordinary circumstances be performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed. If authority for this is necessary it will be found in the judgment of Bowen L. J. in Reg. v.\n\nTylor(1).\"\n\nIn Mullins v. Collins(2), the servant of a licensed victualler having knowingly supplied liquor to a constable on duty without the authority of his superior officer, it was held that the licensed victualler was liable to be convicted although he had no knowledge of the act of his servant.\n\nIn dealing with the case, Blackburn J. observed thus :- '' If we hold that there must be a personal knowledge in the licensed person, we should make the enactment of no effect.\"\n\nThere are many other cases in England in which the same view has been enunciated, and some of them have been collected and classified in the judgment of Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen(3).\n\nThe principle laid down in these cases has been followed in several cases in this country also.\n\nIn this view, the appeal is allowed in part, and while the conviction and sentence imposed on the\n\n11. [1891 J 2 Q B •ss, b91.\n\n(2) l\\814) L.R. 9 Q.B. 292.\n\n( 9) (1~95] 1 Q B. 918, 922.\n\nTh• Stale.\n\nFazl AUJ.\n\nMa\"\"' 14.\n\nappellant on the first charge in both the cases are quashed, the conviction and sentence on the third charge in the second case are affirmed . . Appeal allpwed in part.\n\nAgent for the appellants: S. Subramanian.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nSREE SREE ISWAR GOPAL JIEU THAKUR\n\nII.\n\nPRATAPMAL BA.GARIA AND OTHERS.\n\n(Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1949)\n\nPRATAPMAL BAGARIA AND OTHERS\n\nII.\n\nSREE SREE ISWAR GOPAL JIEU THAKUR.\n\n(Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1949)\n\n[SAJYJD FAZL ALI, s. R: DAS and\n\nCBANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)\n\nRelifiO#S e\"\"-ents-Alienation by trustee-Legal necessity -01' lr•,.IMlions-Original parties and witnesses not a•ailable- V alue of ,.citals-Permanent lease-Not questioned by successive trustu1-Presumption of validity.\n\nWhere the issue is whether there was legal necessity for a particular transaction, if all the original parties to the transaction and those who could have given evidence on the relevant points have passed away, a recital consisting of the principal circumstances of the case assumes greater importance and cannot be lightly set aside.\n\nBa,.ga Chandra Dhar Biswas v. ]agat Kishore Chowdhuri (43 I.A. 249) referred to.\n\nWhere the.validity of a permanent lease granted by a shebait has remained unquestioned for a very long time since the grant, although it is not possible to ascertain fully what the circumstances were in which it was made, the Court should assume that the grant was made for necessity so as to be valid beyond the life time of the gran tor.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "RAVULA HARIPRASADA RAO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAVULA HARIPRASADA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 243, "end_char": 271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 733, "end_char": 761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1179, "end_char": 1207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1882, "end_char": 1902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15 of 1950) from a judgment and order of the High Court of Madras dated 19th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Guntur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2077, "end_char": 2101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1017 and 1018 of\n\n1946 rejecting an application to set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Sessions Judge of Guntur under clauses 22 and 27 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2345, "end_char": 2358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was subsequently transferred to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "K. Bhimasankaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2361, "end_char": 2377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Bhimasankaran (Durga Bai, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Durga Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2379, "end_char": 2388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Bhimasankaran (Durga Bai, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. GanapathiIyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2420, "end_char": 2436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. GanapathiIyer, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2519, "end_char": 2527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 19, The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL ALI J.-This appeal, whic~ has been preferred after obtaining special leave to appeal from the Privy Council, is confined to the single question whether mells rea is necessary to constitute an offence under section 81 of the Defence of India Rules."}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2730, "end_char": 2740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guntur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2895, "end_char": 2901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "552 and 276 at Guntur but is a resident of Chirala, 40 miles away."}}, {"text": "Chirala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2923, "end_char": 2930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "552 and 276 at Guntur but is a resident of Chirala, 40 miles away."}}, {"text": "Ch. Venkatarayudu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3080, "end_char": 3097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ch."}}, {"text": "Dadda Pichayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3102, "end_char": 3116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarayudu and Dadda Pichayya, his employees, were respectively in charge of the aforesaid filling stations."}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Guntur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3264, "end_char": 3299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1946, the appellant and his two employees were tried before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Guntur in respect of offences under the Motor Spirit Rationing\n\nOrder, 1941, and were convicted in each of the cases on the 18th July, 1946."}}, {"text": "18th July, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3417, "end_char": 3432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1946, the appellant and his two employees were tried before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Guntur in respect of offences under the Motor Spirit Rationing\n\nOrder, 1941, and were convicted in each of the cases on the 18th July, 1946."}}, {"text": "27th June, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3568, "end_char": 3583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first case, the charges against the appellant and the employee in charge of the pump in question therein were that they on the 27th June, 1945, at Guntur, supplied petrol to 3 cars without taking coupons, in contravention of clause 22 read with clause 5 of the said Order promulgated under rule 81 (2) of the Defence of India Rules and that they, on the same day and atthe same place, accepted coupons relating to two other cars in advance without supplying petrol, in contravention of clause 27 of the Order."}}, {"text": "clause 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3686, "end_char": 3694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3927, "end_char": 3936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4275, "end_char": 4284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4295, "end_char": 4303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4401, "end_char": 4410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4577, "end_char": 4586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Guntur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4612, "end_char": 4645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Guntur, found the appellant and the employee concerned in each case guilty of the charges brought against them and sentenced the appellant (with whose case alone we are now concerned) to a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge at Guntur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5592, "end_char": 5616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereafter preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge at Guntur, who, while setting aside the conviction of the appellant on the second count in each case, confirmed the conviction and sentence in respect of the other charges, on the 9th September, 1946."}}, {"text": "9th September, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5787, "end_char": 5806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereafter preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge at Guntur, who, while setting aside the conviction of the appellant on the second count in each case, confirmed the conviction and sentence in respect of the other charges, on the 9th September, 1946."}}, {"text": "High Court at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5846, "end_char": 5866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was confirmed in revision by the High Court at Madras on the 19th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "19th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5874, "end_char": 5891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was confirmed in revision by the High Court at Madras on the 19th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "9th July, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 6005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the appellant applied to the .Privy Council for special leave which was granted on the 9th July, 1948, limited to the single question whether mens rea is necessary to constitute an offence under rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules."}}, {"text": "Central or the Provincial Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7556, "end_char": 7592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules empowers the Central or the Provincial Government to provide by order, in certain circumstances, for regulating amongst other matters, distribution, disposal, use or consumption of articles or things and for requiring articles or things kept for sale to be sold either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances, The Central Government in pursuance of the authority thus conferred made the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, for ''securing the defence of British India, the efficient prosecution of the war and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.\""}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7903, "end_char": 7921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules empowers the Central or the Provincial Government to provide by order, in certain circumstances, for regulating amongst other matters, distribution, disposal, use or consumption of articles or things and for requiring articles or things kept for sale to be sold either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances, The Central Government in pursuance of the authority thus conferred made the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, for ''securing the defence of British India, the efficient prosecution of the war and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.\""}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8042, "end_char": 8055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules empowers the Central or the Provincial Government to provide by order, in certain circumstances, for regulating amongst other matters, distribution, disposal, use or consumption of articles or things and for requiring articles or things kept for sale to be sold either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances, The Central Government in pursuance of the authority thus conferred made the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, for ''securing the defence of British India, the efficient prosecution of the war and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.\""}}, {"text": "Clause 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8177, "end_char": 8188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bavula Haripraaada", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8619, "end_char": 8637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bavula Haripraaada\n\nRao v.\n\nThe State."}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8651, "end_char": 8656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bavula Haripraaada\n\nRao v.\n\nThe State."}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8682, "end_char": 8690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8798, "end_char": 8806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8810, "end_char": 8818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9078, "end_char": 9087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9238, "end_char": 9247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 27A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9537, "end_char": 9547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oarbhanga", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10903, "end_char": 10912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 1st appellant was acting as Salt Agent for part of the district of :Oarbhanga."}}, {"text": "Dharbang~", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11118, "end_char": 11127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had been appointed to this office by the District Magistrate, and it was his duty to sell to licensed retail dealers the~ supplies of salt which were allocated by the Central Government to his part of Dharbang~ district."}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11603, "end_char": 11629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".Ravula Haripro\"lda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12808, "end_char": 12827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Ravula Haripro\"lda\n\nRao\n\nv. 7'/&e Slate."}}, {"text": "They see no ground for saying that offences against those of the Defence of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13306, "end_char": 13393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13545, "end_char": 13551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See th~ judgment of Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen(')."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14012, "end_char": 14019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships agree with the view which was recently expressed by the Lord Chief Justice of England, when he said: •It is in my opinion of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a court should always bear in mind that, unless the statute, either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, a defendant should not be found guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has got a guilty mind: Brend v. Wood(•)'.'' ."}}, {"text": "clause 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14623, "end_char": 14632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14643, "end_char": 14651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14712, "end_char": 14721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15591, "end_char": 15608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of the arguments, reference was made on behalf of the appellant to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Isak Solomon Macmull v. Emperor(1) which is a case relating to the contravention of clause 22 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order."}}, {"text": "clause 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15696, "end_char": 15705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16645, "end_char": 16654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 27A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17507, "end_char": 17517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 27A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17732, "end_char": 17742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18389, "end_char": 18429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cl9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19353, "end_char": 19356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845", "statute": "the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845"}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19505, "end_char": 19510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same case, Atkin J. expressed the same view in these words :-\n\n\" I think that the authorities cited by my Lord make it plain that while prima faci.e a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the prohibition or the duty absolute ; in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19971, "end_char": 19981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person uPon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would m ordinary circumstances be performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed."}}, {"text": "Bowen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20327, "end_char": 20332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If authority for this is necessary it will be found in the judgment of Bowen L. J. in Reg."}}, {"text": "Blackburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20680, "end_char": 20689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with the case, Blackburn J. observed thus :- '' If we hold that there must be a personal knowledge in the licensed person, we should make the enactment of no effect.\""}}, {"text": "S. Subramanian", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21539, "end_char": 21553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: S. Subramanian."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21582, "end_char": 21593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "SREE SREE ISWAR GOPAL JIEU THAKUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21596, "end_char": 21629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SREE SREE ISWAR GOPAL JIEU THAKUR\n\nII."}}, {"text": "PRATAPMAL BA.GARIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21636, "end_char": 21654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PRATAPMAL BA.GARIA AND OTHERS.", "canonical_name": "PRATAPMAL BA.GARIA"}}, {"text": "PRATAPMAL BAGARIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21699, "end_char": 21716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "95 of 1949)\n\nPRATAPMAL BAGARIA AND OTHERS\n\nII.", "canonical_name": "PRATAPMAL BA.GARIA"}}, {"text": "SAJYJD FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21802, "end_char": 21817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 of 1949)\n\n[SAJYJD FAZL ALI, s. R: DAS and\n\nCBANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "CBANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21834, "end_char": 21854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 of 1949)\n\n[SAJYJD FAZL ALI, s. R: DAS and\n\nCBANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_332_343_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "Ma\"\"' 14.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951)\n\nappellant on the first charge in both the cases are quashed, the conviction and sentence on the third charge in the second case are affirmed . . Appeal allpwed in part.\n\nAgent for the appellants: S. Subramanian.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.\n\nSREE SREE ISWAR GOPAL JIEU THAKUR\n\nII.\n\nPRATAPMAL BA.GARIA AND OTHERS.\n\n(Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1949)\n\nPRATAPMAL BAGARIA AND OTHERS\n\nII.\n\nSREE SREE ISWAR GOPAL JIEU THAKUR.\n\n(Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1949)\n\n[SAJYJD FAZL ALI, s. R: DAS and\n\nCBANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)\n\nRelifiO#S e\"\"-ents-Alienation by trustee-Legal necessity -01' lr•,.IMlions-Original parties and witnesses not a•ailable- V alue of ,.citals-Permanent lease-Not questioned by successive trustu1-Presumption of validity.\n\nWhere the issue is whether there was legal necessity for a particular transaction, if all the original parties to the transaction and those who could have given evidence on the relevant points have passed away, a recital consisting of the principal circumstances of the case assumes greater importance and cannot be lightly set aside.\n\nBa,.ga Chandra Dhar Biswas v. ]agat Kishore Chowdhuri (43 I.A. 249) referred to.\n\nWhere the.validity of a permanent lease granted by a shebait has remained unquestioned for a very long time since the grant, although it is not possible to ascertain fully what the circumstances were in which it was made, the Court should assume that the grant was made for necessity so as to be valid beyond the life time of the gran tor.\n\nBawa Magniram Sitaram v. Kasturbhai Manibhai (49 I.A. 54) 1951 referred to. _ - Sree Sree Iswar CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Appeals from GopaZ J>eu judgments and decrees of the High Cort o.f Judicature Thakur at Calcutta dated 25th August, 1943, m First Appeals v.\n\nNos. 20 and 173 of 1939 which arose out of a decision Pra~ of the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal\n\nB\":,;~;8~ in Case No. 95 of 1935.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 95 and 96 of 1949.\n\nPanchanan Ghose (Upendra Chandra Mullick, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 95 and respondent in Civil Appeal No. 96.\n\nS.P. Sinha (Nagendra Nath Bose, with him) for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 95 and appellants Nos., 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 96.\n\nS. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 4 in Civil Appeal No. 95.\n\n1951. March 14. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n-FAZL ALI J.-These appeals are directed againstthe ra:iuJ. judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal, confirming a decision of the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal, which modified an award of the First Land Acquisition Collector of Calcutta, made under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the acquisition of two premises, which may conveniently be referred _ to as Nos. 140 and 141, Cotton Street. - In order to understand the points of contest between the various claimants. to the compensation awarded in the case, it seems necessary to refer to certain facts' showing how they came to be interested in the premises which are the subject-matter of the land acquisition proceedings. These premises belonged at one time to one Sewanarayan Kalia, and afterwards they became the property of a deity, Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jieu Thakur, installed by Sewanarayan Kalia at\n\nChinsurah in the district of Hoogly. Sewanarayan, who had three wives, died in 1836, leaving behiQd him his third wife, Muni Bibi, two daughters by his\n\n1951 predeceased wives, these being Jiban Kumari and\n\nS S- 1 Amrit Kumari, and a mistress named Kissen Dasi.\n\n\"\" '\" '\"\"\"'O A Gopa! Jieu n the 23rd ugust, 1836, these persons executed a Thakur deed of solenama which was in the nature of a family v. arrangement, by which the remainder of the estate of\n\nPratapmal Sewanarayan (i.e., what was left after excluding the Bagai-ia and dedicated properties) was divided in the terms of his\n\nOtlw•. will, with the result that Muni Bibi got subject to ra.z Ali J. certain conditions, among other properties, the premises described as 140, Cotton Street, and Jiban Kumari got the contiguous premises, No. 141, Cotton Street. Muni Bibi and Jiban Kumari also became the shebaits of the Thakur or deity with power to appoint their successors. On the 20th January, 1848, Muni Bibi by an arpannamadedicated 140, Cotton Street, to the Thakur.\n\nIt is recited in this deed, among other things, that on account of annual droughts and inundation and consequent diminution in the produce of the lands, certain properties .dedicated to the sewa of the deity had been sold for arrears of revenue, that \"Jiban Kumari had been making advances from her private funds for the expenses of jatra, mahotsob etc., of the deity, when the amount fell short, this being against the provisions laid down by her late husband\", that the house known as 140, Cotton Street, having been let out, was yielding a rent of Rs. 30 p.m., that after deducting the necessary expenses the surplus income left was Rs. 20\n\np.m., and that \"if this amount was included in the expenses for the sheba etc., of the deity every month, the provision made by her deceased husband may remain in force.\" After reciting these facts, it is stated that the rental of the house \"shall be permanently and perpetually jncluded in the expenses of the sheba.\" About 20 years later, on the 30th September, 1869, Muni Bibi created a permanent (maurasi mokrari) lease of the premises bearing No. 140, Cotton Street, in her capacity as a shebait in favour of one Nehal Chand Panday (who was admittedly a benamidar for one Bhairodas Johurry), at a rental of Rs. 25 p. m. (See exhibit L-a kabuliyat executed by Nehal Chand in favour of Muni Bibi). In the same year, on the 8th\n\nDecember, Jiban Kumari granted a permanent lease to 1951 Bhairodas Johurry, in respect of the premises known 8 8- 1 as 141, Cotton Street at a rental of Rs. 90 p. m. (See r; op:•J:;, a• exhibit K-a kabuliyat executed by Johurry in favour 1.'hakur of Jiban Kumari). The main question which has been v. raised in this case is whether the two ladies were com- Pratapmal petent to give debutter properties by way of perma- Ba~;=snd nent lease to another person. In 1870, Muni Bibi died, and, on the 15th January, 1872, Jib an Kumari F'azl Ali J. appointed Gourimoni Devi a shebait by a registered deed and dedicated the premises known as 141, Cotton Street, to the deity. Both Jiban Kumari and Gourimoni Debi died shortly afterwards, and Gopal Das, a minor son of Gourimoni, became the shebait of the idol.\n\nDuring his minority, his father, Raghubar Dayal, became his certificated guardian, and, in that capacity, he executed a usufructuary mortgage deed in respect of the Cotton Street properties to one Lal Behari D_utt, on the 31 August, 1878. After the death of Raghubar Dayal one Ajodhya Debi and after her one Kalicharan Dutta became the certifiqi.ted guardian of Gopal Das, and, on the 17th August, 1890, the latter mortgaged some debutter properties including 140and 141, Cotton Street, to Lal Behari Dutt for a sum of Rs. 2,230. On attaining majority, Gopaldas executed on the 17th January, 1896, a usufructuary mortgage deed in respect of all debutter properties including ·the Cotton Street houses in favour of Lal Behari Dutt for paying the previous mortgage dues which amounted on that date to Rs. 4,955 and odd. This deed provided among other things that the mortgagee was to collect rents, outgoings, carry on the sheba of the deity, and that whatever balance was left out of the income of the property was to go towards the satisfaction of the mortgage dues. Gopaldas died in 1900, leaving behind him surviving his widow, Annapurna, who also died in 1905. By 1918, Lal Behari Dutt also was dead, and his interest in the mortgaged properties, to which reference has been made, was sold to one Naba Kishor Dutt on the 12th December, 1918. On the 17th November, 1933, Naba Kishor assigned the mortgagee's\n\n1951 interest in the mortgaged properties to two of the\n\nS- 1 Bagarias, respondents I and 2 in appeal No. 95, and Sree ree swar . h h d 0 pal Ji\"' mt e same year t e three respon en ts (1 to 3) also\n\nhakur acquired the lessee's interest in the Cotton Street v. hoµses. The land acquisition proceedings, which have Pratapmal given rise to these appeals, were started about the year Bagaria and 1934 in respect of the premises bearing Nos. 140 a. nd Others. 141, Cotton Street, as well as two adjoining premises\n\nFad Ali J. with which we are not concerned in this case. In these proceedings, the following claims were put forward by three sets of persons:-\n\n1. The Bagarias (respondents 1 to 3 in appeal No. 95) at first claimed the entire amount of compensation on the allegation that they were the absolute owners of the premises in question, but later on they claimed only as mortgagees and permanent lessees of those premises.\n\n2. On behalf of the deity, the entire amount of compensation money was claimed by Deosaran Singh and Ram Lakshman Singh, who alleged themselves to be shebaits, on the basisthat the premises in question were de butter properties of the deity, and the Bagarias had acquired no interest therein either by the assignment of the usufructuary m11rtgage or the alleged purchase of the tenant's rights in the properties.\n\n3. Respondent No. 4 claimed compensation as a lessee for 99 years on the basis of a lease alleged to have been given to him by the original landlords.\n\nIn the present appeals, we are concerned with the first two claims only, and we shall briefly state how they were dealt with by the Collector and the courts below. On the 22nd May, 1935, the Collector awarded Rs. 31,740 as compensation for landlord's interests, to be shared by the deity as owner and two of the Bagarias, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in appeal No. 95 in their capacity of usufructuary mortgagee, and awarded a sum of Rs. l,58,000 to the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as compensation for their rights as permanent tenants of the premises in question. Subsequently, 3 separate petitions of reference were filed\n\nby the 3 claimants against. the Collector's award and 1951 the referece made b.y the ~Hector in pursuance there- Sree Sree Jawar of was registered as apportionment case No. 95 of 1935 Gopal Jieu in the Court of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal.\n\nThakur Meanwhile, Deosaran Singh and Ram Lakshman Singh, v. who had put in claims as shebaits, retired from the Pmtapmal contest, and the President of the Tribunal appointed Bagaria and one Narendra Nath Rudra as the next friend of the Others. deity to represent and protect its interests. On the Faz! Ali J. 31st August, 1938, the President of the Tribunal gave his decision, by which he substantially upheld the award of the Collector, but modified it in one respect only. He held that the usufrnctuary mortgage, on the basis of which respondents 1 and 2 had put in a claim, had been paid off and therefore they were not entitled to any compensation, and the whole sum of Rs. 31,740 should be paid to the deity. Respondents 1 to 3 however were held entitled to the sum of Rs. 1,58,000 as permanent tenants, on the ground that leases had been created for legal necessity and therefore were binding on the deity. He also. held that the deity was not entitled to question the leases oy virtue of article 134\n\n(a) of the Limitation Act. Regarding costs, he directed that all costs incurred on behalf of the deity should be paid out of the compensation money lying in deposit in court. Two appeals were thereafter preferred to the High Court by the two main contesting pnrties and ultimately both these appeals were dismissed, and the High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal. Subsequently, the present appeals were preferred to this Court, the deity having obtained a certificate granting leave to appeal from the High Court, and the Bagaria respondents having obtained special leave from the Privy Council to prefer a cross appeal.\n\nThe main questions which arise in these appeals are:-\n\n(1) whether the two mourasi mokrari leases, to which reference has been made were justified by legal necessity; and \"\n\n(2) whether the mortgages on the basis of which\n\nS S I the Bagaria. s had laid their claim to compensation had ree ree 8'War b t' fi d Gopal Jieu een sa 1s e .\n\nThakur The first question arises in Appeal No. 95, and the v. second question arises in Appeal No. 96.\n\nPratapmal Bagaria and So far as the question of legal necessity is concerned, Others. there are concurrent findings of the Tribunal and the High Court against the appellant in appeal No. 95, Fazl AU J. but we allowed his counsel to argue the question at some length, because it was urged before us that on the facts of the case the point in issue was not a question of fact but one of mixed fact and law, especially as the decision of the High Court turned upon the construction of the leases and the inference drawn from the fact that the permanent nature of the tenancy had remained unquestioned for a very long period. The tenancy in question came into existence as Jong ago as 1869, and it is not surprising that no direct evidence bearing on the issue of legal necessity is available now.\n\nWe have therefore to fall back upon the recitals in the documents, to ascertain the circumstances under which the documents, exhibits L and K, were executed, .because it is well settled that if all the original parties to the transaction .and those who could have' given evidence on the relevant points have passed away, a recital consisting of the principal circumstances of the case assumes greater importance and cannot be lightly set aside. [See Banga Chandra Dhar Biswas v. ]agat KisoreChowdhuri(')j. It appears to us that the recitals in the documents afford valuable evidence, because the tenancies were created by two pious ladies who were keenly interested in the sheba of the deity and with regard to whom it was not suggested that they expected to derive any personal advantage from the transactions in question. It seems to us most unlikely that they would be parties to any untrue recitals merely to support the transaction. It may be recalled here that in 1848, certain properties belonging to the deity had been sold for arrears of rent, and Jiban Kumari\n\n(I) 4S I.A, 249.\n\nhad been supplementing the income of the residue 1951 from her own properties for meeting the expenses of per- 8 s-z\n\nforming certain essential services to the deity, such as r;; a:,,,_\"\"J::, a~ jatra, mahotsob, etc. We also find from the arpannama Thakur that the value of the property which is the subject v. matter of the mokrari kabuliyat dated the 30th Pratapmal September, 1869 (exhibit L) was Rs. 2,000 in 1848, Ba:~:~=.nd that it was not in the khas possession of Muni Bibi but had been let out to a tenant and that its net income Fazl Ali J. was Rs. 20 p.m. At the time when the arpannama was executed, Muni Bibi clearly thought that the sum of Rs .. 20 p.m., if.included in the expeqses for the sheba of the deity, would enable the sheba to be carried on without any extraneous help .. From the recitals in exhibit L, it appears that the house bearing No. 140, Cotton Street, was in a dilapidated condition and had collapsed in the rains of 1270 B.S. (1868 A.D.), and Muni Bibi was unable to bear the expenses of constructing a new building at the place. The problem before her therefore was whether the deity should go without any income from this property, or she should enter into such an arrangement as would secure a permanent income for the expenses of the deity, which should not in any case be less than the income which the property had theretofore yielded. She decided to choose what must have appeared to her to be the better and more prudent course, with the result that she got a sum of Rs. 500 cash for the deity as the price of the materials which were sold to the lessee, and also secured a regular monthly income of Rs. 25.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the transaction was in the best interests of the deity and clearly beneficial to it.\n\nA refer.ence to the arpannama shows that the house was in the possession of a tenant even in 1848, and from the recitals in the document it is clear that what Muni Bibi contemplated was that the house should continue to remain in the possession of a tenant, and the rent of the house should be used for the sheba of the deity. At that time, she did not contemplate any other mode of using the property she was going to dedicate. We do not know who was the tenant of the\n\n1951 house in 1848 and what were the commitments of Muni -- Bibi at that time, but, even apart from these facts, it 8''/;:::U,\"/=' is difficult to believe that a devout person like her, who\n\nThakur was not only a shebait but also the widow of the\n\nv. founder of the deity and who had shown such keen Pratapmai interest for the upkeep of the worship of the deity, Bauaria and should have entered into the transaction in question\n\nOthers. unless she considered it absolutely necessary to do so.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nThe contention put forward before us is that it has not been shown that there was no other course open to Muni Bibi than to grant a permanent lease in respect of the property, but it is manifest that.at this distance of time no evidence can be available to show the actual pressure or necessity which impelled Muni Bibi to adopt the course she did. It is now well settled that where the validity of a permanent lease granted by a shebait is called into question a long time after the grant, although it is not possible to ascertain fully what the circumstances were in which it was made, the court should assume that the grant was made for necessity so as to be valid beyond the life of the grantor. [See Bava Magniram Sitaram v. Kasturbhai Manibhai(')]. In the present case, the circumstances which can be gathered from the recitals together with the fact that the document has remained unquestioned for more than half a century, seem to us to be quite sufficient to support the conclusion that the grant was made for legal necessity and is binding on the deity..\n\nOn the facts narrated, it would appear that there were several shebaits between the death of Muni Bibi and the commencement of the present litigation, but the lease was never impugned as being beyond the power of the shebait who granted it. On the other hand, we find that the permanent character of the lease was recognized in a deed executed by Gourimoni on the 18th October, 1873 (exhibit Y), and in a mortgage deed executed by Raghubar Dayal, the guardian of Gopaldas, on the 31st August, 1878.\n\nThe properties in question were subsequently mortgaged by Kali Charan Dutt and Gopaldas, but neither of these persons nor\n\n\\11 '9 I.A. 6f,\n\nthe mortgagees ever came forward to question the per-\n\nHJ51 manent nature of the tenancy. . . .\n\nBree Sree lsu:ar The counsel for the appellant relied upon exh1b1t VI, Gopat Jieu which is a copy of the judgment of the High Court in Thakur a suit instituted by Nabakishore Dutt in 1925 against v. the Administrator-General of Bengal for the rent of the Pratapmat I f h. d h Bagari.a and house in question. t appears rom t ISJU gment t at Others. the tenancy was admitted by the defendant and it was also admitted by him that rent was due, but he claimed Fazl Ali J. that he was entitled to insist upon a receipt specifying the money to have been paid as mourasi mokrari rent.\n\nThe learned Judge, who dealt with the case, however, thought that the point raised by the defendant did not strictly speaking arise in a suit for rent, which according to him could not be converted into a suit for deelaration of title, and on that basis, he passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff.\n\nThe judgment does not say in so many words that Nabakishore resisted the claim as to the tenancy being mourasi mokrari, but, however that may be, assuming that such an assertion was really made by him, it cannot affect the character of a tenancy which had remained unquestioned for :A.early half a century.\n\nThe legal position with regard to 141, Cotton Street, is almost identical with that of the adjoining premises with which we have already dealt. As has been already stated, a mourasi mokrari tenancy was created by J iban Kumari on the 8th December, 1869, as is evidenced by exhibit K. This document recites among other things that the house which was the subject of the lease, \" s'tands in need of repairs and for want of such repairs there is chance of some portion thereof breaking down during the year. \" It also recites that whatever income was derived till then from that house was derived by letting it out on rent and that the mourasi tenancy was being created for the purpose of repairing the house and keeping it in existence. At the end of the document, it is stated that \" the shebait shall keep the kabuliyat and patta in force and shall on taking the sum of Rs. 90 as rent, defray the expenses of the sheba of the deity.\" It is\n\n1951 noteworthy that the actual dedication of this property\n\nBruSreeiswar took place on the .15th January, 1872, more !han 2\n\nGopal Jieu years after the kabuhyat. On that date, a registered Thakur deed of gift was executed by Jiban Kumari in favour v. of Srimathi Gourimoni Debi and it was recited therein Pratapmal that the income of the house was being dedicated by Bagaria and the former to the sheba of the deity. There was also OthttB. a further clause in that deed to the following effect : -\n\n:l'azZ Ali J. ••In accordance with the terms of the solenama the expenses of the lswar seba shall be met from the income of those properties which have been dedicated for the performance of the work of the said seba and the amount by which the expenses for the festivals would fall short and the expenses which would be incurred for repairs to house for sheba of the said Thakur shall be met and the Tahailia (attendant) and the Brahman cook and the Brahman priest (now) employed and to be employed hereafter shall get (their) salaries, from the income of the said property.\" On reading this document along with the solenama and the mokrari lease granted by Jiban KU.mari, it appears that she dedicated the property after having created a mokrari lease, that what she purported to dedicate was the income derived by way of rent from the mourasi mokrari tenancy, and that she had dedicated this income for specific purposes with the object of making up the deficit in the income received from other debutter properties. If it is held that Jiban Kumari was an absolute owner of the property at the time the mourasi mokrari lease was granted and afterwards she dedicated only the income of the property, then the permanent lease cannot be assailed. If, on the other hand, it is held on reading the solenama that Jiban Kumari had only a life estate in the house and it was one of the terms of the solenama that after her death the expenses of the deity were to be borne out of the income from the house, then in that case the question may arise as to whether she was entitled to create a lease beyond her lifetime. Such a question however does not need an elaborate answer, because the same considerations which apply to 140, Cotton Street, will\n\napply to this house, and the presumption as to 1951 necessity which is raised by the long lapse of time, - ld ' h 1 Th' t' • 'd bl Bree Sree ls1mr wou anse ere a so. is presump 1on IS consI era y Gopal Ji.,, strengthened here as well as in the case of the lease Thakur granted by Muni Bibi, by the fact that the grantor of the lease was so devoted to the object of the endow- Pratapmal ment that it does not seem likely that she would have Bagaria and\n\n1 • Others. granted a permanent lease un ess she was Impelled to do so by absolute necessity. It seems to us therefore that p,, zz Ali •1. the view taken by the High Court is substantially correct and the respondents Nos. I and 2 are entitled to compensation as permanent lessees.\n\nIn this view, Appeal No. 95 must fail, and it is dismissed.\n\nAs to Appeal No. 96, it has been concurrently found by the President of the Tribunal and the High Court that the appellants have failed to prove by proper evidence that there is any money still due to them on the usufructuary mortgage executed by Gopaldas in\n\n1886. In arriving at this finding, they have dealt with every possible argument that could be urged and was urged on behalf of the appellants to show that the mortgage had not been satisfied.\n\nThis court has repeatedly held that it will not generally interfere with concurrent findings on a pure question of fact, and . nothing has been shown on behalf of the appellants to induce us to depart from this rule. In the result Appeal No. 96 also is dismissed.\n\nHaving regard to the circumstances of the case, we shall make no order as to costs in either of these appeals.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 95 and respondent in Civil Appeal No. 96 : Sukumar Ghose.\n\nAgent for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 95 and appellants Nos. 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 96 : S. C. Banerjee.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 4 in Civil Appeal No. 95 : P. K. Chatterjee. ·", "total_entities": 88, "entities": [{"text": "S. Subramanian", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 237, "end_char": 251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: S. Subramanian."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 280, "end_char": 291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "SREE SREE ISWAR GOPAL JIEU THAKUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 294, "end_char": 327, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SREE SREE ISWAR GOPAL JIEU THAKUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRATAPMAL BAGARIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 397, "end_char": 425, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRATAPMAL BAGARIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAJYJD FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 500, "end_char": 515, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. R: DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 517, "end_char": 526, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CBANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 532, "end_char": 556, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Panchanan Ghose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1994, "end_char": 2009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchanan Ghose (Upendra Chandra Mullick, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Upendra Chandra Mullick", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2011, "end_char": 2034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchanan Ghose (Upendra Chandra Mullick, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S.P. Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2127, "end_char": 2137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. Sinha (Nagendra Nath Bose, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Nagendra Nath Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2139, "end_char": 2157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.P. Sinha (Nagendra Nath Bose, with him) for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2273, "end_char": 2288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2397, "end_char": 2405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\nFAZL ALI J.-These appeals are directed againstthe ra:iuJ. judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal, confirming a decision of the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal, which modified an award of the First Land Acquisition Collector of Calcutta, made under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the acquisition of two premises, which may conveniently be referred _ to as Nos.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali J."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2482, "end_char": 2537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\nFAZL ALI J.-These appeals are directed againstthe ra:iuJ. judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal, confirming a decision of the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal, which modified an award of the First Land Acquisition Collector of Calcutta, made under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the acquisition of two premises, which may conveniently be referred _ to as Nos."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Improvement Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2585, "end_char": 2614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\nFAZL ALI J.-These appeals are directed againstthe ra:iuJ. judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal, confirming a decision of the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal, which modified an award of the First Land Acquisition Collector of Calcutta, made under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the acquisition of two premises, which may conveniently be referred _ to as Nos."}}, {"text": "Sewanarayan Kalia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3181, "end_char": 3198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These premises belonged at one time to one Sewanarayan Kalia, and afterwards they became the property of a deity, Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jieu Thakur, installed by Sewanarayan Kalia at\n\nChinsurah in the district of Hoogly."}}, {"text": "Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jieu Thakur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3252, "end_char": 3285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These premises belonged at one time to one Sewanarayan Kalia, and afterwards they became the property of a deity, Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jieu Thakur, installed by Sewanarayan Kalia at\n\nChinsurah in the district of Hoogly.", "canonical_name": "SREE SREE ISWAR GOPAL JIEU THAKUR"}}, {"text": "Hoogly. Sewanarayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3351, "end_char": 3370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These premises belonged at one time to one Sewanarayan Kalia, and afterwards they became the property of a deity, Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jieu Thakur, installed by Sewanarayan Kalia at\n\nChinsurah in the district of Hoogly."}}, {"text": "Muni Bibi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3442, "end_char": 3451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sewanarayan, who had three wives, died in 1836, leaving behiQd him his third wife, Muni Bibi, two daughters by his\n\n1951 predeceased wives, these being Jiban Kumari and\n\nS S- 1 Amrit Kumari, and a mistress named Kissen Dasi.", "canonical_name": "Muni -- Bibi"}}, {"text": "Jiban Kumari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3511, "end_char": 3523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sewanarayan, who had three wives, died in 1836, leaving behiQd him his third wife, Muni Bibi, two daughters by his\n\n1951 predeceased wives, these being Jiban Kumari and\n\nS S- 1 Amrit Kumari, and a mistress named Kissen Dasi.", "canonical_name": "J iban Kumari"}}, {"text": "Amrit Kumari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3536, "end_char": 3548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sewanarayan, who had three wives, died in 1836, leaving behiQd him his third wife, Muni Bibi, two daughters by his\n\n1951 predeceased wives, these being Jiban Kumari and\n\nS S- 1 Amrit Kumari, and a mistress named Kissen Dasi."}}, {"text": "Kissen Dasi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3571, "end_char": 3582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sewanarayan, who had three wives, died in 1836, leaving behiQd him his third wife, Muni Bibi, two daughters by his\n\n1951 predeceased wives, these being Jiban Kumari and\n\nS S- 1 Amrit Kumari, and a mistress named Kissen Dasi."}}, {"text": "Pratapmal Sewanarayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3777, "end_char": 3798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jieu n the 23rd ugust, 1836, these persons executed a Thakur deed of solenama which was in the nature of a family v. arrangement, by which the remainder of the estate of\n\nPratapmal Sewanarayan (i.e., what was left after excluding the Bagai-ia and dedicated properties) was divided in the terms of his\n\nOtlw•. will, with the result that Muni Bibi got subject to ra.z Ali J. certain conditions, among other properties, the premises described as 140, Cotton Street, and Jiban Kumari got the contiguous premises, No."}}, {"text": "Ali J.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3972, "end_char": 3978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jieu n the 23rd ugust, 1836, these persons executed a Thakur deed of solenama which was in the nature of a family v. arrangement, by which the remainder of the estate of\n\nPratapmal Sewanarayan (i.e., what was left after excluding the Bagai-ia and dedicated properties) was divided in the terms of his\n\nOtlw•. will, with the result that Muni Bibi got subject to ra.z Ali J. certain conditions, among other properties, the premises described as 140, Cotton Street, and Jiban Kumari got the contiguous premises, No."}}, {"text": "20th January, 1848", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4261, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th January, 1848, Muni Bibi by an arpannamadedicated 140, Cotton Street, to the Thakur."}}, {"text": "Thakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4343, "end_char": 4349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th January, 1848, Muni Bibi by an arpannamadedicated 140, Cotton Street, to the Thakur.", "canonical_name": "Thakur"}}, {"text": "30th September, 1869", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5344, "end_char": 5364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About 20 years later, on the 30th September, 1869, Muni Bibi created a permanent (maurasi mokrari) lease of the premises bearing No."}}, {"text": "Nehal Chand Panday", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "140, Cotton Street, in her capacity as a shebait in favour of one Nehal Chand Panday (who was admittedly a benamidar for one Bhairodas Johurry), at a rental of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Nehal Chand Panday"}}, {"text": "Bhairodas Johurry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5573, "end_char": 5590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "140, Cotton Street, in her capacity as a shebait in favour of one Nehal Chand Panday (who was admittedly a benamidar for one Bhairodas Johurry), at a rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "Nehal Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5660, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 p. m. (See exhibit L-a kabuliyat executed by Nehal Chand in favour of Muni Bibi).", "canonical_name": "Nehal Chand Panday"}}, {"text": "8th\n\nDecember", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same year, on the 8th\n\nDecember, Jiban Kumari granted a permanent lease to 1951 Bhairodas Johurry, in respect of the premises known 8 8- 1 as 141, Cotton Street at a rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "Johurry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5947, "end_char": 5954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "90 p. m. (See r; op:•J:;, a• exhibit K-a kabuliyat executed by Johurry in favour 1.'hakur of Jiban Kumari)."}}, {"text": "15th January, 1872", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6222, "end_char": 6240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1870, Muni Bibi died, and, on the 15th January, 1872, Jib an Kumari F'azl Ali J. appointed Gourimoni Devi a shebait by a registered deed and dedicated the premises known as 141, Cotton Street, to the deity."}}, {"text": "Jib an Kumari F'azl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6242, "end_char": 6265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1870, Muni Bibi died, and, on the 15th January, 1872, Jib an Kumari F'azl Ali J. appointed Gourimoni Devi a shebait by a registered deed and dedicated the premises known as 141, Cotton Street, to the deity."}}, {"text": "Gourimoni Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6279, "end_char": 6293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1870, Muni Bibi died, and, on the 15th January, 1872, Jib an Kumari F'azl Ali J. appointed Gourimoni Devi a shebait by a registered deed and dedicated the premises known as 141, Cotton Street, to the deity.", "canonical_name": "Gourimoni Devi"}}, {"text": "Gourimoni Debi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6417, "end_char": 6431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Jiban Kumari and Gourimoni Debi died shortly afterwards, and Gopal Das, a minor son of Gourimoni, became the shebait of the idol.", "canonical_name": "Gourimoni Devi"}}, {"text": "Gopal Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6461, "end_char": 6470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Jiban Kumari and Gourimoni Debi died shortly afterwards, and Gopal Das, a minor son of Gourimoni, became the shebait of the idol.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Das"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6564, "end_char": 6578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During his minority, his father, Raghubar Dayal, became his certificated guardian, and, in that capacity, he executed a usufructuary mortgage deed in respect of the Cotton Street properties to one Lal Behari D_utt, on the 31 August, 1878."}}, {"text": "Lal Behari D_utt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6728, "end_char": 6744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During his minority, his father, Raghubar Dayal, became his certificated guardian, and, in that capacity, he executed a usufructuary mortgage deed in respect of the Cotton Street properties to one Lal Behari D_utt, on the 31 August, 1878.", "canonical_name": "Lal Behari D_utt"}}, {"text": "31 August, 1878", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6753, "end_char": 6768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During his minority, his father, Raghubar Dayal, became his certificated guardian, and, in that capacity, he executed a usufructuary mortgage deed in respect of the Cotton Street properties to one Lal Behari D_utt, on the 31 August, 1878."}}, {"text": "Ajodhya Debi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6808, "end_char": 6820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Raghubar Dayal one Ajodhya Debi and after her one Kalicharan Dutta became the certifiqi.ted guardian of Gopal Das, and, on the 17th August, 1890, the latter mortgaged some debutter properties including 140and 141, Cotton Street, to Lal Behari Dutt for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kalicharan Dutta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6839, "end_char": 6855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Raghubar Dayal one Ajodhya Debi and after her one Kalicharan Dutta became the certifiqi.ted guardian of Gopal Das, and, on the 17th August, 1890, the latter mortgaged some debutter properties including 140and 141, Cotton Street, to Lal Behari Dutt for a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Kalicharan Dutta"}}, {"text": "17th August, 1890", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6916, "end_char": 6933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Raghubar Dayal one Ajodhya Debi and after her one Kalicharan Dutta became the certifiqi.ted guardian of Gopal Das, and, on the 17th August, 1890, the latter mortgaged some debutter properties including 140and 141, Cotton Street, to Lal Behari Dutt for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Lal Behari Dutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7021, "end_char": 7036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Raghubar Dayal one Ajodhya Debi and after her one Kalicharan Dutta became the certifiqi.ted guardian of Gopal Das, and, on the 17th August, 1890, the latter mortgaged some debutter properties including 140and 141, Cotton Street, to Lal Behari Dutt for a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Lal Behari D_utt"}}, {"text": "Gopaldas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7084, "end_char": 7092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On attaining majority, Gopaldas executed on the 17th January, 1896, a usufructuary mortgage deed in respect of all debutter properties including ·the Cotton Street houses in favour of Lal Behari Dutt for paying the previous mortgage dues which amounted on that date to Rs.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Das"}}, {"text": "17th January, 1896", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7109, "end_char": 7127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On attaining majority, Gopaldas executed on the 17th January, 1896, a usufructuary mortgage deed in respect of all debutter properties including ·the Cotton Street houses in favour of Lal Behari Dutt for paying the previous mortgage dues which amounted on that date to Rs."}}, {"text": "Annapurna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7661, "end_char": 7670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopaldas died in 1900, leaving behind him surviving his widow, Annapurna, who also died in 1905."}}, {"text": "Naba Kishor Dutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7831, "end_char": 7847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By 1918, Lal Behari Dutt also was dead, and his interest in the mortgaged properties, to which reference has been made, was sold to one Naba Kishor Dutt on the 12th December, 1918.", "canonical_name": "Naba Kishor Dutt"}}, {"text": "12th December, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7855, "end_char": 7874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By 1918, Lal Behari Dutt also was dead, and his interest in the mortgaged properties, to which reference has been made, was sold to one Naba Kishor Dutt on the 12th December, 1918."}}, {"text": "17th November, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7883, "end_char": 7902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th November, 1933, Naba Kishor assigned the mortgagee's\n\n1951 interest in the mortgaged properties to two of the\n\nS- 1 Bagarias, respondents I and 2 in appeal No."}}, {"text": "Naba Kishor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7904, "end_char": 7915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th November, 1933, Naba Kishor assigned the mortgagee's\n\n1951 interest in the mortgaged properties to two of the\n\nS- 1 Bagarias, respondents I and 2 in appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Naba Kishor Dutt"}}, {"text": "s\n\n1951", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7939, "end_char": 7946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bagarias", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8004, "end_char": 8012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th November, 1933, Naba Kishor assigned the mortgagee's\n\n1951 interest in the mortgaged properties to two of the\n\nS- 1 Bagarias, respondents I and 2 in appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Bagarias"}}, {"text": "hakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8142, "end_char": 8147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h h d 0 pal Ji\"' mt e same year t e three respon en ts (1 to 3) also\n\nhakur acquired the lessee's interest in the Cotton Street v. hoµses.", "canonical_name": "Thakur"}}, {"text": "Fad Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8453, "end_char": 8460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "141, Cotton Street, as well as two adjoining premises\n\nFad Ali J. with which we are not concerned in this case."}}, {"text": "Deosaran Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8954, "end_char": 8968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the deity, the entire amount of compensation money was claimed by Deosaran Singh and Ram Lakshman Singh, who alleged themselves to be shebaits, on the basisthat the premises in question were de butter properties of the deity, and the Bagarias had acquired no interest therein either by the assignment of the usufructuary m11rtgage or the alleged purchase of the tenant's rights in the properties."}}, {"text": "Ram Lakshman Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8973, "end_char": 8991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the deity, the entire amount of compensation money was claimed by Deosaran Singh and Ram Lakshman Singh, who alleged themselves to be shebaits, on the basisthat the premises in question were de butter properties of the deity, and the Bagarias had acquired no interest therein either by the assignment of the usufructuary m11rtgage or the alleged purchase of the tenant's rights in the properties."}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9609, "end_char": 9623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 22nd May, 1935, the Collector awarded Rs."}}, {"text": "Sree Sree Jawar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10172, "end_char": 10187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Collector's award and 1951 the referece made b.y the ~Hector in pursuance there- Sree Sree Jawar of was registered as apportionment case No."}}, {"text": "Bagaria", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10480, "end_char": 10487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Meanwhile, Deosaran Singh and Ram Lakshman Singh, v. who had put in claims as shebaits, retired from the Pmtapmal contest, and the President of the Tribunal appointed Bagaria and one Narendra Nath Rudra as the next friend of the Others.", "canonical_name": "Bagarias"}}, {"text": "Narendra Nath Rudra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10496, "end_char": 10515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Meanwhile, Deosaran Singh and Ram Lakshman Singh, v. who had put in claims as shebaits, retired from the Pmtapmal contest, and the President of the Tribunal appointed Bagaria and one Narendra Nath Rudra as the next friend of the Others."}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali J. 31st August, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10603, "end_char": 10632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the Faz!"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11301, "end_char": 11312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11325, "end_char": 11339, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pratapmal Bagaria", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12383, "end_char": 12400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pratapmal Bagaria and So far as the question of legal necessity is concerned, Others.", "canonical_name": "PRATAPMAL BAGARIA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "arpannama Thakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14506, "end_char": 14522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We also find from the arpannama Thakur that the value of the property which is the subject v. matter of the mokrari kabuliyat dated the 30th Pratapmal September, 1869 (exhibit L) was Rs."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14806, "end_char": 14817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000 in 1848, Ba:~:~=.nd that it was not in the khas possession of Muni Bibi but had been let out to a tenant and that its net income Fazl Ali J. was Rs.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali J."}}, {"text": "Muni -- Bibi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16555, "end_char": 16567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not know who was the tenant of the\n\n1951 house in 1848 and what were the commitments of Muni -- Bibi at that time, but, even apart from these facts, it 8''/;:::U,\"/=' is difficult to believe that a devout person like her, who\n\nThakur was not only a shebait but also the widow of the\n\nv. founder of the deity and who had shown such keen Pratapmai interest for the upkeep of the worship of the deity, Bauaria and should have entered into the transaction in question\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Muni -- Bibi"}}, {"text": "Bauaria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16866, "end_char": 16873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not know who was the tenant of the\n\n1951 house in 1848 and what were the commitments of Muni -- Bibi at that time, but, even apart from these facts, it 8''/;:::U,\"/=' is difficult to believe that a devout person like her, who\n\nThakur was not only a shebait but also the widow of the\n\nv. founder of the deity and who had shown such keen Pratapmai interest for the upkeep of the worship of the deity, Bauaria and should have entered into the transaction in question\n\nOthers."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16997, "end_char": 17005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nThe contention put forward before us is that it has not been shown that there was no other course open to Muni Bibi than to grant a permanent lease in respect of the property, but it is manifest that.at this distance of time no evidence can be available to show the actual pressure or necessity which impelled Muni Bibi to adopt the course she did.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali J."}}, {"text": "18th October, 1873", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18440, "end_char": 18458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, we find that the permanent character of the lease was recognized in a deed executed by Gourimoni on the 18th October, 1873 (exhibit Y), and in a mortgage deed executed by Raghubar Dayal, the guardian of Gopaldas, on the 31st August, 1878."}}, {"text": "31st August, 1878", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18556, "end_char": 18573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, we find that the permanent character of the lease was recognized in a deed executed by Gourimoni on the 18th October, 1873 (exhibit Y), and in a mortgage deed executed by Raghubar Dayal, the guardian of Gopaldas, on the 31st August, 1878."}}, {"text": "Kali Charan Dutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18634, "end_char": 18650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The properties in question were subsequently mortgaged by Kali Charan Dutt and Gopaldas, but neither of these persons nor\n\n\\11 '9 I.A. 6f,\n\nthe mortgagees ever came forward to question the per-\n\nHJ51 manent nature of the tenancy. . . .", "canonical_name": "Kalicharan Dutta"}}, {"text": "Bree Sree", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18813, "end_char": 18822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bree Sree lsu:ar The counsel for the appellant relied upon exh1b1t VI, Gopat Jieu which is a copy of the judgment of the High Court in Thakur a suit instituted by Nabakishore Dutt in 1925 against v. the Administrator-General of Bengal for the rent of the Pratapmat I f h. d h Bagari.a and house in question."}}, {"text": "Thakur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18948, "end_char": 18954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bree Sree lsu:ar The counsel for the appellant relied upon exh1b1t VI, Gopat Jieu which is a copy of the judgment of the High Court in Thakur a suit instituted by Nabakishore Dutt in 1925 against v. the Administrator-General of Bengal for the rent of the Pratapmat I f h. d h Bagari.a and house in question."}}, {"text": "Nabakishore Dutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18976, "end_char": 18992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bree Sree lsu:ar The counsel for the appellant relied upon exh1b1t VI, Gopat Jieu which is a copy of the judgment of the High Court in Thakur a suit instituted by Nabakishore Dutt in 1925 against v. the Administrator-General of Bengal for the rent of the Pratapmat I f h. d h Bagari.a and house in question.", "canonical_name": "Naba Kishor Dutt"}}, {"text": "Administrator-General of Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19016, "end_char": 19047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bree Sree lsu:ar The counsel for the appellant relied upon exh1b1t VI, Gopat Jieu which is a copy of the judgment of the High Court in Thakur a suit instituted by Nabakishore Dutt in 1925 against v. the Administrator-General of Bengal for the rent of the Pratapmat I f h. d h Bagari.a and house in question."}}, {"text": "Nabakishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19743, "end_char": 19754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment does not say in so many words that Nabakishore resisted the claim as to the tenancy being mourasi mokrari, but, however that may be, assuming that such an assertion was really made by him, it cannot affect the character of a tenancy which had remained unquestioned for :A.early half a century.", "canonical_name": "Naba Kishor Dutt"}}, {"text": "J iban Kumari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20216, "end_char": 20229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been already stated, a mourasi mokrari tenancy was created by J iban Kumari on the 8th December, 1869, as is evidenced by exhibit K. This document recites among other things that the house which was the subject of the lease, \" s'tands in need of repairs and for want of such repairs there is chance of some portion thereof breaking down during the year. \"", "canonical_name": "J iban Kumari"}}, {"text": "8th December, 1869", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20237, "end_char": 20255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been already stated, a mourasi mokrari tenancy was created by J iban Kumari on the 8th December, 1869, as is evidenced by exhibit K. This document recites among other things that the house which was the subject of the lease, \" s'tands in need of repairs and for want of such repairs there is chance of some portion thereof breaking down during the year. \""}}, {"text": "Gopal Jieu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21070, "end_char": 21080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "han 2\n\nGopal Jieu years after the kabuhyat.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Jieu"}}, {"text": "l'azZ Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21445, "end_char": 21454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also OthttB. a further clause in that deed to the following effect : -\n\n:l'azZ Ali J. ••In accordance with the terms of the solenama the expenses of the lswar seba shall be met from the income of those properties which have been dedicated for the performance of the work of the said seba and the amount by which the expenses for the festivals would fall short and the expenses which would be incurred for repairs to house for sheba of the said Thakur shall be met and the Tahailia (attendant) and the Brahman cook and the Brahman priest (now) employed and to be employed hereafter shall get (their) salaries, from the income of the said property.\""}}, {"text": "Tahailia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21844, "end_char": 21852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also OthttB. a further clause in that deed to the following effect : -\n\n:l'azZ Ali J. ••In accordance with the terms of the solenama the expenses of the lswar seba shall be met from the income of those properties which have been dedicated for the performance of the work of the said seba and the amount by which the expenses for the festivals would fall short and the expenses which would be incurred for repairs to house for sheba of the said Thakur shall be met and the Tahailia (attendant) and the Brahman cook and the Brahman priest (now) employed and to be employed hereafter shall get (their) salaries, from the income of the said property.\""}}, {"text": "Jiban KU.mari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22102, "end_char": 22115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On reading this document along with the solenama and the mokrari lease granted by Jiban KU.mari, it appears that she dedicated the property after having created a mokrari lease, that what she purported to dedicate was the income derived by way of rent from the mourasi mokrari tenancy, and that she had dedicated this income for specific purposes with the object of making up the deficit in the income received from other debutter properties.", "canonical_name": "J iban Kumari"}}, {"text": "Gopal Ji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23383, "end_char": 23391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is presump 1on IS consI era y Gopal Ji.,,", "canonical_name": "Gopal Jieu"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24920, "end_char": 24933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 : Sukumar Ghose."}}, {"text": "S. C. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25045, "end_char": 25059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96 : S. C. Banerjee."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25114, "end_char": 25130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "95 : P. K. Chatterjee. ·"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_344_370_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "March 16.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nJANARDAN REDDY AND OTHERS\n\n[1951]\n\nTHE STA TE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS.\n\nKULLURI YELLADU AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS.\n\nMUNGALA SAMUEL AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS.\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au. MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, :MUKHERJEA, DAS and (HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 32-Special Tribunals Regulation (Hyderabad), ss. 2, 7-Conviction and death sentence by Special Tribunal-Confirmation by High Court before 26th January, 1950- App!ication under Art. 32 for writs of prohibition, certiorari and habeas corpus-Maintainability-Detention under conviction by criminal court-Applicatio1t for habeas corpus-Jurisdiction of convicting court, whether can be gone into-Effect of confirmation of conviction on appcal-Misjoinder of charges-Omission to provide counsel for accused-Validity of conviction-Interference under\n\nArt. 32.\n\nThere is a basic difference between want of juri<diction and an illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction, and mere non-compliance with rules. of procedure (e. g., misjoinder of charges) cannot be made a ground for granting a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The defect, if any, can, according to the procedure established by law, be corrected only by a court of appeal or revision, and if the appellate court which was competent to deal with the matter has considered the matter and pronounced its judgment, it cannot be reopened in a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nWhere, some time after the pronouncement of a sentence of death by hanging by a Special Tribunal of the Hyderabad State and pending confirmation of the sentence by the High Court of Hyderabad, a Regulation was passed to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force any sentence of death passed by a Special , Tribunal shall be carried into execution by hanging: Held, that the Regulation\n\nmust be taken to have retrospective t'ffect, as the mode of execul!l51 tion of a sentence cannot be regarded as a matter of substantive law, and. the sentence for hanging cannot be held to l>e illegal Janardan Redd.I/ even assuming that under the law which was in force in Hyderabad and Othera at the time the sentence was passed by the Special Tribunal, v. sentences to death could be carried out only by decapitation. n The State of any event, as the Hi.E(h Court which upheld the conviction had Hydembrrd and the power to impose the sentence of death by hanging under the Otoos.\n\nRegulation, no relief could be granted to the accused under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nSection 7(2) of the Special Tribunals Regulation passed by the Military Governor of Hyderabad covered all those cases where manzuri and tashih were contemplated under the old law arid\n\nsentences of death passed by a Special Tribunal could therefore be executed without the assent or approval of H.E. H. the Nizam.\n\nThe result of s. 271 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code, (which corresponds to s.340 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code) read along with the Rules and Circular Orders issued by the Hyderabad High Court is : (i) that it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that in every capital sentence where the accused is unrepresented the trial should be held to be vitiated; and (ii) that a court of appeal or revision is not powerless to interfere if it is found that the accused was so handicapped for want of legal aid that the proceedings against him may be said to amount to negation of a fair trial.\n\nThe writs referred to in Art. 32 must obviously be correlated to one or more of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and can be made only for the enforcement of such rights.\n\nThe petitioners who were convicted by a Special Tribunal of Hyderabad of murder and other offences and sentenced to death by hanging and whose convictions and sentences had been confirmed by the Hy'derabad High, Court before the 26th January,\n\n1950, applied to the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the new Constitution for the following reliefs: (i) a writ ih 'the nature of certiorari calling upon the Government of Hyderabad and the Special Judge to produce the records of the case and show cause why the convictions and sentences should not be quashed, (ii) for a writ of prohibition directing the Government and Special Judge not to execute the petitioners, and (iii) for a writ of habeas corpus: Held, (i) that the writs of certiorari and prohibition could not be granted as at the date when the High Court dealt with the case and confirmed the conviction and sentences of the petitioners, the Supreme Court was not in existence and the Hyderabad Court could not by any stretch of reasoning be said to have bn subordinate to the Supreme Court;\n\n(ii) the writ of habeas corpus could not be granted inasmuch as a return that the person is in detention in execution Janardan Reddy of a sentence on indictment on a criminal charge is a sufficient and Others answer to an application for such a writ ; v.\n\n(iii) assuming that it is open even in such cases to investi- The SUit• of gate the jurisdiction of the court which convicted the petitioners, Hyderabad and the mere fact that the trial court had acted without juri'<liction\n\nOthers. would not justify interference, if the conviction and sentence had been upheld on appeal by a court of competent jurisdiction; for, the appellate court in a case which properly comes before it on appeal, is fully competent to decide whether the trial was with or without jurisdiction and it has jurisdiction to decide tho matter rightly as well as wrongly; and as the High Court at Hyderabad had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal, the detention of the petitioners could not be held to be invalid;\n\n(iv) as the judgment of the High Court was pronounced before the 26th January, 1950, and it had acquired a finality in the fullest sense of the term before that date, the Supreme Court had no power to re-open that judgment under the provisions of the new Constitution ;\n\n(v) the fact that the petitioners had lost their right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad by a sudden change in the law and by the delay on the part of the High Court in the disposal of their application for leave to appeal to the said Committee was a matter for the executive authorities to consider; it could not widen the scope of the existing remedial laws beyond legitimate bounds. 1 Quaere: Whether an application under Art. 32 is maintainable after a similar application under Art. 226 has been dismissed by the High Court.\n\n. In re Authers [(1889) 22 Q.B.D. 345], In re Bailey (3 E. & B.\n\n607) andln re Bakers (2 H. & N. 219) not followed. In re Newton (139 E. R. 692), In re Bonomally Gupta (44 Cal. 723), Greene v.\n\nSecretary of State for Home Affairs ([1942] A.C. 284), Ex parte Lees [(1868) E.B. & E. 828], R .. v. Suddis [(1801) 1 East 306], Carus Wilson's case [(1845) 7 Q.B. 984] referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : These were two sets of petitions by three groups of persons, one under Art. 32 of the Constitution (Petitions Nos. 12, 13 and 14, of\n\n1951) and the other under Art. 136(1) of the Constitution (Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 14, 15 and 16) against the judgment and order dated 19th December, 1950, of the. High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad (M. Khaliluzzaman Siddiqi J.) in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 2297, 2298 and 2299 of 1950.\n\nThe facts are set out in detail in the judgment.\n\n1951 D. N. Pritt (Dattial Latifi and Gopal Singh, with him) for the petitioners. • • Janardan Reddy M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Ra1aand Others ram Aiyar, Advocate-General of Hyderabad, (G.N. Joshi, v. with them) for the respondents.\n\nThe Stat• oJ Hyderabad and\n\n1951. March 16. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J .-These are six petitions which have been presented to this Court on behalf of three groups of persons in the following circumstances.\n\nOn the 30th October, 1948, the Military Governor of Hyderabad by virtue of the powers delegated to him by H. E. H. the Nizam enacted the Special Tribunals Regulation (No. 5 of 1358 F}, which was amended by several later Regulations issued on the 22nd May, 1949, 10th July, 1949, 23rd July and 30th October,\n\n1949. The Regulation provided among other things that the Military Governor may constitute a Special Tribunal or Tribunals, each consisting of three members appointed by him, and that he may by general or special order direct that these Tribunals shall try any offence, whether committed before or after the commencement of the Regulation, or any class of1 offences.\n\nSection 8 of the Regulation empowered the Military Governor to direct, by order, that in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, any power or duty conferred or imposed upon him by the Regulation may be exercised or discharged by any other authority. In accordance with the Regulation, certain Tribunals were constituted, and one of the Tribunals-Tribunal A for Nalgonda district - proceeded to try certain cases made over to it by the Civil Ad!llinistrator of Nalgonda under the powers vested in him by the Military Governor. Among the cases tried by this Tribunal were also three cases in which the petitioners were concerned, these being registered as Criminal Cases Nos. 14, 17 and 18 of 1949. These cases were based on three charge sheets submitted by one Mr. Hanumantha\n\nOthers.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\n1951 Naidu, a senior police officer of Nalgonda district, one Janaman R..utyof which was No. 14 dated the 7th April, 1949, and\n\narnl oti..rs the other two were Nos. 14 and 15 dated the 20th July, v.\n\n1949. In these chargesheets, the accused were generally The State 0! referred to as \"Communists wedded to the policy of\n\nHyd~\";.baa arnl overthrowing the Government by violence and setting\n\n~· up in its place Communist Raj.\" and the specific cases Fazl Ali 1. made out against them were briefly as follows. In the first case (Criminal Case No. 14 of 1949), the charge sheet stated that the accused went to a certain village in Nalgonda district on 21st September, 1948 'in khaki uniform and holding unnotified firearms,\" caught hold of four persons as they had not paid the full subscription demanded of them, decoyed them to the outskirts of the village and then \"killed them by cutting their throats.\" In the second case (Criminal Case No. 17), it was stated that on the 6th April, 1949, at about 9 A. M. two of the accused came to a certain village and began to fire their guns, but when \"the public\" approached them asking them to surrender they ran away and joined the other persons accused in the case. Later on, all the accused \"marched on the villagers\" and opened fire at them indiscriminately with the result that one of them received an injury in his right thigh which subsequently proved fatal, and another received a minor injury on his left hand. The version given at the trial in this case was slightly different and shows that the two accused who had visited the village were chased by 50 or 100 persons to a place called Madireddychelka where the other accused joined them, and after parleying with the chasers, accnsed No. 4 fired and hit one of the villagers on the thigh and the latter died .. Thereupon the accused chased the remaining villagers, firing their guns, and one of the bullets grazed the middle finger of one of the villagers and caused a slight injury to it. In the third case (Criminal Case No. 18), the facts were stated to be these:-On the 15th May, at about midnight, the accused visited Kasthala village, carrying firearms and dressed in khaki uniform. They got upon the terrace of one Kankayya where one Natala Rama Reddy was\n\nsleeping, caught hold of him and took him forcibly to 1951 the outskirts of the village in spite of the protests of a J rda R dd num her of villagers who had followed, and \"killed a':rnt the;• Y him by firing gunshots at him.\" . v.\n\nUpon these facts, the trial of the petitioners pro- The State of ceeded, and they were ultimately convicted of murder Hyd::':ibaa and and sentenced to death, and also convicted of certain\n\n1 era. other offences including the offence of carrying fire- Fazl AU J. arms without licences and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. After their conviction, the petitioners appealed to the Hyderabad High Court, but their convictions and sentences were confirmed. Thereafter, they tried to obtan the leave of the High Court for appealing to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad, but, while their applications were stil1 pending, the Constitution of India came into force and since the Judicial Committee ceased to function under the new Constitution they amended their original application by asking fur leave to appeal to this Court under article 134 (c) of the Constitution. This application being unsuccessful, they applied to this Court for special leave to appeal, but that application was dismissed on the ground that this Court had no jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution to hear an appeal from a judgment delivered by the High Court at Hyderabad before the 26th January, 1950, since that Court was not within the territory of India*. The petitioners then made applications to the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution, and those applications having been rejected, they filed two sets of petitions in this Court, one under article 32 of the Constitution, and the other for special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court refusing to grant them relief under article 226.\n\nThe main points urged by Mr. Pritt, who appeared before us on behalf of the petitioners, were as follows:- ( I) The trial of the petitioners by the Special Tribunal was without jurisdiction.\n\n(2) In Criminal Cases Nos. 17 and 18 of 1949, there was no fair trial, inasmuch as the persons accused in\n\n• Vide (19~0] S.O, R. 940.\n\n1951 those cases were not afforded any opportunity to - instruct counsel and they had remained undefended Ja\"\"'_'1;'0n hReddy throughout the trial. anut era v.\n\n(3) The trials in question were illegal by reason of Th• Stat• of misjoinder of charges.\n\nHya....ba<t and ( 4) At the time of the passing of the sentence, the Others. sentence of death could be lawfully executed by :Fazl Ali 1. decapitation only and not by hanging, and hence the sentence of death by hanging passed upon the accused in the first case was illegal.\n\n(5) The sentence of death could not be executed without the assent or the approval of H. E. H. the Nizam which had not yet been obtained.\n\nThe last three points seem to us to have very little substance and may be shortly disposed of.\n\nIt appears that in all the three cases, besides being charged with murder, rioting and certain other cognate offences, which on the face of the record appear to have been committed in the course of the same transaction, the petitioners were also charged with carrying unlicensed firearms. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the offence of carrying unlicensed firearms was wholly unconnected with the other offences and could not be said to have been committed in the course of the same transaction. It seems that this very point was raised in the High Court, but it was negatived, firstly on the ground that there was no misjoinder of charges and no violation of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, and secondly, on the ground that no prejudice had been caused by the so-called niisjoinder. The entire argument on behalf of the petitioners was based on the case of Subramania Iyer v. King Emperor('). That case had somewhat peculiar features, because the accused was tried for no less than 41 separate offences in contravention of the provisions of section 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and in these circumstances it.was observed by the Privy Council that the mischief sought to be avoided by the section having been\n\nll) L. 11. !18 LA. 2b7.\n\ncommitted, '' the effect of the multitude of charges 1951 before the jury had not been averted by dissecting the d f d d ' · . 1.anardan Reddy ver ict a terwar s an . appropnatmg the finding of' and Others guilt only to such parts of the written accusation as v. ought to have been submitted to the jury.'' The case The State of has been discussed, explained and distinguished in a Hyderabad and number of cases, and it must be read with the sub- Others. sequent decisions of the Privy Council in Abdul Rah- Fazl AU J. man v. King Emperor (1) and in Babu Lal v. Emperor(2) which have been understood by some of the Indian courts to have greatly modified and restricted the very broad rule which at one time there was a tendency to deduce from certain general observations made by the\n\nPrivy Council. It may be that on a more appropriate occasion we may have to review the case law on the subject and lay down the true scope of the pronouncements made by the Privy Council in the cases referred to above and the effect which in law the misjoinder of charges would have upon the trial. But, for the purpose of the present case, it is sufficient to point out that even if we assume that there was some defect in the procedure followed at the trial, it does not follow that the trial court acted without jurisdiction. There is a basic difference be! ween want of jurisdiction and an illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction, and our attention has not been drawn to any authority in which mere non-compliance with the rules of procedure has been made a ground for granting one of the writs prayed for.\n\nIn either case, the defect, if any, can according to the procedure establishe.d by law be corrected only by a court of appeal or revision. Here, the appellate court which was competent to deal with the matter has pronounced its judgment against the petitioners, and the matter having been finally decided is not one to be reopened in a proceeding under article 32 of the Constitution.\n\nThe fourth point raised on behalf of the petitioners is not only a highly technical one but is also entirely devoid of merit. A reference to the Hyderabad Penal Code shows that in section 243, which deals with the\n\n(I) L. R. 6' l. A, 96.\n\n(t) A. I. B. 1930 P. O. 130,\n\n1951 offence of murder, all that is stated is that death is one of - the penalties. That section does not state how the sen- Jana.:ida; h Reddy tence of death is to be executed. When we turn to the a v'. era Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code, we find that\n\nThe State of section 311, which is the relevant section, runs as Hyderabad and follows : -·\n\nOther•. \"When an order of death sentence or any other\n\nFa'1AliJ. sentence has been submitted to .the High Court for ratification (tashih) the Sessions Court shall, on receiving the order of ratification or other order of the High Court thereon, cause such order to be carried into effect by issuing a warrant or taking such other steps as may be necessary or expedient.\"\n\nIn this section also, no mention is made as to how the sentence of death is to be executed, but in Schedule IV of the Code, in the form prescribed for the warrant of execution of a death sentence (Form No. 29) the concluding sentence runs as follows : -\n\n\" ...... you shall hand over the accused ...... to the executioner so that the latter may separate the head from the body of the said prisoner in such a way that his life may be extinct and that the execution of this order may be reported to the High Court.\"\n\nIn the first case (Criminal Case No. 14 of 1949), the sentence was\" death by hanging,\" but in the other two cases the accused were simply sentenced to death, without any indication as to how the sentence was to be executed. It has been argued that in view of the provisions of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code, the sentence of death by hanging was not strictly appropriate. But, however that may be, we find that on the 30th October, 1949, i, e., sometime after the pronouncement of the sentences by the Special Tribunal and before they were confirmed by the High Court, the Special Tribunals Regulation was amended and a specific provision was made to the following effect:-\n\n\" 2-B. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force-\n\n(i) arty sentence of death passed by a Special Tribu_nal shall be carried into execution by causing\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT kEPORTS 353\n\nthe person sentenced to be hanged by the neck until 1951 he is dead • Janardan Reddy\n\n(ii) warrants of commitments under sentence of and Others death, warrants of execution of a sentence of death v. and any other instruments issued by a Special The State 0!\n\nTribunal ....... shall be issued in such form as the Special Hyd~bad and Tribunal thinks fit.\" era.\n\nApparently, these provisions applied to all sentences which had remained unexecuted or were to be executed at the date of the amending Regulation, and therefore they should govern the case of the petitioners also. In our opinion, they must be taken to have retrospective effect, because the mode of the execution of a sentence can hardly be regarded as a matter of substantive law or something which would affect any substantive rights. In any event, the High Court, which upheld the conviction, had the power to inflict the sentence of death by hanging under the amended Regulation, and therefore this point does not properly arise in a matter involving the question whether any relief under article 32 of the Constitution should be granted.\n\nThe fifth point also does not appear to us to have much merit. The determination of this point is said to rest upon the proper interpretation of the word \"manzuri,\" which is used in sections 20, 302, 307 and 309 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nSection 20, which is the most important section, runs as follows :-\n\n\"Every Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law but such sentence shall not be carried into effect until\n\n(1) in the case of a sentence of ten years imprisonment or more the appropriate Bench of the High Court, (2) in the case of life imprisonment the Government, and\n\n(3) in the case of death sentence H. E. H. the Nizam shall have assented thereto (given manzitri),\"\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\n1951 Section 302 (I) states that in certain cases, execution - of sentence shall be stayed until manzuri in accordance Janardad 0\"hReddy with section 20 is given. Section 307 deals with cases\n\nan t era h h H' ffi h v. w ere t e 1gh Court a rms a deat sentence or a The state of sentence of life imprisonment and provides that after Hyderabad an4 such confirmation, the opinion of the High Court to-\n\nOther.•. gether with the file of the case shall be forwarded for tashih (rectification or ratification) to the Government }'azl Ali J. within one week and the sentence shall not be carried into effect until manzuri is obtained as provided in section\n\n20. Section 308 runs as follows:-\n\n\" When the High Court thus forwards any file for ratification (tashih) H. E. H. the Nizam or the Government as the case may be shall be empowered\n\n(a) to uphold the sentence of the High Court,\n\n(b) to substitute any other penalty for the same,\n\n(c) to set the prisoner at liberty,\n\n(d) to make any other appropriate order.\" Section 309 provides that after the manzuri is obtained in the manner already stated, the Registrar of the High Court shall send a copy of the order to the Sessions Court for carrying it into effect. It will be noticed that there are two different words used in these sections, viz., manzuri and tashih.\n\nM anzuri literally means approval or acceptance, but, in the context in which it occurs, confirmation would seem to convey adequately the sense underlying it. Tashih means rectification or correction, and conveys the sense that the superior authority named in section 308 may either uphold the sentence or revise it in the manner stated therein.\n\nNow, the important point to be considered is in what way the provisions to which reference has been made, have been affected by the Regulations issued by the Military Governor. A reference to these Regulations will show that in section 7 of the original Regulation, the following words have been substituted:-\n\n\"7. (2) ......... no sentence of a Special Tribunal shall be subject to confirmation (tausiq is the vernacular expression used here.)\n\n(3) The Military Governor may'on such conditions, 11151 if any, as he thinks fit, suspend, remit, reduce, oralter J ;;;:-Redd the nature of, any sentence passed by a Special Tribua';; nd 0\",,_ Y nal, or any sentence substituted by the High Court on v. an appeal under sub-section (2) for any sentence so The state of passed.'' Hyderabad and It was contended by the learned Attorney-General Other•. that these provisions cover all those cases where man- Fazt Ali J. zuri nd tashih were contemplated under the old law.\n\nOn the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that manzuri was a peculiarly apt expression when used with reference to a ruler, and the primary sense conveyed by it was that no sentence was a good sentence without the approval or sanction of the monarch. A mere reference to section 20 will show that the word manzuri has not been used with reference only to H. E. H. the Nizam, but it has also been used with reference to the High Court and the Government, and therefore it is difficult to hold that the word bears the special meaning attributed to it on behalf of the petitioners. In the context in which it is used, it has no other meaning than the act of confirmation, and the new word, tausiq, which has been used in the Regulation, and which literally' means confirmation, appears to convey the same sense as the word manzuri. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioners that the use of the word • hakim ' in connection with confirmation in one of the amending Regulations could not have been intended to cover confirmation by H. E. H. the Nizam. But since • hakim' literally means a ruler or an authority, we are not inclined to attach much importance to the distinction sought to be drawn between hakim and ruler. It is quite plain that one of the objects of the Regulations was to simplify procedure and expedite trials, and the interpretation which is suggested by the learned Attorney-General seems to be in conformity with those objects;\n\nHaving dealt with these minor points, we shall now advert to the first and second points, which appear to us to be the only serious points urged in this case. In urging the second point, which arises only in Criminal\n\n1951 Cases Nos. 17 and 18 (covered by Petitions Nos. 13 J -;;;: Redd and 14 under article 32), it is contended on behalf of\n\nu::~ oer' Y the petitioners that the whole trial in these cases was\n\n•. bad, because the accused were denied the right of being\n\n1'hc State of defended by a pleader. The petitions with which we Hydemoad and are dealing, do not recite any facts to support this\n\nUthers. point. There are however the following allegations\n\nPuzl.4ti J. made in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners :-\n\n\"2. All this time I was not allowed to communicate with my relations and friends.\n\nBefore I was brought before the Special Tribunal on 3-8-49, during the trial or afterwards I never saw any of my friends or relations, whether in the lock-up, the Court or in the jail. due to circumstances best known to the police. * * *\n\n4. The Court never offered to facilitate my communication with my relations and friends or to adjourn the case or to appoint counsel at State expense for my defence. In fact they said they would not adjourn tlie case under any circumstances. Being ignorant I did not know that I had any right to ask for any of these things.\"\n\nIn arguing this part of the case, Mr. Pritt relied on certain American cases, especially on Powell v. Ala. bama('). in which the Supreme Court of America is reported to have observed as follows:-\n\n\"In a capital case where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable of adequately making his own defence because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy or the like, it is the duty of the Court whether requested or not, to assign a counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law.\"\n\nThat the assignment of a counsel in the circumstances mentioned in the passage is highly desirable, cannot be disputed. But the question raised before us is whether in law non-assignment of a counsel would vitiate the trial. It seems to us that in dealing with the point, we cannot rest our judgment wholly on\n\n\\1) ~-7 u.s. 45.\n\nAmerican precedents, wich are based on the doctrine 1951 of due process of law, which is peculiar to the Ameri- J rda Redd can Constitution, and also on certain specific provisions a~ /:ihers , y bearing, on the right of representation in a criminal v. proceeding. The provision which is material to the The Stale of contention raised before us is section 271 of the Hydera- Hyderabad and\n\nbad Criminal Procedure Code which corresponds to Others. section 340 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, Fazl Ali J. which runs as follows :- ''Any person accused of an offence before a criminal court, or against whom proceedings are instituted under this Code in any such court, may of right be defended by a pleader.\"\n\nThis provision must undoubtedly be construed liberally in favour of the accused and must be read along with the rules made by the High Courts and the circular orders issued by them enjoining that where in capital cases the accused has no means to defend himself, a counsel should be provided to defend him.\n\nThe proper view seems to us to be: (1) that it cannot be laid down as a. rule of law that in every capital case where the accused is unrepresented, the trial should be held to be vitiated ; and (2) that a court of appeal or revision is not powerless to interfere, if it is found that the accused was so handicapped for want of legal aid that the proceedings against him may be said to amount to negation of a fair trial.\n\nPassing now to the facts of the cases before us, it appears that in Criminal Case No. 14, the accused persons concerned were defended by a pleader, but those concerned in Cases Nos. 17 and 18 were not represented at all by any lawyer. Further a reference to the docket sheets in Case No. 17 shows that the accused in Case No. 17 were brought into court on the 3rd August, 1949, and they were informed on that day that the case would be heard on the 6th August,\n\n1949, and that they must get ready with their defence lawyers and witnesses on that date. On the 6th August, the case was adjourned because none of the prosecution witnesses was present and the trial\n\n19°1 commenced on the 7th August, i.e., next day. In Case - edd No. 18, an order similar to the one passed in Case No.\n\nJa:::; i,; h!, Y 17 was passed on the 3rd August, but the hearing was\n\n•· fixed for the 7th August. The docket sheets also show\n\n2•1w State of that the trial was concluded in Case No. 17 on the 14th\n\nHyderabad and August and in Case No. 18 on the 13th August. As to\n\nOthere. the circumstances under which the accused were not\n\nraz1 Ali J. represented by a lawyer, we have been referred to a counter-affidavit filed by Mr. Hanumantha Naidu, who investigated the case, in which the following statement occurs:-\n\n\"4. Regarding the means of accused Hanumanthu enquiries were made by the Tribunal and it was found that he had enough means to engage a lawyer. He owned lands and house property. But he, however, did not want to engage a lawyer and this is noted in docket sheet of Criminal Case No. 14/49 by the President of the Tribunal.\n\nFacilities were given to the accused to engage lawyers for their defence. In cases in which the accused had no means to engage pleaders for their defence and applied to the Tribunal for appointment of pleaders at Government cost, this was done. In some cases, the accused declined to accept the pleaders appointed by the Tribunal for their defence.\n\nSome engaged pleaders of their choice at their cost.\n\n5. The allegations in para 5 of the affidavit that lawyers were afraid to come forward and defend the accused, that they were afraid of incurring the displeasure of the police and the Administration and that they were unwilling to appear before the Special Tribunal, are not true. Lawyers were willing to appear and defend the accused if they were engaged, and in Criminal Case No. 14/49, Ramireddy, Pleader, appeared for A-4, A-7 and A-8 and conducted their defence.\n\nMr. Ramireddy also offered to defend the other accused, but they declined to have him and stated that they did not want any lawyer to defend them. In Nalgonda, there aTe about 40 practising pleaders out of whom about half a dozen are B.A. LL.B.s well conversant with English and able to conduct cases in English.''\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'fS 359\n\nIt was .contended on behalf of the petitioners that 1951 this affidavit concerns the petitioners in Case No. 14 of J< ;;;;- Rt44 1949 only, and this contention does receive some ap-\n\n0':..a ; thera\n\n11 parent support from the fact that in the earlier part of v. paragraph 4 reference is made to the means of one of The state of the accused in Case No. 14, and there is also a direct Hyderabad and reference to that case later. But, on a careful reading Othera. of the affidavit as a whole, it seems to us that the affi- Fau Ali J. davit was intended to cover the allegations of the petitioners in all the three cases. We also find that the point raised before us was also urged before the High Court when the petitioners applied for leave to appeal against their conviction, and it was dealt with somewhat elaborately by two learned Judges in separate judgments, and they have expressed the view that the contention that the Tribunal did not give the accused an adequate opportunity to engage lawyers is not wellfounded. Sripat Rao J., who delivered the leading judgment, after dealing with the various facts, observed as follows:-\n\n\"lt was not contended before us in appeal that they were not afforded such an opportunity by the Special Tribunal. In fact, in Appeal No. 1385 of 1358 F .. proceedings dated 29-2-58 F., show that the High Court also wanted them to be represented by lawyers for which time was allowed, but on the next hearing they stated that they do not wish to engage any lawyer on their behalf and that the High Court need not engage any lawyer for them. This shows that the accused for reasons best known to themselves did not avail of the opportunity of engaging lawyers. This was also the case regarding appeals Nos. 1379 to 1384 of 1358 F., in which High Court's proceedings dated 29-2-59 F. show that the accused neither wanted to engage any lawyer on their behalf nor did they wish the High Court should engage any one for them. In view of this, the plea that opportunity was not given to the accused to engage lawyers and therefore the trial was vitiated in our opinion fails.\"\n\nIt appears to us on the materials before us that we cannot altogether rule out the suggestion of the High\n\n1951 Court that the curious attitude adopted by the accused, - to whatever cause it may have been due, to some\n\nJan;:;::;;, h~;:4Y extent accounts for their not being represented by a\n\nv. lawyer. In the course of the arguments, our attention The State f was drawn to the fact that some of the relations of Hyderabad and the accused in the first case (Case No. 14) were present\n\nOthe,... at the trial, and some of the accused in that case were -- in fact defended by a pleader, and it was contended Fazl Ali J. h\" f h that t 1s act lent support to t e conclusion expressed by the High Court, because if the accused in the first case were not denied access to their relations and lawyers, there was no reason why the accused in the other cases should have been denied such access. Therefore, in the state of evidence before us, the position is hardly clear enough to justify the conclusion which the petitioners ask us to draw in these petitions. But we must state that throughout the arguments on this point, we could not help feeling that the Special Tribunal should have taken some positive steps to assign a lawyer to aid the accused in their defence.\n\nWe will now deal with the first point which relates to the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal by which the accused have been tried and convicted. The general ground urged to make good this point is that the order made by the Civil Administrator purporting to confer jurisdiction on the Special Tribunal to try the petitioners did not indicate with sufficient certainty that the petitioners were the persons whose cases were to be tried by that Tribunal, and hence there was no proper order to enable the Tribunal to take cognizance of the petitioners' cases. It was contended that under the ordinary law, the cases of the petitioners would have been placed in the first instance before a Magistrate for holding an enquiry before commitment and thereafter they would have been tried by a Sessions Judge. This procedure, it is argued, could have been dispensed with only if a proper order had been made under the Regulation by the Civil Administrator, and, in the absence of such an order, the trial was null and void. This point was also raised by the petitioners in their application to the High Court for leave to\n\nappeal to this Court, and the High Court in negativing 111111 it relied on the .orders made by the Civil Administra- J ;;-Rt4d tor in two letters produced before it, viz., (1) letter a:;~hera !/ NJ. 3176/49-ST, slated 7th April, 1949, by which criv. minal cases covered by charge sheets Nos. 1 to 14 were The Btate of ordered to be tried by the Special Tribunal at Nalgon- Hyderabad\"and da; and (2) letter No. 4234/49-ST, dated 23rd July, Others. 1949, by which cases covered by charge sheets Nos. 15 Fazl Ali J. to 40 were made over to the same Tribunal for trial.\n\nThe statement made in the judgment of the High Court is confirmed by an affidavit filed before us on behalf of the respondents. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that a mere reference to the number of the charge sheet is too vague a description to satisfy the requirements of law and that the Civil Administrator in making over the cases should have stated the names of the accused and other necessary particulars.\n\nWe think however that the reference to the charge sheet numbers was in the circumstances of the case sufficient to particularize the cases which were being made over to the Speci!ll Tribunal, especially as the charge sheets containerl the names of the accused as well as other details necessary to identify the cases made over to the Tribunal. The general argument therefore necessarilv fails.\n\nBut, on a careful scrutiny of the record as it stands before us, we are unable to find any specific order of the Civil Administrator making over the case covered by the charge sheet No. 14 dated the 20th July, 1949, to the Tribunal. It will be recalled that there were two charge sheets numbered 14, one of which was submitted by the Investigating Officer on the 7th April, 1949, and the other on the 20th July, 1949. The first letter of the Civil Administrator, which was written on the 7th April, 1949, covered one of the charge sheets numbered 14 (the earlier one), but it cannot be held to cover the second charge sheet bearing the same number (No. 14), which came into existence on the 20th July, 1949, i.e., nearly 3 months after that letter was despatched. The second letter does not refer to any charge sheet numbered 14\n\ntDM Therefore the charge sheet No. 14 of the 20th July,\n\n- edd which we will for the sake of brevity describe as 14 (2), Ja~;.h!. Y is not covered by any written order made by the Civil a v.\n\nAdministrator. Prima jacie, therefore, there is room The State of for the argument that Case No. 17, which is affected Hyderabad a.a by this charge sheet LNo. 14 (2)], was never properly\n\n0 \"'\"•· made over to the Tribunal and the trial of the accused Fail Ali J. in that case was therefore without jurisdiction.\n\nIn the course of the arguments, the learned Attorney- General referred to the affidavit of Mr. Hanumantha Naidu, in which it is stated that that case also was transferred by the Civil Administrator to the Tribunal for trial, and he was also prepared to file an affidavit by the Civil Administrator himself to show that the case had been validly transferred to the Tribunal. It is unfortunate that this point was neither raised nor investigated in the appeal to the High Court, but has to be dealt with in this Court merely upon affidavits, many of which are not properly drafted or sworn. In these circumstances, we would have been inclined to pursue the matter by further investigation had we felt that such a course would serve any useful purpose, but we think it unnecessary to do so, as we find that there are.certain insuperable obstacles in the way of our granting the petitioners any relief under article 32.\n\nArticle 32 (2) provides that \"the Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the -rights conferred by this Part (Part III).\" The power given to this Court under this provision is a large one, but it has to be exercised in accordance with well established principles. The writs to which reference has been made must obviously be correlated to one or more of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and can be made only for the enforcement of such rights. In the petitions before us, the petitioners have made the following relevant prayers:-\n\n\"(1) that this Court may issue a writ in the nature 1951 of certiorari or a direction or order directed to res- J rda-Redd pondents Nos. 1 and 3 (the Government of Hyderabad a:':m !:thers v and the Special Judge, Nalgonda) calling upon them v. to produce the records before it and to show cause The state of why the convictions and sentences of the petitioners Hyderabad and should not be quashed; Others.\n\n(2) that this Court may issue a writ of prohibition Fau Alo J. or a direction or order directed to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (the Government of Hyderabad and the Superintendent of the Jail) requiring them not to execute the petitioners.\" At a late stage of the hearing of the case., an application was made on behalf of the petitioners to allow them to amend their petition so as to include a further prayer for a writ of habeas corpus, and this was done.\n\nThe question to be decided now is whether any of these prayers can be granted. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hardly appropriate remedies in this case, because they are usually directed to an inferior court, but at the date when the High Court dealt with these cases and confirmed the convictions and sentences of the petitioners, this Court was not in existence, and at that point of time, by no stretch of reasoning, the High Court can be said to have been subordinate to this Court. The prayer for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus is however said to stand clear of this difficulty, on the ground that the detention of the ti tioners would be illegal from day to day, if it is held\n\nto be based on an order made without jurisdiction which is therefore liable to be ignored as a nullity.\n\nThe matter is however not so simple as it may appear at the first sight. There is a long line of cases relating to the habeas corpus writs, in which it has been held that when the return states that the party who is alleged to be unlawfully detained, is detained in execution of a sentence on indictment on a criminal charge, the return cannot be controverted. [See R. v. Suddis (1), Carus Wilson's case (2), Ex parte Lees (3)] In some\n\n(1) llAJli 1 East 30~.\n\n(~I (1815) 7 Q. B. 984. (3\\ (18'8) E. B. & E. s; s.\n\n1961 cases, however, the question arose as to whether affidarda-Rt.dd vits would be admissible to show that there was no J•::i ;;.h.,.• Y jurisdiction in the court by which the prisoner was con-\n\n,. victed. On this point, there are three cases in which it The state of was held that such an affidavit would be admissible.\n\nHyderabad and The most important of these cases is In re Authers (1),\n\nou..r.. on which very great rfliance has been placed by Mr.\n\nFzl Ali J.\n\nPritt. In that case, the manager of a club was convicted under. a certain statute of selling beer by retail without having _an excise retail licence. Subsequently, he was convided of selling intoxicating liquor, viz., beer, without a licence under another statute. Upon the hearing of the latter charge, the magistrate treated it as a second offence, and imposed the full penalty authorized in the case of'\"the second offence\" by the latter statute. His appeal to the Quarter Sessions having been dismissed, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus, and it was granted by the Queen's Bench Division on the ground that the Magistrate could not treat the later offence as a second offence, because it was not a second offence under the Act under which he was convicted for the second time. Hawkins J. in dealing with the case observed as follows:-\n\n\"! have had many doubts whether it was competent for us to go behind a conviction which had not been quashed upon certiorari or by any other process of law; but I have satisfied myself that we can go behind this conviction upon affidavits. There are two authorities, in the Queen's Bench and Exchequer respectively, which seem to be conclusive. They were two cases of prosecution of workmen for neglecting their duty to their employers, and in each of them there was a summary conviction; upon the argument of a rule for a writ of habeas corpus it was allowed to be proved by affidavits that the men were, as a fact, not in that particular employment, and, therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of the justices, the ground of admission of the affidavits being that there was no evidence before the justices to justify a conviction. So, in the present case, the Court is at liberty to go behind the\n\n\\I) (1899} 22 Q. B. D. 316 al BW.\n\nconviction and to receive affidavits, it not being a case 1951 of conflicting testimony, but oe n which th~ magi.st- Jana,;;;: RWdy\n\nrate had found a prev10us conv1chon, when, m pomt and Others of fact, there was none. For these reasons, I think that v. the prisoner is entitled to be discharged.\" The State of Referring to the appeal of the prisoner to the Quar- Hyd::::!.O:. and ter Sessions, the learned Judge observed:-\n\n\"This is true as a fact, but it puts the prosecution Fa.z AU J. in no better position, for if the magistrate had no power to give himself jurisdiction by finding that there had been a first offence where there had been none, the justices could not give it to him.\"\n\nIn his judgment, the learned Judge did not refer to the previous precedents on which he relied, but it has been generally assumed that he intended to refer to In re Bailey (1), and In re Baker (2).\n\nAs against these cases,_ there are a number of cases in which a different view has been taken and which cannot be easily reconciled with them. The leading case on the other side of the line is In re Newton (3), where it was held that \"the Queen's Bench Division had no power to grant p. habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner who had been convicted at the Central Criminal Court, on the ground that the offence charged was committed at a place out of the jurisdiction of that court,\" In dealing with the case, Jervis C. J. observed as follows:- ' 'The question raised in this case is undoubtedly one of very great importance. No authority has been found to warrant it. The point, it would seem, therefore, has never before been raised,-it may be because it is so plain that there is nothing in it. The state of things is this: Mr. Newton has been tried and convicted on an indictment alleging that the offence charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court. Either that was traversed, or the jurisdiction was admitted by pleading over. If it were traversed, the finding of the jury is that the prisoner committed the offence within the jurisdiction of the\n\n(I) 3 E & 8. 607.\n\n(2) 2 H. & N. ~19.\n\n18) 1:19 R. R. ~9~.\n\n1951 court, as alleged. He now seeks to impeach that finding,\n\n..ia Redd on the ground that the place where the offence was\n\n' 0 \".:'rn1 thm Y actually committed is more than one thousand yards\n\n•. distant from the boundary of the parish in which the The State of record alleges it to have been committed. That is not Hyd<robad arnl to be governed by the inquiry whether the fact be in-\n\nOthers, disputable or otherwise. If we could entertain the\n\nb'azl Ali J. application because the boundary is clearly ascertained, we should be equally bound to entertain disputes of the most refined and minute character. The inconvenience of this is manifest. The truth is that the remedy is not by an application of this sort.\"\n\nAnother learned Judge agreeing with the view of the Chief Justice, observed as follows:-\n\n\"Ordinarily upon criminal trials, the jurisdiction of the court over the place where the offence is alleged to have been committed is assumed. And here, no doubt, the trial proceeded upon the assumption that Beulah Spa was within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court. Whether it was so or not was as much a matter of fact to be proved (or admitted) as any other fact alleged in the indictment, in order to establish the conviction.\" The view expressed in this case has been taken in several other cases also, and in Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1), Viscount Maugham seems to have thrown the weight of his authority in favour of that view. A Bench of the Calcutta High Court has also supported that view in In re Bonomally Gupta(').\n\nThe trend of decisions thus seems to be in favour of the view that if it should appear on the face of the return that a person is in detention in execution of a sentence on indictment on a criminal charge, that would be a sufficient answer to an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Assuming, however, that it is open even in such cases to investigate the question of jurisdiction, as was held in In re Auth.ers (') it appears to us that the learned judges who\n\n(1) [19,~J A. C, 284. (~I I, L. R. 44 Cal, 7~8.\n\n(8) 11889) 2~ Q, B. n. 845.\n\ndecided that case went too far in holding 1951 that notwithstanding the fact that the conviction.,, ;;-- and sentence had been upheld on appeal by a court of a':t h!:ddy competent jurisdiction, the mere fact that the trial v. court had acted without jurisdiction would justify The State of interference, treating the appellate order also as a Hyderabad and nullity. Evidently, the appellate tourt in a case which Others. properly comes before it on appeal, is fully competent Fa:i; u J. to decide whether the trial was with or without jurisdiction, and it has jurisdiction to decide the matter rightly as well as wrongly. If it affirms the conviction and thereby decides wrongly that the trial court had the jurisdiction to try and convict, it cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction, and its order cannot be treated as a nullity. It is true that there is no such thing as the principle of constructive res judicata in a criminal case, but there is such a principle as finality of judgments, which applies to criminal as well as civil cases and is implicit in every system, wherein provisions are to be found for correcting errors in appeal or in revision.\n\nSection. 4.30;< Criminal Procedure Code, and section 355 of t~~, Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code, have given e, lfpress recognition to this principle of finality by providing that \" Judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court\n\nupon appeal shall be final, except in cases provided for in section 417 and Chapter XXXll.\"\n\nIt is well settled that if a court acts without jurisdic. tion, its decision can be challenged in the same way as it would have been challenged if it had acted with jurisdiction, i. e., an appeal would lie to the court to which it would lie if its order was with jurisdiction. (See Ranjit Misser v. Ramudar Singh (1); Bandiram M ookerjeev. Purna Chandra Ro~ (2); W ajuddi Pramanik\n\nv. Md. Balaki Moral (3); andKalipada Karmorkar v.\n\nSekher Bashini Dasya(4)]. Therefore, the High Court at Hyderabad had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal in this case. In view of this fact, the deprivation of life or liberty, upon which the case of the\n\n(I) (1911) 16 O. L.1. 77.\n\n(9) I. L. R. 45 0 .. 1. 926 Of 929,\n\n(S) 80 O. W. N. 68 ,., 64.\n\n(4) 114 O. L. J, !198,\n\n1961 petitioners is founded, has been brought about in - accordance with a procedure established by law, and\n\nJm;;:.ida;; h:,~Y their present detention cannot be held to be invalid.\n\nThere is also another difficulty in the way of the The State of petitioners which may be briefly stated. From the Hyderabad and facts already narrated, it should be clear that the\n\nOthers. judgment of the High Court affirming the convictions\n\nFnzl Ali J. and sentences of the petitioners had acquired finality in the fullest sense of the term before the 26th January,\n\n1950, and by reason of this finality, no one could question the validity of the convictions at the date when the Constitution came into force. Can then a new law or a change in the old law entitle us to reopen a transaction which has become closed and final? It is common ground that the provisions of the Constitution which are invoked here, were not intended to operate retrospectively, and therefore something which was legally good on the 25th January, 1950, cannot be held to have become bad on the 26th January, 1950.\n\nIf we had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the judgment of thi! Hyderabad High Court, can we now reinvestigate the cases and pails orders which cannot be passed without virtually setting aside the judgments of the High Court which have become final. Can we, in other words, do indirectly what we refused to do directly? It is argued that we are asked not to reopen a past transaction but to deal with the present detention of the petitioners, i. e., their detention at this moment. But, how can we hold the present detention to be invalid, unless we reopen what could not be reopened prior to the 26th January, 1950. This is, in our opinion, one of the greatest difficulties which the petitioners have to face, and it rests not merely on technical grounds but on sound legal principles which have always been, and should be, respected.\n\nThe learned counsel for the petitioners tried to make much of the fact th,.at the petitioners had lost their right to appeal by a sudden change in the law and by the delay on the part of the High Court in the disposal of their application for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad. That may be unfortunate,\n\nbut there can be no justification for widening the scope 19°1 of the existing remedial laws beyond legitimate J ;;;;; Ridel bounds. A similar argument was addressed in Ex a:~ oherB Y parte Lees(1), and Lord Campbell C. J. met it with these v. observations :- The State of \" It is alleged on the part of the prisoner that the Hyderabad and , , Mp roceedings were upon a repealed statute, and that there were errors in the judgment and hardships Fazl Ali J. and irregularities in the proceedings. If such allegations are well-founded, and obstacles are found to prevent any remedy by appeal to the Privy Council, or by writ of error to this Court, we apprehend that -the advisers of the Crown will take the matter into ·\n\ntheir consideration, and form their judgment with respect to any alleged error, wrong or hardship which may be brought before them; and, if any such be established to their satisfaction, will advise the Crown to give the relief to which they may think the applicant entitled, by pardon or mitigation of punishment. We have no authority to interfere.\" All that we can say is that the petitioners accused in Criminal Case No. 17 of 1949 have made out a Prima facie case that there was no specific order of the Civil Administrator directing the case to be tried by a Special Tribunal and they have shown that in that case one of the three members of the Tribunal gave a dissenting judgment which is more favourable to the accused than the majority judgment. While the facts were being analysed before us, it was brought to our notice that there were altogether six accused in Case No. 17, out of which five have been convicted and sentenced to death in Case No. 18 also. The remaining accused, Kallur Gowndla Elladu, is thus the only person to be affected by the arguments relating to the trial being without jurisdiction, and a further point in his favour is that the fatal blow on which the charge of murder is based, is not attributed to him but to another person and no definite overt acts are ascribed to him. We have no doubt that these facts will receive\n\n(1) (18iiB) E; B. &. E, 828,\n\n1951 due consideration at the hands of the executive -R.,,., authorities.\n\nJanardan ~...,, A h . , 1 d , h 't' f , 1 and others s t e pomts 1nvo ve m t e petI ions or spec1a v. leave to appeal to this Court against the order of the The Stat• of High Court refusing to grant relief under article 226 of Hyderabad and the Constitution are the same as those involved in the\n\n0~· petitions under article 32, all the six petitions are Fau Ali J. dismissed. It may however be observed that in this case we have not considered it necessary to decide whether an application under article 32 is maintainable after a similar application under article 226 is dismissed by theHigh Court, and we reserve our opinion\n\n_19~1\n\nl.tareh 19.\n\n.on that .question.\n\nPetitions dismissed.·\n\nAgent for the petitioners: I. N. Shroff.\n\nAgent for the respondents: P. A. Mehta.\n\nRAM DHAN LAL AND OTHERS.\n\nRADHE SHAM AND OTHERS [SAIYID FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and\n\n(HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)\n\nBengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation (Xl of 1825), ss. 2, 4 -Custom of dhar dhura-Incidents-River changing course s11ddenly-River flowing entirely outside the villages which it divided- Whether custom applies-On\"s of proof-Reasonableness of custom -Application of Regulation XI-Revival of dhar dhura rights.\n\nThe meaning of the custom of dhar dhura is that the deep stream or channel of a river is to be regarded, irrespective of its changes, as the constant boundary between two or more villages, and such a custom is expressly recognised in s. 2 of Regulation XI of 1825.\n\nWhether such custom applies even to cases of sudden changes in the course of a stream or only to gradual alluvial action is a matter which has to be determined upon the evidence adduced in each case. The onus of proving that the custom applies to sudden changes also is on the person who sets it up, but such custom is not unreasonable and can be established like any other", "total_entities": 152, "entities": [{"text": "JANARDAN REDDY AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Janardan Reddy M.C. Setalvad", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 167, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAzL Au. MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 234, "end_char": 268, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 271, "end_char": 280, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 282, "end_char": 285, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 291, "end_char": 314, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 317, "end_char": 338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 340, "end_char": 347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Special Tribunals Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 348, "end_char": 376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2, 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390, "end_char": 398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Tribunals Regulation", "statute": "Special Tribunals Regulation"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 521, "end_char": 528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Tribunals Regulation", "statute": "Special Tribunals Regulation"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Tribunals Regulation", "statute": "Special Tribunals Regulation"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1138, "end_char": 1145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Tribunals Regulation", "statute": "Special Tribunals Regulation"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1461, "end_char": 1468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1595, "end_char": 1604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where, some time after the pronouncement of a sentence of death by hanging by a Special Tribunal of the Hyderabad State and pending confirmation of the sentence by the High Court of Hyderabad, a Regulation was passed to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force any sentence of death passed by a Special , Tribunal shall be carried into execution by hanging: Held, that the Regulation\n\nmust be taken to have retrospective t'ffect, as the mode of execul!l51 tion of a sentence cannot be regarded as a matter of substantive law, and."}}, {"text": "High Court of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1659, "end_char": 1682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where, some time after the pronouncement of a sentence of death by hanging by a Special Tribunal of the Hyderabad State and pending confirmation of the sentence by the High Court of Hyderabad, a Regulation was passed to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force any sentence of death passed by a Special , Tribunal shall be carried into execution by hanging: Held, that the Regulation\n\nmust be taken to have retrospective t'ffect, as the mode of execul!l51 tion of a sentence cannot be regarded as a matter of substantive law, and."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2568, "end_char": 2575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2598, "end_char": 2610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.E. H. the Nizam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2893, "end_char": 2910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 7(2) of the Special Tribunals Regulation passed by the Military Governor of Hyderabad covered all those cases where manzuri and tashih were contemplated under the old law arid\n\nsentences of death passed by a Special Tribunal could therefore be executed without the assent or approval of H.E. H. the Nizam.", "canonical_name": "H. E. H. the Nizam"}}, {"text": "s. 271", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2927, "end_char": 2933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.340", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2998, "end_char": 3003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3103, "end_char": 3123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of s. 271 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code, (which corresponds to s.340 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code) read along with the Rules and Circular Orders issued by the Hyderabad High Court is : (i) that it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that in every capital sentence where the accused is unrepresented the trial should be held to be vitiated; and (ii) that a court of appeal or revision is not powerless to interfere if it is found that the accused was so handicapped for want of legal aid that the proceedings against him may be said to amount to negation of a fair trial."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th January,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3949, "end_char": 3968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners who were convicted by a Special Tribunal of Hyderabad of murder and other offences and sentenced to death by hanging and whose convictions and sentences had been confirmed by the Hy'derabad High, Court before the 26th January,\n\n1950, applied to the Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3985, "end_char": 3998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners who were convicted by a Special Tribunal of Hyderabad of murder and other offences and sentenced to death by hanging and whose convictions and sentences had been confirmed by the Hy'derabad High, Court before the 26th January,\n\n1950, applied to the Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4005, "end_char": 4012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the new Constitution for the following reliefs: (i) a writ ih 'the nature of certiorari calling upon the Government of Hyderabad and the Special Judge to produce the records of the case and show cause why the convictions and sentences should not be quashed, (ii) for a writ of prohibition directing the Government and Special Judge not to execute the petitioners, and (iii) for a writ of habeas corpus: Held, (i) that the writs of certiorari and prohibition could not be granted as at the date when the High Court dealt with the case and confirmed the conviction and sentences of the petitioners, the Supreme Court was not in existence and the Hyderabad Court could not by any stretch of reasoning be said to have bn subordinate to the Supreme Court;\n\n(ii) the writ of habeas corpus could not be granted inasmuch as a return that the person is in detention in execution Janardan Reddy of a sentence on indictment on a criminal charge is a sufficient and Others answer to an application for such a writ ; v.\n\n(iii) assuming that it is open even in such cases to investi- The SUit• of gate the jurisdiction of the court which convicted the petitioners, Hyderabad and the mere fact that the trial court had acted without juri'<liction\n\nOthers."}}, {"text": "Janardan Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4886, "end_char": 4900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the new Constitution for the following reliefs: (i) a writ ih 'the nature of certiorari calling upon the Government of Hyderabad and the Special Judge to produce the records of the case and show cause why the convictions and sentences should not be quashed, (ii) for a writ of prohibition directing the Government and Special Judge not to execute the petitioners, and (iii) for a writ of habeas corpus: Held, (i) that the writs of certiorari and prohibition could not be granted as at the date when the High Court dealt with the case and confirmed the conviction and sentences of the petitioners, the Supreme Court was not in existence and the Hyderabad Court could not by any stretch of reasoning be said to have bn subordinate to the Supreme Court;\n\n(ii) the writ of habeas corpus could not be granted inasmuch as a return that the person is in detention in execution Janardan Reddy of a sentence on indictment on a criminal charge is a sufficient and Others answer to an application for such a writ ; v.\n\n(iii) assuming that it is open even in such cases to investi- The SUit• of gate the jurisdiction of the court which convicted the petitioners, Hyderabad and the mere fact that the trial court had acted without juri'<liction\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Janardan Reddy M.C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "High Court at Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5625, "end_char": 5648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "would not justify interference, if the conviction and sentence had been upheld on appeal by a court of competent jurisdiction; for, the appellate court in a case which properly comes before it on appeal, is fully competent to decide whether the trial was with or without jurisdiction and it has jurisdiction to decide tho matter rightly as well as wrongly; and as the High Court at Hyderabad had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal, the detention of the petitioners could not be held to be invalid;\n\n(iv) as the judgment of the High Court was pronounced before the 26th January, 1950, and it had acquired a finality in the fullest sense of the term before that date, the Supreme Court had no power to re-open that judgment under the provisions of the new Constitution ;\n\n(v) the fact that the petitioners had lost their right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad by a sudden change in the law and by the delay on the part of the High Court in the disposal of their application for leave to appeal to the said Committee was a matter for the executive authorities to consider; it could not widen the scope of the existing remedial laws beyond legitimate bounds."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5829, "end_char": 5847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "would not justify interference, if the conviction and sentence had been upheld on appeal by a court of competent jurisdiction; for, the appellate court in a case which properly comes before it on appeal, is fully competent to decide whether the trial was with or without jurisdiction and it has jurisdiction to decide tho matter rightly as well as wrongly; and as the High Court at Hyderabad had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal, the detention of the petitioners could not be held to be invalid;\n\n(iv) as the judgment of the High Court was pronounced before the 26th January, 1950, and it had acquired a finality in the fullest sense of the term before that date, the Supreme Court had no power to re-open that judgment under the provisions of the new Constitution ;\n\n(v) the fact that the petitioners had lost their right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad by a sudden change in the law and by the delay on the part of the High Court in the disposal of their application for leave to appeal to the said Committee was a matter for the executive authorities to consider; it could not widen the scope of the existing remedial laws beyond legitimate bounds."}}, {"text": "Judicial Committee of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6107, "end_char": 6138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "would not justify interference, if the conviction and sentence had been upheld on appeal by a court of competent jurisdiction; for, the appellate court in a case which properly comes before it on appeal, is fully competent to decide whether the trial was with or without jurisdiction and it has jurisdiction to decide tho matter rightly as well as wrongly; and as the High Court at Hyderabad had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal, the detention of the petitioners could not be held to be invalid;\n\n(iv) as the judgment of the High Court was pronounced before the 26th January, 1950, and it had acquired a finality in the fullest sense of the term before that date, the Supreme Court had no power to re-open that judgment under the provisions of the new Constitution ;\n\n(v) the fact that the petitioners had lost their right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of Hyderabad by a sudden change in the law and by the delay on the part of the High Court in the disposal of their application for leave to appeal to the said Committee was a matter for the executive authorities to consider; it could not widen the scope of the existing remedial laws beyond legitimate bounds."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6475, "end_char": 6482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6533, "end_char": 6541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Carus Wilson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6904, "end_char": 6916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "723), Greene v.\n\nSecretary of State for Home Affairs ([1942] A.C. 284), Ex parte Lees [(1868) E.B. & E. 828], R .. v. Suddis [(1801) 1 East 306], Carus Wilson's case [(1845) 7 Q.B. 984] referred to."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7053, "end_char": 7060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7142, "end_char": 7153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "19th December, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7265, "end_char": 7284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14, 15 and 16) against the judgment and order dated 19th December, 1950, of the."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7294, "end_char": 7331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad (M. Khaliluzzaman Siddiqi J.) in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "M. Khaliluzzaman Siddiqi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7333, "end_char": 7357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad (M. Khaliluzzaman Siddiqi J.) in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "D. N. Pritt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7479, "end_char": 7490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1951 D. N. Pritt (Dattial Latifi and Gopal Singh, with him) for the petitioners. • •"}}, {"text": "Dattial Latifi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7492, "end_char": 7506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1951 D. N. Pritt (Dattial Latifi and Gopal Singh, with him) for the petitioners. • •"}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7511, "end_char": 7522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1951 D. N. Pritt (Dattial Latifi and Gopal Singh, with him) for the petitioners. • •"}}, {"text": "Janardan Reddy M.C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7559, "end_char": 7587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janardan Reddy M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Ra1aand Others ram Aiyar, Advocate-General of Hyderabad, (G.N. Joshi, v. with them) for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "Janardan Reddy M.C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "G.N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7679, "end_char": 7689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janardan Reddy M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Ra1aand Others ram Aiyar, Advocate-General of Hyderabad, (G.N. Joshi, v. with them) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7815, "end_char": 7822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J .-These are six petitions which have been presented to this Court on behalf of three groups of persons in the following circumstances.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "30th October, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7968, "end_char": 7986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th October, 1948, the Military Governor of Hyderabad by virtue of the powers delegated to him by H. E. H. the Nizam enacted the Special Tribunals Regulation (No."}}, {"text": "H. E. H. the Nizam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8067, "end_char": 8085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 30th October, 1948, the Military Governor of Hyderabad by virtue of the powers delegated to him by H. E. H. the Nizam enacted the Special Tribunals Regulation (No.", "canonical_name": "H. E. H. the Nizam"}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8207, "end_char": 8221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 of 1358 F}, which was amended by several later Regulations issued on the 22nd May, 1949, 10th July, 1949, 23rd July and 30th October,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "10th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8223, "end_char": 8238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 of 1358 F}, which was amended by several later Regulations issued on the 22nd May, 1949, 10th July, 1949, 23rd July and 30th October,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "23rd July and 30th October,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8240, "end_char": 8267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 of 1358 F}, which was amended by several later Regulations issued on the 22nd May, 1949, 10th July, 1949, 23rd July and 30th October,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8637, "end_char": 8646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nalgonda district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9050, "end_char": 9067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with the Regulation, certain Tribunals were constituted, and one of the Tribunals-Tribunal A for Nalgonda district - proceeded to try certain cases made over to it by the Civil Ad!llinistrator of Nalgonda under the powers vested in him by the Military Governor."}}, {"text": "Hanumantha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9453, "end_char": 9463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These cases were based on three charge sheets submitted by one Mr. Hanumantha\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Hanumantha Naidu"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9474, "end_char": 9482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\n1951 Naidu, a senior police officer of Nalgonda district, one Janaman R..utyof which was No.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Naidu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9492, "end_char": 9497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\n1951 Naidu, a senior police officer of Nalgonda district, one Janaman R..utyof which was No."}}, {"text": "Janaman R", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9549, "end_char": 9558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\n1951 Naidu, a senior police officer of Nalgonda district, one Janaman R..utyof which was No."}}, {"text": "7th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9593, "end_char": 9608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 dated the 7th April, 1949, and\n\narnl oti..rs the other two were Nos."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9935, "end_char": 9943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the specific cases Fazl Ali 1.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "21st September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10135, "end_char": 10155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of 1949), the charge sheet stated that the accused went to a certain village in Nalgonda district on 21st September, 1948 'in khaki uniform and holding unnotified firearms,\" caught hold of four persons as they had not paid the full subscription demanded of them, decoyed them to the outskirts of the village and then \"killed them by cutting their throats.\""}}, {"text": "6th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10460, "end_char": 10475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17), it was stated that on the 6th April, 1949, at about 9 A. M. two of the accused came to a certain village and began to fire their guns, but when \"the public\" approached them asking them to surrender they ran away and joined the other persons accused in the case."}}, {"text": "Madireddychelka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11125, "end_char": 11140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The version given at the trial in this case was slightly different and shows that the two accused who had visited the village were chased by 50 or 100 persons to a place called Madireddychelka where the other accused joined them, and after parleying with the chasers, accnsed No."}}, {"text": "Kasthala village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11613, "end_char": 11629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18), the facts were stated to be these:-On the 15th May, at about midnight, the accused visited Kasthala village, carrying firearms and dressed in khaki uniform."}}, {"text": "Kankayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11712, "end_char": 11720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They got upon the terrace of one Kankayya where one Natala Rama Reddy was\n\nsleeping, caught hold of him and took him forcibly to 1951 the outskirts of the village in spite of the protests of a J rda R dd num her of villagers who had followed, and \"killed a':rnt the;• Y him by firing gunshots at him.\" ."}}, {"text": "Natala Rama Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11731, "end_char": 11748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They got upon the terrace of one Kankayya where one Natala Rama Reddy was\n\nsleeping, caught hold of him and took him forcibly to 1951 the outskirts of the village in spite of the protests of a J rda R dd num her of villagers who had followed, and \"killed a':rnt the;• Y him by firing gunshots at him.\" ."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12617, "end_char": 12638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12824, "end_char": 12835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13045, "end_char": 13056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13232, "end_char": 13237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application being unsuccessful, they applied to this Court for special leave to appeal, but that application was dismissed on the ground that this Court had no jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution to hear an appeal from a judgment delivered by the High Court at Hyderabad before the 26th January, 1950, since that Court was not within the territory of India*."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13303, "end_char": 13314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13439, "end_char": 13449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13585, "end_char": 13596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pritt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13628, "end_char": 13633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main points urged by Mr. Pritt, who appeared before us on behalf of the petitioners, were as follows:- ( I) The trial of the petitioners by the Special Tribunal was without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "section 234", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15763, "end_char": 15774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1.anardan Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16090, "end_char": 16105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1.anardan Reddy ver ict a terwar s an .", "canonical_name": "Janardan Reddy M.C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17919, "end_char": 17929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18107, "end_char": 18117, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 243", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18132, "end_char": 18143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18429, "end_char": 18462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18491, "end_char": 18502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19042, "end_char": 19065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19883, "end_char": 19901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, however that may be, we find that on the 30th October, 1949, i, e., sometime after the pronouncement of the sentences by the Special Tribunal and before they were confirmed by the High Court, the Special Tribunals Regulation was amended and a specific provision was made to the following effect:-\n\n\" 2-B. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force-\n\n(i) arty sentence of death passed by a Special Tribu_nal shall be carried into execution by causing\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT kEPORTS 353\n\nthe person sentenced to be hanged by the neck until 1951 he is dead • Janardan Reddy\n\n(ii) warrants of commitments under sentence of and Others death, warrants of execution of a sentence of death v. and any other instruments issued by a Special The State 0!"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21412, "end_char": 21422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 20, 302, 307 and 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21645, "end_char": 21674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21718, "end_char": 21728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22189, "end_char": 22200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22326, "end_char": 22336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22347, "end_char": 22358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "azl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22708, "end_char": 22715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 307 deals with cases\n\nan t era h h H' ffi h v. w ere t e 1gh Court a rms a deat sentence or a The state of sentence of life imprisonment and provides that after Hyderabad an4 such confirmation, the opinion of the High Court to-\n\nOther.•. gether with the file of the case shall be forwarded for tashih (rectification or ratification) to the Government }'azl Ali J. within one week and the sentence shall not be carried into effect until manzuri is obtained as provided in section\n\n20.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "section\n\n20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22826, "end_char": 22837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 308", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22839, "end_char": 22850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23194, "end_char": 23205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 308", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23759, "end_char": 23770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24074, "end_char": 24083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25104, "end_char": 25114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26587, "end_char": 26597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "3-8-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27182, "end_char": 27188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before I was brought before the Special Tribunal on 3-8-49, during the trial or afterwards I never saw any of my friends or relations, whether in the lock-up, the Court or in the jail."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27825, "end_char": 27849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in which the Supreme Court of America is reported to have observed as follows:-\n\n\"In a capital case where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable of adequately making his own defence because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy or the like, it is the duty of the Court whether requested or not, to assign a counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law.\""}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28532, "end_char": 28537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 271", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28888, "end_char": 28899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 340", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28987, "end_char": 28998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30344, "end_char": 30360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 were brought into court on the 3rd August, 1949, and they were informed on that day that the case would be heard on the 6th August,\n\n1949, and that they must get ready with their defence lawyers and witnesses on that date."}}, {"text": "6th August,\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30433, "end_char": 30450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 were brought into court on the 3rd August, 1949, and they were informed on that day that the case would be heard on the 6th August,\n\n1949, and that they must get ready with their defence lawyers and witnesses on that date."}}, {"text": "14th\n\nHyderabad", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30961, "end_char": 30976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 on the 14th\n\nHyderabad and August and in Case No."}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31099, "end_char": 31102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the circumstances under which the accused were not\n\nraz1 Ali J. represented by a lawyer, we have been referred to a counter-affidavit filed by Mr. Hanumantha Naidu, who investigated the case, in which the following statement occurs:-\n\n\"4."}}, {"text": "Hanumantha Naidu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31189, "end_char": 31205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the circumstances under which the accused were not\n\nraz1 Ali J. represented by a lawyer, we have been referred to a counter-affidavit filed by Mr. Hanumantha Naidu, who investigated the case, in which the following statement occurs:-\n\n\"4.", "canonical_name": "Hanumantha Naidu"}}, {"text": "Hanumanthu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31312, "end_char": 31322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regarding the means of accused Hanumanthu enquiries were made by the Tribunal and it was found that he had enough means to engage a lawyer.", "canonical_name": "Hanumantha Naidu"}}, {"text": "Ramireddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32394, "end_char": 32403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14/49, Ramireddy, Pleader, appeared for A-4, A-7 and A-8 and conducted their defence.", "canonical_name": "Ramireddy"}}, {"text": "Ramireddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32478, "end_char": 32487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ramireddy also offered to defend the other accused, but they declined to have him and stated that they did not want any lawyer to defend them.", "canonical_name": "Ramireddy"}}, {"text": "Sripat Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33847, "end_char": 33857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sripat Rao J., who delivered the leading judgment, after dealing with the various facts, observed as follows:-\n\n\"lt was not contended before us in appeal that they were not afforded such an opportunity by the Special Tribunal."}}, {"text": "-2-58", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34135, "end_char": 34140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1385 of 1358 F .. proceedings dated 29-2-58 F., show that the High Court also wanted them to be represented by lawyers for which time was allowed, but on the next hearing they stated that they do not wish to engage any lawyer on their behalf and that the High Court need not engage any lawyer for them."}}, {"text": "29-2-59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34630, "end_char": 34637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1379 to 1384 of 1358 F., in which High Court's proceedings dated 29-2-59 F. show that the accused neither wanted to engage any lawyer on their behalf nor did they wish the High Court should engage any one for them."}}, {"text": "20th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39102, "end_char": 39117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be recalled that there were two charge sheets numbered 14, one of which was submitted by the Investigating Officer on the 7th April, 1949, and the other on the 20th July, 1949."}}, {"text": "Fail Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39974, "end_char": 39982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 (2)], was never properly\n\n0 \"'\"•· made over to the Tribunal and the trial of the accused Fail Ali J. in that case was therefore without jurisdiction.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40940, "end_char": 40950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40953, "end_char": 40963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Hyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41858, "end_char": 41881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 3 (the Government of Hyderabad a:':m !:"}}, {"text": "Special Judge, Nalgonda", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41906, "end_char": 41929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "thers v and the Special Judge, Nalgonda) calling upon them v. to produce the records before it and to show cause The state of why the convictions and sentences of the petitioners Hyderabad and should not be quashed; Others."}}, {"text": "Fau Alo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42167, "end_char": 42174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) that this Court may issue a writ of prohibition Fau Alo J. or a direction or order directed to respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "Fau Alo"}}, {"text": "s.\n\n1961", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43888, "end_char": 43896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fzl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44347, "end_char": 44354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hyderabad and The most important of these cases is In re Authers (1),\n\nou..r.. on which very great rfliance has been placed by Mr.\n\nFzl Ali J.\n\nPritt.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Hawkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45145, "end_char": 45152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hawkins J. in dealing with the case observed as follows:-\n\n\"!"}}, {"text": "Jervis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47541, "end_char": 47547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leading case on the other side of the line is In re Newton (3), where it was held that \"the Queen's Bench Division had no power to grant p. habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner who had been convicted at the Central Criminal Court, on the ground that the offence charged was committed at a place out of the jurisdiction of that court,\" In dealing with the case, Jervis C. J. observed as follows:- ' 'The question raised in this case is undoubtedly one of very great importance."}}, {"text": "Newton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47862, "end_char": 47868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The state of things is this: Mr. Newton has been tried and convicted on an indictment alleging that the offence charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court."}}, {"text": "Beulah Spa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49293, "end_char": 49303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And here, no doubt, the trial proceeded upon the assumption that Beulah Spa was within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court."}}, {"text": "Central Criminal Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49339, "end_char": 49361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And here, no doubt, the trial proceeded upon the assumption that Beulah Spa was within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court."}}, {"text": "Viscount Maugham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49662, "end_char": 49678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view expressed in this case has been taken in several other cases also, and in Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1), Viscount Maugham seems to have thrown the weight of his authority in favour of that view."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49767, "end_char": 49786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Bench of the Calcutta High Court has also supported that view in In re Bonomally Gupta(')."}}, {"text": "Bonomally Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49825, "end_char": 49840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Bench of the Calcutta High Court has also supported that view in In re Bonomally Gupta(')."}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51574, "end_char": 51597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 355", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51603, "end_char": 51614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51623, "end_char": 51656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51853, "end_char": 51864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Fnzl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53073, "end_char": 53081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "judgment of the High Court affirming the convictions\n\nFnzl Ali J. and sentences of the petitioners had acquired finality in the fullest sense of the term before the 26th January,\n\n1950, and by reason of this finality, no one could question the validity of the convictions at the date when the Constitution came into force.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "25th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53642, "end_char": 53660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that the provisions of the Constitution which are invoked here, were not intended to operate retrospectively, and therefore something which was legally good on the 25th January, 1950, cannot be held to have become bad on the 26th January, 1950."}}, {"text": "Campbell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55098, "end_char": 55106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar argument was addressed in Ex a:~ oherB Y parte Lees(1), and Lord Campbell C. J. met it with these v. observations :- The State of \" It is alleged on the part of the prisoner that the Hyderabad and , , Mp roceedings were upon a repealed statute, and that there were errors in the judgment and hardships Fazl Ali J. and irregularities in the proceedings."}}, {"text": "State of \"", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55154, "end_char": 55164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar argument was addressed in Ex a:~ oherB Y parte Lees(1), and Lord Campbell C. J. met it with these v. observations :- The State of \" It is alleged on the part of the prisoner that the Hyderabad and , , Mp roceedings were upon a repealed statute, and that there were errors in the judgment and hardships Fazl Ali J. and irregularities in the proceedings."}}, {"text": "Kallur Gowndla Elladu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56602, "end_char": 56623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining accused, Kallur Gowndla Elladu, is thus the only person to be affected by the arguments relating to the trial being without jurisdiction, and a further point in his favour is that the fatal blow on which the charge of murder is based, is not attributed to him but to another person and no definite overt acts are ascribed to him."}}, {"text": "Janardan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 57076, "end_char": 57084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janardan ~...,, A h . ,", "canonical_name": "Janardan Reddy M.C. Setalvad"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57288, "end_char": 57299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57393, "end_char": 57403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Fau Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57431, "end_char": 57438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 d , h 't' f , 1 and others s t e pomts 1nvo ve m t e petI ions or spec1a v. leave to appeal to this Court against the order of the The Stat• of High Court refusing to grant relief under article 226 of Hyderabad and the Constitution are the same as those involved in the\n\n0~· petitions under article 32, all the six petitions are Fau Ali J. dismissed.", "canonical_name": "Fau Alo"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57573, "end_char": 57583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57634, "end_char": 57645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57796, "end_char": 57808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the petitioners: I. N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57838, "end_char": 57849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "RAM DHAN LAL", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57852, "end_char": 57864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAM DHAN LAL AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "RADHE SHAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57878, "end_char": 57888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RADHE SHAM AND OTHERS [SAIYID FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and\n\n(HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57901, "end_char": 57916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RADHE SHAM AND OTHERS [SAIYID FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and\n\n(HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57960, "end_char": 57999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58014, "end_char": 58022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation", "statute": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation"}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58077, "end_char": 58080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation", "statute": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58506, "end_char": 58510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation", "statute": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_370_380_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951)\n\n1951 due consideration at the hands of the executive -R.,,., authorities.\n\nJanardan ~...,, A h . , 1 d , h 't' f , 1 and others s t e pomts 1nvo ve m t e petI ions or spec1a v. leave to appeal to this Court against the order of the The Stat• of High Court refusing to grant relief under article 226 of Hyderabad and the Constitution are the same as those involved in the\n\n0~· petitions under article 32, all the six petitions are Fau Ali J. dismissed. It may however be observed that in this case we have not considered it necessary to decide whether an application under article 32 is maintainable after a similar application under article 226 is dismissed by theHigh Court, and we reserve our opinion\n\n_19~1\n\nl.tareh 19.\n\n.on that .question.\n\nPetitions dismissed.·\n\nAgent for the petitioners: I. N. Shroff.\n\nAgent for the respondents: P. A. Mehta.\n\nRAM DHAN LAL AND OTHERS.\n\nRADHE SHAM AND OTHERS [SAIYID FAZL ALI, MUKHERJEA and\n\n(HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.)\n\nBengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation (Xl of 1825), ss. 2, 4 -Custom of dhar dhura-Incidents-River changing course s11ddenly-River flowing entirely outside the villages which it divided- Whether custom applies-On\"s of proof-Reasonableness of custom -Application of Regulation XI-Revival of dhar dhura rights.\n\nThe meaning of the custom of dhar dhura is that the deep stream or channel of a river is to be regarded, irrespective of its changes, as the constant boundary between two or more villages, and such a custom is expressly recognised in s. 2 of Regulation XI of 1825.\n\nWhether such custom applies even to cases of sudden changes in the course of a stream or only to gradual alluvial action is a matter which has to be determined upon the evidence adduced in each case. The onus of proving that the custom applies to sudden changes also is on the person who sets it up, but such custom is not unreasonable and can be established like any other\n\ncustom by cogent evidence. (Their Lordships upheld the finding lfi5I of the High Court that under the custom prevailing in the villages in question it was applicable also to cases of the stream suddenly Ram Dhan Lal altering its course.) and Other a As the custom of dhar dhura implies that the deep stream v. of the river irrespective of the changes in its course, is to be Radhe Sham regarded as a fixed boundary line between two or more villages, and Othera. it is necessary for the application of this custom that the main stream of the river must flow within the limits of these villages.\n\nWhen the river changes its course so widely that it oversteps the boundaries of the villages concerned and ceases to divide these villages, the rights of the riparian properties can be determined only in accordance with the provisions of Regulation XI of 1825.\n\nObiter. Though a riparian owner cannot claim a land under the custom of dhar dhura so long as the river flows outside the limits of the villages concerned, his rights under the custom would revive as soon as the river again flows within the villages.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Appeal (Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1949) against the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court (Allsop and VermaJJ.) dated 8th September, 1942, in First Appeal No. 473 of 1936, arising out of the decree of the Civil Judge, Bareilly, dated 30th September, 1936, in Original Suit No. 18 of 1934.\n\nWalter Dutt (P. S. Sajeer, with him) for the appellants.\n\nP.L. Banerjee (Baleshwar Prasad, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1951. March 19. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J .-This appeal is directed against an Mukherjoa J. appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated September 8, 1942, by which the learned Judges reversed a decree made in favour of the plaintiff by the qvil Judge of Bareilly in Original Suit No. 18 of 1934 and dismissed the suit as against defendants 1 to 4.\n\nThe suit out of which the appeal arises, was commenced by one Babu Ram as plaintiff and it was for\n\n1951 a declaration that the lands in suit appertained to a -. 1 village named Sikha situated in Tehsil Aonla within Ra\":.an:;:;.:;• the district of Bare illy, of which the plain tiff was the a v.\n\nZemindar and Lambardar, and that the defendants had\n\nllad./w Sham no right or title to the same. There was a claim for and others. recovery of possession in case the plaintiff was found\n\nM ukherjta J. to have been dispossessed from the whole or a portion of the disputed lands with an ancillary prayer for mesne profits. The original plaintiff died sometime after the plaint was filed and the suit was continued by his two sons, who were brought on the record as his heirs and successors. There were as many as 41 persons impleaded as parties defendants to the suit and they were alleged to have proprietory interest in two contiguous villages named Jhawa Nagla and Gurganwan which lie to the south and east of village Sikha.\n\nThe allegations as they appear in the plaint, in substance, are that the river Ram Ganga flowed to. the south and east of mouza Sikha belonging to the plaintiff and according to the custom of Dhar Dhura or deep stream boundary prevalent in the locality, the main channel of the river constitutes the indisputable, though fluctuating, boundary line between village\n\nSikha on one side and villages Jhawa Nagla and Gurganwan on the other.\n\nUp to Fasli year 1340 the course of the river, it is said, changed several times and the Zemindars of the three villages were deriving gains and suffering losses of land on account of these alluvial and diluvial changes. In the Fasli year 1340, the Dhar or main stream of the river was at the place marked C, D, E and F in the map attached to the plaint and the plaintiff. as Zemindar of village Sikha, possessed a tract of land shown on the map to which the dispute now relates and which was situated to the north-west of the stream and stretched on the northern and western side up to the limits of villages Sisauna, Hazipur and Sheopuri. In the year 1341 the river suddenly changed its course and leaving its old bed altogether began to flow entirely outside the limits of the three villages mentioned above, The \"dabri\" or the old bed of the river as it stood in the year 1340\n\nhas been shown in the plaint map and constit_utes, 1951 according to the plaintiffs, the line of demarcation bet- R - L ween Sikha on one side and the tw? villages Jhawa ::a_~~~:. al Nagla and Gurganwan on the other. It is alleged by the v. plaintiff that the custom of Dhar Dhura could not Rooke Sham create any title in the defendants, who are the proand Othera. prietors of villages Jhawa Nagla and Gurganwan, to the disputed plot, which is to the north and west of Mukherjea J. the main current of the river as it fl.owed in the year\n\n1340, as the custom applies only when the change in the deep stream is gradual and not sudden and it cannot have any possible application when the river leaves the three villages altogether and ceases to flow within them as has happened in the present case. The different proprietors therefore should be allowed, according to the plaintiff, to hold and possess as appertaining to their Zemindary the lands which were in their respective possession in the year 1340; and in law and. equity the disputed property should remain in possession of the plaintiff as owner of mouza Sikha.\n\nAs the defendants were threatening to interfere with the plaintiff's possession in collusion with the Patwari of the villages, the present suit was instituted.\n\nOut of the 41 defendants, written statements were filed by 9 only. Two .of them again admitted the plaintiffs' claim and pleaded that they were made parties to the suit unnecessarily. The suit was really contested by defendants 1 to 4 and 30 and they resisted the plaintiffs' claim on a number of grounds, most of which are immaterial for our present purpose. The substantial case made by the contesting defendants was that the custom of Dhar Dhura applied to every sort of change in the deep stream of the river irrespective of the fu.ct whether the change was gradual or sudden, or whether the river flowed within or outside the villages; and as the river had receded to the north, the defendants were according to this custom entitled to the lands which had been joined to the lands of their villages up to the main channel of the river. It was asserted that the \"dabri\" or the old bed of the\n\n1951 river could not be treated as the demarcating line bet-\n\nRam -;,::n Lal ween the three villages.\n\nand Others Thus. the existence of the custom of Dhar Dhura \"· was affirmed by both the parties. The difference betliadh• Sham ween them was as regards the extent of the custom.\n\nand Others. • ff According to the plainti s, the custom was restricted Mukherjea J. in its operation to gradual accretion and did not extend to cases where old formations were suddenly severed by fluvial action without destroying their identity or preventing recognition of the land so removed. The second point raised by the plaintiffs was that the custom could not apply when the main stream had shifted entirely beyond the villages between which it was to form the boundary line.\n\nOn the first point the decision of the trial court was adverse to the plaintiffs, but on the other point the court decided in their favour.\n\nThe result was that the plaintiffs' claim was allowed and a decree was passed in accordance. with. the prayers made in the plaint.\n\nAgainst this decision the defendants 1 to 4 took an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Allsop and Verma JJ. who allowed the appeal to this extent that the plaintiffs' claim was dismissed as against defendants Nos. 1 to 4 who had filed the appeal, though as regards the rest of the defendants the decision of the trial iudge was kept intact. It is against this judgment that the plaintiffs got leave to appeal to the\n\nPrivy Council and the appeal has now come up for hearing by this court. It has been brought to our notice that of the two plaintiffs who filed the appeal, one has since then compromised the suit with the contesting defendants and the appeal is being prosecuted before us on behalf of plaintiff No. 1 alone.\n\nThe learned Counsel appearing in support of the appeal has pressed for our consideration both the two points which were put forward in support of the plaintiff's case in the courts below. It has been contended in the first place that the evidence adduced in this case does not establish the custom of Dhar Dhura in\n\nsuch extreme form as would create a change of owner. 1951 ship even when there is transfer of lands by a sudden R Dha Lal change in the course of the deep stream. It is urged :':a Oth\".... that even if such a custom is proved to exist, it should v. be held to be unreasonable and hence unenforceable Radhe Sham in law. The other contention raised is that in any and Others. view there is no scope for application of the.custom m h . h d h Mukherjea J. the present case w ere the nver as oversteppe t e limits of the three villages and has ceased to be the dividing line between them.\n\nAs regards the first point, it seems to us that on the facts admitted and proved, it is not possible for us to take a view different from that taken by both the Courts below. The meaning of the custom Dhar Dhura is that the deep stream or channel of a river is to be regard- 6d. irrespective of its changes, as the constant boundary between two or more villages; Such custom is expressly recognised in section 2 of Regulation XI of 1825 which lays down that \"whenever any clear and definite usage ...... may have been immemorially established for determining the rights of the proprietors of two or more contiguous estates divided by river (such as that the main channel of the river dividing the estates shall be the constant boundary between them whatever changes may take place in the course of the river, by encroachment on one side and accession on the other), the usage so established shall govern the decision of all claims and disputes relating to alluvial lands between the parties.\" That such custom prevails in the locality is proved by the \"Wazibularz'' prepared at the last settlement of Monza Sikha and the custom is there recorded as follows:-\n\n\"The river Ram Ganga flows on the boundary line of thiS village. The custom of Dhar Dhura prevails between this village andGurganwan, Jhawa Naglaand Rakhara, Pa:rgana Aenla. If any piece of land is included in the area of this village on account of the alluvial action of the river, we the Zemindars shall be the owners thereof and if any piece of land of this village is washed away, it shall be owned and possessed by the Zemindars of the village wherein it appears in the\n\n1951 same way in which we were in possession thereof.\" The\n\n8 ;;;:: Lal record thus speaks of change by alluvial action of the :'::a 0,;:.,., river. It does not say whether such alluvial action v. should be gradual or sudden; by itself, therefore, it Badh• Sham does not indicate with precision the ambit of the right and Others. that is connoted by the custom. This is a matter which\n\nMukhet\"jea J. has got tq be determined upon the evidence adduced by the parties and the onus of proof is undoubtedly on the person who sets up a custom at variance with the general law. We are in agreement with the view expressed by Oldfield J. in Sibt Ali v. Muniruddin (1) that the court should \"scrutinise with care evidence in regard to a custom which would have the effect of passing from one owner to another land long held and enjoyed and of which the character is in no way altered by river action\"; but if cogent and satisfactory evidence is \"forthcoming, there is no reason why the existence of such custom could not be established like any other fact. Apart from the oral evidence that has been adduced in this case there are two Rubkaris of the Col!ectorate and one judgment by a Civil Court to all of which the predecessors of the parties to the present litigation were parties and they show clearly that demarcation of the lands of the three villages has always been made with reference to the position of the deep stream of the river at dfferent times and it was regarded as immaterial whether the change in the stream happened gradually or all on a sudden. From the Rubkari (Ex. H. 27) it appears that in 1283 Fasli the river suddenly altered its course and cut away not only the vacant accretion to Sikha but also a part of the mouza as it existed at the date of settlement. The land thus cut off was treated as an increment to Jhawa Nagla and Gurganwan and fresh settlement was made with the Zemindars of these villages. It is stated by the Assistant Collector of Barei!ly in this Rubkari that the existence of the custom was proved by careful local investigation and it was to the effect that the bed of the river should always be held to be the boundary and that it should\n\ntll I. J;.. R. 6 All. 479 ot 481,\n\nbe so held whether the river suddenly altered its 1951 course or gradually encroached on any mouza. The - Peshkar, who was deputed to make an enquiry, quoted Ra•;.,,, V~Lal a number of instances where the river altered its a v. • course both ways within the last 30 years prior to Radke Sham this date. This Rubkari, it is to be noted, is dated and OIM.ra. the 8th November, 1876. Ex. D-1 is a judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Bareilly dated the 29th of MukherJ•a J.\n\nJuly, 1907, and it was passed in a suit instituted by the proprietor of mouza Sikha against the owner of Jhawa Nagla. The que!i_tion raised was whether a quantity of land appertaining to mouza Sikha which was detached by a sudden change in the course of the river and thrown on the Jhawa N agla village could be claimed by the plaintiff. The answer was given in the negative, and the decision was based entirely upon the custom of Dhar Dhura which was held to be applicable even when the change was sudden. These documents furnish clear proof of the custom being held applicable to cases of the river suddenly altering its course and cutting off blocks of land from villages situated on one or other side of its channel. In the face of this clear and definite proof of the usage, we are unable to say that the decision of the courts below on this point is wrong. lt is urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that such custom is unreasonable and should for that reason be held to be unenforceable in law. It cannot be denied that the application of the deep stream rule might work injustice in certain cases as the gan or loss of property is made to depend upon accidental and uncertain phenomena or mere caprice of nature; but on the other hand the custom affords a convenient and effective way of avoiding boundary disputes which might otherwise be a fruitful source of strifeand contention between riparian proprietors. A custom must not certainly be against reason, but the reason referred to here is not to be understood as meaning every unlearned man's reason but artificial and legal reason warranted by authority of law (1). It is sufficient if\n\n(1) Vide Coke on Littleton 62 (a.),\n\n1951 no good legal reason can be assigned against it.\n\nPre-\n\nR Dil4 Lal vention of quarrels and disputes between contiguous Oth\".,.. villages and estates is certainly an object beneficial to v. the community and judged by this test, the custom of\n\nRadhe Sham Dhar Dhura cannot be held to be unreasonable. It may\n\nand Others. be pointed out in this connection that in some hape or other this deep stream rule has been recognised in Mukherjea J. J . ndia from very early times as a convenient mode of settling boundary disputes and Brihaspati, the Hindu Smriti writer, enunciates the rule in almost id_i:ntical terms which has been referred to in the writings of later commentators as pointed out by Lal Mohan Doss in his Tagore Law Lectures on the Law of Riparian Rights ('). The first contention of the appellant, therefore, cannot be accepted.\n\nThe other contention put forward by the appellant raises the question as to whether the custom of Dhar Dhura could have any application to the facts of the present case where the river is not flowing within the villages at all.\n\nOn this point, we think that the correct view has been taken by the learned Subordinate Judge and the reasons and the conclusion of the High Court upon it do not appear to us to be sound.\n\nIf, as the custom of Dhar Dhura implies, the deep stream of a river irrespective of the changes in its course, is to be regarded as a fixed boundary line between two or more villages, it is absolutely necessary that the main stream of the river must flow within the limits of these villages. It is only for the purpose of determining the boundary between certain villages and estates that the custom of Dhar Dhura can be invoked; and unless the river actually divides the villages or estates, there can be no question of its being regarded as a boundary line between them and in such\n\ncircumtances the deep stream rule cannot possibly have any meaning. A custom which defeats or has no relevancy to the very object for which it came into existence cannot under any circumstance be regarded as valid. We are not satisfied also that the evidence\n\n11) Ville Doss on the Law of Riparian Righs p. 178\n\nin the record establishes the existence of such custom I9n at all.\n\nSection 2 of Regulation XI of 1825 makes it Ram Dfw.m Tm perfectly clear that a custom contrary to the provisions and otheY• of the Regulation would be enforceable only when it is v. a custom for determining the rights of proprietors of RadheShain two or more contiguous estates divided by the river-. and OtlierB.\n\nWhen the river ceases to divide the estates, the rights Mtik'-J•a .J. of the riparian proprietors can be determined only in accordance with the provisions made in the Regulation itself. It has been argued by Mr. Banerjee, appearing for the respo11dents. that a55uming that the custom of Dhar Dhura could not be invoked by the defendants when the river had receded beyond the limits of mouza Sikha, still the plaintiff in order to succeed in the suit must have to show how he acquired title to the tract of land lying to the north and west of the \"dabri\" or the old water course, which is the subject matter of the claim in the present suit. The answer to this argument would clearly be that when the main current of the river was at the place where the \"dabri\" .stands at present, the entire stretch of land lying to the north west of the main.stream came to the plaintiff under the custom of Dhar Dhura. In the year 1341 Fasli the river suddenly changed its course and as it shifted t0 the north and west beyond the limits of mouza Sikha, the custom of Dhar Dhura would no longer govern the rights of the parties and the .title to the plot of land, which is the subject matter of dispute, must be determined ip. accordance with the provisions of the Regulation itself. As the change in the course of the river was sudden and not gradual and the character and identity of the land hav~ remained intact, the plaintiff would clearly be entitled to possess the land on the strength of his original title as provided for in section 4, clause (2), of Regulation XI of 1825. In our opinion, therefore, the decision of the learned Judges of the High Court .on this point is not correct and should be reversed.\n\nMr. Banerjee argues further that even if his clients cannot claim the disputed land under the custom of Dhar Dhura so long as the river fiC1ws outside the limits\n\n1051 of the village, their rights under the custom should\n\nRam Doon LU r.evve as soon as. the rive~ come~ .down within the\n\namt other. limits of mouza S1kha. This position certainly has v. got to be admitted but as we are concerned with the Radh' Sham state of affair£ existing at the date of the institution of and Other•. the suit and there is no evidence on the record as to the position of the river at the present moment, the J1.ukherjea J,\n\nAJ>Til 9.\n\nplaintiff will be entitled to a decree in the form as it was given by the trial judge, it being clearly understood that the rights declared in this suit would be subject to the custom of Dhrtr Dhura which the defendants may invoke if and when the proper occasion arises.\n\nSubject to this observation, we allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the trial judge.\n\nThe plaintiff No. I wiJI be entitled to his costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: R. S. Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondents : Tarachand Brijmohan Lal.\n\nTHE UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. v.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN\n\n(and other cases)\n\nUNION OF INDIA-Intervener.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J ., SA!YID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA: S.R. DAS and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (XTV of 1947), ss. 7, 8, 12, 16-Rules under the Act, R. 5-Constitution of Tribunal of three membcrs- Absence of one of three members on other duty-Absent member rejoining after some time-Validity of awards made during his absence by the two remaining members, and by all of them after he rejoined-Construction and effect of ss. 7, 8, 12 and Rule ~.\n\nThe Central Government constituted an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, consisting of A, B, and C", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "Janardan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janardan ~...,, A h . ,"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 317, "end_char": 328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 422, "end_char": 432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "all the six petitions are Fau Ali J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 434, "end_char": 470, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 602, "end_char": 612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 663, "end_char": 674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I. 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CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 989, "end_char": 1028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1043, "end_char": 1051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation", "statute": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation"}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1106, "end_char": 1109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation", "statute": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1535, "end_char": 1539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation", "statute": "Bengal Alluvion and Diluvion Regulation"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3158, "end_char": 3178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41 of 1949) against the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court (Allsop and VermaJJ.)"}}, {"text": "Allsop", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3180, "end_char": 3186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41 of 1949) against the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court (Allsop and VermaJJ.)"}}, {"text": "VermaJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3191, "end_char": 3198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41 of 1949) against the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court (Allsop and VermaJJ.)", "canonical_name": "VermaJJ"}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Bareilly", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3294, "end_char": 3315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "473 of 1936, arising out of the decree of the Civil Judge, Bareilly, dated 30th September, 1936, in Original Suit No."}}, {"text": "Walter Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3379, "end_char": 3390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Walter Dutt (P. S. Sajeer, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. S. Sajeer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3392, "end_char": 3404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Walter Dutt (P. S. Sajeer, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P.L. Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3437, "end_char": 3450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.L. Banerjee (Baleshwar Prasad, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Baleshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3452, "end_char": 3468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.L. Banerjee (Baleshwar Prasad, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J .-This appeal is directed against an Mukherjoa J. appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated September 8, 1942, by which the learned Judges reversed a decree made in favour of the plaintiff by the qvil Judge of Bareilly in Original Suit No.", "canonical_name": "M ukherjta"}}, {"text": "Mukherjoa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3611, "end_char": 3620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J .-This appeal is directed against an Mukherjoa J. appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated September 8, 1942, by which the learned Judges reversed a decree made in favour of the plaintiff by the qvil Judge of Bareilly in Original Suit No.", "canonical_name": "M ukherjta"}}, {"text": "Babu Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3972, "end_char": 3980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit out of which the appeal arises, was commenced by one Babu Ram as plaintiff and it was for\n\n1951 a declaration that the lands in suit appertained to a -."}}, {"text": "M ukherjta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4394, "end_char": 4404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "recovery of possession in case the plaintiff was found\n\nM ukherjta J. to have been dispossessed from the whole or a portion of the disputed lands with an ancillary prayer for mesne profits.", "canonical_name": "M ukherjta"}}, {"text": "Jhawa Nagla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4857, "end_char": 4868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were as many as 41 persons impleaded as parties defendants to the suit and they were alleged to have proprietory interest in two contiguous villages named Jhawa Nagla and Gurganwan which lie to the south and east of village Sikha."}}, {"text": "Gurganwan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4873, "end_char": 4882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were as many as 41 persons impleaded as parties defendants to the suit and they were alleged to have proprietory interest in two contiguous villages named Jhawa Nagla and Gurganwan which lie to the south and east of village Sikha."}}, {"text": "Sikha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4926, "end_char": 4931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were as many as 41 persons impleaded as parties defendants to the suit and they were alleged to have proprietory interest in two contiguous villages named Jhawa Nagla and Gurganwan which lie to the south and east of village Sikha."}}, {"text": "Dhar Dhura", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5126, "end_char": 5136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the south and east of mouza Sikha belonging to the plaintiff and according to the custom of Dhar Dhura or deep stream boundary prevalent in the locality, the main channel of the river constitutes the indisputable, though fluctuating, boundary line between village\n\nSikha on one side and villages Jhawa Nagla and Gurganwan on the other."}}, {"text": "Sisauna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5981, "end_char": 5988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as Zemindar of village Sikha, possessed a tract of land shown on the map to which the dispute now relates and which was situated to the north-west of the stream and stretched on the northern and western side up to the limits of villages Sisauna, Hazipur and Sheopuri."}}, {"text": "Hazipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5990, "end_char": 5997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as Zemindar of village Sikha, possessed a tract of land shown on the map to which the dispute now relates and which was situated to the north-west of the stream and stretched on the northern and western side up to the limits of villages Sisauna, Hazipur and Sheopuri."}}, {"text": "Sheopuri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as Zemindar of village Sikha, possessed a tract of land shown on the map to which the dispute now relates and which was situated to the north-west of the stream and stretched on the northern and western side up to the limits of villages Sisauna, Hazipur and Sheopuri."}}, {"text": "Jhawa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6417, "end_char": 6422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "villages Jhawa ::a~~~:."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6722, "end_char": 6731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "prietors of villages Jhawa Nagla and Gurganwan, to the disputed plot, which is to the north and west of Mukherjea J. the main current of the river as it fl.owed in the year\n\n1340, as the custom applies only when the change in the deep stream is gradual and not sudden and it cannot have any possible application when the river leaves the three villages altogether and ceases to flow within them as has happened in the present case.", "canonical_name": "M ukherjta"}}, {"text": "mouza Sikha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7360, "end_char": 7371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "equity the disputed property should remain in possession of the plaintiff as owner of mouza Sikha.", "canonical_name": "mouza Sikha"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9536, "end_char": 9559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decision the defendants 1 to 4 took an appeal to the High Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Verma", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9627, "end_char": 9632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Allsop and Verma JJ.", "canonical_name": "VermaJJ"}}, {"text": "Radhe Sham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10870, "end_char": 10880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged :':a Oth\".... that even if such a custom is proved to exist, it should v. be held to be unreasonable and hence unenforceable Radhe Sham in law.", "canonical_name": "Radhe Sham"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11557, "end_char": 11566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Monza Sikha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12256, "end_char": 12267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That such custom prevails in the locality is proved by the \"Wazibularz'' prepared at the last settlement of Monza Sikha and the custom is there recorded as follows:-\n\n\"The river Ram Ganga flows on the boundary line of thiS village.", "canonical_name": "mouza Sikha"}}, {"text": "andGurganwan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12435, "end_char": 12447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The custom of Dhar Dhura prevails between this village andGurganwan, Jhawa Naglaand Rakhara, Pa:rgana Aenla."}}, {"text": "Mukhet\"jea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13177, "end_char": 13187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is a matter which\n\nMukhet\"jea J. has got tq be determined upon the evidence adduced by the parties and the onus of proof is undoubtedly on the person who sets up a custom at variance with the general law.", "canonical_name": "M ukherjta"}}, {"text": "Oldfield", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13410, "end_char": 13418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are in agreement with the view expressed by Oldfield J. in Sibt Ali v. Muniruddin (1) that the court should \"scrutinise with care evidence in regard to a custom which would have the effect of passing from one owner to another land long held and enjoyed and of which the character is in no way altered by river action\"; but if cogent and satisfactory evidence is \"forthcoming, there is no reason why the existence of such custom could not be established like any other fact."}}, {"text": "Barei!ly", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14759, "end_char": 14767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is stated by the Assistant Collector of Barei!ly in this Rubkari that the existence of the custom was proved by careful local investigation and it was to the effect that the bed of the river should always be held to be the boundary and that it should\n\ntll I. J;.. R. 6 All."}}, {"text": "Peshkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15112, "end_char": 15119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The - Peshkar, who was deputed to make an enquiry, quoted Ra•;.,,,"}}, {"text": "Radke Sham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15287, "end_char": 15297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V~Lal a number of instances where the river altered its a v. • course both ways within the last 30 years prior to Radke Sham this date.", "canonical_name": "Radhe Sham"}}, {"text": "8th November, 1876", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15367, "end_char": 15385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 8th November, 1876."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Bareilly", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15416, "end_char": 15445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-1 is a judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Bareilly dated the 29th of MukherJ•a J.\n\nJuly, 1907, and it was passed in a suit instituted by the proprietor of mouza Sikha against the owner of Jhawa Nagla."}}, {"text": "Radhe Sham Dhar Dhura", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17425, "end_char": 17446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "villages and estates is certainly an object beneficial to v. the community and judged by this test, the custom of\n\nRadhe Sham Dhar Dhura cannot be held to be unreasonable."}}, {"text": "Brihaspati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17707, "end_char": 17717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ndia from very early times as a convenient mode of settling boundary disputes and Brihaspati, the Hindu Smriti writer, enunciates the rule in almost id_i:ntical terms which has been referred to in the writings of later commentators as pointed out by Lal Mohan Doss in his Tagore Law Lectures on the Law of Riparian Rights (')."}}, {"text": "Lal Mohan Doss", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17875, "end_char": 17889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ndia from very early times as a convenient mode of settling boundary disputes and Brihaspati, the Hindu Smriti writer, enunciates the rule in almost id_i:ntical terms which has been referred to in the writings of later commentators as pointed out by Lal Mohan Doss in his Tagore Law Lectures on the Law of Riparian Rights (')."}}, {"text": "Ville Doss", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19290, "end_char": 19300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not satisfied also that the evidence\n\n11) Ville Doss on the Law of Riparian Righs p. 178\n\nin the record establishes the existence of such custom I9n at all."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19406, "end_char": 19415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19934, "end_char": 19942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been argued by Mr. Banerjee, appearing for the respo11dents."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21242, "end_char": 21251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21740, "end_char": 21742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J1.ukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22020, "end_char": 22031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position certainly has v. got to be admitted but as we are concerned with the Radh' Sham state of affair£ existing at the date of the institution of and Other•. the suit and there is no evidence on the record as to the position of the river at the present moment, the J1.ukherjea J,\n\nAJ>Til 9."}}, {"text": "R. S. Narula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22509, "end_char": 22521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants: R. S. Narula."}}, {"text": "Tarachand Brijmohan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22552, "end_char": 22575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : Tarachand Brijmohan Lal."}}, {"text": "UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22582, "end_char": 22608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD."}}, {"text": "THEIR WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22614, "end_char": 22627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN\n\n(and other cases)\n\nUNION OF INDIA-Intervener."}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22648, "end_char": 22662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN\n\n(and other cases)\n\nUNION OF INDIA-Intervener."}}, {"text": "HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22682, "end_char": 22695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J .,"}}, {"text": "SA!YID FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22703, "end_char": 22717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SA!YID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA: S.R. DAS and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (XTV of 1947), ss."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22720, "end_char": 22736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SA!YID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA: S.R. DAS and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (XTV of 1947), ss."}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22738, "end_char": 22756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SA!YID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA: S.R. DAS and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (XTV of 1947), ss."}}, {"text": "S.R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22769, "end_char": 22777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SA!YID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA: S.R. DAS and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (XTV of 1947), ss."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22782, "end_char": 22793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SA!YID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA: S.R. DAS and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (XTV of 1947), ss."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22800, "end_char": 22823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 8, 12, 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22839, "end_char": 22855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 8, 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23148, "end_char": 23160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government constituted an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23178, "end_char": 23271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_380_430_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951)\n\n1051 of the village, their rights under the custom should\n\nRam Doon LU r.evve as soon as. the rive~ come~ .down within the\n\namt other. limits of mouza S1kha. This position certainly has v. got to be admitted but as we are concerned with the Radh' Sham state of affair£ existing at the date of the institution of and Other•. the suit and there is no evidence on the record as to the position of the river at the present moment, the J1.ukherjea J,\n\nAJ>Til 9.\n\nplaintiff will be entitled to a decree in the form as it was given by the trial judge, it being clearly understood that the rights declared in this suit would be subject to the custom of Dhrtr Dhura which the defendants may invoke if and when the proper occasion arises.\n\nSubject to this observation, we allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the trial judge.\n\nThe plaintiff No. I wiJI be entitled to his costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nAgent for the appellants: R. S. Narula.\n\nAgent for the respondents : Tarachand Brijmohan Lal.\n\nTHE UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. v.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN\n\n(and other cases)\n\nUNION OF INDIA-Intervener.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J ., SA!YID FAZL Au,\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA: S.R. DAS and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.J\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act (XTV of 1947), ss. 7, 8, 12, 16-Rules under the Act, R. 5-Constitution of Tribunal of three membcrs- Absence of one of three members on other duty-Absent member rejoining after some time-Validity of awards made during his absence by the two remaining members, and by all of them after he rejoined-Construction and effect of ss. 7, 8, 12 and Rule ~.\n\nThe Central Government constituted an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, consisting of A, B, and C\n\nfor deciding certain disputes and the Tribunal commenced its 19111 sittings in September, 1949. On the 23rd Novem\\)er, 1949, the services of C were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Thi United External Affairs as a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Commercial Disputes Triounal, and the two remaining members, after an ob- Banlc Ltd. jection raised by one side, continued to sit and hear the disputes. v.\n\nOn the 20th February, 1950, C returned from the Boundary Their Workm<in.\n\nDisputes Tribunal and began to sit again with the other two members and hear the further proceedings in the case of disputes which were part heard and not finally decided on that date. On the 20th May, 1950, the Government issued a notification that C had \" resumed charge of his duties as a member of the All India Indu!itrial Tribunal\". Some awards were made by A and B before the 20th February, 1950, and some awards were made after that date by A, Band C together.\n\nHeld, per KANIA, C. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BOSE JJ. (FAZL ALI and PATANJALI SASTRI JJ. dissenting):-\n\n(i) when C was appointed as a member of the Boundary Disputes Tribunal, his services \"ceased to be available\" and there arose \" a vacancy \" within the meaning of Sec. 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act ;\n\n(ii) under the said section read with Rule 5 of the Industrial Disputes Rules, when a vacancy occurred it was obligatory on the Government to notify its decision as to whether it intended to fill up the vacancy or not, and if the Government decided not to fill up the vacancy, a notification under Sec. 7 of the Act was essential to constitute the remaining members a Tribunal inasmuch as a Tribunal of three members is a different Tribunal altogether from a Tribunal consisting of two of them only;\n\n(iii) neither the fact that C began to sit again along with the two other members from the 20th February, 1950, nor the notification of the 20th May, 1950, stating that Chad \"resumed charge of his duties as a member\" of that Tribunal could be treated as an appointment to the vacancy created on C's appointment as a member of the Boundary Disputes Tribunal;\n\n(iv) awards made by A and B after the services of C ceased to be available, and awards made after the 20th February, 1950, by A, B and C were not made by a Tribunal duly constituted under the Act and were void ;\n\n(v) since the two remaining members were not a duly con stituted Tribunal and the duty to work and decide was the joint respomibility of all the three members who originally constituted the Tribunal, the matter was one of absence of jurisdiction and not a mere_irregularity in the conduct of proceedings, and the defect could not be cured by acquiescence or estoppel.\n\n1951 PerFAzLALiandPATANJALI SASTRI}J. (contra)-There was a ' vacancy ' within the meaning of Sec. 8 of the Act when the The Unittd services of C were placed at the disposal of the Boundary Disput.es Commercial Tribunal, \\Vhich provided an occasion for the Government to Bank Ltd. exercise the discretion vested in it under Sec. 8 of the Act to fill v, up the vacancy or not. The fact that the Government decided not Their Workmen. to fill up the vacancy, could not render the Tribunal an imperfectly constituted Tribunal, and the proceedings could validly be continued before the Tribunal in spite of the vacancy. Fnrther, since the vacancy was a temporary one and was not filled np, C did not cease to be a member of the Tribunal and could therefore rejoin it as soon as he was free from the duties of his new office.\n\nEven if it be assnmed that it was necessary for the Government to make an appaintment under Sec. 8 (1), the requirements of that section were complied with, when C joined under the orders of the Government and that fact was also notified by the Government on the 20th May, 1950. Rnle 5 of the Industrial Disputes Rules applies only when a Tnbunal is initially constituted. It does not apply to appointments to fill vacancies.\n\nPer MuKHERJliA J .-An Industrial Tribunal can be constituted only in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act and unless a Tribunal is properly constituted, it cannot be invested with jurisdiction to adjudicate on industrial disputes. Under snb-sec. (2) of Sec. 7, the number of members constituting the Tribunal has to be determined by the appropriate Government and a change in the number of members could be made therefore only in pursuance of the provision contained in that sub-section. As Sec. 8 does not lay down that, in case the services of a member of the Tribunal cease to be available and the Government does not choose to make a new appointment in his place, the remaining members should continue to form the Tribunal, the constitution or reconstitution of the remaining members as a Tribunal could be made only under Sec. 7 of the Act and as there was no notification by the appropriate Government under Sec. 7 constituting the two remaining members a Tribunal under the Act during the absence of C, the proceedings before these two members and the awards made and signed by them ouly during C's absence were void. But, there was no necessity for a fresh notification and a fresh constitution of the Tribunal when the absent member returned as the original notification was still there unaltered and unamended, and by virtue of this notification alone, the three members would be competent to sit as a Tribunal and discharge its duties. The Tribunal was thefore, properly constituted from the 20th February; 1950, and the awards made by all the three members after that date were not void for want of jurisdiction in the Tribunal.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Appeals by special leave against an Award dated 31st July, 1950,\n\nof the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) : 1901 Civil Appeals Nos. 35 to 50of1951. The facts of the TM Unit\"I case and the arguments of Counsel appear in the commercial judgment.\n\nBank Ltd.\n\nC. K. Daphtary ·(R. ]. Kolah, with him) for the Th . .;· k appellanti in Civil Appeals Nos. 35, 36 and 37. eir\n\n0 ' :mon. ]amshedji Kanga (R.]. Kolah, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 38.\n\nS. Chaudhuri (G. C. Mathur, with him) for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 41, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 49.·\n\nS:Chaudhuri (S.N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 48 and 50.\n\nR. ]. Kolah, for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 39, 40 and 42.\n\nRam Lal Anand (Charan Das Pu_ri, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 47.\n\nA.C. Gupta (M.M. Sen and R.K. Banerji, with him) for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44.\n\nM.M. Sen for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 37, 39, 45 and 46.\n\nNiren be (B.K. Chaudhury, with him) for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 38 and 50.\n\nT. R. Bhasin for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 48 and 49.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the Intervener (Union of India) in Civil Appeal No. 35.\n\n1951. April 9. The judgment of Kania C.J, Mehr Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das and Vivian Buse J]. was delivered by Kania C.J.,. Fazl Ali. Patanjali Sastri and Mukherjea JJ. delivered separate judgments.\n\nKANIA C.J.-In these appeals the question whether Kanu. o. J. the Industrial Tribunal (Bank Dispute~) had jurisdiction to make the awards has been directed by the Court to be tried as a preliminary issue. The decision depends on the true construction of sections 7, 8, 15 and 16 of the Industrial Disputes Act. On\n\n1951 this question, the agreed statement of facts shows that by a notification of the Government of India dated\n\n~::::;:;;:: the 13th June, 1949, the Central Government constitut-\n\nBtmkLtd. ed an Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication of v. industrial disputes in banking companies consisting of Their Workmen.Mr. K.C. Sen, chairman, Mr. S. P. Varma and Mr.\n\nJ. N. Mazumdar.\n\nA second notification dated the Kania 0 J. 24th August, 1949, was thereafter issued as follows:-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Central Government was pleased to appoint Mr. N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar as a member of the Industrial Tribunal constituted by the notifications of the Government of India in the Ministry of Labour dated the 13th June, 1949, in the place of '.Vlr. S. P. Varma whose services have ceased to be available.\" The Tribunal commenced its regular sittings at Bombay from the 12th to the 16th of September, 1949. It thereafter sat at Delhi and Patna between the 19th September, 1949, and 3rd April,\n\n1950. Further sittings were held, at some of which Mr. Mazumdar was absent on various dates and Mr.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar was absent from the 23rd November, 1949, to the 20th of February, 1950, as his services were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of External Affairs as a member of the lndo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal.\n\nBetween the 23rd November, 1949, and 20th February 1950, Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar together sat at several places and made certain awards. Those awards have been accepted by the Government under section 15 of the Act and published in the Gazette as the awards of the Tribunal. The Tribunal held its sittings in Bombay to hear general issues from the 16th January, 1950, and concluded them on the 3rd April, 1950.\n\nIn the agreed statement of facts. it is stated that the services of Mr.\n\nChandrasekhara AiyaJ' were not available to the Tribunal from the afternoon of 23rd November, 1949, to the forenoon of 20th February, 1950.\n\nFrom the 16th January, 1950, up to 20th February, 1950, several matters, particularly including 15 items covering, inter alia, Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 15, 23, 27, 28, 33, 34, 37\n\nand dealing with the question of the jurisdiction of 19111 the Tribunal in respect of officers regarding banks The United having branches in more than one Province and banks Oommercial in liquidation; question of retrospective effect to be Bank Ltd. given to the award, question relating to provident and v. guarantee fund and allowances to special categories of Their Workmen. workmen, were dealt with by the Tribunal. From the\n\nK J notes of the proceedings of the Tribunal it appears an.a . that as numerous banks anB workmen were parties to the proceedings, some workmen who had not found it convenient to attend throughout appeared and put forth their views in respect of the aforesaid issues and questions after Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar started his work from the afternoon of the 20th February, 1950, again by sitting with Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the Tribunal of the aforesaid three persons to make the award is disputed on two grounds:\n\n(1) That when Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar's services ceased to be available, as mentioned in the agreed statement of facts, the remaining two members had to be re-appointed to constitute a Tribunal. (2) That when Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar beg; m to sit again with Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar from the forenoon of 20th February, 1950, it was imperative to issue a notification constituting a Tribunal under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The argument is that in the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar the two members had no jurisdiction to hear anything at all without the appropriate notification and that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar's services having ceased to be available on the 23rd of November, 1949, he cannot sit again with the other two members to form the Tribunal in the absence of a notification under section 7.\n\nIn order to appreciate the correct position, it is necessary to consider the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act. It envisages the establishment of a Conciliation Board, a Court of Inquiry and a Tribunal for adjudication. Relevant portions of sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 15 and 16 of the Act which only are material for the present discussion run as follows: -\n\n1961 5.\n\n(1) \"The appropriate Government may as occasion arises by notification in the official Gazette\n\n~=~~;:.~ constitute a Board of Conciliation for promoting the Bank Ltd. settlement of an industrial dispute.\n\nv. • (2) A Board shall consist of a chairman and two or Their Workmen. four other members, as the appropriate Government thinks fit.\n\nKania 0. J. .\n\n(3) The chairman shal~ be an independent . persn and the other members shall be persons appomted m equal numbers to represent the parties to the dispute and any person appointed to represent a party shall be appointed on the recommendation of that party : * * *\n\n(4) A Board, having the prescribed quorum, may act notwithstanding the absence of the chairman or any of its members or any vacancy in its number.\n\nProvided that if the appropriate Government notifies the Board that the services of the chairman or any other member have ceased to be available, the Board shall not act until a new chairman or member, as the case may be, has been appointed.\" 6.\n\n(1) \"The appropriate Government may as occasion arises by notification in the official Gazette constitute a Court of Inquiry for inquiring into any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute.\n\n(2) A Court may consist of one independent person or of such number of independent persons as the appropriate Government may think fit and where a Court consists of two or more members, one of them shall be appointed as the chairman.\n\n(3) A Court, having the prescribed quorum, may act notwithstanding the absence of the chairman or any of its members or any vacancy in its number.\n\nProvided that, if the appropriate Government notifies the Court that the services of the chairman have ceased to be available, the Court shall not act until a new chairman has been appointed.\" 7.\n\n(1) \"The appropriate Government may constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR! REPORTS 387\n\nadjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with 19ol the provisions of this Act.\n\nThe United (2)A Tribunal shall consist of such number of Oomm<1'Cial members as the appropriate Govemm1ent thinks fit.\n\nBank Ltti.\n\nWhere the Tribunal consists of two or more members, v. one of the~ shall be appointed as the chairman. .\n\nTheir Workmen.\n\n(3) Every member of the Tribunal shall be an , Kania o. J. independent person,\n\n(a) who is or has been , a Judge of a High Court or a District Judge, or\n\n(b) is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court:\n\nProvided that the appointment to a Tribunal of any person not qualified under part (a) shall be made hi consultation with the High Court of the Province in which the Tribunal has, or is intended to have, its usu<!-1 place of sitting.\" 8.\n\n(1) \"If the services of the chairman of a Board or the chairman or other member of a Court or Tribunal cease to be available at any time, the appro~ priate Government shall in the case of a chairman, and may in the case of any other member, appoint another independent person to fill the vacancy, and the proceedings shall be continued before the Board, Court or Tribunal so reconstituted.\n\n(2) Where a Court or Tribunal consists of one person only and his services cease to be available the appropriate Government shall appoint another independent person in his place, and the proceedings shall be continued before the person so appointed.\n\n(3) Where the services of any member of a Board other than the chairman have ceased to be available, the appropriate Government shaff appoint in the manner specified in sub-section (3) of section 5 another person to take his place, and the proceedings shall be continued before the Board so reconstituted.\" 15..\n\n(1) \"Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, as soon as\n\n1951 practicable on the conclusion thereof, submit its award Th• United to the appropriate Government.\n\numnmercial\n\n(2) On receipt of such award, the appropriate bank Ltd.\n\nGovernment shall by order in writing declare the v. award to be binding : Their W QTkmen. * * *· Kania o. J.\n\n(4) Save as provided in the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 19, an award declared to be binding under this section shall not be called in question in any manner.\"\n\n16. \"The report of a Board or Court and the award of.a Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by all the members of the Board, Court or Tribunal, as the case may be : Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent any member of the Board, Court or Tribunal from recording a minute of dissent from a report or award from any recommendation made therein.\" Confining our attention to the aspect of absence of members at the sittings of the different bodies and what results follow therefrom, it is clear that under section 5 (4) when a member of a Board of Conciliation\n\nis absent or there is a vacancy, the Board is permitted to act, notwithstanding such absence, provided there is the prescribed quorum.\n\nSuch quorum is fixed by the rules framed under the Act.\n\nAccording to the proviso to this sub-section however, if the appropriate Government notifies the Board that the services of the chairman or any other member have ceased to be available, the Board shall not act until a new chairman or a member, as the case may be, has been appointed. Reading these two parts together, it is therefore clear that a distinction is drawn between the situation arising from the absence of the chairman or any of its members and a vacancy in the Board, and the position when the Government has intimated that the services of a chairman or member have ceased to be available. The words \"having the prescribed quorum\" put a further limitation on the right of the\n\nremaining members of the Board to act, when all of rn51 them are not acting together. The proviso thus makes it clear that when the serviees of a chairman or member ~=:~; r~;~ have ceased to be available and that fact has been Bank Ltd. notified to the Board by the appropriate Government, v. the remaining members have no jurisdiction to act in Their Workmen. the name of the Board. Thus all the contingencies of\n\nK temporary or casual absence. as well as permanent ania J. vacancy, and the contingency of the chairman or a member's services having ceased to be available are contemplated and provided for. In the same way and in the same terms, provision is made in respect of the Court of Inquiry in section 6 (3).\n\nThe provisions as regards the Tribunal are found in section 7. No other section deals with the establishment of the Tribunal. The first clause empowers the appropriate Government to constitute one or more industrial tribunals having the functions allotted to it under the Ad.\n\nSub clause (2) provides that a Tribunal shall consist of such number of members as the appropriate Government thinks fit.\n\nThis clause therefore authorizes the appropriate Govern ment to fix the number of members which will constitute the Tribunal. Sub-clause (3) and the proviso deal with the qualifications of individuals to be members with which we are not concerned. Although in this section there is no provision like sections 5 (I) and 6 (1) requiring a notification of the constitution of\n\nthe Tribunal in the official Gazette, the deficiency is made up by rule 5 of the Industrial Disputes Rules, 1949, framed by the Government under section 38 of the Act. The rule provides that the appointment of a Board, Court or Tribunal \"together with the names of the persons constituting the Board, Court or Tribunal\" shall be notified in the official Gazette. It is therefore obligatory on the appropriate Government to notify the composition of the Tribunal and also the names of the persons constituting the same. In respect of a\n\nTriOunal which is entrusted with the work of adjudicating upon disputes between employers and employees whi.ch have not been settled otherwise, this provision\n\nrns1 is absolutely essential. It cannot be left in doubt to\n\nThe United the employers or the employees as to who are the per-\n\nCo•M\"ercial sons authorized to adjudicate upon their disputes.\n\nBank Ltd.\n\nThis is also in accordance with notifications of appointv. ments of public servants discharging judicial or quasi- Their Workmen. judicial functions.\n\nThe important thing therefore to\n\n-.-0 J note is that the number forming the Tribunal and the Kania · names of the members have both to be notified in the official Gazette for the proper and valid constitution of the Tribunal.\n\nIt is significant that there is no provision correspond- • ing to section 5 (4) or 6 (3) in section 7.\n\nSection 15 of the Act provides that when an industrial dispute has been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and as soon as practicable and at the conclusion thereof submit its award to the appropriate Government. It is thus clear and indeed it is not disputed that the tribunal as a body should sit together and the award has to be the result of the joint deliberations of all members of the Tribunal acting in a joint capacity.\n\nSection 16 requires that all members of the Tribunal shall sign the award. This again emphasizes that the function of the Tribunal is joint and it is not open to any member to refrain from signing the award. If the award is not signed by all members it will be invalid as it will not be the award of the Tribunal.\n\nIn the light of the provisions of section 7 the question arising for consideration is, what was the duty of the Government when the services of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be available. The two telegrams exchanged between Mr. Sen and the Government show that the Government fook the view that a vacancy had occurred and they did not think of filling it up at the time. In the first place, on the true construction of the Act, was it not obligatory on the Government to notify to the contesting parties that it had decided not to fill up the vacancy? Is it open to them to leave the parties in doubt in respect of a Tribunal entrusted with the work of adjudicating upon very important disputes between parties? In our opinion, the whole\n\nscheme of the Act leads to the conclusion that the 1951 Government must notify its decision as to what it The United desired to do, i.e., whether it intended to fill up the Cammercial vacancy or not and thereupon notify what members Bank Ltd. were going to constitute the Tribunal. We are led to v. that conclusion because a Tribunal of three consisting Their Workmen. of Mr. Sen, Mr. Mazumdar and Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar is a different tribunal from one consisting of Kania 0 J. two, viz., of Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdaronly.\n\nIn this setting, it is next necessary to consider the words of section 8 on which strong reliance is placed on behalf of the respondents. The marginal note of that section is \"filling of vacancies \". The section deals with the Board, the Court and the Tribunal in its clauses. Under sub-section {l), the Legislature clearly contemplates that when the services of a member cease to be available at any time there will arise a vacancy. This sub-section deals with the situation in three stages. The first question is, have the services of a member {and this includes, for the present discussion, a chairman) ceased to be available? If so, the vacancy having thus arisen, the next question is, what can be done by the appropriate Government ? If the vacancy is filled up by making the appointment, the final question is, how the proceedings shall go on before the Board, Court or Tribunal so reconstituted ? It was argued on behalf of the respondents that it was for the appropriate Government alone to pronounce whether the services of a member had ceased to be available at any time and that was not a matter for the decision of the Court. In our opinion, what is left to the option of the Government is, in case of the services of a member ceasing to be available, to appoint or not to appoint. Those stages having passed, the appropriate Government, under the section, is obliged to appoint another person to fill the vacancy, if the vacancy is c.reated in respect of a chairman. In respect of the vacancy of a member's p9st, the Government is given the option to appoint or not to appoint another person. The concluding words of the sub-section \"so reconstituted\" clearly relate only to tpe contingency of\n\n1951 the Government making the appointment of another independent person in the vacancy. The concluding The United • .\n\nCommercial part of that sub-section provides for the continuance of Bank Ltd. the proceedings before the body so reconstituted. Subv, section (2) also provides that where a i:ourt or tribu- Their Woekmen. nal consists only of one person and his services have ceased to be available, on the appointment of another Kmiia 0 J. independent person the proceedings shall be continued before the person so appointed and it will not be necessary to start the proceedings from the beginning before that person. Section 8 (3) provides for the contingency of the services of a member of a Board not being available.\n\nIt requires the appropriate Government to make the appointment as provided in section 5 (3) and further provides that notwithstanding the inclusion of a totally new man in that vacancy, the proceedings shall be continued before the Board so reconstituted. Reading the three clauses together, therefore, it is quite clear that the object of section 8 is to make specific provisions in respect of situations when the Government must or does fill up vacancies in the event of the services of a member or chairman not being available and the consequences of a totally new man filling up the vacancy. As we read the Act, that is the total object and intention of this section. It does not contemplate the consequences of the Government not making an appointment where it has the option not to do so.\n\nThe emphasis on the words \"so reconstituted \" in sub-sections (1) and (3) and the concluding words of each of those clauses clearly bear out this intention of the legislature.\n\nIt was argued that although no provision is made in section 8 (1) about what is to happen if the Government did not fill up the vacancy, it is implied that in that event the remaining members can continue the work. We are unable to accept that argument. In the first place, as pointed out above, the object of section 8 is to provide in what cases vacancies must be filled up and how the proceedings should continue on the vacancy being filled up. It does not deal at all with the situation arising from the not filling up of the\n\nvacancy by the Government. In this connection the 1951 provisions of sections 5 (4) and 6 (3) have been already The United noted. When the legislature wanted to provide that commercial in spite of the temporary absence or permanent vacancy Bank Ltd . .the remainip.g members should be authorised to proceed v. with the work they have made express provision to Their Workmen. that effect. If in the case of a Board or Court of Inquiry, neither of which is adjudicating any disputes, Kania 0 J. such a provision was considered necessary to enable the remaining members to act as a body, we think that the absence of such provision in respect of the Tribunal, which adjudicates on the disputes and whose quasi judicial work is admittedly of a joint character and responsibility leads to the irresistible conclusion that in the absence of one or more members the rest are not competent to act as a Tribunal at all.\n\nAgain the provisos to sections 5 (4) artd 6 (3) are important. Under those provisos when the Government intimates to the remaining members that the services of one \"have ceased to be available\" the rest have no right to act as the Board or Court. It appears under the circumstances proper to hold that in respect of a Tribunal when the services of a member have ceased to be available, the rest by themselves have no right to act as the Tribunal.\n\nTh'e question which we have got to consider can be divided in two stages. On the_ appointment of Mr.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar as a member of the Boundary Tribunal, did his services cease to be available within the meaning of section 8, and thereby was a vacancy created? The parties have put before us only two telegrams exchanged between the chairman and Mr.\n\nMazumdar on the one hand and the Central Government on the other, to reach our conclusion about the situation arising from Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar joining the Boundary Tribunal. Certain Government notifications published in May and June, 1950, i.e., over three or four months after Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar finished his work on the Boundary Tribunal, have been put before us, but in our opinion these ~\n\n1961 ex post facto notifications cannot help us in deciding the Th• Unittd important question under section 8. It is obvious that, commercial on the date the appointment of Mr. Chandrasekhara\n\nBank Ltd.\n\nAiyar as a member of the Boundary Tribunal was •· made, it could not have been known how long that Their Workmen. Tribunal would take to complete its work. In any event, the evidence put before us as of that date does Kania O. J. . not show that the appomtment was for a short time.\n\nThe Boundary Tribunal's work may have lasted for a month or a year.\n\nHaving regard to the urgency and the necessity of quick disposal of industrial disputes recognised in section 15, the deputation of a member of such a Tribunal to another Tribunal. whose work may be of an indefinite duration, obviously makes the services of the member cease to be available to the Industrial Tribunal within the meaning of section 8 so as to bring about a vacancy. The later statement in the Government notification of May, 1950, that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar's services were lent to the External Affairs Ministry \"from the 23rd of November, 1949, to the 20th of February, 1950, \" appears to be more a notification for the purpose of the Accountant-General and the Audit departments of the Government than a disclosure of the mind of the Government when the appointment was made on the 23rd of November.\n\nWhen Mr. Sen, as chairman, and Mr. Mazumdar held their first sitting in the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, an objection was raised about the constitution of the Tribunal. Thereupon Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar conveyed to the Government what had happened at the meeting. The Government was therefore clearly faced with the problem as to what it wanted to do.\n\nThe reply telegram from the Government asked Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar to go on with the proceedings. It further stated that the Government might fill up the vacancy later on.\n\nThe question for consideration is, what is the effect of this telegram of the Government ?\n\nIn the light of the provisions of section 8 that telegram can only mean that the Government had decided not to fill up the vacancy. If a vacancy had occurred they had to make the appointment or state that they will\n\nnot do so. They cannot defer their decision on the. 1951 question of filling up the vacancy and in the interval Th• United direct the remaining members to go on with the commercial reference. That seems to us to be the correct position Bank Ltd. because the fundamental basis on which the Tribunal v. has to do its work is that all members must sit and Their Workmen. take part in its proceedings jointly. If a member was \"l b t 11 h Kania C. J., casually or temporan y a sen ·. owmg to 1 ness, t e remaining members cannot have the power to proceed with the reference in the name of the Tribunal, having regard to the absence of any provision like section 5 ( 4) or 6 (3) in respect of the tribunal. The Government had notified the constitution of this Tribunal by the two notifications summarized in the earlier part of the judgment and thereby had constituted the Tribunal to consist of three members and those three were Mr. Sen, Chairman, Mr. Mazumdar and Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar. Proceeding with the adjudication in the absence of pne, undermines the basic principle of the joiQt work and responsibility of the Tribunal and of all its members to make the award.\n\nMoreover, in their telegram the Government had not suggested that no vacancy had occurred. Indeed, they recognised the fact of a vacancy having occurred but stated that they might make the appointment later on.\n\nIf those words are properly construed, without any outside considerations, it is clear that the Government intended that the remaining two members of the Tribunal should proceed with the adjudication as a Tribunal. This direction in fact was accepted and the two members proceeded with the reference and made certain awards. Those awards were sent to the Government under section 15 (2) and the Government by its order declared the awards to be binding, and published them in the official Gazette. Those awards are signed only by Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar. Reading those awards with the notifications and the provisions of sections .15 and 16 it is therefore clear that between 23rd November, 1949, and 20th February,\n\n1950, the Government \"intended\" the tribunal to .consist only of Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar. It was rlot and\n\n1 9~1 cannot be seriously disputed that in the event of the\n\nThe United Government deciding to fill up the vacancy, a notifica- Oommercial tion had to be issued. The question is, why and under Bank Ltd. what rule? The answer clearly is that they had to do v. it because of rule 5.\n\nThe reason why intimation of a Their Workmen. new man forming a member of the Tribunal has to be\n\n- publicly given, in our opinion, applies with equal force Kania a. J. 'b 1 .. when a tn una m1tially constituted of three persons, viz., Mr. Sen, Mr. Mazumdar and Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, is, by the Government decision, as from a certain date, to be a tribunal of Mr.Sen and Mr. Mazumdaronly.\n\nThe word \" reconstituted \" is properly used in section 8 because when a new member is introduced in the panel so far performing its duties, it is a reconstitution, but the words of section 8 do not exclude the obligation on the Government to issue a notification under rule 5 when there is not a reconstitution, but a new constitution of the Tribunai. The Government, however, did not give effect to its intention by issuing a fresh notification under section 7.\n\nTherefore, when the services of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be available and they decided that another independent person was not to be appointed to fill the vacancy, there arose the situation when only two members constituted the Tribunal.and for the constitution of such Tribunal no notification under section 7 of the Act was issued. To enable such a Tribunal of two persons to function, under the provisions of the Act, a notification under section 7 of the Act, in our opinion, was absolutely essential. The work of the two members in the absence of such a notification cannot be treated as the work of a Tribunal established under the Act and all their actions are without jurisdiction.\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the respondents that when Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar left for the Boundary Tribunal, there arose a temporary abs('lnce which it was not necessary to fill up and the remaining two members had jurisdiction under the Act to proceed with the adjudication. In our opinion, this contention cannot be accpted. In the first place, in the agreed statement of facts, it is not stated that there was any temporary\n\nabsence. Again, as we have pointed out the Govern- 1951 ment by its telegram of the 29th of November accepted The Unite.d the position that a vacancy had occurred and. no commercial question of temporary absence therefore arises for our Bank Ltd. consideration. An analogy sought to be drawn between v. the temporary absence on leave or on deputation of a Their Workmen.\n\nJudge is misleading having regard to the fact that under section 7 the Government has to decide at the Kania 0• J. initial stage how many members and who will constitute the Tribunal and have to notify the same.\n\nThat step having been taken, it is not within the power or competence of the Government to direct a few members only of such Tribunal to proceed with the adjudication for however short or long time it be. In our opinion, section 8 has no application to that situation. In this connection, it may be useful to notice that under rule 12 it was provided that \" when a Tribunal:; consists of two or more members, the tribunal may, with the consent of the parties, act notwithstanding any casual vacancy in its number ...... \" This rule clearly shows that even when there was a casual vacancy and the remaining members desired to proceed with the work they could do so only with the consent of the parties.\n\nThis rule framed under section 38 of the Act strongly supports the contntion that if the Act impliedly gave power under section 8 to the remaining two members of the Tribunal to act, as contended on behalf of the respondents, there was no necessity at all for making this rule. Although this rule was repealed on the 3rd of December, it was in operation when the services of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be available to the Tribunal as from the 23rd of November.\n\nIf in the case of temporary absence, the consent of the parties was essential to enable the remaining members to act, it certainly follows that the objection to their working as a Tribunal when there is no consent and the 1-bsence is not casual, but is due to the services of one of the members having ceased to be available, is fatal. It follows therefore that all awards made by Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar, after the services of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be available, were\n\n1951 not made by a tribunal duly constituted under section 7 and those a wards are therefore void.\n\nThe United Gomm•rcial l1; was contended that by directing Mr. Chandra- Bank Ltd. sekhara Aiyar to work again as a member of the Banks v.\n\nTribunal in February, 1950, the Government had filled Th•ir Workm•n. up the vacancy under section 8. In our.opinion this - position cannot be supported on the admitted facts.\n\nKania 0 • J. As regards filling up of a vacancy under section 8, we have already noticed that by directing the remaining two members to proceed with the work and by notifying their awards as the awards of the Tribunal the Government must be considered to have intended not to fill up the vacancy. Again, the later notification published in June, 1950, does not even state that Mr.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the fribunal \" in any vacancy.\" The word used there is \" resumed,\" suggesting thereby that he had gone out for the time being but had started the work again.\n\nUnder the circumstances and in the absence of any other evidence, we are unable to consider the fact of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar sitting along with the two members from and after the 20th February, 1950, as an appointment by the Government in the vacancy created by his appointment to the .Boundary Tribunal in November, 1949.\n\nAt one stage it was suggested that the members of the Tribunal could delegate their work to a few members only and the award can be supported in that way.\n\nApart from the question what work could be so delegated, it was ascertained that the Rule permitting delegation was first published on 3rd December, 1949, and as Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar had gone to his work on the Boundary Tribunal on 23rd November, no delegation in that manner was possible. Moreover, the statement of facts nor the award of the three persons suggests that there was any delegation of work by the Tribunal in the matter of the general issues to some members only.\n\nNor was any report made to or considered by the full Tribunal as required by the rule.\n\nThe next question to be considered is the effect of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar sitting with the two\n\nmembers of the Tribunal after 20th February, 1950.\n\nThe record shows that the two members considered\n\nThe United most of the general issues raiSed in respect of the banks oommercial at many meetings. The nature and volume of the work Bank Ltd. done by them during this interval has been summarizv. ed in the earlier part of the judgment. It is not contend- Their Workmen. ed that on Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar commencing to - sit again_ with the other two members on and from the Kania 0 • J. 20th February what had happened in his absence was re-done or re-heard. Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar along with the other two members continued to work from the point work had proceeded up to 19th February,\n\n1950, and the award which is put before us is signed by all the three of them, i.e., on the footing that all the three of them were members of the Tribunal. It was suggested that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar should be treated as having remained throughout a member of the Tribunal of three and that he resumed workaftera temporary absence between November, 1949, and February, 1950. In our opinion, this position is quite unsupportable. When the services of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be available to the Tribunal in November; 1949, and the Government accepted the position that a vacancy had occurred, Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be a member of the Tribunal of three as constituted under the Government notification ofJune, 1949. Thereafter Mr .. Chandrasekhara Aiyar never became a member of the Tribunal as he was never appointed a member before he signed the award. No notification making such an appointment under section 7 read with section 8 of the Act has been even suggested to exist. In the circumstances, the position in law was that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be a member of the Tribunal of three as originally constituted, that no new Tribunal of two was legally constituted and that, having ceased to be a member of the tribunal of three, Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar could not resume duties as a member of the Tribunal of three without a fresh constitution of a T ribunal of three. The result is that all the interim awards purported to be made by Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar as\n\n1951 well as the final awards made by the three must all be held to have been made without 1\"urisdiction. It seems The United Commercial to us that the only way in which the Government\n\nBank Led. could have put matters right was by a notification \"· issued in February, 1950, constituting the tribunal Their Workmen. as a fresh Tribunal of three members (and not by pro-\n\n-.- ceeding as if a vacancy had been filled up on 20th Kania 0 J. February, 1950, undersection8) and the three members proceeding with the adjudication de novo. Even if the contention of the respondents that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar continued throughout a member of the tribunal were accepted, in our opinion, the appellants' objection to the jurisdiction of the three persons to sign the award must be upheld. Section 16 which authorizes them to sign is preceded by section 15. Unless they have complied with the provisions of section 15, i.e , unless all the three have heard the matter together, they have no jurisdiction to make the award in terms of section 15 and have therefore also no jurisdiction to sign the award under section 16.\n\nIn any view of the matter the awards are therefore without jurisdiction: It was suggested that .his signature on the award could be treated as surplus. In our opinion, this argument requires only to be stated to be rejected. It is not and cannot be disputed that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar took active part in the deliberations and in the proceedings after 20th February, 1950, and naturally discussed and influenced the decision of the other two members of the Tribunal by such discussions. This is not a case where an outsider was consulted by the members of a Tribunal and thereafter the members came to their own independent decision. It is obi ous that> for making the award all the three persons worked together and were jointly responsible for the resultant award. The argument of surplusage therefore must fail. In this view of the matter, the . final award put before the Court is clearly without jurisdiction and the appellants' contention must be upheld.\n\nThe final contention that the sittings in the interval constituted only an irrelarity in the proceedings\n\ncannot again be accepted because, in the first place, an ioin objection was raised about the sitting of the two mem- The Unit\"! bers as the Tribunal. That objection, whether it was oommercial raised by the appellants or the other party, is im- Bank Ltd. material. The objection having been overruled, no . v. question of acquiescence or estoppel arises Nor can Th••r Workmen. consent give a court jm:isdiction if a condition which Kania 0. J. goes to the root of the jurisdiction has not been performed, or fulfilled. No acquiescence or consent can give a jurisdiction to a court of limited jurisdiction which it does not possess. In our opinion, the position here clearly is that the responsibility to work and decide being the joint responsibility of all the three members, if proceedings are conducted and discussions on several general issues took place in the presence of only two, followed by an award made by three, the question goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and is not a matter of irregularity in the conduct of those proceedings. The absence of a condition necessary to found the jurisdiction to make the award or give a decision deprives the award or decision of any conclusive effect. .The distincti(Jn clearly is between the jurisdiction to decide matters and the ambit of the matters to be.heard b)' a Tribunal having jurisdiction to deal with the same. In the second case, the question of acquiescence or irregularity may be considered and overlooked. When however the question is of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to make the award under the circumstances summarized above, no question of acquiescence or consent can affect the decision.\n\nIt was contended that under section 8 the contingency of the Government not filling up a vacancy is clearly visualized. It is also provided in the section that in the event of a vacancy the Government may fill it up by appointing a new man and in such a case the proceedings need not start afresh. It was argued that nothing more had happened in the present case and therefore no question of invalidity of the awards ari$CS We are unable to accept these contentions. In the first place, when Government decides not to fill up\n\n1951 a vacancy its decision has to be notified. It is not a matter of the Government's internal administration The United commercial where the officers can work under departmental orders.\n\nBank Ltd.\n\nMoreover it should be noticed that when the services\n\nv. of a member cease to be available and that fact is con- Their Workmen. veyed to the rest of the members under sections 5 (4)\n\nKania a. J. and 6 (3), the rest have no right to act as a Body at all. The wording of section 7 or 8, in our opinion, does not permit the remaining members of a Tribunal to have a higher right in the absence of a proper new notification issued under section 7 of the Act.\n\nAs regards the second contention, it should be noticed. that the Government is given the option to make an appointment when a vacancy occurs, and section 8 provides that if a new man is appointed in the vacancy the proceedings need not start de novo. That however does notrnean 'that the Government must appoint a man in every case of vacancy and the proceedings must go on without commencing the same afresh. It appears that the option is left to Government having regard to the stage to which the proceedings may have reached.\n\nSuppose only after some preliminary work of a data finding nature is done a vacancy occurs, the Government may well think of appointing a new man as it may not be considered necessary to start the proceedings afresh.\n\nOn the other hand, if the work has progressed considerably the Government may not think it just and proper to fill up a vacancy by bringing in a new man, as by doing so they will in effect permit the work of the Body being done in two parts, viz., the first with two men and the second with three men. These considerations emphasize the importance of the Government making up its mind to fill up or not to fill up a vacancy when it occurs. It cannot keep its decision in abeyance and at one stage intend to proceed on the footing that the vacancy is not filled up and later on after considerable work is done by the remaining members change its mind and proceed to act on the footing that a vacancy has continued and fill up the same after some months. ·\n\nOn the admitted principle that the work of he Tri- 1951 bunal, which is of a quasi-judicial nature, is one of 7-'ke United joint respnsibility of all its members, section 8 proaomrnercial vides exceptions .. The Legislature having thus fixed Bank Ltd. in that section the limits of the exceptions, the limits v. have .to be strictly observed and it is not within the Their Workmon. competence either of the Tribunal or the Government - to extend the limits of those exceptions. In our opinion, Kania 0 J. the incidents in respect of the sittings and work of this Banking Tribunal, as mentioned above, do not fall within the limits of the exceptions and therefore the awards must be considered as made without jurisdiction.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the awards made and signed by Messrs. Sen and Mazumdar and by all the three persons are without jurisdiction and the contention of the appellaJ.lts on this issue must be accepted.\n\nFAZL Au J.-The questions which this Bench is FazlAZiJ. called upon to decide arise upon the following facts.\n\nBy a Notification datedthe 13th June, 1949, the Government of India constituted a Tribunal for the adjudication of industrial disputes in Banking Companies, consisting of Mr. K. C. Sen (Chairman), Mr.\n\nS. P. Varma and Mr. Majumdar (Members).\n\nSubsequently, Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the Tribunal in the place of Mr. Varma, whose services had ceased to be available. On the 13th June, 1949, the Government referred to the Tribunal the disputes between a number of Banking Companies and their employees, and the Tribunal consisting of the chairman and 2 members commenced hearing them on the 12th September, 1949. In November, 1949, the services of Mr. Aiyar were placed at the disposal of the Department of External-Affairs of the Government of India, and he was appointed a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, with the result that during his absence which covered a period of nearly 3 moJ!ths beginning from the 23rd\n\n1951 November, 1949, and ending on the 20th February, 1950, the proceedings were continued before the chair-\n\n~:;;;:;;.\": man and theremaining member, and certain interim\n\nBank Ltd. awards were also made during this period. Mr. Aiyar\n\nv. rejoined the Tribunal on the 20th February, 1950, and 1'/wir Work•nen. ultimately all the 3 members made and signed an -. award on the 31st July, 1950, which was published in Faz! Al• 1• the Gazette of India on the 12th August, 1950.\n\nThe main point raised in these appeals is that this award is without jurisdiction. In some of the appeals, it is also contended that some of the interim awards, namely those given by the chairman of the Tribunal and Mr.\n\nMajumdar on the 5th January, 25th January, 20th\n\nFebruary and.22nd February, 1950, in the case of the Imperial Bank of India, the Lloyds Bank and the Punjab National Bank, were also without jurisdiction.\n\nBriefly, the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants is that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, did not permit either of the following courses, firstly, that 2 members of the Tribunal, which originally consisted of 3 members, should deal with any of the controversies between the parties in connection with the disputes referred to the Tribunal, and secondly, that a member who had left the Tribunal in the midst of the hearing should rejoin and influence the decision of the other members in regard to the matters which he ad not heard.\n\nThese contentions, however plausible they mayappear at the first sight, especially when we consider them in the light of our notions of judicial procedure to be followed in courts of law, will, in my opinion, be found to be without much substance, on close examination, once we realize that the Industrial Tribunal, though it has all the trappings of a court of law, is not such a court and has to follow its own procedure which has to be determined by the provisions of the Indusrial Disputes Act and the rules framed by the Government thereunder. The determination of the questions raised before us will depend mainly upon the proper construction of section 8 ( 1) of the Act, which runs as follows:-\n\n\"8 (1) If the services of the chairman of a Board or rns1 of the chairman or other member of a Court or. Tribu- 1 h The United nal cease to be availab e at any time, t e appropriate Commercial Government shall, in the case of a chairman, and may Bank Ltd. in the case of any other memher, appoint another v. independent person to fill the vacancy, and the pro- 1.'heir Workrnw. ceedings shall be continued before the Board, Court or Tribunal so reconstituted.\" F'azl Ali J.\n\nOne of the questions to be decided in construing this section is, as to the exact meaning of the words \" services cease to be available.\" Ordinarily, the word \" cease\" conveys a sense of permanency, and therefore the expression would certainly cover cases where the services of a person have ceased to be available permanently or for all time. But that word is also sometimes applied to\" intermission of a state or condition of being, doing or suffering\" (see Oxford Dictionary), and, among several instances of its being used in this narrower sense, we were referred to The Queen v.\n\nEvans(1) which is a case dealing with an English statute in which the expression \" cease to reside \" was used so as to include a case where the person concerned was away .from England for a period and then returned there. It seems to me that the words '' services cease to be available\" include cases where the services are not available for a defined or undefined period, provided that during that period they are completely unavailable. These words should, I think, be read with the marginal note of section 8, which indicates that they were intended to cover every situation necessitating the filling of a vacancy. As we are aware, a vacancy may . be permanent or temporary, and therefore if the services of a member of a Tribunal are temporarily placed at the disposal of another department of the Government for performing specia. work, such a case will be covered by the section. This must necessarily be so, if the nature of the duties which the member is called upori to discharge is such as to necessitate that particular member severing himself completely from the Tribunal during the\n\n(t • [ l 896] 1 Q.B. 228.\n\n1961 period in which he holds bis new office.\n\nI find it Ti.. United difficult to hold that the section was meant to ap>ply oommerciol only to a permanent vacancy, and that no provision Bank Ltd. whatsoever was made for a temporary vacancy, which v.. is by no means a matter of uncommon occurrence. It Their Workmen. should be noted that in sections 5 and 6 of the Act ' Fa::l AU J. the Legislature has been careful to use the words\n\n\"vacancy in number\" which are wide enough to include cases where, though there is a vacancy, the membership does not cease . • It is common ground that in the present case, the services of Mr. Aiyar were not available to the Tribunal, while be was employed as a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal.\n\nIt is also not disputed that at the time his ser.vices were transferred, it was not known for what period his new duties would keep him away from the work of the Industrial Tribunal. There can be no doubt therefore that there was a vacancy, which provided an occasion for the Government to exercise the discretion vested in it under section 8 of the Act.\n\nAt this stage it will be relevant to quote certain correspondence which passed between the chairman of the Tribunal and the Government soon after Mr. Aiyar left the Tribunal. We find that on the 28th November, 1949, the chairman sent an express telegram to the Labour Ministry stating that in the absence of Mr.\n\nAiyar objections had been raised to the remaining two members of the Tribunal continuing the proceedings and urging the Ministry either to appoint a substitute or to intimate that the Tribunal could proceed with two members during Mr. Aiyar's absence. To this, the Government sent the following reply:-\n\n\"Reference your telegram twentyeighth stop Government advised that rule twelve is inconsistent with section eight stop rule twelve being deleted through notification stop Government ad1•ised Tribunal can continue proceedings with remaining two members stop no formal order or notificati'on. necessary stop Government may fill vacancy tater date.\"\n\nThese two telegrams indicate that both the chair- 1951 man of the Tribunal and the Government took the view that in the circumstances of the case, there was a ~::;,~;::;:i vacancy within the terms of section 8, that under that Bank Ltd. section it was open to the Government either to make an v. appointment to fill the vacancy or not to make an ap- Their Worlmen. pointment, and that the proceedings before the Tribunal could continue even if the vacancy was not filled. This is Fazl Ali J. quite clear from the concluding words (which I have underlined) of the telegram sent by the Government to th~ chairman of the Tribunal. In my judgm, ent, the view taken by the .chairman of the Tribunal and the Government was perfectly correct.\n\nThe question involved here is twofold, namely, (1) whether section 8 applies to a temporary vacancy; and (2) whether, in case the Government decides not to fill such a vacancy, the proceedings can continue before the chairman and the remaining member. I have already dealt with the first point, and the second point may also be now dealt with briefly. In substance, what section 8 provides is that if the chairman goes out, the vacancy must be filled, bat, if a meml?er goes out, the Government may or may not fill the vacancy. It seems to me to follow from this by necessary implication, that if there is a member's vacancy and the Government decide not to fill it, the Tribunal will not become an imperfectly constituted Tribunal. In other words, the proceedings can be continued before the Tribunal in spite of the vacancy. The argument put forward before us on behalf on the appellants was that in the event of a member's vacancy, either the Government should make an appointment at once or the work of the Tribunal should be suspended until an appojntment is made.\n\nThese inferences however do not appear to me to be warranted by the words of the section, firstly because if the section says that the Government may or may not appoint a new member, how can we say that the Government must appoint him, and secondly because there is nothing in the section to show that the work of the Tribunal should remain suspended indefinitely in the situation with\n\n1951 which we have to deal. A reference to the correspond-\n\nThe unma ing Acts in England and America will show that sus- Oommercial pension of work is generally ruled out in cases of Bank Ltd. industrial disputes since they need expeditious settlev. ment. (See section 3 (b)' of the National Labour Rela- Thei\" Workmen. tions Act of America and section 3 of the Industrial\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nCourts Act, 1919, of England). The scheme of our Industrial Disputes Act appears to me to be the same, and I think that it will be entirely foreign to that scheme to suggest that the proceedings of the Tribunal should remain suspended indefinitely. The principle that the proceedings may continue in spite of there being a vacani; y in number, is expressly laid down in sections 5 and 6 of the Act which govern Boards of Conciliation and Courts of Enquiry, and is in my opinion recognized by necessary implication in section 8 with reference to proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal. It was strenuously argued before us that if the intention of the Legislature had been that the proceedings before the Tribunal should continue in spite of a vacancy, an express provision would have been made in section 8 in the same terms as it has been made in sections 5 and 6. This argument however will not bear close examination. Sections 5 and 6 have been reproduced from the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, without any verbal change whatsoever, and it is quite understandable that a provision dealing with the subject of a prescribed quorum should expressly state what would be the effect of the absence of the chairman or a member when the quorum is complete. Section 8, on the other hand, has not been borrowed from the old Act, but is a completely new section in which its draftsman has used his own language and proceeded on the footing that if it was possible to convey the meaning intended to be conveyed in fewer words, there was no necessity for reproducing the entire phraseology used in sections 5 and 6. Besides, in the context in which the provision occurs, there is no room for surmising that the intention of the framer of the section might have been to suspend the work of the Tribunal. The words \"the proceedings shall be continued\n\nbefore the Board, Court or Tribunal so reconstituted\", 1961 obviously refer to a situation which arises when a new • • The United chairman or a new member is appotnted, but they Oommercial also show that the framer of the section must Bank Ltd. have assumed that the proceedings before the Tribuv. nal shall continue when there is a vacancy in number Tlte.:r IVorkm•••· and the Government decides not to fill it.\n\nFa.Z Ali J. ' The position we have now arrived at is this. There was a vacancy of an indefinite duration and the Government decided, as itwas<:ompetent for ittodecide, not to fill it for the time being but to let the Tribunal continue the work. In my J'udgment, in such circumstances, the proceedings be ore the chairman and the remaining member cannot be said to have been without jurisdiction.\n\nThe further question which now arises is, \"what would be the legal effect of Mr. Aiyar rejoining the Tribunal on the 20th February, 1950?\" It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the whole award is vitiated by Mr. Aiyar being brouht into the Tribunal at a late stage, and the argument is put in the following way.\" The Government had originally appointed a Tribunal consisting of 3 members. Granting that a Tribunal of 3 members can, under section Sof the Act, become a Tribunal of 2, how can it again become a Tribunal of 3, without the Government acting in strict compliance with the procedure laid down in the section and without making a fresh appointment.\" The same argument was put a little more rhetorically by likening the proceedings before the Tribunal to a running train and enquiring whether it was permissible for one to \"jump into and jump off\" the train as one chose.\n\nI must confess that though I have very carefully con-\n\n~' sidered this argument I have not been able to appreciate its force. In answering the argument, we have to bear in mind that the Legislature has conferred very large powers on the Government, and the entire constitution of the Tribunal as well as the appointment of its members have been left to its discretion. Section 7 (2) provides that the Tribunal shall consist of such\n\n1931 number of members as the appropriate Government\n\nTh• United thinks fit. Again, section 8 (1) provides that the comm•rcial Government may or may not appoint a member to fill Bank Ltd. a vacancy. Under sectiop 9, no order of the appropriv. ate Government appointing any person as a member Their Workm•n. of a Tribunal shall be called in question in any man- - ner. Under section 38, for the purpose of giving effect Fazl.Ali .J. to the provisions of the Act, the Government may make rules, and, as far as I can see, there is nothing to prevent the Government from making a rule fixing the minimum strength of the Tribunal for hearing any of the matters before it. Thus, in a way, the Governi:nent is empowered to constitute as well as reconstitute the Tribunal, and though it is not expected to use the power arbitrarily, or unfairly the power is there. Therefore lookng at the substance of the matter, as opposed to mere technicalities and legal refinements, it appears to me to be a sufficient answer to the question posed on behalf of the appellants to say that, if the going out and coming in of Mr. Aiyar was under the orders of the Government, the proceedings cannot be held to be invalid.\n\nApart from this general answer, I shall now try to deal with the question a little more closely. As I have already pointed out, under section 8, the Government is empowered not to fill a member's vacancy at all.\n\nNow, there appear to me at least two obvious reasons, which may induce the Government not to fill the vacancy, namely, (1) because it considers that the chairman and the remaining member or members are sufficient to carry on the work of the Tribunal, and\n\n(2) because the vacancy being a temporary 011e, it considers it unnecessary to introduce a new member and prefers to await the return of the old member. It seems to me that it was the latter alternative that commended itself to the Government in ihe present case. Here, the vacancy being a temporary one, Mr. Aiyar had not ceased to be a member of the Tribunal, and could therefore rejoin it as soon as he was free from the duties of his new office.\n\nIn such an event, it was not necessary for the Government to\n\nmake any order reappointing him to the Tribunal. He 1951. was still a member of the Tribunal and resumed his duties as such under the orders of the Government. It The Unitid Commercial will, therefore, be entirely wrong to describe him as an Bank Ltd intermeddler and to argue that the proceeding was v. vitiated by his return to the Tribunal. There is indeed Their Workine11. no difficulty in the present case in holding that Mr.\n\nAiyar joined the Tribunal under the orders of the Gov- :b'azl AU J. ernment, and we find that the Government ultimately declared the award, to which he was a party, to be binding under section 15 of the Act. He was allowed to resume his duties as member of the Tribunal, and drew his salary as such from the 20th February, 1950, till the termination of the proceedings. Such being the facts, it would be far too abrupt a conclusion to hold that the entire proceedings are void and the award is bad. One of the arguments which has been advanced before us against the validity of the award is that Mr. Aiyar, though he did not participate in the proceedings which took place in his absence, was at least theoretically able to influence the decision of the remaining members who had participated in them. But I do not see any basis for this argument in law, unless we allow our minds to be influenced by any preconceived notions of strict judicial procedure followed in a regular court of law.\n\nA perusal of section 8 (2) will show that the Act does not contemplate a de novo hearing. in those cases where a new member is appointed by the Government iri the place of a member whose services had ceased to be available. The new member may join at any stage of the proceedings, and no party will be heard to say that a member who has not taken part in 'the earlier proceedings is able to influence the views of those who had participated in them. How then can such an objection be raised in the case of Mr. Aiyar, who was familiar with the proceedings and had taken part in them in the earlier stages.\n\nWhen we therefore examine the facts closely, we :find that in substance nothing has happened in this case which could not have legitimately happened\n\n1961 under section 8 of the Act. Even if we assume that\n\nT,,. UniUd it was necessary for the Government to make an oommncial appointment under sub-section (1) of section 8, the\n\nBank Lid. requirements of the provision appear to me to have v. been substantially fulfilled in this case, because Mr. 2•i..;. Workm<n.Aiyar could not have joined the Tribunal without\n\nFad AU J. giving notice to the Government and without obtaining its orders.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the Government permitted Mr. Aiyar to join the Tribunal, and I do not find any substantial difference between its directing a. person to participate in the w9rk of :the Tribunal and appointing him as a member of that Tribunal.\n\nOnce therefore it is dearly understood that under the Act, the Government has been empowered not only to constitute the Tribunal but also to reconstitute it under certain circumstances, the problem which is supposed to arise from the numerical changes in the composition of the Tribunal in question should not present any difficulty.· I think that the answer to that problem is to be found within the four corners of section 8. If there is a vacancy within the terms of that section and the Government does not fill it the Tribunal of 3 members will evidently become a Tribunal of 2 members.\n\nBut the power of filling the vacancy being vested in the Government, the Tribunal may again become a Tribunal of 3 members, as soon as the vacancy is filled. I think that the Government can take its own time in filling the vacancy and may allow the work of the Tribunal to go on in the meantime.\n\nSometimes, the filling of the vacancy may be delayed, because a suitable person is not at once available, and it may also be delayed for other conceivable reasons.\n\nI do not see anything in the Act or in section 8 to restrict the powers of the Government in such a manner as to compel it either to fill the vacancy at once or to Jet the vacancy remain unfilled for ever. To import such a condition would be placing an undue restriction on the power of the Government, which neither the provisions nor the scheme of the Act justify.\n\nThe section, as it stands, will also in my opinion cover\n\n.f\n\na case where the vacancy being a temporary one, the Government chooses not to fill it but awaits the return of the old incumbent.\n\nTh~ United Commercial It was contended that there was no formal notifica- . Bank Ltd. tion made at the proper time to furnish evidence of the TM ;\n\ndecision arrived at by the Government. .Jn fact, how- 'r kmen. ever, a Notification was issued by the Government on Fazl ..tz• J. the 20th May, 1950, to the following effect:-\n\n\"After relinquishing charge of membership of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Dispute Tribunal, Sri N.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar resumed charge of his duties as Member of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) on the 20th February 1950 (forenoon).\" It is argued that this ex post facto notification cannot legalize an illegality which had already been committed. I do not however appreciate this argument. In the first place, there was no illegality committed; secondly, the section does not require any notification ; and thirdly, it is not correct to say that the Notification was issued ex post facto, as the proceedings had not terminated but were still going on.\n\nThe Government can take its. own time for issuing a Notification, and I am unable to hold that the Government did not act bona fide in making the Notification to which I have referred.· As I have already stated, the fact that Mr. Aiyar joined the Tribunal with the concurrence of the Government and the Government wanted him to continue to participate in the work of the Tribunal and paid him his salary on that basis, is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Act. How the absence of a formal order or delay in the Notification can have such a far-reaching effect on the proceedings before the Tribunal as to make the whole award void as having been piade without jurisdiction, is a matter which I find considerable difficulty in appreciating.\n\nIt seems to me that the . objections . raised on behalf of the appellants are of the most unsubstantial <:haracter, and in the absence of any cogent if not compelling reason to do so, I cannot pursuade myself to hold that the work which has been\n\n1961 accomplished by the Tribunal after nearly a year's\n\nThe Unit.a deliberations and peregrinations all over the country\n\ncommero>al at considerable cost to the public exchequer is so much Bank Ltd. money and labour thrown away. ·\n\n. v.\n\nIn the course of the arguments, we were asked to Thflr Workmen.read section 8 with sections 7 and 16.\n\nI do not find\n\nPazl Ali J. anything in either of these sections which militates against the view which I have ventured to express, and I do not think that the provision contained in section 16 that the report of the Tribunal shall be signed by all the members of the Tribunal, means that it should be signed even by those members who had not taken part in the proceedings. It really means that the award shall be signed by such members as have taken part in the proceedings and could have taken part in them under the Act. It should be remembered that the provision is general and applies to the awards made by the Tribunals as well as the Boards and Courts, and it should be read with the provisions contained in sections 5 and 6 which state that a Board or Court having the prescribed quorum may act notwithstanding the absence of the chairman or any of its members or any vacancy in its number. It may be that the Tribunal and the Government could have acted in this case with more care so as to avoid the criticisms directed against the proceedings of the Tribunal, but I find no sufficient ground for holding that the proceedings were without jurisdiction.\n\nReference was made in the course of the arguments to rules Nos. 5 and 12 framed by the Government under section 38 of the Act, which run as follows:-\n\n\"5. The apintment of a Board, Court or Tribunal together wlth the names of persons constituting the Board, Court or Tribunal shall be notified in the official Gazette. 12.\n\nWhere a Tribunal consists of two or more members, the Tribunal may, with the consent of the parties, act notwithstanding any casual vacancy in its number and no act, proceeding or determination of the Tribunal shall be called in question or invalidated by reason of any such vacancy.\"\n\nThese rules however have in my opinion no bearing 1951 on the point in dispute.\n\nRule 5, dealing as it does • f B d C The United with the appointment o a oar , ourt or Tribunal Ormimerciat together with the names of persons constituting them, Bank Ltd. refers to a Notification which the Government has to v. make when a Board, Court or Tribunal is initially con- Their Workmen. stituted under the Act. This was done in this case, as will appear from the award itself. The rule has no F'a•l Ali 1 reference to the appointments made under section 8 of the Act to fill vacancies. I take it that the Govern- . ment will, as a matter of practice, issue a notification in regard to the appointments made under section 8, but the notification will not be under rule 5, and section 8 itself does not expressly provide for issuing any notification. Nor is a notification necessary under sections in cases where the Government decides not to fill a vacancy. The mere fact that the word 'reconstituted' occurs in section 8, is not in my opinion enough to attract rule 5. Rule 12 which was in force till the 5th December, 1950, dealt with a casual vacancy, and provided that on the occurrence of such a vacancy, the Tribunal may act with the consent of the parties.\n\nThis rule had nothing to do with the vacancy caused by the services of a chairman or a member ceasing to be available, which is dealt with in section 8. At the first sight, it may appear that if the consent of parties was necessary in the case of a casual vacancy for continuing .the proceedings, it may also be necessary for continuing the proceedings under section 8 of the Act when no appointment is made. In my opinion, however, no such inference can be drawn from rule 12. Under that rule, the proceedings could go on without the Government being informed, but as to vacancies which occur under section 8, the matter passes into the hands of the Government and its action alone, one way or the other, legalizes the proceedings, and no question of consent of parties arises. On the other hand, rule 12 lends support to the respondents' contentions in two ways.\n\nFirstly, it shows that a\" vacancy\" for the purposes of the proceedings before the Tribunal can be casual and\n\nrns1 need not always be a permanent one, as suggested on\n\nThe Uni\"4 behalf of the appellants; and secondly, what is more commercial important, that a \"vacancy \" does not affect the Bank Ltd. jurisdiction of the remaining members to continue the v. proceedings, for it is settled law that consent cannot Their Workmen. give jurisdiction in respect of a subject-matter though\n\nF 1 Al' it might cure a mere irregularity. It was said that rule \"' ' 1• 12 was ultra vires, but it appears to me to be unneces. sary to inquire into this side issue.\n\nPatanjali SaatriJ,\n\nMukherjta J.\n\nFor the reasons I have set out, I respectfully differ from the conclusion arrived at by my Lord the Chief Justice and the majority of my colleagues, and hold that the objections raised on behalf of the appellants should be overruled.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-1 agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother Fazl Ali whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading. He has said all I wished to say and has said it so well that I have nothing to add.\n\nMUKHERJEA, J.-1 concur in the decision of my learned brother Faz! Ali, J. that the award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) dated the 31st July, 1950, could not be held to be illegal and inoperative by reason of any lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal which made it. However, as the line of reasoning by which I have reached my conclusion is not the same as that adopted by my learned brother and as I have not been able to agree with him as regards the validity of certain earlier awards which the Tribunal purported to make in the months of January and February 1950, I deem it necessary and proper to express my own views on the subject matter of controversy in these appeals as succinctly as possible in a separate judgment.\n\nThe only point that has been canvassed before us at this stage of the hearing of the appeals relates to the question of jurisdiction, and the substantial ground upon which the legality of the awards has been assailed by the learned Counsel appearing for the several\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 417 ' Banks is that the awards were not made by a Tribunal 19111 properly constituted and competent to adjudicate upon The United industrial disputes under the terms of the Industrial oommercial Disputes Act. To appreciate the arguments that have Bank Ltd. been raised by the respective parties on this point, it v. would be necessary to state a few facts.\n\nTheir Workmen.\n\nBy a notification dated the 13th of June, 1949, the Mukherjoo J.\n\nCentral Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, constituted an Industrial Tribunal consisting of three members to wit: (1) Mr. K. C. Sen, (who was appointed chairman of the Tribunal), (2) Mr. S. P.\n\nVerma and (3) Mr. J. N. Mazumdar. By a further Notification dated August 24, 1949, Mr. N .. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the Tribunal in place of Mr. S. P. Verma whose services ceased to he available and the Tribunal so reconstituted was designated \"The All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes).\" The Tribunal consisting of the chairman and the two members mentioned aforesaid commenced their sittings at Bombay on September 12, 1949, and continued to sit as so constituted at Bombay and various other places since then. From the afternoon of 23rd September, 1949, the services of Mr. N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar were placed temporarily at the disposal of the Ministry of External Affairs, he being appointed a member of the lndo-Pakistali Boundary Tribunal.\n\nMr. Aiyar's work in connection withthelndo-Pakistan Boundary Tribunal ended on 27thof January, 1950, and a Government Notification shows that he was absent on leave from 28th January, 1950, uptil the 19th of February following and it is on the 20th February, 1950 that he actually resumed his duties as a member of the Industrial Tribunal. During the entire period of his absence there were various sittings of the Industrial Tribunal in which the two remaining members took part and a number of a wards were also made and signed by these two members adjudicating upon several items of dispute concerning certain Banks. It may be mentioned here that in exercise of the powers\n\nr,4\n\n1951 conferred by section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act, certain rules were framed by the C.entral Government The United Commercial which came into force on 3rd December, 1949, and under Bank Ltd. which the Tribunal, as constituted by the Notification v. of 13th June, 1949, was authorised to entrust such Their Workmen. cases or matters referred to it, as it deemed fit, to one or more members for enquiry and report. In case of Mukherjea J. such entrustment, the report of the enquiring member was to be placed before the chairman of the Tribunal and the Tribunal after considering the report and making such further enquiry as it deemed proper could deliver the award. Purporting to act in pursuance of these rules, a large number of matters pending before the 1'ribunal were divided amongst the members for enquiry and report and the members of the Tribunal did sit separately at different places from the 3rd of December, 1949.\n\nAfter Mr. Aiyar joined the Tribunal, the proceedings continued as before. The hearing of the general issues, which began at Bombay, was concluded on 3rd April,\n\n1950. The Tribunal made and signed the, main award on 31st July, 1950, which was published in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) on August 12, 1950.\n\nThe point that has been pressed for our consideration on behalf of the appellants Banks is that on the services of Mr. Aiyar having ceased to be available by reason of his being appointed a member of the Indo-\n\nPakistan Boundary Tribunal, the remaining two members could not, in law, constitute an Industrial Tribunal without its being reconstituted as such in the manner contemplated by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, The proceedings after the 23rd of November, 1949, became, therefore, void and inoperative and the subsequent rejoining of the Tribunal by Mr. Aiyar was of no avail, as a vacancy having once occurred, a fresh appointment of a member and a fresh constitution of the Tribunal were imperative in law.\n\nWe have been asked to declare the award made on 31st of July, 1950, as well as the earlier awards void and inoperative on these grounds.\n\nThese contentions have been sought to be repelled 1951 on behalf of the respondents employees as well as by TM- Unilel the learned Attorney-General who appeared for the oommerotai Central Government as intervener, on a variety of Bank Ltil. grounds and though the grounds are not quite uniform v. or consistent, they have all been invoked in support of Their Workmen. the position that even in the absence of Mr. Aiyar it Mukherjea J. was quite competent to the two other members to continue to function legally as a Tribunal under the provisions and the general scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There was nothing irregular, it is said, in Mr. Aiyar's subsequently taking part in the Tribunal and signing the award on 31st July, 1949. I will notice these arguments in detail as I proceed with my judgment.\n\nIt will be convenient first of all to advert to such of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as have a bearing on the questions raised in this case.\n\nThe object of the Industrial Disputes Act, as set out in the preamble is \" to make provisions for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing.\" There are three classes of authorities provided for by the Act which are entrusted with the powers and duties of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes.\n\nFirst of all, there are Conciliation Officers or Boards of Conciliation, whose duties mainly are to induce the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the disputes amongst themselves. Secondly, there are Courts of Enquiry and though they are described as courts, their duties end with investigation into tl}.e matters referred to them and submitting reports thereon to the appropriate Government. Lastly, there are Industrial Tribunals composed of independent persons who either are or had been Judges of the High Court or District Judges, or are qualified for appointment as High Court Judges.\n\nSub-section (2) of section 5 provides for the constitution of a Board of Conciliation.\n\nA Board of Conciliation shall consist of a chairman and two or four other members as the appropriate Government thinks\n\n1951 fit, and sub-section (3) provides that the chairman The Uniwi shall be an independent person, while the members\n\noom,,..roial shall be persons appointed in equal numbers by the\n\nBank Ltd, parties to the dispute. Sub-section (4) makes an im v. portant provision, namely, that a Board can function 1'heir Workm.,.. despite the absence of the chairman or any of the\n\nMukherjeo J. members if it has the prescribed quorum as laid down in the rules, provided however that if the Government notifies the Board that the services of the chairman or of any other member have ceased to be available, the Board shall not act unless a new chairman or member, as the case may be, has been appointed.\n\nSection 6 of the Act relates to Courts of Enquiry and such court may consist of one independent person or such number of independent persons as the appropriate Government may think fit. Where a Court of Enquiry consists of two or more members, one of them has got to be appointed as a chairman. The Court like the Board of Conciliation can function in the absence of the chairman or any of its members or in the case of any vacancy in its.number, provided it has the prescribed quorum; bnt it cannot function if the appropriate Government notifies it that the services of the chairman have ceased to be available, so long as a new chairman is not appointed. There is no provision in section 6 relating to notification by Government in case the services of a member of a Court cease to be available as there is in the case of a member of the Conciliation Board under setion 5.\n\nSection 7 deals with Industrial Tribunals. Sub-sectjon (1) lays down that tbe appropriate 'Government may constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with _the provisions of this Act. Sub-section (2) provides that a Tribunal shall consist of such number of members as the appropriate Government thinks fit.\n\nWhere the Tribunal consists of two or more members, one of them shall be appointed a chairman.\n\nThere is no provision in section 7 similar 1o that appearing in sections 5 and 6 empowering a Tribunal to continue its proceedings in the absence of the chair man\n\n...\n\nor any of its members, provided there is a requirni;1 site quorum; in fact, no quorum has been prescribed in • The United the rules in regard to an Industrial Tribunal at all. It commercwl is clear, therefore, from the provisions of section 7 of Bank Ltd. the Industrial Disputes Act referred to aboveand v. this position has not been disputed by Mr. De who Their Workmen. appeared for the employees of some of the Banksthat -. if a Tribunal has eeen constituted as consisting of three Mukher; ea J. members as in the present case, then subject to any exception that may be created by any other provision of the Act all the three members of the Tribunal must act together.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents very great stress has been laid upon section 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act, and it is contended that in the circumstances which have happened in the present case, the provision of section 8 would furnish a clear authority to the two remaining members to continue as a legally constituted Tribunal during the period that the service~ of Mr.\n\nAiyar ceased to be available, even though there was neither a fresh appointment in his place nor a fresh constitution of the Tribunal Section 8 is in the following terms:-\n\n\"(!) If the services of the chairman of a Board or of the chairman or other member of a Court or Tribunal cease to be available at any time, the appropriate Government shall, in the case of a chairman, and may in the case of any other member, appoint another independent person to fill the vacancy, and the proceedings shall be continued before the Board, Court or Tribunal so reconstituted.\n\n(2) Where a Court or Tribunal consists of one per. son only and his services cease to be available, the appropriate Government shall appoint another independent person in his place, and the proceedings shall be continued before the person so appointed.\n\n(3) Where the services of any member of a Board other than the chairman have ceased to be available, the appropriate Government shall appoint in the manner specified in sub-section (3) of section 5 another\n\n1951 person to take his place, and the proceedings shall be continued before the Board so reconstituted.\" The United oom\"\"'rcial The section purports to provide for filling up vacan- Bank Ltd. cies.\n\nSub-section (2) is not material for our present v. purpose. Taking sub-sections (1) and (3) together we Th<ir Workmen. find that if the services of the chairman of a Board a ' Muklwrjea J. Court or a Tribunal cease to be available at any time, it is incumbent upon the appropriate Government in each case to fill the vacancy by the appointment of another independent person as chairman and the proceedings shall be continued before the authorities so reconstituted and they would not have to be commenced de novo. In case the services of a member of either a Court or a Tribunal cease to be available, it is discretionary with the appropriate Government to fill the vacancy or not as it chooses. If it chooses to ap point a new member in place of the old, the same provision will apply as in the case of appointment of a new chairman.\n\nThe section does not say, at least in express terms, as to what would happen if the Government does not think it proper to appoint a new member. So far as a Board of Conciliation is concerned, a different provision is made even when the services of a member cease to be available. ln such a case, re-appointment has got to be made as provided for in subsection (3) of section 5 and the reasons are obvious; because the essential thing in a Board of Conciliation is the equal representation of both parties to the dispute and the parties would be unequally represented if the vacancy of a member is not filled up.\n\nIn the present case one of the membP.rs of the Tribunal namely, Mr. Aiyar, was admittedly absent for a period of above three months and as he was appointed to do duties in another capacity, his services could not possibly be available during the period that he was engaged elsewhere. This fact, it appears, was brought to the rrotice of the appropriate Government by the other two members, but the Government decided not to make any new appointment in his place.\n\nThe question is, what exactly became the legal position of the other two members? Could they function\n\nas a Tribunal in the absence of the third member and 111111 without the Government reconstituting the Tribunal as The United a Tribunal of two?\n\nThe contention of the respondents Oommercial is that as section 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act Bank Lid. gives an option to the appropriate Government to fill v. the vacancy or not, as it chooses, when the services of a Their Workmen.\n\nmember cease to be available and as it provides for reconstitution only when a new member is appointed by Mukherjta J. the Government, it is implicit in the provision of the section itself that in case the Government does not decide to appoint a new member, the rell}aining\n\nmembers would automatically constitute the Trihunal and would proceed as such. It is said that the Industrial Tribunals are really administrative bodies and as the very object of establishing such Tribunals is to settle industrial disputes as quickly and as expeditiously as possible with a view to secure industrial . peace, certain amount of laxity m the procedure cannot but be allowed to these Tribunals as appears from the various provisions of the Act and it would defeat the very object of the enactment if the normal rules of law and procedure are made applicable to them. It is suggested further that what section 7 (I) contemplates is the constitution of a Tribunal irrespective of its members for adjudication of industrial disputes. What number of persons the Tribunal shall consist of can be determined by the Government at different times and in different manner and no question of fresh constitution of a Tribunal would arise in case the number is subsequently altered.\n\nSo far as an Industrial Tribunal is concerned, section 8 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act comes into operation when the services of the chairman of the Tribunal or of any member thereof cease to be avail- . able at any time. This non-availability of services may be permanent or temporary and may be occasioned by any cause or circumstance. When the services of a member cease to be available, the appropriate Government has got to make up its mind whether it would fill the vacancy or not ; and in case it chooses to appoint a new member, the Tribunal must be eemed\n\n1un to be reconstituted within the meaning of section 8,\n\nThe United the primary object of which is to provide that the pro- Oommucial ceedings shall be continued before such reconstituted Bank Lid.\n\nTribunalfrom the stage at whick they were left and v. they would not have to be started afresh. Thus it Their Work,,..n. follows from the language of section 8 that the recon- - stitution spoken of or contemplated by the section is M ukh\"i\"' J. reconstitution by reason of the appointment of a new member in place of the old. There is no question so far as section 8 is concerned of reconstitution of the Tribunal when the Government chooses not to fill the vacancy.\n\nThe point that is stressed on behalf of the respondents is that as section 8 dties not provide for reconstitution of the Tribunal when no new appointment of a member is made, the implication must necessarily be that the remaining members would continue to act as a Tribunal and no further order or notification by the Government is necessary. The argument seems plausible at first sight but an examination of the material provisions of the Act reveals the difficulties, and those of a formidable character, in the way of accepting this contention as sound.\n\nAs has been pointed out already, there is a marked distinction between the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the Industrial Disputes Act on the one hand and those of section 7 on the other. Sections 5 and 6 expressly empower a Board of Conciliation and a Court of Enquiry to exercise their functions in the absence of aqy of the members, provided the prescribed quorum is present ; but such provision has been deliberately omitted from section 7 and nothing has been prescribed either in the Act or in the rules in regard to any quorum for the members of the Tribunal. It cannot be argued that no quorum has been laid down in the case of a Tribunal, as it can consist of one member only.\n\nThe position of a Court of Enquiry, it seems, is precisely the same so far as this point is concerned and yet there is a rule prescribing a quorum for members of a Court. Having regard to the language of section 7 which admittedly contemplates that the members of\n\na Tribunal must act all together, it would, in my 1951 opinion, be a perfectly legitimate view to take that if The United the legislature did intend to make an exception to this Commercial rule, it would have done so in clear terms instead of Bank Ltd. leaving it to be gathered inferentially from the v. provision of another section which itself is not couched Their workmen. in unambiguous language.\n\nM kh .\n\nJ An Industrial Tribunal can be constituted only in \" l!f'jea • accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act and unless a Tribunal is properly constituted, it cannot be invested with. jurisdiction to. adjudicate o~ industrial disputes Under sub-section (2) of section 7, the number of members constituting the Tribunal has got to be determined by appropriate Government and that is an integral part of the Tribunal itself. A change in the number of members of a Tribunal could be made therefore only in pursuance of the provision contained in sub-section (2) of section 7. As section 8 does not lay down that in case the services of a member of the Tribunal cease to be available and the Government does not choose to make a new appointment in his place, the remaining members should continue to form the Tribunal, the constitution or reconstitution of the remaining members as a Tribunal should, in my opinion, be made only under section 7 of the Act.\n\nI am not impressed by the argument of Mr. De that a Tribunal is to be conceived of as an entity different from the members o~ which it is composed and whatever changes might occur in the composition of the Tribunal, the identity of the Tribunal remains intact. A distinction undoubtedly exists between the court and the judge who presides over it, but if the constitution of the court requires that it is to be composed of a certain number of judges, obviously a lesser number could not perform the functions of the court.\n\nMr. De also argued that the very object of the Industrial Disputes Act is to ensure a speedy and quick determination of industrial disputes and section\n\n!951 15 of the Act expressly lays down that the Tribunal\n\nThe United shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, as oom1ne1'Cial soon as practicable, on the conclusion thereof, submit\n\nBank Ltd. its award to the appropriate Government. This object, \"· it is said, would be frustrated if the strict rules of Their Workmen. ordinary law are extended to the proceedings of an\n\nMu!:herjea , J, Industrial Tribunal.\n\nIt is quite true that a quasi-judicial tribunal enjoys greater flexibility and freedom from the strict rules of law and procedure than an ordinary court of law, but however much informality and celerity might be considered to be desirable in regard to the proceedings of an Industrial Tribunal, it is absolutely necessary that the Tribunal must be properly constituted in accordance with requirements of law before it is allowed to function at all. I fail to see further how the issuing of a formal notification under section 7 of the Act could delay the proceedings of the Tribunal or hamper expeditious settlement of the disputes. Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes Act makes the imperative provision that the a ward of a Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by all the members. So long as there is no change or alteration in the original notification which constituted the Tribunal, the expression \" all the members\" must mean and refer to all the members whose names appear in this notification and, unless all of them sign the award, it would not be a valid or operative award in law.\n\nOur attention was drawn in course of the arguments. to rule 12 ofthe rules framed by the C'entral Government in exercise of its powers under section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act. This rule, it is to be noted, was deleted with effect from 6th of December\n\n1949. As it stood originally, it was worded as follows:-\n\n\" Where a Tribunal consists of two or more members the Tribunal may with the consent of the parties act notwithstanding any casual vacancy in its number and no act, proceeding or determination of the Tribunal shall be called in question or invalidated by reason of any such vacancy.\"\n\nIt has been contended on behalf of the appellants that rn.; i this rule was ultra vires of the authority which passed The Unite!/ it. It is not necessary for us for purposes of the commercial present case to discuss this matter. Assuming the rule Eank Ltd. to be valid, it certainly does not assist the respondv: , ents in any way, as there is no suggestion in this Their Workmen. case that during the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca .1.\n\nAiyar the proceedings continued before the remaining two members with the consent of both parties. On the other hand, the provision in the rule certainly goes against the broad contention that the respondents wanted to raise upon the languae of section 8. In my opinion, as there was no notification by the appropriate Government under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act constituting the two members a Tribunal under the Act during the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, the proceedings before these two members were void and inoperative and the award made and signed by them only during this period must be held to be void.\n\nI do not think however that it should be held that the Tribunal was not a properly constituted authority or lacked jurisdiction to exercise its function when Mr. Aiyar resumed his duties on 20th of February,\n\n1950. As I have said already, what is necessary for due constitution of an Industrial Tribunal is a notification or order by the appropriate Government under section 7 of the lndustrial Disputes Act and the number and names of the members as given in the notification form an essential or integral part of the Tribunal thus constituted. If the services of one of the members cease to be available at any time as is contemplated by section 8 and the appropriate Government does not choose to appoint another member in his place, one or other of two consequences may follow.\n\nThe Government may, by a fresh notification under section 7, constitute a Tribunal with the remaining members or in any other way it likes or it may not take. any steps at all and allow the original notification to remain. It can certainly be assumed that the Government will choose the latter alternative only\n\n1961 when it thinks that the vacancy is only for a short period and is not likely to continue long. In such\n\n~:=.~=~ circumstances, as I have already indicated, the true Bank Ltd. position is that the remaining members cannot\n\nv. function as a Tribunal and all the proceedings must be 'l'J..ir Warkm<11. held to remain in abeyance till the absent member rejoins his duties. But I do not see any reason why MukherJea J. there should be a fresh notification and.a fresh constitution of the Tribunal when the absent member returns. The original notification is still there unaltered and unamended and not affected in any way by any subsequent notification; and by virtue of this notification alone, the three members would be competent to sit as a Tribunal and discharge its duties. The fact that the services of one of them were not available at a time would not make the original notification null and void.\n\nThe only effect of the absence of a member would be that the remaining members would not be competent to continue the proceedings ; but this disability would cease as soon as the services of the absent member become available and a Tribunal as constituted by the notification is ready and able to function.\n\nThe appellant's contention seems to be that once a vacancy has. occurred, the Tribunal becomes imperfectly constituted and a fresh constitution is necessary.\n\nI do not think that this position is sound. As I have said already, the non-availability of the services of a member may be permanent or purely temporary and may be due to various causes. The word \" vacancy \" has no technical meaning.\n\nAs will appear from a reference to the Oxford Dictionary, the word ' vacancy \" is ordinarily used in the sense of a \" temporary freedom or cessation from a business or occupation\" If the absence of a member was merely temporary, the vacancy would mean nothing else but an interval or period during which a particular office remained unoccupied.\n\nThe question of a fresh appointment might arise if the vacancy was actually filled up; but, as has happened in the present case, if the vacancy is not filled up but is allowed to remain, it would automatically come to an erd\n\nas soon as the member whose absence caused the 1951 vacancy comes back and rejoins the office. It may be Th• United desirable in the interests of the public t6 issue a notice 00111111erciat or make some announcement in regard to the resump- Banic Ltd. tion of duties by the absent member, but in my opinion . v. no reconstitution of the Tribunal with the self same Th .. r Workmen. members is called for or necessary under the provi- Mukherjea 1. sions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is pointed out that cases may be conceived of where the non-availability of the services of a member is due to death, lunacy or some such circumstance; but in such cases there could be no question of the man's coming back and joining his office, and as I have said already under section 16 of the Industrial Disputes Act no award would be valid unless all the members whose names appeared in the notification signed it. This would be impossible in the case of death, lunacy or some other disablement of that character.\n\nIt will be seen that in the Government Notification .\n\nNo. LR 60 (47) dated 20th March, 1950, it was expressly stated that the services ofShri N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Member.of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), were temporarily placed at the disposal of the Ministry of External Affairs with effect from 23rd November, 1949, (afternoon). Mr. Aiyar's new duties continued till 27th J atmary, 1950. As soon as this work was over, he was regarded as coming back to bis office as a member of the All India Industrial Tribunal and he was allowed leave in that capacity by the Ministry of Labour from 28th January, 1950, to 19th February, HJSO, (vide Notification No. LR 60 (73) dated 16th September, 1950.) By another Government notification (being Notification No. LR 60 (47) dated 29th May, 1950), it was declared that Shri Cbandrasekhara Aiyar resumed charge of his duties as member of the All India Industrial Tribunal on the 20th February, 1950, (forenoon).\n\nIt is true that these notifications were issued much after the time when Mr. Aiyar actually resumed his duties, but as they are not notifications under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, and cannot constitute\n\n1us1 a condition precedent to investing the Tribunal with\n\n7, h• Unu<d jurisdiction under the law, the delay in the actual\n\n00,,.,,.,\"'ial publication of the notices is really immaterial. They\n\nDank Ltd. are relevant only for the purpose of showing what the v. state of affairs really was. In my opinion, therefore, Their w ... t ...... the Tribunal was a properly constituted authority on - and from the 20th February, 1950, and as the award Mukherjea.J. dated 31st July, 1950, was signed by all the three members appointed under the notification dated 24th August, 1949, no objection is legally sustainable that the award was made without any jurisdiction.\n\nA question may be raised that as the hearing of the general issues before the Tribunal commenced at a time when Mr. Aiyar was absent and he had not the opportunity of being present all through the proceedings when arguments of both sides were advanced, there has been an irregularity or illegality in the procedure which vitiates the whole award. A decision on this point would require investigation of various matters which have not been placed before us at the present stage by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants Banks; and I would refrain from expressing any opinion upon it. My conclusion is that the award dated the 31st of July is not void by reason of any Jack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal which made it.\n\nI am, however, of the opinion that the other awards which were made during the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar or which were not signed by him must be held to be without jurisdiction.\n\nAwards declared void.\n\nAgent for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 & 49: Rajender Narain.\n\nAgent for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 48 and 50; Ranbir Sawhney.\n\nAgent for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 47: Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondents: Naunit Lal.\n\nAgent for the Intervener: P. A. Mehta.", "total_entities": 341, "entities": [{"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. S. 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Narula."}}, {"text": "Tarachand Brijmohan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 993, "end_char": 1016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : Tarachand Brijmohan Lal."}}, {"text": "THE UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1019, "end_char": 1049, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THEIR WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1055, "end_char": 1068, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THEIR WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1177, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Patanjali SaatriJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1179, "end_char": 1197, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA: S.R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1199, "end_char": 1218, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1223, "end_char": 1237, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 8, 12, 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 8, 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1589, "end_char": 1601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government constituted an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1619, "end_char": 1712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "23rd Novem\\)er, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1844, "end_char": 1864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd Novem\\)er, 1949, the services of C were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Thi United External Affairs as a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Commercial Disputes Triounal, and the two remaining members, after an ob- Banlc Ltd. jection raised by one side, continued to sit and hear the disputes."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Thi United External Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1919, "end_char": 1958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd Novem\\)er, 1949, the services of C were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Thi United External Affairs as a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Commercial Disputes Triounal, and the two remaining members, after an ob- Banlc Ltd. jection raised by one side, continued to sit and hear the disputes."}}, {"text": "Indo-Pakistan Boundary Commercial Disputes Triounal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1978, "end_char": 2029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd Novem\\)er, 1949, the services of C were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Thi United External Affairs as a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Commercial Disputes Triounal, and the two remaining members, after an ob- Banlc Ltd. jection raised by one side, continued to sit and hear the disputes."}}, {"text": "20th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2165, "end_char": 2184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nOn the 20th February, 1950, C returned from the Boundary Their Workm<in."}}, {"text": "20th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2424, "end_char": 2438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th May, 1950, the Government issued a notification that C had \" resumed charge of his duties as a member of the All India Indu!itrial Tribunal\"."}}, {"text": "All India Indu!itrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2538, "end_char": 2568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 20th May, 1950, the Government issued a notification that C had \" resumed charge of his duties as a member of the All India Indu!itrial Tribunal\"."}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2712, "end_char": 2717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per KANIA, C. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BOSE JJ. (", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2726, "end_char": 2744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per KANIA, C. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BOSE JJ. (", "canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2746, "end_char": 2749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per KANIA, C. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BOSE JJ. ("}}, {"text": "BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2754, "end_char": 2758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per KANIA, C. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BOSE JJ. ("}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2764, "end_char": 2772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL ALI and PATANJALI SASTRI JJ.", "canonical_name": "F'azl Ali"}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2975, "end_char": 2981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2989, "end_char": 3012, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3314, "end_char": 3320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3686, "end_char": 3690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 of the Act was essential to constitute the remaining members a Tribunal inasmuch as a Tribunal of three members is a different Tribunal altogether from a Tribunal consisting of two of them only;\n\n(iii) neither the fact that C began to sit again along with the two other members from the 20th February, 1950, nor the notification of the 20th May, 1950, stating that Chad \"resumed charge of his duties as a member\" of that Tribunal could be treated as an appointment to the vacancy created on C's appointment as a member of the Boundary Disputes Tribunal;\n\n(iv) awards made by A and B after the services of C ceased to be available, and awards made after the 20th February, 1950, by A, B and C were not made by a Tribunal duly constituted under the Act and were void ;\n\n(v) since the two remaining members were not a duly con stituted Tribunal and the duty to work and decide was the joint respomibility of all the three members who originally constituted the Tribunal, the matter was one of absence of jurisdiction and not a mere_irregularity in the conduct of proceedings, and the defect could not be cured by acquiescence or estoppel."}}, {"text": "Boundary Disputes Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3847, "end_char": 3873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 of the Act was essential to constitute the remaining members a Tribunal inasmuch as a Tribunal of three members is a different Tribunal altogether from a Tribunal consisting of two of them only;\n\n(iii) neither the fact that C began to sit again along with the two other members from the 20th February, 1950, nor the notification of the 20th May, 1950, stating that Chad \"resumed charge of his duties as a member\" of that Tribunal could be treated as an appointment to the vacancy created on C's appointment as a member of the Boundary Disputes Tribunal;\n\n(iv) awards made by A and B after the services of C ceased to be available, and awards made after the 20th February, 1950, by A, B and C were not made by a Tribunal duly constituted under the Act and were void ;\n\n(v) since the two remaining members were not a duly con stituted Tribunal and the duty to work and decide was the joint respomibility of all the three members who originally constituted the Tribunal, the matter was one of absence of jurisdiction and not a mere_irregularity in the conduct of proceedings, and the defect could not be cured by acquiescence or estoppel."}}, {"text": "PerFAzLALiandPATANJALI SASTRI}J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1951 PerFAzLALiandPATANJALI SASTRI}J. (contra)-There was a ' vacancy ' within the meaning of Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4551, "end_char": 4557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4781, "end_char": 4787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5370, "end_char": 5376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MuKHERJliA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5709, "end_char": 5719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per MuKHERJliA J .-An Industrial Tribunal can be constituted only in accordance with the provisions of Sec.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJliA"}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5808, "end_char": 5814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5822, "end_char": 5845, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5993, "end_char": 5999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6231, "end_char": 6237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6567, "end_char": 6573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6654, "end_char": 6660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20th February; 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7243, "end_char": 7262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal was thefore, properly constituted from the 20th February; 1950, and the awards made by all the three members after that date were not void for want of jurisdiction in the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7683, "end_char": 7697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bank Ltd.\n\nC. K. Daphtary ·(R. ]."}}, {"text": "amshedji Kanga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7806, "end_char": 7820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "amshedji Kanga (R.]."}}, {"text": "S. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7887, "end_char": 7899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Chaudhuri (G. C. Mathur, with him) for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. Chaudhuri"}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Chaudhuri (G. C. Mathur, with him) for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7997, "end_char": 8006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S:Chaudhuri (S.N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. Chaudhuri"}}, {"text": "S.N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8008, "end_char": 8022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S:Chaudhuri (S.N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "R. ]. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8087, "end_char": 8098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. ]."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8157, "end_char": 8170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lal Anand (Charan Das Pu_ri, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Charan Das Pu_ri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8172, "end_char": 8188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lal Anand (Charan Das Pu_ri, with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "A.C. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8243, "end_char": 8253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.C. Gupta (M.M. Sen and R.K. 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Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9552, "end_char": 9560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K.C. Sen, chairman, Mr. S. P. Varma and Mr.\n\nJ. N. Mazumdar.", "canonical_name": "K. C. Sen"}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9576, "end_char": 9587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K.C. Sen, chairman, Mr. S. P. Varma and Mr.\n\nJ. N. Mazumdar.", "canonical_name": "S. P.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "J. N. Mazumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9597, "end_char": 9611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K.C. Sen, chairman, Mr. S. P. Varma and Mr.\n\nJ. N. Mazumdar."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9771, "end_char": 9780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9788, "end_char": 9811, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9863, "end_char": 9886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second notification dated the Kania 0 J. 24th August, 1949, was thereafter issued as follows:-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Central Government was pleased to appoint Mr. N. 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sittings were held, at some of which Mr. Mazumdar was absent on various dates and Mr.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar was absent from the 23rd November, 1949, to the 20th of February, 1950, as his services were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of External Affairs as a member of the lndo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal.", "canonical_name": "Mazumdaronly"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10407, "end_char": 10427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further sittings were held, at some of which Mr. Mazumdar was absent on various dates and Mr.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar was absent from the 23rd November, 1949, to the 20th of February, 1950, as his services were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of External Affairs as a member of the lndo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca"}}, {"text": "Ministry of External Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10551, "end_char": 10579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further sittings were held, at some of which Mr. Mazumdar was absent on various dates and Mr.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar was absent from the 23rd November, 1949, to the 20th of February, 1950, as his services were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of External Affairs as a member of the lndo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal."}}, {"text": "23rd November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10654, "end_char": 10673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between the 23rd November, 1949, and 20th February 1950, Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar together sat at several places and made certain awards."}}, {"text": "20th February 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10679, "end_char": 10697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between the 23rd November, 1949, and 20th February 1950, Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar together sat at several places and made certain awards."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10703, "end_char": 10706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between the 23rd November, 1949, and 20th February 1950, Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar together sat at several places and made certain awards."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10836, "end_char": 10846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10991, "end_char": 11009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held its sittings in Bombay to hear general issues from the 16th January, 1950, and concluded them on the 3rd April, 1950."}}, {"text": "3rd April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11037, "end_char": 11052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held its sittings in Bombay to hear general issues from the 16th January, 1950, and concluded them on the 3rd April, 1950."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara AiyaJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11128, "end_char": 11148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it is stated that the services of Mr.\n\nChandrasekhara AiyaJ' were not available to the Tribunal from the afternoon of 23rd November, 1949, to the forenoon of 20th February, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12808, "end_char": 12817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12825, "end_char": 12848, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "23rd of November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13093, "end_char": 13115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument is that in the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar the two members had no jurisdiction to hear anything at all without the appropriate notification and that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar's services having ceased to be available on the 23rd of November, 1949, he cannot sit again with the other two members to form the Tribunal in the absence of a notification under section 7."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13224, "end_char": 13233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13327, "end_char": 13350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13481, "end_char": 13511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17172, "end_char": 17181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17717, "end_char": 17722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "*· Kania o. J.\n\n(4) Save as provided in the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 19, an award declared to be binding under this section shall not be called in question in any manner.\""}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17788, "end_char": 17798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18440, "end_char": 18449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20082, "end_char": 20091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20150, "end_char": 20159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20798, "end_char": 20808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20953, "end_char": 20984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21017, "end_char": 21027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22215, "end_char": 22224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22241, "end_char": 22250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22253, "end_char": 22263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22732, "end_char": 22742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23081, "end_char": 23090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mazumdaronly", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24302, "end_char": 24314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdaronly.", "canonical_name": "Mazumdaronly"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24380, "end_char": 24389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26648, "end_char": 26657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26830, "end_char": 26839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27092, "end_char": 27101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27777, "end_char": 27786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28035, "end_char": 28044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28325, "end_char": 28335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29190, "end_char": 29200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29838, "end_char": 29847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30479, "end_char": 30488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30556, "end_char": 30570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is obvious that, commercial on the date the appointment of Mr. Chandrasekhara\n\nBank Ltd.\n\nAiyar as a member of the Boundary Tribunal was •· made, it could not have been known how long that Their Workmen.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31038, "end_char": 31048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31276, "end_char": 31285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23rd of November", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31477, "end_char": 31493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The later statement in the Government notification of May, 1950, that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar's services were lent to the External Affairs Ministry \"from the 23rd of November, 1949, to the 20th of February, 1950, \" appears to be more a notification for the purpose of the Accountant-General and the Audit departments of the Government than a disclosure of the mind of the Government when the appointment was made on the 23rd of November."}}, {"text": "20th of February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31508, "end_char": 31530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The later statement in the Government notification of May, 1950, that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar's services were lent to the External Affairs Ministry \"from the 23rd of November, 1949, to the 20th of February, 1950, \" appears to be more a notification for the purpose of the Accountant-General and the Audit departments of the Government than a disclosure of the mind of the Government when the appointment was made on the 23rd of November."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32422, "end_char": 32431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33253, "end_char": 33262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34358, "end_char": 34368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20th February,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34688, "end_char": 34708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reading those awards with the notifications and the provisions of sections .15 and 16 it is therefore clear that between 23rd November, 1949, and 20th February,\n\n1950, the Government \"intended\" the tribunal to .consist only of Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar."}}, {"text": "United Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34877, "end_char": 34894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was rlot and\n\n1 9~1 cannot be seriously disputed that in the event of the\n\nThe United Government deciding to fill up the vacancy, a notifica- Oommercial tion had to be issued."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35535, "end_char": 35544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35669, "end_char": 35678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35940, "end_char": 35949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36263, "end_char": 36272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36404, "end_char": 36413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37511, "end_char": 37520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37888, "end_char": 37897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38393, "end_char": 38403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38490, "end_char": 38499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39375, "end_char": 39384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United Gomm•rcial", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39428, "end_char": 39445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The United Gomm•rcial l1; was contended that by directing Mr. Chandra- Bank Ltd. sekhara Aiyar to work again as a member of the Banks v.\n\nTribunal in February, 1950, the Government had filled Th•ir Workm•n."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39652, "end_char": 39661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39792, "end_char": 39801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40945, "end_char": 40963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the question what work could be so delegated, it was ascertained that the Rule permitting delegation was first published on 3rd December, 1949, and as Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar had gone to his work on the Boundary Tribunal on 23rd November, no delegation in that manner was possible."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43106, "end_char": 43115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43126, "end_char": 43135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44466, "end_char": 44476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44522, "end_char": 44532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44583, "end_char": 44593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44710, "end_char": 44720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44785, "end_char": 44795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47576, "end_char": 47585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48442, "end_char": 48452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48544, "end_char": 48553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48708, "end_char": 48717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48877, "end_char": 48886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50398, "end_char": 50407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 51024, "end_char": 51027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, therefore, the awards made and signed by Messrs. Sen and Mazumdar and by all the three persons are without jurisdiction and the contention of the appellaJ.lts on this issue must be accepted."}}, {"text": "Mazumdar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 51032, "end_char": 51040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, therefore, the awards made and signed by Messrs. Sen and Mazumdar and by all the three persons are without jurisdiction and the contention of the appellaJ.lts on this issue must be accepted."}}, {"text": "FAZL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51167, "end_char": 51171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZL Au J.-The questions which this Bench is FazlAZiJ. called upon to decide arise upon the following facts.", "canonical_name": "F'azl Ali"}}, {"text": "13th June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51304, "end_char": 51319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Notification datedthe 13th June, 1949, the Government of India constituted a Tribunal for the adjudication of industrial disputes in Banking Companies, consisting of Mr. K. C. Sen (Chairman), Mr.\n\nS. P. Varma and Mr. Majumdar (Members)."}}, {"text": "K. C. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51452, "end_char": 51461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Notification datedthe 13th June, 1949, the Government of India constituted a Tribunal for the adjudication of industrial disputes in Banking Companies, consisting of Mr. K. C. Sen (Chairman), Mr.\n\nS. P. Varma and Mr. Majumdar (Members).", "canonical_name": "K. C. Sen"}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51479, "end_char": 51490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Notification datedthe 13th June, 1949, the Government of India constituted a Tribunal for the adjudication of industrial disputes in Banking Companies, consisting of Mr. K. C. Sen (Chairman), Mr.\n\nS. P. Varma and Mr. Majumdar (Members).", "canonical_name": "S. P.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "Majumdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51499, "end_char": 51507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Notification datedthe 13th June, 1949, the Government of India constituted a Tribunal for the adjudication of industrial disputes in Banking Companies, consisting of Mr. K. C. Sen (Chairman), Mr.\n\nS. P. Varma and Mr. Majumdar (Members).", "canonical_name": "Mazumdaronly"}}, {"text": "Varma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51618, "end_char": 51623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the Tribunal in the place of Mr. Varma, whose services had ceased to be available."}}, {"text": "12th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51892, "end_char": 51912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th June, 1949, the Government referred to the Tribunal the disputes between a number of Banking Companies and their employees, and the Tribunal consisting of the chairman and 2 members commenced hearing them on the 12th September, 1949."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51953, "end_char": 51958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November, 1949, the services of Mr. Aiyar were placed at the disposal of the Department of External-Affairs of the Government of India, and he was appointed a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, with the result that during his absence which covered a period of nearly 3 moJ!ths beginning from the 23rd\n\n1951 November, 1949, and ending on the 20th February, 1950, the proceedings were continued before the chair-\n\n~:;;;:;;.\":", "canonical_name": "Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Department of External-Affairs of the Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51994, "end_char": 52051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November, 1949, the services of Mr. Aiyar were placed at the disposal of the Department of External-Affairs of the Government of India, and he was appointed a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, with the result that during his absence which covered a period of nearly 3 moJ!ths beginning from the 23rd\n\n1951 November, 1949, and ending on the 20th February, 1950, the proceedings were continued before the chair-\n\n~:;;;:;;.\":"}}, {"text": "Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 52090, "end_char": 52130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November, 1949, the services of Mr. Aiyar were placed at the disposal of the Department of External-Affairs of the Government of India, and he was appointed a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, with the result that during his absence which covered a period of nearly 3 moJ!ths beginning from the 23rd\n\n1951 November, 1949, and ending on the 20th February, 1950, the proceedings were continued before the chair-\n\n~:;;;:;;.\":"}}, {"text": "23rd\n\n1951 November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52234, "end_char": 52259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In November, 1949, the services of Mr. Aiyar were placed at the disposal of the Department of External-Affairs of the Government of India, and he was appointed a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, with the result that during his absence which covered a period of nearly 3 moJ!ths beginning from the 23rd\n\n1951 November, 1949, and ending on the 20th February, 1950, the proceedings were continued before the chair-\n\n~:;;;:;;.\":"}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 52468, "end_char": 52473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Aiyar\n\nv. rejoined the Tribunal on the 20th February, 1950, and 1'/wir Work•nen.", "canonical_name": "Aiyar"}}, {"text": "31st July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52613, "end_char": 52628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "award on the 31st July, 1950, which was published in Faz!"}}, {"text": "12th August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52693, "end_char": 52710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Al• 1• the Gazette of India on the 12th August, 1950."}}, {"text": "Majumdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 52934, "end_char": 52942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In some of the appeals, it is also contended that some of the interim awards, namely those given by the chairman of the Tribunal and Mr.\n\nMajumdar on the 5th January, 25th January, 20th\n\nFebruary and.22nd February, 1950, in the case of the Imperial Bank of India, the Lloyds Bank and the Punjab National Bank, were also without jurisdiction.", "canonical_name": "Mazumdaronly"}}, {"text": "5th January, 25th January, 20th", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52950, "end_char": 52981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In some of the appeals, it is also contended that some of the interim awards, namely those given by the chairman of the Tribunal and Mr.\n\nMajumdar on the 5th January, 25th January, 20th\n\nFebruary and.22nd February, 1950, in the case of the Imperial Bank of India, the Lloyds Bank and the Punjab National Bank, were also without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "February and.22nd February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52983, "end_char": 53015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In some of the appeals, it is also contended that some of the interim awards, namely those given by the chairman of the Tribunal and Mr.\n\nMajumdar on the 5th January, 25th January, 20th\n\nFebruary and.22nd February, 1950, in the case of the Imperial Bank of India, the Lloyds Bank and the Punjab National Bank, were also without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Imperial Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53036, "end_char": 53058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In some of the appeals, it is also contended that some of the interim awards, namely those given by the chairman of the Tribunal and Mr.\n\nMajumdar on the 5th January, 25th January, 20th\n\nFebruary and.22nd February, 1950, in the case of the Imperial Bank of India, the Lloyds Bank and the Punjab National Bank, were also without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Lloyds Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53064, "end_char": 53075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In some of the appeals, it is also contended that some of the interim awards, namely those given by the chairman of the Tribunal and Mr.\n\nMajumdar on the 5th January, 25th January, 20th\n\nFebruary and.22nd February, 1950, in the case of the Imperial Bank of India, the Lloyds Bank and the Punjab National Bank, were also without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Punjab National Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53084, "end_char": 53104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In some of the appeals, it is also contended that some of the interim awards, namely those given by the chairman of the Tribunal and Mr.\n\nMajumdar on the 5th January, 25th January, 20th\n\nFebruary and.22nd February, 1950, in the case of the Imperial Bank of India, the Lloyds Bank and the Punjab National Bank, were also without jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53210, "end_char": 53239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54336, "end_char": 54345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "F'azl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54849, "end_char": 54858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F'azl Ali J.\n\nOne of the questions to be decided in construing this section is, as to the exact meaning of the words \" services cease to be available.\"", "canonical_name": "F'azl Ali"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 55624, "end_char": 55631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But that word is also sometimes applied to\" intermission of a state or condition of being, doing or suffering\" (see Oxford Dictionary), and, among several instances of its being used in this narrower sense, we were referred to The Queen v.\n\nEvans(1) which is a case dealing with an English statute in which the expression \" cease to reside \" was used so as to include a case where the person concerned was away .from England for a period and then returned there."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55950, "end_char": 55959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56912, "end_char": 56928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57657, "end_char": 57666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57875, "end_char": 57894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find that on the 28th November, 1949, the chairman sent an express telegram to the Labour Ministry stating that in the absence of Mr.\n\nAiyar objections had been raised to the remaining two members of the Tribunal continuing the proceedings and urging the Ministry either to appoint a substitute or to intimate that the Tribunal could proceed with two members during Mr. Aiyar's absence."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58845, "end_char": 58854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59441, "end_char": 59450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59753, "end_char": 59762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 60933, "end_char": 60940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reference to the correspond-\n\nThe unma ing Acts in England and America will show that sus- Oommercial pension of work is generally ruled out in cases of Bank Ltd. industrial disputes since they need expeditious settlev."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61101, "end_char": 61110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61185, "end_char": 61194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Courts Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61227, "end_char": 61243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61276, "end_char": 61299, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61597, "end_char": 61613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act, 1919", "statute": "Courts Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61744, "end_char": 61753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act, 1919", "statute": "Courts Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62026, "end_char": 62035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act, 1919", "statute": "Courts Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62077, "end_char": 62093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act, 1919", "statute": "Courts Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "Sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62150, "end_char": 62166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act, 1919", "statute": "Courts Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "Trade Disputes Act, 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62197, "end_char": 62221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62477, "end_char": 62486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Disputes Act, 1929", "statute": "the Trade Disputes Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62813, "end_char": 62829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Disputes Act, 1929", "statute": "the Trade Disputes Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "Fa.Z Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63479, "end_char": 63487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fa.", "canonical_name": "Fa.Z Ali"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65138, "end_char": 65147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65286, "end_char": 65295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65576, "end_char": 65586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65621, "end_char": 65625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 38, for the purpose of giving effect Fazl.", "canonical_name": "F'azl Ali"}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65626, "end_char": 65629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali .J. to the provisions of the Act, the Government may make rules, and, as far as I can see, there is nothing to prevent the Government from making a rule fixing the minimum strength of the Tribunal for hearing any of the matters before it."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66536, "end_char": 66545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68001, "end_char": 68011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68821, "end_char": 68830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69575, "end_char": 69584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69726, "end_char": 69735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 69877, "end_char": 69882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Workm<n.Aiyar could not have joined the Tribunal without\n\nFad AU J. giving notice to the Government and without obtaining its orders."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70676, "end_char": 70685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71353, "end_char": 71362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72294, "end_char": 72318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ever, a Notification was issued by the Government on Fazl ..tz• J. the 20th May, 1950, to the following effect:-\n\n\"After relinquishing charge of membership of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Dispute Tribunal, Sri N.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar resumed charge of his duties as Member of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) on the 20th February 1950 (forenoon).\"", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca"}}, {"text": "All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 72365, "end_char": 72410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ever, a Notification was issued by the Government on Fazl ..tz• J. the 20th May, 1950, to the following effect:-\n\n\"After relinquishing charge of membership of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Dispute Tribunal, Sri N.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar resumed charge of his duties as Member of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) on the 20th February 1950 (forenoon).\""}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74182, "end_char": 74191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74197, "end_char": 74214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74232, "end_char": 74240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not find\n\nPazl Ali J. anything in either of these sections which militates against the view which I have ventured to express, and I do not think that the provision contained in section 16 that the report of the Tribunal shall be signed by all the members of the Tribunal, means that it should be signed even by those members who had not taken part in the proceedings.", "canonical_name": "F'azl Ali"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74399, "end_char": 74409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74931, "end_char": 74947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75484, "end_char": 75494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76528, "end_char": 76537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76695, "end_char": 76704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76757, "end_char": 76766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76993, "end_char": 77002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th December, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77087, "end_char": 77105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 12 which was in force till the 5th December, 1950, dealt with a casual vacancy, and provided that on the occurrence of such a vacancy, the Tribunal may act with the consent of the parties."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77388, "end_char": 77397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77605, "end_char": 77614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77846, "end_char": 77855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali SaatriJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78765, "end_char": 78782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali SaatriJ,\n\nMukherjta J.\n\nFor the reasons I have set out, I respectfully differ from the conclusion arrived at by my Lord the Chief Justice and the majority of my colleagues, and hold that the objections raised on behalf of the appellants should be overruled.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali SaatriJ"}}, {"text": "Mukherjta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78785, "end_char": 78794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali SaatriJ,\n\nMukherjta J.\n\nFor the reasons I have set out, I respectfully differ from the conclusion arrived at by my Lord the Chief Justice and the majority of my colleagues, and hold that the objections raised on behalf of the appellants should be overruled.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJliA"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79118, "end_char": 79126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTRI J.-1 agree with the reasoning and conclusion of my learned brother Fazl Ali whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading.", "canonical_name": "F'azl Ali"}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79264, "end_char": 79273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUKHERJEA, J.-1 concur in the decision of my learned brother Faz!", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJliA"}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79325, "end_char": 79333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUKHERJEA, J.-1 concur in the decision of my learned brother Faz!", "canonical_name": "Fa.Z Ali"}}, {"text": "Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 80557, "end_char": 80566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To appreciate the arguments that have Bank Ltd. been raised by the respective parties on this point, it v. would be necessary to state a few facts."}}, {"text": "13th of June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80712, "end_char": 80730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated the 13th of June, 1949, the Mukherjoo J.\n\nCentral Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, constituted an Industrial Tribunal consisting of three members to wit: (1) Mr. K. C. Sen, (who was appointed chairman of the Tribunal), (2) Mr. S. P.\n\nVerma and (3) Mr. J. N. Mazumdar."}}, {"text": "Mukherjoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80736, "end_char": 80745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated the 13th of June, 1949, the Mukherjoo J.\n\nCentral Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, constituted an Industrial Tribunal consisting of three members to wit: (1) Mr. K. C. Sen, (who was appointed chairman of the Tribunal), (2) Mr. S. P.\n\nVerma and (3) Mr. J. N. Mazumdar.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJliA"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80816, "end_char": 80825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80833, "end_char": 80862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "K. C. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 80943, "end_char": 80952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated the 13th of June, 1949, the Mukherjoo J.\n\nCentral Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, constituted an Industrial Tribunal consisting of three members to wit: (1) Mr. K. C. Sen, (who was appointed chairman of the Tribunal), (2) Mr. S. P.\n\nVerma and (3) Mr. J. N. Mazumdar.", "canonical_name": "K. C. Sen"}}, {"text": "S. P.\n\nVerma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 81008, "end_char": 81020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated the 13th of June, 1949, the Mukherjoo J.\n\nCentral Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, constituted an Industrial Tribunal consisting of three members to wit: (1) Mr. K. C. Sen, (who was appointed chairman of the Tribunal), (2) Mr. S. P.\n\nVerma and (3) Mr. J. N. Mazumdar.", "canonical_name": "S. P.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "August 24, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81081, "end_char": 81096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a further Notification dated August 24, 1949, Mr. N .. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the Tribunal in place of Mr. S. P. Verma whose services ceased to he available and the Tribunal so reconstituted was designated \"The All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes).\""}}, {"text": "N .. Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81102, "end_char": 81127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a further Notification dated August 24, 1949, Mr. N .. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the Tribunal in place of Mr. S. P. Verma whose services ceased to he available and the Tribunal so reconstituted was designated \"The All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes).\"", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca"}}, {"text": "S. P. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 81183, "end_char": 81194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a further Notification dated August 24, 1949, Mr. N .. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the Tribunal in place of Mr. S. P. Verma whose services ceased to he available and the Tribunal so reconstituted was designated \"The All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes).\"", "canonical_name": "S. P.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 81287, "end_char": 81332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a further Notification dated August 24, 1949, Mr. N .. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the Tribunal in place of Mr. S. P. Verma whose services ceased to he available and the Tribunal so reconstituted was designated \"The All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes).\""}}, {"text": "September 12, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81453, "end_char": 81471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal consisting of the chairman and the two members mentioned aforesaid commenced their sittings at Bombay on September 12, 1949, and continued to sit as so constituted at Bombay and various other places since then."}}, {"text": "23rd September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81581, "end_char": 81601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the afternoon of 23rd September, 1949, the services of Mr. N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar were placed temporarily at the disposal of the Ministry of External Affairs, he being appointed a member of the lndo-Pakistali Boundary Tribunal."}}, {"text": "27thof January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81873, "end_char": 81893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Aiyar's work in connection withthelndo-Pakistan Boundary Tribunal ended on 27thof January, 1950, and a Government Notification shows that he was absent on leave from 28th January, 1950, uptil the 19th of February following and it is on the 20th February, 1950 that he actually resumed his duties as a member of the Industrial Tribunal."}}, {"text": "28th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81964, "end_char": 81982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Aiyar's work in connection withthelndo-Pakistan Boundary Tribunal ended on 27thof January, 1950, and a Government Notification shows that he was absent on leave from 28th January, 1950, uptil the 19th of February following and it is on the 20th February, 1950 that he actually resumed his duties as a member of the Industrial Tribunal."}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82494, "end_char": 82504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82512, "end_char": 82535, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C.entral Government The United Commercial", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 82570, "end_char": 82611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned here that in exercise of the powers\n\nr,4\n\n1951 conferred by section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act, certain rules were framed by the C.entral Government The United Commercial which came into force on 3rd December, 1949, and under Bank Ltd. which the Tribunal, as constituted by the Notification v. of 13th June, 1949, was authorised to entrust such Their Workmen."}}, {"text": "3rd of December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83390, "end_char": 83411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purporting to act in pursuance of these rules, a large number of matters pending before the 1'ribunal were divided amongst the members for enquiry and report and the members of the Tribunal did sit separately at different places from the 3rd of December, 1949."}}, {"text": "3rd April,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83563, "end_char": 83579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The hearing of the general issues, which began at Bombay, was concluded on 3rd April,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "August 12, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83709, "end_char": 83724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal made and signed the, main award on 31st July, 1950, which was published in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) on August 12, 1950."}}, {"text": "Indo-\n\nPakistan Boundary Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 83931, "end_char": 83964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point that has been pressed for our consideration on behalf of the appellants Banks is that on the services of Mr. Aiyar having ceased to be available by reason of his being appointed a member of the Indo-\n\nPakistan Boundary Tribunal, the remaining two members could not, in law, constitute an Industrial Tribunal without its being reconstituted as such in the manner contemplated by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, The proceedings after the 23rd of November, 1949, became, therefore, void and inoperative and the subsequent rejoining of the Tribunal by Mr. Aiyar was of no avail, as a vacancy having once occurred, a fresh appointment of a member and a fresh constitution of the Tribunal were imperative in law."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84137, "end_char": 84160, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "31st of July, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84508, "end_char": 84526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have been asked to declare the award made on 31st of July, 1950, as well as the earlier awards void and inoperative on these grounds."}}, {"text": "TM- Unilel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84706, "end_char": 84716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These contentions have been sought to be repelled 1951 on behalf of the respondents employees as well as by TM- Unilel the learned Attorney-General who appeared for the oommerotai Central Government as intervener, on a variety of Bank Ltil."}}, {"text": "Tribunal under the provisions and the general scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85115, "end_char": 85204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "31st July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 85328, "end_char": 85343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was nothing irregular, it is said, in Mr. Aiyar's subsequently taking part in the Tribunal and signing the award on 31st July, 1949."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85495, "end_char": 85524, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85601, "end_char": 85624, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86583, "end_char": 86592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjeo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87141, "end_char": 87150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "despite the absence of the chairman or any of the\n\nMukherjeo J. members if it has the prescribed quorum as laid down in the rules, provided however that if the Government notifies the Board that the services of the chairman or of any other member have ceased to be available, the Board shall not act unless a new chairman or member, as the case may be, has been appointed.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJliA"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87464, "end_char": 87473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88147, "end_char": 88156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88341, "end_char": 88350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88828, "end_char": 88837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88867, "end_char": 88883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89205, "end_char": 89214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89232, "end_char": 89255, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "De", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 89323, "end_char": 89325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It commercwl is clear, therefore, from the provisions of section 7 of Bank Ltd. the Industrial Disputes Act referred to aboveand v. this position has not been disputed by Mr. De who Their Workmen."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89712, "end_char": 89721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89729, "end_char": 89752, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89858, "end_char": 89867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90153, "end_char": 90162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91027, "end_char": 91036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92450, "end_char": 92459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93464, "end_char": 93473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93481, "end_char": 93504, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94536, "end_char": 94545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94954, "end_char": 94963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 94975, "end_char": 94998, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95523, "end_char": 95532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95827, "end_char": 95836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96034, "end_char": 96043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96212, "end_char": 96221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96792, "end_char": 96808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96816, "end_char": 96839, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96869, "end_char": 96878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96893, "end_char": 96909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97139, "end_char": 97148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97596, "end_char": 97605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98166, "end_char": 98175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 98183, "end_char": 98206, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98358, "end_char": 98367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98660, "end_char": 98669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98674, "end_char": 98683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99029, "end_char": 99038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "De also argued that the very object of the Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99580, "end_char": 99646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mu!:herjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100111, "end_char": 100121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ordinary law are extended to the proceedings of an\n\nMu!:herjea , J, Industrial Tribunal.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJliA"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100667, "end_char": 100676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100782, "end_char": 100792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100800, "end_char": 100823, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101396, "end_char": 101406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101414, "end_char": 101437, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "6th of December\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101498, "end_char": 101519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule, it is to be noted, was deleted with effect from 6th of December\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102275, "end_char": 102301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case that during the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca .1.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102552, "end_char": 102561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102643, "end_char": 102652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102660, "end_char": 102683, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "20th of February,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 103131, "end_char": 103154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not think however that it should be held that the Tribunal was not a properly constituted authority or lacked jurisdiction to exercise its function when Mr. Aiyar resumed his duties on 20th of February,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103308, "end_char": 103317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103581, "end_char": 103590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103774, "end_char": 103783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MukherJea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104442, "end_char": 104451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But I do not see any reason why MukherJea J. there should be a fresh notification and.a fresh constitution of the Tribunal when the absent member returns.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJliA"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106679, "end_char": 106702, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106986, "end_char": 106996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 107004, "end_char": 107027, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "20th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 107303, "end_char": 107319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LR 60 (47) dated 20th March, 1950, it was expressly stated that the services ofShri N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Member.of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), were temporarily placed at the disposal of the Ministry of External Affairs with effect from 23rd November, 1949, (afternoon)."}}, {"text": "27th J atmary, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 107621, "end_char": 107640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Aiyar's new duties continued till 27th J atmary, 1950."}}, {"text": "All India Industrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 107737, "end_char": 107766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon as this work was over, he was regarded as coming back to bis office as a member of the All India Industrial Tribunal and he was allowed leave in that capacity by the Ministry of Labour from 28th January, 1950, to 19th February, HJSO, (vide Notification No."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Labour", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 107816, "end_char": 107834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon as this work was over, he was regarded as coming back to bis office as a member of the All India Industrial Tribunal and he was allowed leave in that capacity by the Ministry of Labour from 28th January, 1950, to 19th February, HJSO, (vide Notification No."}}, {"text": "16th September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 107924, "end_char": 107944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LR 60 (73) dated 16th September, 1950.)"}}, {"text": "29th May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108023, "end_char": 108037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LR 60 (47) dated 29th May, 1950), it was declared that Shri Cbandrasekhara Aiyar resumed charge of his duties as member of the All India Industrial Tribunal on the 20th February, 1950, (forenoon)."}}, {"text": "Cbandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 108066, "end_char": 108086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LR 60 (47) dated 29th May, 1950), it was declared that Shri Cbandrasekhara Aiyar resumed charge of his duties as member of the All India Industrial Tribunal on the 20th February, 1950, (forenoon)."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108356, "end_char": 108365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108373, "end_char": 108396, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 108615, "end_char": 108624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They\n\nDank Ltd. are relevant only for the purpose of showing what the v. state of affairs really was."}}, {"text": "24th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108975, "end_char": 108992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. dated 31st July, 1950, was signed by all the three members appointed under the notification dated 24th August, 1949, no objection is legally sustainable that the award was made without any jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "31st of July", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 109716, "end_char": 109728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My conclusion is that the award dated the 31st of July is not void by reason of any Jack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal which made it."}}, {"text": "Rajender Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 110123, "end_char": 110138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 & 49: Rajender Narain."}}, {"text": "Ranbir Sawhney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 110199, "end_char": 110213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "48 and 50; Ranbir Sawhney."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 110264, "end_char": 110274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "47: Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 110304, "end_char": 110314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: Naunit Lal."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 110343, "end_char": 110354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Intervener: P. A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_431_451_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAJA BRAJA SUNDAR DEB\n\nti.\n\nMONI BEHARA AND OTHERS\n\n[MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nFisheries-Fisherm; n of particular villages allowed to fish for .several years by zemindar-Acqu1stion of right to fish-Presump- Jion of lost grant-Prescription-Adverse possession-Proceedings .under s. 145, Cr. P. C., effect of.\n\nA right exercisable by the inhabitants of a village from time to time is neither attached to any estate in land nor is it such a right as is capable of being made the subject of a grant, ' there being no ascretainable g(antes.\n\nThe doctrine of lost grant originated as a technical device to enable title to be made hy prescription despite the impossibility -of proving immemorial user and since it originated in grant, .its -owners, whether original or by devolution, had to be such persons as were capable of being the recipients of a grant.\n\nWhere all that appeared from the evidence was that the fishermen who were residents of certain villages had been . for a long time exercising the right of fishing in certain rivers which flowed through a zemindari with the consent of some of the zemindars : Held, that the fishermen residing in these villages cannot be treated as a corporate body or a kind of unit in whose favour a lost grant could be presumed or who could acquire a :right to fish either by adverse possession or by prescription.\n\nWhere, however, there were proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code between the zemindars and certain :fishermen and the Magistrate found that the fishermen were in possession of the disputed fishery and he directed the issue of an order declaring their possession until victed therefrom in due course of law and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction, and no steps were taken by the zcmindars to set aside the order of the Magistrate within three years as required by article 47 of the Limitation Act : Held, that so far as the fishermen who were parties to the proceedings under section} 45, the order of the Magistrate had become final and they were entitled to remain in possession of the fishery.\n\nAn exclusive right of fishing in a given place means that no other person has a co-extensive right with the claimant of the\n\nrigh~ The mere fact that some other person has a right to a\n\nparncular class of fish in the fishery or that another person is\n\nMarch 21;\n\n&jaBr41a Sumlar Deb\n\nMoni Beluzra\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan].\n\nentitled to fish at a certain, time of the year docs not destroy the right of exclusive fishing in any manner\n\nC1VIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1948.\n\nAppeal against the judgment and decree dated the 21st April, 1943, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Faz! Ali C. J. and S. C. Chatterji J.) in First Appeal No. 17 of 1939 arising out of decree dated the 19th July, 1939, of the Subordinate Judge at Puri in Original Suit No. 62 of 1936.\n\nManohar Lal (G. P. Das, with him) for the appellant.\n\nB. N. Das (Sir Kant Mahanti, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1951, March 27. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The dispute in this appeal is between the fishermen residing in nine villages of Killa Marichpur, a permanently settled zamindari in the Puri Collectorate (Orissa State) and the Raja of Aul, the owner of seven annas, seven pies, and ten karants share in the zamindari.\n\nThe other shares in the zamindari are defendants 19 to 29.\n\nWithin the ambit of the estate flows \"Devi Nadi,\" with its several branches and tributaries. Three fisheries \"Madhurdia,\"· \"Marichpurdia\" and \"Maladia\" appertain to this estate.\n\nThe controversy in this appeal concerns die fishery known as the \"Madhurdia\" fishery.\n\nIn the year 1936, three suits, Nos. 62, 63 and 64, were brought by the Raja of Aul against defendants 1 to 18 on behalf of themselves and other fishermen residing in the nine villages of Killa Marichpur for a declaration in respect of his rights in the three above mentioned fisheries. All these suits were decided in his favour by the trial court.\n\nThe defendants, preferred no appe:il in suits 63 and 64, with the result that the controversy regarding the two fisheries involved in these two suits stands concluded by the decision of the trial court. In suit No. 62 of 1936, however, the\n\ndefendants preferred an appeal to the High Court and it was partially allowed. The decree of the trial Judge in favour of the' plaintiff was modified and it was held that the defendants had exclusive rights as tenants at will to . fish in this fishery during the Hilsa season (Margasir to Baisakh) and that the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration or an injunction in respect of that period. The plaintiff thereupon obt; Uned leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council and that appeal is now before us for decision.\n\nIt was alleged in the pl:iint that the proprietors of Marichpur zamindari are the exclusive owners . of the fishery in question and have all along been exerc1smg their right of catching fish in the same sometimes by employing fishermen and 5ometimes by letting out the fishery to them, that the plaintiff has ever since his acquisition of the .zamindari interest been the owner in khas possession of the fishery right according to his share in the zamindari, that the defendants-fishermen were never in possession of the d fishery, nor have they anv right to it, that in the yea.r 1918 they started proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, to create evidence of their possession but in spite of those proceedings the plaintiff continued to be in possession of the fishery and has been catching fish by employing fishermen, that by taking advantage of the fact that there are several co-sharers in the zamindari and there is mismanagement of the estate, the defendants wrongfully and unlawfully trespassed on the fishery from time to time between May, 1933, and November, 1933, and disturbed the plaintiff in the enjoyment of his right and have caused loss to him and his co-sharers by catching large quantity of fish without any leave or licence. On these allegations, the plaintiff claimed a declaration to the effect that defendants 1 to 18 in their personal and representative capacity have no right or title in the fishery known as \"Madhurdia\" fishery or to the fishery in the southern portion of the area recorded as the iver block; Risilo and Husgarh. :Prayer was also made fr the grant of a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from\n\nRaja Broja Sundar Deb\n\nMani Belwra\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan].\n\nRaja Brqja Sundar Deb\n\nMani Behara and Othns.\n\nMahqjan].\n\nfishing in the above fishery and in the above mentioned blocks and for the award of a sum of money by way of damages and on account of price of Ii.sh.\n\nThe defendants contested the allegations made in the plaint and asserted thai: the fishermen of Killa Marichpur including the principal defendants and their ancestors, about 846 persons in all, have all along remained in undisturbed actual physical possession of the fishery known as \"Charkhatia\" alias \"Madhurdia\" fishery on a fixed annual rental of Rs. 135-7-0, and have a right to remain in possession in perpetuity on payment of that rent ; that they have acquired this right in all possible ways, i.e., by grant, custom, adverse possession and easement.\n\nOn these plcadi!lgs of the parties the trial Judge framed as many as nine issues, the material ones being issues 6 an.d 7, which are in these terms :-\n\n\"6. Has the plaintiff any title to the disputed fishery ?\n\n7. Have the defendants Nos. 1 to 18 acquired any right, by adverse possession, prescription or custom\"?\n\nThe trial Judge on these issues hdd that the defendants neither in their personal nor in their representative capacity had any right or title in the fishery in question and issued a permanent injunction against them from fishing in it. The claim for damages was disallowed. It was obserVed by the learned Judgi:: that the defendants did not claim the right to catch all the Ii.sh found in the fishery but that they had confined their claim in respect to Hilsa Ii.sh only during the Hilsa season between the months of Margasir and Baisakh (November to April) and that as regards the other varieties of Ii.sh found in these waters during the rest of the year they did not assert any right to catch Ii.sh.\n\nHe also observed that the defendants did not deny that the plainrilf was the owner of the zamindari and as such owner of the soil and of the waters of the fishery, hut that they claimed a subordinate right, i.e., the right of fishing in e\n\nwaters belonging to the plaintiff and his co-sharers during the Hilsa season to the exclusion of the plaintiff and his co-sharers.\n\nIn view of these contentions the onus was laid on the defendants to prove their permanent right of fishing in these waters by grant, custom, prescription or adverse possession and it was held that the defendants failed to discharge the onus that rested on them.\n\nAcquisition of the right by grant, prescription and adverse possession was held not provable in law in favour of an indeterminate and fluctuating body of persons.\n\nThe claim for permanent tenancy in the fishery was negatived on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the tenancy came by descent to these 846 persons from the persons who actually took it in the year 1842, or that it was obtained from all the sixteen anna landlords, or that there was any fixity of rent. It was funher said that there was no cenainty as to who were the owners of the right, as to the local area over which the right was to be exercised, as to the measure of the right and of the periods during which the right could be exercised and that in these circumstances the defendants' claim could not be upheld. The defendants' contention that under article 47 of the Indian Limitation Act the plaintiff had lost his right was held unsustainable and the plea of custom was ruled out on the ground that the custom alleged would be of an unreasonable kind.\n\nAll the questions raised in the trial court exceotin~ the question of custom were canvassed by the defendants before the High Court.\n\nThe High Court in a judgment, by no means clear or satisfact.ory, reached the conclusion that the defendants since the time of their predecessors had all along been fishinrr in the disputed fishery as of right under a lost rant and that the plaintiff'-s story that he had been in enjovment of the fishery was not true and that the defendants' right to fish in the disputed fisherv was established. One would have thought that in view of this finding the plaintiff's suit would have been dismissed\n\nRajaBrda Sundor Deb\n\nMani Bthara\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan]\n\nRojaBrq.ia Sund\"' D, b v.\n\nMani Be!wro\n\nand Others\n\nMahajan].\n\nbut this did not happen. The High Court proceeded to find that though from the evidence it appeared that the right was being exercised by the defendants or their predecessors from a very long time, that is to say, from the year 1842, yet there . was no evidence to iutisfy the inference that they had got a permanent right. The defendants' plea, therefore, that they were permanent tenants of the fishery in dispute was not upheld.\n\nAs regards the defendants' contention that the plaintiff was bound by the order passed in proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, it was found that he not having challenged that order within the prescribed period, his right to khas possession of the disputed fishery except to the extent of five pice share was extinguished under section 28 of the Limitation Act but that his proprietary right subsisted as it was never denied. It was funher held that the plaintiff's right to khas possession of this fishery was also extinguished by operation of anicle 144 of the Indian Limitation Act.\n\nPlaintiff's evidence that he had been catching fish during the Hilsa season by employing other fishermen was disbelieved and it was held that the defendants had been exercising exclusive right to fish in the disputed fishery during the Hilsa season adversely to the plaintiff and the other co-sharers for more than twelve years.\n\nIn spite of these findings the High Coun reached the somewhat strange conclusion that the defendants acquired by adverse possession a mere tenancy at will and that it could be determined by the entire body of landlords and the plaintiff being only a co-sharer could not bring the present suit in his own behalf and it had not the effect of determining the tenancy and hence the plaintiff could not be granted the declaration and the injunction restraining the defendants from fishing during the Hilsa season.\n\nAs regards the point raised by the plaintiff that by reason of the change in the course of the river the fishery . in. dispute was not the same regarding which an order was made under section 145 proceedings or in which the defendants have been exercising their right, it was held that this contention was without force because\n\nthe river was identical and the channels, whether old or new, which comprise the Madhurdia or Charikhati fishery, have always formed one. connected sheet of water and that fishing in different parts of such a connected sheet of water comprised in the same fishery can hardly be said to be a separate act of aggression so as to disturb the continuity or extent of adverse possession and that the fishermen though a fluctuating body, have unity of interest and possession and could not be described as several independent trespassers.\n\nAs a result of these findings the decree of the trial Judge was modified and the plaintiff was given a permanent injunction restraining the principal defendants from fishing in the disputed fishery except during the Hilsa season (Margasir to Baisakh) during which the defendants were declared to have exclusive right of fishing.\n\nAst the decision of the . Hig1i Court no appeal was preferred by the defendants though tliey had only been found to be in possession _l)f the fishery in the status of mere tenants at will. The plaintiff challenged this decision and contested the finding that the defendants wee lawfully in possession of the fishery and could exercise their right of fishing during the Hilsa season exclusively.\n\nThe real grievance of the plaintiff seems to be that by the decision under appeal the High Court has declared a fluctuating body of persons tenants at will, and that such a tenancy cannot be determined as its constitution is liable to vary with each birth and death and with influx or efflux of fishermen to and from these villages. It was argued that the High Court has erroneously found that the defendants were in possession of the fishery and were in enjoyment of the fishing right under a lost grant and that the plaintiff's right to khas possession of the fishery had been extinguished by operation of articles 47 and 144 of the Limitation Act read with section 28 of the Act. It was contended that from the evidence placed on the record the only correct conclusion to draw was that from time to time some fishermen were allowed to fish in these waters by a number of landlords\n\nRajaBraia Surular D•b\n\nMoni Behara . and Othn's.\n\nMahaianJ.\n\nRa_; a Broja Sundar Deb\n\nMoni Behara\n\nand Others.\n\nMo.haj,,, n].\n\non payment of rent but that the prdent defendants were not the descendants of those fishermen who were occasionally granted leave to fish and that those isolated acts of letting the fishery were not connected with one another and from these it could not be inferred that the defendants or their predecessors were in continuous possession of the fishery on payment of a fixed rent and that the present defendants were mere trespassers and had no right to fish in the disputed fishery.\n\nIt was further contended that no title of any kind could be presumed to exist in the defendants to the fishery in suit and on the basis of a lost grant as in this case there was no capable grantee and that even title by adverse possession or prescription could not be acquired by them as they form an indeterminate and Auctuating body of persons. As regards the finding of the High Court that the plaintiff's suit was barred by article 47 of the Limitation Act and his title to khas • possession was extinguished by operation of the provisions of section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, it was contended that the proceedings that took place in the year 1918 were wrongly labelled under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and that in substance the order made in tho5e proceedings fell within the ambit of section 147 of the Code and therefore article 47 had no application to the case and the plaintiff was not bound to bring his suit within three years of that order to enforce his right. It was further contended that the order could only benefit the parties impleaded in those proceedings and the other defendants could not derive any assistance from it, that in any case the order could not bind the plaintiff to the extent of the share purchased by him from co-sharers not made parties in those proceedings and that the river having changed its course in the year 1925, the fishery as it stood in 1918 was no longer in existence and in the substituted fishery the plaintiff's right could not be held to have been extinguished by the effect of the order made in section 145, Criminal Procedure Code proceedings.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondents contended that the defendants had in the status of\n\ntenants an exclusive right to fish in the fishery and were entitled to remain in enjoyment of it on payment of a fixed rent of Rs. 135-7-0 in perpetuity, that the plaintiff's right of fishing in the fishery during Hilsa season had become extinguished by operation of article 47 and article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act.\n\nIt was denied that by a change in the course of the river, if any, the defendants' right had in any way been affected. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties it is necessary to state a few facts which emerge from the documentary evidence produced in the case.\n\nThe State of Orissa came under ihe British rule in the year 1803. A revenue settlement of the State was made in 1904-05.\n\nFrom the village note prepared during the settlement, it appears that Killa Marichpur was originally owned by one Padmalav Mangaraj and that during the time of his great grandson Balabhadra Mangaraj the estate was sold in auction for satisfaction of debts incurred by him and was purchased by (1) Mohan Bhagat, (2) Chakradhar Mahapatra, and (3) the ancestors of one Haziran Nisa Bibi in equal shares.\n\nFrom the jamabandi of the year 1842 (Exhibit C) it appears that the jalkor income of Killa Marichpur zamindari at that time was Rs. B5-7-0, and this was being realised from Hari Behera and Brundu Anukul Singh, two fishermen. It is not clear from this document in what status they were paying this amount and what was the nature of their tenancy.\n\nExhibit A is a kabuliyat of the year 1845 by Brundu Anukul Singh and Hari Behera in favour of Babu Mohan Bhagat and Bibi Mobarak Nisa, and it shows that these two fishermen took a lease of the fishing right in Devi river on payment of Rs. 135 as rent, from the landlords.\n\nIt was stated therein that these fishermen will catch fish from these waters according to former custom and will pay \"machidia sarbara\" of Rs. 135 in accordance with the instalments.\n\nThere is no indication in the kabuliyat that these two persons were executing it in a representative capacity or that the lease taken by them was of a permanent character or\n\nRajaBf!ia Sundar Dlb\n\nMarti.Btluwa\n\nand Othm\n\nMahqjaa J,\n\nRaja BroJa .Sundar Deb\n\nv. ..Mani Behara\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan].\n\nthat the rent payable was not liable to enhanceent in the future. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that these two persons executed the kabuliyat in a representative capacity and on behalf of all the fishermen who originally resided in four villages of Killa Marichpur and who subsequently came to reside in the nine villages mentioned in the plaint.\n\nThe only evidence placed on the record in support of the suggestion and relied upon by the High Court is the statement of D. \\V. 11 who was born some time in the year 1873, about 28 years after the execution of the kabuliyat, and who has no special means of knowledge to depose as to the relationship of persons mentioned in the kabuliyat with the defendants in the present case or to know the capacity of persons who executed the kabuliyat.\n\nIt is not possible, therefore, to hold that the kabuliyat was executed in a representative capacity by these two -persons and on behalf of all the persons interested in the presenc controversy.\n\nThere is no evidence on the record to prove the .state of affairs of this fishery between the years 1845 and\n\n1873. Reliance . was placed bv the defendants on a number of rent receipts produced by them in evidence.\n\nThe first of these is dated 30th .March, 1873, and was executed by one of the Mahapatra co-sharers on account of the instalment of fishery rent of \"Charkbati\" paid through Hari Behera and Rama Behera in the sum of Rs. 8-12-0.\n\nAll the co-sharers were not parties to this receipt and it is not stated what was the total rent payable for the whole fishery. On the 11th May, 1875, another receipt was executed by Bibi Masudannisa and others, co-share.rs of five anna four pies in the zamindari in favour of Hari Behera and Ananta Hehera and others for a sum of Rs. 18.\n\nIt seems that different co-sharers were giving permission to different persons to fish in the fishery on payment of certain sums of money. There is no evidence whatsoever connecting the receipt of 1873 given by two co-sharers to two persons with the receipt given by another set of co-sharers to these two persons and it is not possible to\n\nsay that these payments were made towards a fixed\n\nrent of Rs. 135-7-0 payable for the whole fishery.\n\nThe state of affairs of this fishery between 1876 to 1893 remains shrouded in mystery as no evidence for that period has been filed on the record. On the 1st May, 1894, Mohan Bhagat's descendant gave a receipt to Pandab Behera and Phagu Behera for Rs. 10, which was to be set off against fishery rent.\n\nIt is difficult to connect this receipt with the other receipts or to treat it as evidence in .support of the defendants' case of a permanent tenancy.\n\nSimilar receipts by different co-sharers in favour of different persons were executed on the 1st May, 1895, 5th May, 1896, 9th May, 1897, and 22nd October, 1899 ; but in' none of those receipts is any mention made of any fixed rental of Rs. 135-7-0 for the fishery in respect of the whole year and payable. to all the landlords. A printed rent receipt on behalf of one of the proprietors to Hurshi Behera and Agani Bchera of village Alsahi was given on the 22nd October, 1899.\n\nThe receipt relates to payment of tw:elv.e annas as arrears of fishery rent and in the receipt it is stated, that the cash rent payable was Rs. 150. This receipt, if it relates to the rent payable to all the co-sharers, is inconsistent with th~ defendants' case that the fishery had been leased out from time immemorial on a fixed rent of Rs. 135-7-0.\n\nOn the 23rd August, 1902, a receipt was given on behalf of nine anna seven pie co-sharers in the zamindari to Maguni Behera and Ram Behera of Kalia Kona and to Sapani Behera of some other village in the sum of Rs. 83-12,11 stating that the amount of total. rent of which Rs. 83-12-11 w:as the fractional share of these landlords was a sum of Rs. 135-7-0.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the defendants that the sum of Rs. 135-7-0 mentioned in this receipt was the identical amount that was. men. tione<l in the jamabandi of 1842 as P,?yable to the zamindars as income of the jalker and from this entry an inference should be drawn that the fishery had been continuously leased for this sum from 1842 to the date of this receipt. The coincidence reli!!d upon undoubtedly exists, but on that basis it is not possible to draw the inference suggested as such an inference . would be\n\nRajaBraja Sundar Deb v.\n\nMani Beharac\n\nand Othns.\n\nMahajan J ..\n\nliq/a Jhqja -Swuiar 1\"6\n\nMofti &hara\n\n\"\"'1 Otiw1.\n\nMa/14ian].\n\nof a conjectural nature. All these receipts are consist cnt with the contention of the plaintiff that from time to time different co-sharers permitted different fishermen to fish in the fishery on payment of a certain rental. A receipt similar to the one above mentioned was also executed on the 5th March, 1906, by certain co-sharers owning eight pies in the zamindari in favour of some fishermen, the annual rent being Rs. 135-7-0.\n\nThe \"Remarks Column\" states that i~ the rent is more than mentioned therein, the further amourtt due would be made good. Same remarks arc applicable to this receipt as to the previous one.\n\nThe next rent receipt is dated 19th April, 1907, and is for a sum of Rs. 168-6-0.\n\nNo inference either way can be drawn from this receipt. On the 21st June, 1912, a receipt was given in favour of twelve persons in respect of rent for the year 1317. The receipt was given by the nine anna seven pie co-sharer in the zamindari but it is not clear how this amount was made up. On the 4th February, 1914, a receipt was given by an eight pie co-sharer in the zamindari to 174 persons, aescribed as tenants and residing in different villages of the zamindari for a sum of Rs. 5-13-0 as rent for the year 1319.\n\nThe entry in the \"Remarks\" column is similar to the receipt above mentioned. The amount of annual rent is mentioned as Rs. 135-7-0 and it is stated that it is being paid in accordance with a decree of court No. 181.\n\nIt is difficult to connect this receipt with the other documents previously discussed.\n\nAnother receipt dated 30th March, 1914, was given by nine anna seven pie co-sharers in the fishery to twelve persons for the year\n\n1320. It seems to us that these occasional receipts given to different persons by different sets of co-sharers can lead to no definite conclusion in regard to the rights of the parties. They are consistent with the case argued on behalf of the plaintiff that by leave and licence a number of fishermen used to fish in the waters from time to time and they do not necessarily lead to the inference of the existence of a permanent tenancy of the fishery in favour of the defendants on a fixed rent of Rs. 135-7-0.\n\n\" '\n\nBy a registered deed dated 24th May, 1914, the plaintiff for the first time acquired an eight pie interest in the zamindari in the name of Smt.\n\nMahisthali Patamahadei, his wife, from one Balaram Das Bhagat, .a descendant of Mohan Bhagat.\n\nSubsequently he in his own name and sometimes in the name of the Rani purchased some further shares in the zarnindari and eventually became the owner of seven anna seven pie .and ten kranth share in it. The acquisition of interest by the plaintiff (Raja of Aul) in the zamindari coincides with the period of the first world war, the .aftermath, of which was a rise in prices.\n\nFish which was a cheap commodity and brought no appreciable income to the fishermen or to the owners became a s111urce of considerable income and this circumstance led to disputes between the owners of the fishery and the fishermen.\n\nA number of letters of the years 1914 to 1918 have been proved on behalf of the plaintiff :showing that he was deriving income from this fishery.\n\nSimilar letters for subsequent periods have also been proved but no regular accounts of the income so realized were produced in the case. The enhanced income of the fishery created a scramble for its possession between the landlords and the fishermen and there was an apprehension of a breach of pc; tce which resulted in proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. A report was made to the police on the 11th February, 1918, that a dispute had arisen which was likely to cause a breach of the peace between the landlords of Killa Marichpur and twelve fishermen in regard to the possession of Charikhati fisheries in Debi\n\nriver. The Magistrate on receipt of the police repotl issued notice to the parties for the 19th February, 1918, and decided the case on. the 10th June, 1918.\n\nFrom his order it appears that notice was given to all concerned and they were irivited to put their respective claims as regards the facts of the actual possession of the fishery in dispute before him. On behalf of certain co-sharers evidence was led to prove that they were in possession of the fishery through one Sundari Behera and other fishermen numbering about 100. The Rani\n\n&ija Bri a Sundar 'Eb\n\nMoni Be/UJra\n\nand Othlrs •\n\nMahajan],_\n\n114fer Brqja Sund\"' Deb v.\n\nMOllilhhara\n\nand Olhtrt.\n\nMa!iqjanJ.\n\nof Aul who had then eight pie interest in the zamindari as benamidar of her husband led evidence to establish that she was in possession of the fishery through fishermen employed by her agent.\n\nRam Behera, Hrushi Behera and other fishermen of the second party, twelve in number, led evidence to show that. they were in possession of the fishery on payment of rent and that the owners of the. zamindari had never been in actual possession of the fishery.. The Magistrate found that this contention was true. He disbelieved the story of the witnesses produced by the Rani of Aul, and also rejected the testimony of the witnesses produced by othc1 owners. Some Aul fishermen were produced on behalf of the Rani but their evidence was also not accepted. The same kind of documentary evidence that has been placed on this record on behalf of the plaintiff wn also placed before the Magistrate but it was not acceptea by him. From these proceedings, it further appears that all the sixteen anna owners of Killa Marichpur issued a notice to the. second party, the fishermen, for surrendering possession of the fishery with effect from September, 1917, but after service of notice they took no legal steps to eject them from possession of the fishery ; on the other hand, they took the law into their own hands and made attempts to take forcible possession of the fishery. These attempts, however, were unsuccessful. The result of these proceedings was that the Magistarte found that the fishermen (the second party) were in possession of the disputed fishery and he directd the issue of an order declaring their possession until evicted therefrom in due course of law and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction. This order indicates that though all the landlords were not named as parties in the case, yet all of them had notice of the proceedings and all of them were actually interested in turning out the fishermen from possession by forcible means, and notice had been given to them on behalf of all of them.\n\nIt also appears from those proceedings that though one dozen people were named as second party in the case there were certain other persons also interested in the\n\nfishery along with them, but it is difficult to ascertain their nwnber, names and addresses from these proceedings. Evidence has been led on behalf of the plaintiff to prove that afrer the determination of these proceeding5 the plaintiff has been deriving income from this fishery by leasing }}is right through the agency of fishermen of Aul. The High Court has not placed any reliance on this evidence and, in our opinion, rightly.\n\nIt is not possible to believe that after a successful fight in the criminal court, the fishermen would have allowed the men of the Raja or of the Rani to fish in these waters during the Hilsa season.\n\nBoth parties led oral evidence to prove that each party exercised exclusive right of fishing during Hilsa season in the fishery.\n\nWe have been taken through the evidence and after examining it, have reached the conclusion that it is of an unsatisfactory character and valuable rights cannot be decided on its footing. No steps were taken by the landlords to question the order of the Magistrate within three years from its date as required by article 47 of the Limitation Act.\n\nThe landlords, how~ ever, refused to receive any rent from these persons after the termination of the proceedings and they have been depositing it in court under the provisions of the Orissa Tenancy Act.\n\nThe last purchase by the Raja of Aul of some interest in the zamindari was made in the year 1935 and having acquired by this date a substantial interest in it and having discovered that the fishery was a paying proposition, he brought this suit in the year 1936 on the allegations set out above and asserted that since about three years the defendants had started disturb.. ing his possession of the fishery in dispute.\n\nIn the circumstances mentioned above this assertion cannot be taken seriously.\n\nIn order to get out of the effects of the proceedings urider section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, he alleged that he had been in possession of the fishery in spite of the proceedings taken under that section and that his possession had only been disturbed recently. The evidence on this point was 2-62 S. C. India/58\n\nR4fa Br<!fo; SOllrttlar D11>\n\nM\"\"i lhltllrt1 tl1ld Oth1r1.\n\nMoluija11J.\n\nRiga Br1!i4 Su\"'1ar Ih6\n\nrejected by the High Court and we sec no reason to disagree with that finding.\n\nIt is now convenient to consider the different points canvassed before us by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. We find it difficult to uphold the view of the High Court that the defendants were in possession of the disputed fishery under a lost gant.\n\nThis doctrine has no application to the case of inhabitants of particular loc; ilities seeking to establish rights of user to some piece of land or water. As pointed out by Lord Radcliffe in Lakshmidhar Misra V. Rangalal ( 1) the doctrine of lost grant originated as a technical device to enable title to be made by prescription despite the impossibility of proving immemorial user and that since it originated in grant, its owners, whether original or by devolution, had to be such persons as were capable of being the recipients of a grant, and that a right exercisable by the inhabitants of a village from time to time is neither attached to any estate in land nor is it such a right as is capable of being made the subject of a grant, there being no admissible grantees. Reference in this connection may be made to a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Asrabulla V. Kiamatulla(•) wherein the law on this subject has been examined in some detail. In that case the question arose whether the right of pasturage claimed by a whole body of villagers could be acquired by grant, express or presumed. Aft, r an examination of a number of English and Indian cases it was held that no lost grant could be presumed in favour of a Buetuating and unascertained body of persons who constitute the inhabitants of a village and that such a right could only be acquired by custom.\n\nThe defendants in this case are a fluctuating body of persons and their number increases or decreases by each birth or death or by influx or clBux of fishermen to or from these villages. From the evidence of D. V•!. 11 it appears that formerly the Kouts (fishermen) claiming the right to fish were residents of four villages, then some of them shifted to other villages on account of their\n\n(1) A.l.R. 1950 P.C. 56. (•) A.l.R. 1937 Cal. •45.\n\nhouses being washed away, and settled themselves in -other villages. At the time of the suit they were residing in nine villages. He further deposed that during the last ten or twelve years there were 600 bohanias and that their families increased, their present number being 846. It is in evidence that since this evidence was given their number has gone up to 1500. From the documentary evidence it appears that up to the year 1918 their number was not very large. Only .twelve persons were impleaded in the section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, proceedings and it was said that there were som~ more interested. The maximum number given in one or two receipts is 174.\n\nIt is again not possible to hold that the fishermen residing in these villages arc a corporate body and that being fishermen by profession it has the effect of incorporating them. We find ourselves unable to sub- :Scribe to the view of the High Court that the defendants constitute some kind of a unit simply because they are a body having a common interest to fish in this fishery; unless the defendants-fishermen form a corporate body, or it is found that a trust was created for their benefit, such a body of persons could acquire no right by the doctrine of lost grant. A right to fish from the fishery based on mere inhabitancy is capable of an increase almost indefinite and if the right exists in a body which might increase in number it would necessarily lead to the destruction of the subject matter of the grantt Moreover, there could not be a valid grant to a body so incapable of succession in any reasonable sense of the word, so as to confer a right upon each succeeding inhabitant.\n\nFor the reasons given above, the defendants' right to remain in possession of the fishery on the basis of ::i lost grant or on the basis of prescription or adverse possession stands negatived.\n\nAll that appears from the evidence is that a number of fishermen from time to time have been. exercising the right of fishing with the leave and licence of some of the owners. This is not sufficient for the acquisition of the right either by\n\nRaja Braja Sundar Dt~\n\nMani Bthara\n\nand Others.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nRaja BraJa $uNlar D16\n\nv. • \"ttni Bthara .JIUi 0th,,,.\n\n-'lfalugan ]_.\n\nadverse possession or by prescription. finding can be given in their favour as does not establish that they have been formly the same amount of rent .\n\n[1951}\n\nFurther, no the evidence paying uni-\n\nThe next finding of the High Court that the landlords have lost their right to khas possession of the fishery in dispute by reason of the operation of article 47 of the Indian Limitation Act is, in our opinion, sound.\n\nThe High Court, however, was not right in holding that the order made in the section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, proceedings was not binding on the plaintiff to the extent of five pies share. Its true scope and effect do not seem to have been fully appreciated.\n\nThe order appears to have been made after nqtice to :ill the landlords and was brought about by reason of the action of all of them and binds the full sixteen a1llla interest in the zamindari. In clear and unambiguous terms the Magistrate declared that the second party were in exclusive possession of the disputed fishery and that the landlords had no right to disturb their possession and they were directed to being a suit to establish their right to possession. This they failed to do with the result that the order became final and the right of the landlords to get into possession of the fishery became extinguished.\n\nThis order therefore affirmed the defendants' possession of the fishery on payment of a certain rental. This right, however, can only be exercised by those who were parties to the section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, proceedings or their successors in interest.\n\nIt was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the proceedings that took place in the year 1918 were in substance under section 147, Criminal Procedure Code, and were wrongly labelled under section 145 of the Code.\n\nWe are not able to accede to this contention because the dispute raised in the year 1918 related to possession of the fishery itself and was a dispute concerning any water or the boundaries thereof in the language of section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-section 2 of section 145 provides that for the purpose of the section the expression \"land or water\" includes fisheries. It\n\nwas then argued that in any case the benefit of the order made under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code,\n\ncould only be taken by the persons in whose favour that order was made ani:l that it could not operate for the benefit of all the 846 fishermen represented by the eighteen defendants or in favour ·, of all fishermen who would oome to reside in these nine villages in times to come. In our opinion, this contention bas force and the High Court was in error in holding otherwise.\n\nThere is no evidence whatsoever to show that besides the twelve persons mentioned as second party in the section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, proceedings who else was represented by them and we are therefore bound to hold that the benefit of that order can only be given to those defendants who arc . represented by those twelve persons.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant gave us a list of the persons who were parties in Section 145 proceedings and of those out of the <lefendants who stand in their shoes.\n\nAccording to this list, defendants 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 7, 9 and 12 are the persons who themselves or through their predecessors in interest were parties in the former case arid are entitled to the benefit of the result of those proceedings. All the other defendants, whether impleaded' personally in this suit or in a representative capacity, or those whom they represent, are not entitled to take advantage <>f those proceedings. The result therefore is that the <lefcndants above mentioned only are entitled to remain in possession of . the fishery on payment of a rent of Rs. 135-7-0 per annum till it is enhanced in due course of law or for good cause they lose their right to remain in possession of the fishery. In an earlier litigation it has been decided that the right to possession of the fishery for fishing during Hilsa season is not assignable or transferable, it however can be enjoyed by the heirs and successors.\n\nThe contention that there has been a change in the\n\nourse of the river and that the fishery now in , dispute is not the same fishery which was in dispute on the proceedings of 1918 cannot be sustained.\n\nWe see no reason to differ from the view of the High Court,\n\nRajaBroja Sundar D•b\n\nMooi Behara\n\nand Othtrs.\n\nMahajan J,\n\nRajaBrl.Jia S.Niar Di•\n\nMoni Bl/wo\n\nand Ot!Ws.\n\n• Vahaju].\n\nthat the change in the course of the river has not in any way affected the defendants' possession as the channels. whether old or new, which comprise the Madhurdia or Charkhati fishery form one connected sheet of water.\n\nIt is well settled that the fish follow the course of the river and the fishermen follow the fish .\n\nIt was then argued that an exclusive right of fishing. could not be acquired in respect of a particular kind. of fish and during any particular season. This argument is not tenable in view of section 145, Criminal .Procedure Code,. proceedings. Moreover an exclusive: right of fishing in a given place means that no other person has a coextensive right with the claimant of the: right. The niere fact that some other person has a right to a particular class of fish in the fishery or that another person is entitled to fish at a, certain time of the year does not destroy die right of exclusive fishing . in any manner (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England,.\n\nHailsham Edn., Vol. 15, para. 59).\n\nThe result is that . the appeal is allowed partially. the decree of the.\n\nHigh . Court is modified and the: plaintiff's suit for a declaration and injunction is decreed as follows :-'- ·\n\n(i) It is declared that the plaintiff is entitled to fish in the disputed fishery except during the Hilsa season ( Margasir to Daisakh) during which season defendants l, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 12 have an. exclusive right of fishing in the fishery in respect. to Hilsa fish which right they can exercise either personally or with the help of other fishermen, on payment of a rent of Rs. 135-7-0 per year till it is enhanced in due course ?f law o~ for food cause they lose their right to remain m possess10n o the fishery ;· .\n\n(ii) The defendants are restrained. ftom interfering with his right of fishing during the months during which the defendants named above have not the exclusive right of fishing;\n\n(iii) That defendants other than defendants I, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 12 have no right of any kind whatsoever\n\n.RAM SINGH\n\n\"· THE STATE Of DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\nBALRAJ KHANNA\n\nt'.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\nRAM NATH KALIA.\n\n• t'.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.J\n\nConstitution of lnaia, Arts. 19(1) & (2), 22 (5)-Freedom of speech-Preventive detention to prevent speeches with a view to maintain public ordei-Omission to state objectionable passages ill grounds supplied-Legality of detention.\n\nThe District Magistrate of Delhi, \"being satisfied that with a view to the maintenance of public order in Delhi it is necessary to do so\" ordered the detention of the petitioners under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.\n\nThe grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners were \"that your speeches generally in the past and particularly on the 13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi has been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Mussalmans and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making sucft speeches it is necessary to make the said order.\" The petitioners contended that under the Constitution the maintenance of public order was not a purpose for which restriction can be imposed on the freedom of\n\nJfpil, 6.", "total_entities": 157, "entities": [{"text": "RAJA BRAJA SUNDAR DEB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Raja BroJa .Sundar Deb", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MONI BEHARA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MONI BEHARA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1466, "end_char": 1477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1937, "end_char": 1947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1955, "end_char": 1969, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Moni Beluzra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2455, "end_char": 2467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An exclusive right of fishing in a given place means that no other person has a co-extensive right with the claimant of the\n\nrigh~ The mere fact that some other person has a right to a\n\nparncular class of fish in the fishery or that another person is\n\nMarch 21;\n\n&jaBr41a Sumlar Deb\n\nMoni Beluzra\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2482, "end_char": 2489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan].", "canonical_name": "MahaianJ."}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2775, "end_char": 2783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the judgment and decree dated the 21st April, 1943, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Faz!"}}, {"text": "S. C. Chatterji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2794, "end_char": 2809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali C. J. and S. C. Chatterji J.) in First Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2961, "end_char": 2972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohar Lal (G. P. Das, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. P. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 2983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohar Lal (G. P. Das, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. N. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3015, "end_char": 3024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Das (Sir Kant Mahanti, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Kant Mahanti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3030, "end_char": 3042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Das (Sir Kant Mahanti, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The dispute in this appeal is between the fishermen residing in nine villages of Killa Marichpur, a permanently settled zamindari in the Puri Collectorate (Orissa State) and the Raja of Aul, the owner of seven annas, seven pies, and ten karants share in the zamindari.", "canonical_name": "MahaianJ."}}, {"text": "Killa Marichpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "62, 63 and 64, were brought by the Raja of Aul against defendants 1 to 18 on behalf of themselves and other fishermen residing in the nine villages of Killa Marichpur for a declaration in respect of his rights in the three above mentioned fisheries."}}, {"text": "Baisakh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4623, "end_char": 4630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fish in this fishery during the Hilsa season (Margasir to Baisakh) and that the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration or an injunction in respect of that period."}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5474, "end_char": 5485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5487, "end_char": 5510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raja Brqja Sundar Deb", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6584, "end_char": 6605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Brqja Sundar Deb\n\nMani Behara and Othns.", "canonical_name": "Raja BroJa .Sundar Deb"}}, {"text": "article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9846, "end_char": 9856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9871, "end_char": 9885, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "RajaBrda Sundor Deb\n\nMani Bthara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10684, "end_char": 10716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One would have thought that in view of this finding the plaintiff's suit would have been dismissed\n\nRajaBrda Sundor Deb\n\nMani Bthara\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Mani Be!wro", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10768, "end_char": 10779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan]\n\nRojaBrq.ia Sund\"' D, b v.\n\nMani Be!wro\n\nand Others\n\nMahajan]."}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11345, "end_char": 11356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11358, "end_char": 11381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11583, "end_char": 11593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11601, "end_char": 11615, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11825, "end_char": 11839, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12866, "end_char": 12877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baisakh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13787, "end_char": 13794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of these findings the decree of the trial Judge was modified and the plaintiff was given a permanent injunction restraining the principal defendants from fishing in the disputed fishery except during the Hilsa season (Margasir to Baisakh) during which the defendants were declared to have exclusive right of fishing."}}, {"text": "articles 47 and 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14879, "end_char": 14898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14906, "end_char": 14920, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14931, "end_char": 14941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MahaianJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15206, "end_char": 15215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MahaianJ.\n\nRa_; a Broja Sundar Deb\n\nMoni Behara\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "MahaianJ."}}, {"text": "Moni Behara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15242, "end_char": 15253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MahaianJ.\n\nRa_; a Broja Sundar Deb\n\nMoni Behara\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "MONI BEHARA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Mo.haj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15268, "end_char": 15274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mo.haj,,, n]."}}, {"text": "article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16196, "end_char": 16206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16214, "end_char": 16228, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16315, "end_char": 16325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16340, "end_char": 16354, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16455, "end_char": 16466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16468, "end_char": 16491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16576, "end_char": 16587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16614, "end_char": 16624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17337, "end_char": 17348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17350, "end_char": 17373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17747, "end_char": 17757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "article 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17762, "end_char": 17773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17788, "end_char": 17802, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18096, "end_char": 18111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Orissa came under ihe British rule in the year 1803."}}, {"text": "Killa Marichpur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18284, "end_char": 18299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the village note prepared during the settlement, it appears that Killa Marichpur was originally owned by one Padmalav Mangaraj and that during the time of his great grandson Balabhadra Mangaraj the estate was sold in auction for satisfaction of debts incurred by him and was purchased by (1) Mohan Bhagat, (2) Chakradhar Mahapatra, and (3) the ancestors of one Haziran Nisa Bibi in equal shares.", "canonical_name": "Killa Marichpur zamindari"}}, {"text": "Padmalav Mangaraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18328, "end_char": 18345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the village note prepared during the settlement, it appears that Killa Marichpur was originally owned by one Padmalav Mangaraj and that during the time of his great grandson Balabhadra Mangaraj the estate was sold in auction for satisfaction of debts incurred by him and was purchased by (1) Mohan Bhagat, (2) Chakradhar Mahapatra, and (3) the ancestors of one Haziran Nisa Bibi in equal shares."}}, {"text": "Balabhadra Mangaraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18393, "end_char": 18412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the village note prepared during the settlement, it appears that Killa Marichpur was originally owned by one Padmalav Mangaraj and that during the time of his great grandson Balabhadra Mangaraj the estate was sold in auction for satisfaction of debts incurred by him and was purchased by (1) Mohan Bhagat, (2) Chakradhar Mahapatra, and (3) the ancestors of one Haziran Nisa Bibi in equal shares."}}, {"text": "Mohan Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18511, "end_char": 18523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the village note prepared during the settlement, it appears that Killa Marichpur was originally owned by one Padmalav Mangaraj and that during the time of his great grandson Balabhadra Mangaraj the estate was sold in auction for satisfaction of debts incurred by him and was purchased by (1) Mohan Bhagat, (2) Chakradhar Mahapatra, and (3) the ancestors of one Haziran Nisa Bibi in equal shares."}}, {"text": "Chakradhar Mahapatra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18529, "end_char": 18549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the village note prepared during the settlement, it appears that Killa Marichpur was originally owned by one Padmalav Mangaraj and that during the time of his great grandson Balabhadra Mangaraj the estate was sold in auction for satisfaction of debts incurred by him and was purchased by (1) Mohan Bhagat, (2) Chakradhar Mahapatra, and (3) the ancestors of one Haziran Nisa Bibi in equal shares."}}, {"text": "Haziran Nisa Bibi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18580, "end_char": 18597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the village note prepared during the settlement, it appears that Killa Marichpur was originally owned by one Padmalav Mangaraj and that during the time of his great grandson Balabhadra Mangaraj the estate was sold in auction for satisfaction of debts incurred by him and was purchased by (1) Mohan Bhagat, (2) Chakradhar Mahapatra, and (3) the ancestors of one Haziran Nisa Bibi in equal shares."}}, {"text": "Killa Marichpur zamindari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18701, "end_char": 18726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the jamabandi of the year 1842 (Exhibit C) it appears that the jalkor income of Killa Marichpur zamindari at that time was Rs.", "canonical_name": "Killa Marichpur zamindari"}}, {"text": "Hari Behera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18789, "end_char": 18800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B5-7-0, and this was being realised from Hari Behera and Brundu Anukul Singh, two fishermen."}}, {"text": "Brundu Anukul Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18805, "end_char": 18824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B5-7-0, and this was being realised from Hari Behera and Brundu Anukul Singh, two fishermen."}}, {"text": "Babu Mohan Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19057, "end_char": 19074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit A is a kabuliyat of the year 1845 by Brundu Anukul Singh and Hari Behera in favour of Babu Mohan Bhagat and Bibi Mobarak Nisa, and it shows that these two fishermen took a lease of the fishing right in Devi river on payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bibi Mobarak Nisa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19079, "end_char": 19096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit A is a kabuliyat of the year 1845 by Brundu Anukul Singh and Hari Behera in favour of Babu Mohan Bhagat and Bibi Mobarak Nisa, and it shows that these two fishermen took a lease of the fishing right in Devi river on payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "RajaBf!ia Sundar Dlb\n\nMarti.Btluwa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19595, "end_char": 19629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no indication in the kabuliyat that these two persons were executing it in a representative capacity or that the lease taken by them was of a permanent character or\n\nRajaBf!ia Sundar Dlb\n\nMarti."}}, {"text": "Mahqjaa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19641, "end_char": 19648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Btluwa\n\nand Othm\n\nMahqjaa J,\n\nRaja BroJa .Sundar Deb\n\nv. ..Mani Behara\n\nand Others."}}, {"text": "Raja BroJa .Sundar Deb", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19653, "end_char": 19675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Btluwa\n\nand Othm\n\nMahqjaa J,\n\nRaja BroJa .Sundar Deb\n\nv. ..Mani Behara\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Raja BroJa .Sundar Deb"}}, {"text": "Mani Behara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19682, "end_char": 19693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Btluwa\n\nand Othm\n\nMahqjaa J,\n\nRaja BroJa .Sundar Deb\n\nv. ..Mani Behara\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "MONI BEHARA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "30th .March, 1873", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20964, "end_char": 20981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of these is dated 30th .March, 1873, and was executed by one of the Mahapatra co-sharers on account of the instalment of fishery rent of \"Charkbati\" paid through Hari Behera and Rama Behera in the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Rama Behera", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21124, "end_char": 21135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of these is dated 30th .March, 1873, and was executed by one of the Mahapatra co-sharers on account of the instalment of fishery rent of \"Charkbati\" paid through Hari Behera and Rama Behera in the sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Rama Behera"}}, {"text": "11th May, 1875", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21298, "end_char": 21312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th May, 1875, another receipt was executed by Bibi Masudannisa and others, co-share.rs of five anna four pies in the zamindari in favour of Hari Behera and Ananta Hehera and others for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bibi Masudannisa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21346, "end_char": 21362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th May, 1875, another receipt was executed by Bibi Masudannisa and others, co-share.rs of five anna four pies in the zamindari in favour of Hari Behera and Ananta Hehera and others for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ananta Hehera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21456, "end_char": 21469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 11th May, 1875, another receipt was executed by Bibi Masudannisa and others, co-share.rs of five anna four pies in the zamindari in favour of Hari Behera and Ananta Hehera and others for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "1st May, 1894", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22101, "end_char": 22114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st May, 1894, Mohan Bhagat's descendant gave a receipt to Pandab Behera and Phagu Behera for Rs."}}, {"text": "Pandab Behera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22160, "end_char": 22173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st May, 1894, Mohan Bhagat's descendant gave a receipt to Pandab Behera and Phagu Behera for Rs."}}, {"text": "Phagu Behera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22178, "end_char": 22190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 1st May, 1894, Mohan Bhagat's descendant gave a receipt to Pandab Behera and Phagu Behera for Rs."}}, {"text": "1st May, 1895", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22495, "end_char": 22508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar receipts by different co-sharers in favour of different persons were executed on the 1st May, 1895, 5th May, 1896, 9th May, 1897, and 22nd October, 1899 ; but in' none of those receipts is any mention made of any fixed rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "5th May, 1896", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22510, "end_char": 22523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar receipts by different co-sharers in favour of different persons were executed on the 1st May, 1895, 5th May, 1896, 9th May, 1897, and 22nd October, 1899 ; but in' none of those receipts is any mention made of any fixed rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "9th May, 1897", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22525, "end_char": 22538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar receipts by different co-sharers in favour of different persons were executed on the 1st May, 1895, 5th May, 1896, 9th May, 1897, and 22nd October, 1899 ; but in' none of those receipts is any mention made of any fixed rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "22nd October, 1899", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22544, "end_char": 22562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar receipts by different co-sharers in favour of different persons were executed on the 1st May, 1895, 5th May, 1896, 9th May, 1897, and 22nd October, 1899 ; but in' none of those receipts is any mention made of any fixed rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "Hurshi Behera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22793, "end_char": 22806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A printed rent receipt on behalf of one of the proprietors to Hurshi Behera and Agani Bchera of village Alsahi was given on the 22nd October, 1899.", "canonical_name": "Hurshi Behera"}}, {"text": "Agani Bchera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22811, "end_char": 22823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A printed rent receipt on behalf of one of the proprietors to Hurshi Behera and Agani Bchera of village Alsahi was given on the 22nd October, 1899."}}, {"text": "Alsahi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22835, "end_char": 22841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A printed rent receipt on behalf of one of the proprietors to Hurshi Behera and Agani Bchera of village Alsahi was given on the 22nd October, 1899."}}, {"text": "23rd August, 1902", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23240, "end_char": 23257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd August, 1902, a receipt was given on behalf of nine anna seven pie co-sharers in the zamindari to Maguni Behera and Ram Behera of Kalia Kona and to Sapani Behera of some other village in the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Maguni Behera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23343, "end_char": 23356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd August, 1902, a receipt was given on behalf of nine anna seven pie co-sharers in the zamindari to Maguni Behera and Ram Behera of Kalia Kona and to Sapani Behera of some other village in the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ram Behera", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23361, "end_char": 23371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd August, 1902, a receipt was given on behalf of nine anna seven pie co-sharers in the zamindari to Maguni Behera and Ram Behera of Kalia Kona and to Sapani Behera of some other village in the sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Rama Behera"}}, {"text": "Kalia Kona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23375, "end_char": 23385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd August, 1902, a receipt was given on behalf of nine anna seven pie co-sharers in the zamindari to Maguni Behera and Ram Behera of Kalia Kona and to Sapani Behera of some other village in the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Sapani Behera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23393, "end_char": 23406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 23rd August, 1902, a receipt was given on behalf of nine anna seven pie co-sharers in the zamindari to Maguni Behera and Ram Behera of Kalia Kona and to Sapani Behera of some other village in the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24163, "end_char": 24170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J ..\n\nliq/a Jhqja -Swuiar 1\"6\n\nMofti &hara\n\n\"\"'1 Otiw1.", "canonical_name": "MahaianJ."}}, {"text": "Mofti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24202, "end_char": 24207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J ..\n\nliq/a Jhqja -Swuiar 1\"6\n\nMofti &hara\n\n\"\"'1 Otiw1."}}, {"text": "5th March, 1906", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24536, "end_char": 24551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A receipt similar to the one above mentioned was also executed on the 5th March, 1906, by certain co-sharers owning eight pies in the zamindari in favour of some fishermen, the annual rent being Rs."}}, {"text": "19th April, 1907", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24896, "end_char": 24912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next rent receipt is dated 19th April, 1907, and is for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "21st June, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25011, "end_char": 25026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 21st June, 1912, a receipt was given in favour of twelve persons in respect of rent for the year 1317."}}, {"text": "30th March, 1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25797, "end_char": 25813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another receipt dated 30th March, 1914, was given by nine anna seven pie co-sharers in the fishery to twelve persons for the year\n\n1320."}}, {"text": "24th May, 1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26451, "end_char": 26465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" '\n\nBy a registered deed dated 24th May, 1914, the plaintiff for the first time acquired an eight pie interest in the zamindari in the name of Smt."}}, {"text": "Mahisthali Patamahadei", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26569, "end_char": 26591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahisthali Patamahadei, his wife, from one Balaram Das Bhagat, .a descendant of Mohan Bhagat."}}, {"text": "Balaram Das Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26612, "end_char": 26630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahisthali Patamahadei, his wife, from one Balaram Das Bhagat, .a descendant of Mohan Bhagat."}}, {"text": "s111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27151, "end_char": 27155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27762, "end_char": 27773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27775, "end_char": 27798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "11th February, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27839, "end_char": 27858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A report was made to the police on the 11th February, 1918, that a dispute had arisen which was likely to cause a breach of the peace between the landlords of Killa Marichpur and twelve fishermen in regard to the possession of Charikhati fisheries in Debi\n\nriver."}}, {"text": "Debi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28051, "end_char": 28055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A report was made to the police on the 11th February, 1918, that a dispute had arisen which was likely to cause a breach of the peace between the landlords of Killa Marichpur and twelve fishermen in regard to the possession of Charikhati fisheries in Debi\n\nriver."}}, {"text": "10th June, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28198, "end_char": 28213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 10th June, 1918."}}, {"text": "Sundari Behera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28533, "end_char": 28547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of certain co-sharers evidence was led to prove that they were in possession of the fishery through one Sundari Behera and other fishermen numbering about 100."}}, {"text": "MOllilhhara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28690, "end_char": 28701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rani\n\n&ija Bri a Sundar 'Eb\n\nMoni Be/UJra\n\nand Othlrs •\n\nMahajan],_\n\n114fer Brqja Sund\"' Deb v.\n\nMOllilhhara\n\nand Olhtrt."}}, {"text": "Ram Behera", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28922, "end_char": 28932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Behera, Hrushi Behera and other fishermen of the second party, twelve in number, led evidence to show that.", "canonical_name": "Rama Behera"}}, {"text": "Hrushi Behera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28934, "end_char": 28947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Behera, Hrushi Behera and other fishermen of the second party, twelve in number, led evidence to show that.", "canonical_name": "Hurshi Behera"}}, {"text": "Rani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29431, "end_char": 29435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some Aul fishermen were produced on behalf of the Rani but their evidence was also not accepted."}}, {"text": "article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32004, "end_char": 32014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32022, "end_char": 32036, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32806, "end_char": 32817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32819, "end_char": 32842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Radcliffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33694, "end_char": 33703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Lord Radcliffe in Lakshmidhar Misra V. Rangalal ( 1) the doctrine of lost grant originated as a technical device to enable title to be made by prescription despite the impossibility of proving immemorial user and that since it originated in grant, its owners, whether original or by devolution, had to be such persons as were capable of being the recipients of a grant, and that a right exercisable by the inhabitants of a village from time to time is neither attached to any estate in land nor is it such a right as is capable of being made the subject of a grant, there being no admissible grantees."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34359, "end_char": 34378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference in this connection may be made to a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Asrabulla V. Kiamatulla(•) wherein the law on this subject has been examined in some detail."}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35849, "end_char": 35860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35862, "end_char": 35885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raja Braja Sundar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37445, "end_char": 37462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is not sufficient for the acquisition of the right either by\n\nRaja Braja Sundar Dt~\n\nMani Bthara\n\nand Others.", "canonical_name": "Raja BroJa .Sundar Deb"}}, {"text": "Raja BraJa $uNlar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37506, "end_char": 37523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nRaja BraJa $uNlar D16\n\nv. • \"ttni Bthara .JIUi 0th,,,.", "canonical_name": "Raja BroJa .Sundar Deb"}}, {"text": "ttni Bthara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37535, "end_char": 37546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nRaja BraJa $uNlar D16\n\nv. • \"ttni Bthara .JIUi 0th,,,."}}, {"text": "article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37927, "end_char": 37937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37952, "end_char": 37966, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38072, "end_char": 38083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38085, "end_char": 38108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39064, "end_char": 39075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39077, "end_char": 39100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39281, "end_char": 39292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39294, "end_char": 39317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39351, "end_char": 39362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39594, "end_char": 39605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39607, "end_char": 39630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39636, "end_char": 39645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39649, "end_char": 39660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39830, "end_char": 39841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39843, "end_char": 39866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40353, "end_char": 40364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40366, "end_char": 40389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40676, "end_char": 40687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "RajaBroja Sundar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41951, "end_char": 41967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We see no reason to differ from the view of the High Court,\n\nRajaBroja Sundar D•b\n\nMooi Behara\n\nand Othtrs.", "canonical_name": "Raja BroJa .Sundar Deb"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42585, "end_char": 42596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43037, "end_char": 43044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in any manner (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England,."}}, {"text": ".RAM SINGH", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44085, "end_char": 44095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ftom interfering with his right of fishing during the months during which the defendants named above have not the exclusive right of fishing;\n\n(iii) That defendants other than defendants I, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 12 have no right of any kind whatsoever\n\n.RAM SINGH\n\n\"· THE STATE Of DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\nBALRAJ KHANNA\n\nt'."}}, {"text": "STATE Of DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44104, "end_char": 44118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ftom interfering with his right of fishing during the months during which the defendants named above have not the exclusive right of fishing;\n\n(iii) That defendants other than defendants I, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 12 have no right of any kind whatsoever\n\n.RAM SINGH\n\n\"· THE STATE Of DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\nBALRAJ KHANNA\n\nt'.", "canonical_name": "ST ATE OF DELHI"}}, {"text": "ST ATE OF DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44156, "end_char": 44171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\nRAM NATH KALIA.", "canonical_name": "ST ATE OF DELHI"}}, {"text": "HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44248, "end_char": 44261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.J\n\nConstitution of lnaia, Arts."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44269, "end_char": 44285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.J\n\nConstitution of lnaia, Arts."}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44287, "end_char": 44305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.J\n\nConstitution of lnaia, Arts."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44307, "end_char": 44316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.J\n\nConstitution of lnaia, Arts."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44321, "end_char": 44332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.J\n\nConstitution of lnaia, Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44362, "end_char": 44373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44574, "end_char": 44602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate of Delhi, \"being satisfied that with a view to the maintenance of public order in Delhi it is necessary to do so\" ordered the detention of the petitioners under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44755, "end_char": 44759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44767, "end_char": 44797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "13th and 15th August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44928, "end_char": 44954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners were \"that your speeches generally in the past and particularly on the 13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi has been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Mussalmans and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making sucft speeches it is necessary to make the said order.\""}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44978, "end_char": 44983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners were \"that your speeches generally in the past and particularly on the 13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi has been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Mussalmans and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making sucft speeches it is necessary to make the said order.\""}}, {"text": "Mussalmans", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45043, "end_char": 45053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners were \"that your speeches generally in the past and particularly on the 13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi has been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Mussalmans and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making sucft speeches it is necessary to make the said order.\""}}, {"text": "Jfpil", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 45378, "end_char": 45383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners contended that under the Constitution the maintenance of public order was not a purpose for which restriction can be imposed on the freedom of\n\nJfpil, 6."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_451_473_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n.RAM SINGH\n\n\"· THE STATE Of DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\nBALRAJ KHANNA\n\nt'.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\nRAM NATH KALIA.\n\n• t'.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.J\n\nConstitution of lnaia, Arts. 19(1) & (2), 22 (5)-Freedom of speech-Preventive detention to prevent speeches with a view to maintain public ordei-Omission to state objectionable passages ill grounds supplied-Legality of detention.\n\nThe District Magistrate of Delhi, \"being satisfied that with a view to the maintenance of public order in Delhi it is necessary to do so\" ordered the detention of the petitioners under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.\n\nThe grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners were \"that your speeches generally in the past and particularly on the 13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi has been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Mussalmans and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making sucft speeches it is necessary to make the said order.\" The petitioners contended that under the Constitution the maintenance of public order was not a purpose for which restriction can be imposed on the freedom of\n\nJfpil, 6.\n\n11 ... s • .,. \"\"' 011wr, ...\n\nTIN Stalt ef\n\nD1lhi and\n\nAnother.\n\nspeech guaranieed by Art. 19 (1) and that the grounds commuI; i. cated were too vague and inde6nitc to enable them Io make a representation and the provisions of Art. 22 (5) of the Constiiution were not complied with, and their detention was therefore ultra virtt and illegal :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (KANIA C. J., PATANJ.UI SASTRI, Mm• CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. D.u am!\n\nVIVIAN Bos. JI.) th.at though personal liberty is suffi.cicnrly comprehensive to include the freedoms enumerated in Art. 19 (1) and its deprivation would result in the extinction of rho~ -freedoms, the Constitution has treated these civil liberties as disinct fundamental rights an<l made separate provisions in Arts. 19, 21 and 22 as to Ihe 1imit:>- tioos and conditions subject to which alone they could be taken a\\vay or abridged. Consequently, c\\'Cn though a law which restricts freedom of speech ::ind cxprcsion \\vhich i.s not <lirected solely ag:iinst the undermining of the .o; ecurity of the State or its ovcrthro\\\\· but is concerned gcncrlly in the interests of public order 111ay not fall within the reservation of cl. (2) of Art. 19 and may therefore be void, :in orJcr of preventive detention cannot be held to be invali<l merely bc, ause the detention is n1ade with a view to prevent the making of spe<:ches prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\n\nThe decisions in Rrij Bl1ushan and Anotller v. Tiie Stale of De/Iii ( 1 ) and Romesh Thapparv. TheS111te Madra1(1) arc not inconsistent with. the decision in A .. 1'.. Gopalan\n\nv. Tiie S1111e(1 ). .\n\nHeld per\n\nKANIA C. J., PATANjAl.I SAsTRI and S. R. DAS JJ. (Mum CHAND MAHAJAN and BosE JJ. dissenting)-As the time and place at which the speeches \\Vere alleged to haye heen made and their general nature and effect, namely, that they were such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims were also stated in the grounds communicated, they were not too vague or indefinite to enable the petitioners to 1nake an effective representation and the detention cannot be held to be illegal on the ground that Art. 22 ( 5) was not complied with.\n\nPer MEuR CHAND M.<HAJ AN and BoSE JI. (contra )-In the absence of any indication in the grounds as to the nature of the \\.Vords used by the petitioners in their speeches, fron1 which an inference has been drawn against them, the petitioners would not be able fully to exercise their fundamental right of making a representation and as there were no such indic..1tions in the grounds supplied.\n\nJhcrC \\Vas a noncompliancc with the provisions of cl.\n\n(5) of, Art. 22 and the detention was illegal.\n\nThe State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(') applied.\n\nOa1c1NAL\n\nJURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 21, 22 and 44 of 1951.\n\n(I) [I950] S.C.R. 6o5.\n\n(•) (1950] S.C.R. 594.\n\n(3) [ 1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\n(4) [1951] S.C.R. 167.\n\nApplications under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs in the nature of habeas Corpus.\n\nHardaylll Hardy for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 21 and 22.\n\nGopal Singh for the petitioner in Petition No. 44.\n\n• S. M. Sikri for the respondents. 1951.\n\nApril. 6.\n\nThe following judgments were delivered.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRl J.-These three petitions have been presented to this Court under article 32 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of writs in the nature of habeas corpus for release of the petitioners who are respectively the President, Vice- President and Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha of the Delhi State.\n\nThe petitioners were arrested on 22nd August, 1950, by order of the District Magistrate, Delhi, made under\n\nsub.section\n\n(2) read with clause (a) sub.clause (i) of sub.section (1) of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The order ran as follows :\n\n\"Whereas I, Rameshwar Dayal, District Magistrate, Delhi, am satisfied that with a view to the maintenance of public order in Delhi it is necessary to do so, I, Rameshwar Dayal, District Magistrate, Delhi, hereby order the detention of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . under sub-section (2) of section 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the Preventive Detention Act. Given under my seal and signature\".\n\nThe grounds of detention communicated to the petitioners were in identical terms, save as to the -dates on which the speeches were said to have been\n\nmade, and read thus :\n\n\"In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act you are hereby informed that the grounds on which the detention order dated 22nd August, 1950, has been made against you arc that your speeches generally in the past and particularly on .... August,\n\nR.,,, SinJ; h and 01htrs\n\nTiu S1au of\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnolhtr.\n\nPalanjali Saslri].\n\nRam s; nth\n\nand Others\n\nThe State of\n\nDelhi and\n\nAtwth, r.\n\nPata!Jjali Sostri J.\n\n1950, at public meetings in Delhi 'has been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making such speeches it is necessary to make the said order\".\n\nThe petitioners applied to the High Court at Simla for similar relief under article 226 of the Constitutiop, but the petitions were dismissed. It appears to have been contended before the learned Judges (Khosla and Falshaw JJ.) who heard those petitions that although this Court held in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras (') chat the provisions of section 3 of the Act were constitutional and valid, detention under chat section was ultra vires and illegal where, as here, it was based on the ground of making speeches prejudicial to the security of the Seate or the maintenance of public order. This was said to be the result of the later pronouncements of this Court in Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State of Delhi ( 1) and Ramesh Thappar v. The State of Madras (•). This contention was rejected on the ground that no such proviso could be read into section 3 on the strength of the later decisions referred co above which related to a different point, viz. the scope of authorised restrictions on the right to freedom of speech conferred by article 19 (1).\n\nFalshaw J. (with whom Khosla J. concurred), proceeded, however, to draw attention to what he conceived to be an \"anomaly\" -while a State Government should not be allowed co interfere with the freedom of the press by way of stopping the circulation of newspapers or by pre-censorship of news, the Government shoul<l, for the same object, be entitled to place a person under preventive detention which is \"even greater restriction on personal liberty than any restriction on a newspaper ever could be\".\n\nThis distinction appeared to the learned Judge to be illogical, and he thought that there was \"an apparent conflict\" between the decisions of this Court in Go pal an' s case ( 1 ) and the other cases, which could only be resolved by this Court. \"k\n\n(1) [1950] S. C.R. 88.\n\n(1) (1950] S. C.R. 594\n\n(1) (1950] S. C.R. 605.\n\nwould be well\" the learned Judge concluded \"if the point were raised in this form at an early date in the Supreme Court\".\n\nNo wonder that, after this encouragement, the petitioners have preferred these petitions raising the . same contention before us. On behalf of the petitioners Mr. Hardy submitted that the provisions of the Act should not be used to prevent a citizen from making speeches though they might be considered to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, for maintenance of public order is not a purpose for which imposition of a restriction on freedom of speech is authorised by the Constitution, as held by this Court in the Cross-Roads( 1 ) and the Organizer(•) cases.\n\nIt is true that in those cases this Court decided by a majority of 5 to 1 that \"unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it such law cannot fall within the reservation of clause (2) of article 19 although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order\". But it will he noticed that the statutory provisions which were there declared void and unconstitutional. authorised the imposition, in the one case, of a ban on the circulation of a newspaper and, in the other, of pre-censorship on the publication of a journal.\n\nNo question arose of depriving any person of his personal liberty by detaining him in custody, whereas here, as in Gopalan's case (' }, the Court is called upon to adjudge the legality of the detention of the petitioners with a view to prevent them from making speeches prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\n\nAlthough personal liberty has a content sufficiently comprehensive to include the freedoms enumerated in article 19\n\n(1), and its deprivation would result in the extinction of those freedoms, the Constitution has treated these civil liberties as distinct fundamental rights and made separate provisions in article 19 and articles 21 and 22 as to the limitations and conditions subject to which\n\n<:l fl950] S.C.R. 594.\n\n(') [1950] S C.R. 88.\n\n( .J [I 950] S. C.R. 605.\n\nRam Sititlr altd Othns\n\nTMStat•q/\n\nD•lhi Md\n\nAINl!w.\n\nPalanjali\n\nSastri ].\n\n19!tl\n\nllam Sin1A\n\nand Other1\n\nT/1' Stah ef\n\nDelhi and\n\n.Anothtr.\n\nPatanja/i\n\n.Sostri ].\n\nalone they could be taken away or abridged. The interpretation. of these articles and their correlation were elaborately dealt wich by the full Court in Gopalan's case('). The question arose whether section 3 of the Act was a law imposing restrictions on \"the right to. move freely throughout the territory of India\" guaranteed under article 19 (1) (d) and, as such, was liable to be tested wl1h reference to its reasonableness under clause (5) of that article.\n\nIt was decided by a majority of 5 to 1 that a law which authc>- rises deprivation of personal liberty did not fall within the purview of article 19 and its validity was not to be judged by the criteria indicated in that article but depended on. its compliance with the requirements of articles 21 and 22, and as section 3 satifised those requirements, it was constitutional.\n\nIf the learned Judges in the High Court had paid close attention to the Judgments delivered in this 'Court, they would have found that there was nothing illogical in that view and no conflict between the decisions in that case and in the other cases to which reference has bee~ made. The observations of the Chief Justice in Gopalan's case( 1) make the position quite clear :\n\n\"As the preventive detention order results in the detention of the applicant in a cell it was contended on his. behalf that the rights specified in article 19\n\n(1) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (g) have been infringed.\n\nIt was argued that because of his detention he cannot have a free right to spech as a!Jd where he desired and the same argument was urged in respect of the rest of the rights mentioned in sub-clauses (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g). Although this argument is advanced in a case which deals with preventive detention, if correct, it should be applicable in the case of punitive detention also, to any one sentenced to a term of imprisonment under the relevant section of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSo considered, the argument must clearly be rejected.\n\nIn spite of the saving clauses (2) to (6), permitting abridgement of the rights connected with each of them, punitive detention under several sections of the Penal Code, e.g., for theft, cheating, forgery and even (') [1950] S.C.R. Jl!I.\n\nordinary assault, will be illegal. Unless such conc; lusion necessarily follows from the article, it is obvious that such construction should be avoided • - In my opinion such result is clearly not the outcome of the Constitution. The article has to be read without any preconceived notions. So read, it clearly means that the\n\nlegislatio~ to be examined must be directly in respect of one of the rights mentioned in the sub-clauses. If there is a legislation directly attempting to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms, etc., the question whether that legislation is saved by the relevant saving clause of article 19 will arise. If, however, thelegislation is not directly in respect of any of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for instance, for punitive or preventive detention, his right under any of these sub-clauses is abridged, the question of the application of article 19 does not arise. The true approach is only to consider the directness of the legislation and not what will be the result of the detention otherwise valid, on the mode of the <letenu's life. On that short ground, in my opinion, this argument about the infringement of the rights mentioned in article - 19 (1) generally must fail.\n\nAny other construction put on the article, it seems to me, will be unreasonabka\" (1 )\n\nSimilar conclusions expressed by the other learned Judges will be found at pages 194, 229, 256 arid 305. It follows that the petitions now before us are governed by the decision in Gopalan' s case ( 1 ), notwithstanding that the petitioner's right under article 19 (1) (a) is abridged as a result of their detention under the Act. The anomaly, if anomaly there be in the resulting position, is inherent in the structure and language of the relevant articles, whose meaning and effect as expounded by this Court by an overwhelming majority in the cases referred to above must now be taken to be settled law, and courts in this country will be serving no useful purpose by discovering supposed conflicts and illogicalities and recommending parties to re-agitate the points thus settled.\n\n( 1) [1950] S.C.R. 88, 100-101.\n\nRam Sirl&/t, and Otlier1\n\nThe Stale of\n\nDelhi and\n\n..4.ot/rn.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J~\n\nR.m Si11gh .mu! Olhm ...\n\nThe Stal• qf\n\nD•lhi and\n\n.Anolfwr.\n\nPa1anjali\n\nSastri J.\n\nMr. Hardy next contended that, in view of the recent decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (1 ), the grounds of detention communicated to each of the petitioners must be held to be too vague and indefinite to enable them to make their \"representations\" to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, and the requirements of clause (5) of article 22 not having thus been complied with, the petitioners were entitled to be set at liberty. According to Mr. Hardy it was not sufficient that the time and place of the alleged speeches and their general effect were indicated, but it was also necessary that the offending passages or at least the gist of them should be commuaicated in order to enable the petitioners to make effective representations.\n\nIn the case relied on, this Court, no doubt, held by a majority that, though the first part of article 22 (5), which casts an obligation on the detaining authority to communicate the grounds of the order of detention, would be sufficiently complied with if the \"deductions or conclusions of facts from facts\" on which the order was based were disclosed, the latter part of the clause, which confers on the person detained the right of making a \"representation\" against the order, imposed, by necessary implication, a duty on the authority to furnish the person with further particulars to enable him to make his representation. It was further held that the suffidency of this \"second communication\" of particulars was a justiciable issue, the test being whether \"it is sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation which, on being considered, may give relief to the detained person.\" While the communication of particulars should, subject to a claim of privilege under clause (6), be \"as full and adequate as the circumstances permit\", it did not, however, follow from clause ( 6) that ''what is not stated or considered to be withheld on that ground must be disclosed and if not disclosed there is a breach of a fundamental right. A wide latitude is left to the authorities in the matter of disclosure.\" Referring to the use of the term\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 167.\n\n'Vague\" in this connection, it was remarked \"If on reading the ground furnished it is capable of being intelligently understood and is sufficiently definite to furnish materials to enable the detained person to make a representation against the order of detention, it cannot be called vague\".\n\nThis decision docs not, in our opinion, support the broad proposition contended for by Mr. Hardy that wherever an order of detention is based upon speeches made by the person sought to be detained, the detaining authority should communicate to the person the offendin3 passages or at least the gist of such passages on\n\npain of having the order quashed if it did not. In the cases now before us the time and place at which the speeches were alleged to have been made were specified and their general nature and effect (being such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims) was also stated. It is difficult to see how the communication of particular passages or their substance-one of the petitioners denied having made any speech on the day specified-was necessary in addition to the particulars already given, to enable the petitioners to make their representations. It should be remembered in this .connection that the Court is not called upon in this class of cases to judge whether or not the speech or speeches in question constituted a prejudicial act falling within the purview of section 3 of the Act as it is called upon in prosecutions for offences under section 124A or section 153A of the Indian Penal Code to find whether the speech attributed to the accused person constituted an offence under those sections. That is a matter for the detaining authority to be . satisfied about. Nor do these cases belong to the category where a reference had to be made to the Advisory Board under the Act, so that any attempt by the petitioners to rebut the inference drawn by the detaining authority from their speeches had to be. made only rn;. fore the executive authorities.\n\nIn such circumstances the suggestion that without the communication of the offending passages or . their substance the petitioners were not in a position to make their representations\n\nRt1tn Sinp mu/ Othns\n\nTl# Stolt of\n\nDllhi ad\n\n.4notltn.\n\nPa14rifoli\n\nSaitti J\n\nRam Sin&h and Others\n\nThe Sta11 of\n\nDe/m and\n\nAnot.ln\n\nPotatliali\n\nSallri].\n\nto the executive authorities sounds unreal and is. devoid of substance. It may be possible to conceive of peculiar situations where perhaps the person detained on ground of prejudicial speeches might be in a better position to make a representation if he was given the objectionable passages or the gist of them, but the\n\npesent cases are not of such peculiar character. On the other hand, cases have come before this Coun where speeches were alleged to have been made after . midnight at secret gatherings of Kisans and workers inciting them to violence, crime and disorder. Such allegations could only be based in most cases on information received by the executive authorities from confidential sources and it would not be practicable in all such cases to have a record made of the speeches delivered. To hold that article 22 (5) requires that, wherever detention is grounded on alleged prejudicial speeches, the detaining authority Should indicate to the person detained the passages which it regards as objectionable would rob the provisions of the Act of much of their usefulness in the very class of cases where those provmons were doubtless primarily intended to be used and where their use would be most legitimate.\n\nIn the case of these petitioners, no doubt, the speeches are said to have been made at public meetings, and it is not suggested on behalf of the respondents, that no record was made of the speeches, so that the details asked for could have been furnished. The omission to do 50, for which no reason is disclosed in these proeecdings, is regrettable, as it has given rise to avoidable grievance and complaint. The authorities who feel impelled in discharge of their duty to issue orders of detention will do well to bear in mind the following remarks of the Chief Justice in the case referred to above :\n\n\"In numerous cases that have been brought to our notice, we have found that there has been quite an unnecessary obscurity on the pan of the detaining authority in stating the grounds for the order. Instead of giving the information with reasonable details, there\n\nis a deliberate attempt to use the minimum number\n\nOf words in the communication conveying the grounds of detention. In our opinion, this attitude is quite deplorable\".\n\nThis, however, does not affect our conclusion in these cases that the grounds communicated to the 'petitioners contain sufficient particulars to enable them to make their representations to the authority concerned, and that the requirements of article 22 (5) have thus been complied with.\n\nIt is. also urged that the orders of detention were bad because they did not specify the period during which the petitioners were to be under detention. Thi1 point is now concluded against the petitioners by the decision of this Court in Ujager Singh v. The State of Punjab ( 1 ) and /agjit Singh v. The State of Punjab ( 1 ) where it was pointed out that as section 12 of the Act itself prescribed a maximum period of one year for detention thereunder, such orders could not be said to be of indefinite duration and unlawful on that ground.\n\nLastly, it was said that the petitioners were prominent members of a political organisation which was opposed to the ideals and policies of the party in power, and that the orders of detention were made: \"for the collateral purpose of stifling effective political opposition and legitimate criticism of the policies pursued by the Congress Party and had nothing to do with the maintenance of public order\". Allegations: of ma/a fide conduct arc easy to make but not always.\n\nas easy to prove. The District Magistrate has, in hi&. affidavit filed in these proceedings, stated that, from the materials placed before him by persons experienced in investigating matters of this kind, he was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioners with a view to preventing them from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and he haS; emphatically repudiated the purpose and motive imputed to him. We have thus allegations on the one side and denial on the other, and the petitioners made no attempt to discharge the burden, which undoubtedlv lay upon them, to prove that the District\n\n(r) Petition No r 19 or l950 (~) Petition No. r67of1950.\n\nM5SCI 62 S, C. India/59.\n\nRam Sint and Others\n\n'If.\n\nThi Stale of\n\nD1llii and\n\nAllDlher.\n\nPatanjali.\n\nSastti J.\n\nRam Sin.fill\n\nand Othm\n\nThi State OJ ..\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnother.\n\nMahajan],\n\nMagistrate acted ma/a fidt: in issuing the orders of detention.\n\nThe petitions are dismissed.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-These three petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India were presented by Prof.\n\nRam Singh, Bal Raj Khanna and Ram Nath Kalia, all three of whom were arrested and placed in detention on the 22nd August, 1950, under the orders of the District Magistrate of Delhi, under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.\n\nThe petitioners are respctively. the President, Vice-President and the Secretary of the Delhi State Hindu Mahasabha.\n\nThe grounds of detention supplied to them are almost identical. Those furnished to Prof. Ram Singh read as follows :-\n\n\"In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, you are hereby informed that the grounds on which the detention order dated August 22, 1950, has been made against you • are that your speeches generally in the past and particularly on the 13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi have been such as to excite disa.ffection between Hindus and Muslims and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making such speeches it is necessary to make the said order.\n\nYou arc further informed that you are entitled to make a representation against your detention to the State Government, that is, the Chief Commissioner, Delhi.\"\n\nThe grounds supplied to the other two petitioners were the same except that in the case of Bal Raj Xhanna only the 15th August, 1950, is metioned as the date on which the public speech was made, and in the case of the third petitioner, it is only the 13th > August, 1950.\n\nMr. Hardy on behalf of the pet1aoners inter alia -urged that the grounds served on the petitioners as justifying the orders of detention are quite indefinite and are not sufficient to enable them to make an effective representation to the State Government against\n\ntheir detention and that being so, their detention is illegal.\n\nAn affidavit of the District Magistrate was placed before us at the hearing of the cases stating that he was satisfied that the petitioners' speeches generally, and particularly those made on the 13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi had been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims.\n\nNo particulars of the oe:ending words or passages or any indication of the nature of the language employed by the petitioners was mentioned either in the grounds or in this affidavit.\n\nReference was made to two speeches of the 13th and 15th in the case of the first petitioner and to only one speech delivered on the Bth and 15th respectively by the other two. So far as the earlier speeches are concerned, it is not even stated on what occasions, on what dates and during what years were those speeches made or delivered.\n\nAfter a reference to the dates of the two speeches, the conclusion drawn by the District Magistrate has been mentioned. The question for decision is whether what is stated in the grounds is sufficient material on the basis of which the fundamental right conferred on the petitioners by article 22 (5) of the Constitution can be adequately exercised and whether without knowing the substance of the offending passages in the speeches from which the inference has been drawn by the District Magistrate it is possible to prove that this inference is not justified.\n\nAfter considerable thought I have reached the deci- . sion that these cases fall within the ambit of the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram, Shriahar Vaidya ( 1 ). In that case certain general principles applicable to cases of this nature were stated by the learned Chief Justice, who delivered the majority judgment, in the following terms :\n\n(1) That if the representation has to be intelligible to meet the charges contained in the grounds, the information conveyed to the detained person must\n\n(1) [195l]S. C.R. 167.\n\nRam Singh\n\nand Others\n\nThe Stauqf\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnother.\n\nMahajan].\n\nRam Singh\n\nand Other.,\n\nTill Sta11 of\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnotht<.\n\nMaJuij .. ].\n\nbe suflicicnt to attain that object. Without getng information suflicient to make a representation against the order of detention it is not possible for the man to make the representation. Indeed, the right will be only illusory but not a real right at all.\n\n(2) That while there is a connection between thccobligation on the pllrt of the detaining authority to furnish grounds and the right given to the detained person to have an earliest opportunity to make thccrepresentation, the test to be applied in respect of the contents of the grounds for the two purposes is quite different. For the first, the test is whether it is sufficient to satisfy the authority. For the second, the test is, whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person to make the representation at the earliest opportunity.\n\nOn an infringement of either of these two rights the detained person has a right to approach the court and to complain that there has been an infringement of a fundamental right and even if the infringement of the second part of the right under article 22(5) is established he is bound to be released by the court1\n\n(3) That it cannot be disouted that the representation mentioned in the second part of article 22(5) must be one which on being considered may give relief to the detaining person. It was pointed out that in the numerous cases that had been brought to the notice of the court it was found that there had been quite an unnecessary obscurity on the part of the detaining authority in stating the grounds for the order, and that instead of giving the information with reasonable details, there is a deliberate attempt to use the minimum number of words in the communication convevin~ the grounds of detention and that such an attitude was quite deplorable.\n\nIn my opinion, these observations have an apposite application to the grounds furnished to the petitioners in the present cases. The speeches alleged to have been made hy the petitioners were made in public meetings and could not be described as of a confidential nature and no privilege in respect of them was\n\nclaimed under article 22 ( 6) of the Constitution. That being, so the material on the basis of which the District Magistrate drew the inference that these speeches . would cause or were likely to ca.use disaffection amongst Hindus and Muslims should have been communicated to the petitioners so that they may be able to make a representation, which on being considered may give relief to them.\n\nFor that purpose either the words used by them or the substance of the speeches should have been communicated to the detenus so that they may be able to prove that such words or passages never formed part of the speeches and have been introduced in them as a result of some error or that no reasonable person could draw an inference from them that those were likely . to cause hatred and enmity between the two communities. The sufficiency of the material supplied is a justiciable issue, though . the sufficiency of the grounds on which the detaining authority made up his mind is not a justiciable issue.\n\nIn my opinion, in the absence of any indication in the grounds as to the nature of the words used by the detenus in their speeches from which an inference has been drawn against them they would not be able fully to exercise their fundamental right of making a representation and would not be able to furnish a proper defence to the charge made against them.\n\nEnvisaging oneself in the position of a person asked to draw out a '!ritten representation on behalf of the detenus on the materials supplied to them, the effort could not proceed beyond a bare denial of the speeches having been made, or a bald statement that no words were used which could possibly excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims.\n\nSuch a representation would be an idle formality inasmuch as mere denials without any cogent arguments to support them would convince nobody. Without a knowledge of the offending words or passages, or their substance, it is not possible to argue that the inference drawn is not a legitimate one or to allege that the words Used fall within the ambit of legitimate criticism permissible in law and cannot be considered to excite disaffection\n\nRam Singh\n\nand OtMrs\n\nv • Thi Stat• of Delhi and\n\n.Anotlrer.\n\nMahajan].\n\nRam Singh\n\narrd Others\n\nThe State of Delhi and Another.\n\nMahajan].\n\namongst Hindus and Muslims.\n\nThe phraseology employed by the detaining authority in the charge sheet supplied to the detenus seems to have been borrowed from the language used in sections 124A and 153A of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nJudicial literature abounds in cases where words and passages likely to cause disaffection between Hindus and Muslims or which have that effect have been considered and discussed.\n\nIf the words objected to were known, the representation on behalf of the detenus ould easily have been drawn up with the help of judicial precedents and reasoning considered good in those cases. Again, without knowing the substance of the offending words from which the inference has been drawn by the detaining authority it is not even possible to urge that these words were merely a quotation from some known author or that the words used fall within legitimate religious propaganda permitted by article 25 of the Constitution or concern the propagation of some political creed to which no objection could be taken.\n\nAs regards the two speeches alleged to have been given by the detenus, if the allegation that they were such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims is correct, the detenus were guilty of the offence under section 153A of the Indian Penal Code and could not only have been punished for the offence under that section but could also have been kept out of harm's way for the future by that procedure. A charge sheet under that section or in a trial under section 124A which uses analogous language would have been defective if it did not mention the substance of the speeches alleged to have been made by the person charged. [Vide Chint Ram v.\n\nEmperor (1 ) ; Chidambaram Pillai v. Emperor (•) Mylapore Krishnaswami v. Emperor (\").] In some of these cases the charge was in substance similar to the charge here. If a charge in an open trial for an offence under these sections is defective without the substance of the words used or the passages being cited therein, a fortiori the material supplied in a preventive\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 186.\n\n(3) I.LR. 32 Mad, 384.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 32 Mad. 3.\n\ndetention case on a similar charge should be regarded as insufficient when a man has not even a right of being heard in person and has merely to defend himself by means of a written representation. It has to be remembered in this connection that the phrase \"excite disaffection amongst Hindus and Muslims\" is of a very general nature and an inference of this kind may easily have been drawn on material which would not warrant such an inference. No reason whatsoever has been stated in the affidavit of the District Magistrate for not disclosing the words used by the detenus even after this length of time and from which he drew the conclusions on the basis of which he has kept the petitioners under detention for a period well over six months or more.\n\nFor the reasons given above I venture to dissent from the opinion of the majority of the Court with great respect and hold that the detention orders above mentioned are illegal.\n\nI accordingly order the release of the petitioners. On the other points argued in the case I agree with judgment of Sastri J.\n\nBosE J.-1 agree with my brother Mahajan whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading, and with the utmost respect find myself unable to accept the majority view. I am of opinion that these petitio'lers should all be released on the ground that their detentions are illegal.\n\nI do not doubt the right of Parliament and of the executive to place restrictions upon a man's freedom.\n\nI fully agree that the fundamental rights conferred bv the Constitution are not absolute.\n\nThey are limited.\n\nIn some cases the limitations are imposed by the Constitution itself.\n\nIn others, Parliament has been given the power to impose further restrictions and in doing so to confer authority on the executive to carry its purpose into effect.\n\nBut in every case it is the right> which are fundamental, not the limitations ; and it is the duty of this Court and of all courts in the land to guard and defend these rights jealously.\n\nIt is our duty and privilege to see that rights which were\n\nRam Singh arrd Others\n\n\"· The Staie of Delhi and\n\nAMther.\n\nMahajan].\n\n1~51\n\nRam Singh ana Others\n\nTMStaitf\n\n.Delhi an\n\nAnothn.\n\n1JoseJ.\n\nintended to be fundamental are kept fundamental and to see that neither Parliament nor the executive exceed the bounds within which they are confined by the Constitution when given the power to impose a restricted set of fetters on these freedoms ; and in the case of the executive, to see further that it does not travel beyond the powers conferred by Parliament.\n\nWe are here to preserve intact for the peoples of India the freedoms which have now been guaranteed to them and which they have learned through the years to cherish, to the very fullest extent of the guarantee, and to ensure that they are not whittled away or brought to nought either by Parliamentary legislation or by executive action •\n\n. It is the right to personal freedom which is affected here : what the Constitution calls the \"right to move freely throughout the territory of India.\" Now I do not for a moment deny the right of Parliament to place limitations upon that right and to do it by preventive detention.\n\nMuch as all freedom loving persons abhor the thought of locking men and women up without trial and keeping them behind bars indefinitely, the regrettable necessity to do so is to my mind undoubted. The safety of the State, which is paramount, requires it and, in any event, the Constitution allows it but-and this is important-subject to limitations.\n\nSo far as the Constitution is concerned, it has given Parliament the powers to legislate on this subject by article 246 read with item 9 of List I of the 7th Schedule and item 3 in List III, and I have no doubt that the legislation sought to be impugned here is intra vires. But I am unable to hold that the executive action . taken in these cases on the strength of that legislation is within the law. The executive has no power to detain except within the four corners of the Constitution and the Act now challenged.\n\nIn my opinion, it has not kept itself within those limits.\n\nThe provisions of the Constitution relevant to the present purpose have been examined by this Court in previous cases and I have neither the right nor the desire to go behind them.\n\nMy brother Mahajan has\n\nset out his view of the law which these cases ltave settled. I respectfully agree with him and will not cover the same ground. But I do wish to say this; I am not prepared to place any narrow or stilted construction either upon the Constitution or upon the decisions of this Court which have so far interpreted it. If it were permissible to go behind the Constitution and enquire into the reason for the provisions dealing with the fundamental rights, one would find them bound up with t:Jie history of the fight for personal freedom in this land. But that is not permissible and is irrelevant. What does matter is that the right to personal freedom has been made fundamental and that the power even of Parliament itself to hedge it round with fetters is \"cribbed, cabined and confined\". I conceive it to be our duty to give the fullest effect to every syllable in the Articles dealing with these rights. I do not mean to say that any impossible or extravagant construction should be employed such as would make the position of Government impossible or intolerable. But I do insist that they should be interpreted in a broad and liberal sense so as to bring out in the fullest measure the purpose which the framers of the Constitution had in mind as gathered from the language they used and the spirit their words convey, namely to confer the fullest possible degree of .personal liberty upon the subject consistent with the safety and welfare of the State.\n\nMy Lord the Chief Justice has pointed out in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya (1) that the information supplied to the detenu must be sufficient to enable him to meet the charges contained in the grounds given to him and that without that the right would be illusory. Are the present cases covered by that rule ? I do not think they are. Put at their highest, the grounds set out the date and place of the meetings at which the speeches complained of are said to have been made and they do no more than say that they were.\n\n(r) (1951) S.C.R. 167.\n\nRam Singh and Others\n\nThe Stale of Delhi and\n\nAnother.\n\nBose].\n\nRam Singh\n\nand Others\n\nThe State ef\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnother.\n\nBose].\n\n• \"Such as to excite disaffection Muslims and thereby prejudice public order in Delhi.\"\n\nbetween Hindus and the maintenance of\n\nI have no quarrel with the details regarding the date and place but I do not consider that the portion relating to the nature of the speeches fulfils the requirements which have been laid down by this Court regarding particulars.\n\nNow I fully agree that each case will have to be decided on its own facts so far as this is concerned.\n\nBut when weighing the circumstances this must be borne in mind. The detenu has no right of personal appearance before the Advisory Board or other revising authority, nor can be he represented by counsel.\n\nThe Board or other authority can deal with his representation without hearing him or anyone on his behalf. Therefore, his only hope of being able to convince the Board lies in the explanation he offers. But how can anyone give a fair explanation of his conduct unless he is told with reasonable plainness what he has done, and in the case of a speech, the words used are everything.\n\nThey have been called \"verbal acts\" in another connection. Now I take it to be established that Government is bound to give a detenu reasonable particulars of the acts complained of when conduct is in question. Why should a differen5 rule obtain when the acts complained of are verbal ?\n\nIt was contended in the argument that the man whc make.s the speech is in a position to know what he said and so is not at a disadvantage. But that, in my opinion, is not the point.\n\nHe may know what he said but he cannot know what the authorities think he said unless they give him some reasonable inkling of what is in their minds. It has to be remembered that what the Advisory Beard has before it is not necessarily the words employed or even their substance but what the authorities say the man said.\n\nThis has to be viewed from two angles. The first is whether the reports handled in to the authorities are correct. Even with the utmost good faith mistakes do\n\noccur and it is quite easy for a reporter to get his notes mixed and to attribute to A what was said by B. But unless A knows that that is what happened, it would be very difficult for him to envisage such a contingency and give the necessary explanation of fact in his representation.\n\nThe next point is this.\n\nWhen a man is told that his speech excited disaffection and so forth, he is being given the final conclusion reached by some other mind or minds from a set of facts which are not disclosed to him. If the premises on which the conclusion is based are faulty, the conclusion will be wrong. But even if the premises are correct, the process of reasoning may be at fault.\n\nIn either event, no representation of value can be made without a reasonably adequate knowledge of the premises.\n\nEnvisage for a moment the position of the Board., In the ordinary course, it would have before it a speech wi'th the offending passages in full, or at any rate the gist of them.\n\nFrom the other side it would have a bare denial, for that is about all a detenu can say in answer to the grounds given to him when he is not told the premises on which the conclusion is based. In most cases, that sort of representation would have very little value. Consider this illustration. Let us assume the detenu had spoken about Hindus and Muslims but had urged unity and amity and had said nothing objectionable but that unknown to him thepolice, through a perfectly bona fide mistake, had imputed to him certain offensive words used by another speaker.\n\nWhat would be the value of a detenu saying \"I said nothing objectionable\" and that is almost all he can say in such a case. He cannot envisage the mistake and say, \"Oh yes, that was said, but not by me. It was said by A or B.\" Consider a second illustration where the detenu had quoted a well known living authority. I can conceive of cases where words in the mouth of A might be considered objectionable by some but would never be . condemned in the mouth of B. It might make a world of difference to\n\nRam Singh\n\nand Othm\n\nThe State of Delhi and\n\nAnother.\n\nBose].\n\nRamSU.gh\n\nand Othtrs\n\nTM State of\n\n.Delhi and ·\n\nAnother.\n\nJioSI].\n\nthe detenu if he could explain the source of the passages complained of in his speech.\n\nBut it might be very difficult for him to envisage the possibility of objection being taken to anything commg from the source from which he quoted.\n\nI am anxious not to be technical and I would be averse to an interpretation which would unnecessarily embarrass Government, but I do conceive it to be our duty to give a construction which, while falling strictly within the ambit of the language used, is yet liberal\n\nand reasonable, just to the detenu, fair to the Government.\n\nAnd after all, what does a construction such as I seek to make import ? It places no great or impossible strain on the machinery of Government. All that is required is that the authorities should bestow on the cases of these detenus a very small fraction of. the thought, time and energy which the law compels in the case of even the meanest criminal who is arraigned before the Courts of this country. The fact that there is absent in the case of these persons all the usual safeguards, the glare of publicity, the right to know with precision the charge against him, the right to speak in his own defence, is all the more reason why Government should be thoughtful, considerate and kind and should give them the maximum help. In any case, that, in my opinion, is what the Constitution requires and I am not prepared to abate one jot or tittle of its rigours.\n\nMy attention has been drawn to two decisions of this Court which are said to be on all fours with the present case. One is Vaidya's case ( 1 ) and the other Lahiri's(' ). In the latter, the point whether the gist of the speech should be given was not considered. It seemed to have been assumed that it need not. But I am unable to accept that as authority for anything beyond the fact that that was not considered necessarv on the facts and in the circumstances of that particular case. As my Lord the Chief Justice pointed out in the earlier decision cited above, the question of\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 167.\n\n(2) Not reported.\n\nwhat is vague \"must vary according to the circumstances of each case.\" It was also said there that \"the conferment of the. right to make a representation necessarily carries with it the obligation on the part of the detaining authority to furnish the grounds, i.e., materials on which the detention order was made.\"\n\nIt was further said- \"Ordinaril y, the 'grounds' in the sense of conclusions drawn by the autorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenu is suspected of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him.\"\n\nThis envisages cases in which that would not be enough. It is therefore sufficient for me to say that in a case of this kind, where the matter has to turn on the facts and circumstances of each case, no useful purpose can be served by examining the facts of some other case for use as an analogy. In my opinion, on the facts and circumstances of the present cases, the grounds supplied were insufficient and the gist of the offending passages should have been supplied. The omission to do so invalidates the detention and each of the detenus is entitled to immediate release.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 21 & 22 : Ganpat Rai.\n\nAgent for the petitioner in Petition No. 44 : V. P. K.\n\nNambiyar.\n\nAgent for the respondents: P. A. Mehta.\n\nRam Singl\n\nand Others\n\nThe State qf\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnother.\n\nBose].", "total_entities": 126, "entities": [{"text": "RAM SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE Of DELHI AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE Of DELHI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 207, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 231, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANjAl.I SAsTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 233, "end_char": 251, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 253, "end_char": 262, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R. 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J., PATANjAl.", "canonical_name": "KANIA C."}}, {"text": "PATANjAl.I SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2962, "end_char": 2979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held per\n\nKANIA C. J., PATANjAl.", "canonical_name": "PATANjAl.I SAsTRI"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2984, "end_char": 2993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I SAsTRI and S. R. DAS JJ. (", "canonical_name": "S. R. D.u am"}}, {"text": "Mum CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2999, "end_char": 3016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mum CHAND MAHAJAN and BosE JJ."}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3021, "end_char": 3025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mum CHAND MAHAJAN and BosE JJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "MEuR CHAND M.<HAJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3490, "end_char": 3507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per MEuR CHAND M.<HAJ AN and BoSE JI. ("}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3943, "end_char": 3950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4222, "end_char": 4229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hardaylll Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4314, "end_char": 4329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardaylll Hardy for the petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4380, "end_char": 4391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4434, "end_char": 4445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• S. M. Sikri for the respondents."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4526, "end_char": 4542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAsTRl J.-These three petitions have been presented to this Court under article 32 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of writs in the nature of habeas corpus for release of the petitioners who are respectively the President, Vice- President and Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha of the Delhi State.", "canonical_name": "PATANjAl.I SAsTRI"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4626, "end_char": 4647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "22nd August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4884, "end_char": 4901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners were arrested on 22nd August, 1950, by order of the District Magistrate, Delhi, made under\n\nsub.section\n\n(2) read with clause (a) sub.clause (i) of sub.section (1) of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5034, "end_char": 5043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5051, "end_char": 5081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5160, "end_char": 5175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order ran as follows :\n\n\"Whereas I, Rameshwar Dayal, District Magistrate, Delhi, am satisfied that with a view to the maintenance of public order in Delhi it is necessary to do so, I, Rameshwar Dayal, District Magistrate, Delhi, hereby order the detention of. . . . . . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5435, "end_char": 5444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5718, "end_char": 5727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5990, "end_char": 5992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nDelhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6068, "end_char": 6083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram s; nth\n\nand Others\n\nThe State of\n\nDelhi and\n\nAtwth, r.\n\nPata!Jjali Sostri J.\n\n1950, at public meetings in Delhi 'has been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making such speeches it is necessary to make the said order\".", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nDelhi"}}, {"text": "Pata!Jjali Sostri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram s; nth\n\nand Others\n\nThe State of\n\nDelhi and\n\nAtwth, r.\n\nPata!Jjali Sostri J.\n\n1950, at public meetings in Delhi 'has been such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making such speeches it is necessary to make the said order\".", "canonical_name": "PATANjAl.I SAsTRI"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6464, "end_char": 6475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Khosla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6592, "end_char": 6598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears to have been contended before the learned Judges (Khosla and Falshaw JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Falshaw", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6603, "end_char": 6610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears to have been contended before the learned Judges (Khosla and Falshaw JJ.)"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6739, "end_char": 6748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7245, "end_char": 7254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7437, "end_char": 7447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8384, "end_char": 8397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "would be well\" the learned Judge concluded \"if the point were raised in this form at an early date in the Supreme Court\"."}}, {"text": "Hardy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8564, "end_char": 8569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the petitioners Mr. Hardy submitted that the provisions of the Act should not be used to prevent a citizen from making speeches though they might be considered to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, for maintenance of public order is not a purpose for which imposition of a restriction on freedom of speech is authorised by the Constitution, as held by this Court in the Cross-Roads( 1 ) and the Organizer(•) cases."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9270, "end_char": 9280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9780, "end_char": 9787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No question arose of depriving any person of his personal liberty by detaining him in custody, whereas here, as in Gopalan's case (' }, the Court is called upon to adjudge the legality of the detention of the petitioners with a view to prevent them from making speeches prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10089, "end_char": 10099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10290, "end_char": 10300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10305, "end_char": 10323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Sititlr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10453, "end_char": 10464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sititlr altd Othns\n\nTMStat•q/\n\nD•lhi Md\n\nAINl!w.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill"}}, {"text": "llam Sin1A", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10536, "end_char": 10546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19!tl\n\nllam Sin1A\n\nand Other1\n\nT/1' Stah ef\n\nDelhi and\n\n.Anothtr."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10818, "end_char": 10827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10953, "end_char": 10963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11219, "end_char": 11229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11367, "end_char": 11385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11394, "end_char": 11403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11983, "end_char": 11993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12523, "end_char": 12540, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12756, "end_char": 12766, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13512, "end_char": 13522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13812, "end_char": 13822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14493, "end_char": 14503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Sirl&/t", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15058, "end_char": 15069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sirl&/t, and Otlier1\n\nThe Stale of\n\nDelhi and\n\n..4.ot/rn.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15587, "end_char": 15597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16092, "end_char": 16102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18773, "end_char": 18782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 124A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18850, "end_char": 18862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 153A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18866, "end_char": 18878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18886, "end_char": 18903, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20524, "end_char": 20534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22214, "end_char": 22224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22619, "end_char": 22629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Sint", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23998, "end_char": 24006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sint and Others\n\n'If.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill"}}, {"text": "Sastti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24074, "end_char": 24080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sastti J.\n\nRam Sin.fill\n\nand Othm\n\nThi State OJ ..\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "Sastti"}}, {"text": "Ram Sin.fill", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24085, "end_char": 24097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sastti J.\n\nRam Sin.fill\n\nand Othm\n\nThi State OJ ..\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24147, "end_char": 24154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan],\n\nMagistrate acted ma/a fidt: in issuing the orders of detention.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24253, "end_char": 24260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-These three petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India were presented by Prof.\n\nRam Singh, Bal Raj Khanna and Ram Nath Kalia, all three of whom were arrested and placed in detention on the 22nd August, 1950, under the orders of the District Magistrate of Delhi, under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24292, "end_char": 24302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24310, "end_char": 24331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24357, "end_char": 24366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-These three petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India were presented by Prof.\n\nRam Singh, Bal Raj Khanna and Ram Nath Kalia, all three of whom were arrested and placed in detention on the 22nd August, 1950, under the orders of the District Magistrate of Delhi, under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill"}}, {"text": "Bal Raj Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24368, "end_char": 24382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-These three petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India were presented by Prof.\n\nRam Singh, Bal Raj Khanna and Ram Nath Kalia, all three of whom were arrested and placed in detention on the 22nd August, 1950, under the orders of the District Magistrate of Delhi, under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Bal Raj Khanna"}}, {"text": "Ram Nath Kalia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24387, "end_char": 24401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAJAN J.-These three petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India were presented by Prof.\n\nRam Singh, Bal Raj Khanna and Ram Nath Kalia, all three of whom were arrested and placed in detention on the 22nd August, 1950, under the orders of the District Magistrate of Delhi, under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24549, "end_char": 24579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi State Hindu Mahasabha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24670, "end_char": 24697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the President, Vice-President and the Secretary of the Delhi State Hindu Mahasabha."}}, {"text": "Ram Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24789, "end_char": 24798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those furnished to Prof. Ram Singh read as follows :-\n\n\"In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, you are hereby informed that the grounds on which the detention order dated August 22, 1950, has been made against you • are that your speeches generally in the past and particularly on the 13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi have been such as to excite disa.ffection between Hindus and Muslims and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making such speeches it is necessary to make the said order.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24836, "end_char": 24845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "August 22, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24955, "end_char": 24970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those furnished to Prof. Ram Singh read as follows :-\n\n\"In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, you are hereby informed that the grounds on which the detention order dated August 22, 1950, has been made against you • are that your speeches generally in the past and particularly on the 13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi have been such as to excite disa.ffection between Hindus and Muslims and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making such speeches it is necessary to make the said order."}}, {"text": "Bal Raj Xhanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25610, "end_char": 25624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds supplied to the other two petitioners were the same except that in the case of Bal Raj Xhanna only the 15th August, 1950, is metioned as the date on which the public speech was made, and in the case of the third petitioner, it is only the 13th > August, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Bal Raj Khanna"}}, {"text": "15th August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25634, "end_char": 25651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds supplied to the other two petitioners were the same except that in the case of Bal Raj Xhanna only the 15th August, 1950, is metioned as the date on which the public speech was made, and in the case of the third petitioner, it is only the 13th > August, 1950."}}, {"text": "13th > August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25770, "end_char": 25789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds supplied to the other two petitioners were the same except that in the case of Bal Raj Xhanna only the 15th August, 1950, is metioned as the date on which the public speech was made, and in the case of the third petitioner, it is only the 13th > August, 1950."}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27252, "end_char": 27262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28074, "end_char": 28083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Singh\n\nand Others\n\nThe Stauqf\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill"}}, {"text": "Ram Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28141, "end_char": 28150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Singh\n\nand Other.,", "canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill"}}, {"text": "MaJuij", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28201, "end_char": 28207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MaJuij .. ]."}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29266, "end_char": 29279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29424, "end_char": 29437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30317, "end_char": 30327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32557, "end_char": 32571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Singh\n\narrd Others\n\nThe State of Delhi and Another.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nDelhi"}}, {"text": "sections 124A and 153A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32776, "end_char": 32798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32806, "end_char": 32823, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33505, "end_char": 33515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 153A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33845, "end_char": 33857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33865, "end_char": 33882, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 124A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34092, "end_char": 34104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35779, "end_char": 35785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other points argued in the case I agree with judgment of Sastri J.\n\nBosE J.-1 agree with my brother Mahajan whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading, and with the utmost respect find myself unable to accept the majority view.", "canonical_name": "Sastti"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35822, "end_char": 35829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other points argued in the case I agree with judgment of Sastri J.\n\nBosE J.-1 agree with my brother Mahajan whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading, and with the utmost respect find myself unable to accept the majority view.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36099, "end_char": 36109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not doubt the right of Parliament and of the executive to place restrictions upon a man's freedom."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37324, "end_char": 37329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are here to preserve intact for the peoples of India the freedoms which have now been guaranteed to them and which they have learned through the years to cherish, to the very fullest extent of the guarantee, and to ensure that they are not whittled away or brought to nought either by Parliamentary legislation or by executive action •\n\n."}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38358, "end_char": 38369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vaidya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46917, "end_char": 46923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One is Vaidya's case ( 1 ) and the other Lahiri's(' )."}}, {"text": "Lahiri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46951, "end_char": 46957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One is Vaidya's case ( 1 ) and the other Lahiri's(' )."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48718, "end_char": 48728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 & 22 : Ganpat Rai."}}, {"text": "V. P. K.\n\nNambiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48777, "end_char": 48795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "44 : V. P. K.\n\nNambiyar."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48825, "end_char": 48836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "Ram Singl", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48839, "end_char": 48848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Singl\n\nand Others\n\nThe State qf\n\nDelhi and\n\nAnother.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sin.fill"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_474_524_EN", "year": 1951, "text": ".April 6.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nSTATE OF SERAIKELLA\n\nfl.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER\n\n(Suit No. 1 of 1950)\n\nSTATE OF DHENKANAL\n\nfl.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER\n\n(Suit No. 2 of 1950)\n\nSTATE OF BAUDH\n\nfl.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER\n\n(Suit No. 3 of 1950)\n\nSTATE OF TIGIRIA\n\nfl.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER\n\n(Suit No. 4 of 1950)\n\nSTATE OF ATHGARH\n\nfl.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER\n\n(Suit No. 5 of 1950)\n\nSTA TE OF BARAMBA\n\nfl.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER\n\n(Suit No. 6 of 1950)\n\nSTA TE OF NARSINGPUR\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER\n\n(Suit No. 7 of 1950)\n\nt SHRI HAluLAL KANIA C. J ., PA\"rANJ ALI\n\nSAS TRI, MEH1l\n\nCHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAS and VIVIAN BosE JJ.] Constitution of India, Arts. 363 (! ), 374 (2)-Indian States- Accession to India under Instruments of Accession-Orders treatjng States as having merged in lnda-Suit to declare orders ultra\n\nvires and enforce rights under Instrument of Accession-Suits filed in Federal Court before 26th /anuary 1950-/urisdiction of Supreme Court to try such suits-Scope of Arts. 363 (1) and 374 (2).\n\nArticle 374 (2) of the Constitution of India provides that all suits, appeals and proceedings pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of this Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same.\n\nArticle 363 ( l) provides that notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement or similar instrument entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State.\n\nCertain States had acceded to the Dominion of India under Instruments of Accession in August 1947.\n\nThey were treated as having merged in the Province of Bihar and were administered as a part of that Province under Orders issued under the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, and s. 290-A of the Government of India _Act, 1935 (as amended by the Constituent Assembly Act of 1949). The States instituted suits in the Federal Court of India before the 26th January, 1950, for a declaration that the various Orders under which the States came to be administered as a part of Bihar and the laws under which those Orders were made were ultra vires and void and the Province of Bihar had accordingly no authority to carry on the administ - Tation of the States. The suits stood transferred to the Supreme Court of India under Art. 374 (2) of the new Constitution:\n\nHeld, per\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SASTRI J. and BosE J.\n\n(MAHAJAN ). dissenting).-That even though the suits were instituted before the new Constitution came into force and under Art. 374 (2) they stood removed to the Supreme Court, nevertheless the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 374 (2) was controlled by Art. 363 ( l) of the Constitution in view of the . opening words of the latter namely, \"notwithstanding anything in this Constitution\". As the suits were really to enforce the plaintiffs rights under their Instruments of Accession and the dispute between the parties really arose out of those instruments, under Art. 363 (1) the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suits.\n\nThis view did not involve giving any retrospective effect to Art. 361 (3).\n\nMAHAJAN J. (contra.)-Art. 363 takes away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on the subjects mentioned therein if suits about them were instituted after the 26th January, 1950, or disputes concerning them arise after that date, while Art. 374 { 12) empowers the Supreme Court to hear and determine suits which were pending in the Federal Court on the 26th January, 1950, and which that court was competent to hear and determine.\n\nThere is no confilct between\n\nState of Seraikel/a and Others.\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nSl!Jleef &raikella and 01/urs\n\nv. l!nion qf India\n\n\"\"\" Malltlr.\n\nKa11iaC.J.\n\nthese articles, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the suit.\n\nDAs J.-As the plaintiff States, by virtue of the States Merger (Governor's Provinces) Order, 1949, were immediately before the commencement of the new Constitution being administered as if they formed part of the Provinces of Bihar or Orissa the territories of Bihar and Orissa included the territories of the plaintiff States under Art. I of the Constitution read with the third paragraph of Part A of the First Schedule. These States consequently ceased to be States so far as the new Constitution is concerned, they had no legal existence as acceding States, and could not therefore be recognised as such States by Courts, as Courts arc bound by the Constitution and cannot question the validity of any of its provisions.\n\nThe suits must therefore be regarded as .having. abated.\n\n0IUGJNAL JuIUSDICTION.\n\nSuits Nos. 1 to 7 of 1950.\n\nThe facts are stated in detail in the judgment of KANIA c J.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Roy Choudhry, with him) for the plaintiffs in suits Nos. 1, 3, and 6.\n\nDr. N. C. Sen Gupta (A. N. Roy Choudhry, with him) for the plaintiffs in suits Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 7.\n\nM. C. Setalvad Attorney-General for India (G, N. /oshi with him) for the defendants in all the suits.\n\n1951. April 6. The following judgments were delivered:-\n\nKANIA C J .-This is a suit filed on the 15th of January, 1950, under the Original Jurisdiction of the Federal Court as it was functioning before the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January,\n\n1950. The State of Seraikella was a State in Orissa and its Ruler was Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Dea. On the 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff State acceded to the Dominion of India by virtue of an Instrument of Accession executed by its Ruler and accepted by the Governor-General of India under section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935. After reciting that under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Dominion of India was set up and that under the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted, it provided that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of India\n\nby an Instrument of Accession, the Instrument stated that the Raja acceded to the Dominion of India and that he accepted that the matters specified in the Schedule to the Instrument were the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State. The three principal heads mentioned in the Schedule to that Instrument were Defence, External Affairs and Communications, with particulars detailed under each of those heads. The Instrument expressly provides that by executing the same the Ruler shall not be deemed to be committed to the acceptance of any future Constitution of India or to fetter his discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future , Constitution. It further expressly provides that nothing in the Instrument affects the continuance of the sovereignty in and over the State, or save as provided by or under the Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights so far enjoyed by him as Ruler of the State or the validity of any law then in force in the State. It also provides that the terms of the Instrument of Accession are not to be varied by any amendment of the Government of India Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 unless such amendment is accepted by the Ruler or by an Instrument supplementary to the said Instrument.\n\nIt was denied in the plaint that any such supplementary instrument was executed by the Ruler and no amendment of the aforesaid Acts has been accepted by him or the plaintiff State. A Standstill Agreement was also executed by the Ruler under which it was agreed that matters of common concern and specified in the Schedule to the Agreement would continue between the Dominion of India and the said State until new agreements were made in that behalf.\n\nOn the 15th December, 1947, an agreement is alleged to have been entered into between the Governor- General of India and the Ruler of the plaintiff State. 'By that document the Raja ceded to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of 4-62 s. a. India/59.\n\nStale of\n\nSerl111 llllli Ot/reri\n\nUnion of lndi11\n\nand A.not/rer.\n\nEaniaC.].\n\nStat• of S1rafk, lla and Others\n\nUnion of l•di4\n\n*1ld Anolillr.\n\nKaniaC.].\n\nthe State and agreed to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the 1st of January, 1948, Article 2 contained a provision for the Privy Purse of the Raja and it is contended by the plaintiff that when the Raja signed the document the figure in this clause had been left -blank. Under article 3 of that agreement, it was provided that the Raja would be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties belonging to him on the date of the agreement and that by the 1st of Janliaty, 1948, the Raja will furnish to the Dominion Government an inventory of all immovable propertieS; securities and cash held by him as such private property. Under article 4, the personal privileges enjoyed by the Raja and the members of his family mentioned . therein had to continue.\n\nOn the 24th of December, 1947, an Act to provide for the exercise of certain extra-provincial Jurisdiction of the Central Government (Act XLVII of 1947) was passed. Under section 3 of that Act it was provided that it shall be lawful for the Central Government to exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction in such manner as it thinks fit and the Central Government may delegate any such jurisdiction as aforesaid to any officer or authority in such manner and to such extent as it thinks fit. Under section 4 it was provided that the Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette make such orders as may seem to it expedient for the effective exercise of any extra-provincial jurisdiction of the Central Government.\n\nA notification under' section 4 of that Act was thereafter issued by the Central Government delegating, under section 3, the power£ contained in that Act to the Province of Orissa.\n\nOn the 18th of May, 1948, that notification was cancelled and the powers in respect of the two specified States including the plaintiff State were delegated to the Province of Bihar. On the same day the Government of Bihar passed an order called \"The Seraikella and Kharaswan States Order\" providing for the administration of the two States. On the 5th of January, l!m, the Legislative Assembly of India,\n\nwhich was also functioning as the Constituent Assembly, passed the Constituent Assembly Act I of 1949 and added section 290-A to the Government of India Act, 1935. That section runs as follows :-\n\n\"Administration of certain Acceding States as a Chief Commissioner's Province or as part of a Governor's or Chief Commissioner's Province-\n\n(1) Where full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the Government of any Indian State or of any group of such States are for the time being exercisable by the Dominion Government, the Governor-General may be Order direct\n\n(a) that the State or the group of States shall be administered in all respects as if the State or the group of States were a Chief Commissioner's Province; or\n\n(b) that the State or the group of.\n\nStates shall be administered in all respects as if the State or the group of States formed part of a Governor's or a Chief Commissioner's Province specified in the Order : Provided that if any Order made under clause (b) of this sub-section affects a Governor's Province, the Governor-General shall before making such Order, ascertain the views of the Government of that Province both with respect to the proposal to make the Order and with respect to the provisions to be inserted therein.\n\n(2) Upon the issue of an Order under clause (a) of sub-section ( 1) of this section, all the provisions of this Act applicable to the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi shall apply to the State or the group of States in respect of which the Order is made.\n\n(3) The Governor-General may in making an Order under sub-section (1) of this section give such supplemental, incidental and consequential directions (including directions as to representation in the Legislature) as he may deem necessary. ( 4) In this section, reference to a State shall include reference to a part of a State.\"\n\nOn the 27th of July, 1949, the Governor-General of India promulgated an Order called the States Merger\n\nStat1 of Seraikella and Others\n\ny, Uuion of India\n\nanti Ano th#.\n\nKania C. J•\n\nState of Seraikella a.1d Oiht1J ...\n\nUnion oj\"lndia\n\nand AMlh.,,\n\nKania C. J.\n\n(Governors' Provinces) Order of 1949. The result of that was that the plaintiff State is claimed to have merged in the Province of Bihar.\n\nThe plaintiff State contends that the Government of Orissa wrongfully and illegally purp9rted to administer the plaintiff State by virtue of the .Notification of the 23rd of December, 1947, under Act XLVII of 1947. It is claimed that the Act was and is ultra vires and ot no effect and not binding on the plaintiff State. The alleged agreement of the 15th of December, 1947, is contended to be void for want of consideration and is inoperative. Indeed it is contended that as the figure was left blank there was no agreement at all. It is contended that on the 18th May, 1948, without the consent and approval of the plaintiff State or its .Ruler, the Province of Bihar wrongfully and illegally took over the administration of the State and passed the Seraikella and Kharsawan Administration Order, 1948.\n\nIn paragraph 10 of the plaint it is contended that the Dominion of India had no authority to go beyond the Instrument of Accession, had no authority to delegate powers to the Province of Bihar to administer the plaintiff State and the said Order, in any event, is illegal and inoperative as it went beyond the ambit of . the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947. As regards the Order issued by the Governor-General on the 27th of July, 1949, it is contended that he had no authoritii or power to promulgate the Order and the State Merger Order of 1949 purporting to be passed under section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, is also void. The enactment of the Constituent Assembly Act I of 1949 is contended to be ultra vires and illegal.\n\nThat Act is further challenged on the ground that it was enacted without the assent of the Governor- General of India. It is contended in the plaint that the defendants, viz., the Union of India and the State of Bihar, deny and are interested in denying the existence or entity of the plaintiff State and in disputing the rights, privileges, powers and prerogatives of its Ruler as well as the right to the private properties as set out in the annexure. The States Merger Order of\n\ns.e.R.\n\nSlJPREME COU.RT REPORTS 481\n\nl949 is .contended to be an abuse -of power and autho.. rity and a fraud on the Government of India. Act, 1935, and the Indian Independence Act, 1947, It is contended that the Government. of India or the Constituent Assembly had no uthprity to pass any legisla- . tion on a matter not specified in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession. In paragraph 19 of the plaint it is contended that the dispute between the parties comprised and involyed questions on which the existence or extent of legal rights depends and the plaintiff\n\nState is a party to the same. These disputes concern the intc; rpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935, and/or of an order made thereunder J.nd/or the interpretation of the Indian Independence Act and/or an order made thereunder and/or the .extent of. authority vested in the Dominion by virtue of the Instrument of Accession of the plaintiff .State. The prayers are: (a) Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the States Merger Order, 1949.\n\n(b) For a declaration that the Dominion Government had no authority to assume any power or jurisdiction beyond the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession and had no authority to delegate any power in relation to the plaintiff . State to the Provincial Government of Bihara ( c) For a declaration tha~ Act XL VII of 1947, the Constituent Assembly Act I .of 1949, section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted, and the States Merger Order, 1949, are ultra vires, illegal and .inoperative in so far as they are made applicable to the plaintiff tate and Orders made thereunder as also actions taken or purported to be taken thereunder; (d) For a declaration that the Province of. Bihar had no authority or jurisdiction to carry on tlie administration of the plaintiff State and tMt. the alleged merger was illegal and unauthorized : ( e) For a declaration as to the rights of th.e parties and as to the extent of the authority of the Domini9n of India over and in respect of the plaintiff State; (f) For a declaration that the. plaintiff State retained its entitv and territ6ri:il . integrify; that its administration' should\n\nState of Seraike/la and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nmrd Another .\n\nKania C.J.\n\nState of Seraiktlla muJ Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nKaniaC.].\n\nin any event be carried on in the name of its Ruler and that his rights and privileges as set out in annexure 'C' and his private properties as set out in annexure 'D' remain unaffected ; and (g) For a declaration that the Province of Bihar had no authority or jurisdiction over the plaintiff State and that it should not interfere in any way with the State or the sovereignty of its Ruler.\n\nSix other suits by other States of the former Eastern Agency were filed also before the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th of January, 1950, on the same lines, except that in four of them the agreement similar to the agreement of the 15th December, 1947, is admitted to have been executed by the Ruler and is admitted to be binding on the plaintiff.\n\nThe material part of section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which provides for the accession of Indian States, runs as follows :-\n\n6. Accession of Indian States.-(1) An Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion .if the Governor-General has signified his acceptance of an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof whereby the Ruler on behalf of the State :-\n\n(a) declares that he accedes to the Dominion with the intent that the Governor-General, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of his Instrument of Accession, but, subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State such functions as may be vested in them by order under this Act; and\n\n(b) assumes the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given within the State to the provisions of this Act so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of the Instrument of Accession.\n\n(!) An Instrument of Accession shall specify the matters which the Ruler accepts as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State, and the limitations, if any, to which the\n\npower of the Dom.inion Legislature to e laws for the State, and the exercise of the cxecuttve authority of the :Dominion in the State, are respectively to be subject.\n\n(3) A Ruler may, by a , supplementary Instrument eYl\"CUted by him and accepted by the Governor-General, vary the Instrument of Accession of his State by extending the functions which by virtue of that Instru• ment are exercisable by any Dom.inion authority in :relation to his State.\n\n• • • •\n\n(5) In this Act a State which has acceded to the Dominion is referred to as an Acceding State and the Instrument by virtue of which a State has so acceded construed together with any supplementary Instrument executed under this section, is referred to as the Instrument of Accession of that State .... \" A supplementary Instrument executed under subsection (3) by the Ruler and accepted by the Governor- General is, by virtue of sub-section (5), therefore to be considered a part of the Instrument of Accession of 1 that State. The supplementary Instruments signed by the four States only bring within the scope of discussion those supplementary Instruments on the. footing that they were a part of the Instrument of Accession.\n\nWritten statements have been filed on behalf of the defendants contesting the contentions raised in the , plaint. There are several contentions in respect of the jurisdiction of the Court. Several contentions cover pure issues of law and some raise issues of fact in respect of the document of 15th December, 1947. The parties agreed on the issues and they have been filed in Court. It was further agreed between the parties that issues 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 may be tried as preliminary issues and we have heard counsel on those issues fully. The-first issue is in these terms:\n\n\"Whether, having regard to the subject-matter of the suit and the provisions contained in article 363 (1) of the Constitution of India, this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.\"\n\ni95t\n\nS1a1; ef.\n\nSeraiklili& tiild Olhits\n\nUnion of IlliiilJ\n\niJlltl Anolfltf.\n\nKaniaC.j.\n\nSime of Seraikella ...i 011im\n\nUn oflndi•\n\naad AnotM?..\n\n.K4~UJ ~~.3.\n\n484 StlJP.llEME COURT REOORTS [1'951]\n\nIn the view I take of this issue I do not think it necessary to discuss the other preliminary issues raised on the question of jurisdiction. For determining this issue, it may be noted that the Federal Court, prior to the 26th of January, 1950, had original jurisdiction in respect of matters covered by section 204 of the Gove.rnment of India Act.\n\nUnder that section, that Court had jurisdiction in any dispute between a State and the Dominion if and in so far as the dispute involved any question (whether of law or fact) on which existence or extent of a legal right depended, provided .that the said jurisdiction did not extend to a dispute to which a State was a party unless the dispute was covered by clause (a) (i) of the Proviso, which runs as follows:-\n\n\"Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to- ·\n\n(a) a dispute to which a State is a party, unless the dispute-\n\n(i) concerns th<\" \"interp.retation of this Act or of an Order in Council made thereunder before the date of the establishment of the Dominion, or of an order made thereunder on or after that date, or the interpretation of the Indian Indepepdence Act, 1947, or of any order made thereunder, or the extent of the legislative or executive authority vested in the Dominion by virtue of the Instrument of Accession of that State ; or .. \"\n\nThe rest of the section is not material. Section 204\n\n(2) provided that the Federal Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall not pronounce any judgment other than a declaratory judgment. The suit having been filed prior to the 26th of January, 1950, the suit stOOd transferred to this Court under article 374 (2) of the Constitution of India. That article. runs as follows i-\n\n\"374. (2) All suits, appeals, and . proceedings, civil or criminal, pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of this Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to. hear and determine the same, and the\n\njudgments and orders of the Federal Court delivered or made before the. commencement of this Constitution shall have the . same force and effect as if they had been d( livered or made by the Supreme Court.\" Article 131 of the Constitution deals with the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and its material portion runs as follows :-\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall .... have original jurisdiction in :any dispute ....\n\n(b) between the Government of India :ind any State Qr States on one side arid one or more other States on the other .... if and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence of a 1egal right depends : ·\n\nProvided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to (i) a dispute to which a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule is a party if the dispute arises out -of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrumel).t which was entered into or executed before the commencement -of· this Constitution and has or has been continued in <Operation after such commencement.\"\n\nThe, States specified in Part B of the First Schedule <lo not mention any , of the plaintiff States. ..Article 363 of the Constjtution of India runs as follows :-\n\n\"363. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143 neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any :Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any. of its predecessor Governments was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right w:ruing under or any liability or obligation\n\nState of Seraikel/a and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nKania C.J\n\nState ef Seraiktlla and OtlurJ\n\nv, Uniot• of India\n\nand Anot/rn.\n\nKania C.J.\n\narising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, convenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument.\n\n(2) In this article-\n\n( a) 'Indian State' means any territory recognised before the commencement of this Constitution. by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State ; and\n\n(b) 'Ruler' includes the Prince, Chief or other person. recognised before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the- Ruler of any Indian State.\"\n\nThe first question arising for consideration is the. true interpretation of article 374 (2) of the Constitution of India. It was argued that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to try the suit as framed before the Constitution of India came into operation. Under article 347 (2) that suit stood removed to the Supreme\n\nCourt and the question of jurisdiction to try this suit at the present stage has to be determined only having regard tothe jurisdiction of the Federal Court, because the trial of the suit was transferred to the Supreme Court under this article. It was argued that if there was any limitation on the jurisdiction of the SQpreme Court to hear such a suit, (if instituted in it under its original jurisdiction), such limitation is not relevant to be considered in respect of suits which stood transferred to. the Supreme Court under article 374 (2).\n\nIn other words, in respect of such suits the Supreme Court had a wider jurisdiction as compared with thejurisdiction of the Federal Coutt, if its jurisdiction is construed as limited by virtue of the different article.~ of the Constitution. In this connection, some reliance was placed on the use of the word 'jurisdiction' . as; connected with the Supreme Colll't in article 374 (2).\n\nIn my opinion, this argument is unsound. Article 374 is in the Part dealing with temporary and transitional provmons.\n\nIn article 374 (1) it is provided that the Judges of the Federal Court holding office ore tht! commencement of the . Constitution, unless they have\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSuPREMl!: COURT REPORTS 487\n\n. elected otherwise, become Judges of the Supreme Court.\n\nArticle 374 (2), in my opinion, similarly provides, firstly, for the removal .of all suits, appeals and proceedings, civil or criminal, pending in the Federal Court to the Supreme Court and, secondly, provides that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine these matters. 'lt may be noticed that in this clause provision is made not only in respect of suits but of civil and criminal appeals and also of other pending procee-Oings.\n\nBy providing only for the removal of these matters to the Supreme Court, there will remain a lacuna, if it was not furthr stated that after such removal the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to try the matters. It is from that point of view only that, in my opinion, the Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same.\n\nI think it is not correct to read those words as giving to the Supreme Court an extended jurisdiction in these matters.\n\nTwo stages have therefore to be considered in determining the operation of this clause : (1) whether the suits, appeals or proceedings, which were pending before the Federal Court, were within the jurisdiction of the Fede-. ral Court ; and (2) whether on removal the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the same having regard to all the provisions of the Constitution relating to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It must be n,, oticed that the Supreme Court was a new Court established by the Constitution of India.\n\nIt had no existence before that. The jurisdiction of that Court has therefore to be ascertained by considering all the relevant articles of the Constitution of India. It is in that light that the provisions of article 363 have to be read and interpreted.\n\nBefore doing so I think it is essential to bear in mind the political bakground. Prior to August, 1947, British India, as it was then described, was governed under the Government of India Act, 1935' Indian States, as they were then described, were independent States not governed by the Government of India.\n\nThey were under the suzerainty of His Majesty the King and their\n\nState of Straikel/a and Others\n\nV.\n\nUnion °of India.\n\nand Another.\n\nKania C.J.\n\nStatt of Straik11lla and Olhers\n\nv Onion of India\n\nand Anothtr.\n\n.KaniaC.J.\n\nadministration was controlled under the advice of. the Political Department of the Government of India, on the footing that the King . was the Sovereign and had the right to exercise suzerain powers over those States.\n\nOn the passing of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, from the 15th August, 1947, the British Parliament and the King ceased to have power to make any laws for India or rnake any changes in its Constitution.\n\nThese were left to India.\n\nAs regards the Indian States, while provision continued in the Governm.ent of India Act for the Rulers signing instruments of accession, no suzerain rights were given to the Dominion of India by the Indian Independence Act.\n\nIf, therefore, the Dominion of India or any of these States committed acts of aggression or territorial trespass, there was no law, the enforcement of which could give either party a relief and there was no court also which could give such a relief; Section 204 of the Government of India Act also did not provide any relief to any of these Indian States unless they signed an Instrument of Accession.\n\nWith the passing of the Constitution of India, India became a Sovereign Independent Republic.\n\nIf that Dominion or Republic committed any .acts of aggression towards a neighbouring Indian State (as it is convenient to. describe under the circumstances) the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to give relief to the Indian . State.\n\nA.s noticed above, its jurisdiction under article 131 is limited and even in respect of a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule if a dispute arises out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument, it w.ill not be .entertained by this Court if the conditions of the proviso apply to the same. It is with this background that we have to read article 363 of the Constitution.\n\nThe opening words of that article in terms override all provisions of the Constitution, but are made subject only to the provisiQO.s of article 143 which enabks the President to consult the Supreme Court on matters referred to it. These all embracing opening words of article .363 thcrefo~ clearly override the operation of\n\narticle 374 (2) also. The result is that article 363 is the controlling .article over article 374(2) also. The jurisdiction of the' Supreme Court having been stated in articles 131-136, article 363 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in . those articles and other articles of the Constitution, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court will have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement. If . therefore the dispute arises in respect of a document of that description and if such document had been executed Qefore the Constitution by a Ruler and which was or had continued in operation after such commencement, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine such issue.\n\nIt was argued that as the agreement had to be in operation after the commencement of the Constitution, no dispute can arise in respect of such document before the commencemenr of the Constitution and therefore as the dispute in the present case had arisen before the commencement . of the Constitution, article 363 had no\n\noperaton. In my opinion, this is not a correct reading of article 363 (1). The time factor is related only to the document in question and not the dispute. It is provided that such. document should have been executed before the Constitution came into force and has to be in operation after the Constitution, but the dispute, which is the subject-matter of the litigation, may arise before or. after.\n\nIt was argued that the article is prospective and not retrospective. Therefore it onlv covers the cases which are filed in the Supreme cOurt after the Constitution comes into force and does not affect suits filed in the Federal Court before the Constitution of India came into operation. In my opinion this argument is based on a mistaken meaning given to the words \"prospective\" and \"retrospective\". It is not disputed that the Constitution is prospective.\n\nThe question however\n\nStale of Seraikella and Othns\n\nv. u .. ion of l1zdit&\n\nand Another.\n\nKaniaC.J.\n\n'Stal< ef Setail¢Ua and Others\n\nOnion ef India\n\nand .Another.\n\n.KaniaC.J.\n\nis that the Supreme Court having been created by the Constitution itself, on the day the Court proceeds to determine the matter, what according to the Constitution of India, is the jurisdiction of this Court. This approach doc~ not make the provision retrospective.\n\nIn this connection, the similarity in language of articles 363 (1) and 131 proviso (i) may be noted. Considered in that way, the only question which remains for decision is whether on the structure of the plaint, the dispute raised by the suit arises out of the provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or any other similar instrument. I have already noticed above that the dispute in respect of the agreement of the 15th December, 1947, is immaterial for the present discussion. If the plaintiff repudiates that agreement he is seeking to enforce his rights after ignoring the same. If the plaintiff (as noticed in four of the suits) relies on this agreement, it becomes a part of the Instrument of. Accession under section 6 (5) of the Government of India Act, 1935. and the dispute will still have to be considered having regard to the terms of the two documents, viz., the original Instrument of Accession and the supplementary Instrument. The question thus resolves itself into an analysis of the plaint and to find out what the plaintiff seeks . to get by his suit. Apart from the fact that in prayers (f) and\n\n(g) of his plaint he seeks to enforce his rights under the Agreement of the 15th December, 1947, it appears clear that the whole ambit of the suit is to enforce his Instrument of Accession. The plaintiff contends firstly that it had signed the Instrument of Accession through its Ruler. The State next complains that, acting beyond the powers given over under the Instrument of Accession, the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are trespassing wrongfully on its legislative ; md executive functions, that the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are making laws which they have no power to make having regard to the Instrument of Accession, and arc wrongfully interfering with the administration of the State beyond the rights given to them under the Instrument of Accession.\n\nThe whole plaint i$\n\nnothing else except the claim to enforce the plaintiff's .right uhder the Instrument of Accession. The dispute therefore in my opinion clearly is in respect of this Instrument of Accession and is covered by article 363 (1) of the Constitution of India. The question of the validity of the different enactments and orders is also based on the rights claimed under the Instrument of Accession so far as the plaintiff is concerned. On\n\nthe side of the defendants, the position is that they admit the Instrument of Accession and they do not daim that they are exercising the disputed rights under that Instrument. Their contention is that the Agreement of the 15th of December, 1947, was validly signed and is binding and enforceable against the plaintiff.\n\nThe defendants contend that their action in passing the disputed, legislation and orders and the action in taking over the administration are all based on that Agreement of 15th December, 1947. If the plaintiff contends that that Agreement is not binding on it, it cannot enforce its rights under the original jurisdiction of the Court.\n\nIf the plaintiff has a grievance and a right to a relief which the defendants contend it has not, the forum to seek redress is not the Supreme Court exercising its original jurisdiction on the transfer of the suit from the Federal Court. According to the defendants, the situation in those circumstances will be of a Sovereign Independent State trespassing on the territories, powers and privileges of another neighbouring independent State.\n\nTo redress a grievance arising out of such action on the part of the defendants, the Supreme Court is not the forum to give relief. The issue is answered in the negative . th ' costs costs m e cause.\n\nVMAN BosE J.-1 agree.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is a batch of suits brought by plaintiffs claiming to be Acceding States for certain declaratory reliefs in regard to the allep; ed\n\nwrongful merger of their respective territories in the territories of the adjoining Provinces of Bihar and Orissa. The Dominion of India was impleaded as the\n\nState of Seraikella and Others\n\nv, Union of India and Anot\"'r.\n\nKaniaC. J.\n\nPattm, iali Saslri J.\n\nState of Straiktlla anti Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nPatarefali\n\nSastri].\n\nSUPR£ME COURT REPORTS [1951}\n\nfirst defendant, and the Province of Bihar or the Province of Orissa, as the case may be, as the second defendant.\n\nThe suits were instituted in the Federal Court of India under section 204 of the Government of India Act, 1935, shortly before the commncement of the new Constitution.\n\nApart from certain minor variations, the substance of the plaintiff's case in each suit, shorn of verbiage, is that the merger and the taking over of the adminiscration of the territory concerned; carried out in purported exercise of powl:rs conferred by the State Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949, made by the Governor-General of India under section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, was a breach of the terms of the Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler and accepted by -the Governor- General in August, 1947, which continued the sovereignty of the Ruler in .and over the State, and that all notifications, orders or enactments issued or made in violation of the rights and obligations flowing out of that Instrument were ultra vires, void and inoperative.\n\nIn the plaints in Suits Nos. 1, 2 and 3 reference was made to an agree1I1ent entered into between the Governor-General and the Ruler concerned in. December, 1947, and it was alleged that it was inoperative and void because it was not a concluded agreement and, in any case, not supported by consideration. In the other Suits Nos. 4, 5; 6 and 7 that agreement was fully admitted, but \"in spite of the agreement aforesaid\" it was contended that \"the actions taken by the defendants including the promulgation of the orders, notifications and legislation mentioned herein are wrongful, illegal and. ultra vird' The crucial prayer in all the suits was \"a declaration that the Dominion of India has no authority vested in it to assume any power or jurisdiction beyond the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession and had no authority to delegate any power or powers in relation to the plaintiff State to the Provincial Government\" of Bihar or of Orissa, as the case may be. The other reliefs asked for were merely ancillary a:nd consequeritiaf.\n\nThe defence, in the main, was based on the aforesaid agreement of December, 1947, under which, it was alleged, the plaintiff in each case \"ceded full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the plaintiff to the Government of India with effect from 1st January, 1948\".\n\nIt was claimed that, from that date and particularly from January 26, 1950, when the Constitution of India came into force and made the territory of the plaintiff an integral part of the territory of the State of Bihar (or of Orissa, as the case may be), the plaintiff ceased to be a distinct legal unit and had no capacity to maintain the suit. The said agreement was a political agreement and not a civil contract requiring consideration for its effectiveness and, in any case, was a concluded agreement supported by consideration.\n\nIn view of that agreement, all the actions, notifications and orders referred to in the plaint proceeded \"on the basis of the supersession of the said Instrument of Accession by the consent of the parties\" and they were legal, valid and operative to bind the plaintiff. In a supplementary written statement the defendants raised the plea that \"this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit having regard to the subject-matter of the suit and the provisions contained in article 363 (1) of the Constitution of Indja\".\n\nOn the 9th December, 1950, by consent of both sides, it was ordered by the Judge in Chambers that the suit should be heard on the preliminary issue, namely, \"whether having regard to the subject matter of the suit and the provisions contained in article 363 (1) of the Constitution of India, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit\". When the matter was taken up for hearing on 5th March, 1951, it was considered desirable that 'issues should be settled on all matters in controversy in the suits, and all the issues relating to the maintainability of the suits, including the issue of jurisdiction, should be tried as preliminary issues, and the suits were adjourned tothe 7th March for that purpose.\n\nThe parties then filed seventeen agreed issues as arising out of the, 5-62 S. C. India/59\n\nState of Seraikellti and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nPatanjali &istri ].\n\nState ef Seraikella and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nPatarefol_i Sastn J.\n\npleading;, and they further agreed that issues 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 might be tried first. These issues are as follows:\n\n1. Whther having regard to the subject matter of the suit and t_he provisions contained in article 363 ( 1) of the Constitution of India, this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?\n\n3. Whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit under section 204 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and particularly in regard to the questions as to the existence and validity of the agreement of merger ?\n\n4. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?\n\n5. Whether the suit is maintainable in view of the absence of the requisite notice to the defendants under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code ?\n\n6. Whether having regard to the provisions of the Constitution, the plaintiff has a legal capacity and is entitled to maintain the suit ?\n\n7. Whether this Court is competent to examine the validity of section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, enacted by the Constituent Assembly ?\n\nAs I am of opinion that issue No. 1 should be found for the defendants and the suits must fail on that ground, I do not propose to consider the other issues, although arguments have been addressed to us on all of them.\n\nThe determination of issue No. 1 turns on the proper construction of articles 363 (1) and 374 (2) which read thus:\n\n\"363. (1) Notwithstanding anything in tl1is Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and which has\n\n-0r has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right :accruing under or any liability or obligation ansmg -0ut of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty,· agreement, covenant, engagement,\n\nanad or other similar instrument.\"\n\n\"374. (2) All suits, appeals and proceedings, civil or criminal, pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of this Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and the judgments and orders of the Federal Court delivered -0r made before the commencement of this Constitution shall have the same force and effect as if they had been delivered or made by the Supreme Court.\"\n\nAs already pointed out, the sheet anchor of the plaintiffs' case is the Instrument of Accession, which, according to them, continues to operate in full force.\n\nThey contend that \"the Dominion of India or the Constituent Assembly of India has no authority or power under the Indian Independence Act or otherwise to enact section 6 of the Constituent Assembly Act I of 1949 or to introduce section 290-A into the Government of India Act, 1935, or to legislate for the plaintiff State in any manner except with reference to the matters specified in the Schedule to the said Instrument of Accession\"\n\n(paragraph 18 of the plaint in Suit No. 1 of 1950).\n\nThey proceed to state that \"the disputes between the parties comprise and involve questions on which the extent or existence of a legal right depends and such disputes, to which the said Acceding State is a party, concern (among other things) the extent of authority vested in the Dominion bv virtue of the Instrument of Accession of the plaintiff State.\" And prayer (b), to which reference has been made already, is for \"a declaration that the Dominion Government has no authoritv vested in it to assume any power or jurisdiction beyonri the matters specified in the Instmment of Accession\" (paragraph 21). These passages are reproduced in all the plaints. On the other hand, the mainstay of the\n\nState of Seraikella and Others\n\nUnion oflndia\n\nand Another.\n\nPatanjali.\n\nSastri J.\n\nState ef Straiktlla and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Anot'Mr.\n\nPalmifali\n\nSaslri ... 1.\n\ndefence is the subsequent agreement of December 1947. and it is claimed that the States Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949, under which the impugned merger was effected, was made \"on the basis of the supcrsession of the said Instrument of Accession by the consent of parties\". (Vide paragraph 21 of the written statement of the first defendant which was adopted by the second defendant). And, although the defendants proceeded to state, on the aforesaid basis. that there was no dispute regarding the Instrument of Accession, inasmuch as that basis is repudiated in the piaints, such repudiation obviously raises the dispute whether the Instruments of Accession are still in force or have been superseded. That dispute \"arising'', as it does, \"out of\" the.\n\nInstrument of Accession in each case falls within the purview of article 363 (1).\n\nIt was said that the suits involved also certain other disputes not falling within article 363 (1) such as, for instance, those relating to the agreement of Dec em br, 1947, and the validity of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, of section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, and of the States Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949, etc. The controversies regarding these matters are but contentions whereby the parties seek fo establish, on the one hand, that the Instrument of Accession still governs their mutual rights and obligations and, on the other, that that Instrument stands superseded and is no longer in force.\n\nIssues have no doubt been framed in regard to these matters but they cannot in my opinion, be considered to be disputes for the purposes of article 131 or article 363 (1). These articles deal with the jurisdiction of courts and they envisage disputed claims to substantive legal rights. The claims in these suits arc undoubtedly based on the respective Instruments of Accession and they are repudiated because those Instrument of Accession are said to have been superseded by reason of the alleged agreement of lJecember,\n\n1947. These claims are disputes to which article 363 (1) clearly applies. The other s<><alled disputes are only incidental and ancillary controversies\n\nraised with a view to support or overthrow the claims and cannot, in my opinion, affect the operation of the bar under that Article any more than, for instance issue No. 5 relating to the necessity for notice to the defendants under section 80 of the CiYil Procedure Code.\n\nNevertheless, it is contended, the article has no :application here and it cannot operate retrospectively and applies only to disputes arising after the Commencement of the Constitution. I am unable to accept this restrktcd interpretation of article 363 ( 1). While the Article undoubtedly postulates the continued operation of the treaties, agreements, etc., entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution and giving rise to the disputes, it does not require, as a condition of its appliCation, that such Disputes should arise after the commencement of the Constitution. I sec no reason for importing a restriction which a plain grammatical construction of the language employed does not warrant.\n\nIt is not correct to say that the wider constmction would make the operation of the article retrospective, for the bar to interference by the court operates only after the Constitution came into force irrespective of the disputes concerned having :arisen before or after the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nIt was said that the article should not be construed so as .to bar the trial of pending suits or proceedings.\n\nBut this is not a case of a pending .action in a court which continues to function.\n\nThe Federal Court, in which the suits were pending, and which had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with them, was abolished and a new court, the Supreme Court of India, was created with original jurisdiction strictly limited to disputes relating to legal rights between States recognised as such under the Constitution.\n\nBut as the . States specified in Part B of the First Schedule had a\n\nsemi-sovreign status before the Constitution, agreements with them were in the nature of international treaties and covenants, and disputes arising out of them would not lie in municipal courts. That principles is given effect to, so far as the Supreme Court's\n\nState of Seraikel/a and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Anothtr.\n\nPatanja/i Sostri ].\n\nStaJe of SeraikeUa and Others\n\nUnWn of India\n\nand Another.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSastri J.\n\noriginal jurisdicuon is concerned, by the proviso . o article 131 which defines such jurisdiction and, m regard to all courts and in respect of all proceedings,. by article 363 (1). The reason for applying that principle is greater, not less, in regard to such disputes arising before the Constitution when these States, then known as Indian States, enjoyed a• higher degree of political freedom.\n\nFurthermore, the construction contended for by the plaintiffs as applied to article 131 would mean that the Court would, notwithstanding the proviso, have jurisdiction in respect . of such disputes, provided they arose before the commencement of the Constitution. If that had been intended, one would expect that such jurisdiction would have heen conferred by positive enactment, instead of being left to be derived by implication from a .proviso intended to delimit the jurisdiction conferred by that article.\n\nIt seems to me, therefore, that the proviso to article 131 must be construed as applicable to disputes of the kind mentioned arising both before and after the commencement of the Constitution. If so, article 363 ( 1) must receive the same construction, the language employed heing essentially the same.\n\nEven so, it is next contended, article 363, which enacts a general rule of non-interference by courts in certain classes of disputes, cannot control the operation of article 374 (2), which is a special provision providing that suits, appeals and proceedings pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of the Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same. There would he considerable force in this argument but for the opening words of article 363 (1), namely, \"notwithstanding anything in this Constitution.\" These words clearly indicate that the bar to the exercise of jurisdiction enacted in article 363 controls the operation of article 374 (2) and excludes the rule of construction invoked by the plaintiffs.\n\nI find issue No. 1 for the defendants~\n\nMAHAJAN J.-On the 16th January, 1950, ten days before the inauguration of the Constitution of India, the State of Serailtella (an Orissa State attached to the Eastern States Agency) brought .a suit in the Federal Court of India against the Dominion of India and the Province ot Bihar for the following reliefs :\n\n\"(a) Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and of. the States Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949;\n\n(b) Declaration that the Dominion Government has no authority vested in it to assume any power or jurisdiction beyond the matters specified in .the Instrument of Accession and had no authority to delegate any power or powers in relatioh to the plaintiff State on the Provincial Government of Bihar or Orissa ; ( c) Declaration that the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, XL VII of 1947, the Constituent Assembly Act, I of 1949, section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the States Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949, are ultra vires, illegal and inoperative in so far as they are made applicable to the plaintiff State and that all orders made or purported to .be made and/or all actions taken or purported to be taken thereunder are also illegal and inoperative ; ( d) Declaration that the Province of Bihar has no authority or jurisdiction to carry on the administration of the plaintiff State and that the alleged merger of the said State in the Province of Bihar is illegal and unauthorized and is not binding on the said State and its Ruler; ( e) Declaration as to the rights of the parties and as to the extent of authority of the defendant Dominion of India over and in respect of the plaintiff States ;\n\n(f) Declaration that the plaintiff State retains its entity arid territorial integrity that its administration should in any event be carried on in the name of its Ruler and that his rights and privileges as set out in\n\nState of Seraikella and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nMahajan].\n\nState of Seraiktlla and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another,\n\nMahajan].\n\nannexure \"C\" and his private properties as set out in aµnexure \"D\" remain unaffected ;\n\n(g) Declaration that the Province of Bihar has no authority or jurisdiction over the plaintiff State and that it should not interfere in any way with the said State or the sovereignty '?f its Ruler.\" All the different reliefs set out .above in substance converge on the reliefs stated in clause ( f). The plaintiff wants a declaration from this court to the effect that the State of Seraikella retains its entity ; rnd territorial integrity and has not integrated itself with the territories of the Indian Dominion. ·\n\nThis suit was pending in the Federal Court on the 26th January, 1950, and under the provisions of article 374 (2) of the Constitution it has to be heard and determined by this Court. The plaintiff claims the above reliefs on the following allegations :\n\n(1) That on the 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff State acceded to the Dominion of India under the terms of an Instnunent of Accession (Exhibit A) executed by its Ruler and accepted by the Governor-General of India, that the said instrument could not be added to or amended unless suc11 addition or amendment was accepted by the Ruler by a supplementary Instrument ; that no such supplementary Instrument was ever executed or accepted by the Ruler ;\n\n(2) That from 31st August, 1947, the Government of Orissa wrongfully and illegally purported to administer the plaintiff State by virtue of an alleged delegation of authority by the Dominion Government by a notification dated 23rd December, 1947, issued under an Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, XL VII of 1947, that the said Act is ultra vires and of no effect and does not bind tne plaintiff and that the Act was not authorised by the T nstrument of Accession;\n\n(3) That the defendant claims to rely for the validity of its wrongful acts on an \\llleged agreement of 15th December, 1947, but the same is void and\n\n.inoperative and that it never became a concluded -contract between the parties ;\n\n(4) That on the 18th May, 1948, the Province of 13ihar wrongfully and illegally took over the administration of the State and issued an administrative order -under Act XL VII of 1947, that the Dominion of India had no authority beyond the Instrument of Accession to delegate its power to the Province of Bihar to :administer the plaintiff State ;\n\n(5) That on the 26th July, 1949, the Governor- General wrongfully and illegally promulgated an order.\n\n<:ailed the States Merger Order of 1949, unqer which\n\nthe State was illegally merged in the Province of Bihar, that this order was made under section 290-A of the Government of India Act which section was introduced in that Act by section 6 of the Constituent Assembly Act, I of 1949, which was ultra vires and illegal, that the Dominion of India had no authority to bring the plaintiff State within the provisions of section 290-A <>f the Government of India Act, that the Constituent Assembly Act, I of 1949, was inoperative as it was enacted without the consent of the Governor-General that the Merger Order prejudicially affects the existence and entity of the State, its position and status :and goes beyond the ambit of section 290-A.\n\nShorn of all its verbiage, the plaint in substance denies the agreement of the 15th December, 1947, on the foot of which the plaintiff State was integrated with the territories of the Indian Dominion and on the basis of which Act XL VII of 1947 was made applicable to it, and the notifications mentioned in the plaint were issued. On the basis of the same agreement section 290-A of the Government of India Act was also made applicable to the plaintiff State. By reason of the denial <>f the agreement of the 15th December it is asserted by the plaintiff that the actions of the Dominion Government in first merging the plaintiff State with the Province of Orissa and subsequently meming it with the Stat.'! of Bihar is unlawful and ille; al ; in other words; the plaintiff alleges that in the absence of any supplementary agreement as contemplate.cl by\n\nState of Seraikella and Otht.rs\n\nUnion of India and Another.\n\nMahajan].\n\nState of SeraikeUa and Otlv.rs\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nMahajan].\n\nsection 6, sub-section (3), of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Dominion of India had no authority whatsoeyer to bring the plaintiff State within the ambit of the different statutes mentioned above and that all its acts in depriving the State of its legal entity are acts in excess of the terms of the Instmment of Accession and amount to usurpation of the sovereignty of the plaintiff State which was retained by it under that Instrument and that being so, the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration from this Court to the effect that the plaintiff State still retains its entity and territorial integrity and that the various orders and laws under which it has been integrated with the State of Bihar are void and ultra vires and are acts of encroachment on the sovereignty of the State• Shortly stated, the plaintiff seeks by this suit to specifically enforce the terms of the Instrument of Accession by denying the existence of the agreement of. 15th December, 1947, or by pleading its invalidity.\n\nThe suit brought against the Dominion of India and the.\n\nProvince of Bihar has now to be continued and determined against the Government of the Union of India and the State of Bihar in view of the provisions of article 300 of the Constitution. Both the defendants contested the suit on similar grounds. The followingagreed issues between the parties bring out the points' in dispute that arise out of the pleadings :\n\n1. Whether having regard to the subject matter of the suit and the provisions contained in article 36J ( 1) of the Constitution of India, this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?\n\n2. Whether the plaintiff acceding State and a distinct of the institution of the suit ?\n\nhad ceased to be an legal entity at the date\n\n3. \\Vhether the Federal Court had jurisdiction toentertain the suit under section 204 of the Government\n\nof India Act, 1935, and particularly in regard to thc questions as to the existence and validity of the agreement of merger ?\n\n4. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit?\n\n5. Whether the suit is maintainable in view of the absence of the requisite notice to the defendants under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code ?\n\n6. Whether having regard to the provisions of the Constit1ftion, the plaintiff has a legal capacity and is entitled to maintain the sµit ?\n\n7. Whether this Court is competent to examine the validity of section\n\n290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, enacted by the Constituent Assembly ?\n\n8. Whether the States Merger (Governor's Provinces) Order dated the 27th July, 1948, made by the Governor-General under section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, is valid and competent ? ·\n\n9. Whether the Ex:tra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, was ultra vires and invalid ?\n\n10. Whether the delegation of authority by the Government of India to the Government of Orissa was ultra vires and illegal ?\n\n11. Whether the Constituent Assembly was competent to enact the Constituent Assembly Act I of 1949 under the provisions of the Indian Independence Act ?\n\n12. Whether the Seraikella and Kharsawan States (Amendment Act) Order, 1948, is ultra vires and goes beyond the ambit of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Acr. 1947?\n\n13. Whether the plaint discloses any cause of action ?\n\n14. Whether the agreement dated 15th December, 1947, is a concluded agreement between the parties ?\n\n15. Whether the agreement dated 15th December, 1947, is void and inoperative for want of consideration ?\n\n16. Whether the agreement dated 15th December, 1947, is a political agreement and not a civil contract ?\n\n17. Whether the administration of the plaintiff was handed over to the Government of Bihar under\n\nState of Seraikella and OtMrs\n\nUnion of lrul/o:\n\nand Another.\n\nMahajan\n\nState of Seraikella and Others\n\nv • .Vnion of India\n\nand Anoth~.\n\nMahaja11].\n\nNotification No. 217-P dated 18th May, 1948, m consultation with the Ruler of the plaintiff State ?\n\nWith the consent of parties it was decided to hear arguments on issues I, 3, 5, 6 and 7 as they could be decided without taking any evidence.\n\nIssue I : As regards this issue, it was contended by the learned Attorney-General that this Court has no jurisdiction \"to determine any dispute arising out of any provisio11 of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which .the Government of the Dominion of India .. . . was a party and \\vhich has or has been continued in operation after such commencement .... ,\" and that the\n\npresent suit relates to a dispute of this nature and though the suit is removed to the records oi the Court from he Federal Court, this Court must decline to hear it. Article 363 on the basis of which this contcrotion is raised provides thus :\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement ...... which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution\n\nby any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Govem; nent of the Dominion of India ot anv of its predecessor Governments was a party and whih has or has been continued in operation after such commencement ... . \"\n\nThe learned Attorney-General pointed out that particular subjects were removed from the jurisd.iction of this Court and it had no power or authority to adjudicate on them nqtwithstancling any other provision in the Constitution to the contrary.\n\nThe learned counsel for the plaintiff tontroverted this contention and urged that article 363 of the Constitution had no retrospective effect and could not affect suits that were pending in the Federal Court and\n\nwhich uncle( the provisions of article 374 (2) were removed to the Supreme Court and regarding which jurisdiction was conferred on it under the provisions of that article. It was said that article 363 could only have application to suits or disputes brought or raised 'after the 26th January, 1950, and not to suits that had aircady .been brought before that date. It was further contended that the plaintiff's suit did not arise out of any treaty or agreement inasmuch . as it denied the very existence of such a treaty or agreement. It was further pointed out that the suit did not relate to any of the subjects that were within the scope of this article. In order to appreciate these contentions it is necessary to refer to article 374 (2), which provides as follows :-\n\n\"All suits, appeals and proceedings, civil or criminal, pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of this Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme O>Urt, and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same .. \"\n\nThe question for decision under this issue concerns the true scope of the provisions of articles 363 and 374 (2) of the Constitution. It is easy to frame difficult conundrums on the material offered by the. two articles in question but when one considers them without a desire for controversy, they soon open to a clear and simple meaning. Article 363 takes away the jurisdiction of this Court on certain subjects if suits about them are instituted fter the 26th January, 1950, or disputes concerning them arise after that date, while article 374 (2) empowers this Court to hear and to determine suits which were pending in the Federal Court of India on the 26th January, 1950, and which that court was competent to try and determine. There is, in my opinion, no conflict between these two articles.\n\nThey operate on two different fields. The Feder11l Court of India had jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 204 of the Government of India Act . ' . , 1935, to determine certain suits between acceding States and the Government of India with respect to certain subject matters and that jurisdiction was continued for the time being and was conferred on this\n\nStale of Seraik•lla and Others\n\nUnion of Indiaand Another.\n\nMahqjan J.\n\nSiok ef SnaikeUa -end Othtrs\n\nv . .(JnWn of India\n\nand Another.\n\nMahajan].\n\nCourt. The original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is conferred by article 131 in respect of similar suits bur it does not embrace all the subjects that were covered by section 204 of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nIn Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay ( 1) it was held by this Court that the Constitution of India has no retrospective operation.\n\nThis proposition was not disputed by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nArticle 363 of the Constitution has therefore to be given a prospective operation and as such it cannot affect suits pending before the 26th January, 1950. It was contended by the learned Atton1ey-General that though the article has no retrospective operation, yet the language employed in it affects the jurisdiction of this court in respect of suits that were pending in the Federal Court if they relate to subjects stated therein.\n\nEmphasis was laid on the opening words of the article.\n\nIn my opinion, this contention is without force.\n\nThe opening words of the article do not make the article retrospective. Once it is held that the whole article operates prospectively on suits that are brought after the 26th January, 1950, or on disputes that arise after that date, then the opening words of the article cannot affect cases transferred to this Court from the Federal Court under the provisions of article 374 (2) of the Constitution. It is a well known rule of construction of statutes that no statute unless it be a statute dealing with procedure only should be construed as having retrospective effect, unless the statute expressly makes its provisions retrospective or retrospective effect must be given to it by necessary implicatioµ or intendment. The law leans against giving retrospective effect to statutes. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Court of Exchequer in Moon v.\n\nBurden(•). Ther~ the learned Barons of the Exchequer had to consider whether section 18 of the Gaming Act,\n\n~ and 9 Viet., Chapter 109, was retrospective. The words of that section Were as follows :-\n\n\"And be it enacted, that all contracts or agreements, whether by oral or in writing by way o~ gaming or,\n\n(r) [1951] S. C.R. 228.\n\n(2) [1884] 2 Ex. 22.\n\nwagering, shall be null and void ; and that no suit shll\n\nhe brought or maintained in any court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing .alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in Mie hands of any person to decide the event on which ny wager shall have' been made.\"\n\nAlthough the section provided that no suit should be brought or maintained in any court for the recovery of any such sum, nevertheless the Court of Exchequer held that that section did not apply to suits which had been instituted though not decided before . the Act came into force. It was observed by Baron Parke that the enactment \"that all contracts or agreements, by way of gaming or wagering shall be null and void\", if it stood by itself, ought most clearly to be construed :as applicable to future contracts and agreements only, and that if the next part stood alone, it would, though not so clearly, be construed to apply to future actions only and it should be construed to mean, not that an action already brought should not be maintained but that no action should afterwards be brought, or, if brought, maintained. In Beadling v. Coll( 1), the Court of Appeal in England held that the Gaming Act, 1922, which provided that no action under section 2 of the Gaming Act, 1855, to recover back money paid in respect of gaming debts \"shall be entertained in any court\", did not apply to actions which had been commenced before the Gaming Act of 1922 came into force.\n\nIn Henshall v. Porter (2 ), McCardie J., went further and held that the Gaming Act, 1922, which prohibited . all courts from entertaining such suits, did not apply to cases Where the cause of action had arisen before the passing of the Act though no suit had been instituted until the Act had been passed.\n\nThe rule laid down in these cases was expressly approved by the Federal Court of India in The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum( 8) and the learned Attorney-General frankly conceded that the rule laid down therein was not contested. It seems to me that this rule of construction\n\n(1) P922]39 T. L. R. 128.\n\n(3) [1940] F. C.R. 110.\n\n(~) [1923] 2 K. B. 193.\n\nState of Seraiktlla and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nMll/i4ian ].\n\n;)'fate of Seraiktlla and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.\n\nMahajan].\n\nhas apposite application to the construction of article 363 of the Constitution and the article has no retrospective operation and only affects disputes that would arise after the 26th January, 1950. As pointed out in Willis in his Constitutional Law, the same principle~ govern the construction of constitutions and the construction of statutes, but that the dominant force in the construction of constitution is to construe one part in the light of the provisions in the other part, as the. constitution is a logical whole, each provision of which is an integral part of itself.\n\nIn the majority judgment of this Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay(') it was observed that the idea of the preservation of past inchoate rights or liabilities and pending proceedings to enforce the same is not foreign or abhorrent to the Constitution of India and that idea can be given effect to if article 363 ( 1) is construed as above.\n\nAny other interpretation of article 363 would make the provisions of article 374 (2) partially nugatory inasmuch as certain suits pending in the Federal Court under section 204 of the Government of India Act, though removed to this Court with a direction that they have to be determined by us, could not be heard by this Court.\n\nSuch a result is avoided if article 363 is construed as suggested by me.\n\nThe contention raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that this suit does not arise out of any agreement as it questions its very existence does not seem sound because the dispute in this case clearly arises out of the provisions of the Instrument of Accession.\n\nThe next contention raised that the suit in so far as it questions the validity of certain statutes by . interpreting the provisions of the Government of India Act and the Independence Act has force as these subjects fall outside the scope of article 363. The question of jurisdiction has to. be determined on the allegations made in the plaint and cannot be decided by considering the written statement and the validity of the grounds alleged in the plaint.\n\n(1) [1951] S. C.R. 228.\n\nFor the reasons given above I respectfully beg to differ from the view of the majority of the Court on this issue and hold that issue l should be decided in favour of the plaintiff.\n\nIssue 3: Section 204 of the Government of India Act provides as follows :- ·\n\n\"(l) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Federal Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have an original jurisdiction in any disp?te between any two or more of the foliowing parties, that is to say, the Dominion, any of the Provinces or any of the Acceding States, if and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends : Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to-\n\n(a) a dispute to which a State is a party, unless the dispute-\n\n(i) concerns the interpretation of this Act or of an Order in Council made thereunder 'before the date of the establishment of the Dominion, or of an order made thereunder on or after that date, or the interpretation of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, or of any order made thereunder, or the extent of the legislative or .executive authority vested in the Dominion by virtue of the Instrument of Accession of that State ; or .... ''.\n\nUnder this section the Federal Court was conferred exclusive jurisdiction on disputes between the Dominion, any of the Provinces or the Acceding States, provided that in the case of the Acceding States the conditions laid down in clause (a) cited above were fulfilled. It was contended by the learned Attomey- General that the basic relief claimed in the plaint is that the Instrument of Accession subsists and that in substance the suit is to enforce the terms of the Instrument of Accession on the allegation that these have been contravened, but that the fact is that the Instrument of Accession was superseded by the agreement of the 15th December, 1949, and is no longer subsisting,\n\nM5SCI 6-62 S. C. India/59\n\nState 'ef Seraiketla 'and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another._\n\nMahqjan J\n\nStale of &raiklUa and Otklr}\n\nUnioa qf India\n\nand Anotlrlr.\n\nMalrqjon J.\n\n510 SUPREME COURT REPOR'.fS [1951]\n\nand that beillg so, the subject matter of this dispute is outside the scope of: the section.\n\nIt was also argued that unlawful. acts by one sovereign State over the sovereignty of another State would be in the natw;'e of\n\npolitial acts (acts of State) and that the municipal courts could have no jurisdiction to give relief concerning them. It was not disputed that in those suits in which the execution of the supplementary agreement of the 15th December, 1949, was not derlied the controversy raised in the plaint would be within the ambit of the section.\n\nIn reply to these contentions the following submissions were made on behalf of the plaintiffs in this and in the connected suits :\n\n( 1) That the subject matter of the suit concerned the construction of sections 6 and 101 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the point to be decided was whether on the correct construction of these sections the Dominion of India was competent to pass the Extra Territorial Jurisdiction Act, XL VII of 1947, so as to affect the plaintiff's rights, and could promulgate the various orders concerning the merger of the plaintiff State;\n\n(2) That on the allegations in the plaint, that on a true construction of the provisions of stction 6( 3) of. the Government of India Act, 1935, the alleged or admitted supplementary instrUlllent did not fall within iis purview was a matter within section 204 of: that Act ;\n\n(3) That it having been alleged in the plaint tha~ the merger order in pursuance of. which pbintiff Stare was merged with the Province of Bihar was not within the ambit of section 290-A, brought the suit within the provisions of section 204 inasmuch as it was a question concerning the interpretation of section roA of that Act ; .\n\n(4) That on the allegations in the plaint that on a proper construction of: the Indian Independence Act, section 290-A was not a valid piece. of legislation the suit came again within the ambit of the section ;\n\n(5) That the defendant not having raised the ple:i of act of: State to defend its various ~Ctions taken qua\n\nthe plaintiff State, the point could not be raised at this stage, and that in any case when the defendant had pleaded that its acts were done under the agreement of 15th December, 1949, it was not open to it to take that plea. ·\n\nAs already observed, the question of jurisdiction has to be decided purely on the allegations made in the plaint and it seems clear that on those allegations the suit is within the ambit of section 204.\n\nIt is, however, quite a different matter that those allegations may not on further inquiry be substantiated.\n\nQuestions regarding the interpretation both of the Government of India Act and of the Indian Independence Act have been canvassed in the plaint and it has also been contended that on a true construction of the scope of the Instrument of Accession which subsists none of the acts of the defendant can be justified. The merger order, it has been said, is in excess of the provisions of section 290-A of the Government of India Act and this raises the question of the true scope and intent of that section. The issue therefore is decided in favour of (he plaintiff.\n\nIssue 6 : The decision of the question raised by this issue depends on the determination of the question whether the plaintiff State has been validly integrated with the Province of Bihar. If section 290-A of the Government of . India Act is not a valid piece of legislation or if the merger order issued under that section is void, 'then it cannot be said that the plaintiff State no longer exists and . has been merged in the . .Province of Bihar. The learned ttorney-General made reference to article 1 of. the Constitution, which defines the territories -of India and also referred to the schedule in which .. it has been noted that the territory of the State of Bihar includes those territories which under the provisions of section 290-A have been integrated with it. This statement in the schedule has to be read subject to the conntion raised above.\n\nIt cannot be denied that ; m Instrument of Accession was executed by the plaintiff State in favour of the Dominion of\n\nStall of Seraiiulla and Othm\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Anot/ter.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nStau of &..WU a and Oilurs\n\nUnion of lnt!ia\n\nand Another.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'J;'S [1951]\n\nIndia and the plaintiff by this suit alleges that on the true construction of that instrument the plaintiff State retains its integrity. The plaintiff State denies the execution of the supplementary instrument and also denies that its merger is valid under its terms. Without determining the correctness of these allegations it is difficult to hold that mere non-recognition of the State in the Constitution wipes out its existence and that the situation is analogous to the case of death of a party in a suit. It may be pointed out that under the terms of the Instrument of Accession the plaintiff was not bound either to accept the future Constitution of India or to subscribe to its terms and that being so, it would not be correct to find that by the coming into force of the Constitution the plaintiffs suit has abated.\n\nThis Court has to decide the case in the situation in which it was instituted in the Federal Court of India and on the merits of the controversy it .has to be determined whether the State has been integrated validly with the territories of the Dominion of India or not; In these circumstances, in my opinion, the plea of abatement raised has no validity. It was argued tht this Court must accept the Constitution and cannot go behind it. This is unquestionably so, but in this case no question arises of going behind the Constitution, when the court is only exercising jurisdiction conferred on it by article 374 (2) of the Constitution and deciding suits filed by Acce<ling States before the Constitution came into force.\n\nIssue 5 : In my judgment, the plea raised under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no validity. The Code of civil Procedure has not been made applicable as in the case of High Courts by section 117 to the Federal Court of Indi~ By section 204 of the Government of India Act, exclusive original jurisdiction was conferred on the Federal Court in respect of suits between States and States which were outside the ken of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nBy section 214 of the Government of India Act, the F edcral Court was authorised. to make its own rules of procedure.\n\nThe Code in section 4 has enacted that it does not affect\n\nany special jurisdiction or special forms of procedure.\n\nRule 5 of the Federal Court Rules framed under Section 214 of the Government of India Act lays down in .clear and unambiguous language that none. of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to any proceedings in the Federal Court unless specifically incorporated in these rules. The provisions of section 80 have not been incorporated in the rules and that being so, section 80 cannot affect suits instituted ' in the Federal Court under section. 204 of the Government of India Act,· 1935. It was contended by the learned Attorney-General that the condition precedent for instituting a suit laid down in section 80 was not a qiatter of procedure falling within the ambit of section 214 of the Government of India Act and that the Federal Court could not make rules eliminating the condition precedent laid down in section 80 before a suit could be instituted against the Government.\n\nIn my judgment, this contention is not sound. Section 214 lays down that the Federal Court may from time to time with the approval of the Governor-General make rules of court for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the wurt. \"Practice\" in its larger sense like procedure, denotes the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the law that gives and defines the right. \"Procedure\" as defined in Wharton means the mode in which successive steps in litigation . are taken. It seems to me that what is enacted in section 80 is the first step in litigation between the parties when the cause of. action is complete.\n\nSection 80 in effect provides that an advance copy of the plaint should be served on the defendant and no suit should be instituted in court until the expiry of two months after such service. Section 80 does not define the rights of parties or confer any. rights. on the parties.\n\nIt. only provides a mode of . procedure . for getting the relief in respect of a cause of .action. . It is a part of the machinery for obtaining legal rights, i.e., machinery as distinguished from its products [Vide Boyser v.\n\nMinors(').] (') 50 L. J. F..x. 555.\n\nState of S.raike11a and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand 1lnoth1r.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nS1au of Ser.WI/a\n\n111111 Othm ... u.; •• of India\n\nnd Anot/rlr,\n\nMahajan J.\n\nReference was made by the learned Attorney- General to the decision in Bhagchand Dagadusa v.\n\nSt:crt:tary of State for lndia ( 1). At page 357 their Lordships of the Privy Council examined the view that had been taken in some of the . High Courts in India on the applicability of section 80 to suits for injunction and it was held that these had been decided on an erroneous assumption that a statutory provision as to procedure was subject to an exception in cases of hardship or in <; ases where irremediable harm might be caused, if it was strictly applied. It was pointed out that the Procedure Code must be read in accordance with the natural meaning of its words and that section 80 being explicit and mandatory, it admitted of no implications or exceptions.\n\nTheir Lordships then made these observations :-\n\n\"To argue as the appellants did, that the plaintiffs had a right urgently calling for a remedy, while section 80 is mere procedure, is fallacious, for section 80 imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the Court.''\n\nThe learned Attorney:.Gcneral relying on those observations contended that section 80 did not lay down any role of procedure hut was a provision affecting substantive rights.\n\nI . am unable o accede to this contention. Their Lordships did not decide, and it is not possible to think that they would make any such decision, that section 80 did not lay down a rule of procedure but was a piece . of. legislation defining substantive rights. All that they said was that section 80 was not mere procedure but was of a mandatory character and more than this they did not say.\n\nFurther, it seems to me that suits between States and States in respect of their political or public rights and which were wholly outside the ambit of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be governed by a rule like this which aptly applies to cases of private persons seeking to enforce private rights against Government.\n\nParliament while conferring original jurisdiction on\n\n( 1) L. R. 54 I. A. 338.\n\nS.C.lt •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 515\n\n. the Federal Court of . India concerning these political rights could not be intended, to clog the enforcement of those rights by the provisions of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The only conditions precedent for the maintainability of the suit arc those laid. down in section 204 and the hearing of these suits has to be m accordance with the rules of procedure prescribed by the Federal Court of India under the provisions of s¢ction 214 of the Gqvernmcnt of India Act.\n\nIssue 7 : This issue was not very seriously argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. The validity of section 290-A of the Government of India Act was disputed on the ground that the assent of the Governor- Gencral was not obtained to the addition of this section in the Act. The section was added to the Government of India Act by the Constituent Assembly in its sovereign capacity and was assented to by. the President of the Assembly. The Government of India Act, 1935, was the Constitution Act of the Dominion of India and the Constituent As5cmbly was authorized by the Independence Act to amend or alter it till that Assembly framed a permanent Constitution for India.\n\nThe provisions of sections 6 and 8 of the Independence Act fully bear this out.\n\nIn my opinion, there is no validity in the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff State that section 290-A was not a valid piece of legislation and that it could not become law till the assent of the Governor-General was obtained in respect of it. This Court has no jurisdiction to examine the legislation passed by a sovereign body.\n\nThe result is that these suits, in my opinion, cannot be disposed of on the preliminary issues and must proceed to trial on the other issues. This order will also be treated as an order in all the other connected suits.\n\n19;;1 s\"\"' of Seraikell4 and Otlilrs\n\nUnion of India\n\ntlllll A.not/aw.\n\nMahajan].\n\nDAs J.-1 prefer to base my decision on issue No. 6.\n\nDas J. and I express no opinion on the . other preliminary issues argued -before us.\n\nThe seven suits which have been posted before us for• hearing on several preliminary issues came to be instituted in the following circumstances :\n\nState of Seraiktlla 6114 Othm\n\n'\" Onion of India\n\nnnd Another.\n\nDas].\n\nOn different dates hereinafter mentioned caeh .of the plaintiff States acceded to the Dominion of India by virtue of Instruments of Accession executed by their respective Rulers and accepted by the Governor- General of India.\n\nEach of the said States also entered into standstill agreements with the Dominion of India.\n\nLater on, each of the plaintiff State, s entered into separate Articles of Agreement with the Governor- General of India. Instruments of Accession and standstill agreements entered into by the State of Seraikella (plaintiff m Suit No. 1 of 1950), the State of Dhenkanal (plaintiff in Suit No. 2 of 1950), and the State of Baudh (plaintiff in Suit No. 3 of 1950) were executed on or about August 16, 1947, by the State of Tigiria (plaintiff in Suit No. 4 of. 1950) and the State of Athgarh (plaintiff in Suit No. 5 of 1950) on August 15, 1947, and by the State of Baramba (plaintiff in Suit No; 6 of 1950) and the State of Narsinghpur (plaintiff in Suit No. 7 of 1950) on July 18, 1947, and November 11, 1947, respectively.\n\nArticle& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947.\n\nBy the Instruments of Accession, which were in the same terms in all the cases, the respective Rulers of the plaintiff States acceded to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor-General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other administrative authority should, by virtue of the said Instruments but subject to the terms thereof and for the purposes pnly of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State concerned such. functions as might be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India on the 15th of August, 1947. By article 3 of the said Instrument of Accession, the respective Rulers accepted the matters specified in the Schedule as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature: might make: laws for the respective States. The matters specified in the Schedule comprised, broadly speaking,\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUP.REME COURT ~R.TS 517\n\nDefence, External Affairs and Communications.\n\nArticle 5 provided that the terms of the Instrument of Accession should not be varied by any amendment of the Government of India Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment was accepted by the Ruler by an Instrument supplementary to the Instrument Of Accession. Article 7 provided that nothing in the Instrument of .Accession should be deemed to commit the Ruler of the State\n\nconcerned in any way to acceptance of any future Constitution of India or to fetter his discretion to enter into arrangements with the Governme.nt of India under any such future Constitution. Article 8 preserved the continuance of the Ruler's sovereignty in and over his State, and, save as provided by or under the Instrument of Accession, the exercise of all powers, authority and rights then enjoyed by him as Ruler of the State.\n\nBy the standstill agreements, which were also in similar terms, all agreements and administrative arrangements as to matters of common concern then existing between the Crown and any Indian State continued as between the Dominion of India and the State.\n\nBy article 1 of the Agreements, the respective Rulers ceded to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the . State and agreed to transfer the administration of the State to .the Dominion. Government on the first day of January,\n\n1948, and the Dominion Government, as from the. last mentioned date, became competent to exercise the ceded powers, authority :].nd jurisdiction in such manner and through such agency as it might think fit.\n\nArticle 2 secured to the respective Rulers theii: respective privy purse. It may here be mentioned that the amount of the privy purse payable to the Rulers of the States of Seraikella, Dhenkanal and Baudh not having been agreed upon at the date of the signing of the Artcles of Agreements the space meant for . inserting the amount of privy purse was left blank in the\n\n19Sl\n\nSl4t1 •f Slftlikell• And Others\n\nUni•n of Indio\n\n\"\"4 .Another.\n\nDas].\n\nSidi< of Stmik<l/a aM Others\n\nUnion \"! llltiit1\n\nmid Another.\n\nDas].\n\nAgreements signed by the said Rulers. Article J. preserved the Rulers full ownership, use and enjoyment of all his private properties as distinct from State properties.\n\nArticle 4 saved all personal privileges. enjoyed by the Rulers whether within or outside the territories of the States immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947. Article 5 guaranteed the succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi _ of the State and to the Ruler's personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles.\n\nOn December 24, 1947, the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (Act XL VII of 1947) received the assent of the Governor-General and came into force.\n\nThe preamble of the Act and the definition, in section 2 of 'extra-provincial jurisdiction' made it quite clear that the Central Government could, under this Act, exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction over a State only if it had by treaty, agreement etc. acquired full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the State. In the case of these seven States the Central Government could exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction over them only on the strength of the Articles of Agtcement of mbcr,\n\n1947. It could not exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction by reason of the Instrument of Accession.\n\nOn December 23, 1947, the Central Government issued a notification purporting to delegate its cxtraprovincial jurisdiction with respect to the plaintiff States under the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (No. XL VII of 1947) to the Government of Orissa which at once began to exercise extraprovincial jurisdiction over the seven States.\n\nIt is not quite clear how there could be a delegation of jurisdiction before the Act came into force; Be that as it may, on May 18, 1948, another notification was issued by the Central Government under sections 3 and 4 of the Extra-Provincial Juris:- diction Act, 1947, cancelling the previous notification with respect only to the State of Scraikella and the State of Kharsawan and delegating its jurisdiction iii or in relation to those two States to the Goverrurient of\n\nS.C..R.\n\nSUPRE~ COURT REPORTS 519\n\nBihar and on the same date the Government of Bihar after promulgating the. . Scraikclla and . Kharsawan States Ordr asslimcd jurisdiction over them. The other States continued to be administered by the Government of Orissa. The Constituent Assembly by the Government of India (Amendment) Ac~ 1949 (No. I of 1949) which received the assent of the President of the Constituent Assembly on January 10, 1)149, amended the Government of India Act, 1935, by, inter alia inserting the following section as section 290-A :-\n\n. \"Administration of certain acceding States as a Cliief Commissioner's Province or as part of a Governor's or Chief Commissioner's Province.-(1) Where full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of any Indian State or of any group of such States arc for the time being .exercisable by the Dominion of India, the Governor-General\n\nmay by order direct- ( a) that the State or the group of States shall be administered in all respects as if the State or the group of States were a Chief Commissioner's Province ; or\n\n(b) that the State or the group of States shall be administered in all respects as if the States or the group of States form part of a Governor's or a Chief Commissioner's Province specified in the order :\n\nProvided that if any order made under . <:lausc (b) of this sub-section affects a Governor's PrQVincc, the Governor-General shall before making such order ascertain the views of the Government of that Province both with respect to the proposal to make. the order and with respect to the provisions to be inserted therein\".\n\nIt will be noticed that the Governor-General could act under the new scctiOn only where full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and .. powers for and. in relation tO the govcrnan~ of any .Indian State were for the time J>cing . cxCic:isablc by the P.omioion of India.. It follows that . the Governor..GcQeral could, under this new section, make an. or.der of !llergcr. with respect to tbC5C seven States only on the strength of the .Articles\n\nStllU •f &nrikeU.\n\nOflll 01Mr$\n\nUniorc qf lrulils _, Anollrer.\n\nDas].\n\nS..Uqf &raikella \"\"\" o,,,,,., r, lfltMn of-lttdia -anti .Anot/Nr.\n\nDasJ.\n\nof Agreements of December 1947. He could not make any such order by reason of the Instrument of Accession.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred on him by the new section 290-A, the Governor-General, on July 27, 1949, promulgated an Order called the States' Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order,\n\n1949. Section 3 of this Order provided as follows :-\n\n\"A.s from the appointed day, the States specified in each of the Schedules shall be administered in all respects as if they formed part of the Province specified in the heading of that Schedule : and accordingly, any reference to an acceding State in the Government of India Act, 1935, or in any Act or Ordinance made on or after the appointed day shall be construed as not including a reference to any of the merged States, and any reference in any such Act or Ordinance as aforesaid to a Province specified in a Schedule to this Order shall be construed as including the territories of all the States specified in chat Schedule.\"\n\nSchedule III of the Order showed that the State of Seraikella was one of .the two States merged in the Province of Bihar and Schedule IV showed that the other Orissa States including the plaintiffs in Suits Nos. 2 to 7 of 1950 were merged in the Province of Orissa.\n\nBeing aggrieved by the enactments, orders and notifications resulting in their merger with Bihar or Orissa the plaintiff States filed the present suits in the Federal Coun of India in its Original Jurisdiction.\n\nSuit No. 1 of 1950 was filed on or about January 15, 1950, and the other six suits were fikd on January 23,\n\n1950. The defendants in the suits are two in number.\n\nThe first defendant in all the suits is the Dominion of India and the second defendant in Suit No. l .is the State of Bihar while the second defendant in all the other stiits is. the State of Orissa.\n\nThe main written statements in all the suits arc filed on behalf of the first defendant and the second defendant; the State of Bihar or the State of. Orissa, as the case may be, has adopted\n\nthe contentions set forth in the written statements of the first defendant.\n\nAn additional written statement was filed by the first defendant raising another preliminary issue of law hich has also been adopted by the second defendant.\n\nThe Constitution of India having come into force on January 26, 1950, all these suits, by virtue of article 374 (2), .stood removed to this Court which was created by the Constitution.\n\nThe learned Chamber Judge directed that the issue of law raised in the additional written statement be tried as a preliminary issue.\n\nWhen the suits were called on for hearing on that\n\npreliminary issue, learned Attorney-General handed in a list of 17 issues and it was agreed by counsel on both sides that the following issues only should be determined first as preliminary issues :- . L Whether having regard to the subject-matter of thr suit and the provisions contained in article 363(1) of the Constitution of India. this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?\n\n3. Whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit under section 204 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and particularly in regard to the questions as to the existence and validity of the agreement of merger ?\n\n4. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?\n\n5. Whether the suit is maintainable in view of the absence of the requisite notice to the defendants under se.ction 80 of the Civil Procedure Code ?\n\n6. Whether having regard to the provisions of the Constitution the plaintiff has a legal capacity and is entitled to maintain the suit ? ·\n\n7. Whether this Court is competent to examine the validity of section 290-A of the Government of India- Act, 1935, enacted by the Constituent assembly ?\n\nRe-Issue No. 6.-I take up issue No. 6 which appears to me to be decisive. Article 1 of the Constitution says that India shall be a Union of States and that the States and territories thereof shall be the States and\n\nState qf Siraik•Ila and Others\n\nUnion of lndU.\n\nand Another.\n\nDas].\n\nSiok of Snoik#l/o .,,, 011 ... , v. u,.;,,. ef r.m.\n\nand .11 .. 1111 ••\n\nD.,].\n\nSUPREME COURTREPORTS [1951]\n\ntheir territories specified in Parts A, B and C of the First Schedule. The First Schedule to the Constitution in Parts A, B and C sets out the names of the States and indicates what the territories of the States shall be comprised of. The third paragraph in Part A provides as follows :- \"The territory of each of the other States in this Part shall comprise the territories which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution were comprised in the corcsponding Province and tl'ic territories which, by virtue of an order made under section 29Q.A of the Government of India Act, 1935, were immediately before such commencement . being administered as if they formed part of that Province.\" The argument is that as the territories of the plaintiff States, by virtue of the States' Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949, made under section 29Q.A of the Government of India Act, 1935, were immediately before the commencement of the Constitution being administered as if they formed part of the Provinces of Bihar or Orissa, the territories of the States of Bihar and Orissa therefore now comprise the territories of the plaintiff States.\n\nThe subjects of the plaintiff States have now become the citizens of India, their territories have been .merged in the State of Bihar or Orissa, as the case may be.\n\nThese States arc no longer recognised as States in Parts A, B or C of the First Schedule to die Constitution. In short, they have ceased . to be States so far as our Constitution is concerned and consequently they have no legal existence .as acceding States which thi:s Court hich is bound by the Constitution may recognise. These States, in the circumstances, cannot come to this Court to enforce their political rights and arc no longer entitled to maintain the suits. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs, howeve~, contend that the order made under section 290-A of the Government of India Act, bejng ultra vires and illegal, the territories of the States were never lawfully administered as part of the Provinces of Bihar or Orissa and, therefore, the territories of the State of Bihar or Orissa cannot be\n\nsaid to comprise the territories of the plaintiff States.\n\nIt seems to me that the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is misconceived, for the part of the sentence beginning with the words \"which immediately before the commencement\" and ending with the words \"formed part of that Province\" are but description of the territories which the Constitution states are to be comprised in the territories of the States of Bihar or Orissa.\n\nThe validity or otherwise of the order made under section 290-A of the Government of India Ac~ has no relevancy. The question is whether the territories of the plaintiff States were in fact being administered as if they formed part of the Provinces of Bihar or Orissa and whether such territories were being so administered by virtue of an order made under section 290-A of the Government of India Act. There can be no doubt that the answer must be in the affifD)ative. This Court is bound by the Constitution and cannot question the validity of any of its provisions.\n\nThe Constitution says that the territories of Bihar and Orissa shall comprise the territories specified in Part A and this Court must accept that position. None of these States is included amongst the States named in Parts A, B and C. Our Constitution docs not recognise any of these States . as an acceding State. The Government of India Act which recognised them as acceding States has been repealed.\n\nTherefore, the plaintiff States have no existence in the eye of the Constitution and cannot come to this Court to enforce their political rights. It is not necessary to consider whether in international law there may be a State without any territory or .·. without any subject such as many of the States, which during the last war had been overrun by the invaders and which functioned in foreign countries, claimed to be. The problem before us is quite different. The States which are plaintiffs in suits Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 ceased to be acceding States by reason of the Merger agreement of December 1947 admittedly concluded by their respective Rulers. In any event, our Constitution has quite clearly eliminated these States as such by absorbing\n\nStau.t Straih/la ad Others ., um.n of 11111ia\n\non4 .f ulhn.\n\nDas].\n\nThe Si.te of\n\nSeraikeUa and OtMrs\n\nUnion Qf India\n\nand ..fnotf!Lr.\n\nDasJ.\n\ntheir territories with the States of Bihar or Orissa. As our Constitution does not recognise these States as acceding States or even as States, this Court cannot recognise these States or their political rights. These cases may have been within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court _when they were instituted, but since then the Government of India Act has been repealed and the new Constitution has come into force.\n\nUnder the Constitution, these States do not exist at all. Assuming that these States are still in existence notionally, they have, at any rate, ceased to be States of the kind which could maintain a suit under section 204 of the Government of India Act. After the repeal of the Government of India Act and the commencement of the Constitution none of these States is an acceding State which may continue a suit filed under section\n\n204. The suits must, therefore, be regarded as having abated by reason of the elimination of the plaintiff States as States or acceding States just as an ordinary suit would abate on the death of a plaintiff. In my judgment, these suits can no longer be continued in this Court.\n\nIn view of my decision on issue No. 6, the other preliminary issues need not be considered.\n\nSuits dismissed.\n\nAgent for the plaintiffs in Suits Nos. 1, 3 & 4 : R. R. Biswas.\n\nAgent for the plaintiffs in Suits Nos. 2 & 5 : P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for the plaintiffs in Suits Nos. 6 & 7 : S. C. Bannerjee.\n\nAgent for the defendants : P. A. Mehta.", "total_entities": 432, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF SERAIKELLA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 505, "end_char": 531, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "t SHRI HAluLAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 555, "end_char": 575, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 613, "end_char": 626, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 628, "end_char": 637, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 642, "end_char": 657, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 659, "end_char": 680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 682, "end_char": 691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1015, "end_char": 1024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1043, "end_char": 1054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1066, "end_char": 1087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1234, "end_char": 1247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 374 (2) of the Constitution of India provides that all suits, appeals and proceedings pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of this Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same."}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1327, "end_char": 1338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1702, "end_char": 1719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain States had acceded to the Dominion of India under Instruments of Accession in August 1947."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1822, "end_char": 1827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were treated as having merged in the Province of Bihar and were administered as a part of that Province under Orders issued under the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, and s. 290-A of the Government of India _Act, 1935 (as amended by the Constituent Assembly Act of 1949)."}}, {"text": "s. 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1952, "end_char": 1958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Federal Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2088, "end_char": 2110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The States instituted suits in the Federal Court of India before the 26th January, 1950, for a declaration that the various Orders under which the States came to be administered as a part of Bihar and the laws under which those Orders were made were ultra vires and void and the Province of Bihar had accordingly no authority to carry on the administ - Tation of the States."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2122, "end_char": 2140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The States instituted suits in the Federal Court of India before the 26th January, 1950, for a declaration that the various Orders under which the States came to be administered as a part of Bihar and the laws under which those Orders were made were ultra vires and void and the Province of Bihar had accordingly no authority to carry on the administ - Tation of the States."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2463, "end_char": 2485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suits stood transferred to the Supreme Court of India under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2492, "end_char": 2500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2542, "end_char": 2547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "374 (2) of the new Constitution:\n\nHeld, per\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SASTRI J. and BosE J.\n\n(MAHAJAN ).", "canonical_name": ".KaniaC.J."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2556, "end_char": 2572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "374 (2) of the new Constitution:\n\nHeld, per\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SASTRI J. and BosE J.\n\n(MAHAJAN )."}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2580, "end_char": 2584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "374 (2) of the new Constitution:\n\nHeld, per\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SASTRI J. and BosE J.\n\n(MAHAJAN )."}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2590, "end_char": 2597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "374 (2) of the new Constitution:\n\nHeld, per\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SASTRI J. and BosE J.\n\n(MAHAJAN ).", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Art. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2822, "end_char": 2830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2853, "end_char": 2861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3165, "end_char": 3173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3297, "end_char": 3305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3548, "end_char": 3556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Seraikel", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3774, "end_char": 3791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no confilct between\n\nState of Seraikel/a and Others.", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3807, "end_char": 3821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Union of India\n\nand Another.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Sl!Jleef &raikella", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3837, "end_char": 3855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sl!Jleef &raikella and 01/urs\n\nv. l!nion qf India\n\n\"\"\" Malltlr."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4223, "end_char": 4229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAs J.-As the plaintiff States, by virtue of the States Merger (Governor's Provinces) Order, 1949, were immediately before the commencement of the new Constitution being administered as if they formed part of the Provinces of Bihar or Orissa the territories of Bihar and Orissa included the territories of the plaintiff States under Art."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4395, "end_char": 4409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4886, "end_char": 4902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are stated in detail in the judgment of KANIA c J.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Roy Choudhry, with him) for the plaintiffs in suits Nos."}}, {"text": "A. N. Roy Choudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4904, "end_char": 4922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are stated in detail in the judgment of KANIA c J.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Roy Choudhry, with him) for the plaintiffs in suits Nos."}}, {"text": "N. C. Sen Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4985, "end_char": 5000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. N. C. Sen Gupta (A. N. Roy Choudhry, with him) for the plaintiffs in suits Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5082, "end_char": 5096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad Attorney-General for India (G, N. /oshi with him) for the defendants in all the suits."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5391, "end_char": 5412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Seraikella", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5461, "end_char": 5480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Seraikella was a State in Orissa and its Ruler was Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Dea."}}, {"text": "Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Dea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5521, "end_char": 5549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Seraikella was a State in Orissa and its Ruler was Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Dea."}}, {"text": "State acceded to the Dominion of India by virtue of an Instrument of Accession executed by its Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5591, "end_char": 5690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5744, "end_char": 5753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State acceded to the Dominion of India by virtue of an Instrument of Accession executed by its Rule", "statute": "State acceded to the Dominion of India by virtue of an Instrument of Accession executed by its Rule"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5761, "end_char": 5790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "After reciting that under the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5792, "end_char": 5851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dominion of India was set up and that under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5857, "end_char": 5934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6607, "end_char": 6628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6693, "end_char": 6712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Instrument expressly provides that by executing the same the Ruler shall not be deemed to be committed to the acceptance of any future Constitution of India or to fetter his discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future , Constitution."}}, {"text": "Standstill Agreement was also executed by the Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7810, "end_char": 7829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 15th December, 1947, an agreement is alleged to have been entered into between the Governor- General of India and the Ruler of the plaintiff State. '"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8222, "end_char": 8224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Standstill Agreement was also executed by the Rule", "statute": "Standstill Agreement was also executed by the Rule"}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8410, "end_char": 8419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Standstill Agreement was also executed by the Rule", "statute": "Standstill Agreement was also executed by the Rule"}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8604, "end_char": 8613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1st of Janliaty, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8810, "end_char": 8831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 3 of that agreement, it was provided that the Raja would be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties belonging to him on the date of the agreement and that by the 1st of Janliaty, 1948, the Raja will furnish to the Dominion Government an inventory of all immovable propertieS; securities and cash held by him as such private property."}}, {"text": "Dominion Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8862, "end_char": 8881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 3 of that agreement, it was provided that the Raja would be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties belonging to him on the date of the agreement and that by the 1st of Janliaty, 1948, the Raja will furnish to the Dominion Government an inventory of all immovable propertieS; securities and cash held by him as such private property."}}, {"text": "article 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8988, "end_char": 8997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9038, "end_char": 9042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 4, the personal privileges enjoyed by the Raja and the members of his family mentioned ."}}, {"text": "24th of December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9118, "end_char": 9140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th of December, 1947, an Act to provide for the exercise of certain extra-provincial Jurisdiction of the Central Government (Act XLVII of 1947) was passed."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9282, "end_char": 9291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9352, "end_char": 9370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 3 of that Act it was provided that it shall be lawful for the Central Government to exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction in such manner as it thinks fit and the Central Government may delegate any such jurisdiction as aforesaid to any officer or authority in such manner and to such extent as it thinks fit."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9606, "end_char": 9615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9863, "end_char": 9872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9951, "end_char": 9960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18th of May, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10030, "end_char": 10047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 18th of May, 1948, that notification was cancelled and the powers in respect of the two specified States including the plaintiff State were delegated to the Province of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10226, "end_char": 10245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day the Government of Bihar passed an order called \"The Seraikella and Kharaswan States Order\" providing for the administration of the two States."}}, {"text": "5th of January, l!m", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10372, "end_char": 10391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th of January, l!m, the Legislative Assembly of India,\n\nwhich was also functioning as the Constituent Assembly, passed the Constituent Assembly Act I of 1949 and added section 290-A to the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "Legislative Assembly of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10397, "end_char": 10426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th of January, l!m, the Legislative Assembly of India,\n\nwhich was also functioning as the Constituent Assembly, passed the Constituent Assembly Act I of 1949 and added section 290-A to the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "Assembly Act I of 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10508, "end_char": 10530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10541, "end_char": 10552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assembly Act I of 1949", "statute": "Assembly Act I of 1949"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10562, "end_char": 10591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11881, "end_char": 11886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Upon the issue of an Order under clause (a) of sub-section ( 1) of this section, all the provisions of this Act applicable to the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi shall apply to the State or the group of States in respect of which the Order is made."}}, {"text": "27th of July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12312, "end_char": 12330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th of July, 1949, the Governor-General of India promulgated an Order called the States Merger\n\nStat1 of Seraikella and Others\n\ny, Uuion of India\n\nanti Ano th."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12475, "end_char": 12480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C. J•\n\nState of Seraikella a.1d Oiht1J ...\n\nUnion oj\"lndia\n\nand AMlh.,,", "canonical_name": ".KaniaC.J."}}, {"text": "State of Seraikella", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12488, "end_char": 12507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C. J•\n\nState of Seraikella a.1d Oiht1J ...\n\nUnion oj\"lndia\n\nand AMlh.,,", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12744, "end_char": 12764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff State contends that the Government of Orissa wrongfully and illegally purp9rted to administer the plaintiff State by virtue of the .Notification of the 23rd of December, 1947, under Act XLVII of 1947."}}, {"text": "15th of December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13057, "end_char": 13079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The alleged agreement of the 15th of December, 1947, is contended to be void for want of consideration and is inoperative."}}, {"text": "18th May, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13267, "end_char": 13281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended that on the 18th May, 1948, without the consent and approval of the plaintiff State or its .Ruler, the Province of Bihar wrongfully and illegally took over the administration of the State and passed the Seraikella and Kharsawan Administration Order, 1948."}}, {"text": "Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13837, "end_char": 13876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14097, "end_char": 14108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "statute": "the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14118, "end_char": 14147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Assembly Act I of 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14196, "end_char": 14218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14444, "end_char": 14458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Union of India and the State of Bihar, deny and are interested in denying the existence or entity of the plaintiff State and in disputing the rights, privileges, powers and prerogatives of its Ruler as well as the right to the private properties as set out in the annexure."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14467, "end_char": 14481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Union of India and the State of Bihar, deny and are interested in denying the existence or entity of the plaintiff State and in disputing the rights, privileges, powers and prerogatives of its Ruler as well as the right to the private properties as set out in the annexure."}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14903, "end_char": 14932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government. of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14959, "end_char": 14979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act, 1935, and the Indian Independence Act, 1947, It is contended that the Government."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15399, "end_char": 15428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15698, "end_char": 15776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15782, "end_char": 15811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16221, "end_char": 16232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16242, "end_char": 16271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Seraike", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16999, "end_char": 17015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "integrify; that its administration' should\n\nState of Seraike/la and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nmrd Another .", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "State of Seraiktlla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17074, "end_char": 17093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C.J.\n\nState of Seraiktlla muJ Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17627, "end_char": 17648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17672, "end_char": 17693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Six other suits by other States of the former Eastern Agency were filed also before the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th of January, 1950, on the same lines, except that in four of them the agreement similar to the agreement of the 15th December, 1947, is admitted to have been executed by the Ruler and is admitted to be binding on the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17926, "end_char": 17935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17943, "end_char": 17972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21012, "end_char": 21023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21035, "end_char": 21056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21125, "end_char": 21127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sime of Seraikella", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21210, "end_char": 21228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sime of Seraikella ...i 011im\n\nUn oflndi•\n\naad AnotM?..", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21624, "end_char": 21635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Indepepdence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22436, "end_char": 22465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22686, "end_char": 22697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Indepepdence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Indepepdence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22958, "end_char": 22969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Indepepdence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Indepepdence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22981, "end_char": 23002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23513, "end_char": 23524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24142, "end_char": 24156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24486, "end_char": 24500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24550, "end_char": 24561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24700, "end_char": 24711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": 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C. 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India"}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53962, "end_char": 53973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "16th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54102, "end_char": 54120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 for the defendants~\n\nMAHAJAN J.-On the 16th January, 1950, ten days before the inauguration of the Constitution of India, the State of Serailtella (an Orissa State attached to the Eastern States Agency) brought .a suit in the Federal Court of India against the Dominion of India and the Province ot Bihar for the following reliefs :\n\n\"(a) Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and of."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54162, "end_char": 54183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Serailtella", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54189, "end_char": 54209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 for the defendants~\n\nMAHAJAN J.-On the 16th January, 1950, ten days before the inauguration of the Constitution of India, the State of Serailtella (an Orissa State attached to the Eastern States Agency) brought .a suit in the Federal Court of India against the Dominion of India and the Province ot Bihar for the following reliefs :\n\n\"(a) Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and of.", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54402, "end_char": 54480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54486, "end_char": 54515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Declaration that the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54895, "end_char": 54949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55008, "end_char": 55019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Declaration that the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act", "statute": "Declaration that the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55029, "end_char": 55058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56884, "end_char": 56895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "16th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57056, "end_char": 57073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff claims the above reliefs on the following allegations :\n\n(1) That on the 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff State acceded to the Dominion of India under the terms of an Instnunent of Accession (Exhibit A) executed by its Ruler and accepted by the Governor-General of India, that the said instrument could not be added to or amended unless suc11 addition or amendment was accepted by the Ruler by a supplementary Instrument ; that no such supplementary Instrument was ever executed or accepted by the Ruler ;\n\n(2) That from 31st August, 1947, the Government of Orissa wrongfully and illegally purported to administer the plaintiff State by virtue of an alleged delegation of authority by the Dominion Government by a notification dated 23rd December, 1947, issued under an Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, XL VII of 1947, that the said Act is ultra vires and of no effect and does not bind tne plaintiff and that the Act was not authorised by the T nstrument of Accession;\n\n(3) That the defendant claims to rely for the validity of its wrongful acts on an \\llleged agreement of 15th December, 1947, but the same is void and\n\n.inoperative and that it never became a concluded -contract between the parties ;\n\n(4) That on the 18th May, 1948, the Province of 13ihar wrongfully and illegally took over the administration of the State and issued an administrative order -under Act XL VII of 1947, that the Dominion of India had no authority beyond the Instrument of Accession to delegate its power to the Province of Bihar to :administer the plaintiff State ;\n\n(5) That on the 26th July, 1949, the Governor- General wrongfully and illegally promulgated an order."}}, {"text": "31st August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57504, "end_char": 57521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff claims the above reliefs on the following allegations :\n\n(1) That on the 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff State acceded to the Dominion of India under the terms of an Instnunent of Accession (Exhibit A) executed by its Ruler and accepted by the Governor-General of India, that the said instrument could not be added to or amended unless suc11 addition or amendment was accepted by the Ruler by a supplementary Instrument ; that no such supplementary Instrument was ever executed or accepted by the Ruler ;\n\n(2) That from 31st August, 1947, the Government of Orissa wrongfully and illegally purported to administer the plaintiff State by virtue of an alleged delegation of authority by the Dominion Government by a notification dated 23rd December, 1947, issued under an Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, XL VII of 1947, that the said Act is ultra vires and of no effect and does not bind tne plaintiff and that the Act was not authorised by the T nstrument of Accession;\n\n(3) That the defendant claims to rely for the validity of its wrongful acts on an \\llleged agreement of 15th December, 1947, but the same is void and\n\n.inoperative and that it never became a concluded -contract between the parties ;\n\n(4) That on the 18th May, 1948, the Province of 13ihar wrongfully and illegally took over the administration of the State and issued an administrative order -under Act XL VII of 1947, that the Dominion of India had no authority beyond the Instrument of Accession to delegate its power to the Province of Bihar to :administer the plaintiff State ;\n\n(5) That on the 26th July, 1949, the Governor- General wrongfully and illegally promulgated an order."}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57527, "end_char": 57547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff claims the above reliefs on the following allegations :\n\n(1) That on the 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff State acceded to the Dominion of India under the terms of an Instnunent of Accession (Exhibit A) executed by its Ruler and accepted by the Governor-General of India, that the said instrument could not be added to or amended unless suc11 addition or amendment was accepted by the Ruler by a supplementary Instrument ; that no such supplementary Instrument was ever executed or accepted by the Ruler ;\n\n(2) That from 31st August, 1947, the Government of Orissa wrongfully and illegally purported to administer the plaintiff State by virtue of an alleged delegation of authority by the Dominion Government by a notification dated 23rd December, 1947, issued under an Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, XL VII of 1947, that the said Act is ultra vires and of no effect and does not bind tne plaintiff and that the Act was not authorised by the T nstrument of Accession;\n\n(3) That the defendant claims to rely for the validity of its wrongful acts on an \\llleged agreement of 15th December, 1947, but the same is void and\n\n.inoperative and that it never became a concluded -contract between the parties ;\n\n(4) That on the 18th May, 1948, the Province of 13ihar wrongfully and illegally took over the administration of the State and issued an administrative order -under Act XL VII of 1947, that the Dominion of India had no authority beyond the Instrument of Accession to delegate its power to the Province of Bihar to :administer the plaintiff State ;\n\n(5) That on the 26th July, 1949, the Governor- General wrongfully and illegally promulgated an order."}}, {"text": "23rd December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57716, "end_char": 57735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff claims the above reliefs on the following allegations :\n\n(1) That on the 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff State acceded to the Dominion of India under the terms of an Instnunent of Accession (Exhibit A) executed by its Ruler and accepted by the Governor-General of India, that the said instrument could not be added to or amended unless suc11 addition or amendment was accepted by the Ruler by a supplementary Instrument ; that no such supplementary Instrument was ever executed or accepted by the Ruler ;\n\n(2) That from 31st August, 1947, the Government of Orissa wrongfully and illegally purported to administer the plaintiff State by virtue of an alleged delegation of authority by the Dominion Government by a notification dated 23rd December, 1947, issued under an Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, XL VII of 1947, that the said Act is ultra vires and of no effect and does not bind tne plaintiff and that the Act was not authorised by the T nstrument of Accession;\n\n(3) That the defendant claims to rely for the validity of its wrongful acts on an \\llleged agreement of 15th December, 1947, but the same is void and\n\n.inoperative and that it never became a concluded -contract between the parties ;\n\n(4) That on the 18th May, 1948, the Province of 13ihar wrongfully and illegally took over the administration of the State and issued an administrative order -under Act XL VII of 1947, that the Dominion of India had no authority beyond the Instrument of Accession to delegate its power to the Province of Bihar to :administer the plaintiff State ;\n\n(5) That on the 26th July, 1949, the Governor- General wrongfully and illegally promulgated an order."}}, {"text": "Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57753, "end_char": 57801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58569, "end_char": 58584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff claims the above reliefs on the following allegations :\n\n(1) That on the 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff State acceded to the Dominion of India under the terms of an Instnunent of Accession (Exhibit A) executed by its Ruler and accepted by the Governor-General of India, that the said instrument could not be added to or amended unless suc11 addition or amendment was accepted by the Ruler by a supplementary Instrument ; that no such supplementary Instrument was ever executed or accepted by the Ruler ;\n\n(2) That from 31st August, 1947, the Government of Orissa wrongfully and illegally purported to administer the plaintiff State by virtue of an alleged delegation of authority by the Dominion Government by a notification dated 23rd December, 1947, issued under an Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, XL VII of 1947, that the said Act is ultra vires and of no effect and does not bind tne plaintiff and that the Act was not authorised by the T nstrument of Accession;\n\n(3) That the defendant claims to rely for the validity of its wrongful acts on an \\llleged agreement of 15th December, 1947, but the same is void and\n\n.inoperative and that it never became a concluded -contract between the parties ;\n\n(4) That on the 18th May, 1948, the Province of 13ihar wrongfully and illegally took over the administration of the State and issued an administrative order -under Act XL VII of 1947, that the Dominion of India had no authority beyond the Instrument of Accession to delegate its power to the Province of Bihar to :administer the plaintiff State ;\n\n(5) That on the 26th July, 1949, the Governor- General wrongfully and illegally promulgated an order."}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58798, "end_char": 58809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act", "statute": "Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58887, "end_char": 58896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59074, "end_char": 59085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59382, "end_char": 59393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State was integrated with the territories of the Indian Dominion and on the basis of which Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59533, "end_char": 59627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59764, "end_char": 59775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State was integrated with the territories of the Indian Dominion and on the basis of which Act", "statute": "State was integrated with the territories of the Indian Dominion and on the basis of which Act"}}, {"text": "State of SeraikeUa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60326, "end_char": 60344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of SeraikeUa and Otlv.rs\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60399, "end_char": 60408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State was integrated with the territories of the Indian Dominion and on the basis of which Act", "statute": "State was integrated with the territories of the Indian Dominion and on the basis of which Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60434, "end_char": 60463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of the Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61534, "end_char": 61566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Province of Bihar has now to be continued and determined against the Government of the Union of India and the State of Bihar in view of the provisions of article 300 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61619, "end_char": 61630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 36J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61917, "end_char": 61928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61941, "end_char": 61962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62234, "end_char": 62245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62265, "end_char": 62283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62562, "end_char": 62572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government\n\nof India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government\n\nof India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section\n\n290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62806, "end_char": 62818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government\n\nof India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government\n\nof India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62828, "end_char": 62857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63018, "end_char": 63029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63039, "end_char": 63068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63120, "end_char": 63153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Whether the Constituent Assembly was competent to enact the Constituent Assembly Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63316, "end_char": 63400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65196, "end_char": 65207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65354, "end_char": 65365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66137, "end_char": 66148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66299, "end_char": 66310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66457, "end_char": 66468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66995, "end_char": 67006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme O", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 67195, "end_char": 67204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to appreciate these contentions it is necessary to refer to article 374 (2), which provides as follows :-\n\n\"All suits, appeals and proceedings, civil or criminal, pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of this Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme O>Urt, and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same .. \"\n\nThe question for decision under this issue concerns the true scope of the provisions of articles 363 and 374 (2) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "articles 363 and 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67381, "end_char": 67401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67633, "end_char": 67644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67828, "end_char": 67839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Feder11l Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 68136, "end_char": 68159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Feder11l Court of India had jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 204 of the Government of India Act . ' . ,"}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68208, "end_char": 68219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahqjan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68526, "end_char": 68533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahqjan J.\n\nSiok ef SnaikeUa -end Othtrs\n\nv .", "canonical_name": "Mahqjan J"}}, {"text": "article 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68684, "end_char": 68695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68786, "end_char": 68797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68805, "end_char": 68834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68926, "end_char": 68947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69049, "end_char": 69060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69954, "end_char": 69965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70545, "end_char": 70555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71453, "end_char": 71458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was observed by Baron Parke that the enactment \"that all contracts or agreements, by way of gaming or wagering shall be null and void\", if it stood by itself, ought most clearly to be construed :as applicable to future contracts and agreements only, and that if the next part stood alone, it would, though not so clearly, be construed to apply to future actions only and it should be construed to mean, not that an action already brought should not be maintained but that no action should afterwards be brought, or, if brought, maintained."}}, {"text": "Court of Appeal in England held that the Gaming Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72000, "end_char": 72057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72095, "end_char": 72104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Court of Appeal in England held that the Gaming Act, 1922", "statute": "the Court of Appeal in England held that the Gaming Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Gaming Act, 1855", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72112, "end_char": 72128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "McCardie", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72347, "end_char": 72355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Henshall v. Porter (2 ), McCardie J., went further and held that the Gaming Act, 1922, which prohibited ."}}, {"text": "Gaming Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72391, "end_char": 72407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1940] F. C.R. 110", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 72940, "end_char": 72958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Seraiktlla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 72986, "end_char": 73005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Seraiktlla and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another.", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73185, "end_char": 73196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Gaming Act, 1922", "statute": "the Gaming Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Willis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73355, "end_char": 73361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out in Willis in his Constitutional Law, the same principle~ govern the construction of constitutions and the construction of statutes, but that the dominant force in the construction of constitution is to construe one part in the light of the provisions in the other part, as the."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73978, "end_char": 73999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74040, "end_char": 74051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74109, "end_char": 74120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74150, "end_char": 74161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74246, "end_char": 74257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74438, "end_char": 74449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74999, "end_char": 75010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75433, "end_char": 75444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76270, "end_char": 76299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th December, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77122, "end_char": 77141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended by the learned Attomey- General that the basic relief claimed in the plaint is that the Instrument of Accession subsists and that in substance the suit is to enforce the terms of the Instrument of Accession on the allegation that these have been contravened, but that the fact is that the Instrument of Accession was superseded by the agreement of the 15th December, 1949, and is no longer subsisting,\n\nM5SCI 6-62 S. C. India/59\n\nState 'ef Seraiketla 'and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Another._"}}, {"text": "Mahqjan J", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77265, "end_char": 77274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahqjan J\n\nStale of &raiklUa and Otklr}\n\nUnioa qf India\n\nand Anotlrlr.", "canonical_name": "Mahqjan J"}}, {"text": "Malrqjon", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77337, "end_char": 77345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malrqjon J.\n\n510 SUPREME COURT REPOR'.fS [1951]\n\nand that beillg so, the subject matter of this dispute is outside the scope of: the section."}}, {"text": "sections 6 and 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78148, "end_char": 78166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78174, "end_char": 78203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78632, "end_char": 78661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78766, "end_char": 78777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78966, "end_char": 78977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79023, "end_char": 79034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79232, "end_char": 79243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79868, "end_char": 79879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80376, "end_char": 80387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Questions regarding the interpretation both of the Government of India Act and of the Indian Independence Act", "statute": "Questions regarding the interpretation both of the Government of India Act and of the Indian Independence Act"}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80748, "end_char": 80759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Questions regarding the interpretation both of the Government of India Act and of the Indian Independence Act", "statute": "Questions regarding the interpretation both of the Government of India Act and of the Indian Independence Act"}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81052, "end_char": 81061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Questions regarding the interpretation both of the Government of India Act and of the Indian Independence Act", "statute": "Questions regarding the interpretation both of the Government of India Act and of the Indian Independence Act"}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81286, "end_char": 81297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81595, "end_char": 81602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nStau of &..WU a and Oilurs\n\nUnion of lnt!ia\n\nand Another.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82352, "end_char": 82373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83138, "end_char": 83149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83309, "end_char": 83319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83323, "end_char": 83350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "The Code of civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83368, "end_char": 83395, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83458, "end_char": 83469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Federal Court of Indi~", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 83477, "end_char": 83499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Code of civil Procedure has not been made applicable as in the case of High Courts by section 117 to the Federal Court of Indi~ By section 204 of the Government of India Act, exclusive original jurisdiction was conferred on the Federal Court in respect of suits between States and States which were outside the ken of the Code of Civil Procedure."}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83503, "end_char": 83514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83690, "end_char": 83717, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83723, "end_char": 83734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83851, "end_char": 83860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84002, "end_char": 84013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84122, "end_char": 84149, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84269, "end_char": 84279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84339, "end_char": 84349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84576, "end_char": 84586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84646, "end_char": 84657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84786, "end_char": 84796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84902, "end_char": 84913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wharton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85300, "end_char": 85307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Procedure\" as defined in Wharton means the mode in which successive steps in litigation ."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85415, "end_char": 85425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85518, "end_char": 85528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85710, "end_char": 85720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of S.raike11a", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 86063, "end_char": 86082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of S.raike11a and Others\n\nUnion of India\n\nand 1lnoth1r.", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 86126, "end_char": 86133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nS1au of Ser.", "canonical_name": "MAHAJAN"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86138, "end_char": 86140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86495, "end_char": 86505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86893, "end_char": 86903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87132, "end_char": 87142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87181, "end_char": 87191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87333, "end_char": 87343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87586, "end_char": 87596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87725, "end_char": 87735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87981, "end_char": 88008, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L. R. 54 I. A. 338", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 88213, "end_char": 88231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Federal Court of . India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 88277, "end_char": 88301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Federal Court of ."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88420, "end_char": 88430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States and States in respect of their political or public rights and which were wholly outside the ambit of the Code", "statute": "States and States in respect of their political or public rights and which were wholly outside the ambit of the Code"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88434, "end_char": 88461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88553, "end_char": 88564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States and States in respect of their political or public rights and which were wholly outside the ambit of the Code", "statute": "States and States in respect of their political or public rights and which were wholly outside the ambit of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88866, "end_char": 88877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States and States in respect of their political or public rights and which were wholly outside the ambit of the Code", "statute": "States and States in respect of their political or public rights and which were wholly outside the ambit of the Code"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89206, "end_char": 89235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 6 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89457, "end_char": 89473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89619, "end_char": 89630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90218, "end_char": 90221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J. and I express no opinion on the ."}}, {"text": "State of Dhenkanal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 91094, "end_char": 91112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1950), the State of Dhenkanal (plaintiff in Suit No."}}, {"text": "State of Baudh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 91156, "end_char": 91170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 of 1950), and the State of Baudh (plaintiff in Suit No."}}, {"text": "August 16, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 91231, "end_char": 91246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of 1950) were executed on or about August 16, 1947, by the State of Tigiria (plaintiff in Suit No."}}, {"text": "State of Tigiria", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91255, "end_char": 91271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of 1950) were executed on or about August 16, 1947, by the State of Tigiria (plaintiff in Suit No."}}, {"text": "State of Athgarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91315, "end_char": 91331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950) and the State of Athgarh (plaintiff in Suit No."}}, {"text": "August 15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 91369, "end_char": 91384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 of 1950) on August 15, 1947, and by the State of Baramba (plaintiff in Suit No; 6 of 1950) and the State of Narsinghpur (plaintiff in Suit No."}}, {"text": "State of Baramba", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91397, "end_char": 91413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 of 1950) on August 15, 1947, and by the State of Baramba (plaintiff in Suit No; 6 of 1950) and the State of Narsinghpur (plaintiff in Suit No."}}, {"text": "State of Narsinghpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91456, "end_char": 91476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 of 1950) on August 15, 1947, and by the State of Baramba (plaintiff in Suit No; 6 of 1950) and the State of Narsinghpur (plaintiff in Suit No."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 91514, "end_char": 91527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 of 1950) on July 18, 1947, and November 11, 1947, respectively."}}, {"text": "November 11, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 91533, "end_char": 91550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 of 1950) on July 18, 1947, and November 11, 1947, respectively."}}, {"text": "Agreemenr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 91579, "end_char": 91588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "Seraikella", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91620, "end_char": 91630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "D henkanal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91632, "end_char": 91642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "Baudh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91647, "end_char": 91652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "December 15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 91656, "end_char": 91673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "Tigiria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91696, "end_char": 91703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "Athgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91705, "end_char": 91712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "Baramba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91714, "end_char": 91721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "N arsinghpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91726, "end_char": 91738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 91742, "end_char": 91759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, D henkanal and Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of Tigiria, Athgarh, Baramba and N arsinghpur on December 14, 1947."}}, {"text": "Governor-General of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91946, "end_char": 91971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the Instruments of Accession, which were in the same terms in all the cases, the respective Rulers of the plaintiff States acceded to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor-General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other administrative authority should, by virtue of the said Instruments but subject to the terms thereof and for the purposes pnly of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State concerned such."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92277, "end_char": 92306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 92352, "end_char": 92372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "functions as might be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India on the 15th of August, 1947."}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92377, "end_char": 92386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92745, "end_char": 92754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93031, "end_char": 93040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Instrument of Accession should not be varied by any amendment of the Government of India Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Instrument of Accession should not be varied by any amendment of the Government of India Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93195, "end_char": 93216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93338, "end_char": 93347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93838, "end_char": 93847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dominion. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94092, "end_char": 94112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State and agreed to transfer the administration of the State to .the Dominion."}}, {"text": "first day of January,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94120, "end_char": 94147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government on the first day of January,\n\n1948, and the Dominion Government, as from the."}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94351, "end_char": 94360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dhenkanal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 94536, "end_char": 94545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may here be mentioned that the amount of the privy purse payable to the Rulers of the States of Seraikella, Dhenkanal and Baudh not having been agreed upon at the date of the signing of the Artcles of Agreements the space meant for ."}}, {"text": "Article 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95038, "end_char": 95047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "15th day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 95180, "end_char": 95204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "enjoyed by the Rulers whether within or outside the territories of the States immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947."}}, {"text": "Article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95206, "end_char": 95215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 24, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 95372, "end_char": 95389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 24, 1947, the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (Act XL VII of 1947) received the assent of the Governor-General and came into force."}}, {"text": "Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 95395, "end_char": 95434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95569, "end_char": 95578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "statute": "the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "December 23, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 96169, "end_char": 96186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 23, 1947, the Central Government issued a notification purporting to delegate its cxtraprovincial jurisdiction with respect to the plaintiff States under the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (No."}}, {"text": "May 18, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 96634, "end_char": 96646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not quite clear how there could be a delegation of jurisdiction before the Act came into force; Be that as it may, on May 18, 1948, another notification was issued by the Central Government under sections 3 and 4 of the Extra-Provincial Juris:- diction Act, 1947, cancelling the previous notification with respect only to the State of Scraikella and the State of Kharsawan and delegating its jurisdiction iii or in relation to those two States to the Goverrurient of\n\nS.C..R.\n\nSUPRE~ COURT REPORTS 519\n\nBihar and on the same date the Government of Bihar after promulgating the. ."}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96712, "end_char": 96728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Scraikella", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 96842, "end_char": 96861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not quite clear how there could be a delegation of jurisdiction before the Act came into force; Be that as it may, on May 18, 1948, another notification was issued by the Central Government under sections 3 and 4 of the Extra-Provincial Juris:- diction Act, 1947, cancelling the previous notification with respect only to the State of Scraikella and the State of Kharsawan and delegating its jurisdiction iii or in relation to those two States to the Goverrurient of\n\nS.C..R.\n\nSUPRE~ COURT REPORTS 519\n\nBihar and on the same date the Government of Bihar after promulgating the. ."}}, {"text": "State of Kharsawan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 96870, "end_char": 96888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not quite clear how there could be a delegation of jurisdiction before the Act came into force; Be that as it may, on May 18, 1948, another notification was issued by the Central Government under sections 3 and 4 of the Extra-Provincial Juris:- diction Act, 1947, cancelling the previous notification with respect only to the State of Scraikella and the State of Kharsawan and delegating its jurisdiction iii or in relation to those two States to the Goverrurient of\n\nS.C..R.\n\nSUPRE~ COURT REPORTS 519\n\nBihar and on the same date the Government of Bihar after promulgating the. ."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1)149", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 97406, "end_char": 97423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I of 1949) which received the assent of the President of the Constituent Assembly on January 10, 1)149, amended the Government of India Act, 1935, by, inter alia inserting the following section as section 290-A :-\n\n. \""}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97437, "end_char": 97466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97518, "end_char": 97529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99383, "end_char": 99394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 27, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 99423, "end_char": 99436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred on him by the new section 290-A, the Governor-General, on July 27, 1949, promulgated an Order called the States' Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99522, "end_char": 99531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99812, "end_char": 99854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule III", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100203, "end_char": 100215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State in the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "State in the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100328, "end_char": 100339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State in the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "State in the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "15, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 100731, "end_char": 100739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1950 was filed on or about January 15, 1950, and the other six suits were fikd on January 23,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "January 23,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 100778, "end_char": 100795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1950 was filed on or about January 15, 1950, and the other six suits were fikd on January 23,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 101028, "end_char": 101043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State of Orissa.", "canonical_name": "State of Seraikellti"}}, {"text": "State of. Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 101186, "end_char": 101202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main written statements in all the suits arc filed on behalf of the first defendant and the second defendant; the State of Bihar or the State of."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101477, "end_char": 101498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101573, "end_char": 101584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 363(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102136, "end_char": 102150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102158, "end_char": 102179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102316, "end_char": 102327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102335, "end_char": 102364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102889, "end_char": 102900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103055, "end_char": 103064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103430, "end_char": 103444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103450, "end_char": 103464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29Q", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103919, "end_char": 103930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103940, "end_char": 103969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 29Q", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104220, "end_char": 104231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104241, "end_char": 104270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104767, "end_char": 104781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105243, "end_char": 105254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106003, "end_char": 106014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 290", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106310, "end_char": 106321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SeraikeUa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 107757, "end_char": 107766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Si.te of\n\nSeraikeUa and OtMrs\n\nUnion Qf India\n\nand ..fnotf!Lr."}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108447, "end_char": 108458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "After the repeal of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108491, "end_char": 108538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section\n\n204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108660, "end_char": 108672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the repeal of the Government of India Act", "statute": "After the repeal of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 109110, "end_char": 109122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, 3 & 4 : R. R. Biswas."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 109172, "end_char": 109188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 & 5 : P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "S. C. Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 109238, "end_char": 109253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 & 7 : S. C. Bannerjee."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 109283, "end_char": 109294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the defendants : P. A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_525_533_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "...\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS\n\n\"· SRIMATHl CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN\n\nand\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS\n\nti.\n\nC. R. SRINIVASAN\n\n[Sm1 HAlllLAL KANIA C. J. FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTU, M&Hll. CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHUJEA, S. R. DAS and VMAN BosE JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 13, 16 (4), 29 (2), 46-Admission to educational institution1-E:cecuti11e Order fi:cint number of seius for particular communities-Invalidity-Fundamental ritht aiainst discrimination on the iround of reli1ion only-Directive principles of State policy-Value of.\n\nWith regard to admission of students tO the Engineering and • Medical Colleges of the State, the Province of Madras had issued an order (known as the Communal G. 0.) that seats should be filled in by the selection committee strictly on the following basis, i.e., out of every 14 scats, 6 were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), 2 to Backward Hindus, 2 to Brahmins, 2 to Harijans, 1 to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and 1 to Muslims :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (Kania C. /., Fazl Ali, Pataniali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahaian, Mukher; ea, S.\n\nDas and . Vivian Bose 1/.)-that the Communal G. 0. constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Art. 29 (2) of the Constitution, namely, that \"no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of the State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them,\" and was therefore void under Art. 13.\n\nThe directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV of the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part UI. On the other hand they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part tu .\n\nJudgment of the Madras High Court affirmed.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuRisDICTION.-Case Nos. 270 and 271 of 1951.\n\n.April 9\n\nSrimothi Ch4mMam\n\nDorasrajon\n\nAppeals under Art. 132 ( 1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated 27th July, 1950, of the Madras High Court in certain applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution for protection of the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 15 ( 1) and Art. 29 (2) of the Constitution and praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other suitable prerogative writ restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following the order of the Government known as the Communal G. 0. which laid down rules to be observed by the selection committee in the matter of admission of students to the Medical and Engineering Colleges of the State.\n\nV. K. T. Chari, Atl11ocatt:-General, Madras (R. Ganapat/1y lyt:r, with him) for the appellant.\n\nAl/adj Krjshnasw11mj Aiyar (Al/adj Kupuswamj Ajyar, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1951, April 9. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDas].\n\nDAs J.-This judgment covers both Case No. 270 of 1951 (State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairaian) and Case No. 271 of 1951 (State of Madras v.\n\nC. R. Srini11asan) which are appeals from the judgment passed by the Higl) Court of Judicature at Madras on July 27, 1950, on two separate applications under article 226 of the Constitution complaining of breach of the petitioners' fundamental right to get admission into educational institutiQns maintained by the State. ·\n\nThe State of Madras maintains four Medical Colleges and only 330. seats aie available for students in those four Colleges. Out of these 330 scats, 17 seats are reserved for students coming from outside the State and 12 seats are .reserved for discretionary allotment by the State and the balance of the scats available are apportioned between four distinct groups of districts in the State.\n\nLikewise, the State of Madras maintains four Engineering Colleges and the total number of seats available for students in those Colleges are only 395.\n\nOut of these, 21 seats are reserved for students coming from outside the State, 12 seats are reserved for discretionary allotment by the State and the balance of the seats available are apportioned between the same four distinct groups of districts.\n\nFor many years before the commencement of the Constitution, the seats in both the Medical Colleges and the Engineering Colleges so apportioned between the four distinct groups of districts used to be filled up according to certain proportions set forth in what used to be called the Communal G.O.\n\nThus, for\n\n- every 14 seats to be filled by the sdection committee, candidates used to be selected strictly on the following basis:-\n\nNon-Brahmin (Hindus) Backward Hindus Brahmins Harijans Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians Muslims\n\nSubject to the aforesaid regional and what have been claimed to be prottct1vc prov1S1ons selection from among the applicants from a particular community from one of the groups of districts used to be made on certain principles based on academic qualifications and marks obtained by the candidates. In the case of the Medical Colleges, not less than 20 per cent. of the total number of seats available for students of the State were filled by women candiates separately for each region, it being open to the selection committee to admit a larger number of woman candidates in any region if qualified candidates were available in that region and if they were eligible for selection on merits vis a vis the men candidates in accordance with the general principles governing such\n\nThe State of Madras v.\n\nSrimathi Champakam\n\nDorairajan\n\nDas].\n\nTh< Stal< of\n\nMadras\n\nSrimathi Chompakam\n\nDorairajan\n\nDas].\n\nadmissions as laid , down in those rules. It appears that the proportion fixed in the old Communal G. 0. has been adhered to even after the commencement of the Constitution on January 26, 1950.\n\nIndeed, G. 0.\n\nNo. 2208, dated June 16, 1950, laying down rules for the selection of candidates for admission into the Medical Colleges substantially repi; oduces the communal proportion fixed in the old Commu111l G. 0.\n\nOn June 7, 1950, Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Judicature at Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for protection of her fundamental rights under article 15\n\n(1) and article 29 (2) of the Consiitution and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other suitable prerogative writ restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following or requiring the enforcement, observance, maintenance 9r following by the authorities concerned of the notification or order generally referred to as the Communal G. 0. in and by which admissions into the Madras Medical Colleges were sought or purported to be regulated in such manner as to infringe and involve the violation of her fundamental rights. From the affidavit filed in support of her petition, it does not appear that the petitioner had actually applied for admission in the Medical College. She states that on inquiry she came to know that she would not be admitted to the College as she belonged to the Brahmin community. No objection, however, was taken to the maintainability of her petition on the ground of absence of any actual application for admission made by her. On the contrary, we have been told that the State had agreed to reserve a seat for her, should her application before f the High Court succeed. In the peculiar circumstances, we do not consider it necessary to pursue this matter any further. But we desire to guard ourselves against , being understood as holding that we approve of a person who has not actually applied for admission into an cduca; ional institution coming to Court complaining of infringement of any fundamental right\n\nunder article 29 (2). The High Court by its judgment delivered on July ll, 1950, allowed this application of Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan.\n\nThe State , of Madras has now come up before us on appeal which has been numbered Case No. 270 of 1951.\n\nSri Srinivasan who had actually applied for admission into the Government Engineering College at Guindy, filed a petition praying for a writ of mandamus or any other writ restraining the State of Madras .and all officers thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following the Communal G.O. in and by which admission into the Engineering College was sought to be regulated in such manner as to infringe and involve the violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner under article 15 (1) and artide 29 (2) of the Constitution. In the affidavit filed in support of his petition, the petitioner has stated that he had passed the Intermediate Examination held in March, 1950, in Group 1, passing the said examination in the first class and obtaining marks set out in paragraph 1 of his affidavit.\n\nIt will appear that in the optionals which are taken into consideration in determining the academic test for admission in the Engineering College the petitioner Srinivasan secured 369 marks out of a maximum of 450 marks. The High Court has by the same judgment allowed this application also and the State has filed an appeal which has been numbered 271 of 1951.\n\nThe learned counsel appearing for the State of Madras conceded that these two applicants would have been admitted to the educational institutions they intended to join and they. would not have been denied admission if selections had been made on merits alone.\n\nArticle 29 which occurs in Part III of the Constitution under the head \"Cultural and Educational Rights\" runs as follows :\n\n\"(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.\n\nMadras v.\n\nSrimathi Champakam\n\nDorairqjan\n\nDas].\n\nThe Stau ef\n\nMadras ...\n\nSrimathi Champakam\n\nDorairflian\n\nDas].\n\n(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.\n\nIt will be noticed that while clause ( 1) protects the language, script or culture of a section of the citizens, clause (2) guarantees the fundamental right of an individual citizen.\n\nThe right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause\n\n(2) •is a right which an indivjdual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. If a citizen who seeks admission into any such educational institution has not the requisite academic qualifications and is 'denied admission on that ground, he certainly cannot be heard to complain of an infraction of his fundamental right under this article.\n\nBut, on the other hand, if he has the academic qualifications but is refused admission on! y on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them, then there is a clear breaclt of his fundamental right.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General appearing for the State contends that the provisions of this article have to be read along with other articles in the Constitution. He urges that article \"6 charges the State with promoting with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and with protecting them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.\n\nIt is pointed out that although this article finds a place in Part IV of the Constitution which lays down certain directive principles of State policy and though the provisions contained in that Part are not enforceable by any Court, the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental for the governance of the country and article 37 makes it obligatory on the part of the State to apply those principles in making laws.\n\nThe argu ment is that having regard to the provisions of article \"6, the State is entitled to maintain the Communal\n\nG. 0. fixing proportionate seats for different communities and if because of that Order, which is thus contended to be valid in law and not in violation of the Constitution, the petitioners are unable to get admissions into the educational institutions, there is no infringement of their fundamental rights. Indeed, the learned Advocate-General of Madras even contends that the provisions of article 46 override the provisions of article 29(2). We reject the above noted contentions completely. The directive principles of the State policy, which by article 37 are expressly made unenforceable by a Court, cannot -override the provisions found in Part III which, notwithstanding other provisions, are expressly made enforceable by appropriate Writs, Orders or directions under article 32. The chapter of Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by any Legislative or Executive Act or order, except to the extent provided in the appropriate article in Part III. The directive principles of State policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the Chapter of Fundamental Rights. In our opinion, that is the correct way in which the provisions found in Parts III and IV have to be understood. However, so long as there is no infringement of any Fundamental Right, to the extent conferred by the provisions in Part III, there can be no objection to the State acting in accordance with the directive principles set out in Part IV, but subject again to the Legislative and Executive powers and limitations . conferred on the State under different provisions of the Constitution.\n\nIn the next place, it will be noticed that article 16 which guarantees the fundamental right of equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and provides that .no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of any employment or office under the State\n\nalso_ includes a specific clause iii the following terms :-\n\n\" ( 4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from ma!cing any provision for the reservation of appointments of posts in favour of any backward class\n\nMadras\n\nSrimathi Champa/cam\n\nDorairajan\n\nDas].\n\nThe State of Madras ...\n\nSrimathi Ckampakam\n\nDorairojan\n\nDas]\n\nof citizens which, in the opinion of the adequately represented in the services State.\"\n\n[1951]\n\n.State, is not under the\n\nIf the arguments founded on article 416 were sound then clause ( 4) of article 16 would have been wholly unnecessary and redundant.\n\nSeeing, however, that clause ( 4) was inserted in artick 16, the omission of such an express provision from article 29 cannot but be regarded as significant. It may well be that the intention of the Constitution was not to introduce at all communal considerations in matters _of admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds.\n\nThe protection of backward classes of citizens may require appointment of members of backward classes in State services and the reason why power has been given to the State to provide for reservation of such appointments for backward classes. may under those circumstances be understood, That consideration, however, was not obviously considered pccessary in the case of admission into an educational institution and that may well be the reason for the omission from article 29 of a clause similar to clause ( 4) of article 16.\n\nTake the case of the petitioner Srinivasan.\n\nIt is not disputed that he secured a much larger number of marks than the marks secured by many of the Non- Brahmin candidates and yet the Non-Brahmin candidates who secured less number of marks will be admitted into six out of every 14 seats but the petitioner Srinivasan will not be admitted into any of them.\n\nWhat is the reason for this denial of admission except that he is a Brahmin and not a Non-Brahmin. He may have secured higher marks than the Anglo-Indian and Indian Christians or Muslim candidates but, nevertheless, he cannot get any of the scats reserved for the last mentioned communities for no fault of his except that he is a Brahmin and not a member of the aforesaid communities.\n\nSuch denial of admission cannot but be regarded as made on ground only of his caste.\n\nIt is argued that the petitioners arc not denied admission only because they arc Brahmins but for a\n\nvariety of reasons, e.g., (a) they are Brahmins, (ho) 8rahmins have an allotment of only two scats out of l4 and ( c) the two scats have already been filled up by more meritorious Brahmin candidates. This may be true so far as these two seats reserved for the 8rahmins arc concerned but this line of argument can have no force when we come to consider .the scats reserved for candidates of other communities, for, so far as those seats are concerned, the petitioners are denied admission into any of them not on any ground other than the sole ground of their being Brahmins and not being members of the community for whom those reservations have been made.\n\nThe classification in the Communal G. 0. proceeds on the basis of religion, race and caste.\n\nIn our view, the classification made in the Communal G. 0. is opposed to the Constitution and constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen under article 29 (2). In this view of the matter, we do not find it necessary to consider the effect of articles 14 or 15 on the specific articles discussed above.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, we arc of opinion that the Communal G. 0. being inconsistent with the provisions of article 29 (2) in Part III of the Constitution is void under article 13. The result, therefore, is that these appeals stand dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant: P. A; MehttZ.\n\nAgent for the respondents : M. S. K. StZStri.\n\n19.51\n\nTh4 Stale of\n\nMadrtU\n\n.Y.\n\nSrimathl Champakam\n\nDorairajan\n\nD'\"J", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "SRIMATHl CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SRIMATHl CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "and\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. R. SRINIVASAN", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. R. SRINIVASAN\n\n[Sm1 HAlllLAL KANIA C. J. FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTU, M&Hll."}}, {"text": "Sm1 HAlllLAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hll. CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 212, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 224, "end_char": 233, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VMAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 238, "end_char": 251, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 13, 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 277, "end_char": 289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 653, "end_char": 659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to admission of students tO the Engineering and • Medical Colleges of the State, the Province of Madras had issued an order (known as the Communal G. 0.)"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1027, "end_char": 1035, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Fazl Ali", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Pataniali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1037, "end_char": 1053, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Pataniali Sastri", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Mehr Chand Mahaian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1055, "end_char": 1073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that seats should be filled in by the selection committee strictly on the following basis, i.e., out of every 14 scats, 6 were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), 2 to Backward Hindus, 2 to Brahmins, 2 to Harijans, 1 to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and 1 to Muslims :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (Kania C. /., Fazl Ali, Pataniali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahaian, Mukher; ea, S.\n\nDas and ."}}, {"text": "Mukher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1075, "end_char": 1081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that seats should be filled in by the selection committee strictly on the following basis, i.e., out of every 14 scats, 6 were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), 2 to Backward Hindus, 2 to Brahmins, 2 to Harijans, 1 to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and 1 to Muslims :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (Kania C. /., Fazl Ali, Pataniali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahaian, Mukher; ea, S.\n\nDas and ."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nDas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1087, "end_char": 1094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that seats should be filled in by the selection committee strictly on the following basis, i.e., out of every 14 scats, 6 were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin (Hindus), 2 to Backward Hindus, 2 to Brahmins, 2 to Harijans, 1 to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and 1 to Muslims :\n\nHeld by the Full Court (Kania C. /., Fazl Ali, Pataniali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahaian, Mukher; ea, S.\n\nDas and ."}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1101, "end_char": 1112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vivian Bose 1/.)-that the Communal G. 0."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1221, "end_char": 1226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "constituted a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1230, "end_char": 1237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1506, "end_char": 1513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1812, "end_char": 1829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of the Madras High Court affirmed."}}, {"text": "Srimothi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".April 9\n\nSrimothi Ch4mMam\n\nDorasrajon\n\nAppeals under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1958, "end_char": 1966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 2000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2202, "end_char": 2209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2219, "end_char": 2226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2350, "end_char": 2365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29 (2) of the Constitution and praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other suitable prerogative writ restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following the order of the Government known as the Communal G. 0."}}, {"text": "V. K. T. Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2674, "end_char": 2688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Atl11ocatt:-General, Madras (R. Ganapat/1y lyt:r, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapat/1y", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2719, "end_char": 2732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Atl11ocatt:-General, Madras (R. Ganapat/1y lyt:r, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3229, "end_char": 3240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Srimathi Chompakam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5585, "end_char": 5603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th< Stal< of\n\nMadras\n\nSrimathi Chompakam\n\nDorairajan\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "SRIMATHl CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN"}}, {"text": "June 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6043, "end_char": 6055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 7, 1950, Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Judicature at Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for protection of her fundamental rights under article 15\n\n(1) and article 29 (2) of the Consiitution and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other suitable prerogative writ restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following or requiring the enforcement, observance, maintenance 9r following by the authorities concerned of the notification or order generally referred to as the Communal G. 0."}}, {"text": "Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6057, "end_char": 6086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 7, 1950, Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Judicature at Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for protection of her fundamental rights under article 15\n\n(1) and article 29 (2) of the Consiitution and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other suitable prerogative writ restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following or requiring the enforcement, observance, maintenance 9r following by the authorities concerned of the notification or order generally referred to as the Communal G. 0.", "canonical_name": "SRIMATHl CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6114, "end_char": 6148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 7, 1950, Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan made an application to the High Court of Judicature at Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for protection of her fundamental rights under article 15\n\n(1) and article 29 (2) of the Consiitution and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other suitable prerogative writ restraining the State of Madras and all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following or requiring the enforcement, observance, maintenance 9r following by the authorities concerned of the notification or order generally referred to as the Communal G. 0."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6155, "end_char": 6166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6234, "end_char": 6244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6254, "end_char": 6264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras Medical Colleges", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6702, "end_char": 6725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in and by which admissions into the Madras Medical Colleges were sought or purported to be regulated in such manner as to infringe and involve the violation of her fundamental rights."}}, {"text": "article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7776, "end_char": 7786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July ll, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7836, "end_char": 7849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court by its judgment delivered on July ll, 1950, allowed this application of Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan."}}, {"text": "Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7879, "end_char": 7908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court by its judgment delivered on July ll, 1950, allowed this application of Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan.", "canonical_name": "SRIMATHl CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN"}}, {"text": "State , of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7915, "end_char": 7932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State , of Madras has now come up before us on appeal which has been numbered Case No."}}, {"text": "Srinivasan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8020, "end_char": 8030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Srinivasan who had actually applied for admission into the Government Engineering College at Guindy, filed a petition praying for a writ of mandamus or any other writ restraining the State of Madras .and all officers thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following the Communal G.O. in and by which admission into the Engineering College was sought to be regulated in such manner as to infringe and involve the violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner under article 15 (1) and artide 29 (2) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Srinivasan"}}, {"text": "article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8502, "end_char": 8512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Srinivasan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8985, "end_char": 8995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will appear that in the optionals which are taken into consideration in determining the academic test for admission in the Engineering College the petitioner Srinivasan secured 369 marks out of a maximum of 450 marks.", "canonical_name": "Srinivasan"}}, {"text": "Article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9448, "end_char": 9458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Srimathi Champakam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9772, "end_char": 9790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madras v.\n\nSrimathi Champakam\n\nDorairqjan\n\nDas].", "canonical_name": "SRIMATHl CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN"}}, {"text": "article 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11859, "end_char": 11869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12467, "end_char": 12477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12505, "end_char": 12518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12625, "end_char": 12635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12852, "end_char": 12862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13718, "end_char": 13728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14335, "end_char": 14350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madras ...\n\nSrimathi Ckampakam\n\nDorairojan\n\nDas]\n\nof citizens which, in the opinion of the adequately represented in the services State.\""}}, {"text": "article 416", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14545, "end_char": 14556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14588, "end_char": 14598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14758, "end_char": 14768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15501, "end_char": 15511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15550, "end_char": 15560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17428, "end_char": 17438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17526, "end_char": 17537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17701, "end_char": 17711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17762, "end_char": 17772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. A; MehttZ.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17893, "end_char": 17906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: P. A; MehttZ.\n\nAgent for the respondents : M. S. K. StZStri."}}, {"text": "M. S. K.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17936, "end_char": 17944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant: P. A; MehttZ.\n\nAgent for the respondents : M. S. K. StZStri."}}, {"text": "Srimathl Champakam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17989, "end_char": 18007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19.51\n\nTh4 Stale of\n\nMadrtU\n\n.Y.\n\nSrimathl Champakam\n\nDorairajan\n\nD'\"J", "canonical_name": "SRIMATHl CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_534_548_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "May2\n\n1951 Mayl,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSUKHDEV SINGH\n\nII.\n\nMAHARAJA BAHADUR OF GIDHAUR\n\n[ SA1Ym FAzL ALI, MuKHEERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J\n\n[1951]\n\nGhatwali tenures-Nature and incidents-Gova-nment ghatwalis and Zemindary ghatwalis-Difference-Zemindar' s right to sub-soil minerals-District Gazetteers-Evidentiary value.\n\nThough there are several instances in which Government ghat4 walis were included in the zemindary of other persons, yet wh.cro no clear evidence is forthcoming as to the true character of a ghat4 wali, the fact that the tenure is included within a zamindary and is covered by the jama assessed upon it should turn the scale in favour of the party who alleges that it is a tenure which is dependent upon the zemindary.\n\nThe mere fact that the ghatwali was shown to be under the Collector cannot alter the character of the ghatwali, i.e., if it Was a zemindary ghatwali, it could not become a Government ghanvali merely because it was stated to be under the Collector.\n\nA zemindar is presumed to be the owner of underground rights in the tenancies created by him in the absence of evidence that he ever parted with them.\n\nA statement in the District Gazetteer is not necessarily conclusive, but the Gazetteer is an official document of some value, as it is compiled by experienced officials with great care after obtaining the facts from official records,\n\n(History and incidents of ghatwali tenures discussed).\n\nC1VIL APPELLATE Juruso1CTI0N. Civu. Appeal No. 29 of 1950.\n\nAppeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 10th October, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Das JJ.) in Appeal No. 64 of 1942 arising out of decree dated the 28th February, 1942, of the Subordinate Judge at Monghyr in Suit No. 10 of 1941.\n\nAmarendra Nath Sinha (Samarendra Nath Mukherjee, with him) for the appellants.\n\nLal Narain Sinha (R. C. Prasad, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1951 May 2. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, affirming a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr in a title suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent.\n\nThe plaintiff, the Maharaja of Gidhaur, who has succeeded in both the courts below, is the proprietor of an impartible estate known as Gidhaur raj in the district of Monghyr.\n\nThe ancestors of the defendants 1st party originally held a 4 annas share in a ghatwali tenure known as Mahal Dumri Nisf Katauna T. No. 325, and subsequently by private partition they were allotted mouza Dumri with its 47 tolas which are detailed in schedule I of the plaint. In execution of a mortgage decree obtained by one Chethru Rai against the ancestors of defendants 1st party, their interest, to which reference has been made, was purchased by the Maharaja of Gidhaur in the name of one of his employees, and the latter took delivery of possession of the property on the 19th April, 1904.\n\nOn the 13th August, 1903, the ancestors of the defendants 1st party filed an application for setting aside the sale which was dismissed by the executing court and the appeal from the order of the executing court was dismissed by the High Court as well as by the Privy . Council. After certain disputes in the criminal courts, the defendants second party alleging themselves to be the lessees of the defendants first party, obtained a mining license in 1937 from the sub-divisional officer of Jamui, and the District Magistrate apprehending a breach of the peace, started proceedings under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which ended in favour of the defendants first and second parties and against the plaintiff.\n\nThe plaintiff's case is that, emboldened by the order in the proceedings under section 144, the defendants started working mines in the tolas mentioned in schedule II of the plaint and extracted a considerable\n\n1951)\n\n<Jukhdev Singh\n\nMahara}a\n\nBahadurof\n\nGidhaur\n\nFaz/ A/IT.\n\nSll/ohdev Singh\n\nMalrarqja Bahadurof\n\nGidhaur.\n\nFaz/ A.Ii J,\n\n9uatity of mica and hence he was compelled to mst1tute the present suit.\n\nIn this suit, after reciting the facts to which reference has been made he prayed for a declaration of the sub-soil rights with regard to the entire Mahal Durnri and for recovery of possession of the mortgage lands situated in the tolas specified in schedule II of the plaint.\n\nHe also prayed for mesne profits and a permanent injunction restraining the defendants first and second parties from extracting mica or other underground minerals from the lands mentioned in schedule II of the plaint. The grounds on which these reliefs were claimed are summarized in paragraph 12 of the plaint in these words :-\n\n\"That the plaintiff submits that he being the 16 annas proprietor of Durnri Nisf Katauna has got an indefeasible right and title to all the underground minerals including mica situate within the said talukas.\n\nThe plaintiff further submits that all the titles and interest in the said 4 annas mokrari shares of the ancestors of the defendant 1st party having been acquired by plaintiff's ancestor by auction purchase in 1903, the defendant 1st party have no sort of right and interests in the mica and other underground minerals nor the defendant 2nd party have derived any lawful right under leases alleged to have been granted in their favour by defendant 1st party, the plaintiff in law is entitled to get a declaration of his title and possession with respect to all the underground . h . 1 d. . \" rig t me u mg rmca ........... .\n\nThe suit was contested by ~$fendants Nos. I to 11 (defendants 1st party), but, as the trial judge has pointed out, the real defendant was defendant No. l, father of the appellant. The case of this defendant was that . the four annas interest in village Dumri was a ghatwali tenure granted to the ancestors of the defendants first party by Muhammadan rulers to guard the hill passes in the taluka, and the grant under which they held was affirmed subsequently by Captain Browne, a representative of the East India Company.\n\nThe defendant No. 1 further contended that the mineral\n\nand subsoil rights were vested in him as the holder of the ghatwali tenure, and that the plaintiff had acquired no right by his auction-purchase in 1903 inasmuch as the property in suit being Government ghatwali tenure was inalienable and consequently the auction-purchased was invalid. Lastly, it was contended that this defendant and his ancestors had been exercising rights of possession over the mines and minerals for more than 12 years prior to the suit in assertion of their ghatwali right and to the knowledge of the plaintiff and his ancestors and had thus acquired an indefeasible right by adverse possession to the mines and minerals in suit, especially those in the lands specified in schedule II of the plaint.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge decreed the suit, holding among other things that the disputed tenure was a zamindary ghatwali tenure, that it was not inalienable, that the plaintiff had been in possession of the property since he purchased it in 1903 until the order of the District Magistrate made in 1938, that the plaintiff as the proprietor of the Mahal was entitled to the mineral and subsoil rights and that under the mortgage-sale only the surface right had passed to the plaintiff. The findings of the Subordinate Judge were substantially upheld on appeal by the High Court, with this modification that, while agreeing with the Subordinate Judge that the subsoil rights remained with the proprietor, the High Court also held that even if the defendant No. 1 was assumed to have had the subsoil rights, those rights passed at the mortgagesale of 1903 and therefore in any event the plaintiff was the real owner of the subsoil.\n\nOn the plea of adverse possession raised in defence, the finding of the High Court was that there was no clear evidence that any mine was worked on behalf of the lessees of defendant No. 1 and that at the utmost the evidence adduced in the case showed that there had been some isolated acts of possession during recent years, probably since 1935 onwards, and therefore the plea could not be upheld.\n\nThe two main points urged on behalf of the appellant in this appeal are :-\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMaharaia Baliadurof\n\nGid/iaur.\n\nFazl Ali J,\n\n19SI\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMahara}a Bahadurof 'Gidhaur.\n\nFaz/ All J.\n\n( 1) that the finding of the courts below that the ghatwali tenure held by the defendants first party was a zamindary ghatwali and not a Government ghatwali, could not be sustained and that in fact it was a Government ghatwali and therefore the property was inalienable and no title passed to the plaintiff ; and\n\n(2) that in any event, the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation under articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act.\n\nThe first point does not appear to us to be free from difficulty, and since its determination depends upon the proper construction of several old documents, we heard the parties at considerable length, notwithstanding the fact that the courts below have concurrently found that the tenure in question is not a government ghatwali. Before .dealing with the merits of the controversy between the parties, it is necessary to understand what is meant by a \"ghatwal\" and what is a ghatwali tenure, and for the purpose of correctly apprehending what these expressions stand for, it is sufficient in our opinion to quote the following passage from the decision of the Patna High Court in Rani Sonabati Kumari v.\n\nRaja Kirtyanand Singh('), in which the subject of ghatwali tenures has been very elaborately discussed :-\n\n\"Literally a ghatwal means a guard of the passes and the term 'ghatwali tenure' was applied by the Moghuls to lands assigned at a low rent or free of rent for guarding the mountain passes and protecting the villages near the hills from the depredatioqs of lawless hill tribes.\n\nThese ghatwali tenures are to be found for the most part on the western frontier of Bengal and particularly in the areas known as Kharagdiha, Gidhaur, Birbhum, Kharagpur, Bhagalpur, and the Santai Parganas.\n\nThe ghatwals varied in rank and the incidents of their tenure varied in different places.\n\nIn some cases they were owners of large estates, some of these estates being more or less of the nature of semi-military colonies .......... In some cases the\n\nghatwalis were created directly by the ruling power, while in other cases they were created by the landlords or zamindars for the purpose of protecting their zamindary and tenantry and to enable them to have a small force at their command and to discharge the obligations they owed to the ruling power.\n\nSometimes the owners of large ghatwali estates subdivided and re-granted the lands to other tenants 'who besides paying small rents held their lands on condition of rendering certain quasi police and military services and providing a specified number of armed men to fulfil the requirements of the Government or of the zamindar as the case might be.\"\n\nA Government ghatwali is thus a tenure created by the ruling power in favour of a person who is required to render ghatwali services to it, whereas a zamindary ghatwali is a tenure created by a zamindar for ghatwali services to be rendered to him. It is quite plain that the reason why the appellant is anxious to establish that the tenancy is a Government ghatwali is that a Government ghatwali has been uniformly held to be inalienable.\n\nOn the other hand, a zamindary ghatwali may be alienated with the consent of the zamindar, and, where local custom permits, even without his consent.\n\nFrom the reports of cases relating to zamindary ghatwalis, it appears that by the passage of time the consent of the zamindar has ceased to be a matter of much significance, and is generally . presumed when it is found that the alienation has been made without any objection from the zamindar.\n\nAs to the extent of the power of alienation, the following observations of the Privy Council in Kali Prasad v. Ananda Rai (1) are pertinent :-\n\n\"When once it is established that the ghatwal had the power of alienation, as before stated, that power forms an integral portion of his right and interest in the ghatwali, and there is no evidence whatever to limit it to an alienation for his own life and no longer.\"\n\n(1) lSI.A.18\n\nSukhdev Singh\n\nMaharaia\n\nBahadurof\n\nGidhaur.\n\nFazl Ali .T.\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMaharaj a Bahadurof Gidhaur.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nIn order to determine the true character of a ghatwali tenure, it is usually necessary to refer to the grant by which the tenure was created. In the present cas_e, the appellant relies upon exhibit C (1), which is a ghatwali sanad granted in 1776 to the ancestors of the appellant and which runs as follows : -\n\n\"Know ye the Chaudhuris, kanungoes, zamindars and mutasaddis of mauza Dumri Ghat (illegible) pargana Gidhaur, Sarkar Monghyr comprised in the province of Bihar.\n\nThe perquisites of ghatwari in all the rahdaris in mauza aforesaid, have now been granted to Kunji Singh, Jangal Singh, Ragho Singh and Manorath Singh, ghatwars of the said mauza, in accordance with what has been in vogue from old time, with effect from the commencement of 1184 fasli.\n\nIt is desired that they should allow the said ghatwars to enjoy the perquisites of the ghatwari in all the rahdaris according to old customs. It will be the duty of the said ghatwars to be ever ready in discharging the duties of the post and guarding the ghats and chaukis of their elaqa by making rounds day and night.\n\nIf murder, mischief, theft, highway robbery and sudden night attack be committed in their elaqa, they will be held liable therefor and will be dismissed from their post. Treat this as peremptory and act according to what is written.\n\nDated the 5 Ziqada of the 18th year of the August reign corresponding to 1184 Fasli.'\n\nThis sanad was granted by Captain Browne, who was deputed by the East India Company to restore order in a tract known as Jungle Terai, a vast waste and hilly country as its name signifies, lying to the south of Bhagalpur and west of Rajarnahal Hills. This document was construed by a Bench of the Patna High Court in Fulhati Kumari v. Maheshwari Prasad('), and as has been pointed out by Dawson Miller C.J. in that case,-\n\n\" It is not a grant of land but an authority to the persons named to collect as formerly ghatwari or\n\nghatwali fees or tolls from those using the roads and passes which the ghatwals undertook to protect.\"\n\nWhen W(! compare this sanad with other ghatwali sanads granted by Captain Browne, some of which are found discussed in reported cases, the contrast becomes very marked. In some of the other documents-for example in the document which was the subject of the decision of the Privy Council in Narayan Singh v.\n\nNiranjan Chak._ravarti(1), and of the Patna High Court in Rani Sonabati Kumari v.\n\nRaja Kirtyanand Singh(2) the grant was in respect of a very extensive area of land and there were also words used to indicate that the services were to be rendered directly to the ruling power. The mere fact, therefore, that the sanad in this case was granted by Captain Browne cannot be held to be decisive of the nature of the tenure, because it seems to have been part of the duties assigned to him to confirm and recognise old titles. As was pointed out by Dawson Miller C.J., the sanad should be read along with the record of certain proceedings before the Dewani Adalat of Ramgarh, which show that a tenancy comprising 8 annas in mauza Dumri was granted by the zamindar of Gidhaur to 2 persons, one of whom was the ghatwal mentioned in Captain Browne's sanad, with the sanction of Captain Browne.\n\nIn the present case, a document of 1798, which was the proceeding of the original court and which was before the learned judges who decided Fulbati's case(3) has not been produced, but we have before us a judgment dated the 18th March, 1799, of the appellate court in the same proceeding.\n\nThis judgment recites that the case of the ghatwals was that they had been for 3 generations in possession of half of village Dumri, but in the year 1187 fasli (1780 A.D.) the zaminar of Gidhaur wanted to raise \"revenue\" or rent but they refused to accept a new patta or kabuliyat at an enhanced rent.\n\nSubsequently, the court ordered the zamindar to grant a patta, but the zamindar did not do so and forcibly dispossessed the ghatwals. They thereupon prayed that\n\n( 1 ) 51 I.A. 37\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMaharafa Bahadurof Gidhaur.\n\nFaz/ .A.// J,\n\nSukhdev Singh\n\nV; Mahara}a Bahathlrof\n\nGidhaur.\n\nFa2l Ali J.\n\nthe zamindar may be ordered to gran't them a patta and receive the kabuliyat at the old rent.\n\nThe appellate court, to which the zamindar had appealed, upheld the decree of the first court ordering the patta to be granted. This document shows firstly that the ghat wali tenure in respect of half of Dumri had been in existence for 3 generations prior to 1789, i.e., it must have come into existence long before Captain Browne's sanad, and secondly that it was held under the zamindar ; otherwise, it was not necessary that the zamindar should grant a patta and the ghatwal should execute a kabuliyat in his favour.\n\nWe have also before us a document (exhibit 1) which is a report of one Khadim Muhammad Ataullah, an employee of the East India Company, incorporating certain statements made by the then zamindars of Gidhaur showing that they had been in possession of the zamindary for nearly 700 years and that \"the milkiat zamindary, Chaudhri and Kanungoi of the pargana .......... had all along been in their possession.\" This document shows that Gidhaur was an ancient zamin- <lary and the zamindar also performed the functions cf chaudhri and kanungoi.\n\nThe last mentioned point is of some significance, because the sanad of Captain Browne was addressed to chaudhris, kanungos, etc.\n\nIn the case of Fulbati Kumari('), to which reference has been made, there was an extract quoted from the Bengal District Gazetteer, volume XVII, at page 168, which runs as follows :-\n\n\"About 1774 the lawless state of this tract led the British to place it in charge of Captain James ' Browne, who settled the estates with the ghatwals with two exceptions. These two exceptions were Dumri and Mahesri which were settled directly with the proprietors, the story being that the ghatwal tenure holders fled at the approach of Captain Browne their reputation as dacoits and brigands being too strong for them to face a Government officer without fear of the consequences.\n\nIn the case of Dumri however, the\n\nghatwals finding that in their absence a settlement had been made of their tenure, returned and obtained a sanad settling it with them under the Raja of Gidhaur.\n\nOf the estates settled with ghatwals only two or now held by their descendants, viz., Tilwa and\n\nKewal. The others qavc passed into the hands of the Maharaja of Gidhaur, Chetru Rai, Akleswar Prasad and others of Rohini.\"\n\nThe statement in the District Gazetteer is not necessarily conclusive, but the Gazetteer is an official document of some value, as it is compiled by experienced officials with great care after obtaining the facts from official records. As Dawson Miller C.J. has pointed out in Fulbati's case(1), there are a few inaccuracies in the latter pan of the statement quoted above, but so far as the earlier part of it is concerned, it seems to derive considerable suppon from the documents to which reference has been made.\n\nThe counsel for the appellant greatly relied on the fact that Dumri ghatwali is . mentioned in Captain Browne's \"India Tracts\" as one of the ghatwalis placed under. the Collector of Jungle Terrai districts.\n\nIt appears that this point was not raised before any of the courts below, nor was Captain Browne's treatise placed before them. There is thus considerable force in the objection raised on behalf of the respondent that he has not had sufficient opportunity to study the matter and place relevant materials before this coun to enable it to determine what meaning and value 6hould be attached to Captain Browne's statement.\n\nBut apart from this objection, it seems to us on the evidence as it stands, that the inference sought to be drawn from Captain Browne's statement is not fully justified for the following reasons :-\n\n1. The mere fact that the ghatwali was shown to be under the Collector cannot alter the character of the ghatwali, i.e., if it was a zamindary ghatwali, it could not become a Government ghatwali merely because it was stated to be under the Collector.\n\n(1) A.I.R.1923 Patna4S3\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMaharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur.\n\nFaz/ Ali J,\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMaharQ/a Bahadurof Gidhaur.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nAs Collector of Jungle Terrai districts, Captain Browne appears to have had control not only over the ghatwals but also over the zamindars within the area administered by him.\n\n3. The observations made by Captain Browne with regard to the Jungle Terrai ghatwals and their relation to the zamindar hardly support the view urged on behalf of the appellant.\n\nReferring to the Jungle Terrai ghatwalis, Captain Browne states in his book as follows :-\n\n\"All the Jungle Terry gautwalls were formerly subject to the several Rajahs, to whose territories their Gautwallies belonged; they paid a slight tribute in token of feodal obedience, and were bound to oppose all invasions (principally from the south) to attend their Rajahs when summoned, with all their followers in arms, and to be responsible for every violence and irregularity committed in their respective boundaries ;- their followers are still bound by the same feodal ties to them, and have lands for feodal services ; nothing can be conceived more absolute than the authority of these chiefs over their vassals ; the fear of death even, when seized on in war, is not sufficient to force from them the discovery of any secret respecting their chief, his family, or property.\"\n\nAgain, Captain Browne's description of the zamindar of Gidhaur is to the following effect :-\n\n\"The Raja of Guidore was formerly of great extent, but the conquests made from it by the Rajah of Bierboom and Comgar Cawn, and the independency which these wars gave the Gautwalls an opportunity of assuming, have reduced the present Rajahs Gopal Singh, and Durrup Singh, to follow an ebb, that they can scarcely recover sufficient consequence to be of any political weight whatever.\"\n\nOn the whole, it appears that the ghatwals of Dumri were hardly men of such consequence as to break off from the zamindar and set themselves up as independent chiefs.\n\nThere are two other items of evidence which seem to have an important bearing on the question. In the first place, the appellant's tenure was included within the Gidhaur zamindary in the Permanent Settlement, and secondly, it is shown in the Record of Rights as istemrari mokrari tenure under the zemindar of Gidhaur. In the case of Raja Lelanund Singh Bahadr, or\n\nv. The Bengal Government(1) where the Government set up a claim to resume the ghatwali in the zamindary of Khuruckpore for the purpose of revenue assessment, the claim was negatived by the Privy Council, and one of the grounds upon which the decision was based was that the ghatwali lands were part of the zamindary and were included in the Permanent Settlement of the zamindar and were covered by the jama assessed on that zamindary. There can be no doubt that prima facie the fact that the tenure was included in the Permanent Settlement of the zamindar and under that Settlement the ghatwal had to pay rent to the zamindar raises a presumption that the ghatwali was in some way connected with the zamindar, but it must be recognized that the permanent settlement of the land \"would not affect the nature of the tenancy upon which the lands were held, nor can it convert the services which were public into private services under the zamindar\": [vide Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Bakranath Singh(2) ]. There are several reported cases which furnish instances in which the properties of persons who were Government ghatwals were included in the zamindary of other persons, but where no clear evidence is forthcoming as to the true character of the ghatwali, the fact that the tenure is included within a zamindary and is covered by the jama assessed upon it should turn the scale in favour of the party who alleges that it is a tenure which is dependent upon the zamindary. In this case, the presumption arising under the Permanent Settlement is reinforced by the entry in the record of Rights which shows that the tenure in question 1s istemrari mokrari held under the Zamindar.\n\n( 1) 6 Moore's I.A. IOI\n\n( 1) 9 I. A. 104\n\nSukhadev Singh\n\nMaharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nSukhdev Singh\n\nMaharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur.\n\nFaz/ Ali, J.\n\nThe learned counsel for !he appellant relied upon exhibits N and N-1 and certain rent receipts granted by the zamindar to show !he appellant's independent title, but, in our opinion, lhese documents do not help him much. Exhibit N is a notice issued to an ancestor of !he appellant in 1859 by an official whose signature on !he document is not legible. Jt refers to a report of the sub-inspector of thana Chakai stating !hat \"the sautars (bad characters) are in their places of residence and no riots or disturbances are taking place\", and directs the ghatwali to prepare a list of the sautars of his ilaqa and file it before the officer-in-charge of the lhana. Exhibit N-1 is a similar notice, but it is incomplete and bears no indication as to who issued it.\n\nIt recites a report of a police sub-inspector stating !hat owing to failure of crops there were burglaries and !hefts and recommends that the zamindars of the ilaqa should be directed to \"look after !he occurrences and keep eyes over the bad characters and mischief makers sci that occurrences may be stopped\".\n\nThese documents do not necessarily show that !he appellant is a Government .gatwal.\n\nIt Was not unusual in old days to issue notices like those referred to, to the zantjndars of !he ilaqa, as exhibit\n\nN-1 itself shows, and the mere fact that. the person to whom the notice was issued was described as a ghatwal docs not show that he was addressed in the capacity of a Government ghatwal and not as a zamindari ghatwal.\n\nThe next item of evidence upon which the appellant tried to rely consists of certain rent receipts and road cess receipts, but these also do not help him, seeing that they contain, among other things, a statement that the tenure with regard. to which the receipts were granted, appertained to the proprietary zamindary of Gidhaur.\n\nThis brief review of the evidence is sufficient to show that the appellant has not been able b~ clea~ .and conclusive evidence to rebut the presumptton ansmg from the Record of Rights and the record of the Permanent Settlement, and he has failed to establish his claim that the tenure in question is Government ghatwali. It\n\nmay be incidentally mentioned that in the mortgage suit which preceded this litigation, there was no allegation J?y way of defence that the ghatwali was not alienable, and though the point was raised in the execution proceedings it was decided against the appellant by the court of first instance and was abandoned on appeal.\n\nIn these circumstances, we see no reason to disturb tlie concurrent finding of the courts below which have dealt with the piatter with great care.\n\nPassing now to the second point raised in this appeal, we find that tllere are concurrent findings of both the courts below against the defendants on the plea of adverse possession. In arriving at this findings, the courts below have fully discussed the evidence and given cogent reasons in support of their conclusions.\n\nThis coilr~ iit usually reluctant to reinvestigate matters which have beetr fully investigated by the courts below and on which there are cop, rent findings. In the present case, the appellant has failed to show to us any exceptional circwnstinces to induce us to depart from the sound and well established practice; -and in this view the findings of the court below must be accepted.\n\nIt was however contended that in any event the plaintiff's suit is barred under article 142 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as it was incumbCnt on the plaintiff to prove that he had been in possession of the disputed lands, especially those mentioned in schedule II of the plaint, within 12 years of the suit, but he had failed to do so.\n\nIn our opinion, this plea must be negatived.\n\nThe trial judge in his judgment came to a very clear finding in these words :-\n\n\"The story of possession and dispossession as put forth in the plaint must be believed, because, as I have\n\nalready said there is overwhelming evidence in this case to prove the possession of the plaintiff over the surface as well as the subsoil.\"\n\nThe finding of the Subordinate Judge does not appear to have been -challenged before the_ High Court, and though no less than 16 reasons have been givc; n in\n\n2-10 S. C. Indial67\n\nSlfkhd<> Slqh\n\nMaharaj a Bahadur of\n\nGidhaur\n\nFaz/ All J.\n\nSlll6tle• Si gh v.\n\nMa/roraja Bah•dur of\n\nGi4/raur\n\nFazl All J.\n\nthe statement of case filed in this court on behalf of the appellant, it has not been stated that there is no evidence to show that the plaintiff was in possession of the disputed land or the land mentioned in schedule U within 12 years of the suit.\n\nThus both the points urged in this appeal fail. There can be no doubt that the entire tenure has passed to the plaintiff by the sale, but, apart from this fact, it is well-settled that a zamindar is presumed to be the owner of the underground rights in the tenancies created by him in the absence of evidence that he ever parted with them: [See Hari Narayan Singh v.\n\nSriram Chak_ravarthi(1) and Durga Prasad Singh v.\n\nBraja Nath Bose(')].\n\nThe result is that this appeal fails, and it is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. R. Biswas.\n\nAgent for the respondent : R. C. Prasad.\n\nBISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER\n\nSEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH\n\n[Smu liAB.ILAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\n- MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.]\n\nCivil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), 0. 32, r. 7-Suit for partilion to which minor is party-Compromise by guardian-Sanction of Court not obtained before entering into agreement-Validity of decree-Suit by minor to set aside decree-Mere unfairness of divinon, effect of.\n\nWhere a Court has sanctioned an agrccm.cnt or compromise in a suit to which a minor is a party after satisfying itself that it is for the minor's benefit, the decree based on the agreement or compromise cannot be held to be invalid or not binding on the minor merely because the sanction of the Court was not obtained by the next friend or guardian before he began to negotiate for the agrccmC11t or compromise.\n\n(I) 37 I.A. 136\n\n(2) 39 I.A. 133", "total_entities": 87, "entities": [{"text": "SUKHDEV SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Sukhadev Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHARAJA BAHADUR OF GIDHAUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHARAJA BAHADUR OF GIDHAUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SA1Ym FAzL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1579, "end_char": 1612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 10th October, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Das JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1614, "end_char": 1625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 10th October, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Das JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1630, "end_char": 1633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 10th October, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Das JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Amarendra Nath Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1778, "end_char": 1798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarendra Nath Sinha (Samarendra Nath Mukherjee, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Samarendra Nath Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1800, "end_char": 1825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarendra Nath Sinha (Samarendra Nath Mukherjee, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1858, "end_char": 1874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha (R. C. Prasad, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1876, "end_char": 1888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha (R. C. Prasad, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1977, "end_char": 1984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, affirming a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr in a title suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Monghyr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2114, "end_char": 2142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZL Au J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, affirming a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr in a title suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent."}}, {"text": "Monghyr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2363, "end_char": 2370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, the Maharaja of Gidhaur, who has succeeded in both the courts below, is the proprietor of an impartible estate known as Gidhaur raj in the district of Monghyr."}}, {"text": "Chethru Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2699, "end_char": 2710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of a mortgage decree obtained by one Chethru Rai against the ancestors of defendants 1st party, their interest, to which reference has been made, was purchased by the Maharaja of Gidhaur in the name of one of his employees, and the latter took delivery of possession of the property on the 19th April, 1904.", "canonical_name": "Chethru Rai"}}, {"text": "Gidhaur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2841, "end_char": 2848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of a mortgage decree obtained by one Chethru Rai against the ancestors of defendants 1st party, their interest, to which reference has been made, was purchased by the Maharaja of Gidhaur in the name of one of his employees, and the latter took delivery of possession of the property on the 19th April, 1904."}}, {"text": "19th April, 1904", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2952, "end_char": 2968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of a mortgage decree obtained by one Chethru Rai against the ancestors of defendants 1st party, their interest, to which reference has been made, was purchased by the Maharaja of Gidhaur in the name of one of his employees, and the latter took delivery of possession of the property on the 19th April, 1904."}}, {"text": "13th August, 1903", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2978, "end_char": 2995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 13th August, 1903, the ancestors of the defendants 1st party filed an application for setting aside the sale which was dismissed by the executing court and the appeal from the order of the executing court was dismissed by the High Court as well as by the Privy ."}}, {"text": "Jamui", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3463, "end_char": 3468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After certain disputes in the criminal courts, the defendants second party alleging themselves to be the lessees of the defendants first party, obtained a mining license in 1937 from the sub-divisional officer of Jamui, and the District Magistrate apprehending a breach of the peace, started proceedings under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which ended in favour of the defendants first and second parties and against the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3560, "end_char": 3571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3776, "end_char": 3787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jukhdev Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3916, "end_char": 3929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff's case is that, emboldened by the order in the proceedings under section 144, the defendants started working mines in the tolas mentioned in schedule II of the plaint and extracted a considerable\n\n1951)\n\n<Jukhdev Singh\n\nMahara}a\n\nBahadurof\n\nGidhaur\n\nFaz/ A/IT.", "canonical_name": "Sukhadev Singh"}}, {"text": "Durnri Nisf Katauna", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4786, "end_char": 4805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds on which these reliefs were claimed are summarized in paragraph 12 of the plaint in these words :-\n\n\"That the plaintiff submits that he being the 16 annas proprietor of Durnri Nisf Katauna has got an indefeasible right and title to all the underground minerals including mica situate within the said talukas."}}, {"text": "Dumri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5806, "end_char": 5811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the four annas interest in village Dumri was a ghatwali tenure granted to the ancestors of the defendants first party by Muhammadan rulers to guard the hill passes in the taluka, and the grant under which they held was affirmed subsequently by Captain Browne, a representative of the East India Company."}}, {"text": "Browne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6023, "end_char": 6029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the four annas interest in village Dumri was a ghatwali tenure granted to the ancestors of the defendants first party by Muhammadan rulers to guard the hill passes in the taluka, and the grant under which they held was affirmed subsequently by Captain Browne, a representative of the East India Company."}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the four annas interest in village Dumri was a ghatwali tenure granted to the ancestors of the defendants first party by Muhammadan rulers to guard the hill passes in the taluka, and the grant under which they held was affirmed subsequently by Captain Browne, a representative of the East India Company."}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8259, "end_char": 8272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two main points urged on behalf of the appellant in this appeal are :-\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMaharaia Baliadurof\n\nGid/iaur.", "canonical_name": "Sukhadev Singh"}}, {"text": "Maharaia Baliadurof", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8277, "end_char": 8296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two main points urged on behalf of the appellant in this appeal are :-\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMaharaia Baliadurof\n\nGid/iaur."}}, {"text": "articles 142 and 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8778, "end_char": 8798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8806, "end_char": 8820, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9484, "end_char": 9500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before .dealing with the merits of the controversy between the parties, it is necessary to understand what is meant by a \"ghatwal\" and what is a ghatwali tenure, and for the purpose of correctly apprehending what these expressions stand for, it is sufficient in our opinion to quote the following passage from the decision of the Patna High Court in Rani Sonabati Kumari v.\n\nRaja Kirtyanand Singh('), in which the subject of ghatwali tenures has been very elaborately discussed :-\n\n\"Literally a ghatwal means a guard of the passes and the term 'ghatwali tenure' was applied by the Moghuls to lands assigned at a low rent or free of rent for guarding the mountain passes and protecting the villages near the hills from the depredatioqs of lawless hill tribes."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9998, "end_char": 10004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ghatwali tenures are to be found for the most part on the western frontier of Bengal and particularly in the areas known as Kharagdiha, Gidhaur, Birbhum, Kharagpur, Bhagalpur, and the Santai Parganas."}}, {"text": "Kharagdiha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10044, "end_char": 10054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ghatwali tenures are to be found for the most part on the western frontier of Bengal and particularly in the areas known as Kharagdiha, Gidhaur, Birbhum, Kharagpur, Bhagalpur, and the Santai Parganas."}}, {"text": "Birbhum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10065, "end_char": 10072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ghatwali tenures are to be found for the most part on the western frontier of Bengal and particularly in the areas known as Kharagdiha, Gidhaur, Birbhum, Kharagpur, Bhagalpur, and the Santai Parganas."}}, {"text": "Kharagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10074, "end_char": 10083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ghatwali tenures are to be found for the most part on the western frontier of Bengal and particularly in the areas known as Kharagdiha, Gidhaur, Birbhum, Kharagpur, Bhagalpur, and the Santai Parganas."}}, {"text": "Bhagalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10085, "end_char": 10094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These ghatwali tenures are to be found for the most part on the western frontier of Bengal and particularly in the areas known as Kharagdiha, Gidhaur, Birbhum, Kharagpur, Bhagalpur, and the Santai Parganas."}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh\n\nMaharaia\n\nBahadurof\n\nGidhaur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12343, "end_char": 12386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) lSI.A.18\n\nSukhdev Singh\n\nMaharaia\n\nBahadurof\n\nGidhaur."}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12456, "end_char": 12459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali J.\n\nIn order to determine the true character of a ghatwali tenure, it is usually necessary to refer to the grant by which the tenure was created."}}, {"text": "Kunji Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13031, "end_char": 13042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The perquisites of ghatwari in all the rahdaris in mauza aforesaid, have now been granted to Kunji Singh, Jangal Singh, Ragho Singh and Manorath Singh, ghatwars of the said mauza, in accordance with what has been in vogue from old time, with effect from the commencement of 1184 fasli."}}, {"text": "Jangal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13044, "end_char": 13056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The perquisites of ghatwari in all the rahdaris in mauza aforesaid, have now been granted to Kunji Singh, Jangal Singh, Ragho Singh and Manorath Singh, ghatwars of the said mauza, in accordance with what has been in vogue from old time, with effect from the commencement of 1184 fasli."}}, {"text": "Ragho Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13058, "end_char": 13069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The perquisites of ghatwari in all the rahdaris in mauza aforesaid, have now been granted to Kunji Singh, Jangal Singh, Ragho Singh and Manorath Singh, ghatwars of the said mauza, in accordance with what has been in vogue from old time, with effect from the commencement of 1184 fasli."}}, {"text": "Manorath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13074, "end_char": 13088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The perquisites of ghatwari in all the rahdaris in mauza aforesaid, have now been granted to Kunji Singh, Jangal Singh, Ragho Singh and Manorath Singh, ghatwars of the said mauza, in accordance with what has been in vogue from old time, with effect from the commencement of 1184 fasli."}}, {"text": "Rajarnahal Hills", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14100, "end_char": 14116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This sanad was granted by Captain Browne, who was deputed by the East India Company to restore order in a tract known as Jungle Terai, a vast waste and hilly country as its name signifies, lying to the south of Bhagalpur and west of Rajarnahal Hills."}}, {"text": "Dawson Miller", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14255, "end_char": 14268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This document was construed by a Bench of the Patna High Court in Fulhati Kumari v. Maheshwari Prasad('), and as has been pointed out by Dawson Miller C.J. in that case,-\n\n\" It is not a grant of land but an authority to the persons named to collect as formerly ghatwari or\n\nghatwali fees or tolls from those using the roads and passes which the ghatwals undertook to protect.\""}}, {"text": "Captain Browne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14562, "end_char": 14576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "compare this sanad with other ghatwali sanads granted by Captain Browne, some of which are found discussed in reported cases, the contrast becomes very marked."}}, {"text": "Ramgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15466, "end_char": 15473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was pointed out by Dawson Miller C.J., the sanad should be read along with the record of certain proceedings before the Dewani Adalat of Ramgarh, which show that a tenancy comprising 8 annas in mauza Dumri was granted by the zamindar of Gidhaur to 2 persons, one of whom was the ghatwal mentioned in Captain Browne's sanad, with the sanction of Captain Browne."}}, {"text": "Gidhaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15566, "end_char": 15573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was pointed out by Dawson Miller C.J., the sanad should be read along with the record of certain proceedings before the Dewani Adalat of Ramgarh, which show that a tenancy comprising 8 annas in mauza Dumri was granted by the zamindar of Gidhaur to 2 persons, one of whom was the ghatwal mentioned in Captain Browne's sanad, with the sanction of Captain Browne."}}, {"text": "Fulbati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15831, "end_char": 15838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, a document of 1798, which was the proceeding of the original court and which was before the learned judges who decided Fulbati's case(3) has not been produced, but we have before us a judgment dated the 18th March, 1799, of the appellate court in the same proceeding."}}, {"text": "18th March, 1799", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15915, "end_char": 15931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, a document of 1798, which was the proceeding of the original court and which was before the learned judges who decided Fulbati's case(3) has not been produced, but we have before us a judgment dated the 18th March, 1799, of the appellate court in the same proceeding."}}, {"text": "Maharafa Bahadurof Gidhaur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16482, "end_char": 16508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They thereupon prayed that\n\n( 1 ) 51 I.A. 37\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMaharafa Bahadurof Gidhaur.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJA BAHADUR OF GIDHAUR"}}, {"text": "Mahara}a Bahathlrof\n\nGidhaur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16544, "end_char": 16572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ .A.// J,\n\nSukhdev Singh\n\nV; Mahara}a Bahathlrof\n\nGidhaur."}}, {"text": "Khadim Muhammad Ataullah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17275, "end_char": 17299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have also before us a document (exhibit 1) which is a report of one Khadim Muhammad Ataullah, an employee of the East India Company, incorporating certain statements made by the then zamindars of Gidhaur showing that they had been in possession of the zamindary for nearly 700 years and that \"the milkiat zamindary, Chaudhri and Kanungoi of the pargana .......... had all along been in their possession.\""}}, {"text": "Chaudhri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17523, "end_char": 17531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have also before us a document (exhibit 1) which is a report of one Khadim Muhammad Ataullah, an employee of the East India Company, incorporating certain statements made by the then zamindars of Gidhaur showing that they had been in possession of the zamindary for nearly 700 years and that \"the milkiat zamindary, Chaudhri and Kanungoi of the pargana .......... had all along been in their possession.\""}}, {"text": "Kanungoi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17536, "end_char": 17544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have also before us a document (exhibit 1) which is a report of one Khadim Muhammad Ataullah, an employee of the East India Company, incorporating certain statements made by the then zamindars of Gidhaur showing that they had been in possession of the zamindary for nearly 700 years and that \"the milkiat zamindary, Chaudhri and Kanungoi of the pargana .......... had all along been in their possession.\""}}, {"text": "James ' Browne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18153, "end_char": 18167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Fulbati Kumari('), to which reference has been made, there was an extract quoted from the Bengal District Gazetteer, volume XVII, at page 168, which runs as follows :-\n\n\"About 1774 the lawless state of this tract led the British to place it in charge of Captain James ' Browne, who settled the estates with the ghatwals with two exceptions."}}, {"text": "Dumri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18559, "end_char": 18564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Dumri however, the\n\nghatwals finding that in their absence a settlement had been made of their tenure, returned and obtained a sanad settling it with them under the Raja of Gidhaur."}}, {"text": "Tilwa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18828, "end_char": 18833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tilwa and\n\nKewal."}}, {"text": "Kewal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18839, "end_char": 18844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tilwa and\n\nKewal."}}, {"text": "Chetru Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18912, "end_char": 18922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The others qavc passed into the hands of the Maharaja of Gidhaur, Chetru Rai, Akleswar Prasad and others of Rohini.\"", "canonical_name": "Chethru Rai"}}, {"text": "Akleswar Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18924, "end_char": 18939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The others qavc passed into the hands of the Maharaja of Gidhaur, Chetru Rai, Akleswar Prasad and others of Rohini.\""}}, {"text": "Rohini", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18954, "end_char": 18960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The others qavc passed into the hands of the Maharaja of Gidhaur, Chetru Rai, Akleswar Prasad and others of Rohini.\""}}, {"text": "Dumri ghatwali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19544, "end_char": 19558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counsel for the appellant greatly relied on the fact that Dumri ghatwali is ."}}, {"text": "A.I.R.1923 Patna4S3", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20567, "end_char": 20586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) A.I.R.1923 Patna4S3\n\nSukhdev Singh v.\n\nMaharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20695, "end_char": 20703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nAs Collector of Jungle Terrai districts, Captain Browne appears to have had control not only over the ghatwals but also over the zamindars within the area administered by him.", "canonical_name": "Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Guidore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22047, "end_char": 22054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Captain Browne's description of the zamindar of Gidhaur is to the following effect :-\n\n\"The Raja of Guidore was formerly of great extent, but the conquests made from it by the Rajah of Bierboom and Comgar Cawn, and the independency which these wars gave the Gautwalls an opportunity of assuming, have reduced the present Rajahs Gopal Singh, and Durrup Singh, to follow an ebb, that they can scarcely recover sufficient consequence to be of any political weight whatever.\""}}, {"text": "Bierboom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22132, "end_char": 22140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Captain Browne's description of the zamindar of Gidhaur is to the following effect :-\n\n\"The Raja of Guidore was formerly of great extent, but the conquests made from it by the Rajah of Bierboom and Comgar Cawn, and the independency which these wars gave the Gautwalls an opportunity of assuming, have reduced the present Rajahs Gopal Singh, and Durrup Singh, to follow an ebb, that they can scarcely recover sufficient consequence to be of any political weight whatever.\""}}, {"text": "Comgar Cawn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22145, "end_char": 22156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Captain Browne's description of the zamindar of Gidhaur is to the following effect :-\n\n\"The Raja of Guidore was formerly of great extent, but the conquests made from it by the Rajah of Bierboom and Comgar Cawn, and the independency which these wars gave the Gautwalls an opportunity of assuming, have reduced the present Rajahs Gopal Singh, and Durrup Singh, to follow an ebb, that they can scarcely recover sufficient consequence to be of any political weight whatever.\""}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22275, "end_char": 22286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Captain Browne's description of the zamindar of Gidhaur is to the following effect :-\n\n\"The Raja of Guidore was formerly of great extent, but the conquests made from it by the Rajah of Bierboom and Comgar Cawn, and the independency which these wars gave the Gautwalls an opportunity of assuming, have reduced the present Rajahs Gopal Singh, and Durrup Singh, to follow an ebb, that they can scarcely recover sufficient consequence to be of any political weight whatever.\""}}, {"text": "Durrup Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22292, "end_char": 22304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Captain Browne's description of the zamindar of Gidhaur is to the following effect :-\n\n\"The Raja of Guidore was formerly of great extent, but the conquests made from it by the Rajah of Bierboom and Comgar Cawn, and the independency which these wars gave the Gautwalls an opportunity of assuming, have reduced the present Rajahs Gopal Singh, and Durrup Singh, to follow an ebb, that they can scarcely recover sufficient consequence to be of any political weight whatever.\""}}, {"text": "Bengal Government(1)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22960, "end_char": 22980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Raja Lelanund Singh Bahadr, or\n\nv. The Bengal Government(1) where the Government set up a claim to resume the ghatwali in the zamindary of Khuruckpore for the purpose of revenue assessment, the claim was negatived by the Privy Council, and one of the grounds upon which the decision was based was that the ghatwali lands were part of the zamindary and were included in the Permanent Settlement of the zamindar and were covered by the jama assessed on that zamindary."}}, {"text": "Khuruckpore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23060, "end_char": 23071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Raja Lelanund Singh Bahadr, or\n\nv. The Bengal Government(1) where the Government set up a claim to resume the ghatwali in the zamindary of Khuruckpore for the purpose of revenue assessment, the claim was negatived by the Privy Council, and one of the grounds upon which the decision was based was that the ghatwali lands were part of the zamindary and were included in the Permanent Settlement of the zamindar and were covered by the jama assessed on that zamindary."}}, {"text": "Sukhadev Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24671, "end_char": 24685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 1) 6 Moore's I.A. IOI\n\n( 1) 9 I. A. 104\n\nSukhadev Singh\n\nMaharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur.", "canonical_name": "Sukhadev Singh"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24687, "end_char": 24713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 1) 6 Moore's I.A. IOI\n\n( 1) 9 I. A. 104\n\nSukhadev Singh\n\nMaharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJA BAHADUR OF GIDHAUR"}}, {"text": "Faz/ Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24716, "end_char": 24724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali J.\n\nSukhdev Singh\n\nMaharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur."}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24729, "end_char": 24742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali J.\n\nSukhdev Singh\n\nMaharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur.", "canonical_name": "Sukhadev Singh"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24744, "end_char": 24770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali J.\n\nSukhdev Singh\n\nMaharaja Bahadurof Gidhaur.", "canonical_name": "MAHARAJA BAHADUR OF GIDHAUR"}}, {"text": "article 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28201, "end_char": 28212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28220, "end_char": 28234, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29946, "end_char": 29958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. R. Biswas."}}, {"text": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30003, "end_char": 30019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER\n\nSEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH\n\n[Smu liAB.ILAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\nMEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SEOGENI RAI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30033, "end_char": 30044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER\n\nSEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH\n\n[Smu liAB.ILAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\nMEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAGERNATH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30049, "end_char": 30058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER\n\nSEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH\n\n[Smu liAB.ILAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\nMEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30090, "end_char": 30106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER\n\nSEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH\n\n[Smu liAB.ILAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\nMEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30111, "end_char": 30130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER\n\nSEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH\n\n[Smu liAB.ILAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\nMEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30132, "end_char": 30141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER\n\nSEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH\n\n[Smu liAB.ILAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\nMEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30147, "end_char": 30158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER\n\nSEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH\n\n[Smu liAB.ILAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\nMEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30165, "end_char": 30185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_548_560_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "Slll6tle• Si gh v.\n\nMa/roraja Bah•dur of\n\nGi4/raur\n\nFazl All J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nthe statement of case filed in this court on behalf of the appellant, it has not been stated that there is no evidence to show that the plaintiff was in possession of the disputed land or the land mentioned in schedule U within 12 years of the suit.\n\nThus both the points urged in this appeal fail. There can be no doubt that the entire tenure has passed to the plaintiff by the sale, but, apart from this fact, it is well-settled that a zamindar is presumed to be the owner of the underground rights in the tenancies created by him in the absence of evidence that he ever parted with them: [See Hari Narayan Singh v.\n\nSriram Chak_ravarthi(1) and Durga Prasad Singh v.\n\nBraja Nath Bose(')].\n\nThe result is that this appeal fails, and it is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : R. R. Biswas.\n\nAgent for the respondent : R. C. Prasad.\n\nBISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER\n\nSEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH\n\n[Smu liAB.ILAL\n\nKANIA\n\nC. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\n- MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.]\n\nCivil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), 0. 32, r. 7-Suit for partilion to which minor is party-Compromise by guardian-Sanction of Court not obtained before entering into agreement-Validity of decree-Suit by minor to set aside decree-Mere unfairness of divinon, effect of.\n\nWhere a Court has sanctioned an agrccm.cnt or compromise in a suit to which a minor is a party after satisfying itself that it is for the minor's benefit, the decree based on the agreement or compromise cannot be held to be invalid or not binding on the minor merely because the sanction of the Court was not obtained by the next friend or guardian before he began to negotiate for the agrccmC11t or compromise.\n\n(I) 37 I.A. 136\n\n(2) 39 I.A. 133\n\nAwadesh Prasad Missir v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad Missir (I.L.R. 19 Pat. 343) disapproved. ·\n\nThe rule that in the case of partition between. members of a joint Hindu family one of whom is a minor, if the minor, on obtaining majority, is able to show that the division was unfair and . unjust, the court will set it aside, does not apply to decrees in partition suits in which the minor was properly represented before the court. The 'decree is as binding on him as on the adult parties unless the minor can show fraud or negligence on the part of. his friend or guardian ad litem.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\n}UIUSDICTION.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 78 of 1950.\n\nAppeal against the Judgment and decree dated the 1st December, 1942, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Shearer JJ.) in F. A. No. 188 of 1939 arising out of a Decree dated the 23rd December, 1937, of the Subordinate Judge at Saron, Chapra, in Suit No. 48 of 1936.\n\nH. /. Umrigar for the Appellant.\n\nS. P. Sinha (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the Respondent No. 1.\n\n1951. May 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by '\n\nBosE J.-This is a plaintiffs' appeal from a judgment and decree of the. High Court of Judicature at Patna. Their Lordships of the Privy Council had granted special leave and the matter has been transferred to this Court.\n\nThe suit out of which the appeal arises was for a declaration tliat a compromise decree, made in a previous suit for partition, does not bind the plaintiffs.\n\nThe learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants also contends that he asked for partition in the present case.\n\nBut that is a matter of . doubt.\n\nThe facts in brief are as follows :\n\nThe parties are members of a family whose cc>mmon ancestor was one 1Moti Rai. A long genealoiPcal tree was attached to the plaint but it is not necessary to reproduce more than the following : .\n\nNarain and Another\n\n'!/.\n\nSeogeni Rai and lagernath •\n\nMoti Rai\n\nBha, an Rai HuariRai\n\nGhuahull, Rai r- FirangiJ Rai\n\nJ .\n\nSeogcni Rai / Deft. No. I I\n\nCharichan Rai\n\nI Bikram I Rai\n\nsons\n\nsons Defts 3, 4 & s.\n\n~-~-----, Bisundeo Rai Gaurisbankar Ra Plff. No. I PUf. No. 2 Defis II & 12\n\nB1'shundeo\n\nNara; n and Another\n\nSeogen/ Rai and Jagernath\n\nMoti Rai had two sons, Bhanjan Rai and Hazari Rai. The defendants are descended from the former and the plaintiffs from the latter. The contesting defendant is Seogeni Rai, son of Firangi Rai. The plaintiffs did not disclose that Mo ti Rai' s two sons were by different wives, as that was not their case, but that has now been found to be the fact and was not disputed here.\n\nThe plaintiffs' case is that the family was joint at all material times until their father Ghughuli Rai was forced into a partition in the year 1924. They state that this partition does not bind them for a variety of reasons which, so far as they affect the present appeal, will be detailed later.\n\nAccording to the plaintiffs, the circumstances of that partition were as follows.\n\nThe plaintiffs' father Ghughuli Rai and the first plaintiff instituted partition suit No. 51 of 1924 against Firangi Rai and his brothers and their descendants, that is to say, against all the members of Bhanjan Rai's branch who were then in existence. The second plaintiff was not then born and the first plaintiff was a minor.· There were also minors among the defendants. Firangi Rai, who was the karta of the family, through the exercise of undue influence,\n\nand by coercion, forced the plaintiffs' father to compromise.\n\nThe compromise was grossly unfair and unequal but. nevertheless a decree for partition followed.\n\nThis is the decree which the plaintiffs seek to challenge here. •\n\n) •\n\nIt is admitted on both sides that that decree left certain properties undivided.\n\nThe extent of those properties is in dispute but the fact that some properties were left undivided is amitted.\n\nIn the year 1936 the first defendant instituted partition suit No. 29 of 1936 for partition by metes and bounds of that portion of the estate which was not divided in 1924. The plaintiff's case is that the previous partition does not bind them and so the whole of the family estate must be brought into hotch-pot and divided and not merely the properties which were left undivided in 1924; also .that their share in these properties is greater than the share allotted to their father under the compromise decree. The plaintiffs state that so long as the compromise decree in partition suit No. 51 of 1924 stands, such a defence is not open to them in suit No. 29 of 1936. Accordingly, they have brought the present suit.\n\nThe first defendant alone contested and as we are not concerned with any of the others except indirectly, it will be convenient to refer to him thrQ.Ughout as the defendant. He stands by the compromise and denies that the partition effected by it was either unequal or unfair. On the contrary,· he asserts that the plaintiffs got much more than they were entitled to.\n\nHe also denies the allegation about undue influence and coercion.\n\nThe defendant's case about the compromise is this.\n\nHe admits that the family was once joint but says that there was a separation long ago in the lifetime of Moti Rai himself. Moti Rai's two wives could not pull on, so the defendant's grandfather Bhanjan Rai separated from his father Moti Rai and his step-brother Hazari Rai.\n\nThis was some twenty years before the suit. Ever since the two branches have had nothing in common.\n\nThe defendant states that there were further partitions among the defendant's branch and that from time to time members of the defendant's branch, as also those on the plaintiffs' side, have been acquiring\n\nBi&hundeo\n\nNarain a•d Another v.\n\nSeogeni Ral ti•d lagernatft.\n\nBoie/, -\n\nB/$hundeo\n\nNraln and An'1ther v.\n\nSeogenl Rdl and Jageaath\n\nBose I.\n\nproperty for themselves with which the others have no concern.\n\nThus, at the date of the plaintiffs' suit (No. 51 of 1924) a number of properties stood in the separate names of various members of the family and were the separate properties. The plaintiffs thus had no right of suit at all. But in order to avoid a long litigation and to settle this family dispute amicably, the defendant's father Firangi Rai agreed to give the plaintiffs a four annas share in many of the properties acquired by the defendant's branch after th~ first partition in Moti Rai's lifetime to which the plaintiffs' branch had no claim at all. The defendant claims that this is a family arrangement which binds all sides.\n\nThe first Court decided in the plaintiffs' favour and decreed their claim not only for a declaration but also for partition. It is a matter of doubt whether the plaintiffs ever claimed partition, but there is no doubt that the properties which the learned trial judge has directed to be partitioned were not admitted by the defendant to be subject to partition even on the. assumption that the plaintiffs are right in all their other allegations.\n\nThus, the defendant stated that some of the properties were non-existent, others self-acquired and so forth.\n\nBut the learned Judge, without trying any of these issues (the dispute is covered by Issue No. 9) and without any evidence being led on the point, directed that they be partitioned. That, of course, cannot be upheld on any view of the case.\n\nThe defendant appealed to the High Court and succeeded.\n\nThe learned High Court Judges reversed the decree of the trial Court and dismissed . the plaintiff's claim.\n\nThe appeal here lies .in a very narrow compass and can be disposed of quite simply.\n\nIn substance only five points were raised before us. The first concerns Order 32, rule 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure. As minors were parties on both sides in the previous suit, the sanction of the Court was necessary for the compromise. On 17th November, 1924, the trial Court made the following entry in its order sheet :-\n\n\"Selenama filed with petitions on behalf of minor defendant for permission to compromise. Put up on the date fixed for order.\"\n\nOn the following day, viz., 18th November, 1924, we have this-\n\n\"Petition of compromise put up. The proposed guardian of minor plaintiff and defendants have filed petitions for permission to compromise.\n\nPermission granted as the compromise was for the minor's benefit.\"\n\nIt is contended that this is insufficient to show that the learned Judge applied his mind to the matter and satisfied himself that the compromise was for the minor's benefit.\n\nWe do not think the Allahabad decision helps the certificate which the Court is required to record need be made. It is evident that the Judge had the provisions of Order 32, rule 7, in view. He adjourned the case on 17th November, 1924. He realised that he had to give permission and he realised that the compromise had to be for the benefit of the minors. The portion of the order reproduced above shows that he did give . permission and that he was satisfied about the mlnor's benefit. In our opinion, there was not only a technical but also a clear compliance with the law. This objection fails.\n\nThe next point also concerns Order 32, rule 7. The argument here is based on a ruling of the Patna High Court and a full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. It is to this effect.\n\nUnless the next friend or guardian ad /item obtains the sanction of tht; Court before beginning to negotiate with the other side, and certainly before committing himself to any agreement, any subsequent sanction is invalid and the agreement and the decree, if any, following on it is without force.\n\nWe do not think the Allahabad decision helps the appellants. It is reported in Hariam Bibi v. Amna Bibi'(1). The question there was about arbitration.\n\nA suit had been filed in which a minor was involved. The guardian ad !item of the minor agreed to• refer the (I) I.L.R.1937 All.317.\n\n19S1\n\nBiJhundeo\n\nNarai11 and A.nother\n\nv, Seogeni Ral and Jagernath.\n\nbo3e J.\n\nB/Jhundeo\n\nNarain a•d Another\n\nSeogenl Rai a\"d Jagernath.\n\nIJ01e /.\n\ndispute to arbitration. He did not seek the penmss1on of the Court to enter into the agreement but did place the matter before the Court in another way. He said that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration and asked the Court to sanction the reference. The Court did so, an award followed, and a decree was passed in terms of the award.\n\nNow it will be seen that the learned Judge, who sanctioned the reference, never applied his mind to the question whether a reference to arbitration would be for the minor's benefit under the circumstances of the: case.\n\nHis whole attitude was that as the parties had agreed, that was enough.\n\nThis did not comply with the provisions of Order 32, rule 7. The learned Judge did not even certify that the compromise was for the minor's benefit. The Full Bench held that Order 32, rule 7, had not been complied with and that in a case of that kind the permission of the Court to enter into an agreement for reference must precede the reference.\n\nBut they also held that the omission to obtain the necessary sanction would not make the reference and the award and the decree nullities. It mily made them voidable at the minor's option. That, in our opinion, is no authority for the contention urged on behalf of the appellants before us.\n\nThe Patna case reported in Awadhesh Prasad Missir\n\nv. Widow of Tribeni Prasad Missir(') is.more in point.\n\nThere, the parties compromised in the High Court without obtaining the sanction of the Court. They then placed the concluded agreement ( concludeq, that is to say, so far as they were concerned) before the Court, apparently for its approval, and the Court made the following order :-\n\n\"We are satisfied that the terms settled between the parties are for the benefit of the minor defendantsrespondents concerned.\"\n\nThe Court then passed a decree in terms of the compromise.\n\nWhen the minors attained majority, they sued for a declaration that the decree did not bind them\n\n(1) 1.L.R.19 Pat. 343 at 348.\n\non the ground that there was no proper compliance with the provisions of Order 32, rule 7. The learned Judges of the Patna High Court upheld the. contention and decided that unless the guardian ad litem obtained permission to enter into an agreement or compromise before reaching agreement with the other side, any subsequent sanction of the Court to a completed compromise (completed, that is to say, so far as the parties were concerned) was not binding on the minors and the proceedings which follow consequent on that sanction were therefore of no avail. They accordingly granted the minors the declaration they sought.\n\nIn our opinion, Order 32, rule 7, must be read as a ' whole. Sub-rule (2) contemplates a position where the mandatory provisions of sub-rule ( 1) have been ignored.\n\nIn such a case, the resultant agreement or compromise is not to be held a nullity. It is only voidable. Therefore, it is good unless the minor chooses to avoid it.\n\nIt follows that a decree or order based on the agreement is also. good unless the minor ch005.? to challenge it.\n\nThat is the position where there is no sanction of the Court. Reading the two provisions together, the rule merely means this. No next friend or guardian for the suit can enter into an agreement or compromise which will bind the minor unless the court sanctions it. If the Patna decision is meant to convey that before the guardian even begins negotiations for compromise with the other side, he must obtain the sanction of the Court, we are unable to agree with that view.\n\nThe next point was put in the form of a question.\n\nCan a minor have a compromise which effects a partition set aside on the single ground of unfairness to him?\n\nIt was argued that he can, and reliance was placed on Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu(1) and on Mulla's Hindu Law, 10th Edition, page 394, section 308(2) •\n\n• The rule laid down in Mulla's book is expressly stated to be in cases where the partition is not effected by a decree of a competent Court. In our opinion, that is correct. It does not matter whether the decree was by\n\n(1) 30 I.A.139 at ISO.\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogent Ra} and Jogernath.\n\nBoJe J,\n\nBi, hundeo Narain and Another\n\nSeogeni Roi and Jagernath\n\nBo\" J.\n\nconsent or otherwise, for a decree, unless and until it is set .aside or avoided in one or other of the ways in which alone a decree may be attacked, holds its force and binds all concerned.\n\nIt is well established that a minor can sue for partition and obtain a decree if his next friend can show that that is for the minor's benefit. It is also beyond dispute that an adult coparcener can enforce a partition by suit even when there are minors. Even without a suit, there can be a partitin between members of a joint family when one of the members is a minor.\n\nIn the case of such lastly mentioned partitions, where a minor can never be able to consent to the same in law, if a minor on attaining majority is able to show that the division was unfair and unjust, the Court will certainly set it aside. The rule, however, does not apply to decrees if the minor is properly represented before the Court and the decree is as binding on him as on the adult parties, unless the minor can show fraud or negligence on the part of his next friend or guardian ad /item. This contention also therefore fails.\n\nWe turn next to the questions of undue influence and coercion. Now it is to be observed that these have not been separately pleaded. It is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they arc separate and separable categories in law and must be separately pleaded.\n\nIt is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particular as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an avcrment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice however strong the language in which they arc couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. See Order 6, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe allegations in the plaint regarding this part of the case are as follows. In paragraph 13 the plaintiffs say-'-\n\n\"That the said Firangi Rai being infuriated by the filing of the said suit, put such a pressure upon the father of the plaintiffs that the father of the plaintiffs under fear of his threatend death filed a compromise in the said suit before any written statement was filed by Firangi Rai and other defendants.\"\n\nIn paragraph 15 they say-\n\n''That the said compromise was nothing but a dictated mandate of Firangi Rai which the father of plaintiffs, out of sheer fear of Firangi Rai submitted against his own free will and signed under compulsion and coercion and undue influence of the said Firangi Rai\".\n\nThen, in paragraph 17 and 18 the plaintiffs state-\n\n\"17~ That plaintiffs' father being a man of weak intellect and finding no help and succour from the people of residential village or neighbourhood and being also unaware of the details of properties of the family could not but submit meekly and quitely to the dictates of Firangi Rai who taking advantage of his fearful supremacy wanted to have everything according to his own sweet wish.\n\n\"18. That even after the compromise plaintiffs' father could not get any income of the family properties and Firangi Rai remained the sole master of the family appropriating every pice to himself.\"\n\nWe will deal with the case of coercion first It will be seen that the plaintiffs case regarding that is grounded on the single allegation that their father was threatened with death.\n\nWhen all the verbiage is cleared away, that remains as the only foundation.\n\nThe rest, and in particular the facts set out in paragraphs 8 to 12 about the ferocious appearance of Firangi Rai and his allegedly high-handed and criminal activities and his character, are only there\n\nNarain and Anothe\n\nSeogeni Rai and Jogemath.\n\nBose J.\n\nB/lhundeo\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogeni Rai .and Jagernath•\n\nBose J.\n\nto lend colour to the genuineness of the belief said to have been engendered in Ghughuli Rai's mind that the threat of death administered to him was real and imminent.\n\nBut as regards the threat itself, there is not a single particular. We do not know the nature of the threat. We do not know the date, time and place in which it was administered. We do not know the circumstances. We do not even know who did the threatening. Now, when a court is asked to find that a person was threatened with death, it is necessary to know these particulars, otherwise it is impossible to each a proper conclusion.\n\nIt was argued that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to give particulars and if the other side is not satisfied, there are provisions in the Code which entitle him to ask for them. That is a grave misapprehension.\n\nBut all that apart, what is the evidence here ?\n\nThere are only three witnesses who need be considered as the others had no personal knowledge. They are, No. 6 Sheokumar Dube, No. 9 Bodhu Rai and No. IO Sheonandan Prasad.\n\nOf these, only Bodhu Rai suggests that Firangi ever made any threat. He is not supported by the other two and we cannot believe him.\n\nAll that the others say is that Ghughuli Rai said his life would be in danger without however explaining how or why.\n\nThat is insufficient to sustain pleas of undue influence and coercion, particularly when we have the following facts which negative these pleas:\n\n(1) Two pleaders were engaged by Ghughuli Rai; (2) the first draft was torn up by one of the pleaders as it was unfavourable to his client and the draft e111bodying the compromise ultimately accepted was substituted; (3) Ghughuli Rai refused to sign this second draft until it was read out to him; ( 4) this draft was read over by the pleader who had disapproved of the first and was signed by him after Ghughuli Rai had signed; (5) Ghughuli Rai relied on the compromise on several occasions and filed suits to enforce its terms ; ( 6) he twice sued Firangi Rai himself; (7) though he lived eleven years after the compromise and filed several suits to enforce it. he never suggested that it\n\nhad been brought about by coercion or undue influence;\n\n(~) he took no steps to set it aside or question it even after Firangi Rai's death which was two and a half\n\nyears before this suit; and (9) he did not join as a plaintiff in this suit though he was the real person who knew the truth. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate when the undue influence ceased and we find it impossible to believe that it could have lasted eleven years and even two and a half years after Firangi Rai's death.\n\nThere is also another point. The basis of the claim is the inequality of the partition. Under the compromise, the first plaintiff and his father got those properties which stood in their names and a four annas share in certain other properties. No evidence has been adduced to show the values of these various properties in\n\n1924. For all we know, their value and the four annas share in the other properties may have been equal to eight annas of the entire joint properties. We agree with the learned High Court Judges that coercion is not proved.\n\nThe case of widue influence suffers the same fate.\n\nIt was not separately pleaded and the evidence is the same.\n\nThe last contention is that even if the plaintiffs fail in all else, their case cannot be wholly dismissed because, admittedly, certain properties are still undivided and the plaintiffs are entitled to have them partitioned and to be given separate possession of their share.\n\nAs we remarked at the outset, it is a matter of some doubt whether the plaintiffs sought partition in this suit or whether they merely wanted a declaration here that the compromise decree in the suit of 1924 does not bind them and consequently is no bar to their demanding partition of the whole estate in the first defendant's suit No. 29 of 1936.\n\nwe need not consider whether the present suit is for partition and separate possession or not, because there is pending a previously instituted suit between\n\nl9S1\n\nBishundeo\n\nNarain and Another\n\nSeogeni Rai and lagernath\n\n.Bose J.\n\nBi•hun4eo\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogenl Bal and Jagernath.\n\nBose.J.\n\nMa14\n\nthe same parties for the same relief. It will be more convenient and proper to have these matters decided there. Accordingly, we dismiss the plaintills' suit with costs throughout, but make it plain that in doing so we do not adjudicate upon their right to seek partition of such properties as they contend are omitted to be partitioned under the compromise decree in the pending suit.\n\nAppeal di1mi11ed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : P. K. Chatteriee.\n\nKARNANI INDUSTRIAL BANK, LIMITED\n\n\"· THE PROVINCE OF BENGAL AND OlHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, MuKHE!lJEA and\n\nCliANDIUSEKHAl\\A AlYAR JI.)\n\nTransfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 106, 116-Lease for a term-Acceptance of rent for further period before expiry of term-New tenancy--Necessity of notice ta quit-Lessee's property becoming property of lessor by failure to remove within time-In junction against removal-Whether can be granted.\n\nThe context in which the provision for acceptance of rent finds a place in s. 116 of the Transfer of Property &t shows that what is contemplated is that the payment of rent should be made at such time and in such manner as to. be equivalent to the land lord assenting to the lessee continuing in possession.\n\nWhere payment is made at a time when there was no question of the lessor assenting to the lessee's continuing in possession and neither party treated the payment as importing such assent the case does not fall within s. 116.\n\nA lease deed was executed on the 17th February, 1928, in respect of a land for a period of ten years from 24th February, 1928 the annual rent of Rs. 6,000 being payable in advance every year.\n\nIn April, 1937, a cheque for Rs. 6,000, being the rent from 1st April, 1937, to 31st March, 1938, was sent by the lessee and accepted by the lessor : Held, that as the rent was paid before expiry of the lease and neither party treated the payment of rent as importing assent on the part of the lessor to allow the lessee", "total_entities": 80, "entities": [{"text": "Braja Nath Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 765, "end_char": 780, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 903, "end_char": 915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : R. R. Biswas."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 945, "end_char": 957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 960, "end_char": 988, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 990, "end_char": 1015, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SEOGENI RAI AND JAGERNATH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1033, "end_char": 1038, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1047, "end_char": 1063, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1068, "end_char": 1087, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1089, "end_char": 1098, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1122, "end_char": 1142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2596, "end_char": 2607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and decree dated the 1st December, 1942, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Shearer JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Shearer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2612, "end_char": 2619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and decree dated the 1st December, 1942, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Shearer JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2779, "end_char": 2786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. /. Umrigar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2807, "end_char": 2818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2820, "end_char": 2835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3005, "end_char": 3038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court of Judicature at Patna."}}, {"text": "Jagernath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4032, "end_char": 4041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Defis II & 12\n\nB1'shundeo\n\nNara; n and Another\n\nSeogen/ Rai and Jagernath\n\nMoti Rai had two sons, Bhanjan Rai and Hazari Rai.", "canonical_name": "Jagernath•"}}, {"text": "Moti Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4043, "end_char": 4051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Defis II & 12\n\nB1'shundeo\n\nNara; n and Another\n\nSeogen/ Rai and Jagernath\n\nMoti Rai had two sons, Bhanjan Rai and Hazari Rai.", "canonical_name": "Mo ti Rai"}}, {"text": "Bhanjan Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4066, "end_char": 4077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Defis II & 12\n\nB1'shundeo\n\nNara; n and Another\n\nSeogen/ Rai and Jagernath\n\nMoti Rai had two sons, Bhanjan Rai and Hazari Rai."}}, {"text": "Hazari Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4082, "end_char": 4092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Defis II & 12\n\nB1'shundeo\n\nNara; n and Another\n\nSeogen/ Rai and Jagernath\n\nMoti Rai had two sons, Bhanjan Rai and Hazari Rai."}}, {"text": "Seogeni Rai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4203, "end_char": 4214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contesting defendant is Seogeni Rai, son of Firangi Rai.", "canonical_name": "Seogeni Rai"}}, {"text": "Firangi Rai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4223, "end_char": 4234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contesting defendant is Seogeni Rai, son of Firangi Rai.", "canonical_name": "Firangi Rai"}}, {"text": "Mo ti Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4273, "end_char": 4282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs did not disclose that Mo ti Rai' s two sons were by different wives, as that was not their case, but that has now been found to be the fact and was not disputed here.", "canonical_name": "Mo ti Rai"}}, {"text": "Ghughuli Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4510, "end_char": 4522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs' case is that the family was joint at all material times until their father Ghughuli Rai was forced into a partition in the year 1924."}}, {"text": "Firangi Rai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5176, "end_char": 5187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Firangi Rai, who was the karta of the family, through the exercise of undue influence,\n\nand by coercion, forced the plaintiffs' father to compromise.", "canonical_name": "Firangi Rai"}}, {"text": "thrQ.Ughout", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6557, "end_char": 6568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first defendant alone contested and as we are not concerned with any of the others except indirectly, it will be convenient to refer to him thrQ.Ughout as the defendant."}}, {"text": "Order 32, rule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9451, "end_char": 9467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9472, "end_char": 9499, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "17th November, 1924", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9623, "end_char": 9642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 17th November, 1924, the trial Court made the following entry in its order sheet :-\n\n\"Selenama filed with petitions on behalf of minor defendant for permission to compromise."}}, {"text": "18th November, 1924", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18th November, 1924, we have this-\n\n\"Petition of compromise put up."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10304, "end_char": 10313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not think the Allahabad decision helps the certificate which the Court is required to record need be made."}}, {"text": "Order 32, rule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10448, "end_char": 10464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 32, rule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10913, "end_char": 10929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10977, "end_char": 10993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument here is based on a ruling of the Patna High Court and a full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11027, "end_char": 11047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument here is based on a ruling of the Patna High Court and a full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "BiJhundeo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11664, "end_char": 11673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19S1\n\nBiJhundeo\n\nNarai11 and A.nother\n\nv, Seogeni Ral and Jagernath.", "canonical_name": "BiJhundeo"}}, {"text": "Seogeni Ral", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11700, "end_char": 11711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19S1\n\nBiJhundeo\n\nNarai11 and A.nother\n\nv, Seogeni Ral and Jagernath.", "canonical_name": "Seogeni Rai"}}, {"text": "Jagernath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11716, "end_char": 11725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19S1\n\nBiJhundeo\n\nNarai11 and A.nother\n\nv, Seogeni Ral and Jagernath.", "canonical_name": "Jagernath•"}}, {"text": "Seogenl Rai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11768, "end_char": 11779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bo3e J.\n\nB/Jhundeo\n\nNarain a•d Another\n\nSeogenl Rai a\"d Jagernath.", "canonical_name": "Seogeni Rai"}}, {"text": "Order 32, rule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12499, "end_char": 12515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 32, rule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12630, "end_char": 12646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13101, "end_char": 13106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Patna case reported in Awadhesh Prasad Missir\n\nv. Widow of Tribeni Prasad Missir(') is.more in point."}}, {"text": "Order 32, rule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13880, "end_char": 13896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 32, rule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14448, "end_char": 14464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15610, "end_char": 15615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued that he can, and reliance was placed on Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu(1) and on Mulla's Hindu Law, 10th Edition, page 394, section 308(2) •\n\n• The rule laid down in Mulla's book is expressly stated to be in cases where the partition is not effected by a decree of a competent Court."}}, {"text": "section 308(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15653, "end_char": 15667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15916, "end_char": 15922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narain and Another v.\n\nSeogent Ra} and Jogernath.", "canonical_name": "Narain"}}, {"text": "Jogernath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15955, "end_char": 15964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narain and Another v.\n\nSeogent Ra} and Jogernath.", "canonical_name": "Jagernath•"}}, {"text": "BoJe", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15967, "end_char": 15971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BoJe J,\n\nBi, hundeo Narain and Another\n\nSeogeni Roi and Jagernath\n\nBo\" J.\n\nconsent or otherwise, for a decree, unless and until it is set .aside or avoided in one or other of the ways in which alone a decree may be attacked, holds its force and binds all concerned."}}, {"text": "Seogeni Roi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16007, "end_char": 16018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BoJe J,\n\nBi, hundeo Narain and Another\n\nSeogeni Roi and Jagernath\n\nBo\" J.\n\nconsent or otherwise, for a decree, unless and until it is set .aside or avoided in one or other of the ways in which alone a decree may be attacked, holds its force and binds all concerned.", "canonical_name": "Seogeni Rai"}}, {"text": "Jagernath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16023, "end_char": 16032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BoJe J,\n\nBi, hundeo Narain and Another\n\nSeogeni Roi and Jagernath\n\nBo\" J.\n\nconsent or otherwise, for a decree, unless and until it is set .aside or avoided in one or other of the ways in which alone a decree may be attacked, holds its force and binds all concerned.", "canonical_name": "Jagernath•"}}, {"text": "Order 6, rule 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18018, "end_char": 18033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18035, "end_char": 18055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19885, "end_char": 19891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rest, and in particular the facts set out in paragraphs 8 to 12 about the ferocious appearance of Firangi Rai and his allegedly high-handed and criminal activities and his character, are only there\n\nNarain and Anothe\n\nSeogeni Rai and Jogemath.", "canonical_name": "Narain"}}, {"text": "Anothe\n\nSeogeni Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19896, "end_char": 19915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rest, and in particular the facts set out in paragraphs 8 to 12 about the ferocious appearance of Firangi Rai and his allegedly high-handed and criminal activities and his character, are only there\n\nNarain and Anothe\n\nSeogeni Rai and Jogemath."}}, {"text": "Jogemath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19920, "end_char": 19928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rest, and in particular the facts set out in paragraphs 8 to 12 about the ferocious appearance of Firangi Rai and his allegedly high-handed and criminal activities and his character, are only there\n\nNarain and Anothe\n\nSeogeni Rai and Jogemath.", "canonical_name": "Jagernath•"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19931, "end_char": 19935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nB/lhundeo\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogeni Rai .and Jagernath•\n\nBose J.\n\nto lend colour to the genuineness of the belief said to have been engendered in Ghughuli Rai's mind that the threat of death administered to him was real and imminent.", "canonical_name": ".Bose"}}, {"text": "Jagernath•", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19991, "end_char": 20001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nB/lhundeo\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogeni Rai .and Jagernath•\n\nBose J.\n\nto lend colour to the genuineness of the belief said to have been engendered in Ghughuli Rai's mind that the threat of death administered to him was real and imminent.", "canonical_name": "Jagernath•"}}, {"text": "Sheokumar Dube", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20992, "end_char": 21006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 Sheokumar Dube, No."}}, {"text": "Bodhu Rai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21014, "end_char": 21023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 Bodhu Rai and No."}}, {"text": "Sheonandan Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21035, "end_char": 21052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IO Sheonandan Prasad."}}, {"text": "Bodhu Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21070, "end_char": 21079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, only Bodhu Rai suggests that Firangi ever made any threat."}}, {"text": "Firangi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21094, "end_char": 21101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, only Bodhu Rai suggests that Firangi ever made any threat.", "canonical_name": "Firangi Rai"}}, {"text": "Bishundeo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24101, "end_char": 24110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we need not consider whether the present suit is for partition and separate possession or not, because there is pending a previously instituted suit between\n\nl9S1\n\nBishundeo\n\nNarain and Another\n\nSeogeni Rai and lagernath\n\n.Bose J.\n\nBi•hun4eo\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogenl Bal and Jagernath.", "canonical_name": "BiJhundeo"}}, {"text": "lagernath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24148, "end_char": 24157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we need not consider whether the present suit is for partition and separate possession or not, because there is pending a previously instituted suit between\n\nl9S1\n\nBishundeo\n\nNarain and Another\n\nSeogeni Rai and lagernath\n\n.Bose J.\n\nBi•hun4eo\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogenl Bal and Jagernath.", "canonical_name": "Jagernath•"}}, {"text": ".Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24159, "end_char": 24164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we need not consider whether the present suit is for partition and separate possession or not, because there is pending a previously instituted suit between\n\nl9S1\n\nBishundeo\n\nNarain and Another\n\nSeogeni Rai and lagernath\n\n.Bose J.\n\nBi•hun4eo\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogenl Bal and Jagernath.", "canonical_name": ".Bose"}}, {"text": "Jagernath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24219, "end_char": 24228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we need not consider whether the present suit is for partition and separate possession or not, because there is pending a previously instituted suit between\n\nl9S1\n\nBishundeo\n\nNarain and Another\n\nSeogeni Rai and lagernath\n\n.Bose J.\n\nBi•hun4eo\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogenl Bal and Jagernath.", "canonical_name": "Jagernath•"}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatteriee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24723, "end_char": 24739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : P. K. Chatteriee."}}, {"text": "KARNANI INDUSTRIAL BANK", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24742, "end_char": 24765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KARNANI INDUSTRIAL BANK, LIMITED\n\n\"· THE PROVINCE OF BENGAL AND OlHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, MuKHE!lJEA and\n\nCliANDIUSEKHAl\\A AlYAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "PROVINCE OF BENGAL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24783, "end_char": 24801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KARNANI INDUSTRIAL BANK, LIMITED\n\n\"· THE PROVINCE OF BENGAL AND OlHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, MuKHE!lJEA and\n\nCliANDIUSEKHAl\\A AlYAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAzL Au", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24815, "end_char": 24829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KARNANI INDUSTRIAL BANK, LIMITED\n\n\"· THE PROVINCE OF BENGAL AND OlHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, MuKHE!lJEA and\n\nCliANDIUSEKHAl\\A AlYAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "CliANDIUSEKHAl\\A AlYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24847, "end_char": 24869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KARNANI INDUSTRIAL BANK, LIMITED\n\n\"· THE PROVINCE OF BENGAL AND OlHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, MuKHE!lJEA and\n\nCliANDIUSEKHAl\\A AlYAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24876, "end_char": 24900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 106, 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24915, "end_char": 24927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25253, "end_char": 25259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25704, "end_char": 25710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "17th February, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25746, "end_char": 25765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A lease deed was executed on the 17th February, 1928, in respect of a land for a period of ten years from 24th February, 1928 the annual rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "24th February, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25819, "end_char": 25838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A lease deed was executed on the 17th February, 1928, in respect of a land for a period of ten years from 24th February, 1928 the annual rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25966, "end_char": 25981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,000, being the rent from 1st April, 1937, to 31st March, 1938, was sent by the lessee and accepted by the lessor : Held, that as the rent was paid before expiry of the lease and neither party treated the payment of rent as importing assent on the part of the lessor to allow the lessee"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25986, "end_char": 26002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,000, being the rent from 1st April, 1937, to 31st March, 1938, was sent by the lessee and accepted by the lessor : Held, that as the rent was paid before expiry of the lease and neither party treated the payment of rent as importing assent on the part of the lessor to allow the lessee"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_560_572_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "Bi•hun4eo\n\nNarain and Another v.\n\nSeogenl Bal and Jagernath.\n\nBose.J.\n\nMa14\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1951]\n\nthe same parties for the same relief. It will be more convenient and proper to have these matters decided there. Accordingly, we dismiss the plaintills' suit with costs throughout, but make it plain that in doing so we do not adjudicate upon their right to seek partition of such properties as they contend are omitted to be partitioned under the compromise decree in the pending suit.\n\nAppeal di1mi11ed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : R. C. Prasad.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : P. K. Chatteriee.\n\nKARNANI INDUSTRIAL BANK, LIMITED\n\n\"· THE PROVINCE OF BENGAL AND OlHERS\n\n[SAIYID FAzL Au, MuKHE!lJEA and\n\nCliANDIUSEKHAl\\A AlYAR JI.)\n\nTransfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 106, 116-Lease for a term-Acceptance of rent for further period before expiry of term-New tenancy--Necessity of notice ta quit-Lessee's property becoming property of lessor by failure to remove within time-In junction against removal-Whether can be granted.\n\nThe context in which the provision for acceptance of rent finds a place in s. 116 of the Transfer of Property &t shows that what is contemplated is that the payment of rent should be made at such time and in such manner as to. be equivalent to the land lord assenting to the lessee continuing in possession.\n\nWhere payment is made at a time when there was no question of the lessor assenting to the lessee's continuing in possession and neither party treated the payment as importing such assent the case does not fall within s. 116.\n\nA lease deed was executed on the 17th February, 1928, in respect of a land for a period of ten years from 24th February, 1928 the annual rent of Rs. 6,000 being payable in advance every year.\n\nIn April, 1937, a cheque for Rs. 6,000, being the rent from 1st April, 1937, to 31st March, 1938, was sent by the lessee and accepted by the lessor : Held, that as the rent was paid before expiry of the lease and neither party treated the payment of rent as importing assent on the part of the lessor to allow the lessee\n\nto continue in possession as a lessee after the .period of the lease, no new tenancy was created under s. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. The utmost that could be said was that by implied consent the period of the lease was extended up to the 31st March, 1938, and even then no notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary for terminating the lease.\n\nK. B. Capadia v. Bai Jerbai Warden and Another [1949) F.C.R. 262 distinguished.\n\nWhere in accordance with thC terms of a lease bricks and other materials manufactured by the lessee on the leased premises had become the property of the lessor as they had not been removed by the lessee within the period fixed by the lease : Held that the lessor was entitled to ask for an injunction restraining the lessee from removing the materials even though he was not in possession of the leased premises.\n\nRathnasabhapathi Pillai and Others v. Ramaswami Aiyar (I.L.R. 33 Mad. 452). Bhramar Lal Banduri & Others v. Nanda/al Chowdhuri (24 I. C. 199) and Valia Thamburatti v. Parvati and Others (I. L. R. 13 Mad. 455) distinguished.\n\nCML APPELLATE JmusDICTION.\n\nCivil Appeal No- 58 of 1950.\n\nAppeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 13th February, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Mitter and Sharpe JJ.) in Appeal No. 117 of 1942 arising out of Decree elated the 24th November, 1941, in Suit No. 85 of 1938.\n\nN. C. Chatteriee and Harish Chandra (K. C. Chopra and G. C. Mathur, with them) for the appellant.\n\nChandra Sekhar Sen ( C. N. Laik, with him) for respondent No. 1.\n\n1951, May 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nF AZL Au J.\n\nThe principal question for determina-\n\nKarnani Industrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others.\n\ntion in this appeal is whether a certain lease had validly Fazl Ali J. terminated by efflux of time or whether there was \"holding over\" by the lessee of the leasehold property as contemplated in section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. The circumstances under which this question and several subsidiary questions to which reference will be made later have Erisen may be briefly stated as follows:\n\nKarnani Indrutrlal Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nThe Province of Bengal, (hereinafter referred to as the respondent No. 1 or plaintiff) is admittedly the owner of an area of 1125 bighas and odd of land in village Akra. On the 17th February, 1928, the respondent No. 1 executed a lease (exhibit 3) in respect of the said land for 10 years for manufacture of bricks in favour of the appellant, at a rental of Rs. 6,000 a year.\n\nThe lease was to commence from the 24th February, 1928, and a year's rent was payable in advance.\n\nBy the terms of the said lease, the lessee was prohibited from assigning or subletting the premises or any part thereof without the consent of the lessor except to a limited . company and the lease also contained a general provision that the lessee would at the expiration of the lease restore to the lessor the demised premises in as good condition as it was at the date of the lease, reasonable wear and tear excepted.\n\nTwo further clauses in the lease, which are material for the decision of this appeal, may be reproduced verbatim:-\n\nClause 11 of Part I of the Schedule\n\n\"The Secretary of State reserves the right to terminate the lease at any time subject to six months' notice in the event of the lessee's failing to observe and duly perform the conditions hereinbefore and after mentioned and it is hereby agreed that the lessee shall before the expiration or prior termination of the lease hereby granted remove his boilers engines trucks kilns railway and tram l.Tnes bricks tools and plant and all other materials whatsoever and yield up the said demised premises unto the Secretary of State and that those bricks tools and plant and other materials that shall not be removed before such expiration or prior termination shall become the property of the Secretary of State.\"\n\nClause 1 of Part Ill of the Schedule\n\n''The lessee shall be at liberty to keep on the said premises hereby demised for three months after the expiration or prior termination of the term of this\n\nlease any bricks boilers engines trucks kilns railway and tram lines and all other materials whatsoever as may have been manufactured by him in the premises in accordance with the conditions of these presents but any bricks and other-materials left in - contravention to this condition shall become the absolute property of the Secretary of State without payment.\n\nIt may be stated here that at the time of the execution of the lease, the lessee had purchased from the lessor for Rs. 50,000 \"all the boilers, engines, trucks kilns, railway and tramway lines and all other movable property, plant and machinery on the demised . \" premises.\n\nThe case of the respondent No. 1, who is the plaintiff in the present litigation, is that the appellant (defendant No. 1) had, in contravention of the terms of the lease, sublet the brickfield to defendants-respondents 2 to 18. without the consent of respondent No. 1, and they had caused serious damage to the brickfield in general and failed to maintain the embankments, sluices, etc. in proper repair resulting in a total loss of Rs. 16,840. It was further alleged that the defendants had refused to deliver possession though the lease had terminated, and they had not removed the bricks, pugmills and other materials within 3 months from the termination of the lease.\n\nOn these allegations, the respondent No.. 1 prayed for the fol\\o:wing reliefs :--\n\n(a) a decree for ejectment and khas possession over the brickfield ;\n\n(b) damages amounting to Rs. 4,000 for the pe_riod betWeen the termination of the lease and institution of the suit and mesne profits for the subsequent perio1l;\n\n( c) a decree for Rs. 16,840 for damages caused to. the field ; and\n\n( d) a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from removing or otherwise disposing of the bricks, pugmills, etc. which were claimed to have become the property of the plaintiff. 3-10 S- C. fndi:y'67\n\nKamani Industrial Bank\n\nLimited v.\n\nThe PrtJl'i11ce of\n\nt:t1Bengal and OtherJo\n\nFazal Ali J.\n\nKarnani lndustrit1! Bank\n\nLimited\n\nT!tc Prorincc of\n\n&ngal and 01/zt'rs.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nThe suit was contested by the appellants, and the other defendants, and their defence was that the appellants had held over with the implied consent of respondent No. 1, and hence the lease had not validly terminated, that no damage or injury had been caused to the land, that the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to forfeit the properties of the appellants lying in the brickfield inasmuch as the term in the lease to that effect was by way of penalty and as such unenforceable, and that the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to the relief of injunction.\n\nThe trial Judge by his judgment dated the 24th November, 1941, held that there was no holding over with the assent of the plaintiff and both parties were under a mistaken belief that the lease had expired on the 23rd February, 1938.\n\nHe however held that the evidence did not show that there was any damage or injury caused to the property. On these findings, the suit was decreed in part, and the respendent No. 1 was directed to be put in possession of the brickfield and was also granted a decree for Rs. 4,000 as mesne profits up to the date on which the respondent No. 1 was put in possession. The prayer for damages for injury allegd to have been caused to the field and the prayer for injunction were however disallowed.\n\nThe trial Judge allowed the appellants 3 months' time \"to remove their belongings from the Akra brickfield including kilns, pugmills, bricks, coals and any other brick-making material that may be lying there\" after this period these properties, if any, left in the field, were to become the absolute properties of the plaintiff.\n\nThe appellants thereafter preferred an appeal to the High Court at Calcutta, and the respondent No. 1 also preferred a cross-objection claiming that the prayer for injunction should have been allowed -and the claim for damages should have been decreed in full.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court who heard the appeal, by their judgment dated the 13th February, 1948, dismissed the appeallants' appeal and allowed the cross-objection of the respondent No. 1 in part.\n\nThey held that on the facts established in the case there was no holding over, and that the clause in the lease stating that if the\n\n.appellants did not remove the bricks etc. from the field within 3 months after termination of the lease they would become the property of respondent No. 1, was not a clause by way of penalty and should be given effect to.\n\nThey further held that the claim of respondent No. 1 for damages for injury caused to the demised premises was not established. The present appeal is directed against the judgement of the High Court.\n\nThe admitted facts of the case are briefly these.\n\nThe appellants duly paid Rs. 6,000 as rent to respondent No. 1 in February, 1928. In February, 1929, a sum of Rs. 6,714 and odd was paid by the appellants as rent for the period 17th February, 1929, to the 31st March,\n\n1930, and thereafter they continued to pay Rs. 6,000 as rent for the yearly period, 1st April to 31st March of the succeeding year, and the last payment was made in April, 1937 by means of a cheque sent with a covering letter, the material portion of which runs as follows :- ·\n\n\"We beg to enclose herewith a cheque for Rs. 6,000 in payment of rent of Akra brickfield for the year 1937-38 ending 31st March, 1938, and shall thank. you to please favour us with your formal receipt for the above.\"\n\nThe cheque was duly cashed and the amount was entered in the cash book of the plaintiff in the following terms:-\n\n\"5-4-37 (date of receipt).\n\nReceived without prejudice from Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. on account of yearly rent for Akra brickfield for the year ending 31st March, 1938.\"\n\n. On the 27th August, 1937, the appellants applied to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Public\n\nWorks Department, for renewing the lease for a further period of 10 years, but no reply was received to that letter.\n\nAfter addressing several other letters, the appellants received a letter dated the 23rd February. 1938, with which was enclosed a copy of an extract from a letter addressed by the Executive Engineer.\n\nKatt1ani Industrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Provinetof\n\nBengal and Others\n\nFazl All J.\n\nKarnanl lndultrial Bank Limited ....\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others.\n\nFaz/ Ali J. ·\n\nSuburban Division to the Assistant Engineer, No. III Sub-division, which was a under:-\n\n\"He is requested to make arrangements with Messrs. Karnani Industrial Bank Limited for vacant possesiion of the Akra bricklield on the 24th instant as the lease with the Bank will expire on the 23rd instant according to the terms of the agreement.\"\n\nUltimately, on the 17th March, 1938, the appellants received the following communkation from the Executive Engineer, Suburban Division :-\n\n\"I would inform you that it is not the intention of Government in this Department to lease out the bricklields and arrangement is being accordingly made to make over the lands to the Government in the Revenue Department for disposal.\"\n\nIn a subsequent letter dated the 14th September, !'938, the Executive Engineer wrote to the appellants as follows :-\n\n\"I am instructed to state that Government have decided that you cannot be allowed to continue in occupation of the premises any further ......... However, as a matter of grace Government will allow you time till the 30th day of September next, to dismantle the kilns and to remove all your bricks, boiler etc. from the site, on which date Government will take over possession of the property from you.\"\n\nThe correspondence to which reference has been made does not show that at any point of time the plaintiff had assented to the appellant's continuance of possession.\n\nOn the other hand, some of the letters written by the appellants show that, notwithstanding their having paid rent up to . the 31st March, 1938, they had proceeded all along on the footing that the lease was to expire in February, 1938. For instance, in the appellants' letter of the 23rd August, 1937, it is stated : \"we are desirous of renewing the lease of the bricklield for a further period of 10 years from the date of the expiration of the period of the !ease dated\n\n17-2-1928.\" Again, in the letter dated the 23rd October, 1937, reference is made to the appellants'\n\napplication for renewal of the lease for a further period of 10 years on its expiry. Even in the letter which was written on behalf of the appellants on the 3rd March, 1938, after the expiry of the date on which the lease was to terminate, the statement made in the earlier letters was repeated, and it was further stated : \"we applied for renewal of the lease on the 23rd August, 1937, six months prior to the date of expiration of the lease.\" In this letter, it is nowhere suggested that the appellants were holding over by reason of the acceptance of rent up to the 31st March, 1938.\n\nOn the other hand, at the end of this letter, we find the following statement :-\n\n\"We therefore pray that if the Government is not at all inclined to renew the lease, time may be granted to us for dismantling and removing till the end of December, 1938, and we shall pay the proportional rent to the Government -for seven months time in pursuance of the terms of the lease.\"\n\nThe reference to the period of 7 months shows that it was assumed that the lease had expired in February, 1938.\n\nThe letters wr'itten on behalf of the Government point to the same conclusion, namely, that both the parties were acting on the assumption that the lease was to expire on the 23rd February, 1938.\n\nFor instance in a letter_ written on behalf of the Government on the 25th -February, 1938, the following statement is made :-\n\n\"I have the honour to inform you that none of your agents was present at the Akra brickfield today as previously arranged to make over the possession of the bnckfields.\n\nYou are therefore requested to please inform me about as to what arrangements are being\n\nmde by you to make over the possession of the said brickfield to this department. The term of lease expires on the afternoon of the 23rd February, 1938.\"\n\nApart from the fact that the appellants did not set up in any of their letters a case -of holding over, we have to see whether the plea can be said to have been\n\n19S1\n\nKornani lndwtrial Bank\n\nLimited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Othe,,.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\n19SI\n\nKaman I lnrlwtria/ Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of\n\nBengal and Other$.\n\nFaz/ All J.\n\nsuccessfully made out by them.\n\nThere is no doubt that the appellants have established that the rent was paid on their behalf up to the 31st March, 1938, and it was accepted by the respondent No. 1.\n\nIt has also been established that this payement was made by a cheque and that cheque has been cashed by the Government. Section 116 of the 'J1ransfer of Property Act, on which reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants, runs as follows :-\n\n\"If a lessee or underlessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or underlessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the pr<>- perty is leased ...... \" ·\n\nThis sect'ion was construed by the Federal Court in K. B. Capadia v. Bai Jerbai Warden and Another (1), and it was held that where rem was accepted by the landlord after the expiration of the tenancy by efflux of time, section 116 applied even. though the landlord accepted the amount remitted to him as \"part deposit towards his claim for .compensation for illegal use and occupation, and without prejudice to his rights\". It is to be noted that in that case rent had been accepted after the expiry of the tenancy.\n\nIn our judgment, the present case cannot be governed by that decision because of the fact, which In our opinion is important; that here the payment of rent up to the 31st March, 1938, was made not after the date of expiry of the lease, but on the 5th April, 1937, nearly a year before the expiry of the lease.\n\nA rcterence to section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act will show that for the application of that section, two things are necessary :-\n\n(1) the lessee should be in possession after the tennination of the lease; and (2) the lessor or his representative should accept rem or otherwise assent to his continuing in possession.\n\nThe use of the word 'otherwise'\n\n(l) [19S9] F.C.R.262\n\nsuggests that acceptance of rent by the landlords has been treated as a form of his giving assent to the tenant's continuance of possession.\n\nThere can be no question of the lessee \"continuing in possession\" until the lease has expired, and the context in which the provision for acceptance of rent finds a place clearly shows that what is conte111plated is that the payment of rent and its acceptance should be made at such a time and in such a manner as to be equivalent to the landlord assenting to the lessee continuing in possession.\n\nBoth the courts below, after dealing with the matter elaborately, have concurrently held that in the circumstances of the case of the consent of respondent No. 1 to the appellants' continuing in possession cannot be inferred, and we agree with this finding.\n\nIt was pointed out to us on behalf of the respondent that the entry relating to this payment in the books of the plaintiff contains the words : \"received without prejudice from Karnani Industrial Bank .... \" The same words however occur in several earlier entries, an<l we are not inclined to attach any special signifinance to them.\n\nBut it seems to us that the very fact, that the payment was made at a time when there was no question of the lessor assenting to the lessee's continuing in possession and neither party treated the payment as importing such assent, is sufficient to take the case out of the mischief of section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nThere is also another view which we think is possible to take upon the facts of the case. As we have seen\n\nthe rent for the first year was paid in advance near about the tie of the execution of the lease, and nothing turns upon 1t.\n\nWhen however the second payment was made, the sum paid was Rs. 6,714 and odd, and the payment was made in respect of rent up to the 31st March, 1930.\n\nAfter this, all the subsequent payments were made up to the 31st March of the succeeding year, evidently because the financial year, which the parties considered themselves to be governed by, ran from the 1st April to the 31st March of the succeeding year. It was presumably in view of this fact that the\n\nKarnani Industrial Bank Limited v.\n\nTfie Province <f Bengal and Otheri.\n\nFaz/ Ali J,\n\nKarnani lnduJtrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others•\n\nFaz Ali J.\n\nplaintiff filed an application on the 6th November, 1941, for amending the plaint so as to include the following statement :-\n\n\"The plaintiff submits that even assuming that the registered lease terminated on the 23rd February, 1938, by an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1, the latter was allowed to hold over up to the 31st March, 1938.''\n\nThis application however was rejected, because it was made at a very late stage, that is to say, after the defendants' evidence had been closed and an adjournment had been granted to the plaintiff to adduce rebutting evidence.\n\nHowever that may be, the utmost that can be said upon the evidence as it stands is that by the implied consent of the parties the period of the lease was extended up to the 31st March, 1938.\n\nIn this view, the respondent No. I became entitled to re-enter after the 31st March, and no notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary.\n\nIn the circumstances, the decree for ejectment passed by the courts below must be upheld.\n\nThe next question which arises in the case turns up the proper construction of clause 11 of Part I and clause I of Part III of the lease, which have already been quoted.\n\nIt seems to us that clause 11 should he read as a whole, and, when it is so read, it becomes clear that it was intended to be. applicable only where the Secretary of State decided to exercise his right to terminate the lease 'at any time subject to 6 months' notice,\" in the event of the lessee failing to observe and duly perform the conditions mentioned in the lease.\n\nIn such a case, if the lessee did not remove the boilers, engines and all other materials and yield up the premises to the Secretary of State, those articles were to become the property of the Secretary of State.\n\nThis clause is evidently not applicable to the present case.\n\nThe clause which applies to this case is clause 1 of Part III, which is intended to be applicable to the normal case of the . lease expiring by efllux of time.\n\nThis clause. as we have seen, provides that the lessee\n\nshall be at liberty to keep on the demised pr!!mises for 3 months after the expiration of the lease any bricks, boilers, etc., but it also provides that \"any bricks and other materials left in contravention of this condition shall become the absolute property of the Secretary of State without payment.\" There can be no doubt that under this clause, the bricks and other materials have become the absolute property of the plaintiff. The only question is as to the meaning of \"other materials.\" It seems to us on an examination of the lease as a whole that there must be a distinction between materials, and machinery and tools and similar articles, and the words \"other materials\" have no reference to engines, trucks, railway and tramway lines and plant. They mean building materials such as bricks, tiles and similar articles that might have been manufactured by the appellants on the demised premises.\n\nThat being so, the decree under appeal should be modified accordingly.\n\nThe only other point which arises for consideration relates to the plaintiff's prayer for a decree for permanent injunction against the defendants, to restrain them from removing or otherwise disposing of . the1 articles in regard to which the decree is to be passed.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellants that the respondent No. 1 not being in possession of these properties could not ask for the relief of injunction without asking for the declaration of its title in respect of them and possession over them, and in support of this proposition, the following cases were cited :-Ratnasabhapati Pillai and Others v. Ramaswami Aiyar (1), Bhramar Lal Banduri and Others v. Nanda Lal Chowdhuri (2) and Valia Tamburatti v. Paravati and Others (3).\n\nAfter reading and fully considering those cases, we find them to be wholly inapplicable to the present case.\n\nJn the present case, it has been found that the bricks and other materials have become the property of the plaintiff, and there can be no legal objection to the granting of an injunction as prayed.\n\n(I) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 482 .\n\n.(2) 24 I.C. 199.\n\n13) I.LR. 13 Mad. 455.\n\nKarnani lndurtrlal Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nKarnani Industrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Other1.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nMay 4\n\nThe appeal therefore substantially fails and it is dismissed with costs.\n\nBut it should be made clear m the decree that only the building materials such as bricks, tiles . and similar articles that might have been manufactured by the appellants on the demised premises shall become the property of the respondent No. 1.\n\nAs for the boilers, engines, trucks, kilns, railway and tram lines, etc., three months' time is given from the date of this decree to enable the appellants to remove them from the demised premises.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : Raji11der Narain.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : P. K. Bose.\n\nKUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER\n\nDEBA PROSANNA MUKHERJEE.\n\n[SHR1\n\nHARILAL\n\nKANIA C. J.,\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI and s. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nBengal Money Lenders Act (X of 1940), u. 2(22), 36(5)-Relief under s. 36--\"Suit to which this Act applies\"--Suit in which execution proceeding tvas pending on /an. 1~ 1939-Execution Case struck off but attachment continuing in force on Jan. l, 1939-Applicability of Act-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. 21, r. 57-Striking off execution case keeping attachment in force-\n\nJV he th er terminate)· execution proceeding--Submortgagee-W hether assignee of mortgage-Right to claim protection under s. 36(5).\n\n~ decree on a mortgage was passed in a suit brought by the representatives in interest of a sub-mortgagee in 1929 and a personal decree for recovery of the amount remaining due after the sale of the mortgaged properties was passed in 1935. In 1936 the decree-holder started execution of the personal decree and attached certain properties of the judgment-debtor. The decree-holder filed a petition on January 30, 1937, praying that the execution case \"may be struck off for non-prosecution, keeping the attachment in force\" in Yiew of certain negotiations for amicable settlement, and the court passed an order that the: execution case \"is dismissed for non-prosecution, the attachment", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 540, "end_char": 552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : R. C. Prasad."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatteriee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 584, "end_char": 600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : P. K. Chatteriee."}}, {"text": "KARNANI INDUSTRIAL BANK, LIMITED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 603, "end_char": 635, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KARNANI INDUSTRIAL BANK, LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE PROVINCE OF BENGAL AND OlHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 640, "end_char": 673, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PROVINCE OF BENGAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 737, "end_char": 761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 106, 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 776, "end_char": 788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1114, "end_char": 1120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1565, "end_char": 1571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "17th February, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A lease deed was executed on the 17th February, 1928, in respect of a land for a period of ten years from 24th February, 1928 the annual rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "24th February, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1680, "end_char": 1699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A lease deed was executed on the 17th February, 1928, in respect of a land for a period of ten years from 24th February, 1928 the annual rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1827, "end_char": 1842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,000, being the rent from 1st April, 1937, to 31st March, 1938, was sent by the lessee and accepted by the lessor : Held, that as the rent was paid before expiry of the lease and neither party treated the payment of rent as importing assent on the part of the lessor to allow the lessee\n\nto continue in possession as a lessee after the .period of the lease, no new tenancy was created under s. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,000, being the rent from 1st April, 1937, to 31st March, 1938, was sent by the lessee and accepted by the lessor : Held, that as the rent was paid before expiry of the lease and neither party treated the payment of rent as importing assent on the part of the lessor to allow the lessee\n\nto continue in possession as a lessee after the .period of the lease, no new tenancy was created under s. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act."}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2192, "end_char": 2198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2206, "end_char": 2230, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2385, "end_char": 2391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2399, "end_char": 2423, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1949) F.C.R. 262", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2513, "end_char": 2530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3322, "end_char": 3358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 13th February, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Mitter and Sharpe JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3360, "end_char": 3366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 13th February, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Mitter and Sharpe JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Sharpe", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3371, "end_char": 3377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 13th February, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (Mitter and Sharpe JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatteriee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3488, "end_char": 3504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatteriee and Harish Chandra (K. C. Chopra and G. C. Mathur, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Harish Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3509, "end_char": 3523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatteriee and Harish Chandra (K. C. Chopra and G. C. Mathur, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. C. Chopra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3525, "end_char": 3537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatteriee and Harish Chandra (K. C. Chopra and G. C. Mathur, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatteriee and Harish Chandra (K. C. Chopra and G. C. Mathur, with them) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Chandra Sekhar Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3587, "end_char": 3605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandra Sekhar Sen ( C. N. Laik, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "C. N. Laik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3608, "end_char": 3618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandra Sekhar Sen ( C. N. Laik, with him) for respondent No."}}, {"text": "F AZL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3711, "end_char": 3719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nF AZL Au J.\n\nThe principal question for determina-\n\nKarnani Industrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3894, "end_char": 3905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion in this appeal is whether a certain lease had validly Fazl Ali J. terminated by efflux of time or whether there was \"holding over\" by the lessee of the leasehold property as contemplated in section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act."}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4049, "end_char": 4073, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Akra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 or plaintiff) is admittedly the owner of an area of 1125 bighas and odd of land in village Akra."}}, {"text": "Clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5336, "end_char": 5345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6083, "end_char": 6091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kamani Industrial Bank\n\nLimited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8196, "end_char": 8227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3-10 S- C. fndi:y'67\n\nKamani Industrial Bank\n\nLimited v.\n\nThe PrtJl'i11ce of\n\nt:t1Bengal and OtherJo\n\nFazal Ali J.\n\nKarnani lndustrit1!"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8276, "end_char": 8285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3-10 S- C. fndi:y'67\n\nKamani Industrial Bank\n\nLimited v.\n\nThe PrtJl'i11ce of\n\nt:t1Bengal and OtherJo\n\nFazal Ali J.\n\nKarnani lndustrit1!"}}, {"text": "24th November, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8977, "end_char": 8996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Judge by his judgment dated the 24th November, 1941, held that there was no holding over with the assent of the plaintiff and both parties were under a mistaken belief that the lease had expired on the 23rd February, 1938."}}, {"text": "23rd February, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9147, "end_char": 9166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Judge by his judgment dated the 24th November, 1941, held that there was no holding over with the assent of the plaintiff and both parties were under a mistaken belief that the lease had expired on the 23rd February, 1938."}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10047, "end_char": 10069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants thereafter preferred an appeal to the High Court at Calcutta, and the respondent No."}}, {"text": "13th February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10343, "end_char": 10362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the High Court who heard the appeal, by their judgment dated the 13th February, 1948, dismissed the appeallants' appeal and allowed the cross-objection of the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11963, "end_char": 11991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Received without prejudice from Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. on account of yearly rent for Akra brickfield for the year ending 31st March, 1938.\""}}, {"text": "Akra brickfield for", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12022, "end_char": 12041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Received without prejudice from Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. on account of yearly rent for Akra brickfield for the year ending 31st March, 1938.\""}}, {"text": "27th August, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12087, "end_char": 12104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th August, 1937, the appellants applied to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Public\n\nWorks Department, for renewing the lease for a further period of 10 years, but no reply was received to that letter."}}, {"text": "Government of Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12153, "end_char": 12173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th August, 1937, the appellants applied to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Public\n\nWorks Department, for renewing the lease for a further period of 10 years, but no reply was received to that letter."}}, {"text": "Katt1ani Industrial Bank Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12502, "end_char": 12534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Katt1ani Industrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Provinetof\n\nBengal and Others\n\nFazl All J.\n\nKarnanl lndultrial Bank Limited ....\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others."}}, {"text": "Provinetof\n\nBengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12543, "end_char": 12561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Katt1ani Industrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Provinetof\n\nBengal and Others\n\nFazl All J.\n\nKarnanl lndultrial Bank Limited ....\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others.", "canonical_name": "Provinetof\n\nBengal"}}, {"text": "Province of Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12629, "end_char": 12647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Katt1ani Industrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Provinetof\n\nBengal and Others\n\nFazl All J.\n\nKarnanl lndultrial Bank Limited ....\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others.", "canonical_name": "Provinetof\n\nBengal"}}, {"text": "Karnani Industrial Bank Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12815, "end_char": 12846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "III Sub-division, which was a under:-\n\n\"He is requested to make arrangements with Messrs. Karnani Industrial Bank Limited for vacant possesiion of the Akra bricklield on the 24th instant as the lease with the Bank will expire on the 23rd instant according to the terms of the agreement.\""}}, {"text": "17th March, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13033, "end_char": 13049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, on the 17th March, 1938, the appellants received the following communkation from the Executive Engineer, Suburban Division :-\n\n\"I would inform you that it is not the intention of Government in this Department to lease out the bricklields and arrangement is being accordingly made to make over the lands to the Government in the Revenue Department for disposal.\""}}, {"text": "14th September, !'", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13422, "end_char": 13440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a subsequent letter dated the 14th September, !'"}}, {"text": "30th day of September next", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13723, "end_char": 13749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "938, the Executive Engineer wrote to the appellants as follows :-\n\n\"I am instructed to state that Government have decided that you cannot be allowed to continue in occupation of the premises any further ......... However, as a matter of grace Government will allow you time till the 30th day of September next, to dismantle the kilns and to remove all your bricks, boiler etc."}}, {"text": "23rd August, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14361, "end_char": 14378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance, in the appellants' letter of the 23rd August, 1937, it is stated : \"we are desirous of renewing the lease of the bricklield for a further period of 10 years from the date of the expiration of the period of the !"}}, {"text": "17-2-1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14551, "end_char": 14560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ease dated\n\n17-2-1928.\""}}, {"text": "23rd October, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14594, "end_char": 14612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, in the letter dated the 23rd October, 1937, reference is made to the appellants'\n\napplication for renewal of the lease for a further period of 10 years on its expiry."}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14809, "end_char": 14824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in the letter which was written on behalf of the appellants on the 3rd March, 1938, after the expiry of the date on which the lease was to terminate, the statement made in the earlier letters was repeated, and it was further stated : \"we applied for renewal of the lease on the 23rd August, 1937, six months prior to the date of expiration of the lease.\""}}, {"text": "25th -February, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15995, "end_char": 16015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance in a letter_ written on behalf of the Government on the 25th -February, 1938, the following statement is made :-\n\n\"I have the honour to inform you that none of your agents was present at the Akra brickfield today as previously arranged to make over the possession of the bnckfields."}}, {"text": "Kornani lndwtrial Bank\n\nLimited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16635, "end_char": 16666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the fact that the appellants did not set up in any of their letters a case -of holding over, we have to see whether the plea can be said to have been\n\n19S1\n\nKornani lndwtrial Bank\n\nLimited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Othe,,."}}, {"text": "Kaman I lnrlwtria/ Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16726, "end_char": 16774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali J.\n\n19SI\n\nKaman I lnrlwtria/ Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of\n\nBengal and Other$.\n\nFaz/ All J.\n\nsuccessfully made out by them."}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17132, "end_char": 17143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17934, "end_char": 17945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18479, "end_char": 18494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our judgment, the present case cannot be governed by that decision because of the fact, which In our opinion is important; that here the payment of rent up to the 31st March, 1938, was made not after the date of expiry of the lease, but on the 5th April, 1937, nearly a year before the expiry of the lease."}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18558, "end_char": 18569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18577, "end_char": 18601, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Karnani Industrial Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19902, "end_char": 19925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out to us on behalf of the respondent that the entry relating to this payment in the books of the plaintiff contains the words : \"received without prejudice from Karnani Industrial Bank .... \" The same words however occur in several earlier entries, an<l we are not inclined to attach any special signifinance to them."}}, {"text": "section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20345, "end_char": 20356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20364, "end_char": 20388, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "31st March, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20756, "end_char": 20772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,714 and odd, and the payment was made in respect of rent up to the 31st March, 1930."}}, {"text": "Faz Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21239, "end_char": 21246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali J,\n\nKarnani lnduJtrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Others•\n\nFaz Ali J.\n\nplaintiff filed an application on the 6th November, 1941, for amending the plaint so as to include the following statement :-\n\n\"The plaintiff submits that even assuming that the registered lease terminated on the 23rd February, 1938, by an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No."}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22140, "end_char": 22151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22159, "end_char": 22183, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22370, "end_char": 22379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22482, "end_char": 22491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23150, "end_char": 23158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raji11der Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26177, "end_char": 26193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : Raji11der Narain."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26225, "end_char": 26235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : P. K. Bose."}}, {"text": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26238, "end_char": 26263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER\n\nDEBA PROSANNA MUKHERJEE."}}, {"text": "DEBA PROSANNA MUKHERJEE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26275, "end_char": 26298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER\n\nDEBA PROSANNA MUKHERJEE."}}, {"text": "HARILAL\n\nKANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26308, "end_char": 26322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHR1\n\nHARILAL\n\nKANIA C. J.,\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI and s. R. DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26331, "end_char": 26347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHR1\n\nHARILAL\n\nKANIA C. J.,\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI and s. R. DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "s. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26352, "end_char": 26361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHR1\n\nHARILAL\n\nKANIA C. J.,\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI and s. R. DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Bengal Money Lenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26368, "end_char": 26392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26435, "end_char": 26440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Bengal Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "s. 36(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26864, "end_char": 26872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Bengal Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "January 30, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27276, "end_char": 27292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree-holder filed a petition on January 30, 1937, praying that the execution case \"may be struck off for non-prosecution, keeping the attachment in force\" in Yiew of certain negotiations for amicable settlement, and the court passed an order that the: execution case \"is dismissed for non-prosecution, the attachment"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_572_594_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "Karnani Industrial Bank Limited v.\n\nThe Province of Bengal and Other1.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nMay 4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nThe appeal therefore substantially fails and it is dismissed with costs.\n\nBut it should be made clear m the decree that only the building materials such as bricks, tiles . and similar articles that might have been manufactured by the appellants on the demised premises shall become the property of the respondent No. 1.\n\nAs for the boilers, engines, trucks, kilns, railway and tram lines, etc., three months' time is given from the date of this decree to enable the appellants to remove them from the demised premises.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : Raji11der Narain.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : P. K. Bose.\n\nKUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER\n\nDEBA PROSANNA MUKHERJEE.\n\n[SHR1\n\nHARILAL\n\nKANIA C. J.,\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI and s. R. DAS JJ.]\n\nBengal Money Lenders Act (X of 1940), u. 2(22), 36(5)-Relief under s. 36--\"Suit to which this Act applies\"--Suit in which execution proceeding tvas pending on /an. 1~ 1939-Execution Case struck off but attachment continuing in force on Jan. l, 1939-Applicability of Act-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. 21, r. 57-Striking off execution case keeping attachment in force-\n\nJV he th er terminate)· execution proceeding--Submortgagee-W hether assignee of mortgage-Right to claim protection under s. 36(5).\n\n~ decree on a mortgage was passed in a suit brought by the representatives in interest of a sub-mortgagee in 1929 and a personal decree for recovery of the amount remaining due after the sale of the mortgaged properties was passed in 1935. In 1936 the decree-holder started execution of the personal decree and attached certain properties of the judgment-debtor. The decree-holder filed a petition on January 30, 1937, praying that the execution case \"may be struck off for non-prosecution, keeping the attachment in force\" in Yiew of certain negotiations for amicable settlement, and the court passed an order that the: execution case \"is dismissed for non-prosecution, the attachment\n\nS.C.R-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 573\n\nalready effected continuing\".\n\nOn June 2, 1939, the decreeholder filed a petition statir>g that the decree had been adjusted and attachment may be withdrawn. The Bengal Money-lenders Act came into force on September 1, 1940, and on January 2, 1941 the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor filed a suit 'under s. 36 of the Act praying for re-opening the transactions.\n\nThe question being whether any proceeding or. executions was pending on or after January 1, 1939, w1thm the meaning of the definition of \"a suit to which this Act applies\", contained in s. 2(22) if the Bengal Money-lenders Act:\n\nHeld, per KANIA C. /. and DAs J.-That the order of January 30, 1937, was in form and in substance a final order of dismissal of the execution petition of 1936. The attachment continued not because there was a pending execution proceeding but because a special order for continuing\" the attachment was made under\n\n0. 21, r. 57 of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by the Calcutta High Court, and notwithstanding the fact that the attachment was continued there was no execution proceeding pending on January 1, 1939, and accordingly the decree sought to be reopened was not one passed in \"a suit to which the Act applies\" within the meaning of s. 2(22) of the Act and the Court had no power to re-open the transactions under s. 36 (2).\n\nThe petition of June 2, 1939, was also not a proceeding for execution but a mere certification by the decree-holder of satisfaction of the decree.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI J.-The continuance of the attachment notwithstanding the dismissal of the execution petition, indicated that the proceeding which had resulted in the attachment was kept alive to be carried forward later on by sale of the attached property.\n\nAttachment itself is \"a proceeding in execution\" and so long as it subsists, the proceeding in execution can well be regarded as pending.\n\nIn this view a proceeding in execution was pending on January 1, 1939, and the decree must be taken to have been passed in \"a suit to which this Act applies\". But inasmuch as the sub-mortgage to the respondent's predecessorin-title was bona fide and he obtained by virtue of the sub-mortgage the right to .sue the original mortgagor for recovery of the mortgage debt, the decree-holder was a bona fide assignee and his claim for the entire decree debt was protected by s. 36(5) of the Act.\n\nRenu/a Bose v. Manmatha Nath Bose (L.R.\n\n72 I.A. 156), Promode Kumar Roy v. Nikhil Bhusan Mukhopadhya (50 C.W.N.\n\n407) and Promode Kumar Roy v. Nikhil Bhusan Mukhopadhya (L.R. 76 I.A. 74) referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 90 of 1960.\n\nAppeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd July 1948 of the High Court of Judica-\n\n!ure at Calcutta (K. C. Mitter, and K. C. Chunder JJ) m appeal from Original Decree No. 49 of 1942 arising\n\n---0\n\nKumar PaJhupatinatf1\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Pro1annfJ\n\nMukherjee\n\nKumar Ulashupatinath\n\nMalia adAnvther v.\n\nDebo Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nout of Decree dated the 8th September 1941 of the Subordinate Judge at Asansole in Suit No. 1 of 1941.\n\nPurusottam Chatterji (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellants.\n\nDa, J.\n\nPanchanan Chose, (P. C.\n\nChatterjee, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1951. May 4. The following judgments were delivered:-\n\nDt.s J.-This appeal arises -out of a suit filed by the appellants on January 2, 1941, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Asansole.\n\nThat suit came to be filed in circumstances which may now be stated shortly.\n\nA suit had been instituted by one Kumar Dakhineswar Malia against Rameswar Malia, Rani Bhaba Sundari and others for partition of the Searsole Raj Estate.\n\nOne Bhagabati Charan Mitra was appointed receiver of that estate in that suit. On August 10, 1908, the said receiver with the permission of the Court which had appointed him as receiver granted two mining leases, each for 999 years-one in respect of 5/16 share of the Malias in Mouza Monohar Bahal and • the other in respect of 230 bigh:is in village Marich Kota-to a firm then carrying on business under the name and style of Laik Banerjee & Company.\n\nOn the same day the said receiver with like permission mortgaged these properties to the said firm as security for the due repayment of the loan of Rs. 100,000 advanced by that firm.\n\nThe Malias joined the receiver in executing the aforesaid leases and the mortgage.\n\nAs a result of these transactions the firm of Laik Banerjee & Company became the lessees for 999 years of the two properties as well as the mortgagee of the lessors' interest in the same.\n\nBy diverse processes not necessary to be deailed, the appellants have become the successors in interest of the mortgagors and the respondent Deva Prasanna Mukherjee has become the successor in interest of the mortgagee under the mortgage. of August 10, 1908. ·\n\nOn March 31, 1922, Deva Prasanna filed suit No. 78 of 1922 for enforcing the mortgage of 1908. Preliminary decree was passed in the last mentioned suit on July 31, 1928, and a final decree for sale was made on February 26, 1929.\n\nIn execution of this final decree the mortgaged properties were sold at a Court sale and were purchased by Deva Prasanna for Rs. 59,000.\n\nThis sale was confirmed by the Court on June 30, 1931.\n\nA large sum remaining still due: to Deva Prasanna, he applied for, and 6n October 30,\n\n1935, obtained a personal decree for Rs. 1,27,179-0-6 against Raja Pramatha Nath Malia who had by inheritance acquired the lessors' interest and become the borrower.\n\nIn 1936, Deva Prasanna started execution case No. 118 of 1936 for execution of the personal decree and attached certain properties alleging that the same belonged to the Raja.\n\nThe exact date of the attachment does not appear from the printed record. The Raja as Sibait of a certain deity and his two sons, the appellants before us, objected to the attachment of these properties and filed a claim case.\n\nNegotations for settlement .started and eventually, on January 30, 1937, a petition (Ex. 2) was filed in the executing Court stating as follows:-\n\n\"The judgment debtor having made special requests to the decree-holder for an amicable settlement of the aforesaid execution case, the decree-holder has agreed to the same. But some time is required to settle the talks and all the terms etc.\n\nThe judgment debtor has paid to . the decree holder the costs of this execution amounting to Rs. 76-14-0, and he having made requests for this execution case being struck off for the present on keeping the attachment in force, the decreeholder has agreed to it.\n\nIt is therefore, prayed that under the circumstances aforesaid, the Court may be pleased. to strike off this execution case keeping the attachment in fore~.\"\n\nNeither the original nor a certified copy of the order made on that date by the executing Court on the\n\nKumar Pashupatinath Malia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\n-1951\n\nKumar Pashupatinath\n\nMalla and Another v.\n\nDebo Prosanna\n\nMukherjee\n\n.Da• J\n\nabove petition is forthcoming but the parties have definitely agreed that the order is substantially and correctly entered in column 20 of Ex. F which is a certified copy of extract from the Register of applications for executions of decrees relating to execution Case No. 118 of 1936. The heading of column 20 is \"Date on which execution case was finally disposed of and purport of final order.\" The entry in column 20 under that head is :\n\n\"D. H. admits receipt of Rs. 76114/ - as costs of this case from the J. D. The execution case is dismissed for non-prosecution-the attachment already effected in this case continuing.\n\n30th January 1937.\"\n\nThe entry under column 11 of that very exhibit reads as follows :-\n\n\"Claim case automatically drops as the execution case is dismissed.\n\nIt is, therefore, rejected without any sort of adjudication.\n\n30th January 1937.\"\n\nIn May 1937, the Searsole Raj Estate came under the charge of the Court of Wards. By a Kobala executed with the permission of the Board of Revenue Raja Pramatha Nath Malia and his two sons Kumars Pashupati Nath Malia and Kshitipati Nath Malia represented by Kumar Kshitipati Nath Malia as the Manager of the Searsole Raj Wards Estate conveyed a property known as Seriapati Mahal to Deva Prasanna in full settlement of his claim under the personal decree against the Raja.\n\nBy an agreement of even date, Deva Prasanna agreed to reconvey Senapati Mahal to the Kumars if he was paid Rs. 90,000I - within two years from that date.\n\nSenapati Mahal originally belonged to the Raja but had been transferred by him to his two sons.\n\nA creditor, however, had filed-a suit under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act challenging that transfer and had actually got a decree declaring that transfer as fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the Raja.\n\nAn appeal was filed by the Kwnars which was pending at the date of the Kobala of January 4, 1939, and, in the circumstances, it was considered safer to join the Raja in the last mentioned Kobala in favour of Deva Prasanna.\n\nOn June 2, 1939, a petition was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Asansole, on behalf of Deva Prasanna as the decree holder.\n\nIt was headed \"Money Execution Case No. 118 of 1936.\n\nThe relevant portions of this petition were as follows :-' ·\n\n\"That the above execution case was disposed of On the 30th January 1937 with the attachment of the properties subsisting ; since then the decree put into execution in the above case has been adjusted after remission of a large amount of interest by the out and out sale of certain properties by a registered Kobala dated 4th January 1939 .............................. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . So there is no longer any need -0£ the said attachment remaining subsisting.\n\nIt is, therefore, prayed that the attachment may be withdrawn.' 1\n\nOn the same day the following order was made on th . . • at pet1tton :-\n\n\"Heard learned pleaders for the parties.\n\nThey jointly ask me to cancel the attachment (existing by special order) in Money Ex. 118 of 1936 though that case was dismissed.\n\nOrder\n\nThe said attachment is cancelled and the decree in question is recorded as adjusted as stated by learned pleader for the decree-holder and pleader of the judgment-debtor according to the adjustment mentioned but not detailed in this petition of to-day. Make necessary notes and send this petition to the District Record Room.\"\n\nIn the remarks column No. 22 in Ex. F the following entry was made :-\n\n\"The said attachment is cancelled and the decree in question is recorded as adjusted as stated y learned\n\nKumar Pashupatinath Malia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nDaaJ.\n\nKumar Pashupatinatlr\n\nMalia a_nd Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDai J.\n\npleader for the D. H. and the pleader of the Judgment Debtor according to the adjustment mentioned but not detailed in this petition of to.day.\n\nDated 2nd June 1939.''\n\nThe Raja died in August, 1940, leaving the two appellants as his sons and legal representatives.\n\nThe Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940 (Bengal Act X of\n\n1940) hereinafter called the Act, came into force on September l, 1940. On January 2, 1941, the appellants who, as the legal representatives of the Raja, became \"borrowers\" within the meaning of the Act filed the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen.\n\nThe suit was filed by the appellants against the respondent under section 36 of the Act praying for reopening the transactions and taking accounts and for release from all liabilities in excess of the limits specified by law.\n\nIn short, they asked the Court to give them relief by exercising the powers given to the Court by section 36 of the Act. There was also a prayer for reconveyance of the Senapati Mahal. The respondent filed his written statement setting up a variety of defences founded on merits as well as on legal pleas in bar.\n\nOn May 8, .1941, the Subordinate Judge settled the issues and fixed June 9, 1941, \"for a preliminary hearing of the suit and particularly of such of the issues as have been based on the pleas in bar.\" Eventually, the case was taken up for preliminary hearing on September 4, 1941, and by his judgment delivered on September 8, 1941, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on issue No. 2 which was as follows:\n\n\"Does the plaint disclose a valid cause of action for the suit ?\"\n\nThe appellants preferred an appeal to the High Court at Calcutta.\n\nAlthough the High Court (R. C. Mitter and K. C. Chunder JJ.) did not accept all the reasonings on which the learned Subordinate Judge had based his decision, they, however, agreed that the appellants could get no relief as the decrees in suit No. 78 of 1922 could not be reopened, as they were not passed in\n\n\"a suit to which this Act applies\" and consequently . dismissed the appeal. The. appellants have now come up on appeal before us after having obtained a certificate from the High Court under section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nLearned Advocate appearing in support of this appeal before us has contended that the High Court was in error in holding that the decrees in Suit No. 78 of 1922 were not liable to be reopened under the second proviso to section 36 (1).\n\nLearned advocate for the respondent while joining issue on this point also raised a point which, however, did not find favour with the High Court, namely; that the respondent as a bona fide assignee for value of the mortgage debt was protected by sub-section (5) of section 36.\n\nIt is quite clear that if either of the two points is decided against the appelfants, this appeal must fail.\n\nThe main provisions of section 36 ( 1) are in the following terms :-\n\n\"Notwiths_tanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if in any suit to which this Act applies, or in any suit brought by a borrower for relief under this section, whether heard ex parte or otherwise, the Court has reason to believe that the exercise of one or more of the powers under this section will give relief to the borrower, it shall exercise all or any of the following powers as it may consider appropriate, namely, shall-\n\n( a) reopen any transaction and take an account between the parties ;\n\n(b) notwithstanding any agreement, purporting to close previous dealings and to create new obligations, r, eopen any account already taken between the parties ;\n\n( c) release the borrower of all liability in excess of the Jimits specified in clauses (1) and\n\n(2) of section 30;\n\n(d) if anything has been paid or .allowed in account on or after the first day of January, 1939, in respect of the liability referred to in clause (c), order 4-10 S.C.India./67.\n\nKumar Pashupatinatll Malia and Another v.\n\nDeha Prosa11na\n\nMukherjee.\n\nDa11 J.\n\n19~1\n\nKumar Pa3hupatinoth\n\nMalia on4 Anothtr v.\n\nDeba Proan11iJ\n\nMukherjee.\n\nDa> J,\n\nthe. lender to repay any sum which the Court considers to be repayable in respect of such payment or allowance in account as aforesaid ; ( e) set aside either wholly or in part or .revise or alter any security given or agreement made in respect of any loan, and . if the lender has parted with the security, order him . to indemnify the borrower in such manner and to such extent as it may deem just.\"\n\nIt will be noticed (a) that the provisions of this section apply notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, (b) that the powers conferred on the Court or to he exercised either in any suit to which this Act applies or in any suit brought by a borrower for relief under the section and ( c) that the Court is called upon to exercise all or any of the powers conferred on it by the section if the Court has reason to believe that the exercise of one or more of the powers will give relief to the borrower.\n\nIn the present case the borrowers have instituted a substantive suit for relief under section 36 and, therefore, if there was nothing also in the section and the Court had the requisite belief, the Court could exercise all or any of the powers and give relief to the borrowers in terms of the prayers of the plaint. There arc, however, two provisions to sub-section (1) of section 36.\n\nThe relevant portion of the second proviso is expressed in the words following :\n\n\"Provided that m Court shall not- (i) ..\n\nexercise of these powers the\n\n(ii) do anything which affects any decree of a Court, other than a decree in a suit to which the Act applies which was not fully sati; fied by the first day of January, 1939, or \" <! * • .\"\n\nThe proviso makes it quite clear that in exercise of the powers the Court cannot reopen or otherwise affect a decree of a Court unless such decree is one which was passed in a suit to which this Act applies and which was not fully satisfied by January 1, 1939.\n\nIn the light of the decision of the Full Bench of the\n\nCalcutta High Court in Mrityunjay Mitra v. Satis Chandra Banerji(1) which was approved by the Privy Council in Jadu Nath Roy V Kshitish Chandra Acharyya(2), it has not been contended, in view of the fact that the personal decree for the balance remained unsatisfied on January 1, 1939, that the decrees in Suit No. 78 of 1922 were fully satisfied within the meaning of the above proviso.\n\nTherefore, the on1y thing that remains to be ascertained is whether the decrees were passed in \"a suit to which this Act applies.\" Section 2(22) of the Act is as follows :\n\n\"2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-\n\n(22) \"Suit to which this Act applies\" means any suit or proceedi, ng instituted or filed on or after the 1st day of January, 1939, or pending on that date and includes a proceeding in execution-\n\n( a) for the recovery of a loan advanced before or after the commencement of this Act ;\n\n(b) for the enforcement of any agreement entered into before or after the commencement of this Act, whether by way of settlement of account or otherwise, or of any security so taken, in respect of any loan advanced whether before or after the commencement of this Act ; or\n\n(c) for the redemption of any security given before or after the commencement of this Act in respect of any loan advanced whether before or after the commencement of this Act.\"\n\nThe words \"instituted or filed on or after the 1st day of January, 1939, or pending on that date\" have been read and understood as qualifying the words \"any suit or proceeding\" in the beginning of the definition as well as the words \"proceeding in execution\" occurring further down: see per Spens C. J. in Bank of Commerce Ltd., v. Amulya Krishna(3).\n\nAccordingly, it has\n\n(l) I.L.R. (1944) 2 Cal. 376; 48 C.W.N. 361\n\n(2) L.R. 76 I.A. 179 at p. 190.\n\n(3) (1944) F.C.R. 126; I.A.R. 1944 F.C. 18\n\nKumar Pashupati11ath\n\nMalia a11d Another\n\nDeba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nKumar Pa•hupallnath\n\nMalia and Another\n\n•• Deba ProMnKa\n\nMukherj.e.\n\nDaJ J.\n\nbeen held in Ram Kumar De v. Abhoya Pada Bhatia> charjee (') that where a decree is such that the suit in which it was passed had terminated before January 1, 1939, and no proceeding in execution was started or was actually pending on or after that date it is not a decree in \"a suit to which this Act applies\" and cannot be reopened.\n\nThe same view was upheld by a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Coutt in Aparna Kumari\n\nv. Girish Chandra (2) which overruled two earlier decisions to the contrary. The construction put upon section 2 (22) by the Special Bench and th~ reasons given by them appear to us to be well-founded.\n\nIn the case now before us, the Suit No. 78 of 1922 was insf1tuted and all the three decrees were passed long before the specified date.\n\nThe only question that has, therefore, to be considered is whether any proceeding in execution was pending on or after that date.\n\nThe answer to this question wilt depend on the true meaning and effect of the orders made by the executing Court (i) on January 30, 1937, and (ii) on June 2, 1939.\n\nAs to (i).:--It Is not disputed that the order of January 30, 1937, was made under Order XXI, rule 57, as amended by the Calcutta High Court. Order XXI, rule 57, is expressed in the following terms :-\n\n\"Where any property has been attached in execution of a decree but by reason of the decree-hofder's default the Court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall either dismiss the application or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceedings to a future date.\n\nUpon the dismissal of such application the attachment shall cease.\"\n\nThe marginal note of the rule is determination of attachment.\n\nThe reason why rule 57 was introduced in the Code of 1908 has been explained by Rankin C. J, in Shibnath Singh Ray v. Sheikh Saberuddin Ahmad (\") as follows :-\n\n(I) 46C.W.N.SS7; A.I.R.!942Cal.44l.\n\n(2) 48 C.W.N.,406.\n\n(3) 1.L.R. S6 Cal. 416 at pp. 421-422.\n\n\"Rule 57 of Order XXI was a new provision introduced in 1908.\n\nIt is evident from the language of the rule itself, and it is still more evident from the circumstances under which it was passed, that it was intended to provide a remedy for the grievance or inconvenience which is apt to arise, where, after an attachment in exec; ution, the application for execution cannot further be proceeded with by reason of the decree-holder's default.\n\nThis was, and still is, a very common case.\n\nThe decree-holder makes some informal arrangement to give the judgment-debtor time without obtaining full satisfaction of the decree ; the application for execution is not further prosecuted ; it is not withdrawn ; neither party attends.\n\nIn these cirumstances, the object of the rule is to say that the Court must make either an order for adjournment or an order of dismissal.\n\nThe reason why it was necessary to require the Court, if it did not adjourn a proceeding to a definite date, to dismiss the application for execution formally and definitely can be amply illustrated from the decided cases.\n\nIn the absence of a definite order of dismissal the files of the Courts became encumbered with a number of applications for execution which were water-logged and derelict, and a practice arose whereby such applications were ordered to be 'struck off.' This was a practice not justified by the Code and in cases where attachments in execution had already been entered, the question arose whether the effect of an order 'striking off' was that the attachment made upon application for execution was itself struck off or whether it remained notwithstanding such an order.\n\nMany other awkward and important questions arose out of this practice and the object of rule 57 was to ensure that this illogical and inconvenient practice should be stopped.\n\nApplications for execution were to be definitely dismissed if they were not adjourned to a future date.\n\nThe object of the last sentence in rule 57 is to settle the question whether, when the application in execution is dis- missed, any attachment made , under that application should fall to the ground or should subsist, and\n\nKumar Pash11patinath\n\nMalta and Another\n\nDeba Proaanna Mukherjee\n\nDa& J,\n\nKumar PtUhupat/nath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Projanna\n\nMu/ohel'}ee\n\nDai I.\n\nthe legislature has provided that it is to fall to the\n\nground.\"\n\nThe new rule thus introduced left two distinct courses open to the executing Court in the situation envisaged by the rule.\n\nEach course had its advantage as well as its disadvantage.\n\nThus the adjournment of the execution proceedings kept the attachment alive without any special irection. While the adoption of this course helped bona fide arrangement between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor as to the time and manner of satisfaction of the decree it was calculated also to encourage desultory proceedings resultfog in undesirable congestion in the files of the Execut. ing Court by keeping alive so many execution proceedings. On the other hand, while the dismissal of an application in the circumstances mentioned in the rule had the merit of preventing a congestion of the file by finally disposing of the application by a final order, it was calculated to discourage deqeeholders from giving even reasonable accommodation to the judgment-debtor on account of the destruction of the attachment which left the judgment-debtor free to deal with the property to the detriment of the decreeholder after the attachment ceased.\n\nIt was evidently with a view to preserve the advantage of a dismissal and at the same \"time to avoid the disadvantage of the rigid rule of cesser of the attachment that the Calcutta High Court amended rule 57 by adding the words \"unless the Court shall make an order to the contrary\" at the end of the last sentence of that rule. The rule thus amended leaves three courses open to the Executing Court in case it finds it difficult to proceed with the execution case by reason of the default of the decree-holder. It may (I) adjourn the proceedings for good reason which will automatically keep the attachment alive or (2) simply dismiss the application which will automatically destroy the attachment or (3) dismiss the application but specifically keep alive the attachment by an express order. The rule, as amended, therefore, contemplates three distinct forms of order, any one of which may be made by the Court in the\n\ncircumstances mentioned in the rule. The question before us is as to the category in which the order made on January 30, 1937, in Execution Case No. 118 of 19 36 falls.\n\nIt will be recalled that the order of January 30, 1937, was made on a petition (Exhibit 2) filed on that day in Execution Case No. 118 of 1936.\n\nGreat stress was laid by the learned advocate for the appellants on the words \"struck off for the present\" occurring in the body of that petition.\n\nIt will be noticed that those words formed part of the request of the judgmentdebtor which was being recited in the petition. In the actual prayer portion the decree-holder did not use the words \"for the present\" but only asked the Court \"to strike off the execution case keeping the attachment in force.\" Further, apart from wh, at the parties wanted, the Court made its intention - clear in the very order that it passed and which is entered in column ,20 of Exhibit F.\n\nThe Court regarded the willingness of the the decree-holder to enter into a long and protracted negotiation with the judgment-debtor as eviP, ence of unwillingness on the part of the decree-holder to diligently prosecute the execution proceedings and accordingly dismissed the execution case for nonprosecution but thought fit to expressly keep alive the attachment.\n\nIt is quite obvious that the Court made an order of the third kind mentioned above. The three forms of order permissible under rule 57 as amended by the High Court are quite distinct ano independent of each other and there is no room for their overlapping.\n\nIf the mere continuation of attachment will automatically convert an express order of dismissal of the execution application which is a final order into an order of adjournment which is not a final order then there was no point in the High Court taking the trouble of amending rule 57 at all.\n\nThe Court could by simply adjourning the proceedings automatically continue the attachment without any express direction in that behalf.\n\nThe fact that the Court gave an express direction that the attachment should continue clearly indicates that the\n\nKumar PaJhupatinath\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Prooanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDao J.\n\n19SI\n\nKumc.r P llShupatinath\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Prolanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nCoun intended to make a final order of dismissal.\n\nAgain, the heading of column 20 in Exhibit F clearly indicates that only a final order is to be entered in that column.\n\nThe fact that the order was entered in that column affords some justification for the conclusion that the Court made a final order of dismissal.\n\nThat the claim case was automatically dropped is yet another indication that the execution case was at an end. The fact that the judgment-debtor had paid the full costs of the execution case is also a feature which goes to show, to a certain extent at any rate if not decisively, that the execution proceeding was finally disposed of by the order. The following endorsement appears on the petition Ex. 2(a), dated June 2, 1939:\n\n\"Heard learned pleaders for the parties.\n\nThey jointly ask me to cancel the attachment (existing by special order) in Money Ex. 118 of 1936 though that case was dismissed.\"\n\nThis endorsement also clearly shows that the Court itself understood that the order that it made on January .30, 1937, was a final order of dismissal and that the attachment had been continued by a special order.\n\nOn a consideration of all these matters I have not the least doubt in my mind that the order of January 30, 1937, was in form and in substance a final order of dismissal of the Execution Case No. 118 of 1936 and that the attachment was continued by a special order such as is contemplated and authorised bv the amendment made by the Calcutta High Court in rule 57.\n\nLearned advocate for the appellants contended that if the execution case came to an end the attachment could not be left hanging in the air. There is no substance in this argument.\n\nOrdinarily an attachment is supported by an execution case and if the execution case is simply dismissed the attachment must fall with it. But rule 57, as amended, expressly empowers the Court to dismiss an execution application but at the same time to keep alive the attachment by a special order.\n\nThat is what was done in this case.\n\nHere the attachment docs not, to use the expression of the learned advocate for the appellants,\n\nhang in the air.\n\nIt rests upon the solid foundation of a special order which rule 57, as amended, in terms authorises the Court to make.\n\nThe continuance of the attachment, in the circumstances, needs no execution proceeding to support it.\n\nTake the case of an attachment before judgment. Under Orders XXXVIII, rule 11, where after an order of attachment before judgment a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff, it is not necessary upon an application for execution of such a decree to apply for re-attachment of the property.\n\nIt means that the attachment continues and the judgmentdebtor cannot deal with the property to the disadvantage of the decree-holder.\n\nAfter the decree is passed, the attachment continues but nobody will say that although there has been no application for the execution of the decree at any time by the decree-holder there is, nevertheless, an execution proceeding pending merely because the attachment continues.\n\nHere also the attachment subsists and rests only upon the terms of Order, XXXVI rule 11, and without any proceeding.\n\nSuch attachment cannot be called a proceeding in execution, for none was ever initiated after the decree was passed.\n\nIn my judgment, the order of January 30, 1937, was a final order which brought the Execution Case No. 118 of 1936, to an end and the attachment continued, not because there was a pending execution proceeding but because a special order was made under Order XXI, rule 57, as amended by the High Court.\n\nAs to (ii).-Lcarned advocate for the appellants then contended that the petition (Ex. 2a) dated June 2, 1939, amounted to a proceeding in execution and as that was instituted and was pending after January 1, 1939 the proceedings came within the definition in section 2 (22) of \"a suit to which this Act applies\". I do not think this argument is sound. The petition (Ex. 2a) was not really an application at all.\n\nSee Raja Shri Prakash Singh v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd. (1). In substance, it was nothing but a certification by the decreeholder of the satisfaction of the decree.\n\nThe mere fact\n\n(I} 33 C.W.N. 267; A.l.R. !929 P.C. 19.\n\nKumar PaJhupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nKumar Pashupat; natll\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Pro1anna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nK.1nia C. J.\n\nPatanjali Sa11r; J.\n\nthat the document was in the form of a petition could not convert what was really the usual certifying procedure into a proceeding in execution for recovery of a loan or for enforcement of any agreement. It was purely an intimation given to the Court by the decrecholder that the decree had been satisfied out of Court and the prayer for withdrawal of the attachment was merely consequential and would follow as a matter of course on full satisfaction of the decree being recorded.\n\nThe order made on that petition also shows that the decree was recorded as adjusted and the attachment was cancelled. In my judgment, that petition (Ex. 2a) was not an application such as would initiate a proceeding in execution for any of the purposes mentioned in clauses (a) or (b) or ( c) of section 2 (22) of the Act.\n\nFor reasons stated above, the decrees sought to be reopened were not decrees made in \"a suit to which this Act applies\".\n\nSuit No. 78 of 1922 was neither instituted on or after January 1, 1939, nor was it pending on that date, all the three decrees having been passed long before that date. Nor was any proceedihg in execution such as is contemplated by section 2 (22) instituted or pending on or after that date.\n\nThe Execution Case No. 118 of 1936 was at an end on January 30, 1937, and the petition of June 2, 1939, was not an application at all and was certainly not a proceeding in execution within the meaning of section 2 (22) o~ the Act. This conclusion is sufficient to dismiss this appeal and it is not necessary for us to consider the other question raised by the respondent on the strength of section 36 (5) of the Act and I express no opinion on that question.\n\nThe result is that this appeal must stand dismissed with costs and I order accordingly.\n\nKANIA C. J.-1 agree,\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI J.-Thc facts bearing on the dispute in this appeal arc fully stated in the judgment of my brother Das which I have had he advantage of reading and it is unnecessary to recapitulate them here.\n\nThe appellant mortgagor seeks in these proceedings the reliefs provided by the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in respect of a decree debt payable by him.\n\nThe respondent who represents the sub-mortgagee decree-holder invokes the protection of two exemptions contained in the Act : (1) Section 36(1), proviso (ii), which exempts inter alia \"any decree other than a decree in a suit to which this Act applies which was not fully satisfied by the first day of January, 1939\".\n\nThis raises a dispute as to whether the respondent's decree was passed in a suit to which the Act applies.\n\n(2) Section 36 (5) which exempts \"the rights of any assignee or holder for value if the Court is satisfied that the assignment to him was bona fide and that he had not received the notice referred to in clause\n\n(a) of sub-section ( 1) of section 28\".\n\nThis raises the question whether a sub-mortgagee is an assignee within the meaning of the Act.\n\nOn the first question, \"a suit to which this Act applies\" is defined in section 2(22) as meaning \"any suit or proceeding instituted or filed on or after the 1st day of January, 1939, or pending on that date and includes a proceeding in execution for (among other things) the recovery of loan advanced before or after the commencement of this Act.\" This definition has been construed as requiring that the \"proceeding in execution\" referred to therein should be pending on 1st January, 1939, and the question accordingly arises whether the order of the executing court dated 30th January, 1937, which purported to dismiss the respondent's execution case for non-prosecution while cc5ntinuing the attachment already effected, terminated the proceeding in execution which had resulted in the attachment.\n\nIt was said that the order was made in accordance with Order XXI, rule 57, of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by the Calcutta High Court and must, therefore, be taken to have been intended to put an end to the execution proceeding altogether I am not satisfied that such was the result of the dismissal.\n\nThe amendment wliich added the words \"unless the court shall make an order to the contrary\"\n\nKumar Pashupatinath\n\nMaUa and Another\n\n•• Deba Pro!anna\n\nMukherjee\n\nPatan}ali\n\nSa.•tri J.\n\nKumar Pa.Jbupalinath\n\nMJ/ia end .4n11flt6\n\n\"' Drflh11. Pmsantra..\n\nMi:kherj~~\n\nPatanju/j s, ntrj J.\n\nat the end of the rule envisages a dismissal of an \"application for execution\" while at the same time continuing a subsisting attachment. The dismissal of 30th January, 1937, must, therefore, be taken to be a dismissal of the execution application then before the court and cannot be taken to have any wider operation.\n\nOn the other hand, the continuance, in express terms, of the attachment notwithstanding the dismissal, indicates that the proceeding which had resulted in the attachment was kept alive to be carried forward later on by sale of the attached property.\n\nAttachment itself is a \"proceeding in execution\" and, so long as it subsists, the proceeding in execution can well be regarded as pending.\n\nIn In re Clagett's Estate; Fordham v. Clagett(') Jessel M. R. declared that \"a pending matte( in any court of justice means one in which some proceeding may still be taken\".\n\nThe attachment was cancelled by the court only on 2nd June, 1939, when the decree in question was recorded as adjusted and then and not before, could execution of the decree be properly considered to have terminated.\n\nIn this view, a \"proceeding in execution\" was pending on the 1st day of January, 1939, and the respondent's decree must be taken to have been passed \"in a suit to which this Act applies'', with the result that the respondent's claim to exemption under proviso (ii) to sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Act must fail.\n\nI am, however, of opinion that the respondent's claim to recover his decree debt is protected under section 36(5).\n\nThere is no question here but that the submortgage to the respondent's predecessor in title was bona fide.\n\nNor could he have received the . notlce referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 28 as the transaction took place long before the Act was passed.\n\nIt is not disputed that section 36(5) applies to pre-Act debts. [See Renula Bos-e v. Manmatha Nath\n\nBose(')]. The only question, therefore, is whether the respondent as sub-mortgagee is an assignee within the meaning of sub-section (5) of section 36.\n\nThe learned\n\n(I) 20 ch. D. 637,\n\n(2) L.R. 72 I.A. 156.\n\nJudges in the court below held that he was not, following an earlier decision of their own court in Promode\n\nKumar Roy v. Nikhi1 Bhusan Mukhopadhya(1).\n\nThat decision, however, was reversed by the Privy Council in Promode Kumar Roy v. Nikhil Bhusan Mukhopadhya (2) where their Lordships dealt with the question now before us in the following terms :-\n\n\"It was suggested, in the judgment of Mitter J. (with which Waight J. agreed), and in the argument for the\n\nre; pondents that if a sub-mortgagee were an 'assignee' within section 36, sub-section (5), of the Act, certain di':fficulties and anomalies would result. Their Lordships cannot agree with this suggestion.\n\nThey express no view as to the position which arises if the sub-mortgage contains only a charge on the original mortgage debt, but when it contains an assignment of that debt, and of all the rights of the mortgagee, the position appears to be free from difficulty. Relief can be given to the original mortgagor as against the original mortgagee under section 36, but such relief must not affect the rights of the assignee by way of sub-mortgage.\n\nTo take an imaginary case by way of illustration, let it be assumend that the amount due on the original mortgage, for principal and interest at the original rate, is Rs. 1,000, and the sum due on the sub-mortgage by assignment, for principal and interest at the original rate, is Rs. 500.\n\nLet it further be assumed that if relief could be given, and were given, under section 36 as against both mortgagee and sub-mortgagee, the sums due to them respectively would be Rs. 800 and Rs. 400.\n\nBy reason of sub-section (5), the sub-mortgagee's rights. cannot be affected. He can therefore as assignee of the mortgage debt, claim his full Rs. 500, as against both mortgagor and original mortgagee.\n\nBut if the court gives the mortgagor relief as against the original mortgagee, the mortgagor will only be liable to pay to the original mortgagee Rs. 300, the balance of the reduced debt aiteL paying the sub-mortgagee in full.\n\nAs to contention (b), it is impossible to read subsection (5) of section 36 as referring only to an assignee\n\n(I) 50C.W.N.407.\n\n(2) L. R. 76 I.A. 74.\n\nKumar Pa3hupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee. -!\n\nPatanjafi\n\nSa3tri J.\n\n19SI\n\nKumar Pa:Jhupatinat h\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDba Pro1anna\n\nMukherjee.\n\nPatan}a/i Sajtrl J.\n\nof a mortgage decree. The words 'and that he had not received the notice referred to in clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 28' make it plain that an assignee of a mortgage debt is within the sub-section, since section 28, sub-section (1) is concerned only with assignment of debts\" (pp- B-84).\n\nThe sub-mortgage here in question also contains an assignment of the debt due under the original mortgage debt and of \"the entire interest\" of the origioal mortgagee. After reciting tlieir original mortgage, the mortgagees proceed to state in the deed of submortgage:\n\n\"We mortgage all that is at present due and that will in future become due to us, the first, second, third and fourth parties, on account of the said one lakh of rupees together . with interest and the entire interest under the mortgage taken by us on the basis of the\n\nsaid Indenture in respect of five annas share of the said Niskar Mouza Monoharbahal and in respect of sixteen annas of the surface and underground rights in the said Monza Marichkota and we make over the said Deed of Indenture to you\" : ·\n\nThe decision referred to above is, therefore, directly in point and rules the present case.\n\nIt was suggested that the said decision was inconsistent with the earlier decisions of the same tribunal in Ram Kinkar Banriee v. Satya Charan Srimani(1) and fagadamba Loan Co. v.\n\nRaia Shiba Prasad Singh ( 2). Stress was laid upon the expression \"all the rights of the mortgagee\" used by their Lordships in the passage quoted above, and it was pointed out that in the earlier decisions they held that in India a legal interest remained in the mortgagor even when the mortgage was in the form an English mortgage, and that the interest taken by the mortgagee was not an absolute interest.\n\nThis proposition, it was said, implied that in a sub-mortgage all the rights of the original mortgagee are not assigned to the sub-mortgagee and that the mortgagee still retains a legal\n\n(I) 64 l. A. SO.\n\n12) 68 I.A. 67.\n\ninterest in the original mortgage.\n\nThis is a rather superficial view of the matter. In the earlier cases their Lordships were considering the quantum of interest transferred , by a mortgagor to a mortgagee in a mortgage of leasehold interest for the purpose of determining whether or not there was privity of estate between the landlord and the mortgagee. If the mortgage could operate as an assignment of the entire intest of the mortgagor in the lease, the mortgagee would be liable by privity of estate for the burdens of the lease. If, on the other hand, it operated only as a partial assignment of the mortgagor's interest, no such result would follow. It was sin determining that issue that their Lordships held that no privity of estate arose in India because a legal interest remained in the mortgagor and the interest taken by the mortgagee was not an absolute interest.\n\nThese cases had no bearing on the question, which arose in Promode Kumar Roy v. Nikhil, Bhusan Mukhopadhya(1) and arises in the present case, as to whether a sub-mortgagee\n\nbecoms at). assignee of the mortgage debt and of the mortgagee's right to recover the debt from the original mortgagor.\n\nThe Act affo.i:ds relief to certain classes of debtors by curtailing pro tanto the rights of the creditors, subject to certain exceptions in regard to \"assignments of loans\". In such a context the only relevant consideration could be whether the assignment is such as 10 establish a debtor and creditor relation between the assignee and the debtor so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act.\n\nIf the sub-mortgagee obtained, by virtue of, the sub-mortgage, the right to sue the original mortgagor for recovery of the mortgage debt, that would seem sufficient to make him an assignee within the meaning of the Act. It was from this point of view that the question as to the nature of the right transferred to a sub-mortgagee under his sub-mortgage was considered in Promode Kumar Roy\n\nv. Nikhil Bhusa11 Mukliopadli}w(1) as it has to be considered in the present case, and the reference to the sub-mortgage containing an assignment of , if/ the rights\n\n(l) 76 I. A. 74.\n\nl9Sl\n\nKumar Pashupatinath Malia and .Another\n\nDeha ProJanna Mukherjee.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSa8fri J.\n\n19SI\n\nKumar Pa1hupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba ProJanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nPatanfali\n\nSastri J.\n\nof the mortgagee must, in that context, be understood with reference to the sufficiency of the right assigned to enable the sub-mortgagee to sue the original mort gagor in his own right, so a~ to bring the relevant provisions of the Act into play as between them. The reservation made by their Lordships in the case of a sub-mortgage containing only a charge on the original mortgage is signification and supports this view. I do not consider, therefore, that there is any inconsistency between Promode Kumar Roy v.\n\nNikhil Bhusan Mukhopadhya(') and the earlier decisions, and even if\n\nthere be any such inconsistency it has no relevance to the present case.\n\nIn the result I agree that the appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : R. R. Biswas. ' Agent for the respondent : Sukumar Ghose.\n\nEASTERN INVESTMENTS LTD. v.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.] Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 12(2)-Business expenditure-Interest on debentures-Reducing capital of company hy taking over shares and giving debentures to shareholder-Income of company reJucd-lnterest on Jebentures,.whether allowable.\n\nA private limited company formed for dealing in shares and securities had a share capital of 250 )acs of rupees of which shares of the face value of 50 lacs were held by A and the remaining shares were held by his nominee's.\n\nAs the company was in need of money it was resolved, with the consent of A, to reduce the share capital by 50 lacs by the oompany taking over the 50 lacs shares which were held by A and giving to A instead debentures of the face value of Rs. 50 lacs carrying interest at 5 per. cent. per annum.\n\nThe Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and\n\n(I) 76 I. A. 74.", "total_entities": 154, "entities": [{"text": "Raji11der Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 687, "end_char": 703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : Raji11der Narain."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 735, "end_char": 745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : P. K. Bose."}}, {"text": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 748, "end_char": 783, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DEBA PROSANNA MUKHERJEE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 785, "end_char": 808, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 827, "end_char": 832, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KANIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 841, "end_char": 857, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. R. DAS JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 862, "end_char": 875, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "s. R. DAS JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bengal Money Lenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 878, "end_char": 902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 945, "end_char": 950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Bengal Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "s. 36(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1374, "end_char": 1382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Money Lenders Act", "statute": "Bengal Money Lenders Act"}}, {"text": "January 30, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1786, "end_char": 1802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree-holder filed a petition on January 30, 1937, praying that the execution case \"may be struck off for non-prosecution, keeping the attachment in force\" in Yiew of certain negotiations for amicable settlement, and the court passed an order that the: execution case \"is dismissed for non-prosecution, the attachment\n\nS.C.R-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 573\n\nalready effected continuing\"."}}, {"text": "June 2, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2141, "end_char": 2153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 2, 1939, the decreeholder filed a petition statir>g that the decree had been adjusted and attachment may be withdrawn."}}, {"text": "September 1, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2313, "end_char": 2330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal Money-lenders Act came into force on September 1, 1940, and on January 2, 1941 the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor filed a suit 'under s. 36 of the Act praying for re-opening the transactions."}}, {"text": "January 2, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2339, "end_char": 2354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal Money-lenders Act came into force on September 1, 1940, and on January 2, 1941 the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor filed a suit 'under s. 36 of the Act praying for re-opening the transactions."}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2424, "end_char": 2429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2669, "end_char": 2677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3084, "end_char": 3103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21, r. 57 of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by the Calcutta High Court, and notwithstanding the fact that the attachment was continued there was no execution proceeding pending on January 1, 1939, and accordingly the decree sought to be reopened was not one passed in \"a suit to which the Act applies\" within the meaning of s. 2(22) of the Act and the Court had no power to re-open the transactions under s. 36 (2)."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3213, "end_char": 3228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21, r. 57 of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by the Calcutta High Court, and notwithstanding the fact that the attachment was continued there was no execution proceeding pending on January 1, 1939, and accordingly the decree sought to be reopened was not one passed in \"a suit to which the Act applies\" within the meaning of s. 2(22) of the Act and the Court had no power to re-open the transactions under s. 36 (2)."}}, {"text": "s. 2(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3357, "end_char": 3365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3438, "end_char": 3443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4465, "end_char": 4473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R.\n\n72 I.A. 156", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4522, "end_char": 4539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 76 I.A. 74", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4658, "end_char": 4673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. C. Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4862, "end_char": 4874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ure at Calcutta (K. C. Mitter, and K. C. Chunder JJ) m appeal from Original Decree No.", "canonical_name": "K. C. Mitter"}}, {"text": "K. C. Chunder", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4880, "end_char": 4893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ure at Calcutta (K. C. Mitter, and K. C. Chunder JJ) m appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "Kumar PaJhupatinatf1", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4958, "end_char": 4978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "49 of 1942 arising\n0\n\nKumar PaJhupatinatf1\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Pro1annfJ\n\nMukherjee\n\nKumar Ulashupatinath\n\nMalia adAnvther v.\n\nDebo Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nout of Decree dated the 8th September 1941 of the Subordinate Judge at Asansole in Suit No.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Kumar Ulashupatinath\n\nMalia adAnvther v.\n\nDebo Prosanna Mukherjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5029, "end_char": 5094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "49 of 1942 arising\n0\n\nKumar PaJhupatinatf1\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Pro1annfJ\n\nMukherjee\n\nKumar Ulashupatinath\n\nMalia adAnvther v.\n\nDebo Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nout of Decree dated the 8th September 1941 of the Subordinate Judge at Asansole in Suit No."}}, {"text": "Purusottam Chatterji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purusottam Chatterji (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5222, "end_char": 5237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purusottam Chatterji (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Panchanan Chose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Da, J.\n\nPanchanan Chose, (P. C.\n\nChatterjee, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. C.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5296, "end_char": 5313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Da, J.\n\nPanchanan Chose, (P. C.\n\nChatterjee, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kumar Dakhineswar Malia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5649, "end_char": 5672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A suit had been instituted by one Kumar Dakhineswar Malia against Rameswar Malia, Rani Bhaba Sundari and others for partition of the Searsole Raj Estate."}}, {"text": "Rameswar Malia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5681, "end_char": 5695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A suit had been instituted by one Kumar Dakhineswar Malia against Rameswar Malia, Rani Bhaba Sundari and others for partition of the Searsole Raj Estate."}}, {"text": "Rani Bhaba Sundari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5697, "end_char": 5715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A suit had been instituted by one Kumar Dakhineswar Malia against Rameswar Malia, Rani Bhaba Sundari and others for partition of the Searsole Raj Estate."}}, {"text": "Searsole Raj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5748, "end_char": 5760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A suit had been instituted by one Kumar Dakhineswar Malia against Rameswar Malia, Rani Bhaba Sundari and others for partition of the Searsole Raj Estate."}}, {"text": "Bhagabati Charan Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Bhagabati Charan Mitra was appointed receiver of that estate in that suit."}}, {"text": "August 10, 1908", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5852, "end_char": 5867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 10, 1908, the said receiver with the permission of the Court which had appointed him as receiver granted two mining leases, each for 999 years-one in respect of 5/16 share of the Malias in Mouza Monohar Bahal and • the other in respect of 230 bigh:is in village Marich Kota-to a firm then carrying on business under the name and style of Laik Banerjee & Company."}}, {"text": "Mouza Monohar Bahal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 10, 1908, the said receiver with the permission of the Court which had appointed him as receiver granted two mining leases, each for 999 years-one in respect of 5/16 share of the Malias in Mouza Monohar Bahal and • the other in respect of 230 bigh:is in village Marich Kota-to a firm then carrying on business under the name and style of Laik Banerjee & Company."}}, {"text": "Marich Kota", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6121, "end_char": 6132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 10, 1908, the said receiver with the permission of the Court which had appointed him as receiver granted two mining leases, each for 999 years-one in respect of 5/16 share of the Malias in Mouza Monohar Bahal and • the other in respect of 230 bigh:is in village Marich Kota-to a firm then carrying on business under the name and style of Laik Banerjee & Company."}}, {"text": "Laik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6197, "end_char": 6201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 10, 1908, the said receiver with the permission of the Court which had appointed him as receiver granted two mining leases, each for 999 years-one in respect of 5/16 share of the Malias in Mouza Monohar Bahal and • the other in respect of 230 bigh:is in village Marich Kota-to a firm then carrying on business under the name and style of Laik Banerjee & Company."}}, {"text": "Banerjee & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 10, 1908, the said receiver with the permission of the Court which had appointed him as receiver granted two mining leases, each for 999 years-one in respect of 5/16 share of the Malias in Mouza Monohar Bahal and • the other in respect of 230 bigh:is in village Marich Kota-to a firm then carrying on business under the name and style of Laik Banerjee & Company."}}, {"text": "Malias", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6411, "end_char": 6417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Malias joined the receiver in executing the aforesaid leases and the mortgage."}}, {"text": "Laik Banerjee & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6537, "end_char": 6560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of these transactions the firm of Laik Banerjee & Company became the lessees for 999 years of the two properties as well as the mortgagee of the lessors' interest in the same."}}, {"text": "Deva Prasanna Mukherjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6821, "end_char": 6844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By diverse processes not necessary to be deailed, the appellants have become the successors in interest of the mortgagors and the respondent Deva Prasanna Mukherjee has become the successor in interest of the mortgagee under the mortgage.", "canonical_name": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6945, "end_char": 6959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 31, 1922, Deva Prasanna filed suit No."}}, {"text": "Deva Prasanna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6961, "end_char": 6974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 31, 1922, Deva Prasanna filed suit No.", "canonical_name": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee"}}, {"text": "July 31, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7097, "end_char": 7110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Preliminary decree was passed in the last mentioned suit on July 31, 1928, and a final decree for sale was made on February 26, 1929."}}, {"text": "February 26, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7152, "end_char": 7169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Preliminary decree was passed in the last mentioned suit on July 31, 1928, and a final decree for sale was made on February 26, 1929."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7350, "end_char": 7363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This sale was confirmed by the Court on June 30, 1931."}}, {"text": "October 30,\n\n1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7440, "end_char": 7457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A large sum remaining still due: to Deva Prasanna, he applied for, and 6n October 30,\n\n1935, obtained a personal decree for Rs."}}, {"text": "Raja Pramatha Nath Malia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7515, "end_char": 7539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,27,179-0-6 against Raja Pramatha Nath Malia who had by inheritance acquired the lessors' interest and become the borrower."}}, {"text": "Kumars Pashupati Nath Malia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10157, "end_char": 10184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Kobala executed with the permission of the Board of Revenue Raja Pramatha Nath Malia and his two sons Kumars Pashupati Nath Malia and Kshitipati Nath Malia represented by Kumar Kshitipati Nath Malia as the Manager of the Searsole Raj Wards Estate conveyed a property known as Seriapati Mahal to Deva Prasanna in full settlement of his claim under the personal decree against the Raja.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Kshitipati Nath Malia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10189, "end_char": 10210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Kobala executed with the permission of the Board of Revenue Raja Pramatha Nath Malia and his two sons Kumars Pashupati Nath Malia and Kshitipati Nath Malia represented by Kumar Kshitipati Nath Malia as the Manager of the Searsole Raj Wards Estate conveyed a property known as Seriapati Mahal to Deva Prasanna in full settlement of his claim under the personal decree against the Raja."}}, {"text": "Kumar Kshitipati Nath Malia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10226, "end_char": 10253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Kobala executed with the permission of the Board of Revenue Raja Pramatha Nath Malia and his two sons Kumars Pashupati Nath Malia and Kshitipati Nath Malia represented by Kumar Kshitipati Nath Malia as the Manager of the Searsole Raj Wards Estate conveyed a property known as Seriapati Mahal to Deva Prasanna in full settlement of his claim under the personal decree against the Raja."}}, {"text": "Senapati Mahal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10596, "end_char": 10610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Senapati Mahal originally belonged to the Raja but had been transferred by him to his two sons."}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10737, "end_char": 10747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10755, "end_char": 10779, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 4, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11003, "end_char": 11018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal was filed by the Kwnars which was pending at the date of the Kobala of January 4, 1939, and, in the circumstances, it was considered safer to join the Raja in the last mentioned Kobala in favour of Deva Prasanna."}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge, Asansole", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11191, "end_char": 11231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 2, 1939, a petition was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Asansole, on behalf of Deva Prasanna as the decree holder."}}, {"text": "30th January 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11453, "end_char": 11470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portions of this petition were as follows :-' ·\n\n\"That the above execution case was disposed of On the 30th January 1937 with the attachment of the properties subsisting ; since then the decree put into execution in the above case has been adjusted after remission of a large amount of interest by the out and out sale of certain properties by a registered Kobala dated 4th January 1939 .............................. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ."}}, {"text": "4th January 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11720, "end_char": 11736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portions of this petition were as follows :-' ·\n\n\"That the above execution case was disposed of On the 30th January 1937 with the attachment of the properties subsisting ; since then the decree put into execution in the above case has been adjusted after remission of a large amount of interest by the out and out sale of certain properties by a registered Kobala dated 4th January 1939 .............................. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ."}}, {"text": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12844, "end_char": 12868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F the following entry was made :-\n\n\"The said attachment is cancelled and the decree in question is recorded as adjusted as stated y learned\n\nKumar Pashupatinath Malia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nDaaJ.\n\nKumar Pashupatinatlr\n\nMalia a_nd Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDai J.\n\npleader for the D. H. and the pleader of the Judgment Debtor according to the adjustment mentioned but not detailed in this petition of to.day.", "canonical_name": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee"}}, {"text": "Dai J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12870, "end_char": 12876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F the following entry was made :-\n\n\"The said attachment is cancelled and the decree in question is recorded as adjusted as stated y learned\n\nKumar Pashupatinath Malia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nDaaJ.\n\nKumar Pashupatinatlr\n\nMalia a_nd Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDai J.\n\npleader for the D. H. and the pleader of the Judgment Debtor according to the adjustment mentioned but not detailed in this petition of to.day."}}, {"text": "Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13149, "end_char": 13179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bengal Act X of", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13181, "end_char": 13196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13346, "end_char": 13350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 2, 1941, the appellants who, as the legal representatives of the Raja, became \"borrowers\" within the meaning of the Act filed the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen."}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13527, "end_char": 13537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Act X of\n\n1940", "statute": "Bengal Act X of\n\n1940"}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13786, "end_char": 13796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Act X of\n\n1940", "statute": "Bengal Act X of\n\n1940"}}, {"text": "May 8, .1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14005, "end_char": 14017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 8, .1941, the Subordinate Judge settled the issues and fixed June 9, 1941, \"for a preliminary hearing of the suit and particularly of such of the issues as have been based on the pleas in bar.\""}}, {"text": "June 9, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14070, "end_char": 14082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 8, .1941, the Subordinate Judge settled the issues and fixed June 9, 1941, \"for a preliminary hearing of the suit and particularly of such of the issues as have been based on the pleas in bar.\""}}, {"text": "September 4, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14264, "end_char": 14281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually, the case was taken up for preliminary hearing on September 4, 1941, and by his judgment delivered on September 8, 1941, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on issue No."}}, {"text": "September 8, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14316, "end_char": 14333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually, the case was taken up for preliminary hearing on September 4, 1941, and by his judgment delivered on September 8, 1941, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on issue No."}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14531, "end_char": 14553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants preferred an appeal to the High Court at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "R. C. Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14581, "end_char": 14593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the High Court (R. C. Mitter and K. C. Chunder JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. C. Mitter"}}, {"text": "section 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15056, "end_char": 15067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15071, "end_char": 15098, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15321, "end_char": 15331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15604, "end_char": 15614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15750, "end_char": 15760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16591, "end_char": 16601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kumar Pa3hupatinoth\n\nMalia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16869, "end_char": 16895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Da11 J.\n\n19~1\n\nKumar Pa3hupatinoth\n\nMalia on4 Anothtr v.\n\nDeba Proan11iJ\n\nMukherjee.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17974, "end_char": 17984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18261, "end_char": 18271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19213, "end_char": 19220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the light of the decision of the Full Bench of the\n\nCalcutta High Court in Mrityunjay Mitra v. Satis Chandra Banerji(1) which was approved by the Privy Council in Jadu Nath Roy V Kshitish Chandra Acharyya(2), it has not been contended, in view of the fact that the personal decree for the balance remained unsatisfied on January 1, 1939, that the decrees in Suit No."}}, {"text": "Section 2(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19456, "end_char": 19469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st day of January, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20363, "end_char": 20387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words \"instituted or filed on or after the 1st day of January, 1939, or pending on that date\" have been read and understood as qualifying the words \"any suit or proceeding\" in the beginning of the definition as well as the words \"proceeding in execution\" occurring further down: see per Spens C. J. in Bank of Commerce Ltd., v. Amulya Krishna(3)."}}, {"text": "L.R. 76 I.A. 179", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20738, "end_char": 20754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1944) F.C.R. 126", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20771, "end_char": 20788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kumar Pashupati11ath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20811, "end_char": 20831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) (1944) F.C.R. 126; I.A.R. 1944 F.C. 18\n\nKumar Pashupati11ath\n\nMalia a11d Another\n\nDeba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nKumar Pa•hupallnath\n\nMalia and Another\n\n•• Deba ProMnKa\n\nMukherj.e.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Coutt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21351, "end_char": 21370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was upheld by a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Coutt in Aparna Kumari\n\nv. Girish Chandra (2) which overruled two earlier decisions to the contrary."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21492, "end_char": 21501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rankin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22734, "end_char": 22740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason why rule 57 was introduced in the Code of 1908 has been explained by Rankin C. J, in Shibnath Singh Ray v. Sheikh Saberuddin Ahmad (\") as follows :-\n\n(I) 46C.W.N.SS7; A.I.R.!942Cal.44l."}}, {"text": "SS7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22827, "end_char": 22830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22883, "end_char": 22885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kumar Pash11patinath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25076, "end_char": 25096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object of the last sentence in rule 57 is to settle the question whether, when the application in execution is dis- missed, any attachment made , under that application should fall to the ground or should subsist, and\n\nKumar Pash11patinath\n\nMalta and Another\n\nDeba Proaanna Mukherjee\n\nDa& J,\n\nKumar PtUhupat/nath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Projanna\n\nMu/ohel'}ee\n\nDai I.\n\nthe legislature has provided that it is to fall to the\n\nground.\"", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Deba Projanna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25193, "end_char": 25206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object of the last sentence in rule 57 is to settle the question whether, when the application in execution is dis- missed, any attachment made , under that application should fall to the ground or should subsist, and\n\nKumar Pash11patinath\n\nMalta and Another\n\nDeba Proaanna Mukherjee\n\nDa& J,\n\nKumar PtUhupat/nath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Projanna\n\nMu/ohel'}ee\n\nDai I.\n\nthe legislature has provided that it is to fall to the\n\nground.\"", "canonical_name": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee"}}, {"text": "Kumar PaJhupatinath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29463, "end_char": 29482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the Court gave an express direction that the attachment should continue clearly indicates that the\n\nKumar PaJhupatinath\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Prooanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDao J.\n\n19SI\n\nKumc.r P llShupatinath\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Prolanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nCoun intended to make a final order of dismissal.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Dao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29529, "end_char": 29532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the Court gave an express direction that the attachment should continue clearly indicates that the\n\nKumar PaJhupatinath\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Prooanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDao J.\n\n19SI\n\nKumc.r P llShupatinath\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Prolanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nCoun intended to make a final order of dismissal."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29612, "end_char": 29615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the Court gave an express direction that the attachment should continue clearly indicates that the\n\nKumar PaJhupatinath\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Prooanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDao J.\n\n19SI\n\nKumc.r P llShupatinath\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Prolanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nCoun intended to make a final order of dismissal.", "canonical_name": "Das"}}, {"text": "January .30, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30641, "end_char": 30658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This endorsement also clearly shows that the Court itself understood that the order that it made on January .30, 1937, was a final order of dismissal and that the attachment had been continued by a special order."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33484, "end_char": 33493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deba Prosanna Mukherjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33902, "end_char": 33925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar PaJhupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nKumar Pashupat; natll\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Pro1anna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nK.1nia C. J.\n\nPatanjali Sa11r; J.\n\nthat the document was in the form of a petition could not convert what was really the usual certifying procedure into a proceeding in execution for recovery of a loan or for enforcement of any agreement.", "canonical_name": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee"}}, {"text": "Das J.\n\nKumar Pashupat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33927, "end_char": 33949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar PaJhupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nKumar Pashupat; natll\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Pro1anna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nK.1nia C. J.\n\nPatanjali Sa11r; J.\n\nthat the document was in the form of a petition could not convert what was really the usual certifying procedure into a proceeding in execution for recovery of a loan or for enforcement of any agreement."}}, {"text": "Das J.\n\nK.1nia C. J.\n\nPatanjali Sa11r", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34003, "end_char": 34040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar PaJhupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna Mukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nKumar Pashupat; natll\n\nMalia and Another\n\nDeba Pro1anna\n\nMukherjee\n\nDas J.\n\nK.1nia C. J.\n\nPatanjali Sa11r; J.\n\nthat the document was in the form of a petition could not convert what was really the usual certifying procedure into a proceeding in execution for recovery of a loan or for enforcement of any agreement."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34825, "end_char": 34834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35207, "end_char": 35216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35472, "end_char": 35481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35658, "end_char": 35668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35817, "end_char": 35822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANIA C. J.-1 agree,\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI J.-Thc facts bearing on the dispute in this appeal arc fully stated in the judgment of my brother Das which I have had he advantage of reading and it is unnecessary to recapitulate them here.", "canonical_name": "KANIA"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35954, "end_char": 35957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANIA C. J.-1 agree,\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI J.-Thc facts bearing on the dispute in this appeal arc fully stated in the judgment of my brother Das which I have had he advantage of reading and it is unnecessary to recapitulate them here.", "canonical_name": "Das"}}, {"text": "Section 36(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36371, "end_char": 36384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant mortgagor seeks in these proceedings the reliefs provided by the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "The appellant mortgagor seeks in these proceedings the reliefs provided by the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "first day of January, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36530, "end_char": 36556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent who represents the sub-mortgagee decree-holder invokes the protection of two exemptions contained in the Act : (1) Section 36(1), proviso (ii), which exempts inter alia \"any decree other than a decree in a suit to which this Act applies which was not fully satisfied by the first day of January, 1939\"."}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36672, "end_char": 36682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant mortgagor seeks in these proceedings the reliefs provided by the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "The appellant mortgagor seeks in these proceedings the reliefs provided by the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36906, "end_char": 36916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant mortgagor seeks in these proceedings the reliefs provided by the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "The appellant mortgagor seeks in these proceedings the reliefs provided by the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "section 2(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37088, "end_char": 37101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant mortgagor seeks in these proceedings the reliefs provided by the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "The appellant mortgagor seeks in these proceedings the reliefs provided by the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "1st January, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37488, "end_char": 37505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This definition has been construed as requiring that the \"proceeding in execution\" referred to therein should be pending on 1st January, 1939, and the question accordingly arises whether the order of the executing court dated 30th January, 1937, which purported to dismiss the respondent's execution case for non-prosecution while cc5ntinuing the attachment already effected, terminated the proceeding in execution which had resulted in the attachment."}}, {"text": "30th January, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37590, "end_char": 37608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This definition has been construed as requiring that the \"proceeding in execution\" referred to therein should be pending on 1st January, 1939, and the question accordingly arises whether the order of the executing court dated 30th January, 1937, which purported to dismiss the respondent's execution case for non-prosecution while cc5ntinuing the attachment already effected, terminated the proceeding in execution which had resulted in the attachment."}}, {"text": "Kumar Pashupatinath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38220, "end_char": 38239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment wliich added the words \"unless the court shall make an order to the contrary\"\n\nKumar Pashupatinath\n\nMaUa and Another\n\n•• Deba Pro!anna\n\nMukherjee\n\nPatan}ali\n\nSa.•tri J.\n\nKumar Pa.Jbupalinath\n\nMJ/ia end .4n11flt6\n\n\"' Drflh11.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Kumar Pa.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38311, "end_char": 38320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment wliich added the words \"unless the court shall make an order to the contrary\"\n\nKumar Pashupatinath\n\nMaUa and Another\n\n•• Deba Pro!anna\n\nMukherjee\n\nPatan}ali\n\nSa.•tri J.\n\nKumar Pa.Jbupalinath\n\nMJ/ia end .4n11flt6\n\n\"' Drflh11."}}, {"text": "Jessel M. R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39172, "end_char": 39184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In In re Clagett's Estate; Fordham v. Clagett(') Jessel M. R. declared that \"a pending matte( in any court of justice means one in which some proceeding may still be taken\"."}}, {"text": "2nd June, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39348, "end_char": 39362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The attachment was cancelled by the court only on 2nd June, 1939, when the decree in question was recorded as adjusted and then and not before, could execution of the decree be properly considered to have terminated."}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39803, "end_char": 39813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39937, "end_char": 39950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40149, "end_char": 40159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40247, "end_char": 40260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40462, "end_char": 40472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 72 I.A. 156", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 40512, "end_char": 40528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40921, "end_char": 40927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That decision, however, was reversed by the Privy Council in Promode Kumar Roy v. Nikhil Bhusan Mukhopadhya (2) where their Lordships dealt with the question now before us in the following terms :-\n\n\"It was suggested, in the judgment of Mitter J. (with which Waight J. agreed), and in the argument for the\n\nre; pondents that if a sub-mortgagee were an 'assignee' within section 36, sub-section (5), of the Act, certain di':fficulties and anomalies would result."}}, {"text": "Waight", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40943, "end_char": 40949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That decision, however, was reversed by the Privy Council in Promode Kumar Roy v. Nikhil Bhusan Mukhopadhya (2) where their Lordships dealt with the question now before us in the following terms :-\n\n\"It was suggested, in the judgment of Mitter J. (with which Waight J. agreed), and in the argument for the\n\nre; pondents that if a sub-mortgagee were an 'assignee' within section 36, sub-section (5), of the Act, certain di':fficulties and anomalies would result."}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41054, "end_char": 41064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41549, "end_char": 41559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42015, "end_char": 42025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42633, "end_char": 42643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L. R. 76 I.A. 74", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42700, "end_char": 42716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kumar Pa3hupatinath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42719, "end_char": 42738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar Pa3hupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee. -!", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Deba Prosanna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42762, "end_char": 42775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar Pa3hupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee. -!", "canonical_name": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee"}}, {"text": "Kumar Pa:Jhupatinat h\n\nMalia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42820, "end_char": 42848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjafi\n\nSa3tri J.\n\n19SI\n\nKumar Pa:Jhupatinat h\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDba Pro1anna\n\nMukherjee.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43032, "end_char": 43042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43127, "end_char": 43137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44489, "end_char": 44494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stress was laid upon the expression \"all the rights of the mortgagee\" used by their Lordships in the passage quoted above, and it was pointed out that in the earlier decisions they held that in India a legal interest remained in the mortgagor even when the mortgage was in the form an English mortgage, and that the interest taken by the mortgagee was not an absolute interest."}}, {"text": "Kumar Pashupatinath Malia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47057, "end_char": 47082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l9Sl\n\nKumar Pashupatinath Malia and .Another\n\nDeha ProJanna Mukherjee.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Deha ProJanna Mukherjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47097, "end_char": 47120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l9Sl\n\nKumar Pashupatinath Malia and .Another\n\nDeha ProJanna Mukherjee.", "canonical_name": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee"}}, {"text": "Kumar Pa1hupatinath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47151, "end_char": 47170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSa8fri J.\n\n19SI\n\nKumar Pa1hupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba ProJanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nPatanfali\n\nSastri J.\n\nof the mortgagee must, in that context, be understood with reference to the sufficiency of the right assigned to enable the sub-mortgagee to sue the original mort gagor in his own right, so a~ to bring the relevant provisions of the Act into play as between them.", "canonical_name": "KUMAR PASHUPATINATH MALIA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Deba ProJanna\n\nMukherjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47194, "end_char": 47218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali\n\nSa8fri J.\n\n19SI\n\nKumar Pa1hupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba ProJanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nPatanfali\n\nSastri J.\n\nof the mortgagee must, in that context, be understood with reference to the sufficiency of the right assigned to enable the sub-mortgagee to sue the original mort gagor in his own right, so a~ to bring the relevant provisions of the Act into play as between them.", "canonical_name": "Deba Prosanna\n\nMukherjee"}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48029, "end_char": 48041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : R. R. Biswas. '"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48072, "end_char": 48085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : Sukumar Ghose."}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48117, "end_char": 48157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL."}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48161, "end_char": 48179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48187, "end_char": 48203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48206, "end_char": 48215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]", "canonical_name": "s. R. DAS JJ."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48220, "end_char": 48231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48237, "end_char": 48258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48273, "end_char": 48281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and\n\n(I) 76 I. A. 74", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49008, "end_char": 49058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and\n\n(I) 76 I. A. 74."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_594_602_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "19SI\n\nKumar Pa1hupatinath\n\nMalia and Another v.\n\nDeba ProJanna\n\nMukherjee\n\nPatanfali\n\nSastri J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nof the mortgagee must, in that context, be understood with reference to the sufficiency of the right assigned to enable the sub-mortgagee to sue the original mort gagor in his own right, so a~ to bring the relevant provisions of the Act into play as between them. The reservation made by their Lordships in the case of a sub-mortgage containing only a charge on the original mortgage is signification and supports this view. I do not consider, therefore, that there is any inconsistency between Promode Kumar Roy v.\n\nNikhil Bhusan Mukhopadhya(') and the earlier decisions, and even if\n\nthere be any such inconsistency it has no relevance to the present case.\n\nIn the result I agree that the appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : R. R. Biswas. ' Agent for the respondent : Sukumar Ghose.\n\nEASTERN INVESTMENTS LTD. v.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL.\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.] Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 12(2)-Business expenditure-Interest on debentures-Reducing capital of company hy taking over shares and giving debentures to shareholder-Income of company reJucd-lnterest on Jebentures,.whether allowable.\n\nA private limited company formed for dealing in shares and securities had a share capital of 250 )acs of rupees of which shares of the face value of 50 lacs were held by A and the remaining shares were held by his nominee's.\n\nAs the company was in need of money it was resolved, with the consent of A, to reduce the share capital by 50 lacs by the oompany taking over the 50 lacs shares which were held by A and giving to A instead debentures of the face value of Rs. 50 lacs carrying interest at 5 per. cent. per annum.\n\nThe Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and\n\n(I) 76 I. A. 74.\n\nthe High Court held that the interest on the debentures could not be allowed as business expenditure under s. 12(2) of the Income-tax Act, the main grounds on which this conclusion was arrived at. being (i) the pµrpose of the transaction was to effect. the conversion, (ii) the taxable income of the company was reduced, (iii) it was the same person who brought about the transaction, to whom .the share money was paid and who took the debentures, (iv) the transaction was more in the interest of that person than the company, ( v) the capital of the company could have been reduced in other ways :\n\nHeld by the Full Court\n\n(KANIA C, /. PATANJALI SAsTR1, DAs and BosE, JJ.) that the test for deciding whether the expenditure was allowable under s. 12(2) was whether the transaction was properly entered into as part of the company's ordinary undertakings to facilitate the carrying on of its business for :he purpose of earning income, and in. the absence of fraud the High Court was not justified in . coming to the conclusion that the interest on the debentures was not allowable on the considerations mentioned above.\n\nOn the facts it was clear that the transaction was entered into in order to facilitate the carrying on of the business of the company and that it was made on the ground of commercial expediency.\n\nThe interest on the debentures was accordingly allowable under s. 12(2). Farmer v.\n\nScottish North American Trust Ltd. [1912) A. C. 118 referred to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JuiusI>IcTION.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 89 of 1950.\n\nAppeal against the . Judgment and Order dated 5th . July, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (G. N. Das and Mukherjee JJ.) in Ip.come-tax Reference No. 11 of 1948.\n\nS. Mitra (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the respondent.\n\n1951.\n\nMay 4. The Judgment. of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-This is an assessee's appeal from a judgment of the High Court at Calcutta . delivered on a reference made to it under section 66( 1) of the Incometax Act.\n\nThe question submitted for the High Court's opinion was as follows :-\n\n,_10 S.C.India/67.\n\n19SI\n\nEastern lnveJtment Ltd; v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, We.rt Bengaf.\n\nBose J.\n\nEaJtern lnveJtmenta Ltd. v.\n\nCommisJioner of\n\nlncometax, West Bengal.\n\nBose J.\n\n\"Whether in the circumstances of this case, the interest paid by the assessee on debentures was incurred solely for the purpose of making or earning such income, profits or gains which are assessable under sub.section ( 1) of section 12.\"\n\nThe assessce is a private limited company which was incorporated on 3rd January, 1927.\n\nIt is an investment company known as the Eastern Investments Limited. The objects set out in the memorandum of association are to buy, sell and otherwise deal with shares, securities, bonds and so forth generally. The company was originally formed for acquiring, holding and otherwise .dealing with shares and Government securities which had previously belonged to one Lord Cable. The share capital of the company at the elate of its incorporation was 250 lacs and consisted partly of preference shares and partly of ordinary shares. Of these Lord Cable held the majority including the 50,000 ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 50,00,000 with which we are here concerned.\n\nThe rest of the share capital was held by the nominees of the late Lord Cable.\n\nLord Cable died on the 28th of March, 1937, leaving an estate in Great Britain as well as in India.\n\nOne Geoffrey Lacy Scott was appointed administrator of his estate in India and held these 50,000 shares in question in that capacity.\n\nAccording to the statement of the case drawn up by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in its reference to the High Coun, \"money was needed by the executors of Lord Cable\", and accordingly the administrator of the estate in India reached an agreement with the company on 9th February, 1937, the terms of which were as follows :-\n\nThe company agreed to reduce its share capital by Rs. 50 lacs and to do it by taking over from Scott the 50,000 shares mentioned above which. stood in Lord Cable's name at the rate of Rs. 100 a share. Scott on his part agreed to forego cash payment and agreed instead to receive debentures of the face value of\n\nRs. 50 lacs carrying interest at 5 per cent. per annum \"redeemable at the option of the registered holder at any time\". The sanction of the Calcutta _ High Court . was obtained in due course and the agreement was earned out by the parties.\n\nThe 5 per cent. interest paid to Scott on these debentures forms the subject-matter of the question before the Court. The company claims to deduct this from its income as part of its working expenses .under section 12(2) of the Income-tax Act, that is to say, to use the words of the section, as\n\n\"expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure) incurred solely for the purpose of making or earning such income, profits or gains.\"\n\nThis contention failed before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and also before the High Court. It was agreed all through that the expenditure was not in the nature of capital expenditure, but the view of the Income-tax Commissioner is that (a) it is not expenditure incurred for the purpose of earning the income, profits and gains of the company and (b) that even if it is, it is at any rate not expenditure incurred solely for that purpose. In general, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court both took that view.\n\nThe grounds on which these conclusions were based may be summarised as follows :\n\n( 1) the purpose of the agreement was to effect the conversion without in any way disturbing the holding of the investments of the company or interfering with the earning of its income ;\n\n(2) by this transaction the taxable of the company was diminished ;\n\n(3) There was complete identity of the person who-\n\n(a) - brought about this transaction without disturbing the affairs of the company,\n\n(b) to whom the share money was repaid, and ( c) who took up the debentures ;\n\nEatern Investments Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nincome-ta;)(!, We8t Bengal.\n\nBose J.\n\nEa!.lern Investment.t Ltd. v.\n\nCommi.tsioner of inco1ne-tax, W e!.t Bengal\n\nBose J.\n\nand (4) that the transaction was more in the interest of the shareholder Scott than that of the company.\n\nThe decision of this appeal rests on the true construction of section 12(2).\n\nIn our opinion, the law on this point has been correctly summarised in the judgment of the High Court. The following principles are relevant:\n\n(a) though the question must be decided on the facts of each case, the final conclusion is one of law : Indian Radio & Cable Communications Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tar, Bombay(') and Thta Hydro-Electric Agencies Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tar, Bombay(2) ;\n\n(b) it is not necessary to show that the expenditure was a profitable one or that in fact any profit was earned : Moore v. Stewart & Lloyds(') and Usher's case(')2;\n\n( c) it is enough to show that the money was expended \"not of necessity and with a view to a direct and immediate benefit to the trade, but voluntarily and on the ground of commercial expediency, and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the busin.ess\" : British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd. v.\n\nAtherton(\") ; and\n\n( d) beyond that no hard and fast rule can be laid down to explain what is meant by the word \"solely\".\n\nA case somewhat similar to the present is Parmer\n\nv. Scottish North American Trust Ltd. ( 0 ) where it was held that interest paid on an overdraft required for p11rchasing shares (the shares purchased being retained as security for the overdraft) was an outgoing which could be deducted from the receipts to ascertain the taxable profits and gains which were earned by them. In our opinion, the present case falls within these principles.\n\n(1) 1937 I.T.R. 270 P.C.\n\n(3) 6 Tax caSes SOI\n\n(5) 1926 A.C. 205 at 221 and 235\n\n(2) 1937 1.T.R. 202 P.C'.\n\n(4) 1915 A.C. 433\n\n(6) 1912 A.C.118\n\nOne of the points which weighed with the Incometax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court was that though the conversion did not in any way disturb the holding of the investments of the company or interfere with the earning of its income ; it had the effect of diminishing its taxable income.\n\nIn our judgment, this is not a proper consideration when the transaction is not challenged on the ground of. fraud.\n\nIn the present case there is not even an allegation of fraud.\n\nThe next point on which some stress was placed was that there was complete identity of person between the person whose shares were sold and the person who took the debentures and that the transaction resulted .in considerable benefit to him.\n\nIn the absence of a suggestion fraud this is not relevant at all for giving effect to the provisions of section 12(2) of the Incoriietax Act.\n\nMost commercial transactions are entered into for the mutual benefit of both sides, or at any rate each side hopes to gain something for 'itself.\n\nThe test for present purposes is not whether the other party benefited, nor indeed whether this was a prudent transaction which resulted in ultimate gain to the appellant, but whether it was properly entered into as a part of the appellant's legitimate commercial undertaking in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of its business.\n\nThe High Court doubted whether the transaction could be brought within the functions of an investment company and found it difficult to reconcile it with the objects set out in the Memorandum of Association.\n\nBut we sec no such difficulty.\n\nClause S empowers a reduction of capital of the company and clause 3(3) empowers the company to borrow or raise money by the issue of debentures.\n\nThe matter is clearly \"writ in the bond\".\n\nMorever, we do not think that this inquiry is relevant, for we are dealing with a question of income-tax and not judging the legality or propriety of the transaction on an application to reduce the capital of the company. The only question is whether this was done in the ordinary course of business for the purposes we have already\n\nEaJtern Investments Ltd. v.\n\nCommi5sioner of\n\nincome-I°\"• West Bengal.\n\nBose J.\n\nEa:1ter:1 Investment8 Ltd. v.\n\nCommiJstoner of\n\nincom~-tax, West Bengal.\n\nBose J.\n\npointed out, however mistaken the directors and shareholders of the company may have been.\n\nTherefore, as stated by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in its statement of the case, the executors of Lord Cable's estate needed money.\n\nIn the next place, . the transaction was brought about \"at instance of the holder of the majority of ordinary shares\", and also that the shares were originally held by Lord Cable and his nominees.\n\nIt seems evident therefore that Scott could have compelled the company to pay him . cash for the shares.\n\nHe seems to have had the whip hand.\n\nInstead of doing that he entered into an arrangement which, while giving him the necessary facilities, appears to have satisfied the company by allowing it to retain its investments without a precipitate liquidation of a large portion thereof.\n\nIt docs not matter whether the company was right in this view or wrong, and in any event we arc in no position to judge of the soundness of its decision because we have not all the materials before us.\n\nIt has to be remembered that considerations of this kind go deeper than the apparent profit or loss on an isolated transaction standing by itself.\n\nIt is not enough to say that the 50,000 shares which were cancelled earned in the following year only 3! per cent. 'interest as against 5 per cent. on the debentures because we do not kno'l!I\" to what extent the holdings of the company would have been disturbed if this had not been done.\n\nWhat we do know is what the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has stated, namely, that-\n\n\"the change brought about had been so designed that the investments of the company were not to be disturbed and as a consequence the income accrued was in no way to be affected.\"\n\nThis has only to be stated to show the commercial nature of the transaction from the company's point of view.\n\nThe High Court considered that the capital of the company could have been reduced in other ways.\n\nBut that again is not point.\n\nThere arc usually many\n\nways in which a given thing can be brought about in business circles but it is not for the Court to decide which of them should have been employed when the Court is deciding a question under section 12(2) of the Income-tax Act.\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the respondent (basing the same on paragraph 7 of the appellant's application to the High Court dated 5th April, 1947) that the company had at the time sufficient liquid resources to effect the reduction of capital desired and so it was not necessary to resort to this process.\n\nBut that again is not the point The company chose to do it this way, and as there was not even a suggestion of fraud, the only question is whether it was gone through as an ordinary commercial proposition. But we doubt if that is what paragraph 7 meant because in paragraph 4 of the application to the High Court dated 11th February, 1944, the petitioner stated that the money on hand and at short notice was only Rs. 8,94,379.\n\nThat is a good deal short of 50 lacs. However, we need not enter into this in detail.\n\nOn a full review of the facts it is clear that this transaction was voluntarily entered into in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business of the company and was made on the ground of commercial expediency.\n\nIt therefore falls within the purview of section 12(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 before its amendment in 1939.\n\nThis being an investment company, if it borrowed money and utilised the same for its investments on. which it earned income, the interest paid by it on the loans will clearly be a permissible deduction under section 12(2) of the Income-tax Act. Whether the loan is taken on an overdraft, or is a fixed deposit or on a debenture makes no difference in law. The only argument urged against allowing this deduction to be made is that the person who took the debentures was the party who sold the ordinary shares.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that if the debentures were held by a thinl party, the interest payable on the same would be an\n\nL/N2S.C.L.\n\nEa$tern\n\nlnvestmnts Ltd1\n\nCommiS$ioner of income-tax, W eJt Bengal.\n\nBO$C J,\n\nEal tern /nreltment!Ltd.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nincome-ta;;, We.1t Bengal.\n\nBose J.\n\nallowable deduction in calculating the total income of the assessee company. What difference does it make if the holder of the debentures is a shareholder ? There appears to be none in principle in view of the fact that no suggestion of fraud is made in respect of the transaction which is carried out between the company and the Administrator and which has been sanctioned bv the Court. If the debentures had been paid for in casi1 by the same party, no objection could have been taken to allowing the interest amount to be deducted.\n\nIn principle, there appears to us no difference, if instead of paying in cash the payment of the price is in the shape of giving over shares of the company, when the transaction is not challenged on the ground of fraud and is approved by the Court in the re-organisation of the capital of the company.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the ground on which the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court disallowed the claim of the assessee is not sound.\n\nIn our opinion, the High Court has failed to appreciate the true position and the question submitted for its opinion should be answered in the affirmative. The appeal is therefore allowed.\n\nThe respondent will pay the costs . of the appeal in this Court and of the reference in the High Court.\n\nAppeal allorued\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. K. Chatterjee.\n\nAgent for respondent : P. A. Mehta.", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "Sastri J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 914, "end_char": 926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : R. R. Biswas. '"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 957, "end_char": 970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent : Sukumar Ghose."}}, {"text": "EASTERN INVESTMENTS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 973, "end_char": 996, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EASTERN INVESTMENTS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1002, "end_char": 1042, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI HARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1046, "end_char": 1064, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1091, "end_char": 1100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1105, "end_char": 1120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1122, "end_char": 1143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1158, "end_char": 1166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1893, "end_char": 1922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and\n\n(I) 76 I. A. 74."}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2053, "end_char": 2061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2069, "end_char": 2083, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "KANIA C", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2571, "end_char": 2578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the conversion, (ii) the taxable income of the company was reduced, (iii) it was the same person who brought about the transaction, to whom .the share money was paid and who took the debentures, (iv) the transaction was more in the interest of that person than the company, ( v) the capital of the company could have been reduced in other ways :\n\nHeld by the Full Court\n\n(KANIA C, /. PATANJALI SAsTR1, DAs and BosE, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the conversion, (ii) the taxable income of the company was reduced, (iii) it was the same person who brought about the transaction, to whom .the share money was paid and who took the debentures, (iv) the transaction was more in the interest of that person than the company, ( v) the capital of the company could have been reduced in other ways :\n\nHeld by the Full Court\n\n(KANIA C, /. PATANJALI SAsTR1, DAs and BosE, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2691, "end_char": 2699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3327, "end_char": 3335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. N. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3586, "end_char": 3595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "July, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (G. N. Das and Mukherjee JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3600, "end_char": 3609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "July, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (G. N. Das and Mukherjee JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3657, "end_char": 3665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mitra (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3667, "end_char": 3682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mitra (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3714, "end_char": 3728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. M.\n\nSikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3758, "end_char": 3770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (S. M.\n\nSikri, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3862, "end_char": 3866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-This is an assessee's appeal from a judgment of the High Court at Calcutta .", "canonical_name": "BosE"}}, {"text": "section 66( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3989, "end_char": 4003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Eastern lnveJtment Ltd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4124, "end_char": 4146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19SI\n\nEastern lnveJtment Ltd; v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, We.rt Bengaf.", "canonical_name": "EASTERN INVESTMENTS LTD"}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax, We.rt Bengaf", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4152, "end_char": 4192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19SI\n\nEastern lnveJtment Ltd; v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, We.rt Bengaf.", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4195, "end_char": 4199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nEaJtern lnveJtmenta Ltd. v.\n\nCommisJioner of\n\nlncometax, West Bengal.", "canonical_name": "BosE"}}, {"text": "CommisJioner of\n\nlncometax, West Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nEaJtern lnveJtmenta Ltd. v.\n\nCommisJioner of\n\nlncometax, West Bengal.", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4510, "end_char": 4520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd January, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4592, "end_char": 4609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessce is a private limited company which was incorporated on 3rd January, 1927."}}, {"text": "Cable", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4986, "end_char": 4991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company was originally formed for acquiring, holding and otherwise .dealing with shares and Government securities which had previously belonged to one Lord Cable."}}, {"text": "28th of March, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5394, "end_char": 5413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Cable died on the 28th of March, 1937, leaving an estate in Great Britain as well as in India."}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5442, "end_char": 5449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Cable died on the 28th of March, 1937, leaving an estate in Great Britain as well as in India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5464, "end_char": 5469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Cable died on the 28th of March, 1937, leaving an estate in Great Britain as well as in India."}}, {"text": "Geoffrey Lacy Scott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5476, "end_char": 5495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Geoffrey Lacy Scott was appointed administrator of his estate in India and held these 50,000 shares in question in that capacity."}}, {"text": "9th February, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the statement of the case drawn up by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in its reference to the High Coun, \"money was needed by the executors of Lord Cable\", and accordingly the administrator of the estate in India reached an agreement with the company on 9th February, 1937, the terms of which were as follows :-\n\nThe company agreed to reduce its share capital by Rs."}}, {"text": "Scott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6030, "end_char": 6035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50 lacs and to do it by taking over from Scott the 50,000 shares mentioned above which."}}, {"text": "Calcutta _ High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6387, "end_char": 6408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sanction of the Calcutta _ High Court ."}}, {"text": "section 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6695, "end_char": 6708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6730, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8355, "end_char": 8368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Usher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8937, "end_char": 8942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following principles are relevant:\n\n(a) though the question must be decided on the facts of each case, the final conclusion is one of law : Indian Radio & Cable Communications Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tar, Bombay(') and Thta Hydro-Electric Agencies Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tar, Bombay(2) ;\n\n(b) it is not necessary to show that the expenditure was a profitable one or that in fact any profit was earned : Moore v. Stewart & Lloyds(') and Usher's case(')2;\n\n( c) it is enough to show that the money was expended \"not of necessity and with a view to a direct and immediate benefit to the trade, but voluntarily and on the ground of commercial expediency, and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the busin.ess\" : British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd. v.\n\nAtherton(\") ; and\n\n( d) beyond that no hard and fast rule can be laid down to explain what is meant by the word \"solely\"."}}, {"text": "Incometax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10018, "end_char": 10046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) 1915 A.C. 433\n\n(6) 1912 A.C.118\n\nOne of the points which weighed with the Incometax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court was that though the conversion did not in any way disturb the holding of the investments of the company or interfere with the earning of its income ; it had the effect of diminishing its taxable income."}}, {"text": "section 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10797, "end_char": 10810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11628, "end_char": 11639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14434, "end_char": 14447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14455, "end_char": 14469, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "5th April, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14601, "end_char": 14616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued on behalf of the respondent (basing the same on paragraph 7 of the appellant's application to the High Court dated 5th April, 1947) that the company had at the time sufficient liquid resources to effect the reduction of capital desired and so it was not necessary to resort to this process."}}, {"text": "11th February, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15097, "end_char": 15116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But we doubt if that is what paragraph 7 meant because in paragraph 4 of the application to the High Court dated 11th February, 1944, the petitioner stated that the money on hand and at short notice was only Rs."}}, {"text": "section 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15563, "end_char": 15576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15584, "end_char": 15604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15844, "end_char": 15857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15865, "end_char": 15879, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17765, "end_char": 17781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allorued\n\nAgent for the appellant : P. K. Chatterjee."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17807, "end_char": 17818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for respondent : P. A. Mehta."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_603_620_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nBHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS\n\nII.\n\nDULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER\n\nAND ANOTHER\n\n(SAIYID fAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ .)\n\nHindu Law-Joint family-Presumption of iointness-Separation of one member-Effect of-Burden of proof of subsequent state of family-Evidence of separation-Statement of deceased member- Evi dence Act (I of 1872), s. 32(3).\n\nThough the general principle is that a Hindu family is presum- -ed to be joint unless the contrary is proved, yet where it is admitted that one of the coparceners did separate himself from the other members of the joint . family and had his share in the joint property partitioned off for him, there is no presumption that the rest of the coparcners continued to be joint. There is no presumption on the other side too that because one member of the family separated himself, there has been separation with regard to all.\n\nIt would be a question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there was a separation amongst the other coparceners or they remained united and the burden would undoubtedly lie on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which the claims relief.\n\nExcept in the case of reunion, the mere fact that separated coparceners chose to live together or act jointly for purposes of business or trade or in their dealings with properties would not give them the status of coparceners under the Mitakshara law.\n\nThe statements of a particular person that he is separated from a joint family of which he was a coparcener, and that he has no further interest in the joint property or claim to any assets left by his father, would be statements made against the interest of such person, and, after such person is dead, they would be relevant under s. 32{3) of the Evidence Act. The assertion that there was separation not only in respect of himself but between all the coparceners would be admissible as a connected matter and an integral part of the same statement. It is not merely the precise fact which is against interest that is admissible but all matters that are \"involved in it and knit up with the statement.\"\n\nThe expression \"joint family\" is used in legal as well as in a loose sense. The fact that the said expression is used in\n\nMay 7,\n\nBlurgwali PraJadSah\n\nand Other1\n\nDulhin Ramehwari x.,,, and Another.\n\nMukherl•a J.\n\ndescribing a family in a document does not therefore nece!:sarily lead to the inference that the family is a joint Hindu family with all its legal incidents.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRrsmCTioN.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 83 of 1950.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 2nd March, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Ray, JJ.) in Appeal from Original Deeree No: 60 of 1944 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd December, 1943, of the Court of the First Sub-Judge of Saran, Ch:ipra, in Title Suit No. 24 of 1941.\n\nBaJr..shi TeJr.. Chand (Ramanugrah Prasad, with him) for the appellants.\n\nGopinath Kunzru (D. K. Saran, with him) for Respondent No. 1.\n\n1951. May 7. The judgmeQt of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Patna High Coun dated 2nd March, 1949, by which the learned judges reversed, on appeal, a decision of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge of Saran in Title Suit No. 24 of 1941.\n\nThe controveri; y between the parties to the suit centres round only one question of fact, viz., whether the plaintiff's father, who died in 1926, was joint with or separate from his nephew, the defendant No. l, at the time of his death. If he died separate, it is not disputed that his properties would devolve by inheritance upon his widow and after the death of the widow would vest in his daughter, who is the plaintiff in the suit.\n\nIf, on the other hand, he died joint, his interest in the joint properties would pass by survivorip to defendant No. 1, who together with his male descendant constitute a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitikshara law.\n\nIt may be convenient at the outset to give a brief resume of the materiai facts as they appear in tht:\n\n'.•\n\npleadings of . the parties. One Sheo Narain Sah, who was the grandfather of the plaintiff as well as of defendant No. 1 had three sons: (1) Imrit, .(2) Janki and (3) Ram Narain. lmrit's branch is, represented by defendants 11 and 12 in the suit, and they are his son and grandson respectively. Janki's only son is Ram Saran, the defendant No. 1. Defendants 2 to 4 are the sons of defendant No. 1 and defendants 5 to 10 are his minor grandsons. Ram Narain died in 1926 leaving behind him his widow Sumitra and a daughter Rameshwari who is the plaintiff in the suit.\n\nSumitra died in 1933 and the plaintiff claims to be the sole heir of Ram Narain after the death of her mother.\n\nAccording to the plaintiff, there was a complete separation tween the three sons of Sheo Narain in food, estate and business nearly 65 years prior to the institution of the suit. After separation, Ram Narain and Ram Saran, the defendant No. l, did carry on a cloth shop jointly and dealt with the profits of this business together, as well as acquired properties in their joint names.\n\nBut these properties and interests they could and did hold as tenants in common. Sumitra was a woman of weak intellect and after the death of Ram Narain, she was completely under the influence of defendant No. 1 and his sons. It is stated in the plaint that in the year 1928 the defendant No. 11, who is the son of Imrit, instituted a suit at the instigation of defendant No. I and his sons in which he denied the separation of lmrit from the joint family and claimed the properties in possession of defendant No. 1 and his sons as the joint properties of the family. That suit, it is said, ended in a collusive compromise and Sumitra was made to file a collusive written statement in that suit as well as to depose falsely on commission to the effect that her husband died joint with defendant No. 1.\n\nThe: plaintiff herself brought an earlier suit on much the same allegations as she has made now but that suit she had to wididraw because of some formal defects. The present suit was instituted on 20th of December, 1940, and the plaintiff prayed for recovery of possession of the properties specified in Schedules I to IV in the plaint together with mesne profits both past and future.\n\nBhagwati Prasad Sak IJJfd Otheu\n\nDulhin\n\nRamehwari\n\nKuer and Another\n\nMllkherjea J.\n\nBhagwoti Pra3adSah and Others v.\n\nDu/hin Rameshwar; Kuer and Another.\n\nM ukherjea J.\n\nDefendants 11 and 12 did not appear or contest the suit.\n\nThe suit was contested by defendants l to 4 who filed one joint written statement.\n\nAnother written statement and that of a formal character was filed on behalf of the minor defendants by their pleader guardian appointed by the Court: The material thing stated in this written statement \\vas that the natural guardians of the minors . in spite of notices . being given to them did not properly instruct the pleader guardian.\n\nThe defence of defendants l to 4 in substance was that there was no separation between Ram Narain and defendant No. l as alleged in the plaint, but that after the death of Janki, the father of defendant No. 1, Imrie alone separated himself from Ram Narain and the defendant No. l when the latter was only five years old. Ram Narain and defendant No. l continued to remain joint as before and as Ram Narain died joint, the defendant No. l got all the properties by right of survivorship.\n\nIt was denied that Sumitra was influenced in any way by defendant No. l or his sons or that she was made to file a collusive written statement in the suit. instituted by defendant No. 11 or make a false statement in her deposition while giving evidence therein. Several other pleas were taken with which we , are not concerned for our present purpose.\n\nThe material issue framed in the suit was issue No. 6 and this was worded as follows :-\n\n\"Was there any separation between Ram Narain Sah, plaintiff's father and defendant No. l as •alleged?\".\n\nThe trial Court on a consideration of the evidence adduced in this case decided this issue against the plaintiff and in that view dismissed th~ suit.\n\nThere was an appeal taken . to the Patna High Court against this decision by the plaintiff and the learned Judges of the High Court reversed the decision of the trial Judge and gave the plaintiff\n\na decree in terms of the prayers made in the plaint.\n\nThe defendant No. 1 died after the decision of the trial . Judge, and his sons and grandsons have now come up on appeal to this Court. The substantial contention raised by Mr. Bakhshi Tek Chand, who appeared in support of the appeal, is that the decision arrived at by the High Court on the question of separation is not warranted by the evidence on the record.\n\nBefore we discuss the evidence on the record, we desire to point out that on the admitted facts of this case neither party has any presumption on his side. either as regards jointness or separation of the family. The general principle undoubtedly is that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved, but where it is admitted that one of the coparceners did separate himself from the other members of the joint family and had his share in the joint property partitioned off for him, there is no presumption that the rest of the coparceners continued to be joint.\n\nThere is no presumption on the other side too that because one member of the family separated himself, there has been separation with regard to all.\n\nIt would be a question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there was a separation amongst the other coparceners or that they remained united. The burden would undoubtedly lie on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which he claims relief.\n\nThese principles which have been laid down in several pronouncements of the Judicial Committee seem to us to be perfectly sound : (vide Bal Krishna v. Ram Krishna(1) and Palaniammtrl\n\nv. Muthuvenkatachala(2) and Balabux Ladhuram v ..\n\nRukhmabai(3); Another thing to be noted in this connection is that it is not the case of the defendants made either in the pleadings or in the evidence that even if there was a separation between Ram Narain and Rarr:\n\n(1) L.R. SS I.A. 220\n\n(2) L.R. S9 I.A. 83\n\n(3) LR. 301 .A. 130\n\nBhagwati Prasad Sali\n\nand OtFiers\n\nDulhin Rames/.wari\n\nKuer and Another\n\nMuhkerjea J.\n\nBh.agwati Pra&adSah\n\nandOtbtr1\n\nDul/Ji• Ralh•OTi\n\nKuer and Another.\n\nMukherieo J.\n\nSaran at any anterior time they subsequently rennited.\n\nThe controversy, therefore, narrows down to the short point as to whether at any time before the death of Ram Narain there was a separation between him and Ram Saran. If, as the plaintiff avers, there was a d~ ruption of the joint status in regard to all the three brothers, it would really be immaterial if, subsequent to separation, Ram Narain and Ram Saran lived together in commensality or dealt with their properties in such manner as is ordinarily done by members of a joint Hindu family which is not set up in the present case. Except in the case of reunion, the mere fact that separated coparceners chose to live together or act jointly for purposes of business or trade or in their dealings with properties, would not give them the status of coparccners under the Mitakshara law.\n\nIt is in the light of these principles that we propose to examine the evidence before us.\n\nBoth the Courts below have discarded the oral evidence adduced by the parties as wholly unreliable and the learned. counsel appearing for neither side has invited us to place any rclia'lcc on the same. W c do not, therefore, think it necessary to refer to the oral evidence at all.\n\nAs regards documentary evidence, it must be admitted that there is no deed of partition in the present case, nor is there in existence any document to which all the members of the family were part\\es and which\n\nproceed~ on the basis of any admitted partition.\n\nImrit's separation from the family is of course an admitted fact but there is no evidence even on the side of the defendants to show when this separation took place. The defendant No. 1 in his deposition in a Money Suit, to which he was a party, stated in the year 1942 that his age was Bl at that time. If tllis is a correct statement, Ram Saran must have been born some time in 1861 and Imrit' s separation may be dated near about the year 1866.\n\nThe earliest document that we have on the record is Ex. 2 dated the \"30th of September, 1879. This is a\n\nmortgage bond executed by Imrit in favour of Ram Narain.\n\nThere is no recital of separation in the document itself, but the statement of boundaries of the mortgaged properties shows clearly that Ram Narain's share was separated from that of Imrit. The mortgaged\n\nproprties were two houses, one of which was situated at Dahiawan and the northern boundary of this house is stated to be \"house of Ram Narain Sahu, puttidar of me, the executant, partitioned\". This shows that there was a partition. between lmrit and Ram Narain and Ram Narain had a separate house of his own. It is not stated in this document that this house was the joint property of Ram Narain and Ram Saran.\n\nExhibit 2 (a) is another mortgage bond between Imrit and Ram Narain and is dated the 21st of March, 1885 . and here the northern boundary of the mortgaged property is stated to be the \"Bakasht land of Ram Saran Sahu, puttidar of me, the executant.\" This is a strong piece of evidence in favour of the plaintiff and taking Exhibits 2 and 2(a) together, it can legitimately be inferred that Ram Saran was also separate and he had certain bakasht lands allotted to him in his share.\n\nThe matter is practically clinched by the recital of another document . which is Exhibit 2 (b) and which is also a registered mortgage bond executed by I mrit in favour of Ram Narain. The date of the instrument is 8th of November,\n\n1898. T4ere is a recital in the document to the following effect :-\n\n\"I, the executant, have. been living separately and have been separate in mess from Ram Narain Sahu and Ram Saran Sahu my own nephew for a long time and at the time of separation all the movable and immovable properties were partitioned among all the three parties.\n\nSince separation, all business is carried on separately.\"\n\nThe document further recites that Sheo Narain Sahu, the father, was a party to this partition and he was given a house for his residence and Rs. 1,100 in cash for trade and ' maintenance and that after his death these properties were also divided amongst the three sons. It is stated that Imrit received a sum of\n\nBhagwati PrasadSah and Others\n\nDu/hin Rameshwari\n\nKuer and Another.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n19SI\n\nBhagwati PrasadSah and Others\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer a11d Another\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRs. 334-7-9 as his share of the cash money left by his father and this money he paid to Ram Narain in part satisfaction of his debt. Then again, in the description of the mortgaged property given in the schedule, the northern boundary is stated to be \"House of Ram Saran Sahu nephew of me, the executant.\"\n\nThere is no reason to doubt the truth of these statements which were 'made in an old document long before any dispute arose between the parties in regard to these matters.\n\nA question was raised, however, as to whether this statement of Imrit could be legally admissible as evidence.\n\nImrit is undoubetedly dead and Mr. Kunzru, appearing for the respondents, contended that this statement could be. admitted in evidence under section 32 (7) of the Indian Evidence Act.\n\nWe are not sure that section 32 (7) is really of assistance to the respondents.\n\nThe particular right, which is the subject-matter of dispute before us, was certainly asserted in this transaction but not by it within the meaning of section 13 (a) of the Evidence Act. We think, however, that the statements could be admitted under section 32(3) of the Evidence Act.\n\nThe statements of . a particular person that he is separated from a joint family, of which he was a coparcener, and that he has no further interest in the joint property or claim to any assets left by his father, would be statements made against the interest of such person, and, after such person is dead, they would be relevant under section 32(3) of the Evidence Act. The assertion that there was separation not only in respect of himself but between all the coparceners would be admissible as a connected matter and an integral part of the same statement (Vide Blackburn J. in Smith v.\n\nBlakey(') ). It is not merely the precise fact which is against interest that is admissible but all matters that are \"involved in it and knit up with the statement.\" See Wigmore on Evidence, Art. 1465.\n\nWe agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that Exhibits 2, 2 (a) and 2 (b) taken together afford most satisfactory evidence of there being a separation\n\n(ll L.R. 2 Q.B. 326\n\namongst all the sons of Sheo . Narain and that ey .\n\nshow further that the separanon took place dunng Sheo Narain's lifetime.\n\nThis conclusion is fortified by the recitals in several other documents which were executed during this period. In fact, prior to 1905 there is no evidence of any transaction in which. both Ram Narain and Ram Saran took part, or of any acquisition of property in their joint names.\n\nIt seems that on the very day that Exhibit 2(b) was executed there was another mortgage bond executed by Imrit in favour of Ram Saran and though that document has not been produced, the transaction is recited in a latter document, namely, Exhibit C (9), where it is expressly stated that the money was taken by Imrit on the strength of the mortgage bond from out of the funds of Ram Saran. Exhibit C (5) is a deed of sale dated 14th of February, 1880, and by this instrument one Welayat Mian sold a house to Ram Narain and the document stands in the name of Ram Narain alone.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants, it is contended that this house was treated as the joint property of both Ram Narain and Ram Saran as would be evident from a Kobala Exhibit C(7) executed on 23rd of May, 1925, by both of them together in favour of one Dulhin Ram Kuer. It is said that this identical property was the subject-matter of the subsequent sale deed.\n\nWe have compared the boundaries and description of the properties given in the: two documents and\n\ne are unable to hold that they relate to the same property. The property dealt by Exhibit C(7) is situated in Mahalia Karim Chak, while that sold by Welayat Mian was situated in Dahiawan. The boundaries on the three sides are also quite different. Exhibt C(8)\" s another sale deed executed during this penod.\n\nIt 1s dated 13th of December, 1898, and in this document also . Ram Narain figures as the sole purchaser of certam property from Ram Singari Singh.\n\nHere again, it is the appellants' case that this property was shown to be the joint . property of Ram Narain and Ram Saran in the Survey Khatian. We do not think .that this contention can be accepted as correct.\n\n6-10 S.c. India/67.\n\nBhagwati PrasadSah and Other3\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer and Another\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nBhagwatl PraJadSah\n\nand Others\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer and Another\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nThe property that is recorded in Khatian No. 233 in the joint names of Ram Narain and Ram Saran is situated in mouza Purbari Telpa, while the property that is dealt with by Exhibit C(S) is in Telpa Buzurg.\n\nMoreover, the area of the property in Exhibit C(S) is only 6 cottas 8 dhoors, while that in the settlement record is more than one bigha. Thus, all the earlier documents support the inference which may be drawn from Exhibits 2, 2 (a) and 2 (b) that all the three sons of Sheo Narain separated from each other, though it is not possible to fix. the precise time at which such separation took place.\n\nFrom 1905 onwards we come to another series of documents upon which considerable stress was laid by the Subordinate Judge in support of his decision that Ram Narain and Ram Saran remained joint throughout. It is perfectly true that for a period of nearly 20 years from this date, we find quite a number of transactions in which Ram Narain and Ram Saran jointly took part and in some of which they were described as members of a joint Hindu .family. In our opinion, the High Court is right in holding that during this period the cloth and money-lending business that was carried on jointly by Ram Narain and Ram Saran probably became a flourishing concern.\n\nRam Narain had no son of his own and Ram Saran being an orphan, the uncle and the nephew were drawn very much closer to each other and to all out:Ward appearances they conducted themselves like members of a joint family, of which the uncle would naturally be the head. It was natural also that properties, which were acquired out of the profits of the joint business, would be acquired in the names of both and in suits and other legal proceedings they would figure as joint parties. The question however is whether from these documents it is possible to infer that Ram Narain and Ram Saran were joint all along and are they sufficient to destroy the inference of separation that can legitimately be drawn from the earlier documents referred to above ?\n\nExhibit E is a Zarpeshgi deed executed by the sons of lmrit in favour of Ram Narai!i and Ram Saran\n\njointly. The consideration for this lease was the money due to them under the mortgages executed separately in their favour on 8th of November, 1895. One of these mortgages, as we have pointed out already, is Exhibit 2(b), while .the existence of the other is recited in Exhibit C(9.). Although in Exhibit 2(b) it was stated that all the three brothers were separated, it was stated in Exhibit E that Ram Narain and Ram Saran were living jointly and that their business was joint.\n\nVv e do not think that the statement in Exhibit E contradicts the recital of Exhibit 2(b). There might have been complete separation between the two brothers and yet it is quite possible that afterwards, when Ram Narain and Ram Saran began to carry on business together, they lived like members of a joint Hindu family. Exhibit C(3) is a sale deed dated 9th of July,\n\n1909, executed by Bibi Bechan in favour of Ram Narain and Ram Saran.\n\nIt is somewhat surprising that the vendor, who was a complete stranger, recites in this document that the purchasers are related to each other as uncle and nephew and form members of a joint family.\n\nExhibit C(4) is another sale deed dated the 7th of May, 1913, executed by one Kishun Chand and Gopi Chand in favour of Ram Narain alone. Ram Saran does not figure as a purchaser in this document.\n\nIt is argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that this land was recorded in the joint names of both Ram Narain and Ram Saran in the Survey Khatian, but the description of the land as given in the sale deed is totally different from what appears in the Khatian.\n\nThere is marked difference both as regards the area as well as the Touzi number. In Exhibit C(2), which is a sale deed executed by Mustafa Hussain on 20th April, 1922, in favour of Ram Narain and Ram Saran, the purchasers are mentioned as 1omt Zarpeshgidars of the executant of the deed, but there is no description of them as members of a joint family. Similarly, in Exhibit C(h), which is the sale deed is totally different from what appears in the Ram Saran were described as joint creditors of the vendor. The only other sale deed executed during the lifetime of Ram Narain is Ex. C (1). This was also a deed of sale in favour of both Ram Narain and Ram\n\n19SI\n\nBhagwatl Pra:JadSa[J andOthen v, Dulhin Rame:Jhwar\n\nKuer and Another\n\nMukher}ea I.\n\nBhagwati Prasad Sah and Others\n\nDu/bin Rame$hwari\n\nKu er and Another\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nSaran, though they are not described as members of a joint family.\n\nIn our opinion, a proper consideration of all these sale deeds does not necessarly lead to the conclusion that there was no original separation between Ram Narain and Ram Saran, as alleged by the plaintiff and proved by the earlier documents. There is no doubt that Ram Narain and Ram Saran did carry on a cloth and moneylending business jointly. The vendors in the above sale deeds had borrowed money from this joint moneylending concern and the consideration for the sales in the majority of instances were unsatisfied debts due by tliese persons.\n\nIt was quite natural, therefore, that these properties should be purchased in the names of both Ram Narain and Ram Saran jointly. Except in Ex. C(3), there is no recital in any of these documents that they were members of a joint Hindu family and even if there was any such recital, there would have been nothing unusual in it, having regard to the way in which they conducted their affairs, both in and outside the family.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants laid considerable emphasis however upon the statements of Ram Narain and also of Sumitra after the death of Ram Narain in a number of plaints and depositions where it was expressly stated that Ram Narain and Ram Saran constituted a joint Hindu family, of which Ram Narin was the karta. In Ex. K (2), whicli is a plaint in a mortgage suit filed in the year 1917, there is a statement in paragraph (y) of the plaint as follows:-\n\n\"The bond in suit, is executed in favour of plaintiff No. 1 alon(!, who is the head and managing member of the joint family, but the plaintiff No. 2, who is the brother's son of plaintiff No. l, has got a claim to one-half share in the amount claimed.\n\nTherefore, he joins as a plaintiff.\"\n\nIt may be noted that plaintiff No. 1 in the suit was Ram Narain and plaintiff No. 2 was Ram Saran. In\n\nEx. K (1), which is another plaint in a mortgage suit of 1924 and in which both Ram Narain and Ram\n\nSaran figured as plaintiffs, it was stated in paragraph 6 of the plaint that plaintiff No. 2 (Ram Saran) was the member of a joint family with plaintiff No. 1 (Ram Narain) and, therefore, he was also joined in the suit.\n\nLastly, we have got the following statement in a plaint in another mortgage suit, (Ex. K), which was filed by Ram Narain a.i1d Ram Saran in the year 1923 :-\n\n\"That the plaintiffs are members of a joint family . and carry on money-lending business jointly. Mortgage bonds are . executed in favour of any member of the family. Accordingly, the mortgage bond sued upon was executed in favour of plaintiff No. 1 alone. But both of the plaintiffs have got claim thereto.\"\n\nIt may be pointed out, first . of all, that these statements occur in plaints filed in mortgage suits arising out of the money-lending business which was carried on by Ram Narain and Ram Saran jointly. The business being a joint business, even if the bonds were taken in the name of one of the creditors, it was necessary, to avoid all risks, that both of them should join as plaintiffs. It was for the purpose of explaining as to why the bond sued upon did not stand in the name of both the plaintiffs, that this explanation was. added to each one of these plaints.\n\nIn the second place, it may be noted that it was expressly stated in these plaints that Ram Saran had also an equal share in the mortgage money. It would be unusual in, and quite inappropriate to, a transaction relating to a Mitakshara joint family, of which the karta or manager can by himself file suits and conduct transactions, to specify that another coparcener has got so much share in the claim or property. Thirdly, the expression \"joint family\" can certainly be used in a legal as well as in a loose sense, and it would not be improper in the circumstances of the present case to hold that it was in fact used in a loose sense.\n\nThe deposition of Ram Narain given in a mortgage suit {Ex. N) does hot really improve the the position. In his deposition Ram Narain states as follows :-\n\nBhagwati Prasad Sall andOthen\n\nDu/hill Rameshwarl Kuer and Another.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nBhagwati PraJad Sah andOther1\n\nDulhin Rame.shwarl Kuer and Anothtr.\n\nMukherfea /,\n\n\"Ram Saran Sahu is my nephew and we live jointly. I am karta of my family.\"\n\nHere again the deposition being given in a mortgage suit only for the purpose of justifying the inclusion of the name of Ram Saran as a co-plaintiff, no undue stress could be laid upon the words used.\n\nMr. Bakhshi Tek Chand tried to make much also of the statements made by Sumitra, the mother of the plaintiff, both in the written statement which she filed in the suit brought against the defendants by Imrit's son and also in the deposition on commission which was given by her in that suit.\n\nIt is to be noticed that tl1e plaintiff was a party to this suit but later on Ram Saran and his sons had her name expunged from the suit altogether in order that there may be a petition of compromise between them and the plaintiff in that suit in her absence.\n\nIt would appear from the deposition given on commission by the lady in that suit that she was completely under the °influence of defendant No. 1 and her sons. The High Court, in our opinion, has rightly laid stress on some portions of her deposition where she made certain admissions even against her will.\n\nOne thing said in her deposition was that there were really three houses and not two and this lits in with the story of a complete partition. In the second place, she admitted that the separation of Imrit took place during the lifetime of Sheo Narain. That the stock of knowledge of this lady was very small and she could be made to say any thing as the defendants liked is apparent from the fact that she herself did not know what was north, south, east or west. She did not know how to count money and did not know even how her husband conducted his business.\n\nIn such circumstances, we feel unable to attach much importance to the evidence of this lady, though it is somewhat surprising that she should have made any statement against the interests of her own daughter.\n\nThe two other classes of <locuments whicli are relevant for our present purpose and to which reference was made by the learned counsel for the appellants are the settlement records and the account books.\n\nThe\n\nsettlement records Exs. 4 and R are not, in our opinion, decisive of the point in issue. The records show that some lahds were recorded in the name of Ram Narain alone and others were recorded in the names of both Ram Narain and Ram Saran with a further remark that they have equal shares in the properties.\n\nIf really the family was joint from the very beginning and Ram Narain was the k..arta, then all the lands would have been recorded in the name of Ram Narain alone.\n\nThe fact that some lands were recorded in the name of Ram Narain alone, while others were recorded in their joint names, clearly indicates that it was not a joint Mitakshara family in the proper sense of the word. In this connection reference may be made . to two important documents to which just importance has been attached by the learned Judges of the High Court. These are Exhibits G and 1. The first is a deed of relinquishment of claim by Ram Narain to Shri Thakur Lachhmi Narayan Swamiji Maharaj. The document is dated 9th of November, 1899, and by this instrument Ram Narain relinquished his interest in certain properties which he purchased in his own name, but for the benefit of the deity.\n\nIt is stated in this document that Ram Narain would. remain manager of the temple during his lifetime and shall make settlement and management of the properties in such a way as he thought proper and after his death Ram Saran Sah, son of his full brother, and after him the heir and representative of Ram Saran Sah would be the managers. Ram Saran was an attesting witness to this document. This clearly shows that Ram Narain had property of his own which he was disposing of in any way he . liked to the knowledge of his nephew who is alleged to be his joint coparcener. If it was an endowment created by the family itself, there was .no necessity of laying clown that after the death of Ram Narain, his nephew would become the manager as the managership would descend in the line of Ram Saran as a matter of course.\n\nBy the subsequent document (Exhibit l), which was executed shortly before the death of Ram Narain, this arrangement was changed and a\n\nBhagwati Prawd :Jah\n\nand Other.\n\nv. Du/hin Rameshwari\n\nKuer and Another.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n19SI\n\nBii:Jgwati Prasad Sah and Others\n\nDu/bin\n\nRamehwarl\n\nKu er and Another.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\ncertain Mahant, namely, Mahant Goswami Hirdaya Saran Deoji, was appointed manager of this endowed property.\n\nThis proves that Ram Narain did purport to exercise absolute and unrestricted power of disposition over his properties in any way he liked, and that the properties except those which were jointly acquired by himself and his nephew out of the profits of the joint business, belonged to him absolutely.\n\nAs regards the .account books that have been produced in this case, the learned Judges of the High Court, it appears, are not quite correct in saying that there were two sets of accounts kept side by side, one in the name of Ram Narain and other in the name of Ram Saran. At least the learned counsel appearing for the respondents could not satisfy us that this was in fact the true position.\n\nWe think, however, that the entries in the ; lccount books to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the appellants do not realy improve the defendants' case.\n\nWe agree with the learned Judges of the High Court in holding that the entries are inconclusive and at the best equivocal.\n\nThus, for, example, certain expenses were debited to Ram Narain on account of the costs incurred by Ram Saran and others in going to Puri. It is not known who were the persons who actually accompanied Ram Saran to Puri and whether or not they were the wife and daughter of Ram Narain himself.\n\nThen again certain amounts were debited on account of SaJaisa ceremony but nothing is elicited as to whose Sataisa ceremony it was.\n\nCertain expenses in connection with the marriage of Ram Saran's daughter undoubtedly find place in these account books and they are debited against Ram Narain.\n\nWe have looked into the entries ourselves.\n\nThey relate to very small sums of money cons1stmg mostly of expenses incurred in connection with invitation of guests and presents received from them.\n\nThey are not marriage expenses proper and in the absence of better evidence we are unable to say that they support the defendants' story of there being a joint family in the true sense of the expression.\n\nThe result is that on the whole we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Judges of the High\n\nCourt is correct and that there was in fact a separation of all the members of the family and not of Jmrit alone during the lifetime of Sheo Narain himself. As no case of re-union has been attempted to be made on behalf of the defendants, the facts that Ram Narain and Ram Saran lived in commensality, carried on business together and acquired properties in their joint names, or that their names \\Vere recorded as joint holders of properties in the settlement records might at least create a tenancy in common between them, but not a joint tenancy under the Mitakshara law which would attract the law of survivorship.\n\nDefenaant No. 1, therefore, did not acquire any right by survivorship to the properties which were owned by Ram Narain and the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on this ground.\n\nWe are unable, however, to affirm the decree in the ' form in which it has been made by the High Court in I favour of the plaintiff.\n\nThe plaintiff laid claim to the properties which are specified in schedules I to IV of the plaint.\n\nIn paragraph 21 of the written statement, it was expressly averred by the defendants that the list of properties and the valuation given at the foot of the plaint were incorrect.\n\nSome of the properties, it was said, were non-existent.\n\nSome debts had become time-barred and claims with regard to certain others had been dismissed.\n\nThen, there were properties .owned jointly by Ram Narain and Ram Saran\n\nto Vie entirety of which no clim could be laid by the plaintiff. Upon this defence, issue No. 7 was raised in the trial Court and it involved a consideration of the question as to what properties the plaintiff could claim to recover possession of even if she succeeded in establishing that her father died separate.\n\nThe trial Court did not think it necessary to decide this issue, as it dismissed the plaintiffs suit altogether.\n\nThe High Court, it is to be seen, has given a decree to the plaintiff in terms of her prayers in the plaint without considering this matter at all.\n\nIt may be further pointed out that the plaintiff in her plaint claimed Rs. 6,600 as past mesne profits and there was a prayer for recovery of future mesne profits as well.\n\nWhat amount, if any, the plaintiff would be entitled to\n\nBhagwati Pra.<ad Sah and Others\n\ny, D11/hin Rameahwori\n\nKuer and Another.\n\nMukherfea J.\n\nBhagwati Pra•adSah\n\nand0thet3\n\nDulhin Rame3hwari\n\nKuer and Another.\n\nMukher}ea J,\n\nrecover as mesne profits and on what basis mesne profits should be calculated formed the subject-matter of issue No. 8 and that issue has also been left undecided by the High Court. In these circumstances, although we agree with the decision of the High Court that the plaintiff's father did die separate from defendant No. 1 and consequently the latter was not entitled to claim any property by right of survivorship, still for the determination of the properties with regard to which a decree for possession could be made and also for ascertainment of mesne profits, the case must be sent back to the High Court.\n\nThe result is that we affirm the findings of the High Court and remand the case in order that it may be disposed of in accordance with law after determination of issues Nos. 7 and 8.\n\nIt would be open to the learned Judges to remit the issues to the trial Court for findings on the points to be arrived at on the eyidence on the record or on such further evidence, as the parties might be allowed to adduce.\n\nThe plaintiffrespondent will be entitled to costs of the appeal.\n\nFurther costs would abide the result.\n\nCase remanded\n\nAgent for the appellants : Tarachand Briimohanlal.\n\nAgent for respondent No. 1 : R. C. Prasad.", "total_entities": 97, "entities": [{"text": "BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER\n\nAND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 161, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 32(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 375, "end_char": 383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1851, "end_char": 1856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Blurgwali PraJadSah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2354, "end_char": 2373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the said expression is used in\n\nMay 7,\n\nBlurgwali PraJadSah\n\nand Other1\n\nDulhin Ramehwari x.,,, and Another."}}, {"text": "Dulhin Ramehwari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2387, "end_char": 2403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the said expression is used in\n\nMay 7,\n\nBlurgwali PraJadSah\n\nand Other1\n\nDulhin Ramehwari x.,,, and Another.", "canonical_name": "DULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mukherl•a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2424, "end_char": 2433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherl•a J.\n\ndescribing a family in a document does not therefore nece!:sarily lead to the inference that the family is a joint Hindu family with all its legal incidents.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2762, "end_char": 2773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 2nd March, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Ray, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2778, "end_char": 2781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 2nd March, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lal and Ray, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "BaJr..shi TeJr.. Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2990, "end_char": 3012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BaJr..shi TeJr.. Chand (Ramanugrah Prasad, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Ramanugrah Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BaJr..shi TeJr.. Chand (Ramanugrah Prasad, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Gopinath Kunzru", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3064, "end_char": 3079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopinath Kunzru (D. K. Saran, with him) for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. K. Saran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3081, "end_char": 3092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopinath Kunzru (D. K. Saran, with him) for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "2nd March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3300, "end_char": 3315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgmeQt of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Patna High Coun dated 2nd March, 1949, by which the learned judges reversed, on appeal, a decision of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge of Saran in Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "Sheo Narain Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4262, "end_char": 4277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Sheo Narain Sah, who was the grandfather of the plaintiff as well as of defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Sheo Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Imrit", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4370, "end_char": 4375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 had three sons: (1) Imrit, .(2) Janki and (3) Ram Narain.", "canonical_name": "Imrit"}}, {"text": "Janki", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4382, "end_char": 4387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 had three sons: (1) Imrit, .(2) Janki and (3) Ram Narain."}}, {"text": "Ram Narain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4396, "end_char": 4406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 had three sons: (1) Imrit, .(2) Janki and (3) Ram Narain.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Ram Saran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4544, "end_char": 4553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janki's only son is Ram Saran, the defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Sumitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Narain died in 1926 leaving behind him his widow Sumitra and a daughter Rameshwari who is the plaintiff in the suit.", "canonical_name": "Sumitra"}}, {"text": "Rameshwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4750, "end_char": 4760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Narain died in 1926 leaving behind him his widow Sumitra and a daughter Rameshwari who is the plaintiff in the suit."}}, {"text": "Sumitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sumitra died in 1933 and the plaintiff claims to be the sole heir of Ram Narain after the death of her mother.", "canonical_name": "Sumitra"}}, {"text": "Sheo Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4992, "end_char": 5003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the plaintiff, there was a complete separation tween the three sons of Sheo Narain in food, estate and business nearly 65 years prior to the institution of the suit.", "canonical_name": "Sheo Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Ram Saran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5120, "end_char": 5129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After separation, Ram Narain and Ram Saran, the defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "20th of December, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6294, "end_char": 6316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present suit was instituted on 20th of December, 1940, and the plaintiff prayed for recovery of possession of the properties specified in Schedules I to IV in the plaint together with mesne profits both past and future."}}, {"text": "Imrie", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7349, "end_char": 7354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Imrie alone separated himself from Ram Narain and the defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Imrit"}}, {"text": "Ram Narain Sah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8103, "end_char": 8117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 and this was worded as follows :-\n\n\"Was there any separation between Ram Narain Sah, plaintiff's father and defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Patna High Court against this decision by the plaintiff and the learned Judges of the High Court reversed the decision of the trial Judge and gave the plaintiff\n\na decree in terms of the prayers made in the plaint."}}, {"text": "Bakhshi Tek Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8752, "end_char": 8769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substantial contention raised by Mr. Bakhshi Tek Chand, who appeared in support of the appeal, is that the decision arrived at by the High Court on the question of separation is not warranted by the evidence on the record."}}, {"text": "Rarr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10479, "end_char": 10483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These principles which have been laid down in several pronouncements of the Judicial Committee seem to us to be perfectly sound : (vide Bal Krishna v. Ram Krishna(1) and Palaniammtrl\n\nv. Muthuvenkatachala(2) and Balabux Ladhuram v ..\n\nRukhmabai(3); Another thing to be noted in this connection is that it is not the case of the defendants made either in the pleadings or in the evidence that even if there was a separation between Ram Narain and Rarr:\n\n(1) L.R. SS I.A. 220\n\n(2) L.R. S9 I.A. 83\n\n(3) LR."}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10517, "end_char": 10519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwati Prasad Sali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10550, "end_char": 10570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "301 .A. 130\n\nBhagwati Prasad Sali\n\nand OtFiers\n\nDulhin Rames/.wari\n\nKuer and Another\n\nMuhkerjea J.\n\nBh.agwati Pra&adSah\n\nandOtbtr1\n\nDul/Ji• Ralh•OTi\n\nKuer and Another.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Muhkerjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10623, "end_char": 10632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "301 .A. 130\n\nBhagwati Prasad Sali\n\nand OtFiers\n\nDulhin Rames/.wari\n\nKuer and Another\n\nMuhkerjea J.\n\nBh.agwati Pra&adSah\n\nandOtbtr1\n\nDul/Ji• Ralh•OTi\n\nKuer and Another.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Mukherieo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10706, "end_char": 10715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherieo J.\n\nSaran at any anterior time they subsequently rennited.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Imrit", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12201, "end_char": 12206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Imrit's separation from the family is of course an admitted fact but there is no evidence even on the side of the defendants to show when this separation took place.", "canonical_name": "Imrit"}}, {"text": "30th of September, 1879", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12719, "end_char": 12742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 dated the \"30th of September, 1879."}}, {"text": "Dahiawan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13074, "end_char": 13082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgaged\n\nproprties were two houses, one of which was situated at Dahiawan and the northern boundary of this house is stated to be \"house of Ram Narain Sahu, puttidar of me, the executant, partitioned\"."}}, {"text": "Ram Narain Sahu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13149, "end_char": 13164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgaged\n\nproprties were two houses, one of which was situated at Dahiawan and the northern boundary of this house is stated to be \"house of Ram Narain Sahu, puttidar of me, the executant, partitioned\".", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "21st of March, 1885", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13515, "end_char": 13534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit 2 (a) is another mortgage bond between Imrit and Ram Narain and is dated the 21st of March, 1885 ."}}, {"text": "Ram Saran Sahu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13631, "end_char": 13645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and here the northern boundary of the mortgaged property is stated to be the \"Bakasht land of Ram Saran Sahu, puttidar of me, the executant.\"", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "8th of November,\n\n1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14125, "end_char": 14147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The date of the instrument is 8th of November,\n\n1898."}}, {"text": "Sheo Narain Sahu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14572, "end_char": 14588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document further recites that Sheo Narain Sahu, the father, was a party to this partition and he was given a house for his residence and Rs.", "canonical_name": "Sheo Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14921, "end_char": 14930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\n19SI\n\nBhagwati PrasadSah and Others\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer a11d Another\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRs.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati PrasadSah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14941, "end_char": 14959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\n19SI\n\nBhagwati PrasadSah and Others\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer a11d Another\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRs.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Dulhin Rameshwari Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14972, "end_char": 14994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\n19SI\n\nBhagwati PrasadSah and Others\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer a11d Another\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nRs.", "canonical_name": "DULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Kunzru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15650, "end_char": 15656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Imrit is undoubetedly dead and Mr. Kunzru, appearing for the respondents, contended that this statement could be."}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15756, "end_char": 15766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15778, "end_char": 15797, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15821, "end_char": 15831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16032, "end_char": 16042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16131, "end_char": 16144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16503, "end_char": 16516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vide Blackburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16727, "end_char": 16741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assertion that there was separation not only in respect of himself but between all the coparceners would be admissible as a connected matter and an integral part of the same statement (Vide Blackburn J. in Smith v.\n\nBlakey(') )."}}, {"text": "Art. 1465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16949, "end_char": 16958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sheo . Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17168, "end_char": 17181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that Exhibits 2, 2 (a) and 2 (b) taken together afford most satisfactory evidence of there being a separation\n\n(ll L.R. 2 Q.B. 326\n\namongst all the sons of Sheo .", "canonical_name": "Sheo Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "14th of February, 1880", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17982, "end_char": 18004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit C (5) is a deed of sale dated 14th of February, 1880, and by this instrument one Welayat Mian sold a house to Ram Narain and the document stands in the name of Ram Narain alone."}}, {"text": "Welayat Mian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18033, "end_char": 18045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit C (5) is a deed of sale dated 14th of February, 1880, and by this instrument one Welayat Mian sold a house to Ram Narain and the document stands in the name of Ram Narain alone."}}, {"text": "23rd of May, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18318, "end_char": 18335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that this house was treated as the joint property of both Ram Narain and Ram Saran as would be evident from a Kobala Exhibit C(7) executed on 23rd of May, 1925, by both of them together in favour of one Dulhin Ram Kuer."}}, {"text": "Dulhin Ram Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18379, "end_char": 18394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that this house was treated as the joint property of both Ram Narain and Ram Saran as would be evident from a Kobala Exhibit C(7) executed on 23rd of May, 1925, by both of them together in favour of one Dulhin Ram Kuer.", "canonical_name": "DULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "13th of December, 1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18910, "end_char": 18932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It 1s dated 13th of December, 1898, and in this document also ."}}, {"text": "Ram Singari Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19027, "end_char": 19044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Narain figures as the sole purchaser of certam property from Ram Singari Singh."}}, {"text": "Dulhin Rameshwari Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19312, "end_char": 19334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati PrasadSah and Other3\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer and Another\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nBhagwatl PraJadSah\n\nand Others\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer and Another\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nThe property that is recorded in Khatian No.", "canonical_name": "DULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Bhagwatl PraJadSah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19362, "end_char": 19380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati PrasadSah and Other3\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer and Another\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nBhagwatl PraJadSah\n\nand Others\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Kuer and Another\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nThe property that is recorded in Khatian No.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Ram Narai!i", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21534, "end_char": 21545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit E is a Zarpeshgi deed executed by the sons of lmrit in favour of Ram Narai!i and Ram Saran\n\njointly.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "8th of November, 1895", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21688, "end_char": 21709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The consideration for this lease was the money due to them under the mortgages executed separately in their favour on 8th of November, 1895."}}, {"text": "9th of July,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22397, "end_char": 22409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit C(3) is a sale deed dated 9th of July,\n\n1909, executed by Bibi Bechan in favour of Ram Narain and Ram Saran."}}, {"text": "Bibi Bechan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22429, "end_char": 22440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit C(3) is a sale deed dated 9th of July,\n\n1909, executed by Bibi Bechan in favour of Ram Narain and Ram Saran."}}, {"text": "7th of May, 1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22725, "end_char": 22741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit C(4) is another sale deed dated the 7th of May, 1913, executed by one Kishun Chand and Gopi Chand in favour of Ram Narain alone."}}, {"text": "Kishun Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22759, "end_char": 22771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit C(4) is another sale deed dated the 7th of May, 1913, executed by one Kishun Chand and Gopi Chand in favour of Ram Narain alone."}}, {"text": "Gopi Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22776, "end_char": 22786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit C(4) is another sale deed dated the 7th of May, 1913, executed by one Kishun Chand and Gopi Chand in favour of Ram Narain alone."}}, {"text": "Mustafa Hussain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23281, "end_char": 23296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Exhibit C(2), which is a sale deed executed by Mustafa Hussain on 20th April, 1922, in favour of Ram Narain and Ram Saran, the purchasers are mentioned as 1omt Zarpeshgidars of the executant of the deed, but there is no description of them as members of a joint family."}}, {"text": "20th April, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23300, "end_char": 23316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Exhibit C(2), which is a sale deed executed by Mustafa Hussain on 20th April, 1922, in favour of Ram Narain and Ram Saran, the purchasers are mentioned as 1omt Zarpeshgidars of the executant of the deed, but there is no description of them as members of a joint family."}}, {"text": "Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23789, "end_char": 23792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was also a deed of sale in favour of both Ram Narain and Ram\n\n19SI\n\nBhagwatl Pra:JadSa[J andOthen v, Dulhin Rame:Jhwar\n\nKuer and Another\n\nMukher}ea I.\n\nBhagwati Prasad Sah and Others\n\nDu/bin Rame$hwari\n\nKu er and Another\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nSaran, though they are not described as members of a joint family."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati Prasad Sah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23899, "end_char": 23918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was also a deed of sale in favour of both Ram Narain and Ram\n\n19SI\n\nBhagwatl Pra:JadSa[J andOthen v, Dulhin Rame:Jhwar\n\nKuer and Another\n\nMukher}ea I.\n\nBhagwati Prasad Sah and Others\n\nDu/bin Rame$hwari\n\nKu er and Another\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nSaran, though they are not described as members of a joint family.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Ram Narin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25327, "end_char": 25336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the appellants laid considerable emphasis however upon the statements of Ram Narain and also of Sumitra after the death of Ram Narain in a number of plaints and depositions where it was expressly stated that Ram Narain and Ram Saran constituted a joint Hindu family, of which Ram Narin was the karta.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "alon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25554, "end_char": 25558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 alon(!,"}}, {"text": "Ram Narain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25838, "end_char": 25848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in the suit was Ram Narain and plaintiff No.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Ram Saran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25873, "end_char": 25882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 was Ram Saran.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Ram\n\nSaran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25983, "end_char": 25993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K (1), which is another plaint in a mortgage suit of 1924 and in which both Ram Narain and Ram\n\nSaran figured as plaintiffs, it was stated in paragraph 6 of the plaint that plaintiff No.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Ram Narain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27901, "end_char": 27911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deposition of Ram Narain given in a mortgage suit {Ex."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati Prasad Sall", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28038, "end_char": 28058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his deposition Ram Narain states as follows :-\n\nBhagwati Prasad Sall andOthen\n\nDu/hill Rameshwarl Kuer and Another.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI PRASAD SAH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Dulhin Rame.shwarl Kuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28152, "end_char": 28175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nBhagwati PraJad Sah andOther1\n\nDulhin Rame.shwarl Kuer and Anothtr.", "canonical_name": "DULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Mukherfea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28190, "end_char": 28199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherfea /,\n\n\"Ram Saran Sahu is my nephew and we live jointly.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Ram Saran Sahu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28205, "end_char": 28219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherfea /,\n\n\"Ram Saran Sahu is my nephew and we live jointly.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Thakur Lachhmi Narayan Swamiji Maharaj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31268, "end_char": 31306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first is a deed of relinquishment of claim by Ram Narain to Shri Thakur Lachhmi Narayan Swamiji Maharaj."}}, {"text": "9th of November, 1899", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31330, "end_char": 31351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document is dated 9th of November, 1899, and by this instrument Ram Narain relinquished his interest in certain properties which he purchased in his own name, but for the benefit of the deity."}}, {"text": "Ram Saran Sah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31722, "end_char": 31735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "remain manager of the temple during his lifetime and shall make settlement and management of the properties in such a way as he thought proper and after his death Ram Saran Sah, son of his full brother, and after him the heir and representative of Ram Saran Sah would be the managers.", "canonical_name": "Ram Narain Sahu"}}, {"text": "Ram Saran", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31844, "end_char": 31853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Saran was an attesting witness to this document."}}, {"text": "Jgwati Prasad Sah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32558, "end_char": 32575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\n19SI\n\nBii:Jgwati Prasad Sah and Others\n\nDu/bin\n\nRamehwarl\n\nKu er and Another."}}, {"text": "Mahant Goswami Hirdaya Saran Deoji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32665, "end_char": 32699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\ncertain Mahant, namely, Mahant Goswami Hirdaya Saran Deoji, was appointed manager of this endowed property."}}, {"text": "Puri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33881, "end_char": 33885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, for, example, certain expenses were debited to Ram Narain on account of the costs incurred by Ram Saran and others in going to Puri."}}, {"text": "Mukherfea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37167, "end_char": 37176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherfea J.\n\nBhagwati Pra•adSah\n\nand0thet3\n\nDulhin Rame3hwari\n\nKuer and Another.", "canonical_name": "MuKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "Dulhin Rame3hwari\n\nKuer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37212, "end_char": 37235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherfea J.\n\nBhagwati Pra•adSah\n\nand0thet3\n\nDulhin Rame3hwari\n\nKuer and Another.", "canonical_name": "DULHIN RAMESHW ARI KUER\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Tarachand Briimohanlal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38436, "end_char": 38458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Case remanded\n\nAgent for the appellants : Tarachand Briimohanlal."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38490, "end_char": 38502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 : R. C. Prasad."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_621_654_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "[1951]\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nS. KRISHNAN AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS\n\n(AND OTHER PETITIONS)\n\nUNION OF INDIA-Intervener\n\n[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,\n\nMEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN, s. R. DAS d\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nPreventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, ss. 9, 10, 11, 12- Indian Constitution, 1950, Arts. 22( 4) (a) & (b), 22(7)-Dctentions under eariicr Act treated as detentions under new Act and continued for more than one year-Omission to fix maximum period-Infringement of fundamental rights-Contravention of Constitution- Validity of amending Act-Temporary Stateites-Order of detentions -Validity after expiry of Statute.\n\nThe Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act of 1951 which extended the operation of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 for a period of one more year, that is, up to 1st April, 1952, effected two material alterations by providing (i) that a reference to an Advisory Board shall be made in all cases within six weeks (s. 9) ; (ii) that every detention order in force at the commencement of the new Act shall continue in force and shall have effect as if had been made under the Act as amended (s. I:!). The petitioners, who were on the date of the commencement of the amending Act in detention in pursuance of orders made under s. 3(1) (a) (ii) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, and who but for the amending Act would have been entitled to be released under the eai\"lier Act on the expiry of one year from the date of the order of detention, applied for habeas corpus contending that ss. 9 and 12 of the amending Act which enacted the above mentioned provisions contravened the provisions of Art. 22( 4) (a) of the Constitution and were consequently void under Art. 13(a) inasmuch as the combined effect of these sections was to keep the petitioners in detention for a period longer than three months without reference to an Advisory Board, and also to keep them in detention for a period of more than one year.\n\nThe Act was also attacked on the ground that it did not fix any maximum period for detention :\n\nHeld, per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MAHAJAN, S. R. DAS and BosE JJ. :-that ss. 9 and 12 of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, and not contravene Art. 22 (4) of the Constitution and were not void.\n\nMay 7\n\n1951 s. Krbhnan\n\nand Others\n\nThe State of MadraJ.\n\nPer KANIA C.].1 and PATANJALI SAsTRI J.-The amending Act could be regarded as a law made substantially in accordance with sub-clauses (a) and (b) of cl. (7) of Art. 22, and as such it satisfied the requirements of Art. 22(4) (b) and cannot be held to be unconstinttional or void.\n\nPer MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.-The law enacted by the amending statute is not the same law as was declared by the original statute and to that extent the amended statute was in the nature of a new and independent statute; the effect of s. 12 was to make the detention of the petitioners a fresh detention under the r.cw la\\v ; and there was nothing in the new law standing by itself \\vhich authorised detention of a person for more than three months without refrence to an Advisory Board or for more than one year and there was thus no contravention of any of the provi~ sions of Art. 22 ( 4).\n\nHeld also per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTR1, MAHAJAN and DAs Tl. (BosE J. dissenting).-The Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, was not invalid on the ground that it did not fix a maximum period for detention, inasmuch as the Act itself \\Vas to be in force only for a period of one year and no detention under the Act could be continued after the expiry of the Act. Born J.-Sub-scction (!) of s.\n\nII of the impugned Act contravened Art. 22 ( 4) of the Constirution inasmuch as it did not fix any maximum period of detention, but on the other hand empowered the government in express terms to order that a detention shall continue \"for such period as it thinks fit\".\n\nThe view that a detention which has been ordered under an Act would come to an end with the expiry of the Act is not sound.\n\nORIGINAL Jm1sn1CT10N.-Petitions Nos. 303, 617 to 619, 621 to 631, 561 to 571, 592, 594, 596 and 600 of 1950. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution for writs in the nature of habeas corpus.\n\nThe petitioners . were detained in pursuance of orders for detention made under s. 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.\n\nOn the 22nd February, 1951 while they were under detention the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, came into force and this Act by substituting the figures \"1952\" for \"1951\" in sub-sec. (3) of s. 1 of the Preventive Detention Act of\n\n1950 continued the operation of the Act until 31st March, 1952.\n\nSince the maximum period of detention fixed by the Act of 1950 was one year the petitioners applied for writs in the nature of habeas corpus for their release.\n\nThe material facts, the points raised by\n\nthe petitioners and the arguments of the counsel appear in the Judgment.\n\nM. 1<.. Nambiyar (V. G. Raw, with him) for the Petitioner in Petition No. 303 of 1950.\n\nBawa Shiv Charan Singh for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 618, 619, 621, 622, 624, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630 and 631 of 1950.\n\nBasant Chandra Chose (amicus curiae) for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 592, 594, 596, and 600 of 1950.\n\nV. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General, Madras, and G. S. Swaminathan (R. Ganapathy Iyer with them) for the Respondents in Nos. 618, 619, 621, 622, 624, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630 and 631 of 1950.\n\nFakhruddin Ahmed (Numddin Ahmed with him) for the Respondents in Petitions Nos. 567, 568, 569, 570, 571 592, 594, 596 and 600 of 1950.\n\nPetitioner in person in Petition No. 617 of 1950.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the Union of India, Intervener.\n\n1951 May 7. The following Judgments were delivered-\n\n1951 s. Krishnan and Others\n\nThe State of Madras.\n\nKANIA C. J.-:-1 agree with the Judgment prepared by\n\nKANIA C. J. Sastri J. and have nothing more to add.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-The common question which PatanjaliSastriJ. arises for consideration in these petitions is whether certain provisions of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, purporting to amend the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, so as to authorise detention of the petitioners to be continued beyond the expiry of one year are ultra vires and inoperative.\n\nThe amending Act (hereinafter referred to as the new Act) came into force on 22nd February, 1951, and by substituting the figures \"1952\" for \"1951\" in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the old Act), it\n\n1951 s. Kri5/rllan and Others\n\nv. the State of MadraJ.\n\nPatanfalt\n\nSa>trl J.\n\ncontinues the operation of the old Act till 31st March, 1952.\n\nThe petitioners in all these cases were, at the commencement of the new Act, under detention in pursuance of orders made under section 3(1) (a) (ii) of the old Act and, save in a few cases where the detention was also attacked on some special grounds which have no\n\nubstance, the legality of that detention was not open to question. But such detention having commenced more than a year before the date of hearing of these petitions the petitioners would have been entitled to be rele;>.sed had it not been for the provisions of the new Act which purport to authorise the continuance of their detention.\n\nMr. Nambiyar, on behalf of the petitioners, urged that these provisions contravened article 22( 4) (a) of the Constitution and were, therefore, .void under article 13(2).\n\nArticle 22(4) (a) provides:\n\n\"No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless-\n\n(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention :\n\nProvided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7).''\n\nIt will be seen that two conditions have to be fulfilled in order that a person can be detained for a longer period than three months; ( i) his case must be referred to an Advisory Board constituted in the manner specified and (ii) that Board must make a report before the expiration of three months that there is sufficient cause for such detention. Section 12 of the old Act having provided that there was to be no review by an Advisory Board in cases falling within\n\nsection 3 (l)(a)(ii), the petitioners' detention in pursuance of orders made under the latter section fell under article 22 ( 4) (b), and there was no question, therefore, of such detention contravening article 22 ( 4) (a).\n\nThe scheme of the new Act, however, was to extend the benefit of a review by an Advisory Board to all cases and to bind the detaining authorities to act conformably to the report of the Board.\n\nThe method adopted to give effect to this scheme was to delete some of the provisions of the old Act and to substitute in their place new provisions.\n\nThe material provisions of the new Act are sections 9, 10, 11 and 12.\n\nSection 9 provides for a reference to an Advisory Board within six weeks from the date specified in sub-section\n\n(2) which says \"The date referred to in sub-section (1) shall be-(a) in every case where at the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, the person is under detention in pursuance of a detention order made under sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 3, the date of commencement of the said Act ; and (b) in every other case the date of detention under the order\". By section 10 the Advisory Board is required to submit its report within ten weeks from the date specified in sub.section (2) of section 9.\n\nSection 11 ( 1) authorises the appropriate Government to continue the period of detention for such period as it thinks fit in case the Advisory Board reports that there are sufficient grounds for the detention, while sub-section (2) provides tliat the Government shall revoke the detention order and release the person concerned if the Advisory Board reports the other way.\n\nSub-section (1) of section 12 declares for the \"avoidance of doubt\" that every detention order in force at the commencement of the new Act \"shall continue in force and shall have effect as if. it ad been made under this Act as amended\" by the \"'new Act, and sub-section (2) provides that nothing contained in subsection (3) of section 1 or in sub-section (1) of section 12 of the old Act shall affect the validity or duration of any such order.\n\n$.Krishnan and Othera\n\nThe State of\n\nMadraa.\n\nPatanja/i\n\nSa>tri J.\n\nS Kri.shan and Other:1\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras\n\nPatan}ali\n\nSa-stri J.\n\nIt will be seen that although the object of the new Act was to liberalise the provisions of the old Act in the manner indicated above, section 12 had the effect of enlarging .he period of detention of the petitioners who were under detention at the commencement of the new Act by enacting the legal fiction that detention in such cases shall have effect as if it had been made under the new Act.\n\nOn that basis, the new Act seeks to bring detention orders in force at its commencement and more than three months old into conformity with article 22( 4) (a) by prescribing a period of six weeks in section 9 for referring such cases to the Advisory\n\nBo~.rd and ten weeks in section 10( l) for the submission by the Board of its report, the period in each case being calculated from the commencement of the new Act.\n\nBut this fiction cannot obscure the fact that in the case of the petitioners more than three months had elapsed from the date of their arrest without any Advisory Board making a report on their detention and it is, of course, not possible for the Advisory Board now provided for in such cases to submit its report before the expiration of that period, with the result that their detention contravened article 22(4) (a).\n\nNo doubt the detention up to the commencement of the new Act was lawful under section 12 of the old Act, as it was in accordance with sub-clause (b) of clause ( 4) of article 22, but that could not make the petitioners' continued detention any _the less a violation of article 22(4) (a) after the deletion of old section 12.\n\nIt is a fallacy to treat what was a lawful detention under sub-clause (b) as being no detention at all for purposes of sub-clause (a). Detention is a hard physical fact, and the total period of detention of the petitioners having far exceeded three months without an Advisory Board having reported within three months that there were sufficient grounds therefore, it could not lawfully be continued under article 22(4) (a).\n\nConstitutional provisions regarding fundamental rights cannot be circumvented by resorting to legal fictions.\n\nIt was said that if the petitioners had been released on 22nd February, 1951, and re-arresteC. 1nd detained\n\nimmediately thereafter under the new Act such detention would have been valid.\n\nBut, for proceeding in that manner the enactment of section 9(2) (a) and section 12(1) would be unnecessary. Parliament has, however, adopted a different mode of proceeding by providing for the continuance of detention orders in force at the commencement of the new Act on the basis that they should have effect as if they had been made under the new Act. The resulting position must, therefore, be dealt witn only on that basis and not on any other hypothetical footing.\n\nThe Attorney-General, however, contended in the alternative that the constitutional validity of section 9 (2) (a) and section 12 (1) of the new Act could be sustained under article 22(4) (b) which has been held by a majority of the Judges in A. K. Gopalan v. The\n\nState of Madras (1) to be a distinct and independent provision authorisil).g preventive detention for a period longer than three months in accordance with a law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7) of article 22. The Attorney-General claimed that the aforesaid provisions were such a law, none the less because Parliament may have intended to make a law within article 22 (4) (a) by providing for a review by an Advisory Board in all cases or preventive detention.\n\nOn a question of vires, the intention of the Legislature is immaterial, and I agree that a provision for an Advisory Board is not a hall-mark which stamps a preventive detention law as one necessarily falling within sub-clause (a) of clause (4), so as to make its constitutional validity determinable exclusively with reference to the requirements of that sub-clause.\n\nThe law could still be upheld if it fulfilled the conditions laid down in sub-clause (b) of clause ( 4). Mr. Nambiyar, however, submitted that the new Act did not fulfil those conditions, for it is not a law made under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7). The word \"and\" should be understood in its ordinary conjunctive sense, and the new Act neither prescribes the circumstances and classes referred to in sub-clause\n\n(a) nor thr co [t950J s.c.R. 88. 7-10 S.C. India/67\n\n1951 s. Krishnan and Others.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadras.\n\nPatan}ali\n\nSastri J,\n\n19SI\n\ns. KriJhnan\n\nand Others.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadra&.\n\nPatan]a//\n\nSastri J.\n\nmaxim um period of detention required to be prescribed under sub-clause (b) of clause (7). The contention is devoid of substance. The new Act can, in my opinion, be regmx:led as a law made substantially in accordance with sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7), According to the majority view in Go pa/an' s case, sub-clause (a) of clause (7) being an enabling provision, the word \"and\" should be understood in a disjunctive sense.\n\nThe combined effect of sections 9(2) (a) and 12(1) is to provide, in a certain class of cases, namely, where detention orders were in force at the commencement of the new Act, that the persons concerned could be detained for a period longer than three months if an Advisory Board reports that there are sufficient grounds for detention within ten weeks from the commencement of the new Act, that is to say, without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board before the expiration of the three months from the commencement of the detention as provided in sub-clause (a) of clause (4).\n\nAnd, although the new Act does not in express terms prescribe in a separate provision any maximum period as such for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained, it fixes, by extending the duration of the old Act till the 1st April, 1952, an over-all timelimit beyond which preventive detention under the Act cannot be continued.\n\nThe general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that, in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires (Craies on Statutes, 4th Edition, p. 347). Preventive detention which would, but for the Act authorising it, be a continuing wrong, cannot, therefore, be continued beyond the expiry of the Act itself.\n\nThe new Act thus in substance prescribes a maximum period of detention under it by providing that it shall cease to have effect on a specified date. It seems to me, therefore, that section 9(2) (a) and section 12(1) of the new •Act substantially satisfy the requirements of sub-clause (b) of clause ( 4) of article 22, and cannot be declared unconstitutional and void.\n\nThe objection to the validity of section 11(1) can be disposed of in a few words. The argument is that the discretionary powc:r given to the appropriate Government under that sub-section to , continue the detention ''for such period as it thinks fit\" authorises preventive detention for an indefinite period, which is contrary to the provisions of article 22(4).\n\nBut, if as already observed, the new Act is to be in force only up to 1st April, 1952, and no detention under the Act can continue thereafter, the discretionary power could be exercised only subject to that over-all limit.\n\nThe objection therefore fails.\n\nIn the result the petitions are dismissed.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-The question to be decided in these petitions is whether the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, or any part thereof is invalid and whether the petitioners who have been detained are entitled to a writ in the nature of habeas corpus on the ground that their detention is illegal.\n\nThe Act was enacted by Parliament on the 27th February, 1951, and according to its express terms will cease to have effect on the 1st April, 1952, save as regards things done or omitted to be done before that date.\n\nThe point that has been canvassed before us is that sections 9(2) {a) and 12 of the Act are invalid as these infringe the fundamental rights conferred under articles 21 and 22 of Part III of the Constitution.\n\nSection 9 of the Act as amended reads as follows :-\n\n\" (1) In every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within six weeks from the date specified in subsection (2) place before an advisory board constituted by it under section 8 the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer, also the report made by such officer under sub-section (3) of section 3.\n\n1951 s. Krishan and Other&.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadra&.\n\nPatanjali\n\nSa&t&il.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n1951 s. Kr/Jhnan\n\nand Others.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadrOJ.\n\nMahajan J.\n\n(2) The date referred to in sub-section (1) shall be-\n\n(a) in every case where at the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, a person is under detention in pursuance of a detention order made under sub-clause ( i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section ( 1) of section 3, the date of commencement of the said Act ; and\n\n(b) in every other case the date of the detention order.\"\n\nSection 12 is in these terms :-\n\n\"For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared- ( a) every detention order in force at the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, shall continue in force and shall have effect as if it had been made under this Act as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951 ; and\n\n(b) nothing contained in sub-section ( 3) of section 1, or sub-section ( l) of section 12 of this Act as origi nally enlcted shall be deemed to affect the validity or duration \\>f any such order.\"\n\nMr. Nambiar for the detenus challenged the vires of these sections on he following grounds : ( l) That article 22( 4) of the Constitution limits the legislative power of Parliament and State legislatures in respect of preventive detention laws in the matter of duration of the period of detention and provides that no law of preventive detention can authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months without the intervention of an advisory board and without obtaining its opinion with.in three months. The amending Act, 1951, by section 9 authorizes detention for a period longer than three months without the opinion of the advisory board having been obtained within the said period of three months from the date of the actual detention in respect of persons detained under Act IV of 1950 as it ornally stood and it thus infringes the fundamental right conferred by article 22( 4).\n\n(2) That Parliament in exercise of powers conferred on it under artide 22(7) having prescribed in section 12 of Act IV\n\nof 19'0 a maximuttl period of one year for detention in certain classes of cases without obtaining the opinion of the advisory board, that period of one year became a part of the content of the fundamental right conferred under article 22(4) of the Constitution. Sections 9 and 12 of the amended Act contravene this fundamental right inasmuch as they authorize detention of persons yvho were detained under orders passed under section 3 (1) (i) and (ii) of Act IV of 1950 beyond the period of one year prescribed therein, and are therefore void.\n\n(3) That Parliament has no authority to alter the period of one year prescribed by it by virtue of authority given to it under article 22 (7) (b) of the Constitution so as to affect the cases of persons detained under Act IV of 1950.\n\n(4) That the Constitution does not envisage detention for an indefinite period and that inasmuch as the amended Act has failed to provide a maximum period for the detention of a person, it is repugnant to the Constitution and is void ; that it was obligatory on Parliament while making the law providing for preventive detention to fix the maximum period for such detention.\n\n(5) That the provisions ot these sections infringe article 21 of the Constitution inasmuch as they authorize detention contrary to procedure established by law (Act IV of 1950) in rs pect of detentions under that Act, because under established procedure detention beyond a period of one year was void.\n\nFor the reasons given above it was contended that as in the case of the petitioners the maximum period of one year under section 12 of Act IV of 1950 had expired on 27th February, 1951, they were entitled to their release.\n\nFor a proper appreciation of the points urged by the learned counsel and the manner in which they were combated by the learned Attorney-General, it is necl!ssary to shortly state the nature of the relevant amendments introduced by the amending Act iii. the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950. In section 8 of Act IV of 1950, which concerns tl1e constitution of advisory boards, the new Act has provided that the board shall consist of three persons instead of two except in cases s -10 S.C. In dia/67.\n\n1951 s. Kri$hnan and Others v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMadra!\n\nMahajan J.\n\n1951 s. Krl, hna11\n\nand Others\n\nTh• Stale of Madras\n\nMahajan}•\n\nwhere before the commencement of the amended Act reference had already been made to an advisory board.\n\nSection 9 of Act IV of 1950 has been substituted by section 9 'of the amending Act and it gives the benefit of the advisory board to all classes and cases of persons, who under Act IV of 1950 were not entitled to that benefit.\n\nIt makes it . obligatory on government to place all these cases, like all other cases, within six weeks from a prescribed date before an advisory board.\n\nIn section 10 the amended Act makes it obligatory on the adviso_ry board to submit its report to the government within ten weeks of the date specified under section 9 and it also authorizes the advisory board to call for such information as it deems necessary from government and from the person concerned and it empowers it to give a hearing to the detenu if in any particular case it considers it essential. Section 11 makes the opinion of the adisory board binding on government.\n\nIt also authorizes government to continue the detention of persons for such period as it thinks fit in cases where the opinion of the board is in favour of the continuance of detention.\n\nSection 12 provides that orders of detention in force at the commencement of the amended Act will be deemed to have been made under this Act. A new section, 14, has been introduced in Act IV of 1950 and it authorizes temporary release of persons detained.\n\nThe provisions of the amended Act are thus a great improvement on the original Act inasmuch as they provide a greater opportunity to the detenus of proving their innocence than they had under the original Act. The detention of a person without the case being referred to the opinion of an advisory board constituted of independent persons has been completely done away with, except for a period of three months provided for in article 22(4) of the Constitution. What the amended Act has in substance done is that instead of the cases of persons preventively detained being considered by ordinary courts of law, a special tribunal designated as an advisory board and consisting of men of high judicial experience has been given authority\n\nto examine their cases within a prescribed period and the decision of that authority has been made binding on government.\n\nThis tribunal is obviously no substitute for a court of law but a provision like this is in the nature of a substantial solatium in cases of preventive detention wherein ordinarily the detaining authority is the judging authority as well.\n\nShortly stated, Mr. Nambiar's attack on these beneficial provisions and concerning their vires is based principally on the method adopted by the draftsmen of the Act for switching over the detentions which were being continued under section 12 of Act IV of\n\n1950 and which were valid by virtue of the constitutional provisions contained in article 22( 4) (b) of the Constitution to the constitutional provisions contained in article 22( 4) (a) so that they may be given the benefit of an advisory board's opinion.\n\nHis grievance is that in doing so the amended statute has enlarged the period of three months provided under article 22( 4) for a report of the advisory board and has extended the period of one year mentioned in section 12 of Act IV of 1950. This argument is based on the assumption that the period of one year mentioned in section 12 of Act IV of 1950 was an Immutable and unalterable orie and that Parliament could not amend section 12 of tl1e Act in any manner whatsoever once having enacted it.\n\nI am unable to accept this contention.\n\nIt seems to me, that it was open to Parliament to amend section 12 and substitute another maximum for the period of one year mentioned therein.\n\nIf Parliament had recourse to that alternative, t11en in my opinion, the petitioners could have no possible grievance as regards the vires of the new legislation.\n\nAs regards the period of three months, it was essential to fix some date from which that period had to be calculated in respect of cases which were previously governed by section 12 of Act\n\nIV of 1950.\n\nUnder that section they did not have the benefit of the advisory board and when the new law gave them that benefit, a t(rminus quo had to be fixed for the period of three months during which the advisory board had to submit its report.\n\nThe amended Act\n\nS Krishnan and Other&\n\nThe State of\n\nMadra1\n\nMaha} an/.\n\ns. Krishnan and OtherJ\n\nThe State of MadraJ\n\nMahajan J.\n\nachieved this by prescribing in these specified classes of cases the date of the commencement of the amended Act as the date from which this period was to begin and by section 12 it provided that all detentions continuing at the date of the commencement of the amended Act shall be deemed to be detentions under the amended Act.\n\nAfter a careful consideration of the argument of Mr. Nambiar I have reached the conclusion that there is considerable force in the reply made to it by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nHe contended that article 22(4) provides that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorize detention of a person for a longer period than three months and that the amended Act has not in any manner infringed this provision ; on the other hand, it provides that the advisory board must make its report to the government within ten weeks.\n\nIt was urged that in order to judge the vires of the amended Act it was not relevant to take into consideration detention of persons validly detained under a different statute and that its vires must be adjudged on its own provisions and not with reference to what has actually happened under another law.\n\nIt was frankly conceded that if Parliament or a State legislature passed legislation in a manner which amounted to a fraud on the Constitution inasmuch as those enactments were passed with the purpose of defeating the constitutional provisions, then those laws could be attacked on that ground but not on the ground of their vires, that in the present case no such argument had been taken or could be taken and that being so, the contention of Mr. Nambiar was not justified.\n\nIn my opinion, the statute as framed docs not in any way contravene or abridge either the provisions of article 21 or of article 22.\n\nIt was open to Parlia. ment, as already observed, to alter the maximum period of detention mentioned in section 12 of Act IV\n\nof 1950 and to enhance it. It was also open to government to release these detenus after the expiry of one year and to serve fresh orders of detention on them after their revise under the amended Act. If that\n\nhad been done, no question could possibly be raised that the period of three months provided for in article 22(4) of the Constitution had in any way been affected.\n\nInstead of going through that form of ceremony, Parliament by section 12 of the amended Act provided that all detention orders in force under Act IV of 1950 be treated as detention orders under the amended Act. By the effect of this section the detention of all such persons becomes a fresh detention, under the new law, with the result that nothing in the amended statute can be said to abridge the fundamental right conferred by article 22 ( 4) of the Constitution. It was argued that the amended statute is not a new and an independent statute and that in spite of the amendments it remains the same statute as was passed in 1950, and that the detention of the petitioners is under the same law of preventive detention and it therefore offends against article 22( 4) of the Constitution and that it virtually amounts to tacking of the period of detention under one Act to the period of detention under another Act and as such amounts indirectly and substantially to an infringement of the fundamental right.\n\nIn my opinion, this contention, though attractive, is without force. Technically speaking, an amended statute remains the same statute as originally enacted but from that proposition it does not follow that the law contained in the amended statute is the same law as was contained in the original one. Section 9 of the original Act has been substituted by section 9 of the amcI).ded Act and declares a new law and it is not a re-enactment of the law as was contained in the earlier statute.\n\nSection 12 of the original statute has been completely repealed and no longer exists.\n\nThe law declared by that section has been abrogated.\n\nThe law declared by section 12 of the amended Act is in the nature of a substituted provision.\n\nIt seems to me that the law declared by the amended statute is not the same law as was declared by the original statute and to that extent the amended statute is in the nature of a new and independent statute.\n\nThe petitioners are being detained today by\n\n1951 s. Krishnan and Other~\n\nThe State of Madras\n\nMahajan J.\n\n19Sl\n\nS. Krishnan and Others\n\nThe State of Madras\n\nMa/lajan J.\n\nforce of the provisions contained in sections 9 and 12 of the amen<led Act and not under the law that was passed in 1950, as by repeal of section 12 of that Act their detention Wlder it technically terminated.\n\nThe new law admittedly standing by itself does not authorize detention of any person beyond a period of three months except in the manner provided by article 22(4) of the Constitution.\n\nNo question whatever arises of tacking of the period of detention under one law to the period of detention under another law, inasmuch as the detention under the earlier law automatically terminates with the repeal of section 12 of Act IV of\n\n1950. For the. reasons given above, the first contention of Mr. Nambiar fails.\n\nIn view of the above decision it is unnecessary to consider the alternative argument of the learned Attorney-General to the effect that in case it is held that section 9 contravenes article 22(4) (a) of the Constitution, it is a valid law under article 22(4) (b) of the Constitution and hence the order of detention is legal.\n\nMr. Nambiar's contention to the effect that in case the petitioners' detention is regarded as a fresh detention under the amended Act, then it is necessary to serve them with fresh grounds of detention does not appear to me to be well founded.\n\nThe point was not raised in the petitions and no argument was addressed to us that any right under article 22(5) had been infringed. Moreover, as at present advised, I think the contention has not got much force because of the clear provisions of section 12 of the amended Act which treats every detention order having force at the commencement of the amended Act as being deemed to continue unde_r it. When detention is not on any fresh grounds but on grounds already served, any default in observing the formality of again serving those very grounds on the detenu cannot be said to be an infringement of the fundamental right under article 22(5) of the Constitution.\n\nThe next contention of Mr; Nambiar that Parliament having fixed the maximum period of detention in section 12 of Act IV of 1950 under its powers contained\n\nin article 22(7) of the Constitution, that maximum became a part of the content of fundamental right and sections 9 and 12 of the amended Act contravene this fundamental right inasmuch as these authorize detention of the petitioners for a period beyond one year again, in my opinion, is not sound.\n\nIn other words, the argument of the learned counsel amounts to this ; that as soon as Parliament by law under article 22(7) prescribed a maximum period for which any person may be detained under any law providing for preventive detention, then that period becomes a part of the fundamental right conferred on a person under Part III of the Constitution. The only method of adding to or subtracting from those rights is by an amendment of the Constitution in the manner provided therein.\n\nBy clause (7) of article 22 Parliament has not been authorized to add to the fundamental rights.\n\nThe contention of the learned counsel is based on an erroneous assumption that article 22 in clause (7) confers a fundamental right on a person ; in its true concept it restricts to a certain degree the measure of the fundamental right contained in clause 4 (a) of the article.\n\nThe argument that Parliament has no authority to alter the period of one year prescribed by it under article 22(7) (b) of the Constitution is again founded on an erroneous assumption that the clause confers legislative power on Parliament.\n\nThe ambit of the legislative powers of Parliament is contained in article 245 of the Constitution read with the entries in the Seventh Schedule.\n\nArticle 22 of the Constitution restricts those powers to a certain extent. It does not enlarge them. Clause (7), however, cuts down these restrictions to a certain extent.\n\nParliament having power to make the law has also the power to alter or amend it, if it so chooses.\n\nIt is difficult to assent to the proposition of the learned counsel that if a person is detained according to a law that existed at the time of his detention, then in regard to him it is that and that law alone which matters and any change in the\n\nl!\"Sl s .. Krishn•11 and Othert\n\nTht State of\n\nMadras\n\nMahajan J.\n\n19Sl\n\nSi,, Krishnan\n\nand Others\n\n\"~ Thi Stale of\n\nMadra3\n\nMallajan J.\n\nlaw, even if it has retrospective effect, cannot affect him in any manner whatever.\n\nThe next point canvassed before us was that the Constitution does not envisage detention for an indefinite period and that it is obligatory on Parliament to provide a maximum period for detention of a person under a law of preventive detention.\n\nIn my opinion, this argument again is not sound.\n\nEmphasis was laid on the proviso to article 22(4) (a) which enacts that nothing in the . sub-clause shall authorize the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7), and it was urged that the word \"may\" in article 22(7) must be read in the sense of \"must\" and as having a compulsory force inasmuch as the enactment authorizes Parliament to prescribe by law a maximum period for detention, for the advancement of justice and for public good, or for the benefit of persons subjected to preventive detention.\n\nReference was made to Maxwell on \"Interpretation of Statutes\" (9th Edn., page 246) and to the well-known case of Julius v. Bishop of Oxford('). Lord Cairns in that case observed as follows :-\n\n\"Where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons that power ought to be exercised.\"\n\nIn my opinion, clause (7) of article 22, as already pointed out, in its true concept to a certain degree restricts the measure of the fundamental right contained in clause ( 4) (a) and in this context the rule referred to by Maxwell has no application whatever.\n\nMoreover, the provision in the Constitution is merely\n\nan enabling one and it is well settled that in an enabling Act words of a permissive nature cannot be given a compulsory meaning. ( Vide Craies on Statute law, p. 254). Be that as it may, the point is no longer open as it has been concluded by the majority decision in Gopalan's case( 2). The learned Chief Justice at p. 119 of the report observed as follows :-\n\n(I) 5 App. ca•. 214.\n\n(2) '19S0] 8CR 18<\n\n\"Sub-clause (b) is permissive.\n\nIt is not obligatory on the Patliament to prescribe any maximum period.\n\nIt was argued that this gives the Parliament a right to allow a person to be detained indefinitely.\n\nIf that construction is correct, it springs out of the words of sub-clause (7) itself and the court cannot help in the matter.\"\n\nNothing said by Mr. Nambiar is sufficient to persuade me to take a different view of the matter than was taken in Gopalan's case(1). It may be pointed out that Parliament may well have thought that it was unnecessary to fix any maximum period of detention in the new statute which was of a temporary nature and whose own tenure of ife was limited to on_e year.\n\nSuch temporary statutes cease to have ahy effect after they expire, they automatically come to an end at the expiry of the period for which they have been enacted and nothing further can be done under them.\n\nThe detention of the petitioners therefore is bound to come to an end automaticaUy with the life of the statute and in these circumstances Parliament may well have thought that it would be wholly unnecessary to legislate and provide a maximum period of detention for those detained under this law. - ·\n\nThe fast point urged by Mr. Nambiar that the provisions of the amended Act contravene the provisions of article 21 of the Constitution does not impress me.\n\nThe expression \"procedure established by law\" was considered by the majority in Gopalan's case(1) as meaning procedure prescribed by law. The petitionen have been detained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the amended statute and their detention therefore is in accordance with procedure prescribed by law. The contention of Mr. Nambiar that they are :JOVerned by the procedure contained in section 12 of Act IV of 1950 as that was the procedure at the time when initially they were detained is, in my opinion, unsound. It is open to Parliament to change the procedure by enacting a law and that procedure becomes the procedure established by law within the meaning\n\nc1 > [19SOJ s.c.1..11s.\n\n1951 s' Kwitnatt mtd Ot ltera\n\nv. 17.e State of\n\nMtt/lrtn.\n\n'Mahai11n J.\n\nll\n\nS-lVWuual\n\not/Ot~'\n\n\"· '17,. 3••tt •I\n\nJI .....\n\nS. I.. D•• J.\n\nof that expression in article 21 of the Constitµtion.\n\nFurther, the present detention of the petitioners being by virtue of section 12 of the amended Act a new detention under the amended Act, the procedure pres-\n\n- cribcd by the amended Act is the procedure established\n\nby law within the meaning of article 21.\n\nFor the reasons given above, in my opinion the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, is a valid statute and the provisions impugned by Mr. Nambiar do not contravene the Constitution and the pctitionen arc not entitled to their release merely on the ground that the period of one year mentioned in section 12 of.\n\nAct IV of 1950 has expired.\n\nOn the merits of the petitions it was urged (1) that the grounds supplied to then were vague and insufficient to enable them to make a, proper representation, and (2) that their detention was mala fide and on poli tical and party considerations. There is no force what• ever in hese contentions.\n\nThe result is that all these pet1t1ons arc dism!_ssed and the rules are discharged.\n\nThis order will have force in the case of petitioners who have so far not been released by Government.\n\nS. R. DAs J.-1 agree that the petitions should be dismissed and I do so substantially on the grounds itatcd by my learned brother Mahajan.\n\nBosE J .-With the utmost respect I am unable to accept the majority view. fo my judgment, section 11\n\n(1) of the amcndip.g Act is ultra virei. The ground on which I hold it to be so was suggested by me in the course of the arguments. It was, however, not very fully dealt with possibly because I expressed my view at a late stage and possibly because I did so somewhat akctchily.\n\nBut as I am ploughing a lonely furrow .that, fortunately, will not much matter.\n\n' Articles 21 and 22 confer the fundamental right of. personal liberty. The first is general, and as the meaning of the words \"procedure establishedhf law\" ha&\n\nbeen thoroughly discussed in Gopalan's casc:(1), I do not intend to cover that ground.\n\nBut so far as article 22 ( 4) is concerned, my opinion is that it confers a fundamental right not to be kept under preventive detention beyond a certain period.\n\nThe extent of that pcriqd can vary but it can only be extended beyond three months within certain fixed liniits and subject to specified conditions.\n\nArticle 246 read with item 9 in List I and item 3 in List III of the Seventh Schedule conf crs jurisdiction upon the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures to make laws for preventive detention, but article 22\n\n(4) imposes restrictions.\n\nIt says that- • \"No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months,\"\n\nunless certain conditions arc fulfilled.\n\nThe conditions arc set out in sub-clause (a) and subclausc (b). Under the former, a law can provide for preventive detention over three months provided (1) there is an advisory board of a certain character, (2) the board is of opinion that there is sufficient cause for longer detention, and (3) the board reports before the expiration of the three months.\n\nThen follows a further restriction which is contained in the proviso to\n\n5ub-clause (4).\n\nThis states that- \"nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the\n\ndc.ention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7) .\"\n\nSub-clause (b) of clause (7) reads as follows :- \" (7) Parliament may by law prescribe-\n\n(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention.''\n\nThe second set of conditions is given in sub-dause (b) Gf clause (4). This sets out that a person can also be detained beyond three months providcd-\n\n'1). (19SOJ s.c.R.118.\n\n19SJ.\n\ns. Kmhn1J11 alld Othera •• The State of\n\nMadra1.\n\nBose/.\n\n1951 s, Krl .. nd'n and Otlt<n\n\nThe Srate of\n\nMadras.\n\nBose J,\n\n\"such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law :inade by Patliament under subclauses (a)~ Cb) of claus.e (7).''\n\nI venture to underline the \"and\" becausei in my opinion, a lot turn~ on it.\n\nBut I shall deal with that later.\n\nSub-clause (a) of clause (7) empowers Parliament to prescribe- .\n\n\"the circumstances under which, and the cla~ or classes of cases in which, a person may. be detained fot a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion or an advisory board in accordance with the provision of sub-clause (a) of clause (4).\"\n\nIn my opinion, these provision~ confer a fundamental right not to be detained beyond a certain period.\n\nThe extent of that period can vary but the maximum period of detention cannot exceed tertain fixed limits.\n\nThose limits are (a) in the first instance, three months : if not, (b) the maximum prescribed - by Parliament under sub-clause (7) (b ). In my opinion, no law can be made authorising detention either under sub-clause (4)\n\n(a) or ( 4) (b) unless maximum period of detention 1' ·\n\nprescribed by Parliament under sub-clause (7) (b).\n\nI do hot agree with the contention that tlie word \"may\" in clause (7) means \"must\". I am not prepared to depart from the usual meaning of worti& unlt:sa compelled to do so for overwhelming reasons. In my . opinion, Parliament is free to prescribe or not to prescribe a .maximum peried under clause (7) (b).\n\nIt cannot be compelled to do so.\n\nBut equally neither Parliament nor a State Legislature is compelled to authorise preventive. detcniiOll beyond three months.\n\nIf, howevc:r, either wishes ltl do so, then it il bound to conform to the provision$ -of either sub<!awe (a) er sub-clause (b) of clause ( 4) or both ; and in the case of sub-clause (a) the proviso Is as much .:t part of the sub. clause a& its main provision. ll no maximum . llinit &\n\nfixed under clause (7) (b}, then the proviso o.nn11 t operate and if it cannot operate, no legnlatl~ action\n\ncan, in my opinion, be taken under clause (4) (a). If A is told hy B that he may go to a bank and withdraw a sum of money not exceeding such limit as may be med by c, it is evident that until c fixes the limit no money can be withdrawn.\n\nC cannot be compelled to fix a limit but if he chooses not to do so, the money cannot be withdrawn. Equally, if A is told that he may withdraw money not exceeding a limit which he himself may fix, there can, in my O.{>inion, be no right of withdfawal until . he fixes the limit.\n\nLook at it another way. A British General is told by the Indian Government that he may travel from India to Burma quickly and easily by plane.\n\nHe is also told that he may in addition drive by car over the hills and through the jungles provided he does not go beyond the confines of any road made hy the Burmese Government ; and the Burmese Government is told , that it may, if it so chooses, put in a. road at India's expense.\n\nIt is fairly obvious that the Burmese Govern~ ment is not bound to make the road and it is equally obvious that under these conditions the General will not be able to go by car unless the road is made.\n\nI realise that analogies are often iqaccurate and' may be misleading.\n\nBut these examples serve to illustrate the line of my reasoning. In my opinion, the Constitution (a) tells the State Legislatures that they may legislate for preventive detention beyond three months but not beyond a limit which Parliament may fix and\n\n(b) tells Parliament that Parliament itself may do the same thing provided the detention does not exceed a maximum which it may itself fix. There is no need to fix a maximum in either event but if that is not done, then there can be no legislation under clause (4) (a), Until tl\\e road is built there is no right of way.\n\nThe same limitation attaches to clause (4) (b ). Legislative action cannot be taken under this unless, first,\n\nthe law is made by Parliament and, second, it is madtt \"µrlEler sub-clauses (; i.) and (b) of claus¢ (7)\". l again \"enturc to underline the \"and\" becaqse, in my opinion, \"'-andl' means and &liould mean \"and\" unless there is\n\n1!)~1\n\n$. Kru/llfan qn4 O 11.er.J\n\nTM State of\n\nMad.raJ.\n\nBo~J.\n\nS. XriJhnan and Oth\"er!\n\nThe State of MadraJ.\n\nBan!.\n\ncompelling reason to make it mean \"or\". To my mind, not only is there no compelling reason here but, on the contrary, there are powerful reasons why it should be construed in its usual and normal sense. The reasons are these.\n\nArticles 21 and 22 confer a fundamental right and give a fundamental guarantee.\n\nIt is therefore the duty of the Court to sec that the right is kept fundamental and that the fullest scope is given to the guar.antee.\n\nIt is our duty to ensure that the right and the guarantee are not rendered illusory and meaningless.\n\nTherefore, wherever there is scope for difference of opinion on a matter of interpretation in this behalf, the interpretation which favours the subject must always be used because the right has been conferred upon him and it is the right which has been made fundamental, not the , fetters and limitations with which it may be circumscribed by legislative action.\n\nIt is true the full scope and content of the right cannot be determined without examining the boundaries within which it is to be confined, and I agree that in interpreting these provisions equal weight must be given to all the clauses; also that no one part can be treated with greater sanctity than the rest.\n\nBut if, when all that is done, doubt still remains, then the doubt must, in my judgment, be resolved in favour of the subject and not of the State.\n\nBrush aside for a moment the pettifogging of the law and forget for the nonce all the learned disputations about this and that, and \"and\" \"or\", or \"m4yu and \"m:ust\".\n\nLook past the mere verbiage of the words and penetrate deep into the heart and spirit of the Constitution. What sort of State are we intended to be? Have we not here been given a way of life, the right to individual freedom, the utmost the State can confer in that respect consistent with its own safety?\n\nIs not the sanctity of the individual recognised :and emphasised again and again? Is not our Constitution in violent contrast to those of States where the State is everything and the individual but a slave or a serf to\n\nserve the will of those who for the time being wield almost absolute power ? I have no doubts on this score.\n\nI hold it therefore to be our duty, wh.en there is ambiguity or doubt about the construction of any clause in this chapter on Fundamental Rights, to resolve it in favour of the freedoms which have been so solemnly . stressed.\n\nRead the magnificent sweep of the preamble:-\n\n\"We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens : Justice, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.\"\n\nRead the provisions of the chapter on Fundamental Rights:--\n\n\"All citizens shall have the right etc.\"\n\n• • \"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure csablished by law.\"\n\n\"No person who , is arrested . shall be detained in custody without etc.\"\n\n'No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise etc. unless-\"\n\nRead the provisions which circumscribe the powers of Parliament and prevent it from being supreme. What does. it all add up to ? How can it be doubted that the stress throughout is on the freedom conferred and that the limitations placed on them are but regrettable necessities ?\n\nI do not doubt that in construing the f'..onstitutior:i we must do. so according to all the usual well recognised canons of construction. I do not doubt that when the language i.s plain, full effect must be giftn to it whatever the implications. All I insist on is that when there is ambiguity or doubt and it is poMible to take either this view or that, then we must come down on the side of liberty and freedom; and I err in good company in so holding. Lord Romer said as much in LiversiJge's case (1) though he made an exception in the\n\n(J) (t9'J2J A.c. 206 at 2so.\n\nS. L-isfitt'111 tmd C)tller3\n\nTfle Sta!e of\n\nMcirtu.\n\nllt11e 1.\n\nS. K,;, hnan anA Ot, ers\n\nThe State sf\n\nMadra!.\n\n~~ .. J.\n\ncase of war legislation. How can it be said that in this case there is no ambiguity and that there is no room for doubt ?\n\nWhen I am asked to hold that \"and\" means \"or,, and that \"may\" means \"must\", how can it be said that there is no room for difference of opinion?\n\nWhen I am old that-\n\n\"no law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months\"\n\nunless there is an Advisory Board etc., and even then not beyond\n\n\"the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7)\"\n\nhow can it be said that there is no doubt about the intention and that this clearly and unambiguously means that the detention can be for an. indefinite period even under a State law if Parliament does not choose to act under clause (7) (b)? To my mind, there is ambiguity and there is room for doubt.\n\nI feel that the people of India chose for themselves the free way of life and that they entrusted to Parliament, which represents their will, the duty of satisfying itself that any limitations hereafter to be placed on the freedoms conferred. are necessary and essential and that these limitations will not exceed such limits as Parliament itself shall determine solemnly and deliberately, after anxious scrutiny and dutiful care.\n\nI cannot bring myself to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended that the liberties guaranteed should be illusory and meaningless or that they could be toyed with by this person or that. They did not bestow on the people of India a cold, lifeless, inert mass of malleable clay but created a living organism, breathed life into it and endowed it with purpose and vigour so that it should grow healthily and sturdily in the democratic way of life, which is the free way.\n\nIn the circumstances, I prefer to decide in favour of the freedom of the subject.\n\nI am not hampered here by considerations of war . necessity or emergency legislation where some authorities hold that the canons of constructions are different\n\nand that allowance must be made in favour of the State for the imperfections of language used in legislation which had to be drafted and enacted in a desperate hurry with the State in dire and immediate peril.\n\nI am construing a Constitution which was hammered out solemnly and deliberately after the most mature consideration and with the most anxious care.\n\nI feel bound, therefore, when there is ambiguity or doubt, to resolve it in favour of what I conceive to be the free way of a Sovereign Demoatic Republic.\n\nAfter all, who framed the Constitution and for whose benefit was it made ?-not just for those in brief authority, not only for lawyers and dialecticians bqt for the common people of India.\n\nIt should therefore be construed, when that can be done without doing violence to the language employed, in a simple straightforward way so that it makes sense to the man in the street, so that the common people of .the land can follow and understand its meaning, To my mind, the whole concept of the Constitution is that after years of bitter struggle the citizens of India are assured that certain liberties shall be guaranteed to them and that these liberties shall not be curtailed beyond limits which they and all the world can know and which can only be fixed by the highest authority in the land, Parliament itself, directly and specifically after affording opportunity for due deliberation in that august body.\n\nI would struggle hard against any interpretation which permitted evasion of those important limitations and which permitted those hardwon liberties to be curtailed by some accidental side wind which allows virtual delegation of the responsibility for fixing the maximum limits which Parliament is empowered to fix to some lesser authority, and worse, for' fixing them ad hoc in each individual case, for that, in my opinion, is what actually happens, whatever the technical name, when Parliament fixes no maximum and lesser authorities are left free to decide in each case how long the individual should be detained.\n\nI am clear that these are not matters which should be viewed technically or narrowly but in the broad and liberal spirit in which they were conceived.\n\nBearing this in mind, I will\n\nS. Kri.shnan and Others v.\n\nTise State of\n\nMadra1.\n\nBoie I.\n\n19SI\n\nS. IriJhnan 111111 Othm v.\n\nTh• Stat1 •I\n\nMadr.aJ.\n\nB11Jt J.\n\nproceed to examine the impugned provisions of the amending Act.\n\nIn my judgment, section 9 is good because it confers a benefit and a privilege.\n\nIt takes away nothing.\n\nIt gives all detenus the right to ga before an Advisory Board for review of their cases.\n\nIt confers this right not only on those who may be detained In the future hut also on those already under detention. And further, it confers this right on those who had no such right before. This is not an infringement of any fundamental right nor does it contravene any article of the Constitution; therefore Parliament was free to legislate as. it pleased regarding that. It was free artificially to alttr the starting point of the order of detention which i& what it has done in sub-section (2)(a). That section,· in my judgment, is intra vires.\n\nSo also is new section 12 which continues in force existing detentions despite the expiry of the old Act and states that the passing of the new Act shall not affect either the validity or Jurlllion of orders passed under the old Act.\n\nIt will be remembered that the detentions we are considering in these cases were good under the old Act. That Act prescribed a maxim, um limit, namely one year, for this class of detention. In my opinion, Parliament had the right to say in this particular manner, for the purpose of removing doubts, that detentions already in force under that Act should continue in force for the maximum period already prescribed.\n\nThat, to my mind, is the force of the words \"continue,\" \"validity\" and \"durlltion.\" That would have been the result in any event but section ll is there to remove possible doubts.\n\nSection 11 (2) is alS<? good because here again a benefit is conferred.\n\nDetenus who had no right to rclcaM: on the .idvicc of an Advisory Board arc here giv~ this privilege.\n\nTherefore, this also intra I/ires.\n\nBut &uh-section (1) is, to my mind, 11ltr11 oires.\n\nIt is e that we find an infringement of article 22( 4).. It reads:-\n\n\"ln any case where the Advisory Board has report• ed that there is in its opinion suflicicnt cause for the detention of a peison, the appropriate Government may\n\nconfirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as'it think.~ fit\".\n\nThis is word for word the same as section 11 of the old Act. It does not prescribe a maximum limit.\n\nNow section 11 replaces sections 11 and 12 of the old Act.\n\nThe amending At directs that new section 11 be substituted for old sections 11 and 12.\n\nOld sccci_on 12 had prescribed a maximum limit of one year in certain classes of cases. That is done away with in the new Act As regards the rest, neither the old Act nor the new prescribes any limit for other classes of detention. That, in my opinion, not only contravenes article 22( 4) but in effect shifts the responsibility for prescribing a maximum to the executive authorities of each State and allows them to do it ad hoc in each case. I am not speaking technkally at the moment.\n\nI am viewing it broadly as the man in the street would.\n\nI am placing myself in the position of the dctenu and looking at it through his eyes. The niceties of the law do not matter to him. He docs not care about grammar. All that matters to him is that he is behind the bars and that Parliament has not fixed any limit in his kind of case and that local authorities tell him that they have the right to say how long he shall remain under detention. I cannot bring myself to think that. this was intended by the Constitution.\n\nThe powers given to Parliament arc ample .. The Safeguards for the safety of the State are all there.\n\nIn the last resort, immediate action can be taken under the emergency provisions. Therefore, when Parliament and the State Legislatures arc told that they cannot authorise preventive detention beyond three months unless Parliament docs tMs and that, I am of opinion that the responsibility to do these things is on Parliament ·· itself and that in this particular matter there can be no delegation of authority. The Constituent Assembly has entrusted this particular matter to the care of Parliament\n\nitself and has mdc this Parliament's special responsibility.\n\nThe country is therefore entitled to receive the benefit of . the mature judgment, wisdom and patriotism of that august body.\n\n19SI s. KriJ1t1111n •M OtlierJ v.\n\nThe $tote 11 f\n\nltlurl!IJ.\n\na111e J.\n\n1951 s. Kris/Jnan WJd Others v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMathas.\n\n81)3, I J.\n\nI am not doubting Parliament's . general powers of delegatlon.\n\nBut, in my opinion, . these powers are circumscribed and each case must be judged upon its own circumstances.\n\nAs this matter is under consideration in another case and as mine is a dissenting voice here, all I need say in this case is that in my judgment this Is not one of the matters which can be delegated.\n\nIt was said that all this is irrelevant because a maximum limit has in fact been fixed in the present , instance.\n\nIt was argued that the life of this Act has only been fixed for one year and that the life of the old Act was also only one year and that th'is in effect fixes a maximum.\n\nI am aware that there is high authority for this view and I venture to dissent with the utmost reluctance, but with the greatest respect I find myself unable to agree.\n\nIn the first place, I cannot agree that the maximum limit which Parliament is authorised to fix can be fixed in this indirect way.\n\nWhat Parliament is empowered to do under article 22(7) (b) is to prescribe-\n\n\"the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained.\"\n\nIt cannot do this by saying that no person shall be detained beyond the 26th of February, 1952, because that means that persons arrested on the 27th of February, 1951, can be kept under detention for a year while those arrested on the 25th of February, 1952, can only be detained for one day.\n\nThat, in my judgment, is not what is meant by prescribing a maximum period.\n\nIn the next place, when Parliament is authorised to do this, it is expected to do so consciously and deliberately after giving the matter due and mature consideratlon.\n\nIt is not possible to say that Parliament had this provision in mind and intended to act under it when ft merely fixe-0 the duration of the Act. Had the matter been properly discussed and placed lx1fore Parliament in the way it should have been, it is conceivable that it might have considered that the maximum period o~ detention should not exceed, say, six months though the duration of the Act should be OB!!\n\nyear. In other words, that person could continue to be arrested so long as the Act was in force but they could not be kept under detention for more than six months. With the utmost respect, I cannot agree that functions so solemnly entrusted to the care of Parliament under these fundamental clauses can be discharged unconsciously.\n\nIn the third place, I cannot agree that these deten- - tions would come to an end with the expiry of the Act.\n\nThe rule in the case of temporary Acts is that-\n\n\"as a general rule, and . unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired no proceedings can be taken . upon it, and it ceases to have any further effect.\n\nTherefore, offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosectded and punished before the Act expires.\" (Craies on Statute Law, 4th edition, page 347)·\n\nBut transactions wh'ich are concluded and complete before the Act expires continue in being despite the expiry.\n\nSee Craies on Statute Law, page 348, and 31 Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition), page 513.\n\nI take this to mean that if a man is tried £or an offence created by a temporary Act and is found guilty and sentenced to, say, five years' imprisonment, he would have to serve his term even if the Act Were to expire the next day.\n\nIn my opinion, the position is the same in the case of detentions.\n\nA man, who is arrested under a temporary detention Act and validly ordered to be detained for a particular period, would not be entitled to claim release before his time juSt because the Act expired earlier.\n\nThen again. The Act we are considering has special provision to the contrary.\n\nSection 11(1) empowers either a State or the Union Goverrunent to order the detention of a person \"for such period as it thinks fit;,.\n\nIf this provision is not altra vires, then the Act in\n\nexpress terms permits the appropriate Government to order a detention which shall endure beyond the life of the Act itself, and unless the fundamental provisions of the Constituti()n can be called in aid, there is nothing to prevent Parliament from enacting such a\n\n19Sl\n\nS. ICHi1iltdt ttndOthers . . v.\n\nThe State\n\nMadras.\n\nBose I.\n\ns. XriJlinan andOi/,.n .....\n\nTh• St•I• •f\n\nM,,.,,.,,, .\n\n.... 1.\n\nlaw.\n\nTherefore, the mere fact that the Act under consideration is to expire on the 26th of February; 1952, docs not, in my opinion, mean that detentions under it must necessarily come to an end on that date.\n\nThat in turn means that no maximum period has been prescribed even indirectly •\n\nVioked straight in the face, what docs the decision of the majority uphofding the validity of section 11 (1) impon if it is pushed to its logical conclusion ? To me it spells just this.\n\nThe Constitution tells all persons resident in the land-\n\n\"Hcre is the full extent of your liberty so far as the length of detention is concerned.\n\nW c guarantee That you will not be detained beyond three months unless Parliament otherwise directs, either generally or in your particular class of case; but we empower Parliament to smash the guarantee absolutely if it so chooses without let or hindrance, without restriction.\n\nThough we authorise Parliament to prescribe a maxi mum limit of detention if it so chooses, we place no compulsion on it to do so and we authorise it to pass legislation which will empower any person or authority Parliament chooses to name, right down to a police ronstablc, to arrest you and detain you as long as he pleases, for the duration of your life if he wants, so that you may linger and rot in jail till you die, as did men in the Bastille.\"\n\nIn the absence of restrictions Parliament undoubtedly has these powers, for it can legislate about preventive detention.\n\nBut if you remove the restrictions, what is left of the fundamental right ? My concept of a fundamental right is something which Parliament cannot touch save by an amendment of the Constitution. The full content of the right can be as small or as narrow as yo1f please, but unless there i$ a residue which can answer that test, there is to my mind nothing fundamental. Now, I have no doubt that a fundamental right regarding the length of deteqtion was intended to be conferred, It would be poin~ lcss to make the provision about three .months and place it in the chapter on Fundamental Rights if that were. not so ; so also there would be no point in tht:\n\nelaborate provisions regarding this in clauses (4) and (7). A simple clause saying that no detention shall exceed three months \"unless Parliament otherwise directs\" would have met the case.\n\nIt is therefore clear to my mind that something fundamental regarding the length ol. detention which Parliament could not touch save by amendment of the Constitution was intended to be conferred. But if section 11 (1) is upheld, what is there\n\nleft which is beyond the reach of Parliament ? Parliament has here in effect said that there need be no general limit to the duration of detentions and that lesser authorities can fix the duration in each individual case and arc free to detain for as long as they please.\n\nIf that is so, then what is there left of anything fundamental regarding the maximum length of detention ?\n\nTo my mind, the whole object of the elaborate provisions in clauses ( 4) and (7) is to place restraints on powers regarding the length of indefinite and arbitrary detentions which would otherwise be absolute.\n\nFor these reasons, I am of opinion that section 11 (1) is ttltra vires. My only hesitation has been on the score of Gopalarl1 case (1). I have searched long and anxiously to see whether this question is concluded there and whether my hands are tied. After con- 51derablc study of the decisiol\\, I have reached the conclusion that I am not pound.\n\nThere were six Judges there.\n\nThe present Act, the amending Act of 1951, was not under consideration but section 11 of the old Act, which corresponds t~ section 11(1) of the new, was considered. But only two Judges, namely, my Lord the Chief Justice and my\n\nbrotcr . Mahajan, icalt with this section directly.\n\nTheir views arc directly counter to mine.\n\nThey expressly hold that section 11 of the old Act is intra vires.\n\nThat means that section 11 ( 1) of the present Act would also have to be upheld on their view.\n\nBut the other four Judges did not discuss the vires of section 11 at all. They concentrated their attention on sections 12 and 14 of the old Act. . It is true my\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 8!.\n\nS. Krishnan and Other8\n\nThe State of Madras.\n\nBose J.\n\n1951 s. Kri•hnan and Other>\n\nThe Stale of\n\nMadt&•·\n\nBo3e J.\n\nbrother Das made a general observation at the end of. his judgment that in his view \"the impugned Act is valid law except as to section 14\" but he did not expressly consider section\n\n11. In the circumstances, I do not think Gopalan' s case concludes the matter.\n\nIt is perhaps ironical that I should struggle to uphold these freedoms in favour of a class of persons who, if rumour is to be accredited and if the list of their activitirs furnished to us is a true guide, would be the first to destroy them if they but had the power. But I cannot allow personal predilections to sway my judgment of the Constitution.\n\nAs Lord Justice Scrutton remarked in Rex. v. Home Secretary (1) :-\n\n\"It is, indeed, one test of belief in principles if you apply them to cases with which you have ot> sympathy at all.\"\n\nand as Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court said, speaking of the American Constitution,\n\n\"If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperativelycalls for attachment than ahy other\n\nit is the principle of free thought-not free thought for th<>se who agree with us but freedom for the thought that wt hate.\"\n\nI respectfully dissent from the majority view and consider that section 11 (1) is ultra vires.\n\nIt follows, in my view, that the present detentions are bad.\n\nI am of opinion that the petitioners in these cases arc\n\nntitlcd to immediate rdeasc.\n\nl'e'litions dismissed.\n\nAgent for the petitioner in Petition No. 303 : S11bralimanyt1m.\n\nAgent for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 618, 619, 021, 622 and 624 to 631 : V. P. K. Nambiyar.\n\nAgent for the State of. Madras: P. A. Melita.\n\nAgent for the State of. Assam : N aimit Ltd.\n\nAgent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta.\n\n(I) (1923) L.J.K.B. 797", "total_entities": 251, "entities": [{"text": "S. KRISHNAN AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. 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(", "canonical_name": "KANIA C."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2490, "end_char": 2497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2544, "end_char": 2554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2840, "end_char": 2845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3184, "end_char": 3191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3226, "end_char": 3242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held also per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTR1, MAHAJAN and DAs Tl. (", "canonical_name": "PatanjaliSastriJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3638, "end_char": 3645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vas to be in force only for a period of one year and no detention under the Act could be continued after the expiry of the Act", "statute": "Vas to be in force only for a period of one year and no detention under the Act could be continued after the expiry of the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4123, "end_char": 4130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vas to be in force only for a period of one year and no detention under the Act could be continued after the expiry of the Act", "statute": "Vas to be in force only for a period of one year and no detention under the Act could be continued after the expiry of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4274, "end_char": 4278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vas to be in force only for a period of one year and no detention under the Act could be continued after the expiry of the Act", "statute": "Vas to be in force only for a period of one year and no detention under the Act could be continued after the expiry of the Act"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4299, "end_char": 4329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4533, "end_char": 4537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "31st March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4620, "end_char": 4636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3) of s. 1 of the Preventive Detention Act of\n\n1950 continued the operation of the Act until 31st March, 1952."}}, {"text": "Nambiyar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4924, "end_char": 4932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 1<.. Nambiyar (V. G. Raw, with him) for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "V. G. Raw", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 1<.. Nambiyar (V. G. Raw, with him) for the Petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "Bawa Shiv Charan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5004, "end_char": 5026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Basant Chandra Chose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5132, "end_char": 5152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basant Chandra Chose (amicus curiae) for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "V. K. T. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5265, "end_char": 5279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General, Madras, and G. S. Swaminathan (R. Ganapathy Iyer with them) for the Respondents in Nos."}}, {"text": "G. S. Swaminathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5311, "end_char": 5328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General, Madras, and G. S. Swaminathan (R. Ganapathy Iyer with them) for the Respondents in Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5330, "end_char": 5347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General, Madras, and G. S. Swaminathan (R. Ganapathy Iyer with them) for the Respondents in Nos."}}, {"text": "Fakhruddin Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5454, "end_char": 5470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fakhruddin Ahmed (Numddin Ahmed with him) for the Respondents in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Numddin Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5472, "end_char": 5485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fakhruddin Ahmed (Numddin Ahmed with him) for the Respondents in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5641, "end_char": 5655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the Union of India, Intervener."}}, {"text": "s. Krishnan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5809, "end_char": 5820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered-\n\n1951 s. Krishnan and Others\n\nThe State of Madras.", "canonical_name": "S. KRISHNAN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5837, "end_char": 5852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered-\n\n1951 s. Krishnan and Others\n\nThe State of Madras.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nMadraa.\n\nPatanja"}}, {"text": "C. J. Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5914, "end_char": 5926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANIA C. J.-:-1 agree with the Judgment prepared by\n\nKANIA C. J. 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7515, "end_char": 7528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8081, "end_char": 8091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 22(4) (a) provides:\n\n\"No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless-\n\n(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention :\n\nProvided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person 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IriJhnan 111111 Othm v.\n\nTh• Stat1 •I\n\nMadr.aJ.\n\nB11Jt J.\n\nproceed to examine the impugned provisions of the amending Act."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58001, "end_char": 58010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58745, "end_char": 58755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59563, "end_char": 59573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and states that the passing of the new Act shall not affect either the validity or Jurlllion of orders passed under the old Act", "statute": "Act and states that the passing of the new Act shall not affect either the validity or Jurlllion of orders passed under the old Act"}}, {"text": "article 22( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59867, "end_char": 59881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and states that the passing of the new Act shall not affect either the validity or Jurlllion of orders passed under the old Act", "statute": "Act and states that the passing of the new Act shall not affect either the validity or Jurlllion of orders passed under the old Act"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60208, "end_char": 60218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60279, "end_char": 60289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 11 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60299, "end_char": 60317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60368, "end_char": 60378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 11 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60402, "end_char": 60420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60697, "end_char": 60711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMathas.\n\n81)3,", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62341, "end_char": 62365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a111e J.\n\n1951 s. Kris/Jnan WJd Others v.\n\nThe State of\n\nMathas."}}, {"text": "article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63377, "end_char": 63390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th of February, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63578, "end_char": 63600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot do this by saying that no person shall be detained beyond the 26th of February, 1952, because that means that persons arrested on the 27th of February, 1951, can be kept under detention for a year while those arrested on the 25th of February, 1952, can only be detained for one day."}}, {"text": "27th of February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63650, "end_char": 63672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot do this by saying that no person shall be detained beyond the 26th of February, 1952, because that means that persons arrested on the 27th of February, 1951, can be kept under detention for a year while those arrested on the 25th of February, 1952, can only be detained for one day."}}, {"text": "25th of February, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63741, "end_char": 63763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot do this by saying that no person shall be detained beyond the 26th of February, 1952, because that means that persons arrested on the 27th of February, 1951, can be kept under detention for a year while those arrested on the 25th of February, 1952, can only be detained for one day."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 65489, "end_char": 65496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Craies on Statute Law, page 348, and 31 Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition), page 513."}}, {"text": "Section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66116, "end_char": 66129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. ICHi1iltdt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 66579, "end_char": 66592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If this provision is not altra vires, then the Act in\n\nexpress terms permits the appropriate Government to order a detention which shall endure beyond the life of the Act itself, and unless the fundamental provisions of the Constituti()n can be called in aid, there is nothing to prevent Parliament from enacting such a\n\n19Sl\n\nS. ICHi1iltdt ttndOthers . ."}}, {"text": "law", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 66708, "end_char": 66711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "law."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67093, "end_char": 67103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69241, "end_char": 69251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69913, "end_char": 69923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopalarl1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69989, "end_char": 69998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My only hesitation has been on the score of Gopalarl1 case (1).", "canonical_name": "Gopalarl1"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70325, "end_char": 70335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70373, "end_char": 70386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70599, "end_char": 70609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70658, "end_char": 70668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70793, "end_char": 70803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 12 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70849, "end_char": 70867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Krishnan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 70924, "end_char": 70935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Krishnan and Other8\n\nThe State of Madras.", "canonical_name": "S. KRISHNAN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71048, "end_char": 71051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\n1951 s. Kri•hnan and Other>\n\nThe Stale of\n\nMadt&•·\n\nBo3e J.\n\nbrother Das made a general observation at the end of."}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71168, "end_char": 71178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71214, "end_char": 71225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Scrutton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71672, "end_char": 71680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Lord Justice Scrutton remarked in Rex."}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71862, "end_char": 71868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and as Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court said, speaking of the American Constitution,\n\n\"If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperativelycalls for attachment than ahy other\n\nit is the principle of free thought-not free thought for th<>se who agree with us but freedom for the thought that wt hate.\""}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 71876, "end_char": 71903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and as Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court said, speaking of the American Constitution,\n\n\"If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperativelycalls for attachment than ahy other\n\nit is the principle of free thought-not free thought for th<>se who agree with us but freedom for the thought that wt hate.\""}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72246, "end_char": 72256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72498, "end_char": 72501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. P. K. Nambiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 72596, "end_char": 72613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "618, 619, 021, 622 and 624 to 631 : V. P. K. Nambiyar."}}, {"text": "P. A. Melita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 72648, "end_char": 72660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madras: P. A. Melita.", "canonical_name": "P. A. Melita"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 72723, "end_char": 72737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assam : N aimit Ltd.\n\nAgent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 72739, "end_char": 72750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assam : N aimit Ltd.\n\nAgent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta.", "canonical_name": "P. A. Melita"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_655_671_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nMUMMAREDDI NAGI REDD! AND OTHERS\n\nPITTI DURAIRAJA NAIDU AND OTHERS\n\n[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nHindu Law-widow-Surrender-Release in favour of daughter and son-in-law-Validity-Suit by reversioner-Right to mesne profits.\n\nWhere a Hindu widow who had inherited her husband's estate executed a deed, described as a deed of release, in favour of her daughter who w;; s the next reversioner and the daughter's husband jointly :\n\nHeld, that though under the Hindu Law it is open to a widow to surrender the estate to the next reversioner even though the btter is a female heir, a widow cannot validly surrender in favour of the next female heir and a stranger jointly. Such a transaction cannot be treated as a surrender in favour of the female heir and a transfer by the latter to the stranger, and is not binding upon the ultimate reversioners.\n\n/agrani v. Gaya (A.I.R. 1933 All. 8%) approved.\n\nNobo Kishore v. Harinath (1.L.R. 10 Cal. 1102) commented upon.\n\nVytla Sitanna v. Marivada (L. R. 51 I.A. 200), Rangasami Goundan v.\n\nNachiappa Goundan ( 41 I.A. 72) and Debi Prasad v. Gola Bhagat (1.L.R. 40 Cal. 721) referred to.\n\nIn a suit by the reversioner to set aside an alienation made. by a Hindu widow mesne profits can be awarded to the reversioner from the date of the widow's death even though such an alienation is not void.\n\nEven in cases where the decree for possession in favour of the reversioner is conditional on his depositing the amount which has been found to have been used for the benefit of the estate, mesnc profits can be awarded to the re<versioner if he is ordered to pay interest on the amount payable to the alienee.\n\nBhagwat Dayal v. Debi Dayal (L.R. 35 I.A. 48) and Satgur Prasad v. Harinarain Singh (L.R. 59 I.A. 147) referred to.\n\nBanwarilal v. Mahesh (l.L.R. 41 All. 63) distinguished.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE No. 51 of 1950.\n\nJURISDICTION ; Civil Appeal\n\nAppeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 12th January, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Gentle C.J. and Satyanarayana Rao J.) m\n\nMayB.\n\n!951\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.\n\nMukherjea. J.\n\nAppeal No. 167 of 1945 arising out of decree dated the 17th August, 1942, of th~ Subordinate Judge at Nellore in 0. S. No. 3 of 1940.\n\nK. Rajah Aiyar (R. Ganapathi Iyer, with him) for the appellants.\n\nB. Somayya (M. Krishna Rao, with him) for the respondents.\n\n1951. May 8. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against an appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated the 12th January, 1948, reversing in part, a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Nellore passed in 0. S. No. 3 of 1940.\n\nTo appreciate the material facts of the case and the controversy that now centres between the parties, it would be convenient to refer to a short genealogy which is given below :-\n\nI Durairaja Plff. I.\n\nU da tha Narayanappa :_Chanchamma ( d. 1933)\n\nI Venkata Narasamma (d. \"1926) -Pitti Rangayya (d. 1914)\n\nI I Vcnkatadri-Rajakantamma\n\nI Rajavathi Plif. 2.\n\nBalakrishna Plff. 3.\n\nKrishnababulu Plff. 4.\n\nThe properties in dispute which are described in schedule A to the plaint admittedly belonged to one Narayanappa who was the father of the paternal grandmother of the plaintiffs. Narayanappa died intestate sometime before 1884 leaving him surviving his wife Chanchamma and a daughter named Venkata Narasamma.\n\nNarasamma was married to one Pitti Rangayya and they had a son named Venkatadri, who was. the father of the plaintiffs. Chanchamma died in\n\nMarch, 1933, and the plaintiffs aver that they being the heritable bandhus of Narayanappa as the daughter's son's sons of the latter and there being no nearer heir in existence, they became entitled to all the properties left by Narayanappa on the death of his widow.\n\nIt appears thar on 22nd February, 1894, Chanchamma executed, what has been described as a deed of release, in favour of her daughter Narasamm; i and her son-inlaw Pitti Rangayya, under which the entire estate of Narayanappa came into the possession of the latter.\n\nAfter the execu.tiol.1 of this document, the daughter and\n\nn-in-law of Chaachamma began to deal with the properties left by Narayanappa as their' own and entered into various transactions on that footing.\n\nPitti Rangayya died in 1914 and Narasamma followed him in 1926.\n\nThere are six items of property comprised in schedule A to the plaint.\n\nOf these items, 4 and 5 were sold by Venkata Narasamma along with her son, the father of the plaintiffs, on July 9, 1922, to the 5th defendant and the father of defendants 6 to 9 for a sum of Rs. 6,500.\n\nAgain, on October 26, 1929, when both Narasamma and the plaintiffs' father were dead, item 1 of schedule A was sold by the mother of the plaintiffs as their guardian to the 1st defendant for a consideration of Rs. 33,000.\n\nDefendants 2 and 3 are the undivided sons of the 1st defendant.\n\nThere are other transfers in favour of other defendants in the suit but they are not the subject-matter of the appeal before us.\n\nThe plaintiffs' allegations in substance are that these alienations are not binding on them as the so-called deed of release executed by the widow could not and did not operate as a deed of surrender and any transfer effected on the strength of this deed by Venkata Narasamma or her son, Venkatadri, or even on behalf of the plaintiffs by their mother as guardian, could not be operative after the death of the widow. As these transfers were made during the lifetime of Chanchamma and without any legal necessity, the plaintiffs as actual reversioners were not bound by them and they are entitled to recover possession of the properties\n\nMummareddi Nagi Reddi\n\narzd Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukhajea. J.\n\nMwnmaredtli\n\nNagi Reddi\n\nand Olhtrs\n\nPitti Darairaja\n\nNaidu and Othm\n\nMukli•rj•a J.\n\nby evicting the transferees.\n\nIt was for the recovery of possession of these properties that the present suit was brought and there was a claim for mesne profits as well from the date of the widow's death to the date of delivery of possession.\n\nThe defence of the defendants who are interested in the properties mentioiy:d above, were really of a threefold character.\n\nIt was contended in the first place that the plaintiffs were not the next reversionary heirs of Narayanappa and consequently were not entitled to succeed to the estate of the latter on the death of the widow. The second contention was that the deed of release operated as a surrender of the widow's estate in favour of the daughter who was the next reversioner and although by such a surrender the daughter could get only a limited estate which she would have been entitled to on the death of the widow, yet as the daughter died in 1926, the present suit which was instituted more than 12 years after the date of death, was barred by limitation. The third plea was that in any event, these alienations could not be set aside as they were justified by legal necessity.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge who heard the suit decided it adversely to the plaintiffs. It was held first of all that though the plaintiffs were the heritable bandhus of Narayanappa, the evidence adduced by them fell short of establishing that there were no agnatic relations or nearer heir in existence. As regards the document of release (Exhibit P. 6) executed by the widow in favour of her daughter and son-in-law, the Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the deed operated as a surrender of the widow's estate and as the daughter died in 1926, the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation.\n\nOn the question of legal necessity, the finding recorded by the Subordinate Judge was that the sale deed (Exhibit D-1) executed in favour of the lst defendant was supported by legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 5,061 and odd annas and that the other document under which defendants 5 to 9 claimed title was not binding on the estate\n\nat all, In the result, the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed in its entirety.\n\nAgainst this dc; cision, the plaintiffs took an appeal to the High Court of Madras and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Gentle C. J. and Satyanarayana Rao J. The learned Judges allowed the appeal in regard to the items of property mentioned above and reversed the, decision of the trial Judge to that extent It was held that the plaintiffs were the nearest reversionary heirs of Narayanappa and that the ded of release did not operate as a surrender of the widow's estate. The plaintiffs were given a decree for possession in respect of item 1 of the schedule propertie~ as against defendants 2 and 3 on condition of their depositing into court the sum of Rs. 5,061, and odd annas, that being the amount of debt legally binding on the estate which was discharged out of the sale proceeds of the transfer, and there was a further direction to pay interest upon this amount: at the rate of six per cent per annum from certain specified dates up to the date of making the deposit. It may be noted here that the 1st defendant died after the trial Court's decree and his interest passed by survivorship to defendants 2 and 3, who are his undivided sons.\n\nAs against defendants 5 to 9, there was an unconditional decree for recovery of possession in respect . of items 4 and 5 of schedule A. The plaintiffs were further given a decree. for mesne profits, both past and future, commencing from the date of the widow's death down to the date of delivery of possession, and the amount of mesne profits was directed to be ascertained in a separate proceedings under Order XX, rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nIt is against this decision that the present appeal has been preferred by defendants 2, 3 and 5 to 9. '\n\nMr. Rajah Aiyar, appearing for the appellants, did not seriously challenge the finc:\\ing of the High Court as to the plaintiffs being the nearest reversioners at the time of. Chanchamma's death. He has assailed the propriety of the High Court's decision substantially on two points.\n\nHis first contention is that the deed of\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nJ95J\n\nMummartddi Nagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nrelease (Exhibit P-6) executed by Chanchamma had the effect of a surrender of the widow's estate in favour of her daughter and son-in-law and the daughter having died in 1926, the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation.\n\nThe second ground urged is that the High Court should not have given the plaintiffs a decree for mesne profits from the date of the widow's death.\n\nMesne profits could at best have been allowed from the date of the institution of the suit and so far as defendants 2 and 3 are concerned against whom a conditional decree was given, mesne profits could be allowed only from the time when the condition was fulfilled by the plaintiffs' depositing the specified amount in court.\n\nThe first point taken by the learned counsel for the appellants raises the question as to the legal effect of the document (Exhibit P-6), upon which the defendants mainly base their contention. The document is more than 50 years old and language of it is not very clear or definite.\n\nIt begins and ends by saying that it is a deed of release.\n\nIt says that as the executant is a woman unable to look after her wordly affairs and as the persons in whose favour the document is executed are the son-in-law and daughter of the executant, she has put the latter in possession of all her properties, movable and immovable.\n\nThen comes a description of the properties and after that the provisions run as follows:-\n\n\"Therefore you shall yourself pay the quit rent, etc., payable herefor every year to the Government and enjoy the same permanently from your son to grandson and so on hereditarily.\n\nFor my lifetime you shall pay for our maintenance expenses Rs. 360 per year every year, before the month of Palguna of the respective years.\"\n\nThe remammg clauses of the deed eniom upon the recipients thereof the duty of realizing all debts due to the executant by other people and also of paying all just debts due by her.\n\nIt is stated finally that the lands are under an izara lease executed by the widow in favour of one Narasimha Naidu which is due to expire\n\nby the end of 1346 Fasli and it would be for the daughter and son-in-law to consider what they would do with regard to the lease.\n\nThere are no words of transfer used in the deed, though the widow purports to endow her son-in-law and daughter with hereditary rights of enjoyment in the property.\n\nThe document is described as a release and is stamped as such.\n\nApparently it comprises all the properties which the widow had, and in a sense the document indicates an intention on the part of the lady to give up all connection with business affairs.\n\nPrima facie, these facts lend support to the story of surrender.\n\nIt is not and cannot be disputed that there can be a surrender even when the next reversioner is a female heir herself who takes a limited interest in the property, though such surrender cannot give her a larger interest than she would get as an heir under the law of inheritance. The whole difficulty in this case, however, is created by the fact that the widow purports to exercise her right of relinquishment of her husband's estate in favour of two persons, one of whom is a next heir, but the ot:P.er, though related to her as son-in-law, is a complete stranger so far as rights of inheritance are concerned; and there can be no doubt that she intended that her husband's estate should go to the son-in-law jointly with her own daughter.\n\nThe doctrine of surrender . or relinquishment by the widow of her interest in the husband's estate which has the effect of accelerating the inheritance in favour of the next heir of her husband is now a well-settled doctrine of Hindu law which has been established by a long series of judicial decisions. Though the judicial pronouncements cannot be said to be altogether uniform or consistent, yet there can be no doubt as regards the basic principle upon which the doctrine rests, namely, that it is the self-effacement by the widow or the withdrawal of her life estate which opens the estate of the deceased husband to his next heirs at that date. \"It must be remembered\" thus observed the\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others v.\n\nPitti Durairaja and Naidu\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMummareidi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and Others\n\nMukhtrjta J.\n\nJudicial Committee in Vytla Sitanna v. Mariwada(') \"that the basis of the doctrine is the effacement of the widow's estate and not the ex facie transfer by which such effacement is brought about.\n\nThe result merely is that the next heir of the husband steps into the succession in the widow's place\". This effacement may be effected by any process and it is not necessary that any particular form should be employed.\n\nAll that is required is that there should be a bona fide and total renunciation of the widow's right to hold the property and the surrender should not be a mere device to divide the estate with the reversioners : vide Rangasami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan (2). It would be clear from the principle underlying the doctrine of surrender that no surrender and consequent acceleration of estate can possibly be made in favour of anybody except the next heir of the husband. It is true that no acceptance or act of consent on the part of the reversioner is necessary in order that the estate might vest in him; vesting takes place under operation of law.\n\nBut it is not possible for the widow to say that she is withdrawing herself from her husband's estate in order that it might vest in somebody other than the next heir of the husband. In favour of a stranger there can be an act of transfer but not one of renunciation. The position is not materially altered if, as has happened in the present case, the surrender is made in favour of the next heir with whom a .stranger is associated and the widow purports to relinquish the estate in order that it might vest in both of them.\n\nSo far as the next heir is concerned, there cannot be in such a case a surrender of the totality of interest which the widow had, for she actually directs that a portion of it should be held or enjoyed by somebody else other than the husband's heir.\n\nAs regards the stranger, there can be no question of renunciation; the trausaction at the most may be evidence of an intention to confer a bounty on him, though such intention is not clothed in proper legal form.\n\n(1) L. R. 61 I.A. 200 at 207.\n\n(1) L.R. 41 I.A. 72.\n\nMr. Rajah Aiyar made a strenuous attempt to induce us to hold that the docume11t is. a composite document combining really two separate transactions, one, an act of surrender by the widow of tfie entire estate in favour of her daughter and the other a transfer of a portion of the interest which thus vested in the daughter in favour of her husband. If the document could be read and interpreted that way, obviously the decision should be in favour of the appellants; but, in our opinion, there seem to be difficulties and those of an insuperable character in the way of the document being interpreted as such.\n\nNeither in form nor in substance does the document purport to be a relinquishment of the entire widow's estate in favour of the daughter alone, nor is there any indication that the interest intended to be given to the son-in-law was being received by him by way of transfer from the daughter.\n\nThe document is not one executed by the widow and her daughter jointly in favour of the son-in-law containing a recital of relinquishment of the estate by the widow in favour of the daughter and transferring a portion of the same to the son-in-law.\n\nThe daughter does not figure as an executant of the deed nor even as an a, testing witness. She is the recipient of the deed along with her husband and it is\n\nimpossible to spell out of the document either that she received the entire estate on renunciation by her mother or transferred or even consented to transfer a\n\nportion of it to her husband.\n\nMr. Aiyar in support of his contention placed great reliance upon the principleenunciated in' the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nobokishore v. Harinath(1) whiCh was impliedly accepted by the Judicial Committee in Rangasami Gounaan v. Nachiappa Goundan(2). It was held by the Calcutta High Court in a number of cases which were reviewed and affirmed in Nobokishore v. Har.inath(1), that a widow is entitled to sell or transfer the\n\n(1) 1.L.R. 10 Cal. 1102.\n\nMummartrldi\n\nNagi Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nJ95J\n\nMummareddi Nagi Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairoja\n\nNaidu and\n\nOthers.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nentire estate of her husband without any necessity but with the consent of the next reversioner so as to bar the rights of the actual reversioner at the time of her death.\n\nThis was explained by the Judicial Committee as an extension of the principle of surrender in Rangasami Go2mda11 v. Nachiappa Goundan('). \"The surrender, once exercised\", observed their Lordships, \"in favour of the nearest reversioner or reversioners, the estate became his or theirs, and it was an obvious extension of the doctrine to hold that inasmuch as he or they were in title to convey to a third party, it came to the same thing if the conveyance was made by the widow with his or their consent.\n\nThis was decided to be possible by Nobokishore's case (') already cited.\n\nThe judgment went upon the principle of surrender, and it might do so for the surrender there was of the tvhole estate : but it is worthy of notice that the order of reference showed that the alienation was ostensibly on the ground of necessity, so that it might have been supported on the grounds to be mentioned under the second head above set forth.\"\n\nIt would be quite consistent with established principles of law if the widow relinquishes her interest in the husband's estate and the reversioner in whom the estate vests transflers the estate either in whole or in part to another person.\n\nIf the transfer is of the entire estate, the two transactions may be combined in one document and the widow and the reversioner might jointly transfer the whole estate to a stranger but the implication in such cases must always be that the alienee derives his title from the reversioner and not the widow.\n\nThe extension of this doctrine in the class of cases of which Nobokishore v. Harinath (2 ) may be taken as the type seems to be rather far-fetched and somewhat anomalous.\n\nIn these cases the effect of the immediate reversioner's giving consent to the iilienation of the whole estate by the widow to astranger has been held to import a double fiction : the first is the fiction of a surrender by the widow in favour of the consenting reversioner and the second is the fiction of\n\n(') I.L.R. 46 I.A. 72. (') I.L.R. I 0 Cal. II 02.\n\na trasfer by the latter to the alienee, although both fictions are contrary to the actual facts. It is difficult to say in the first place why a surrender should be presumed at all when the widow gives the property directly to the stranger and not to the reversioner.\n\nEven if this position is assumed, then also the question arises as to how the consent of a party can take the place of a conveyance which is requisite for the purpose of vesting title in a transferee.\n\nA consent merely binds the consenting party or anybody else who derives his title from him. If the actual reversioner at the date of the widow's death is the same person who gave his consent, obviously he can be precluded from challenging the transfer; but if the actual reversioner is a different person, there seems to be no justification for holding that he would be bound by the consent expressed by a person who had nothing but a chance of succession at that time and which chance did not materialize at all. (See observations of Mahajan J. in Ali Mohamad v. Mst. Nughlani (1)). Sir- Richard Garth C. J. in his judgment in Nobokishore v.\n\nHarinath (2) expressed considerable doubt as. to the propriety of the view which would make a sale by thewidow with the consent of her reversioner stand on the same footing as an actual renunciation. But in view of a series of previous decisions of the court he was constrained to accept that view as correct.\n\nIt may be necessary for this court at some time orother to reconsider the whole law on this subject. Ir seems probable that the Privy Council did not subject the decision in Nobokishore's case to a critical examination from the point of view of the doctrine of surrender,. as the transfer in that case was upheld on the ground of legal necessity as well. For the purpose of the present case we will proceed on the assumption that the law laid down in Nobokishore's case is correct.\n\nBut the doctrine should certainly not be extended any further.\n\nAs was feliciously expressed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, \"The road to the decision in Nobokishore's case was not without its difficulties but the learned\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1946 Lah. 180 at 188. ( 2) I.L.R. 1°' Cal. 1102.\n\nMummareddi Nagi Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n!95!\n\nMummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Othns\n\nMtikherjea J.\n\nJudges felt it had to be travelled that titles might be quieted.\n\nBut it is settled that there should be no extension of this Bengal doctrine\" : Per Jenkins C. J. in Debiprosad v. Gola Bhagat (' ).\n\nThe present case obviously does not come within the purview of the doctrine laid down in Nobokishore\n\nv. Harinath (2) which presupposes an alienation of the entire property in favour of a stranger to which the immediate reversioner was a consenting party.\n\nHere it cannot be said that the entire interest was transfer' red to the son-in-law of the widow with the consent of her daughter.\n\nThe interest transferred was a fraction of the interest held by widow and strictly speakmg, there was no consent expressed by the daughter.\n\nShe was a sort of a co-assignee with her husband.\n\nMr. Aiyar contends that her consent was implied by her accepting the deed and joining in several sub- .sequent transactions on the basis of the same, and once this consent is established we can impor_t the fiction of surrender in her favour of the entire estate, and if that fiction could be invoked it would be only .a logical extension of the principle in N obokishore' s case to hold that a part transfer in favour of a stranger could also be validated on the theory of surrender.\n\nWe are unable to a<; cept this chain of reasoning as sound. As stated above, it would be most improper to extend the doctrine in N obokishore' s case which is not itself based on sound legal principles to what Mr. Aiyar calls, its logical consequence.\n\nWe cannot invoke the fiction of surrender in a case like this when the renunciation, if any, was of a part of the estate; and the attempt to validate a part alienation by the widow in favour of a stranger on the basis of the doctrine of surrender, simply because the reversioner has impliedly assented to it, is m our opinion, absolutely unwarranted.\n\nIt remains to notice a few decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts upon which Mr. Rajah Aiyar relies in support of his contention.\n\nThe case of Abhay\n\n( 1) I.L.R. 40 Cal. 721 at 751. ( 2) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 1102.\n\nPadha v. Ramkinkar(1), decided by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, seems to be very similar in its facts to the present case, and pn\"ma f acie it is in favour of the appellants. There a Hindu widow executed a nadabi patra or deed of release in favour of her husband's brother who was the nearest reversioner and three sons of a predeceased brother of her husband.\n\nAfter the death of the widow the husband's brother instituted a suit for recovery of possession of the e'ntire property denying the rights of his nephews under the deed executed by the widow.\n\nThe suit was dismissed by both the courts below and this decision was affirmed in second appeal by the High Court.\n\nThe point was definitely raised before the High Court that the transaction could not be upheld on the footing of surrender as it was partly a surrender in favour of the next heir and partly an alienation in favour of certain remoter heirs.\n\nThis point was disposed of by Cumming J., who delivered the judgment, in the following manner :-\n\n\"I do not think that there is much substance in this contention. It is a question more of form than of substance. If the widow had surrendered the whole estate to the reversioner and the reversioner had at the same moment made a transfer of his estate to his nephews nothing could be said against the transaction, and this is what in effect has been done by the present document.\"\n\nWe do not know what the contents of the document in the case actually were, nor whether the husband's brother joined in the execution of the document.\n\nBe that what it may, we canot for the reasons already discussed accept the view that a transfer made by a widow of her entire estate in favour of the nearest reversioner and an outsider jointly would operate as a surrender of the whole estate to the immediate reversioner and a transfer of a half share in it to the stranger.\n\nThis, of course, is subject to any rule of estoppel that may on proper materials be urged against the presumptive reversioner.\n\nThis is precisely the view that has\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 228.\n\nMummaretldi\n\nNagi Ret!t!i\n\nanti Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMummartddi Nagi Rtddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others\n\nMukh,,.jea J.\n\nbeen taken by the Allahabad High Court, in Mt. ]agrani v. Gaya(') and, in our opinion, this is the correct view to take.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appelants has in this connection referred us to two decided authorities of the Bombay High Court. The first is the case of Y ashwanta\n\nv. A11tu('), w_here the widow together with her daughter who was the immediate heir excuted a deed of gift of the entire estate in favour of a stranger who was the husband of a predeceased daughter.\n\nIt was held that the transaction was valid on the basis of the doctrine of surrender: It is quite clear that this case comes directly within the purview of the principle enunciated in Nobobkishore's case, and there are two material facts which distinguish it from the case before us. In tlie first place, the reversioner joined with the widow in making the transfer in favour of a stranger and secondly, the transfer to the stranger was of the entire estate. There can be no difficulty in construing such a transaction as a valid act of surrender.\n\nOf the other case which is to be found reported in Bala Dhondi v. Baya(3) the facts are somewhat similar to those in the present case, but the actual decision does not assist the appellants.\n\nThere a Hindu widow made a gift of the entire estate of her husband in favour of her daughter and her husband jointly, the daughter being tlie next heir at that time. The lower appellate court held that the gift was a valid surrender, but this decision was reversed by the High Court on appeal and it was held that the transaction was not valid in law inasmuch as it was not a gift in favour of the daughter alone but in favour of her son-in-law as well who was to take jointly with the daughter. It was further held that tlie daughter being a minor, was not competent to consent to the gift in favour of her husband. It is true that there is no question of minority in the present case, but the decision certainly is no authority on the point which we are called upon to\n\n(') A.LR. 1933 All. 856.\n\n{2) I.L.R. 58 Born. 521.\n\n(8) l.L.R. 60 .Born. 211.\n\ndecide.\n\nIn our opinion, the view taken by the High Court in regard to the legal effect pf the document (Exhibit P-6) is the correct one and the first contention raised by Mr. Rajah Aiyar should therefore fail.\n\nw G'. now come to the other point which relates to the question of mesne profits.\n\nMr. Aiyar's main contention under this head is that as an alienation by the' widow is not void but only voidable and the reversioner can avoid it by choosing to institute a suit, the possession of the alienee could not be held to be unlawful before that date and consequently no mesne profits should have been allowed for the period prior to the institution of the suit. The other branch of his contention is that in respect of property No. 1 of the schedule there was only a conditional decree passed against defendants. 2 to 3 and so long as the condition is not fulfilled by the plaintiffs depositing the required amount in court, the. plaintiffs' right to take possession does not accrue and consequently no mesne profits can be allowed to them. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Banwarilal v. Mahesh(1).\n\nAs regards the first branch of the contention, it may be pointed out that prior to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Bijoya Gopal v. Krishna Mahishi(2) there was some misconception regarding the legal position of an alienee of a property from a Hindu widow vis a vis the reversioner, upon the death of the widow. It was held in an earlier case by the Judicial Committee that an alienation by the widow was not void but voidable and the reversioner might elect to assent to it and treat it as valid.\n\nIt did not absolutely come to an end at the death of the widow.\n\nOn the strength of this decision, it was held by the Calcutta High Court in Bijoya Gopal v. Krishna Mahishi( 2)\n\n(supra) that it was necessary for a reversioner to have the alien_ation set aside before he could recover. possession of the widow's property and the period of limitation for a suit to set aside such an alienation was that\n\n(1) ~.L.~. 41 All. 63, 2--4 s. C. India/66\n\n(2) I.L.R. 34 Cal.,329.\n\nMummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.\n\nMulr:herjea J.\n\n195!\n\nMummartddi Nagi Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidi, and Others.\n\nMukherjea ],\n\nprescribed by article 91 of the Indian Limitation Act.\n\nOn appeal to the Privy Council, it was P.Ointed out by their Lordships that this view was based on a misconception and they explained in what sense a transfer by a Hindu widow was not void but voidable.\n\nIt was said that the alienation by a Hindu widow does not become ipso facto void as soon as the widow dies; for, if that were so it could not have been ratified by the reversioners at all.\n\nThe alienation, though not absolutely void, is prima facie voidable at the election of the reversionary heir.\n\nHe may, if he thinks fit, affirm it or he may at his pleasure treat it as a nullity without the intervention of any court and he can show his election to do the latter by commencing an action to recover possession of the property. There is in fact nothing for the court either to set aside or cancel as a condition precedent to the right of action of the reversionary heir. A reversioner's suit for recovery of possession of the property alienated by a 'widow, it is well settled, is governed by article 141 of the Limitation Act, and as it is not necessary that the transfer should be set aside before any decree for possession is made, all that is necessary is that the reversioner should file a suit for possession within 12 years from the death of the widow and a decree passed in such a suit must be on the basis that the poosession of the transferee was unlawful ever since the widow died.\n\nThis being the position, we think that it is quite proper to allow the reversioner mesne profits against the alienee from the date of the widow's death. There is no rule of law that no mesne profits can be allowed in a case where the alienation cannot be described as absolutely void.\n\nThe decisions of the Judicial Committee in Bhagwat Dayal v. Debi Dayal(') and Satgur Prasad v. Harnarain Singh( 2 ) may be cited as illustrations where mesne profits were allowed in transactions which were only voidable. We think further that there is a difference between the alienee of a widow and the transferee of joint property from a Mitakshara father.\n\nA son of a Mitakshara father is bound to set aside an\n\n(1) L.R. 35 I.A. 48.\n\n(•) L.R. 59 I.A. 147.\n\nalienation made by the father within the period laid down in Article 125 of the Indian Limitation Act and it is only on the alienation being set aside that he is entitled to recover possession of the property. The High Court, in our opinion, was perfectly right in holding that the decision in Banwarilal v. Mahesh(1) which related to a suit instituted by a son against an :alienee of the father under the Mitakshara law does not apply to the facts of the present case.\n\nIt is true that as regards defendants 2 and 3 the decree is a conditional decree and the plaintiff cannot recover possession unless he pays a certain amount of money to the extent of which the widow's estate has been held to be benefitted, but the High Court has very properly allowed interest upon this amount to the alienee while making the latter liable for the mesne profits.\n\nThe result is that, in our opinion, the decision of the High Court cannot be assailed on either of these two points and the appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with cost5.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : M. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\nAgent for the respondents : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nMANOHARLAL~THESTATE\n\n{SHJU HARJLAL KANIA C. J., SAIYm FAZAL Au,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nPuniab Trade Employees Act, 1940, ss. 2-A (i) and (i), 7 (1), 16, -fh?fkuper without employees - Sale by son on close day- L1abil1ty of shop'fr..eeper-'-Scope of s. 2-A (i) and (i).\n\nSection 7 sub-s. (1) of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940. as aended in 1943, provided that \"save as otherwise . provided by this Act, every shop shall . remain closed on a dose day.\" Subscctiort (2) (i) stated that \"The choice of a close day. shall rest with the owner or octupier of a shop ...... and shall be intimated\n\nMummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMay 23.", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "REPORTS\n\nMUMMAREDDI NAGI REDD! AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUMMAREDDI NAGI REDDI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PITTI DURAIRAJA NAIDU AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PITTI DURAIRAJA NAIDU AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mtikherjea", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. R. 51 I.A. 200", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1039, "end_char": 1056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 35 I.A. 48", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1725, "end_char": 1740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 147", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1781, "end_char": 1797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gentle C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2045, "end_char": 2056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JURISDICTION ; Civil Appeal\n\nAppeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 12th January, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Gentle C.J. and Satyanarayana Rao J.) m\n\nMayB.\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2061, "end_char": 2078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JURISDICTION ; Civil Appeal\n\nAppeal against the Judgment and Decree dated the 12th January, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Gentle C.J. and Satyanarayana Rao J.) m\n\nMayB.\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Mummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2099, "end_char": 2121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "951\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.", "canonical_name": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi"}}, {"text": "Pitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2135, "end_char": 2157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "951\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.", "canonical_name": "PITTI DURAIRAJA NAIDU AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2171, "end_char": 2180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea.", "canonical_name": "Mtikherjea"}}, {"text": "K. Rajah Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2321, "end_char": 2335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rajah Aiyar (R. Ganapathi Iyer, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathi Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2337, "end_char": 2354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rajah Aiyar (R. Ganapathi Iyer, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. Somayya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2387, "end_char": 2397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Somayya (M. Krishna Rao, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "M. Krishna Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2399, "end_char": 2413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Somayya (M. Krishna Rao, with him) for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Nellore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2683, "end_char": 2711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against an appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated the 12th January, 1948, reversing in part, a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Nellore passed in 0."}}, {"text": "Durairaja Plff", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2927, "end_char": 2941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To appreciate the material facts of the case and the controversy that now centres between the parties, it would be convenient to refer to a short genealogy which is given below :-\n\nI Durairaja Plff."}}, {"text": "Venkata Narasamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2995, "end_char": 3012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nU da tha Narayanappa :_Chanchamma ( d. 1933)\n\nI Venkata Narasamma (d. \"1926) -Pitti Rangayya (d. 1914)\n\nI I Vcnkatadri-Rajakantamma\n\nI Rajavathi Plif.", "canonical_name": "Venkata Narasamma"}}, {"text": "Vcnkatadri-Rajakantamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3055, "end_char": 3078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nU da tha Narayanappa :_Chanchamma ( d. 1933)\n\nI Venkata Narasamma (d. \"1926) -Pitti Rangayya (d. 1914)\n\nI I Vcnkatadri-Rajakantamma\n\nI Rajavathi Plif."}}, {"text": "Rajavathi Plif", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3082, "end_char": 3096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nU da tha Narayanappa :_Chanchamma ( d. 1933)\n\nI Venkata Narasamma (d. \"1926) -Pitti Rangayya (d. 1914)\n\nI I Vcnkatadri-Rajakantamma\n\nI Rajavathi Plif."}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Plff", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3102, "end_char": 3118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Balakrishna Plff."}}, {"text": "Krishnababulu Plff", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3124, "end_char": 3142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishnababulu Plff."}}, {"text": "Narayanappa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3249, "end_char": 3260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The properties in dispute which are described in schedule A to the plaint admittedly belonged to one Narayanappa who was the father of the paternal grandmother of the plaintiffs.", "canonical_name": "Narayanappa"}}, {"text": "Narayanappa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3327, "end_char": 3338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayanappa died intestate sometime before 1884 leaving him surviving his wife Chanchamma and a daughter named Venkata Narasamma.", "canonical_name": "Narayanappa"}}, {"text": "Venkata Narasamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3438, "end_char": 3455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayanappa died intestate sometime before 1884 leaving him surviving his wife Chanchamma and a daughter named Venkata Narasamma.", "canonical_name": "Venkata Narasamma"}}, {"text": "Narasamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3458, "end_char": 3467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narasamma was married to one Pitti Rangayya and they had a son named Venkatadri, who was.", "canonical_name": "Narasamma"}}, {"text": "Pitti Rangayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3487, "end_char": 3501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narasamma was married to one Pitti Rangayya and they had a son named Venkatadri, who was."}}, {"text": "Venkatadri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3527, "end_char": 3537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narasamma was married to one Pitti Rangayya and they had a son named Venkatadri, who was."}}, {"text": "Chanchamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3578, "end_char": 3588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chanchamma died in\n\nMarch, 1933, and the plaintiffs aver that they being the heritable bandhus of Narayanappa as the daughter's son's sons of the latter and there being no nearer heir in existence, they became entitled to all the properties left by Narayanappa on the death of his widow."}}, {"text": "22nd February, 1894", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3886, "end_char": 3905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears thar on 22nd February, 1894, Chanchamma executed, what has been described as a deed of release, in favour of her daughter Narasamm; i and her son-inlaw Pitti Rangayya, under which the entire estate of Narayanappa came into the possession of the latter."}}, {"text": "Narasamm", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4000, "end_char": 4008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears thar on 22nd February, 1894, Chanchamma executed, what has been described as a deed of release, in favour of her daughter Narasamm; i and her son-inlaw Pitti Rangayya, under which the entire estate of Narayanappa came into the possession of the latter.", "canonical_name": "Narasamma"}}, {"text": "Chaachamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4203, "end_char": 4213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the execu.tiol.1 of this document, the daughter and\n\nn-in-law of Chaachamma began to deal with the properties left by Narayanappa as their' own and entered into various transactions on that footing."}}, {"text": "Narasamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4370, "end_char": 4379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pitti Rangayya died in 1914 and Narasamma followed him in 1926.", "canonical_name": "Narasamma"}}, {"text": "July 9, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4583, "end_char": 4595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these items, 4 and 5 were sold by Venkata Narasamma along with her son, the father of the plaintiffs, on July 9, 1922, to the 5th defendant and the father of defendants 6 to 9 for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "October 26, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4689, "end_char": 4705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, on October 26, 1929, when both Narasamma and the plaintiffs' father were dead, item 1 of schedule A was sold by the mother of the plaintiffs as their guardian to the 1st defendant for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "Mummareddi Nagi Reddi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5735, "end_char": 5756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As these transfers were made during the lifetime of Chanchamma and without any legal necessity, the plaintiffs as actual reversioners were not bound by them and they are entitled to recover possession of the properties\n\nMummareddi Nagi Reddi\n\narzd Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi"}}, {"text": "Pitti Durairaja Naidu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5771, "end_char": 5792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As these transfers were made during the lifetime of Chanchamma and without any legal necessity, the plaintiffs as actual reversioners were not bound by them and they are entitled to recover possession of the properties\n\nMummareddi Nagi Reddi\n\narzd Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "PITTI DURAIRAJA NAIDU AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Mukhajea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukhajea.", "canonical_name": "Mtikherjea"}}, {"text": "Pitti Darairaja\n\nNaidu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5858, "end_char": 5880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nMwnmaredtli\n\nNagi Reddi\n\nand Olhtrs\n\nPitti Darairaja\n\nNaidu and Othm\n\nMukli•rj•a J.\n\nby evicting the transferees.", "canonical_name": "PITTI DURAIRAJA NAIDU AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8125, "end_char": 8145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this dc; cision, the plaintiffs took an appeal to the High Court of Madras and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Gentle C. J. and Satyanarayana Rao J. The learned Judges allowed the appeal in regard to the items of property mentioned above and reversed the, decision of the trial Judge to that extent It was held that the plaintiffs were the nearest reversionary heirs of Narayanappa and that the ded of release did not operate as a surrender of the widow's estate."}}, {"text": "C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8212, "end_char": 8214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this dc; cision, the plaintiffs took an appeal to the High Court of Madras and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Gentle C. J. and Satyanarayana Rao J. The learned Judges allowed the appeal in regard to the items of property mentioned above and reversed the, decision of the trial Judge to that extent It was held that the plaintiffs were the nearest reversionary heirs of Narayanappa and that the ded of release did not operate as a surrender of the widow's estate."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9662, "end_char": 9689, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rajah Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9801, "end_char": 9812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Rajah Aiyar, appearing for the appellants, did not seriously challenge the finc:\\ing of the High Court as to the plaintiffs being the nearest reversioners at the time of."}}, {"text": "Mummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10123, "end_char": 10145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His first contention is that the deed of\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nJ95J\n\nMummartddi Nagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nrelease (Exhibit P-6) executed by Chanchamma had the effect of a surrender of the widow's estate in favour of her daughter and son-in-law and the daughter having died in 1926, the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation.", "canonical_name": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi"}}, {"text": "Mummartddi Nagi Reddi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10213, "end_char": 10234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His first contention is that the deed of\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nJ95J\n\nMummartddi Nagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nrelease (Exhibit P-6) executed by Chanchamma had the effect of a surrender of the widow's estate in favour of her daughter and son-in-law and the daughter having died in 1926, the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation.", "canonical_name": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi"}}, {"text": "Pitti Durairaja Naidu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10247, "end_char": 10268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His first contention is that the deed of\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nJ95J\n\nMummartddi Nagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nrelease (Exhibit P-6) executed by Chanchamma had the effect of a surrender of the widow's estate in favour of her daughter and son-in-law and the daughter having died in 1926, the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation.", "canonical_name": "PITTI DURAIRAJA NAIDU AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Narasimha Naidu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12313, "end_char": 12328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is stated finally that the lands are under an izara lease executed by the widow in favour of one Narasimha Naidu which is due to expire\n\nby the end of 1346 Fasli and it would be for the daughter and son-in-law to consider what they would do with regard to the lease."}}, {"text": "Nagi Reddi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14419, "end_char": 14429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be remembered\" thus observed the\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others v.\n\nPitti Durairaja and Naidu\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMummareidi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and Others\n\nMukhtrjta J.\n\nJudicial Committee in Vytla Sitanna v. Mariwada(') \"that the basis of the doctrine is the effacement of the widow's estate and not the ex facie transfer by which such effacement is brought about."}}, {"text": "Mukhtrjta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14563, "end_char": 14572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be remembered\" thus observed the\n\nMummareddi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others v.\n\nPitti Durairaja and Naidu\n\nOthers\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMummareidi\n\nNagi Reddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja Naidu and Others\n\nMukhtrjta J.\n\nJudicial Committee in Vytla Sitanna v. Mariwada(') \"that the basis of the doctrine is the effacement of the widow's estate and not the ex facie transfer by which such effacement is brought about.", "canonical_name": "Mtikherjea"}}, {"text": "L. R. 61 I.A. 200", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16643, "end_char": 16660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 41 I.A. 72", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16674, "end_char": 16689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18203, "end_char": 18208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Aiyar in support of his contention placed great reliance upon the principleenunciated in' the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nobokishore v. Harinath(1) whiCh was impliedly accepted by the Judicial Committee in Rangasami Gounaan v. Nachiappa Goundan(2)."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18324, "end_char": 18343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Aiyar in support of his contention placed great reliance upon the principleenunciated in' the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nobokishore v. Harinath(1) whiCh was impliedly accepted by the Judicial Committee in Rangasami Gounaan v. Nachiappa Goundan(2)."}}, {"text": "Mummartrldi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18676, "end_char": 18687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mummartrldi\n\nNagi Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.", "canonical_name": "Mummartrldi"}}, {"text": "Mummareddi Nagi Reddi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18769, "end_char": 18790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nJ95J\n\nMummareddi Nagi Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairoja\n\nNaidu and\n\nOthers.", "canonical_name": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi"}}, {"text": "Nobokishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19568, "end_char": 19579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was decided to be possible by Nobokishore's case (') already cited.", "canonical_name": "N obokishore"}}, {"text": "L.R. 46 I.A. 72", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20995, "end_char": 21010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22046, "end_char": 22053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See observations of Mahajan J. in Ali Mohamad v. Mst."}}, {"text": "Richard Garth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22100, "end_char": 22113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir- Richard Garth C. J. in his judgment in Nobokishore v.\n\nHarinath (2) expressed considerable doubt as."}}, {"text": "Lawrence Jenkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23049, "end_char": 23065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was feliciously expressed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, \"The road to the decision in Nobokishore's case was not without its difficulties but the learned\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1946 Lah."}}, {"text": "Mummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23316, "end_char": 23338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Othns\n\nMtikherjea J.\n\nJudges felt it had to be travelled that titles might be quieted.", "canonical_name": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi"}}, {"text": "Mtikherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23386, "end_char": 23396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Othns\n\nMtikherjea J.\n\nJudges felt it had to be travelled that titles might be quieted.", "canonical_name": "Mtikherjea"}}, {"text": "Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23550, "end_char": 23557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is settled that there should be no extension of this Bengal doctrine\" : Per Jenkins C. J. in Debiprosad v. Gola Bhagat (' )."}}, {"text": "N obokishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24539, "end_char": 24551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Aiyar contends that her consent was implied by her accepting the deed and joining in several sub- .sequent transactions on the basis of the same, and once this consent is established we can impor_t the fiction of surrender in her favour of the entire estate, and if that fiction could be invoked it would be only .a logical extension of the principle in N obokishore' s case to hold that a part transfer in favour of a stranger could also be validated on the theory of surrender.", "canonical_name": "N obokishore"}}, {"text": "Calcutta and Bombay High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25315, "end_char": 25346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It remains to notice a few decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts upon which Mr. Rajah Aiyar relies in support of his contention."}}, {"text": "Cumming", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26447, "end_char": 26454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This point was disposed of by Cumming J., who delivered the judgment, in the following manner :-\n\n\"I do not think that there is much substance in this contention."}}, {"text": "Mummaretldi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27568, "end_char": 27579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mummaretldi\n\nNagi Ret!t!i\n\nanti Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.", "canonical_name": "Mummartrldi"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27644, "end_char": 27653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMummartddi Nagi Rtddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others\n\nMukh,,.jea J.\n\nbeen taken by the Allahabad High Court, in Mt. ]agrani v. Gaya(') and, in our opinion, this is the correct view to take.", "canonical_name": "Mtikherjea"}}, {"text": "Mummartddi Nagi Rtddi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27658, "end_char": 27679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMummartddi Nagi Rtddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others\n\nMukh,,.jea J.\n\nbeen taken by the Allahabad High Court, in Mt. ]agrani v. Gaya(') and, in our opinion, this is the correct view to take.", "canonical_name": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27760, "end_char": 27780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMummartddi Nagi Rtddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others\n\nMukh,,.jea J.\n\nbeen taken by the Allahabad High Court, in Mt. ]agrani v. Gaya(') and, in our opinion, this is the correct view to take."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27971, "end_char": 27988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the appelants has in this connection referred us to two decided authorities of the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "Nobobkishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28411, "end_char": 28423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held that the transaction was valid on the basis of the doctrine of surrender: It is quite clear that this case comes directly within the purview of the principle enunciated in Nobobkishore's case, and there are two material facts which distinguish it from the case before us.", "canonical_name": "N obokishore"}}, {"text": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31975, "end_char": 31998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi\n\nand Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.", "canonical_name": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi"}}, {"text": "herjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32053, "end_char": 32059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mulr:herjea J.\n\n195!"}}, {"text": "article 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32170, "end_char": 32180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32195, "end_char": 32209, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33213, "end_char": 33224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33232, "end_char": 33246, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L.R. 35 I.A. 48", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34319, "end_char": 34334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 147", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 34341, "end_char": 34357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34421, "end_char": 34432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34447, "end_char": 34461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35435, "end_char": 35452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : M. S. K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35483, "end_char": 35498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondents : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "SHJU HARJLAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35523, "end_char": 35541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANOHARLAL~THESTATE\n\n{SHJU HARJLAL KANIA C. J., SAIYm FAZAL Au,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "SAIYm FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35549, "end_char": 35563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANOHARLAL~THESTATE\n\n{SHJU HARJLAL KANIA C. J., SAIYm FAZAL Au,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35586, "end_char": 35606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANOHARLAL~THESTATE\n\n{SHJU HARJLAL KANIA C. J., SAIYm FAZAL Au,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35629, "end_char": 35661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35663, "end_char": 35668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35791, "end_char": 35795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35812, "end_char": 35821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35840, "end_char": 35872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36138, "end_char": 36160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "shall rest with the owner or octupier of a shop ...... and shall be intimated\n\nMummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.", "canonical_name": "Mummarttldi\n\nNagl Reddi"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_671_676_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 671\n\nalienation made by the father within the period laid down in Article 125 of the Indian Limitation Act and it is only on the alienation being set aside that he is entitled to recover possession of the property. The High Court, in our opinion, was perfectly right in holding that the decision in Banwarilal v. Mahesh(1) which related to a suit instituted by a son against an :alienee of the father under the Mitakshara law does not apply to the facts of the present case.\n\nIt is true that as regards defendants 2 and 3 the decree is a conditional decree and the plaintiff cannot recover possession unless he pays a certain amount of money to the extent of which the widow's estate has been held to be benefitted, but the High Court has very properly allowed interest upon this amount to the alienee while making the latter liable for the mesne profits.\n\nThe result is that, in our opinion, the decision of the High Court cannot be assailed on either of these two points and the appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with cost5.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants : M. S. K. Aiyangar.\n\nAgent for the respondents : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nMANOHARLAL~THESTATE\n\n{SHJU HARJLAL KANIA C. J., SAIYm FAZAL Au,\n\nMEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nPuniab Trade Employees Act, 1940, ss. 2-A (i) and (i), 7 (1), 16, -fh?fkuper without employees - Sale by son on close day- L1abil1ty of shop'fr..eeper-'-Scope of s. 2-A (i) and (i).\n\nSection 7 sub-s. (1) of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940. as aended in 1943, provided that \"save as otherwise . provided by this Act, every shop shall . remain closed on a dose day.\" Subscctiort (2) (i) stated that \"The choice of a close day. shall rest with the owner or octupier of a shop ...... and shall be intimated\n\nMummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMay 23.\n\nThe Stale.\n\nBose j.\n\nto the prescribed authority.\" Clauses (i) and (j) of s. 2-A provided that nothing in the Act. shall apply to persons employed in a managerial capacity and the members of the family of the employer.\n\nThe appellant owned a shop, and on a close day the appellant's son sold an article from the shop, and the appellant was convicted under s. 16 of tht Act.\n\nIt was contended on his behalf that s. 7 of the Act was ultra 11ire1 as it did not fall under any. of the items in either the Provincial or the Concurrent Legislat:ve List of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that in any event as he did not employ any labour and was also the manager of the shop he cannot be convicted .in view of the provisions of clauses (i) and (j) of s. 2-A of the Act.\n\nHeld,. hy the Full Court-(i) that the Provincial Government could under item No. 27 in List II regulate the hours, place, date and manner of sale of any commodity and s. 7 of the Act was not ultra vires; the matter could, also be brought under item 27 in list III \"welfare of labour; conditions of labour;\"\n\n(ii) clause (j) of s. 2-A did not protect the appellant because the conviction was not for the sale by the son but for the appeltant having kept the shop open on a close day;\n\n(iii) the appellant was not entitled to be exempted under cL (i) of s. 2-A even though he was himself the manager of the shop, because bis capacity and liability as an owner must be kept distinct. from that of a manager for the purposes of the Ila.\n\nCl\\IMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JtWSD1cnoN: Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1950.\n\nAppeal under Art. 134 ( l) ( c) of the COnstitucion of India against the Judgment and Order dated the 10th Apri1, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Simla in Criminal Revision No. 449 of 1949. The facts of the case appear in the judgment.\n\nKundan Lal Arora for the appellant.\n\nS. N. Chopra for the respondent.\n\n1951. May 23. The Judgment of the Coon wa delivered by\n\nBosE J.-This is a criminal appeal against .a conviction under section 16 of the Punjab 'frade Employees Act, 1940, as amended in 1943, read with section 7(1).\n\nThe appellant is a shopkeeper who owns and runs a shop in the Cantonment Area oe Ferozepore. He has no \"employees\" within the meaning of the Act but is assisted by his son in running the shop. The: shop is\n\ndivided into two sections.\n\nIn one, articles of haberdashery are sold; in the other, articles of stationery.\n\nSection 7(1) of the Act as amended i:equires that- \"Save as otherwise proided by tbiJ Act, every shop ........ shall remain closed on a dose' 4ay.\"\n\nSub-section (2) (i) states that-\n\n\"The choice of a close day shall rest with the owner or occupier of a shop .... and shall be intimated to the prescribed authority within etc.\"\n\nThe appellant made the following choice. He elected to close the haberdashery section on Mondays and the stationery section on . Saturdays and gave the necessary intimation to the prescribed authority to that effect.\n\nOri Monday, the 17th of May, 1948, the appellant's son sold a tin of boot polish to a customer from the haberdashery section of the shop.\n\nThe appellant was present in person at the time of the sale. Monday was a close day for the haberdashery section and so the appellant was prosecuted under section 16 read with section 7.\n\nThe trying Magistrate held that in selling the article of haberdashery on a_ close day and in not observing Monday as a close day the appellant had infringed the provisions of section 7(1) of the Act. He accordingly convicted him and imposed a fine of Rs. 20.\n\nA revision application to the High Court failed.\n\nThe High Court held that as the appellant had failed to keep his shop closed one day in the week, his conviction was proper.\n\nA certificate for leave to appeal to this Court, on the ground that a substantial question of law relating to the Government of India Act, 1935, was involved, was granted and that is how we come to be seized of the matter.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant contended that section 7 of the Act is ultra vires in that it does not fall under any of the items in either the Provincial or the Concurrent Legislative Lists in the Government of India Acr, 1935. In our opinion, the matter can come either under item No. 27 in List II or item No. 27 in List IIJ.\n\nBose J.\n\n195!\n\nBose].\n\nItem No. 27 in List II covers \"trade and commerce within the Province.\" In our opinion, a Provincial Government could, under that entry, regulate the hours, place, date and manner of sale of any particular commodity or commodities.\n\nIt could, ihr example, state that the sale of explosives or other dangerous substances should only be in selected areas, at specified times or on specified days when extra precautions for the general safety of the public and those directly concerned could be arranged for.\n\nThat would appear to be obvious.\n\nIn the same way, it could, if it so pleased, say that there shall be no sales on a particular day, say a Sunday or a Friday, or on days of religious festivals and so forth .. Instead of doing that, it has chosen to regulate the internal trade of the Province in this manner which is only one of the various ways in which it could have acted.\n\nThe matter can also be brought under item 27 in List III : \"welfare of labour; conditions of labour.\" The impugned section is a general one and applies to all kinds of shops; that is to say, to those in which labour is employed as well as to those which are run by the owners and their families.\n\nThe Act in which the section occurs is directed at regulating the hours of employment of persons who are employed in the business of shops or commercial establishments.\n\nTherefore, in so far as section 7 covers establishments where labour is employed, it is undoubtedly intra vires.\n\nBut it was argued that the section can have no application to shops which an owner runs with or without the assistance of his family. Reliance for this was placed on section 2-A (i) and (j) which is as follows :\n\n\"2-A. Nothing in this Act shall apply to- • • • •\n\n(i) persons employed in a lll; U1agerial capacity .... and\n\n(j) the members of the family of the employer.\"\n\nIt was argued that the salo was by the wn. He is not affected by the Act Therefore, he was entitled to sell and he could not sell unless the shop was kept\n\nopen to enable him to do so.\n\nSO also as regards the appellant, the owner, who was there in a managerial capacity. In our opinion, this is fallacious because the conviction here is not for the sale but for keeping the shop open on a close day.\n\nSection 2-A {j) does not give the son a right to keep the shop open or, for that matter, a right to sell. All it says is that he, being a member of the family, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Act. Section 7 (1), on the other hand, is directed against the owner of the shop, not against his family.\n\nIt compels the owner to keep his shop closed one day in a week.\n\nIt was then contended that if a person employed in a managerial capacity cannot be affected by the Act, then the appellant who was there in that capacity cannot be compelled to close , the shop under section 7.\n\nThis is also fallacious.\n\nIt happens in _the present case that the owner and the manager are the same but the Act obviously makes provision for a class of case in . which they are different. The owner is obliged to close the shop one day in a week, though the manager of the shop can work without, for example, having the twenty-four consecutive hours of rest every week which section 7-A enjoins. The appellant's capacity as manager will have to be separated from his character as owner for this purpose. Section 2-A(i) does not control section 7 (1).\n\nLastly, it was argued that the scheme of the Act makes it plain that it is for ameliorating the conditions of labour employed in shops. It carinot therefore. apply to shops in which no labour is employed, particularly when the family of. the \"employer\" is expressly excluded from the purview of the Act. For this reason alo, it cannot fall under item 27 in List III. We are of opinion that such .a narrow interpretation cannot be placed upon the entry.\n\nThe legislature may have felt it necessary, in order to reduce the possibilities of evasion to a minimum, to encroach upon the liberties of those who would not otherwise have been affected.\n\nThat we think it had power to do. Further, to require a shopkeeper, who employs one or two men, to close and\n\n1951 .\n\nThe Stat,,\n\nQose J.\n\nThe State.\n\nBose J.\n\nMay 24\n\npermfo his rival, who employs perhaps a dozen mctnbers of his family, to rctnain open, dearly places the former at a grave commercial disadvantage. To permit such a distinction might well engender discontent and in the end react upon the relations between employer and employed.\n\nAll these are matters of policy into which we cannot enter but which serv.e to justify a wide and liberal interpretation of words and phrases in these entires.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : Vidya Sagar.\n\nAgent for the;_ respondent : P. A. Mehta.\n\nLOGENDRA NATH JHA & OTHERS\n\nSHRI POLAILAL BISW AS.\n\n[SHRI liARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAS and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), s. 439 (4)-R<vision against acquittal-High Court's powers-Rer•ersal of findings of facts- /mpropriety of.\n\nThough sub-s. (I) of s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorises the High Court to exercise in its discretion any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by s. 423, yet sub-s. ( 4) specifically excludes the power to \"convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.\" This docs not mean that in dealing with a revision petition by a private party against an order of acquittal, the High Court can in the absence of any error on a point of law rcappraisc the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal was based, provided only it stops short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him, by ordering a retrial.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 1951.\n\nAppeal against a Judgment and Order dated 22nd January, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Imam J.) in Criminal Revision No. 1533 of 1950.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "Article 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 136, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1110, "end_char": 1127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellants : M. S. K. Aiyangar."}}, {"text": "Sastri.\n\nMANOHARLAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1167, "end_char": 1186, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANOHAR LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHJU HARJLAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1198, "end_char": 1216, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1259, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1261, "end_char": 1281, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1286, "end_char": 1301, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1304, "end_char": 1336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1338, "end_char": 1343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1466, "end_char": 1470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1487, "end_char": 1496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "Puniab Trade Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1515, "end_char": 1547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagi Rtddi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1825, "end_char": 1835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "shall rest with the owner or octupier of a shop ...... and shall be intimated\n\nMummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others."}}, {"text": "Pitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1848, "end_char": 1870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "shall rest with the owner or octupier of a shop ...... and shall be intimated\n\nMummartddi\n\nNagi Rtddi and Others\n\nPitti Durairaja\n\nNaidu and Others."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1884, "end_char": 1893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J.\n\nMay 23."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1919, "end_char": 1923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose j.\n\nto the prescribed authority.\""}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1981, "end_char": 1985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2263, "end_char": 2268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2318, "end_char": 2322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "List of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2449, "end_char": 2490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2659, "end_char": 2663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2846, "end_char": 2850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3006, "end_char": 3010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3231, "end_char": 3235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3492, "end_char": 3500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kundan Lal Arora", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kundan Lal Arora for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Chopra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3762, "end_char": 3774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Chopra for the respondent."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3914, "end_char": 3924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Employees Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3946, "end_char": 3965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3997, "end_char": 4009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Ferozepore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4093, "end_char": 4103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a shopkeeper who owns and runs a shop in the Cantonment Area oe Ferozepore."}}, {"text": "Section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Employees Act, 1940", "statute": "Employees Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "17th of May, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4891, "end_char": 4908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ori Monday, the 17th of May, 1948, the appellant's son sold a tin of boot polish to a customer from the haberdashery section of the shop."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5190, "end_char": 5199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5378, "end_char": 5390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5753, "end_char": 5782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5916, "end_char": 5925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7598, "end_char": 7607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7854, "end_char": 7863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8462, "end_char": 8471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8674, "end_char": 8683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9041, "end_char": 9050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9430, "end_char": 9439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9559, "end_char": 9568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9591, "end_char": 9600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vidya Sagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10942, "end_char": 10953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : Vidya Sagar."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10985, "end_char": 10996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the;_ respondent : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "LOGENDRA NATH JHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10999, "end_char": 11016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LOGENDRA NATH JHA & OTHERS\n\nSHRI POLAILAL BISW AS."}}, {"text": "POLAILAL BISW", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11032, "end_char": 11045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LOGENDRA NATH JHA & OTHERS\n\nSHRI POLAILAL BISW AS."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11079, "end_char": 11095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI liARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAS and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11098, "end_char": 11107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SHRI liARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAS and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11130, "end_char": 11153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11167, "end_char": 11173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11295, "end_char": 11301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11441, "end_char": 11447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "22nd January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12046, "end_char": 12064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against a Judgment and Order dated 22nd January, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Imam J.) in Criminal Revision No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12073, "end_char": 12106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal against a Judgment and Order dated 22nd January, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Imam J.) in Criminal Revision No."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_676_681_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "ManoharLal\n\nThe State.\n\nBose J.\n\nMay 24\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\npermfo his rival, who employs perhaps a dozen mctnbers of his family, to rctnain open, dearly places the former at a grave commercial disadvantage. To permit such a distinction might well engender discontent and in the end react upon the relations between employer and employed.\n\nAll these are matters of policy into which we cannot enter but which serv.e to justify a wide and liberal interpretation of words and phrases in these entires.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellant : Vidya Sagar.\n\nAgent for the;_ respondent : P. A. Mehta.\n\nLOGENDRA NATH JHA & OTHERS\n\nSHRI POLAILAL BISW AS.\n\n[SHRI liARILAL KANIA c. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAS and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), s. 439 (4)-R<vision against acquittal-High Court's powers-Rer•ersal of findings of facts- /mpropriety of.\n\nThough sub-s. (I) of s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorises the High Court to exercise in its discretion any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by s. 423, yet sub-s. ( 4) specifically excludes the power to \"convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.\" This docs not mean that in dealing with a revision petition by a private party against an order of acquittal, the High Court can in the absence of any error on a point of law rcappraisc the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal was based, provided only it stops short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him, by ordering a retrial.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 1951.\n\nAppeal against a Judgment and Order dated 22nd January, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Imam J.) in Criminal Revision No. 1533 of 1950.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COl}RT REPORTS 677\n\nS. P. Sinha (P. S. Safeer and K. N. Aggarwal, with him) for the appellants.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\n1951. May 24. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI J.-This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna setting aside an order of acquittal of the appellants by the Sessions Judge, Purnea, and directing their retrial.\n\nThe appellants were prosecuted for alleged offences under sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 326, 302 and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code at the instance of one Polai Lal Biswas who lodged a complaint against _them before the police. The prosecution case was that, while the complainant was harvesting the paddy crop on, his field at about 10 a.m. on 29th November, 1949, a mob of about fifty persons came on to the field armed with ballams, lathis apd other weapons and that the first appellant Logendranath Jha, who was leading the mob, demanded a settlement of all outstanding disputes with the complainant and said he would not allow the paddy to be removed unless the disputes were settled.\n\nAn altercation followed a.s a result of which Logendra ordered an assault by his men.\n\nThen Logendra and one of his men, Harihar, gave ballam blows to one of the labourers, Kangali, who fell down and died on the spot.\n\nInformation was given to the police who investigated the case and submitted the charge-sheet.\n\nThe committing Magistrate found that a prima f acie case was made out and committed the appellants to the Court of Sessions for trial.\n\nThe appellants pleaded not guilty alleging inter alia, that Mohendar and Debender, the brothers of Logendra (appellants 2 and 3) were not present in the village of Dandkhora with which they had no concern, as all the lands in that village had been allotted to Logendra at a previous partition, that Logendra himself was not in the village at the time of the occurrence but arrived\n\nLogmdranath\n\nShri Polailal Biswas.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\n1~51\n\nlogendranath Jha and Others\n\nShri Polailal Biswas.\n\nPatanjali Sastri ].\n\n678 SUPREME COURT lEPORT5 [1951)\n\nsoon after and was dragged tQ th!! place at the instance of his enemies in the village and was pled under arrest by the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police w!Jo had arrived there previously.\n\nIt was also .alleged that there were two factions in the village, one of which was led by one Harimohan, a relation of the complainant, and the other by Logcndra and there had been numerous revenue and criminal proceedings and long-standing enemity between the families of these leaders as a result of which this false case was foisted upon the appellants.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge examined the evidence in great detail . and found that the existence of factions as alleged by the appellants was true. He found, however, that the appellants' plea of alibi was not satisfactorily made out, \"but the truth of the prosecution'', he proceeded to observe, \"cannot be judged by the falsehood of the defence nor can the prosecution derive its strength from the weakness of the defence.\n\nProsecution must stand on its own legs and must prove the story told by it at the very first stage. The manner of occurrence alleged by the prosecution must be established beyond doubt before the accused persons can be convicted\".\n\nApproaching the case in this manner and seeing that the basis of the prosecution case was that Polai had batai settlement of the disputed land and had raised the paddy crop which he was harvesting when the occurrence took place, the learned Sessions Judge examined the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who belonged to the opposite faction critically and found that the story of the prosecution was not acceptable. Polai, who was alleged to have taken the land on batai settlement from his own maternal grandmother Parasmani who brought him. up from his childhood, was only 19 years old and unmarried and was still living with his grandmother.\n\nHe did not claim to be a bataidar of any other person. \"In these circumstances\", said the learned Judgci, \"it does not appear to me to be probable that Polai would have been allowed to maintain himself by running adhi cultivation of his mamu's land in the lifetime of\n\nhis nani who has brought him up from his infancy like her own child. Nor does it appeal to me that the unmarried boy Polai would have undertaken upon himself the task of running batai cultivation of the lands of his mamu where he has been living since his childhood without any trouble, more particularly in view of the heavy expenses of cultivation brought out by the evidence of Tirthanand (P.W. 14)'.'. He, therefore, disbelieved the whole story that Polai had taken the lands of his grandmother or his uncles as bataidar for cultivation and that he was engaged in harvesting the paddy crop on the lands at the -time of the occurrence. This false story, in his opinion, \"vitally affected the prosecution case regarding the alleged manner of the occurrence\".\n\nHe also found a number of discrepancies and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which, in his view, tended to show that the prosecution was guilty of concealment of the real facts. \"In view of such concealment of real facts,\" the learned Judge concluded, \"it does not appear to me to be possible to apportion liability and to decide which of the two parties comll)enced the fight and which acted in self-defence.\n\nSuch being the position, it is not possible at all to hold either party responsible for what took place.\n\nIn such a view of the matter coupled with the fact that the manner of occurrence alleged by the prosecution has not been established to be true beyond doubt, I think that the accused persons cannot be safely convicted of any of the offences for which they have been charged.\" The learned Judge accordingly acquitted the appellants of all the charges. framed against them.\n\nAgainst that order the complainant Polai preferred a revision petition to the High Court under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, The learned Judge who heard the petition reviewed the evidence at some length and came to the conclusion that the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge could not be allowed to stand as the acquittal of the . appellants was \"perverse\".\n\nIn his opinion, \"the entire judgment displays a lack\n\n19,?l\n\nLogllldranalk\n\n]ha andQthm\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswqs,\"\n\nPatanjali Saslrt J-\n\nLogendranath\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswas.\n\nPatanjali SastrJ J.\n\nof true perspective in a case of this kind. The Sessions Judge had completely misdirected himself in looking to the minor discrepancies in the case and ignoring the essential matters so far as the. case is concerned,\" and there was no justifiable ground for rejecting the prosecution evidence regarding the cultivation and harvesting by Polai. And he concludedwith the warning \"I would, however, make it perfectly clear tl1at when the case is re-tried, which I am now going to order, the Judge proceeding with the trial will not be in the least influenced by any expression of opinion which I may have given in this Judgment.\"\n\nOn behalf of the appellants Mr. Sinha raised two contentions.\n\nIn the first place, he submitted that having regard to section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides for an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal only at the instance of the Government, a revision petition under section 439 at the instance of a private party was incompetent, and, secondly, that sub-section ( 4) of section 439 clearly showed that the High Court exceeded its powers of revision in the present case in upsetting the findings of fact of the trial Judge. We think it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the first contention of Mr .. Sinha especially as the respondent is unrepresented, as we are of opinion that his second and alternative contention must prevail.\n\nIt will be seen from the judgment summarised above that the learned Judge in the High Court re-appraised the evidence in the case and disagreed with the Sessions Judge's findings of fact on the ground that they were perverse and displayed a lack of true perspective.\n\nHe went further and, by way of \"expressing in very dear terms as to how perverse the judgment of the court below is\", he indicated that the discrepancies in the prosecution evidence and the circumstances of the case which led the Sessions Judge to discredit the prosecution story afforded no justifiable ground for the conclusion that the prosecution failed to establish their case.\n\nWe are of opinion that the learned Judge in the High Court did not properly appreciate the\n\nscope of inquiry in revision against an order of acquittal.\n\nThough sub-section (I) of section 439 authorises the High Court to exercise, in its discretion, any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by section 423, sub-section (4) specifically excludes the power to \"convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction\".\n\nThis does not mean that in dealing with a revision petition by a private party against an order of acquittal the High Court could in the absence of any error on a point of law re-appraise the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal was based, provided only it stopped short of finding .the accused guilty and passing sentence on him.\n\nBy merely characterising the judgment of the trial Cou~ as \"perverse\" and \"lacking in perspective\", the Hig Court cannot reverse pure findings of fact based on th trial Court's appreciation of the evidence in the case!\n\nThat is what the learned Judge in the court. below bas done, but could not, in our. opinion, properly do on an application in revision filed by a private party against acquittal. No doubt, the learned Judge formally complied with sub-section (4) by directing only a retrial of the appellants without convicting them, and warned that the court retrying the case should not be influenced by any expression of opinion contained in his judgment.\n\nBut there can be little doubt that he loaded the dice against the appellants, and it might prove difficult for any subordinate judicial officer dealing with the case to put aside altogether the strong views expressed in the judgment as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the circumstances of the case in general.\n\nWe are of opinion that the learned Judge in the High Court exceeded his powers of revision in dealing with the case in the manner he did, and we set aside his order for retrial of the appellants and restore the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge.\n\nAppeal allowed ..\n\nAgent for the appellant: Kundan Lal Mehta.\n\nLog•ndrall4lh\n\nJha and Olhm\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswas. ·\n\nPatatifali Sastri J.", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "Bose J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Vidya Sagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 593, "end_char": 604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : Vidya Sagar."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 636, "end_char": 647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the;_ respondent : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "LOGENDRA NATH JHA & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 650, "end_char": 676, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LOGENDRA NATH JHA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "POLAILAL BISW AS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 683, "end_char": 699, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "POLAILAL BISW AS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRI liARILAL KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 703, "end_char": 722, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 730, "end_char": 746, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 749, "end_char": 758, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 781, "end_char": 804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 818, "end_char": 824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 946, "end_char": 952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1092, "end_char": 1098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1844, "end_char": 1855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COl}RT REPORTS 677\n\nS. P. Sinha (P. S. Safeer and K. N. Aggarwal, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. S. Safeer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1857, "end_char": 1869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COl}RT REPORTS 677\n\nS. P. Sinha (P. S. Safeer and K. N. Aggarwal, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. N. Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1874, "end_char": 1888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COl}RT REPORTS 677\n\nS. P. Sinha (P. S. Safeer and K. N. Aggarwal, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2011, "end_char": 2027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI J.-This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna setting aside an order of acquittal of the appellants by the Sessions Judge, Purnea, and directing their retrial.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI J.-This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna setting aside an order of acquittal of the appellants by the Sessions Judge, Purnea, and directing their retrial."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Purnea", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2182, "end_char": 2204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATANJALI SAsTRI J.-This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna setting aside an order of acquittal of the appellants by the Sessions Judge, Purnea, and directing their retrial."}}, {"text": "sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 326, 302 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2351, "end_char": 2368, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Polai Lal Biswas", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2392, "end_char": 2408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were prosecuted for alleged offences under sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 326, 302 and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code at the instance of one Polai Lal Biswas who lodged a complaint against _them before the police.", "canonical_name": "POLAILAL BISW AS"}}, {"text": "29th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2582, "end_char": 2601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case was that, while the complainant was harvesting the paddy crop on, his field at about 10 a.m. on 29th November, 1949, a mob of about fifty persons came on to the field armed with ballams, lathis apd other weapons and that the first appellant Logendranath Jha, who was leading the mob, demanded a settlement of all outstanding disputes with the complainant and said he would not allow the paddy to be removed unless the disputes were settled."}}, {"text": "Logendranath Jha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2727, "end_char": 2743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case was that, while the complainant was harvesting the paddy crop on, his field at about 10 a.m. on 29th November, 1949, a mob of about fifty persons came on to the field armed with ballams, lathis apd other weapons and that the first appellant Logendranath Jha, who was leading the mob, demanded a settlement of all outstanding disputes with the complainant and said he would not allow the paddy to be removed unless the disputes were settled.", "canonical_name": "Logendranath Jha"}}, {"text": "Logendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 2982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An altercation followed a.s a result of which Logendra ordered an assault by his men.", "canonical_name": "Logendranath Jha"}}, {"text": "Harihar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3049, "end_char": 3056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then Logendra and one of his men, Harihar, gave ballam blows to one of the labourers, Kangali, who fell down and died on the spot.", "canonical_name": "Harimohan"}}, {"text": "Kangali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3101, "end_char": 3108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then Logendra and one of his men, Harihar, gave ballam blows to one of the labourers, Kangali, who fell down and died on the spot."}}, {"text": "Mohendar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3438, "end_char": 3446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants pleaded not guilty alleging inter alia, that Mohendar and Debender, the brothers of Logendra (appellants 2 and 3) were not present in the village of Dandkhora with which they had no concern, as all the lands in that village had been allotted to Logendra at a previous partition, that Logendra himself was not in the village at the time of the occurrence but arrived\n\nLogmdranath\n\nShri Polailal Biswas."}}, {"text": "Debender", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3451, "end_char": 3459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants pleaded not guilty alleging inter alia, that Mohendar and Debender, the brothers of Logendra (appellants 2 and 3) were not present in the village of Dandkhora with which they had no concern, as all the lands in that village had been allotted to Logendra at a previous partition, that Logendra himself was not in the village at the time of the occurrence but arrived\n\nLogmdranath\n\nShri Polailal Biswas."}}, {"text": "Logendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3477, "end_char": 3485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants pleaded not guilty alleging inter alia, that Mohendar and Debender, the brothers of Logendra (appellants 2 and 3) were not present in the village of Dandkhora with which they had no concern, as all the lands in that village had been allotted to Logendra at a previous partition, that Logendra himself was not in the village at the time of the occurrence but arrived\n\nLogmdranath\n\nShri Polailal Biswas.", "canonical_name": "Logendranath Jha"}}, {"text": "Dandkhora", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants pleaded not guilty alleging inter alia, that Mohendar and Debender, the brothers of Logendra (appellants 2 and 3) were not present in the village of Dandkhora with which they had no concern, as all the lands in that village had been allotted to Logendra at a previous partition, that Logendra himself was not in the village at the time of the occurrence but arrived\n\nLogmdranath\n\nShri Polailal Biswas."}}, {"text": "Polailal Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3778, "end_char": 3793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants pleaded not guilty alleging inter alia, that Mohendar and Debender, the brothers of Logendra (appellants 2 and 3) were not present in the village of Dandkhora with which they had no concern, as all the lands in that village had been allotted to Logendra at a previous partition, that Logendra himself was not in the village at the time of the occurrence but arrived\n\nLogmdranath\n\nShri Polailal Biswas.", "canonical_name": "POLAILAL BISW AS"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri J.\n\n1~51\n\nlogendranath Jha and Others\n\nShri Polailal Biswas.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "logendranath Jha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3823, "end_char": 3839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri J.\n\n1~51\n\nlogendranath Jha and Others\n\nShri Polailal Biswas.", "canonical_name": "Logendranath Jha"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3875, "end_char": 3891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri ].", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Harimohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4214, "end_char": 4223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also .alleged that there were two factions in the village, one of which was led by one Harimohan, a relation of the complainant, and the other by Logcndra and there had been numerous revenue and criminal proceedings and long-standing enemity between the families of these leaders as a result of which this false case was foisted upon the appellants.", "canonical_name": "Harimohan"}}, {"text": "Logcndra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4273, "end_char": 4281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also .alleged that there were two factions in the village, one of which was led by one Harimohan, a relation of the complainant, and the other by Logcndra and there had been numerous revenue and criminal proceedings and long-standing enemity between the families of these leaders as a result of which this false case was foisted upon the appellants.", "canonical_name": "Logendranath Jha"}}, {"text": "Polai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5554, "end_char": 5559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Polai, who was alleged to have taken the land on batai settlement from his own maternal grandmother Parasmani who brought him."}}, {"text": "Parasmani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5654, "end_char": 5663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Polai, who was alleged to have taken the land on batai settlement from his own maternal grandmother Parasmani who brought him."}}, {"text": "Polai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5936, "end_char": 5941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances\", said the learned Judgci, \"it does not appear to me to be probable that Polai would have been allowed to maintain himself by running adhi cultivation of his mamu's land in the lifetime of\n\nhis nani who has brought him up from his infancy like her own child.", "canonical_name": "Polai"}}, {"text": "Tirthanand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6434, "end_char": 6444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor does it appeal to me that the unmarried boy Polai would have undertaken upon himself the task of running batai cultivation of the lands of his mamu where he has been living since his childhood without any trouble, more particularly in view of the heavy expenses of cultivation brought out by the evidence of Tirthanand (P.W. 14)'.'."}}, {"text": "Polai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7768, "end_char": 7773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against that order the complainant Polai preferred a revision petition to the High Court under section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, The learned Judge who heard the petition reviewed the evidence at some length and came to the conclusion that the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge could not be allowed to stand as the acquittal of the .", "canonical_name": "Polai"}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7828, "end_char": 7839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Polailal\n\nBiswqs", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8203, "end_char": 8219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his opinion, \"the entire judgment displays a lack\n\n19,?l\n\nLogllldranalk\n\n]ha andQthm\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswqs,\"\n\nPatanjali Saslrt J-\n\nLogendranath\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswas.", "canonical_name": "POLAILAL BISW AS"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Saslrt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8223, "end_char": 8239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his opinion, \"the entire judgment displays a lack\n\n19,?l\n\nLogllldranalk\n\n]ha andQthm\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswqs,\"\n\nPatanjali Saslrt J-\n\nLogendranath\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswas.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Polailal\n\nBiswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8263, "end_char": 8279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his opinion, \"the entire judgment displays a lack\n\n19,?l\n\nLogllldranalk\n\n]ha andQthm\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswqs,\"\n\nPatanjali Saslrt J-\n\nLogendranath\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswas.", "canonical_name": "POLAILAL BISW AS"}}, {"text": "Patanjali SastrJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8282, "end_char": 8298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali SastrJ J.\n\nof true perspective in a case of this kind.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SASTRI"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8963, "end_char": 8968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellants Mr. Sinha raised two contentions."}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9049, "end_char": 9060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9232, "end_char": 9243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9336, "end_char": 9347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10535, "end_char": 10546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 423", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10657, "end_char": 10668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kundan Lal Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12439, "end_char": 12455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed ..\n\nAgent for the appellant: Kundan Lal Mehta."}}, {"text": "Jha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12473, "end_char": 12476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Log•ndrall4lh\n\nJha and Olhm\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswas. ·"}}, {"text": "Olhm", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12481, "end_char": 12485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Log•ndrall4lh\n\nJha and Olhm\n\nShri Polailal\n\nBiswas. ·"}}, {"text": "Patatifali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12513, "end_char": 12530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patatifali Sastri J."}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_682_729_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "!951\n\nMay 25.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER\n\nF. N. BALSARA\n\nF. N. BALSARA v.\n\nTHE STA TE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER\n\n[SA1Ym FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRI, MUKHERJEA,\n\nS. R. DAs and V1v1AN BosE lf.]\n\nBombay Prohibition Act (XXV of 1949)-Constitutional validity -Applicability of Act to foreign liquors-To medicinal and toilet\n\npreparations containing alcohal-Validity of ss. 2(24) (a), 12, 13, 23, 24, 39, 40(1) (b), 46, 52, 53, 139 (c)-Law of Province prohibiting possession and sale of foreign liquor within Province-W he th er encroaches on power of Dominion to make laws as to \"ituport and export\" -Doctrine of original pack.age -Applicability to India - Construction of Lists-Restriction on fundamental right uto acquire, hold and dispose of property\" and to \"equal protection of the laws\" Government of India Act, 1935, s. 297 (4), Seventh Sched., List I entry 19--List 11 entry 31-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1), 19 (2).\n\nUnder entry 31 of List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial . Legislatures had the power to make laws in respect of \"intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxiqting liquors\" and under entry 19 of List I, the Dominion Legislature had the power to make laws with respect to \"import and export across customs frontiers\".\n\nThe constitutional validity of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, in so far as it rcstrict.ed the possession and sale of foreign liquors was impugned on the ground that it was an encroachment on the field assigned to the Dominion Legislature under entry 19 of List I :\n\nH eltl~ ( i) that the words \"possession and sale\" occurring in entry 31 of List II must be read without aJiy qualification, ahd the word \"import\" In ntry 19 of List 1 standing by itself will not include either sale or possession of the article imported into the country.\n\nThere was thus no conflict between entry 31 of List II and entry 19 of List I and the Bombay Prohibition Act, in so far as it purported to restrict the possession and sale of foreign liquors, did not encroach upon the field of the Dominion Legislature; (ii) even assuming that the prohibition of purchase, ue, possession, transport and sale of liquor will affect its import, the Bombay Prohibition Act was in pith and substance an Act fall-\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT Rm>ORTS 683\n\ning within entry 31 of List . II and. the fact tht. the law. incid cntally encroached upon the powers i:lf the Domm1on Legislature under entry 19 of List I would not effect its validity.\n\nThe American doctrine of \"original package\" which laid down the importation was not over so long as the goods were still in that original package, has no application in India having regard to the scheme of legislation that has been outlined in the Govern roent of India Act, 1935, and in the present Constitution in which the various entries in the Legislative Lists have been expressed in clear and precise language.\n\nBhQla Prasad v. The King Emperor [1942] F.C.R. 17 and Miss IGshor, Sethi v. The King [ 1949] F.C.R. 650 relied on. In re the\n\nCentral Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1838 [1939) F.C.R., 18, The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum [1940] F.C.R. 110, Governor General in Council v. Province of Madras [1945] F.C.R. 179, Prafulla Kumar Mul(k_erjea and others v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna [1947] F.C.R. 28, Subramanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan [1948) F.C.R. 207 referred to: Brown v. Maryland (25 U.S. 419) and Leisy v. Hardin (135 U.S. 100) distinguished.\n\nThe Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, does not in any way contravene the ptovisions of s. 297 ( 1) (a) of the Government of India Act, 1935, inasmuch as it is not a law made by virtue of the entry relating to \"Trade and commerce within the Province\" (entry 2 of List II) or the entry relating to \"the production, supply and distribution of commodities\" (entry 29 of List II).\n\nBhola Prasad v. King Emperor [1942] F.C.R. 17 followed.\n\nThe word \"liquor\" as understood in India lit the time of the Government of India kt, 1935, covered not only those alcoholic liquids which arc generally used as beverages and produce intoxication, but also all liquids containing alcohol; the definition of \"liquor\" eontained in s. 2 (24) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, is not therefore ultra 111'rei.\n\nSection 39 of the Act which empowers the Provincial Government to permit the use or tonsumption of foreign liquor on cargo\n\nboats, warships and troopships and in military and naval messes and canteens does not contravene Att. 14 of the Constitution (which provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws) inasmuch as the relaxation of the general law In respect of the persons contemplated by the section is not arbitrary or capti dous but is based on a reasonable classification.\n\nRu\\e 67 of. the Bombay Foreign Liquor Rules which authorises the granting of a permit to \"any foreigner on a tour of India who enters the! Ste of . Bombay and de!sircs to possess, use and\n\ncnsume foreign liquor\" is not void on the ground of discrimina t1on, firstly because,· thought it provides for the case of a foreign\n\nThe Staltqf\n\nBombily find Anol/ler\n\n. v.\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nThe Stat• ef\n\nBombay and Anotlur\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nvisitor, tl:Q:rc is no prohibition against .any other outsider being granted a permit, .and secondly, because the policy underlying the rule is quite consistent with the policy underlying s. 40 of the Act which enables permits to be granted to foreigners under certain c(Kl.ditions.\n\nSection 52, 53 and 139 ( c) of the act do not constitute delegation of legislative power, and delegation of the character which these sections involve cannot in any view be held to be invalid.\n\nIn re Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc.(1 ) relied on.\n\nThe restrictions impose by ss. 12 and 13 of the Act on the possession, sale, use and consumption of liquor are not reasonable restrictions on the fondamcntal right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution \"to acquire, hold and dispose of property\", so far as medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol are concerned and the said sections arc invalid so far as they prohibit the possession, sale, use and consumption of these articles, but the sections arc not wholly void on this around as the earlier categories mentioned in the dfinition of. liquor, namely, spirits of wine, methylated spirit, \\Vine, beer and toddy are distinctly separable items which are easily severable from the last category, namCly, all liquors containing alcoho~ and the restrictions on the possession, sale, use arid consumption of these earlier categories are not unreasonable restrictions.\n\nRomesh Thappar v. Tie Stue. of Madras (1950] S.CR. 594 anti Chintaman Rab v. ]he Su~ of Madhya Pradesh [1950] S.C.R. 759 distinguished ..\n\nSections 23 (a) and 24 (1) (a) of the act in so far as they refer to \"commending\" any intoxicant, conflict with the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution andnone of the conditions mentioned in cl. (2) of Art. 19 applies to the case and therefore these provisions arc void. Section 23 {b) is also void, because the words 0 incite\" and 0-enc:ouragc'' Uc wide enough tO include incitement and encouragement by words and speeches and also by acts artd the wotds used in the section are so wide and vague that the clause .must be held to. be void .in its entirety.\n\nThere is nothing unreuonab!c in a law relating to prohibition discriminating between . Indian citizens against whom it is primarily to be tnforccd and. foreigners who ha•!c n<> intention of permanently residing in India. A provisinn enabling a certain class of pessons holding permits to offer drink to persons holding similar permits is also not unreasonable.\n\nNotilications No. 10484/45C and 2843/49(a) arc not therefore invalid.\n\nThe requirement that an applicant .for a permit on .the ground of health undct ' 40( 1) (b) must get a medical certificate declaring that he is 1111 \"addict'' is n<>t warranted by the provisions of\n\n( 1) Repc>rkd infra.\n\nthe Act.\n\nThe word \"addict\" in the form of the medical certificate should therefore be replaced by the words used in s. 40 ( 1)\n\n(b) of the Act or words corresponding to them.\n\nThe provisions of the Act which have been held to be invalid are not so inextricably bound up with the remaining provisions of the Act as to render the whck Act void.\n\n[The decision of the High Court that ss. 136 (1), 136 (2) (b), 136 (2) (c) 136 (2) (e) and 136 (2) (f) were void inasmuch as they offended against Art. 19 of the Constitution was not assailed before the Supreme Court.}\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd August, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Miscellaneous Application No. 139 of 1950.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (M. M. Desai and H. M. Seervai. with them) for the appellants in Case No. 182 and respondents in Case No. 183.\n\nN. P. Engineer (G. N. Joshi, R. ]. Kolah and .N. A. Palkhiwala, with him) for the respondent in Case No. 182 and appellant in Case No. 183.\n\n195. May 25. The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nFAzL Au J.-These appeals arise from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon the application of one\n\nF. N.\n\nBalsara (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner), assailing the validity of certain specific provisions o~ the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act No. XXV of 1949), as well as of the Act as whole. The petitioner, claiming to be an Indian citizen, prayed to the High Court inter alia for a writ of mandamus against the State of Bombay and the ProhibitiQn Commissioner ordering . them to forbear from enforcing against him the provisions of the Prohibition Act and for the issue of a writ of mandamus ordering them (1) to allow him to exercise his right to possess, consume and use certain articles, namely, whisky, brandy, wine, beer, medicated wine, eau-de-cologne, etc., and to import and export across the Customs frontier . and to purchase, possess consume and use any stock of foreign 3-4 S. C. India/68\n\nTh~ State of Bombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFar.I Ali J.\n\nBombay and Anotbtr\n\nF. }{. Bahara.\n\nFar.I Ali J.\n\nliquor, eau-de..:ologne, lavender water, medicated wines and medicinal preparations containing alcohol, and (2) to forbear from interfering with his right to possess these articles and to take no steps or proceedings against him, penal or otherwise, under the Act.\n\nThe petitioner also prayed for a similar order under section _ 45 of the Specific Relief Act against. the respondents.\n\nThe High Court, agreeing with some of the petitioner's contentions and disagreeing with others, declared some of the provisions of the. Act to be invalid and the rest to be valid. Both the State of Bombay and the petitioner, being dissatisfied with the judgment of the High Court, have appealed to this Court after obtaining a certificate frpm the High Court under article 132 ( 1) of the Constitution.\n\nThe Act in question was passed by the Legislature of the Province of Bombay as it was constituted in 1949, and was published in the Bombay Government Gazette on the 20th May, 1949, and came into force on the 16th June 1949.\n\nThe Act consis~ of 148 sections with 2 schedules and is divided into 11 chapters.\n\nIt is both an amending and consolidating Act and incorporates the provisions of the Bombay Abkari Act which it repeals and also those of the Bombay Opium and Molasses Acts and containS new provisions for putting into force the policy of prohibition which is one of the objects mentioned in the preamble of the Act. The most important provision in Chapter I his the definition of \"Liquor\" which has been vigorously assailed as being too wide and therefore beyond the powers of the Provincial Legislature.\n\nChapter II relates to establishment and is not relevant to the present appeal.\n\nChapter III, which contains a ntimber of prohibitions in regard to liquor as defined in the Act, is said to enact sweeping provisions which are liable to be assailed.\n\nSections 12 a:nd 13 and the relevant provisions of sections 23 :ind 24 in this Chapter may be quoted :-\n\n12. No person shall-\n\n(a) manufacture liquor;\n\n(b) construct or work any distilfery or brewery;\n\n(c) import, export, transport or possess liquor; or\n\n(d) sell or buy liquor.\n\n13. No person shall-\n\n( a) bottle any liquor for sale;\n\n(b) consume or use liquor; or . ( c) use, keep or have in his possession any materials, still, utensils; implements or apparatus whatsoever for the manufacture of any liquor.\n\n23. No person shall- ( a) commend, solicit the use of, offer any intoxicant or hemp, or\n\n(b) incite or encourage any member of the public or any class of individuals of the pufilic generally to commit any act, which frustrates or defeats the provisions of this Act, or any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, or. .....\n\n24 (1). No person shall print or publish in any newspaper news-sheet, book leaflet, booklet or any other single or periodical publication . or otherwise display or distribute any advertisement or other matter-\n\n( a) which commends, Solicits the use of, or offers any intoxicant or hemp,\n\n(b) which is calculated to encourage. pr mc1te any individuals or the public generally to coll).mit an offence under this Act, or to commit a breach of or to evade the provisions of any rule, regulation or order made thereunder or the conditions of any licence, permit, pass or authorisation granted thereunder.\n\nChapter IV relates to \"control, regulation and exemptions\", and contains inter alia sections 30 to 38 and section 44 which provide for cases in which, licenses for the manufacture, export, import, transport, sale or possession of liquor may be granted; section 39, which authorises the Government to permit the use or consumption of foreign liquor on cargo boats, warships, troopships and in military and naval messes and canteens; section 40, which provides for the grant of\n\nTh•State of\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFaz! Ali J.\n\n!95!\n\nThtStaie of Bombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFad Ali J.\n\npermits fot the use or consumption of foreign liquor to persons whose health would be seriously and permanently affected if they were not permitted to use or consume such liquor and to foreigners who do not intend to stay permanently in India; section 41, whicJ:i enables special permits to be granted to diplomats and foreign sovereigns; section 45, which authorises use of liquor for sacramental purposes; section 52, which empowers an authorised officer to grant licenses, permits, etc., in cases not specifically provided for; section 53, which deals with the form in which and the conditions under which licenses, etc., may be granted; and section 54 which provides for the cancellation or suspension of licenses and permits. The other material chapters of the Act are Chapter VII, which provides for offences and penalties, and Chapter IX which deals with \"powers and duties of officers and procedure.\" Sections 118 and 119 of the Act declare the offences under the Act to be cognisable and some of them to be non-bailable. Under section 121, any authorised prohibition officer or any police officer may open any package and examine any goods and may stop any vessel, vehicle, or other means of conveyance and search for any intoxicant. Section 136(1) provides that if any of the officers mentioned therein is satisfied that any person is acting or is likely to act in a manner which amounts to preparation, attempt, abetment or commission of any of the offences punishable under section 65 or 68 of the Act, he may arrest such person without a warrant and direct that such person shall be committed to such custody aS such officer may deem lit for a period not exceeding 15 days.\n\nBy section 136(2), the State Government is given the extraordinary power of imposing restrictions on the right of free movement of any person if it is satisfied that such person is acting or is likely to act in the manner aforesaid.\n\nChapter XI contains certain miscellaneous prmtlsions and the only sections of this Chapter which need be referred to are section 139 ( c ), which statj:s that the State Government may by general or special order exempt any person or class of persons or institution or class of institutions from the\n\nobservance of all or any of the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, and section 147, which declares that nothing in the Act shall be deemed to apply to any intoxicant or other article in respect of its import or export across the customs frontier as defined by the Central Government.\n\nThe High Court accepted the contention of the petitioner that the definition of \"liquor\" in the Act was too wide and went beyond the power vested in the legislature to legislate with regard to intoxicating liquors under item 31 of List II. It also held the following section to be invalid :-\n\nSections 23 (a) and 24 (1) (a) so far as they refer to \"commending\"; section 23 (b); 24 (1) (b) so far as it. refers to \"evasion\"; section 39; section 52; section 53 in part; section 136 (1); section 136 (2) (b), (c), (e), (f); and section 139 (c). The High Coun also held Rule 67 of the Bombay Foreign Liquor Rules and Notifications Nos. 10484/45 (c) and 2843/49 (a), dated the 30th March, 1950, invalid.\n\nIt further held that the word \"addict\" in the medical certificate was not warranted by the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe two important questions which this Court is called upon to decide in these appeals are :-\n\n( l) whether there are sufficient grounds for declaring the whole Act to be invalid; and\n\n(2) to hat extent the judgmerit of the High court can be upheld with regard to the specific provisions of the Aot which have been declared by it to be void.\n\nIt seems to me that it will be convenient to deal in the first instance with the argument assailing the validity of the Act as a whole, which is based on\n\nthree grounds, these being :-\n\n( 1) that the law is an encroachment on the field which has been assigned exclusively to the Central Legislature under entry 19 of List I;\n\n(2) that some of the material provisions of the Act interfere with or are calculated to interfere with inter- State trade and commerce and as such transgress the\n\nTiu Stale of\n\nBom/Jay dlll/ 4.Mther\n\n\"· F. N. Balsara.\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nBombay and Anothtr\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nprovmons of section 2'J7 of the Government of India Act, 1935; and\n\n(3) that the High Court having held a number of material provisions to be void, should have declared the Act as a whole to be invalid, especially as the provisions found by the High Court to be void are not severable from the rest of the Act and it cannot be said that the legislature would have passed the Act in the truncated form in which it is left after the decision of the High Court.\n\nIt is obvious that the proper occasion to deal with the third ground will be after examining the specific provisions which have been declared by the High Court to be void, but the first two grounds may be dealt with at once. ·\n\nThe first question is whether the impugned law can be said to have made any encroachment upon the field of legislation . assigned to the centre.\n\nIn order to decide this point, it will be necessary to refer to entry No. 31 in List II,· under which the law purports to have been made, and entry No. 19 of List I, which is said to have been transgressed. These entires run as\n\nfollows:~\n\nEntry 31, List 11 :. Intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, that is to i!ay, the production, manufacture possession, transport,· purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs, but subject as respects opium, to the provisions of List I and, as respects poisons and dangerous drugs, to the provisions of List III.\n\nEntry 19, List I : Import and export across customs frontiers as defined by the Dominion Government.\n\nPrima facie, it would seem that there is no real conflict between these two entries, because entry 31 of List II has no reference to import or export but merely deals with production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale. Dealing with t1iis entry, Gwyer C. J. observed as follows in the case of Bhola Prasad v. The King Emperor(') :-\n\n(')[1942] F.C.R. 17 at 25.\n\n. \"A power to legislate 'with respect to intoxicating liquors' could not well be expressed in wider terms, and would, in our opinion, unless the meaning of the words used is restricted or controlled by . the context or by other provisions in the Act, undoubtedly include the _power to prohibit intoxicating liquors throughout the. Province or in any specified part of the Province.\"\n\nThus, under entry 31, the Provincial Legislature can pass any law regarding production, manufacture, transport, purchase, possession and sale of intoxicating liquor. But the point that is pressed for our consideration is that \"import\" does not end with mere landing of the goods on the shore or their arrival in the customs house, but it implies that . the imported goods must reach the hands of the importer and he should be able to possess theµi.\n\nOn !ltls basis, it is contended that there is no difference in effect between a power to prohibit the possession and sale of an article and a power to prohibit ts import or introductiqn into the country, since the one would be a necessary consequence of the other.\n\nThis contention is based upon some American cases to which I shall refer lter, but it may be stated at once that the point which is raised in this case is precisely the point which was raised and negatived in Miss Kishori Shetty v. The King(1).\n\nIn that case, the appellant had been convicted under section 14-B of the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878, as amended by the Bombay Abkari (Amendment) Act, 1947, for having in possession a certain quantity of foreign liquor in excess of the limit prescribed by a notification issued under the following provision of the Act :-\n\n\"14-B (2) ...... the Provincial Government may by notification in the Official Gazette prohibit the possession by any individual or a class or a body of individuals or the public generally, either throughout the whole Presidency 9r in any . local area, of any intoxicant, either absolutely or subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.\"\n\n(1) [1949] F.C.R. 650.\n\nBombay anti AnotMt v.\n\nF. /(. Balsara.\n\nFa.i; l Ali J.\n\n!951\n\nTheStatt ef\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nThe main argument advanced in that case was reproduced in the judgment in these words :-\n\n\"But counsel for the appellant. drew attention to item 19 of List I which covers \"Import and export across customs frontiers as defined by the Dominion Government\", and argued that if \"intoxicating liquors\" in item 31 of List JI were held to include also liquors imported from abroad, then the Provincial Legislature, by prohibiting possession of such liquors by all persons, whether private consumers, common carriers or warehousemen, could defeat the power of the Federal Legislature to regulate imports of foreign liquors across the sea or land frontiers of British India which are customs frontiers as defined by the Central Government and thus seriously jeopardise an important source of central customs revenue. As under section 100 of the Constitution Act the Provincial legislative powers under List JI were subject to the exclusive powers of the Federal Legislature in List I, the Bombay Act to the extent to which it trenched upon the subject of item 19 of the latter List must, it was submitted, be regarded as a nullity.\"\n\nIt will be seen that the rationale of the argument there is the same as that of the argument advanced in the present case, but it was rejected for reasons which are clearly set out in the following passage_:-\n\n\"There is, in our view, no irreconcilable conflict here such as would necessitate recourse to the principle of Federal supremacy laid down in section 100 of the Constitution Act.\n\nSection 14-B does not purport to restrict or prohibit dealings in liquor in respect of its importation or exportation across the sea or land frontiers of British India.\n\nIt purports to deal with the possession of intoxicating liquors which, in the absence of limiting words, must include foreign liquors. It is far-fetched, in our opinion, to suggest that, in so far as the provision covers foreign liquors, it is legislation with respect to import of liquors into British India by sea or land\".\n\nSince the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, there have been several cases in which the principles which govern the interpretation of the Legislative Lists have been laid down.\n\nOne of these principles is that none of the items in each List is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense(1). The second principle is that where there is a seeming conflict between an entry in List II and an entry in List I, an attempt should be made to see whether the two entries cannot be reconciled so as to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction.\n\nThis principle has been stressed in a number of cases by the Federal Court as well as by the Privy Council.\n\nIn re The Central PrOtlinces and Berar Act No. XIV -0/ 1938(2), the question arose as to whether a tax on the sale of motor spirits was a tax on the sale of goods within entry 48 of the Provincial List or a duty of excise within entry 45 of the Federal list. Dealing with the difficulty which arose in that case, Gwyer C. J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"Only in the Indian Constitution Act can the particular problem arise which is now under consideration; and an endeavour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial Committee have said, by having recourse to the context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and by interpreting, and, where neceessary, 'modifying, the language of the one by that of the other. If indeed such a reconciliation should prove impossible, then, and only then, will the non-obstante clause operate and the federal power prevail; for the clause ought to be regarded as a last resource, a witness to the imperfections of human expression and the fallibility of legal craftsmanship.\"\n\nTo the same effect are the following observations made by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras(3),\n\n(1) Vide United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, [1940) F. C. R. 110 at 134.\n\n(2} [1939) F.C.R. 18.\n\n(3) fl935] F.C.R. 179 at H!l.\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nEa.ti Alj J.\n\nThi Stale qf\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFazl Ali].\n\nafter referring to section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 :-\n\n\"Their Lordships do not doubt that the effect of these words is that, if the legislative powers of. the Federal and Provincial Legislatures, which are enumerated in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule, cannot fairly be reconciled, the latter must givJ: way to the former.\n\nBut it appears to them that it is right first to consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be effected by giving to the language of the Federal Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it might in another context bear; is yet one that can properly be given to it, and equally giving to the language of the provincial Legislative List a meaning which it can properly bear.\" In the present case, as already pointed out, the words \"possession and sale\" occurring in entry 31 of List II are to be read without any qualification whatsover, and it will not be doing any violence to the construction of that entry to hold that the Provincial Legislature has the power to prohibit the possession, use and sale of intoxicating liquor absolutely. If we forget for the time being the. principles which have been laid down in some of the American cases, it would be difficult to hold that the word 'import' standing by itself will include either sale or possession of the article imported into the country by a person residing in the territory in which it is \"imported.\n\nThere is thus no real conflict between entry 31 of List II and entry 19 of List I, and I find it difficult to hold that the Bombay Prohibition Act in so far as it purports to restrict possession, use and sale of foreign liquor, is an encroachment on the field assigned to the Federal Legislature under entry 19 of List I.\n\nThere is also another way of dealing with the contention raised before us.\n\nIt is well settled that the validity of an Act is not affected if it incidentally trenches on matters outside the authorised field, and therefore, it is necessary to inquire in each case what is the pith and substance of the Act impugned.\n\nIf the Act, when so viewed, substantially falls within the\n\npowers expressly conferred upon the Legislature which enacted it, then it cannot be held to be invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters which have been assigned to another lgislature. This was emphasised very clearly in Gallagher v. Lynn(1) in these words:-\n\n\"It is well established that you are to look at the \"true nature and character of the legislation : Russell\n\nv. the Queen(2) 'the. pith and substance of the legislation'. If, on the view of the statute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express powers, then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorised field\".\n\nIn Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and Others v. Bank of Commerce, Ltd., Khulna(8) the question arose before the Privy Council whether the Bengal Money-lenders Act, 1940, which provided that no borrower shall be liable to pay after the commencement of the Act more than a limited sum in respect of 'principal and interest, WM intra vires the Provincial Legislature as dealing in pith and substance with money-lending and moneylenders, a subject-matter within the competence of the Provincial Legislature under entry 27 of List II, or whether it trenched on \"promissory notes\" and \"banking'', which were subjects reserved for the Federal Legislature under entries 28 and 38 respectively of List I. The Privy Council, notwithstanding the fact that loans. on promissory notes would also have been subject to the provisions of the impugned Act, held that the Act was valid, and while rejecting the argument . that it was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature which had enacted it, their Lordships observed as follows :-\n\n\"As Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. said in the Subrahmanyam Chettiar case: \"It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a\n\n( 1) [1937] A.e. 863 at 870.\n\n( 2) 7A.C. 829.\n\n(a) [1947] F.C.R. 28. ,\n\nBombay and &iolhn\n\nF. N. BalstZl'a •.\n\nFa(l AU J.\n\n195!\n\nTh•Statt of Bombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFa:! Ali J.\n\nsubject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely inter-twined that blind observance to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee, whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its 'pith and substance', or its 'true nature and character', for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that\". Their Lordships agree that this passage correctly describes the grounds on which the rule is founded, and that it applies to Indian as well as to Dominion legislation\"(').\n\nThe same principle was reiterated by the Federal Court in Ralla Ram v. The Province of East Punjab(2) and was also referred to in Miss Kishori Shetty v. The King( 3 ) in the following passage :-\n\n\"It may be that a general adoption of the policy of prohibition by the Provinces will lead to a fall in the import of foreign liquors and to a consequential diminution of the Central customs revenue, but where the Constitution Act has given to the Provinces legislative power with respect to a certain matter in clear and unambiguous terms, the Court should not deny it to them or impose limitations on its exercise, on such extraneous consideration.\n\nIt is now well settled that if an enactment according to its true nature, its pith and substance, clearly falls within one of. the matters assigned to the Provincial Legislature, it is valid notwithstanding its incidental encroachment on a Federal subject.\"\n\nThe short question therefore to be asked is whether the inipugned Act is in pith and substance a law relating to possession and sale etc. of intoxicating liquors or whether it relates to impon and export of intoxicating liquors. If the true nature and character\n\n(') [1947] F.C.R. at p. 51.\n\n(3) [1949] F.C.R. 650 at 655. (•) [1948] F.R.C. 207 at 225.\n\nof the legislation or its pith and substance is not import and export of intoxicating liquor but its s:ile and possession etc., then it is very difficult to dechre the Act to be invalid.\n\nIt is said that the prohibition of purchase, use, possession, transport and sale of liquor will affect its import. Even assuming that such a result may follow; the encroachment, if any, is only incidental and cannot affect the competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact the law in question.\n\nOn these considerations, there is really nothing else to be said on the question befoo:: us, but in view of the very great stress laid upon the American doctrine of \"original package\", it seems necessary to deal with what that doctrine means and under what conditions it was evolved. The wide meaning of 'import' on which reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner was adopted for the first time by Marshall C. J. in BrQwn\n\nv. Maryland(1), in which the facts were these. The State of Maryland had passed an Act prohibiting importers of foreign goods from selling their goods without . taking a license for which a certain amount had to be paid. The question which was raised in that case was that the Act was repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution which provided that \"no State shall without the consent of Congress allow any imposts or duties on imports or exports except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.\" In the course of his judgment, Marshall C. J. observed inter alia as follows :-\n\n\"There is no difference, in effect, between a power to prohibit the sale of an article and .a power to prohibit its introduction into the country. The one would be a necessary consequence of the other.\n\nNo goods would be imported if none could be sold.\n\nNo object of any description can be accomplished by laying a duty on importation, which may not be accomplished with equal certainty by laying a duty on the thing imported in the hands of the importer.\" (2)\n\nThe learned Chief-Justice further observed :-\n\n(1) (1827) 25 U.S. 419.\n\n(2) (1827) 25 U.S. at p. 439\n\nBombay antf Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nF ;:lll Ali J.\n\n'The Stat• qf\n\nBombay and Anotlt1r\n\nv • . .F. N. Balsara.\n\n.Fazl Ali J.\n\n\"Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a part.\n\nIt is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, then as importation itself.\n\nIt must be considered as a component part of the power to regulate commerce. Congress has a right, not only to authorise importation, but to authorise the importer to sell.\"(')\n\nUpon principles so stated, what is known as the \"original package\" doctrine was evolved in America, which was applied not only to commodities imp0rted from foreign countries but also to commodities , which were the subject of inter-state commerce. This doctrine laid down that importation was not over so long as the goods were in the original package and hence a State. had no power to tax imports until the original package was broken or there was one sale while the goods were still in the original package. The principle upon which this doctrine was founded is explained by Marshall C. J. in the case referred to in these words :-\n\n\"There must be a point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the power of the State to tax commences; we cannot admit that this point of time is the instant that the articles enter the country .... It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted upon the th:ing imported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become .imbject to the taxing power of the State ; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his ware.- house, in the original form of package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution.\"(2)\n\nThe doctrine was reiterated in a number of cases, =d in Leisy v. Hardin(8 ), it was laid down that \"the\n\nimporters had the right to sell in the original packages unopened and unbroken, articles brought into the\n\n(') (1827) 25 U.S. at p. 447. {') (1827) 25 U.S. at p. 441.\n\n( 8) 135 U.S. 100.\n\nState from another State or territory notwithstanding a starute of the State prohibiting the sale of such articles except for purposes mentioned therein and under a license from the State\".\n\nThe American writers have however pointed out the difficulty which arose from time to time in apply_ing the \"original package\" - doctrine, since sometimes very intricate questions arose before the courts, such as whether the d9Ctrine applied to the larger cases only or to _the smaller packages contained therein, or whether it applied to SJ:!laller paper packages of cigarettes taken from loose piles of packages at the factory and transported in baskets.\n\nThe difficulty in applying the doctrine was particularly experienced in working prohibition schemes, :md to combat its mischief and uncertainty, new legislative measures had to be passed by the Congress like the Wilson Act, Webb-Kenyon Act, etc. I do not wish to pursue the matter, but wish only to point out that the doctrine has no plac~ in this country, having regard to the scheme of legislation that has been outlined in the Government of India Act, 1935, and in the present Constirution, in which the various entries in the Legislative Lists have been expressed in cleat and precise language. In The Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons(1), Gwyer C.J., while expressing hjs profound respect for the views expressed by Marshall C.J. in Brown v. Maryland( 2 ), mildly hinted that it was easier to follow the line of reasoning of Thompson J. in his dissenting judgment in that case and concluded with the following remarks :-\n\n\"Next, it is to be observed that the American Constitution also provides that Congress alone has power \"to regulate commerce with foreign nations,\n\namong the several States and with the Indian tribes\", and it was held that the Maryland tax was no less repugnant to this provision also. Marshal C. J. asked: \"To what purposes should the power to allow importation be given, unaccompanied with the power to authorise the sale of the thing importtd?\n\nCongress has a right, pot only to authorise importation, but to\n\n(1) [1942] F.C.R. 90.\n\n(1) (1827) 25 U.S. 419.\n\nT/al Stt111 ef\n\nBomba, and Ar11111ttr\n\nF. N. BabaTo.\n\nFal Ali].\n\n!95(\n\nBombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFat/AU].\n\nauthorize the importer to sell. . . . )\\'hat does the importer purchase, if he does not purchase the privilege to sell?\" On this view of the Commerce Clause, it would indeed be difficult to recognize the right of the State to impose a tax upon the first sale of the commodity, at any rate so long as it remained. in tl)e importer's hands. In the Indian Constituion Act no such question arises; and the right of the Provincial Legislature to levy a tax on sales can be considered without any reference to so formidable a power vested in the Central Government.\n\nLastly, the prohibition in the American Constitution is against the laying of \"any imposts or duties on imports _or exports\" the prohibition is not merely against the laying of du.ties of customs, but is expressed in what we conceive to be far wider terms; and it does not appear to us that it would necessarily follow from the principle of the Maryland decision that in India the payment of customs duty on goods imported from abroad or the payment of an excise duty on goods manufactured or produced in India can be regarded as conferring some kind of license or title on the importer or manufacturer to sell his goods to any purchaser without incurring a further liability to tax.\n\nThat was the view which commended itself to the Court in the Maryland Case(') and it was a view adopted and argued before us. The analogy with the American case is an attractive one, but for the reasons which we have given we are wholly unable to accept it.\"(2)\n\nI find considerable force in the opinion thus expressed by Gwyer C.J. and agree that the \"original package\" doctrine has no application to this country. In the United States, the widest meaning could be given to the Commerce Clause, for there Was not question of reconciling that Clause with another Clause containing the legislative povu:r of the State. Under the provisions of the Government of India Act, a limited meaning must be given to the word \"import\" in entry 19 of List I in order to . give effect to the very general words;\n\nused in entry 31 of List II.\n\n(') (1827) 25 u. s. 419. (') [1942] F.C.R. 90 at 106-7.\n\nThe second attack on the Act is founded upon the provision contained in section 297 (1) (a) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and it is contended that the prohibitions contained in the impugned Act in regard to the use, consumption, purchase, transport, possession and sale of intoxicating liquor will necessarily amount to prohibiting and restricting inter-provincial commerce, and inasmuch as they tend to stop and restrict entry into or export from the Province of Bombay of goods of a particular class or description, the Act contravenes section 297 (1) (a). This section runs as follows :-\n\n\"No Provincial Legislature or Government shall-\n\n(a) by virtue of the entry in the Provincial Legislative List relating to trade and commerce within the Province, or the entry in that List relating to the production, supply and distribution of commodities, have power to pass any law or take any executive action prohibiting or restricting the entry into, or export from the Province of goods of any class or . description .... \"\n\nIt should be noticed that tliis provlSton refers to \"trade and commerce within the Province\", which is the subject of entry 27 of List II and to \"production, supply and distribution of commodities\", which is the subject of entry 29 of List II.\n\nThe provision virtually means that import into or export from a Province of goods of any class or description cannot be prohibited or restricted on the ground that it will affect, trade and commerce within the Province or the production, supply and distribution of commodities.\n\nIf therefore by any law framed by a Provincial Legislature relating to or based on the subjects of entry 27 or entry 29 of List II, the entry into or export from the Province of any goods is prohibited or restricted, such a law will be invalid. But, here, we are concerned not with a law which purports to be made and was made by virtue of entry 27 or entty 29 of List II, but a law which is claimed to have been made\n\n4-4 S.C. lndia/68\n\nBombll! and Anotlur\n\nF. N. Balsara,\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nTMS1ate of\n\nBomba, a1ld Anoth\"\n\nF. N. Bal•ara.\n\nFad Ali].\n\nand was made by virtue of entry 31 of that List and certain other entries therein. Section 297(1) (a) therefore has no application to the present case. This was clearly pointed out in the case of Bhola Prasad v. King Emperor('). In that case, the Bihar Excise (Amendment) Act, 1940, which amended the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, was challenged as contravening section 297 (1) (a), but it was held to be a valid Act on grounds already stated, as will appear from the following observations of Gwyer C. J. :-\n\n\"The second point raised on behalf of the appelh, nt was that s. 19 ( 4) of the Act. of 1915, as amended by the Act .of 1940, is invalid because repugnant to s. 297 (1) (a) of the Constitution Act.\n\nWe confess that we have difficulty in appreciating thjs argument.\n\nSection 297 (1) (a) enacts that .... It is plain beyond words that this provision only refers to legislation with respect to entry No. 27 and entry NQ. 29 in the Provincial Legislative I..ist ; it has no application to legislation with respect to anything in entry No. 31.\n\nA Provincial Legislaure, if it desires to pass a law prohibiting export from, or import into, the Province, must therefore seek for legislative authority to do so in entries other than entry No. 27 or entry No. 29. If it can point to legislative pmvers for the purpose derived from any other entry in the Provincial Legislative List, then its legislation cannot be challenged under section 297 (1) (a). There is no substance at all in the appellant's arguments on this point\"(\").\n\nHaving dealt with and negatived the first two contentiOJll upon which the validity of the entire Act was assailed, I now proceed to . ., deal with certain sections of the Act, the validity of which also was brooght into question. The provision which was most vigorously assailed and in regard to which the attack was successful in the High C<iurt, is the definition of the: word 'liquor' _in section 2 (24) of the Act.\n\nThe definition runs thus:-\n\n\"Liquor\" includet-\n\n(1) [1942] F.C.R. 17 at 21. { 1) [1942] F.C.R.. 17 at 27. 28.\n\n(a) spirits of wine, toddy and all liquids alcohol; and\n\nmethylated spmts, wine, beer, consisting of or containing\n\n(b) any other intoxicating substance which the Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be liquor for the purposes of this Act.\n\nThe High Court has held that the word \"liquor\" ordinarily means 'a strong drink as opposed to soft drink\" but .it must in any event be a beverage which is ordinarily drunk.\n\nProceeding upon this view, the High Cou'rt has held that although the legislature may while legislating under entry 31 prevent the consumption of non-intoxicating beverages and also prevent the use as drinks of alcoholic liquids which are not normally consumed as drinks, it cannot prevent the legitimate use of alcoholic preparations which are not beverages nor the use of medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol.\n\nThis view of the High Court was very strongly supported on the one hand and equally strongly challenged on the other before us, and I ther~ fore proceed to deal with the question at some length.\n\nIn the Oxford English Dictionary, edited by James Murry, several meanings are given to the word \"liquor\", of which the following may be quoted :-\n\nLIQUOR .... 1. A liquid; matter in a liquid state; in wider sense a fluid.\n\n2. A liquid or a prepared solution used as a wash or bath, and in niany processes in the industrial arts.\n\n3. Liquid for drinking; beverage, drink.\n\nNow almost exclusively a drink produced by fermentation or distillation. Malt liquor, liquor brewed from malt; ale, beer, porter etc.\n\n4. The water in which meat has been boiled; broth, sauce; the fat in which bacon, fish or the like has been fried; the liquid contained in oysters.\n\n5. The liquid produced by infusion (in testing the quality of a tea). In liquor, in the state of an infusion.\n\n195!\n\nBombay and Anothlr\n\nF. N. Balsra.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\n195!\n\nThe Stale ef\n\nBombay. anti Another\n\nF. N. Balsa.a.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nThus, according to th: Dictionary, the word 'liquor' may have a general meaning in the sense of a liquid, or it may have a special meaning, which is the third meaning assigned to it in the extract quoted above, viz., a drink or beverage produced by fermentation or distillation.\n\nThe latter is undoubtedly the popular and most widely accepted meaning, and the basic idea of beverage seems rather prominently to run through the main provisions of the various Acts of this country as well as of America and England relating to intoxicating liquor, to which our attention was drawn- But at the same time, on a reference to these very Acts, it is difliculty to hold that they deal exclusively .... with beverages and are not applicable to certain articles which are strictly speaking not beverages.\n\nA few instances will make the point clear. In the National Prohibition Act, 1919, of America (also known as the Volstead Act), the words, liquor and intoxicating liquor, are used as having the same meaning and the definition states that these words shall be construed to \"include alcohol, brandy, whisky, rum, gin, beer, ale, porter and wine, and in addition thereto any spirituous, vinous malt, or fermented liquor, liquids, and compounds, whether medicated, proprietary, patented or not, and by whatever name called, containing one-half of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume which are fit for use for beverage purposes.\" Having defined 'liquor' and 'intoxicating liquor' rather widely, the Volstead Act excepted denatured alcohol, medicinal preparations, toilet and antiseptic preparations, flavoring extracts and sirups, vinegar and preserved sweet cider (s. 4) which suggest that they were included in the definition.\n\nIn some of these items, we have the qualifying words \"unfit for use for beverage purposes'', but the heading of section 4 of the Volstead Act, under which these exceptions are enumerated, is exempted liquors.\"\n\nThe Licensing (Consolidating) Act, 1910, of England was an Act relating to licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquor, etc. The definition of \"intoxicating liquor\" in this Act was as follows :-\n\n\" 'Intoxicating liquor' mean& (unless inconsistent with the context) spirits, wine, bear, porter, cider, perry and sweets, and any fermented, distilled, or spirituous liquor which cannot, according to any law for the time being in force, be legally sold without an excise licence.\"\n\nThe word \"spirits\" has been defined in the Spirits Act, 1880, as meaning spirits of any . description, and includes all liquors mixed with spirits, and all mixtures, compounds, or preparations made with spirits.\" It was contended before us that the definition of the word \"spirits\" in the Spirits Act should not be imported in the Act of 1910, but in our view for the purpose of understanding the definition of 'intoxicating liquor', the two Acts should be read together. I do not suggest that the definition of \"liquor\" in the present Act was borrowed from those Acts, but I am only trying to show that the word 'liquor' is capable of being used in a wide sense.\n\nComing now to the various definitions given in the Indian Acts, I may ref er in the first instance to the Bombay Abkari A!_:t of 1878 as amended by subsequent Acts, where the definition is substantially the same as in the Act with which we are concerned. In the Bengal Excise Act, 1909, \"liquor\" is said to mean 'liquid consisting of or conaining alcohol' and includes spirits of wine, spirit, wine, tari pachwai, beer, and any substance which the Provincial Government may .... declare to be liquor for the purposes of the Act.\" In several other Provincial Acts, e.g., the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, the U.P. Excise Act, 1910, \"liquor\" is used as meaning intoxicating liquor and as including all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol.\n\nThe definition of \"liquor\" in the Madras Abkari Act, 1886, is the same as in the Bombay Act of 1878. Even if we exclude the American and English Acts from our consideration, we find that all the Provincial Acts of\n\nthis country have consistently included liquids containing alcohol in the definition of 'liquor' and 'intoxicating liquor'.\n\nThe framers of the Government of India Act, 1935, could not have been entirely\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFaz:./ Ali J.\n\nThe Stalt of\n\nBom&q, an4 Anotht1\n\nP. N. Bals., a.\n\nPa:l Ali J.\n\nignorant of the accepted sense in which the word 'liquor' has been used in the various excise Acts of this country an.d, accordingly I consider the appropri~.te conclusion to be that the word \"liquor\" covers not only those alcoholic liquids which are generally used for beverage purposes and produce intoxication, but also all liquids containing alce>- hol.\n\nIt may be that the latter meaning is not the meaning which is attributed to the word \"liquor\" in common parlance especially when that word is prefixed by the qualifying word \"intoxicating\", but in my opinion having regard to the numerous staturory definitions of that word, such a meaning could not have been intended to be excluded from the scope of the term \"intoxicating liquor\" as used in entry 31 of List II.\n\nThere is in my opinion another method of approaching the question which also deserves consideration. Remembering that the object of the Prohibition Act was not merely to levy excise duties but also to prohibit use, consumption, possession and sale of intoxicating liquor, the legislature had the power to legislate upon the subjects included in the Act not .only under entry 31 of Lilt II, but also under entry 14, which refers inter alia to public health. Article 47 of the Constitution, which contains one of the directive principles of State policy, provides that \"the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption, except for medicinal purposes, of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health\".\n\nThis article has no direct bearing on the Act which was passed in 1949, but a reference to it supports to some extent the conclusion that the idea of prohibition is connected with public health, and to enforce prohibition effectively the wider definition of the word \"liquor\" would have to be adopted so as to include all alcoholic liquids which may be used as substitutes for intoxicating drinks, to\n\nthe detriment of health.\n\nOn the whole, I am unable to agree with the High 0urt's finding, and hold that the definition of \"liquor\" in the Bombay Prohibition Act is not ultra vires.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General also relied upon entry 1 of List II which relates among other items to \"public order\", and though .at first. sight it may appear to be far-fetched to bring the subject of intoxicating liquor under \"public order\", yet it should be noted that there has been a tendency in Europe and America to regard alcoholism as a menace to public order.\n\nIn Russel v.\n\nThe Queen(1), Sir Montague Smith held that the Canada Temperance Act, 1878, the object and scope of which was to promote temperance by means of a uniform law throughout the Dominion, was a law relating to the \"peace, order, and good government\" of Canada, and in so deciding said as follows :-\n\n\"Laws of this nature designed for the promotion of public order, safety, or morals and which subject those who contravene them to criminal procedure and punishment, belong to the subject of public wrongs rather than to that of civil rights. They are of a nature which falls within the general authority of Parliament to make laws for the order and good government of Canada .... \"(2)\n\nAgain, referring to liquor laws and liquor control, a. learned British author(3) says as follows :-\n\n\"The dominant motive everywhere, however, has been a social one, to combat a menace to public order and the increasing evils of alcoholism in the interests of health and social welfare.\n\nThe evils vary greatly from one country to another according to differences in climate, diet, economic conditions and even within the same countr}\" according to differences in habits, social customs and standards of public morality. A new factor of growing importance since the middle of the 19th\n\n( 1) 7 A. C. 829.\n\n(2) 7 A. C. 829 at p. 839.\n\n( 3) The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th Edition, Volume 14, page 191.\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFaz/ Ali j.\n\n!951\n\nF.iJI. Balsata.\n\nFa.ti Ali J.\n\ncentury has been the rapid urbanisation, industrialization and mechanization of our modern every day life in the leading nations of the world, and the consequent wider recognition of the advantages of sobriety in safeguarding public order and physical efficiency.\"\n\nThese passages may lend some support to the contention of the learned Attorney-General that tile Act comes also within the subject of \"public order'', but I prefer to leave out of account th~ entry, which has a remote bearing, if any, on the object and scope of the present Act.\n\n1 now come to section 39 of the Act which has been impugned on the ground that it offends against article 14 of the Constitution which states that \"the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India\".\n\nThe meaning and scope of this article has been fully discussed in the case of Chiraniit Lal Chowdhury\n\nv. The Uhion of India and others('), and the principles laid down in that case may be summarized as follows :\n\n(1) The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be assumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems ' made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grollnds.\n\n(2) The presumption i; nay be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute, there is no classification t all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, af\\d yet the law hits only a particular individual or class.\n\n(3) The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all i>ersons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment.\n\n(') [t950J s.a.R. 869.\n\n( 4) The principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes.\n\n(5) Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere production of inequality is not enough.\n\n(6) If a law dels equally with embers of a welldefined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons.\n\n(7) While reasonable classification is permissible, such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained, and the classification cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis.\n\nSimilarly, Professor Willis, dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees equal protection of the laws, sums up. the law as prevailing in that country in these words :\n\n\"The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws means the protection of equal laws.\n\nIt forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction.\n\nIt does not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. 'It. merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both iu the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed'. 'The inhibition of the amendment .... was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation.' It doc:; not take from the states the power to classify either in the adoption of police laws or tax laws, or eminent domain laws, but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and nullifies what they do only when it is without any reasonable ba, sis.\n\nMathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required.\n\nSimilarity, not identity of\n\nThe State of Bombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nBomf>ay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFa<I All J.\n\ntreatment, is enough. If any state. of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification, the existence of that state of facts must be assumed. One who\n\nassails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis.\"('}\n\nWith these principles in view, I have to decide whether article 14 of the Constitution has been violated by the provisions contained in section 39 of the At before us.\n\nThat sectiofl runs as follows :-\n\n\"The Provincial Government may, on such conditions as may be specified in the notification published in the Official Gazette, permit the use or consumption of foreign liquor on cargo boats, warships and troopships and in military and naval messes and canteens.\"\n\nWhat is contended is that the concession shown ta the warships, troopship, and military and naval messes and canteens is a violation of the principle• of equality and the legislature has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in selecting certain bodies or 'groups of people for favoured treatment, while subjecting the petitioner\n\nmd other citizens to the general provisions of the Act.\n\nIt is said that the law should have been enforced alike against the civil population and military personnel, between whom no distinction can be made at all on any rational ground in the enforcement of the policy of prohibition.\n\nThe scheme of Chapter IV of the Prohibition Act, in which the impugned provision finds a place, seems inter alia to relax the law in favour of certain persons or groups of persons or institutions by introducing the system of passes, licences, permits and authorizations.\n\nA few examples will show that the legislature did not proceed without making any classification.\n\nFor instance, section 35 deals with licences to hotels, section 37 with licences to dining cars and coastal steamers, section 38 with liceaces to shipping companies, section 40 with permits to foreigners and persons who need liquor on grounds of health, section 41 with permits to foreign sovereigns and diplomats, section 44\n\n( ') Constitutional Law; by Prof. Willis, (1st Edition) p. 578.\n\nwith licences to clubs, section 45 with authorisations for sacramental purposes, section 46 with visitors' permits, and so on,.\n\nThese sections were not challenged before us, and it may be assumed that the classification made by the legislature has been accepted so far as they are concerned.\n\nThe question is whether in relaxing the rule in favour of warships, troopships, and military and naval messes and canteens, the legislature has acted arbitrarily and capriciously or it has proceeded here also on the basis of reasonable classification. The learned Attorney-General referred us to several statutes, army regulations and certain prov151ons of the Constitution, in order to show that the military force has been regarded in this country as a class by itself, and there are many special provisions with regard to it.\n\nBut it is contended that this is not enough and that no classification can be held to be valid unless it is shown to bear a just and reasonable relation to the objects of the particular legislation before us. The argument, in other words, is this : Assuming that the armed forces may be treated as a class for certain purposes, can it be treated as a class for the purpose of enforcing prohibition?\n\nThis argument found favour with the High Court, and section 39 was declared to be void.\n\nIn my opinion, the judgment of the High Court cannot be supported because I think that , there is an understandable basis for the exemptions granted to the military canteens, etc. by the Act.\n\nThe armed forces have their own traditions and mode of life, conditioned and regulated by rules and regulations which are the product of long experience and which aim at maintaining at a high level their morale and those qualities which enable them to face dangers and perform unusual tasks of endurance and hardship when called l!pon to do soqualitie~ such as dash and courage, unbreakable tenacity and energy ready for any sacrifice which should .be unfaltering for long days together.\n\nBy these rules and regulations, drinking among the forces is not prohibited, but it is properly and carefully regulated.\n\nThe state ef\n\nBomb~ Gnd Anof/ur\n\nv; F.N. Balstll'll.\n\nFail Ali J.\n\n195]\n\n11. N. Balsaro.\n\nFazl .Ali].\n\nIt is easy to understand that the legislature chose not to interfere with the mode of life to which the forces have been accustomed, lest such interference should affect their morale and lead to subterfuges which may prove unwholesome for their discipline and good behaviour.\n\nBesides, when drinking is regulated among a class of persons by specific rules and regulations and drunkenness is made an offence, the relaxation of the law of prohibition in their case is not likely to produce the same evil results as it may produce under other circumstances. I find therefore nothing wrong prima facie in the legislature according special treatment to persons who form a class by themselves in many respects and who have been treated as such in various enactments and statutory provisions. In my opinion, therefore, section 39, in so far as it affects the military and naval messes and canteens, warships and troopships, cannot be held to be invalid. So far as the cargoboats are concerned, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that no rational differentiation could be made between them and the passenger boats, and there was no conceivable ground for granting exemption or concession of any kind to the former.\n\nHere again, we cannot assume that the legislature has proceeded arbitrarily.\n\nThe cargoboats being slower boats have to be on the sea for long periods, the number of persons affected by the exemption is comparatively small, and they are mostly sojourners who stay at the port for a short time and then go away.\n\nThese cos:iderations may well have induced the legislature to show some concession to them, and we cannot say that these are irrelevant considerations.\n\nThe provision relating to exemption of cargoboats should therefore be held to be valid.\n\nI have already referred to section 46 which deals with visitors' permits.\n\nThat section provides that the Provincial Government may authorize an officer to grant visitors' permits to consume, use and buy foreign liquor to persons who visit the Province for a period of not more than a week. The High Court held this pr<>- vision to be valid, but it considered rule 67 of the\n\nBombay Foreign Liquor Rules, framed under section 143 of the Act, to be invalid. That rule provides that any foreigner on a tour of India who enters the State of Bombay and desires to possess, use and consume foreign liquoF shall apply to certain officers for obtaining a permit, which may be granted for a period not exceeding one month subject to subsequent renewal.\n\nThe High Court declared this rule to be invalid on th<1 ground that it discriminated between foreign visitors and Indian visit<m who visit Bombay from neighbouring Provinces. It seems to me that this is hardly a matter which should have been gone into on the petitioner's application, since he claims to be neither a foreigner nor an Indian visitor from another Province.\n\nBut in any event, the rule cannot be assailed on the ground of discrimination, firstly because though it provides for the case of a foreign visitor there is no prohibition against any other outsider being granted a permit, and secondly, because the policy underlying the rule is quite consistent with the policy underlying section 40 of the Act which enables permits to be granted to foreigners under certain conditions.\n\nThe High Court has also declared sections 52, 53 and 139(c) of the Act invalid on the ground that they constitute \"delegation of legislative power\".\n\nThe reasons given by the High Court for arriving at this. conclusion are stated in its judgment as follows :-\n\n\"Under section 52 power is given to the Government to grant licences in cases other than those specifically provided under any of the provisions of the Act.\n\nUnder section 53 Government is inter a/, ia empowered to vary or substitute any of the conditions of the licence laid down in the Act, and under section 139 ( c) power is given to Government to exempt any person or institution of any class of persons or institutions from the observance of all or any of the provisions of the Act or any rule or regulation or order made thereunder. The policy of legislation has been clearly laid down by the legislature in the Act itself.\n\nAs pointed out bv us before. the legislature intended\n\n!95I\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nJ95J\n\nThe Slate ef Bombay and A.noth1r\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFa:! Ali J.\n\nto grant permits ordinarily only on grounds of health and certain exceptions were made in the case of certain classes.\n\nIt is always open to the legislature to leave it to the Government to work out the policy in details.\n\nIt would be impossible for the legislature to provide for all circumstances and all eventualities that may arise in the actual working of the Act. But it is not open to the legislature to permit Government to alter the policy itself.\n\nIn our opinion, in leaving it to Government to issue permits in cases other than those provided for by the Act, . in permitting Government to vary or substitute conditions of the licence, and in permitting Government to exempt persons or classes from the provisions of the Act, the legislature was -clearly delegating to Government its own power of legislation. This it can clearly not do.\"\n\nThis Court had to consider quite recently the 9uestion as to how far \"delegaed legislation\"\n\nJS permissible, and a reference to 1ts final conclusion will show that delegation of the character which these sections involve cannot on any view be held to be invalid. (See Special Reference No. 1 of 1951 : In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912, etc. (') ). A legislature while legislating cannot foresee and provide for all future contingencies, and section 52 does no more than enable the duly authorized officer to meet, contingencies and deal with various situations as they arise.\n\nThe same considerations will apply to sections 53 and 139 ( c). The matter however need not be pursued further, as it has already been dealt with elaborately in the case referred to.\n\nI now proceed to deal with a group of sections in l'egard to which I find myself in agreement up to a\n\npoint with the views expressed by the High Court.\n\nSection 12 of the Act provides inter alia that no person shall possess or sell or buy liquor and section 13 provides inter alia that no person shall consume or use liquor.\n\nSubstituting for the word \"liquor\" occurring in these two sections the definition . of that word as given in clause (a) of section 2 (24) of the Act, the effect of these two sections is that no person shall\n\n(') Reported infra.\n\npossess, or sell or buy or consume or use \"s, pirits of wine, methylated spirit, wine, beer, toddy and all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol.\" I have already held that under entry 51 of List II, the Bombay Legislature was quite competent to make a law with respect to \"liquor\" even as broadly defined.\n\nIt is however contende<l that the power of making laws has to be exercised subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and in particular to those relating to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.. The provisions to which I have referred have been assailed on the ground that they are in conflict with article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution -which guarantees that all the citizens shall have the right \"to acquire, hold and dispose of property\". This clause is wide enough to include movable as well as immovable property.\n\nThe provisions in question un- .doubtedly prevent a citizen from possessing, selling, buying, consuming or using \"liquor\" as defined, and therefore they prima f acie infringe the fundamental right of the Indian citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of a kind of property, namely, \"liquor\" as defined in section 2 (24) of the Act, and as such would be void under article 13. The question_ to be considered is whether they can be saved by clause (5) of article 19, which runs as follows :-\n\n\"Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said -clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said subclauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any scheduled tribe.\"\n\nThe question boils down to ascertaining whether the restrictions imposed by the provisions to which reference has been made are reasonable. In judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the Act, one has to bear in mind the directive principles of State policy set forth in article 47 of the Constitution, \"The State is charged with the duty of bringing about\n\nTh1Stat1 qf\n\nBomb If! and.41111thn\n\nF. N. Baltar1J,\n\nFat.I Ali J.\n\nTheState qf\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFatl Ali].\n\nprohibition of the consumption, except for medical purposes, of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.\" That the restrictions imposed by the sections on the right of a citizen to possess, or sell or buy or consume or use spirits of wine, methylated spirits, wine, beer, toddy are in view of the aforesaid directive principles of State policy quite reasonable, has not been disputed before us. The controversy has centred round the words \"and all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol.\" It is said that those words include \"all liquids, toilet or medicinal preparations containing alcohol\" and the restrictions imposed upon the ordinary use of such toilet or medicinal preparations are unreasonable and therefore void.\n\nSo far as these preparations are concerned, the High Court has dealt with the matter as follows :-\n\n\"To put it in a simple form, the question to which we have to address ourselves is whether the legislature can prohibit the legitimate use of an article which ordinarily is not drunk, merely because its use may be perverted for the possible purpose of defeating or frustrating the objects and purposes of the Prohibition Act. Let us take the concrete case of eau-de-<:ologne or lavender water. Their legitimate use is only for the purpose of toilet.\n\nThey contain spirit and it may be that an addict deprived of his drink may drink it in order to satisfy his thirst.\n\nIs it permissible to the legislature under such circumstances to deprive the general public of the legitimate use of eau-de-cologne or lavender water as articles of toilet?\n\nThe legislature may prevent the abuse of these articles, but can it prevent their legitimate use?\n\nIt is difficult to understand how any restriction on the legitimate use of these articles can be in the interests of the general public so as to make these restrictions reasonable within the meaning of article 19(5). If a citizen uses eau-de-cologne or lavender water for the purpose of toilet, he is not doing anything against public interest.\n\nIt is only when he is preverting their use that it may be said that he is acting against public interest. Therefore, in our opinion, while it was open\n\nto the legislature to provide against the abuse of these articles, it was not open to it to prevent its legitimate use.\n\nBut the legislature has totally prohibited the use of possession of all liquids containing alcohol except under permits to be granted by Government.\n\nIt is contended by the Advocate-General that a citizen may possess eau-de-cologne or lavender water under a permit.\n\nBut that is a restriction upon the right of the citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and, in our opinion, that restriction is not reasonable. The same argument applies to medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol.\n\nTherefore we hold that to the extent to which the Prohibition Act prevents the possession, use and consumption of non-beverages and medicinal and toilet preparations containing .alcohol for legitimate purposes the provisions are void as offending against article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution even if they may be within the legislative competence . of the Provincial Legislature.\"\n\nThe next step in the argument is that as the law purports to authorise the imposition of a restriction on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of on stitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied W!ithin the constitutional limits, as it is not severable. This line of reasoning, no doubt, seeks to find suppon from the observations made in the majority decisions of this Court in Rome sh T happar\n\nv. The State of Madras(1) and in Chintaman Rao v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh(2), but in my opinion those observations do not apply to the case before us.\n\nIt will be noticed that the legislature has defined the term \"liquor\" as including several distinct categories of things followed by a general category.\n\nThere can be no doubt whatever that the earlier categories of liquor, namely, spirits of wine, methylated spirit, wine, beer, toddy are _distinctly separable items which are easily severable from the last category, namely, all liquids consisting . of or containing alcohol.\n\nThese\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 594. 5-4 S. C. India/68\n\n( 2) [1950J s.c.R. 759.\n\nJ 951\n\nThe State of Bombay and Another v.\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFa{/ Ali J.\n\nThe State of Bombay and Anotter\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFad Ali].\n\nitems being thus treated separately by the legislature itself and being severable, and it not being contended, in view of the directive principles of State policy regarding prohibition, that the restrictions imposed upon the right to possess or sell or buy or consume or use those categories of properties are unreasonable, the impugned sections must be held valid so far as these categories are concerned. The next question is whether those sections are void in so far as they purport to impose restrictions on the 'citizens' right to acquire, hold or dispose of all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol.\n\nIt is said that this is one general item and it cannot be split up into different sub-categories and therefore the sections in so far as they relate to this general item must be held to be void. This argument at first appears to have some force but a close scrutiny will reveal that it is not in the circumstances of this case sound.\n\nSection 139 of the Act authorises the Provincial Government, by general or special order, to exempt any intoxicants or class of intoxicants from all or any of the provisions of the Act. An order made by the Provincial Government in exercise of the power conferred by this section owes its legal efficacy to this section and therefore in the eye of the law the notification has the force of law as if made by the legislature itself.\n\nIn exercise of powers vested in it by section 139( d) the Provincial Government issued an order No. 10484/45(e) exempting intoxicants specified in column 1 of the Schedule thereto annexed from the provisions of the Act specified against them in column 2 of that Schedule.\n\nTurning to the Schedule, we find that in item ( 1) duty-paid prefumed spirits (except eau-de-cologne), in item (3) duty-paid spirituous toilet preparations (except lavender water) and in item ( 4) duty-paid spirituous medicinal preparaticns other than 123 specified liquids, are exempted from the operation of sections 12(c) and (d) and 13(b) to the extent specified therein. This notification was superseded on the 1st April, 1950, by another notification which is more liberal in certain respects, and these notifications, being made in exercise of the power given by the Act itself\n\nhave undoubtedly the force of law and must be read along with the Act.\n\nSo read, it is quite clear that \"all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol\" are capable of being split up into and have in fact been split up into several distinctly separate sub-items including liquid toilet and medicinal preparations containing alcohol.\n\nThe legislature itself contemplated this sub-division, for by section 139 it authorised the Provincial Government to exempt any intoxicant or class of intoxicants from the operation of the Act. This circumstance takes the case out of the principles laid down in the two cases mentioned above and the item being thus severable I am free to consider whether the restrictions imposed on a sub-itJem, namely, !liquid toilet and medicinal preparations containing alcohol, are reasonable or not. I am substantially in agreement with the line of reasoning adopted by the High Court and I consider that the Act is not a law impoing reasonable restrictions so far as medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol are concerned.\n\nThe National Prohibition Act or the Volstead Act of America, to which I have referred, was also an Act relating to prohibition; but toilet and medicinal preparations containing alcohol were expressly excluded from the scope of that Act.\n\nI refer to that Act simply to show that a complete scheme of prohibition can be worked without including such articles among those prohibited.\n\nAgain, article 47 of the Constitution also takes note of the fact that medicinal preparations should be excluded in the enforcement of prohibitio~.\n\nI do not consider that it is reasonable that the possession, sale, purchase, consumption or use of medicinal and toilet preparations should be prohibited merely because there is a mere possibility of their being misused by some perverted addicts.\n\nIt was contended that there was no meaning in declaring the provisions relatbg to purchase, sale, possession, use and consumption of medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol to be invalid, since in the Notification No. 10484/45, issued by the Provincial\n\nF. N. Balsaro.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nThtStatt of\n\nBombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nGovernment on the lst April, which is no part of the Act, the Government have exempted duty-paid perfumed spirits (including eau-de-cologne), duty-paid spirituous toilet preparations and certain classes of duty-paid spirituous medicinal preparations from the following . provisions of the Act :-·\n\n(i) Section 12 (c);\n\n(ii) Section 12 (d), in so for as it relates to buying of such preparations;\n\n(iii) Section 13 (b), in so far as it relates to use of such preparations.\n\nBut it is to be noted that the sale of these articles is not covered by the above notification, but is regulated by two other notifications, namely, Notification No. 2843/49, dated the 6th April, 1950, and Notification No. 2843/49, dated the 11th April, 1950. In these two Notifications, there are provisions imposing limits on sales.\n\nFor example, in the first notificaµon issued on the 6th April, rule 10( l) provides as follows :-\n\n\"The licensee shall not sell to any person on any one day any. kind of perfumed spirits, . spirituous toilet preparations or .essences in excess of such quantity as may be prescribed by the COmmissioner under the\n\nAct.\" .\n\nSimilarly, in the second notification of the 11th April, rules 9 and 10 run as follows :-\n\n\"9. The licensee shall not sell medicated tonics 0r medicated wines containing more than 10 per cent. of alcohol (or containing alcohol in strength more than 17.5 per cent. of proof spirit) except those which are classified as spirituous medicinal preparations and regulated as such under the Drugs Act, 1940.\n\nl 0. Subject to the provisions of rule 9 the licensee shall not sell the following spirituous medicinal preparations to any person unless he produces a medical prescription in that behalf, namely :-\n\n(a) medicated tonics and medicated wines;\n\n( b) asaves and arishtas specified in the schedule hereto annexed;\n\n( c) any other spirituous medicinal preparations containing more than 10 per cent of alcohol (or containing alcohol in strength more than 17 5 per cent . of proof spirit) which are intended for internal use :\n\nProvided that . the following spirituous medicinal preparations may be sold to any person without the production by such person of any medical prescription; namely .... \"\n\nIn view of the restrictions imposed on the sale of these preparations, it is pertinent to enquire whether those restrictions will not also affect their purchase possession, use and consumption, and whether the socalled exemptions contained in the notification of the 1st April really go as far as they purport to -go: (vide in this connection conditions in col. 7 of Notification No. 10484/45 (a) of the 1st April, 1950). Again, in the Notification No. 10484/45 of the 1st April, only 8 medicinal preparations arc totally exempted as regards their purchase, possession, and use, and so far as medicinal preparations for internal consumption are concerned, only those containing not more than 10% of alcohol or 17.5% of proof spirit are exempted.\n\nThis notification has to be read along with another notification No. 10484/45(a). of the same date, which was to remain in force till 31st March, 1951, only; In the latter notification, for the purpose of possession, purchase, consumption and use, the quantity of medicinal preparations containing not more than 100/o of alcohol, etc., is restricted to such quantity as may be prescribed by a registered medical practitioner.\n\nEven these notifications may be withdrawn, superseded or amended at any moment b J the Provincial Government, as was done in the case of the notifications issued on the 16th June, 1949, which have been referred to. An ordinary citizen may find it a peplexing task to attempt to extract information out of the long series of complicated regulations, as to the true nature and extent of the right which the law i::onf ers upon him.\n\nIndeed it was only with the help of the learned counsel appearing for the parties that we were able to know what the position was up to the 31st March, 1950, and\n\nThe State of Bombay and Another v.\n\nF. Jv. Balsara.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\n195!\n\nTiii State qf\n\nBombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nwhat changes were made on the 1st April, 1950.\n\nBut in the bundle of notifications which have been placed before us, there is no notification stating what step has been taken after the 31st March, 1951, and none was brought to our notice in the course of the arguments. Having given my careful consideration to the matter, I am of the opinion, that the restrictions imposed by the Act even when read with the above notifications are not reasonable, and I would affirm the conclusion arrived at by the High Court.\n\nThe next group of sections which the High Court has held to be invalid, are sections 23(a) and 24(l)(a) in so far as they refer to \"commending\" any intoxicant, section 23(b) in its entirety, and section 24(1) (b) in so far as it refers to \"inciting or encouraging\" any individual or class of individuals or the public generally \"to evade the provisions of any rule, regulation or order made thereunder or the conditions of any licence, etc.\" These provisions run as follows :-\n\n23. No person shall-\n\n( a) commend, solicit the use of, or offer any intoxicant or hemp, or\n\n(b) mc1te or encourage any member of the public or any class of individuals or the public generally to commit any act which frustrates or defeats the provisions of this Act, or any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, or ....\n\n24. (1) No person shall print or publish in any news paper, news-sheet, book, leaflet, booklet or any other single or periodical publication or otherwise display or distribute any advertisement or other matter,-\n\n(a) which commends, solicits the use of or offers any intoxicant or hemp, or\n\n(b) which is calculated to encourage or incite any individual or class of individuals or the public generally to commit an offence under this Act, or to commit a breach of or to evade the provisions of any rule, regulation or order made thereunder or the conditions of any licence, permit, pass or authorization granted thereunder.\"\n\nSections 23(a) and 24(1)(a) in so far as they refer to \"commending\" any intoxicant are. said to conflict with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(l)(a), namely, the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there can be no doubt that the prohibition against . \"commending\" a.ny intpxicant is a curtailment of the right guaranteed and it can be supported only if it is saved by clause (2) of article 19 which, as it stands at present, provides that \"nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to libel, slander, defamation, contempt of court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the securit~ of, or tends to overthrow, the State.\" It seems to me that none of the conditions mentioned in clause (2) applies to the present case, and therefore the provisions in question must be held to be void. Section 23\n\n(b) must also be held to be void, because the words \"incite\" and \"encourage\" are wide enough to include incitement or encouragement by words and speeches and also by acts.\n\nThe words \"which frustrates or defeats the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation . or order made thereunder\" are so wide and vague that it is difficult to define or limit thir scope.\n\nI am therefore in agreement with the view of the High Court that this provision is invalid in its entirety.\n\nSo far as article 24(1)(b) is concerned the judgment of the High Court in regard to it cannot be upheld. The learned counsel for the petitioner also conceded before us chat he was not going to assail this provision.\n\nThe High Court has also declared sections 136(1), 136(2)(b), 136(2)(c), 136(2)(e), 136(2)(£) to be void as offending against various provisions of article 19 of the Constitution, but no argument was addressed to us on behalf of the Government of Bombay assailing the judgment of the High Court with regard to these provisions. The judgment of the High Court in regard to them will therefore stand.\n\nI will now deal with two Notifications Nos. 10484/45\n\n(c) and 2843/49(a), dated the 30th March, 1950, which\n\nI<'. N. Balsam\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\n!951\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFa, I Ali J.\n\nthe High Court has held to be invalid. As regards the first notification, the High Coun has stated that section 139 ( c) having been held to be ultra vires the legislatute, this notification, which was issued under that section is ultra vires the Bombay Government.\n\nBut, since this Court has taken a different view in regard to the validity of section 139 ( c), the decision of the High Court as regards the above notification cannot stand.\n\nIt appears from certain observations in the judgment under appeal, firstly that the High Court upheld section 40(1) (c) (i) and (ii), which deals with the grant of permits to foreigners who do not intend to stay permanently in India, merely because the Explanation to that section provided that \"a person shall be deemed to be residing or intending to reside in India temporarily, if the period of his residence does not exceed six months\"; and secondly, that the High Court would have found it difficult to uphold the classification on which section 40(1) (c) is based if the restriction regarding six months' residence was not there, as would be the result of reading the section subject to the above notification.\n\nI am however unable to see how the notification will tum a classification which is otherwise a good classification into a bad one.\n\nThere is nothing unreasonable in a law relating to prohibition discriminating between Indian citizens against whom it is primarily to be enforced, and foreigners who have no intention of permanently residing in this country. The condition of six months' residence which is laid down in the Explanation to ection 40 is somewhat arbitrary, and the mere fact that the Government by notification withdrew this condition cannot in principle alter the basis of the classification.\n\nThe High Court has declared the other notification issued by the Government on the 30th March, 1950, to be invalid on grounds which are stated in these words:-\n\n\"That notification exempts persons holding permits under clause (c) of wb-section (1) of section 40, special permits under section 41, or interim permits under section 47, from the provisions of section 23 (a)\n\nin so far as it relates to the offering of foreign liquor to persons holding similar permits. This is clearly not justified.\n\nHaving created a class, having given to that class the right of obtaining a permit on grounds other than those of health, it will be totally wrong to permit that class not to abide by the same provisions with regard to permits as others to whom permits have been given. The restrictions placed by the 'legislature itself on a permit-holder regar'ding the use and consumption of hi~ stock of liquor is to be found in section 43 under which the permit-holder shall not allow the 'use and consumption by any person who is not a permit-holder. That restriction must apply equally to permits issued under section 40 to Indian citizens as well as foreigners, and in our opinion it is improper to allow a foreigner permit-holder to stand drinks to other permit-holders and to deny that privilege to Indian permit-holders.\n\nThe guarantee of equality before the law extends under our Constitution not only to legislation but also to rules and notifications made under statutory authority and even to excutive orders and as the notification offends against the principle of equality it is, therefore, void.\"\n\nIn order to under.stand these remarks, it will be necessary to state that persons holding permits under clause ( c) of sub-section ( 1) of section 40 are foreigners as described in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c), that persons holding special permits under section 41 are foreign sovereigns, ambassadors, etc., and that persons holding interim permits under section 47 are persons applying for permits under either section 40, or section 41. The last class will include not only foreigners but also Indian citizens applying for permits on the ground that their health will be seriously and permanently affected if they are not permitted to use or consume liquor. Thus, the assumption on which the conclusion of the High Court is based, does not appear to be correct.\n\nBesides, I do not find anything in this notification which violates the principle of equality. It simply enables a certain dass of pers&'is holding per-' mits to offer drinks to persons holding similar permits.\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFa;.l Ali J.\n\nBombay am/ Anoth<r\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFaz! Ali j.\n\nThis is in accord with the principle underlying the provisions of section 43 which has not been assailed before us and which provides that \"no holder of a permit granted under section 40 or 41 shall allow the use or consumption of any part of the stock held by him under the permit to any person who is not the holder of such a permit\". In my opinion, there is no substantial ground for holding the notification to be invalid. The points relating to the notifications . are extremely small, and the subtle distinctions upon which they are based, are hardly worth the attention which the High Court has bestowed on them.\n\nThere is another point which arises on the judgment of the High Court which may also be noticed.\n\nThe point is set out in that judgment in these words :-\n\n\"When a person applies for a perm.it on the ground of health, he has to forward with it a certificate from the medical board and when we turn to the form of this certificate, it requires the medical board to declare the applicant an addict. Therefore the position is that it is only on the applicant being found an addict bv the medical board that he would be entitled to a permit if his health would be seriously and permanently affected if he was not permitted to use or consume liquor It is not only in the case of addicts that such a contingency would arise.\n\nEven persons who are not addicts may have been accustomed to drink for a long period of time and a sudden discontinuance of drink may seriously and permanently affect their health.\n\nIt may also happen that without being accustomed to drink at all a person may contract an illness which may require the use by him of alcoholic drink under medical opinion. To be an addict, in our opinion, means something more than being merely accustomed to drink.\n\nWe must give to it its plain natural meaning. It is certainly not a term of art, and giving to it its plain natural meaning, the expression \"addict\" does carry with it a sense of moral obloquy.\n\nThe intention of the Government seems to be that only persons who mess that they are deviating from standards of morality should be given permits. Now\n\ninsistence upon a medical certificate in this form is not at all warranted by the provisions of the Act.\"\n\nThe point is a small one but it seems to me that there is some substance in it. In my opinion, the word \"addict\" in the medical certificate should be replaced by the words used in section 40 (1) (b) of the Act or words corresponding to them. '\n\nThe only other point which remains to be decided is whether as a result of some of the sections of the Act having been declared to be invalid, what is left of the Act should survive or whether the whole Act should be declared to be invalid.\n\nThis argument was raised before the High Court also. but it was rejected and it was held that it was not possible on a fair review of the whole matter to assume that the legislature would not have enacted the part which remained without enacting the part that was held to be bad.\n\nIt is to be noted that upon the findings of the High Court, the question should have assumed a more serious aspect than it presents now, because the High Court has declared several important sections of the Act including the definition of \"liquor\" to be ultra vires the legislature. I have now examined those sections and have held many of them to be valid. The provisions which are in my view invalid cannot affect the validity of the Act as a whole. The test to be applied when an argument like the one addressed in this case is raised, has been very correctly summed up by the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney- General for Canada(1) in these words :-\n\n\"The real question is whether what remains is so inextricably bound up with the part declared invalid that what remains cannot independently survive or, as it has sometimes been put, whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that the legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires at all.\"\n\nIt is quite clear that the provisions held by me to be invalid are not nextricably bound up with the\n\n(1) [1947] A.C. 505 ·.t 518.\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nFa;:.l Ali J.\n\n195! r he State qf Bombay and Anotlat'.\n\nF. N. Balsata.\n\nFaz/ Ali].\n\nremaining pn; ivisions of the Act, and it is difficult to hold that the legislature would not have enacted the Act at all without including that part which is found to be ultra vires.\n\nThe Act still remains substantially the Act as it was passed, i.e., an Act amending and consolidating the law relating to the promotion and enforcement of the policy of prohibition and also the Abkari law in the Province of Bombay.\n\nIn the result, I declare the following provisions of the Act only to be invalid :-\n\n(1) Clause (c) of section 12. so far as it affects the possession of liquid medicinal and toilet preparations ccontaining alcohol.\n\n(2) Clause (d) of section 12, so far as it affects the selling or buying of such medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol.\n\n(3) Clause (b) of section 13, so far as it affects the consumption or use of such medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol.\n\n( 4) Clause (a) of section 23, so far as it prohibits the commendation of any intoxicant or hemp.\n\n(5) Clause (b) of section 23, in entirety.\n\n(6) Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 24, so far as it prohibits commendation of any intoxicant or hemp.\n\n(7) Sub-section (1) of section 36, in entirety.\n\n(8) Clauses (b), (c), (e), and (f) of sub-section (2) of section 136, in their entirety.\n\nI hold that the rest of the provisions of the Act are valid, and I also hold that my decision declaring some of the provisions of the Act to be invalid does not affect the validity of the Act as it remains.\n\nAppeal No. 182, preferred by the State of Bombay, is there fore substantially allowed and Appeal No. 183 pre.\n\n£erred by the petitioner is dismissed.\n\nOn the question of costs I am disposed to make the same order as the High Court has made, not only because some of the provisions of the Act are still found to be invalid, but also because the present case\n\nappears to have been instituted to test the validity of a controversial measure and to secure a final decision on it to set at rest the doubts and uncertainties which may have clouded the minds of a section of the public as to how far the provisions of the Act conform to law and to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in the present Constitution.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-1 agree and have nothing more to add.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-1 have read the judgment of my learned brother Mr. Justice Fazl Ali and I am in entire agreement with his conclusions and reasons.\n\nThere is nothing further which I can usefully add.\n\nS. R. DAs J.-1 agree and I have nothing further to add.\n\nV1VIAN BosE J.-I also agree.\n\nAppeal No. 182 allowed.\n\nAppeal No. 183 dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants in Case No. 182 and respondents in Case No. 183 : P. A. Mehta~ .\n\nAgent for the respondent in Case No. 182 and appellant in Case No. 183 : Rajinder Narain for R. A. Gagrat.\n\nTARA SINGH\n\nTHE STATE.\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), ss. 173 (1), 190 (1) (b), 340 (1), 342, 288-Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 145-Filing of second challan-Whether vitiates first report-Examination of accused-Imp<>rtance of-Statements made in Committal Court- W hen admissible.\n\nWhere the report made by a police officer to the Magistrate complies with the requirements of s. 173 ( 1) of the Criminal Procedure Code the Magistrate can take cognisance. of the case\n\nBol1'bay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nPatanjali Sastri :J.\n\nMuklurjea :J.\n\nS. It. 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C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8980, "end_char": 8994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (M. M. Desai and H. M. Seervai."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8999, "end_char": 9013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (M. M. Desai and H. M. Seervai."}}, {"text": "M. M. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9015, "end_char": 9026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (M. M. Desai and H. M. Seervai."}}, {"text": "H. M. Seervai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9031, "end_char": 9044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (M. M. Desai and H. M. Seervai."}}, {"text": "N. P. Engineer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9126, "end_char": 9140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. P. Engineer (G. N. Joshi, R. ]."}}, {"text": "G. N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9142, "end_char": 9153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. P. Engineer (G. N. Joshi, R. ]."}}, {"text": "R. ]. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9155, "end_char": 9166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. P. Engineer (G. N. Joshi, R. ]."}}, {"text": ".N. A. Palkhiwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9171, "end_char": 9188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kolah and .N. A. Palkhiwala, with him) for the respondent in Case No."}}, {"text": "FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9324, "end_char": 9331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nFAzL Au J.-These appeals arise from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon the application of one\n\nF. N.\n\nBalsara (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner), assailing the validity of certain specific provisions o~ the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act No.", "canonical_name": ".Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "F. N.\n\nBalsara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9454, "end_char": 9468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nFAzL Au J.-These appeals arise from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon the application of one\n\nF. N.\n\nBalsara (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner), assailing the validity of certain specific provisions o~ the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act No.", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": "Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9575, "end_char": 9603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10282, "end_char": 10297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and to purchase, possess consume and use any stock of foreign 3-4 S. C. India/68\n\nTh~ State of Bombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara."}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10749, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10966, "end_char": 10981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the State of Bombay and the petitioner, being dissatisfied with the judgment of the High Court, have appealed to this Court after obtaining a certificate frpm the High Court under article 132 ( 1) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11142, "end_char": 11153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Legislature of the Province of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11219, "end_char": 11256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act in question was passed by the Legislature of the Province of Bombay as it was constituted in 1949, and was published in the Bombay Government Gazette on the 20th May, 1949, and came into force on the 16th June 1949."}}, {"text": "20th May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11346, "end_char": 11360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act in question was passed by the Legislature of the Province of Bombay as it was constituted in 1949, and was published in the Bombay Government Gazette on the 20th May, 1949, and came into force on the 16th June 1949."}}, {"text": "16th June 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11389, "end_char": 11403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act in question was passed by the Legislature of the Province of Bombay as it was constituted in 1949, and was published in the Bombay Government Gazette on the 20th May, 1949, and came into force on the 16th June 1949."}}, {"text": "Sections 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12242, "end_char": 12253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12293, "end_char": 12304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 30 to 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13766, "end_char": 13783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13788, "end_char": 13798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13935, "end_char": 13945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14114, "end_char": 14124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14188, "end_char": 14196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz!"}}, {"text": "Fad Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14255, "end_char": 14262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fad Ali J.\n\npermits fot the use or consumption of foreign liquor to persons whose health would be seriously and permanently affected if they were not permitted to use or consume such liquor and to foreigners who do not intend to stay permanently in India; section 41, whicJ:i enables special permits to be granted to diplomats and foreign sovereigns; section 45, which authorises use of liquor for sacramental purposes; section 52, which empowers an authorised officer to grant licenses, permits, etc.,"}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14511, "end_char": 14521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14606, "end_char": 14616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14675, "end_char": 14685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14798, "end_char": 14808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14912, "end_char": 14922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 118 and 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15176, "end_char": 15196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 121", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15303, "end_char": 15314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15510, "end_char": 15524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15753, "end_char": 15763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 136(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15958, "end_char": 15972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16310, "end_char": 16321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16597, "end_char": 16608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16790, "end_char": 16808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter XI contains certain miscellaneous prmtlsions and the only sections of this Chapter which need be referred to are section 139 ( c ), which statj:s that the State Government may by general or special order exempt any person or class of persons or institution or class of institutions from the\n\nobservance of all or any of the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, and section 147, which declares that nothing in the Act shall be deemed to apply to any intoxicant or other article in respect of its import or export across the customs frontier as defined by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Sections 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17104, "end_char": 17115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17173, "end_char": 17183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17235, "end_char": 17245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17247, "end_char": 17257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17259, "end_char": 17269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17279, "end_char": 17290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17296, "end_char": 17307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17336, "end_char": 17347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "F. N. Balsara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18498, "end_char": 18511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems to me that it will be convenient to deal in the first instance with the argument assailing the validity of the Act as a whole, which is based on\n\nthree grounds, these being :-\n\n( 1) that the law is an encroachment on the field which has been assigned exclusively to the Central Legislature under entry 19 of List I;\n\n(2) that some of the material provisions of the Act interfere with or are calculated to interfere with inter- State trade and commerce and as such transgress the\n\nTiu Stale of\n\nBom/Jay dlll/ 4.Mther\n\n\"· F. N. Balsara.", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18526, "end_char": 18532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay and Anothtr\n\nF. N. Balsara.", "canonical_name": "Bombay"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18586, "end_char": 18595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18606, "end_char": 18635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gwyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20358, "end_char": 20363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with t1iis entry, Gwyer C. J. observed as follows in the case of Bhola Prasad v. The King Emperor(') :-\n\n(')[1942] F.C.R. 17 at 25."}}, {"text": "[1942] F.C.R. 17", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20448, "end_char": 20464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21872, "end_char": 21882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Abkari Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21892, "end_char": 21915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 650", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22485, "end_char": 22502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23247, "end_char": 23260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "drew attention to item 19 of List I which covers \"Import and export across customs frontiers as defined by the Dominion Government\", and argued that if \"intoxicating liquors\" in item 31 of List JI were held to include also liquors imported from abroad, then the Provincial Legislature, by prohibiting possession of such liquors by all persons, whether private consumers, common carriers or warehousemen, could defeat the power of the Federal Legislature to regulate imports of foreign liquors across the sea or land frontiers of British India which are customs frontiers as defined by the Central Government and thus seriously jeopardise an important source of central customs revenue."}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23413, "end_char": 23424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24073, "end_char": 24084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24111, "end_char": 24121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Since the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24608, "end_char": 24664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Only in the Indian Constitution Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25608, "end_char": 25643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1940) F. C. R. 110", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26567, "end_char": 26586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1939) F.C.R. 18", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26600, "end_char": 26616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "F. N. Balsara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26650, "end_char": 26663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. N. Balsara.", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26741, "end_char": 26752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26760, "end_char": 26789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26985, "end_char": 27001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Privy Council whether the Bengal Money-lenders Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29628, "end_char": 29684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maurice Gwyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30566, "end_char": 30579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that it was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature which had enacted it, their Lordships observed as follows :-\n\n\"As Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. said in the Subrahmanyam Chettiar case: \"It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a\n\n( 1) [1937] A.e."}}, {"text": "Subrahmanyam Chettiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30598, "end_char": 30619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that it was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature which had enacted it, their Lordships observed as follows :-\n\n\"As Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. said in the Subrahmanyam Chettiar case: \"It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a\n\n( 1) [1937] A.e."}}, {"text": "[1947] F.C.R. 28", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30813, "end_char": 30829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "F. N. BalstZl'a", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30853, "end_char": 30868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay and &iolhn\n\nF. N. BalstZl'a •.\n\nFa(l AU J.\n\n195!", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30944, "end_char": 30947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali J.\n\nsubject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely inter-twined that blind observance to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere."}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 650", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32933, "end_char": 32950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33881, "end_char": 33889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The wide meaning of 'import' on which reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner was adopted for the first time by Marshall C. J. in BrQwn\n\nv. Maryland(1), in which the facts were these."}}, {"text": "State of Maryland", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33957, "end_char": 33974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Maryland had passed an Act prohibiting importers of foreign goods from selling their goods without ."}}, {"text": "S. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35039, "end_char": 35045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".F. N. Balsara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35173, "end_char": 35187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".F. N. Balsara.", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": ".Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35190, "end_char": 35199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Fazl Ali J.\n\n\"Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a part.", "canonical_name": ".Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35721, "end_char": 35728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon principles so stated, what is known as the \"original package\" doctrine was evolved in America, which was applied not only to commodities imp0rted from foreign countries but also to commodities , which were the subject of inter-state commerce."}}, {"text": "S. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37300, "end_char": 37306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38388, "end_char": 38417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Thompson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38800, "end_char": 38808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons(1), Gwyer C.J., while expressing hjs profound respect for the views expressed by Marshall C.J. in Brown v. Maryland( 2 ), mildly hinted that it was easier to follow the line of reasoning of Thompson J. in his dissenting judgment in that case and concluded with the following remarks :-\n\n\"Next, it is to be observed that the American Constitution also provides that Congress alone has power \"to regulate commerce with foreign nations,\n\namong the several States and with the Indian tribes\", and it was held that the Maryland tax was no less repugnant to this provision also."}}, {"text": "[1942] F.C.R. 90", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 39414, "end_char": 39430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39449, "end_char": 39455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41244, "end_char": 41257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States, the widest meaning could be given to the Commerce Clause, for there Was not question of reconciling that Clause with another Clause containing the legislative povu:r of the State."}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41668, "end_char": 41674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1942] F.C.R. 90", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 41680, "end_char": 41696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41780, "end_char": 41791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41807, "end_char": 41836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42254, "end_char": 42265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "F. N. Bal•ara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43782, "end_char": 43795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Anotlur\n\nF. N. Balsara,\n\nFad Ali J.\n\nTMS1ate of\n\nBomba, a1ld Anoth\"\n\nF. N. Bal•ara.", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": "Section 297(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43892, "end_char": 43906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44110, "end_char": 44143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44176, "end_char": 44187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44386, "end_char": 44391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "s. 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44482, "end_char": 44488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44590, "end_char": 44601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "section 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45246, "end_char": 45257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45737, "end_char": 45746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1942] F.C.R. 17", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 45817, "end_char": 45833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "James Murry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47002, "end_char": 47013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Oxford English Dictionary, edited by James Murry, several meanings are given to the word \"liquor\", of which the following may be quoted :-\n\nLIQUOR .... 1."}}, {"text": "arts.\n\n3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47281, "end_char": 47289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47731, "end_char": 47737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay and Anothlr\n\nF. N. Balsra.", "canonical_name": "Bombay"}}, {"text": "F. N. Balsra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47751, "end_char": 47763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay and Anothlr\n\nF. N. Balsra.", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48355, "end_char": 48362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter is undoubtedly the popular and most widely accepted meaning, and the basic idea of beverage seems rather prominently to run through the main provisions of the various Acts of this country as well as of America and England relating to intoxicating liquor, to which our attention was drawn- But at the same time, on a reference to these very Acts, it is difliculty to hold that they deal exclusively .... with beverages and are not applicable to certain articles which are strictly speaking not beverages."}}, {"text": "National Prohibition Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48696, "end_char": 48726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49512, "end_char": 49516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the National Prohibition Act, 1919", "statute": "In the National Prohibition Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49688, "end_char": 49697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In the National Prohibition Act, 1919", "statute": "In the National Prohibition Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "Spirits Act, 1880", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50310, "end_char": 50327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Coming now to the various definitions given in the Indian Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50932, "end_char": 50993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bengal Excise Act, 1909", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51194, "end_char": 51217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Excise Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51506, "end_char": 51529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Excise Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51540, "end_char": 51556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Abkari Act, 1886", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51707, "end_char": 51730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Even if we exclude the American and English Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51774, "end_char": 51821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "framers of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52017, "end_char": 52061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Remembering that the object of the Prohibition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53063, "end_char": 53113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53419, "end_char": 53429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Remembering that the object of the Prohibition Act", "statute": "Remembering that the object of the Prohibition Act"}}, {"text": "Europe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54774, "end_char": 54780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sight it may appear to be far-fetched to bring the subject of intoxicating liquor under \"public order\", yet it should be noted that there has been a tendency in Europe and America to regard alcoholism as a menace to public order."}}, {"text": "Sir Montague Smith held that the Canada Temperance Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54872, "end_char": 54932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55459, "end_char": 55469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are of a nature which falls within the general authority of Parliament to make laws for the order and good government of Canada .... \"(2)\n\nAgain, referring to liquor laws and liquor control, a. learned British author(3) says as follows :-\n\n\"The dominant motive everywhere, however, has been a social one, to combat a menace to public order and the increasing evils of alcoholism in the interests of health and social welfare."}}, {"text": "Fa.ti Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56294, "end_char": 56303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fa.ti Ali J.\n\ncentury has been the rapid urbanisation, industrialization and mechanization of our modern every day life in the leading nations of the world, and the consequent wider recognition of the advantages of sobriety in safeguarding public order and physical efficiency.\""}}, {"text": "These passages may lend some support to the contention of the learned Attorney-General that tile Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56574, "end_char": 56674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56868, "end_char": 56878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These passages may lend some support to the contention of the learned Attorney-General that tile Act", "statute": "These passages may lend some support to the contention of the learned Attorney-General that tile Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56952, "end_char": 56962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These passages may lend some support to the contention of the learned Attorney-General that tile Act", "statute": "These passages may lend some support to the contention of the learned Attorney-General that tile Act"}}, {"text": "Willis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59022, "end_char": 59028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Professor Willis, dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees equal protection of the laws, sums up."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60318, "end_char": 60333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarity, not identity of\n\nThe State of Bombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60759, "end_char": 60769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60839, "end_char": 60849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62167, "end_char": 62177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62209, "end_char": 62219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62271, "end_char": 62281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62319, "end_char": 62329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62407, "end_char": 62417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62468, "end_char": 62478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62569, "end_char": 62579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62626, "end_char": 62636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63821, "end_char": 63831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. Balsaro", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64739, "end_char": 64749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Balsaro.", "canonical_name": "N. Balsaro"}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65577, "end_char": 65587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66564, "end_char": 66574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66955, "end_char": 66966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 67075, "end_char": 67081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That rule provides that any foreigner on a tour of India who enters the State of Bombay and desires to possess, use and consume foreign liquoF shall apply to certain officers for obtaining a permit, which may be granted for a period not exceeding one month subject to subsequent renewal."}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67979, "end_char": 67989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 52, 53 and 139(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68111, "end_char": 68137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68346, "end_char": 68356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68503, "end_char": 68513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68642, "end_char": 68653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69048, "end_char": 69056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nJ95J\n\nThe Slate ef Bombay and A.noth1r\n\nF. N. Balsara.", "canonical_name": ".Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70285, "end_char": 70313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70420, "end_char": 70430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "sections 53 and 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70594, "end_char": 70613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70894, "end_char": 70904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70991, "end_char": 71001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71190, "end_char": 71199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71950, "end_char": 71960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72475, "end_char": 72484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72534, "end_char": 72544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72623, "end_char": 72633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73338, "end_char": 73348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "F. N. Baltar1J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73461, "end_char": 73475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and.41111thn\n\nF. N. Baltar1J,\n\nFat.", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": "I Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73482, "end_char": 73487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Ali J.\n\nTheState qf\n\nF. N. Balsara."}}, {"text": "article 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75426, "end_char": 75439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Therefore we hold that to the extent to which the Prohibition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76349, "end_char": 76414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76604, "end_char": 76614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Therefore we hold that to the extent to which the Prohibition Act", "statute": "Therefore we hold that to the extent to which the Prohibition Act"}}, {"text": "Section 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79021, "end_char": 79032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 139( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79492, "end_char": 79507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 12(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80037, "end_char": 80051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80143, "end_char": 80158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This notification was superseded on the 1st April, 1950, by another notification which is more liberal in certain respects, and these notifications, being made in exercise of the power given by the Act itself\n\nhave undoubtedly the force of law and must be read along with the Act."}}, {"text": "section 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80710, "end_char": 80721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81764, "end_char": 81774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "F. N. Balsaro", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82421, "end_char": 82434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10484/45, issued by the Provincial\n\nF. N. Balsaro.", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": "N. Balsara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 82486, "end_char": 82496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nThtStatt of\n\nBombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.", "canonical_name": "N. Balsaro"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82801, "end_char": 82811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82823, "end_char": 82833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82902, "end_char": 82912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83157, "end_char": 83172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2843/49, dated the 6th April, 1950, and Notification No."}}, {"text": "11th April, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83214, "end_char": 83230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2843/49, dated the 11th April, 1950."}}, {"text": "Drugs Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84014, "end_char": 84029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 85606, "end_char": 85622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the same date, which was to remain in force till 31st March, 1951, only; In the latter notification, for the purpose of possession, purchase, consumption and use, the quantity of medicinal preparations containing not more than 100/o of alcohol, etc.,"}}, {"text": "16th June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86068, "end_char": 86083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even these notifications may be withdrawn, superseded or amended at any moment b J the Provincial Government, as was done in the case of the notifications issued on the 16th June, 1949, which have been referred to."}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 86570, "end_char": 86575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tiii State qf\n\nBombay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara."}}, {"text": "sections 23(a) and 24(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87218, "end_char": 87245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87302, "end_char": 87315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87337, "end_char": 87350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 23(a) and 24(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88571, "end_char": 88598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88717, "end_char": 88733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88978, "end_char": 88988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89540, "end_char": 89550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 24(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90036, "end_char": 90052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90390, "end_char": 90400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 90475, "end_char": 90495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has also declared sections 136(1), 136(2)(b), 136(2)(c), 136(2)(e), 136(2)(£) to be void as offending against various provisions of article 19 of the Constitution, but no argument was addressed to us on behalf of the Government of Bombay assailing the judgment of the High Court with regard to these provisions."}}, {"text": "N. Balsam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90756, "end_char": 90765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Balsam\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\n!", "canonical_name": "N. Balsaro"}}, {"text": "section 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90920, "end_char": 90931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91161, "end_char": 91172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91361, "end_char": 91374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91802, "end_char": 91815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 92668, "end_char": 92684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has declared the other notification issued by the Government on the 30th March, 1950, to be invalid on grounds which are stated in these words:-\n\n\"That notification exempts persons holding permits under clause (c) of wb-section (1) of section 40, special permits under section 41, or interim permits under section 47, from the provisions of section 23 (a)\n\nin so far as it relates to the offering of foreign liquor to persons holding similar permits."}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92835, "end_char": 92845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92869, "end_char": 92879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92906, "end_char": 92916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92941, "end_char": 92951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93499, "end_char": 93509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93683, "end_char": 93693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94321, "end_char": 94331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94446, "end_char": 94456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94547, "end_char": 94557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94604, "end_char": 94614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94619, "end_char": 94629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 95199, "end_char": 95205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fa;.l Ali J.\n\nBombay am/ Anoth<r\n\nF. N. Balsara."}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95314, "end_char": 95324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95424, "end_char": 95434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97671, "end_char": 97681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "F. N. Balsata", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 99499, "end_char": 99512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. N. Balsata.", "canonical_name": "F. N. BalstZl'a"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100047, "end_char": 100057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100179, "end_char": 100189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100315, "end_char": 100325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100453, "end_char": 100463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100551, "end_char": 100561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100614, "end_char": 100624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100713, "end_char": 100723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100796, "end_char": 100807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101742, "end_char": 101758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-1 agree and have nothing more to add.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI"}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101801, "end_char": 101810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-1 have read the judgment of my learned brother Mr. Justice Fazl Ali and I am in entire agreement with his conclusions and reasons.", "canonical_name": "MUKHERJEA"}}, {"text": "V1VIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102055, "end_char": 102066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V1VIAN BosE J.-I also agree.", "canonical_name": "V1v1AN BosE"}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 102212, "end_char": 102224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "183 : P. A. Mehta~ ."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 102301, "end_char": 102316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "183 : Rajinder Narain for R. A. Gagrat."}}, {"text": "TARA SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102336, "end_char": 102346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TARA SINGH\n\nTHE STATE."}}, {"text": "SAIYID FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102361, "end_char": 102376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]", "canonical_name": "SAIYID FAZL ALI"}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102378, "end_char": 102394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102411, "end_char": 102422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]", "canonical_name": "V1v1AN BosE"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102429, "end_char": 102452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102466, "end_char": 102473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102536, "end_char": 102542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102785, "end_char": 102791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Bol1'bay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 102877, "end_char": 102885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the case\n\nBol1'bay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102915, "end_char": 102931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri :J.\n\nMuklurjea :J.\n\nS. It.", "canonical_name": "PATANJALI SAsTRI"}}, {"text": "Muklurjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102937, "end_char": 102946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri :J.\n\nMuklurjea :J.\n\nS. It."}}, {"text": "S. It. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102952, "end_char": 102962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri :J.\n\nMuklurjea :J.\n\nS. It.", "canonical_name": "S. It. Das"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102966, "end_char": 102977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vivian Bose J.\n\nJune 1", "canonical_name": "V1v1AN BosE"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_729_746_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 729\n\nappears to have been instituted to test the validity of a controversial measure and to secure a final decision on it to set at rest the doubts and uncertainties which may have clouded the minds of a section of the public as to how far the provisions of the Act conform to law and to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in the present Constitution.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-1 agree and have nothing more to add.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-1 have read the judgment of my learned brother Mr. Justice Fazl Ali and I am in entire agreement with his conclusions and reasons.\n\nThere is nothing further which I can usefully add.\n\nS. R. DAs J.-1 agree and I have nothing further to add.\n\nV1VIAN BosE J.-I also agree.\n\nAppeal No. 182 allowed.\n\nAppeal No. 183 dismissed.\n\nAgent for the appellants in Case No. 182 and respondents in Case No. 183 : P. A. Mehta~ .\n\nAgent for the respondent in Case No. 182 and appellant in Case No. 183 : Rajinder Narain for R. A. Gagrat.\n\nTARA SINGH\n\nTHE STATE.\n\n[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,\n\nS. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), ss. 173 (1), 190 (1) (b), 340 (1), 342, 288-Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 145-Filing of second challan-Whether vitiates first report-Examination of accused-Imp<>rtance of-Statements made in Committal Court- W hen admissible.\n\nWhere the report made by a police officer to the Magistrate complies with the requirements of s. 173 ( 1) of the Criminal Procedure Code the Magistrate can take cognisance. of the case\n\nThe State qf\n\nBol1'bay and Another\n\nF. N. Balsara.\n\nPatanjali Sastri :J.\n\nMuklurjea :J.\n\nS. It. Das].\n\nVivian Bose J.\n\nJune 1\n\nTia• Stott\n\nunder s. 190 (1) (b) of the Code. The fact that a second challan was put in later would not necessarily vitiate the first and invalidate the proceedings taken before the second challan was submitted.\n\nThe right conferred by s. 340 ( 1) of the Criminal Procedure Code does not extend to a right in an accused person to be provided with a lawyer by the State or by the Police or by the Magistrate.\n\nThat is a privilege given to him and it is his duty to ask for a lawyer if he wants to engage one, or to engage one himself, or get \"his relations to engage one for him.\n\nThe only duty cast on the Magistrate is to afford him the necessary opportunity.\n\nAn accused should be properly examined under s. 342 of th.,.\n\nCode and, if a point in the evidence is considered important against the accused and the conviction is intended to be based upon it, then it is right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it if he so desires.\n\nThis is an important and salutary provision and should not be slurred over.\n\nIt is not a proper compliance of s. 342 to read out a long string of questions and answers made in the Committal Court and ask the accused whether the statement is correct.\n\nA question of that kind is misleading.\n\nIn the next place, it is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him.\n\nDwark_anath v. Emperor (A.LR. 1933 P. C. 124) referred to.\n\nIn view of the words \"subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act\" whith occur in s. 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the evidence given by a witness in the Committal Court cannot be used as substantive evidence in the Sessions Court unless the witness is confronted with those parts of his evidence which arc to be used for the purpose of contradicting him, even though if the only object of the prosecution is to discredit the evidence given in the Sessions Court by cross-examination him with reference to previous statements made in the Committal Court, it is not necessary to do so.\n\nCluMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURiso1cnoN : Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 1951. Appeal against the Judgment and Order dated the 6th June, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla in Criminal Appeal No. 75 of 1950.\n\nHardayal Hardy for the appellant.\n\nS. L. Chibber for the respondent.\n\n1951.\n\nJune 1.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered.\n\nBosE J.-This is an appeal under arti:cle 136 (1) of the Constitution. The appellant, Tara Singh, was convicted of murder by the Additional Sessions Judge of Amritsar and sentenced to death. On appeal the High Court upheld the conviction and confirmed the sentence.\n\nTara Singh has made a further appeal to this Court.\n\nAs we intend to order a retrial, it will not be desirable to say anything about the merits of the case. The case for the prosecution is that two persons, Milkha Singh and Hakam Singh, were murdered in the early hours of the morning of Friday the 30th of September, 1949.\n\nThe former is the appellant's uncle.\n\nHe died on the spot.\n\nThe latter is the appellant's father. He was removed to the hospital and died there on Friday, the 7th of October, 1949.\n\nThe murders are said to have been committed about three in the morning. The appellant's brother Narindar Singh reported the occurrence at the Police Station, about 7 miles distant, at 8.45 the sae morning.\n\nAccording to this report, Narindar was present and he named the appellant as the assailant.\n\nThe prosecution alleges that there were three eyewitnesses to the assault on the father Hakam Singh,\n\nnamely the appellant's brother Na:rindar Singh, his mother Bibi Santi and his sister Bibi Jito, aged 14.\n\nThey are said to have arrived on the scene while the appellant was still attacking the father with a kripan.\n\nThe prosecution version is that these three persons saw the uncle Milkha Singh laying . dead on the scene of the occurrence with injuries on his person, and it is said that the appellant admitted to them that he had killed the uncle.\n\nThe appellant is also said to have made an extrajudicial confession to three persons, Ujagar Singh (P.W. 8), Fauja Singh (P.W. 9) and Gurbakhsh Singh (P.W. 10). The prosecution also adduced evidence about three dying declarations made by the father Hakam Singh in each of which he implicated the appellant.\n\nThe State.\n\nBose].\n\n!951\n\nThe State\n\nBose J.\n\nTwo of these were made to the police and the third was recorded by a Magistrate on the !st of October.\n\nThe appellant was arrested between 4 and 5 p.m. on Friday, 30th September, the day of the occurrence, and was produced before a Magistrate on the 1st October.\n\nThe. police asked for a remand to police custody till the 2nd as their enquiry was not complete. This was granted and the appellant was produced bef9re another Magistrate on the 3rd.\n\nWhen the appellant was produced on the 3rd October, the police handed over to the Magistrate what they called an incomplete challan dated the 2nd October, 1949, and also produced certain prosecution witnesses.\n\nIt is not clear whether these witness~ were named in the challan of that date or not, but that is a matter which can be cleared up in the course of the retrial which we intend to order. Among the witnesses so produced were three who are said to have witnessed. the occurrence.\n\nThey were the appellant's brother Narindar, his mother Bibi Santi and his sister Bibi Jito. The Magistrate examined them straightaway and recorded their evidence.\n\nThe appellant was not at the time represented by counsel.\n\nOn the 5th of October, the police put in what they called a complete challandmd on the 19th they put in a supplementary chllan. The Magistrate committed the appellant for trial on the 12th of November, 1949.\n\nThe first objection taken to the trial is that the Magistrate had no power to take cognizance of the case on the 3rd October. Accordingly, the depositions ofthe three so-called eye-witnesses which he recorded on the 3rd cannot be received in evidence, and if they are excluded, then for reasons which I shall set out hereafter, the whole case against the appellant collapses because, according to the learned counsel, there is no other evidence on which the conviction can properly be based.\n\nThis part of the argument is based on section 190, Criminal Procedure Code. It is contended that cognizance of an offence can only be taken in one of the ways set out in that section.\n\nWe are concerned here with the method set out in clause (b) of sub-section (1), namely \"upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer.\" It is cont.ended that the police are not permitted to send in an incomplete report because of the provisions of section 173(1) which runs as follows :-\n\n\"Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and as soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall:_\n\n(a) forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed etc ...... \"\n\nI need not express any opinion about this because, in my opini<m the challan which the police referred to as an incomplete challan, namely the one of 2nd October, 1949, was in fact a complete report within the meaning of section 193(l)(b}, Criminal Procedure Code, read with section 173(1).\n\nWhen the police drew up their challan . of the 2nd October, 1949, . and submitted it to the court on the 3rd, they had in fact completed their investigation except for the report of the Imperial Serologist and the drawing of a sketch map of the occurrence.\n\nIt is always permissible for the Magistrate to take additional evidence not set , out in the challan. Therefore the mere fact that a second challan W?S put in on the 5th October would not necessarily vitiate the first.\n\nAll that section 173(1) (a) requires is that as so0n as the police investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code is complete, there should be forwarded to the Magistrate a report in the prescribed form \"seting forth the names of the parties, the nature of the information _and the names of the person who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case.\" All that appears to have been done in the report of the 2nd October which the police called their incomplete challan. The witnesses named in the second\n\n6=!l. s. a. India/68\n\nTiu Stall\n\nBost].\n\nTh• Stat•\n\nBas<].\n\nchallan of the 5th October were not witnesses who were \"acquainted with the circumstances of the case.\" They were merely formal witnesses on other matters.\n\nSo also in the supplementary challan of the 19th. The witnesses named are the 1st class Magistrate, Amritsar, who recorded the dying declaration, and the Assistant Civil Surgeon.\n\nThey are not witnesses who were \"acquainted with the circumstances of the case.\" Accordingly, the challan which the police calltd an incomplete challan was in fact a completed report of the kind which section 173(1)(a) of the Code contemplates. There is no force in this argument and we hold that the Magistrate took proper cognisance of the matter.\n\nThe next point urged was that when, the Magistrate recorded the evidence of the three eye-witnesses, he did not afford the appellant an opportunity of being represented by counsel though he is given that right by section 340 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThere might have been force in this contention because of the peculiar circumstances of this case, had it not been for the fact that the inquiry continued after the date on which the three eye-witnesses were examined and the appellant made no complaint about this.\n\nHe did not at any of the subsequent proceedings before the Committing Magistrate ask for permission to engage a counsel or indicate in any way that he desired to be represented by one.\n\nI have referred to the peculiar circumstances of this case.\n\nI say that because this is a case in which the accused is said to have killed his father and his uncle.\n\nAs far as I can gather from the record, his only relatives are his brother Narindar, his mother Bibi Santi and his sister Bibi Jito. Ordinarily, when a man is arrested for murder and is proceeded against and he wants to be represented, his relatives come to his\n\nrescue and engage counsel for him, but in a case like this, if the prosecution story is true, the only relatives the man has would not help him because, in their eyes, he was a patricide and they, being filled with indigna- 1 tion against him, took all steps they could to bring\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSuPREME\" COURT REPORTS 735\n\nhim to justice. On the other hand, if the present story of the appellant is correct and the witnesses were . intimidated by the police, equally they would take no steps to assist the appellant.\n\nEither way, the appellant would, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, be helpless from that point of view. Therefore, had it not been for the fact that there were subsequent proceedings in which the apllant could have raised this objection had there been any substance in it, we might have considered the argument with more favour.\n\nBut the appellant's subsequent conduct indicat.es that he had no intention of engaging counsel and made 'no grievance of the fact. I need hardly say that the right conferred _by section 340 (1) does\"not extend to a right in an accused person to be provided . with a lawyer by the State or by the police or by the . Magistrate. That is a privilege given to him and it is his , duty to ask for a lawyer if he wants to engage one and to engage one himself or get his relations. to engage one for him.\n\nThe only duty cast on the Magistrate is to afford him the necessary opportunity. There is no force in this contention either ..\n\nThe next point taken regarding the committal stage of the case is that the Committing Magistrate did not examine the appellant properly under sections 209 and 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nSection 342 (1) states that \"for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court may etc ... \" And sub-section (3) states that \"the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial.\" Further, section 287 requires that \"the examination of the accused duly recorded by or before the Committing Magistrate shall be tendered by the prosecutor and read as evidence.\" (This refers to the sessions trial).\n\nIt is important therefore that an accused should be properly examined under section 342 and, as their Lordships of the Privy Council indicated in Dwarkanath v. Emperor(1), if a point in the evidence is\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1933 P.O. 124 at 130. 7'4 s. C. India/68\n\nTiu Stott\n\nBost].\n\n!951\n\nTara SingA\n\nTiu State\n\nBose].\n\nconsidered important against the accused and the conviction is intended to be based upon it, then it is right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it if he so desires.\n\nThis is an important and salutary provision and I cannot permit it to be slurred over. I regret to : find that in many cases scant attention is paid to it, particularly in Sessions Courts.\n\nBut whether the matter arises in the Sessions Court or in that of the Committing Magistrate, it is important that the provisions of section 342 should be fairly and faithfully observed.\n\nSo far as the committal proceedings in this case are concerned, the examination was on the whole fair and full for the purposes of a Committal Court though I feel the form of the questions put could have been a little different.\n\nAs they stand, the questions read more like cross-examination than an examination under section 208(2). I refer, for example, to the first question which reads as follows :-\n\n\"Was Milkha Singh deceased your uncle issueless and wanted to gift away his land to the Gurdwara Baba Bakala, which fact you resented?\"\n\nand to the second question which reads-\n\n\"did you also resent your father mortgaging his land?\"\n\nThe proper form in these two cases would have been to tell the accused who suggested that he resented the .fact that his uncle who was issueless wanted to gift away his land, and in the second question, who said that he resented his father mortgaging his land, and then, after having told him that to ask him after each question whether he wanted to say anything about the matter. However, the point is trivial in this case because the questions put are based on the evidence of witnesses before the Committing Magistrate and the questioning was sufficient for the Committing Magistrate's purposes. All that he had to consider was whether under section 209(1) there were sufficient grounds for committing the appellant for trial and not\n\nwhether, on an appreciation of the whole evidence and other material in the case, including witnesses for the defence, the charge against him was proved. I am of opinion that despite some shortcomings the committal was good.\n\nI turn next to the proceedings in the Sessions Court.\n\nThere are two grave defects there which, in my opinion, vitiate the trial. The first is that the examination of the appellant was not in accordance with the provisions of section 342.\n\nThe second is that when the depositions of some of the witnesses examined before the Committing Magistrate were brought on record in the Sessions Court under section 288, the witnesses who made the statements were not confronted with their previous statements as required by section 145 of the Evidence Act.\n\nDealing first with the examination of the appellant by the Sessions Judge, all he did was to read over the examination of the accused in the Commital Court and then record the following statements and answers:-\n\n\"Q. Did you make the statement: on 9th November, 1949, as read out to you, and is it correct ?\n\nA. Yes.\n\nQ. Have you anything else to say ?\n\nA. No. I am innocent and the statement of the witnesses in the Court of the Committing Magistrate were recorded without any notice to me.\n\nI could not therefore, engage any counsel.\n\nQ. Do you wish to produce any defence ?\n\nA. No.\"\n\nSection 342 requires the accused to be examined for the purpose of enabling him \"to explain any . circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.\" Now it is evident that when the Sessions Court is required to make the examination under this section, the evidence referred to is the evidence in the Sessions Court and the circumstances which appear against the accused in that Court.\n\nIt is not therefore enough to\n\nThi State\n\nBose J.\n\nThe State\n\nBose J.\n\nread over the questions and answers put in the Committing Magistrate's Court and ask the accused whether he has anything to say about them. In the present case, there was not even that.\n\nThe appellant was not asked to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him but was asked whether the statements made before the Committing Magistrate and his answers given there were correctly recorded.\n\nThat does not comply with the requirements of the section. There is also more than that in this case.\n\nThe evidence recorded in the Committal Magistrate's Court. is not as full and as complete as the evidence recorded in the trial before the Sessions Judge.\n\nAccordingly, it often happens that evidence is given in the Sessions Court and facts are disclosed which do not appear on the record of the Committing Magistrate.\n\nIf the Judge intends to use these against the accused, it is clearly not enough to question him about matters which occurred in the Committal Court, for material of this kind will not be found in the committal record m these circumstances.\n\nThat has happened here.\n\nThe Sessions Judge relied on the following circumstances.\n\nFirst of all, he characterised as a \"most significant piece of evidence\" the fact that the three eyewitnesses had admitted before him that the appellant was present in the Deohri before they went to the scene of the occurrence on hearing the victims' cries and that these witnesses did not suggest that there was anybody else who was responsible for the injuries to the deceased. Now, this was evidence which was recorded exclusively in the Sessions Court. The eye witnesses before the Sessions Judge had resiled from the previous statements which they made in the committal proceedings.\n\nAccordingly, a questioning by the Committing Magistrate would not and could not cover the point made here and, naturally, the Magistrate has not questioned the appellant about that circumstance.\n\nAs the three eye witnesses had resiled from their statements made in the committal proceedings, the Sessions Judge brought their depositions on record\n\nunder section 288, Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nHe next relied on the evii:lence of these witnesses as recorded in the Court of the Committing Magistrate. One point he used against them was the evidence of motive which these witnesses supplied in the committal proceedings.\n\nThe appellant was not told what that evidence was nor was he asked to explain it. He was questioned about this motive in the committal proceedings by the Committing Magistrate, but even there he was not told who had given the evidence, and the material on which the Committing Magistrate relied to establish the presense of motive was not disclosed.\n\nThe Sessions Judge also relied on the fact that the appellant had confessed to the three eye witnesses that he had killed his uncle and injured his ather. There is not a single question regarding. that either in the Committing Magistrate's Court or in the Sessions Court.\n\nAnother ground on which the Sessions Judge proceeded was the extra-judicial confessions made by the appellant to Ujagar Singh, Fauja Singh and Gurbakhsh singh.\n\nThe appellant was questioned about an extrajudicial confession by the Committing Magistrate btit not about one made to these three persons. What the Committing Magistrate asked was :-\n\n\"Did you confess on 30th September, 1949, at Timmowal before Ujagar Singh, Mangal Singh P.Ws. etc., that you had killed Milkha Singh and cause injuries to your father ?\n\nIt will be seen that Fauja Singh and Gurbakhsh Singh were not mentioned at all, and yet the Sessions Judge considered them \"respectables of the village\" and said that they were independent witnesses. If the appellant had been asked about them, he might have been able to show that they were not disinterested and that they had some motive for implicating him falsely, or that they were not there.\n\nNext, the Sessions Judge considered that \"the most important piece of evidence damaging to the accused\" was the dying declaration of Hakam Singh recorded\n\n195!\n\nTata Singft\n\nTAI Stale\n\n8o11 J.\n\nTara Sing/,\n\nThe Stat•\n\nBose J.\n\nby the Magistrate, P.W. 5.\n\nNeither the Sessions Judge nor the Committing Magistrate questioned the appellant about that.\n\nThe Sessioas Judge also relied on the two statements of Ha.kam Singh made before the police one of which the police recorded as his dying declaration. Again, not on~ word was put to the appellant about this.\n\nNow, section 342(2) requires that the anwsers given by the accused may be ta.ken into consideration.\n\nIf the accused had been properly questioned and had given reasonable explanations and the Sessions Judge had omitted to take them into consideration, it is obvious that that would have constituted . a grave defect in his judgment. How much graver is the defect when the accused is not questioned at all and is not given an opportunity of explaining the circumstances which are intended to be used against him.\n\nThe unfairness of the Sessions Judge's conclusion can be gathered from the fact that he (the Sessions Judge) considered the evidence of the eye witnesses before him (as distinct from the depositions brought on record under section 288) material and then, not having asked the appellant for any explanation, he said:-\n\n\"The accused himself has not rendered any explanation as to at whose hands the two deceased had met their death.\"\n\nThis is precisely what the Privy Council commented on in Dwarkanath v. Emperor(') where the High Court having relied on a piece of evidence which it considered vital went on to say that the accused had not explained it.\n\nTheir Lordships remarked that that \"deprives of any force the suggestion that the doctor's omission to explain what he was ne\\>er asked to explain supplies evidence on which the jury should infer etc.\"\n\nThe High Court has fallen into the same error and has based its decision on material which the appellant was not asked to explain. For example, the learned Judges rely on the evidence of the three eye\n\n(') A.LR. 1933 P.C. 134 at 135.\n\n' _,\n\nwitnesses before the Committing Magistrate. They also rely on the fact that Narindar's evidence in the Committing Magistrate's Court in corroborated by the First Information which he gave to the police. The appellant was not questioned about these maers either in the Sessions Court or by the Committing Magistrate.\n\nThe High Court also relies on the evidence of the three witnesses who speak about !the extra-judicial confeSlsion and the learned Judges state that these witnesses \"are not suggested to be in any way unfriendly to the appellant and they seem to be persons of respectability.\" Here, again, if the appellant was not asked whether these witnesses were unfriendly or not, it is not fair to use the absence of such a suggestion as something which tells against the appellant. It is true the accused can cross-examine as to comity but he is not confined to that.\n\nIt may be that in a given case cross-examination would be futile, for it would only elicit a denial, whereas a statement made by the accused which the Code directs should be used as evidence, for or against him, might be of great Yalue.\n\nIn any event, the Code directs that the accused shall be afforded these opportunities and an omission to do so vitiates the trial if prejudice occurs or is likely to occur.\n\nThe High Court also bases its conclusion on the circumstantial evidence arising from the production of the Kripan and the recovery of the shirt from the appellant.\n\nThose articles are said to be stained with human blood.\n\nThe appellant was not asked to give any explanation about this.\n\nThe Serologist's report had not been received whrn the appellant was questioned by the Committing Magistrate. Therefore, he could not be asked to explain the presence of human blood stains on the Kripan.\n\nAll he was asked was whether the blood-stained Kripan was recovered at his instance.\n\nThat is not enough. He should also have been asked whether he could explain the presence of blood stains on it.\n\nThe two are not the same.\n\nThen, in the Sessions Court there was the additional evidence of the Imperial Serologist showing that the Kripan had\n\nT Illa Sintli\n\nTli1 St4t1\n\n8011 J.\n\nThe State\n\nBose J.\n\nstains of human blood on it. That was an additional and very vital piece of evidence which the appellant should have been afforded an opportunity of explainmg.\n\nI cannot stress too strongly the importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of section 342, Criminal Procedure Code_ It is not a proper compliance to read out a long string of questions and answers made in the Committal Court and ask whether the statement is correct.\n\nA question of that kind is misleading.\n\nIt may mean either that the questioner wants to know whether the recording is correct, or whether the answers given are true, or whether there is some mistake or misunder£landing despite the accurate recording.\n\nIn the next pface, it is not sufficient compliance to string together a long seri, es of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them.\n\nHe must be questioned separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him.\n\nThe whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him.\n\nThe questioning must therefore be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand.\n\nEven when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of murder. He is therefore in no lit position to understand the significance of a complex question. Fairness therefore requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand.\n\nI do not suggest that every error or om1ss1on in this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial because I am opinion that errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case depends upon the . degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been occasioned.\n\nIn my opinion, the disregard of the provisions of section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, is so\n\ngross. in this case that I feel there is. grave likelihood of prejudice.\n\nBut this it not the only error.\n\nTwo of the three eye witnesses whose depositions before the Committing Magistrate were brought on the sessions record under section 288 were not confronted with their former statements in the; manner required by section 145, Evidence Act. 'All that happened is that they were asked something about their previous statements and they replied that they were made under coercion.\n\nNow, section 145 of the Evidence Act states that :- . ''\n\n\"A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, (without such writing being shown to him) or being proved .... \".\n\nThis is all that seems to have occurred in the cases of Bibi Santi (P.W. 6) and Bibi Jito (P.W. 7). But the section goes on :-\n\n\"but if it is intended to contradict him by. the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.\"\n\nNow, it is evident that one of the main purposes of using the previous statements was to contradict and displace the evidence given before the Sessions Court because until that evidence was contradicated and displaced, there was no room in this case for permitting the previous 5.tatcments to be brought on record and used under section 288.\n\nTherefore, as these statements were not put to these witnesses and as their attention was not drawn to them in the manner required by section 145, Evidence Act, they were not admissible in evidence.\n\nThe observations of the Privy Council in Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit(1) are relevant here.\n\nIn the case of Narindar Singh, his previous statement does seem to have been put to him in the proper\n\n(1) 42 I.A. 135 at 147.\n\nThe Stale\n\nBose j.\n\n!951\n\n'T•asiagh v. 'Thi St.ti\n\n, S.S• ].\n\nway.\n\nThe partiCular portions on which the prosecution desired to contradict him were read out and he was afforded an opportunity of explaining them.\n\nSo the inadmissiblity extends only to the other two witnesses.\n\nThere is some difference of opm1on regarding this matter in. the High Courts. Section 2~8 provides that the evidence recorded . by the Committing Magistrate in the presence of the accused may, in the circumstances set out in the section, \"be treated as evidence in the case for all purposes subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.\" One line of reasoning is that section 145, Evidence Act, is not attracted because that section relates to previous statements in wntmg which are to be used for the purpose of contradiction alone.\n\nStatements of that kind do not become substantive evidence and though the evidence given in the trial can be destroyed by a contradiction , of that kind, the previous statements cannot be used as substantive evidence and no decision can be grounded on them.\n\nBut under. section 288, Criminal Procedure Code, the previous statement becomes evidence for all purposes and can form the basis of a conviction.\n\nTherefore, according to this line of reasoning, section 145 of the Evidence Act is not attracted. Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act referred to are those relating to hearsay and matters of that kind which touch substantive evidence.\n\nThe other line of reasoning is that section 288 makes no exception of any provision in the Evidence Act and therefore section 145 cannot be excluded.\n\nAs that section is one of the provisions or the Act, the statements are subject to its provisions as well.\n\nAll that section 288 does is to import into the law of evidence somethiug which is not to be found in the Evidence Act, namely,. to make a statement of this kind substantive evidence, but only when all the provisions of the Evidence Act have been duly complied with.\n\nIn my opinion, the secohd line of reasoning is to be preferred. I see no reason why •ection 145 of the\n\nEvidence Act should be excluded when section 288 states that the previous statements are to be \"subject\n\nto the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.\" Section 145 falls fairly and squarely within the plain meaning of these words.\n\nMore than that.\n\nThis is a fair and proper provision and is in accord with the sense. of £airplay to which _Courts are accustomed.\n\nEven the learned Judges who take the first view consider for the most part that though it is not obligatory (o confront a witness with his former statement when section 288 is resorted to, it is always desirable that that should be done if only for the reason that an omission to do so weakens the value of the testimony.\n\nI am of opinion that the matter is deeper than that, and giving effect to the plain meaning of the words \"subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act\" as they stand. I hold that the evidence in the Committal Court cannot be used in the Sessions Court unless the witnesses is confronted with his previous statement as required by section 145 of the Evidence Act.\n\nOf course, the witness can be cross-examined about the previous statement and that cross-examination can be used to destroy his testimony in the Sessions Court.\n\nIf that serves the purpose of the prosecution, then nothing more is required, but if the prosecution wishes to go further and use the previous testimony to the contrary as substantive evidence, then it must, in my opinion, confront the witness with those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. Then only can the matter be brought in as substantive evidence under section 288.\n\nAs two of the eye witnesses were not confronted in the anner required by section 145, their statements will have to be ruled out, and if that is done the material on which the conviction is based is considerably weakened.\n\nI have considered anxiously whether this is a case in which we should direct a retrial de novo or whether the\n\nretial should be from the stage at which the irregularity occurred or whether we should refuse to alfow a\n\nretral and acquit th~ appellant.\n\nHaving given my anxious thought to this matter, I am of opinion that\n\nT•ts Sing!&\n\nTiu S1ti11\n\n/Jifsl J.\n\nTMa Slogh\n\nThi SI\"''\n\n&s•]·\n\nthere should be a retrial de novo in the Sessions Court either by the same or by some other Sessions Judge. I consider it inexpedient to say more than this, lest I prejudice the issue one way or the other.\n\nThe conviction and sentence are set aside and the case is sent back to the High Court with a direction that that Court will order a retrial de novo in the Sessions Court, treating the committal as good.\n\nFAZL Au J.-1 agree and have nothing to add.\n\nPATANJALI SASTRI J.-1 agree and have nothing further to add.\n\nDAS J.-1 agree to the order proposed by my learned brother Bose.\n\n• , •\n\nRe-trial cwdered.\n\nAgent for the appellant : Ganpt1t Rai.\n\nAgent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta .", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 513, "end_char": 521, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIR SYED FAZL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. 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L. Chibber", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4119, "end_char": 4132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. L. Chibber for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Tara Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Tara Singh, was convicted of murder by the Additional Sessions Judge of Amritsar and sentenced to death.", "canonical_name": "TARA SINGH"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge of Amritsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4339, "end_char": 4376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Tara Singh, was convicted of murder by the Additional Sessions Judge of Amritsar and sentenced to death."}}, {"text": "Tara Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4477, "end_char": 4487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tara Singh has made a further appeal to this Court.", "canonical_name": "TARA SINGH"}}, {"text": "Milkha Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4684, "end_char": 4696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case for the prosecution is that two persons, Milkha Singh and Hakam Singh, were murdered in the early hours of the morning of Friday the 30th of September, 1949."}}, {"text": "Hakam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case for the prosecution is that two persons, Milkha Singh and Hakam Singh, were murdered in the early hours of the morning of Friday the 30th of September, 1949.", "canonical_name": "Ha.kam Singh"}}, {"text": "30th of September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4776, "end_char": 4799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case for the prosecution is that two persons, Milkha Singh and Hakam Singh, were murdered in the early hours of the morning of Friday the 30th of September, 1949."}}, {"text": "7th of October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4961, "end_char": 4981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was removed to the hospital and died there on Friday, the 7th of October, 1949."}}, {"text": "Narindar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5080, "end_char": 5094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's brother Narindar Singh reported the occurrence at the Police Station, about 7 miles distant, at 8.45 the sae morning.", "canonical_name": "Na:rindar Singh"}}, {"text": "Narindar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to this report, Narindar was present and he named the appellant as the assailant.", "canonical_name": "Na:rindar Singh"}}, {"text": "Na:rindar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5417, "end_char": 5432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution alleges that there were three eyewitnesses to the assault on the father Hakam Singh,\n\nnamely the appellant's brother Na:rindar Singh, his mother Bibi Santi and his sister Bibi Jito, aged 14.", "canonical_name": "Na:rindar Singh"}}, {"text": "Bibi Santi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution alleges that there were three eyewitnesses to the assault on the father Hakam Singh,\n\nnamely the appellant's brother Na:rindar Singh, his mother Bibi Santi and his sister Bibi Jito, aged 14."}}, {"text": "Bibi Jito", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5471, "end_char": 5480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution alleges that there were three eyewitnesses to the assault on the father Hakam Singh,\n\nnamely the appellant's brother Na:rindar Singh, his mother Bibi Santi and his sister Bibi Jito, aged 14."}}, {"text": "Ujagar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is also said to have made an extrajudicial confession to three persons, Ujagar Singh (P.W. 8), Fauja Singh (P.W. 9) and Gurbakhsh Singh (P.W. 10)."}}, {"text": "Fauja Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is also said to have made an extrajudicial confession to three persons, Ujagar Singh (P.W. 8), Fauja Singh (P.W. 9) and Gurbakhsh Singh (P.W. 10)."}}, {"text": "Gurbakhsh Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5971, "end_char": 5986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is also said to have made an extrajudicial confession to three persons, Ujagar Singh (P.W. 8), Fauja Singh (P.W. 9) and Gurbakhsh Singh (P.W. 10)."}}, {"text": "State\n\nBose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6175, "end_char": 6186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "951\n\nThe State\n\nBose J.\n\nTwo of these were made to the police and the third was recorded by a Magistrate on the !"}}, {"text": "5th of October", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7358, "end_char": 7372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th of October, the police put in what they called a complete challandmd on the 19th they put in a supplementary chllan."}}, {"text": "12th of November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Magistrate committed the appellant for trial on the 12th of November, 1949."}}, {"text": "section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8091, "end_char": 8102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8104, "end_char": 8127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 173(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8506, "end_char": 8520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 173(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9631, "end_char": 9645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter XIV of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9709, "end_char": 9732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10456, "end_char": 10464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses named are the 1st class Magistrate, Amritsar, who recorded the dying declaration, and the Assistant Civil Surgeon."}}, {"text": "section 173(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10737, "end_char": 10754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 340", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11100, "end_char": 11111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 340", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13058, "end_char": 13069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 209 and 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13650, "end_char": 13670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13704, "end_char": 13715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 287", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13999, "end_char": 14010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14283, "end_char": 14294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15081, "end_char": 15092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 208(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15454, "end_char": 15468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 209(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16420, "end_char": 16434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16965, "end_char": 16976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17137, "end_char": 17148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17254, "end_char": 17265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th November, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17535, "end_char": 17553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing first with the examination of the appellant by the Sessions Judge, all he did was to read over the examination of the accused in the Commital Court and then record the following statements and answers:-\n\n\"Q. Did you make the statement: on 9th November, 1949, as read out to you, and is it correct ?"}}, {"text": "Section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17874, "end_char": 17885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20436, "end_char": 20447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20449, "end_char": 20472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ujagar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21439, "end_char": 21451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another ground on which the Sessions Judge proceeded was the extra-judicial confessions made by the appellant to Ujagar Singh, Fauja Singh and Gurbakhsh singh."}}, {"text": "Fauja Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21453, "end_char": 21464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another ground on which the Sessions Judge proceeded was the extra-judicial confessions made by the appellant to Ujagar Singh, Fauja Singh and Gurbakhsh singh."}}, {"text": "Gurbakhsh singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21469, "end_char": 21484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another ground on which the Sessions Judge proceeded was the extra-judicial confessions made by the appellant to Ujagar Singh, Fauja Singh and Gurbakhsh singh.", "canonical_name": "Gurbakhsh singh"}}, {"text": "September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21697, "end_char": 21712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What the Committing Magistrate asked was :-\n\n\"Did you confess on 30th September, 1949, at Timmowal before Ujagar Singh, Mangal Singh P.Ws."}}, {"text": "Timmowal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21717, "end_char": 21725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What the Committing Magistrate asked was :-\n\n\"Did you confess on 30th September, 1949, at Timmowal before Ujagar Singh, Mangal Singh P.Ws."}}, {"text": "Mangal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21747, "end_char": 21759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What the Committing Magistrate asked was :-\n\n\"Did you confess on 30th September, 1949, at Timmowal before Ujagar Singh, Mangal Singh P.Ws."}}, {"text": "Gurbakhsh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21879, "end_char": 21894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be seen that Fauja Singh and Gurbakhsh Singh were not mentioned at all, and yet the Sessions Judge considered them \"respectables of the village\" and said that they were independent witnesses.", "canonical_name": "Gurbakhsh singh"}}, {"text": "Tata Singft", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22401, "end_char": 22412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Singft\n\nTAI Stale\n\n8o11 J.\n\nTara Sing/,\n\nThe Stat•\n\nBose J.\n\nby the Magistrate, P.W. 5."}}, {"text": "Tara Sing/", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22434, "end_char": 22444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Singft\n\nTAI Stale\n\n8o11 J.\n\nTara Sing/,\n\nThe Stat•\n\nBose J.\n\nby the Magistrate, P.W. 5.", "canonical_name": "TARA SINGH"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22458, "end_char": 22462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Singft\n\nTAI Stale\n\n8o11 J.\n\nTara Sing/,\n\nThe Stat•\n\nBose J.\n\nby the Magistrate, P.W. 5."}}, {"text": "Ha.kam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22646, "end_char": 22658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessioas Judge also relied on the two statements of Ha.kam Singh made before the police one of which the police recorded as his dying declaration.", "canonical_name": "Ha.kam Singh"}}, {"text": "section 342(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22804, "end_char": 22818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23535, "end_char": 23546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26847, "end_char": 26858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26860, "end_char": 26883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28659, "end_char": 28670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28672, "end_char": 28695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28935, "end_char": 28946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29023, "end_char": 29034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29194, "end_char": 29205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Bibi Santi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29514, "end_char": 29524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is all that seems to have occurred in the cases of Bibi Santi (P.W. 6) and Bibi Jito (P.W. 7)."}}, {"text": "Bibi Jito", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29538, "end_char": 29547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is all that seems to have occurred in the cases of Bibi Santi (P.W. 6) and Bibi Jito (P.W. 7)."}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30119, "end_char": 30130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30267, "end_char": 30278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30920, "end_char": 30929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31166, "end_char": 31191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31224, "end_char": 31235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31661, "end_char": 31672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31674, "end_char": 31697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31845, "end_char": 31856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31895, "end_char": 31969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32108, "end_char": 32119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act", "statute": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32190, "end_char": 32201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act", "statute": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32340, "end_char": 32351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act", "statute": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32740, "end_char": 32751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act", "statute": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32833, "end_char": 32852, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32855, "end_char": 32866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act", "statute": "Judges who hold that view consider that the proyisions of the Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33228, "end_char": 33239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33529, "end_char": 33548, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33728, "end_char": 33739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 288", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34319, "end_char": 34330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34406, "end_char": 34417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34895, "end_char": 34897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35461, "end_char": 35464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAS J.-1 agree to the order proposed by my learned brother Bose."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35520, "end_char": 35524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAS J.-1 agree to the order proposed by my learned brother Bose.", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "Ganpt1t Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35579, "end_char": 35590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the appellant : Ganpt1t Rai."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35619, "end_char": 35630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta .", "canonical_name": "P. A. Mehta~"}}]}
{"document_id": "1951_1_747_1125_EN", "year": 1951, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 747\n\nIn re THE DELHI LAWS ACT, 1912,\n\nTHE AJMER-MERW ARA (EXTENSION OF LAWS)\n\nACT, 1947\n\nAND\n\nTHE PART C STATES (LAWS) ACT, 1950. ·\n\n[SHRI\n\nHARILAL\n\nKANIA, C. J., FAZL Au, PATANJALI\n\nSAsTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHEllJEA,\n\nDAs AND BosE JJ.]\n\nDelhi Laws Act, 1912, s. 7-Ajmer~Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, s. 2-Part C States (1.Aws) Act, 1950-Laws giving power to Government to extend to DClhi and Ajmer-Merwara with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any law in force in any other part of India-Law ., mpowering Government to extend to Part C States any law in force in a Part A Stateand to repeal existing laws -Validity-Rule against delegation of legislative powers-Scope and basis of the rule-Applicability to lndia:-Difference between delegation of legislative power and conditional legislation-Powers of Indian Legislature under the Indian Councils Act, 1861, the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Indian Constitution, 1950.\n\nSection 7 of the Delh.i Laws Act. 1912, provided that \"The Provincial Govemment may by notification in. the official gazette extend, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, to the Province of Delhi, or any part thereof, any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification\".\n\nSection 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, provided that \"The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend to the Province of Ajmer-Merwara, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in any other Province at the date of such notification. Section 2 of the P; trt C States\n\n(Laws) Act, 1950, provided that \"The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette extend to any Part C State ........ or to any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law . . . . which is for the time . being applicable to that Part C State.\n\nAs a result of a decision of the Federal Court, doubts were entertained with regard to the\n\nva\\ictity of laws delegating legislative powers to the executive Government and the President of India made a reference to the Supreme Court under Art. 143(1) of the Constitution for consider ing the question whether the above-mentioned sections or any provisions thereof were to any extent and if so to what extent\n\n2-!1 S.C India/68\n\n}, fay 23\n\n19'1\n\netc.\n\nand in what particulars, ultra vires the legislatures that respectively passed these laws, and for reporting to him the opinion of the Court thereon :\n\nHeld, (1) per FAZL ALI, PATANJALt SAsTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ, (KANIA. C. J., and MAHAJAN J., dissenting).- Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and s. 2 of the Ajmer- Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, are wholly intra vircs.\n\nKANIA C. ].-Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and s. 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, are ultra vircs to the extent power is given to the Government to extend Acts other than Acts of the Central Legislature to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara respectively inasmuch as to that extent the Central Legislature has abdicated its functions and delegated them to the executive government, MAHAJAN J.-Thc abovesaid sections arc ultra vires in the following particulars :\n\n(i) inasmuch as they permit the executive to apply to Delhi and AjmcrMcrwara, laws enacted by legislatures not competent to make laws for those territories and which these legislatures may make within their own legislative field, and (ii) inasmuch as they clothe the executive with co-extensive legislative authority in the matter of modification of laws made by legislative bodies in India.\n\n(2) Per FAZL ALI, PATANJAI.I SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAs and BoSE JJ.-The first portion of s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, which empowers the Central Government to extend to any Part C State or to \"!lY part of such State with such modifications and restrictions as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in a Part A State, is intra vires.\n\nPt+\n\nKANIA C. J.\n\nMAHAJAN, MVKHERJEA and BosE JJ.-The latter portion of the said section which empowers the Central Government to make provision in any enactment extended to a Part C Stes, for repeal or amendment of any law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C States, is ultra llirn. Per FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI and DAS JJ.-The latter portion of s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, is also intra virt:s . .\n\nKANIA C. J.-To the extent that s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, empowers the Central Government to extend laws passed by any Legislature of a Part A State to a Part C State it is ultra v; res.\n\nMAHAJAN ].-Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, is ultra vires in so far as it empowers the Central Government (i) to extend to a Part C State laws passed by a legislature which is not competent to make laws for that Part C State and (ii) to make modifications of laws made by the legislatures of India and\n\n(iii) to repeal or amend laws already applicable to that Part C State.\n\nKANIA C. J.-(i) The essentials of a legislative function arc the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct and these essentials arc the characteristics of a legislature by itself.\n\nThose essentials are preserved when the legislature specifies the basic conclusions of fact upon the ascertainment of which from relevant . data by a designated administrative agency it ordains that its statutory command is to be effective. The legislature having thus made its laws, every detail for working it out and for carrying the enactment into operation and effect may be done by the legislature or may be left to another subordinate agency or to some executive :officer. While this is . also sometimes described as delegation of legislative powers.\n\nIn essence it is different from delegation of legislative powes as t_his docs not involve the delegation of the power to determine the legislative policy and formulation of the same as a rule of conduct.\n\nWhile the so called delegation which empowers the making of rules and regulations has been recognised as ancillary to. legislative power, the Indian Legislature had no power prior to 1935 to delegate legislative power in its true sense.. Apart from the sovereign character of the British Parliament whose powers arc absolute and unlimited, a general power in the legislature to delegate legislative powers is not recognised in any sta!e. The powers of the Indian Legislature under the Constitution Acts of 1935 and 1950 a, re not different in this respect (ii) An\n\n\"abdication\" of its powers by a legislature need not necessarily .amount to complete effacement of itself. It may be partial.\n\nIf full powers to do everything that the legislature can do nre conferred on a subordinate authority, although _the legislature retains thb power to control the action of the subOrdinate authority by recalling such power or repealing the Acts passed by the subordinate authority, there is an abdication or effacement of the legislature conferring such power.\n\nFAZL Au J.-(i) The legislature must formally discharge its pimary legislative function itself and not through others. (ii) once 1t has been established that it has sovereign powers within a certain sphere, it is free to l.:gislatc within that sphere in any way which appears to it to be the best way to give effect to its intention and policy in making a particular law and it may utilise any outside agency to any extent it finds necessary for doing things, which it is unable to do itself . or finds it inconvenient to <lo. (iii) It cannot however abdicate its 1 cgislative functions and therefore, while entrusting power to an outside agency, it must sec that such agency acts as a subordinate authority and does not become a parallel legislature. (iv) As the courts of India arc not cornmittcci to the doctrine of separation of powers and the judicial interpretation it has received in America; there arc only two main checks in this country on the power of the legislature to delegate, these being its good sense and the principle that it should not cross the line beyond whlcli delegation amounts to\n\n1951 In,. rhe Dtlhl Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\n'abdication and sclf.dfacement.' ( v) The power to introduce necessary restrictions and modifications is incidental to the power to adapt or apply the law. The modifications contemplated arc such as can be made within the framework of the Act and no such as to affect its identity or structure or the essential purpose to be served by it.\n\nPATANJALI SASTIU J.-(i) It is now estal\\lishcd beyond doubt that the Indian Legislature, when acting within the limits cir cumscribiqg its Jcgislative power, has and was intended to have plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as those of the British Parliament itself and no constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative power to a subordinate unit is to be found in the Indian Councils Act, 1861, or the Govern ment of India Act, 1935, or the Constitution pf 1950.\n\nIt is therefore as competent for the Indian Legislature to make a law delegating legislative power, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as it is for the British Parliament to do so, provided it acts within the circumscribed limits (ii) Delegation of legislative authority is different from the creation of a new legislative power. In the former, the delegating body docs not efface itself but retains its legislative power intact and merely elects to exercise such power through an agency or instrumentality of its choice.\n\nIn the latter, there is no delegation of power to subordinate units but a grant of power to an independent and <\"ordinate body to make laws operative of their own force.\n\nFor the first, no express. provision authorising delegation is required. In the absence of a constitutfonal inbibitation, delegation of legislative power, however extensive, could be made so long as the delegating body retains its own legislative power intact.\n\nFor the second,. however, a positive coabling provision in the constitutional document is re~ quired.\n\n(iii) The maxim dekgatus non protest dekgare is not part of the constitutional law of Indian and has no more force than a political precept to be acted upon by legislatures .in the discharge of their function of making laws, and the courts cannot strike down an Act of Parliament as unconstitutional merely because Parliament decides in a particular instance to entrust its legislative power to another in whom it has c.onfidencc or, in other words, to exercise such power through its appointed instrumentality, however repugnant such entrustmcnt may be to the democratic process.\n\nWhat may be reg:irdcd as politically undesirable is constitutionally c:ompctcnt. (iv) however wide a meaning may be attributed to the expression \"restrictions and modification,\" it would not affect the constitutionality nf the delegating statute.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-(i) It is a set.tied maxim of c:Onstitutional law that a legislative body cannot delegate its power.\n\nNot only the nature of the legislative power but the very existence of representative gov..-nment depends on the doctrine that. legislative powers cannot be transferred. The legislature cannot: substitute thejudgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body, for those to which alone the people have been seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. The view that unless expressly prohibited a legislature has .a general power to delegate its legislative functions to a subordinate authority is not supported by authority or principle.\n\nThe correct v.iew is that unless the power to delegate is expressly given by the constitution, a legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative functions.\n\nAs the Indian Constitution does not give such power to the legislature, it has no power to delegate \"Cssential legislative functions to any other body. (ii) Abdication by a legislative body need not necessarily amount to complete effacement.\n\nThere is an abdication when in respect of a subject in the Legislative List that body says in effect that it will not legislate but would leave it to another to legislate on it.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-As regards constitutionality of the delegation -0f legislative powers, the Indian Legislature cannot be in the same position as the omnipotent British Parliament and how far delegation is permissible has to be ascertained in India as a matter -0f construction from the express provisions of the Indian Conti tution. It cannot be said that an unlimited right of delegation is inherent in the legislative power itself. This is not warranted by the provisions of the constitution and the legitimacy of delegation depends entirely upon its being used as an ancillary measure which the legislature considers to be necessary for the purpose of exercising its legislative powers effectively and com- . pletely.\n\nThe legislature must retain in its owh hands the essential legislative functions which consist in declaring the legislative policy and laying down the standard which is to be enacted into a rule of law and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute which delegates the power to make it.\n\nProvided the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts should not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself in determining the extent of delegation necessary in a particular case.\n\nDAs J.-(i) The Principle of non-delegation of legislative powers founded either on the doctrine of separation of powers or the theory of agency has no application to the British Parliament or the legislature constituted by an Act of the British Parliament; (ii) in the even present complexity of comlition is with which governments have tO deal, the power of delegation is necessary for, and ancillary to, the exercise of legislative power and is a component part of it; (iii) the operation of the act performed under delegated power is directly and immediately under .and by virtue of the law by which the power was delegated and its efficacy is referable _to that antecedent law ; (iv) if what the legislature does is legislation within the general scope of the a ffirmative words which give the power and if it violates no express\n\nJn re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912 etc.\n\ncondition or restriction by which that power is limited, then it is not for the court to enquire further or enlarge constructively those conditior.is or restrictions; { v) while the legislature is acting within its prescribed sphere there is, except as hereinafter stated,. no degree of, or limit to, its power of delegation of its legislative power, it being for the legislature to determine how far it should seek the aid of subordinate agencies and how long it shall continue them, and it is not for the court to prescribe any limit to the legislature's power of delegation ; (vi} the power of delegation is however subject to the qualification that the legislature may not abdicate or efface itself, that is, it may not, without preserving its own capacity intact, create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created or authorised by the Act to which it owes its own existence. {vii) The impungcd laws may also be supported as instances of conditional legislation within the meaning of the decision in Queen v. Burah.\n\nBo SE J .-Tlie Indian Parliament can legislate along the lines of Queen v. Burah, that is to say, .it can leave to another person or body the introduction or application of laws which arc, or may be, jn existence at that time in any part of India which is subject to the legislative control of Parliament, whether those laws are enacted by Parliament or by a State Lagislature set up by the constitution.\n\nBut delegation of this kind cannot proceed beyond that; it cannot extend to the repealing or altering in essential particulars laws which arc already in force in the area in qU:estion.\n\nSPECIAL Jm1sD1CT10N Special Reference No. 1 of 1951.\n\nThe circumstances which led to this Special Reference by the President and the questions referred appear fi om the full text of the reference dated 7th January, 1951, which is reproduced below :-\n\n\"W HEREAs in the year 1812 the Governor-General of India in Council acting in his legislative capacity enacted the Delhi Laws Act, 1812, section 7 of which conferred power on the Central Government by notification to extend to the Province of Delhi (that is to say,• the present State of Delhi) or any part thereof, with such restrictions and modifications at it thought fit, any enactment which was in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS in 1947 the Dominion Legislature enacted the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws} Act, 1947, section 2 of which conferred power on the Central Government by notification to extend to the Province of Ajmer- Merwara (that is to say, the present State of Ajmer), with such restrictions and modifications as it thought fit, any enactment which was in force in any other Province at the date of such notification;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS, by virtue of the powers conferred by the said sections of the said Acts, notifications were issued by the Central Government from time to time extending a number of Acts in force in the Governors' Provinces to the Province of Delhi and the Province of Ajmer-Merwara, sometimes with, and sometimes without, restrictions and modifications, and the Acts so extended and the orders, rules, by-laws and other instruments issued under such Acts were and arc regarded as valid law in force in the Province (now State of Delhi and in the Province of Ajmer-Merwara (now State of Ajmer ), as the case may be, and rights and privileges have been created, obligations and liabilities have been incurred and penalties, forfeitures and punishments have been incurred or imposed under such Acts and instruments ;\n\n\"AND WHEllEAs Parliament with the object inter .alia of making a uniform provision for extension of laws with regard to all Part C States except Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands enacted the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, section 2 of which comes power on the Central Government by notification to extend to any Part C State (other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and also confers the power on the Central Government to make provision in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Patt C State ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS section 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 has repealed section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension .of Laws) Act, 1947, but the effect of the provisos to the said section is, notwithstanding the said repeals, to continue, inter alia in force the Acts extended to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Mcrwara or the States of Delhi and Ajmer under the provisions repealed by the said section ;\n\n\"AND\n\nWHEREAS notifications have been issued by the Central Government from time to time under section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, extending Acts in force in Part A States to various Part C States sometimes. with, and sometimes without, restrictions and modifications ;\n\n\"AND\n\nWHEREAS the Federal Court of India in /atindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar( 1) held by a majority that\n\n( 1) (1949) F.C.R. S9S.\n\n19$1\n\nIn re T•e Delhi Law1Act,1912,\n\netc\n\nthe proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, was ultra .vires of the Bihar Legislature inter alia on the ground that the said proviso conferred power on the Provincial Government to. modify an Act of the Provincial Legislature and thus amounted to a delegation of legislative power ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS as a result of the said decision of the Federal Court, doubts have arisen regarding the validity of Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, Section 2 of the Ajmer-Marwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, and Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, and of the Acts extended to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara .and various Part C States under the said sections espccti vely, and of the orders and other instruments issued under the Acts so extended :\n\n\"AND WHEREAS the validity of Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, and of the Acts extended by virtue of the powers conferred by the said section has been challenged in some cases pending at present before the Punjab High Court, the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer, and the District Court and the Subordinate Courts in Delhi ;\n\n0 AND WHEREAS, in view of what. is hcrcinbcforc stated, it appears to me that the following qliestions of law have arisen and arc of such nature and of such public importance that it is expedient that the opinion of the Supreme Court of India should be obtained thereon;\n\n\"Now THEREPoJtE, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by clause powers (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution, I,\n\nRajendra Prasad, President of India, hereby refer the said questions. to the Supreme Court of India for consideration and report thereon, namely :-\n\n\"( 1) Was section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars .or to what extent ultra vires the Legislatore which passed the said Act ?\n\n\"(2) Was the Ajmer-Mcrwara (Extension 1947, or any of the provisions thereof and cular or particulars . or to what extent ultra lature which passed the said Act?\n\nof Laws) in what\n\nvirs the\n\nAct, parti- Lcgis-\n\n\"(3) Is section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra ires the Parliament?\"\n\nArguments were heard on the 9th. 10th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th and 30th days of April 1951.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the President of India.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Advocate-General of Bombay ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the State of Bombay.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer, for the State of Madras.\n\nM. L. Saxena, for the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nA. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the State of Mysore.\n\nP. S. Safeer, for Captain Deep Chand.\n\nN. S. Bindra, for Pt. Amarnath Bharadwaj.\n\nM. M. Gharak_han, for the Ajmer-Electric Supply Co. Ltd.\n\nN. C. Chauerjee, (G. C. Mathur, Basant Chandra Ghose, and Tilak. Raj Bhasin, with him), for the Maiden's Hotel.\n\n/essaram Banasingh, for Runglal Nasirabad.\n\nJyoti Sarup Gupta and K. B. Asthana, for the <., Municipal Committee, Ajmer. --.,/\n\nDin Dayal Kapur, for Shri Munshilal and two others.\n\n1951, May 23. The following judgments were delivered.\n\n19S1\n\nKANIA C. J .-This is a reference made by the Presi- Kania C. J. dent of Incha under article 143 of the Constitution asking the Court's opinion on the three questions submitted for its consideration and report.\n\nThe three questions are as follows :- -\n\n\" ( 1) Was section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, Or any of the provisions thereof and in wliat particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act ?\".\n\nSection 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, mentioned in the question, runs as follows :-\n\nKania C. J.\n\n\"The Provincial Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend with such restnct10ns\n\nand modifications as it thinks fit to the Province of Delhi or any part thereof, any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.\"\n\n\"(2) Was the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act?\"\n\nSection 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, runs as follows :-\n\n\"Extension of Enactments to Ajmer-Merwara.-The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend to the Province of Ajmer-Merwara with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in any other Province at the date of such notification.\"\n\n\"(3) Is section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra t1tres the Parliament ?\"\n\nSection 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, runs as follows :-\n\n\"Power to extend enactments to certain Part C States.-The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend to any Part C State\n\n(other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restricrions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force iii a part A State at the date of the notification and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applfcable to that Part C State.\"\n\nThe three sectioqs referred to in the three questions are all in respect of what is described as the delegation of legislative power and the three particular Acts are selected to raise the question in respect of the three main stages in the constitutional development of India.\n\nThe first covers the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature during the period prior to the Government of India Act, 1915.\n\nThe second is in respect of its legislative power after the Government of India Act, 1935, as amended by the Indian Independence Act of 1947.\n\nThe last is in respect of the power of the Indian Parliament under the present Constitution of 1950.\n\nIt is therefore necessary to have an idea of the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature during those r.h.ree periods.\n\nWithout going into unnecessary details, it will not be out of place to know the historical background.\n\nThe East India Company first started its operations as a trading company in India and gradually acquired political influence.\n\nThe Crown in England became the legislative authority in respect of areas which had come under the, control of the East India Company.\n\nThe Indian Councils Act of 1861, section 22, gave power to the Governor-General in Council, with additional nominated members, to make laws. The constitutional position therefore was that the British Parliament was the sovereign body which passed the Indian Councils Act.\n\nIt gave the Governor-General in Council in his legislative capacity powers to make laws over the territories in India under the governance of the Crown.\n\nUnder the English Constitution the British Parl1ament with its legislative authority in the King and the two Houses of Parliament is supreme and its sovereignty cannot be challenged anywhere.\n\nIt has no written Charter to define or limit its power and authority.\n\nIts powers are a result of convention but are now recognised as completely absolute, uncontrolled and unfettered. Sir Cecil Carr in h'is book on English Administrative Law at page 15 observes : \"A more basic difference between the Constitutions of the United States and Britain is the notorious fact that Britain has to written Constitution, no fundamental statute which serves as a touchstone for all other legislation and which cannot be altered save by some specially solemn and dilatory process. In Britain the King in Parliament is all powerful.\n\nThere is no Act which cannot be passed and will not be valid within\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Delhi Laws, Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nKa11ia C. J.\n\nthe ordinary limits of judicial interpretation ......... .\n\nEven Magna Carta is not inviolate ........ The efficient secret of the English Constitution was the close union and nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers.\n\nIn other words by the system of Cabinet Government the executive authority 1s entrusted to a committee consisting of members of the dominant party in the legislature and in the country:\"\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. VI, Article 429, it is further stated that it is for this reason that there is no law . which the King in Parliament cannot make or unmake whether relating to the Constitution itself or otherwise ; there is no necessity in as States whose Constitutions are drawn up in a fixed and rigid from and contained in written documents for the existence of a judicial body to determine whether any particular legislative Act is within the constitu6onal powers of Parliament or not and laws affecting the Constitution itself may be enacted with the same ease and subject to the sanie procedure as ordinary laws.\n\nIn England, when occasions of conferment of powers on subordinate bodies became frequent and assumed larger scope, questions about the advisability of that procedure were raised and a Committee on the Minister's Powers, what is generally described as the Donoughmore Committee was appointed.\n\nThe Committee recommended that certain cautions should be observed by the Parliament in the matter of conferment of such powers on subordinate bodies.\n\nThis is natural because of the well-recognised doctrine of the English Constitution that Parliament is supreme and absolute and no legislation can control its powers.\n\nSuch a legislative body which is supreme has thus certain principal characteristics. It is improper to use the word \"constitutional\" in respect of laws passed by such a sovereign body.\n\nThe question of constitutionality can arise only if there is some touchstone by which the question could be decided.\n\nIn respect of a sovereign body like the British Parliament there is no\n\ntouchstone.\n\nThey are all laws and there is no distinction in the laws passed by the Parliament as constitutional or other laws.\n\nSuch laws are changed by the same body with the same ease as any other law.\n\nWhat follows from this is that no court or authority has any right to pronounce that any Act of Parliament is unconstitutional.\n\nIn Dicey's Law of the Constitution, 9th Edition, in considering the Constitution of France, it was observed that the supreme kgislative power under the Republic was not vested in the ordinary Parliament of two Chambers, but in a National Assembly or Congress composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate sitting together.\n\nThe Constitutions of France which in this respect were similar to those 0f Continental polities exhibited as compared with the expansiveness or flexibility of English institutions that characteristic which was described by the author as rigid.\n\nA flexible constitution was one under which every law of every description can legally be changed with the same ease and in the same manner by one and the same body.\n\nThe flexibility of the British Constitution consists in the right of the Crown and the two Houses to modify or repeal any law whatever.\n\nThey can modify or repeal in the same manner in wMch they can pass an Act enabling a company to make a new railway from Oxford to London.\n\nTherefore, in England laws are called constitutional because they refer to subjects proposed to affect the fundamental institutions of the State and not because they are legally more sacred or difficult to change than other laws.\n\nUnder the circumstances the term \"constitutional law or enactment\" is rarely applied to any English statute to give a definite description to its character.\n\nUnder a rigid constitution, the term \"constitutional\" means that a particular enactment belongs to the articles of the constitution and cannot be legally changed with the same ease and in the same manner as ordinary laws, and it is because of this characteristic that cOJJrts are invested with powers to determine whether a particular legislation is permitted or not by the constitution.\n\nSuch a question can\n\n& re The Detlli Laws Jfcr, 1912, etc.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912 etc.\n\nKama c.1.\n\nnever arise in respect of an enactment of the British Parliament.\n\nAs against this, the Governor-General in Council with legislative powers established under the Indian Councils Act stood in a different position. Its charter was the Indian Councils Act.\n\nIts powers were there necessarily defined and limited.\n\nThat power, again, at any time could be withdrawn, altered and expanded or further curtailed.\n\nMoreover, as the powers were conferred by an Act of the British Parliament, the question whether the act!on of the Governor-General in Council in his legislative capacity was within or without its legislative power was always capable of being raised and decided by a court of law.\n\nIn Dicey's Law of the Constitution, 9th Edition, the author has distinguished the position of a sovereign legislature and a subordinate law-making body.\n\nThe distinction is drawn from the fact that the subordinate legislatures have a limited power of making laws.\n\nAt page 99, he has specifically considered the position of the legislative Council of British India prior to 1915 and stated as follows :-\"Laws are made for British India by a Legislative Council having very wide powers of Legislation.\n\nThis Council, or, as it is technically expressed, 'the Governor-General in Council', can pass laws as important as any Acts passed by the British Parliament.\n\nBut the authority of the Council in the way of law-making is as completely subordinate to, and as much dependent upon. Acts of Parliament as is the power of the London and North Western Railway Company to make byelaws .......... Now observe, that under these Acts the Indian Council is in the strictest sense a non-sovereign legislative body, and this independently of the fact the laws or regulations made by the Governor-General in Council can be annulled or disallowed by the Crown ; and note that the position of the Council exhibits all the marks or notes of legislative subordination.\n\n(1) The Council is bound by a large number of rules which cannot be changed by the Indian legislative body itself and which can be changed by the superior power of the Imperial Parliament.\n\n(2) The Acts themselves, from which the Council derives its authority, .cannot be changed by the Council and ...... they stand in marked contrast with the laws or regulations which the Council is empowered to make.\n\nThese fundamental rules contain, it must be added, a number of specific restrictions on the subjects with regard to which the Council may legislate .... (3) The courts in India ........ may, when the occasion arises, pronounce upon the validity or constitutionality of laws made by the Indian Council.\" It is therefore clear that the Indian Legislature in 1861 and up to 1915 was a subordinate legislature and not a sovereign legislature.\n\nAt this stage it may again be noticed that the Government was unitary and not federal.\n\nThere was no distribution of legislative powers as between the Centre and the different Provinces.\n\nAnother important factor to be borne in mind is that while the British Parliament was supreme, its executive Government came into power and remained in power so long only as the Parliament allowed it to remain and the Parl'iament itself was not dissolved.\n\nThe result is that the executive government was a part of the legislature and the legislature controlled the actions of the executive.\n\nIndeed, the legislature was thus supreme and was in a position effectively to direct the actions of the executive government.\n\nIn India the position was quite different if not the reverse. The Governor-General was appointed by the Crown and even after the expanion of the legislative body before the Government of India Act of 1915 in numbers, it had no control over the executive.\n\nIn respect of the Indian Legislature functioning prior to the Government of India Act of 1915 the control from the Secretary of State was justified on the ground that the Provincial Legislatures were but an enlargement of the executive government for the purpose of making laws and were no more than mere advisory bodies without any semblance of power.\n\nThe executive Government of India was not responsible to the Indian Legislature and the composition of the Indian Legislature was such that the executive officers\n\nKania C. J.\n\nlnre T1rt Delhi Lows Act, 1912, etc.\n\nKJmkt C. J.\n\ntogether with the nominated members constituted the majority in the Legislature. The result was that the Legislative Council was practically a creature of the executive Government of India and its functions were practically limited to registering the decrees of the executive government.\n\nIt would not be wrong, according to Mr. Cowell in his lecntre on \"Courts and Legislative Authorities in India,\" to describe the laws made in the Legislative Councils as in reality the order of Government. Every Bill passed by the Governor- General' s Council required his assent to become an Act.\n\nThe Indian Councils Act of 1892 empowered the Governor-General in Council, with the approval of the Secretary of State in Council, to make regulations as to the conditions under which nomination of the additional members should be made. The word 'election' was carefully avoided.\n\nThe existence of a strong official block in the Councils was the important feature of the Act.\n\nAs noticed by a writer on Indian Constitution, the Government maiittained a tight and close control over the conduct of official members in the Legislature and they were not allowed to vote as they pleased. They were not expected to ask questions or move resolutions or (In some Councils) . to intervene in debate without Government's approval.\n\nTheir main function was to vote-to vote with the Government.\n\nHowever eloquent the non-official speakers might talk and however reasonable and weighty their arguments\n\nmight be, when the time for voting came the silent oflicial flanks stepped in and decided the matter against them. All these factors contnbuted to the unreality of the proceedings in the Council because the number of elected members was small and the issue was often known beforehand.\n\nSpeaking in the House of Lords in December 1908 on the Bill which resulted in the Government of India Act of 1909, Lord Morley, the then Secretary of State for India, declared : \"If I were attempting to .set up a Parliamentary system in India, or if it could be said that this chapter of rules led directly or necessarily up to the establishment of a Parliamentary system in India.\n\nI for one W<111ld have\n\nnothing at all to do with it ............ A Parliamentary system is not at all the goal to which I would for one moment aspire.\" The constitution of the Central Legislative Council under the Regulation of November,\n\n1909, as revised in 1912, was this :\n\nOrdinary members of the Governor-General's Council, The Commander-in-Chief and the Lt.-Governor 8 Nominated members of than 28 must be officials Elected members, and The Governor-General\n\nwhom not more .. 33 .. 27\n\nThe executive government -was thus supreme and was not bound to obey or carry out the mandates of the legislature.\n\nInstances where Finance Bills were rejected and other Bills were backed by the popular feeling and which decisions the Governor-General overruled, are well known.\n\nThe Indian Legislature Was powerless to do anything in the matter.\n\nWithout the consent of the executive government no Bill could be made into an Act nor an Act could be amended or repealed without its -consent.\n\nThe possibility of the Legislature recalling the . power given under an Act to the executive against the latter's consent was therefore nil.\n\nOnce an Act giving such power (like the Delhi Laws Act) was passed, practically the power was irrevocable.\n\nIn my opinion, it is quite improper to compare the power and position of the Indian Legislature so established and functioning with the supreme and severeign character of the British Parliament\n\nThe legislative power of the Indian Legislature came to be changed as a result of the Act of 1915 by the creation of Provincial legislatures. . I do . not propose to go into the derails of the changes, except to the . extent they arc directly material for the discussion of the questions submitted for the Court's opinion.\n\nDiarchy 3-3 S.C. India/68\n\nIn re The Delhi L{l1fls Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nKtmto c.1.\n\n111 re 111<! Del/ti WI Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\n~C.J.\n\nwas thus created but there was no federation under the Act of 1915.\n\nUnder the Government of India Act, 1935, the legislative powers were distributed between the Central legislature and the Provincial legislature, each being given exclusive powers in respect of certain items mentioned in Lists I and II of the Seventh Schedule.\n\nI.:ist III contained subjects on which it was open to the Centre or the Province to legislate and the residuary power of legislation was controlled by se~ tion 104.\n\nThis Act however Was still passed by the British Parliament and therefore the powers of the Indian Central legislature as well as the Provincial legislatures were capable of being altered, expanded or limited according to the desire of the British Parliament without the Indian legislature or the people of India having any voice in the matter.\n\nEven under this Act, the executive government was not responsible to the Central Legislature or the Provincial Legislature, as the case may be. I emphasize this aspect because it shows that there was no fusion of legislative and . executive powers as was the case with the Constitution in England.\n\nThe result of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, was to remove the authority of the British Parliament to make any l:iws for India.\n\nThe Indian Central Legislature was given power to convert itself into a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution for India, including the power to amend or repeal the Government of India Act, 1935, which till the new Constitution was adopted, was to be the Constitution of the country.\n\nEven with that change it may be noticed that the executive gova-nment was not responsible to the Central Legislature.\n\nIn fact with the removal of the control of the Parliament it ceased to be responsible to anyone.\n\nUnder the Constitution of India as adopted on the 26th of January, 1950, the executive government of the Union is vested in the President acting on the advice of the Ministers.\n\nA Parliament is established to make laws and a Supreme Court is established with the powers defined in different articles of the Constitution.\n\nThe executive, legislative and judicial\n\nfo!lctions of the Government, which have to be discharged, were thus distributed but the articles giving power to these bodies do not vest the legislative or judicial powers in these bodie.-. expressly.\n\nUnder the Constitution of India, the Ministers are responsible to the legislatures and to that extent the scheme of the British Parliament is adopted in the Constitution.\n\nWhile however that characteristic of the British Parliament is given to the Indian Legislature, the Principal point of distinction between the British Parliament and the Indian Parliament remains and that is that the Indian Parliament is the creature of the Constitution of India and its powers, rights, privileges and obligations have to be found in the relevant articles of the Constitution of India.\n\nIt is not a sovereign body, uncontrolled with unlimited powers.\n\nThe Constitution of India has conferred on the Indian Parliament powers to make laws in respect of matters specified in the appropriate places and Schedules, and curtailed its rights and powers under certain other articles and in particular by the articles found in Chapter III dealing with Fundamental Rights.\n\nIn case of emergency where the safety of the Union of India is in danger, the President is given express power to suspend the Constitution and assume all legislative powers.\n\nSimilarly in the event of the break- . ing down of the administrative machinery of a State, the President is given powers under articles 257 to assume both legislative and executive powers in the manner and to the extent found in the article.\n\nThere can be no doubt that subject to all these limitations and controls, within the scope of its powers and on the subjects on which it is empowered to make laws, the Legislature is supreme and its powers are plenary.\n\nThe important question underlying. the three questions submitted for the Court's consideration is what is described as the delegation of legislative powers.\n\nA legislative body which is sovereign like an autocratic ruler has power to do anything.\n\nIt may, like a Ruler, by an individual decision, direct that a certain person may be put to death or a certain property may be\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Delhi laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nK.ania C. J.\n\nIn re The Dtllti Law1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nKonlo C. J.\n\ntaken over by the State.\n\nA body of such character may have power to nominate someone who can exercise all its powers and make all its decisions.\n\nThis is possible to be done because there is no authority or tribunal which can question the right or power of the authority to do so.\n\nThe contentions urged on behalf of the President of India arc that legislative power carries with it a power of delegation to any person the legislature may choose to appoint.\n\nWhether sovereign or subordinate, the legislative authority can so delegate its function if the delegation can stand three tests. ( 1) It must be a delegation in respect of a subject or matter which is within the scope of the legislative power of the body making the delegation.\n\n(2) Such power of delegation is not negatived by the instrument by which the legislative 'body is created or established. And (3) it docs not create another legislative body having the same powers and to discharge the same functions which it itself has, if the creation of such a body is prohibited by the instrument which estab?ishes the legislative body itself. It was urged that in the case of an unwritten constitution, like the British Parliament there can be no affirmative limitation or negative prohil:lition against delegation and therefore the power of delegation is included to the fullest extent within the power of legislation.\n\nThe British Parliament can efface itself or evi:n abdicate because it has a power to pass the next day a law repealing or annulling the previous day's legislation.\n\nWhen the British Parliament established .legislative bodies in India, Canada and Australia by Acts of the British Parliament, the legislatures so established, although in a sense subordinate, because their existence depended on the Acts of the British Parliament and which existence could be terminated or further fettered by an Act of the British Parliament, nevertheless are supreme with plenary powers of the same nature as the British Parliament, on the subjects and matters within their respective legislative authority.\n\nAs the power of delegation is\n\nincluded. in the power of legislation, these legislative bodies have also, subject to the three limitations mentioned above, full power of delegation in teir turn.\n\nThese legislative bodies were not agents of the British Parliament.\n\nNot being agents or delegates of the British Parliament, the doctrine delegata potestas non\n\nf'Okst delegare cannot apply to their actions and if these legislatures delegate powers to some other authGrity to make rules or regulation, or authorise the executive government to enforce laws made by them or other legislatures wholly or in part and With or without restrictions or modifications, the legislatures are perfectly competent to do so.\n\nThe history of legislation in England and India and the other Dominions supports this contentiop. It is recognised as a legislative practice and is seen in several Acts passed by the legislatures of the Dominions and in India.\n\nSuch delegation of the legislative functions has been recognised over a series of years by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and it is too late to contest the validity of such delegation.\n\nIt was lastly contended that the observation of the Federal Court in fatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar(1), tending to show that delegation was not permissible, required to be reconsidered.\n\nBefore considering these arguments in. detail, I think it is essential to appreciate . clearly what is conveyed by the word \"delegation\". That word is not used, either in discussions or even in some decisions of the courts, with the same meaning.\n\nWhen a legislative body\n\n--t . f>asses an Act it has exercised its legislative function.\n\nThe essentials of such function are the determination of the legislative pollcy and its formulation as a rule 1 of <!onduct.\n\nThese essentials are the characteristics of a legislature by itself.\n\nIt has nothing to <Jo with the principle of division of powers found in the Constitu tion on the United States of .America.\n\nThose essentials are preserved, when the legislature specifies the basic\n\nconclusions of fact, upon ascertainment of which, from relevant data, by a designated .administrative agency\n\n(I) (1949] F.C.R.. 595.\n\n1!151\n\nIn re The D1lha Law11Act,1912,\n\netc.\n\nKilnlo C. J.\n\nIn re The De/hi Law• Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nKania C . .1.\n\nit ordains that its statutory command is to be effective.\n\nThe legislature hav'mg thus made its laws, it 'is clear\n\nthat every detail for working it out and for carrying the enactments into operation and effect may be done by the legislature or may be left to another subordinate agency or to some executive officer.\n\nWhile thi1 also is sometimes described as a delegation of legislative powers, in essence it is different from delegation of legislative power which means a determination of the\n\nlegislative polky and formulation of the same as a rule of conduct.\n\nI find that the word \"delegation\" is quite often used without bearing this fundamental distinction in mind.\n\nWhile the so-called delegation, which empowers the making of rules and regulanons, has been recognised as ancillary to the power to define legislative policy and formulate the rule of conduct, the important question raised by the Attorney-General is in respect of the right of the legislature .to delegate the legislative functions strictly so called.\n\nIn support of his contention that the legislative power of the Indian Legislature carried with it the power of delegation, the Attorney-General relied on several decisions of the Jud\"1cial Committee of the Privy Council and decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and. Australia.\n\nThe first is The Queen v. Burah(').\n\nAct XXII of 1869 of the Council of the Governor- General of India for making laws and regulations was an Act tQ. remove the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of the tribunals established under the General Regulations and Acts passed by any legislature in British India and provided that \"no Act hereafter passed by the Council of tl1e Governor-General for making laws and regulations shall be deemed to extend to any part of the said territory unless the same was specifically named therein.\" The administration of civil and criminal justice within the said territory was vested in sucli oflicers as the Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time appoint.\n\nSections 8 and 9 of the said Act provided as follows :-\n\n0) SI. A. 178.\n\n\"Section 8.\n\nThe said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette extend to the said territory any law, or any portion of any law, now in force . in the other territories subject to his Government, or which may hereafte:r be enacted by the Council of the Governor-General, or of ¢.e said Lieutenant-Governor, for making laws and regulations, and may on making such extension direct by whom any powers of duties . incident to the provisions o. so extended shall be exercised or performed, and make\n\nany order which he shall deem requisite for carrying\n\nsuch provisions into operation.\"\n\n\"Section 9.\n\nThe said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend mt1tatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India.\n\nEvery such notification shall specify the Q<>undaries of .the territories to which it applies.\"\n\nThe Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal issued a notification in exercise of the power conferred on him by section 9 and extended the provisions of the said Act to the territory known as the Khasi and Jaintia Hills and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil and criminal courts.\n\nBy a majority judgment the Cakutta High Court decided that the said notification had no legal force or effect In the Calcutta High Court, Mr. Kennedy, counsel for the Crown, boldly claimed for the Indian Legislative Council the power to transfer legislative functions to the Lieutenant-Gover- . nor of Bengal and Markby J. framed the question for decision as follows : \"Can the Legislature confer . on the Lieutenant-Governor legislative power?\" Answer : \"It is a general principle of law in India that any substantial delegalion of legislative authority by the Legislature of this country is void.\"\n\nLord Selbourne after agreeing with the High Court that Act XXII of 1869 was within the legislative\n\nl!ISI\n\n111 re Ile Dellll LtMa ltct, 1912,\n\net~.\n\nCalo C. I.\n\nIn re Th< Delhi Law• Act. 1912, etc. ca1o a.1.\n\npower of the Governor-General in Council, considered the limited question whether consistently with that view the 9th section of that Act ought nevertheless to be held void and of no effect. The Board noticed that the majority of the Judges of the Calcutta High CoUrt based their decision on the view that the 9th section was not legislation but was a delegation of legislative power.\n\nThey noticed that in the leading judgment of Markby J. the principle of agency was relied upon and the Indian Legislature/ seemed to be regarded an agent \" delegate, acting under a mandate from the Imperial • , Parliament.\n\nThey rejected this view.\n\nThey observed : \"The Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can, of course, do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers. But, when acting Within those limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself. The established courts of justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity -determine that question ; and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to. the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted.\n\nIf what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited ..... .it is not for any court of justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions.\n\n\"Their Lordships agree that the Governor-General m Council could not, by any form of enactment, create in India and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power not created or authorised by the Councils Act. Nothing of that le.ind has, in their Lordships' opinion, been done or attempted in the present case.\n\nWhat has been done is this.\n\nTire Governor-General in Council has determined, ;,, tire\n\ndue and ordinary course of legislation, to remove a particular district from the. jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and offices, and to place it under new courts and offices, to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieut.-Govemor of Bengal; leaving it to the Lieut.- Governor to say at what time that change shall take place ; and. also enabling him not to make what laws he pleases for that or any other district, but to apply by public notification to that district any law, or part of a law, which either already was, or from time to time might be, in force by proper legislative authority, . in the other territories subject to his government.\n\nThe legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place; but that it was expedient to leave the time and the manner o( carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieut.-Govemor ; and also, that the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories subject to the same Government were such as it might be fit and proper to apply to this district also ; but that, as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them, could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient on that point also, to entrust a discretion to th\" Lieut-Governor.\n\nThis having been done as to the Garo Hills} what was done as to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills ? The legislature decided that it was fit and proper that the adjoining district of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills should also be removed from the jurisdiction of the existing courts and brought under the same provisions with the Garo Hjlls ........ if and when the Lieut.-Govemor should think it desirable to do so ; and that it was also possible that it might be expedient that not all, but some only, of those pr<>· visions should be applied to that adjoining district ; and accordingly the legislature entrusted for these purposes also a dlscretionary power to the Lieut.- Governor.\"\n\nThe important part of the decision dealing with the question before them was in these terms :-\"Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak of the\n\nKonlo C. I\n\nfJi ,.\n\nThe Delhi Law1 Act, 1911,\n\n1tc.\n\nKania C. /.\n\npowers thus conferred upon the Lieut.-Governor (large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority than that of the Governor-General in Council.\n\nTheir whole operation is directly and immediately under and by virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself.\n\nThe proper legislature has exercised its iudgment as to place, person, laws, powers and the remlt of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. The conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute.\n\nWhere plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an Imperial or in a Provincial Legislature, they may (in their Lordships' judgment) be well exercised, either absolutely 'or conditionally.\n\nLegislation, conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing ; and, in many circumstances it may be highly convenient.\n\nThe British Statute Book abounds with examples of it : and it cannot be supposed that the Imeprial Parliament did not, when constituting the Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of conditional legislation as within t/1e scope of the legislative powers which is from time to time conferred. It certainly used no words to exclude it.\" (The italics arc mine).\n\nThey then mentioned by way of illustrations the power given to the Governor-General in Council (not in his legislative capacity) to extend the Code of Civil P(ocedure and Code of Criminal Procedure by section 385, Civil Procedure Code, and section 445 Criminal Procedure Code, to differ.cot territories. They held that a different conclusion will be casting doubt upon the validity of a long series of legislation, appropriate, as far as they can judge, to the peculiar circumstances of India ; great part of which belongs to the period antecedent to the year 1861, and must therefore be presumed to have been known to and in the view of, the Imperial Parliament, when the Councils Act of that year was\n\npassed.\n\nFor such doubt their Lordships were unaole\n\nto discover any foundation either in the affirmative or in the negative words of the Act before them.\n\nI have quoted in extenso extracts from this judgment because it is considered the foundation for the argument advanced by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nIn my opinion this judgment does not support the - contention as urged.\n\nThe Privy Council noted the follo\\ling : (1) That the Garo Hills were removed by the\n\nct from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.\n\n(2) That in respect of the K.hasi and Jaintia Hills the same position had been arrived at;\n\n(3) That the power was to . be exercised over areas which, notwithstanding the Act, remained under the administrative control of\n\nthe Lieut.-Governor.\n\n(4) That the authority given to the Lieut.-Governor was not to pass new laws but only to extend Acts which were passed by the Lieut- Governor or the Governor-General in respect of the\n\nProvince both being competent legislatures for the area in question.\n\nHe was not given any power to modify any law.\n\n(5) They rejected the view of the majority of . the Judges of the Calcutta High Court that the Indian Legislature was a delegate or an agent of the British Parliament.\n\n(6) That within the powers conferred on the Indian Legislature it was supreme and its powers were as plenary and of the same nature as the British Parliament.\n\n(7) That by the legislation the Indian Parliament had not created a legislative body with all the powers which it had.\n\n(8) The objection on the ground of delegation was rejected because what was done was not delegation at all but it was. conditional legislation.\n\nThroughout the judgment it is .nowhere suggested that the answer of Markby J. to the question framed by him (and quoted earlier in this judgment) was incorrect. (9) It emphasized that . the order of the Lieut~Governor derived its sanction from the Act of the Govenor-General and not because it was an order of the Lieut .. Govemor. (10) That in the legislation of the Governor-General in Council ·(legislative) all that was necessary to constitute legislation was found.\n\nThis applied equally to future laws\n\n3S the appropriate legislative body for the area W:i.~\n\n19SI\n\nhue Tiie Del/d ,_, kt, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nK1111to C J.\n\nt951\n\nJn re Th• Delhi l.11113 Act, 1912,\n\nle.\n\n\"4•io C. I.\n\nthe same.\n\nThis decision therfore carefully and deliberately did not endorse the contention that the power of delegation was contained in the power of legislation.\n\nThe Board after affirming that what was done was no delegation at all held that the legislation was only conditional legislation.\n\nIn Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma and others('), the question arose about the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance II of 1942, issued by the Governor-General under the powers vested in him on the declaration of an emergency on the outbreak of war The validity of that Ordinance was challenged in India either ( 1) because the language of the section showed that the Governor-General, notwithstanding the preamble, did not consider that an emergency existed but was making provision in case one should arise in future, or {?~ else because the section amounted to what was called delegated legislation by which the Governor- General without legal authority sought to pass the decision as to whether an emergency existed, to the Provincial Government instead of deciding it for himself.\n\nThe relevant provision of the Government of India A.ct, 1935, was in these terms :\n\n\"72.\n\nThe Governor-General may, m cases of emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof, and any Ordinance so made shall for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature ; but the power of making\n\nOrdinances under this section is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian Legislature to make laws; and any Ordinance made under this c tion is subject to the like disallowance as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature and may be rontrolled or superseded by any such A.ct.\"\n\nIn rejecting tills second objectiop, their Lordships observed that under paragraph 72 of Schedule 9, the\n\nGovernor-General himself must discharge the duty of\n\n(I) 72 I. A.27.\n\nlegislation and cannot transfer it to other authorities.\n\nBut the Governor-General had not delegated his le~ lative powers at all.\n\nAfter stating again that what was done was not delegated legislation at all, but was merely an example of the not uncommon legislative arrangement by which the local application of the provision of a statute is determined by the judgment of a local administrative body as to its necessity, their Lordships disagreed with the majority view of the Federal Court that what was done was delegation of legislative functions. If the power of delegation was contained in the power of legislation as wide as contended by the Attorney-General, there appears no reason why the Privy Council should have rejected the argument that the Act was an act of delegation and upheld its validity on the ground that it was conditional legislation.\n\nMoreover they reaffirmed the following passage from Russell v. The Queen(1) : \"The short answer to this objection (against delegation of legislative power) is that the Act does not delegate any legislative powers whatever.\n\nIt contains within itself the whole legislation on the matters with which it deals.\n\nThe provision that certain parts of the Act shall come into operation only on the petition of a majority of electors does not confer on these persons powers to legislate.\n\nPaNiament itself enacts the condition and everything which is to follow upon the condition (Jeing fulfilled.\n\nConditional legislation of this kind is in many cases convenient, and is certainly not unusual, and the power so to legislate cannot be denied to the Parliament of Canada when the subject of legislation is with'.in its competency.\" (The italics are mine). Support for this last mentioned statement was found in the decision of the Privy Council in The Queen v. Burah(2 ). It is clear that this decision does not carry the matter further.\n\nEven though this was a war measure the Board emphasized that the Governor-General must himself discharge the duty of legislation and cannot transfer it to other authorities.\n\nThey examined the impugned Act and\n\n(I) 7 App. Cas. 629.\n\n(2) 5 I. A. 178.\n\netc.\n\nKllnio C. J.\n\n19'1\n\nbi re The Delhi I.ow• .ifct, 1912, etc.\n\nCan/a c.' I.\n\ncame to the conclusion that it contained within itself the whole legislation on the matters with which it dealt and there was no delega6on of legislative functions.\n\nA close scrutiny of these decisions and the observations contained therein, in my opinion clearly discloses that instead of supporting the proposition urged by the Attorney-General impliedly that contention is negatived.\n\nWhile the Judicial Committee has pointed out that the Indian Legislature had plenary powers to legislate on the subjects falling within its powers and that those powers were of the same nature and as supreme as the British Parliament, they do not endorse the contention that the Indian Legislature except that it could not create another body with the same powers as it has or in other words, efface itself had unlimited powers of delegation.\n\nWhen the argument of the power of the Indian Legislature to delegate legislative powers in that manner to subordinate bodies was directly urged before the Privy Council in each one of their decisions the Judicial Committee has repudiated the suggestion and held that what was done was not delegation but was subsidiary legislation or conditional legislation.\n\nThus while the Board has reiterated its views that the powers of the Indian Legislature were \"as plenary and of the same nature as the British Parliament\" no one, in no case, and in no circumstances, during the last seventy years, has stated that the Indian Legislature has power of delegation (as contended in this case) and which would have been a direct, plain, obvious and conclusive answer to the argument.\n\nInstead of that, they have examined the . impugned legislation ii> each case and pronounced on its validity on the ground that it was conditional or subsidiary legislation. The same attitude is adopted by the Privy Council in respect of the Canadian Constitution.\n\nThe expressions \"subsidiary\" or \"conditional legislation\" are used to Indicate that the powers confer.red on the subordinate bodies were not powers of legislation but powers conferred only to carry the enactment into operation and effect, or that the Legislature having discharged legislative functions had specified the basic conclusions of fact upon\n\nascertainment of which, from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, that body was permitted to bring the statute into operation.\n\nEven in such cases the Board has expressly pointed out that the force of these rules, regulations or enactments does not arise out of the decision of the admidistrativc or executive authority . to bring into o?eration the enactment or the rules framed thereunder.\n\nThe authoritative force and binding nature of the same are found in the enactment passed by the legislature itself.\n\nTherefore, a correct reading of these decisions does not support the contention urged by the Attorney-General.\n\nSome decisions of the Privy Council on appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada and some decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, on the point under discussion, on which the learned Attrney-General relied for his contentio~ may be noticed next.\n\nIn Hon!(e v.\n\nThe Queen(1), which was an appeal from the Court of Appeal, Ontario, Canada a question about the validity of the Liquor Licences Act arose.\n\nAfter holding that the temperance laws were under section 92 of the British North America Act for \"the good government\" their Lordships considered the objection that the Imperial Parliament had conferred no authority on the local legislature to delegate those powers to the Licence Commissioners.\n\nIn other words, it was argued that the power conferred by the Imperial Parliament on the local legislature should be exercised in full by that body and by that body alone.\n\nThe maxim delegata potestas non potest delegare was relied upon to support the objection.\n\nTheir Lordships observed : ''The objection thus raised by the appellants was founded on an entire misconception of the true character and position of the Provincial Legislatures.\n\nThey are in no sense delegates of or acting under mandate from, the Imperial Parliament.\n\nWhen the British North America Act enacted that there should be a legislature for .\n\nOntario and that its Legislative Assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the Province and for Provincial purposes in relation to the matters ·\n\nCl) 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\nln\"e The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912. etc.\n\nKa11ia C. J.\n\n19SI\n\nlnre 111e De/Iii Law1Act,1912,\n\netc.\n\nKt111it1 C. J.\n\nenumerated in section 92 it conferred powers, not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from, or as agents of. the Imperial Parliament, but authority as plenary and as ample with in the limits prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the . plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow.\n\nWithin these limits of subiects and area the local legislature is supreme and has the same authority as the Imperial Parliament, or the Parliament of the Dominion, would have had under like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority tQ make bye-laws w resolutions as to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation and effect.\n\nIt is obvious that such authority, 'is ancillary to legislation' and without it an attempt to provide for varying details and machinery to carry them out might become oppressive or absolutely fail. ... It was argued at the Bar that a legislature committing important regulations to agents or delegates effaces itself.\n\nThat is not so. It retains its power intact and can whenever it pleases destroy the agency it has created and set up another or take the matter directly into its own hands.\n\nHow far it shall seek the aid of subordinate agencies and how long it shall continue them are matters for the legislature and not for the .courts of law to decide.\"\n\n(The italics are mine).\n\nAs regards the creation of new offences, their Lordships observed that if bye-laws or resolutions are warranted the power to enforce them seemed necessary and equally lawful.\n\nThis case also does not help the Attorney-General.\n\nIt recognises only the grant of power to make regula- . tions which are \"ancillary to legislation\".\n\nIn In re The Initiative and Referendum Act('), the Act of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba was held\n\nO\\ltside the scope 2f section 92 of the British North America Act inasmuch as it rendered the Lieut.-Governoc pbwerless to prevent the Act from becoming actual law, if approved by the voters, even without his consent.\n\nTheir Lordships observed; \"Section 92 of the\n\n(!) 1919] A. C. 935.\n\nAct of 1867 intrusts the legislative power in a Province to its legislature and to that legislature only. No doubt a body with power of legislation on the si:ibjects entrusted to it so ample as that enjoyed by a Provincial Legislature in Canada could, while preserving its own capacity intact, seek the assistance of subordinate agencies as had been done in Hodge v. The Queen(1) but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence.\"\n\nIn In re George Eduin Gray(2), the question of delegation of powers in respect of the War Measures Act, 1914, came for consideration. The prov-isions there were very similar to the Defence of India Act and the Rules made thereunder in India during the W arid War I. In delivering judgment Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C. J. observed as follows :-\"The practice of authorising adm'mistrative bodies to make regulations to carry out the ob; ect of an Act instead of 1etting out all the details of the Act itself is well known and its legality is unquestioned.\" He rejected the argument that such power cannot be granted to the extent as to enable the ex press prvisions of a statute to be amended or repealed, as under the Constitution, Parliament alone is to make laws under the Canadian Constitution.\n\nHe observed that Parliament cannot indeed abdicate its function but within reasonable limits at any rate it . can delegate its powers to tqe executive government.\n\nSuch powers must necessarily be subject to determination at any time by Parliament.\n\nHe observed .: \"I .cannot however find anything in that Constitutional Act which would impose any limitation on the authority of the Parliament of Canada to which the Imperial Parliament is not subject.\" Against the objection that such wide discretion should not be left to the executive he observed that this objection should have been urged when the regulations were submitted to Parliament for its approval or better still when the War Measures Act was being discussed.\n\nThe Parliament was the delegating authority and it was for that body to put any\n\n(I) 9 App. Cas. 111. 4-3 S.C.India/68\n\n(2) S7 S. C. R. Canada 150.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nl9Sl\n\nllnre The Delhi Lawa Act, 1912, etc.\n\n1flmla c. J.\n\nlimitations on the powers conferred upon the executive.\n\nHe then stated : \"Our legislators were no doubt impressed in the hour of peril with the conviction that the safety of the country was the supreme law against which no other law can prevail.\n\nIt is clearly our duty to give effect to their patriotic intentions.\"\n\nIn the Chemical, Reference case('), Duff C. J. set out the true effect of the decision in the War Measures Act.\n\nHe held that the decision of the Privy Council in the Fort Frances' case (2) had decided the validity of the War Measures Act and no further question remained in the respect. He stated : \"In In re Gray(\") was involved the principle, which must be taken in this Court to be settled, that an Order-in-Council in conformity with the conditions prescribed by, and the provisions of, the War Measures Act may have the' effect of an Act of Parliament.\" The Court considered that the regulations framed by the Governor-General in Council to safeguard the supreme interests of the State were made by the Governor-General in Council \"who was conferred subordinate legislative authority.\" He stated : ''The judgment of the Privy Council in the FfJrt Frances' case(2), laid down the principle that in an emergency, such as war, the authority of the Dominion in respect of legislation relating to the peace, order and good government of Canada may, in view of the necessities arising from the emergency, disable or over-bear the authority of the Provinces in relation to a vast field in which the Provinces would otherwise fu>ve exclusive jurisdiction. It must not however be taken for granted that every matter within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada even in ordinary times could be validly committed by Parliament to the executive for legislative action in the case of an emergency.\" Unlike the Indian Constitution, in the British North America Act there is no power to suspend the Constitution or enlarge .the legislative powers in an emergency like war. The Courts therefore stretched the language of the sections to meet the emergency in\n\n(I) [1943) S. C.R. Canada I.\n\n(2) [1923) A. C.695.\n\n(3) [1918) 57 S. C.R. Canada ISO.\n\nthe highest interest of the country but it also emphasized that such action was not permissible in ordinary times.\n\nThe War Measures Acts were thus considered by the Supreme Court of Canada on a different footing. The question was of competence but owing to the unusual circumstances and exigencies what was stated in the legislation was considered a sufficient statement of the legislative policy.\n\nIt appears to be thought that the same/ test cannot be applied in respect of legislation made in normal times, in respect of a permanent statute whic.h is not of limited duration.\n\nThe discussion in Benaori Lal Sarma's case (1) in the judgment of the Privy Council mentioned above may be usefully noted in this connection as the legislation in that case was also a war measure but was held valid as conditional legislation.\n\nIn so far as the observations in the Canadian decisions go beyond what is held in the Privy Council decisions, with respect, I am unable to agree.\n\nIt appears that the word \"delegation\" has been given an extended meaning in some. obtetvations of the Canadian courts beyond what is found ln the Privy Council decisions.\n\nIt is important to . notice that in all the judgments of the Privy Counci~ the word \"delegation\" as meaning conferment of legislative functions strictly, is not u$ed at all in respect of. the impugned legislation and has been deliberately avoided.\n\nTheir validity was upheld on the ground that the legislation was either conditional or subsidiary or ancillary legislation. ·\n\nAn important decision of the Supreme Court of Australia may be noticed next.\n\nIn the Victorian Stevedorina and General Contracting Company Proprietary Ltd.\n\nv. Dignan( 2 ), the question whether delegation of legislative power was according to the Constitution came to be examined by the High Court of Australia. It was argued that section 3 of the Act in question wal ultra vires and void in so far as it purported to authorise the Governor-General to make regulations whid. (notwithstanding anything in any other Act) shall have\n\n(I) 72 I. A. 27.\n\n(2) 46 Com. L. R. 73.\n\nlnrc The Delhi Lawa Act, 1912, etc.\n\nKania C. I.\n\nKania c. I.\n\nthe force of law.\n\nIn the judgment of Gavan Duffy C.J. and Starke J. it was stated : \"The attack upon the Act itself was based upon the American Constitutional doctrine that no legislative body can delegate to another department of the Government or to any other authority the power either generally or specially to enact laws.\n\nThis high prerogative has been entrusted to its own wisdom, judgment and patriotism and not to those of other persons and it w'ill act ultra vires if it undertakes to delegate the trust instead of executing it. (Cooley's Principles of Constitutional Law, 3rd Edition, p. 111).\n\nRoche v. Kronheimer(') was an authority for the proposition that an authority of subordinate law-making may be invested in the executive.\n\nWhatever may be said for or against that decision I think we should not now depart from it.\" Mr. Justice Dixon considered the argument fully in these terms : ''The validity of this provision is now attacked upon the ground that it is an attempt to grant to the executive a portion of the legislative power vested by the Constitution in the Parliament which is inconsistent with distribution made by the Constitution of legislative executive and iudicial powers.\n\nIn support of the rule that Congress cannot Invest another organ of government with legislative power a second doctrine is relied upon in America but it has no application to the Australian Constitution. Betause the powers of Government are considered to be derived from the authority of the people of the Union no agency to whom the people have confided a power may delegate its exercise.\n\nThe well-known maxim delegata potestas non potest delegare applicable to the law of agency in the general and Common Law is well understood and has had wider application in the constmction of our Federal and State Constitutions than it has in private laws.\n\nNo similar doctrine has existed in respect of British Colonial legislatures whether erected in virtue of the prerogative or by Imperial Statute .... It is important to observe that in America the intrusion of the doctrines of agency into Constitutional inrapretatior\n\n(I) (1921) 29 Com. L. R. 329.\n\nhas in no way obscured the operation of the separation of powers.\n\nIn the opinion of the Judicial Committee a general power of legislation belonging to a legislature constituted under a rigid Constitution does not enable it by any form of enactment to create and arm with general legislative authority a new legislative power not created or authorized by the instrument by which it is established.\" In respect of the legislation passed during the emergency of war and where the power was strongly relied upon, Dixon J. observed : \"It might be considered that the exigencies which must be dealt with under the defence power are so many, so great and so urgent and are so much the proper concern of the executive that from its very nature the power appears by necessary intendment to authorise a delegation otherwise generally forbidden to the legislature .......... I think it certain that such a provision would be supported in America and the passage in Burah's case appears to apply to it in which the Judidal Committee deny that in fact any delegation there took place .......... This does not mean that a law confiding authority to the executive will be followed, however extensive or vague the subject-matter may be if it does not fall outside the boundaries of federal power.\n\nNor does it mean that the distribution of powers can supply no considerations or weight affecting the validity ............... It may be acknowledged that the manner in which the Constitution accomplishes . the separation of power itself logically and theoretically makes the Parliament the executive repository of the legislative power of the Commonwealth.\n\nThe existence in Parliament of powerto authorise subordinate legislation may be ascribed to a conception of that legislative power which depends less upon juristic analysis and perhaps more upon the history and usages of British legilation and the theories of English law ........... Such subordinate legislation remains under Parliamentary control and 'is lacking in the independent and unqualified authority which is an attribute of true legislative power.\" He concludes : \"But whatever it may be, we should now adhere to the interpretation\n\nKania C. J.\n\netc.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nwhich results from the decision of Roche v . . Kronheimer(').\n\nThis whole discussion shows that the learned Judge was refuting the argument that because under the Constitution of U. S. A. such conferment of power would be invalid it should be held invalid under the Canadian Constitution also.\n\nHe was not dealing with the question raised before us. Ultimately he said that Roche V Kronheimer(') was conclusive;\n\nMr. Justice Evatt stated that in dealing with the doctrine of the separation of legislative and executive powers \"it must be remembered that underlying the Commonwealth frame of government there is the notion of the British system of an executive wh'ich is responsible to Parliament.\n\nThat system is not in operation under the United States' Constitution.\n\nHe formulated the larger proposition that every grant by the Commonwealth Parliament of authority . to make rules and regulations, whether the grantee is the executive government or some such authority, is itself a grant-of legislative power.\n\nThe true nature and quality of the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament involves as a part of its content power to confer law-making powers upon authorities other than Parliament itself. If such power to issue binding commands may lawfully be granted by Parliament to the executive or other agencies an increase in the extent of such power cannot of itself invalidate the grant.\n\nIt is true that the extent of the power granted will often be a very material circumstance in the examination of the validity of the legislation conferring the grant.\" In this paragraph the learned Judge appears certainly to have gone much beyond what had been held in any previous decision but he seems to have made the observations in those terms because (as he himself had stated just previously) in his view every conferment of power-whether it was by conditional legislation or ancilary legislation-was a delegation of legislative power. He concluded however as follows : \"On final analysis therefore the\n\n(I) (1921) 29 Com. L. R. 32~.\n\n' .\n\nParliament of the Commonwealth is not competent to abdicate its powers of legislation.\n\nThis is not because Parliament is bound to perform any or all of its legislative powers or functions for it may elect not to do so; and not because the doctrine of the separation of powers prevents Parliament from granting authority to other bodies to make laws or byelaws and thereby d:ercise legislative power for it does so in almost every statute but because each and every one of the laws passed by Parliament must answer the description of law upon one or more of the subject-matters stated in the Constitution. A law by which Parliament gives all its lawmaking authority to another body would be bad merely because it would fail to pass the test last mentioned.\" Read properly, these judgements therefore do !.Ot support the contention of the learned Attorney- General.\n\nThe decisions of the Privy Cow1cil on appeal from Canada do not carry the matter further.\n\nIn the Judgements of the two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the decisions of the Supreme Court of Australia there are observations which may appear to go beyond the limit mentioned above.\n\nThese observations have to be read on the light of the facts of the case and the particular regulation or enactm.::nt before the court in each case. These decisions also uniformly reiterate that the legislature must perform its functions and cannot leave that to any other authnrity.\n\nMore over the word \"delegation\" as stated by Evatt. J. in his judgment is understood by some Judges to cover what is described as subsidiary or conditional legislation also.\n\nTherefore because at some places in these judgments the word \"delegation\" is used it need not be assumed that the world necessarily means delegation of legislative functions, as understood in the strict sense of the word.\n\nThe actual decisiom were on the ground that they were subordinate legislation or conditional legislation.\n\nAgain, in respect of the Constitutions of the Dominions of Canada and Australia I may observe that the legislatures of those Dominions were not packed, as in India, and their Constitl.!tion was\n\n1951,\n\nIn re The Delhi Law.r Act,\n\n0 912, etc.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nKania C. 1.\n\non democratic lines.\n\nThe principle of fusion of powers between the Legislature and Executive can well be considered in operation in those Dominions, while as I ha.ve pointed out above there was no such fusion at all so far as the Indian Constitution in force till 1935 was concerned.\n\nConclusions therefore based on the fusion of legislative and executive powers are not properly applicable to the Indian Constitution.\n\nIn my opinion therefore to. the extent the observations in the Canadian and Austrilian decisions go beyond what is clearly decided by the Privy Council in respect of the Indian Legislature, they do not furnish a useful guide to determine the powers of the Indian Legislature to delegate legislative functions to administrative or executive authorities.\n\nThe Canadian and Australian Constitutions are both based on Acts of the British Parliament and therefore are creatures of written insrruments.\n\nTo that extent they are rigid.\n\nMoreover in the Australian Constitution in distributing the powers among the legislative and executive authorities, the word \"vest\" is used as in the Constitution of the U.S.A. To that extent the two Constitutions have common features.\n\nThere is however no clear separation of powers between the .legislature and executive so as to be mutually and completely exclusive and there is fusion of power so that the Ministers are themselves members of the legislature.\n\nOur attention was drawn to several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America mostly to draw a distinction between the legislative powers of the Congress in the United States of America and the legislative powers of the legislature under Constitutions prepared on the British Parliament pattern.\n\nIt was conceded that as the Constitution itself provided that >the legislative and executive powers were to vest exclusively in the legislature and the executive authority mentioned in the Constitution, it was not permissible for one body co delegate this authority and functions to another body.\n\nIt may be noticed that several decisions of the Supreme Court of U.S.A.\n\nare based on the incompetence of the delegate to receive the power sought to be conferred on it. Its\n\nompetence to function as the executive body is expressly set out in the Constitution, and it has been thought that impliedly the Constitution has thereby prevented such body from receiving from the legislative body other powers.\n\nIn view of my final conclusion I shall very briefly notice the position ; i, ccording to the U. S. A. Constitution.\n\nIn Crawford on Statutory Construction, it is stated as follows : \"So far however as the delegation of any power to an executive official or Administrative Board is concerned, the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases and must provide a standard to guide the official or the Board, empowered to execute the law.\n\nThis standard must not be too indefinite or general.\n\nIt may be laid down in broad general terms.\n\nIt is sufficient if the legislature will lay down ah intelligible principle to guide the executive or administrative official. ......... From these difficult criteria it is apparent that the Congress exercises considerable liberality towards upholding legislative delegations if a standard is established.\n\nSuch delegations are not subject to the objection that the legislative power has been unlawfully delegated.\n\nThe filling in mere matters of details within the policy of, and according to, the legal principles and standards, established by the Legislature, is essentially ministerial rather than legislative in character, even if considerable discretion is conferred upon the delegated authority.\"\n\nIn Hampton & Co. v. United States(1), Taft C. J. <Observed : \"It is a breach of the national fundamental 1aw if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President or to the judicial branch Qr if by law it attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive or judicial power.\n\nThis is not to say that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of one Government and that each in the field of duties\n\n(I) (1928] 276 u. S. 394, 406 and 407.\n\nKania C. J.\n\netc.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nmay not invoke the action of the two other branches in so fas as ihe action invoked shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch ...... The field of Congress involves all and many varieties of legislative action and Congress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the executive branch within defined limits to secure to exact effect intended by its act of legislation by vesting discretion in such officers to make public regulations, interpreting a statute and directing the details of its executive even to the ex.tent of providing for penalizing a breach of such regulations ............ Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective, because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time to the decision of an executive.\" He agreed with the often cited passage from the judgment of Ranny J. of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati W,. & Z. R. Co. v.\n\nClinton County Commissioners('), viz \"The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law which necessarily involves a discretions as to what it shall be and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.\n\nThe first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.\"\n\nIn Locke's Appeal(2 ), it is stated : \"The proper distinction in this. The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend.\n\nTo deny this would be to stop the wheels of Government.\n\nThere are many things upon which useful legislation must depend, which cannot be ktrown to the law-making power and _must therefore be a subject of enquiry and determination outside the halls of legislature.'~\n\nIn Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan ( 3), it was observed by Hughes C.J. : ''The Congress is not permitted to\n\n(I) I Ohio St. 88.\n\n(3) 293 U.S. 388.\n\n(2) 72 p.'A. 491.\n\nabdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is vested.\n\nUndoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the National Legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establish standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.\n\nWithout capacity to give authorisations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility but the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions and the wide range of administrative authority which has been declared by means of them cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate if our constitutional system is to be maintained.\n\nSimilarly, in Schechter v. United States('), it is stated : \"So long as the policy is laid down and standard established by a statute no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to. which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.\"\n\nThe complexity of this question of delegation of power and the consideration of the various decisions in which its application has led to the support or invalidation of Acts has been somewhat aptly put by Schwartz on American Administrative Law.\n\nAfter quoting from Wayman v. Southend (2) the observations 0£ Marshall C. J. that the line has not been exactly drawn which 'separates those important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself from those of less interest in which a general provision may be made and powers given to those who are to\n\n(I) 29S U.S. 459.\n\n(2) 10 Wheat 1 U.S. 1825.\n\nKania C.\"J.\n\nJn re The Delhi uws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nKaniil C. I.\n\nact under such general provision to fill up details, the author points out that the resulting judicial dilemma, when the America courts finally were squarely confronted with delegation cases, was resolved by the judicious .choice of words to describe the word \"delegated power\".\n\nThe authority transferr.ed was, in Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase, \"softened by a quasi\", and the courts were thus able to grant the fact of delegated legislation and still to deny the name.\n\nThis result is well put in Prof. Cushman's syllogism :\n\n\"Major premise : Legiilative power cannot be constitutionally delegated by Congress.\n\nMinor premise : It is essential that certain powers be delegated to administrative officers and regulatory commissions.\n\nConclusions : Therefore the powers thus delegated are not legislative powers.\n\nThey are instead administrtaive or quasi-legislative powers.\"\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the President that the legislative practice in India for over eighty years has recognised this kind of delegation and as that is one of the principles which the court has to bear in mind in deciding the validity of Acts of the legislature, this Court should uphold that practice.\n\nIn support of this contention a schedule annexed to the case field on behalf of the President, containing a list of Acts, is relied upon.\n\nIn my opinion out of those the very few Acts which on a close scrutiny may be cited as instances do not establish any such practice.\n\nA few of the instances can be supported as falling under the description of conditional legislation or subsidiary legislation.\n\nI do not discuss this in greater detail because unless the legislative practice is overwhelmingly clcor, tolearance or acquiescence in the existence of an Act without a dispute about its validity being raised in a coun of law for some years cannot be considered binding, when a question about the validity of such practice is raised and comes for decision before the Court.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, this broad\n\n. -;\n\ncontention of the Attorney-General that the Indian Legislature prior to 1935 had power to • delegate legislative functions in the sense contended by him is neither supported by judicial decisions nor by legislative practice.\n\nA fair and close reading and analysis of all these decisions of the Privy Council, the judgments of the Supreme Courts of Canada and Australia without stretching and straining the words and expressions used therein lead me to the conclusion that while a legislature, as a part of its legislative functions, can confer powers to make rules and regulations for carrying the enactment into operatiqn and effect, and while a legislature has power to lay do:nn the policy and principles providing the rule of conduct, and while it may further provide that on certain data or facts being found and ascqtained by an executive authority,\n\nthe operation of the Act can be extended to certain areas or may be brought into force on such determination which is described as conditional legislation the power to delegate legislative functions generally is not warranted under the Constitution of India at any stage.\n\nIn cases of emergency, like war where a large latitude has to be necessar.ily left in the matter of enforcing regulations to the executive, the scope:: of the power to make regulations is very wide, but even in those cases the suggestion that there was delegation of \"legislative functions\" has been repudiated.\n\nSimilarly, varying according to the necessities of the case and the nature of the legislation, the doctrine of conditional legislation or subsidiary legislation or ancillary legislation is equally upheld under all the Constitutions.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, the contention urged by the learned Attorney-General that legislative power carries with it a general power to delegate legislative functions, so that the legislature may not define its policy at all and may lay down no rule of conduct but that whole thing may be left either to the executive authority ot administrative or other body, is unsound and not supported by the authorities on which he relies.\n\nI do not think that apart from the sovereign character oi\n\n19Sl\n\netc.\n\nKania.C.J.\n\nKaaia C. J.\n\nthe British Parliament which is established as a matter of comrention and whose powers are also therefore absolute and unlimited, in any legislature of any other cc,.:.ntry such general powers of delegation as claimed by the Attorney-General for a legislature, have been recognised or permitted.\n\nIt was contended by the learned Attorney-General that under the power of delegation the legislative body cannot abdicate or efface itself.\n\nThat was its limit.\n\nIt -ras argued that so long as the legislature had power to control the actions of the body to which power was delegated, that so long as the actions of such body were capable of being revoked there was no abdication or effacement.\n\nIn support of this argument some reliance was placed on certain observations in the judgments of the Privy Council in the cases mentioned above.\n\nIt should be noticed that the Board was expressing its views to support the conclusion that the particular piece of legislation under consideration was either a conditional legislation or that the legislation derived its force and sanction from what the legislature had done and not from what the delegate had done.\n\nI do not think that those observations lead to the conclusion that up to that limit legislative delegation was permitted.\n\nThe true test in respect of \"abdication\" or \"effacement\" appears to be whether in conferring the power to the delegate, the legislature, in the wfJrds used to confer the power, retained its control.\n\nDoes the decision of the delegate derive sanction from the act of the delegate or has it got the sanction from what the -legislature has enacted and decided ? Every power given to a delegate can be normally called back.\n\nThere can hardly be a case where this cannot be done because the legislative body which confers power on the delegate has always the power to re¥oke that authority and it appears difficult to visualise a situation in which such power can be irrevocally lost.\n\nIt has been recognised that a legislative body established under an Act of the British Parliament by its very establishment has not the right to create another legislative body with the same functions and\n\npowers and authority.\n\nSuch power can be only in the British Parliament and not in the legislature established by an Act of the British Parliament.\n\nTherefore, to say that the true test of effacement is that the authority which confers power on the subordinate body should not be able to . withdraw the power appears to be meaningless.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, the question whether there is \"abdication\" and \"effacement\" or not has to be decided on the meaning of words used in the instrument by . which the power is conferred on the authority.\n\nAbdication, according to the Oxford Dictionary, means abandonment, either formal or virtual, of sovereignty.\n\nAbdication by a legislative body need not necessarily amount to a complete, effacement of it.\n\nAbdication may be partial or complete.\n\nWhen in respect of a subject in the Legislative List the legislature says that it shall not legislate on that subject but would leave it to somebody else to legislate on it, why does it not amount to abdication or effacement ? If full powers to do anything and everything which the legislature can do are conferred on the subordinate authority, although the legislature has power . to control the action of the subordinate authority, by recalling such power or repealing the Acts passed by the subordinate authority, the power conferred by the instrument, in my opinion, amounts to an abdication or effacement of the legislature conferring such power.\n\nThe power to modify an Act in its extension by the order of th~ subordinate authority has also come in for considerable discussion. Originally when power was conferred on the subordinate authority to apply existing legislation to specified areas it was given only to apply the whole or a portion thereof.\n\nThat power was further expanded by giving a power to restrict its application also.\n\nIn the next stage power was given to modify \"so as to adapt the same\" to local conditions.\n\nIt is obvious that till this stage the clear intention was that the delegate on whom power was conferred was only left with the discretion to apply who was considered suitable, as a whole or in part,\n\n19Sl\n\nKania C. J.\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act; l912,\n\netc.\n\nKmrlo C. J. ·\n\nand to make adaptations which became necessary because of local conditions and nothing more.\n\nOnly in recent years in some Acts power of modification is given without any words of limitation on that power.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General contended that the word \"modify\" according to the Oxford Dictionary means \"to limit, restrain, . to assuage, to make less severe, rigorous, or decisive ; to tonedown.\" It is also given the meaning \"to 'make partial changes in ; to alter without radical transformation\" He therefore contended that if the donee of the power exceeded the limits of the power of modification beyond that nse, that would be exceeding the limits of the power and to that extent the exercise of the power may be declared invalid.\n\nHe claimed no larger power under the term \"modification\".\n\nOn the other hand, in Rowland Burrows' \"Words and Phrases\", the word \"modify\" has been defined as meaning \"vary, extend or enlarge, limit or restrict.\" It has been held that modification implies and alteration.\n\nIt may narrow or enlarge the provisions of the former Act. It has been pointed out that under the powers conferred by the Delhi Laws Act, the Central Government has extended the application of the Bombay Debtors' Relief Act to Delhi.\n\nThe Bombay Act limits its application to poor agriculturists whose agricultural income is less than Rs. 500.\n\nUnder the power of modification conferred on it by the Delhi Laws Act, the Central Government has removed this limit on the income, with the result that the principles, policy and machinery to give relief to poor peasants or agriculturists with an in_£ome of less than Rs. 500 is made applicable in Delhi to big landowners .even with an income of 20 lakhs ! !\n\nThis shows how the word \"modification\" is understood and applied by the Central Government and acquiesced in by the Indian Legislature. I do not think such power of modification as actually exercised by the Central Government is permitted in law. If power of modification so understood is permitted, it will be open to the Central Legislature in dfcct to change the whole basis of the legislation and the reason for making the\n\nlaw.\n\nThat will be a complete delegation of legislative power because in the event of the exercise of the power in that manner the Indian legislature has not applied its. mmd either to the policy under whicli relit should be g'1ven nor the class of persons not the cu cumstances nor the machinery by which relief is to be given.\n\nThe provisions of the Rent Restriction Act in different Provinces are an equally good example to show how dangerous it is to confer the power of modification on the executive government.\n\nHaving considered all the decisiOJ, l.S vv, liich were cited before us and giving 'anxious consideration to the elaborate and detalled arguments advanced by . the learned Attorney-General in the discussion of this case, I adhere to what I stated in /atindra Nath Gupta's case{1) that the power of delegation, in the sense o~ the legislature •conferring power, on either the execut:lve government or another authority, \"to lay down the policy underlying a rule of conduct\" is not permitted.\n\nThe word \"delegation'', as I have pointed out, has been somewhat loosely used in the course of discussion and even by some Judges in expressing their views.\n\nAs I have pointed out throughout the decision of the Privy Council the word \"delegation\" is used so as not to cover what is described as conditional legislation or subsidiary or ancillary . legislation, which means the power to make rules and regulations to bring . into operation and effect the enactment. Giving \"delegation\" the meaning which has always been given to it in the decisions of the Privy Council, what I stated in /atindra Nath Gupta's case as the legislature not havmg the power of delegation is, in my opinion correct.\n\nUnder the new Constitution of 1950, the British Parliament, i.e., . an outside authority, has no more control over the Indian Legislature.\n\nThat Legislature's powers are defined and controlled and the limitations thereon pres.cribed only by the Constitution of India.\n\nBut the scope of its legislative power has not become\n\n(l) [1949] F. C.R. 595. $--)SC India/61.1\n\nIn re The Dellll Laws .ifct, 1912,\n\nKania, C. J.\n\n19S1\n\nKania C. J.\n\nenlarged by the provisions found in the Constitution of India.\n\nWhile the Constitution creates the Parliament and although it does not 'm terms expressly vest the legislatiYe powers in the Parli.ament exclusively, the whole scheme of the Constitution is based on the concept that. the legislative functions of the Union will be discharged by the Parliament and by no other body.\n\nThe essential of the legislative functions, viz., the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct, are still in the Parliament or the State Legislatures as the case may be and nowhere else.\n\nI take that view because of the provisions of article 357 and anicle 22(4) of the Constitution of India.\n\nArticle 356 prowdes against the contingency of the failure of the constitutional machinery in the\n\nStates.\n\nOn a proclamation to that effect being issued, it is provided in article 357(1) (a) that the power of the legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of the Parliament, and it shall be competent for the Parliament to confer on the President the power of the legislature of the State to make laws \"and to authorise the President to delegate, subjec~ to such conditions as he may think fit to impose th~ powers so conferred to any other authority to be specified by him in that behalf.\" Sub-clause (b) runs as follows :-\"For Parliament, or for the President or other authority in whom such power to make laws is vested under sub-cl. (a), to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or authorising the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities thereof.\" It was contended that on the breakdown of such machinery authority had to be given to the Parliament or the President, firstly, to make laws in respect of subjects on which the State Legislature alone could otherwise make laws and, secondly, to empower the Parliament or the President to make the executive officers of the State Government to act in accordance with the laws which the Parliament or the President may pass in such emergency.\n\nIt was argued that for this purpose the word \"to delegate\" is used.\n\nI do not think this argument is sound. Sub-clause (2) relates to the power\n\n.of the President to use the State executive officers.\n\nBut under clause (a) Parliament is given power to confer on the President the power of the legislature of the State to make laws.\n\nArticle 357 (1) (a) thus expressly gives power to the Parliament to authorise the President to delegate his legisla#ve powers. If powers of legislation include the power of delegation to any authority there was no occasion to make this additional provision in the article at all.\n\nThe wording of th'is clause therefore supports the contention tat normally a power of legislation does not include the power of delegation.\n\nArticle 22(4) again is very important in this connection. lt deals with preventive detention and provides that no law shall be valid which will permit preventive detention of a person for a period over three months, unless the conditions laid down in article 22 ( 4) (a) are complied with.\n\nThe exception to this is in respect of an Act of the Parliament made on the conditions mentioned in article 22( 4) (b ).\n\nAccording to that, the Parliament has to pass an Act consistently with the provisions of article 22(7).\n\nThe important point is that in respect of this fundamental right given to a person limiting the period of his detention up to three months, an exception is made in favour of the Parliament by the article.\n\nIt appears to me a violation of the provisions of this article on fundamental rights to suggest that the Parliament having the power to make a legislation within the terms of article 22(7) has the power to delegate that right in favour of the executive government. In my opinion, therefoe the argument that un<ler the Constitution of 1950 the power of legislation carries with it the power of delegation, in the large sense, as contended by the Attorney-General cannot be accepted.\n\nHaving regard to the position of the British Parliament, the question whether it can validly delegate its legislative functions .cannot be raised in a court of law .. 'Therefore from . the fact that the British Parliament\n\nhas delegated legislative powers it docs not follow that the power of delegation is recogni_s.ed in law as necessarily included in the power of legislation.\n\nAlthough\n\nKania C. J,\n\n19~1.\n\nIn re 71ie De/hi LAlws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nX.nlo C. J.\n\nin the Constitution of India there is no express separation of powers, it 'is clear that a legislature is created by the Constitution and detailed provisions are made for making that legislature pass laws.\n\nIs it then too much to say that under the Constitution the duty to make laws, the duty to exercise its own wisdom, judgment and patriotism in making laws is prlmarily cast on the legislatures ? Does it not imply that unl'ess it can. be gathered from other provisions of the Constitution, other bodies, executive pr judicial, are not intended to discharge legislat'ive functions ? I am unable to read the decisions to which our attention has been drawn as laying down that once a legislature observes the procedure prescribed for passing a bill into an Act, it becomes. a valid law, unless it is outside the Legislative Lists iri the Seventh Schedµle prescribing its respective powers. I do not read articles 245 and 246 as covering the question of delegation of legislative powers.\n\nIn my opinion, on a true construction of articles 245 and 246 and the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, construed in the 'light of the judicial decisions mentioned above, legislation delegating legislative powers on some other bodies is not a law on any of the subjects or entries mentioned in the Legislative Lists; It amounts to a law which states that instead of the legjslature passing law.s on any subject covered by the entries, it cgnfers on the body mentioned in the legislation the power to lay down the policy of the law and make a rule of conduct binding on the persons covered by the law.\n\nAs a result of considering all these decisions together it seems to me that the legislature in India, Canada, Australia and the U.S.A. has to discharge its legislative functions, i.e., to lay down a rule of' conduct. In doing so it may, in addition, lay down 'i:ondinons, or state facts which on being fulfilled or ascertained according to the decision of another body or the executive authority, the lc; gislation may beconie applicable to a particular area This is described as conditional legislation.\n\nThe legislature may also, in laying down the rule of conduct, express itself generally if the conditions and circumstances so require.\n\nThe extent of the\n\nspecific and detailed lines of the rule of conduct to be laid down may vary according to the circumstances or exigencies, of each case.\n\nThe result will he that if, owing to unusual circumstances or exigencies, the legislature does not choose to lay down detailed rules or regulations, that work may be left to another body which is then deemed to have subordinate legislative powers.\n\nHaving regard to the distinction. noticed above between the power of delegation of legislative functions\n\nand the authority to confer powers which enables the donee of the power to make regulations or rules to bring into effect or operation the law and the power of\n\nthe legislature to inake conditional legislation, I shall proceed to consider the three specific questions mentioned in the Reference. It • may be noticed that occasions to make legislation of the type covered by the three sections mentioned in the three questions began in the early stages of the occupation of India where small bits of territories were acquired and in respect of which there was no regular legislative body.\n\nIt was thought convenient to apply to these small areas laws which were made by competent legislature in contiguous areas.\n\nThat practice was adopted to avoid setting up a separate, sometimes inconvenient and sometimes costly, machinery of legislation for the small area.\n\nNor might it have been considered possible for the Governor-General in Council to enact laws for the day to day administration of such bits of territory or for all their needs having regard to different Icxal conditions. As local conditions may differ to a certain extent, lt '.lppears t& have been considered also convenient to confer powers on the administrator to apply the law either in whole or in part or to restrict its operation even to a limited portion of such newly acquired area.\n\nThis aspect of legislation is prominently noticed in Act XXII of 1869 discussed in The Queen v. Burah(1).\n\nUnder section 22 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861, the Governor-General in Council was given' power 'to make laws for all persons and for all places and things whatever within British India.\n\nThe Province of Delhi was carved out of the Province of Punjab and was put\n\n{I) SI. A. 178.\n\nIn re The Delhi laws .A.ct, 1912, etc.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nJn re TAe De/Al Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nKania C . .T.\n\nunder a Chief Commissioner and by section 2 of the Delhi Laws Act the laws in force in the Punjab continued to be operative in the newly created Province of Delhi.\n\nThe Province of Delhi had not its legislative body and so far as this Chief Commissioner's Province is concerned it is not disputed that the power to legislate was in the Governor-General in Council in his legislalive capacity.\n\nTe first question as worded has to be answered according to the powers and position of the legislature in 1912.\n\nSection 7 of the Delhi Laws .(\\ct enables the Government (executive) to extend by notification with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, to the Province of Delhi or any part thereof. any enactment which is in force in any part of British India, at the date of such notification, i-e., :r law whic\\i was in force ilOt necessarily in the Province of Punjab only, from which the Province of Delhi was carved out, but any Central or provincial law in force in any. Province.\n\nAgain, the Government is given power to extend any such law with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit.\n\nMoreover it enables the Provincial Government to extend an Act which is in force \"at the date of such notifieation.\" Those words therefore permit extension of future laws which may be passed either by the Central or any Pro\\rinciaI legislature, also with such restrictions and modifications as the Provincial Government may think fit. At this stage, sections 8 and 9 of Act XXII of 1869 under which powers were given to the Lieut.-Governor in The Q11een v. Burah(') may be compared.\n\nThey permitted the extension of Acts whieh were or might be made by the Governor-General in Council (legislative) or tlie Lieut.-Governor, both of whom were the competent leg'islative authorities for the whole area under the administrative jurisdiction of the Lieut.-Governor.\n\nThe power was confined to extend only those Acts. over the area specified in Act XXII of 1869, although that area was declared by Act XXII of 1869 as not subject to the laws of the Province, unless the area was specifically mentioned in the particular Act.\n\n(I) SI.A.\"!78.\n\nthe authority of that decision therefore, so far as section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act gives power to the executive (Central) Government to extend Act~ passed by the Central Legislature to the Province of Delhi, the. same may be upheld.\n\nThe question then remain in respect of the power' of the executive government to extend Acts of other Provincial legislatures (with or without restrictions or modifications) to the Chief Commissioner's Province.\n\nIt is obvious that in respect of these Acts the Central Legislature has not applied its mind at all.\n\nIt has . not considered whether the Province of Delhi requires the rule of conduct laid down in those Acts, as necessary or beneficial for the welfare of the people of the Province or for its government.\n\nThey ar~ passed by other Provincial legislatures according to their needs and circumstances. The effect of section 7' of the Delhi Laws Act therefore in permitting the Central Government to apply such Provincial Acts to the Province of Delhi is . that, instead . of the Central Legislature making up its mind as to the desirability or necessity of making laws on certain subjects in respect of the\n\nProvin~ of Delhi, that duty and right are conferred on the. executive government.\n\nFor example, the question whether a rent act, or an excise act, or what may be generally described as a prohibition act, or a debt relief act is desirable or necessary, as a matter of policy for the Province of Delhi is not considered and . decided by the Central Legislature which, in my. opinion, has to. perform that duty; but that duty and function without any reservation is transferred over to the executive government.\n\nSection 7 of the Delhi Laws Act thus contains an entirely different quality of power from the quality of power conferred by sections 8 and . 9 of Act XXII of 1869.\n\nAll the dec'isions of the Privy Council unequivocally affirm that it is not competent for the Indian Legislature to create a body possessing the same powers as rhe Central Legislature itself.\n\nIt is stated that the legislature cannot efface itself.\n\nOne may well ask, if section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act has done\n\netc.\n\nKania C. J.\n\n111 re 11ie Delhi Law• Act, 1912. c.\n\nX.onla C. J.\n\nanything else.\n\nThe Privy Council decisions emphaSize two aspects m respect of this question.\n\nThe first is whether the new body is empowered to make laws.\n\nThe second is, does the sanction llow from the legisla-. tion made by the legislature or from the decision of the newly ci\"i:ated body.\n\nJu regard the first, it is obvious that in principle there is no difference if' the newly created body itself writes out on a sheet of paper different sections of an Act or states that the Act will be what is writtcr1 or printed on another clearly identifiable paper.\n\nTherefore if such new body says that the law in Delhi will be the same as Bombay or Madras Act so and so of such and such year it has made the law. Moreover it may be remembered that in doing so the new body may restrict or modify the provisions of iuch Act also.\n\nOn the second aspect the sanction flows clearly from the notification of the newly created body that Bombay or Madras Act so and so with such\n\nmodifications as may be mentioned, will be the law.\n\nThat has not been the will or decision of the legislature.\n\nThe legislature has not applied its miad and said \"Bombay Act .............. is the law of: this Province\".\n\nIn my opinion, it ls futile to contend tha~ the sanction flows from the statement of the legislature that the law will be what the newly created body decides or 1ipecilies, for that statement only indicates the new body and says that we confer on it power to select a law of another province.\n\nThe illustrations of the extension of the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, mentioned in the judgment in The Queen v. Burah (1) have to have to be considered along with the fact that at that time the Governor-General in Council, in its legislative capacity, had power of legislation over the whole of India on all subjects.\n\nThe Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes were enacted oy the Central Legislature and it could have made the same applicable at once to the whole of India.\n\nBut having passed the laws, it laid down a condition that 'ts application may be referred to certain areas uittil the particular Provincial Government (executive) considered it convenient for these Codes to be made\n\n(I) SI. A. 178\n\napplicable to its indivlclual area.\n\nA Provincial Government, e.g., of Bombay, was not empowered to lay down any policy in respect of the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code nor was it authorised to select, if it liked, a law passed by the Legislature of Madras for its appl.lcation to the Province of Bombay.\n\nIf it wanted to do so, the Legislature of the Province of Bombay had to exercise its judgment and decision and pass the law which would be enforceable in the Province of Bombay.\n\nIt may be noticed that the power to extend, mutatis mutandis, the laws as contained in sections 8 and 9 of Act XXII of 1869 brings in the idea of adaptation by modification, but so far only as it is necessary for the purpose.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, to the extent section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act permits the Central executive government to apply any law passed by a Provincial legislature to the Province of Delhi, the same is ultra vircs the Central Legislature.\n\nTo that extent the Central Legislature has abdicated its functions and therefore the Act to the extent is invalid. _\n\nQuestion 2 relates to Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act.\n\nTill the. Government of India Act, 1915, there was unitary government in India.\n\nBy the Act of 1915, Provincial legislatures were given powers of legislation but there was no distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and the Provinces. -That was brought about only by the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nSection 94 of that Act enumerates the Chief Commissioner's Provinces.\n\nThey include the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara.\n\nUnde.r sections 99 and 100 there was a distribution of legislative powers between Provinces and Centre, but the word \"Province\" did not include a Chief Commissioner's Province and therefore the Central Legislature was the only law-making authority for the Chief Commissioner's Provinces.\n\nThe Ajmer-Merwara Act was passeg under the Government of India Act as adapted by the Indian lndepend!!nce Act.\n\nAlthough by that Act the control of British Parliament over the Government of India\n\nKania C. J.\n\n19SI\n\netc.\n\nKania C. J.\n\nand the Central Legislature was removed, the powers of the Central Legislature were still as those found in the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThe Independence Act therefore made no difference on the .question whether the power of delegation was contained in the legislative power.\n\nThe result is that to the extent to which section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act 'is held ultra vires, sectiQn 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara Act, 1947, should also be held ultra vires.\n\nThis brings me to Question 3, Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, is passed by the Indian Parliament.\n\nUnder article 239 of the Constitution of India, the powers for the administration of Part C States are all vested in the President.\n\nUrider article 240 the Parliament is empowered to create or continue for any State specified in Part C, and administered through a Chief Commissioner or Lieutenant Governor;\n\n(a) a body whether nominated or elected, or partly nominated or partly elected, to function as a leg'islature for the State, or •\n\n, (b) a Council of Advisers or Ministers.\n\nt is common ground that no law creating such bodies: has been passed by the Parliament so far.\n\nArticle ?46 deals with the distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and the States but Part C States are outside its operation.\n\nTherefore on any subject affecting Part C States, Parliament is the sole and exclusive legislature Ul}til it passes an Act creating a legislature or a Council in terms of article 240.\n\nProceeding on the footing that a power of legislation does not c:irry with fr the power of delegation (as claimed by the Attorney-General), the question is whether section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act is valid or not.\n\nBy that section the Parliament has given power to the Central Government by notification to extend to any part of such State (Part C State), with such restrictio11s and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in Part A State at the date of the notification.\n\nThe section although framed on the lines of tbe Deihl Laws Act and the Ajmer-Merwara Act is restricted in\n\nits scope as the executive goverrunent is empowered to extend only an Act whlch is in force in any of the Part A States.\n\nFor the reasons I have considered certain parts of the two sections . covered by Questions 1 and 2 ultra vires, that p:irt of section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, which empowers the Central Government to extend laws passed by any Legislature of Part A State, will also be ultra vires.\n\nTo the extent the Central Legislature or Parliament has passed Acts which are applicable to Patt A States, there: can .be no objection to the Central Government ext!' 1ding, if necessary, the operation of those Acts to the Province of Delhi, because the Parliament is the C01llpetent legislature for . that Province.\n\nTo the extent however the section permits the Central Government to extend laws made by any legislature of Part A State to the Province of Delhi, the section is ultra vires.\n\nIn view of my conclusion in respect of the first. part of section . 2 of. the Part C States (Laws) . Aq, 1950, I do not think it necessary to deal with separately the other part of the section relating to the power to repeal or amend a corresponding law for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\n\nBefore concluding, I must record the appreciation of the Court in the help the learned Attorney-General and the counsel appearing in the Reference have\n\nrndered to the Court by their industry in collecting all relevant materials . and putting the. same before the Court in an extremely fair manner.\n\nMy answers to the questions are that all the three sections mentioned in the three questions are ultra\n\nvires the Legislatures, functioning at the relevant dates, to the extent power is given to the Government\n\n(executive) to extend Acts other than Acts of the Central Legislature as mentioned in the judgment . .\n\nF AZL ALI J .-The answer to the three questions which. have been referred by the President under\n\narticle 143 of the Constitution of India, depends upon the proper answer to another question which was the\n\n19S1\n\nKania C. J.\n\nFazl Ali I.\n\n19SI\n\nIn re The Delhi Law8 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nFi1Z/ Ali J.\n\nsubject of very elaborate arguments before us and .whlch may be stated thus : Can a legislature which is sovereign or has plenary powers withln the .field assigned to it, delegate its legislative functions to an executive authority or fo another agency, and, if so, to what extent it can do so ?\n\nIn dealing with this question, three possible answers may be considered. They are :- ( 1) A legislature whlch is sovereign in a particular . .field has unlimted power of delegation and the content of its power must necessarily include the power to delegate legislative functions ;\n\n(2) Delegated legislation is perm, issible only within certain limits ; and\n\n(3) Delegated legislation i.~ not permissible at all by reason of certain principles of law whlch arc wcllknown and well-recognised.\n\nI will .first consider the last alternative, but I should state that in doing so I will be using the expressions, \"delegated legislation,\" and \"delegation of legislative authority,\" in the loose and popular sense and not in the strict sense which I shall explain later.\n\nOne of the principles on which reliance was placed to show that legislative power cannot be delegated is said to be embodied in the well-known maxim, delegatus non potest delegare, which in simple language means that a delegated authority cannot be redelegated, or, in other words, one agent cannot lawfully appoint another to perform the duties of agency. Tills maxim however has a liihited application even in the dom:tin of the law of contract or agency wherein ;.t is frequently invoked and is limited to those' cases where the contract of agency is of a confidential character and where authority is coupled with discretion or confidence.\n\nThus, auctioneers, brokers, directors, factors, liquidators and other persons holding a .fiduciary position have generally no implied authority to employ deputies or\n\nsub.agents.\n\nThe rule is so stated is Broom's Legal Maxims, and many other books, and it is also stated that in a number of cases the authority to employ\n\nagents is implied. In applying the maxim to the act of a legislative body, we have necessarily to ask \"who is the principal a, nd who is the delegator\".\n\nIn some cases where the question of the power of the Indian or . a colonial legislature came up for consideration of the courts, it was suggested that such a legislature was a delegate of the British Parliament by which it had been vested with authority to legislate.\n\nBut this view has been rightly repelled by the Privy Council on more than one occasion, as will appear from the following extracts from two of the leading cases on the subject :- -\n\n\"The Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can of coi.Irse do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers.\n\nBut when acting within those limits it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the ~Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself.\" : Reg. v. Burah(1).\n\n\"It appears to their Lordships, however, that the objection thus raised by the appellants is founded on an entire misconception of the true character and position of the Provincial Legislatures.\n\nThey are in no sense delegates of or acting under any mandate from. the Imperial Parliament.\n\nWhen the British North America Act enacted that there should be a Legislature for Ontario, and that • 'its Legislative Assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the Province and for Provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in section 92, it conferred powers, not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament, but authonty as plenary and as ample, within the limits prescribed by section 92, as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow.\n\nWithin these limits of subjects and areas die Local Legislature is supreme, and has the same authority as the lmpedal Parliament.\" : Hodge v.\n\nThe Queen(2).\n\n(I) 3 App Cas. 889.\n\n(2) 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\nJ9Sl\n\nlnre The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, etc .\n\nFaz/ A/IJ.\n\nIn re Tiie De/hi L<lws Act, 1912 etc.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nIt has also been suggested by some writers that the legislature is a delegate of the people or the electors.\n\nThis view again has not been accepted by some constitutional writers, and Dicey dealing with the powers of the British Parliament with reference to the Septennial Act, states as follows :-\n\n\"That Act proves to demonstration that in a legal point of view Parliament is neither the agent of the electors nor in any sense a trustee for its constituents.\n\nIt is legally the sovereign legislative power. in the state, and the Septennial Act is at once the result and the standing proof of such Parliamentary sovereignty.\" ( 1)\n\nThe same learned author further observes :- \"The Judges know nothing about any will of the people except in so far as that will is expressed by an Act of Parliament, and would never suffer the validity of a statute to be questioned on. the round of its having been passed or being kept alive in opposition to the wishes of the electors.\" (2)\n\nThere can be no doubt that members of a legislature represent the majority of their electors, but the legislature as a body cannot be said to be an agency of the\n\nelectorat~ as a whole.\n\nThe individual members may and often do represent different parties and different. shades of opinion, but the composite legislature which legislates, does so on its own authority or power which it derives from the Constitution, and its acts cannot be questioned by the electorate, nor can the latter withdraw its power to legislate on any particular matter.\n\nAs has been pointed out by D1cey,- \"the sole legal right of electors under the English Constituticn is to elect memebrs of Parliament.\n\nElectors have no legal right of initiating, of sanctioning, or of repealing the legislation of Parliament.\"(\")\n\nIt seems to me therefore that it will not be quite accurate to say that the kgislature being an agent of\n\n(l) Dicey's: ''Law of the Constitution'', Sth.edn., p. 4S.\n\n(2) Ibid, P 72.\n\n(3) Dicey's ''Law of the Constituuon\", 8th edn., p. 57.\n\nits constituents, its powers are subject to the restrictions implied 1in the Latin maxim referred to.\n\nI shall however advert to this subject again when I deal with another principle which is . somewhat akin to the principle 1!nddlying the maxim.\n\nThe second principle on which reliance was placed was said to be founded on the well-known Joctrine Qf \"separation of powers.\" It is an old doctrine which is said to have originated from Aristotle, but, as is well-known, it was given great prominence by Locke and Montesquieu.\n\nThe doctrine may be stated in Montesquieu's own words :-\n\n\"In every government there are three sorts of power, the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law ...... ' ... When the legislative and the executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no libertr ; because apprehensions may rise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.\n\nAgain, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legis- . lative and the executive.\n\nWere it joined with the ltg'islative, . the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence . and oppression.\n\nThere should be. an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to nercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.\" (1)\n\nThe doctrine found many enthusiasts in Ani.erica and w:is virtually elevated to a legal principle in that country. 'Washington, in his farewell address, said :-\n\n\"The spirit of enroachinent tends to consolidate the powers of all governments in one, and thus to\n\n(I) Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws. VoL I by J. v. Pritchard; 1914 cdn., 'pp. t62·3.\n\n19Sl\n\nFaz/ AfiJ.\n\n19SI\n\nIn re Th< De/hi Laws Act, 1912 etc.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\ncreate, whatever the form of government, a real despotism.n\n\nlohn Adams wrote on similar lines as follows :-\n\n•it is by balancing one ot these three powers against the other two that the efforts in human nature towards tyranny can alone be checked and restrained and any degree of freedom preserved.\"(')\n\nThese sentiments are fully reflected in the Con-. stitutions of the individual States as well as in the Federal Constitution of America . . Massachusetts in her Constitution, adpoted in 1780,\n\nprovided that \"in the government of this commonwealth the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them ; the executive shall never exercise legislative and judicial powers or either of them ; the judicial shall never exercise legislative and executive powers or either of them ; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.\"(2) The Constitutions of 39 other States were drafted on similar lines, and so far as the Federal Constitution of the United States was concerned, though it does not expressly create a separation of governmental powers, yet from the three articles stating that the legislative power vests in Col)gre'\\f, the judicial power in the Supreme Court and die executive power in the President, the rule has been deduced that the power vested in each branch of the Government cannot be vested in any other branch, nor can one branch interfere with the power possessed by any other branch.\n\nThis rule has been stated by Sutherland J. in Springer v. Government of the Phillipine Islands(') in these words :-\n\n\"It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, that unless otherwise expressly provided or inLidental to the powers conferred, the Legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power ;. the Executive\n\n(I) Vide, Works, Vol. I, P. 186.\n\n(2) Willoughby's Constitution of the United States, Vol. m, 1616.\n\n(3) 277 S.189 at201:\n\ncannot exercise either legislative or judicial power ; the Judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power.\"\n\nFrom the rule so stated; the next step was to dedilce the rul~ against delegation of legislative power which has so often been stressed in the earlier American decisions.\n\nIt was however soon realized that the absolute rule against delegation of legislative -power could not be sustained in practice, and as early as 1825, Marshall C.J. openly stated that the rule was subject to limitations and asserted that Congress \"may certainly delegate to others powers which the Legis.- lature may rightfully exercise itself''{1).\n\nIn course of time, notwithstanding the maxim against delegation, the extent of delegation had become so great that an American writer wrote in 1916 that \"because of the rise of the administrative process, the old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has virtually retired from the field and given up the fight''.(2) This is in one sense an over-statement, because the American Judges have never ceased to be vigilant to check any undue or excessive authority being delegated to the executive as will appear from the comparatively recent decisions of the American Supreme Court in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan(8) and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States(')· In the latter case, it was held that the National Indus.- trial Recovery Act, in so far as it purported to confer upon the President the authority to adopt and make effective codes of fair competition and impose the same upon members of each industry for which such a code is approved, was void because it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.\n\nDealing with the matter, Cardozo J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not canalized within\n\n{I) Wayman v. Southard(l82S)23 U.S. 43.\n\n(2) 41 American Bar Assen. Reports, 356 at 368.\n\n(3) 293 U.S. 388.\n\n(4) 295 U.S. 49!5. 6-3 S.C India/68\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nlnre The Del/ti ltzWs Act, 1912\n\netc.\n\nFazl A/iJ.\n\nbanks that kept it from overfl<>Wing It is wiconfined and vagrant. . . . . . . . . . Here, in the case before us, is an attempted delegation not confined to any single act nor to any class or group of acts identified or described by reference to a standard.\n\nHere in effect is a roving commission to inquire into evils upon discovery to correct them ...... Tllis is delegation running riot.\n\nNo such plenitude of power is capable of transfer.\"(')\n\nThe fact however remains that the American courts have upheld the s<><alled delegated legislation in numerous instances, and chere is now a wide gulf between the theoretical doctrine and its application in practice.\n\nHow numerous are the exceptions engrafted on the rule will appear on a reference to a very elaborate and informing note appended to the report of the case of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan in 79, Lawyer's Edition at page 448.\n\nIn this note, the learned authors have classified instances of delegation upheld in America under the following 8 heads, with numerous sub-heads :-\n\n1. Delegation of power to determine facts or conditions on which operation of statute is contingent.\n\n2. Delegation of non-legislative or administrative fwictions.\n\n3. Delegation of power to make administrative rules and regulations.\n\n4. Delegation to municipalities and local bodies\n\n5. Delegation by Congress to territorial legislature or commission.\n\n6. Delegation to pnvate or non-official persons or corporations.\n\n7. Vesting discretion in judiciary.\n\n8. Adopting law or rule of another jurisdiction.\n\nThe learned American Judges in laying down exceptions to the general rule from time to time, have offered various explanations, a fc:W of which may be quoted as samples :-\n\n(I) 295 u.S.49S at SS!.\n\n\" ...... however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out .the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.\" [Per Holmes J. in Spinger v. The Government of Philippine lslatzds(1)]\n\n\" ...... too. much effort to detail and particularize, so as to dispense with the administrative or fact-finding assistance, would cause great confusion in the laws, and would result in laws deficient in both provision and execution.\" [Mutual Film Corporntion v. Industrial Commission(2)] .\n\n\"If the legislature were strictly required to make provision for all the minutiae of regulation, it woµld in effrct, be deprived of the power to enact effective legislation on subjects over which it has undoubted power.\"\n\n\"The true distinctiqn ...... is this.\n\nThe legislature .cannot delegate its .power to make a law; but it can\n\nmake a law to delegate a power to detcrmiqe some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend-To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government\"(3).\n\n\"The true distinction is between the delegation of ?Qwer to make the law which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.\n\nThe first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.\" (Per Ranney J. in Cincinnati W. & Z. R. Co. v. Clinton County Commissio11ers(4) ].\n\n(1) 277 U.S. 189.\n\n(2) 236 U.S. 230.\n\n(3) Locke's Appeal, 1873 72 Pa. 491.\n\n(4) I Ohio St. 88\n\nIn re Tire Delhi Laws Act, 1912\n\n• etc.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nlnre The Delhi L•ws Act, 1912 etc. ..\n\nFaz/ A/; J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951] .... ·-· ..... \"Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing them.\n\nBut it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of law.\" [Moore v.\n\nReading(1)]\n\n\"Congress may declare its will and, after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon administrative officers the power to fill up the details by prescribing a~ trative rules and regulations.\" [United States v.\n\nShreflt:port Grain & E. Co.(2)]\n\n''The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality whieh will enable ii to perform .its functions in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.\n\nWithout capacity to give authorizations of that sort, we should have the anomaly of a legislative power whieh in many circumstances calling for its t:Xertion would be but a futility.\" [Per Hughes C. J in Panama Refining Co. Ryan(')] .... '' ...... .\n\n''This is .qot to say that the three branches are not c<>-0rdinate parts of one government and that eaeh in the field of its duties may not invoke the action of the two other branches in so far as the aetion invoked shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch.\" [Per Taft C.J. in /. W. Hampton fr. & Co. v. U.S. (')]\n\nI have quoted these extracts at the risk of encumbering my opinion for 2 reasons : firstly, because they\n\n(I) 21 Pa. 202.\n\n(2) 287U.S. 77.\n\n(3) 293 U.S. 388\n\n(4) 276 U.S. 394.\n\nshow that notwithstanding the prevalence of the doctrine of separation of powers in America, the rule against delegation of legislative power is by no means an inelastic one 1n that ::ountry, and many eminent Judges there have tried to give a practical trend to it so as to bring it in line with the needs of the presentday administration, and secondly, because they show that the rule against delegation is not a necessary corollary from the doctrine of separation of powers.\n\nIt is to be noted that though the principle of separation of powers is also the basis of the Australian Constitution, the objection . that the delegation of legislative power was not permissible because of the distribution of powers contained in the Constitution has been raised in that Commonwealth only in a few cases and in all those cases it has been negatived.\n\nThe first case in which this objection was raised was Baxter\n\nv. Ah Way(')- In that case, the validity of section 52 of the Cmtoms Act, 1901, was challenged. That section after enumerating certain prohibited imports provided for the inclusion of \"all goods the importation of which may be prohibited by proclamation.\" Sec- .tion 56 of the Act provided that \"the power of prohibiting importation of goods shall authorise prohioition subject to any specified condition or restriction and goods imported contrary to any such condition or restriction , hall be prohibited imports.\" The ground on which these provisions were challenged was\n\nrliat they amounted to delegation of legislative power which had been vested by the Conslitution in the Federal Parliament, Griffth\n\nC. J. however rejected the contention and in doing so relied on Queen v.\n\nBurah(2) and other cases, observing :-\n\n•· ............ unless the legislature is prcpaml to lay down at once and for all time, or for so far into the future as they may think fit, a list of prohibited goods, they must have power to make a prohihition depending upon a comlitiop, and that .condition may be the coming into existence or the discovery of some fact\n\n(1) (1909) 8 C.LR. 6~6.\n\n(2) 3 App. Cas. 889.\n\nFazl A/iJ.\n\nIn re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912 etc.\n\nFozl All I.\n\n........ And if that fact is to be the condition upon which the liberty to import tile goods is to depend, there must be some means of ascertaining that fact, some person with power to ascertain it; and the Governor-in-Council is the authority appointed to ascertain and declare the fact.\"\n\nThe other cases in which a similar objection was taken, are :-Wekbach Light Co. of Australasia Lttl. v.\n\nThe Commonwealth('), Roche v. Kronheimer(2), and Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. Pty.\n\nLtd. antl Meak, es v. Dignan(\").\n\nIn the last mentioned case in which the matter has been dealt with at great length, Dixon J. observed thus :-\n\n\" .... the time has passed for assigning to the constitutional distribution of powers among the separate organs of government, an operation which confined . the legislative power to the Parliament so as to restrain it from reposing in the Executive an authority of an essentially legislative character.\"(')-\n\nIn England, the doctrine of separation of powers has exercised very little influence on . the course of judicial decisions or in shaping the Constitiltion, notwithstand 'ing the fact that distinguished writers like Locke and\n\nBlackstone strongly advocated it in the 17th and 18th centuries.\n\nLocke in his .treatise on Civil Government wrote as follows :-\n\n\"The legislature cannot transfer the .power of making laws to any other hands ; for it being a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. ( § 141).\n\nBlackstone endorsed this view in these words :- Wherever the right of making and enforcing the law is vested in the same man or one and the same body of men, there can be no public liberty.\"(\").\n\n. Again, Montesquieu, when he enunciated the doctrine . of $cparation of powers, thought that it represented the\n\n(~;.i\\9~·22C.J,.JL26&.\n\n(3) (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73. (2)(19%i)'ttc.J..R. 329. <\"Hbid., P• 100. (5) Comme11tarics on the Lawaoi England, 1765.\n\nquintessence of the British Constitution for which he had great admiration.\n\nThe doctrine had undoubtedly attracted considerable attention in England in the 17th and 18th centuries, but in course of time it came to have a very different meaning there from that it had acquired in the United States of America.\n\nIn the Un'ited States, the emphasis was on the mutual independence of the three departments of Government.\n\nBut, in England, the doctrine means only the independence of the judiciary, whereas the emergence of the Cabinet system forms a link between the executive d the legislature.\n\nHow the Cabinet system works differently from the so-called non-parliamentary system which obtains in the United States, may be stated very shortly.\n\nIn the United States, the execu- _dve power is vested in the President, to whom, and not to the Congress, the members of the Cabinet are personally responsible and neither the President nor the members of the Cabinet can sit or vote in Congress, and they have no responsibility for initiating bills or seeking their passage through Congress. In England, the Cabinet is a body consisting of members of Parliament chosen from the party possessing a majority in the House of Commons. It has a decisive voice in the legislative activities of Parliament and initiates all the important legislation through one or other of the Ministers, with the result that \"while Parliament is supreme in. that it can make or unmake Government, the Government once in power tends to control the Parllament.\"\n\nThe conclusion which I wish to express may now be stated briefly.\n\nIt seems to me that though the rule against delegation of legislative power has been assumed in America to be a corollary from the doctrine of separation of powers, it is strictly speaking not a necessary or nevitable corollary The extent to which the rule ha-; been relaxed in America and the elaborate explanations which have been offered to justify departure from the rule, confirm this view, and it is also supported by the fact that the trend of decisions in Australia, notwithstanding the fact that its Constitution\n\nere.\n\nFrJZi Ali J.\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Delhi Law• Act, 1912\n\netc.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nis at least theotttically based on the principle of separation of powers, is that the principle does not stand in the way of delegation in suitable circumstani:es.\n\nThe divisic>n of the powers of Government is now a normal feature of all civilised constitutions, and, as ponited out by Rich J. in New South Wales v. Commonwealth(1), it is \"well-known in :all British rommunities\"; yet, except in the United States, nowhere it has been 1held that by iuelf it forbids delegation of legislative power.\n\nIt seems to me that the American jurists have gone too far in holding that the rule against delegafion was a direct corollary from the separation of powers.\n\nI will now deal with the tlilid principle, which, in my opinion, is the true principle upon which the rule against delegation may be founded.\n\nIt has been stated in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Volume I at page 224 in these words :-\n\n\"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power . conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.\n\nWhere the sovereign pow et of the State has located the authority, there it must. remain ; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this hlgh prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide tliis sovereign trust.\"\n\nThe same learned author observes thus in his wellknowil: book on Constitutional Law (4th Edition, page 138) :-\n\n\"No legislative body can delegate to another department of the government, or to any other auth1>- rity, the power, either generally or specially, to enact\n\n(I) 20 C.L:R. 54 at 108\n\nlaws.\n\nThe reason is. found in the very existence of its own powers.\n\nThis high pre!ogafive has been intrusted to its own wisdom, judgment, and patriotism, and not to those of other persons, and it will act ultra\n\nvires if it undertakes to delegate the trust, instead of executing it.\"\n\nThis rule; j1,1 a broo<, l sense involves the principle underlying the' 1Dat:im, delegatus non potest delegare, but it is apt to be misi, mderstood. and has been misunderstood.\n\nIn my judgment, all that it _means is that the legislature cannot . abdicate its legislative functions and it cannot efface . itself and set up a parallel legislature to discharge the primary duty with which it has been entrusted.\n\nThis rule has been recognized . both in America and in England, and Hughes C. J has enunciated it in these words :-\n\n''The Congress mainfestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative funct'ions with which it is thus vested.\"(1).\n\nThe I.Patter is again dealt with by Evatt J. in Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. Pty.\n\nLtd. and Neakes v. Dignan(2), in these words :-\n\n\"On final analysis therefore, the Parliament of the Commonwealth is not competent to 'abdicate' its powers of legislat'xon.\n\nThis is not because Parliament is bound to perform any or all of its legislative powers or £unction$, for it may clect not to do so ; and not because the doctrine of separation of powers prevents Parliament from granting authority to other bodies to make laws or bye-laws and thereby exercise legislative power, for it does so 'in almost every statute ; but because each and every one of the laws passed by Parliament must answer the description of a law upon one or more of the subject-matters stated in the Constitution.\n\nA law by which Parliament gave all its law- making authority to another body would be bad merely because it would fail to pass the test last mentioned.\"\n\n(1) 293 U.S. 421.\n\n(2) 46 Com. L.R. 73 at 121,\n\nJn rt 711e. Delhi Lmv1Act,1912\n\netc.\n\nFazl .Ali/.\n\netc.\n\nFar! A/iJ,\n\nI think that the correct legal position has been comprehensively summed up by Lord Haldane in Jn re the Initiative and Referendum Act(') :-\n\n\"No doubt a body, with a power of legislation on the subjects entrusted to it so ample as that enjoyed. by a Provincial Legislature in Canada, could, while preserving its own capacity intact, seek the :wistance of subordinate agencies, as has been done when in Hodge v. The Queen, the Legislature of Ontario was held entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissioners authority to enact regulations relating to taverns ; but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence.\"\n\nWhat constitutes abdication and what class of cases will be covered by that expression will always be a question of fact, and it is by no means easy to lay down any comprehensive formula to define it, but it should be recognized that the rule against abdication does not prohibit the Legislature from employing any subordinate agency of its own choice for doing such subsidiary acts as may be necessary to make its legislation effective, useful and complete.\n\nHaving considered the three principles. which are said to negative delegation of powers, I . will now proceed to consider the argument put forward by the learned Attorney-General that the power. of delegation is implicit ln the power of legislation.\n\nThis argument is based on the principle of sovereignty of the legislature within its appointed field.\n\nSovereignty has been variously described by constitution writers, and sometimes distinction is drawn between legal sovereignty and political sovereignty.\n\nOne of the writers describes it as the power to make laws and enforce them by means of coercion it cares to employ, and he proceeds to say that in England the legal sovereign, i.e., the person or persons who according to the law of the land legislate and administer the Government, is the King in Parliament, whereas the political\n\n(I) [1919) A.C. 935 at 945.\n\nor the constitutional sovereign, i.e., the body of persons in whom power ultimately resides, is the electorate or the voting public(1).\n\nDicey states that the legal conception of sovereignty simply means the power of lawmaking unrestricted by any legal limit, and if the term \"sovereignty\" 'is thus used, the sovereign power under the English Constitution is the Parliament.\n\nThe main attribute of such sovereignty is stated by him in these words :-\n\n\"There is no law which Parliament cannot change (or to put the same thing somewhat differently, funda mental or so-called constitutional laws are under our Constitution changed by the same body and in the same manner as other laws, namely, by Parliament acting in its ordinary legislative character) and any enactment passed by . it cannot be declared to be void.\"\n\nAccording to the same writer, the characteristics of a non-soverefgn law-making body are :-(1) the existence of laws which such body must obey and cannot change; (2) the formation of a marked distinction between ordinary laws and fundamental laws ; and\n\n(3) the existence of some person or persons judicial or otherwise, having authority to pronounce upon the validity or constitutionality of laws passed by such law-making body.\n\nDealing with the Indian or the colonial legislature, the learned writer characterizes it as a non-sovereign legislature and proceeds to observe that its authority to make laws is as completely subordinate to and as much dependent upon Acts of Parliament as is the power of London . and North- Western Railway Co. to make bye-laws.\n\nThis is undoobtedly an overstatement and is certainly not applicable to the Indian Parliament of today.\n\nOur present Parliament, though it may not be as sovereign as the Parliament of Great Britain, is certainly as soveign as the Congress of the United States of America and the Legislatures of other independent countries having a Federal CQnstitution.\n\nBut what is more relevant\n\n(I) Modern Political Constitutions, by Strong.\n\nFaz( A.Ii I.\n\nIn re The Delhi l.Aws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nto our purpose is that Dicey himself, dealing with colonial and other similar legislatures, says that \"they are in short within their own sphere copies of the Imperial Parliament, they are within their own sphere sovereign bodies, but their freedom of action is controlled by their subordination to the Parliament of the United Klngdom.'' These remarks undoubtedly applied to the Legislative CounciL of 1912 which passed the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and they apply to the present Parliament also with this very material modification that its freedom of action is no longer controlled by subordination to the British Parliament but is controlled by the Indian Constifution.\n\nAt this stage, it will be useful to refer to certain cases decided by the Privy Council in England in which the question of the ambit of power exerc.ised by\n\nth~ Indian and colonial legislatures directly arose.\n\nThe leading case on the subject is Queen v. Buran('), which has been cited by this court on more than one occasion and has been accepted as good authority.\n\nIn that case, the question arose whether a section of Act No. XXII of 1869 which conferred upon the Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal the power to determine whether a law or any part thereof should be applied to a certain territory was or was not ultra vires.\n\nWhile holding that the impugned provision was intra vires, the Privy Council made certain observations wlllch have been quoted again and again and deserve to be quoted once more.\n\nHaving held that the Indian Legislature was not a delegate of the Imperial Parliament and hence the maxim, delegatus non potest delegare, did not apply (See ante for the passage dealing with this point), their Lordships proceeded to state as follows :-\n\n\"Their Lordships agree that the Governor-General m Council could not by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power, not created or authorized by the Council~ Act.\n\nNothing of that kind has, in their Lordships' opinion, been done or attempted in the\n\n(I) 5 I.A. 178.\n\npresent case.\n\nWhat has been done is this.\n\nThe Governor-General in Council has determined, in the due and ordinary course of legislation, to remove a particular district from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and offices, and to place it under new Courts and offices to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, leaving . it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that change shall take place ; and also enabling him, not to make what laws he pleases for that or any other district, but to apply by public notification to that district any. law, or part of a law, which either already was, or from\n\ntime to time might be, in force, by proper legislative authority, 'in the other territories subject to his government'.\"\n\nThen, later they added :-\n\n\"The proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers ; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. The conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute. Where plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an Imperial or in a provincial legislature, they m'ly (in their Lordships' judgment) be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally.\n\nLegis.- lation, conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing ; and, in many circumstances, it may be highly convenient.\n\nThe British Statute Book abounds with examples of it ; and it cannot be supposed that the Imperial Parliament did not, when constituting the Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of conditional legislation as with'in the scope of the legislative powers which it from time to time conferred.\"\n\nThe next case on the subject is Russell v. The Queen(1).\n\nIn that case, the Canadian Temperance Act, 1878, was challenged on the ground that it was\n\n(1) 7 App. Cas .829.\n\nlnre Tlte Delhi IAws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nFaz/ A.Ii J.\n\n/nu The Del/JI Lilw• Act, 1912,\n\nFozl AIU.\n\n1dtr11 tlires the Parliament of Canada.\n\nThe Act was to be brought into force in any country or city if on a vote of the majority of the electors of that county or city favouring such a course, the Governor-General in Council declared the relative pan of the Act to be in force.\n\nIt was held by the Privy Council that this provision did not amount to a delegation of legislative power to a majority of the voters in a city or county. The passage in which this is made clear, runs as follows :-\n\n. \"The shon answer to this objection is that the Act does not delegate any legislative powers whatever.\n\nIt contains within itself the whole legislation on the matters with whtch it deals. The provision that cenain parts of the Act shall come into operation only on the petition of a majority of electors does not confer on these persons power to legislate, Parliament itself enacts the condition and everything which is to follow upon the condition being fulfilled. Conditional legislation of this kind is in many cases convenient, and is cenainly not unusual, and the power so to legislate cannot be denied to the Parliament of Canada when the subject of legislation Is within its competency ...... If author'ity on this point were necessary, it will be found in the case of Q11een v. Burah, lately before this Board.\"\n\nThe same doctrine was laid down in the case of Hodge v. The Q11een(1), where the question arose as to whether the legislature of Ontario had or had not the power of entrusting to a local authority-the Board of Commissioners-the power of making regulations with respect to the Liquor Licence Act, 1877, which among other things created offences for the breach of those regulations and annexed penalties thereto Their Lordships held that the Ontario Legislature had that power, and after reiterating that the Legislature which passed the Act was not a delegate, they observed as follows :-\n\n\"When the British North America Act enacted that there should be a legislature for Ontario, and that\n\n(I) 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\nits legislative assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the Proviru:e and for provincial purposes in rdadon to the matters enumerated in section 92, it conferred powers not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament, but authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its powers possessed and could bestow.\n\nWithin these limits of subjects and area the local legislature is supreme, and has the same authority as the Imperial Parliament, or the Parliament of the Dominion, would have had under like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make bye-laws or resolJJ.tions as to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carryjng the enactment into operation and effect.\"\n\nAnother case which may be usefully cited is Powell\n\nv. Apollo Candle Co.(1). The question which arose in that case was whether section 133 of the Customs Regulations Act of 1879 of New South Wales was or was not ultra vires the colonial legislature.\n\nThat section provided that \"when any article of merchandise then unknown to the collector is imported, which, in the opinion of the collector or the commissioners, is apparently a substitute for any known dutiable article, or is apparently designed to evade duty, but possesses properties in the whole or in part which can be used or were intended to be applied for a similar purpose as such dutiable article, it shall be lawful for the Governor to direct that a duty be levied on such article at a rate to be fixed in proportion to the degree in which such unknown article approximates in its qualities or uses to such dutiable article.'' Having repelled the contention that the colonial legislature was a delegate of the Imperial Parliament and having held that it was not acting as an agent or a delegate, the Privy Council proceeded to deal with the question raised in the following manner :-\n\n(1) 10 App. Cas. ~82.\n\nIn.re The Deihl Lows ..fct, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nFozl ..f/IJ.\n\nlnre The Deihl LoWs Act, 1912, etc.\n\nFaz/ AllJ.\n\n\"It is argued that the tax in question has been imposed by the Governor, and not by the Legislature, who alone had power to impose it.\n\nBut the duties levied under the Order in Council are really levied by the authority of the Act under which the order is issued.\n\nThe Legislature has not parted with its perfect control over the Governor, and has the power, of course, at any moment, of withdrawing or altering the power which they have entrusted to him.\n\nUnder these cirmumstances their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court was wrong in declaring section 133 of the Customs Regulations Act of 1879 to be beyond the power of th:e Legislature.\"\n\nSeveral other cases were cited at the Bar in which the supremacy of a legislature (which would be nonsovereign according to the tests laid down by Dicey) within the field ascribed to its operation, were affirmed, bur it is unnecessary to multiply instances illustrative of that principle.\n\nI might however quote the pronouncement of the Privy Council in the comparatively recent case of Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board('), which rnns as follows:-\n\n\"The third objection is that: it is not within the powers of the Provincial Legislature to delegate socalled legislative powers to the Lieutenant-Governor in .\n\nCouncil, or to give him powers of further delegation.\n\nThis objectiQll appears to their Lordships subversive of the rights which the Provincial Leslature enjoys while dealing with matters falling witliin the classes of subjects in relation to which the constitution has granted legislative powers.\n\nWithin its appointed sphere the Provincial Legislature is as supreme as any other Parliament; and it is unnecessary to try to enumerate the innumerable occasions on whi, ch Legislatures, Pre>- vincial, Dominion and lmperial, have entrusted various persons and bodies with similar powers to those contained in this Act.\"\n\nI must pause here to note briefly certain important •rinciples which can be extracted from the cases\n\n(I) (1938] A.C 708 at 722.\n\ndecided by the Privy Council which I have so far cited, apart from the principle that the Indian and colonial legislatures arc supreme in their own field and that the maxim, delegatus non protest delegare, docs not apply to them. In the first place, it seems quite clear that the Privy Council never liked to commit themselves to the statement that delegated legislation was permissible. It was easy for them to have said so and disposed of the cases before them, but they were at pains to show that the provisions impugned before them were not instances of delegatio51 of legislative authority but they were instances of conditional legislation which, they thought, the legislatures concerned were competent to enact, or that the giving of such authority as was entrusted in some cases to subordinate agencies was ancillary to legislation and without it \"an attempt to provide for varying details and machinery to carry them out might become oppressive or absolutely fail.\" They als0 laid down: (1) that it will be not correct to describe conditional legislation and other forms of legislation which they were called upon to consider in several cases which have been cited as legislation through another agency. Each Act or enactment which was impugned before them as being delegated legislation, contained within itself the whole kgislation on the matter which it dealt with, laying down the condition and everything which was to follow on the condition being fulfilled ; (2) that legislative power could not be said to have been parted w.ith if the legislature retained its power intact and could whenever it pleased destroy the agency it had created and set up another or take the matter directly into its own hands ; (3) that the question as to the extent to which the aid of subordinate agencies could be sought by the legislatures and as to have long they should continue them were matters for each legislature and not for the court of law to decide; (4) that a legislature in committing important regulations to others docs not efface itself; and (5) that the legislature, like the Governor\"General in Council, could not by any form of enactment create, and arm with legislative 7-3 S. C. India/68\n\nlnre Tfie Deihl Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nFazl Ali/;\n\nJn rt Th< De/Ai Lows Act, 19]2, etc.\n\nFaz/ A/iJ.\n\nauthority, a new legislative power not created or authorised by the Councils Act to wbich it (the Governor-General in Council) owe' its existence.\n\n[ have already indicated that the expressions \"delegated legislation\" and \"delegating legislative power\" are sometimes used in a loose sense, and sometimes in a strict sense. These expressions have been used in the loose or popular sense in the various treaties or reports dealing with the so-called delegated legislation; and if we apply that sense to the facts before the Privy Council, there can be no doubt that eyery one of the cases would be an instance of delegated legislation or delegation of legislative authority. But the Privy Council have throughout repelled the suggestion that the cases before them were instances of delegated legislation or delegation of legislative authority. There can be no doubt that if the legislature completely abdicates its functions and sets up a parallel legislature transferring all its power to it, that wou Id undoubtedly be a real instance of delegation of its power.\n\nIn other words, there will be delegation in the strict sense if legislative power with all its attributes is tranSferred to another authority.\n\nBut the Privy Council have repeatedly pointed out that when the legislature retains its dominant power intact and cai; i whenever it pleases destroy the agency it has created and set up another or take th\" matter directly into its own hands, it has not paltcd with its own legislative power. They have also pointed out that the act of the subordinate authority docs not possess the true legislative attribute, if they efficacy of the act done by it is not derived from the subordinate authority but from the legislature by which the subordinate authority was entrusted with the power to do the act. In some of the cases to which reference has been made, the Privy Council have referred . to the nature and principles of legislation and pointed out that conditional legislation simply amounts to entrusting a limited discretionary authority to otherS, and that to seek the aid of subordinate agencies in carrying out the object of the legislation is ancillary to legislation and properly\n\nlies within the scope of the powers whkh every legislature must possess to function effectively. 'Fhere is a mass of literature in America also about the socalled delegated legislation, but if the judgments of the eminent American Judges are carefully studied, it will be found that. though in some 'cases they have used the expression in the popular sense, yet in many cases they have been as careful as the Privy Council in laying down the principles and whenever they . have upheld any provision impugned before them on the ground that it was delegation of legislative authority they have rested their conclusion upon the fact that there was in law no such delegation.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General has relied on the authority of Evatt J. for the proposition that \"the\n\ntrue nature and scope of the legislative power of the Parliament involves as part of its content power to\n\nconfer law-making power upon authorities other than Parliament itself'(1).\n\nIt .is undoubtedly true that a legislature which is 5overeign within its own sphere must necessarily have very great freedom of action, but it seems to me that in strkt . point of law the dictum of Evatt J: is not a precise or an accurate statement.\n\nThe first question which it raises is what is meant by law-making power and .whether such power in the true sense of the term can be delegated at all.\n\nAnother difliculty whkh it raises is that on, ce it is held as a general proposition that delegation of lawmaking power is implicit in the power of legislation, it will be diflicult to draw the line at the precise point where the legislature should stop and it will be permissible to ask whether the legislature is competent to delegate 1, 10 or 99 per cent of its legislative power, and whether the strictly logical conclusion will not be that the legislature can delegate the full content of its power in certain cases.\n\nIt seems to me that the correct and the strictly legal way of putting the matter is as the Privy Council have put it in several cases. The legislature in order to function effectively, has to call for sufficient data, has to\n\n(1) See the Victorian Steve6Qring case ; 46 Com. L R.. 73.\n\n19St\n\nlntt J'lte Delfil Lltws.Jkt, 1'912,\n\n.ete.\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\n19'1\n\nIn,.. 71ie Delhi Low1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nFaz/ A/11.\n\nlegislate for the future as well as for the present and has to provide for a multiplicity of varying situations which may be sometimes difficult to foresee. In order to achieve its object, it has to rcson to various types and forms of legislation, entrusting suitable agencies with the power to fill in details and adapt legislation to varying circumstances.\n\nHence, w'hat is known as conditional legislation, an expression which has been very fully explained and described in a series of judgments, and what is known as subordinate legislation, which involves giving power to subordinate authorities to make rules and regulations to effectuate the object and purpose for which a certain law is enacted, have been recognized to be permissible forms of legislation on the principle that a legislature can do everything which is ancillary to or necessary for effective legislation. Once this is conceded, it follows that the legislature can reson to any other form of legislation on the same principle, provided that it acts within the imits of its power, whether imposed from without or conditioned by the nature of the duties it is called upon to perform.\n\nThe conclusions at which I have arrived so far may now be summed up :-\n\n(1) The legislature must normally discharge its primary legislative function itself and not through others.\n\n(2) Once it is established that it has sovrcign powers within a certain sphere, it must follow as a corollary that it is free to legislate within that sphere in any way which appears to it to be the best way to give effect to its intention and policy in making a particular law, and that it may utilize any outside agency to any extent it finds necessary for doing things which it is unable to do itself or finds it inconvenient to do.\n\nIn other words it can do everything which is ancillary to and necessary for the full and effective exercise of its power of legislation.\n\n(3) It cannot abdicate its legislative functions, and therefore while entrusting power to an outside\n\nagency, it must see that such agency, acts as a subordinate authority and does not become a parallel legislature.\n\n( 4) The doctrine of separation of powers and the judicial interpretation it has received in America ever since the American Constitution was framed, enables the American courts to check undue and excessive delegation but the courts of this country are not committed to that doctrine and cannot apply it in the 5ame way as it has been applied in America.\n\nTherefore, there are only two main checks in this country on the power of the legislature to delegate, these being its good sense and the principal that it should not cross the line beyond which delegation amounts to \"abdication and self-effacement\".\n\nI will now deal with the three specific questions with which we are concerned in this Reference, these being as follows:-\n\n( l) Was section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the legislature which passed the said Act?\n\n(2) Was the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra .flire1 the legislature which passed the said Act?\n\n(3) Is section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vzres the Parliament?\n\nBefore attempting to answer these questions, it will be useful to state briefly a few salient facts about the composition and power of the Indian Legislature at the dates on which the three Acts in question were passed.\n\nIt appears that formerly it was the executive Government which was empowered to make regulations and ordinances for \"the good government of the factories and territories acquired in India\", and up to 1833, the laws used to be passed by the Governor- General in Council or by the Governors of Madras and\n\nl9S1\n\netc.\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\n1951 - lnre The Delhi Lows Act, 1912, etc.\n\nFaz/ Ali I.\n\nBombay in Council, in the form of regulations.\n\nBy the Ch.arter Act of 1833, the Governor-General's Council was extended by the inclusion of a fourth , member who was not entitled to sit or vote except at meetings for making laws and regulations.\n\nThe Governor- General in Council was by this Act empowered to make laws and regulations for the whole of India and the legislative powers which vested in the Governors of Madras and Bombay were withdrawn, though they were allowed to propose draft schemes. The Acts passed by the Governor-General in Council were required to be laid before the British Parliament and they were to have the same force as an Act of Parliament.\n\nIn 1853, the strength of the Council of the Governor-General was further increased to 12 members, by including the fourth member as an ordinary member and 6 special members for the purpose of legislation only.\n\nThen came the Councils Act of 1861, by which the power of legislation was restored to the Governors of Madras and Bombay in Council, and a legislative council was appointed for Bengal; but the Governor-General in Council was still competent to exercise legislative authority over the whole of India and could make laws for \"all persons and .all places and things\", and for legislative purposes the Council was further remodelled so as to include 6 to 12 members nominated for a period of 2 years by the Go1•ernor-General, of whom not less than one-half were to be non-officials. In his Council, no measure relating to certain topics could be introduced without the sanction of the Governor-General, and no law was to be valid until the Governor-General had given his assent to it and the ultimate power of disallowing a law was reserved to the Crown.\n\nFurther, local legislatures were constituted for Madras and Bombay, wherein half the members were to be non-officials nominated by the Governors, and the assent of the Governor as well as that of the Governor-General was necessary to give validity to any law passed by the local legislature. A similar legislative was directed to be constituted for the lower Provinces of Bengal\n\nand powes were given to constitute legislative councils for certam other Provinces.\n\nIn 1892, the lnC:ian Councils, Act was passed, by which the legislative councils were further expanded and certain fresh rights were given to the members. In 1909, came the Morley-\n\nMinto scheme under which the strength of the legislative council was increased by the inclusion of 60 additional members of whom 27 were elected and 33 nominated. Soon after this, in 1812, the Delhi Laws Act was passed, and the points which may be noticed in connection with the legislature which functioned at that time are : firstly, within its ambit, its powers were as plenary as those of the legislature of 1861, whose powers came up for consideration before the Privy Council in Burah's case, and secondly, considering the composition of the legislative council in which the non-official and the . executive elements predominated, there was no room for the application of the doctrine of separation of power in its full import, nor could it be said that by reason of that doctr!ne the legislature could not invest the Governor- General with the powers which we find him invested with under the Delhi Laws Act.\n\nIt should be stated that in section 7 of that Act as it originally stood, the Governor-General was mentioned as the authority who could by notification extend any enactment which was in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.\n\nThe \"Provincial Government\" was substituted for the \"Governor-General\" subsequently.\n\nComing to the second Act, namely, the Aimer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947. we find that when it was enacted on the 31st December, 1947, the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted by the India (Provincial OJnstitution) Order, 1947, issued under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, was in force.\n\nUnder that Act, there were three Legislative Lists, called the Federal, Provincial and OJncurrent Legislative Lists. Lists I and II contained a list of subjects on which the Central Legislature and the Provincial Legislature could respectively legislate, and List\n\nIII contained subjects on which both the Central and the\n\nFaz/ A/ii.\n\n19SI\n\nlnre The De/Ai Lows Act, 1912,\n\netc~\n\nProvincial Legislatures could legislate. Seetion 100( 4) of the Act provided that \"the Dominion Legislature has power to make laws with r!!Spect to matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List except for a Province or any part thereof.\" Section 46 (3) stated that the word \"Province\", unless the context otherwise required, meant a Governor's Province.\n\nTherefore, section 100 (4) read with the definition. of \"Provinces\", empowered the Dominion Legislature to make laws with respect to subjects mentionei; I in all the three Lists for Ajmer-Merwara, which was not a Governor's Province. The Central Legislature was thus competent to legislate for Ajmer-Merwara in regard to any subject, and it had also plenary powers in the entire legislative field allotted to it- Further, at the time the Act in question was passed, the Dominion Legislature was simultaneously functioning as the Constituent Assembly and had the power to frame the Constitution.\n\nThe third Act with which we are concerned was passed after the present Constitution had come into force.\n\nArticle 245 of the Constitution lays down that \"subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws frpm the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a St.ate may make laws for the. whole or any part of the St.ate.\" On the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935, Lists I and II in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution enumerate the subjects on which the Parliament and the State Legislatures can respectively legislate, while List III enumerates subjects on which both the Parliament and the State Legislatures can legislate.\n\nUnder article 246( 4), \"Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule nothwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the St.ate List.\" The points to be noted in connection with the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, are :-\n\n( 1) The present Parliament derives its authority from the Constitution which has been framed by the\n\npeople of India through their Constituent Assembly, and not from any external authority, and within its own field it is as §upreme as the legislature of any other country possessing a written federal Constitution.\n\n(2) The Parliament has full power to legislate for the Part C States in regard to any subject.\n\n(3) Though there is some kind of separation of governmental functions under the Constitution, yet the Cabinet system, which is the most notable characteristic of the British Constitution, is also one of the feat1,1res of our Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, which never acquired . that hold or significance in this country as it has in America cannot dominate the interpretation of any of the Constitutional provisions.\n\nI may here refer to an argument which is founded on articles 353 (b) and 357 (a) and (b) of the Constitution. Under article 353 (b ), when a Proclamation of Emergency is made by the President,-\n\n\"the power of Parliament to make iaws with respect to any matter shall include power to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or authorising the corlferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the Union or. officers and authorities of the Union as resp<!cts that matter, , notwithstanding that it is one which is not enumerated in the Union List.\"\n\nUnder article 357, when there is a failure of constitutional machinery in a State, \"it shall be competent-\n\n( a) for Parliament to confer on the President the power of the Legislature of the State to make laws, and to authorise: the President to delegate, subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, the power so conferred to any other a11thority to be specified by him in that behalf;\n\n(b) for Parliament, or for the President or other authority in whom such power to make laws is vested 1833, the laws used to• be passed by the Governor- General in Council or by the Governors of Madras and\n\netc.\n\nFaz/ All I.\n\n:19S1\n\nlnre The Delhi l;•ws Act, 1912, etc.\n\n.fazl Ali J.\n\npowers and the imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities .thereof.\"\n\nIn both these articles, the power of delegation is expressly conferred, and it is argued that if delegation was contemplated in normal legislation, there would have been an express power given to the Parliament, similar to the power given in articles 353(b) and 357 (a) and (b).\n\nIn other words, the absence of an express provision has been used as an argument for absence of the power to delegate.\n\nIt should however be noticed that these are emergency provisions and give no assistance in deciding the question under consideration. So far as article 353(b) is concerned, it is enough to say that a specific provision was necessary to empower the Parliament to make laws in respect of matters included in the State List upon which the Parliament was not otherwise competent to legislate.\n\nWhen the Parliament . was specially empowered to legislate in a field in which it could not normally legislate, it was necessary to state all the powers it could exercise. Again, article 357(a) deals with complete transfer of legislative power to the President, while clause (b) is incidental to the powers conferred on the Parliament and the President to legislate for a State in case of failure of, constitutional machinery in that State.\n\nThese provisions do not at all bear out the conclusion that is sought to be drawn from them. !need, the Attorney-General drew from them the opposite inference, namely, that by these provisions the Constitution-makers have recognized that delegation of power is permissible on occasions when it is found to be necessary. In my opinion, neither of these conclusions can be held to l>ie sound.\n\nI will now deal with the three provisions in regard to which the answer is required in this Reference.\n\nThey are as follows :-\n\nSection 7 of the Delhi Laws Act , 1912.\n\n\"The Provincial Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend with such restncttons and modifications as it thlltks fit to the Province of Delhi or any part thereof, any enactment which is in\n\nforce in any part of British India at the date of such\n\nnotification.\"\n\nSection 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947.\n\n\"The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend to the Province of- Ajmer- Merwara with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in any other Province at the date of such notification.\"\n\nSection 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950.\n\n\"The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, extend to any Part C State (other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or ta any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the i:iotification; and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\"\n\nAt the first sight, these provisions appear to be very wide, their most striking features being these :-\n\n1. There is no specification in the Act by way of a list or schedule of the laws out -of which the selection is to be made by the Provincial or the Central Government, as the case may be; but the Government has been given complete discretion to adopt any 'law whatsoever passed in any part of the country, whether by the Central or the Provincial Legislature.\n\n2. The provisions are not confined merely to the laws in existence at the dates of the enactment of these Acts but extend to future laws also.\n\n3. The Government concerned has been empowered not only to extend or adopt the laws but also to introduce such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit; and in the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, power has been given to the Central Government to make a provision in the enactment extended under the Act for the repeal or amendment of any corre_sponding law\n\nIn re The Delhi L(iw& Act, 1912,.\n\netc.\n\nF11zl Ali J.\n\nIn re The D'11ri Laws ActJ 1912,\n\n_etc.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\n(other than Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to the Part C State concerned.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the powers which have been granted to the Government are very extensive and the three Acts go farther than any Act in England or America, but, in my judgment, notwithstanding the somewhat unusual features to which reference has n made, the provisions in question cannot be held to be invalid.\n\nLet us overlook for the time being the power to introduce modifications with which I shall deal later, and carefully consider the main provision in the three Acts.\n\nThe situation with which the respective legislatures were faced when these Acts were passed, was that there were certain State or States with no local legislature and a whole bundle of laws had to be enacted for them. It is clear that the legislatures concerned, before passing the Acts, applied their mind and decided firstly, that the situation would be met by the adoption of laws applicable to the other Provinces inasmuch as they covered a wide range of subjects approached from a variety of points of view and hence the requirements of the State or States for which the laws had to be framed could not go beyond . those for which laws had already been framed by the various legislatures, and secondly, that the matter should be entrusted to an authority which was expected to be familiar and could easily make itself familiar with the needs and conditions of the State or States for which the laws were to be made.\n\nThus, everyone of the Acts so enacted was a complete law, because it embodied a policy, defined a standard, and directed the authority chosen to act within certain prescribed limits and not to go beyond them. Each Act was a complete expression of the will of the legislature to act in a particular way and of its command as to how its will should be carried out.\n\nThe legislature decided that in the circumstances of the case that was the best way to legislate on the subject and it so legislated. It will be a misnomer to describe such legislation as amounting to abdiction oc powers, because from the very nature of the legislation\n\nit is manifest that the legislature had the power at any moment of withdrawing or altering any power with which the authority chosen was entrusted, and could change or repeal the laws which the authority was required to make applicable to the State or States concerned. What is even more important is that in each case the agency selected was not empowered to enact laws, but it could only adapt and extend laws enacted by responsible and compeent legislatures.\n\nThus, the power given to th~ Governments in those Acts was more in the nature of ministerial than in the nature of legislative power.\n\nThe power given was ministerial, because all that the Government had to do was to study the laws and. make selections out of them.\n\nThat such legislation is neither unwarranted on principle nor without precedent, will be clear from what follows :-\n\n1. The facts of the case of Queen v. Burah(1) are so familiar that they need not be reproduced, but for the purpose of understanding the point under discussion, it will be necessary to refer to section 8 of Act XXII of 1869 and some of the observations of the Privy Council which obviously bear on that section. The section runs as follows :-\n\n''The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend to the said territory any law, or any portion of any law, now in force in the other territories subject to his Government, or which may hereafter be enacted by the Council of the Governor-General, or of the said Lieutenant-Governor, for making laws and regulatiqns, and may on making such extension direct by whom any powers or duties incident to the provisions so extended shall be exercised or performed, and make any order which he shall deem requisite for carrying such provisions into operation.\"\n\nIn their judgment, the Privy Council do not quote this section but evidently they had it in mind when they made the following observations :-\n\n(1) 5 I. A. 178.\n\netc.\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nlaw: Tiie Dellli Law.r Act, 1912\n\netc ..\n\n\"The legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place; but that it was expedient to leave the time and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor; and also, that the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories subject to the same Government were such as it might be fit, and proper to apply to this district also; but that, as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them, could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Lieutenant-Governor.\"\n\nThe language used here can be easily adapted in the following manner so as to cover the laws in question :-\n\n\"The legislature determined that .......... the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories .... (omitting the words \"subject to the. same Government\" for reasons to be stated presently) were such as it might be fit and proper to apply to this State also; but that, as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them, could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Central or Provincial Government.\"\n\nIt seems to me that this line of reasoning fully fits in with the facts before us. The words \"territories subject to the same Government\" are not in my opinion material, because in Burah' s case only such lawa as were in force in the other territories subject to ihe same Government were to be extended.\n\nWe are not to lay undue emphasis on isolated words but look at the principle underlying the decision in that case. In the Delhi Laws Act as originally enacted, the agency which was to adapt the laws was the Governor- General.\n\nIn the other two Acts, the agency was the Central Government. In 1912, the Governor-General exercised jurisdiction over the whole of the territories the laws of which were to be adapted for Delhi. The same remark applies to the Central Government, while dealing with the other two Acts.\n\nIs I have alrelldy\n\nstated, Burah' s case has been accepted by this Court as having been correctly decided, and we may well say that the impugned Acts are mere larger editions of Act XXII of 1869 which was in question in Burah's case.\n\n2. It is now well settled in England and in America that a legislature can pass an Act to allow a Govern ment or a local body or some other agency to make regulations consistently with the provisions of the Act.\n\nAt no stage of the arguments, it was contended before us. that such a power cannot be granted by the legislature to another body. We have known instances in which regulations have been made creaftng offences and imposing penalties as they have been held to be valid.\n\nIt seems to me that the making of many of these regu lations involves the exercise of much more legislative power and discretion -~ the selection of appropriate laws out of a mass of ready-made enactments.\n\nThe following observations in a well-known American case, which furnish legal justification for empowering a subordinate authority to make regulations, seem to me, pertinent:-\n\n\"It is well settled that the delegation by a State legislature to a municipal corporation of the power to legislate, subject to the paramount law, concerning local affairs, . does not violate the inhibition again.St the delegation of the legislative function.\n\nIt is a cardinal principle of our system of govern ment that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authority, and h.::nce, while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make the laws cannot be delegated, the creation of municipalities exercising local self-government has never been held to trench upon that rule.\n\nSuch legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legisla rive power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject, of course, to the interposition of the ; uperior in cases of ni:cessity.\" (Per Fuller J. in Stoutenburgh v. Hennick(1) ).\n\n(1) (1889) 129 u.s. 141.\n\n19'1\n\nbtre The Delhi Low11A.ct,1912 etc.\n\nFail A.Ill.\n\nIn re Tl,. Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc. r- Fazl All J.\n\n3. A point which was somewhat similar to the one raised before us arose in the case of Sprigg v. Sigcau(').\n\nIn that case, section 2 of the Pondoland Annexation Act, 1894, was brought into question. That section gave authority to the Governor to add to the existing laws in force in the territories annexed, such laws as he shall from time to time bv Proclamation declare to be in force in such territories: Dealing with this Provision, the Privy Council observed as follows :-\n\n\"The legislative authority delegated to the Governor by the Pondoland Annexation Act is very cautiously expressed, and is very limited in its scope.\n\nThere is not a word in the Act to suggest that it was intended to make the Governor a dictator, or even to clothe him with the full legislative powers of the Cape Parliament.\n\nHis only authority, after the date of the Act, is to add to the laws, statutes and ordinances which had already been proclaimed and were in force at its date, such laws, statutes and ordinances as he 'shall from time to time by proclamation declare to be in force in such territories'. In the opinion of their Lordships, these words do not import any power in the Governor to make \"new laws\" in the widest sense of that term; they do no more than authorise him to transplant to the new territories, and enact there, laws, stalJltes and ordinances which already exist, and are operative in other parts of the Colony. It was argued for the . appellant that the expression \"all such laws made\" occurrlljg in the proviso, indicates authority to make new laws whil:h are not elsewhere in force; but these words cannot control the plain meaning of the enactment upon which they arc a proviso; and, besides that enactment is left to explain the meaning of the proviso by the reference back which is implied in the word \"such\". {pp. 247-8).\n\nFollowing the line of reasoning in the case cited, it may be legitimately stated that what the Central or the Provincial Government has been asked to do under the Acts in question is not to enact \"new laws\" but \"to transplant\" to the territory concerned laws operative\n\n(I) [1897) A.C. 238.\n\nin other parts of the country. I notice that in section 2 of the Pondoland Annexation Act, 1894, there was a proviso requiring that \"all such laws made under or by virtue of this Act shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within fourteen days after the beginning of the Session of Parliament next after the proclamation thereof as aforesaid, and shall be effectual, unless in so far as the same shall be repealed, altered, or varied by Act of Parliament.\" This provision however does not affect the principle.\n\nIt was made onlv as a matter of caution and to ensure the superintendence of Parliament, for the laws were good laws until they were repealed, altered or varied by Parliament. If the Privy Council have correctly stated the principle that the legislature in enacting subordinate or conditional legislation does not part with its perfect control and has the power at any moment of withdrawing or altering the power entrusted to another authority, its power of superintendence must be taken to be implicit in all such legislation ..\n\nReference mav also be made here to the somewhat unusual case ;£ Dorr v. United States(1 ), where delegation by Congress to a commission appointed by the President of the power to legislate for the Philippine\n\nIslands was held valid.\n\n4. There are also some American cases in which the adopting of a law or rule of another jurisdiction has been permitted, and one of the cases illustrative of the rule is Re Lasswell(2 ), where a California Act declaring the existence of an emergency and providing that where the Federal authorities fixed a Code for the government of any industry, that Code automatically became the State Code therefor, and fixing a penalty :>r violation of such Codes, was held to be constitutional and valid, as against the contention that is was• an unlawful delegation of authority by the State legislature to the Federal Government and its administrative agencies, This case has no direct bearing on the pbints before us, but it shows that application of laws made\n\n(I) (1904) 195 U.S. 138.\n\n(2) (19~4 I Cal. Appl (2d), 183. 8-3 SC lndia/68\n\nFazl Ali J ..\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nby another legislature has in some cases been held to be permissible.\n\n5. There are many enactments in India, which are not wothout their parallel in England, in which it is stated that the provisions of the Act concerned shall apply to certain areas in the first instance and that they may be extended by the Provincial Government or appropriate authority to the whole or any part of a Province.\n\nThe Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is an instance of such enactment, as section 1 thereof provides as follows :-\n\n\"It (the Act) extends in the first instance to all the Provinces of India except Bombay, East Punjab and Delhi.\n\nBut this Act or any part thereof may by notification in the official Gazette be extended to the whole or any part of the said Provinces by the Provincial Government concerned.''\n\nIt is obvious that if in.stead of making similar prov1s1ons in 50 or more Acts individually, a single provision is made in any one Act enabling the Provincial Governments to extend all or any of the 50 or more Acts, in which provision might have been but has not been made for extension to the whole or any part of the Provinces concerned there would be no difference' in principle between the two alternatives. ft was pointed out to us that in the Acts with which we are concerned, power has been given to extend not only Acts of the Central Legislature, which is the author of th~ Acts in question, but also those of the Provincial Legislatures. But it seems to me that the distinction so made does not affect the principle involved.\n\nThe real question is : Can authority be given by a lc; gislature to an outside agency, to extend an Act or sef'les of Acts to a particular area? This really brings us back to the principle of conditional legislation which is too deeply rooted in our legal system to be questioned now.\n\n6. Our attention has been drawn Acts containing provmons similar to to several the Acts\n\nwhich are the subject of the Reference, these being:-\n\n1. Sections 1 and 2 of Act I of 1865.\n\n2. Sections 5 and 5A of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 (Act XIV of 1874).\n\n3. The Burma Laws Act, 1898 (Act XIII of 1898), section 10 (1).\n\n4. Section 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (Act XLVII of 1947).\n\n5. The Merchant Shipping Laws (Extension to Acceding States and Amendment) Act, 1949 (Act XVIlI of 1949), section 4.\n\nThe relevant provisions of two of these Acts, which were passed before the Acts in question may be quoted, to bring out the close analogy.\n\nThe Scheduled Districts Act, 1874.\n\n5. \"The Local Government, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, may, from time to time, by notification in the Gazette of India and also in the local Gazette (if any), extend to any of the Scheduled Districts, or to any part of any such District, any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such extension.\"\n\n5A.\n\nIn declaring an enactment in force in a Scheduled District or part thereof ut1'.ler section 3 of tlµs Act, or in extending an enactment to a Scheduled District or part thereof under section 5 of this Act, the Local Government with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, may declare the operation of the enactment to be subject to such restrictions and modifications as that Government think fit.\"\n\nThe Burma Laws Act, 1898.\n\n10(1). \"The Local Government, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, may, by notification in the Burma Gazette, extend, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, to all or any of the Shan States, or to any specified local arta in the Shan States, any enactment which is in force\n\nIn re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\n19Sl\n\nIn r~ The Deihl Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nFaz/ 11./IJ.\n\nin any part of Upper Burma at the date of the extension.\"\n\nIt is hard to say that any firm legis.lative practice had been established before the Delhi Laws Act and other Acts we are concerned with were enacted, but one may presume that the legislature had made several experiments before the passing of these Acts and found that they had worked well and achieved the object for which they were intended.\n\nI wm now deal with the power of modification which depends on the meaning of the wor<ls \"with such modifications as it thinks fit.\" These are not unfamiliar words and they are often used by careful draftsmen to enable laws which are applicable to one place or object to be so adapted as to apply to another. The power of introducing necessary restrictions and modifications is incidental to the power to apply or adapt the law, and in the context in which the provision as to modification occurs, it cannot bear the sinister sense attributed to it. The modifications are to be made within the framework of the Act and they cannot be such as to affect its identity or structure or the essential purpose to be served by it. The power to modify certainly involves a discretion to make suitable changes, but it would be useless to give an authority the power to adapt a law without giving it the power to make suitable changes. The provision empowering an extraneous authority to introduce modifications in an Act has been nicknamed in England as \"Henry VIII clause\", because that monarch is regarded popularly as the personification of executive autocracy.\n\nSir Thomas Carr, who had considerable experience of dealing with legislation of the character we are concerned with, refers to \"Henry VIII clause\" in this way in his book \"Concerning English Administrative Law\" at page 44 :-\n\n\"Of all the types of orders which alter statutes, the so-called 'Henry VIII clause' sometimes inserted in big and complicated ACts, has probably caused the greatest flutter in England. It enables the Mi.lister\n\nby order to modify the Act itself so far as necessary for bringing it into operation. Any one who will look to see what sort of orders have been made under this power will find them surprjsingly innocuous.\n\nThe device is partly a draftsman's insurance policy, in case he has overlooked something, and is partly due to the immense body of local Acts in England creating special difficulties in particular areas.\n\nThese local Acts are very hard to trace, and the draftsman could never be confident that he has examined them all in advance. The Henry VIII clause ought, of course, to be effective for a short time only.\"\n\nIt is to be borne in mind that the discretion given to modify a statute is by no means absolute or ir.revocable in strict legal sense, with which aspect alone we are principally concerned in dealing with a purely legal question.\n\nAs was pointed out by Garth C.J. in Empress v. BurahC ), the legislature is \"always in a position to see how the powers, which it has conferred, are being exercised, and if they are exercised injudiciously, or otherwise than in accordance with its intentions, or if, having been exercised, the result is in any degree inconvenient, it can always by another Act recall its powers, or rectify the inconvenience.\" The learned Chief Justice, while referring to the Civil Procedure Code of 1861, pointed out that it went further than the Act impugned before him, because \"it gave the Local Governments a power to alter or modify the Code in any way they might think proper, and so as to introduce a different law into their respective Provinces from that which was in force in the Regulation Provinces.\" Nevertheles, the Privy Council considered the Civil Procedure Code . of 1861 to be a good example of valid conditional legislation.\n\nIn the course of the arguments, we were supplied with a list of statutes passed by the Central and some of the Provincial Legislatures giving express power of modification to certain authorities, and judging from the number of instances included in it, it is not an unimpressive list. A few of the Acts which may be mentioned by\n\n(l) I.L.R. 5 Cal. 63 at 140\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nlnre The De/hi Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nFaz/ A//J.\n\nway of illustration are :-The Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, The Burma Laws Act, 1898, The Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act, 1923, The Madras City Improvement Trust Act, 1945, The Madras Public Health Act, 1939, U. P. Kand Revenue Act, 1901.\n\nThere are also many instances of such legislation in England, of which only a few may be mentioned below to show that such Acts are by no means confined to this country. -\n\nIn 1929, a Bill was proposed to carry out the policy of having fewer and bigger local authority in Scotland. During the debate, it was sudden!~ decided to create a new kind of body called the district council There was no time to work out details for electing the new district councillors, and the Bill therefore applied to them the statutory provisions relating to the election of country councillors in rural areas \"subject to such modifications and adaptations• as the Secretary of State may by order prescribe.\"\n\nIn 1925, the Parliament passed the Rating and Valuation Act, and section €7 thereof provided that if any difficulty arose in connection with its application to any exceptional area, or the preparation of the first valuation list for any .'area, the Minister \"may by order remove the difficulty.\" It was also provided that \"any such order may modify the provisions of this Act so far as may appear to the Minister necessary or expedient for carrying the order into effect.\"\n\nIn 1929, a new Local Government Bill was introduced in Parliament, and section 120 thereof provided that \"the Minister may make such order for removing difficulties as he may judge necessary ........ and any such order may modify the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nSection 1(2) of the Road Transport Lighting Act, 1927, provided that \"the Minister of Transport may exempt wholly or partially, vehicles of particular kinds from the requirements of the Act,\" and sub-section (3) empowered him to \"add to or vary such requirements\" by regulations.\n\nBy sectiOn 1 of the Trade Boards Act, 1918, \"the Minister of Labour may, by special order, extend the provisions of the Trade Boards Act, 1909, to new trades ...... and may alter or anfend the Schedule to the Act.\"\n\nThe Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920, by section 45 provided that \"if any difficulty arises with respect to the constitution of special or supplementary schemes ........ the Minister of Labour ........ may by order do anything which appears to him to be necessary or expedient ...... and any such order may modify the provisions of this Act ...... \".\n\nSimilar instances may be multiplied, but that will serve no useful purpose.\n\nThe main justification for a provision empowering modifications to be made, is said to be that, but for it, the Bills would take longer to be made ready, and the operation of important and wholesome measures would be delayed, and that once the Act became operative, any defect m its provisions cannot be removed until amending legislation is passed.\n\nIt is also pointed out that the power to modify within certain circumscribed limits does not go as far as many other powers which are vested by the legislature in high officials and public bodies through whom it decides to act in certain matters.\n\nIt seems to me that it is now too late to hold that the Acts in question are ultra vires, merely because, while giving the power to the Government to extend an Act, the legislatures have also given power to the Government to subject it to such modifications and restrictions as it thinks fit. It must, however, be recognised that what is popularly known as the \"Henry VIII clause\" has from time to time provoked unfavourable comment in England, and the Committee on Ministers' Powers, while admitting that it must be occasiQnally used, have added : \" .... we are clear in our opinion, first, that the adoption of such a clause ought on each occasion when it is, on the initiative of the Minister in charge of the Bill, proposed to Parliament to be justified by him upto the essential.\n\nIt can only be essential for the limited purpose of\n\netc.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\n19Sl\n\nIii. re Tfti..De/hi LawJAct, 1912, etc.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nbringing an Act into operation and it should accordingly be in most precise language restricted to those purely machinery arrangements vitally requisite for that purpose ; and t1:1e clause should always contain a maximum time limit of one year after which the powers should lapse.\n\nIf in the event the time limit proves too short-which is unlikely-the Government should then come back to Parliament with a one clause Bill to extend it.\" It mav also be stated that in England \"delegated legislation\" often requires the regulations or provisions made by the delegate authority to be laid before the Parliament either in draft form or with the condition that they are not to operate till approved by Parliament or with no further direction. The Acts before us are certainly open to the comment that this valuable safeguard has not been observed, but it seems to me that however desirable the adoption of this safeguard and other safeguards which have been suggested from time to time may be, the validity of the Acts, which has to be determined on purely legal considerations, cannot be affected by their absence.\n\nI w1ll now deal with section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, in so far as it gives power to the Central Government to make a provision in the enactment extended under the Act for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law which is for the time being applicable to the Part C. State concerned. No doubt this power is a far-reaching and unusual one, but, on a careful analysis, it will be found to be only a concomitant of the power of transplantation and modification. If a new law is to be made applicable. it may have to replace some existing law which may have become out of date or ceased to serve any useful purpose, and the agency which is to apply the new law must be in a position to say that the old law would cease to apply.\n\nThe nearest parallel that I can find to this provision, is to be found in the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919.\n\nBy that Act, the Church Assembly is empowered to propose legislation touching matters concerning the Church of England, and\n\nthe legislation proposed may extend to the repeal or amendment of Acts of Parliament including the Church\n\nAssembly Act itself.\n\nIt should however be noticed that it is not until Parliament itself gives it legislative force on an affirmative address of each House that the measure is converted into legislation.\n\nThere is thus no real analogy between that Act and the Act before us.\n\nHowever, the provision has to be upheld, because, though it goes to the farthest limits, it is difficult to hold that it was beyond the powers of a legislature which is supreme in its own field; and all we can say is what Lord Hewart said in King v. Minister of Health(1), namely, that the particular Act may be\n\nrgarded as \"indicating the high water-mark of legislative provisions of this character,\" and that, unless the legislature acts with restraint, a stage_ may be reached when legislation may amount to abdication of legislative powers.\n\nBefore I conclude, I wish to make a few general observations here on the subject of \"delegated legislation\" and its limits, using the expression once again in the popular sense. This form of legislation has become a present-day necessity, and it has come to stay-it is both inevitable and indispensable. The legislature has now to make so many laws that it has no time to devote to all the legislative details, and sometimes the subject on which it has to legislate is of such a technical nature that all it can do is to state the broad principles and leave the details to be worked out by those who are more familiar with the subject.\n\nAgain, when complex schemes of reform are to be the subject of legislation, it is difficult to bring out a selfcontamed and complete Act straightaway, since it is not possible to foresee all the contingencies and envisage all the local requirements for which provision is to be made.\n\nThus, some degree of flexibility becomes necessary, so as to permit constant adaptation to unknown future conditions without the necessity of having to amend the law' again and again.\n\nThe advantage of sqch a course is that it enable the delegate authority\n\n(l) [1927] 2 K.13. 229 at 236.\n\n1g.s1\n\nIn re The Defhi Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nFazl AliJ.\n\n19S1\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nto consult interects likely to be affected by a particular law, make actual experiments when necessary, and utilize the results of its investigations and experiments in the best way possible.\n\nThere may also arise emergencies and urgent situations requiring prompt action and the entrustment of large powers to authorities who have to deal with the various situations as they arise.\n\nThere are examples in the Statut~ books of England and other countries, of laws, a reference to which will be sufficient to justify the need for delegated legislation.\n\nThe British Gold Standard (Amendment) Act, 1931, empowered the Treasury to make and from time to time vary orders authorising the taking of such measures in relation to the Exchanges and otherwise as they may consider expedient for meeting difficulties arising in c.onnection with the suspension of the Gold Standard.\n\nThe National Economy Act, 1931, of England, empowered \"His Majesty to make Orders in Council effecting economies in respect 0£ the services . specified in the schedule\" and proved that the Minister designated in any such Order might make regulations for giving effect to the Order. The Foodstuffs (Prevention of Exploitation) Act, 1931, authorised the Board of Trade to take exceptional measures for preventing or remedying shortages in certain articles of food and drink.\n\nIt is obvious that to achieve the objects which were intended to be achieved by these Acts, they could not have been framed in any other way than that in which they were framed. I have referred to these instances to show that the complexity of modem administration and the expansion of the functions of the State to the economic and social sphere have rendered it necessary to resort to new form& of legislation and to give wide powers to various authmities on suitable occasions.\n\nBut while emphasizing that delegation is in these days inevitable, one should not omit to refer to the dangers attendant upon the injudicious exercise of the power of delegation by the legislature. The dangers involved in defining the delegated power so loosely that the area it is intended to - cover cannot be clearly ascertained, and in gjving\n\nwide delegated powers to executive authorities and at the same time depriving a citizen of protection by the courts against harsh and unreasonable exercise of powers, are too obvious to require elaborate discussion.\n\nFor the reasons I have set out, I hold that none of the provisions which are the subject of the three questions referred to us by the President is ultra vires and I would answer those que5tions accordingly.\n\nPATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-The President of India by an order, dated the 7th January, 1951, has been pl¢ased to refer to this Court, under' article 143(1) of th!! Constitution, for consideration and report the following questions : ·\n\nI. Was section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or any of the provisions .thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the legislature which passed the said Act? ·\n\n2. Was the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the legislature which passed the said Act?\n\n3. Is section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vire,; the Parliament? ·\n\nThe reasons for making the reference are thus set out in the letter of reference :\n\n\"And whereas the Federal Court of India in fatindra Nath Gupta v. The Provin(e of Bihar(1) held by a majority that the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, was ultra vires the Bihar Legislature inter alia on the ground that the said proviso conferred power on the Provincial Government to modify an act of the Provincial Legislature and thus amounted to a delegation of legislative power;\n\nAnd whereas as the Federal Court,\n\n(I) [I }19-50} F.C.R. 595.\n\na result of the said decision of doubts have arisen regarding\n\netc.\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nthe validity of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, and section 2 of the Part C States\n\n(Laws) Act, 1950, and of the Acts extended to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara and various Part C States under the said sections respectively, and of the orders and other instruments issued under the Acts so extended;\n\nAnd whereas the validity of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and / section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, and of the Act extended by virtue of the powers conferred by the said sections has been challenged in some cases pending at present before the Punjab High Court, the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer, and the District Court and the Subordinate Courts in Delhi.\"\n\nThe provisions referred to above are as follows :-\n\nSection 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912 :\n\nThe Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit to the Province of Delhi or any part thereof, any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.\"\n\nSection 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947:\n\n\"Extension of enactments . to AJmer-Merwara.-The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, extend to the Province of Ajmer-Merwara with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in any other Province at the date of such notification.\n\nSection 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 : \"Power to extend enactments to certain Part C States.-The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, extend to anv Part C State\n\n(other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any\n\nenactment which is in force in a Pan A State at the date of the notification; and provision may be made in any enactment so extended f9r the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\"\n\nThe Central Legislature, which enacted these provisions, had, at all material times, the power to make laws itself for the designated territories.\n\nBut, instead of exercising that power, it empowered the Provincial Government in the first-mentioned case, and the Central Government in the others, to extend, by notification in the official Gazette, to the designated territories laws made by Provincial Legislatures all over India for territories within their respective jurisdiction. The principal features of the authority thus delegated to the executive are as follows :\n\n( 1) The laws thus to be extended by the executive are laws made not by the delegatinaauthority itself, namely, the Central Legislature, but by different Provincial Legislatures for their respective territories.\n\n(2) In extending such laws the executive is to have the power of restricting or modifying those laws as it thinks fit.\n\n(3) The law to be extended is to be a law in force at the time of the notification of extension, that is to say, the executive is empowered not only to extend laws in force at the time when the impugned provisions were enacted, which the Central Legislature could be supposed to have examined and found suitable for extension to the territories in question, but also laws to be made in future by Provincial Legislatures for their respective territories which the Central Legislature could possibly have no means of judging as to their suitability for such extension.\n\n(4) The power conferred on the executive by the enactments referred to in Question No. 3 is not only to extend to the designated territories laws made by other legislatures but also t.o repeal or amend any corresponding law in force in the designated territories.\n\n19Sl\n\nPatanjali Sastrl J.\n\nIn re The Delhi uws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nPatanjaU Sastri J.\n\nThe question is : Was the delegation of such sweeping discretionary power to pick and choose laws made by other legislatures to operate elsewhere and to apply them to the territories in question within the competence of the Central Legislature?\n\nIn /atindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar('), which has led to this reference, the Federal Court of India held by a majority (Kania C. J., Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ.) that the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1937, purporting to authorise the Provincial Government, on certain conditions which are not material here, to extend by notification, the operation of the Act for a further specified period after its ex,>iry with or without modifications amounted to a delegation of legislative power and as such was beyond the competence of the legislature. The deision proceeded to some extent on the concession by counsel that delegation of legislative power was incompetent though it must be admitted there are observations in the judgments of their Lordships lending the' weight of their authority in support of that view.\n\nFaz! Ali J. in a dissenting judgment held that the power to extend and the power to modify were separate powers and as . the Provincial Government had in fact extended the operation of the Act without making any modification in it, the proviso operated as valid conditional legislation.\n\nWhile agreeing with the conclusion of the, majority that the detention of the petitioners in that case was unlawful,. I preferred to rest my decision on a narrower ground which has no relevancy in the present discussion. In the light of the fuller arguments addressed to us in the present case, I am unable to agree with the majority view.\n\nThe Attorney-General, appearing on behalf of the President vigorously attacked the majority view in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case(') as being opposed alike to sound constitutional principles and the weight of authority. He cited numerous decisions of the Privy\n\n(I) (1949·50] p.c.R. 595.\n\nCouncil and of the American, Australian and Canadian Courts and also called attention to the views expressed by various writers on the subject in support of his contention that legislative power involves as part of its content a power to delegate it to other authorities and that a legislative body empowered to make laws on certain subjects and for a certain territory is competent, while acting within its appointed limits, to delegate the whole of its legislative power to any other person or body short of divesting itself completely of such power.\n\nIt is now a commonplace of constitutional law that a legislature created by a written constitution must act - within the ambit of its powers as defined by the constitution and subject to the limitatibns prescribed thereby and that every legislative act done contrary to the provisions of the constitution is void. In England no such problem can arise as there is no constitutional limitations on the powers of Parliament, which in the eye of the law, is sovereign and supreme. It can, by its ordinary legislative procedure, alter the constitution, so that no proceedings passed by it can be challenged on constitutional grounds in a court of law.\n\nBut India, at all material times,-in 1912, 1947 and 1950 when the impugned enactments were passed-had a written constitut:ion, and it is undoubtedly the function of the courts to keep the Indian legislatures within their constitutional bounds. Hence, the proper approach to questions of constitutional validity is \"to look to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they were restricted. If what has been done is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which gave the power and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which the power is limited (in which category would of course be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it) it is not for any court of justice to inquire further or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions.\": Empress v. Burah(1).\n\n(I) 5 I.A. 178\n\nPatanja/i Sastri J.\n\nPatatJ}all\n\nSastri J.\n\nhave, therefore, to examine whether the delegation of authority made in each of the impugned enactments is contrary to the tenor of the constitution under which the enactment itself was passed.\n\nNo provision is to be found in the relevant constitutions authorising or prohibiting in express terms the: delegation of legislative power. Can a prohibition against delegation be derived inferentially from the terms of the constitution and, if so, is there anything in those terms from which .such a prohibition can be implied?\n\nBefore examm1ng the relevant constitutions to find an answer to the question, it will be useful to refer to the two main theories of constitutional law regarding what has been called delegated legislation. Though, as already explained, no question of constitutionality of such legislation could arise in England itself, such problems have frequently arisen in the British commonwealth countries which have written constitutions, and British Judges, trained in the tradition of parliamentary omnipotence, have evolved the doctrine that evety legislature created by an Act of Parliament, though bound to act within the limits of the subject and area marked out for it, is while acting within such limits, :ts supreme and sovereign as Parliament itself. Such legislatures are in no sense delgates of the Imperial Parliament and, therefore, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare is not applicable to them. A delegation of legislative functions by them, however extensive. so long as they preserve their own capacicy, cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.\n\nThese propositions were laid down in no uncertain terms in the leading case of Hodge v. Queen(') decided by the Privy Council in 1883. Upholding the validity of an enactment by a Provincial Legislature 'in Canada whereby authority was entrusted to a Board of Commissioners to make regulations in the nature of bylaws or municipal regulations for the good government of taverns and thereby to create offences and annex penalties thereto, their Lordships observed as follows :\n\n(1) 9 App. Cas. Il7.\n\n\"It was further contended that. the Imperial Parliament had conferred no authority on the local legislature to delegate those powers to the Licence Commissioners, or any other persons. In other words, that the power conferred by the Imperial Parliament on the local legislature should be exercised in full by that body, and by that body alone.\n\nThe maxim delegatus non potest delegare was relied on. It appears to their Lordships, however, that the objection thus raised by the appellant is founded on an entire misconception of t~ true character and position of the provincial legislatures. They are in no sense delegates of or acting under any mandate from the Imperial Parliament.\n\nWhen the British North America Act enacted that there should be a legislature for Ontario, and that its legislative assemblv should have exclusive authority to make laws for the Province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in section 92, it conferred powers not in any sense to• 'be exercised by delegation from or as agents of the imperial Parliament, but authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow. Within these limits of subjects and area the local legislature is supreme .............. lt was argued at the bar that a legislature committing important regulations to agents or delegates effaces itself..\n\nThat is not so.\n\nIt retains its powers intact, and can, whenever it pleases, destroy the agency it has created and set up another, or take the matter directly into its own • hands. How far it can seek the aid of subordinate agencies, and how long it shall continue them, are matters for each legislature, and not for courts of law, to decide.\" (1)\n\nHere is a clean enunciation of the English doctrine of what may be called \"supremacy within limits\"\n\nthat is to say, within the circumscribed limits of its legislative power, a subordinate legislature can do what the Imperial Parliament can do, and no constitutional limit on its power to delegate can be imported\n\n(1) 9 App. Ca&. 117, 131. 9-3 SC In<lia/68\n\netc.\n\nPatanjali Sastr;.J.\n\n19Si\n\nI• re The Delhi Law! Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nPatolfja/I StUtri J.\n\non the strength of the maxim delt:gatus non potesi delegare, because it is not a delegate. The last few words of the quotation are significant. They insist, as does the passage already quoted from Burah's case('), that the scope of the enquiry when such an issue is presented to the coun is strictly limited to seeing whether the legislature is acting within the bounds of its legislative power.\n\nThe remarks about \"authority ancillary to legislation\" and \"abundance of precedents for this legislation entrusting a limited descretionary authority to others\" have, obviously, reference to the particular authority delegated on the facts of that case which was to regulate taverns by issuing licences, and those remarks cannot be taken to detract from or to qualify in any way the breadth of the general principles so unmistakably laid down inthe passages quoted.\n\nThe same doctrine was affirmed in Powell v. Apollo Candle Co. Ltd.(\"), where, after referring to Burah's case(') and Hodge's case(3), their Lordships categorically stated : \"These two cases have put an end to a doctrine which appears at one time to have bad some currency, that a Colonial Legislature is a delegate of the Imperial Legislature.\n\nIt is a legislature restricted in the area of its powers, but within that area unrestricted, and not acting as an agent or a delegate.\" An objection that the legislature of New South Wales alone had power to impose the tax in question and it could not delegate that power to the Governor, was answered by saying \"But the duties levied under the Order in Council arc really levied by the authority of die Act undor which the order is issued. The legislature has not parted with its perfect control over the Governor, and has the power, of course, at any moment, of withdrawing or altering the power which they have entrusted to him\"(').\n\nIf Hodge's case(\") did not involve an extensive delegation of legislative power, Shannon's case(\") did.\n\n(I) S I.A. 178\n\n(2) 10 App. Cas. 282.\n\n(3) 9 App. Cas. 117\n\n\\4) 10 App. Cas. 282, 291.\n\n'S) {1938) A.C. 708\n\nA provincial legislature in Canada had passed a comprilsory Marketing Act providing for the setting up of Marketing Boards but leaving it to the Government to determine what powers and functions should be given to those Boards.\n\nOne of the objections raised to the legislation was that it was only a \"skeleton of an Act\" and that the legislature had practically \"surrendered its legislative responsibility to another body.\" Lord Haldane's dictum in what is known as the Referendum case(1) (to which a more detailed rcferc:ncc. will be made presently) suggesting a 1loubt as to a provincial legislatures power to \"create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its existence\" was cited in support of the objection. The objection, however, was summarily repelled without calling upon Government counsel for an. answer. Their Lordships contended themselves with reiterating the English doctrine of \"plenary powers of delegation within constitutional limits\" and said : \"This objection appears to their Lordships subversive of the rights which the provincial legislanirc enjoy~ whik dealing with matters falling within the classes of subjects in relation to which the constinition has granted legislative powers. Within hs appointed sphere the pr.avincial legislature is as supreme as any other parliament .......... Martin C. J. appears to have disposed of this objection very satisfactorily in his judgment on the reference, and their Lordships find no occasion . to add to what he theye said.\" What Martin C. J. said is to be found in Re Natural Products Marketing (B.C.) Actf).\n\nHe said \"I shall not, however, persue at length this subject (delegation of legislative powers) because, to use the language of the Privy Cow1cil in Q11u11 v.\n\nBurah(3), 'The British Statute book abounds with examples of it' and a consideration Eor several days of our early and late 'statute hook' discloses such a surprising number of delegations to various persons and bodies in alt sorts of subject-matters that it would\n\n(I) [1919) A.C. 935·\n\n0) 3 Apr. Cas. 889, 906.\n\n2) (1937) 4 D.L.R. 298, 310.\n\n19S1\n\nl'I Te The Delhi !laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nPataniali\n\nSastri J.\n\nIn re Tbe De/Ai Laws Act, 1912; etc.\n\nPatanjali Sastrl J.\n\ntake several pages even to enumerate them, and it would also bring about a constitutional debacle to invalidate them. I must, therefore, content myself by selecting four statutes only.\" The learned Judge then proceeded to refer, among others, to a statute whereby \"carte blanche powers were delegated over affected fruit lands areas to cope with a pest'', and to another \"whereby power was conferred upon the Lieutenant- Governor in Council to make rules of the widest scope\" and the first importance in our system of jurisprudence whereby our whole civil practice and procedure, appellate and trial, are regulated and constituted to' such an extent that even the sittings we hold are thereto subjected\".\n\nThis recent pronouncement of the Privy Council on the English view of the .delegability of legislative power is, in my opinion, of special interest for the following reasons :-\n\n(1) The case involved such an extensive delegation of legislative power-coun.sel thought the \"limit\" had been. reached-that it squarely raised the question of the constitutional validity of surrender or abdication of such power and Lord Haldane's dictum in the Referendum case(') was relied upon.\n\n(2) Nevertheless, the objection was considered so plainly unsustainable that Governmtnt counsel was not called upon to answer, their Lordships having regarded the objection as \"subversive\" of well-established constitutional principles.\n\n(3) Martin C.J.'s instances of \"carte blanche delegation\" were approved and were considered as dispoi;. ing of the objection \"very satisfactorily.\" ·\n\n( 4) All that was considered necessary to repeal the objection was a plain and simple statement of the English doctrine, namely, within its appointed sphere the provincial legislature was as supreme as .any other\n\nParliament, or, in other words, as there can be no legal limit to Parliament's power to delegate. so can there\n\n(I) [1919) A.C. 935.\n\nbe none to the power of the provincial legislature to delegate legislative authority to others.\n\nThus, the English approach to the problem of delegation of legislative power is characterised by a refusal to regard legislation by a duly constituted legislature as exercise of a delegated power, and it emphatically repudiates the application of the maxim delegatus non potest delegare. It recognises the sovereignty of legislative bodies within the limits of the constitutions by which they are created and concedes plenary powers of delegation to them within such limits.\n\nIt regards delegation as a revokable entrustment of the power to legislate to an appointed agent whose act derives its validity and legal force from the delegating statute and not as a relinquishment by the delegating body of its own capacity to legislate.\n\nOn the other hand, the American courts have approached the problem along wholly different lines, which are no less the outcome of their own environment and tradition.\n\nThe American political scene in the eighteenth century was dominated by the ideas of Montesque and . Locke that concentration of legislative executive and judicial powers in the hands of a single organ of the State spelt tyranny, and many State constitution had explicitly provided that each of the great departments of State, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, . shall not exercise the powers of the others. Though the Federal Constitution . contained no such explicit provision, it was construed, against the background of the . separatist ideology, as . embodying the principle of . separation of powers, and a juristic basis for. the consequent non-delegability of its power by one of the departments, to the others was found in the old familiar maxim of the private law. of agency delegatus non potest delegare which soon established itself as a traditional dogma of American constitutional law.\n\nBut the swift progress of the nation in the industrial and economic fields and the resulting complexities of administration forced the realisation on the American Judges of the unavoidable necessity for\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nIn re Tke Delhi Law1Act,1912,\n\netc.\n\nPat an} a/I Sastrl J.\n\nlarge-scale delegation of legislative powers to administrative bodies, and it was soon recognised that to deny this would be \"to stop the wheels of government.\" The result has been that American decisions on this branch of the law consist lergely of attempts to disguise delegation \"by veiling words\" or \"by\n\ntrening it by a quasi\" (per Holmes J. in Springer v.\n\nGovernment of the Philipine Islands('). ''This result\", says a recent writer on the subject, \"is well put in Prof. Cmhman's syllogism-\n\nMajor premise : Legislative power cannot he constitutionally delegated by Congress.\n\nMinor premise : It is essential that certain powers be delegated to administrative officers .and regulatory commissions.\n\nConclusion : Therefore the powers thus delegated are not legislative powers.\"\n\nThey are instead \"administrative\" or \"quasi-legislative\"-(American Administrative Law by Bernard Schwartz, p. 20). After considerable confusion and fluctuation of opinion as to what are \"essentially\" legislative powers which cannot be delegated and what are mere \"administrative\" or \"ancillary\" powers, the delegation of which is permissible, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court would seem to place the dividing line berween laying down a policy or establishing a standard in respect of the subject legislated upon the one hand and implementing that policy and enforcing that standard by appropriate rules and regulations on the other: (vide Schechter Poultry Corpn. v. United States(') and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan(&), a test which inevitably gives rise to considerable divergence of judicial opinion as applied to the facts of a given case.\n\nI will tlow turn to the questions in issue. The first question which relates to the validity of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, has to be determined with reference to the competency of \"the legislature which\n\n(I) 277 U.S. 189.\n\n(2) 295 u.s. 495.\n\n(3) 293 U.S. 388.\n\npasse? the said Act\", that is, with reference to the constitution then in force. It may be mentioned here that the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, as well as the Ajmer- Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, to which the second question relates, were repealed by section 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, but the Acts already extended under the repealed provisions have been continued in force, and hence the necessity for a pronouncement on the constitutional . validity of the repealed provisions.\n\nIn 1912 the Indian Legilature was the Governor- General in Council, and his law-making powers were derived from section 22 of the Indian Councils Act, 1861 (24 and 25 Vic Ch. 7) which conferred power \"to make laws and regulations for repealing, amending or altering any laws or regulations whatever now in force or hereafter to be in force in the Indian territories now under the dominion of Her Majesty and to make laws and regulations for all persons whether British or native, foreigners orothers, and for all courts of justice whatever and for all places and things whatever within the said territories,\" subject to certain conditions and restrictions which do not affect the impugned provisions. The composition and powers of the Governor-General in Council were altered in other respects by the Councils Acts of 1892 and 1909, but his law-making powers remained essentially the. same in 1912. The question accordingly arises whether section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, was within the ambit of the legislative powers conferred on him by section 22 of the Indian Councils Act, 1861. As the power is defined in very wide terrns-\"for all person .... and for all places and things whatevcr\"- within the Indian territories-the issue of competency reduces itself to the question whether section 7 was a \"law\" within the meaning of. section 22 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861.\n\nThis question is, m my opinion, concluded by the decision of the Privy Council in Empress v. Burah(1).\n\n(I) 5 I.A. 178.\n\n19S1\n\netc.\n\nPatanfali Sastri J.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nThat was an appeal by the Government from a judgment of the ma; ority of a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court holding that section 8 and 9 of Act XXII of 1869 were ultra vires the Governor- General in Council as being an unauthorised delegation of legislative power to the• Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.\n\nThe combined effect of those provisions was to authorise the Lieutenant-Governor to extend to certain districts by notification in the Calcutta Gazette \"any law or any portion of any law now in force in the other territories subject to his government or which may hereafter be enacted by the Council of the Governor-General or of the said Lieutenant-Governor, for making laws and regulations .......... \". Markby }., who delivered the leading judgment of the majority, held ( 1) that section 9 amounted to a delegation of legislative authority to the Lieutenant-Governor by the Indian Legislature which, having been entrusted with such authority as a delegate of the Imperial Parliament, had no power in the tum to delegate it to apother, and (2) the Indian Legislature could not \"change the legislative machinery in India without affecting the provisions of the Acts of Parliament which cre.ated that machinery and if it does in any way affect them, then ex consensu omnium its Acts are void.\" The learned Judge referred to the argu- . ment of Govern.ment counsel, namely, \"where Parliament has conferred upon a legislature the general power to make laws, the only question can be 'Is the disputed Act a law'. If it is, then it is valid unless it falls within some prohibition.\" The learned Judge remarked that this argument was \"sound\", but met it by holding that \"it was clearly intended to restrict the Legislative Council to the exercise of functions which are properly legislative, that is, to the making of laws, which (to use Blackston's expression) are rules of action prescribed by a superior to an inferior or 0£ laws made in furtherance of those rules. The English Parliament is not so restricted. It is not only a legislative but a paramount sovereign body ...... The Legislative Council, when it merely grants permission\n\nto another person to legislate, does not make a law within the meaning of the Act from which it derives its authority\"(1).\n\nThe learned Judge rejected the argument based on previous legislative practice as the instances relied on were not \"clear and undisputed instances of a transfer of legislative authority.\" Garth C.J. in his dissenting opinion pointed out that \"by the Act of 1833 the legislative powers which were then conferred upon the Governor-General in Council were in the same language, and (for the purposes of the present case) to the same effot, as those given by the Councils Act in 1861; and from the time when that Act was passed, the Governor-General in Council has constantly been in the habit of exercising those powers through the instrumentality of high officials and public bodies, in whom a large discretion has been vested for that purpose.\"(2) It could not therefore be supposed that \"the Imperial Parliament would have renewed in the Councils Act of 1861 the legislative powers which the Governor-General in Council had so long exercised, if they had disapproved of the course of action which the Legislature had been pursuing.\n\nThe fact that with the knowledge of the cfrcumstances which they must be assumed to have p9ssessed, Parliament did in the Councils Act renew the powers which were gien by the Act of 1833, appears to me to amount to a statutory acknowledgment that the course of action whih had been pursued by the legislature .in the exercise of those powers was one which the Act had authorised.\"(3) The learned Chief Justice accordingly came to the conclusion that Act XXII of 1869 was a law \"which the legislature was justified in passing.\" I have referred at some length to the reasoning and conclusions of the learned judges in the High Court as I think they will be l)elpful in understanding the full import of the judgment of the Privy Council.\n\nIt will be seen, in the first place, that the line of approach adopted by Government counsel in the High\n\n(I) l.L.R. 3 Cal. 63 at 90, 91.\n\n(2) Ibid, 140.\n\n(3) Ibid 144.\n\netc.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nIn re The De/hi Lllw1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nPatanjall Sastri J.\n\nCourt was endorsed by their Lordships as the correct approach to the problem, that is to say, the court has to see whether \"what has been done is legislation within the general scope of affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition by which that power is limin:d it is not for any court to inquire further or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions\" (italics mine).\n\nThis passage clearly lays down [what we have already seen was reiterated in Hodge's case(')] : (1) that the scope of judicial review in such cases is limited only to determining whether the impugned enactment is within the law-making power confer(ed on the legislature and whether it violates any exp~ condition limiting that power, and (2) that in determining the latter question the court should have regard only to express conditions and should not enlarge them inferentially by a pre>- cess of interpretation. In the second place, their Lordships repudiated the doctrine [as they did also in respect of a provincial legislature in Canada in Hodge's case(')] that the Indian Legislature is in any sense an-agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, and that the rule against delegation by an agent applies to the situation.\n\nThirdly, the distinction made by Markby J. between Parliament and the Indian Legislature that the latter is \"restricted to the ....... . making of laws\" in the sense defined by Blackstone, while Parliament was not so restricted, or, in other words, that while Parliament could make a \"law\" delegating its legislative power, the Indian Legislature could not make such a \"law\" was rejected, and the English doctrine of supremacy within limits was laid down specifically in regard to the Indian Legislature, which when acting within the limits circumscribing its legislative power \"has and was intended to have plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself\" (italics mine). It must follow that it is as competent for the Indian Legislature to make a law delegating legislative power, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as it is -£or\n\n(1) 9 App, Cas 117.\n\nParliament to do so, provided, of course, 'it acts within the circumscribed limits.\n\nFourthly, their Lordships \"agree that the Governor-General in Council could not by any form of enactment create in India and arm with general legislative authority a new legislative power not created or authorised by the Councils Act.\n\nNothing of that kind has in their Lordships' opinion been done or attempted in the present case.\"\n\nMr. Chatterjee, on behalf of the opposite party, submitted that the remark regarding the incompetency of the Governor-General in Council to create in India a new legislative power had reference to the subordnate agency or instrumentality to which the legislative authority was to' be delegated and thus negatived the legislature's right to delegate.\n\nThe context, however, makes it clear that their Lordships were expressing agreement on this point with Markby J. who, as we have seen, had stated that the Indian Legislature could not \"change the legislative machinery in India without affecting the provisions of the Acts of Parliament which created that machinery.\" This shows that their Lordships were envisaging the setting up of a new legislative machinery nnt authorised by the Councils Act, that is, a new legislature in the sense in which the Central and Provincial Legislatures in the country were legislatures.\n\nWhile they agreed that that could not be done (because it would be a contravention of the Act of Parliament which confers no power to create such legislatures) their Lordships proceeded to point out that that was not what was done by the impugned Act and that Markby J. fell into an error in thinking that it was. Their Lordships gave two reasons, first, because \"it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor (large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority than that of the Governor-General in Council.\n\nTheir whoie operation is, directly and immediately, under and by virtue of this Act (No. XXII of 1869) itself.\" Here, indeed, their Lordships touch the core of the problem by indicating\n\nln re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\n111 re The Delhi .Law.J_Act, 1912, etc.\n\nPatanjal; Sastri J.\n\nthe true nature of delegated legislation as distinct from creating a new legislative body.\n\nThe point is developed to its logical consequence in later cases as will be seen presently, but here they expose to view the not uncommon \"fallacy\" of treating the one as of the same nature and as having constitutionally the same consequence as the other, a fallacy which perhaps accounts for much of the confusion of thought on the subject. It will be recalled. that in Hodge's case{') it was made clear that in delegated legislation the delegating body does not efface itself but retains its legislative power intact and merely elects to exercise such power through an agency or instrumentality of its choice. There is no finality .about this arrangement, the delegating body being free to \"destroy the agency it has created and set up another or take the matter directly into its own hands.\" In Burah's case(\") their Lordships emphatically stated one consequence of that view, namely, that the act done by the authority to which legislative. power is delegated derives its whole force and efficacy from the delegating legislature, that is to say, when the delegate acts under the delegated authority, it is the legislature that really acts through its appointed instrumentality. On the other hand, in the creation of an new legislative body with general legislative authority and functioning in its own right, there is no delegation of power to subordinate units, but a grant of power to an independent and co-ordinate body to make laws operating of their own force.\n\nIn the first case, according to English constitutional law, no express provision authorising delegation is required.\n\nIn the absence of a constitutional inhibition, delegation of legislative power, however extensive, could be made so long as the delegating body retains its own legislative power intact.\n\nIn the second case, a positive enabling provision in the constitutional document is required.\n\nThe second reason why their Lordships regarded the majority view as erroneous was that Act XXII of 1869 was, in truth, nothing more than conditional legislation\n\n{l) 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\n(2) 5 I.A. 178\n\nand there was no question of delegating legislative power.\n\nTheir Lordships were of opinion that neither in fixing the time for commencement of the Act nor in enlarging the area of its operation was the Lieutenant-\n\nGovernor exerc1smg \"an act of legislation.\" \"The proper legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things.\n\nThe conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute.\n\nWhere plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an Imperial or in a Provincial Legislature, they may (in their Lordships' judgment) be wet! exercised, either absolutdy or conditionally.\n\nLegislation, conditional on the use of particular powers or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons .in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing; and, in many circumstances, it may be highly convenient. The British Statute book abounds with examples of it; and it cannot be supposed that the Imperial Parliament did not, when constituting the Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of conditional legislation as within the scone of the legislative powers which it from time to time conferred. It certainly used no words to exclude it.\"\n\n. Their Lordships finally proceeded to refer to the legislative practice in this country of delegating to the executive government a discretionary power of extending enactments to new territories subject in certain cases to such \"restriction, limitation or proviso\" as the Government may think proper, and they expressed their approval of the reasoning of Garth C.J. based on such practice. \"If their Lordships,\" they said \"were to adopt the view of the majority of the High Court they would (unless distinction were made on grounds beyond the competency of . the judicial office) be casting doubt upon the validity of a long course of legislation appropriate, as far as they can judge to the peculiar circumstances of India ........ For such doubt their Lordships are unable to discover any foundation either in th' affirmative or . the negative words of that Act\"\n\n19S1\n\netc.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nlnre The Delhi Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nPotonjo/i Sartri J.\n\n(Indian Councils Acts, 1861).\n\nThe parenthetic remarks (which I have italicised) is significant. It is not competent for the court, according to their Lordships, to discriminate between degrees of delegation. It might be extensive in some cases and slight in others. fo validity must, however, be founded \"on the affirmative or the negative words\" of the Constitution Act.\n\nAnother logical consequence of the British theory of delegation has been worked out in Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians v. Attomey-General for Canada('), where the question arose as to whether an -order made by the Governor in Council pursuant to authority dekgate<l by the Parliament of Canada was a law made by the Parliament of Canada within the meaning of the Statute of Westminster and, ifl so, whether it was such a law made after the passing of that Statute.\n\nThe delegation of authority to the Governor was made before that Statute was passed but the Governor's order was promulgated after the Statute.\n\nHolding that the order was a \"law\" made by the Parliament of Canada after Statute of Westminster their Lordships observed : \"Undoubtedly, the law as embodied in an order or regulation is made at the date when the power conferred by the Parliament of the Dominion is exercised.\n\nIs it made after that date by the Parliament of the Dominion' That Parliament is the only legislative authority for the Dominion as a whole and it has chosen to make the law through machinery set up and continued by it for that purpose.\n\nThe Governor in Council has no independent status :is a law-making body.\n\nThe legislative activity of Parliament is still present at the time when the orders arc made and these orders are \"law''. In their Lordships' opinion they are law made hy the Parliament at the .date of their promulgation.\"(\")\n\nMr. Chatterjee has urged that in Burah's case(') the Privy Council did no more than hold that the type of legislation which their Lordships there called conditional legislation was within the competem:e of the\n\n(I) (1947] A.C. 87.\n\n(3) 5 I.A. I 78.\n\n(2) Ibid. 106-107.\n\nIndian legislature and was valid, and that the considerations adverted to by their Lordships in upholding such legislation have no relevancy in determining the validity of the provisions impugned in the present case. It is true that the kind of legislation here in quc:stion does not belong to that category, for te operation of the impugned Acts is not made to depend upon the exercise of a discretion by an external :authority, but it is not correct to say that Burah' s case(1) has application only to facts involving conditional legislation.\n\nAs I have endeavoured to show, it lays down general principles of far-reaching importance.\n\nIt was regarded ill Powell's case(2) referred to above as \"laying down the general law\" and as 'putting an end\" to the false doctrine that a subordinate legislature acts as an agent or a delegate.\n\nMr. Chatterjee next relied on the dicti1m of Lord Haldane in the Referendum casc.C) In 'that case their Lordships held that the Initiative ·· and Referendum Act of Manitoba (Canada) was, in so far as it compelled the Lieutenant-Governor to submit a proposed law to a body of rntcrs totally distinct from the legislature of which he was the constitutional head and rendered him powerless to prevent it from becoming an actual law if approved by those voters, ultra vires the Provincial\n\nLegislature, as the power to amend the Constitution of . the Province conferred upon that Legislature by the British, North America Act, 1867, excluded from its scope \"the office of the Lieutenant-Governor\". Lord Haldane, however, proceeded to make the following observations : \"Section 92 of the Act of 1867 entrust~\n\nthe legislative power in a Provutce to its Legislature and to that Legislature only. No doubt, a body,\n\nwith a power of legislation on t11e subjects entrusted to it so ample as that enjoyed by a Provincial Legislature in Canada, could, while preserving its own capacity intact seek the assistance of subordinate agencies, as had been done when in Hodge v. The Queen(t) tl1e Legislature of Ontario was\n\n(I) S I.A. 178.\n\n(2) 10 A.pp. eas .. 2s2.\n\n(3) (1919] A.C. 93S.\n\n(4) 9 App. ens. 111.\n\nlnre The Delhi lows Act, 19121 etc.\n\nPata11jall Sastri J.\n\nPatanjali Sastrj J.\n\nheld entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissioners authority to enact regulations relating to taverns; but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity ; t new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence. Their Lordships do no more than draw attention to the gravity of the constitutional questions which thus arise.\"(')\n\nMr. Chatterjee submitted that the grave constitutional question, to which Lord Haldane drew attention, arose in the present case. I dp not think so. The dictum, like the observation of Lord Selborne in Burah's case(2) regarding the power of the Governor-General in Council \"to create in India and arm with general legislative authority a new legislative power,\" to which reference has been made, seems to envisage the unauthorised creation of a new legislature with an independent status as a law-making body, which, for reasons already indicated, is quite different from delegation of legislative power, and my remarks in connection with that observation equally apply here.\n\nThe only other decision of the Privy Council tu which reference need be made is King Emperor v.\n\nBenoari Lal Sarma.(3 ) It was an appeal from a judgment of the majority of the Federal Court of India (reported in [1943] F.C.R. %) holding, inter alia, that sections 5, IO and 16 of the Special Criminal Court~ Ordinance (No. II of 1942) passed by the Governor- General in exercise of his emergency powers wea ultra vires and invalid. The ground of decision wa that although the powers of the High Court were taken away in for!Il by section 26 of the Ordinance, they were, in fact, taken away by the order of the executive officer to whom it was left by sections 5, 10 and 16 to direct what offences or classes of offences and what cases or classes of cases shonld be tried by the special courts established under the Ordinance. In so far as these sections thus purported to confer on the executive officers absolute and uncontrolled discretion without any legislative provision or direction laying down\n\n(I) [1919} A.C. 935,945.\n\n(2) 51.A.178.\n\n(3) 72 I.A. 57.\n\nthe policy or conditions with reference to which that power was to be exercised, they were beyond the competence of the Governor-General. V aradachariar C. J ., with whom Zafrulla Khan J. concerned, went elaborately into the whole question of delegation of legislative powers, and while conceding, in view of the Privy Council decisions already referred to, that the Governor- General (whose legislative power in emergencies was co-extensive with that of the Indian Legislature) could not e regarded as a delegate of the Imperial Parliament and that, therefore, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare had no application, nevertheless expressed the opinion that \"there is nothing in the above decisions of their Lordships that can be said to be inconsistent with the principle laid down in the passage from the American authority which the Advocate-General of India proposed to adopt as his own argument.\" That prim; iple was this : The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a decretion. as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done, to the latter no valid objection can be made\" (per Judge Ranney of the Supreme Court of Ohio, often cited in American decisions). The learned Chief Justice then proceeded to examine the American decisions bearing upon the delegation of powers and the opinions expressed by writers on a.dministrative law and came to the following conclusion :-\n\n\"As we have already observed, the considerations and safeguard suggested in the foregoing passages may be no more than considerations of policy or expediency under the English Constitution.\n\nBut under Constitutions like the Indian and the American. where the constitutionality of legislation is examinable in a court of law, these considerations are, in our opinion, an integral and essential part of the limitation on the extent of delegation of responsibility by the legislature to the executive. In the present case, it is impossible to deny that the Ordinance-making 10-3 S. C. India/68\n\nP.atanjali Sastri J,\n\nPaton jail Sastrl J,\n\nauthority has wholly evaded the responsibility of laying down any rules or conditions or even enunciating the policy with reference to which cases are .to be assigned to the ordinary criminal courts and to the special courts respectively and left the whole matter to the unguided and uncontrolled action of the executive authorities. This is not a criticism of the policy of the law-as counsel for the Crown would make it appear -but a complaint that the law has laid down no policy or principle to guide and control the exercise of the undefined powers entrusted to the executive authorities by sections 5, IO and 16 of the Ordinance.\"(')\n\nI have set out at some length the reasoning and conclusion of the learned Chief Justice because it summarises and accepts most of what has been said before us by Mr. Chatterjee, in support of his contention that the American rules as to delegation of legislative powers should be followed in this country in preference to views of English Judges on the point and that the delegation of a too wide and uncontrolled power must be held to be bad.\n\nThe Privy Council, however, rejected the reasoning and conclusion of the majority of the Court in a clear and emphatic pronouncemept Their Lordships scouted the idea that what might be no more than considerations of policy or expediency under the British Constitution could, in• India, as in America, become constitutional limitatibns on the delegation of legislative responsibility merely because the constitutionality of legislation was open to judicial review under the constitution of this country.\n\nThey said : \"With the greatest respect to these eminent Judges, their Lordships feel bound to point out that the question whether the Ordinance is intra vires or 11/tra vires does not depend on considerations of jurisprudence or of policy.\n\nIt depends simply on examining the language of the Government of India Act and of comparing the legislative authority conferred on the Governor-General with the provisions of the ordinance by which he is purporting to exercise that authority\"-the old traditional approach. \"It\n\n(I) [l 943] F.C.R. 96, 139-1 O.\n\nmay be that as a matter of wise and well-framed legislation it is better, if circumstances permit, to frame as a statute in such a way that the offender may know in advance before what court he will be brought if he is charged with a given crime ; but that is a question of policy, not of law.\n\nThere is nothing of which their Lordships are aware \"in the Indian constitution to :render invalid a statute, whether passed by the Central legislature or under the Governor-General's emergency powers, which does not accord with this principle ..... .\n\nThere is not, of course, the slightest doubt that the Parliament of Westminster could validly enact that the choice of courts should rest with an executive authority, and their Lordships are unable to discover any valid reason why the same discretion sho.uld not be conferred in India by the law-making authority, whether that authority is the legislature or the Governor-General, as an exercise of the discretion conferred on the authority to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of India.\"(1)\n\nThe English doctrine of supremacy within limits is here asserted once again, and its corollary is applied as the determining test : \"What the British Parliament could do, the Indian legislature and the Governor-General legislating within their appointed sphere could also do.\" There was here a delegation of an \"unguided and\n\nuncontrolled\" discretionary power affecting the liberty of the subject.\n\nIn the language of an American Judge, it was \"unconfined and vagrant\" and was not \"canalised within banks that kept it from over-flowing :\"\n\n(per Cardozo J. in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.(2) Yet, the delegation was upheld. Why?\n\nBecause \"their Lordships are unable to find any such constitutional limitation is imposed.\"\n\nThere is, however, a passage in he judgment of their Lordships, which, torn from its context, may appear, at first blush, to accept the maxim of delegattts non potest delegare as a principle of English constitutional law, notwithstanding its consistent repudiation by the same tribun:d in the previous decisions already\n\n(!) 72 LA. 57, 70-72.\n\n(2) 293 U.S. 388.\n\nIn re 11ie Deihl Laws Act, 1!112\n\netc.\n\nPatanjali Sastrl J.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nreferred to, and Mr. Chatterjee was not slow to seize on it as maki, ng a veering round to the American point of view.\n\nI do not think that their Lordships meant anything so revolutionary. The passage is this : \"It is undouhtedly true that the Governor-General, acting under section 72 of Schedule\n\nIX, must himself discharge the duty of legislation there cast on him, and cannot transfer it to other authorities\"(') (italics mine). This was said, however in answering the \"second objection\" which was that section 1 (3) of the Ordinance \"amounted to what was called delegated legislation by which the Governor-General, without legal authority, sought to pass the decision whether an emergency existed to the Provincial Government instead of deciding it for himself.\" Now, the opening words of section 72 of Schedule IX of the Government of India Act declare : \"The Governor-General may, in case of an emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof.\" The ordinance was thus passed avowedly in exercise of a special power to legislate to meet an emergency, and the argument was that the very basis of this ordinance-making power must be an exercise of personal judg!llent and discretion by the Governor-General which he could not delegate to the Provincial Government or its officers.\n\nTheir Lordships accepted the major premise of this argument but went on to point out that there was no delegation of his legislative power by the Governor-General at all and that \"what was done is only conditional legislation.\" It was with reference to this special ordinance-making power to meet emergencies that their Lordships said that the Governor-General must himself exercise it and could not transfer it to other authorities. The words \"acting under section 72 of Schedule IX\" and \"there cast on him\" make their meaning clear, and the passage relied on by Mr. Chatterjee lends no support to his argument regarding the non-delegability of legislative power tn general.\n\nIn the light of the authorities discussed above and adopting the line of approach laid down there, I am\n\nof opinion that section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, fell within the general scope of the affirmative words of section 22 of the Indian Councils Act, 1861, which conferred the law-making power on the Governor- General in Council and that the provision did not violate any of the clause.> by which, negatively, that power was restricted.\n\nThe same line of approach leads me to the conclusion that section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, was also constitutional and valid.\n\nThis Act was passed by the Dominion Legislature of India, . and the governing constitutional provision was section 99(1) of the Government of India Act,, 1935.\n\nThe Indian Independenee Act, 1947, authorised the removal of certain restrictions on the law-making powers of the Central Legislature and section 108 of the Constitution Act was omitted; but the material words in section 99 (1) which granted the legislative power remained the same, namely, \"may make laws for the whole or any part of the Dominion.\" No doubt, as between the Dominion and the Provinces there was a distribution of legislative power according to the Lists in Schedule VII, but such distribution did not affect the power of the Dominion Legislature to make laws for what are known as Chief Commissioners' Provinces, of which Ajmer-Merwara is one. This was made clear by section 100 ( 4) read with section 46.\n\nSection .2 of the impugned Act was, therefore a \"law\" which the Dominion Legislature was competent to make. and the restrictive words ''subject to the provisions of this Act\" had no application to the case, as no provision was brought to om notice which affected the validity of the law.\n\nThere was some discussion as to the scope and meaning of the words \"restrictions\" and \"modifications\". It was suggested by Mr. Chatterjee that these l words occurring in the impugned provisions would enable the executive authority to alter or amend any law which it had decided to apply to the territories in question and that a power of such undefined amplitude could not be validly delegated by the legislature. On\n\nIn re The De/Ill\n\nf.<ws Act, 1912\n\netc.\n\nPara11ja/i Sa,'\\trl .1.\n\netc.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nthe other hand, the Attorney-General submitted that in such context \"modification\" was usually taken to connote \"making a change without altering the essential nature of the thing changed,\" and that the use of the word would make no difference to the delegability or otherwise of the legislative power.\n\nHe drew attention to an instance mentioned by the Privy Council in Burah' s case, where their Lordships thought that the power given to the local government by Act XXIII of 1861 to extend the Civil Procedure Code of 1859 \"subject to any restriction, limitation or proviso\" which it may think proper was not bad. In the view I have expressed above, however wide a meaning inay be attributed to the expression, it would not affect the constitutionality of the delegating statute, because no constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative power to a subordinate unit is to be found in either of the constitutions discussed above. That, I apprehend is also the reason why the Privy Council too attached no importance to the words in section 39 of Act XXIII of 1861 referred to above.\n\nTurning next to section 2 of the Part C States {Laws) Act, 1950, it is framed on the same lines as the other two impugned provisions save for the addition of a clause empowering repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being in force in the State. This a9ditional clause, however, need not detain us, for, if there is no constitutional inhibition against delegation of legislative power under the present Constitution, delegation can as well extend to the power of repeal as to the power of modification and the Court cannot hold such delegation to be ultra vires. The Constitutional validity of the additional clause thus stands or fall's with that of the first \"part of the section and the only question is : What is the position in regard to delegated legislation under the present Constitution ? Herc we do not have the advantage of Privy Council decisions bearing on the question as we had in Burah's case(') on the Indian Councils Act, 1861, and Benoari Lal\n\n~I) 5 I.A. 178.\n\nSarmas case(1) on the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nBut the line of approach laid down in those cases and in numerous others, to which reference has been made, must be followed, not because of the binding force of those decisions, but because it is indubitably the correct approach to problems of this kind. Indeed, there is no difference between the English and the American decisions on this point.\n\nIn both countries it is recognised that the correct way of resolving such problems is to look to the terms of the constitutional instrument, and to find out whether the impugned enactment falls within the ambit of the lawmaking power conferred on the . legislature which passed. the enactment and, if so, whether it transgresses any restrictions and limitations imposed . on such power. If the enactment inquestion satisfies this double test, then it inust be held to be constitutional.\n\nWe therefore begin by looking to the terms of the Constitution and we· find that article 245 confers lawmaking power . on Parliament in the same general terms as in. the other . tWO cases discussed above.\n\nThe article says \"subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India ...... \" Then we have the scheme of distribution of legislative powers worked orit in article 246 as between Parliament and the legislatures of the States specified in Part A and Part B of die First Schedule, which; however, does not affect the question we have to determine, for article 246(4), like section 100 (4) of the Government of India Act, 1935, pru\"1des that. Parliarpent fuis power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of die territory of India not included in Part A or Part B notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.\n\nThe poslti<>n, therefore, . is . substantially similar to th11t under the Indian Councils Act, 1861, and the Government of India Act, 1935, so far as the words\n\nnferring law-making power are concerned.\n\nIs then this impugned enactment, which merely purports to\n\n(I) 7l I .A; 57.\n\nlnre The Deihl Law,, Act, 1912,\n\net\".·\n\nPatanjall Sastri J.\n\nlnre The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nPatti':! ali sasrri r.\n\ndelegate law-making power to the Central Government for Part C States, a \"law\" within the meaning of article 245 ( 1) ? There can be no question hut that the Act was passed hy Parliament in accordance with the prescribed legislati, e procedure, and I can see no reason why it should not be regarded as a law. It will be recalled that the restricted interpretation which Markby J. (') put on the word in section 22 of the Indian Councils Act in accordance with Blackstone's -0cfinition (formulation of a binding rule of conduct for the subject) was not accepted by the Privy Council in Burah's case.\n\nEven if a mere delegation of power to legislate were not regarded as a law \"with respect to\"\n\none or other of the \"matters\" mentioned in the three Lists, it would be a law made in exercise of the residuary powers under article 248.\n\nThe question next arises whether there is anything in the Constitution which prohibits the making of such a law.\n\nThe main restrictions and limitations on the legislative power of Parliament or of the States are those contained in Part III of the Constitution relating to Fundamental Rights. Our attention has not been <ailed to any specific provision in that Part or elsewhere in the Constitution which prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting the making of a law delegating legislative power to a subordinate agency of Parliament's choice.\n\nWhat Mr. Chatterjee strenuously urged was that, having regard to the Prearpble to the Constitution, whereby the people of India resolved, in exercise of their sovereign right, \"to adopt, enact and to give to themselves the Constitution,\" Parliament, which is charged with the duty of making laws for the territories of the Union, must, as in the American Constitution, be deemed to be a delegate of the people, and that this fund:unental conception, which approximates to the conception underlying the American Constitution, attracts the application of the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, and operates as an implied prohibition against the delegation of legislative power by Parliament or, for that mater, by any other legislature\n\n(I) l.L.R. 3 Cal. 63, 91.\n\niri. the country. It is true to say that, in a sense, the people delegated to the legislative; executive and the judicial organs of the State their respective powers\n\nwhile reserving to themselves the fundamental rights which they made paramount by providing that the\n\nState shall not . make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by that Part. To this extent the Indian Constitution may be said to have been based on the American . model, but this is far from making the principle of separation of powers, as interpreted by the American courts, an essential part of the Indian Constitution or making the Indian Legislatures the delegates of the people so as to attract the application of the maxim.\n\nAs already . stated, the historical background and the political environment which influenced .the making of the . Aerican Constitution were entirely absent here, and beyond the creation of the three organs of the State to exercise their respective functions as a matter of . convenient governmental mechanism, which is a common feature of most modern civilised governments, there is not the least indication that the framers of the Indian Constitution made the American doctrine of separation of powers, namely, that in their, absolute separation and vesting in different hands lay the basis of liberty, an integral and basic feature of the Indian Constitution.\n\nOn the contrary, by providing that there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions and that the Council shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People,\n\nthe Constitution following the British model has effected a fusion of legislative and executive powers which spells the negation of any clear cut division of governmental power into three branches which is the basic doctrine of American constitutional law. Without such a doctrine being incorporated in the Constitution and made its structural foundation, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare could have no constitutional status but could only have the force of a political precept to be acted upon by legislatures in a\n\nPalan'aji Sastrl J.\n\nPatan.ia/i Sastri J.\n\ndemocratic policy consisting of elected representatives of the people in the discharge of their function of making laws, but cannot be enforced by the court as a rule of constitutional law when such function is shirked or evaded.\n\nThe American courts are able to enforce the maxim because it has been made by the process of judicial construction an integral part of the American Constitution as a necessary corollary of the doctrine of separation of powers.\n\nBut the position in India, as pointed out above, is entirely different, and the courts in this country cannot strike down an Act of Parliament as unconstitutional merely because Parliament decides in a particular instance to entrust its legislative power to another in whom it has coHfidence, or, in other words, to exercise such power through its appointed instrumentality, however repugnant such entrustment may be to the democratic process.\n\nWhat may be regarded as politically undesirable is constitutionally competent.\n\nMr. Chatterjee also attempted to spell out an implied prohibition against delegation on the strength of article 357 (I) (a) which provides specifically for delegation by the President of the law-making powers conferred on him by Parliament in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States. This express provision, it is claimed, shows that whenever the makers of the Constitution wanted to authorise delegation of legislative powers they ha'{e made specific provision in that behalf and, in the absence of any such provision in other cases, no delegation of such powers is permissible. I see no force in this argument.\n\nMerely because in a particular instance of rare and extraordinary occurrence an express provision authorising the President to delegate to another the law-making powers conferred on him by Parliament is made in the Constitution, it is not reasonable to infer that it was intended to prohioit the delegation of powers in all other cases. The maxim expressio tmius est exclusio alterius is not one of universal application, and it is inconceivable that the framers of the Constitution could have intended to deny to the Indian Legislatures\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 885 ' a power which, as we have seen, has been recognised on all hands as a desirable, if not, a necessary concomitant of legislative activity in modern States.\n\nAmerica, having started with a rule against delegation as a necessary corollary of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, has made and is making numerous inroads on the rule, and English constitutional law has allowed, as we have seen, even to subordinate legislatures, the widest latitude to delegate their legislative powers so long as they retain their own law-making . capacity intact.\n\nIn such circumstances, a provision for express delegation in a remote contingency is fur too flimsy a ground for inferring a general prohibition against delegation of legislative power in all other cases.\n\nIn this connection, it will be useful to recall Lord Selborne's observation in Burah's case that all that the court has to see in adjudging an enactment constitutional is \"that it violates no express condition or restriction by which the law-making power conferred on the legislature is limited, and that it is not for the court to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions,\" and as recently as 1944, the Privy Council, as we have seen in Benoari Lal Sarma's case referred to what has always been regarded as an established doctrine of English constitutional law, namely, that the Indian legislature could do, in the matter of delegating its legislative powers, what the British Parliament could do.\n\nIt would indeed 'be strange if, in framing the constitution of the Independent Republic of India at the present day, its makers were to ignore the experience of legislative bodies all the world over and to deny to Parliament a power which its predecessors unquestionably possessed.\n\nI have no hesitation in rejecting this argument.\n\nIn the result, I hold that section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, and section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, are in their entirety constitutional and valid and I answer the reference ac; cordingly.\n\nPatanja/i Sastri J.\n\nIn re The Del/ii laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMaluQan J.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (I) of article 143 of the Constitution the President of India has referred the following questions to this Court for its opinion :-\n\n(I) 'Vas section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or any of the prJJvisions thereof and in what particular or particulars and to what extent ultra vires . the legislature which passed the said Act?\n\n(2) Was the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars and to what extent ultra vires\n\nthe legislature which passed the said Act ?\n\n(3) Was section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars and to what extent ultra vires the Parliament ?\n\nThe reference raises questions of great importance concerning the administration of the affairs of the Republic and is the first one of the kind since the inauguration of the new constitution. The only point canvassed in the reference is as to the vires of the laws mentioned therein. It was contended by the learned Attorney-General that legislative power without autho .. rity or power to delegate is a futility and that unless legislative power includes the power to delegate, power to administer will be ineffective. It was suggested that the true nature and scope of the legislative power of Parliament involves as part of its content power to confer law-making powers upon authorities other than Parliament itself and that this is a natural consequence of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament.\n\nIt was said that the Indian legislature when acting within the ambit of its legislative power has plel).ary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as the British Parliament and unless the pes cribed limits are exceeded, no question of ultra vzres can possibly arise, that the proper approach to the question is \"Look at the terms of the instrument by which affirmatively the legislative powers are created and by which negatively they are restricted. If what\n\nhas been done is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which the power is limited, it is not for any court of justice to enquire or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restriction.\" (1) Reliance was also placed on the legislative practice in India and other countries of the Commonwealth sanctioning constitutionality of statutes drawn up in the same form as the impugned enactments.\n\nThe questions referred .. cover three distinct periods of legislation in the constitutional and political history of this country. The first question relates to the period \\Vhen the government of this country was unitary in form and was constituted under the Indian Councils Act, 1861, as amended from time to time up to the stage of the introduction of the Morley-Minto Reforms, when the Indian Legislature achieved the status of a political debating society and when as a result of the\n\nundoing of the partition of Bengal the capital of India was transferred from Calcutta to Del11i. The unitary form of government was changed after the different Round Table Conferences in London into a Federation by the Constitution Act of 1935. This Act with certain adaptations, remain in force till 26th January\n\n1950, when the new constitution was inaugurated.\n\nUnder the Independence Act, 1947, India became a Dominion of the British Empire but the legislative power of the Parliament of the Dominion remained within the ambit of the Constitution Act of 1935, though the Parliament as a Constituent Assembly was conferred unlimited powers like that of a sovereign.\n\nThe federal form of government that had been adopted by the Constitution Act of 1935 was also adopted by the framers of the new constitution. The second question relates to the period when India had attained the status of a dominion under the Indian Independence Act, while the last question concerns the legislative competency of Parliament under the new constitution of the Republic of India.\n\n(I) Queen v. Burah, 51, A. 178.\n\nl9Sl\n\nMaho]anJ.\n\nIt is futile to ask in the year of grace 1951 whether delegated legislation is necessary or not. This kind of legislation is only a special aspect of the problem of administrative discretion.\n\nThe necessity of delegating rule-making power on the largest scale of administrative authorities is as much a basic fact of modern industrial society as the assumption by the State of certain obligations of social welfare. The problem, however, is how delegated legislation and administrative discretion are confined and controlled so as to comply with the elementary principles of law in a democratic society. The answer to the problem has . to be found within the ambit of the constitution of the country concerned and on the construction that a lawyer or a jurist would place on it with a constructive and not a purely legalistic .; ipproach. In this background it is instructive to see how the question has been solved in other countries.\n\nIt was ?JStomary for the mother of Parliaments to delegate mmor legislative power to subordinate authorities and bodies. Some people took the view iliat such delegation was wholly unwise and should be dispensed with. Prof. Dicey, however, pointed out that it was futile for Parliament to endeavour to work out details of large legislative changes and that such an endeavour would result in cumbersome and prolix statutes. Blackstone remarked that powers of this kind were essential to the effective conduct of the government. Constitutional practice grew up gradually as and when the need arose in Parliament, without a logical system, and power was delegated by Parliament for various reasons : because the topic required much <letail, or because it was technical, or because of pressure of other demands on parliamentary time. The Parliament being supreme and its power being unlimited, it did what it thought was right. The doctrine of ultra vires has no roots whatever in a country where the doctrine of supremacy of Parliament holds the field.\n\nThe sovereignty of Parliament is an idea fundamentally inconsistent with the notions which govern inflexible and rigid constitutions existing in countries\n\nwhich have adopted any scheme of representative government.\n\nIn England supremacy of law only means the right of judges to control the executive and it has no greater constitutional value than that. The basis of power in England is the legal supremacy of Parliament and its unrestricted power to make law.\n\nIn the words of Coke, \"It is so transcendent and absolute as it caniiot be confined either for causes or persons within any bounds,'' or again, as Blackstone put it, \"An act of Parliament is the exercise of . the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. It hath power to bind every subject in the land, and the dominions thereunto, belonging; nay; even the King himself, if particularly named therein.\n\nAnd it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of Parliament.\"(1).\n\nThe Parliament being a legal omnipotent despot, apart from being 01 legislature simpliciter, it can in exercise of its sovereign power delegate its .legislative functions or even create new bodies conferring on them power to make laws. The power of delegation is not necessarily implicit in its power to make laws but it may well be implicit in its omnipotence as an absolute sovereign. Whether it exercises its power of delegation of legislative power in its capacity as a mere l!!gislature or in. its capacity as an omnipotent despot, it is not possible to test it on the touchstone of judicial precedent or judicial scrutiny as courts of justice in England cannot inquire into it.\n\nThe assertion therefore that this power Parliament exercises in its purely legislative capacity has no greater value than that of an ipse dixit. For these reasons I am in respectful agreement with the view of that eminent judge and. jurist, Varadachariar J., expressed in Benoari Lal Sarma's case(2) that the constitutional position in India approximates more closely to the American model than to the English model and on this subject the decisions of the United States so far as they lay down any principle are a valuable guide on this question.\n\n(I) Vide Allen \"Law in the Making\", 3rd Bnd;, p. 367.\n\n(2) [1934] F. C.R. 96.\n\nIn re The Delhi laws Act, 1912.\n\netc.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\n111 re The D(•fl1i Laws Act, 1912.\n\netc.\n\nMahajan}.\n\nThis view finds support also from the circumstance that the constitutions of the two countries are fundamentally different in kind and character. They fall in two district classes having different characteristics.\n\nEngland has a unitary form of government with a flexible constitution, while in India we have always had a rigid constitution and since 1935 it is federal in form.\n\nIt is unsafe, therefore, to make any deductions from the legislative power exercised under a system of government which is basically different in kind and not merely in degree from the other on the que5tion of its legislative competency and reach conclusions on the basis of such deductions. In my opinion, search for a solution of the problem referred to us in that direction is bound to produce no results. I have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the learned Attorney-General that the answer to the questions referred to us should be returned by reference to the exercise of power of Parliament in the matter of delegation of legislative power to the executive.\n\nIt may, however, be observed that in spite of the widest powers possessed by the British Parliament, it has adopted a policy of self-abnegation in the matter of delegated legislation. A committee was appointed to report on the Ministers' powers, popularly known as the Donoughrnore Committee. It made its recommendations and stated the limits within which power of delegated legislation should be exercised. Means were later on adopted for keeping a watchful eye on such legislation.\n\nThe Donoughmore Committee discovered a few instances of cases where delegation had gone to the extent of giving a limited power of modifying Parliamentary statutes.\n\nOne of these instances was in section 20 of the Mental Treatment Act, 1930\n\n(20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 23). It empowered the Minister of Health by order to modify the wording of an enactment so far as was necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the section. The whole section related to terminology, its intention being to replace certain statutory expressions in previous use by others which at the moment were regarded less\n\noffensive.\n\nThe other instance was found in stion 76 of the Local Government Scotland Act, 1929, (19 & 20 Geo. V, c. 25).\n\nBy this section the Secretary of State was empowered between 16th May, 1929, and 31st December, 1930, by order to make any adaptation or modification in the provisions of any Act necessary to bring these provisions in conformity with the provisions of other Acts.\n\nSuch a clause in a statute bore the nickname \"Henry VIII clause\". Concerning it the Committee made the following recommendations : \"The use of the so-called Henry VIII clause conferring power on a Minister to modify the provisions of Acts of Parliament (hitherto limited to such amendments as may appear to him to be necessary for the purpose of\n\nringing the statute into operation) should be abandoned in all but most exceptional cases and should not be permitted by Parliament except upon special grounds stated in a ministerial memorandum to the bill.\n\nHenry VIII clause shoi.¥d never be used except for the sole purpose of bringing the Act into operation but subject to the limit of one year.\"\n\nThe language in which . this recommendation is couched clearly indicates that even in a country where Parliament is supreme the power of modifying Parliamentary statutes has never been exercised except in the manner indicated in the above recommendation, and even as regards that limited power . the recommendation was that the exercise of it should be abandoned. It is significant that since then Henry VIII clause has not been used by Parliament.\n\nThe Dominion of Canada has a written constitution.\n\nThe British North America Act (30 & 31 Viet., c. 31).\n\nIt is not modelled on the doctrine of exclusive division of power between the departments of State, legislative executive and judicial. It does not place them in three water-tight compartments and it is somewhat similar in shape in this respect to the British constitution where the King is still a part of the legislature, . the House of Lords still a part of the judicial as well as legislative and where all parts of government form\n\n11-3 S.C.India/68\n\n1951J\n\n<IC.\n\nMahajan I.\n\nIn re The Delhi Lows Act, 1912,,\n\netc.\n\nMaha}llnl.\n\na mutual check upon each other. This similarity, however, does not mean that the legislature in Canada is of the same kind as the British Parliament. It falls in the class of non-sovereign legislatures, like all colonial parliaments.\n\nThe decisions of Canadian courts are by no means uniform on the power of the Canadian Parliament to delegate legislative power. Those cited to us of recent date seem to have been given under the pressure of the two world wars and under the provisions of the War Measures Act. With great respect and in all humility, I am constr.lined to observe that in these decisions, to establish the vires of the powers delegated, arguments have been pressed into service which arct by no means convincing or which can be said to be based on sound juristic principles.\n\nThey can only be justified on the ground that during a period of emergency and danger to the State the dominion parliament can make laws which in peace time it has no competency to enact.. There are a number of Privy CoUnciI decisions which have concerned themselves with the flires of legislative enactments in Canada which purported to transfer legislative power to outside authorities and it seems to me that these decisions furnish a better guide to the solution of the problem before us than the later decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada which seemingly. derive support from these Privy Council decisions for the rules stated therein.\n\nThe first of these decisions is in the case of R11ssell\n\nv. The Queen(') decided in 1882. Two questions were raised in the appeal The first was as to the validity of the Canada Temperance Act, 1878. It was urged that having regard to the provisions of the British North America Act, 1867, relating to the distribution of legislative powers it was not competent for the Parliament . of Canada to pass the Act in question.\n\nThe second question was that even if the Dominion Parliament possessed the powers which it assumed to exercise by the Act, it had no power to delegate them\n\n(I) 7 App Cas. 829.\n\nand to give local authorities the right to say whether t; he provisions of the Act should be operative or not. lt is the second question which is relevant to the present enquiry. The mode of bringing the second part of the Act into force, stating it succinctly, was as follows:- .\n\n\"On a petition to the Governor in Counci~ signed by not less than one-fourth in number of the electors of any country or city in the Dominion qualified to vote at the election of a member of the House of Commons, praying that the second part of the Act should be in force and take effect in such country or city, and that the votes of all the electors be taken for or against the adoption of the petition, the Governor- General, after certain prescribed notices and evidence, may issue a proclamation, embodying such petition, with a view to a poll of the electors being taken for or against its adoption.\n\nWhen any petition has been adopted by the electors of the country or city, named in it, the Governor-General in Council may, after the expiration of sixty days from the day on which the petition was adopted, by Order in Council Jublished m the Gazette, declare that the second part the Act shall be in force and take effect in such country or city, and the same is then to become of force and take effect accordingly.\" .\n\nIt was urged before their Lordships that assuming that the Parliament of Canada had authority to pass a law for prohibiting and regulating the sale of intoxic; i.ti'µg liquon, it could not delegate its powers, and that it had done so by delegating the power to bring into force the prohibitory and penal provisions of the Act t9 a majority of the electors of countries and cities.\n\nTheir Lordships' answer to the counsel's contention was in these words :-\n\n\"The short ai; iswer to this objection is that the Act does not delegate any legislative powers whatever.\n\nIt contains within itself the whole legislation on the matters with which it deals. The provision that certain parts of the Act shall come into operation only\n\nIn re The Dellll Laws Act, 1912. etc.\n\nMahqfanl.\n\nIn re The Delhi Laws II.ct, 1912, etc.\n\nMaJrajanJ.\n\non the petition of a majority of electors does not confer on these persons power to legislate. Parliament itself enacts the condition and everything which is to follow upon the condition being fulfilled.\n\nConditional legislation of this kind is in many cases convenient, and is certainly not unusual, and the power so to legislate cannot be denied to the Parliament of Canada, when the subject of legislation is within its competency.\n\nTheir Lordships entirely agree with the opinion of\n\nChief Justice Ritchie on this objection. If authority on the point were necessary, it will be found in the case of Queen v. Burah('), lately before this Board.\"\n\nIt seems to me that their Lordships acquiesced and assented in the proposition urged by the learned counsel that delegation of legislative power was not permissible when they combated his arguments with the remarks that the Act does not delegate any legislative power whatever. Otherwise, the shon answer to the objection was that delegation of legislative power was implicit within the power of legislation possessed by the legislature. It was not necessary to base the decision on the ground of conditional legislation.\n\nThough Queen v. Burah(') was an appeal from the High Court of Bengal, a reference was made to it and the decision therein was mentioned as laying down an apposite rule for the decision of cases arising under the British North America Act, 1867. In order to appreciate and apprehend the rule to which their Lordships gave approval in the above mentioned case, it seems . necessary to state precisely what Queen v.\n\nBurah(') decided. Act XXII of 1869 of the Council of. the Governor-General of India which is entitled \"An- Act to remove the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of the tribunals established under the General Regulations and Acts, and for other purposes\" among other things provided as follows :-\n\n\"Sec. 4.\n\nSave as hereinafter provided, the territory known as the Garo Hills .... is hereby removed from the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and\n\n(l) SI.A. 178\n\nCriminal Judicature, and from the control of the offices of revenue constituted by the Regulations of the Bengal Code and the Acts passed by any legislature now or heretofore established in British India, as well as from the law prescribed for the said courts and offices by the Regulations and Acts aforesaid. And no Act hereafter passed by the Council of the Governor- General for making laws and Regulations shall be deemed to extend to any part of the said territory, unless the same be specially named therein.\n\nSec. 5. The administration of civil and criminal justice, and the superintendence of the settlement and realization of the public revenue, and of all matters relating to rent, within the said territory, are hereby vested in such officers as the said Lieutenant-Governor may for the purpose of tribunals of first instance or of reference and appeal, from time to time appoint.\n\nThe officers so appointed shall in the matter of the administration and superintendence aforesaid, be subject to the direction and control of the said Lieutenant-Governor and be guided by such instructions as he may from time to time issue.\n\nSec. 8.\n\nThe said Lieutenant-Governor may, from time to time by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend to the said territory any law, or any portion of any law, now in force in the other territories subject to his Government, or which may hereafter be enacted by the Council of the Governor-General, or of the said Lieutenant-Governor, for making laws and regulations, and may on making such extension direct by whom any powers or duties incident to the provisions so extended shall be_ exercised or performed, and make any order which he shall deem requisite for carrying such provisions into operation.\n\nSec. 9.\n\nThe -said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by n<>tification in the Calcutta Gazette extend mutatis mutandis all <>r any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India.\"\n\netc.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nIn r~ Th• Delhi .!law• Act, 1912,\n\ntc.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nUnder the provisions of the Act the Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal on the 14th October, 1871, issued a notification and in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 9, he extended the provisions of the said Act to the territory known as the Khasi and Jaintia Hills and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of th>- Courts of Civil and Criminal Judicature, and specified in the notification the boundaries of the said territory.\n\nThe notification extended all the provisions of the Act to the districts of Khasi and J aintia Hills.\n\nThe Lieutenant-Governor did not exercise the power of selecting parts of these Acts for purposes of local application.\n\nSection 9 of the Act did not empower the Lieutenant-Governor to modify any of the provisions of the Act. The High Court of Bengal by a majority judgment held that the notification had no legal force or effeq in removing the said territories from the jurisdiction which the High Court had previously possessed over it, inasmuch as the Council of the Governor-General of India for making laws and regulations had under its constitution, by the Councils Act, 1861, no power to delegate such authority to the.\n\nLieutenant-Governor as it had by Act XXII of 1869 in fact purported to delegate.\n\nThe Indian Councils Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Viet. c. 67, by section 22, gave the Governor-General in Council power for the purpose of making laws and regulations, power for repealing, amending or altering any laws or regulations whatever then in force or thereafter to be in force and to make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British or native, foreigners or others, and for all courts of justice, whatever, and for all places and things what~ ever within the said territories, and for all servants of the Government of India within the dominions of princes and states, provided always that the said Governor-General in Council shall not have the power Qf making any laws or regulations which shall repeal or in any way affect any of the provisions of the Act.\n\nAs regards section 9 of the Act their Lordships made the following observations :-\n\n\"The ground of the decision to that effect of the majority of the Judges of the High Court was, that the 9th section was not legislation, but was a delegation of legislative power. In the leading judgment of Mr.\n\nJustice Markby, the principles of the doctrine of agency are relied on; and the Indian Legislature seems to be regarded as, in effect an agent or delegate, acting under a mandate from the Imperial Parliament, which must in all cases be executed directly by itself.\n\n\"Their Lordships cannot but observe that, if the principle thus suggested were correct, and justified the conclusion drawn from it, they would be unable to follow the distinction made by the majority of the Judges between the power conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal by the 2nd and that conferred on him by the 9th section. If, by the 9th section, it is left to the Lieutenant-Governor to determine whether the Act, or any part of it, shall be applied to a certain district, by the 2nd section it is also left to him to determine at what time that Act shall take effect as law anywhere.\n\nLegislation which does not directly fix the period for its own commencement, but leaves that to be done by an external authority, may with quite as much reason be called incomplete, as that which does not itself immediately determine the whole area to which it is to be applied, but leaves this to be done by the same external authority~ If ' it is an act of legislation on the part of the external authority so trusted to enlarge the area within which a law actually in operation is to be applied, it would seem a fortiori to be an act of legislation to bring the law originally into operation by fixing the time for its commencement.\n\n\"But their Lordships are of opm1on that the doctrine of the majority of the Court is erroneous, and that it rests upon a mistaken view of the powers of the Indian Legislature, and indeed of the nature and principles of legislation. The Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can, of course, do\n\netc.\n\nMaltaja11 J.\n\nIn re The Delhi l.Aws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMahajan I.\n\nnothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers. But, when acting within those limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of . legislation, as large and of the same natUre as those of Parliament itself. The established courts of justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question; and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted.\n\nIf what has been done is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any court of justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those concµtions and restrictions.\"\n\nThe. learned Attorney-General placed considerable reliance oh. these observations in support of his pr<>- position that if the legislation is within the ambit of the field prescribed for exercise of legislative power, then from it it follows that within that field power can be exercised to delegate to the widest extent. This quotation, however, cannot be torn off from the context and read by itself. Meaning can only be given to these observations in the light of the observations that follow the quotation cited above and which are in these terms:-\n\n\"Their Lordships agree that the Governor- General in Council could not, by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Councils Act. Nothing of that kind has, in their Lordships' opinion, been done or. attempted in the present case. What has been done is. this. The Governor-General in Council has determined, in the due and ordinary course of legislation, to remove a particular district from the\n\njurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and offices an? to place it under new courts and offices, to be appomted by and responsible to the Lieutenant~Governor of Bengal; leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that change shall take p1ace; and also .enabling him, not to make what law he pleases for that or any other district, but to apply by public notification t<>' that district any law, or part of law, which either already was, or from time to time might he, in force, by proper legislative autliority, in the other territories subject to his government.\n\nThe legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place; but that it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner of can1ring it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor; and also, that the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories subject to the same government were such as it might be fit and proper to apply to this district also; but that, as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them, could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Lieutenant-Governor ..... .\n\n\"Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-\n\nGovernor (large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority than that of the Governor-General in Council. Their whole operation is, directly and immediately, under and by virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself.\n\nThe proper legislature has exercised its iudgment as to place, person, laws, powers; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. !he conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation 1s . now absolute.. Where . plenary powers of legislation\n\nex1t as to pat1cular. sub1ects, whether in an Imperial or. m, provmc1al legislature, they may (in their Lordships; _Judgment) ?e ell exercised, either absolutely or con?1t1onally. Leg1slat1on, conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited\n\n19S1\n\nIn re The De/hi Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMahajan/ •\n\nMahajan I.\n\ndiscretion, entrusted by the legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing; and, in many circumstances, it may be highly con venient.\n\nThe B.ritish Statute book abounds with examples of it; and it cannot be supposed that the Imperial Parliament did not, when constituting the Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of conditional legislation as within the scope of the legislative powers which it from time to time conferred. It certainly used no words to exclude it.\"\n\nTowards the close of the judgment certain illustrations were mentioned of legislation in India described as conditional legislation.\n\nReference was made to the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure and particularly, section 39 of Act XXIII of 1861 which authorised the Local Government with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council (not in his legislative capacity) to extend the provisions of the Act \"subject to any restnct1on, limitation or proviso which the Local Government may think proper.\"\n\nIn my opinion, in this case their Lordships did not affirmatively assent to the proposition that the Indian Legislature had full power of delegation withifl the ambit of its legislative field and they did not dissent from the conclusion of Markby J. in the concluding parn of the judgment that under general principles of law in India any substantial delegation of 1egislative power by the legislature of the country was void. On the other hand, they remarked thar legislation of this kind was conditional legislation and it only becomes complete on the fulfilment of those conditioos and that the determination of those conditions could be left to an external authority. In spite of expressing their disapproval of the view of the majority of the Full Bench in applying the principles of the doctrine of agency and in treating the Indian Legislature as an agent of the Imperial Parliament, their Lordships clearly expressed the opinion that the exercise of the legislative will and judgment could not be transferred to an external authority and that it was for the proper legislature to exercise its own judgment as to the\n\nplace, persons, laws and powers.\n\nIt seems to me that though their Lordships were not prepared to assent to the proposition that the matter should be dealt with on principles deducible from the doctrine of the law of agency, they were also not prepared to depart from the rule that apart from the doctrine of the law of agency a person to whom an office or duty is assigned or entrusted by reason of a special qualification cannot lawfully devolve that duty . upon another unless expressly authorised so to do. Public functionaries charged with the performance of public duties have to execute them accordingly to their own judgment and discretion except to the extent that in is necessary to employ ministerial officers tp effec.tively discharge those duties. ·\n\nFor the reasons given above presumably the Privy Council was not prepared . to lay down that delegation of legislative power wa:s a content of the power itself.\n\nIt contended itself by holding the law valid under the name and style of conditional legislation.\n\nIt is difficult to conceive that the Privy Council would have hesitated in saying so if it felt that delegation of legislative power was a content of the power itself.\n\nReference in this connection may be made to a passage in the judgment of Markby J. which reads thus:-\n\n\"The various Parliamentary statutes nowhere confer any express power upon the Indian Legislature to change the machinery of legislation in India. But they do confer that power subject to important restrictions upon the executive government. Mr. Kennedy boldly claimed for the Indian Legislative Council the power to transfer legislative functions to the Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal.\n\nIndeed as I understand him, the only restriction he would attempt was that the Legislative Council could not destroy its own power to legislate though I see no reason why he should stop there. The Advocate-General did not go so far. There are no words in the Acts of Parliament upon which the legislative authority could be made transferable in one class of cases and not in others because I do not\n\netc.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nIn re The De/4i l.Aws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMohajanJ.\n\nfor a moment suggest that every time a discretion is entrusted to others there is the transfer of legislative authority. Every Act of the legislature abounds with examples of discretion entrusted to judicial and executive officers of government, the legality of which no one would think of questioning.\n\nThe broad question, however, is 'Can the legislature confer on the Lieutenant-Governor legislative power?' Answer : 'It is a general principle of law in India that any substantial delegation of legislative authority by the legislature of this countty is void'.\"\n\n It was then contended that the illustration cited in the concluding part of the judgment of their Lordships suggests their approval of the proposition that the legislative power could be delegated conferring power to modify a statute passed by the legislature itself.\n\nThis contention seems to be based on a misapprehen sion of what their Lordships decided. In the Full Eench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Empress\n\nv. Burah & Book Sing(') Markby J. made the following observations while dealing with these illustrations :-\n\n\"Lastly it was argued that the Indian Legislature had done so (delegated power) for a long series of years, and a long list of Acts pa.ssed between 1845 and 1868 has been handed in to us, all of which, it is said, must be treated as instances of delegation of legislative authority and Act XXII of 1869 should be so treated.\n\nThe Acts contained in the list do not appear to me to afford (as was asserted) so many dear and undisputed instances of transfer of legislative authority.\n\nI may observe that as to the provisions which these and many other Acts contain for the making of rules by executive government in conformity with the Act we have the highest authority in Biddle v. Tariney Churn Baneri\"(2 ) that the power to make such rules may be conferred without delegation of legislative authority .......... The list of Acts does not seem to me to show any clear practice of transferring legislative authority.\"\n\n(I) l.L.R 3 Cal. 63.\n\n(2) I Tay, & Bell, 390,\n\nAinslie J. specifically considered the provisions of section 39 of Act XXIII of 1861 and the meaning of the words \"reservations\", \"limitations\" and \"provisos\" and said as follows :-\n\n\"The provisions of section 39, Act\n\nXXIII of 1861, do not affect my view of this matter. This section allows a local Government, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council, to annex any restriction, limitation, or proviso it may think proper when extending the Code of Civil Procedure to any territory not subject to the general regulations; but this is merely another form of delaying the full extension of the Code. So far as the Code obtains operation, it is still, because the extension is pro tanto, a carrying out of the intention of the supefior legislature that this shall be sooner or later the law in the particular tract of country. As I read the section, no power is given to amend the law itself; it is only a power to keep some portion in abeyance or to make its operation contingent on something external to it, which again is only another form of postponing its full operation.\"\n\nNo doubt was cast on this construction of the language of section 39 either in the minority judgment of the High Court or in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council. In view of this clear expression of opinion of Ainslie J. as to the meaning of the language used in section 39 and not disapproved by their Lordships of the Privy Council it cannot with any force be contended that their Lordships in Burah's\n\ncase(1) gave approval to the proposition that the power of conditional legislation included the power of amendment or modification of the Act of the legislature itself.\n\nIn my opinion, the result of the decision in Burah's case(1) is that it was decided that the Indian Legislature had power to conditionally legislate.\n\nThis case is no authority for the proposition that it could delegate the exercise of its judgment on the question as to what the law should be to an external agency. This case d0es not support the\n\n{1) SI.A. 178.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nMahjlmJ.\n\nproposition that amendment of a statute of the legislature itself is a matter which could form the subject of delegated legislation. The expression that Indian Legislature could not arm with legislative power a new legislative body not created by the Indian Councils Act only means that it must function itself in making laws and not confer this power on any other body. In other words, it could not create a person having co-extensive power of legislation and could not clothe it with its own capacity of law making, that is in laying down principles and policies. The possession of plenary powers within the ambit laid down only means that within that particular field it can make any laws on those subjects, but it does not mean that it can shirk its duty in enacting laws within the field by making a law that it shall not itself operate on that field but somebody else will operate on its behalf. In my opinion, their Lordships' judgment amounts to saying that though within the field prescribed it has the largest power of legislation, yet at the same time it is subject to the condition that it cannot abandon formally or virtually its high trust.\n\nHodge v. The Queen(') was the next Canadian case decided by the Privy Council in 1883. The appellant Hodge, was the holder of a liquor licence issued on 25th April, 1881, by the Board of Licence Commissioners for the City of Toronto under the Liquor Licence Act of the Province of Ontario in respect of the St. James Hotel.\n\nHe was also the holder of a licence under the authority of the Municipal Act, authorising him to carry on the business or calling of a keeper of a billiard saloon with one table for hire. The appellant did on the 7th May, 1881, unlawfully permit and suffer a billiard table to be used and a game of billiards to be played thereon, in his tavern during the time prohibited by the Liquor Licence Act for \"sale of liquor therein. It was urged that the Ontario Assembly was not competent to legislate in regard to licences for the sale of liquor and that even if the Ontario legislature could, it could not delegate its power to Licence Commissioners.\n\n{I) 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\nThe local legislature had assigned to three officials the power to define offences and impose penalties. This contention was met with the plea that there w.t.> nv delegation of legislative authority but only of the power to make by-laws. The Court of the King's Bench Division held that the local legislature had no power to delegate in the matter and that such power could be exercised by the legislature alone. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision and it was upheld by their Lordships of the Privy Council. It was found that sections 4 and 5 of the Liquor Licence Act were intra vires the constitution.\n\nIn the course of their judgment their Lordships made the following observations:-\n\n\"It appears to their Lordships, however, that the objections thus raised by the appellants is founded on an entire misconception of the true character and position of the provincial legislatures. They are in no sense delegates of or acting under any mandate from the Imperial Parliament.\n\nWhen the British North America Act enacted that there should be a legislature for Ontario, and that its legislative Assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the Province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in section 92, it conferred powers not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament, but authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow.\n\nWithin these limits of subjects and area the local legislature is supreme, and has the same authority as the Imperial Parliament, or the Parliament of the Dominion, would have had under like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make by-laws or resolutions as to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation and effect.\n\nIt is obvious that such an authority is ancillary to legislation, and without it an attempt for varying details and machinery to carry them out might\n\nl!ISl\n\nlnr 11 Dee Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMaha}anJ.\n\nIn re The Deihl Laws A.ct, 1912, etc.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nbecome oppressive, or absolutely fail.\n\nThe very full and very elaborate judgment of the Court of Appeal contains abundance of precedents for this legislation, entrusting a limited discretionary authority to others, and has many illustrations of its necessity and convenience. It was argued at the bar that a legislature committing important regulations to agents or delegates effaces itself.\n\nThat is not so.\n\nIt retains its powers intact, and can, whenever it pleases, de<>troy the agency it has created and set up another, or take the matter directly into its own hands. How far it shall seek the . aid of subordinate agencies, and how long it sliall continue them, are matters for each legislature, and not for courts of law, to decide.\"\n\nThis case, in my opm10n, decided the following points :-(1) Power to make by-laws or regulations as to subjects specified in the enactment and with the object of carrying that enactment into operation and effect can be transferred to !llunicipal institutions or local bodies.\n\n(2) Such an authority is ancillary to legislation. (3) Giving such power of making regulations to agents and delegates does not amount to an effacement of the legislature itself. The case does not sanction the proposition that power to amend or to modify a statute passed by the legislature itself can be delegated.\n\nPower of amending a statute or altering it cannot . be described as ancillary to legislation, nor is such a power within the ambit of the doctrine of subsidiary legislation.\n\nIt is significant that their Lordships of the Privy Council never gave their approval to the wide proposition that what the legislature itself can do, it can employ an agent with coextensive powers for doing the same. They have been careful in saying to what extent and in what measure delegation was permissible.\n\nAll that they sanctioned was delegation of authority ancillary to legislation or delegation to municipal institutions to make regulations and by-lai.vs and no more. It was not held by their Lordships that power to declare what the law shall be could. ever be delegated or that ·cch delegation will be intra vires the Parliament of Canada or of the\n\nIndian Legislature.\n\nIt was contended that by implication their Lordships held in this case that short of effacing itself the legislature could delegate. ln my opinion, there is no justification for placing such a construction on the language used by their Lordships while they were combating an argument that was placed bcf ore them by the learned counsel.\n\nIn re The Initiative -and Referendum Act(1) is the third Canadian case decided by the Privy Council.\n\nBy the Initiative and Referendum Act of Manitoba the Legislative Assembly sought to provide that the laws of the province will be made and repealed by the direct vote of the electors instead of only by the Legislative Assembly whose members they elect. It was held that the powers conferred on a provincial legislature by section 92 include the power of amendment of the constitution of the province except as regards the office of the Lieutenant-Governor and that the Initiative and Referendum Act of Manitoba excludes the Lieutenant-Governor wholly from the new legislative authority set up and that this was ultra vires the provincial legislature. The Act was therefore held void.\n\nLord Haldane who delivered the opinion of the Privy Council, after having found that the Act was ultra vires the legislature, made the following observations :-:-\n\n\"Having said so much, their Lordships, following their usual practiCe of not deciding more than is strictly necessary, will not deal finally with another difficulty which those who contend for the validity of this Act have to meet. But they think it right, as the point has been raised in the court below, to advert to it. Section 92 of the Act of 1867 entrusts the legislative power in a province to its legislature and to that legislature only.\n\nNo doubt a body, with a power of legislation on the subjects entrusted to it $0 ample as that enjoyed by a provincial lewslanu:e in Canada. could, while preserving its own capacity intact, seek\n\n(I) (1919] A.C. 935. 12-3 S.C.lndia/68\n\nlnre The De/bl Law1Act,1913.\n\netc.\n\nMa/la/1111 I.\n\nIll Te f'Ae Delhi law• Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMahajan I.\n\nthe assistance or subordinate agencies as had been done when in Hodge v. The Queen(') the Legislature of Ontario was held entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissioners authority to enact regulations relating to taverns; but it does not follow that it can . create and endow with its own capacity a _new legislative power not created by. the Act to which it owes its own existence. Their Lorqships do no inore than draw attention to the gravity of the constitutional questions which thus arise.\"\n\nThese observations reiterate the ratio of the decision in Hodge v. The Queen(') and they do not amount to saying that power to amend or modify Acts of the legislature itself could be given by delegation of legislative power. It is, however, important that their Lordships in clear and unambiguous language laid it down dtat section 92 entruJts legislative power to its legislature and to that legislature only and to no other.\n\nThe principle underlying Lord Haldane's remarks is thus stated in Street's book on the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, at page 430 -·\n\n\"The decision . in this case, that the statute was ultra vires, did not turn precisely on the ground of delegation, but these remarks suggest that a legislature will not ordinarily be permitted to shift the onus of legislation, though it may legislate as to main principles and leave details to subordinate agencies.\"\n\nReference may also be made to the case of King v.\n\nNat BellLiquors Ltd.(\") The Liquor Act (6 Geo. V, c. 4,\n\nAlberta) was held intra vires the power of the province under the British North America Act, 1867, and it was found that it was not ultra vires by reasonof being passed pursuant to a popular vote under the Direct Legislation Act (4 Geo. V, c. 3, Alberta). Here the law was made by the provincial legislature itself and it was passed in accordance with the regular procedure of cite Houses of Legislature. This cast. is no authority for the contention taiscd by dte learned Attorney- Gcncral.\n\n(I) 9 App. Case 117.\n\n(2) (I 922) 2 A. C. 128.\n\nThe next Canadian case decided by the Privy Council is reported in Croft v.\n\nDunphy(1). Antismuggling provisions enacted operating beyond territorial limits which had long formed part of Imperial customs legislation and presumably were regarded as necessary for its efficacy were held valid and within the ambit of the constitutional powers. This case does not suggest any new line of thought, not already considered in Queen v. Burah(2), or Hodge v. The Queen(3 ).\n\nShannon\n\nv. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board(4 ) is a case in which the question arose whether Natural Products Marketing Legislation Scheme of control or regulation and imposition . of licence fees were intra vires the provincial legislation. It was argued that it was not within the powers of the provincial legislature to delegate legislative power to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council or to give him further power of delegation.\n\nThis contention was met with the following observations :-\n\n\"The objection seems subversive of the rights which the provincial legislature enjoys while dealin.i; with matters within its ambit. It is wmecessary to enumerate the innumerable occasions on which legislature has entrusted similar powers to various persons and bodies.\n\nOn the basis of past practice the tlelegation was upheld.\"\n\nSo far as I have been able to ascertain, the past practice was in respect of conferring necessary and ancillary powers to carry on the policy of a statute.\n\nReference was also made to Powell v. Apollo Candle co.C) decided in the year 1885.\n\nThere the question arose as to the validity of section 133 of the Customs Regulating Act of 1879 which authorities the levy of certain duties under an Order in Council. The section was held int1a vires the constitution. It was argued that the power given to the colonial legislature to impose duties was to be executed by themselves\n\n(1) [1933) !A.C. I S6.\n\n(2) SI.A. 178.\n\n(3) 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\n(4) [1938) A.c. 708.\n\n(5) 10 App. Cas. 282.\n\n19Sl\n\netc.\n\nM(/lajanl.\n\nIPSI\n\nTare De Delhi 1-1.fcl,1912,\n\nel&.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nonly and could not be entrusted wholly or in part to the Governor or anybody else. This objection was answered in the following way :-\n\n\"The duties levied under the Order in Council are really levied by authority of the Act under which the order was issued. The legislature has not parted with its perfect control of the Governor and has the power of withdrawing or altering the power entrusted.\"\n\nOn this construction of the power delegated, that what the delegate was doing was done under the authority of the Act no question of delegation of lawmaking power arises.\n\nFort Frances Pulp & Power Co. v. Monitoba Free Press('), Co-operative Committee on /apanese Canadians v. Attorney-General for Canada('), and Cooperative Committee v. Attorney-General of Canada(') cited at the Bar are not helpful in giving an opinion on the present matter.\n\nFour recent Canadian cases were cited for the ex• treme view th; it short of effacing itself Parliament or a legislature has t.he widest power of delegation and that it acts intra vires the constitution in doir18 so.\n\nThe first of these cases is In re George Edwin Gray('). The case was under section 6 of the War Measures Act, 1914, which confer.red very wide powers on the Governor-General in Council for the cflicient prosecution of the war. The decision was given by a majority of four to two and in the majority judgment the following observations occur :-\n\n''The practice of authorizing administrative bodies to make regulations to carry out the objectives of an act instead of setting out all details in the Act itself is well-known and its legality is unquestioned hut it is said that the power to make such regulations could not constitutionally be granted to such an extent as to enable the express provisions of the statute to be amended or repealed; that under the constitution\n\n(I) [19231 A.C. 695.\n\n(3) (1947) A.C. 87.\n\n(2) [l947] I D.L.R. 577.\n\n(4) 57 S.C.R. (Canada) 150.\n\nParliament alone is to make laws, the Governor- General to exetute them and the court to interpret them, then it follows that no one of the fundamental branches of government can constitutionally either delegate or accept the function of . any other branch.\n\nIn view of Rex v. Halliday(1 ), I do not think this broad proposition can be maintained.\n\nParliament cannot indeed abdicate its functions, within reasonable ' limits at any rate it can delegate its power to execute government orders.\n\nSuch powers must necessarily be subject to determination at any rate by Parliament and needless to say that rhe acts of the executive under its delegated authority must fall within the ambit of the legislative pronouncement by which this authority is measured.\n\nIt is true that Lord Dunedin in Rex v. Halliday{1) said that the British Constitution has entrusted to the two Houses of Parliament subject to assent by the King an absolute power untrammelled by any other circumstance, obedience to which may be compelled by a judicial body.\n\nThat undoubtedly is not the case in this country.\n\nNothing in the Act imposes any limitations on the authority of the Parliament.\"\n\nTo the proposition stated in the opening part of the quotation there can be no possible objection. But when the learned Judges proceed to lay down the rule that in the absence of any limitations in the constitution Parliament can delegate the power to amend . and repeal laws made by itself to an external authority unless it amounts to an abdication of its functions does not in my humble opinion seem to be sound. In the first instance, these observations seem inconsistent with the fundamental proposition that a duty entrusted to a particular body of persons and which is to be performed according to certain procedure by that body can be entrusted to an external agency which is not controlled by any rules of procedure in the performance of that duty and which would never have been entrusted to perform it.\n\nMoreover, abdication by a legislative body need not necessarily amount to a\n\n(I) (1917) A.C. 260.\n\nIn re The Delhi J.aw3 Aci, 1912, etc.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nIn re The Delhi Lowu4.ct, 1912, etc. -· Mahajan/.\n\ncomplete effacement of it.\n\nAbdication may be partial or complete. It would certainly amount to abdication when in respect of a subject of legislative list that body says it shall not legislate on that subject but would leave it to somebody else to legislate on it.\n\nThat would be delegation of the law-making power which is not authorised. There is no justification for the assumption that the expression \"abdication\" is only applicable when there is a total effacement or a legal extinction of such a body. In my opinion, it is the abdication of the power to legislate when a legislature refuses to perform its duty of legislating on a particular subject and entrusts somebody else to perform that function for it. \"Abdication\" according to the Oxford Dictionary means abandonment, either formal or virtual of sovereignty or other high trust.\n\nIt is virtual abandonment of the high trust when the person charged with the trust says to somebody else that the functions entrusted to him in part or whole be performed by that other person. Be that as it may, the point of view contained in the above quotation cannot be supported on the decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council dis-. cussed .in the earlier part of this judgment.\n\nDuff J. stated his view in the following way :-\n\n\"The true view of the effect of this type of legislation is that the subordinate body in which a lawmaking authority is vested by it is intended to act as the agent or the organ of the legislature and that the acts of the agent take effect by virtue of the antecedent declaration that they shall have the force of law.\"\n\nThese observations, in my opinion,-and I speak with great respect-cannot again be justified on any juristic principle.\n\nIn the matter of making law there cannot be an anticipatory sanction of a law not yet born or even conceived. Moreover, an organ of the legislature for making laws can only be created by the constitution and not by the legislature which is itself bonafided with that power by the constitution.\n\nThe learned dissenting Judge in this case observed that a wholesale surrender of the will of the people to any\n\nautocratic power would not be justified either in constitutional law or by the past history of their ancestors.\n\nThese observations were made in respect df the power of amendment or repeal conferred on the delegate. As I have pointed out earlier in this judgment, such a power has not even been exercised by the British Parliament and the Donoughmore Committee recommended that its exercise as far as possible should be abandoned.\n\nThe decision in this case, in my opinion, is not an apposite authority for arriving at a correct conclusion on the question involved in the reference.\n\nThe next case to which our attention was drawn is Ref. re Regulations (Chemicals) (1). This case arose in connection with the regulations respecting chemicals made pursuant to powers conferred by the Department of Munitions and Supply Act and by the War Measures Act.\n\nThe question was whether these regulations were ttltra vires the constitution. It was held that except in one part the regulations were intra vires, and it was observed that the War Measures A<:t does not attempt to transform the executive government into a legislature in the sense in which the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of provinces are legislatures and that the regulations derive legal force solely from the War Measures Act. Reliance was placed on Queen\n\nv. Burah(2) and Hodge v. The Queen(3). One of the learned Judges observed that the maxim delegatus non potest delegare is a rule of the law of agency and has no application to Acts of a legislature, that the power of delegation being absolutely essential in the circumstances for which the War Measures Act bas been enacted so as to prove a workable Act, power must be deemed to form part of the powers conferred by Parliament in that Act.\n\nAnother learned Judge observed that the maximum was not confined to the law of agency alone but that it had no application to legislation. A third learned Judge, however, said that the maxim quoted above also had application to grants of legislative power but that the Parliament has not (.I) [1943] S.C.R. (Canada) t.\n\n(3) 9 App. Cas.117.\n\n(2) 5 I.A. 178.\n\n19Sl\n\nIn rel The Del/ti Law8 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nlnre Tle De/Al LoWs Act, 1912, etc. ·- Maha/an J.\n\neffaced itself, in the ultimate analysis it had full power to amend or repeal the War Measures Act. In my opinion, for the reasons already stated, the observations in this case also go beyond the rule laid down by their Lordships of the Privy CoUllcil _in Queen v.\n\nBurah(') and Hodge v. The Queen(2 ), and are not a true guide to the solution of the problem.\n\nOur attention was also drawn• to Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Attorney-General of Canada('). This case does not lend full support to the view taken in the cases cited above. Therein it was laid down that neither the Parliament of Canada nor the legislature of any province can delegate one to the other any of the legislative authority respectively conferred upon them by the British North America Act, especiall)' by sections 91 and 92 thereof.\n\nThe legislative authority conferred upon Parliament and upon a provincial legislature is exclusive and in consequence, neither can bestow upon or accept power from the other, although each may delegate to subordinate agencid. On the question of delegation of legislative {lOWer, the learned Chief Justice remarked that \"delegations such as were dealt with in In re George Edwin Gray(') a.nd in Ref. re Regulations ( C hemico/s )(\") under the War Measures Act were delegations to a body subordinate to Parliament and were of a character different from the delegation meant by the bill now submitted to the courts.\". In this case on the general question of delegation the Supreme Court did not proceed beyond the rule enunciated in In re The Initiative and Referendum Act(6 ), or what was stated in Hodge v. The Queen(1).\n\nLastly reference may also be made to the case of Oimuit v. Bazi(8).\n\nThe learned Attorney-General placed reliance on certain obiter dicta of Davies J. to the effect that the Parliament of Canada could delegate its legislative power and such delegation was within its power. The learned Chief Justice did not express (I) 5 l.A.178.\n\n(5) (1943) l D.L.R.248.\n\n(2) 9 App. Cas.117. l6) [1919) A.C. 935.\n\n(3) (1950] 4.0.L.R. 369.\n\n(7) 9 App. Cas.117.\n\n(4) 57 S.C.R. 150.\n\n(8) 46 S.C.R.L. (Canada) 502.\n\nany opinion on the point; while Indington J. w_as not prepared to subscribe to this view.\n\nThe other Judges did not consider the point at all.\n\nIn my opinion, these remarks, the soundness of '!\"hich was doubted by other Judges, are not of much assistance to us in this case.\n\nHaving examined the Canadian cases on this subject it seems pertinent at this stage to refer to a passage from Street on the Doctrine of Ultra vires, which states the true position of colonial legislatures and appositely brings out the meaning of the language used bv the Privy Council in the cases that the legislatres are not the agents of the Imperial Parliament:-\n\n\"However true it may be that colonial legislatures arc not mere agents of the Imperial Government, it is also true that they are not unfettered principals.\n\nWithin the terms of their constitution they are limited at least as to subjects, and area, and, to the extent suggested, perhaps also as to power of delegation. If an ultra vires colonial statute may be ratified by the Imperial Parliament, there is an implication of agency'. To do anything outside the scope of their constitution, as when the Dominion of Canada established the Province of Manitoba (1), and imperial statute is required. It would appear that a legislature cannot, as an ordinary principal, ratify acts purporting to be done under its\n\nauthority(2). Taking a broad . view, non-sovereign legislatures are, and so long as they do not repudiate their constitutions must . remain, delegates of the Imperial Parliament. They have been so regarded by the Privy Council(3). But just as in the case of the prerogative it would be impolitic to apply a formu.la too strictly, so also the law of agency must be accommodated to meet the solid fact that the colonies, or the most important of them, enjoy real independence.\"\n\nThe decisions of American courts on the constitutionality of delegation of legislative power are, as in\n\n{I) 34 Viet. c. 28.\n\n(2) Commonwealth v. Colonial Ammunition Co. 34 C.L.R. 198. n1.\n\n(3) [1906) A.C, S42, [1914] A.C. 237, 2S4. •\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The De/hi Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\n111 ,~ The Delhi Low1Act,1912,\n\netc.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nthe case of other countries, by no means uniform.\n\nJudicial opinion has sometimes taken a strict view against the . validity of such delegation and on other occasions it has liberally upheld it as constitutional on grounds which again by no means are based on logical deductions from any juristic principle, but generally on grounds of convenience or under the doctrine of \"determining conditions\" and sometimes on historical considerations. The Supreme Court of America, has however, never departed from the doctrine that legislative power cannot be delegated to other branches of government or to independent bodies or even back to the PC?ple. The rule against delegation of legislative power is not based merely on the doctrine of separation of powers between the three state departments, legislative, executive and judicial, evolved by the constitution. This doctrine puts a restraint on delegation to other branches of government.\n\nProhibition against delegation to independent bodies and commissions rests on Coke's maxim, delegatus non potest delegare. The maxim, though usually held applicable to the law of agency embodies a sound juristic principle applicable to the case of persons entrusted with the performance of public duties and the discharge of high trusts.\n\nThe restraint on delegation back to the people is, tied up with some notion of representative democracy.\n\nReference was made to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court during the arguments and quotations from several books on constitutional law were cited.\n\nIt is not useful to refer to all of them in my opinion, but a few important ones may be mentioned.\n\nThe first American case that needs mention is Waman\n\nv. Southard('), a decision of Marshall C.J., given in the year 1925.\n\nThe question concerned the validity of certain rules framed by the courts. The learned Chief. Justice observed that it .could not be contended that Congress could delegate to courts or to any other tribunal powers which are strictly or exclusively legislative.\n\n(I) 6 Law Edn.262.\n\nIn Kilbourn v. Thompson(1), it was held that judicial power could not be exercised by the legislative department. Field v. Clark(2) is one of the leading cases in America on this subject. In this case power had been delegated to the executive to impose certain duties. Delegation of power was upheld on the ground that the policy of the law having been determined by the legislature, working out of the details could be left to the President who could not be said to be exercising any legislative will but was merely authorised to execute the law as an agent of the legislature in executing its policy. It was asserted that it was a principle universally recognised as vital to the maintenance of the system of government that Congress could not delegate legislative power to the President.\n\nIn Springer v; Phillipine lslands(3), the same view was expressed.\n\nOn similar lines is the c1ecision in U.S.\n\nv. Gravenport etc. Co.( 4).\n\nIt was observed that after fixing a primary standard, power to fill up details could be devolved by appropriate legislation.\n\nThe provision attacked there was held as not delegation of legislative power but merely giving power to make administrative rules. O'Donouhue v.\n\nU.S.(\") concerned the question of compensation payable to Judges of the Supreme Court and it was held that it could not be lawfully diminished. It was remarked that the object of the creation of the three departments of government was not a mere matter of convenience but was basic to avoid commingling of duties so that acts of each may not be called to have been done under the coercive influence of the other departments.\n\nThe decision in Hampton & Co. v. U.S.(6) is the oft quoted judgment of Taft C.J.\n\nThe following extracts from that judgment may be quoted with advantage :-\n\n\"It is a breach of the national fundamenal law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the judicial branch, or, if by\n\n(l} 103 U.S. 168.\n\n(4) 287 U.S. 77.\n\n(2) 143 U.S. 649.\n\n\\5) 289 U.S. 516.\n\n(3) 277 U.S. 186.\n\n(6) 276 U.$. 394.\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Delltl Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMahajan/.\n\n/•; e T1te Delhi\n\nLtd!~ Act, 19'12,\n\netc.\n\nNallajanJ.\n\nlaw it attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power. This is not to say that the three branches are not co-ordinate parts of one government and that each in the field of duties my not invoke the action of the other two branches in so far as the action invoked shall not be an assumption of t/ie constitutional .field of action of another branch. In determining what it may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to commonsense and the inherent necessities of governmental co-ordination. The field of Congress involves all and many varieties of legislative action and Con gress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the executive branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislatipn, by vesting direction in such ollice'rs to make public regulations interpreting a statute and directing the details of its execution, even to the extent of providing for penalizing a breach of such regulations ...... Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective, because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time to the decision of an executive,. or, as often happens in matters of State legislation, it may be left to a popular vote of th~ residents of a district to be affected by legislation.\"\n\nPanama Refinipg Co. v. U.S.(') is another leading decision of the Supreme Court on this subject. In Benoari Lal Sarma's case(') considerable reliance was placed by Varadachariar J. on this decision for arriving at his conclusion against non-delegation of power in India.\n\nThe following observations from the judgment of Hughes C.J. may appositely be cited :-\n\n\"The Congress is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functiom with which it is vested.\n\nUndoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving\n\n(I} 293 U. S. 388.\n\n(2) (1943] F.C.R. 96.\n\na host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legi~ lature is to apply.\"\n\nCardozo J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"An attempted delegation not confined to any single act nor to any class or group of acts identified or described by reference to standards is in effect a . . . ,, rovmg comm1ss10n.\n\nIn Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator(1), it was said that essential legislature power could not be. delegated but fact finding agencies could be created.\n\nYakus v. U.S.(2) is to the same effect.\n\nIri Lichter v.\n\nU .S.(3) it was held that a constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purpose.\n\nThis power is especially significant in connection with war powers under which the exercise of discretion as to methods to be employed may be essential to an effective use of its war powers by Congress. The degree to which Congress must specify its policies and standards in order that the administrative authority granted may not be an unconstitutional delegation of its own legislative power is not capable of precise specification.\n\nThese decisions seem to indicate that judicial opinion in America is against delegation of essential powers of legislation. by the Congress to administrative bodies or even to independent commissions. It is unnecessary to refer to all the passage that were quoted from the different text-books which apart from the opinions of the text-books writers merely sum up\n\n(I) 312 U.S. 126.\n\n(3) 334 U.S. 742.\n\n(2) 321 U.S. 414.\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Del,, i L!livs kt, 191~\n\netc.\n\nMa•afa11 /.\n\nJla/rQjanJ.\n\nthe result of , the decisions given by the various courts on this point.\n\nThis result has been, in my opinion, very accurately summarized by Crawford in his book on Construction of Statutes .at pages 25, 26 in the following words and represents the present state of constitutional law in that country on this subject :-\n\n\"Legislative power has been delegated, as a general rule, not so often as an effort to break down the triparte theory qf, the separation of powers, but from necessity and fior the sake of convenience.\n\nMore and more with a social system steadily becoming focreasingly complex, the legislature has been obliged in order to legislate effectively, efficiently and expeditiously, to delegate some of its _ functions, not purely legislative in character, to other agencies, particularly to administrative officials and boards.\n\nMost prominent JJmong the powers thus delegated have been the power to Mcertmn facts, and the power to promulgate mies and\n\nregulations.\n\nMany of the other delegated powers, upon analysis, fall within one of these two major or basic classifications.\n\n\"So far, however, as the delegation of any power to an executive official or administrative board is concerned, the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases and must provide a standard to guide the ollicial or the board empowered to execute the law.\n\nThis standard must not be too indefinite or general. t may be laid down in broad general terms.\n\nIt is sullicient if the legislature will lay down an intelligible principle to guide the executive or administrative official. ..... From these typical criterions, it is apparent iliat the courts exercise considerable liberality tc.wards upholding legislative delegations, if a standard is established.\n\nSuch delegations are not subject to the obieetion that\n\nlegislative power has been unlawfully delegated.\n\nThe filling in of mere matters of detail within the policy of, and according to the legal principles and standards established by the legislature is essentially ministerial\n\nrather than legislative in character, even if considerable\n\ndiscretion is conferred upon the delegated authority.\n\nIn fact, the method and manner of enforcing a law must be left to the reasonable discretion of administrative officers, under legislative standards.\"\n\nOn one point, however, there is uniformity of judicial decisions in the American courts and even amongst the text-book writers.\n\nDelegation of general power to make and repeal laws has uniformly been held as unconstitutional: [vide observations of Dixon J. in Victoria etc. Co. & Meakes v. Dignam(1) ]. It was there pointed out that no instance could be cited of a decision of the Supreme Court of America in which Congress had allowed or empowered the executive to make regulations or ordinances which may overreach exisling statutes.\n\nIn Moses v. Guaranteed Mortgage Co. of New YorkC) a section of the Emergency Banking Law of 1933 was held unconstitutional delegation of power. There a banking board was given power to adapt, rescind, . alter or amend rules and regulations inconsistent with and in contravention of any law. In his second edition on Administrative Law, at p. 110, Walter Gellhorn\n\nstates as follows :-\n\n\"Delegations of powers to alter or mo<lify statutes are, jn effect, nothing more than delgations of the dispensing, suspending or rule-making powers, or a combination thereof. Yet the mere use of the terms 'alter' or 'modify' in the statute, has brought unexpected repercussions from courts and commentators.\"\n\nIn a number of decisions mentioned in this book the courts have held that delegation of power to alter or modify a statute is unconstitutional delegation of power. As observed by Prof. Salmond (Jurisprudence\n\n10d1 Edn. p. 159), a legislative Act passed by the supreme legislature cannot be amended by any other body than the supreme legislature itself. In Rowland Burrow's Words and Phrases, the word \"modify\" has been defined as meaning \"'vary, extend or enlarge, limit or restrict.\" In Oxford Dictionary one of the\n\n(I) 46 C.L.R. 73.\n\n(2) 239 App. Div. 703.\n\nIn re The Delhi laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMahajan I.\n\nl~SI\n\n111 r• 'file Qelhi U'lllS ct. 1912,\n\ne_tc.\n\n922 SUPREME COURT iEPORTS (1951)\n\nmeanings of this word is \"the m; iking of partial changes or altering without radical transformation.\" The same dictionary gives the following meaning to the word \"modific, at.ion\" : \"the result of such alteration a modified form or variety.\" In Stevens v. General Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.(') it was stated that modification implies an alteration. It may narrow or enlarge the provisions of a former Act. In my opinion, the view taken in American decisions that delegation of authority to modify an Act of the Congress is unconstitutional is fully borne out by the meaning of the expression \"modify\" though this view is not liked by Walt.er Gellhorn. .Before concluding, it is opposite to quot.e a passage from Baker's Fundamental Law which states the principle on which the American decisions are based and which coincides with my own opinions in respect of those decisions. The passage runs thus :\n\n\"The division of our American government into three co-ordinate branches necessarily prevents either of the three departments from delegating its authority to the other two or to either of them, but there are other reasons why the legislative power cannot be delegated.\n\nRepresentative government vests in the persons chosen to exercise the power of voting taxes and enacting laws, the most important and sacred trust known to civil government.\n\nThe representatives of the people are required to exercise wise discretion and sound judgment, having due regard for the purposes and needs of the executive and judicial departments, the ability of the tax-payers to respond and the general public welfare.\n\nIt follows as a self-evident propositi<m that a representative legislative assembly must exercise its own judgment; that in giving its consent to a tax levied it must distinctly and affirmatively determine the amount of the tax by fixing a definite and certain rate or by fixing an aggregate amount on the tax-payers and that in enacting a law it must so far express itself that the Act when it leaves the legislative department is a complete law. It is therefore a maxim of constitutional law that a legislative body\n\n(ll (1903) I K.B. 890.\n\ncannot delegate its power.\n\nIf it was competent for a representative legislative body to delegate its power it would be open to make the delegation to the executive which would be destructive of representative government and a return to despotism. Not only the nature of the legislative power but the very existence of representative government depends upon the doctrine that this power cannot be transferred.\"\n\nThe Australian Constitution follows the American model (63 & 64, Vic., c. 12, passed in July 1900). The legislative power of the Commonwealth is vested in a Federal Parliament. The executive power is vested in the Queen, while the judicial power is vested exclusively in the courts. The extent of the legislative power is stated in sections 51 and 52 of the Constitution Act. The residuary powers vest in the States.\n\nThe first Australian case c; ited to us is Baxter v. Ah Way(1). This was decided in the year 1909. It was held that section 52, sub-section (g), of the Customs Act of 1901, which provides that all goods the importation of which shall be prohibited by proclamation shall be prohibited imports, is not a delegation of legislative power but conditional legislation and is within the power conferred on Parliament by section 51 of the Constitution.\n\nIt was further held that prohibition of importation is a legislative act of the Parliament itself, the effect of sub-section (g) being to confer upon the Governor-General in Council the discretion to declare to what class of goods the prohibition will apply. In the course of his judgment the learned Chief Justice observed as follows :-\n\n\"The foundation of the argument that this power cannot be delegated by the legislature is to be found in the case oL . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is of course obvious that every legislature does in one sense delegate some of its functions ........ Nor is it to the purpose to say that the legislature could have done the thing itself.\n\nOf course, it could. In one sense this is delegation of authority because it authorizes another body to do\n\nen s c.1.aR. 626.\n\n13-3 i;.c. India/69\n\n19S1\n\nIn re The De/hi Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nMah\"aianJ.\n\nsomething which it might have done itself.\n\nIt is too late in the day to contend that such a delegation, if it is a delegation, is objectionable in any sense ..... .\n\nThe objection cannot be supported <ln the maxim delegatus non potest delegare or on any other ground . ....... There being no objection to conditional legislation being passed, this is a case of that sort.\"\n\nO'Connor J. said as follows:- \"Power is given in section 51 in respect of trade and commerce with other countries on taxation and there is also power to make laws incidental to the exercise of any power vested in Parliament.\n\nIt is a fundamental principle of the constitution that everything necessary to the exercise of a power is included in the grant of a power. Everything necessary to the effective exercise of the power of legislation must be taken to be conferred by the constitution with that power .......... Exercise of such discretion cannot be said to be making of the law.\"\n\nHiggins J. said :- \"According to my view, there is not here in fact any delegation of the law-making power.\"\n\nThis case rests on the principle that legislative power cannot be delegated and it was for that reason that the impugned statute was justified on the ground of conditional legislation.\n\nIf delegation of legislative power was permissible, it was wholly unnecessary to justify the enactment as a form of conditional legislation.\n\nRoche v. Kronheimer(' ), decided in the year 1921, was argued by Dixon (as he then was). The question in that case concerned the validity of the Treaty of Peace Act, 1919, which by section 2 authorized the making of regulations conferring the delegation of powers on certain persons. The legislation was held constitutional. In the argument by Mr. Dixon, its validity was attacked on the following grounds : \"It is not conditional legislation as in the case of Baxter\n\nv. Ah Way( 2 ), but it bestows in the executive full\n\n(I) 29 C.L.R. 329.\n\n(2) 8 C.L.'R.. 626.\n\nlegislative power upon a particular subject. Vesting of legislative power to any _other hands than Parliament is prohibited.\n\nThe making of a law that another body may make laws upon a particular subject matter is not making a law on that subiect.\" The decision was given in these terms :-\n\n\"It was said that if Parliament had authority to legislate, it had no power to confer that authority on the Governor-General. On this topic we were referred to Hodge v. The Queen(1) and Rex v. Halliday(2) and In re The Initiative and Referendum Act(3), and much interesting argument was devoted to the real meaning and effect of the first of those cases. It is enough to say that the validity of legislation in this form has been upheld in Farey\n\nv. Burvett(4); Pankhurst v.\n\nKiermanl,(6); Ferrando v. Pearce(6); and Sickerdich v.\n\nAshton( ), and we, do not propose to enter into any inquiry as to the correctness of those decisions.\"\n\nThis case therefore was decided on the ground of cursus curiae, and the point raised by Mr. Dixon remained unanswered.\n\nIn the year 1931 two cases came before the Supreme Court, one of which was decided in February, 1~31, and the other in November, 1931. The first of these is the case of Huddart Parker Ltd. v. The Commonwealth(8), in which Dixon J. was one of the presiding Judges.\n\nThe question in that case concerned the validity of section 33 of the Transport Workers Act whieh empowered the Governor-General to make regulations in respect of transport workers. The learned Judge observed that Roche v.\n\nKronlzeimer(9 ) had decided that a statilte conferring on the executive power to legislate upon some matters, is law with respect to that subject. On this construction of the decision in Roche v. Kronheimer(9 ) the case.was decidm\n\n(1) 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\n(6) 25 C.L; R. 241•\n\n(2) [1917) A.C. 260.\n\n(7) 2S C.UR. 506,\n\n(3) {1919] A.C. 9350 {8) 44 Cd,.R 492\n\n(4) 21 C.L.R. 433.\n\n(9) 29 C LtR 329. {S) 24 C.z..R. 120.\n\n19S1\n\nInre The Delhi Lat9a Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMahajan/,\n\nlnre The Delhi £aw1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMaha}<lnJ.\n\nSo far as I have been able to see, Roche v. Kronheimer(') decided nothing and it was based on the rule of stare decisis.\n\nVictorian etc. Co. & Meakes v. Dignan(') was decided in November 1931. The question in that case was whether section 3 of the Transport Workers Act was intra vires the constitution inasmuch as it delegated power of making regulation11 notwithstanding anything else contained in other Acts. The delegation was under the name and style of conferring \"regulative power.\" The appellants in that case were informed that they were guilty of an offence against the Waterside Employm\"llt rights, picking up for work as a waterside worker at Melbournea person not a member of the Waterside workers' Federation, while transport workers who were members of the Federation were available for being picked up for the work at the said port. The attack on the Act itself was based on the American constitutional doctrine that no legislative body can delegate to another department of government or to any other authority the power, either generally or specially, to enact laws. The reason, it was said, was to be found in the very existence of its own powers. This high prerogative having been entrusted to its own wisdom, judgment and patriotism and not to those of other persons, it will act ultra vires if it undertakes to delegate the trust instead of executing it. It was, however, said that this principle did not preclude conferring local powers of government upon local authorities. The defence was that the Act did not impinge upon the doctrine because in it the Parliament confined the regulating power on certain specific matters within the ambit of the trade and commerce power and accordingly merely exercised its own legislative power within that ambit, and did not delegate any part of it. Reference was m:ide to the decision of Higgins J. in Baxter\n\nv. Ah Way('), in which it was observed that the Federal Parliament had within its ambit full power to frame its own laws in any fashion µsing any agent, any agency, any machinery that in its .wisdom it thinks\n\n(1) 29 C.L.R. 329.\n\n(2) 46 C.L.R. 7_3\n\n(3) 8 C.L.R. 646.\n\n.fit for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth. Rich J. held that the <iuthority of subordinate law making may be invested in the executive. Reference was made to Roche v. Kronheimer(1).\n\nThe learned Attorney-General paced considerable reliance on the judgment of Dixon J.\n\nThe learned Judge expressed his opinion on the American decisions in these words :-\n\n\"But in what does the distinction lie between the law of Congress requiring compliance with direction upon some specified subject which the administration thinks proper to give and a law investing the administration with authority to legislate upon the same subject? The answer which the decisions of the Supreme Court supply to this question is formulated in the opinion of that Court delivered by Taft C.J. in Hampton & Co. v. U.S.(2) ... ... The courts in America had never had any criterion as to the validity of statutes except that of reasonableness,....:..the common refuge of thought and expression in the face of undeveloped or unascertainable standards.\"\n\nThe learned Judge then reached the conclusion that no judicial power could be given or delegated, but'- from that it did not follow that Parliament was restrained from transferring any power essentially legislative to another organ or body.\n\nIn an earlier decision the learned Judge had expressed the opinion that time had passed for assigning to the constitutional distribution of powers among the separate organs of government, an operation which confined the legislative power to the Parliament so as to restrain it from reposing in the executive an authority essentially legislative in character and he remarked that he was not prepared to change that opinion . or his expression to the effect that Roche\n\nv. Kronheimer(1) did decide that a statute_ conferring upon the executive a power to legislate, on some matters contained within one of the subjects of the legislative power of Parliament is a law with respect to that subject and the distribution of powers\n\n(1} 29 C.L.R. 329.\n\n(2) 276 u.s. 394,406.\n\nlnre The Deihl Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMahajan I.\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1Act,1912,\n\netc.\n\nMaha/an I.\n\ndoes pot restrain Parliament to make the law.\n\nThe learned Judge then proceeded to say ;_\n\n\"This does not mean that a law confiding authority to the executiv.e will be v.alid, however extensive or vague the subject-matter may be, if it does not fall outside the boundaries of federal power ...... Nor does it mean that the distribution of powers can supply no considerations of weight affecting the v.alidity ...... It may be acknowledged that the manner in which the constitution accomplished the separation of power does logically ortheoretically make the Parliament the exclusive repository of the legislativ.e power of the Commonwealth. The existence in Parliament of power to authorize subordinate legislation may be ascribed to a conception: of that legislative power which depends less upon juristic analysis and perhaps more upon the history and usages of British legislation and the theories of English law .... Such subordinate legislation remains under Parliamentary control and is lacking in the independent, and unqualified authority which is .an attribute to true legislativ.e power.\"\n\nIt, seems to me that in its ultimate analysis the judgment of the learned Judge proceeded, as pointed out by him, upon the history and the usages of British legislation and theories of English law and not on the strict construction of the Australian Constitution with respect to which the learned Judge frankly conceded that logically or theoretically the power of delegation of the quality held valid in that case could not be justified on the framework of the constitution.\n\nI have also not been able precisely to follow the distinction drawn by the learned Judge that delegation held justified by him did not include delegation in the fullest extent of any matter falling within the boundaries of federal power. After a careful consideration. of the observations of this very learned and eminent Judge I venture to think that these are not a safe guide for decision of the present reference. Not only were the constitutional limitations of the written constitution over-reached, but the decision was based on the theories of British legislation and English law which could\n\nhardly be applied to a written constitution with a complete separation of power.\n\nMr. Justice Evatt in this case stated the rule differently.\n\nHe observed \"every grant by the Parliament of authority to make regulations is itself a grant of legislature power and the true nature and quality of legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament involves as part of its contents power to confer law-making powers upon authorities other than the Parliament itself.\" The theory that legislative power has a content of delegation in it, to my mind, is not based on any principles of jurisprudep.ce or of legislation and I venture to think that it is inconsistent with the fundamental principle that when a high trust is confided to the wisdom of a particular body which has to be discharged according to the procedure prescribed, such trust must be discharged by that person in whom it is confided and by no other.\n\nThis decision is moreover inconsistent with the decisions of the Privy Council above mentioned.\n\nIf the mere existence of power of legislation in a legislature automatically authorized it to delegate that power, then there was hardly any necessity for their Lordships of the Privy Council to justify delegation in the cases referred to above on the ground of conditional legislation and to state affirmatively that the . cases considered by them were not cases of delegation of legislative authority. This view is certainly in conflict with the observations of the Privy Council in Benoari Lal Sarma' s case(1), given under the Government of India Act, 1935, wherein their Lordships said : \"It is true that the Governor-General acting under section 72 of Schedule IX himself must discharge the duty of legislation there cast on him and cannot transfer it to any other authority.\" Evatt J. after enunciating the rule discussed 'above remarked :-\n\n. \"It is true that the extent of the power granted will often be a material circumstance in the examination of the validity of the legislation conferring the grant ........ The nature of the legislative power of the Commonwealth authority is plenary, but it must be possible to predicate of every law passed by the\n\n(1) [194S) F.C.R. HSI.\n\n19S1\n\nMahajan!.\n\nMahajan/.\n\nParliament that it is a law with respect to one or other of the specific subject-matters mentioned in sections 51 and 52 of the constitution.\n\nAfter referring to a !).umber of circumstances considered by the learned Judge material in reaching at a result as to the constitutionality •of a statute, he observed as follows :--\n\n\"As a final analysis the Parliament of the Commonwealth is not competent to abdicate its powers of legislation.\n\nThis is not because Parliament is bound to perform all or any of its legislative functions though it may elect not to do so, or because of the doctrine of separation of powers, but because each and every one of the laws passed by Parliament must answer the description of a law upon one or more of the subject'matters stated in the constitution. A law by which Parliament gave ml its law-making authority to another body will be bad because it will fat7 to pass the test last mentioned.\"\n\nFrankly speaking, I have not been able to apprehend on what principles, if any, of construction, the relevancy of the matters considered by the learned Judge as material circumstances in judging the validity of an, ct so far as the question of the vires of the Act is concerned could be justified.\n\nAnother Australian case cited is Wishart v. Fraser(').\n\nThere the attack was on section 5 of the National Security Act, 1939-40, which empowered the making oE regulations for securing public safety and defence of the Commonwealth etc.\n\nIt proceeds on the same line as the earlier case discussed above.\n\nIn my opinion, the decision in Baxter v. Ah Way(2) is based on a correct construction of the provions of the Australian Constitution and the later decisions cannot be considered as any guide in this country for a decision of the point involved in the reference. The argument pressed by Mr. Dixon, as he then was, in\n\n(I) 64 C.L.R. 470.\n\n(2) 8 C.L.R. 626.\n\nRoche v.\n\nKronheimer(1) in my opinion, states the principle correctly.\n\nThe decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council from India are not many. The first and the earliest of these is in Queen v. Burah(2), which has already been discussed at considerable length in the earlier part of this judgment and as stated already, it is no authority for the proposition that the Indian Legislature constituted under the Indian Councils Act, 1861, had power to delegate authority to the executive authorising them to modify or amend the provisions of an Act passed by the legislature itself.\n\nKing Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma(8) is the last Indian decision of the Privy Council on this subject. Conviction of fifteen individuals made by a special magistrate purporting to act under Ordinance II of 1942, promulgated by the Governor-General on the 2nd January, 1942, was set aside by a special Bench of the High Court at Calcutta and this decision was affirmed by the majority of the Federal Court of India. The ground on which the conviction was set aside was that the Ordinance was ultra vires. In appeal before their Lordships of the Privy Council it was contended that the Ordinance was valid.\n\nThe Ordinance did not itself set l.:IP any of the special courts but provided by sub-section (3) of section 1 that the Ordinance- '\n\n\"shall come into force in any Province oruy if the Provincial Government, being satisfied of the existence of an emergency arising from any disorder within the Province or from a hostile attack on India or on a • country neighbouring on India or from the imminence of such an attack, by notification in. the official gazette, declare it to be in force in the Province and shall cease to be in force when such notification is rescinded.\"·\n\nIn view of this last provision it was contended that the Ordinance was invalid either because the language showed that the Governor-General notwithstanding the preamble did not cor:,:ider that an emergency existed but was making provision in case one should arise in\n\n{I) 29 C.L.R. 329. t2) S I. 178.\n\n(3) [1945] F.C.R. 161.\n\ni9Sl\n\nIn re The De h Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMahajan.J~\n\nMahajan!.\n\nfuture, or else because the section amounted to what was called \"delegated legislation\" by which the Governor-General without legal authority sought to pass the decision whether an emergency existed to the Provincial Government instead of deciding it for himself. On this last point their Lordships observed as follows:-\n\n\"It i1 undoubtedly true that the Governor-General acting under ' 72 of !Schedule IX, must himself discharge the duty of legislation there cast on him, and cannot transfer it to other authorities. But the Governor- General has not delegated his legislative powers at all.\n\nHis powers in this respect, in cases of emergency, are as wide as the powers of the Indian legislature which, as already poinr.ed out, in view of the proclamation under s. 102, had power to make 1 aws for a province even in respect of matters which would otherwise be reserved to the Provincial legislature.\n\nTheir Lordships are unable to see that there was any valid objection, in point of legality, to the Governor-General's ordinance taking the form that the actual setting up of a special court under the terms of the ordinance should take place at the time and within the limits judged to be necessary by the provincial government specially concerned. This is not delegated legislation at all.\n\nIt is merely an example of the not uncommon legislative arrangement by which the local application of the provision of a statute is determined by the judgment of a local administrative body as to its necessity. Their Lordships are in entire agreement with the view of the Chief Justice of Bengal and of Khundkar J. on this part of the case. The latter Judge appositely quotes a passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in the well known decision in Russell \"· The Queen(').\"\n\nThis case brings out the extent to which conditional legislation can go, but it is no authority justifying delegation of legislative power authorising an external authority to modify the provisions of a legislative enactment. It may be pointed out that the opening part of the passage quoted above seems to approve the viw\n\nfl) 7 App. Cas 829.\n\nof the Federal Court expressed by Varadachariar J. in that case when his Lordship relying on a passage from Street on the Doctrine of Ultra Vires observed that a legislature will not ordinarily be permitted to shift the onus of legislation though it may legislate as to min principles and leave the details to subordinate agencies.\n\nThe decision of 'the Federal Court in /atindra Nath <:; upta v. The Province of Bihar and Others(1), to which I was a party and wherein I was in respectful agreement with the judgment of the learned Chief Justice and my brother Mukherjea, in my opinion, correctly states the rule on the subject of delegation of legislative power.\n\nThe Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, in sub-section (3) of section 1 provided as follows:-\n\n\"It shall remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its commencement.\n\nProvided that the. Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification.\"\n\nActing under the proviso the Provincial Govern. ment on the 11th March, 1948, extended by notification the life of the Act by one year. The validity of the proviso to sub-section ( v) of section 1 of the Act was attacked on the ground that it amounted to delegation of legislative power by the Provincial Legislature and this it was not competent to do. On the authority of the decision . of the Privy Council in Benoari Lal' Sarma's case(2) I held the proviso void. The question was posed by me in the following way :-\n\n\"It may e asked what does the proviso purport to do in terms and in substance? The answer is that it empowers that Provincial Government to issue a notification saying that the Provincial Act shall remaiu\n\n(1) (1949) F.C.R. 595.\n\n(2) (1945) F.C.R. 16f\n\nIn re The Delhi lAws Act, 1912. etc.\n\nMahajan I.\n\nMahajan I.\n\nin force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification.\n\nAs stated in the earlier part of this judgment, unless the power of the Provincial Government is co-extensive with the power of the Provincial Legislature, it is difficult to see how it can have the power to modify a statute passed by that legislature., Modifitation of statute amounts to re-enacting it partial\\y.\n\nIt involves the power to say that certain parts of it are no longer parts of the statute and that a statute with X sections is now enacted with Y sections. In the act of modification is involved a legislative power as a discretion has to be exercised whether certain parts of the statute are to remain law in future or not or have to be deleted from it. The power to modify may even involve a power to repeal parts of it. A modified statute. is not the same original statute. It is a new Act and logically speaking, it amounts to enacting a new law. The dictionary meaning of the word 'modify' is to make something existing much less severe or to tone it down or to make partial changes in it. What modifications are to be made in a statute or whether any are necessary is an exercise of law-making power and cannot amount merely to an act of execution of a power already conferred by the statute. The extent of changes is left to external authority, i.e., the Provincial Government.\n\nNothing is here being done in pursuance of any law. What is being delegated is the power to determine whether a law shall be in force after its normal life has ended and if so, what that law will be, whether what was originally enacted or something different. The body appointed as a delegate for declaring whether a penal Act of this character shall have longer life than originally contemplated by the legislature and if so, with what modification, is a new kind of legislature than that entrusted with the duty under the Government of India Act, 1935.\"\n\nI still maintain the view that the question of the life of an Act is a matter for the judgment of the competent legislature.\n\nIt is a matter of policy whether a certain enactment is to be on the statute\n\nbook permanently or temporarily. Such a question does not fall within conditional legislation as it concerns the extension of the life of a temporary Act. Such an Act dies a natural death when the period fixed for its duration . expires.\n\nIt automatically ceases to operate and there is no real analogy between conditional legislation which authorizes a known authority to determine the commencement or termination of an Act and an act done in exercise of any power conferred by the Act itself. It was said by the learned Attorney-General that this decision had created considerable difficulties and that the various High Courts in India on its authority had held certain enactments void, the validity of which had never l;>een questioned before this decision was given. In my humble judgment, there is nothing whatever in that decision which in any way unsettled the law as settled by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Burah's case(1).\n\nThis decision did not lay down that the Indian legislature did not possess power of delegation necessary for effectively carrying out its legislative functions.\n\nAll that it held war-and I think rightly-that essential legislative function could not be delegated to an external authority and that the legislature could not shirk its own duty and lay the burden of discharging that duty on others. If I was convinced that the decision laid down a wrong rule of law, I would have required no sugar-coated phrases to own the error.\n\nOur attention is not drawn to a single decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council during the whole administration of this country by the British in which the highest court in the land upheld the contention urged by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nOn the other hand, learned Judges in this country of the eminence of Markby J. and Varadachariar J. in very clear and unambiguous terms affirmed the rule that delegation of essential legislative power was not within the competence of the Indian legislatures.\n\nReference may also be .made to the case of The State of Bombay v. Narottamdas(2), decided recently and te>\n\n(1) S I.A. 178\n\n(2) [19SI] s.c.R. SI.\n\nIn re The Del/ti Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\n19SI\n\nMahajan/.\n\nwhich I was a party.\n\nTherein it was explained that Jatindra Nath Gupta's case(') was no authori.ty prohibiting delegation of legislative power in case where the principle and policy of. the law had been declared in the enactments itself and ancillary power had been delegated to the provincial government for bringing in to operation the provisions of an Act.\n\nTo sum up, judicial ofmion on this subject is still in a fluid state and it is impossible to reconcile all the judgments cited to us on the basis of any rigid principles of constitutional law.\n\nIn England the Parliament is for the time being following the recommendatfons of the Donoughmore Committee.\n\nIn America the doctrine against delegation of legislative power still holds the field. In Canada as well as in India the rule laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Burah's case(2 ) has never been departed from in theory. The same view was maintained in the earlier Australian decisions.\n\nRecently Australian decisions however have gone to the length of holding that even essential legislative power can be delegated so long as the principle does not completely efface itself.\n\nIn my opm1on, the true solution of the problem of delegation of legislative power is to be found in the oft-quoted passage from the judgment of Ranney J. of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati W. & Z. R.\n\nCo. v. Clinton County Comrs.(\"). This quotation is in these terms :-\n\n\"The true . distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Tlie first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.\"\n\nThe decision in Locke's Appeal(') is also based on this rnle There it was said :-\n\n(l) (1949] F-CR. S9S-\n\n(2) S JA. 178-\n\n(3) I Ohio St. 88.\n\n(4) 72 Pa. St. 491.\n\n\"To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the legislature of the wer to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know\". The proper distinction the court said was this : \"The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation.\"\n\nThe Federal Court of India in its opinion. exRressed by Varadachariar J. in Benoari Lal Sarma's case( ) considered a contention of the Advocate-General of India made to it based on the above quotation of Ranney J. and observed as follows :\n\n\"We are of the opinion that there is nothing in the above decisions of their Lordships that can be said to be inconsistent with the principle laid down in . the passage from the American authority which the Advocate-General of India proposed to adopt as his own argument.\"\n\nThe majority of the court approved the rule stated by Chief Justice Hughes in Panama Refining Co. v.\n\nU. S.(2), and it was stated that the rule therein held had nothing whatever to do with maxim delegatus non potest delegare, but was only the amplification of what was referred to by the Judicial CoD; lmittee in Burah's case(3) as \"the nature and principles of legislation.\"\n\nThe question cali be posed thus : Why is delegation peculiarly a content of legislative power and not of judicial power? In my judgment, it is a content of none of the three State powers, legislative, judicial or executive. It is, on the other hand, incidental to the\n\n(I) [1943] F.C.R. 96.\n\n(2) 293 U.S. 388.\n\n(3) SI.A. 178.\n\n19S1\n\nMahajanJ.\n\netc.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\nexercise of all power inasmuch as it is necessary to delegate for the proper discharge of all these three public duties.\n\nNo public functionary can himself perform all the duties he is privileged to perform unaided by agents and delegates, but from this circumstance it does not follow that he can delegate the exercise of his judgment and discretion to others. One may well ask, why is a legislat1,1re formed with such meticulous care by all constitution makers? Why do they take pains to lay down the procedure to be followed by an elected legislature in its function of law-making? Why do they define its different functions and lay down the methods by which it shall act ? The only answer that reasonably can be given to these queries is : \"Because the constitution trusts to the judgment of the body . constituocd in the manner indicated in the constitution and to the exercise of its discretion by following the procedure prescribe therein.\" On the same principle the judges are not allowed to surrender their judgment to others. It is they and they alone who are trusted with the decision of a case.\n\nThey can, however, delegate ancillary powers to others, for instance, in a suit for accounts and in a suit for dissolution of partner, ship, commissioners can be entrusted with powers authorising them to give decisions on points of difference between parties as to items in the account.\n\nAgain it may be enquired why cannot other public functionaries entrusted in the matter of appointment of public servants; delegate this particular duty to others.\n\nThe answer again is found in the same principle. I put this query to the learned Attorney-General but I could not elicit any very satisfactory answer. He contended himself by saying that possibly there was something in the nature of the power itself which requires the personal attention of the authorities concerned and that therefore delegation was there impliedly forbiddn. To my mind, the same principle forbids delegation of essential legislative power. It is inherent in the nature of the power that has to be exercised by the legislature elected for the purpose subject to the qualifications already stated. It would be a breach of\n\nthe constitutional duty to bestow this power on some one else.\n\nIn the words of Sir John Salmond; \"In general, indeed, the power of legislation is far too important to be committed to any person or body of persons save the incorporate community itself.\n\nThe great bulk of enacted law is promulgated by the state in its own person.\n\nBut in exceptional cases it has been found possible and expedient to entrust this power to private hands.\" In the words of Mr. Dixon (as he then was), the making of a law that another body may make laws upon a particular subject matter is not making a law on that subject. The quotation cited in the earlier part of this judgment from Baker's book\n\n- appositely states the rule when it says : \"It is. an axiom of constitutional law that representative legislative bodies cannot delegate legislative power because representative government vests in the persons chosen to exercise the power of voting taxes and enacting laws : the most important and sacred trust known to civil government.\" In the words of another jurist, \"Legislation is the formal utterance by the legislative organ of the society and by no others. Its words constitute the law and not the words of the delegate.\"\n\n.. In private law the rule is well settled that an arbitrator cannot lawfully devolve his duty on another unless so expressly authorized. The nature of the duty itself is such that it demands exercise of his own judgment and discretion. It is again well settled that fiduciary duties cannot be made the subject of delegation, though trustees in order to discharge certain functions can use machinery or subordinate agencies for effectively carrying on the duties which attach to their constitution.\n\nDelegation is permissible in cases where there is a legal or physical necessity to do so because without trusting some person or persons it would be impossible efficiently to discharge the duties. It cannot be denied that municipal and other corporations cannot delegate the by-law making power to the executive officers.\n\nIt is so because power is entrusted to them in their corporate capacity and has to be exercised in that capacity.\n\nI am not able to apprehend 14-3 S. C. India/68\n\nMahaja111.\n\nJn re The Delhi Lllws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMa/rajanJ.\n\nwhy this principle which is well settled in private law cannot appositely be applied to the discharge of duties by public functionaries and by a legislature. It seems to me that the nature of the duty is such that it is implicit within it that it should be discharged by the person entrusted with it and by no others. In other words, the nature of the public duty itself demands it and the principles of legislation require it.\n\nFor the reasons given above I cannot accept the proposition contended for by the learned Attorney-General that in the absence of an express or implied provision in . the constitution legislative authority can be best owed on other persons. .In my opinion, the correct proposition, on the other hand, is that unless expressly or impliedly authorized, such delegation is not permissible. The exceptions to this rule fall in two classes which have been stated in the. quotation from Crawford's book earlier cited in this judgment.\n\nIt is now convenient to examine the provisions of our Constitution in order to appreciate the contention of the learned Attorney-General that it has been modelled on the British system and that the Parliament of India is as omnipotent as in England and that in the matter of delegation of legislative power it is in an analogous situation. In my opinion, our Constitution is a judicious combination of the American model with the British Parliamentary system.\n\nIn its main scheme it follows the Government of India Act, 1935, which provides for a federation of States and provides for an executive responsible to the legislature.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the framers of the constitution, though they have borrowed ideas from other constitutions, have not rigidly adhered to any particular model. Certain provisions in our constitution are such for which there is no precedent in the constitution of any other country.\n\nIt seems to me that they were as much alive to the doctrine of administrative convenience as to the dangers of a system whicli permits delegation of unfettered legislative power to the executive. The country had recently emerged from the bonds of a bureaucratic system which had killed\n\nits very soul and they apparently did not wish it to get engulfed again in the rigours of that system.\n\nBureaucratic rule 1s a necessary corollarly to the existence of unfettered delegation of legislative power; To avoid this, the constitution makers made detailed provision in the Constitution on all matters. It has to be emphasized that no country in the world has such an elaborate and comprehensive constitution as we have in this. country and it would not be proper to construe such a constitution with the help of decisions given elsewhere on the construction of constitutions shaped differently. It is only after a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution and its whole scheme that it has to be decided whether delegation of power-legislative, executive or judicial-is implicit in the grant of any of these powers or has been expressly provided for, to the extent it was considered necessary on grounds of administrative convenience in peace or war time and therefore conferment of this power by implication cannot be upheld on its true construction. It has also to be borne in mind that our Constitution is fundamentally different from the British system inasmuch as the doctrine of supremacy of Parliament has its limitations here. The courts are empowered to declare Acts of Parliament unconstitutional if they are inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution or when the trespass on fields demarcated for State legislatures.\n\nObviously, it is implicit in the demarcation of legislative fields that one legislature cannot by delegation of subjects that are exclusively within its field clothe the other with legislative capacity to make laws on that subject as it will amount to an infringement of the Constitution itself.\n\nIt seems clear; therefore, that delegation of legislative power to that extent is prohibited by the Constitution. Illustratively, defence is a Union subject, while law and order is a State subject. Can it be argued with any reason that by delegation Parliament can arm a State legislature with the law-making power on the subject of defence and that a State legisla_ture can arm Parliament with\n\n19Sl\n\nMahafanJ.\n\n19SI\n\ntc.\n\nMahajan I.\n\npower to make law of the subject of law and order?\n\nIn my opinion, any argument on those lines . has to be negatived on the ground that the delegation of such power would be contrary to the Consti?\"tion . itslf and\n\nthat this kind of transfer of power is outside its contemplation. For a similar reason if such transfer of power is not possible in the case of one legislature to the other, it is difficult to justify it if the transfer is made in favour of the executive except to the extent allowed by the Constitution or to the extent that it had already been recognised under the designation \"conditional legislation\" or \"rule-making power\", of which presumably the constitution-makers were fully aware.\n\nI have again no hesitation in holding that our constitution-makers accepted the American doctrine against delegation of legislative power, and on grounds of administrative convenience and to meet particular circumstances they carefully made express provisions within the Constitution for devolution of power in those eventualities.\n\nArticle 53 of the Constitution concerns the executive power cif the Unio~. It is vested in the President and m express terms it is stated in that article that .it shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with this Constitution.\n\nThe Parliament is authorized by law to confer functions on authorities other than the President. A careful reading of this article shows that an elaborate provision has been made in the Constitution for employing agencies and machinery for the exercise of the executive power of the Union. The President is vested \\with the supreme command of the Defence Forces and in addition to this power, power of delegation has been conferred on Parliament even in its executive field in article 53(3) (b).\n\nSimilar provision has been made in regard to the executive power of each State: (vide article 154). In article 77 provision has been made as to how the business of the Government of India has to be conducted. The President has been conferred the power of making rules for the more convenient transaction of the business\n\nof the Government of India and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business.\n\nSuch a detailed provision regarding the exercise of executive power does not exist in the other constitutions to which our attention was drawn.\n\nArticle 79 provides that there shall be a Parliament for the Union.\n\nProvision has then been made in the various articles how the Parliament has to be constituted and how it has to conduct its business, what officers and secretariat it can employ and with what powers.\n\nArticles 107 to 119 relate to legislative procedure.\n\nIt is implicit in these elaborate provisions that the Constitution bestowed the lawmaking powers on the body thus constituted by it, and it was this body in its corporate capacity that had to exercise its judgment and discretion in enacting laws and voting taxes and that judgment had to be arrived at by following the rules of procedure expressly laid down therein.\n\nArticle 123 confers legislative power on the President when Parliament is not in session and this power is co-extensive with the legislative power of the Parliament itself.\n\nArticle 124 deals with the Union judiciary. It prescribes the number of Judges and the method of their appointment and it lays down the procedure that the President has the power in making the appointments.\n\nIn article 140 provision has been made under which Parliament can confer on the Supreme Coun such supplemental powers as may appear to be necessary for the purpose of enabling the court more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by or under this Conititution.\n\nAn express provision of this kind, in my opinion, very clearly negatives the proposition which the learned Attorney-General has been contending for. If the power of delegation of legislative powers is implicit in the power of legislation itself, the constitution-makers would not have made an express provision in . article 140 bestowing authority on Parliament for conferment of ancillary powers on the Supreme\n\nCourt Parliament obviously had authority to legislate on \"Supreme Coun\" as it is one of the subjects in the Union List. Article 145(1) (a) again very strongly\n\n19Sl\n\n/It'\" The Dellii Law1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMaliajan J.\n\netc.\n\nMahajan]~,\n\nnegatives the. proposition of the learned Attorney- General. The Constitution has authorized the Supreme Court to make rules as to the persons practising before the court. This is one of the subjects in the Union List and this conferment of power by the Constitution on the Supreme Court is subject to the provision of any law made by the Parliament. In other words, Parliament has been given express power to take away. this power or supplement it by making a law. In my judgment, such a provision is quite foreign to a constitution in which delegation of law-making powers . is implicit.\n\nDetailed provision . has been made for the appointment of High Court Judges in article 217, and rule making powers have been given to the H; igh Courts under article 227. In article 243 the President. hs been given the power to make. regulations for the peace and good government of territories enumerated in Part D of the First Schedule and in exercise of that power he can repeal or amend any law made by Parliament or existing law. The Constitution itself . has dcle,- gated the powers of the Parliament to the President wherever it thought that such delegation was necessary.\n\nArticles 245 and 246 demarcate the field of legislation between the Parliament and the State . legislature and in article 248 provision has been made that residuary powers of legislation; remain in the Parliament Article 250 makes prlJvision for cases of emergency• Parliament in that event has power to make laws for the whole or any part of the terfaory of India with respect to any matters enumerated in the State lists .. Article 252 is a somewhat peculiar prov1S1on.\n\nUnder it Parliament can legislate for two or more States with their consent.\n\nThis is a form of exercise of legislative power by Parliament as a delegate of the State as by its consent alone Parliament gets the power of legislation.\n\nBy article 258 the President has been authorised with the consent of the Government of a State to entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends.\n\nIn that article provision has also been made for\n\ndelegation of powers by a law made by Parliament. By article 349 the power of the Parliament to enact laws in respect of language has been restricted. Article 353 states the effect of a proclamation of emergency and provides that the executive power of the Union in such a case shall extend to the giving of directions to any State as to the manner in which the executive power thereof is to be exercised. Clause (2) of this article requires emphasis. It provides that the power of Parliament to make laws with respect to any matters shall include power to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or authorizing the conferring of powers\n\nand the imposition of duties, upon the Union, or\n\nofficers and authorities of the Uniori, as respects that matter, notwithstanding that it is one which is not enumerated in the Union List. Parliament in an emergency under article 250 has full power to make laws on subjects within the State List and is certainly entitled to delegate that power if that power is a content of legislative power but the constitution makers thought otherwise and made an express provision for delegation of power in such a situation. Article 357 provides that where by proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356, it has been declared that the powers of the legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, it shall be competent for Parliament to confer on the President the power of the legislature of the State to make laws, and to authorize the President to delegate, subject to sucli conditions as he may think fit to impose, the power so conferred to any other author-ity to be specifiedby him in that behalf.\n\nThis is the onlv article bv which the Constitution has authorized the delegation of essential legislative power. Possibly it was thought that in that contingency it was necessary that Parliament should have power to confer legislative power on the executive and to clothe it with its own legislative capacity in the State field and further to authorize the President to delegate that legislative power to any other authority specified by him.\n\nA reference to the entries. in the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule further\n\n,19S1 ·\n\n; i1n.re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMahajan J,\n\nMahaja•J.\n\nillustrates this point.\n\nEntry 93 of List I is \"Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this List.\" Entry 94 is ~Inquiries, surveys and statistics for the purpose of. any of the matters in this List.\" Entry 96 is \"Fees in espect of any of the matters in this List, but not including fees taken in any court.\" Entry 95 is \"Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.\" All these entries are instances of subjects inciqental and ancillary to the main subjects of legislation contained in the List. Similar entries are to be found in Lists II and III as well. The Constitution seems to have taken care to confer legislative power in express terms even regarding incidental\n\nmatter~ and it is therefore unnecessary to read by implication and introduce by this process within such a constitution any matter not expressly provided therein.\n\nI am satisfied that the constitution-makers considered all aspects of the question of delgation of power, whether executive, legislative or judicial, and expressly provided for it whenever it was thought necessary to do so in great detail. In this situation there is no scope for the application of the doctrine contended for by the learned Attorney-General and it must be held that in the absence of express powers of delegation allowed by the Constitution, the Parliament has no power to delegate its essential legislative functions to others, whether State legislatures or executive authorities, except, of course, functions which really in their true nature are ministerial. The scheme of the Constitution and of the Government of India Act, 1935, is that it expressly entrusted with legislative capacity certain bodies and persons and it also authorised the creation of law-making bodies wherever it thought necessary but gave no authority to create a new law-making body not created bv itself.\n\nIt even created the executive as a legislature in certain contingencies.\n\nIn these circumstances it is not possible to add to the list of legislative authorities by a process of delegation. As pointed out by Crawford on Statutory\n\nConstruction, at page 333. \"If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. So if a statute directs certain acts to be done in a specified manner by certain persons, their performance in any other manner than that specified, or by any other person than is there named, is impliedly prohibited.\" The ordinary rule is that if authority is given expressly by affirmative words upon a defined condition, the expression of that condition excludes the doing of the act authorised under other circumstances than those as defined. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the executive enjoyed a larger power of legislation than is contained in the new constitution.\n\nIt seems to have been cut down to a certain extent. The new constitution confers authority on Parliament to make laws for the State of Delhi. It also authorizes it to create a legislature for that State.\n\nThe Constitution therefore has made ample provision indicating bodies who would be competent to make laws for the State of Delhi.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, delegation of legislative power to the executive in matters essentiai is unconstitutional.\n\nAny legislative practice adopted during the pre-constitution period for undeveloped and excluded areas can have no relevancy in the determination of this point.\n\nHaving examined the provisions of the new constitution, the constitutional position of the Indian legislature under the Indian Councils Act of 1861 and of the Government of India Act, 1935, as subsequently adapted by the Indian Independence Act, 1947, may now be examined.\n\nAs already stated, the Governn1ent of India Act, 1935, envisaged a federal constitution for India with a demarcation of the legislative field between the Federation and the States and it is the scheme of this Act which has been adopted in the new constitution I have already expressed my respectful agreement with the view expressed by Varadachariar J. in Benoari Lal Sarma's case(1) that the constitutional\n\n( 1) (1943] F.C.R. 96.\n\n19S1\n\nIn re The Delhi LllwJ Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMahoj1111 J.\n\n1.951\n\n11'.re The De/hi laws Act, l9!2, etc ...\n\nMahajan.'J.\n\nposition in India under this Act approximates more closely to the American model than to the English model and it seems to me that delegation of legislative power in its essentiality is not allowed by its provisions. During a period of emergency the Governor-\n\nGeneral could himself under his own proclamation become the executive as well as the legislature and the necessities of administrative convenience were not a compelling circumstance for introducing into the scheme of the Act by implication, authority in Parliament for the delegation of legislative power. This Act also contains detailed provisions authorizing delegation of power both in the executive and legislative field wherever it was considered necessary to confer such power. fhe Indian Independence Act by section 6 co11ferred the power of legislation on the Dominion Parliament within the ambit of the Act of 1935.\n\nBy other provisions of the Indian Independence Act it made the Dominion Parliament a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of making the new constitution for India and it also gave it authority to repeal Acts of Parliament. For the purpose of ordinary law-making it had the same powers as the legislatures in India enjoyed under the Government of India Act, 1935, and the question referred to us in regard to the Ajmer-MerWara Act, 1947, has to be answered on the provisions of the constitution contained in the Constitution Act of 1935.\n\nThe constitutional pos1t1on in India prior to the Act of 1935 may now be briefly stated. Before the Charter Act of 1833 there was a division of legislative power between the Governor-General and the Prdidencies.\n\nBy that Act the power of the Presidencies as legislatures was terminated and the whole law-making power was vested in the Governor-General in Council.\n\nMr. Macaulay was added as a legislative member to the executive council without a right to vote. In substance the executive and the legislative functions were performed, by the same body, of course, with the help and advice of Mr. Macaulay.\n\nWith slight modifications the situation remained the same till the Indian Council~ Act, 1861.\n\nUnder tins Act the\n\nGovernor-General in Council in legislative meetings could legislate for the whole of India and local legislatures could also legislate for the provinces.\n\nBy section 10 of the Act the legislative power was vested in the Governor-General in Council.\n\nIn section 15 it was laid down how that power was to be exercised. For conduct of the legislative business power was given to the Governor-General to make rules in section 18.\n\nSection 22 laid down the ambit of the legislative power.\n\nSection 23 bestowed power on the Governor- General in emergencies to make ordinances.\n\nSection 44 empowered the Governor-General to create local legislatures and confer on them legislative power.\n\nIt appears that the scheme of the Councils Act was that whenever Parfiament :wanted the Governor-General in Council to have power to create legislatures or to make. rules or regulations, that power was conferred in express terms.\n\nBy another statute in the year 1870 summary power to make law was conferred on the Governor-General in his executive capacity in respect to less advanced areas, i, e., non-regulation provinces.\n\nAnother charter would not have been necessary if the Governor-General could arm himself with legislative power by a process of delegation from his own Council In my opinion, the constitution as envisaged by the\n\nIndian Councils Act, 1861, does not authorize the delegation of essential legislative power by any of the legislative autliorities brought into existence by that Act to the executive an<l it was for this reason that their Lordships of the Privy Council in Burah's case( 1 ) did not base their decision on this ground but merely upheld the enactment as intra vires on the ground of conditional legislation.\n\nI am in respectful agreement with the opinion of Markby J. expressed in the year 1877 in these terms : \"that any substantial delegation of legislative authority by the legislature of this country is void.\" The Privy Council on appeal did not dissent from this view.\n\nIt was argued that legislative practice in India since a long time has been such as would validate statutes\n\n(1) 5 I. A. 178.\n\n19.Sl\n\nMa/lajan /.\n\netc.\n\nMahajanJ.\n\ndesigned on the model of the three statutes under reference to us.\n\nReference was made to the follawing observations in U. S. v, Curtiss Wright(').\n\n\"Uniform, long continued and undisputed legislative practice resting on an admissible view of the constitution goes a long way to the direction of proving the presence of unassailable grounds for the constitutionality of the practice.\"\n\nIn my opinion, there is no evidence in this case of any uniform, long continued and undisputed legislative practice for validating statutes which have been drafted .on lines similar to the statutes in question.\n\nThe material on which this argument was based is of a most meagre character and does not warrant the conclusion contended for.\n\nAnnexure (A) annexed to the case stated on behalf of the President mentions two instances only before the year 1912 of this alleged long continued legislative practice, but even these instances are not analogous to the statutes which have been given in the reference.\n\nThe scheme of those enactments in vital matters is different from the enactments in question.\n\nThe first instance of tlis legislative practice is said to be furnished by section 5(a) which was added to the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, by Act XII of 1891.\n\nIt provided that with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council in declaring an enactment in force in the scheduled districts or in extending an enactment to a scheduled district the Local Government may declare the application of the Act subject to such restriction and modification as the Government may think fit. It is noticeable that section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act has not been drafted in the same terms as section 5 (a) of the Scheduled Districts Act. Though constitutional! y speaking, the Governor-General discharged the executive and legislative functions in meetings held separately for the two purposes and with the help of some addi6onal members, for all practical purposes the Governor-General wag truly\n\n(') 299 u.s. 304.\n\nspeaking in both executive and legislative matters the real authority in this .country, and if previous sanction of this authority was necessary before declaring the law even with modifications, this instance cannot be such as would constitute legislative practice for what I1as been enacted in section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act.\n\nThe second instance cited is of the Burma Laws Act, 1898.\n\nIn section 10 of this Act it was provided that the Local Government may, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council by notification, with such restrictions and modifications as he thinks fit, extend certain acts in force in any part of Upper Burma at the date of the extension to certain areas.\n\nIn set:tion 4 a schedule was given of all the Acts that were in force in Upper Burma at the time of the enactment.\n\nThis instance also does not furnish evidence of legislative practice for the validation of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act in which there is no provision like the one contained 'm section 4 of the Burma Laws Act, 1898, and which also contains a provision similar to section S(a) of the Scheduled Districts Act requiring the previous sandion of the Governor-General in Council.\n\nBoth these important things are lacking in the Delhi Laws Act.\n\nBetween 1861, and 1912, a period of over fifty years, two instances of this kind which occurred within seven years of .each other cannot fall within the criterion laid down in the case cited above.\n\nAfter the year 1912 three other illustrations were mentioned- The first of these is in sections 68 and 73 of the Inland Steam Vessels Act, 1917.\n\nSection 17 author'1sed modification of an enactment for the purpose of adaptation.\n\nThis certainly is no instance of the kind of legislation contained in the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, section 7, or in the Ajmer-Merwara . Act, 1947.\n\nSection 68 authorized the extension of certain chapters to certain areas with modifications.\n\nThe next instance mentioned was the Cantonments Act, 1924.\n\nBy section 9 of this Act it was provided, that the Central Government may by notification exclude from the operation of any part of this Act the\n\nIn re The Delhi LawsA.ct, 1912. etc.\n\nMahajan J.\n\nMa11ajanJ.\n\nwhole or any. part of a cantonment or direct that any provisions of this Act shall in the case of any cantonment apply with such modifications as may be so specified.\n\nThe third instance mentioned was in section 30 of the Petroleum Act, 1934.\n\nHere it was provided that the Central Government may by notification apply all or any of the provisions of this Act with such modifications as it may think fit to any other dangerous inflammable substance.\n\nThis is an instance of adding certain items to the schedule annexed to an Act.\n\nThese three instances show that between the year 1917 and 1934, a period of seventeen years, three Instances occurred of legislation, though not of the same kind as contained in the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, but bearing some similarity to that kind of legislation.\n\nNo conclusion from those instances of any uniform legislative practice can be drawn.\n\nThe learned counsel appearing for the Government of Uttar Pradesh submitted a note in which an instance is mentioned of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, III of 1901, which in section 1 of subsection (2) provided that the State Government may by notification extend the whole or any part of this Act to all or any of the areas so excepted subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit.\n\nThis instance does not materially affect the situation.\n\nAfter the research of a fortnight the learned Attomcy- General gave us a supplementary list of instances in support of his contention. Two instances contained in this list are from sections 8 and 9 of Act XXII of 1869 discussed in Burah's case('). The third instance is from section 39 of Act XXIII of 1861, again considered in that case, and these have already been discussed in an earlier part of this judgment.\n\nThe only new instance cited is from the Aircraft Act. of 1934, which authorized modification in the specifica. tion of an aircraft.\n\nIt confers no authority to modify any law.\n\nTwo instances in this list are from the Airforce Act, 1950, which was enacted subsequent to\n\n(') S I.A. 178\n\nthe enactment under reference to us and cannot be considered relevant on this subject.\n\nThe last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920, which authorizes the Governor to extend the Act with certain modfications to areas to which it originally had not been made applicable.\n\nThis instance of 1920 bears no rclevancv for determining the validity of section i of tlJt: Act of 1912, enacted eight years before this instance came into existence.\n\nA seemingly similar instance to the enactment contained in section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act is in section 8 of Act XXII of 1869, considered by the Privy Council in Burah's case(1).\n\nThat instance, however, when closelv examined, has no real resemblance to section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act.\n\nAct XXII of 1869 was enacted to remove the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of tribunals established under the General Regulations.\n\nThat was its limited purpose.\n\nBy section 5 the administration of this part was vested in the officers appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and those officers had to be under his control and were to work under his instructions.\n\nThe executive administration of this territory was, therefore, vested in the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.\n\nBy section 8 of the Act, already cited, the Lieutenant-Governor was authorized by notification in the Calcutta Gazette to extend to the excluded territories laws in force in the other territories subject to his government or laws which might thereafter be enacted by the Council of the Governor-General or the Lieutenant-Governor in respect of those territories.\n\nBoth these authorities were competent to make laws for the province of Bengal.\n\nThe validity of section 8 was not questioned in Burah's\n\ncase(2) and no argument was addressed about it.\n\nRegarding this section, however, the following observations occur in the judgment of their Lordship which were emphasized before us :-\n\n\"The Governor-General in Council has determined, m the due and ordinary course of legislation, to remove\n\n( 1) 5 I.A. 178\n\n(') 72 T. A. S7.\n\nMalzaianJ.\n\nIn re The Delhi laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMahajan/.\n\na particular district from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and offices, and to place it under new courts and offices, to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal ; leavmg it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that change shall take place; and also enabling him, not to ma!(e what laws he pleasts for that or any other district but to apply by public notification to that district any law, or part of a law, which either already was, or from time to time might be, in force, by proper legislative authority, 'in the other territories subject to his government.' The legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place ; but that it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner, of carrying it 'mto effect to the discretion of . the .Lieutenant- Governor; and. also, that the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories subject to the same Government were such as k might be fit and proper to apply to this district also.\"\n\nAll that these observations mean is that a law having been made by a competent legisla':Ure for the territory under his jurisdiction could be made applicable to a district excluded for certain purposes by a notification of the Lieutenant- Governor.\n\nAs already pointed out, the Lieutenant- Governor could make laws for the whole province of Bengal and similarly, the Governor-General in Council could do so. The law having been made by a competent legislature for the territory for which it had power .to legislate, the only power left in the Governor-General was to extend that legislation to an excluded area ; but this is not what the Del.J>i Laws Act had done.\n\nAs will be shown later, the Delhi Laws Act in section 7 has authorized the Governor-General in his executive capacity to extend to Delhi Laws made by legislatures which had no jurisdiction or competence to make laws for Delhi.\n\nHaving stated the principles on which answer has to be given to the questions referred to us, I now proceed to give my opinion on each of the three questions\n\nThe first question relates to section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and concerns its validity in whole or in part. The section as enacted in 1912 was in these terms :-\n\n\"The Governor-General in Council may by notification in the official gazette extend with such restrictions and modifications as he thinks fit to the Province of Delhi or any part thereof any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.\"\n\nThe section gives a carte blanche to the Governor- General to extend to the newly formed province any enactment in force in any part of British India at the date of the notification and not necessarily any enactment in force in British India at the date of the passing of the Delhi Laws Act.\n\nNo schedule was annexed to the Act of the enactments that were in force in any part in British India at the date of the passing of the Act.\n\nAs regards the enactments that may be in force any part of British India at the date of any notification, there was no knowing what those laws would be.\n\nLaws that were to be made after 1912, their principle and policy could not be known to the legislature that enacted section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act.\n\nIt seems obvious that the legislature could not have exercised its judgment, nor its discretion in respect of those laws.\n\nIt also conferred on the Governor-General power of modifying existing and future enactments passed by different legislatures in the country.\n\nThe power of modification implies within it the power of amending those statutes.\n\nTo use the words of a learned Judge, the section conferred a kind of a vague, wide, vagrant and uncanalised auhtority on the Goverrior-General.\n\nThere is no provision within the section by virtue of which the mind of the legislature could ever be applied to the amendment made. by the Governor-General in the different statutes passed by different legislatures in India and extended to Delhi. lS-3 s. C. India/68\n\nIn re The Delhi aws Act, 1.912,\n\netc.\n\nMahajan I.\n\nIn re Tire Delhi Law1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMahaia1t-J.\n\nIllustratively, it may be pointed out that numerous rent control Acts have been passed by different legislatures in India, laying down basically different policies and principles.\n\nThe Provincial Government under the Delhi Laws Act is authorised to apply the policy of any one of these Acts to Delhi or the policy which it might evolve by combining different such statutes passed by different State legislatures.\n\nLegislative policy in the matter of rent control had not been evolved by the year 1912.\n\nAnother illustration may be taken from the law of prohibition.\n\nDifferent State governments have adopted a policy of either .complete prohibition or of local option.\n\nWhat policy is to be apphed to Delhi and who is to decide that policy ?\n\nObviously, under section 7 the Provincial Government can without going to the legislature adopt any policy it likes, whether of partial or of complete prohibition and may apply to Delhi any law it thinks fit.\n\nIt Is obvious therefore that within the wide charter of delegated power given to the executive by section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act it could exercise essential legislative functions and in effect it became the legislature for Delhi.\n\nIt seems to me that by enacting section 7 the legislature virtually abdicated its legislative power in favour of the executive.\n\nThat, in my judgment, was not warranted by the Indian Councils Act, 1861, or by any decision of the Privy Council or on the basis of any legislative practice. The section therefore, in my opinion, is ultra vires the Indian Councils Act, 1861, in the following particulars : (i) inasmuch as it 'permits the executive to apply to Delhi laws enacted by legislatures not competent to make laws for Delhi and which these legislatures may make within their own legislative field, and (ii) inasmuch as it clothes the executive with co-extensive legislative authority in the matter of modification of laws made by legislative bodies in India.\n\nIf any list of the existing laws passed by the Governor-General in Council in his legislative capacity and of laws adopted by it though passed by other legislatures was annexed to the Act, to that exteht the delegation of power, but\n\nwithout any power of modifications in favour of the executive, might have been valid, but that is not what was enacted in section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act.\n\nPower to extend laws made in the future by the Governor- General in Council for the whole of India or adopted by it though passed later by other legislatures would also be intra vires, but farther than that the legislature could not go.\n\nIf one may say so, section 7 declares that the legislature has no policy of its own and that the Governor-General in Council can declare it and can determine what laws would be in force in Delhi.\n\nThe second question concerns section 2 of the Ajmer- Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, which provides for extension of enactments to Ajmer-Merwara.\n\nIt says :\n\n''The Central Government may by notification in the official gazette extend to the province of Ajmer- Merwara with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in any other provmce at the date of such notification\"\n\nFor the reasons given for holding that sedion 7 of the Delhi Laws Act is ultra vires the constitution in two particulars, this section also is ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935, in those particular. The section does not declare any law but gives the Central Government power to declare what the law shall be.\n\nThe choice to select any enactment in force in any province at the date of such notification clearly shows that the legislature declared no principles or policies as regards the law to be made on any subject.\n\nIt may be pointed out that under the Act of 1935 different provinces had the exculsive power of laying down their policies in respect to subjects within their own legi:slative field.\n\nWhat policy was to be adopted for Delhi, whether that adopted in the province of Punjab or of Bombay, was left to the Central Government.\n\nIllustratively, the mischlef of such law-making may be pointed out with reference to what happened in pursuance of this section in Ajmer-Merwara. The Bombay Agriculutral Debtors' Relief Act, 1947, has been\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\netc.\n\nMahajan I.\n\nextended under cover oi this section to Ajmer-Mcrwara and under the power of modification by amending the ddinition of the word 'debtor' the whole policy of the Bombay Act has been altered.\n\nUnder the Bombay Act a person is a debtor who is indebted and whose annual income from sources other than agricultural and mainly labour does not exceed 33 per cent. of his total annual income or does not exceed Rs. 500, whichever is greater. In the modified statutes \"debtor\" means an agriculturist who owes a debt, and \"agricutlturist\" means a person who earns llis livelihood by agriculture and whose income from such source exceeds 66 per cent. of his total income.\n\nThe outside limit of Rs 500 is removed.\n\nThe i=:xercise of this power amounts to making a new law by a body which was not in the contemplation of the Constitution and was not authorized to enact any laws. Shortly stated, the question Is, could the Indian legislature under the Act of 1935 enact that the executive could extend to Delhi laws that may be made hereinafter by a legislature in Timbuctoo or Soviet Russia with modifications.\n\nThe answer would be in the negative because the policy of those laws could never be determined by the lawmaking body entrusted with making laws for Delhi.\n\nThe Provincial legislatures in India under the Constitution Act of 1935 qua Delhi constitutionally stood on no better footing than the legislatures of Timbuctoo and Soviet Russia though geographically and politically they were in a different situation.\n\nThe third question concerns section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, which provides that-\n\n\"The Central Government may by notification in the official gazette extend to any Part C State (other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nlcobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restrictions or modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\"\n\nFor reasons given for answering questions 1 and 2 that the enactments mentioned ther.ein are ultra vires the constitution in the particulars stated, this question is also answered similarly.\n\nIt might, however, be observed that in this case express power to repeal or amend laws already applicable in Part C States has been conferred on the Central Government.\n\nPower to repeal or amend laws is a power which can only be exer.cised by an authority that has the power to enact laws.\n\nIt is a power co-ordinate and co-extensive with the power of the legislature itself.\n\nIn bestowing on the Central Government and clothing it with the same capacity as is possessed by the legislature itself the Parliament has acted unconstitutionally.\n\nIn offering my opinion on the questions mentioned in the reference I have approached this matter with great caution and patient attention and having in mind the rule that the benefit of reasonable doubt on questions on the constitutional validity of a statute has to be resolved in favour of legislative action.\n\nThe legislative action, however, in the enactments which are the subject-matter of the reference has been of such a drastic and wide and indefinite nature considered in its full amplitude that it is not possible to hold that in every particular these enactments are constitutional.\n\n1951 - lnre The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc.\n\nMahajan 1.\n\nMuKHERJEA J.-This is a reference made by the Mukherjea/.\n\nPresident of India, under article 143(1) of the Constitution, inviting this court to consider and report to him its opinion on the three following questions :-\n\n( 1) Was section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or - any of the provisions thereof, and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act ?\n\n(2) Was the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, or any of the provisions thereof, and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act ?\n\n(3) Is section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act , 1950, or any of the provisions thereof, and in what\n\nIn re The Ddhl Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMu/ch.erjea J.\n\nparticular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires\n\nthe Parliament ?\n\n. The necessity of seeking the advisory opinion of this Court is stated. to have arisen from the fact that because of the decision of the Federal Court in /atindra Nath Gupta V• The Province of Bihar('), which held the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, ultra vires the Bihar Provincial Legislature, by reason of its amounting to a delegation of its legislative powers to an extraneous authority, doubts have arisen regarding the validity of the three legislative provisions mentioned above, the legafity of the first and the second being actually called in question in certain judicial proceedings which are pending before some of the High Courts in India.\n\nThe Delhi Laws Act, 1912, which is the earliest of the enactments referred to above, was passed in 1912 by the Goveronr-General in Council at its legislative meeting, . that being the legislature constituted for British India at that time, under the proVisions of the group of statutes known as Indian Councils Acts (1861- 1909).\n\nDelhi, which up till the 17th of September, 1912, w:ts a part of the province of the Punjab, was created a Chief Commissioner's Province on that date and on the following date the Governor-General's Legislative Council enacted the Delhi Laws Act (Act XIII) 1912 which came into force on and from the 1st of October, 1912.\n\nSection 7 of the Act, in regard to which the controversy has arisen, provides as follows :-\n\n\"The Provincial Government may, by notification irt the official gazette, extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, to the province of Delhi or any part thereof any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.\"\n\nThe Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act was enacted on the 31st December, 1947, by the Dominion\n\n(I) [1949-50] F.C.R 595.\n\nLegislature of India under the provisions of the Government of Indian Act, 1935 (as adapted under the Indian Independence Act of 1947).\n\nSection 2 of the Act is in the following terms :-\n\n\"2. Extension of enactments to Aimer-Merwara, -The Central Government may by notification in the official gazette extend to the province of Ajmer- Merwara with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in any other province at the date of such notification.\"\n\nPart C States (Laws) Act, 1950, bas been enacted by the Indian Parliament after the new Constitution came into force and the provision of section 2 of the Act to which the dispute relates is worded thus :-\n\n\"2. Power to extend enactments to certain Part C States.-The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend to any Part C State\n\n(other than Coorg and . the Andaman and . Nicobar Islands) or to any part of such State with mcb restrictions and modifications as it thinks . fit any ' enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification; and provision may be rnadt in .any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that in all the three items of legislation, mentioned above, there has been, what may be described, as conferment by the legislatures which passed the respective enactments, to an outside authority, of some of the powers which the legislative bodies themselves could exercise ; and the authority in whose favour the delegation has been made has not only been empowered to extend to particular areas the !aws which are in force in other parts of India but has also been given a right to introduce into such laws, any restrictions or modifications as it thinks fit.\n\nThe controversy centres round the point as to whether such delegation was or is within the competency of the particular legislature which passed these enactments.\n\n111 re The Delh Laws Act, l91i;\n\netc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n19SI\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nThe contention of the learned Attorney-General, who represents the President of India, in substance is that a legislature which is competent to legislate on a particular subject has the competence also to delegate its legislative powers in respect of that subject to any agent or external authority as it thinks proper.\n\nThe extent to which such delegation should be made is entirely a matter for consideration by the legislature itself and a court of law has no say in the matter.\n\nThere could be, according to the learned Attorney- General, only two possible limitations upon the exercise of such right of delegation by a competent legislative body.\n\nOne is that the legislature cannot abdicate or surrender its powers altogether or bring 'into existence a new legislative power not authorised by the constitutional instrument The second is that if the constitutional document has provided for distribution of powers amongst different legislative bodies, one legislature cannot delegate, to another, powers, which are vested in it, exclusively under the Constitution.\n\nIt is argued that, save and except these two limitations, the doctrine of inhibition of delegation by legislative authority has no place in a Constitution modelled on the English system which does not recognise the principle of separation of powers as obtains in the American syst:em.\n\nThese questions are of great constitutional importance and require careful consideration.\n\nIn America the rule of inhibition against delegation of legislative powers is based primarily upon the traditional American doctrine of \"separation of powers.\" Another principle is also called in to aid in support of the rule, which is expressed in the wellknown maxim of Private Law, \"delegatus non potest delegare\", the authority for the same, being based on one of the dicta of Sir Edward Coke.\n\nThe modern doctrine of \"separation of powers\" was a leading tenet in the political philosophy of the 18th century.\n\nIt was elaborated by Montesquieu 'in his \"L'esprit des lois\" in explanation of. the English political doctrine and was adopted, in theory at least in all its fulncss and\n\nrigidity by the constitution-makers of America.\n\nThe constitution of America provides for the separation of the governmental powers into three basic divisions-.- the executive, the le.slative, and the judicial-and the powers appertaining to each department have been vested in a separate body of public servants.\n\nIt is considered to be an essent'lal principle(1) underlying the constitution that powers entrusted to one department should be. exercised exclusively by that department without encroaching upon the powers confided to others.\n\nAs is said by Cooley,(2) \"The different classes of power have been apportioned to different departments ; and as all derive their authority from the same instrument, there is an implied exclusion of each department from exercising the functions conferred upon the others.\"\n\nThe other doctrine that it invoked in suppon of the anti-delegation rule is the well accepted principle of municipal law, which prevents a person upon. whom a power has been conferred, or to whom a mandate has been given, from delegating his powers to other people.\n\nThe legislature is supposed to be a delegate deriving its powers from . the 'people' who are the ultimate repository of all powers, and hence it is considered incapable of transferring such powers to any other authority.\n\nThese doctrines, th01igh well recognised in theory, have a restrlcted and limited application in actual practice.\n\nMr. Justice Story said{8)-\n\n\"But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of Government and maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense.\n\nIt is not meant to allirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon\n\n(1) See Kilbourn v. Thomson, 103 U.S. 168 at p. 190.\n\n(2) See Cooley's \"Constitutional Limitations\", 7th Edition,\n\npage126.\n\n(3) Story's Constitution, s. 525.\n\nIn~ 71te Dellri Lows Act, l91l,\n\netc.\n\nMuklerjea I.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nthe other, in the slightest degree.\n\nThe true meaning . is that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments : and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of free constitution.\"\n\nAs regards the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, its origin and theoretical basis are undoubtedly different from those of the doctrine of separation of powers.\n\nBut, for practical purposes, both these doctrines are linked together and are used as arguments against the Congress attempting to invest any other authority with legislatlve powers.\n\nAccording to Willis, the disability of the Congress to delegate its legislative powers to the executive, purports to be based upon the doctrine of separation of powers ; while its incapacity to bestow its authority upon an 'independent body like a Board or Commission is said to rest on the maxim delegatur non potest delegare(' )·\n\nAs said above, a considerable amount of flexibility was allowed in the practical applicafion of these theories even from early times.\n\nThe vast complexities of social and economic conditions of the modern age, and the ever growing amount of .complicated legislation that is called for by the progressive social necessities, have made it practically impossible for the legislature to provide rules of law which are complete in all their details.\n\nDelegation of some sort, therefore, has become indispensable for making the law more effective and adaptable to the varying needs of society.\n\nThus in America, despite the theory which prohibits delegation of legislative power, one .comes across numerous rules and regulations passed by non-legislative bodies in exercise of authority bestowed on them by the legislature ln some shape or other.\n\nThe legislature has always been deemed competent to create a municipal authority and empower it to make by-laws.\n\nIn fact, such legislation is based upon the immemorial\n\n(!) Willis on Constitutional Law, P' 136.\n\nAnglo-Saxon practice of leaving to each local com- µiunity the management and control of local affairs.\n\nThe Congress can authorise a public officer to make regulations, or the Judges of the Court to frame rules of procedure which are binding in the same way as laws proper.\n\nIt can authorise some other body to determine the conditions or contingencies under which a statute shall become operative and can empower administrative functionaries to determine facts and apply standards. \"The separation qf powers between the Congress and the Executive\", thus observed Cardozo, J. in his dissenting judgment in Panama Refining Company v. Ryan(1), \"is not a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pc:dantic rigour.\n\nThere must be sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of adjustment in response to the practieal necessities of Government which cannot foresee today the developments of tomorrow in their nearly infinite variety\".\n\nIn fact, the rule of non-delegation has so many exceptions engrafted upon it that a well known writer(2) of constitutional law has tersely expressed that it is difficult to decide whether the dogma or the exceptions state the rule correctly.\n\nIt does not admit of any serious dispute .that the doctrine of separation of powers has, strictly speaking no place in the system of government that India has at the present day under her own Constitution or which she had dm'ing the British rule.\n\nUnlike the Amencan and Australian Constitutions, the Indian Constitution does not expressly vest the different sets of powers in the different organs of the State.\n\nUnder article 53(1), the executive power is indeed vested in the President, but there 'is no similar vesting provision regarding the legislative and the judicial powers.\n\nOur Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British Parliamentary system, the essential feature of which is the responsibility of the executive to the legislature The President, as the head of the executive, is to act on the advice of the Council of\n\n(1) 293 U.S. 388 at 440. (2J See Willis on Consitutionl Law, p; 137.\n\nIn re The Dehfi Llw8 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nIn re The De/Ir Law• Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMuklrerfea J.\n\nMinisters, and this Council of Ministers, like the British Camnet, is a \"hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the State to the executive part\".\n\nThere could undoubtedly be no question of the executive being responsible to the legislature in the year 1912, when the Delhi Act XIII of 1912 was passed, but at that time it was the executive which really dom'inated the legislature, and the idea of a responsible government was altogether absent.\n\nIt was the Executive Council of the Govemor- General which together with sixty additional members, of whom 33 were nominated, constituted the Govemor- General' s Legislative Oxmcil and had powers to legislate for the whole of . Bfitish India.\n\nThe local legislatures in the provinces were constituted in a similar manner.\n\nThe first advance in the direction of responsible government was made by the Government of India Act, 1919, which introduced dyarchy in the provinces.\n\nThe Government of India Act, 1935, brought in Provincial autonomy, and ministerial responsibility was established in the provinces subject to certain reserved powers of the Governor.\n\nIn the Centre the responsibility was still limited and apart from the discretionary powers of the Governor-General the Defence and External Affairs were kept outside the purview of ministerial and legislative control.\n\nThus whatever might have been the relation between the legislature and the executive in the different constitutional sets ups that existed at different periods of Indian history since the advent of British rule in this country, there has never been a rigid or institutional separation of powers in the form that exists in America.\n\nThe maxim de/egatus non potest delegare is sometimes spoken of as lying down a rule of the law of agency ; its ambit is certainly wider than that and it is made use of in various fields of law as a doctrine which prohibits a person upon whom a duty or office\n\nhas devolved or a trust has been imposed from delegating his duties or powers to other persons.\n\nThe\n\nintroduction of this maxim into the constitutional field cannot be said to be altogether unwarranted, though its basis rests upon a doubtful political doctrine.\n\nTo attract the application of this maxim, it is essential that the authority attempting to delegate its powers must itself be a delegate of some other authority.\n\nThe legislature, as it exists in India at the present day, undoubtedly is the creature of the Indian Constitution, which defines its powers and lays down its duties ; and the Constitution itself is a gift of the people of India to themselves But it is not a sound political theory, that the legislature acts merely as a delegate of the people.\n\nThis theory once popularised by _Locke and eulogized , by early American writers is not much in favour in modern times. With regard to the Indian Legislature as it existed in British days constituted under the In&an Councils Act, it was definitely held by the Judicial Committee in the well-known case of Queen v. Burah(1 ) that it was in no sense a delegate of the British Parliament.\n\nIn that case the question arose as to the validity of section 9 of Act XXII of 1869 passed by the Governor-General's Legislative Council.\n\nThe Act provided that certain special laws, which had the effect of excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court, should apply to a certain district known as Garo Hills, and section 9 empowered . the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to extend the operation of these laws to certain other areas if and when the Lieutenant-Governor, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, would declare that they should be so applied. The majority of the Judges of the Calcutta High Court upheld the contention of the respondent, Burah, that the authority conferred on the Lieutenant-Governor to extend the Act in this way was in excess of the powers of the Governor-General in Council, and 'in support of this view, one of the learned Judges relied inter alia upon the principles of the law of agency.\n\nThis view was negatived by the Judicial Committee, and Lord Selborne, in delivering the judgment, observed as follows :-\n\n(1) S I.A. 178.\n\nIn re The De/Iii l6ws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nlnre The De/hi Law• Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMukher/ea J.\n\n\"The Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can, of course, do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers.\n\nBut when acting within those littlits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament but has, and was intended to havt;, plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself\".\n\nPractically the same observations were reiterated by the. Judiial Committee in the case of Hodge v. The Queen(') while describing the position of the Provincial Legislature under the Canadian Constitution and stress was laid upon the plenitude of power which such Legislature could exercise when acting within the limits prescribed for it by the Imperial Parliament.\n\nI am quite willing to concede that the doctrine -0f separation of powers cannot be of any assistance to us in the solution of the problems that require consideration Jn the present .case.\n\nIn my opinion, too much importance need not also be attached to the maxim delegatus non potest delegare. although as an epigrammatic saying it embodies a general principle that it is not irrelevant for our present purpose.\n\nBut even then I am unable to agree with the broad proposition enunciated by the learned Attorney-General that a legislative power per se includes within its ambit a right for the legislative body to delegate the exercise of that power in any manner it likes to another person or authority.\n\nI am unable also to accept his contention that in this respect the authority of the Indian Legislature is as plenary as that of the British Parliament, and, provided the subject-matter of legislation is not one outside the field of its legislative competence, the legislature in India is able to do through an agent anything which it could do itself.\n\nIt is to be noted that so far as the British Parliament, is concerned, there is no constitutional limitation upon its authority or power.\n\nIn the words of Sir (I) 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\nEdward Coke(1), \"the Power and jurisdiction of Parliament is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds..................\n\nIt hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, abrogating, repealing, reviving and expounding of laws .................. this being the place where that absolute despotic power which must in all governments reside somewhere is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms.\" The British Parliament cannot only legislate on any subject it likes and alter or repeal any law it likes, but being both \"a legislative and a constituent assembly\", it can change and modify the so-called constitutional laws and they can be changed by the same body and in the same manner as ordinary laws ; and no act of the Parliament can be held to be unconstitutional in a British Court of Law.(2)\n\nThis sovereign character was not, and could not be, predicated of the Legislative Council of British India as it was constituted under the Indian Councils Act, even though it had very wide powers of legislation and within the scope of its authority could pass laws as important as those passed by the British Parla ment( 3).\n\nIt is not present also in the Indian Parliament of the present day which is a creature of the Indian Constitution and has got to exercise its legislative powers with'in the limits laid down by the Constitution itself.\n\nActing in its ordinary capacity as a legislative body, the Indian Parliament cannot go beyond the Constitution or touch any of the Constitutional or fundamental laws, and its acts can always be questioned in a court of law.\n\nConsequences of great constitutional importance flow from this difference and they have a material bearing on the question before us.\n\nThe contention of the learned Attorney-General in substance is that the power of delegation of legislative authority without any limitation as to its extent is\n\n(1) See Coke's Fourth Institute, P• 36.\n\n(2) See Dicey's Law of the Constitution, p. 88 (9th Editition).\n\n(3) See Dieey's Law of the Consitution, p. 99 (9th Edition).\n\netc.\n\nMMkherjea J.\n\n1\"1\n\nIa,.\n\nTA. Delh L,,,.. Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nM\"\"\"4rJea I.\n\nimplicit in the excricse of. the power itself, and in support of his contention he refers to the unrestricted rights of delegation which are exercised by the British Parilament.\n\nBut the validity or invalidity of a delegation of. legislative power by the British Parliament is not and cannot be a constitutional question at all in the United Kingdom, for the Parliament being the omnipotent sovereign is legally competent to do any thing it likes and no objection to the constitutionality of its acts can be raised in a court of law.\n\nTherefore, from the mere fact that the British Parliament exercises unfettered rights of delegation in respect of its legislative powers, the conclusion does not follow that such right of delegation is an inseparable adjunct of the legislative power itself.\n\nThe position simply is this that is England, no matter, to whichever department of the powers exercisable by the British Parliament the right of delegation of• legislative authority may be attributed-and there is no dispute that all the sovereign powers are vested in the Parliamentno objection can be taken to the legality of the exercise of such right.\n\nBut in India the position even at the present day is different.\n\nThere being a written constitutions wllich defines and limits the rights of the legislature, the question whether the right of delegation, either limited or unlimited, is included within, and forms an integral part of, the right of legislation is a question which must be answered on a proper interpretation of the terms of the Constitution itself.\n\nWe need not for this purpose pay any attention to the American doctrine of separation of powers; we must look to the express language of our own Constitution and our approcah should be to the essentfal principles underlying the process of law-making which our Constitution envisages.\n\nAccording to the Indian Constitution, the power of law-making can be exercised by the Union Parliament or a State Legislature which is to be constituted in a particular manner and the process of legislation has been described in detail in various articles(1 ).\n\nPowers have been given to the President\n\n(1) Vide Articles 107 and Ill ; 196 IO 20U.\n\nin article 123 and to the Governor of a State under article 213 to promulgate Ordinances during recess of the respective legislatures.\n\nSpecific provisions have also been made for exercise of the legislative powers by the President on proclamation of emergency and in respect of Part D territories. Law-making undoubtedly is a task of the highest importance and responsibility, and, as our Constitution has entrusted this task to particular bodies of persons chosen in particular ways, and not only does it set up a machinery for law-making but regulates the methods by which it is to be exercised and makes specific provisions for cases where departure from the normal procedure has been sanctioned, the prima f acie presumption must be that the intention of the Constitution is that the duty of law-making is to be performed primarily by the legislative body itself.\n\nThe power of the Parliament to confer on the President legislative authority to make laws and also to authorise the President to delegate the power so conferred to any other authority has been recognised only as an emergency provision in article 357 of the Constitution.\n\nSave and except this, there is :no other proviston in the Constitution under which the legislature has been expressly authorised to delegate its legislative powers. \"It is a well-known rule of construction that if a statute directs that certain acts shall be done in a specified manner or by certain . . persons, then . performance in any other manner than that specified or by any other persons than those named is impliedly prohibited (1) .\" It has been observed by Baker in his treatise on \"Fundamental Laws\" that quite apart from the doctrine of separation of powers, there are other cogent reasons why legislative power cannot ht delegated. \"Representative government\" thus observes the learned author,{2) \"vests in the persons chosen to exercise the power of voting taxes and enacting laws, the most important and sacred trust known to civil government.\n\nThe representatives of the people are\n\n( 1) Vide Crawford's Statutory Construction, p. 334 ..\n\n(') Baker's Fundamental Laws, Vol. L p. 287. 16-3 S.C. India/68\n\n111 re The Delh Law3 Act, 1912. etc.\n\nMukheriea J.\n\n/11r~ Te De/i lAws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\n~ Mukherjeo J.\n\nrequired to exercise wise discretion and a sound judgment, having due regard for the purposes and the needs of the executive and judicial department, the ability of the taxpayer to respond and the general public welfare.\n\nIt follows as a self-evident proposition that a responsible legislative assembly must exercise its own judgment.\" In the same strain ate the observations made by Cooley in his \"Constitution Law\"(') that the reason against delegation of power . by the legislature is found in the very existence of its own powers. \"This high prerogative has been entrusted to rts own wisdom, judgment and patriotism, and not to those of other persons, and it will act ultra vires if it undertakes to delegate the trust instead of executing it\".\n\nThe same considerations are applicable with regard to the legiSlative bodies which exercised the powers of law-making at the relevant periods when the Delhi Laws Act of 1912 and the Ajmer-Merwara Act of 1947 were enacted. Under the Indian Councils Act, 1861, the power of making laws and regulations was expressly vested in a distinct body consisting of the members of the Governor-General's Council and certain additional members who were nominated by the Govcmor- Gencral for a period of two years.\n\nThe number of such additional members which was originally from 6 to 12 was increased by the subsequent amending Acts and under the Indian Councils Act of 1909, it was fixed at 60, of which Tl were elected and the rest nominated by the Governor-General.\n\nIt was this legislative body that was empowered by the Indian Councils Act to legislate .for the whole of British India and there were certain local legislatures in addition to this in some of the provinces.\n\nSection 18 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861 empowered the Governor-General to make rules for t:he conduct of business at meetings of the Council for the purpose of making .laws; section 15 prca:ribe.d the quorum necessary for such meetings and further provided that the seniormost ordinary member could preside in the absence oi. the Governor-General.\n\nThis was\n\n(') Vidc Pourtb Edition, p, 138.\n\nthe normal process of law-making as laid down by the Indian Councils Act.\n\nSpecial provisions were made for exceptional cases when the normal procedure could be departed from.\n\nThus section 23 of the Act of 1861 empowered the Governor-General to make ordinances having the force of law in case of urgent necessity; and later on under section 1 of the Indian Councils Act of 1870 the executive government was given the power to make regulations for certain parts of India to which the provisions of the section were declared to be applicable by the Secretary of State.\n\nBesides these exceptions for which specific provisions were made, there is nothing in the parliamentary Acts passed during this period to suggest that legislative . powers could be exercised by any other person or authority except the Legislative Councils mentioned above.\n\nThe Ajmer-Merwara Act was passed by the Dominion Legislature constituted under the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted under the Indian Independence Act of 1947.\n\nThe provisions of the Constitution Act of 1945 in regard to the powers and functions of the legislative bodies were similar to those that exist under the present Constitution and no detailed reference to them is necessary.\n\nThe point for consideration now is that if this is the correct position with regard to exercise of powers by the legislature, then no delegation of legislative function, however small it might be, would be permissible at all. . The answer is that delegation of legislative authority could be permissible but only as ancillary to, or in aid of, the exercise of law-making powers by the proper legislature, and not as a means to be used by the latter to relieve itself of its own respons'ibility or essential duties by devolving the same on some other agent or machinery.\n\nA constitutional power may be hd.d to imply a power of delegation of authority which is necessary to effect its purpose ; and to this extent delegation of a power may be taken to be implicit in the exercise of that power. This is on the principle \"the everything necessary to the exercise ci a power\n\n19Sl\n\netc.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nelc.\n\nMukherjta I.\n\nis implied in the grant of the power.\n\nEverything necessary to the effective exercise of legislation must, therefore be taken to be conferred by the Constitution within that power.\"(').\n\nBut it is not open to the legislature to strip itself of its essential legislative function and vest the same on an extraneous authority.\n\nThe primary or essential duty of law-making has got to be discharged by the legislature itself ; delegation may be resorted to only as a secondary or ancillary measure.\n\nQuite apart from the decisions of American courts, to some of which I will refer presently, the soundness of the doctrine rests, as I have said already, upon the essential principles involved in our written Constitution.\n\nThe work of law-making should be done primarily by the authority to which that duty is entrusted, although such authority , can employ an outside agency or machinery for the purpose of enabling it to discharge its duties properly and effectively ; but it can on no account throw the responsibility which the Constitution imposes upon it on the shoulders of an agent or delegate and thereby practically abdicate its own powers.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General in support of the position he took up placed considerable reliance on the observations of the Judicial Committee in the case of Queen v. Burah(\"), which I have referred to alr, ady and which have been repeated almost in identical language in more than one subsequent pronowicement of the Judicial Committee.\n\nThe Privy Council made those observations for the purpose of clearing up a misconception which prevailed for a time in certain quarters that the Indian or the Colonial Legislatures were mere agents or delegates of the Imperial Parliament, and being in a sense holders of mandates from the latter, were bound to execute these mandates personally.\n\nThis conception, the Privy Council pointed out, was wrong.\n\nThe .Indian Legislature, or for the matter of that the Colonial Parliament .could, of course, do nothing beyond the limits\n\n{') Per O'Connor J. in Baxter v. All Way 8 C.L, R. 626 at 637.\n\n'I.A. 178.\n\n, >\n\n, { ' '\n\nprescribed for them by the British Parliament.\n\nBut actinl{ withln these limits they were in no sense agents of another body and had plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as those of the Parliament itself.\n\nIt should be noted that the majority of the Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Queen v.\n\nBurah(1) proceeded on the view that the impugned provision of Act XXII of 1869 was not a legislation but amounted to delegation of legislative power and Mr. Justice Markby in his judgment relied expressly upon the doctrine of agency.\n\nThis view of Mr. Jus&ce Mukby was held to be wrong hy the Privy Council in the observations mentioned above and as regards the first and the main point the Jucficial Committee pointed out that the majority of the Judges of the High Court laboured under a mistaken view of the nature and principles of legislation, for as a matter of fact nothing like delegation of legislation was attempted in the case at all.\n\nIt seems to me that the observations relied on by the Attorney-General do not show that in the opinion of the Privy Council the Indian Legislative Council had the same unrestricted rights of delegation of legislative powers as are possessed by the British Parliament. If that were so there was no necesshy of proceeding any further and the case could have been disposed of on the simple point that even if there was any delegation of legislative powers made by the Indian Legislative Council it was quite w_ithin the amblt of its authority.\n\nIn my opinion, the object of making the observations was to elucidate the character in which the Indian Legislative Council exercised its legislative powers.\n\nIt exercised the powers in 'its own right and not as an agent or delegate of the British Parliament.\n\nIf the doctrine of agency is to be imported, the act of the agent would be regarded as the act of the principal, but the legislation passed by the Indian Legislature was the act of the Legislature itself acting witlfin the ambit of its authority and not of the British Parliament, although it derived its authority from the latter. This view has been clearly\n\n( 1) SI.A. 178.\n\n.19Sl\n\n111 re The De/ii Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMuk\"llerjea /.\n\nI• re Tire Delhi Low1Act,1912,\n\netc.\n\nMuklieriea J.\n\nSUPREME COUllT REPO.RTS [1951]\n\nexpressed by Rand J. of the Supreme Court of Canada while the learned Judge was speaking about the essential character of. the legislation passed by the legislative bodies in Canada(').\n\nThe observations of the learned Judge are as follows :-\n\n\"The essential quality of legislation enacted by these bodies is that it is deemed to be the law of legislatures of Canada as a self-governing political organization\n\nand not law of Imperial Parliament.\n\nIt was law within the Empire and law within the Commonwealth, but it is not law as if enacted at Westminster, though its source or authority is derived from that Parliament.\" It should be noted further that in their judgment in Burah's case(2) the Privy Council while dealing with the matter of delegated authority was fully alive to the implications of a written constitution entrusting the exercise of legislative powers to a legislature constituted and defined in a particular manner and 4nposing a disability on such legislature to go beyond the specific cotttutional provisions.\n\nJust after stating that the Indian Legislature was in no sense a delegate of the Imperial Parliament the Privy Council observed : \"The Governor-General in Council could not by any form of an enactment .create in India and arm with legislative authority a new legislative power not created and authorised by the Councils Act\n\nAlmost in the same strain were the observations of the Judicial Committee in In re The Initiative anti Referendum Act, 1919 (3 ) ; and while speakmg about\n\nthe powers of the Provincial Legislature under the Canadian Act of 1867 Lord Haldane said :\n\n\"Section 92 of the Act of 1867 entrusts the legislative power in a province to its legislature and to that legislature only.\n\nNo doubt a body with a power of legislation on the subjects entrusted to 'it so ample as that enjoyed by the provincial legislature in Canada could, while preserving its own capacity intact, seek\n\n(') See Attorney-Genera/ of No1•a Scotia •· Attof'.lle)'Genercl •I Canada, (1950) 4 D.L.R., 369 atp. 945.\n\n(') 5 I.A. 178. (') (1919) A. C. 935 at p. 945.\n\nthe assistance of subordinate agencies as had been done when in Hodge v. Queen(1) the legislature of Ontario was hdd entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissi<>-\n\nners authority to. enact regulations relating to taverns; but it does not follow thit it can create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence.\"\n\nIt s not correct to say that what these observations contemplate is a total effaement of the legislative body on surrender of all its powers in favour of another authority not recognised by the constitution. Such a thing is almost outside the range of practical consideration. 'fhe observations of Lord Haldane quoted above make it quite clear that his Lordship had in mind the distinction between \"seeking the assistance of a subordinate agency. in the framing of rules and regulations which are to become a part of the law,\" and \"conferring on another body the essential legislative function which under the constitution should be exercised by the legislature itself.\" The word \"abdication\" is somewhat misleading, but if the word is to be used at all, it is not necessary in my opinion to constitute legal abdication that the legislature should extinguish itself completdy and efface itself ou~ ci the pages of constitution bequeathing all its rights to another authority which is to step into its shoes and succeed to its rights. The abdication contemplated here is the surrender of essential legislative authority even in respect of a particular subje, t-matter of legislation in favour of another person or authority which is not empowered by the constitution to exercise this fu\"nction.\n\nI will now attempt to set out in some detail the limits of permissible delegation.. in the matter of making laws, with reference to decided authorities.\n\nFor this purpose it will be necessary to advert to some of the more important cases on the subject decided by the highest courts of America, Canada and Australia. We have also a number of pronouncements of the Judicial Committee in appeals from India and the Colonies.\n\nI confess that no uniform view can be gathered from\n\n(') 9App.Cas.l17.\n\nIn re The De/ffi . Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nIn re The Delhi laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMwkherjea J,\n\nthese decisions and none could possibly be expected in view of the fact that the pronouncements emanate from Judges in different countries acting under the influence of their respective traditional theories and the weight of opinion of their own courts on the subject.\n\nNone of these authorities, however, are binding on th; s court and it is not necessary for us to make any attempt at reconciliation.\n\nWe are free to accept the view which appears to us to be well-founded on principle and based on sound juridical reasoning.\n\nBroadly speaking, the question of delegated legislati01• has come up for consideration before courts of law in two distinct classes of cases.\n\nOne of tbese classes comprise,; what is known as cases of \"conditional legislation,\" where according to the generally accepted view, the element of delegation that is present relates not to any legislative function at all, but to the determination of a contingency or event, upon the happening of which the legislative provisions are made to operate.\n\nThe other class comprises cases of delegation proper, where admittedly some portion of the legislative power has been conferred by the legislative body upon what is described as a subordinate agent\n\n01 authority. I will take up for . consideration these two types of cases one after the other.\n\nIn a conditional legislation, the law is full and complete when it leaves the legislative chamber, but the operation of the law is made dependent upon the fulfilment of a condition, and what is delegated to an outside body is the authority to determine, by the exercise of its own judgment, whether or not the condition has been fulfilled. \"The aim of all legislation\", said O'Conner J. in Baxter v. Ah Way(') \"is to project their minds as far as possible into the future and to provide in terms as general as possible for all contingencies likely to arise in the application of the law. But it is not possible to provide s1Jecific:illy for all cases and therefore legislation from the very earliest times, and particularly in more\n\n(') 8 c.L.R. 626 at 637.\n\n....\n\nmodern times, has taken the form of conditional legislation, leaving it to some specified authority to determine the circumstances in which the law shall be applied or to what its operation shall be extended, or t11e particular class of persons or goods or things to which it shall be applied.\" In spite of the doctrine of £eparation of powers, this form of legislation is wellrecognised in the legislative practice of America, and is not considered as an encroachment upon the anti-delegation rule at ail.\n\nAs st:ited in a leading Pennsylvania case('), \"the legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delgate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend.\n\nTo deny this would be to stop the wheels of Government.\n\nThere are many things upon which wise .and useful legislation must depend, which cannot be known to the law-making power and must, therefore, .be a subject of inquiry and determination outside the halls of legislation.\"\n\nOne of the earliest pronouncements of the judicial Committee on the subject of conditional legislation is to be found in Queen v. Burah(2). In that case, as said, already, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal was given the authority to extend all or any of the provisions contained in a statute to certain districts at such time he considered proper by notification in the official gazette. There was no legislative act to be perfo1 med by the Lieutenant-Governor himself. The Judicfal Committee observed in their judgment=-\n\n\"The proper legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, persons, laws, powers, and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to those things.\n\nThe conditions being fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute.\"\n\nJust four years after this decision was given, the case of Russell v. The Queen( 3 ) came up before the\n\n( 1) Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491.\n\n(I) SI.A. 178.\n\n(') 7 App. Cas. 829.\n\netc.\n\nMukherjea, J.\n\n19SI\n\nlit,, he De/hi L11ws A.ct, 1912, etc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nJudicial Committee.\n\nThe subject-matter of dispute in that case was the Canadian Temperance Act of 1878, the prohibitory and penal provisions of which were to be operative in any county or city, only if upon a vote of the majoritv of the electors of that county or city favouring such a course the Governor-General by Order in Council declared the relative part of the Act to be in force. One of the contentions raised before the Judicial Committee was that the provision was void as amounting to a delegation of legislative authority to a majority of voters in the city or county. This contention was negatived by the Privy Council, and the decision in . Queen v.\n\nBurah(') was expressiy relied upon. \"The short answer to this question,\" thus observed the Judicial Committee, \"is that the Act does, not delegate any legislatlive power whatsoever.\n\nIt 'contains within itself the whole legislation on the matter with . which it deals. The provision that certain parts of the Act shall come into operation only on the petition of a majority of electors does not confer authority or power to legislate. Parliament itself enacts the condition and everything which is to follow upon the condition being fulfilled. Conditional legislation of this kind is in many cases convenient and is certainly not unusual and the power so to legislate cannot be denied to the Parliament of Canada when the subject of legislation is within its competency.\"\n\nThe same principle was applied by the Judici; tl Committee in King v. Benoari Lal Sarma(2). In that case, the validity of an emergency ordinance by the Governor-General of India was challenged inter alia on the ground that it provided for setting up of special criminal courts for particular kinds of offences, but the actual setting up of the courts was left to the Provincial Governments which were authorised to set them up at such time and place as they considered proper.\n\nThe Judicial Committee held that \"this is not delegated legislation at all. It is merely an example of the not uncommon legislative power by which the local application of the provisions of a statute is determined\n\n(') SI.A. 178\n\n(•J 72 LA. 57,\n\nby . the judgment of a 1ocal administrative body as to it! necessity.\"\n\nThus, conditional legislation has all along been treat.ed in judicial pronouncements not to be a species of delegated legislation at all. It comes under a separate category, and, if in a particular case all the elements of a conditional legislation exist, the question does not arise as to whether in leaving the task of determining the condition to an outside authority, the legislature acted beyond the scope of its powers.\n\nI now come to the other and more important group of cases where admittedly .a portion of the law-making power of the legislature is conferred or bestowed upon a .subordinate authority and the rules and regulations which are to be framed by the latter constitute an integral portion of the statute itself.\n\nAs said already, it is within powers of Parliament or any competent legislative body when legislating within its legislative field, to confer subordinate administrative and legislative powers upon some other authorities.\n\nThe question is : what are the limits within which such conferment or bestowing of powers could be properly made? It is conceded by the learned Attorney-General that the legislature cannot totally abdicate its functions and invest another authority with all the powers of legislation which it possesses. Subordinate legislation, it is not disputed, must operate under the control of the legislature from which it derives its authority, and on the continuing operation of which, its capacity to function rests.\n\nAs was said by Dixon\n\nJ. (1) \"a subordinate legislation cannot have the independent and unqualified authority which is an attribute of true legislative power.\" It is pointed out by this learned Jud.15e that several legal consequences flow from this doctrine of subordinate legislation. An offence against subordinate legislation is regarded as an offence against the statute and on the repeal of the statute the regulations automatically collapse.\n\nSo far, the propositions cannot, and need not, be disputed. BQt,\n\n( 1) Vide Victoria Stevedoring and General Contrting Co.mpany\n\nv. Dignan, 46 C.L.R- 13 at 102.\n\n/11 re Tire Delh Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nJn re Th De/hi Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\naccording to the learned Attorney-General all that i1 necessary m subordinate legislation is that the legislature should not totally abdicate its powers and that it should retain its control over the subordinate agency which it can destroy later at any time it likes. If this is proved to exist in a particular case, then the character or extent of the powers delegated to or conferred upon such subordinate agent is quite immaterial and into that question the courts haYe no jurisdiction to enter.\n\nThis argument seems plausible at first sight, but 011 closer examination, I find myself unable to accept it as sound. In my opinion, it is not enough that the legislature retains control over the subordinate agent and could recall him at any time it likes, to justify its arming the delegate with all the legislative powers in regard to a particular subject.\n\nSubordinate legisla:ion not only connotes the subordinate or dept:n- <lent character of the agency which is entrusted with the power to legislate, but also implied the subordinate or ancillarv character of the legislation itself. the making of which such agent is entrusted with. If the legislature hands over its essential legislative powers to an outside .authority, that would, in my opinion amount to a virtual abdication of its powers and such an act would be in excessof the limits of permissible ddegation.\n\nThe essential legislative function consists in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. It is open to the legislature to formulate the policy as broadly and with as little or as much details as it tl1inks proper and it may delegate the rest of the legislative work to a subordinate authority who will work out the details within the framework of that policy. \"So long as a policy is laid down and a standard established by statute no constitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination d facts to which the legislation is to apply\" (1 ).\n\nVicic Sch<chter Poullr1 Corp. v. Uniud State•, 295 U.S. 49~\n\nThe Supreme Court of America has held in more cases than one that the policy of the law-making body and .the standards to guide the administrative agency may be la.id down in very broad and general terms. It is enough if the legislature lays down an intelligible principle which can be implemented by the subordinate authorities for specific cases or classes of cases(1). The Court has been exceedingly loath to find violation of this principle and in fact there are, only two cases, viz., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan(\") and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.(3) where the federal legislation was held invalid on the ground that the standard laid down by the Congress for guiding administrative discretion was not sufficiently definite.\n\nIn Panama Refining Co. v.\n\nRyan(2) Chief Justice Hughes very clearly stated \"that the Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is invested.\" \"In every case,\" the learned Chief Justice continued, \"in which the question has been raised the court has recognised that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend ...... We think that section 9(c) goes beyond those limits; as to transportation of oil production in excess of state permission the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard has laid down no rule.\n\nThere is no requirement, no definition of circumstances anJ conditions in which the transportation is to be . allowed or prohibited.\" Mr. Justice Cardozo differed from the majority view in this case and held that a reference express or implied to the policy of Congress as declared in section 1 was a sufficient definition of a standard to make the statute valid. \"Discretion is not unconfined and vagrant\" thus observed the learned Judge. \"It is confined within banks that keep it from overflowing.\"\n\nIt is interesting to note that in the latter case of Schechter Poultry Corporation(3), where the legislative power w~~ held to b~ unconstitutionally delegated by the prov1s1on of section 3 of the National Industrial\n\n( 1) Vide J. w. Hampton v. U.S. 276 U.s. 394. (') 293 u.s. 388\n\n(1) 295 u.s. 495,\n\nCiC.\n\nMukherjee, J.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nRecovery Act of 1933 as no definite standard was set up or indicated by the legislature, Cardozo J. agreed with the opinion of the Court and held that the delegated power of legislation which had found expression\n\nin that Code was not canalised within banks but was unconfined and vagrant. \"Here in the case before us\" thus observed the learned Judge, \"is an attempted ddegation not confined to any single act nor to any class or group of acts identified of described by reference to a standard.\n\nThis is delegation running riot.\n\nNo such plenitude of powers is capable of transfer\".\n\nAs said above, these are the only two cases up till now in which the statutes of Congress have been declared invalid because of delegation of essential legislative powers.\n\nIn the later cases the court has invariably found the standard established by the Congress sufficiently definite to satisfy the prohibition against delegation of legislative powers, and in all such cases a most liberal construction has been put upon the enactment of the legislature( 1).\n\nWe are not concerned with the actual decisions in these cases.\n\nThe decisions are to be valued in so far as they lay down any principles. The manner of applying the principles to the facts of a particul.ar case is not at all material. The decisions referred to above clearly lay down that the legislature cannot part with its essential legislative function which consists in declaring its policy and making it a binding rule of conduct. A surrender of this eS10Cntial function would amount to abdication of legislative powers in the eye of law.\n\nThe policy may be particularised in as few or as many words .as the leglature thinks proper and it is enough if an intelligent guidance is given to the subordinate authority.\n\nThe Court can interfere if no policy is discernible at all or the delegation is of such an indefinite character as to amount to abdication, but as the discretion vests with the legislature in determining whether there is necessity\n\n(1) Sec Opp Cotton Mills v. AdminisfraJor of Wages, 312; U.S. 126; Yaku> v. United StnteJ, 321 U.s. 414; American Pr. & Lt. Co. v. Securi ties and Exchange Comntisnon, 329 U.s. 90for delegation or not, the exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed by the court except in clear cases of abuse. These I consider to be the fundamental principles and in respect to the powers of the legislature the constitution:il position in India approximates more to the American than to the English pattern.\n\nThere is a basic difference between the Indian and the British Parliament in this respect.\n\nThere is no constitutional limitation to restrain the British Parliament from assigning its powers where it will, but the Indian Parliament qua legislative body is fettered by a written constitution and it does not possess the sovereign powers of the British Parliament. The limits of the powers of delegation in India would therefore have to be ascertained as a matter of construction from the provisions of the Constitution itself and as I have said the right of delegation may be implied in the exercise of legislative power only to the extent that it is necessary to make the exercise of the power effective and complete. It is said by Schwartz in his work on American Administrative Law \"that these doctrines enable the American courts to ensure that the growth of executive power necessitated by the rise of the administrative process will not be an uncontrollable one.\n\nDelegation of powers must be limited ones-limited either by legislative prescription of ends and means, or even of details or by limitations upon the area of the power delegated. The enabling legislation must, in other words, contain a framework within which the executive action must operate\"(1).\n\nIt would be worthwhile mentioning in this connectlon that the report of the Committee on Ministers' Power recommended something very much similar to\n\nthi~ Aerican doctrine as a proper check on delegated leg1slaaon.\n\nThe report says that \"the precise limits of a law-making power which Parliament intends to confer on a Minister should always be expressly defined in clear language by the statute which confers it, when discretion is conferred its limits shou\\d be defined with\n\n{') Scbwrtz'• American Administrative Law, p. 22.\n\n19.51\n\nIn re The De/hi laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMukherjeo J.\n\netc.\n\nMukherjeQ J.\n\nequal clearness\"(').\n\nIt is true that what m America is a question of vires and is subject to scrutiny by courts, in the United Kingdom it is a question of policy having a purely political significance.\n\nBut the recommendation of the Committee would clearly indicate that the rules laid down and acted upon by the American Judges particularly is later years can be supported on perfectly clear and sound democratic principles.\n\nI will now advert to the leading Canadian and Australian cases on the subject and see how far these decision lend support to the principles set out above.\n\nMany of these Canadian cases, it may be noted, went up on appeal to the Judicial Committee.\n\nI will start with the case of Hodge v. The Queen(') which came up before the Judicial Committee on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in the year 1883. The facts of the case are quite simple. The appellant was convicted for permitting and suffering a billiard table to be used and a game of billiard to be played thereon in violation of a resolution of the License Commissioners who were authorised by the Liquor License Act of 1877 to enact regulations regulating the use of taverns, with power to create offences aild annex penalties thereto. One of the questions raised was whether the Ontario Legislature could delegate powers to the License Commissioners to frame regulations by which new offences could be created.\n\nThe Privy Council agreed with the High Court in holding that the legislature . for Ontario was not in any sense exercising delegated authority from the Imperial Parliament and it had full authority to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make by-laws or resolutions as to subject specified in the enactment and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation and effect. It was observed :-\n\n\"Such an authority is ancillary to legislation; ...... the very full and very elaborate judgment of the\n\n(') Vide Report, page 65. (') 9 App. Cas. H7.\n\n...\n\nCourt of Appeal contains abundance of precedents for the legislature entrusting a limited discretionary authority to others and as many illustrations of its necessity and convenience.\"\n\nIt will be seen that what was delegated by the Ontario Legislature to the License Commissioners was simply the power to regulate tavern licenses.\n\nThere was no question of parting with subSitantial legislative powers in this case.\n\nBut although the Privy Council stated clearly that the Ontario legislature was quite supreme within its own sphere\n\nad enjoyed the same authority as the Imperial or the Dominion Parliament, they described the power delegated as authority ancillary to legislation and expressly referred to the \"abundance of precedents for the legislature entrusting a limited discretionary authority to others.\" There was no necessity for the Privy Council to use the guarded language it used if in fact the Ontario legislature had the same right of delegaing its powers as the British Parliament. It would be pertinent to note that Davey, Q.C., who appeared for the Crown in support of the judgment appealed against, did not contend before the Privy Council that the Ontario legislature had full rights of delegation like the British Parliamentary and consequently its acts could not be challenged as unconstitutional. His argument was that in this case there was no delegation of legislative authority and what was delegated was only the power to make by-laws. By legislative authority the learned Counsel apparently meant the essential legislative function as distinguished from the power to make rules and regulations and the arguments implied that the essential legislative powers could not be delegated at all.\n\nThe case of Powell v. Appollo Candle Co.(1) is the next case in point of time which has a bearing on the question before us. That case came up on appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and the question arose whether section 133 of\n\n(!) 10 App. Cas. 232. 17-3 S. C. India/68\n\nMukhe1jea J.\n\n19$1\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912 etc.\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nthe Customs Regulation Act of 1879 of the Colony, was or was not ultra vires . the Colonial legislature.\n\nThe attack on the validity of the legislation was inter alia on the ground that it conferred upon the Government power to levy duty on certain articles which in the opinion of the Collector were substituted for other dutiable articles.\n\nThe question was whether such power could be validly conferred.\n\nThe Privy Council had no difliculty in holding that the provision was perfectly valid and it was quite within the competence of the Colonial legislature which was in no sense a delegate of the Imperial Parliament, to confer a discretion of this character on the executive for the purpose of making the statute properly effective.\n\nThe policy of the law as well as the main principles were laid down in the Act itself. What was left to the executive was a power to enforce the provisions of the Act more properly and effectively by levying duties on articles which could be used for similar purposes as the dutiable articles mentioned in the statute.\n\nThe . legislature itself laid down the standard . and it was sufficiently definite to guide the executive officers.\n\nI now come to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in In re Gray(') which was decided during the first world war. The Dominion War Measures Act, 1914, passed by the Dominion Parliament of Canada empowered the Governor-General to make \"such regulations as he may, by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war ........ deem necessary Or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada\"; and the question arose• whether such transfer of power was permitted by the British North America Act.\n\nThe Supreme Court decided by a majority of four to two that the Act was valid, though the Judges who adopted the majority view were not unanimous regarding the reasons upon which they purported to base their decision.\n\nThe Chief Justice was of the opinion that there was nothing in the Constitutional Act which so far as material to the question\n\n(I) S7 C. C.R. UO.\n\nunder consideration would impose any limitation on the authority of the Parliament of Canada to which the Imperial Parliament was not subject Anglin J. referred to the decision in Hodge v. The Queen(1) (supra) in the course of his judgment. He seemed to think that the British North America Act did not contemplate complete abdication of its legislative powers by the Dominion Parliament, but considered such abdication to be something so inconceivable that the constitutionality of an attempt to do anything of that kind was outside the range of practical consideration. Apparently the learned Judge gave the expression \"abdication\" a very narrow meaning. The opinion of Duff J. was much the same, and he considered that there was no abandonment of legislative powers in this case, as the powers granted could at any time be revoked and anything done thereunder nullified by the Parliament.\n\nIdington and Brodeur JJ. dissented from this majority view.\n\nThis decision was followed in the \"Reference in the Matter of the Validity of the Regulations in Relation to Chemicals Enacted by the Governor-General of Canada under the War Measures Act\", which is to be found reported in 1943 S.C.C. 1.\n\nIn this case the question raised related to the validity of certain regulations made by an Order in Council in terms of the powers conferred upon the Governor in Council by the War Measures Act and the Department -0£ Munitions and Supply Act. It was held that with the exception of paragraph 4 of the Order in Council the rest of the Order was no ultra vires. It appears from the report that in this case it was not disputed before the court that powers could be delegated by the legislature to the Governor in Council under the War Measures At. The question raised was whether the Governor in Council could further delegate his powers to subordinate agencies.\n\nThe question was answered in the affirmative, the reason given being that the power of delegation being absolutely essential in the circumstances for which the War Measures Act has been designed so as to have a workable. Act, the power,\n\n(I) 9App. Caa.117.\n\netc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n1951 .\n\nlrt ft Tire Delhi u.,,, Aet, 1912 etc.\n\nlll•khe\"Jea J.\n\ndelegated must be deemed to form part of the powers conferred by Parliament in the Act.\n\nThese are war time decisions and it is apparent that the doctrine of delegation has been pushed too far in the Chemical Reference case.\n\nIn In re Gray(') the learned Chief Justice at the conclusion of his judgment expressly stated that the security of the country was the supreme law against which no other law could prevail. I agree with the Attorney-General that the competency of the Parliament to legislate could not be made dependent upon the fact as to whether the law was a war time or a peace time measure. But on the other hand, it is possible to argue that in a legislation passed by a Parliament in times of war when the liberty and security of the country are in jeopardy, the only policy which the legislature can possibly formulate is the policy of effectively carrying on the war and this necessarily implies vesting of all war operations in the hands of the executive. There appears to be considerable substance in the observations made by Dixon J. (2) that \"it may be considered that the exigencies which must be dealt with under the defence powers are so many, so great and so urgent and so much the proper concern of the executive that from its very nature the power appears by necessary intendment to authorie delegation otherwise generally forbidden by the legislature.\" It may be mentioned here that the deci- sion in In re Gray(') was sought to be distinguished in a subsequent Canadian case on the ground that in case of emergency it was possible to pass legislation of this sort by taking recourse to the residuary powers conferred on the Dominion Parliament by section 91 of the North America Act(8).\n\nIn point of time, the case of In re The Initiative and Referendum Act(') comes immediately after that of In\n\nre Gray('). The dispute in this case related to an Act\n\n{I) 57 S. C.R. ISO.\n\n(~)Vide Victoria Stevedoring and General Contracting Co. v. D/glfon, 46 C. t.ll. 73 at p. 99.\n\n(3) Vide Ctdit Jo'roncier v. Rol8, (1937) 3 n.x..R. 365;-\n\n(,) 11919) A~\"C; 935,\n\npassed by the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, which provided that laws may be made and repealed by the direct vote of the electors of the Province at large. The Privy Council held the Act to be ultra vires primarily on the ground that it would compel the Lieutenant- Governor of the Province to submit a proposed law to a body of voters totally different from the legislature of which he is the constitutional head and render him powerless to prevent it from becoming an actual law if approved of by the voters.\n\nTowards the end of the judgment, Lord Haldane made the observation which I have referred to already, and it clearly shows that in the opinion of the Judicial Committee, while it was open to the Provincial Legislature in Canada to seek the assistance of subordinate agencies in the matter of enacting regulations it did not follow from that that it could create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owed its existienq:.\n\nThis observation unmistakably indicates that in Canada where there is a written constitution, the legislature, though it has otherwise plenary authority, is not entitled to confer unfettered legislative capacity on other bodies although it can take the help of subordinate agencies in the matter of framing regulations.\n\nThe case that next demands our attention is that of Credit Froncier v. Ross(1). The controversy in this case centered round the validity of section 12 of the Alberta Reduction and Settlement. of Debts Act, and the legality of the section was impeached on the ground that it conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor the power to declare from time to time that any kind or description of debt was a debt to which the Act would not apply. The Court of Appeal held the provision to be ultra vires as it constituted an unwarranted delegation of legislative authority to the Lieutenant-Governor Harvey C.J. after quoting a passage from the judg ment of the Privy Council in Hodge v. The Queen (supra), observed as follows ;-\n\n{I) (1937) 3 O.L.R .365.\n\n19Sl\n\nI• re Tire Dellti Law1 Act, 1912\n\n•tc.\n\nlnre The Delhi Law1 Act,1912\n\netc.\n\nMukherJ<a J.\n\n\"It is apparent that the authority to make regu. lations in order to Jilllke legislation enacted by the legislaure completely effective is quite a dilfererit thing from authority to Jilllke an independent rnact, ment. This is not ancillary to legislation but is legislation itself.\" Referring next to the case of In re Gray, the learned Judge further observed.:-\n\n\"It is urged that . •he decision of the Supremc Court in In re Gray' ( 42 D.L.R. 1) supports the view that. the section is intra vires. In that case, there had undoubtedly .been legislative authority to the Governor.\n\nGeneral .. in Council. But, as pointed out, that was a case of emergency. and urgency.\n\nIt was war measure and it has more than once been pointed out by the Judicial Committee that in such a_ case the residuary power conferred by section 91 up0n the Dominion Parliament may be resorted to. This is neither a wartime measure nor is it Dominion legislation. So, the case cited would appear to have iio application.\"\n\nThis decision, if I . may say so, fully bears out the view that I have indicated above. It would be seen that in this case the power conferred on the Lieutenant- Governor could be recalled at any time and yet the delegation of powers was held to be bad.\n\nThe only other Canadian case which should be mentioned in this connection is that of Re Natural Products Marketing Act 1937('), which went up for final decision before the Judicial Committee. The Natural Products Marketing Act, which was passed by the legislature of British Columbia conferred upon the Lieutenant.-Governor in Council the power . to establish marketing boards for the control and regulation of transportation, packing and marketing of natural p~ ducts within the Province.\n\nIt was a sort of skeleton legislation, moulded on an analogous English statute.\n\nManson J. declared the impugned provision to be ultr11 llires but his decision was set aside by the Court of Appeal.\n\nThe argument that the legislature illegally delegated its function to the Lieutenant-Governor in\n\n(I) (1937)4 D.L.R. 298.\n\nCouncil because it passed only the skeleton of an Act leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to clothe it with flesh and blood and thereby abdicating its function was repelled by the appellate court and Martin C.J. obstirved : \"the answer to the .submission depends upon the language . of the statute and all that l can say is that after reading the whole statute it does not\n\nsupport the argument.\"\n\nThus, in substance what was decided was that there was no delegation of real legislative powers, and what was conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor in Council\n\nwas the authority to make rules and regulations in conformity with the standard and policy which . the statute itself laid down and for the purpose of making the law complete in all its aspetts.\n\nAn appeal was taken from this decision to the Privy Council(1), and the Privy Council dismissed the appeal agreeing with the reasons given by Martin C.J. in his judgment in the Court of Appeal. \"Within its appointed sphere.\" thus observed the Judicial Committee, \"the Provincial Legislature is as supreme as any other Parliament, and it is unnecessary to cry to enumerate the innumerable occasions in which legislaturrs, both Provincial and Dominion and Imperial, have entrusted various persons and bodies with similar powers to those contained in the Act.\" The Judicial Committee, though reiterating its previous . decision about the supremacy of the Dominion Parliament, did really base their decision on the reasons given by Martin C.J. , in the Court of Appeal. The conclusion must therefore necessarily be tl1at there is a rule against grant of essential legislative power but the rule was not violated in the present instance.\n\nIt remains to notice two more devisions which are of the High Court of Australia.\n\nThe first of these. is the case of Baxter v. Ah Way(2) and the point raised there related to the validity of certain provisions of the Customs Act, 1901.\n\nThe Act specifically prohibited\n\n(I) Vi4e Sha11non v. Lower Mainland Dairy Product~ Board, [1938) A.c.1os;\n\n(2) 8 C, L. R. 626.\n\nlnre The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 eic.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\n111 re The D•llti Law:1 Act, 191!\n\netc.\n\nthe importation of certain goods and gave a power to the Governor-General in Council to include, by proclamation, other goods in the category of prohibited imports.\n\nIt was held that although prohibition of imports was a legislative act, there was no delegation of legislative authority aQd the pbwer given to the Governor-General in Council was in the nature of conditional legislation.\n\nThe Chief Justice observed in his judgment that unless the legislature was prepared to lay down once and for all a list of prohibited goods, they must have power to make prohibition depending upon a condition and the condition may be the coming into existence or discovery of some fact.\n\nThe duty of ascertaining such fact can very well be left to an outside body.\n\nIt may be stated here that the legislation in this case did not fully comply with the requirements of a conditional legislation.\n\nWhat was left to the executive was not to determine any condition or contingency upon the happening of which the legislation was to be operative, but they were to add to the list of prohibited imports in the exercise of their own judgment; The decision, however, can be supported certainly on the principle of subordinate legislation as discussed already. The policy was declared with sufficient clearness and the standard was also laid down by enumeration of certain specified articles.\n\nThe executive officer was simply to make additions to the list of prohibited imports by applying the same standard.\n\nThe other case is that of Victoria Stevedoring and General Contracting Company v. Dignan('). The controversy in this case was in regard to the validity of section 3 of the Transport Workers Act, 1928-29, which purported to confer upon the Governor-General the power of making regulations not inconsistent with the Act with respect to the employment of transport workers and in particular for regulating the engagement, service and discharge of such workers, and the licensing of persons engaged as transport workers and sevcr21\n\n(I) 46 C. L. R. 73.\n\nother matters.\n\nIt was held by the High Court that it was within the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament to confer upon the Governor-General the power to. make such regulations. There could be no doubt about the correctness of this decision, for the power that was conferred upon the Governor-General was only to make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and in regard to matters which were fully described in the legislation itself. That the Governor-General was given large discretion in the matter of initiating industrial policy was really immaterial so long as . the regulations were within the policy chalked out by the legislature. The case was actually decided on the authority of a prior decision of the Cpurt in Roche v. Kronheimer(1) • There are observations of diverse character in the judgment of the learned Judges, though all of them concurred in holding that the case was concluded by earlier authorities.\n\nThe Chief Justice and Mr.\n\nJustice Starke seem to be of opinion that there was no real delegation of legislative powers in this case and even if there was, no prohibition against such delegation could be urged on the ground of separation of powers which was not accepted in its rigidity in the Australian Commonwealth except in regard to the judiciary. The learned Judges referred in course of their judgment to the decision of . Baxter v. Ah Way(2) though that case was decided on a different principle altogether.\n\nRich J. regarded Roche v. Kronheimer( 1 ) as authorit.y for the proposition that an authority of subordinate law-making might be invested in the executive. Dixon J. discussed the doctrine of separation of powers and also the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare in an elaborate manner and his conclusion was that delegation was permissible, though he did not speak of any limits within which such right was to be exercised. The learned Judge observed, however, that \"this does not mean that a law confiding authority to the. executive will be valid, however, extensive or vague\n\n(I) 29 C.L. R.329.\n\n(2) 8 C.L.R. 626.\n\nline Tiie Delhi LllWI Act, 1912 etc.\n\nMuklierjea J.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nthe subject-matter may be, if it docs not fall outside the boundaries of Federal power. There may be such a width or such an uncertainty of the subject-matter to be handed over that the enactment attempting it is not a law with respect to any particular head or heads of legislative power.\" Evatt J. seemed to be doubtful as to whether this power of law-making in respect of a particular item in the legislative list carries with it the power of delegating legislative powers in respc€t of the same, Thus \"section 51 ( 1) of the Constitution,\" observed the learned Judge \"operates as a grant of power to the Commonwealth Parliament to regulate !he\n\nsubject of inter-state trade and commerce but the grant itself would not be truly descrid as being a law with respect to inter-state trade and commerce.\" It was said further \"the greater the extent of law-making power conierred, the less likely is it that the enactment will be a law with respect to any subject-matter assigned to the Commonwealth Parliament.\" It is diflicult fo gather any uniform or consistent principle from the discussions appearing in the judgments of the several learned Judges.\n\nBut the actual decision, as I have said already, can be supported on the principle which I have attempted to formulate.\n\nIn my op1mon, barring a few exceptions the decisions of the various courts set out above do lend a fair measure of support to the view I have taken.\n\nThe exceptions really relate to cases where under War Measures Acts delegation of almost unlimited powers of legislation to the executive has been upheld by court< of law.\n\nI have. alreadv said how these decisions have been sought to be justified . on exceptional grounds.\n\nAt any rate, there is no necessity of introducing this strained interpretation of law in our country, for under the Indian Constitution adequate provisions have been made in express terms to meet the emergencies of war and other extraordinary circumstances and not only the President has been empowered to make law after a proclamation of emergency has been issued, but he can be given authority to delegate such powe..rs to his subordinate offic.ers\n\nalso('). On a consideration of all these decisions I have no hesitation in holding that as . regards constitution ality .1)f the delegation of legislative powers the Indian Legislature cannot be in the same position as the omni.: potmt British Parliament and how far delegation is permissible has got to be ascertained in India as a matter of construction from the express provisions of the Indian Constitution. It cannot be said that an unlimited right of delegation is inherent in the legislative power itself.\n\nThis is not warranted by the provisifilnb of the . Constitution and the legitimacy of dde.gatioa depends entirely upon its being used as an andllary measure which . the legislature considers to be necessary for the purpose of exercising its legislative powers effectively and completely.\n\nThe legislature , must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions which consist in declaring the legislative policy and laying down the standard which is to be enacted into a rule of law, and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation which by its very nature is ancillary to be statute which delegates the power to make it. Provided the legislative policy is c1)Unciated with sufficient dearness or a standard laid clown the courts cannot and should not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legi~ lature itself in determining the extent of delegation necessary in a particular case.\n\nThese, ih my opinion, are the limits within which delegated leislation is constitutional provided of course the legislature i~ competent to deal with and legislate on the particulai subject-matter. It is in the light of these principles that I propose to examine the constitutional validity of the three legislative provisions in respect to which the reference has been made.\n\nI will begin with section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act and the first thing for consideration is whether the subject-matter of this . legislation is one upon which the Governor-General's Legislative Council, as it existed in t.he year 1912, was competent to legislate under the terms of the Indian Councils Acts from which it\n\n( l) Vide Article 357 of the Colllititution.\n\n19.Sl\n\nIn.re The De 1.Qws Act, 1912\n\netc.\n\nMukherje11 J,\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nderived its powers. As has been stated already, Delhi, which was a part of the Province of Punjab, was detached from the latter and became, as the Imperial enclave, a separate province by a notification issued on the 17th 0£ September, 1912.\n\nThis small area was placed under a Chief Commissioner. The existing laws were continued under section 2 of the Delhi Laws Act and section 7, as it stood originally, was worded as follows:-\n\n\"The Governor-General in Council may by notification in the Gazette of India extend, with such restrictions and modifications as he thinks fit, to the territory mentioned in Schedule A or any part thereof arty enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.\"\n\nNow, the powers of the Governor-General in Council arc r.xercised by the Provincial Government which, so far as a Chief Commissioner's Province is concerned, means the Central Government and the words \"Province of Ddhi\" have been substituted for the expression \"territ.ory mentioned in Schedule A\" which was the description of the Delhi Province at that time.\n\nThe position, therefore, is that the section conferred upon the Governor-General in Council the power to make suitable choice out of the enactments which were actually in force in any other part of British India at the time when the notification was issued and extend the same with such restrictions and modifications as it thought fit to the Province of _Delhi or any part of it. In 1912 the Government in India was unitary in its character and there was nothing like distribution of powers between the Central and the Provincial Legislatures or an enumeration of the topics in respect to which legislation could be made, Section 22 of e Indian Councils Act, 1861, provided that \"the Governor-General in Council shall have power at meetings for the purpose of making laws and regulations .. , .......... , ........ to make laws and regulations for repealing, amending, or altering any laws or regulations whatever now in force or hereafter to be in force in the Indian territories now\n\nunder the Dominion of Her Majesty, and to make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British or native, foreigners or others for all courts of justice whatever, and for all places and things whatever within the said territories ........ \" There were certain conditions annexed to the exercise of these powers by means of a number of provisos but these conditions are not material for our present purpose.\n\nIt seems, therefore, that the legislative powers given to the Governor-General's Legislative Council were couched in the widest language possible, and as no specific subject-matter of legislation was mentioned legislation could extend to all subjects touching any person, place or thing within the Indian territory.\n\nThe Delhi Laws Act obviously related to a particular place or area, namely, the Province or Delhi and\n\natfectd persons who were residents within that area; and as to its subject-matter it must be held to comprise everything that formed the subject-matter of any enactment in force in British India at the time when any notification under section 7 was issued. Having regard to the language of section 22 of the Indian Councils Act, 1861, and the almost unlimited powers conferred on the Governor-General's Legislative Council, it is, I think not possible to say that the legislature was incompetent to legislate on the matter. To quote the language of the Judicial Committee in Queen\n\nv. Burah(1) what was done was legislation within the scope of the affirmative words used by the constitutional instrument which gave the power and it -violated no express condition or restriction by which that power was limited.\n\nThe question now arises whether there was an unwarrant.able delegation of legislative powers to the executive government. If the competent legislature had framed a statute and left it to an outside authority to extend the operation of the whole or al!Y part of it, by notification, to any particular area, it would certainly be an instance of conditional legislation as discussed above and no question of delegation would really arise.\n\nThe position\n\n(l) S I. A, 178 at P• 194.\n\nl?Sl\n\nl1tre The Delh Law1 Act; 1912\n\netc.\n\nMMlclter/ea /.\n\n19,1\n\nJn r~ Tlie .Delhi Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nwould not be materially different, if instead of framing a statute, the legislature had specified one or more existing statutes or annexed them by way of a schedule fo the Act and had given authority to a subordinate or administrative agency to enforce the operation of any one of them at any time it liked to a particular area. It could still be said, in my opinion, that in such circumstances the proper legislature had exercised its judgment already and the subordinate agency was merely to determine the condition upon which the provisions already made could become operative in anv particular locality.\n\nThe difficulty in applying the principle of conditional legislation to the present case is in reality created by two circumstances.\n\nIn the first place, the Central Government was given the power to extend to the Province of Delhi not only any enactment which was in force at the time when . the Delhi Laws Act was passed, but any law which might come into force in future, although at the time when the Act was passed the legislature could not possibly apply its mind to such future legislation. The other circumstance is that the Central Government was given the right not merely to extend either wholly or in part the provisions of any enactment in force in any other part of India to the Province of Delhi but it could introduce these provisions with such modifications and restrictions as it considered proper. 'the question is whether these facts indicate a surrender of the essential powers of legislation by the legislature. The point does not seem to be altogether free from difficulty, but on careful consideration I am inclined to answer this question in the negative. As I have already said, the essential legislative power consists in formulating the legislative policy and enacting it into a . binding rule of law. With the merits of the legislative policy, the court of law has no concern. It is enough if it is defined with sufficient precision and definiteness so as to furnim sufficient guidance to the executive officer who has got to work it out. If there is no vagueness or indefiniteness in the formulation of the policy, I do not think that a court of law has got any say in the matter.\n\nThe\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME OOURT REPORTS 1001\n\npolicy behind the Delhi Laws Act seems to be that in a small area like Delhi which was constituted a separate province only recently and which had neither any local legislature of its own nor was considered to be of sufficient size or importance to have one in the near future, it seemed to the legislature to be quite fit and proper that the laws validly passed and in force: in other parts of India should be applied to such area, subject to such restrictions and modifications as might be necessary to make the law suitable to the local conditions.\n\nThe legislative body thought fit that the power of making selection from the existing statutes as to the suitability of any one of them for being applied to the Province of Delhi, should rest with the Governor-General in Council which was considered to be the most competent authority to judge the necessities and requirements of the Province.\n\nThat this was the policy is apparent from several other legislative enactments which were passed prior . to 1912 and which would show that with regard to areas which were backward or newly acquired or extremely small in size aqd in which it was not considered proper to introduce the regular legislative machinery all at once, this was the practice adopted by the legislature at that time.\n\nAct XXII of 1869, which was the subject-matter of controversy before the Judicial Committee in Queen v.\n\nBura/1(1) may be mentioned as one of the earliest instances of this type of legislation. This Act was passed by the Governor-General's Legislative Council and the primary object, as laid down in section 4 of the Act, was to remove a district known as Garo Hills which was peopled by aboriginal tribes from the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and Criminal Judicature and from the control of the offices of revenue constituted by the regulations of the Bengal Code and other Acts of the legislature then or theretofore established in British India and from the law prescribed for such Courts and offices by such regulations and Acts.\n\nSection 5 provided that the administration of civil and\n\nCl) SJ, A.178.\n\nInr~ The Delhi.\n\nLaw1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nIn rt The De/hi law• Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\ncriminal justice within the same territory was to vest in such officers as the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal might from time to time appoint.\n\nSection 8, which i$ the section material for our present purpose, further laid down that the Lieutenant-Governor \"may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend to the said territory any law, or any portion of any law now in force in the other territories subject to his Government, or which may hereafter be enacted by the Council of the Governor-General, or of the said Lieutenant-Governor, for making laws and regulations, and may on making such extension direct by whom any powers or duties incident to the provisions so extended shall be exercised or performed.\" Then came section 9 which enabled the Lieutenant-Governor to extend these provisions to the Jaintia and Naga Hills and to so much of the Khasi Hills as formed part of British India.\n\nThe Privy Council held, as stated already, that the 9th - section of the Act conferring power upon the Lieutenant-Governor to determine whether the Act or any part of it should be applied to a certain district, was a form of conditional legislation and did not amount to delegation of legislative powers. In course of their judgment the Judicial Committee referred also to the provision of section 8 set out above and observed that the provision did not enable the Lieutenant-Governor to make what legislation he pleased, but he was only to apply by public notification to that district any law or part of law which either already was or from time to time might be in force by proper legislative authority in the other territories subject to his Government.\n\nThe implication clearly is that section 8 also did not amount to conferring of any legislative power upon the Lieutenant- Governor. Section 8, it is to be noted, not only authorised the Lieutenant-Governor to extend any existing legislation into the territories specified in the Act, but also any legislation which might come into existence in future.\n\nIt can be said, therefore, that a policy could be enunciated with regard to the extension\n\nof future legislation also.\n\nThe provision of section 8 of Act XXII of 1869 was, however, not on all fours with that of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act and there are two material points of difference between them. In the first place, there was no power of modification given to the Lieutenant-Governor under Act XXII of 1869 and in the second place, the laws to be extended under the provision of section 7 of that Act were laws which were in force in the other territories subject to the administration of the. Lieutenant-Governor himself.\n\nIn 1874 an Act known as the Scheduled District Act was passed by the Governor-General's Legislative Council.\n\nThe expression \"Scheduled District\" or \"backward tracts\" corresponds to what were subsequently described as \"excluded\" or \"partially excluded areas\" in Chapter V of the Government of India Act, 1935, and there being a substantial element of aboriginal population in these areas the .policy pursued by the Government was not to make the general rules of law and procedure obtaining in other pa$ of the country applicable to them. Under section 5 of this Act, the loC:al government with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council was authorised from time to time bv notification in the official gazette to . extend to any . of the scheduled districts or to any part of any such district any enactment which was in force in any part of British India at the date of such extension.\n\nSection 5 (a) further provided as follows :-\n\n\"In .......... extending an enactment to a scheduled district or part thereof under section 5 of this Act the local government with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council may declare the operation of the enactment to be subject to such restrictions and modifications as that Government thinks fit.\" Thus the two sections takeri together would be almost identical with the provision of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, and the power of extension conferred on the local .government applied to . statutes prevailing in anv part of British India and not onlv in the 13-3 S.C. Ind ia/68\n\n19S1\n\nln re The Delhi Lows Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMukherjea /,\n\nlnre T.6e Delhi Laws A.ct, 1912, etc.\n\nMukherfea I.\n\nterritories subject to the administration of that local government.\n\nAnother instance of this class of legislation is furnished by the Burma Laws Act, 1898, and section 10\n\n( 1) of that Act ran as follows :-\n\n\"The local government with the previous sanction of the Governor-General may, by notification in the Burma Gazette, extend with such restncuons and modifications as it thinks fit to all or any of . the Shan Estates or to any specified local area in the Shan Estate any enactment which is in force in any part of Upper Burma at the date of the extension.\"\n\nThis legislation also is on all fours with the Delhi Laws Act, though the choice of the executive government in the matter of extending the laws was confined to the statutes in force in Upper Burma alone.\n\nThough the instances are not many, yet they do furnish evidence of a legislative practice which is also noticed in a number of instances subsequent to the passing of the Delhi Laws Act. At any rate, it gives an indication of the policy which underlines such enactments, and it would be no unconstitutional delegation if the executive government is entrusted to do any\n\nad within the framework of that policy. Of course the delegate cannot be allowed to change the policy declared by the legislature and it cannot be given the power to repeal or abrogate any statute.\n\nThis leads us to the question as to what is implied in the language of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act which empowers the Central Government to extend any statute in force in any other part of British India to the Province of Delhi wih such \"modifications and restrictions\" as it thinks fit. The word \"restrictions\" does not present much difficulty.\n\nIt connotes limitation imp<>Sed upon a particular provision so as to restrain its application or limit its scope.\n\nIt does not by any means involve any change in the principle. It seems to me that in the context, and used along with the word \"restriction\" the word \"modification\" has been employed also in a cognate sen.~ and it does not involve any\n\nmaterial or substantial alteration.\n\nThe dictionary meaning of the expres&ion \"to modify\" is to \"tone down\" or \"to soften the rigidity of the thing\" or \"to make partial changes without any radical alteration.\" It would be quite reasonable. to hold that the word \"modification\" in section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act means and signifies changes of such character as are necessary to make the statute which is sought to be extended suitable to the local conditions of the province. I do not think that the executive government is entitled to change the whole nature or policy underly- 1ing any parficular Act or take different portions from different statutes and prepare what has been described before us as \"amalgam\" of several laws. The Attorney- General has very fairly admitted before us that these things would be beyond the scope of the section itself and if such changes are made, they would be invalid as contravening the provision of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, though that is no reason for holding section 7 itself to be invalid on that ground.\n\nIn the case of /atindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar(1), I held in concurrence with some of my learned colleagues that to \"modify\" as statute amounts to performing a legislative act and this was not disputed by the learned Counsel appearing for the Province of Bihar.\n\nI held also that the conferring of a power to modify an Act cannot be supported on the principle of conditional legislation, and I see no reason to differ from the opinion which I expressed on that occasion.\n\nAlthough modificatlion of a Statute is an exercise of :legislative function, whether confe:rring of such power could, in_ the circumstances of a particular case and having regard to the provisions of a particular statute regarding the nature of tihe modification to be made, be regarded as delegation of ancillary authority to a subordinate agency was not a question raised before - us in /atindra Nath Gupta's case(1) and was not considered at all.\n\nIt is not profitable to discuss for purposes of this case whether mr own decision would have been different if that point had been raised and\n\n(I) [1949} F.C.R. 596.\n\nMukher}ea J.\n\nlnre T• Deihl /Aw1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nltlukher}ea J,\n\nproperly considered, for, after all, the decision would depend upon the language of the particular statute. I do not think that it is necessary for me to state anything further in regard to the judgment in /atindra Nath Gupta's case which was referred to by both sides in course of their arguments.\n\nAs the word \"modification\" occurring in section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act does not, in my opinion, mean or involve any change of policy but is confined to alteration of such a character which keeps the policy of the Act intact and introduces such changes as arc appropriate to local conditions of which the executive government is made the judge, I have come to the conclusion that there is no unwarrantable delegation of legislative powers in section 7 of . the Delhi Laws Act. '\n\nI now come to the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947. section 2 of which authorises the Central Government to extend, by notification in the official gazette, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit to the Province of Ajmer-Mcrwara any enactment which is in force in any other province at the date of such notification. This Act was passed by the Dominion Legislature of India, functioning under section 18 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (as adapted by the Indian Independence Act, 1947); and it is not disputed that Ajmer-Merwara not being a province within the meaning of section 46 of the Government of India Act, the Dominion Legislature under section 100 (4) of the Act had the right to legi~ late with respect to all matters specified in the three legislative lists attached to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution Act.\n\nThe policy of this legislation seems to be almost the same as that which underlies section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act and the intention of the Dominion Legislature apparently was that until a local legislative body was set up in this territory, the Central Government should be given the right to select such enactments as were already in force in any other province and introduce them to this territory by public notification with such modifications and restrictions as\n\nit thought proper. In my opinion, the grounds which could be urged in support of the validity of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act can, with equal force, be put forward in support of this legislative provision also.\n\nThere is no want of definiteness of the policy which the legislature has declared and the word \"modification,\" as explained already, is to be confined to alterations of such character which do not involve any radical change of policy and are made only for the purpose of ma.king the transplanted legislation suitable to the local conditions of the particular area. If these limitations are transgressed, that would constitute a violation of section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara Act, and on that ground the extended legislation could be impeached; but the section itself cannot be held to be invalid on that ground.\n\nAs to the competency of the Dominion Legislature to pass an enactment of this character, it\n\n1 may Pe pointed out that under the Government of India Act, 1935, there was distribution of legislative powers between the Central and the Provincial Legislatures and all the different subjects of legislation were enumerated in the three legislative lists. It is obviously necessary that a law passed by the legislature should relate to one or more of the legislative topics which are specified in the list.\n\nIt is true that on the face of it a legislation of this kind does not seem to be covered by any particular item or items enumerated in the list.\n\nBut there would be no impropriety in saying that it relates to the various subject-matters in respect to which there are laws in force in other provinces the right to extend which has been conferred upon the Central Government by this Act.\n\nTlie subject-matter of all these legislations must necessarily be comprised within one or other of the legislative items and if they are not, and a particular legislation is invalid on that ground, the fact that such legislation is extended under section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara Act would not make it valid.\n\nIn my opinion, section 2 of the Ajmer- Merwara Act is not ultra vires by reason of its transgressing the limits of permissible delegation.\n\nIn re The Delhi LawaAct, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nIn re The Delhi laws Act, 1912,\n\netr.\n\nMukherjea I.\n\nThe third and the last item for consideration is section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950. The Part C States comprise some of the old Indian States and also some of the Chief Commissioners' Provinces.\n\nUnder article 239 of the Constitution, these States are to be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks proper, through a Chief Commissioner or a Lieutenant.Governor or through the Government of a neighbouring State.\n\nPower is given to the Parliament to create a legislature, a Council of Ministers and High Court for such a State(').\n\nThere is no distribution of legislative powers in regard to these Part C States and the entire legislative powers (including the residuary power under article 248 of the Constitution) are vested in the Parliament. Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, authorises the Central Government to extend, by notification in the official gazette, to any Part C State excluding Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands or to any part of such State with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification. The section further lays down that \"provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C Sta.te.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that the powers conferred by this section upon the Central Government are far in excess of those conferred by the other two legislative provisions, at least in accordance with the interpretation which I have attempted to put upon them. As has been stated already, it is quite an intelli!Pble policy that so long as a proper legislative machinery is not set up in a particular area, the Parliament might empower ari executive authority to introduce laws, validly passed by a competent legislature and actually in force in other parts of the country to such area, with such modifications and restrictions as the authority thinks proper, the modifications being limited to local\n\n(1) Vide articles 240 and 241.\n\nadjustments 'or changes of a minor character. But this pre-supposes that there is no existing law on that particular subject actually in force in that territory.\n\nIf any such law exists and power is given to repeal or abrogate such laws either in whole or in part and substitute in place of the same, other laws which are in force in other areas, it would certainly amount to an unwarrantable delegation of legislative powers.\n\nTo repeal or abrogate an existing law is the exercise of an essential legislative power, and the policy behind such acts must be the policy of the legislature itself.\n\nIf the legislature invests the executive with the power to determine as to which of the laws in force in a particular territory are useful or proper and if it is given to that authority to replace any of them by laws brought from other provinces with such modifications as it thinks, proper, that would be to invest the executive with the determination of the entire legislative policy and not merely of carrying out a policy which the legislature ha< already laid down.\n\nThus . the power of extension, which is contemplated by section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act, includes the power of introducing laws which may be in actual conflict with the laws validly established and already in operation in that territory.\n\nThis shows how the practice, which was adopted during the early British period as an expedient and possibly harmless measure with the object of providing laws for a newly acquired territory or backward area till it grew up into a full-fledged administrative and political unit, is being resorted to in later times for no other purpose than that of vesting almost unrestricted legislative powers with regard to certain areas in the executive government.\n\nThe executive government is given the authority to alter, repeal or amend any laws in existence at that area under the guise of bringing in laws there which are valid in other parts of India.\n\nThis, in my opinion, is an unwarrantable delegation of legislative duties and\n\ncannot he permitted.\n\nThe last portion of section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act )s, therefore, ultra vires the\n\n19S1\n\nlnre The Delhi L11w1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\np<;>wers of the Parliament as being a delegation of essential legislative powers in favour of a body not competent to exercise it and to that extent the legislatiol) must be held to be void. This portion is however severable; and so the entire section need not be declared invalid.\n\nThe result is that, in my opinion, the answer to the three questiO!!S referred to us would be as follows :-\n\n( 1) Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912. is in its entirety intra vires the legislature which passed it and no portion of it is invalid.\n\n(2) The Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, or any of its provisions are not ultra vires the legislature which passed the Act.\n\n(3) Section 2 of Part C States (Laws) Act\" 1950, is ultra vires to the extent that it empowers the Central Government to extend to Part C States laws which are in force in Part A States, even though -such laws might conflict with or affect laws already in existence in the area to which they are extended. The power given by the last portion of the section to make provisions in any extended enactment for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding provincial law, which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State, is therefore, illegal and ultra vires.\n\nDAs J.-The answers to the questions referred to this Court by the President under article 143 of our Constitution depend upon the scope and ambit of the power of legislation of the Indian Legislature during ihe three periods to which the questions relate.\n\nA correct appreciation of the fundamental principles of the British Constitution and those that owe their origin to the British Parliament and of our present Constitution is a pre-requisite for such purpose.\n\nIt is common knowledge that in the British Constitution the King in Parliament is the sovereign power in the State. Ii was after considerable struggle that the concentration of power in the King, which was a feature of the British Constitution of by-gone days,\n\nceased and the supremacy of Parliament was fully established. As to the nature of parliamentary sovereignty Dicey in his Law of the Constitution, 9th Edition, at page 68 says :\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\n\"Parliamentary sovereignty is, therefore, an Das J. undoubted legal fact.\n\nIt is complete both on its positive and on its negative side.\n\nParliament can legally legislate on any topic whatever which, in the judgment of Parliament, is a\n\nfit subject for legislation.\n\nThere is no power which under the English Constitution, can come into rivalry with the legislative sovereignty of Parliament.\"\n\nIn Chapter II, Dicey points out the characteristics of Parliamentary sovereignty. There is no law which Parliament cannot change. There is, under the English Constitution, no distinction between fundamental or constitutional laws and ordinary laws.\n\nThere does not exist any person or body or persons which can pronounce void any enactment passed by the British Parliament on the ground that it is opposed to the constitution or on any other ground. He refers to the flexibility of the British Constitution every part of which may be expanded, curtailed, amended or .abolished with equal ease.\n\nTo the same effect are the observations of Sir Cecil Carr in his lectures concermng English Administrative Law, page 15:\n\n\"In Britain the King in Parliament is all-powerful. There is no Act which cannot be passed and will not be valid within the ordinary limits of judicial interpreration ................ and there is no Act of the \"British Parliament which cannot be repealed like any other Act ............ Even Magna Carta is not inviolate ............ though many Englishmen suppose it cannot be touched.\n\nCoke, you remember, . said that if any statute be made to the contrary of Magna Carta, it is void. Actually, about two-thirds of it has been repealed already.''\n\nIii re The Delhi laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDas J.\n\nParliament being supreme and its power to legislate being unlimited, there is nothing to prevent Parliament from delegating its legislative power to the executive officers or other subordinate bodies. Sir Cecil Carr in his \"Delegated Legislation\" quoted in the Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers, usually referred to as the Donoughmore Committee, said :\n\n\"The first and by far the smallest part is made by the Crown under what survives of the prerogative.\n\nThe second and weightiest part is made by the King in Parliament and consists of what we call Acts of Parliame11t. The third and bulkiest part is made by such persons or bodies as the King in Parliament entrusts with legislative power.\"\n\nThe power of delegation is a necessary incident to the exercise of legislative power and the practical reasons for such delegation have been stated to be :-\n\n\" (a) Parliaments' lack of time to shape all legislative details:\n\n(b) lack of technical knowledge and aptitude of a miscellaneous assembly such as Parliament:\n\n(c) the occurrence of conditions which require immediate attention at a time when Parliament is not in session or is otherwise incapable of giving immediate attention;\n\n(d) a desire to preserve the essential elasticity of laws affecting peoples' lives so closely.''\n\n(See Carr on English Administrative Law, page 23 and also Kennedy on the Constitution of Canada, 2nd Edition, page 461).\n\nAs observed bv Sir Cecil Carr, \"the truth is that if Parliament were not willing to delegate law-making power, Parliament would be unable to pass the kind and quantity of legislation which modern public opinion requires.\" In England, the practice of delegating legislative power has certainly been facilitated by the close fusion of the legislative and executive power resulting from the development of the cabinet system of government in England.\n\nDelegated legislation has been divided in the Donoughmore Committee's Report into twoclasses, (i) normal and\n\n(ii) exceptional. The . normal type is said to have two distinguishable characteristics, one positive and the other. negative. In the normal type of delegation the \"positive characteristic is that the limits of the delegated power are defined . so clearly by the enabling Act as to be made plainly known to Parliament, to the executive and to the pu\"blic and to be readily enforceable by the judiciary.\" The negative characteristic is that the powers delegated are stated not to include the power to . do certain things. The exceptional type of delegation has been c1assified by the Donoughmore Committee under four heads, namely-\n\n(i) power to legislate on matters of principle and even to impose taxation;\n\n(ii) power to amend Acts of Parliament, either the Act by which the powers are delegated or other Acts (nicknamed as Henry VIII clause);\n\n(iii) power conferring so wide a discretion on a Minister, that it is almost impossible to know what limit Parliament did intend to impose;\n\n(iv) instances where Parliament, without formally abandoning its normal pr:\\ctice of limiting delegated powers, has in effect done so by forbidding control of the Courts.\n\nKennedy in his book on the Constitution of Canada, 2nd Edition, page 463, also gives the instances of delegated legislative powers in Canada more or less on the same lines. The above heads clearly show the wide sweep of the power of delegation exerc; ised by the British Parliament.\n\nThe Donoughmore Committee has nowhere questioned the strict legality of these exceptional types of delegated legislation.\n\nThe Committee has not even said that the excepional types of delegated legislation should be done away with altogether.\n\nAll that it has recommended is that the most pronounced kinds of them should be abandoned in all but the most exceptional cases and except\n\n19Sl.\n\netc.\n\nDas I.\n\nlnre The Delhi La1t18 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDasi.\n\nupon special grounds to be stated in the Ministerial memorandum attached to the bill. A Select Committee on Statutory Instruments has since been appointed in England for considering and reporting on every bill proposing to delegate law-making power and for considering and reporting on every regulation and rule made in exercise of the power.\n\nThus, in England, while the power of Parliament to legislate is unlimited and consequently the power of delegation is also without limits, the Parliament, through the Select Committee above referred to, is keeping a watchful eye on the activities of the persons or bodies to whom the power of legislation is delegated so as to preserve its control over such delegated legislation. The charactx:ristic principles of the British Constitution referred to above have not been disputed before us.\n\nTurning now to the American Constitution we find a different principle in operation. The framers of the American Constitution were imbued with the political theories propagated by John Locke and Montesquieu.\n\nSaid John Locke, in his Civil Government, article 141 :\n\n\"The legislature cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other -hands : for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others.\"\n\nAccording to Locke \"the legislature neither must, nor can, transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.\" (Civil Government, Article 142).\n\nMontesquieu in his Esprit Des Lois developed this doctrine of separation of powers. While after 1688 England definitely departed from the tjgid doctrine of separation of powers and has never come back to it, the framers of the American Constitution adopted the doctrine .in its full force because, as explained by Professor Willis at page 168, \"the fathers undoubtedly were so afraid of despotism and tyranny that they intended to establish a separation of the powers of government in order to prevent the exercise of all the\n\npowers of government by any single branch of govern-· rnent.\" Indeed, forty State Constitutions expressly\n\n+;'-\n\nprovided for the separation of powers and it was only the remaining eight State Constitutions that, like the Federal Constitution did not expressly create a separation of governmental powers, although they \"vested\" the powers separately in the three departments of government. Reference may be made to the following provisions. of the Federal Constitution:\n\nArt. 1, section 1.\n\nAll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in the Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.\n\nArt. 2, section 1.\n\nThe executive power shall be vested in a President of the Uruted States of America.\n\nArt. 3, section 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.\n\nIn view of this separate enumeration of the three powers and the vesting of each in separate bodies, the , United States Supreme Court in Springer v. Government of Philippine lslands(1) said that the separation of power \"is implicit in all, as a conclusion logically following from the separation of the several departments.\" The correct position, as stated by Professor Willis at p. 134, is \"that the doctrine of the separation of governmental powers in an American doctrine and an implied doctrine of the United States Constitution, and of those State Constitutions which do not expressly set it forth.\"\n\nAlongside this doctrine of separation of powers the American constitutional law had another doctrine which also negatived the delegation of power. In Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol. 1, p. 56, we read that \"incident to the separation-Ofpowers doctrine was the corollary that legislative power could not be exercised by any agency of the government save the legislature.\" The application of this corollary is thus explained by Willis at p. 137 :-\n\n\"The ruJt: against the delegation of legislative powers, if there is such a rule, is broader than any\n\n(!) (1927) 277 U.S. 189 ; 72 L. Ed. 845.\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Delh I Law1 Act, 1912.\n\netc.\n\nDasi.\n\nlnre Tiu Dellll LiltN Act, 1912,,\n\netc.\n\nDasi.\n\ndoctrine of separation of powers. That part of it which forbids the ddegation of powers to other branches of the government comes within the doctrine of separation of powers.\n\nThat part of it which forbids the delegation of powers to independent boards or commissions rests upon the maxim delegata potestas non potest delegare.\"\n\nThe doctrine of separation of powers is founded on the incapacity, of one government department to receive or exercise the powers of the other two, while the maxim delegata potestas non potest delegare is based on the incapacity of any of the government departments to pass on to other non-governmental bodies the powers expressly confided to its care and charge. As, in practice, the delegation of power is generally and in the main made to the executive officers, the doctrine of separation of powers has, in the American constitutional Jaw, been kept throughout in the forefront and has been regarded as the principal rule, whereas the maxim delegata potestas non potest delegare has; in its application in the field of constitutional law, been relegated to a somewhat subordinate role.\n\nBoth these doctrines, however, are regarded as, to a certain extent, founded on a theory of trust. The argument is that the people of the United States have, by their Constitution, distributed the governmen ta! functions amongst \"the tbree grand departments\" of the State and specifically confided the legislative power to Congress, the executive power to the President and the judicial power l'O the Supreme Court and other courts, and therefore, in view of such separation of power each department of the State must alone perform and carry out its duties so specifically entrusted to them respectively and that this solemn obligation cannot be discharged by or through any other person or agency. This theory of trust or agency has not, as we have seen, been adopted by the British constitutional law and practice. The\n\nBriti!h people do confide the utmost trust in their Parliament, even to the extent of making it a supreme and sovereign authority, but that fact has never\n\nprevented Parliament from exercising the widest power of delegation.\n\nAs Dixon J. points out in his article \"The Law and the Constitution\" published in 1935 in 51 Law Quarterly Review at p. 590, this doctrine of separation of powers is a departure from anrl, indeed, a violation of the British constitutional practice and theory.\n\nThe American doctrines, pushed to their logical conclusion, must necessarily prevent any the least .delegation of power. Cushman in his \"Independent\n\nRegulatory Commissions\", p. 427, said :\n\n\"If the legislative power is vested in the Congress then it logically follows that that power cannot be framed out to anybody else.\"\n\nThe following passage from the judgment in Locke's Appea/(1) also illustrates this view with particular reference to the maxim of non delegation :\n\n\"That a power conferred upon an agent because of his fitness and the confidence reposed in him cannot be delegated by him to another is a general and admitted rule.\n\nLegislatures stand in this relation to the people whom they represent. Hence, it is a cardinal principle of representative government that the legislature cannot delegate the power to maICe laws to .any other body or authority.\"\n\nThe theory against delegation of legislative powers was epitomised by Judge Cooley in his \"Constitutional Limitations.\" At p. 224 of Vol. Ill of the 8th Edn. of his work the following oft-quoted passage occurs :-\n\n\"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the. legislature to\n\nmake laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and \" patriotism this high prerogative has been instrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing\n\n(I) (1873) 72 Pa. 491.\n\n111 re TlreDelhi Lizw1Ael,1912,\n\netc.\n\nDail.\n\nIn re The Delhi Law• '4ct, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDas J.\n\nother agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.\"\n\nWe have now to see how far the American judges and jurists have been able to preserve the pristine purity of these doctrines.\n\nAfter quoting tlie above passage Willoughby in his \"Constitutional Law of the United States\", 2nd Ed.\n\nVol. III, Art. 1075, at p. 1636 adds:\n\n\"The principle as thus absolutely stated is subject to one important exception, and to several qualifications, or at least explanations.\"\n\nThe learned Professor proceeds in the next Article : \"The exception is with reference to the delegation of powers to local governments.\n\nThe courts have held as to this, the giving by the Central legislative body of extensive law-making powers with reference to local matters to subordinate governing bodies being an Anglo-Saxon practice antedating the adoption of the Constitution, and the right of local self government being so fundamental to our system of politics, our constitutions are, in the absence of any 6cpress prohibitions to the contrary, to be construed as permitting it\".\n\nIt should be noted that in the above passage Willoughby recognises this delegation of power to local bodies as \"the giving by the Central legislative body of extensive law-making powers with reference to local matters\".\n\nThis is clearly an inroad on the absolute doctrine of separation of powers or the maxim of nondelegation. This, however is not the limit of such inroad, for the pressure of necessity of practical government has compelled the American judges and jurists to yield further concessions. It will now be necessary to refer to some of the American decisions.\n\nProfessor Corwin in his book entitled \"The President; Office and Powers\", 3rd Ed., Chapter IV, p. 151 refers to the case of Brig Auroro v. U. S.(1)\n\n(I) (1812) 7 Cr. 382.\n\nas the earliest case bearing upon the relation of the legislative power of Congress to national executive powers.\n\nThat case was concerned with the Non-intercourse Acts of 1909-1910. Section 4 made it unlawful to import any goods from any port in Great Britain or France.\n\nSection ll authorised the President, in case either France or great Britain revoked her edicts violating the neutral commerce of the United States, to declare the same by Proclamation and provided that after such Proclamation trade might be renewed with the nation so doing. There was also provision for the revival of the operation of the Act on Proclamation by the President.\n\nThe President issued his Proclamation declaring that Great Britain had revoked her edicts against the United States and consequently the Act ceased to operate against her.\n\nSubsequently, however, the President revoked the Proclamation.\n\nAurora had sailed with a cargo from Liverpool before the revocation of the Proclamation and the cargo was seized.\n\nThe argument was that Congress could not transfer legislative power to the President. To make the revival of a law depend upon the. President's Proclamation was to give that Proclamation the force of law.\n\nThis argument was repelled by Johnson J. who delivered the opinion of the Court which included Chief Justice Marshall with the following words :-\n\n\"On the second point, we can see no sufficient reason why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the Act of March 1st, 1807. either expressly or conditionally, as their iudgment should direct.\"\n\nThe Practical difficulties in a literal application of the maxim against delegation were seen at an early time by John Marshall C. J. in Wayman v. Southard(1).\n\nThe question in that case was whether, by the Constitution of the United States, the Congress had the power to regulate the proceedings of the Federal Courts.\n\n(l) (1825) 16 Wheaton I; 6 L. Ed. 253. 19-3 S.C. India/68\n\nIn re The Delhi IAws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDas J.\n\nlnre TAe Delh \"''\".Act, 1!112, etc. ·\n\nDu J,\n\nThe Process Act adopted the system as it then stood \"subject, however, to such alterations and additions as the said courts respectively shall, in their discretion, .deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme\n\nCourt of the United States shall think proper, from time to time, by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same.\" Counsel for the defendants contended that this clause, \"if extended beyond the mere regulation of practice in the court, would be a delegation of legislative authority which Congress could never be supposed to int.end and had not the power to make.\" This objection was disposed of by Marshall C. J. in the following words :-\n\n\"It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.\n\nBut Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.\"\n\nFurther down the learned Chief Justice proceeded :-\n\n\"The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who arc to act under such general provisions to fill up the details. To determine the character of the power given to the courts by the Process Act, we must enquire into its extent.\"\n\nIt will be observed that the learned Chief Justice avoided the rigours of the doctrine by making a distinction between powers which were \"strictly and exclusively legislative\" and other powers which he designated as only power \"to fill up the details\". This practice of paying homage to the doctrine of separation of powers and at the same time making inroads upon the doctrine for giving effect to the urgent necessity of practical government :uid the use of expressions qualifying the legislative power will be apparent in the subsequent decisions of the American Coutts.\n\nThe case Fieltl v. Clark(1) was concpned with the validity of the third section of the Tariff Act, 1890.\n\nThe objection was that the impugned section tranferred the legislative treaty-making power to . the Presid ent and authorised him to suspend the provisions of the Act relating to the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides. At p. 310 of the Lawyers' Edition, after reiterating that .the doctrine that Congress could not delegate legislative power to the President was a principle universally recognised as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution, Harlan J. said:-\n\n\"Legislative power was exercised when Congress declared that the suspension should take effect upon ., a named contingency.\n\nWhat the President was required to do was simply in execution of the Act of the Congress. It was not the making of law. He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect. It was a part of the law itself as it left the hands of Congres that the provisions, full and complete in themselves\" permitting the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coff ec, tea and hides, from particUlar countries should be suspended, in a given contingency, and that in case of such suspension certain duties should be imposed.\"\n\nThe learned Judge then quoted the following well known passage from the judgment of Judge Ranney of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati W. & Z. R.\n\nCo. v. Clinton County Commissioners(2) :- ·\n\n\"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the' latter no valid objection can be made.\"\n\n(1) (1891) 143 U.S. 649; 36L Ed. 294.\n\n(2) Ohio St. 88.\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re 'Ifie Delhi !aw1 kt,1912, etc.\n\nDa1I.\n\nlnre TheDe/hl Law• Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas 11\n\nThen the learned Judge quoted from Locke'1 Appeal(') :- '\n\n''To assert that law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to be fully known.\"\n\nAgain:\n\n\"The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or. state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend~ To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside the halls of legislation\". ·\n\nThe validity of section 3 was upheld on the basis that it did not really delegate any legislative power and, therefore, did not offend the doctrine of separation of powers but was only an instance of conditional legislation. It will be seen hereafter that on strict analysis a conditional legislation does involve a delegation of legislative power, however small it may be.\n\nButtfield v. Stranahan( 2 ) was concerned with an Act which authorised the Secretary of the Treasury to fix\n\n\"uniform standards of purity, quality and fitness for consumption of all teas\" to be imported into the United States. Delivering the judgment of the Court, White J. observed at p. 494 :-\n\n\"The Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount to declaring\n\n(1) 72 Pa. 491.\n\n(2) (1904) 192 u. s. 471.\n\nthat the plenary power vested \"in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exercised.\" This passage amounts to saying that \"in short Congress may delegate its powers when it is necessary to do so in order to achieve the results which it desires.\"\n\n(Corwin, President, p. 153).\n\nWebb-Kenyon Act of 1913 came up for discussion in Clark Distilling Company v. West Maryland Railway Co.(1).\n\nThe Act prohibited shipment oi transportation of any intoxicating liquor from one State to another in violation of any law of such State. One of the arguments raised was that by the Webb-Kenyon Act the Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to the States. This was disposed of by White C.J. at p. 338 of Lawyers' Edition as follows :-\n\n\"The argument as to delegation to the States rests upon a mere misconception. It is true the legislation which the Webb-Kenyon Act contains permits State\n\nprohibitions to apply to movements of liquor from one State into another, but the will which causes the prohibition to be applicable is that of Congress, since the application of State prohibitions would cease the instant the Act of Congress ceased to apply.\"\n\nThe above passage echoes the observations of the Privy Council in Hodge v. The Queen(2) and other cases to which reference will be made hereafter.\n\nReferring to the maxim against delegation Professor Corwin said that in this case \"the Court seemed to be on the verge of chucking the maxim entirely.\"\n\nIn /. W. Hampton fr. & Co. v. U.S.(3) the question was whether the Tariff Act in so far as it authorised the President to issue a proclamation fixing a tariff rate was invalid for unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President. After referring to the division of the governmental power into three branches and ref erring to the well-known maxim of non-delegation Taft C. J. at page 629 observed :-\n\n(!) (1917)242U.S.3111\n\n(2) (1883) L.R. 9 App. Cal. 117.\n\n(3) (1927) 276 U. S. 394; 72 11 Ed. 624.\n\n19Sl\n\nlnre The Delhi Law1 A.ct, 1912, etc.\n\nDOI I.\n\nIn re The Deihl \"°\"'kt, 1912, etc.\n\nDai I.\n\n\"The field of Congress involves all and many varieties of legislative action and Congress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the executive branch within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vest!ing discretion in such officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and directing the details of its execution, even to the extent of providing for penalising a breach of such regulations.\"\n\nThe reasons for permitting these exceptions to the rule are stated by the learned Chief Justice at page 630 :-\n\n\"If Congress were to be required to fix every rate, it would be impossible to exercise the power at all.\n\nTherefore, commonsense requires that in the fixing of such rates Congress may provide a commission, as it does, called the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix those rates, after hearing evidence and argument concerning them from interested parties, all in accord with a general rule that Congress first lays down that rates shall be just and reasonable considering the service given and not discriminatory.\"\n\nThe following quotation is made from the judgment of Day J. in an earlier decision of the Court in lnter- State Commerce Commission v.\n\nGoodrich Transit Company(').\n\n\"The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigations of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter witliin the rules laid down by the Congress.\"\n\nIn U.S. v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co.(') the respondent was indicted for having misbranded certain sacks containing corn meal contrary to the 1 provisions of the Food and Drugs Act. of 1906. The (I) 224 U.S.194 atp.214; 56 L. Ed. 729atp. 737.\n\n(2) (1932) 287 U.S. 77; 77 L. Ed. 175. ·\n\nrespondent moved for quashing the indictment on the ground, inter alia, that the Act was unconstitutional for delegation of power contrary to the provisions of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Federal Constitution.\n\nSutherland J. said:-\n\n\"That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear.\n\nBut Congress may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon administrative officers of the \"power to fill up the details\" by prescribing administrative rules and regulations .......... The effect of the provision assailed is to define an offence, but with directions to those charged with the administration of the Act to make supplementary rules and regulations allowing reasonable variations, tolerances and exemptions ' which, because of their variety and need of detailed statement, it was impracticable for Congress to prescribe.\"\n\nIt is thus clear that the doctrine of non-delegation has been constantly shrinking in content until it came to be confined to \"strictly and exclusively legislative powers\" or \"purely legislative power\" or \"essential , legislative function.\" But there was a swinging back of the pendulum in 1934 in the Panama Refining Co.\n\nv. Ryan(1) in which the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 passed during the administration of President Roosevelt was assailed on the ground of unconstitutionality.\n\nAfter analysing the provision and effect of section 9(c) and section 1, Chief Justice Hughes concluded :-\n\n\"The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.\n\nUndoubtedly, legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly. The contitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards,\n\n(I) (11134) 293 U.S. 388; 79 L Ed. 446.\n\n19S1\n\netc.\n\nDasi.\n\nIn rt The Delhi Low• A.ct, 1912, etc.\n\nDasi.\n\nwhile leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the deterinination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorisations of that sort we should have the anomally of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility.\n\nBut the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.\"\n\nThe majority of the Court held, in spite of the definite and express language of sections 1 and 9 ( c) that they had not laid down any policy or set up any standard and, therefore, the delegation permitted by section 9 ( c) was unconstitutional. Cardozo J. in a dissenting judgment held that the Act had sufficiently declared a policy and the discretion delegated was \"not unconfined and vagrant\" but was \"canalised within banks that keep it from overflowing.\"\n\nThe case of Schechter v. U. S. (') is on the same lines and it carries the matter no further.\n\nThe two last mentioned cases, however, did not deter Congress from passing other Acts, e.g., Agricultural Marketing Act, 1937, giving equally extensive powers to the executive including the power to fix prices. These later Acts have not been challenged as unconstitutional. Referring to these two cases Professor Corwin says :-\n\n\"Neither of these precedents materially influenced congressional policy even at the time, and both have been subsequently relegated by the Court to its increasingly crowded cabinet of juridical curiosities.\"\n\nThe later cases of Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator(a) and Y akus v. U. S.(8) indicate the possibility in\n\n(1)(1934)29SU.S. 496; 79L.Ed. IS70.\n\n(2) (1940) 312 U.S.126; SSL. Ed. 624.\n\n(3) 321 U.S. 414 ; 88 L. Ed. 834 .\n\nthe near future of another swing of the pendulum. In the former, Stone J. conceded at page 145 that although fact finding often was a step in the legislative process it could nevertheless be left by the Congress to administrative officers or boards whose aid could be resorted to by Congress.\n\nHolmes J. in his dissenting judgment in Springer v.\n\nThe Government of Philippine lslands(1) said:-\n\n\"It is said that the powers of Congress cannot be delegated, yet the Congress has established the Interstate Commerce Commission, which does legislative,- judicial and xecutive acts, only softened by a quasi \"\n\nThe learned Judge then concluded :-\n\n\"It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may. disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.\"\n\nThe following observations of Sir Cecil Carr in his , book concerning English Administrative Law, at page 15 clearly bring out the bewilderment of a non-\n\nAmerican student at the way the doctrine of separation of powers has been treated in American Constitutional law :-\n\n\"A visitor to the United States is frankly afraid of discussing the value of that doctrine. He has found it emphatically, incorporated in the constitutions of various states; he finds it indirectly asserted in the Federal Constitution.\n\nAn absolute insistence upon the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial power must, he feels rule out any delegatien of legislative power to the executive. He finds definite opinions like that of Mr. Justice Harlan that \"that Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognised as vital to the integrity\n\n(I) (1927) 277 U.S.189; 72 L. Ed. 84S.\n\n19S1\n\nlnre The Delhi Lawa..4.ct, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDll8J.\n\nInn T1\" Delhi Laws Jlct, 1912, etc.\n\nDasJ.\n\nand maintenance of the system of Government ordained by the Constitution.\" Yet he is told that from the earliest years of the United States some such delegation occurred.\n\nHe reads that 'it used to be said that \"Congress may not delegate its powers\" but the rule now-a-days has become that Congress may not delegate its powers unless it is convenient to do oo.'\n\n(E. S.\n\nCorwin, The Constitution and what it means to-day) High authority tells him that the Supreme Court of the United States has not treated the separation oi powers as a technical legal doctrine, that the doctrine was not intended to divide the branches into water-tight compartments, and that your country has achieved the control of navigation, the regulation of rail road rates, the administration of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, the allocation of wave lengths and so forth by refusing to be the slave of a sterile dogma. (Frankfurter : The Public and its Government, page 76).\n\nHe is given to understand that it was not till 1935 in the Panama Refining Co.\n\nv. Ryan(') that an Act was declared invalid because it failed to separate the powers.\"\n\nSchwartz in his American Constitutional Law concludes at page 20 :-\n\n\"But there were few who, like the great Chief Justice, could openly admit that the constitutional maxim was not inflexible. The resulting judicial dilemma, when the American Courts finally were squarely confronted with delegation cases, was resolved by the judicious choice of words to describe the delegated power. The authority transferred was in, Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase, 'softened by a quasi, and the Courts were thus able to grant the fact of delegated legislation and still deny the same. /\n\nThis re:ult is well put in Professor Cushman's syllogism :-\n\nMajor Premise : Legislative power cannot be constitutionally delegated by Congtesi.\n\nMU.Or Prmiise : It is essential that certain powers be delegated to administrative ofliccr& and rc:gui:Uocy commission.>..\n\nl) (1934) 293 U.S. 388 ; 79 I.. Ee!. 446.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPPORTS 1029\n\nConclusion: Therefore the powers thus de\\cgated are not legislative powers.\n\nThey are instead \"administrative\" or \"quasikgislative powers.\n\nIn spite of the maxim against delegation, then, the American Legislature has been able to confer very great authority upon the executive. The extent of delegation had, indeed, become so great that Elihu Root could conclude in 1916 that, because of the rise of the administrative process, \"the old doctrine of prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has virtually retired from the field and given up the fight.\"\n\nAccording to Professor Willis, at page 135 :-\n\n\"It is, therefore, an . open question whether or not we now have this doctrine at all under the United State Constitutional Law.\"\n\nAgain, at page 136, we find the following passage :- \"It is a dogma (in harmony with our definition) that legislative power cannot be delegated either to the other branches of the government or to independent boards or commissions, or even back to the people; but the rule of the dogma has so many exceptions that it is difficult to decide whether the dogma or the exceptions state the rule.\"\n\nThe exceptions are summarised by Professor Willis at pp; 137-138 :-\n\n(a) ''The rule does not forbid delegation of powers of local self-government :\n\n(b) The legislature may delegate the power to determine the conditions or contingencies under which a statute shall be operative; ( c) The legislature may delegate the power to matte regulations, as to boards of health, the heads of departments : ( d) Legislature may delegate the power to. ascertain facts and to apply rules of law in controversies, i.e, to administer standards, as in the case of the commerce 'department, land department, Industrial\n\nIn re The Delhi lAw1 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDOii.\n\nlnre t'he Delhi Law1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas J,\n\nCommissions, public utility commissions, tax commissions, and even in case of the President, in connection with the flexible provisions of the tariff and the sale of alien property.\"\n\nAfter referring to these exceptions, Professor Willis concludes at page 141 :-\n\n\"Yet when all of these exceptions to the rule against the delegation of legislative power are observed, one cannot help wondering whether the rule is not honoured more in the breach than in the observance, and whether or not, so far as this matter is concerned, we have a doctrine of separation of powers.\"\n\nTo sum up : the cases and text books referred to above make it quite clear that the framers of the American Constitution were so afraid of tyranny of despotic power that they adopted the political theories of Locke and Montesquieu in their Constitution and provided for separation of powers. The American Courts interpreting the Constitution held that the separation of powers which was expressly adopted in most of the State Constitutions was also implicit in the Federal Constitution. Logically, the doctrine would not permit any delegation at all. They, however, soon realised that the necessities of practical government required delegation of legislative powers to the President or other persons or bodies but such was the fear in the minds of the American people of the tyranny that may result from the concentration of power in despotic hands that the American judges and jurists felt bound to uphold, in theory, the sanctity of the doctrine against delegation while, in practice, to permit large delegafions of legislative powers on the pretence that the power delegated was not really legislative power.\n\nThus the doctrine against delegation came to be confined to \"strictly and exclusively\" (per Marshall C.J.) or \"purely\" (per Day J.) or \"essential\" (pcr- Hughes C. J.) legislative power and the rest of the content of the legislative power were permitted to be delegated under the pretence that they were not really legislative power but were only power \"to fill up the\n\ndetails\" (per Marshall C. J.), or \"to ascertain and declare facts\" (per Harlan J.), or were only \"administrative powers to make rules and regulations\" (per- LLamar J. and Hughes C.J.), or \"minor matters\" (per Lamar J.).\n\nIt cannot be denied that the functions so permitted to be delegated could be performed by the legislature itself and that when so performed such performance would only be the exercise of legislative power. The functions which. when exercised by the legislature are legislative powers, cannot cease to be so when performed by the person to whom it is entrusted by the legislature. By delegation the legislative power cannot become transmuted into executive power.\n\nIt is due to the anxiety of the American Courts to reconcile the doctrine against delegation with the practical necessities of government that they have had to take recourse to such verbal subterfuge. In point of fact, the content of the doctrine has been shrinking fast and although the American Judges and Jurists do not openly acknowledge it, Congress has been exercising the power of delegation of legislative power in an ever increasing measure.\n\nThe truth is that whatever powers are delegated by Congress are in reality parts of the content of its legislative powers.\n\nIn the picturesque language of Professor Corwin in his \"President : Office & Powers\", p. 154, in the ever present complexity of conditions with which governments have to deal \"the Lockian aphorism has fought a losing rearguard action.\" The protagonists of the separation of powers who contend that these exceptions do not constitute delegation of legislative power overlook the, fact that the legislature having only legislative power cannot delegate anything but what forms part of the legislative power.\n\nThe power delegated by Congress, call it by what name you will, must necessarily be a part of the content of its legisiative pvwer, for Congress has nothing but legislative powers. The matter is put very tersely by Professor Corwin in his \"President : Office and Powers\", at p. 150 :-\n\n\"By the strict logic of the principle of the separation of powers, the only power which the legislature\n\nIn re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDas J.\n\nl9SJ\n\nlnro 7716 D•fh L A.cl 1912,\n\n•le\n\nDaaJ.\n\npossesses to delegate is legislative power; yet by the maxim just quoted it is this power precisely which the legislature cannot delegate.\n\nConversely, by the principle of the separation of powers the executive should be incapable of recei,.ing or exercising anything but executive power, from which it must follow either that the executive can never receive any power from the legislature or that when power passes it is aut<>- matically transmuted from legislative into executive power. But the former alternative is obviously contrary to fact, and the latter opens the way to delegation by the legislature of all its power to the executive.\"\n\nThe net result is that even in the land of separation of powers all that now remains of the doctrine is simply that the legislature itself must lay down the ; policy (per Hughes C. J.) or fix a primary standard (per Sutherland J.).\n\nWhat will amount to sufficiently laying down policy or setting up a primary standard will, of course, vary with the length of the foot of the learned Judges who deliver the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States. The elaborate formulation of policy purported to be made by Congress in section 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act did not t appear to the American Supreme Court which decided the Panama Refining Co.'s case to be sufficient laying down of policy so as to be constitutional whereas, as will be seen hereinafter, the mere enumeration of the different subjects with respect to which the Governor-General was given power to make rules by the Canadian Parliament in the War Measures Act, 1914, and 'by the Australian Parliament in the National Security Act, 1939, for the defence and effectual prosecution of the war, without laying down any specific policy with regard to any of those subjects, was accepted as perfectly constitutional\n\nI now pass on to the law-making power of the legislatures established by , or under the authority of the British Parliament.\n\nIt will be tiseful at this stage to set out briefly the provisions of the instruments by which the important dominion legislatures were brought into existence.\n\n...\n\nCanada. The relevant provisions of the British North America Act, 1867 (30 Vic. C 3) are as follows:-\n\n\"Section 9. The executive government and authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue and to be vested in the Queen.\n\nSection 17. There shall be one Parliament for Canada consisting of the Queen and Upper House styled ''The Senate\" and the \"House of Commons.\"\n\nSection 96; The Governor-General shall appoint the Judges of the superior, district and county Courts in each province except those of the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.\n\nSection 101. The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from time to time, provide for the constitution, maintenance and organization of a general Court of Appeal for Canada and for the establishment of any additional courts for the better administration of the laws of Canada.\"\n\nAustralia. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900 (63 & 64 Vic. C. 12) provides as follows:-\n\nPart I, Sec. 1.\n\nThe legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Parliament which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate and a House of Representatives, and which is hereinafter called the Parliament or the Parliament of the Commonwealth.\n\nCh. 2, Sec .. 61. The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution and of the laws of the Commonwealth.\n\nCh. 3, Sec. 71. The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Fedal Supreme Court, to be called ''The High Court of Australia. and in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction.\"\n\nIndia. The constitution of India has varied during the three relevant periods with which we are concerned in this reference. The provisions of the statutes or\n\nlnre The Delhi Ltlwa .ifct, 1912, etc.\n\nDasi.\n\nI 5\n\nIn re The Delhi Lows Bet, 1912, etc.\n\nDa1J.\n\nother instruments governing the constitution of India will be set out in detail hereafter. Suffice it, for the present, to say that in India there was, at no time, separate vesting of power in the three departments as in America or in Australia.\n\nIt will be noticed that under the British North America Act only the executive power is \"vested\" in ,- the. Queen and that provisions are simply made for a Parliament and a Judiciary without expressly vesting the legislative and judicial powers in any person or body.\n\nAs will be seen more fully hereafter, there was no strict separation of powers in the Indian Constitution at any time. On the other hand, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act follows the American pattern and in terms causes the legislative, executive and judicial powers to be 'vested' in the three departl ments of the State.\n\nAs will be presently seen, neither Canada nor Australia has accepted the principle of non-delegation of powers founded either on a doctrine of separation of powers or on any theory of agency except that in Australia the non-delegation of power is recognised only in its application to the Judiciary.\n\nIn the Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Company v. Dignan(') to which detailed reference r will be made hereafter Gavan Duffy C. J. referred to the passage in Judge Cooley's work regarding the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power and proceeded at p. 83 as follows :-\n\n\"A >swning, however, that the Act does impinge upon the doctrine, still such a restriction has never been implied in English law from the division of powers between the several departments of government.\"\n\nDixon J. in his judgment in the same case referring to the maxim delegata potestas non potest delegare observed at pp. 94-95 that it had no application to Australia and that no similar doctrine had existed in respect of British Colonial Legislatures whether erected in virtue of the prerogative or by the Imperial Statute.\n\nEvatt J. in the same case expressed the view at p. 114:-\n\n(1) (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73.\n\n\"In dealing . with the doctrine of \"separation\" of legislative and executive powers, it must be remembered that, underlying the Commonwealth frame of government, there is the notion of the British system of an Executive which is responsible to Parliament.\n\nThat system is not in operation under the United States Constitution.\"\n\nIn his Article \"The Law and the Constitution\" published in 1935 in 51 Law Qu; uterly Review, p. 590, Mr. Justice Dixon, after referring to the American doctrine of separation of powers, stated at p. 605 as follows:-\n\n\"This artificial and almost impracticable classification was opposed to British practice and theory. The frame of our constitution in this respect follows the American plan. The notion that all law-making was confined to the legislature which, therefore, could not authorise the executive to complete its work was so foreign to the conceptions of E11glish law that the Australian Courts ignored, or were unaware of, the full consequences of the American plan we had adopted.\n\nIn a series of decisions here, the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to authorise the executive to legislate by regulation was recognised and thus, in effect, established, although the logical difficulty created by the frame of the constitution was no adverted to.\"\n\nThe result, according to Dixon J., was that notwithstanding the language of the Australian Constitution \"legal symmetry gave way to commonsense.\" The very fact that a Dominion legislature was brought into being by the British Crown by a commission issued in exercise of its prerogative or by the British Parliament under an Act prevented the legislature so created from being a supreme sovereign legislature in the sense in which the British Parliament is supreme and sovereign for, of necessity, the scope and ambit of the Dominion legislature's power was circumscribed by the Instrument creating it and it could not go beyond it. But, nevertheless, the concept of a suprem~ 20-3 S.C. lodia/68\n\n In re The Delh Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas I,., •\n\nDasJ.\n\nsovereign legislature was so vivid and deep-rooted in the minds of the British people that they imputed even to such a subordinate legislature, within its own field, all the attributes of the Imperial Parliament.\n\nIn the words of Dicey in his Law of the Constitution, 9th Edn., at page 112, these legislatures \"are, within their own sphere, copies of the Imperial Parliament.\" I lay considerable importance to this aspect of the matter which, I find, had also been emphasised in numerous judicial decisions which' I now proceed to consider.\n\nWith reference to the powers of the House of Assembly of New Found!and which was established by a commission issued by King William IV in exercise of his prerogative right \"with the full power to make, / constitute and ordain laws, statutes and ordinances for the public peace, welfare and good government of the Island .............. \" Baron .Parke in Kielly v.\n\nCarson(') observed:-\n\n\" .................. nor has it been disputed in the argument before us, and therefore we consider it as conceded, that the sovereign had not merely the right of appointing such magistrates and establishing such f corporations and Courts of Justice as he might do by the common law at home, but also that of creating a local legislative assembly with authority subordinate, indeed, to that of. Parliament, but supreme within the limits of the colony for the government of its inhabitants.\"\n\nIn Phillips v. Eyre( 2 ) in which the powers of the legislature of Jamaica to pass an Indemnity Act after the Rebellion of 1865 came into question, Willes J., after quoting the above passage from the judgment of Baron Park, observed at page 20 :-\n\n\"We are satisfied that it is sound law, and that a confirmed Act of the local legislature lawfully constituted, whether in a settled, or conquered colony, has, as ro matters within its competence and the limits of its jurisdiction, the operation and force of sovereign\n\nCl> (1841)4 Moo. P.c. 84\n\n(2) (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1.\n\nlegislation, though subject to be controlled by the imperial Parliamept.\"\n\nA good deal of argument has been founded on Burah's case(1).. The proceedings in that .case before the Hih Court are reported sub nom. The Empress v.\n\nBurah( ).\n\nIts was concerned with the validity of Act XXII of 1869 passed by the Governor-General. in Council, By section 2, the Act was to come into operation 'on such date as the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal shall, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, direct.\" By section 4, the territories called Garo Hills were removed from the jurisdiction of Courts and from control of the offices of revenue in the territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal as well as from the law prescribed for the said Courts and offices.\n\nSections 8 and 9 were as follows :\n\n\"Section 8.\n\nThe said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta G:izette, extended to the said territory any law or any portion of any law, now in force in the other territories .subject to his Government, or which may hereafter be enacted bv the Council of the Governor-General or of the said Lieutenant-Governor, for making laws and regulations, and may on making such extension direct by whom any powers or duties incident to the provisions so extended shall be exercised or performed, and make any order which he shall deem requisite for carrying such provisions into operation.\n\n\"Section 9. The said Lieutenant-Governor may ftom time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend mutatis mutandis all or .any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India.\n\n\"Every such notilication shall specify the boundaries of the territories to which it applies.\"\n\nOn October 14, 1871, the Lieutenant-Gov.ernor, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 9,\n\n(!) (1878) SIA. 178.\n\n(2) (1877) I.L.R. 3 Cal. 63.\n\nIn re The De/ht Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas J.\n\nIn re The De/6 Laws Act, 1912. etc.\n\nDas J.\n\nextended the Act to Khasi and Jaintia Hills and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of the counts. In 1876, Burah was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Deputy Commissioner of Khasi and Jaintia Hills. The death sentence was in April, 1876 commuted to transportation fur life. On July 9, 1876, Burah sent a petition of appeal from the jail to the Calcutta High Court. Two questions were raised in that case, namely, (i) whether the Governor-General had power to remove the district from the jurisdiction of the High Court, and (ii) if the Governor-General had such power, whether, by the Act, he could authorise the Lieutenant-Governor by notification to extend the provisions of the Act to the Khasi and J aintia Hills. On the first point the Full Bench held unanimously that the Governor-General in Council had the power to remove the district from the jurfsdiction of the High Court. On the second question the majority of the High Court (Markby, Kemp, Ainslie and Jackson JJ.) held that Act XXII of 1869 was invalid as the Governor-General in Council had no power to delegate its legislative functions to the Lieutenant- Governor in the way it had done. Garth C. J. and Macpherson and Pontifex JJ. took a different view.\n\nMarkby J. delivered the leading judgment of the majority of the Court. He expressed the view that the Act did not evince \"a final determination on the part of the legislature that the jurisdiction of the High Court should be taken away\" from the Khasi and J aintia Hills.\n\nAccording to him, the legislature, when it determined it to be expedient to remove the Garo Hills, from the jurisdiction of the Courts, only contemplated the possibility of its being expedient to remove the Khasi and Jaintia Hills from this jurisdiction also but this they l, eft an entirely open question to be decided by the Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal. He pointed out (pages 81-S3) the , difference between the language of section 2 and that of section 9. At page 85, the learned Judge stated that the legislature did not decide that in Khasi and Jaintia Hills the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts\n\nshould be excluded and it did not express any opinion but left the decision of it to the absolute and uncontrolled discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor. Then his Lordship pointed out at page 86 that the Indian Legislature was not itself sovereign but exercised sovereign powers by delegation only. After referring to the distinction between written and unwritten constitution and the duty of the Court, the learned Judge dealt with the theory of agency and die delegation of legislative power by Parliament to the Indian Legislature and came to the conclusion at page 98 that the Indian Legislature could not change the legislative machinery without affecting the provisions of the various Acts of Parliament which created that machinery and that if it did in any way affect them then ex conscnsu omnium its Acts were void. Of the dissentienn Judges, the leading judgment was that of Garth C.J. At page 139 the learned Chief Justice observed:-\n\n\"No doubt, as soon as the fact is once established, that an Act of the legislature which has been duly passed is within the scope of their powers, the court has no right to inquire into the propriety or wisdom of the law which is established by that Act; but it is not every Act which the' Legislature may pass which can legally be considered as a law. Thus to bring the argument nearer home to our present purpose, suppose the legislature were to pass an Act, -transferring the whole of their legislative powers over the Indian Empire to the Governor-General. That, in my opinion, would not be a law at all within the meaning of the statute. It would simply be an abdication of their legislative powers in favour of the Governor-General directly at variance with the language and plain meaning of the Councils Act; and I should say the same of a similar transfer of their powers with regard to any portion of the Indian Empire.\"\n\nAfter ref erring to the legislative pratice and the necessity for the power of delegation, Garth C. J. at p. 140 said :-\n\nlnre The Deihl Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas I.\n\nIn re The Deihl Laws A.ct, 1912, etc.\n\nDas!.\n\n\"Moreover, it must be borne in mind, that whatever important trusts are thus created by the legishture, they are by no means absolute or irrevocable.\n\nHer Majesty in Council can put a veto upon any Act of the Governor-General in Council which her advisers may not approve, and the Government here are always in a position to see how the powers which they have conferred are being exercised, and if they are exercised injudiciously, or otherwise than in accordance with their intentions, or if, having been exercised, . the result is in any degree inconvenient, they can always by another Act recall their powers, or rectify the in- . \" convemence.\n\nThen his Lordship referred to some of the Acts conferring upon, the Local Governments of Non-Regulation ' Provinces same kind of power, placing in their hands the right of abolishing, at their pleasure, old systems of procedure and of introducing a new system and in some cases also giving power to alter or moqify the Act in any way they . might think proper and so . to introduce a different law . into their respective provinces.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice at p. 143 made the • following observations :- 4111\n\n''Now all these Acts amount in one sense to a transfer of legislative power, \"because in each of them the legislature entrusts to some other person or body of persons the making of law and regulations which it might have made itself.\"\n\nThe Crown took the matter on appeal to the Judicial Committee and the proceedings will be found reported sub n()m. The Quuil v. Burah(1). It was urged that the decision of the Privy Council in this case impliedly but quite clearly negatived the power of delegation of legislative authority by the Indian Legislature.\n\nIt is, therefore, necessary to examine and scrutinise the ' observations of the Privy Council. After stating the ' facts and disposing of some questions which are not material for our purpose, Lord Selborne, in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, referred at p. 192\n\n(I) (1878) S I.A.178.\n\nto the ground of the majority decision that the 9th section was not legislation but was a delegation 9f legislative power and to the doctrine of agency relied upon by the majority. At p. 193 his Lordship refuted the alleged distinction made by. the majority between section 2 and section 9 of the Act of 1869, and observed:-\n\n\"But their Lordships are of op1ruon that the doctrine of the majority of the Court is erroneous, and that it rests upon mistaken view of the powers of the Indian Legislature, and indeed of the nature and principles of legislation.\n\nThe Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it tan, of course, do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers. But, when acting within those limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself.\"\n\nHis Lordship at pp. 193-194 laid down the test for ascertaining the validity of an impugned Act and the extent of the authority of the Court in that behalf in the following words :-\n\n\"The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question; and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted.\n\nIf what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in . which category would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restI'ictions.\"\n\nDasi.\n\nIn re The Delh Laws Act, 1912,\n\nHaving disposed of the grounds on which the judgment of the majority of the High Court was founded, his Lordship proceeded to say :-\n\netc. \"Their Lordships agree that the Govcrnor-Gcner- Das J. al in Council could not, by any 'form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Councils Act. Nothing of that kind has, in their Lordships' opinioa, been done or attempted in the present case.\"\n\nLord Selborne thereafter explained what had really been done by Act XXII of 1869 which I may now pass over but to which I shall revert at a later stage.\n\nAt p. 195 his Lordship stated :-\n\n\"Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant- Governor (large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority. than that of the Governor-General in Cquncil. Their whole operation is, directly and immediately, under and by virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself. The proper legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things.\n\nThe conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute. Where plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an imperial or in a provincial legislature, they may, (in their Lordships' judgment) be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally.\"\n\nThen his Lordship rderred to the legislative practice of entrusting such powers to persons in whom the legislature places confidence and actually gave several instances of such legislation which he held to be good but which according to the view of the majority of the High Court would be illegal.\n\nThe majority of the High Court had held that section 9 of Act XXII of 1869 and the notification thereunder were bad on the ground of delegation of\n\nlegislative power. This argument could be refuted in one of these ways, namely, by saying (1) that the Legislature was not an agent of Parliament, or (2) that it had not in fact delegated its powers, or (3) that it had full power to delegate;· The Privy Council preferred to base thCit decision on grounds (1) and (2).\n\nThis does not mean that the Privy Council negatived the third ground. Indeed,. the language of Lord Selborne indicated just the contrary.\n\nIf Privy Council intended to negative. the power of delegation, why was any comparison made between the powers of the Indian Legislature and those of the Imperial Parliament? Why was any reference made to the affirmative terms of the instrument by which the legislature was constituted and the negative conditions or restrictions on its powers as tests for ascertaining the validity of the Act and why was it said that it was not for the Coun to inquire further? If delegation of power was denied why did the Privy Council take the trouble of agreeing that the Governor-General in Council could not create and arm with general legislative authority a new legislative power. If there was no question of delegation, why was it laid down that the efficacy of the act of the Lieutenant-Governor was referable to the authority of the Governor-General in Council?\n\nIt seems to me that after refuting the grounds on which the majority of the High Court had based their decision, the Privy Council conceded the power of delegation but only set out the .limit of such power. In my opinion the Privy Council expressed, in . a different language, what Chief Justice Ganh had said regarding the abdication of the legislative powers by the Indian legislature without retaining control over the acts of . the person to whom the power was delegated. At this time the Indian legislature, i.e., the Governor-General in Council,. was not a legislature responsible to the people but was completely .dominated by the executive and was subservient to the British Parliament but nevertheless the English Judges imbued with their constitutional notions of supremacy of die legislature\n\nIrr re The D~/hi Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas.[.\n\nDas J.\n\nimputed to it, within the ambit and scope circwmcribed for it by the Parliament, the attributes of the supreme and sovereign British Parliament and regarded it within its own sphere as an image of that Par liament.\n\nThis position will be made clearer in subsequent decisions of the Privy Council to which some of their Lordships who decided Burah' s case were also parties.\n\nRussell v. The Queen(') was concerned with the Canadian Temperance Act, 1878.\n\nThe procedure for bringing Part I of that Act into force was as follows :-\n\n(a) A petition signed by not less than one-fourth of the voters of a country or city praying that the Act should be applied to the county or city was to be submitted; '\n\n(b) the Governor-General was then to issue a proclamation directing that a poll be taken; and\n\n( c) on adoption of the petition by the voters, the Act was to become applicable to that county or city.\n\nIt was contended by the appellants' counsel that assuming that Parliament of Canada had authority to pass a law for prohibiting and regulating the sales of intoxicating liquors, it could not delegate the power to bring into force the prohibitory and penal provisions of the Act to a majority of the electors of counties or cities.\n\nThis contention was repelled by Sir Montague E. Smith at page 835 as follows :-\n\n\"The short answer to this objection is that the Act does not delegate any legislative powers whatsoever. It contains within itself the whole legislation on the matters with which it deals. The provision that certain parts of the Act shall come into operation only on the petition of a majority of electors does not confer on these persons power to legislate. Parliament itself enacts the condition and everything which is to follow upon the condition being fulfilled. Conditional legislation of this kind is in many cases convenient and is certainly not unusual, and the power so to legislate cannot be denied to the Parliament of Canada,\n\nll) <!880) L.R. 7 App. Cas. 829.\n\nwhen the subject of legislation is within its competency.\"\n\nTwo things are to be noted. In the first place the Privy Council did not treat conditional legislation as involving delegation of legislative power.\n\nConditional legislation, as will be seen hereafter, does in a sense amount to a delegation of . power and, therefore, it is clear that the ' Privy Council used the expression \"delegatfon\" in a stricter sense than its ordinary popular meaning. In the next place, his Lordship laid stress on the subject of legislation being within the competency of the legislature as the correct test for asq:rtaining the validity of a law and referred to the case of The Queen v. Burah(1) as authority on the point.\n\nOn an examination of the scheme of the British North America Act with regard to the distribution of legislative powers and the general scope and effect of sections 91 and 92 of that ACt his Lordship came to the conclusion that the Temperance Act: did not fall within the subjects exclusively assigned to the Provincial legislatures and was, therefore, intra vires the Parliament of Canada.\n\nThe Liquor Licence Act, 1877, of Ontario authorised the Licence Commissioners to make regulations, create offences and annex penalties. It was contended that the local legislature had no power to delegate such powers to the Commissioners and that the maxim delegata potestas non potest delegare applied.\n\nThis argument was repelled by the Privy Council in Hodge\n\nv. The Queen(2). The following observations from the judgment of Lord Fitz-Gerald who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council are of great importance :-\n\n\"It appears to their Lordships, however, that the objection thus raised by the appellan.ts is founded on an entire misconception of the true character and position of the provincial legislature. They are in no\n\n~ sense delegates of; or acting under any mandate from,\n\ne Imperial Parliament.\n\nWhen the British North\n\n(I) (1880) L.R. 7 App. Cas. 829.\n\n(2) (l 883) L.R. 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\nDas J.\n\n19S1\n\nIn re The Delh i.awS:Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDasJ.\n\nAmerica Act enacted that there should be a legislature for Ontario, and that its legislative assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in section 92, it conferred powers not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliameqt, but authority as plenary and as ample within the lim, its prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow. Within these limits of subjects and area the local legislature is supreme, and has the same authority as the Imperial Parliament, or the Parliament of the Dominion, would have had under like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make by-laws or resolutions as to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation and effect.\n\n\"It is obvious that such an authority is ancillary to legislation, and without it an attempt to provide for varying details and machinery to carry them out might become oppressive or absolutely fail.\" A little further down his Lordship observed :-\n\n\"It was argued at the bar that a legislature committing important regulations to agents or delegates effaces itself. That is not so.\n\nIt retains its powers intact, and can, whenever it pleases, destroy, the agency it has created and set up another, or take the matter directly into its own hands. How far it shall seek the aid of subordinate agencies, and how long it shall continue them, are matters for each legislature, and not for the Courts of law, to decide.\"\n\nTo the argument that the Provincial legislature had no power to confer authority on the License Commissioners to impose imprisonment with hard labour for breach of newly created rules or by-laws, his Lordship gave the following reply at page 132 :-\n\n\"The Provincial legislature having thus the authority . to impose imprisonment, with or without hard labour, had also power to detegate similar\n\nauthority to the municipal body which it created,\n\ncalled the License Commissioners.\"\n\nThe result of the above observations naturally was that \"if by-laws or resolutions are warranted, power to enforce them seems necessary and equally · lawfull.\" Nobody can deny that the Act in question acly delegated real legislative power to the License Commissioners, for the power to create offences and to anneJ penalties cannot but be a part of real legislative\n\npow~. Indeed, the Privy Council in judgment proceeded on the footing that it was a delegation of legis.- lative power but held that it was ancillary to legislation, that such power of delegation was Co-extensive with the power of legislation itself, that as long as the legislature had not effaced itself, such delegation was permissible and that it was for the legislature to decide how much power should be delegated and for how long such delegation should continue and that these were not questions for_ -the Court to decide. The above passages clearly uphold the views expressed by Garth C.J. in Empress v. Burah\n\n(supra) and state explicitly what was somewhat cryptically said by the Privy Council in Queen v. Burah\n\n(supra) at page 194. about the legislature not having the power to set up, and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power, not created or authorized by the Councils Act.\n\nIt is interesting to note that Sir Barnes Peacock and Sir Robert P. Collier who were among the members of the Board which decided The Queen v. Burah were also members of the Board which decided Hodge v. the Queen.\n\nThe quesnon raised in Powell v. Apollo Candle Company, Limited(1) was whether section 133 of the Customs Regulation Act, 1879, of New South Wales which authorised the Governor to levy a duty upon an article which, in the opinion of the Collector, possessed properties similar to those of a dutiable article, was invalid on the grmmd that the Colonial legislature had exceeded the powers conferred on it by section 45 of\n\n(1) (1885) L. R. 10 App. Cas. 282.\n\nl!lSt\n\nIn re Tile Dellll 1-1 Act, 1912~\n\netc.\n\nDa1l.\n\nDasJ.\n\nthe Constitution Act of New South Wales which authe>- rised only the legislature to impose and levy customs duty. Sir Robert P. Colf1er in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council referred to The Queen v Burah\n\nand Hodge v. The Queen to both of which he was a party. He observed at page 290 :-\n\n\"These two cases have put an end to a doctrine which appears at one time to have had some currency, that a Colonial legislature is a delegate of the Imperial Legislature. It is a legislature restricted in the area of its powers, but within that area unrestricted and not acting as an agent or a delegate.\" ·\n\nAt page 291, after indicating that the duties levied under the Order in Council were really levied by the authority of the Act under which the Order was issued, his Lordship concluded :-\n\n\"The legislature has not parted with its perfect control over the Governor, and has the power, of course, at any moment, of withdrawing or altering the power which they have entrusted to him.\"\n\nThis is nothing but a reiteration of the principle that short of self-effacement the legislature can freely delegate its legislative power.\n\nAs long as the legislature retains its own power of control, there can be no objection to delegation, for if the delegatee does anything foolish or wrong che same may at. once be put right by the legislature by removing the delegatee and appointing another in his place or taking up the matter in its own hands. The observations of Lord Selborne in The\n\nQueen v. Burah (supra) as to the legislature setting up a new legislative power should, therefore, be read In the light of these later decisions, and in the way I have suggested above.\n\nThe principle that even a provincial legislature of a Dom.inion is supreme within the lin1.its assigned by section 92 of the Act of 1867 was also reiterated by Lord Watson when delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in The lJquidators of the Maritime Bank\n\nof Canda v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick(').\n\n(!) L. R. [1892) A. C. 438 at p. 442.\n\nBaxur v. Ah Way(1) is an illustration of the application of the J>rinciple of conditional legi!llation.\n\nSection 50 of the Australian Customs Act of 1901 provided that no \"prohibited imports\"- should be imported.\n\nSection 52 enumerated the prohibited imports in a series of sub-sections of which sub-section (g) was as follows:-\n\n\"AU goods, the importation of which may be prohibited by proclamation.\" ·\n\nThe defendant was prosecuted for an offence against sections 50 and 52\n\n(g) for importing prohibited imports, i.e., opium suitable for smoking. At the trial, before the High Court. the Prosecutor tendered in evidence the Commonwealth Gazette containing a proclamation by the Governor-General in Council under section 52 (g) declaring opium in that condition to be a prohibited import. Objection was taken, to the validity of the proclamation on the ground that subsection (g) of section 52 was ultra vires the Commonwealth Parliament.\n\nThe matter was referred to the Full Court and the Court held that section 52(g) was not a delegation of legislative power but was conditional legislation.\n\nGriffith C.J. said at page 632 :-\n\n\"It is of course obvious that every legislature does in one sense delegate some of its functions. It is too late in the day to say that the legislature cannot create, for instance, a municipal authority and give it power to make by-laws, or create a public authority with power to make regulations that shall have the force of law, or confer upon the Governor-in-Council power to make regulations having the force of law, or upon the Judges of the Court power to make rules of Court having the force of law. Nor is it to the purpose to say that the legislature could have done the thing itself.\n\nOf course it could. In one sense this is a delegation of authority because it authorises another body which it specifies to do something that it might have done itself.\n\nIt is too late in the day to contend that such a delegation, if it is a delegation, is objectionable in any sense.\"\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDasJ.\n\n19Sl\n\nInre 71u D•llll L\"1r1 kt, 1912, etc.\n\nDar I.\n\nHis Lordship then referred to The Q11em v; Buralz and held that this was a conditional legislation.\n\nThe objection that under Chapter I, Part I, section 1 legislative power was vested in the Federal Parliament and could not be delegated was disposed of by the lcanK.d Chief Justice by saying that \".that section is merely introdw:tory to the provisions of the Constitution which deal with the lcgis~.\" To the C()lltcntion that the power of the Conunoowcalth Parliament waa less than the power exercised by the British Parliament the following answer wai given by O'Connor J. at page 639:-\n\n\"Can it be seriously contended that, in creating a legislature such as that of. the Commonwealth with plenary powers, and in giving it power to deal with this particular subject -matter, the power is to be denied it which is necessary and essential, and has been always treated as necessary and essential, for the acrcisc of that legislative power in England and in several of the Australian States.\n\nTo read the gift of power to the Parliament of the Commonwealth in that limited way would, it seems to me, be altogether to deny full force and effect to the words of the Constitution itself.\"\n\nI saw J. referred to the legislative practice and on the principles laid down in Hodge v. The Queen, The Queen\n\nv. Burah and Powell v. Apollo Candle. Co. and concluded that the position in the case before him was exactly covered by the decislons in those cases. Higgins J. concluded his judgment with the following observations:-\n\n\" .......... that the Federal Parliament has, within its ambit, full power to frame its laws in any fashion, using any agent, any agency, any machinery that in its W1Sdom it thinks fit, for the peace, order and good government of Australia.\"\n\nThe next case to be referred to is that of In re George Edwin Gray(1 ). Section 6 of War Measures Act, 1914, of the Parliament of Canada provided :-\n\nCl) (1918) 57 S. C. C. UO; 42 D.L.R. I.\n\n• •\n\n'.'The Governor-General in Council shall have the power to do and authorise such. acts and. things and to : make from time to time such' orders and regulations as he may, by reason of the-existence of real or apprehended war, deem necessary or adviseable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada.\n\nFor greater .· certa'mty but not so as to restrict . the generality of the foregoing terms,. it is hereby declared. that the powers of the_ Governor-General in Council shall extend to all -matters coming within the classes of subjects hereinafter enumerated, that is to say ........ '!\n\nHere foIIO\\ved sevral clauses. . It will be noclced that in the body, of the section there _was.only .. an enumeration of certain subjects with respect to ·which ..\n\nthe. GO\\ernor-General in · Council was authorised to make regulations but ihat' the legislature 'itself ' did not formulate any policy with \"respect to any of . the. 'said subjects.\n\nThe section gave a carte blanche, as it . were, to. the.· Governor-General in Council.\n\nIn exercise of .the powers thus conferred, the Governor-General in .Council on .April 20, 1918, passed an Order in Council containing various regulations.\n\nThe regulations had the effect of amending and modifying some parts of the Military Services Act, 1917.\n\nGrey; who. had been granted exemption under the Act of 191J7, was ordered to report for. duty., On his failure to do so, he was arrested.\n\nThen an application for a writ of habeas corpus was\n\n~ taken out.\n\nThe practice of authorising administrative . bod'ies to make regulations to carry out the objects of an Act instead of setting out all the details in the Act itself was not seriously questioned, but it was said that the power to make regulations could not consti- ' tutionally be granted to such an extent as to enable the express provisions of a Statute to be amended or revealed.\n\nFitzpatrick C. J., in repelling the above . argument, said at page 156 :-\n\n\"In view of Rex v. Halliday, [1917] ·A. C. 269, I do not think that this broad proposition can be main- \"' tained. · Parliament cannot, indeed, abdicate its functions, but within reasonable limits at any rate it . can\n\n21-3 S.C. India/68\n\n19.:51\n\nIn re 'The 'Ddhl law• Acl, 1912, etc.-\n\nbas J,\n\n19Sl\n\nIN,..\n\nTAe Deihl Law• Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas I.\n\ndelegate its power to the executive government.\n\nSuch powers must necessarily be subject to determination at any time by Parliament, and needless to say the acts of the executive, under its delegated authority, must fall within the ambit of the legislative pronouncement by which its authority is measured.\"\n\nEven Idington J. who delivered a dissenting judgment conceded that delegation of legislation by regulations could be very well resorted to in such a way. as to be clearly understood as such, but his objection was that \"a wholesale surrender of the will of the people to an autocratic power is exactly what we are fighting against.\" Duff J. at page 170 said :-\n\n\"It is a very extravagant description of this enactment to say that it professes (on any construction of it) to delegate to the Governor in Council the whole legislative authority of Parliament ................... .\n\nThe powers granted could at any time be revoked and anything done under them nullified by Parliament, which Parliament did not, and for that matter could not, abandon any of its own legislative jurisdiction.\n\nThe true view of the effect of this type of leg'islation is that the subordinate body in which the law-making authority is vested by it is intended to act as the agent or organ of the legislature and that the acts of the agent take effect by virtue of the antecedent legis.. lative declaration (express or implied) that they shall have the force of law.\"\n\nAnglin J., after referring to Powell v. Apollo Candle Company,\n\n(supra) proceeded :-\n\n\"A complete abdication by Parliament of its legislative functions is something so inconceivable that the constitutionality of an attempt to do anything of the kind need not be considered.\n\nShort of such an abdication, any limited delegation would seem to be within the ambit of a legislative jurisdiction certainly as wide as that of which it has been said by .......... \"\n\nHis Lordship here quoted passages from Hodge v.\n\nThe Queen and The Queen v. Burah.\n\nI Section 92(1) of British North America Act, 1867, empowered the Provincial Legislature to amend the constitution \"excepting as regards the office of the Lieutenant-Governor.\" The Initiative and Referendum Act passed by the -legislature o£ Manitoba required the Lieutenant-Governor to submit a proposed law to a body of voters totally distinct from the legislature and rendered him powerless to prevent its becoming an actual law if approved by the voters.\n\nThe validity of the Act passed by the Legislature of Manitoba was called into question in In re The Initiative and Referendum Act(1). On a consideration of the provisions of the British North Amerka Act, 1867, the Privy Council held that the impugned Act was ultra vires the Manitoba Legislature.\n\nThis was enough to dispose of the appeal.\n\nBut Lord Haldane proceeded to say, but without finally deciding :-\n\n\"Section 92 of the Act of 1867 entrusts legislative power in a province to its legislature, and to that legislature only. No doubt a body, with a power of legislation on the subjects entrusted to it so ample as that enjoyed by a Provincial Legislature in Canada, could, while preserving its own capatity intact, seek the assistance of subordinate agencies, as had been done when in Hodge v. The Queen, the Legislature o£ Ontario was held entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissioners authority to enact regulations relating to taverns ; but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to_ which it owes its existence\"\n\nIn the above passage a distinction is sought to be made between a delegation of power by the legislature while preserving its own capacity intact and a creation and endowment by the Legislature with its own capacity of a new legislative power not created by the Act.\n\nAccording to the earlier authorities as well as to / this decision there was no objection to the former whereas the latter could not be done, for the creation and endowment with its own capacity of new legislative power postulated that the legislature in doing so\n\n(1) [1919] A. C. 935.\n\nlllre Tire Delhi' Laws Aet, -i912,\n\netc'\n\nDas I.\n\nl•u TAe De/la Ltn.1.Ac1, 1912,\n\ntc.\n\nDa1 J,\n\nhad to transfer its own capacity and, therefore, did not preserve its own capacity intact.\n\nThe case of The Victorian SteveJfor;; zg and General Contracting Co. v. Dignan(') was concerned with section 3 of the Transport Workers Act, 1928-29, of Australia which provided :-\n\n\"The Governor-General may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, which, notwithstanding anything in any other Act, but subject to the Acts Interpretation Act, 1901-1918, and the Acts lnterpretat'lon Act, 1904-1916, shall have the force of law, with respect to the eployment of transport workers, and in particular for regulating the engagement, service, and discharge of transport workers, and the licensing of persons as transport workers, and for regulating or prohibiting the employment of unlicensed persons as transport workers, and for the protection -of trartsport workers.\"\n\nIn exercise: of the powers conferred by this section the Governor-General on June 26, 1931, 'issued the \"Watersiqe Employment Regulations.\" These regulations provided, amongst other things, that transport workers of certain kinds should be given priority in employment.\n\nThis ran counter, to a certain extent, to an award of the Coun of Conciliation and Arbitranon made under a previous Act.\n\nThe appellants were convicted of an offence under the regulations.\n\nThe question was whether section 3 was ultra vires on the ground that it delegated legislative power to the Governor-General.\n\nThis objection was overruled.\n\nThe Court felt itself bound by its earlier decision in Roche\n\nv. Kronheimer(2), which was taken as an authority for the proposition that an authority of subordinate lawmaking may be .invested in the Executive.\n\nDixon J. at p. 100 observed :-\n\n\"I, therefore, retain the opinion which I expressed in the earlier case that Roche v. Kronheimer( 2 ) did Jecide that a statute conferring upon the Executive a power to legislate upon some matter contained within\n\n(I) (1931)46 c.L.R. 73.\n\n(2) (1921) 29 c.L.R. 329.\n\n' ...\n\none of the subjects of the legislative power of the Par-\n\n1 iament is a law with respect to that subject, and that the distribution of legislative, execuftve and judicial poY•ers in the Constitution does not operate to restrain the power of the Parliament to make such a law.\n\nThis does not mean that a law confiding authority to the ' Executive will be valid, however extensive or vague\n\nthe subject-matter may be, if it does not fall outside the boun<lari~ of Federal Power.\n\nThere may be such a width or such an uncertainty of the subject-matter to be handed over that the enactment attempting it is not a law with respect to any particular head or heads of legislative power.\"\n\nFurther down the learned Judge said :-\n\n\"In English law much weight has been given to the dependence of subordinate legislation for its efficacy, not only on the enactment, but upon the continuing operation of the statute by which it is so authorised.\n\nThe statute is conceived to be the source of obligation and the expression of the continuing will of\n\nthe Legislature.\"\n\nThen his Lordship referred to \"the emphasis laid in Apollo's case and in Hodge's case upon the retention by the legislature of the whole of its power of control and of its capacity to take the matter back into its own hands.\" Evatt J. referring to the duty of the Judiciary to recognise the needs of the nation and not to act as a clog upon the legislative and executive departments, expressed himself at p. 118 as follows :-\n\n\"Such authority always extended beyond the issue by Parliament itself of binding commands.\n\nParliament could also authorise the issue of such commands by any person or authonty it chose to select or create. 'Legislative power' connoted the power to deposit or delegate legislative power because this was implied in the idea of parliamentary . sovereignty itself.\n\nIt wa~ of course, always understood that the power of the delegate or depository could be withdrawn by the Parliament that had created it, and in\n\n19S1\n\nIn re Tiu Dh/i Lows Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDai J.\n\nDas J.\n\nthis sense Parliament had to preserve 'its own capacity intact', (In re Initiative and Referendum Act)\".\n\nHis Lordship after tating the view that, if Parliament passed a law within its powers, it might, as part of its legislation, endow a subordinate body with power to make regulations for the carrying out of the scheme described in the statute, posed the question- Docs the Constitution impliedly prohibit Parliament from enlarging the extent of the powers to be conferred on subordinate authorities ? The learned Judges gave the answer :-\n\n\"In my opinion, every grant by the Commonwealth Parliament of authority to make rules and regulations, whether the grantee is the Executive government or some other authority, is itself a grant of ' leg\\slative power.\n\nThe true nature and quality of the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament involves, as part of its content, power to confer lawmaking powers upon authorities other than Parliament itself.\n\nIf such power to issue binding commands may lawfully be granted by Parliament to the Executive or other agencies, an increase in the extent of such power cannot of its invalidate the grant.\n\nIt is true I that the extent of the power granted will often he a very material circumstance in the examination of the validity of the legislation conferring the grant.\n\nBut this is for a reason quite different and distinct from the absolute restriction upon parliamentary action which is supposed to result from the theory of Separation of Powers\"\n\nAgain, his Lordship said at page 119 :-\n\n\"The nature of the legislative power of the Commonwealth authority is plenary, but it must be possible to predicate of every law. passed by the Parliament that it is a law with respect to one or other of the specific subject-matters mentioned in sections 51 and\n\n52 of the Constitution.\" <\n\nEvatt J. then indicated the matters which were material for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of an Act.\n\nHe classified them under seven heads which\n\nit is not necessary to set out in detail.\n\nUnder heads\n\n(5) and (6) Evatt J. made a distinction between a law with respect to a subject and a law with respect to the legislative power to make a law with respect to that subject.\n\nAccording to him, a statute was valid if it was a law with respect to granted subject-matter-, although it was also a law with respect to the exercise of legislative power.\n\nHis conclusion is set out at page 121 :-\n\n\"On final analysis, therefore, the Parliament of the Commonwealth is not competent to \"abdicate\" hs\n\npowers of legislation. This is not because Parliament is bound to perform any or all of its . legislative powers or functions, for it may elect not to do so ; and not because the doctrine of separation of powers prevents Parliament from granting authonty to other bodies to make laws or by-laws and thereby exercise legislative power, for it does so in almost every statute ; but because each and every one of the laws passed by\n\nParliament must answer the description of a law upon one or more of the subject-matters stated in the Constitution.\n\nA law by which Parliament gave all its law-making authority to another body would be bad merely because it would fail to pass the test last mentioned.\"\n\nI entirely. agree with the leai:ned Judge that the legislature must not abdicate but must retain its control so as to be able to withdraw the legislative power conferred on the subordinate authority whenever it may become necessary.\n\nThe reported decisions to which reference has been made above clearly establish that, shon of such abdication or effacement, the legislature. may freely delegate its legislative powers , and . it is not for the Court to decide how much authority should be delegated or for how long such delegation should continue.\n\nI also agree that the law made by ' the lelaturc must be within the ambit of its legislative power and it cannot go beyond that ambit.\n\nBut I am find no jmtification, either in principle or authority for the fanciful distinction between a law_ with respect\n\nhire The De/Iii Law11 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDa11J.\n\nlnrt TA1 Delhi Laws, Act, 1912,\n\net.c.\n\nDas J.\n\nto a subject and a law with respect to the exercise of legislative power with respect to that subject.\n\nIndeed, it is opposed to the observations of Lord Fitz-Gerald in Hodge v. The Queen to which I have already referred.\n\nIn my opinion, the power to make law with respect to a subject includes the power to make a law delegating the power to make a law with respect to that subject.\n\nFurther 'it should be noted (i) that the Transport Workers Act was not an emergency measure passed during or on the eve of a war but was a peace time legislation passed in 1928-1929 and\n\n(ii) that the impugned section of the Act only enumerated the subjects with respect to which power was given to the Governor-General to make regulations and, to use the language of the American decisions, did not itself lay down any policy with respect to any of the said subjects or set up any standard to which the regulations so authorised were to conform.\n\nAnd yet the High Court of Australia found no difficulty in upholding the validity of that section Evatt J. could not deny, at page 123, that the section was what he described as a law with respect to the legislative power of the Commonwealth but on an examination of the circumstances came to the conclusion that the section could al<o be described as a law with respect to trade and commerce with other countries or among the States.\n\nW\\th great respect to the learned Judge, the circumstances referred to by him could only be the occasion and perhaps some justification for the delegation of power made by the section.\n\nThe section did nothing but delegate the power to make regulations.\n\nIt did not lay down any policy or standard at all.\n\nIt was purely and simply what he called a law with respect to the exercise of legislative power and nothing else and according to his classification, if that were correct, should have been held to be invalid.\n\nIt was a straining of language to say that section 3 was a law with respect to any of the subjects mentioned therein.\n\nIn my opinion, section 3 could only be supported on the simple and logical ground that short of se!f-efacement delegation was permissible.\n\nCroft v. Dunphy(1) reiterated the principle that the Colonial legislature was , sovereign within its own ambit and that if the legislation was within its legislative c01t1petence no further enquiry was ne.cessary.\n\nAt page 163 Lord Macmillan said :-\n\n\"Once it is found that a parlicular topic of legislation is among those upon 'Yhich the Dominion Parliament may competently legislate as being for the peace, order and good government of Canada or as being one of the specific subjects enumerated in section 91 of the British North America Act, their Lordships see no reason to restrict the permitted scope' of such legislation by any other consideration than is applicable to the legislation of a fully sovereign State.\"\n\nThe case of Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board(2) was concerned with the Natural Products Marketing (British Columbia) Act, 1936, which enabled the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to\n\nset up a Central Marketing Board to establish or approve schemes for the control and regulation of\n\ntranspotation, packing, storage and marketing of any natural products anrl to constitute marketing bo; irds to administer the >c:hemc; and to vest in those bo:irds the power ro fix .and collect licence fees.\n\nIt should be noted that the Act permitted even sub.- delegation of legislative power hy the Lieutenant- Gove.rnor in Council.\n\nThe appellants were dairy farmers and were affected by a inilk marketing scheme.. They, however, declined to obtain a licence from the board.\n\nThey filed a suir for a declaration that the Act was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature In the Privy Council the validity of the Act was questioned on the ground of delegation of legislative power to the Lieutcnant~Governor in Council and by the latter to the Marketing Board~.\n\nLord Atkin who delivered the judgment of the Board said at p. 722 :-\n\n\"The third objection is that it is not within the powers of the Provincial Legislatme to delegate\n\n(I) (1933) A.C. 156; A.l.R. 1933 P.C. 16.\n\n(l) (1938] A.C. 708; A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 36.\n\nIn re The Ddhi Laws Act, , l9t2,\n\netc.\n\nDas 1.\n\nln re The Delhi L!lws Act, 1912. etc.\n\nDas J.\n\nso-called legislative powers to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, or to give him powers of funher delegation.\n\nThis objection appears to their Lordships subversive of the nghts which the Provincial Legislature enjoys while dealing with matters falling within the classes of subjects in relation to which the Constitution has\n\ngranted legislative powers.\n\nWithin its appointed sphere the Provincial Legislature is as supreme as any other Parliament ; and it is unnecessary to try to enumerate the innumerable occasions on which legislatures, Provincial, Dominion and Imperial, have entrusted various persons and bodies with similar powers to those contained in th'is Act.\"\n\nIt is worthy of note that the Privy Council not only upheld the validity of a single delegation but also upheld the validity of a sub-Oclegation of power.\n\nIn Wishart v. Fraser(') the appellant had been convicted of an offence under reg. 41 of the National Security (Central) Regulations 1939-1940 made by the Governor-General in Council of Australia under section 5 of the National Security Act, 1933.\n\nThat section conferred power on the Governor-General in Council to make regulations for securing the public safety and tl; ie defence of the Commonwealth and the territories of the Commonwealth and for prescribing all matters which were necessary or convenient to be prescribed for. the more effettual prosecution of the war.\n\nIt will be noticed that the section only enabled the Governor-General in Council to make regulations for securing the public safety etc., but did not lay down any policy at all or set up any standard to which the Regulat'lons were to conform.\n\nThe section was more general than even section 6 of the Canadian War Measures Act, 1914, which, besides referring to public safety etc., did enumerate several specific subjects with respect to which regulations had to be made.\n\nRich A. C. J., with whom Starke J. agreed, held that the matter was concluded by the decisions of the Court in the Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting\n\n(I) (1941) 64 C.L.R. 470.\n\n... -\n\nS.CJl.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1061\n\nCompany v. DignanC)· To the suggestion that in section 5 there was such a width or uncertainty of the subject-matter that the enactment could not be said to be a law with respect to the naval and military defence or with respect to any other head of legislative power, Dixon J .. at p. 485 gave the following answer :-\n\n\"This suggestion cot be. sustained. The defence of a country is peculiarly the concern of the Executive, and in war the exigencies are so many, so varied and so urgent that width and generality are a characteristic of the powers which it must exercise. Section 5 is clearly directed to the prosecution of the war and is valid exercise of the defence power.\"\n\nThe other learned Judges took the same view. The circumstances that the subejct of defence power needs greater latitude for delegation of legislative . power is no answer to the supposed requirement that the statute must lay down the policr.\n\nJn the matter of a Reference as to Validity of Regulations in Relation to Chemicals etc.(2 ) arose out of the War Measures Act, (Ch. 286 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927).\n\nSection 3 of the revised statute was almost in the same terms as section 6 of the War Measures Act which was considered in George Edwin Gray's case(3).\n\nThis section gave power to the Governorin-Council to do and authorise such acts and things and to make such orders and regulations as he might by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war deem necessary for the security, defence, peace, oruer and welfare of Canada.\n\nWithout prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the section set out several specific matters on which regulations could be made.\n\nIn this case the validity of the War Measures Act, 1914, itself was not questioned because that was upheld in George Edwin Gray's case(3). The questions raised were whether the chemical regulation was ultra vires the power given to the Governor-General in Council and whether the\n\n(I) (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73.\n\n(3) 57 s.c.R. !Su.\n\n(2) (1943} S.C.C. I; (1943} 2 D.L.R. 248.\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1A.ct,1912,\n\netc.\n\nDasJ.\n\nt'/C.\n\nlatter could sub-delegate the powers to subordinate bodies.\n\nDuff C. J. at page 12 said :-\n\n\"As in respect of any other measure which the Executive Government may be called upon to consider, the duty rests upon it to decide whether, in the conditions confronting it, it deems' it necessary or advisable for the safety of the State to appoint such subordinate agencies and to determine what their powers shall be.\n\n\"There is always, of course, some risk of abuse when wide powers are committed in general terms to anybody of men.\n\nUnder the War Measures Act the final responsibility for the acts of the Executive rests upon Parliament.\n\nParliament abandons n.one of its powers, none of its control over the Executive, legal or constitutional.\"\n\nRinfret J. at page 17 observed :-\n\n\"The powers conferred upon the Governor-in- Council by the War Measures Act constitute a lawmaking authority, an authority to pass legislative enactments such as should be deemed necessary and advisable by reason of war; and, when acting within those limits, the Governor-in-Council is vested with plenary powers of legislation ;., 1Jrge and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself : (Lord Selborne in The Queen v. Burah).\n\nWithin the ambtt of the Act by which his authority is measured, the Governor-in-\n\nCouncil is given the same authority as is vested in the Parliament itself.\n\nHe ha~ been given a law-making power.\"\n\nAfter quoting the passage from Hodge v. The Queen,(') the learned Judge proceeded at page 18 :-\n\n\"Parliament has not abdicated its general legislative powers.\n\nIt has not effaced itself, as has been\n\nsuggested~ It has indicated no intention of abandoning colltrol and has made no abandonment of control in fact.\n\nThe subordmate instrumentality, which it has created for exercising the .powers, remains responsible directly to Parliament for the continuance of its official existence.\"\n\n(I) (1883) L.R. 9 App. Cas. 117,\n\nThe le.arned Judge disposed of the doctrine of agency as follows :-\n\n\"The maxim delegatus non , potest delegare is a rule of the law of agency.\n\nIt has no reference _to an authority to legislate conferred by statute of Parlia- . ment.\n\nIndeed, the power of delegation being absolute- 1 y essential, in the circumstances for which the War Measures Act has been designed, so as to have a workable Act, that power of delegation must be deemed to form part of. the powers conferred by Parliament in the Act.\n\nThe Governor-in-Council, within the ambit o{ the Act, is not a delegate.\n\nThe Act constitutes a devo lution of the legislative power of Parliament, and, within the prescribed limits, it can legislate as Parliament itself could.\n\nTherefore, it can delegate its powers, whether legislative or administrative.\"\n\nDavis J. reiterated the same principle at pp. 25-26 :- \"But the safety valve of our constitutional system of government remains intact.\n\nParliament has not effaced itself.\n\nIn the ultimate analysis the House of Commons as representative of the people has, in a practical sense, full power to amend or repeal the War Measures Act or to make ineffctive any of the orders in Council passed in pursuance of its provisions.\"\n\nTo the same effect are the following observations of Kerwin J. at p. 30 :-\n\n\"If at any time Parliament considers that too great a power . has been conferred upon the Governoi - in-Council the reniedy lies in its own hands.\"\n\nWe have seen that in Shannon's case(1) the power given to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council expressly included a power of further delegation.\n\nAnd yet the Privy Council upheld the enactment. If power of legislation contains w'1thin itself the power of delegation then logically the donee of the legislative power must also have the power of delegation as part of the content of the power delegated to him.\n\nThe reasoning adopted by the learned Judges in the last Canadian case appears\n\nt~ me to be perfectly logical.\n\n(I) [1938] A.C. 708, A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 36.\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The. Delhi Ltlw1Act,1912,\n\netc.\n\n.DasJ.\n\n19S1\n\nl11n Tlie De/Iii Law• Act; 1912,\n\nle.\n\nDas I.\n\nThe case of King-Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma(') requires careful consideration.\n\nSection 72 as set out in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, read witli the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, authorised the Governor-General \"in cases of emergency\" to \"make and promulgate ordinances for the peace, order and good government of British India or any part thereof\" and further provided that \"any ordinance so made shall .......... have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature ............ \" In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by this section the Governor-General on January 2, 1942, promulgated Ordinance No. II of 1942 called the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance.\n\nThe preamble to the Ordinance recited that \"an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide for tlie setting up of special Criminal Courts.\" By section 1(3) the Act was to come into force in any Province \"only if the Provincial Government, being satisfied of the existence of an emergency arising from any disorder with the Province .............. by notification in the Official Gazette, declares it to be in force in the Province and shall cease to be in force when such notification is rescinded.\" Broadly speaking, sections 5, 10 and lb provided that a special Judge, a special Magistrate and a Summary Court should try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes or cases as the Provincial Government or a servant of the Crown authorised in this behalf might by general or special order direct Section 26 took away the right of appeal or rev'1sion in respect of an order made by any of these Courts.\n\nThe respondents, who were all policemen, had been convicted by the Special Magistrate at Jessore and sentenced to 2 years' rigorous imprisonment on charges of rioting, assault and committing prejudicial acts tending to cause disaffection in the Police force.\n\nThey came up to High Court on petitions for revision and contended that the Ordinance was ultra vires the powers of the Governor- General.\n\nIt was overlooked in the Courts below that\n\n(1) (1944) 72 I.A. 57; [1945] F.C.R. 161.\n\nif the Ordinance was ultra ,,; ces then the Court of the\n\nSpecial Magistrate was not a Court at all and, therefore, there could be no question of revising the order made by such an illegal body.\n\nThe proper course was certainly to proceed under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court held that the Ordinance was ultra vires.\n\nThe majority of the Federal Court of India affirmed the decision of the High Court.\n\nThe Crown went up to the Privy Couru:iL Alth1; mgh Ordinance No. II of 1942 was, after the decision of the High Court, replaced by Ordinance No. XIX of 1943, the Privy Council, in view of the importance of the questions raised, decided the question of . the validity of Ordinance No. II of 1942 The Ordinance was attacked on several grounds.\n\nTwo of the objections related to the question of emergency.\n\nThey are set out at p. 65.\n\nIt was contended that the Ordinance was invalid either because the language of section 1 (3) showed that the Governor-General, notwithstanding the preamble, did not consider that an emergency existed but was making provision for a future emergency or else because the section amounted to what was called \"delegated legislation\" by which the Governor-General, without legal authority, sought to pass the decision whether an emergency existed to the Provincial Government instead of deciding it himself.\n\nTheir Lordships held that there was no valid ground for either of these contention.\n\nViscount Simon, who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council, disposed of the first objection at pp. 65 and 66.\n\nThe second objection, be it remembered, was that the Governor-\n\nGeneral had by section 1 (3) delegated the question as to whether an emergency existed to the decision of the Provincial Government instead of deciding it himself.\n\nTherefore, the objection was not that any legislative power was, by section I (3), delegated but that the\n\nobfgation to decide the question of emergency . on which depended the power of making the Ordinance\n\nhad been delegated to the Provincial Government.\n\nThis objection is dealt with at pp. 66--67.\n\nIt is with reference to this particular objection that Viscount Simon observed :-\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re Tle D, Jhi 1-1 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nD11s I.\n\n19SI\n\nelc.\n\nDas J.\n\n\"It ls undoubtedly true that the Govcrnor- General, acting under Section 72 of Schedule IX, must himself discharge the duty of legislation there cast on him, and cannot transfer it to other authorities.\n\nBut the Governor-General has not delegated his legislative powers at all.\n\nHis powers in this respect, in cases of emergency, are as wide as the powers of the Indian Legislature which, as already pointed out, in view of the proclamation under section 102, had power to make laws for a Province even in respect of matters which would otherwiJ; e be reserved to Prov'mcial legislature.\n\nTheir Lordships are unable to see that there was any valid objection, in point of legality, to the Governor-General's Ordinance taking the form that the actual setting up of a special court under the terms of the Ordinance should take place at the time and witHm the limits judged to be necessary by the Provincial Government specially concerned.\n\nThis is not delegated legislation at all. It is merely an example of the not uncommon legislative arrangement by which the local application of the provision of a statute 'is determined by the judgment of a loc.al administrative body as to its necessity.\"\n\nThen his Lordship referred to Russell v. The Queen(').\n\nLearned counsel for the interveners relied on the above passage, and particularly on the opening sentence In support of his contention that legislative power could not be delegated at all.\n\nI do not think the above passage, properly understood, supports that contention.\n\nIn the first place the above observations should be read in the light of the context.\n\nThe Privy Council in that passage was repelling the particular objection. I have mentioned and that objection related to the delegation of the decision as to the existence of emergence and not to any delegation of legislative power.\n\nIn the next place it must be remembered that section 72 gave a very special or limited power of legislation to the Governor-General and the existence of that power of legislation was made conditional upon the existence of an emergency of which the Governor-General was the\n\n(I) (1880) L.R. 7 App. Cas. 829.\n\nsole judge.\n\nAs the decision as to the existence of emergency was not an exercise of legislative power and could not be delegated the ordinance-making power also could not be delegated. This circumstance explains the opening sentence and I cannot read that passage as upsetting all that had been said in a series of earlier decisions about the delegability of legislative power.\n\nThis decision, therefore, throws no light on the question which is now before us, namely, whether legislative power may be delegated at all and if yes, to what extent it may be done.\n\nI have at the risk of prolix:1ty quoted at length several passages from the different decisions of the Privy Council and other Courts bearing on the question now before us not because any of them is binding on us but because I believe they enable us to appreciate the true legal principles.\n\nI think it is possible to deduce from them the following principles :-\n\n(a) that a legislature etstablished by or under an Act of the British Parliament is in no sense an agent or delegate of the British Parliament ;\n\n. (b) that the power of such a legislature is circumscribed by the Act by which it is constituted and the legislature cannot go beyond it, but within its ambit it is supreme and its power is as large and of the same nature as that of the British Parliament ; ( c) that the principle of non-delegation, founded either on the doctrine of separation of powers or on the theory of agency, has no application to the British Parliament or the legislatures constituted by an Act of the British Parliament ;\n\n(d) that in the ever present complexity of the conditions with which governments have to deal, the power of delegation is necessary for and ancillary to the exercise of legislative power and is a component part of its content ; ( e) that the operation of the act performed under the delegated power is directly and immediately under and by virtue of the law by which the power was delegated and its efficacy is referable to that antecedent law;\n\nl2-3 S.C. India/68\n\n1951 11-.-\n\nIn re The Delhi Urws Act, 1912;\n\netc.\n\nD•s 'J..\n\nl9Sl\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\n(f) if what the legislature docs is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited, then it is not for the Court to enquire further or to enlarge constructively those conditions or restrictions ;\n\n(g) that while the legislature is acting within its prescribed sphere there is, except as hereinafter stated. no degree of or limit to its power of delegation of its legislative power, it being for the legislature to determine how far it should seek the aid of subordinate agencies and how long it shall continue them and it is not for the Court to prescribe any limit to the legislature's power of delegation ; and\n\n(h) that the power of delegation is, however, subject nnly to the qualification that the legislature may ?I not abdicate or efface itself, that is to say, may not, without preserving its own capacity intact, create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created or authorised by the Act to which it owes its own existence.\n\nOf the above propositions, (a) and (b) have not been seriously questioned before us but the controversy has centred round (c) to (h).\n\nIt is conceded that the British Parliament may transfer the whole of lts legislative powers to any other person or body, legislative or executive, and may thereby efface itself, but it is contended that it can do all that because it is a supreme omnipotent and sovereign legislature.\n\nA Dominion Legislature, it is pointed out, is a non-sovereign body and, therefore, cannot claim to possess all the attributes of sovereignty that the British Parliament possesses.\n\nNo less than eight several points of dissimilarity between the sovereign British Parliament and a non-sovereign Dominion Legislature have been brought to our notice and a number of text books and judicial decisions have been cited before us.\n\nThere can be no doubt that a Dominion Legislature cannot be sove- . rCign in the sense in which the British Parliament is sovereign, for the powers of the former, unlike those of\n\n\" ,\n\nwithin its own sphere the Dominion Legislature is supreme and its power, mark the words, \"is as large and of the same nature\" as that of the British Parliament. Professor Dicey, it is true, at pages 149-150 of the authorities quoted above clearly establish that the British Parliament, are circumscribed by the instrument by which it is constituted. It cannot do anything outside the area or ambit fixed for it. But his Law. of the Constitution, 9th Edition, described a legislative assembly under a federal constitution as \"merely a subordinate law-making body, whose laws are of the nature of by-laws, valid whilst within the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution but invalid or unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of such authority.\" He, no doubt, classified such a legislature as a non-sovereign body and likened its laws to the by-laws of a railway company. But in the Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver- General of New Brunswick(1) to which reference has already been made, Lord Watson plainly asserted that the status of a colonial legislature was \"in no way analogous to that of a municipal institution.\" Indeed Dicey himself at page 112 acknowledged that the \"colonial legislatures; in short,· are, within their. own sphere, copies of the Imperial Parliament.\" Jennings and Young in their Constitutional Laws of the British Empire (1938 Edition), at page 30 say:--:\n\n\"It has been said that a colonial legislature is 'sovereign within its powers.' To a political scientist this phrase is nonsense. But it is a convenient way of stating the legal rule that a power to legislate for the peace, order and good government of a colony is a power to enact any . kind of legislation, reasonable or unreasonable, desirable or undesirable.\"\n\nAccording to these authors \"the most important application of this principle that a colonial legislature is 'sovereign within its powers' is, however, in relation to the delegation of legislative powers.'' They say ' - that \"a colonial legislature, within its powers, can pass the same kind of legislation as the Imperial Parliament and it can, therefore, empower subordinate\n\n(I) [1892] I\\ .C. 437.\n\nDO,, I.\n\nI• re TA1 Delhi Law1Act,1912,\n\netc.\n\nDai J,\n\nauthoril'ies to legislate.\" In short, the English Judges regarded a colonial legislature as replica or image of the Imperial Parliament itself and imputed to it, within its own sphere, all the attributes of the supreme and sovereign British Parliament including the power of delegation of its law-making functions.\n\nThus in Hodge v. The Queen (supra) Lord Fitz-Gerald regarded the p0wer of delegation as \"ancillary to legislation,'' and indeed co-extensive with the law-making power itself.\n\nThis power of delegation was conceded in Powell v. Apollo Candle Company (supra). In re George Edwin Gray('), delegatioo which was \"short of abdication\" was upheld- Evatt J. in Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Company v. Dignan (supra), acknowledged that legislative power connoted the power to delegate legislative power.\n\nThe objection against delegation or sub.delegation was regarded by Lord Atkin in Shannon's case(2 ) \"as subversive of the rights\" of the Provincial Legislature.\n\nIn the matter of a Reference af to the Validity ofi Regulations in Relation to Chemicals etc.(8 ), a sub.delegation of legislative power was also upheld. If the legislature had no power of delegation, how could the legislature authorise any local authority or any other person or body to make rules, regulations and by-laws ?\n\nThere can be no doubt that real law is often made by and through subordinate instrumentalities regulat:\\ng the conduct of the people, imposing taxes,· 'creating offences and providing penalties.\n\nSir Cecil Carr describes the rules and regulations made by sub. ordinate authorities as \"the bulkiest part\" of English law.\n\nEven in the land of the doctrine of the separation of powers where the legislative powers of Congress are not sovereign but circumscribed by the Constitution exceptions to the rule against delegation have had to be recognised and allowed by the American judges and jurists.\n\nThe Indian legislature, dominated as it was by the executive, was regarded in the same light as the colonial legislature.\n\nTherefore, one cannot but concede the existence of the power of delegation in the legislative power itself of the Indian Legislature even\n\n(I) 51 S.C.R. ISO.\n\n(2) [1938) A.C. 708.\n\n(3) (19-43) $.C.R. (Canada) I.\n\n...\n\n...\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT :Rl!PORTS 1071\n\nthough it was not a sovereign legislature like the British Parliament.\n\nThis concession, however, is not openly acknowledged by some people and they seek to camouflage it by the dogmatic pretence that the matters which are frequently found to be delegated are not really legislative powers at all but are only minor functions which can be delegated.\n\nIn the first place, assuming that these are not legislative powers in the real sense, even so where docs the power of delegation of even those minor matters come from ? The answer must be that this power of delegation is \"ancillary to legislation\" as said by Lord Fitz-Gerald and, therefore, is a part of the content of the lawcmaking power 'itself.\n\nIn the next place, there can be no doubt that the legislature may itself do the minor things, i.e., make the rules, regulations and by-laws etc. instead of entrusting any other persons or body with the power of doing them.\n\nWhen the legislatilre itself make the rules etc, it can- . not be denied that the legislature exercises its legislative power, for, as I have already said, the legislature has only legislative power and nothing else.\n\nIf, however, the legislature gives that power to a subordinate authority, why should the power, in the process of delegation, be: .transmuted into something other than what it was, lose its original intrinsic attributes and\n\ncease to be a part of the legislative power ? The delegated power may be of a minor nature or only a fractional part of the legislative power possessed by the legislature but it is, nevertheless, a legislative power, Every grant of power to make rules etc. was stated by Evatt J. in Dignan's case(1) to be \"itself a grant of legislative power.\" Even what 'in Burah's case(2) was called conditiQn.al legislation is, on strict analysis, nothing but a delegation of a fractional legislative power.\n\nIndeed; Professor Kennedy in his Const'.Jtution of Canada, 2nd Edition, at page 463 refers to conditional legislation as \"this form of delegation.\" Ref erring . to several Acts containing provisions similar\n\nto those of Act XXU of 1869 which were described later on by the Privy Council as instances of\n\n(I) [l931j 46 C.L.R. 73.\n\n(2) (1878) SI.A. 178.\n\nDa~I.\n\nDas/.\n\nconditional legislation, Garth C. J. in Burah's case(') said that they amounted \"in one sense to a transfer of legislative power, because in each of them the legislature entrusts to some other person or body of persons the makint: of law and regulations which it might have made itself.\" In Gray's case(2) Anglin J. regarded conditional legislation as \"a very common instance\" of limited. delegation.\n\nIn Choitram v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar(3 ), the Federal Coun expressed the view that when, Pie Governor made a notification under section 92 ( 1) of the Government of India Act . he exercised a legislative power. It cannot, therefore, be denied that every legislature must, in any event, have some power of delegation of its law-making power and seeing that this power of delegation may be exercised by a Dominion Legislature which, ex concessis, is not sovereign, it must be conceded that this power of delegation is implicit in or ancillary to the legislative power itself and is not an attribute of the overall sovereignty which the British Parliament does, and the Dominion Legislature does not, possess.\n\nDogma dies hard.\n\nIt falls back upon a second line of defence and contends that although the legislature .., may delegate the minor pans of its legislative powers, yet it cannot delegate its essential legislative powers.\n\nThis is nothing but the doctrine of American Constitutional law which makes a distinction between \"strictly and exclusively\", or \"purely\" or \"essential\" legislative power and the power \"to fill up the details\", \"to ascertain and declare facts and events\" or \"minor matters.\" I find no logical basis for such distinction •. when once I concede the power of delegation.\n\nIn Burah's case(') Markby J referring to Mr. Kennedy's arguments said at p. 98 :-\n\n\"He boldly claimed for the Indian Legislative Council of lndi<\\ the power to transfer its legislative functions to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.\n\nIndeed, as I understand him, the only restriction he would .., admit was that the Legislative Council could not\n\n(I) f.L.R. 3 Cal. at p. i 43.\n\n(2) 57 S.C.R. 150.\n\n(3) (1947] F:C.R. 116.\n\ndestroy its own power to legislate, though I see no .., reason why he should stop there.\n\nThe Advocate..\n\nGeneral did not, I think, go quite so far.\n\nBut in my opinion there is no narrower question which can be substituted £or the broad and general question which the learned counsel put and which I have considered.\n\nThere are no words in the Acts of Parliament upon\n\n~ which legislative authority could be made transferable in one class of cases and not in others.\"\n\nTo the same effect are the following observations of Anglin J. in In re George Edwin Gray(1) at p. 176 :-\n\n\"Short of such an abdication; any limited delegation would seem to be within the ambit of a legislative jurisdiction ........ \"\n\nIf once the power of delegation is let in, where is the line of its termination to be drawn and who s to draw the line ? Lord Fitz-Gerald said in Hodge v. The Queen(2) :-\n\n\"How far it shall seek the aid of subordinate agencies, and how long it shall continue them, are matters for each legislature and not for the Courts of law to decide.\" ·\n\nIn Baxter v. Ah Way(3), Higgins J. said that the legislature had \"within its ambit, full power to frame its laws in any fashion, using any agency, any machinery that in its wisdom it thinks fit.\" On the other hand in the United States the Judges under the due process clause took upon themselves the power to draw this line but, as we have seen, in 1825 Marshall C. J. acknowledged that \"the line has not been '\"\" exactly drawn\", and Lamar J. in 1914 had to admit that \"it is difficult to define the line.\" Who can tell when and where, if ever or at all, the line shall be drawn ? I find it much easier to appreciate the simpler principles enunciated by the Privy Council as I have explained above than to follow the everchanging and elusive American doctrine.\n\nIndeed, it is impossible • logically to restrict delegation in the way suggested by the American decisions, the principles of which learned counsel for the interveners would like us to adopt.\n\n(Jj 57 s.c.R. ISO.\n\n(2) 9 App. Cas. 117.\n\n(3) (1909) 9 C.L.R. 626.\n\nIn re Tiie Delhi Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDai.I.\n\nIn re The Delfti Laws Act,'1912,\n\netc.\n\nDas J.\n\nby \"essential\" legislative power is meant the power to lay down policy and if it is to be held that this \"essen- .- tial\" power cannot be delegated, then it will be difficult to explain some of the statutes and decisions referred to above.\n\nI shall not refer to the English Emergency Powers (Defence Act) 3 & 4 Geo. VI, C. 20 or to cases like R. v. Halliday('), for the drastic powers there delegated to the executive and upheld by the Court may -r be explained on the theory that the British Parliament as a sovereign legislature could do what it pleased and was not bound to lay down any principle whatever but might give a blank cheque to the executive m times of emergency.\n\nI shall, however, find it difficult to explain the decisions in In re George Edwin Gray(2), Wishart v. Fraser(') and in In the matter of a Reference as to the Validity of Regulations in Relation to Chemicals('), all of which dealt with Dominion statutes conferring the widest powers of delegation to the executive, except upon the basis of the legal existence of a very wide power of delegation.\n\nIn the relevant Acts, which came up for discussion the legislature laid down no policy at all but enumerated certain matters with respect to which the Governor- General was authorised to make regulations.\n\nThis i.... difficulty is sought to be resolved by the learned counsel for the Interveners by saying that those cases dealt with war measures and that in case of national emergency the legislature is permitted to delegate all its powers to the executive for the defence of the country.\n\nThe argument that an emergency can .enlarge the competency of a legislature which is fixed by the instrument constituting the legislature is entirely untenable • and opposed alike to principle and authority.\n\nSa'i<l Markby J. in Burah's case(supra) at p. 101 :-\n\n\"In extreme cases the executive may suspend the operation of all laws.\n\nBut I am not aware that such emergencies in any way affect the powers of the legislature ; certainly not unless the legislature were• actually overawed.\"\n\n(I) [1917] A.C. 260.\n\n(2) 57 S.C.R. 150 ..\n\n(3) (1941) 64 Cl,.R. 470.\n\n(4) (1943) S.C.R. (Canad~).\n\nEven the American cases do not support the contention urged. by. counsel for the interveners.\n\nThus in Schechter v. U. S.(1) to which reference has already been made Hughes C. J. at p. 1579 said :-\n\n\"Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies.\n\nBut the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority.\n\nExtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.\"\n\nTo the like effect arc the observations of Viscount Simon in Attorney-General for Ontario v.\n\nCanada Temperance Federation(2) :-\n\n\"True it is that an emergency may be the occasion which calls for the legislation, but it is the nature of the legislation itself, and not the existence of emergency, that must determine whether it is valid or not.\" Usually, in times of emergency, the legislature exercises its power of delegation extensively and entrusts its Jaw-making powers to the executive almost without hmit but this it can do only . because it has the power of delegation irrespective of the existence of any emergency and it by no means follows that the legislature cannot exercise its power of delegation as widely as it chooses in peace time or with respect to any subjects other than public security or the defence of the nation.\n\nThere can be no logical reason for any such distinction. ltl<leed, without conceding the widest power of delegation the decision in Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Company v.\n\nDignan(3), to take only one instance, cannot be explained, for section 3 o.f the Transport Workers Act which was considered in that case was a peace time legislation enacted in 1928-29 and only enumerated the subjects with respect to which the power to make regulations was given to the Governor-General.\n\nIn my judgment there cannot logically be any limit to the power of delegation of the Indian Legislature acting within its sphere.\n\n(1) 265 U.S. 495.\n\n(2) [1946) A.C. 193 a1 p. 206.\n\n(3) 46 C.L.R. 73.\n\n195l\n\nIn re TAe De/Iii L~ Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDaJ /.\n\nThe only rational limitation upon the exercise of otthis absolute power of delegation by the . Indian Legislature as by any Dominion Legislature is what has been laid down in the several privy council and other cases from which relevant passages have been quoted above.\n\nIt is that the legislature must not efface itself or abdicate all its powers and give up its control over .,.. the subordinate authority to whom it delegates its lawmaking powers.\n\nIt must not, without preserving its own capacity intact, create and arm with its own\n\ncapacity a new legislative power not created or authorised by the instrument by which the legislature itself was constituted.\n\nIn short, it must not destroy its own legislative power.\n\nThere is an antithesis. be.tween the abdication of legislative power and the exercise of the .., power of legislation.\n\nThe former excludes or destroys the latter.. . There is no such antithesis between the delegation of legislative power and the exercise of the legislative power, for however wide the delegation may be, there is nothing to prevent the legislature if it is so minded, from at any 6me, withdrawing the matter into its own hands and exercising its law-making powers.\n\nThe delegation of legislative power involves ..., an exercise of the legislative power. it doe5 not exclude or destroy the legislative power itself, for the legislative power is not diminished by the exercise of it.\n\nA power to make law with respect to a subject must, as we have seen, include within its content, the power to make a law delegating that power.\n\nHavmg regard to emry No. t; fJ in ljie Union List and .article 248 of our Constitution, the residuary power of our -< Parliament is wide enough to include delegation of\n\nlgislative power of a subject-matter with respect to wh'ich Parliament may make a law.\n\nApart from that consideration. if a statute laying down a policy and delegating power to a subordinate authority to make rules and regulations to carry out that policy is permisible then l do not see why an Act merely delcgat- • ing legislative power to another person or body should be unconst'itutional if . the legislature does not efface itself or abandon its control over the subordinate\n\nauthority.\n\nIf the legislature can make a law lying down a bare principle or policy and commanding people to obey the rules and regulations, made by a subordinate authority, why cannot the legislature without effacing itself but keeping its own capacity intact, leave the entire matter to a subordinate authority and Command people to obey the Commands of that subordinate authority ?\n\nThe substance of the thing is the command which is binding and the efficacy of the rules of conduct made by the subordinate authority is due to on other authonty than the command of the legislature itself.\n\nTherefore, short of self-effacement, the Jegislative power may be as freely and widely delegated as the Dominion Legislature, like the British Parliament, may think fit and choose.\n\nThe difficulties in the way of the American judges and jurists are quite understandable.\n\nForty of the State Constitutions had expressly adopted the doctrine of separation of powers by providing that one department of the government shall never exercise the powers assigned to the other two departments.\n\nThe remaining eight State Constitutions as well as their Federal Constitution impliedly accepted the doctrine The American Constitutions having thus adopted the doctrine of Locke and Montesquieu_as to the separation of powers in its full force, the American judges and jurists could not, only and without doing violence to their constitutions, give the go-bye to that doctrine and acknowledge the principle of delegation of legislative power to its fullest extent and had, therefore, to make a compromise between dogma and practical necessity by .confining the doctrine of separation of powers to merely laying down policy.\n\nIn Australia, in spite of the identity of the language of. its Constitution with the American pattern, \"legal symmetry gave way to commonsense.\" Canacl\\an Supreme Court has found no difficulty in even permitting sub-delegation of legislative power.\n\nWhen in reference to conditional legislation the Privy Council in Burah's case and in RuS$e//' s case saJ.d that there was no delegation they obviously used the expression \"delegation\" m the\n\nIn re The De/Iii Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas J.\n\nIn re The Delhi Law:1 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDas J.\n\nHl.78 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1951]\n\nsense of effacement or abdication by the legislature, which sense has been made more explicit and clear in Hodge's case and other subsequent cases.\n\nIn Benoari Lal' s case, as I have shown, there was no question of delegation of legislative power at all.\n\nWhen referring to section 4 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, I said in my judgment in T/1e State of Bombay v.\n\nNarottamdas(') that the section was an instance of conditional legislation and that there was no delegation of legislative power to the executive, I only adopted the language used by the Privy Council in Burak' s case in the sense I have explained above.\n\nIt was not neccs-- sary in that 'ase to examine or express any opinion on the larger question as to the scope or ambit of. the power of delegation or as to whether conditional legislation was a species of delegation of legislative power.\n\nIn England the power of delegation of legislative iJower bas never 11cen and cannot be successfully challenged in Court and nobody has ever thought of questioning the validity of the drastic Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, nicknamed as the \"Everything and Everybody Act.\" In India the doctrine of separation of powers was at no stage of her constitutional history under the British Crown accepted as the governing principle and now that in our Constitution we have made a fusion of the legislative and executive powers by definitely adopting the principle of the joint rcsponSibility of the Council of Mfrtlsters to Parliament on the same lines as the system of joint responsibility of the British Cabinet to the British Parliament there is 1\\0 compelling necesility whatever for importing into our law the elusive American doctrine of non-deletion which bas not yet succeeded in defining its own limit.\n\nI see no cogent reason why the \"artificial and almost impracticable classification\" of governmental powers laid down by the American decisions in a haphazard and illogical manner should be magnified into and epitomised as laying down a sound principle of legislation, and be adopted by us.\n\nIn my opinion, the true tests of the validity of a law enacted by the Indian\n\n(1) [1951) S.C.R. Sl.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUkT REPORTS 1079\n\nLegislature conferring legislative power on a subordinate authority are : ( 1) Is the law within the legislative competency fixed by the instrument creating the legis- . lature ? and (ii) Has the legislature effaced itself or abdicated or destroyed its ow-n legislative power ? If the answer to the first is in the affirmative and that to the second in the negative, it is not for any Court of Justice to enquire further or. to question the wisdom or the policy of the law.\n\nIt is said that it will be dangerous if the legislature is permitted to delegate all its legislative functions without formally abdicating its control r effacing itself, for then the legislature 'will shirk its responsibility and go to sleep and peoples' life, liberty or property may be made to depend on the whims of the meanest police officer in whom, by successive delega~ tion, the legislative power may come to be vested.\n\nI do not feel perturbed.\n\nI do not share the feeling of oppression which some people Jn; lf possbly entertain . as to the danger that qiay ensue if the legislature goes to sleep after delegating tts legislative functions, for r feel sure that the legislators so falling into slumber will have a rude awakening when they will find themselves thrown out of the legislative chamber at the next general election.\n\nI have no doubt in my mind that the legislature after delegating its powers will always keep a watchful eye on the acti.vitlcs of the persons to whom it delegates its powers of legislation and that as soon as it finds that the powers are . 'being misused to the detriment of the public, the legislature will either nullify the acts done under sch delegation or app<>iht some more competent authority or withdraw the matter into its own hands.\n\nThere is and will always remain some risk of abuse whenever wide legislative powers are committed in general terms to a subordinate body, but the remedy lies . in the corrective power of the legislature itself and on ultimate analysis, in the vigilance of. public opinion and not in arbitrary judicial fiat against the free\n\nexercise of law-making power by the legislature within the ambit fixed by the instrument of its coristitution\n\nt9S1\n\netc.\n\nDas J.\n\nDas J.\n\nIt is not for the Court to substitute 'its own notions of expediency for the will of the legislature.\n\nThis, I apprehend, is the correct position in law.\n\nIn my judgment, if our law is not to be completely divorced from logic and is not to give way and surrender itself to sterile dogma, the widest power of delegation of legislative power must perforce be conceded to our Parliament.\n\nA denial of this necessary power will \"stop the wheels of government\" and we shall be acting \"as a clog upon the legislative and executive departments.''\n\nThe observations of Varadachariar C. J. in Emperor\n\nv. Benoari Lall(') were strongly relied on by learned counsel for the interveners.\n\nThe opinion of that eminent Chief Justice is always entitled to the highest respect and one must, therefore, carefully consder the same. It will be seen from the report that the learned Advocate-General of India appearing for the Governor- General in Council definitely adopted the observations of Judge Ranney, which I have already quoted, as his argument without conceding that American decisions could offer a safe guidance on the point.\n\nTnis concession and the reference in Burah's case to \"the nature and principles of legislation\" appear to have induced and led the learned Chief Justice to adopt the principles of the American decisions regarding the non-delegat'ion of legislative powers.\n\nAfter referring to the several Privy Council cases, the learned Chief Justice opined that there was nothing in those cases which could be said to be inconsistent with the principles laid down by Judge Ranney.\n\nThen his Lordship discussed various American decisions and referred to the safeguards against delegated legislation suggested by Sir Cecil Carr and concluded :-\n\n\"As we have already observed, the considerations and safeguards suggested in the foregoing passages may be no more than considerations of policy or expediency under the English Constitution.\n\nBut under Constitutions like the Indian and the American, where the constitutionality of legislation is examinable in a court of law, these considerations are, in our\n\n(I) (1943) F.C.R. 96, A.I.R.1943 F.C. 36.\n\n...\n\nopiruon, an integral and essential part of the limitation on the extent of delegation of responsibility by the legislature to the executive.\n\nIn the present case, it is impossible to deny that the ordinance-making authority has wholly evaded the responsibility of laymg down any rules or conditions or even enunciating the policy with reference to which cases are to be assigned to the ordinary criminal Courts and to the Special\n\nCourts respectively and left the whole matter to the unguided and uncontrolled action of the executive authorities.\n\nThis is not a criticism of the policy of the laiw-as counsel for the Crown would make it appear -but a complaint that the law has laid down no policy or principle to guide and control the exercise of the undefined powers entrusted to the executive authorities by sections 5, 10 and 16 of the Ordinance\"\n\nThe learned Chief Justice overlooked the fact that underlying the frame of Indian legislation there was always the notion firmly established by the Privy Council that within the ambit fixed by the Act of Parliament the Indian Legislature was as supreme and had as plenary powers of legislation as the British Parl'1ament itself, and that \"the nature and principles of legislation\" referred to in Burah's case was the English concept of legislation and not the American variety.\n\nWith the utmost respect to the learned Chief Justice, I firid myself unable to accept as correct his view that the pronouncements of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the several cases referred to by him did not authorise \"every kind of delegation by the legislature.\" On the contrary, for reasons I -have already explained, I read the passages I have quoted from the different Privy Council cases as indicating in unmistakable terms that the Privy Council approved of the widest power of delegation of legislative power which was short of abdication or effacement of the legislature itself.\n\nFurther:, the view of the learned Chief Justice on this point was expressly overruled by Viscount Simon who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in the appeal from that decision in the following words :-\n\nIn re The Delhi Law! Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDa11J.\n\n49S1 l•n The Del/ti 1-s Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDasi.\n\n\"With the greatest respect to these eminent judges, their Lordships feel bound to point out that the question whether the ordinance is intra virt:s or ultra virt:s does not depend on considerations of jurisprudence or of policy.\n\nIt depends simply on examining the language of the Government of India Act and of comparing the legislative autho, ity conferred on the Governor-General with the provisions of the ordinance by which he is purponing to exercise that authority.\n\nIt may be that as a matter of wise and well-framed legislation it is better, if circumstances permit, to . frame a statute in such a way that the offender may know in advance before what court he will be brought if he is charged with a given crime ; but that in a question of policy, not of law.\n\nThere is nothing of which their Lordships arc aware in the Indian Constitution to render invalid a statute, whether passed by the Central Legislature or under the Governor-General's emergency powers, wh'1ch does not accord with this principle.\"\n\nFunher, whatever was the cogency of the view that wider the Government of India Act our Constitution approximated more nearly and closely to the American Constitution than it does the British Constitution, that view cannot posstbly hold good now in view of the provisions of our new Constitution under which the Executive is responsible to the Legislature, and the Parliament has been given the residuary power of legislation in the Widest terms.\n\nIn the premises, I am unable to accept the correctness of the observations of the learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court.\n\nReliance was placed by learned counsel for the interveners on the judgment of the Federal Court in /atindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar('). The learned Attorney-General on behalf of the President has strenuously challenged the correctness of the decision of the majority of the Federal Court in that case.\n\nIndeed, the present reference has in a way been occasioned by that decision.\n\nThat case was concerned\n\n(1) [1949] F.C.R. S9S, A.l.R. 1949 F.C. 17S.\n\nwith the question of the validity of the proviso to scc-- tion 1 (3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act (V of 1947).\n\nSection 1 (3) provided that the Act should remain in force for a period for one year from the date of the commencement.\n\nThe relevant part of the proviso was in the following terms :-\n\n\"Provided that the Provincial Government may, by noafication, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Smar Legislative Council, dircet that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification.\"\n\nThree of the learned Judges held that the proviso and the notification there under were ultra vires and void. They laid particular emphasis on the power given to the ProvinciaLGovernment to, make any modification in the Act when extending its lill~ as indicating that it was a delegation of legislative power.\n\nAnother learned Judge did not decide this point but agreed to set aside the order of detention on another ground not material for our pr.esent purpose and the remaining learned Judge took a different view ofthe effect of the proviso and held that it was a conditional legislation within the meaning of the decision in The\n\nQueen v. Burah (supra).\n\nOn a perusal of the judgment of the majority of the Federal Court in that case it appears to me that the important questions were . not convassed before them half so strenuously and fully as they have been done before us on this occasion .\n\nIndeed, I am led to believe 1 that learned counsel appearing for the Province of Bihar practically conceded that the delegation of the power of modification was not permissible and that his whole case was that that part of the ptovision was severable and the rest was conditional legislation which came within the principle laid doWI1 in Burah's case.\n\nThe majority of the Court, h<>Wever, held that the power of modification included in the proviso to section 1 (3) was not severable as suggested by counsel 23-3 s.c. India/68\n\netc.\n\nDas J.\n\nInn The Delhi 1-• Act,.1912,\n\netc.\n\nDasJ.\n\nd, therefore, the whole of the proviso was ultra titres and consequently the notification issued thereunder was 'illegal.\n\nI feel bound to say, with the utmost humility and for reason given already, that the observations of the majority of the Federal . Court in that case went too far and, in agreement with the learned Attorney-General, I ai:n unable to accept them as correct exposition of the principles relating to the delegation of legislative power.\n\nIn my judgment, the power of delegation is inherent in the legislative power itself and that, short of self-effacement, the legislature may exercise the widest power of delegation.· In the light of the principles discussed above I now proceed to discuss the question referred to us.\n\nRe Question 1 : The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, came to be passed in the circumstances recited in the preambles to the Act.\n\nBy notification No. 911, dateil September 17, 1912, the Central Government, with the sanction of the Secretary of State for India, took under its immediate authority and management the territory mentioned in Schedule A, whith was formely 'included in the Province of the Punjab and provided for the administration thereof by a Chief Commissioner as a separate Province to be known as the Province of Delhi.\n\nThe separation of Delhi from the Province of the Punjab and its constitution as a separate Province required immediate provision for the making of laws for the new Province.\n\nAccordingly, Delhi Laws Act, 1912, was passed by the Governor-General in Council on September 18, 1912.\n\nSection 2 of the Act saved the territorial application of all the then existing laws which were in :force there prior to such separation.\n\nSection 7 provided as follows :- ·\n\n\"The Provincial Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, to the Province of Delhi or any part thereof, any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.\"\n\nIn order to determine the validity of this Act it is necessary to ascertain the scope and ambit of the legislative power of the Governor-General in Council in the year 1912. This has to be done, as said by Lord Selborne in Burah's case by looking to the terms of the instrument by which affirmatively the legislative powers were created and by which Jiegatively, they arc restricted.\n\nThe first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV C. 85).\n\nBy section 39 the superintendence, direction and control of the whole civil and military government was vested in a Governor-General and Counsellors, to be styled \"The Governor-General of India in Council.\" The Council\n\n~ was,- under section 40, to be composed of three members who were or had bee'n servants of the Company, and one member who was not a servant of the Company.\n\nTllis fourth member was not entitled to sit or vote in the said Council except at meetings thereof for making law and regulations.\n\nSection 43 empowered the Governor- General in Council \"to make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British or native, foreigners or\n\n~ others, and for all Courts of Justice, whether established by His Majesty's Charters or otherwise, and the jurisdiction thereof, and for all places and things whatsoever ...................... \" save and except as therein specified.\n\nSection 44 reserved power to the Court of Directors to disallow any. law made by the Govcmor- General in Council.\n\nSection 45 provided. that all laws and regulations so made should be of the same force • and effect within and throughout the said territories as any Act of Parliament would be within the same territories and should be taken notice of by all Courts in the same manner as an Act of Parliament would be taken notice of.\n\nSection 66 enabled the Governors or Governors in Council of Bengal; Madras, -Bombay and Agra to propose to the Governor-General in Council drafts or projects of any law and the latter was to consider the same.\n\nThe former legislative powers of the Governors in Council appear to have been taken away by this Act.\n\nThe Charter Act of 1853 (16 and\n\nIn re The Delhi Ltzw4 Act, J912 etc.\n\n.Daa J.\n\nlnre Tlk D•lhl 1..aw1A.ct,1912, etc.\n\nDtU I.\n\n17 Vice. C. 95) by section 22 enlarged the Governor- General's Council but the scope of the legislative powers under section 43 of the Act of 1833 remained intact.\n\nBy the Government of India Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vic. C\n\n106) the British Crown took over the government of the territories theretofore vested in the East India Company.\n\nThen came the Indian Councils Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vic. C. 67).\n\nSection 2 repealed sections 40, 43, 44, 50, 66 and 70 of the Act of 1833 and provided that all other enactments whatsoever then in force with relation to the Council of the Governor-General or to the Councils of the Governors should continue in force.\n\nThis meant that section 45 of the Act of 1833 wlllch gave to the laws made by the Governor-General in Council the force oE an Act of Parliament continued, so that the laws made under the Act of 1861 by the Governor-General in Council also had in British India the force of an Act oE Parliament.\n\nSection 3 dealt with the composition of the Governor-Gen.era! in Council.\n\nSection 22 substantially rc<nacted the provisions of section 43 of the Act of 1833 subject to the proviso that the Governor- Gcneral in Council should not have power to repeal or affect the provisions of this Act of 1861 or other Acts therein' specified.\n\nThe power of the Governors in Council of the Presidencies to make laws was restored.\n\nTllis A.ct was subsequently amended from time to time but those modifications related principally to the composition of the Governor-General in Council.\n\nThe Council was enlarged but all the time it was dominated by the executive and official block of members so that the laws made by the Governor-General in Council were tantamount to executive fiat.\n\nThere was, thus, a sort of fusion in which the executive power dominated over the legislative power and, therefore, a delegation of legislative power to the executive made no difference in practice.\n\nThe ambit and scope of the legisladve power remained as wide and vague as in 1833.\n\nTherefore, the legislative power of the Governor- Gencral. in Council in 1912 when the Delhi Laws Act was passed was .the same as in 1869 when Act XXII\n\nof 1869 which was considered in Burah's case was passed.\n\n'It will be interesting to compare the language of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act with section 8 of Act XXII of 1869 which was considered by the Privy Council in Burah's case.\n\nSection 9 of that Act authe>- rised the Lieutenant-Governor, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, to extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of the Act to certain places mentioned therein The Lieutenant-Governor did, by notification, extend all the provisions of that Act to the district of Khasi and Jaintia Hills.\n\nThat means that section 8 was also extended to that district.\n\nOn a close analysis it will be noticed that section 8 authorised the Lieutenant-Governor to extend to that place any law or any portion of any law ( i) now in force in the other territories subject to his government or (1i) which may hereafter be enacted by the Council (a) of the Governor-General or (b) of the said Lieutenant-G'lvernor.\n\nNote the points of similanues.\n\nBy section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, as by section 8 of Act XXII of 1869, all existing laws could be extended.\n\nNo serious objection has been taken to the propriety of giving power to the executive to apply the existing laws because the existing laws were all known to the Governor-General in Council and the latter might, conceivably, be presumed to have applied its legislative mind to the desirabiY1ty of extending those laws to the territories in question.\n\nThe real objection to section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act is that it gave power to the executive w extend future laws, because, It is said, the Governor-General in Council could not possibly anticipate what , laws it or any provincial\n\nlegishitive authority would make in future.\n\nThe force of this objection with regard to laws to be made in future by the Governor-General in Council is negligible but the objection certainly is of considerable force in the case of the . future laws to be made by any Provincial authority.\n\nBut section 8 of Act XXII of 1869 authorised the Lieutenant-Governor to extend to the districts in question the future laws to be made, not\n\nDas J.\n\nlnr~ The Delhi Lat., Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDt1J J.\n\nonly by the Governor-General in Council, but also made by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council Aftcc , those districts were, by notification, separated from the other territories under the Lieutenant-Governor, the laws made by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council\n\n(legislative) after such separation did not ipso fact<> apply to those districts, for otherwise there would be no point in authorising the Lieutenant-Governor \" (executive) to extend those future laws to those districts.\n\nTherefore, when laws were made after such separation by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council\n\n(legislative) for the other parts of the territories under the charge of the Lieutenant-Governor\n\n(executive) the former could not be assumed to have applied its legislative mind to the suitability or necessity of such laws for those districts, for there was no \"' knowing then that those laws would later on be extended to those districts by the Lieutenant-Governor (executive).\n\nFurther and what is more important is that at any rate the Governor-General irl Council while enacting sections 8 and 9 of Act XXII of 1869 could not possibly have applied its legislative mind to the suitability of those future laws to be made by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council for the new districts. \"- Therefore, 'in this respect section 7 of the Delhi laws Act stood exactly on the same footingas section 8 of Act XXII cif 1869.\n\nIt is said that under latter section the Lieutenant- Governor had no power to modify the law before extending the same whereas under the former section the Provincial Government had that power and such a • power involved a law-making power.\n\nSection 9 of Act XXII of 1869 authorised the Lieutenant-Governor to extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions of the Act to certain territories and section 8 authorised the Lieutenant-Governor to extend any law or any portion of any law.\n\nThe power to extend an Act mutatis mutandis certainly involved some modification however small it may be.\n\nThe power to extend a part of an Act necessarily included the power to omit some sections or parts of some sections, or the important\n\nqualifications and provisos to any sections A power of modification wa~ thu~ involved in this process also.\n\nThe illustrations given by the Privy Council at the end of their judgment in Burah's case clearly indicate that the extension of a law \"subject to any restrictions, limitation, or proviso which the Local Government may think proper\" was considered by their Lordships to be quite permissible.\n\nIt may well be argued that the intention of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act was_ that the permissible modifications were to be such as would, after modification, leave the general Character of the enactment intact.\n\nOne of the meanings of the word \"modify\" is given in the Oxford Dictionary\n\nVol. I, page 1269, as \"to alter without radical transformation.\" If this meaning is given to the word \"modification\" in section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, then the modifications contemplated thereby were nothing more than adaptations which were included in the expressions \"mutatis mutandis\" and the \"restrictions, limitations or proviso\" mentioned in the several instances of conditional legislation referred to by the Privy CounciL It would, thel'.efore, seem quite clear, on this construction, that section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act stood on the same footing as section 8 of Act XXII of 1869 and had the same effect as the latter section.\n\nWhat the effect of sections 8 and 9 of Act XXII of 1869 was had better be said in the language of Lord Selborne in Burah's case at pp. 194-195 :-\n\n\"The Governor-General in Council has determined, in the due and ordinary course of legislation, to remove a particular district from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and offices, and place it under new Courts and offices, to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal ; leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that change shall take place; and also enabling him, not to make what laws he pleases for that or any other district, but to apply by public notification to that district any law, or part of a law, which either already was, or from time to time might be in force by proper legislative\n\n19S1\n\nln re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDasi.\n\n19SI\n\nDas J.\n\nauthority, \"in the other territories subje.ct to his government.\" The legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place ; but that it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner of carrying it into . effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant- Governor ; and also, that the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories subject to the same Government were such as it m1ght be fit and proper to apply to this district also : but that, as it was not certain that all those laws and every part of them, could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Lieutenant-Governor.\n\nThis having been done as to the Garo Hills, what was done as to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills ? The legislature decided that it was fit and proper that the adjoining district of the Khasi and J aintia Hills should also be removed from the jurisdiction of the existing Courts, and brought under the same provisions with the Garo Hills, not necessarily and at all events but if and when the Governor-General should think it desirable to do so ; and that it was also possible that it might be expedient that not all, but some only, of those provisions should be applied to that adjoining district.\n\nAnd accordingly the legislature entrusted, for these purposes also, a discfetionary power to the Lieutenant-Governor.\"\n\nIf section 8 of Act XXII of 1869 could, on the above reasoning and construction be upheld as in instance ot \"good and valid conditional legislation\" I do not sec why section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act should not be so upheld on the same rcasoni ng.\n\nAdapting the language of Lord Selbornc to the Delhi Act it may be said with equal .force that, when the new Province of Delhi was set up, the legislature, i.e., the Governor-General in Council which enacted the Delhi Laws Act, had decided that it was expedient to enable the Provincial Government, not to make what law it pleased for the\n\nnw Province, but to apply, by notification, to that Province any enactment which either already was or from time to time might be in force by proper legislative authority in the other Provinces and also\n\nthe laws which were or might be in force in the other Provinces were such as it might be fit and proper to apply to this new Province but as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them could wfrh\n\nequal convenience be so applied, it was expedient on that point to entrust a discretion to the Provincial Government to apply such of those laws or such part of such laws as it thought fit.\n\nIf the use of the word \"modification\" in the Delhi Laws Act is regarded as hav'mg given wider power to the Provincial Government, than what was given to the Lieutenant-Governor by section 89 of Act XXII of 1869, even that fact can make no difference, for such a power of modification .can also be easily . brought within the principle of conditional legislatim1.\n\nIt may be said that the approphate legislature, i.e., the Governor-General in Council, which enacted the Delhi Laws . Act applied its legislative mind. and decided that the laws which were or might be in force in any other part of British India were such that it ni1ght be fit and proper to apply it to the new Province of Delhi but as it was not certain that all those laws could with equal convenience be so applied in toto, it was, therefore, expedient on that point also to entrust a discretion to the Provincial Government to apply such law w'1th such restrictions or modifications as would make it more suitable to the new Province before actually extending it This reasoning will immediately bring the Delhi Laws Act, in spite of the power of modification, within the four corners of the decision in Burah's case. l am, therefore, prepared to hold that question No. 1 is concluded by the decision of the Privy Council in Burah's case.\n\nThe matter does not, however, rest on the foregoing ground alone, for, assuming that the power of modification given to the Provincial Government took section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act out of the ambit and -scope of conditional, legislation I reach the same conclusion as to its validity, on the alternative ground of the lawful exercise of the inherent power of delegation of legislative power by the GovernorcGeneral in Council\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Delh Laws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas J.\n\n19Sl\n\nln re The Delhi Law$ Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas J.\n\nto the Provnical Government. The principles deducible from the judicial decisions make it clear that the legislature, by enacting the Delhi Laws Act, did not efface itself or abdicate all power or destroy its own capacity or set up and arm with its own capacity a new legislative power.\n\nI discern no such intention in the Act.\n\nIt is said that the Provincial Government might have decided questions of principle or policy, e.g., as regards prohibition, and extended the prohibition laws of some other Province to Delhi which might not have been suitable for Delhi at all.\n\nI do not think the Provinical Government did, in practice, do any such drastic thing.\n\nIn any case there was no need to feel perturbed by the possibility of the executive doing something wrong by mistake or even by design, for if it did it was easy enough for the legislature to put its foot down, rectify the mistake or nullify the wrong doing or, if need be, to withdraw the matter into its own hand.\n\nThis being the position, the only other thing to ascertain is whether the Governor-General in Council in 1912 had the legislative capacity to enact the Delhi T-.aws Act.\n\nI have already said that section 22 of the Act of 1861 substantially re-enacted section 43 of the Charter Act of 1833 and authorised the Governor-General m Council to make laws for all persons, for all Courts, and for all places and things whatsoever.\n\nIt is difficult to imagine any wider law-making power given to a subordinate legislature Its laws were given the same force and effect within British India as were given to an Act of Parliament.\n\nThe only limitation was that the Governor-General in Council could not make any laws affecting the Act of 1861 itself and certain other Acts mentioned therein.\n\nThe Delhi Laws Act was certainly law for the \"persons\" of the \"place\" called the Province of Delhi.\n\nApart from this the judicial decisions, as I apprehend them, quite clearly establish that the power of delegation is a component part of the content of legislative power and once this power of delegation is conceded, there is no limit to it except . what I have mentioned.\n\nTherefore, there remains no\n\n...\n\ndoubt in my mind that the Governor-General in Council acted well within its power to delegate to the Provincial Government the power of selection of laws suitable for the new Province of Delhi and to extend the same to that Province with such restrictions and modifications as the latter thought fit. I am, therefore, satisfied that in enacting section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act in 1912 the Governor-General in Council acted within the ambit of the legislative power then vested in him and no part of the section was ultra vires the powers of the Governor-General in Council.\n\n19SI\n\nlnre The Delhi Laws. ifct, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nDas.J.\n\nRe Question 2: The Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act was enacted on December 31, 1947. The Constitution of India was then governed by the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted under the Indian Independence Act, 1947.\n\nUnder section 7 of the Act of 1935 the executive authority of the Dominion was to be exercised on behalf of His Majesty by the Governor-General. According to section 46 \"Province\" meant a Governor's Province.\n\nUnder ' section 49' the executive authority of a Province w.as to be exercised on behalf of His Majesty by the Governor.\n\nSection 18 as adapted provided that the powers of the Dominion Legislature should be exercised by the Constituent Assembly.\n\nSection 42 which was in Chapter IV of Part II gave legislative powers to the Governor- General in certain circumstances. Section 60 provided that there should for everv Province be a Provincial Legislature consisting of His Majesty represented by the Governor and two Chambers in some Provinces and one in the others. Section 94 enumerated the Chief Commissioners' Provinces.\n\nDelhi and Ajmer-Merwara were included within the section. Sections 99 and 100 distributed legislative powers between the Dominion Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures and confined their respective law-making powers within the appropriate Legislative Lists set out in the Seventh Schedule.\n\nSub-section ( 4) of section 100 was asfollows :- ... :\n\n\"The Dominion Legislature has power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the\n\nIn re The Delhi l.Qws Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas J,\n\nProvincial Legislative List except for a Province or any part thereof.\"\n\nApplying the definition of \"Province\" to this subsection, it meant that the Dominion Legislature was empowered to make laws for the Chief Commissioners' Provinces on all subjects in all the three Lists. Part IX dealt with the Judiciary.\n\nSection 200 provided that there should be a Federal Court. Section 219 enumerated the different High Courts. From what I have stated it is clear that in the Government of India Act, 1935, there was no \"vesting\" of powers in the Executive, Legislature or the Judiciary as in the American Constitution.\n\nSection 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara .(Extension of Laws) ,.\n\nAct, 1947, was as follows :-\n\n\"The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend to the Province of-Ajmer- Merwara with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactent which is in force in any other Province at the date of such notification.\"\n\nI see no difficulty in treating this Act as a piece of conditional legislation within the meaning of Burah' s case on the same line of reasoning as I have employed in the case of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act. The language of Lord Selborne may equally be applied to this Act mutatis mutandi!.\n\nI also think, alternatively, that. the Ajmer-Merwara Act may also be supported as a valid delegation of legislative power by the legislature without effacing itself in the sense I have explained above.\n\nIt is true that the powers of the Dominion Legislature to make laws for the Chief Commissioners' Provinces were circumscribed by the entries in the three Lists and did not include the residuary power of legislation which, under our present Constitution, Parliament has under entry 97 in the Union List and under article 248, nevertheless the power of the Dominion Legislature to make laws extended to all the three Lists. and, therefore, included a power of delegation with respect to each of the subjects in each of the three Lists.\n\nOut of that the Dominion Legislature by\n\nsection 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, delegated to the Central Government the power to extend, by notification, to Ajmer-Merwara only the laws which were in force in any other Province at the date of such notification. The law made by the Dominion Legislature, of course, applied to every part of the Dominion and there was no question of the Central Government extending them to Ajmer-Merwara.\n\nIn any case, the Dominion Legislature while enacting a law did actually apply its mind to it. In effect, therefore, by section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara Act the Dominion Legislature delegated to the Central Government legislative power with respect to the Provincial and Concurrent Lists. This was quite clearly within the ambit of its p<>wer and no part of that Act was ultra vires.\n\nRe Question 3: Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, was enacted on April 16, 1950, after our Constitution came into force.\n\nIn order to answer this question we have to ascertain what the legislative power of our Parliament is under the Constitution.\n\nBy article 53 the executive power of the Union shall be \"vested\" in the President. Article 74 requires that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President. Under article 73(3) the Council of Ministers are to be collectively responsible to the House of the People: Article 79 requires that there shall be a Parliament for the Union consisting of the President and two Houses. The distribution of legislative powers between the Parliament and State Legislatures is done by articles 245 and 246.\n\nUnder article 245 Parliament mav make laws for the whole or any part of India. The subject-matters with respect to which Parliament may make laws are enumerated in the Union List set out in the Seventh Schedule to our Constitution. The State Legislature may make laws with respect to matters set out in the State List. Both Parliament and the State Legislature may also make laws with respect to the Concurrent List. Entry 97 of the Union List as well as article 248 however give the residuary power of legislation to\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nDas J.\n\nl9Sl\n\nIn re The Dhe Law1 Act, 1912,\n\n:etc.\n\nDas I.\n\nParliament to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent or State Lists. Chapter IV of Part V deals with the Union Judiciary. Article 124 provides that there shall be a Supreme Court of India.\n\nThere are similar provisions with regard to the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary of the State.\n\nIt is to be noticed that it is only the executive authority that is \"vested\" in the President or the Governor as the case may be.\n\nThere is no vesting of the legislative or judicial power as in the American Constitution. In this respect our Constitution follows the pattern of the Canadian Constitution. Further, our Constitution has adopted the British Cabinet system and provided for the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the House of the People. There is thus a fusion of executive and the legislative power as in England. Although ours is a federation, we have nevertheless adopted the main features of the British Constitution.\n\nThe next thing to notice is that the power of both Parliament and the State Legislature to make laws is \"subject to the provisions of this Constitution.\" Article 13(2) provides that the Union or the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III by the Constitution. Again, the exclusive demarcation of the legislative field may possibly imply a limitation that Parliament cannot delegate its legislative powers to a State Legislature as such and vice versa, for that would run counrer to the Constitution itself. [See Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Attorney-General of Canada(')] Whether the Parliament or the State Legislature has in any way overstepped the limits prescribed by the Constitution is certainly justiciable and in this matter the Court has supremacy over the legislature. But within their respective sphere, -0ur Parliament and the Stare Legislatures are supreme and the Court cannot question the wisdom or propriety -0£ any law made within their respective competence.\n\n(1) [19S0] 4 D.L.R. 369.\n\n\" -\n\nOn this question I adhere to what I said in Gopalan's\n\ncase(1 ).\n\nPart C of the First Schedule enumerates and. includes 10 States. Each of these States, under article 239, is administered by the President through a Chief Com~\n\nmissioner or a Lieutenant-Governor or through the government of a neighbouring State.\n\nArticle 240 empowers Parliament to create or continue local legislature or Council of Advisers for any of these States and article 241 empowers Parliament to constitute a High Court for any of these States.\n\nUnder article 246(4) Parliament is given power to make laws with respect to any matter in the State List for any of these States.\n\nUnder article 245, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India. Therefore,\n\nParliament , has power to make laws for the Part C States with respect to any matter in any of the three Lists as well as any other matter in exercise of its residuary legislative power.\n\nIn other words, the legislative power of Parliament with respect to the Part C States is much wider than the legislative power the Dominion Legislature had under the Government of India Act. It is in exercise of this wide power that Parliament has enacted Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, section 2 of which runs thus :-\n\n\"The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend to any Part C State (other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment\n\nwhich is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification; and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act}, which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\"\n\nThe only difference between this section and section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, is that\n\n{I) [1950] S.C.R. 88.\n\n-· In re The Deihl LaWa Atit, 1912.;\n\netc.\n\nDasi.\n\nDasi.\n\nthis section gives power to the Central Government while extending an Act of a Part A State to a Part C State, to p:ovide for the repeal or amendment of any -corresponding law which is in force in that Part C State.\n\nI do not think even this difference prevents this section from being regarded as a piece of conditional legislation within the meaning of Burah's case.\n\nThe language of Lord Selborne fits in with the first part of section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act just as it did with section 8 of Act XXII of 1869 or section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or section 2 of the Ajmer- Merwara (Extension of Law~) Act, 1947. That language may equally be applied to the latter part of section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, for it may be said with equal plausibility that the appropriate legislature, i.e., Parliament, has, as regards the second part of the section, also applied its mind and decided that it is expedient to enable the Central Government not to make what law it pleases, but to apply, by notification, to a Part C State the laws which were or may be in force in a Part A State and also that such law having been enacted by a competent legislature will be such that it may be fit and proper to apply to any of these Part C States but as such a law may be inconsistent with a similar law alreadv in force in such State it will be necess; ry and desirable to repeal or amend the last mentioned law so as to enable the more suitable law to be extended and applied to such State and that it is, therefore, expedient, on that point also to entrust a discretion to the Central Government to ; epeal or amend the law in. f?rce. So pu~ . the matter comes directly under the pnnc1ple of cond1uonal legislation established in Burah' s case.\n\nAlternatively if section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act is for any reason outside the ambit of conditional legislation, the section may, nevertheless, be upheld as an instance of permissible delegation of -legislative power on two grounds, namely, first t!iat a pow?'\" of delegation is inherent in the law-makmg power itself and, secondly, that this delegation is within its legislative power as expressly given by Entry 97 of the Union List as well\n\nas by article 248. To make a law with respect to the delegation of its legislative power may easily be regarded as matter not enumerated in the Concurrent or\n\nState List. Parliament has not effaced itself. The law is within the legislative competency of Parliament and is, therdore, valid.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General also relied on Indian legislative practice in support of the validity of these three enactments. He has relied on several instances of such enactments appended to the President's statement of case.\n\nDuring the time of the expansion of the British possessions in India, small bits of territories in outlaying parts of India were being constantly annexed by the British but on account of the smallness of such territories or the undesirability of their immediate merger with the established Provinces it was . not found to be practically possihle to provide legislative Councils for these enclaves. Nor was it possible for the Governor-General in Council to enact laws for the day to day administration of these bits of territories or for all their needs.\n\nThe practice, therdore grew up for the Govemor- General in Council, by a simple legislation, to confer power on the Lieutenant-Governor to extend to such territories such of the laws as were or might be in force in other parts of the territories under the Lieutenant-Governor which were .considered siutable for these territories.\n\nSuch practice was certainly convenient, and even since Burah' s case does not appear to have been seriously questioned. I do not say that the argument has no merit, but in the view I have taken and expre.\"ed above, I do not find it necessary, on the present occasion to base my opinion on this argument.\n\nBdorc I conclude, it is necessary to take note of one argument based on article 353 and article 357.\n\nThose Articles are in Part XVIII of the Constitution and are emergency provisions.\n\nArticle 362 empowers the President, if he is satisfied that a grave emergency of the specified kind exists, to make a proclamation dcclar~\n\n24-3 S. C. India/68\n\netc.\n\nDas.I.\n\n19$1\n\nJ~,. 7' It• IJellll Ltzw, A.ct, l~U,\n\nere.\n\n1100 SUPltEME COURT REPORTS (19511\n\nsuch emttgency. While such proclamation is in opera tion, the executive power of. the Union shall extend to giviDg clinictions to any State as to the manner in which the c:xecnuive power of. the State is to be exercised :md the power of Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter shall include power to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties or authorising the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities of the Union as respects that matter.\n\nArtide 356 provides for breakdown of the constitutional machinerv in the States and empowers the President bY proclamation to assume to himself the powers of the State government and to declare that the powers of tht State Legislature shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament.\n\nArticle 357 declattS that hi tasc of such procla.mation it shall be competent for Parliament to c<>nfer on the President the power of the Statc Legislatilte to make laws and to a11thorise the Ptesident tO delegate the power so conf =cd to any other authority.\n\nThe argument is that :if legislative power contains within itself a power of delegation then why was express power of delegation provided for jn articles 353 and 357.\n\nThe conclusion is sought to be drawn that grant of legislative power, without more, does not carry a power of delegation and that is why in these two Articles power of delegation was given expressly.\n\nThis argument docs not appear tQ me to be sound. In the first place, it should be noted that these two Articles were providing for the exercise of the powers of the State government or the State LtgislatuEe by the Union government or Parliao11111t. Th11refore it was considered necessary to expressly include the power of delegation. Further in view of the emergency or other stress of circumstances it may well have been expedient to expressly provide fm this power of delgation tx 11liundanti cafltela. I am not prepared to say that the provisions of these two Articles can poMibly negative the power cauteld. I am not prepared to say that the provisions of delegation of lcglsl:!tive power which is incidental and ancillary to the power of legislation and which\n\n...\n\nis, up to a point, oonccdcd, even in the land of separation of powers.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that I answer the questions as follows :-\n\nQuestion 1: Section 7 of the Delhi s Aa. 19~2, was valid and no part thereof was ultra vms the legislature that passed it.\n\nQuestion 2 : Ajmer-Mcrwara {Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, was valid and no thereof . was ultra tlires the legislature that passed it.\n\nQuestit>n 3: Section 2 of the Part C States (laws) Act, 1950, is valid and no part thcrf is Hltra tlires the Parliament.\n\nBOSE J.-1 will deal with the Delhi Laws Act of 1912 first. The questiOn is whether $CCtion 7, . or any of. its provisions, is #ltra \"'1-t1. To dettrmiuc that, it will be necessary to forget the present Constitution . of India and project our minds back to the year 1912 when India was still under British rule.\n\nDelhi was originally part of the province of Punjab but it was constituted into a separate province under a Chief Commissioner on the 17th September 1912 When that was done legislation was required to determine what laws were to apply in this new province.\n\nInstead of starting afresh by bringing in a whole series of new Acts, the Delhi Laws Act wa.S enacted. Under\n\nsection 2 the entire body of law which was in fume in this area just before it was taken out of the Punjab was continued in force and under section 7 the Provincial Government of the new province, that is to say, the executive authority, was authorised to extend to this area, by notification, with or without restrictions or modifications, any enactment in force in any part of British India at the date of the notification. It is not disputed that this Act was passed by a legislations or modifications, any, enactment in force in any it is contended by those impugning the Act that that legislature had no power to confer on the Provincial Government, which is not a legislative body, what in\n\nIll re lM8 .kt, JPU.\n\n77111 lJdll\n\netc.\n\nDOii.\n\nBoae I.\n\nlnre The De/hi LIN1 Act, 1912, etc.\n\nBoie J.\n\nessence is legislative power, namely authority to introduce into the province new laws which were not there before.\n\nThe legislature which enacted the Delhi Laws Act 1912 was the legislative section of the Governor- General in Council or, what for convenience may be termed, the Governor-General in Legislative Council.\n\nThis body was constituted by an Act of the British Parliament, originally the Charter Act of 1833. Its composition and powers were altered from time to time, as, for example, by the Charter Act of 1853 and the Indian Councils Acts of 1861, 1892 and 1909, but essentially that was the legislative authority in India in the 1912.\n\nIn that year . its powers were derived from section 22 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861. That being the case, the scope and ambit of these powers are naturally to be gathered from that Act, but unfortunately that does not help us here because these powers were of necessity conferred in general terms and the whole question is what do the words mean. It was conceded that there is no provision which in express terms empowered this new legislative body the Governor- Gcncral in Legislative Council, to confer on any other authority the wide powers embodied in section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act of 1912, but it was contended that the right to do that is inherent in the power to legislate and inasmuch as the Governor-General in Legislative Council was empowered to legislate for, among other areas, the Province of Delhi, it had the right to do what it did in the Delhi laws Act was as part of its normal legislative functions.\n\nThat brings us to the question, of what does the legislative power in a Sate, or a portion of a State, consist? There is a great divergence of opinion about this and we were taken elaborately through the views of many eminent judicial authorities and jurists in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, India, the United f States of America and the q>ntinent of Europe. I do not think it will be profitable to examine them at length because in the end it all comes to this.\n\nThe\n\nconcept of legislative power varies in different countries and indeed often from mind to mind in the same country: There is no universally accepted definition.\n\nWe have therefore to reach our own conclusions and choose between them.\n\nBut in doing that I conceive it to be proper to lean towards what I may term the British point of view for the following reasons.\n\nWe are concerned here, at the source, with an Act of the British Parliament and with a country which at that time was governed by the British.\n\nThe legislative authority in India was derived from Britain.\n\nThe Governor-General in Legislative Council was a creation of the British Parliament.\n\nWhen, therefore, Parliament endowed it with the power to legislate, we have necessarily to determine wh:it that Parliament intended to do and what matters that body considered lay within the ambit of legislative power.\n\nThe only way to do that is to examine the usage and practice of the British Parliament in similar cases and see how its Acts \"in this behalf were interpreted by British Courts of law. I do not of course mean bv this that we are to examine the power of the British Parliament because everyone concedes that it.s powers ate legislatively absolute and that no court of law can question anything it docs : I mean examine the nature of the powers conferred by it upon other legislature, like the Governor-General tin Legislative Council, which have been created from time to time by the British Parliament in various parts of the British Empire. In doing this I wish to avoid, as far as I can, the use of words and phrases which have acquired technical significance but about whose meaning no two minds se:m to agree. I have in mind words such as sovereign, abdication, delegated authority, separation of powers and so forth.\n\nI do not think it is necessary to enter upon tl\\e wide field of enquiry which an analysis of these terms would entail because, in my view, what we have to determine .here lies within a much narrower compass.\n\nProjecting ourselves back to the position in 1912 we will have to consider the position as British Courts\n\nlnre Tiie De/Iii Lows Act, 1912,\n\nere.\n\nBose J.\n\nBose J.\n\nwould have done and in particular the Judicial Committee of the Privy Co:mciL In Croft v. Dunphy(') the Judicial Committee said, in a Canadian case :-\n\n\"In these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive that the Imperial Parliament in bestowing plenary powers on the Dominion Parliament to legislate in relation to customs should have withheld from it the power to enact provisions similar in scope to those which had long been an integral part of 1lhe Imperial customs legislation and which presumably were recognised as necessary to its eflicacy.\"\n\nThat, to my mind, justifies the approach that in construing section 22 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861 and the subsequent Acts of 1892 and 1909, we must take into consideration the fact that the British Par- \" liament had present to its mind a number of judicial pronouncements regarding the scope and ambit of the legislative. authority conferred pon legislatures which were the creation of the Imperial Parliament. But so far as the Delhi Laws Act is concerned, one case will be enough, namely The Queen v. Burah(2).\n\nThat was a decision of the Judicial Committee given • in the year 1878.\n\nThe case came from India.\n\nTheir Lorsdhips made several observations of a general and far-reaching nature, but far the present purpose I will confine myself to a somewhat narrower point which, in my opinion, is more germane to the present case. Their Lordships were concerned with an Act of the Governor-General in Legislative Council of the year 1869 which was being impugned. At that date a slice of territory known as the Khasi Hills was govern- • ed by Act VI of 1835 and Bengal Regulation X of 1822; so also another piece of territory known as the Garo Hills.\n\nSection 3 of the impugned Act repealed these laws (except on matters which do not concern us) so far as they related to the Khasi Hills and section 4 excluded the Garo Hills from their operation. Section\n\n8 enacted that :- \" \"The said Lieutenant-Governor (Bengal) may from time to lime, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette,\n\n01 [1933] A.C.156 at 161.\n\n(2) SI.A. 178.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1105. extend to the said territory (Garo Hills) any law, or any portion of any law, now in force in the other territories subject to his Government, or which may hereafter be enacted by the Council of the Govemt>r- General or of the said Lieutenant-Governor, for malting laws and regulations, and may on making such extension direct by whom any powers or duties incident to the provisions so extended shall be exercised or performed, and make any order which he shall deem requisite for girrying such provisions into operation.\"\n\n(page 180).\n\nSection 9 empowered the Lieutenant-Governor to do .the same thing for the Khasi Hills by applying section 8 (among others) to the Khasi Hills (page 180). These provisions were attacked as ultra vires. See page 190\n\nwhere their Lordships say :-\n\n\"The next question is whether the whole Act of 1869 is void.\" Two grounds of attack were; (1) that this was not legislation but a delegation. of legislative power (page 192) and (2) that the Govenior-General in Legislative Council was here attempting to create a new legislature (page 194). Both contensions were refuted, the first on the ground that the Indian Legislature was in no sense an agent or delegate of the British Parliament and the second, because this did not have the effect of creating a new legis1ative body.\n\nAt the moment I wish to concentrate attention on the second point. This is how the Judicial Committee dealt. with it. Their Lordships said, refuting the argument about the creation of a new legislature :_\n\n\"Nothing of that kind has, in their Lordships opinion, been done or. attempted in the present case.\n\nWhat has been done is this. The Governor-General in Council has determined, in the due and ordinary course of legislation to remove a particular district from the -jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and offices, and to place it under new rts and offices, to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal; leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that rhange shall take place; and\n\n19S1\n\netc.\n\nBose/.\n\nBose J.\n\nalso enabling him, not to make what laws he pleases for that or any other district, . but to apply by public nqtilication t.o that district any law, or part of a law, which either already was, or from time to time might be, in force, by proper, legislative authority 'in the other territories subject to his government.' The legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place; but that it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lietenant-Governor; and also, 'that the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories subject to the same Government were such as it might be fit and proper to apply to this district also; but that, as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them, could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Lieutenant-Governor.\"\n\nNow I do not intend, at the moment, to enquire into the juristic principles on which that decision is based because in my opinion, it is direct authority for this, namely, that a leglsative body which I shall call A, created by the British Parliament to enact laws for an area X+Y+Z, has authority to do the following things:- ,.\n\n( 1) to repeal all laws existing in a particular area X which has been carved out of the whole X+Y+Z and which is subject to A's legislative jurisdiction;\n\n(2) to authorise a purely executive authority B who is in subordinate executive and legislative control of Y and who is now placed in executive charge of X as well, to pick and choose for X any law which are then in existence in Y or Z, whether made by legislature A or by a subordinate legislature in Y for Y, and apply them either in whole or in part, as he pleases to X; further,\n\n(3) to audiorise B to pick and apply, either in whole or in part, any law ttJhich might hereafter be\n\nmade either by legislature A for Y or Z. or by another subordinate legislature which is . not A but which is under B for Y.\n\nNow the application of that to the present case (the • Delhi Laws Act) is this.\n\nThe legislature which enacted the Delhi Laws Act was the same legislature as .the , one in Burah's case, though of course its composition was different. In Burah' s case, the powers were derived from the Acts of 1833, 1853 and 1861. In the present case, the powers are derived from the same series of\n\n-~ Acts coupled with those of 1892 and 19()<). The later Acts altered the composition of the legislarure and effected certain alterations in the mode of its legislation but its overall power to leigslate was based on section 22 of the Imperial Act of 1861, as in Burah' s case.\n\nTherefore, in my illustration, A remains A but B becomes the Provincial Government of the new province of Delhi and X becomes the area embraced by the new province. Y +z are the remaining provinces ,,. . having none. Section 7 of! the Delhi Laws Act enacted by legislature A empowers an executive authority B in charge of area X-\n\n(1) to apply to X, with or without restrictions or modifications, any law then in existence made by A for Y or Z;\n\n(2) similarly to apply to X any law• made by a Provincial Legislature in Y for Y;\n\n(3) in the sanie way to apply to X any law which might hereafter be made by A for either Y or Z; and\n\n(4) tp apply, as before, to X any law which might hereafter be made by a Provincial Legislature in Y not in charge of B, for Y.\n\nIt will be seen that the only difference between this and Burah's case lies in items (2) and (4). The Privy Council upheld the legislation which empowered B to choose for X any laws made by A. Therefore, to that extent at any rate section 7 would have t.o be upheld and the qm:stion in every case would be whether the Provincial Government had selected a Central or a Provincial law.\n\nBut the Privy Council went further and permitr.cd B to c.hoose a Provinci\"al law as well,\n\n19Sl\n\n111 re The D Lawa Act, 1912, etc.\n\nBose J.\n\nlnrt The De/Al Law1 -\"ct, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951} though the area of selection was restricted to Provin-- cial laws in territories of which B was Lieutenant- Governor and which were under his executive and legislative control. In the Delhi case, the field of selecttion is wider and extends to provinces which are not in charge of B. Does that make any difference in principle?\n\nI cannot see that it does so as A is concerned.\n\nIt is true the Judicial Committee said that the laws which the Lieutenant-Governor was entitled to apply \" were \"laws which were or might be in force in other territories subiect to the same Government.\" Reading that in the light of section 8 from which the words were culled, I think that means other territories under the Lieutenant-Governor (not the Governor-General), and of course the Lieutenant-Governor's area of choice was restricted in that way in that case but that was because such a limitation was placed in the Act of 1869 which applied there. There is no similar limitation in . ,.. the Delhi Laws Act of 1912.\n\nWhatever the true ground of decision in Bur ah' s case may be the fact remains that the Privy Council upheld a law made by Legislature A empowering an executive authority B, which bears the same relation to A as the. Provincial Government of Delhi, to select r and apply to an area X within the legislative jurisd.iction of A, laws made by a Provincial Legislature in another part of India, also legislatively under A. That is the exact position here.\n\nThe only other point of difference between this case and Burah' s case is that the Lieutenant-Governor was permitted to select \"any law, or any portion of any law\" whereas, here, the Provincial Government is empowered to extend the specified enactments \"with such restrictions and modifications\" as it thinks lit.\n\nI do not think this makes any difference of substance.\n\nConsequently, placing myself in the position of a British Court of the year 1912 bound by decisions of the Privy Council, I would hold on this narrow ground that section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act of 1912 is intra vires.\n\nI can hardly think that the Privy Council bound by its own precedents would have decided athtrwi&e.\n\nI turn next to the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947. Section 2 is the portion impugned.\n\nIt is worded much the same as the other, only in thi~ case the Central Government (against an executive body) has been given the power to introduce laws (with restrictions and modifications) instead of the Provin:- cial. Government.\n\nHere also, the laws which can be introduced are not only those made by the Central Legislature but also those enacted by Provincial Legislatures, and the laws which can be selected are both those in being at, the date of the Act and those which may be made . in the future.\n\nBut by this time the character of the Indian Legislature had undergone a radical change and the question is whether that made any difference. I do not think it did.\n\nThe Government of India Act, 1935, introduced a federal element into the government of the country and gave it a constitution. It divided the ambit of legislative authority and created legislative spheres of interest between the Centre and the Provinces -and gave residuary power to the .Centre.\n\nBut except for that, it did not alter the basic concept of the legis~ lative power.\n\nUnder section 22 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861 the Governor-General in Legislative Council was empowered to \"make laws\" for all persons and things within British India though within certain prescribed limits, For instance, it could not make any law altering o:: affecting an Act of the Imperial Parliament unless expressly authorised but, as we hav~ seen, such power as was conferred included the power to do what was done under the Delhi Laws Act. The Government of India Act of 1915 which consolidated the previous Acts touching the government of the coun: try, made no alteration regarding this though Parlia~ ment had The Queen v. Burah before it. In 1935, des.: pite the division of power between the Centre and the Provinces, the essential concept of the power was not altered, only its method of functioning.\n\nIf anything, the sphere of authority was enlarged because the Feder ral Legislature was empowered to make law having extra-territorial application, a right which the lhdiaq\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912., etc.\n\nBose J.\n\nlnre The Dellll La.is Act, 1911,\n\netc.\n\nBose J.\n\nLegislature did not up till then possess. Section 99 authorised the Federal Legislature to \"make laws\" for the whole or any part of British India subject, however, to the other provisions of the Act. The other provisions merely divided the subjects on which legislation is permissible.\n\nThey say nothing about the essential elements which go to make up the legislative power. The language, it will be seen, is the same as the language in the Government of India Act of 1915.\n\nBut, to my mind, the really fundamental fact is that we are here still dealing with an Ace of the British Parliament enacting a law for India.' It is reasonable to conclude that that Parliament's concept of the essentials of legislative power had not alrered, particularly when we find it employing the same language as in 1861 and in 1915.\n\nNext comes the Indian Independence Act of 1947.\n\nThat converted India into a Dominion and conferred even wider powers upon its legislatures. The limitations on legislation which section 108 of the Act of 1935 imposed were removed.\n\nBut, so far as the essential content of the legislative power was concerned, the poo; ition remained the same and the same language was employed namely, the Dominion Legislature \"may make laws etc.\" No fresh limitation on its law-making powers was imposed.\n\nNow here again, though India was given independence and was given the right to frame a constitution for itself until it did so the old constitution which was framed by the British Parliament remainCd. The position at this juncture is much. as it was in Canada.\n\nSee the observations of Viscowit Haldane in Att<>rney-\n\nGeneral for the Commonwealth of Australia v. The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited(1). Therefore, at bottom, we are still construing an Act of the British Parliament.\n\nWe are still looking at these legislatures through British eyes. We still have to consider what answer the Privy Council would have given regarding the validity of this law in the year 1947 when it was enacted.\n\nIn the face of The Queen\n\n(1) [1914] A.C. 237 at 2S3.\n\nI , \"\"\n\nv. Burah I have no doubt in my mind that this legislation would have been upheld. I need not therefore enquire further because, though there was a large volwne of litigation about this kind of legislation subsequent to that date, no single decision of the Judicia1 Committee has thrown any doubt upon the soundness of Burah' s case.\n\nOn the contrary, the decision has been relied on in case after case from the Dominions and the widest amplitude of its terms has been endorsed.\n\nTherefore, I would uphold the validity of this Act also.\n\nBut I wish to emphasise that I do so on the same narrow ground as before and that I have not attempted to define what the legislative power consists of.\n\nI am only concerned in these two cases . with the narrow question whether these two Acts are intra vires.\n\nMy answer is that they are in British eyes because, whatever else the legislative power may or may not contain, the Privy Council has decided that this type of Act is valid and that when the British Parliament creates another legislature for the proper governance of a country it envisages this type of legislation as being within its competence. That is enough in these two cases.\n\n• The third Act we are asked to examine is the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950.\n\nSection 2 is the provision which has been called in question.\n\nThe first part of the section follows the now familiar pattern.\n\nThe Central Government is given power to extend by notification any Act which is in force in a Part A State at the . date of the notification to any Part C State (except three) \"with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fif.\" Power is also given to the Central Government, when extending any\n\nsuch enactment, to make provision in it.\n\n\"for the repeal or amendment of y corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\"\n\nThis latter portion goes a good deal further than before. But that apart. This was in the year 1950 after the Indian Constitution came into force.\n\nW c arc\n\nIn re The Delhi Lllw1kt,1912.\n\netc.\n\nBose J.\n\nla re TA. Dtl~I Law1 Act, 19Jl,\n\nere.\n\nBDle J.\n\ntherefore here treading on virgin soil The legislature which passtd this A£t was the Indian Parliament, a body created, not by the British Parliament with its British concept of legislative power, but by the Constituent ASJCmbly of India which drew not only on the British model but culled from all the world that which in its wisdom it considered best fitted for this country and after adding bits of its owa, produced an amalgam which adheres to non of its models but is something fresh and in that sense uiliquc. We can, on analysis, find traces in it of the British model, of the American, the Canadian, the Australian and the J apanesc.\n\nIt seems to me therefore that it ia useless to try and look at this through the eyes of another country or of their Courts.\n\nWe have to try and discover from the Constitution iolelf what the concept of legislative power looked like in the eyes of the Constituent Assembly which conferred it.\n\nWhen that body created an Indian Patliammt for the first time and endowed it with lift, what did they think they were doing?\n\nWhat concept oi kgislative power had they in mind?\n\nTo answer this it will be necessary to envisage the various facts which were at their disposal at that time.\n\nFirst and focemost. they had the British model in view where Parliament is supreme in the sense that it <:an do what it pleases and no Court of law can sit in judgment over its Acts.\n\nThat model it rejected by introducing a federation and dividing the ambit of legislative authority.\n\nIt rejected by enacting funda,. mental laws. It rejected by dra~ a distinction between the exercise of constituent {>owers and ordinary legislative activity.\n\nIt rejected by expressly envisaging the incompetency of Parliament to act in certain cases as in article 249(3).\n\nIt rejected by fashioning an elaborate Constitution within the ambit of which alone Parliament could function.\n\nWe have therefore next to consider what material the Constituent Assembly had to draw on regat'ding restricted types of legislatures.\n\nOn the one hand, they had bdore them the flexible British concept favouring the widest devolution of\n\nauthority short of creating a new legislature.\n\nI say short of creating a new. legislature because the Privy Council said in The Queen v. Burah(1) at page 194 that-\n\n\" the Governor-General in Council could not by any form of enactment create in India, and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Councils Act.\"\n\nThis was repeated in other cases which I do not intend to examine because I am now searching for principles and not considering whether I am bound by this authority or that.\n\nI am treading on virgin soil.\n\nAs against this, they had before them the American model with its rigid doctrine of the separation of powers; and in between they had the Canadian and Australian models which were neither wholly one thing nor the other but something in between.\n\nNow in endeavouring to discover from the Constitution what the COnstitucnt Assembly thought of this grave problem, I consider it proper to take the following matters into consideration.\n\nFirst, it has been acknowledged in all free countries that it is impossible to carry on the government of a modern . State with its infinite complexities and ramifications without a large devolution of power and delegation of authority. It is needless to cite authority.\n\nThe proposition is self-evident.\n\nNext, the practical application of that principle has been evident throogh the years both in India and in other parts of the British Empire and in England itself. In the third place, even in America. Judges hae hadto veer away from the rigidity of their earlier doctrine and devise ways and means for softening its rigour aq.d have not always been able, under a barrage of words, to disguise the fact that they are in truth and in fact effecting a departure because compelled to do by the force of circumstances.\n\nI next consider it relevant to take into consideration the fa.ct that this country has for dose\n\n(1) SI. A. 178.\n\nIn re 111B Deihl Law1 Act, 1912..\n\netc. &ml.\n\n111 .,, 7lU D<lltl L4Ws Act• 1912, etc.\n\non a , century been governed along British lines and that the present Constitution is very like that of the year 1935 where it deals with the powers of legislation. The concept of those powers is therefore something to which the peoples of India and those who govern them have been accustomed for nearly a hundred years.\n\nIt is consequently something whieh must have been thought good, otherwise it would have been expressly negatived in -the Constitution as have been othe( things which were not considered proper in this country.\n\nAs against this, we have the fact that Parliament has not been left free except when it exercises constituent powers.\n\nFetters have been placed upon it under the Constitution. Certain things have been made fundamental.\n\nCertain guarantees have been given.\n\nThe people of India have been given a gift of the free way of life. The country has been constituted into a Sovereign Democratic Republic.\n\nAs, , however, was inevitable, fetters have been placed upon the freedoms.\n\nThat had to be because there is no such thing as absolute liberty. If every man did just as he liked there would be ehaos; also the safety of the State would be imperilled. In some cases, the fetters are to be found ready forged in the , Constitution itself.\n\nBut in others the Constitution has merdy envisaged the possibility that further restrictions may be necessary in the future and has entrusted to Parliament that duty of determining within fixed limits when, were and how, and their extent. I am of opinion that in these cases Parliament is not free to delegate its authority. It caiinot leave to another something whieh has been entrusted to its own particular care.\n\nThe people of India arc entitled in that particular class of case to the fruits of Parliament's own mature deliberations, to its patriotism and to its collective wisdom. I would draw the distinction in this way. Where Parliament has been left free to legislate in a general way on a particular topic, I consider it can legislate in the manner which has been a common place in this land over the years. I do not think it desirable to lay down general rules. Each\n\ncase will have to be considered on its own facts as it arises. The only limitation is that what is done. must be legislation.\n\nBut when Parliament has been directe? to do a particular and specific thing under the Constitution, and particularly under the Chapter on F.undamental Rights, as for example, to fix a maximum period of detention under article 22 (7) (b), that sort of duty cannot, in my opinion, be delegated. I am not prepared in this case to go any further than that in either direction.\n\nMy reasons for so holding are these. Article 245(1) of the Constitution states :-\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, ..\n\nPaFliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State.\"\n\nThis is word for word the same as section 99(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, except for the changes consequential on the altered status of the\n\n~ country. But when we turn to other portions of the Constitution we find certain things which are new.\n\nThere is, for example, the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. Now when a thing is made fundamental and its ambit indicated except to the extent that it may be altered in a particular way, it can, in my judgment, only be altered in that way and no other. To hold otherwise would be to derogate from the solemnity of the guarantee and place it on a par with any other law.\n\nI am clear that that was not the intention. The whole point of the guarantees regarding fundamental rights was to afford relief against arbitrary executive action restraining a man's _ liberties; and it is no guarantee against an improper exercise of power by A to say that A shall not detain ¥ you unless he wants to and that he shall have no right to detain you beyond a specified period unless he so desires. It i; a guarantee to say that A shall not detain you for longer than three months unless the\n\n-.I 25-3 S. C. India{68\n\nBose/.\n\n19$1\n\nJn re The Delhi Lows Act. 1912\n\n/JQsel.\n\nchosen representatives of the people after the deliberation think it proper to fix a longer period. But when that is done there can be no delegation to A or indeed to any other. I am clear that a departure was intended from the normal methods of legislation (normal, that is to say, to this country) in this class of case. This is particularly so when we fine! express provision setting out the incompetency of Parliament to make certain laws as in article 249(3) and when we find express provision for delegation of authority in particular cases.\n\nI have in mind, for example, article 357.\n\nArticle 356 envisages the possibility of failure of constitutional machinery in a State. In that event the President is empowered to \"declare that the powers of the legislature of the Stace shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament.\" When that is done, article 357 ( l )(a) empowers Parliament to confer on the President the power of the legislature of the State to make laws and to authorised the President to delegate the powers so conferred to any other authority he chooses to specify. I am clear that this power cannot be delegated and that only Parliament can confer the requisite authority on the Presiden• It cannot leave the decision to somebody else and authorise him to do it though that would have been the case had it not been for this express authorising.\n\n' This article was referred to in the arguments and it was contended that the Constitution does not envisage the right to delegate except when it is expressly auliorised. It was argued that if the right to delegate authority was inherent in the right to legislate, then this part of article 357 would be otiose. Therefore, the fact that the Constitution expressly authorises delegation in particular cases indicates that no general power of delegation exists. There is force in this but, with respect, I do not think it is sound. Article 357 ( l )(a) is not dealing with what the Privy Council has decided is not a delegation of legislative power at all . but is empowering that which the Privy Council held an Indian Legislature could not do before the Constitution, namely, create a new legislature and arm it with\n\ngeneral legislative authority. I do not seek to enter the lists and joust with those who dispute the true meaning of \"delegation\" and of \"essential legislative power\" because it is enough for me to say that whatever other authorities . may have thought, the Privy Council held that in Burah's case there was no delegation of the legislative power but an ordinary and normal exercise of it. They also held that the creation of a new legislature was beyond the competence of the Indian Legislature as then constituted. I am clear that in enacting article 357 ( 1) (a) the Constituent Assembly was of opinion that Parliament was not to have an inherent\n\nright to 'create a new legislature. It could only do that when expressly empowered. But that in itself does not import the idea that the Constituent Assembly was also of' opinion that Parliament would have no power to do that which had been accepted as the normal function of an Indian legislature ever since The Queen v.\n\nBurah in 1878.\n\nThat particular concept of legislative power has not been altered or abrogated by the Constitution except in particular cases.\n\nI prefer therefore to hold that that which The Queen v. Burah authorised, whatever you may choose to call it, was not abrogated except in special cases.\n\nI so hold for another reason as well namely, that to • decide otherwise would make the government of India an exceedingly difficult matter and would put back the hands of the clock. I prefer therefore to hold-and that has the logic of history behind it-that the concept of legislative power which had hitherto been accepted in India continued to hold goods but that this limitation was placed upon it by the Constitution, namely that wherever the Constitution employers Parliament to do a particular thing as oppq; ed to legislating generally on a particular topic, there can be no delegation. .Parliament must itself act.\n\nBut even that is not the full picture because it has been held from the earliest times, even when viewed through purely British eyes, that a legislature created by the British Parliament (1) cannot act beyond the ambit of its pcwers the extent of which must be\n\n19$1\n\nl11re The Delhi Lowa Act, 1912,\n\netc.\n\nBon I.\n\nIJi,.\n\nTA• D•lhi Law1 Act, 1911,\n\ntc·\n\nBou/.\n\ngathered from the document which brings it into being (2) it cannot create a new legislature for the purpose of legislating generally and (3) it cannot abdicate. These limitations are to be gathered from a series of cases to which I shall presently refer. I am of opinion that the same limitations exist in the case of the Indian Parliament because that, unlike the British Parliament,. is not free to do as it likes; it is bound by the Constitntion.\n\nI do not here wish to enter into questions of sovereignty because the concept of sovereignty ' varies.\n\nIt may be that looked at from one point of view Parliament is fully sovereign because it can by the requisite majority and following the prescribed procedure amend the Constitution and confer what powers it pleases upon itself.\n\nBut viewed from another angle it is evident that. the framers of the Constitution elected to put into the Constiution restrictions on change and we have in each case to interpret a compact made between the Union and the States and the people of India.\n\nTo use the language of Viscount Haldane in Attm-ney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia v.\n\nColonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd.(') :-\n\n\"Their Lordships are called upon to interpret the legislative compact made between the Commonwealtiland the States ....... .It is clear that any change in the\n\nexisting distribution of powers has been safeguarded in such a fashion that on a point such as that before the Board the Commonwealth Parliament could not legislate so as to alter that distribution merely of its own motion.\"\n\nTo enquire whether this imports full sovereignty is to my mind mere playing with words. I do not doubt that Parliament has powers of amendment but equally I am clear that until it chooses to alter the Constitution it is bound by it and by the implications which follow therefrom. What you choose to label a body, however august, haVing powers of this kind and hedged in by sw:h limitations, hardly matters. The only\n\n(I) [1914) A.C. 237 at 256.\n\nquestion is what is the ambit of those powers and what the extent of the limitations.\n\nSo far as the British concept goes, the following limitations UP9Jl a legislature which is the creation of a. written. instrument and which .is bound. by its t~\n\nwhether an Act of the British Parliament or otherwise, have been indicated from time to time.\n\nThe earliest pronouncement is one of 1871, The Queen v. Burah(1)\n\nto which I . have already :r; eferred, That case set out the three limitations which I have just enumerated.\n\nIn addition, their Lordships said at page 194 that. the powers conferred on the Lieutenant-Governor in that case were not to make what laws he pleased but to apply to the new territory any law which already was, or might frollJ. time to time be, in .. force, by proper legislative authority, in the other territories subject to his government.\n\nThe same principle was repeated in 1882 in Rusrell\n\nv~ T h, e Queen (2), a case from Cariada. The Privy\n\nCouncil said at page 835 :-\n\n\"The provisions that certain parts Of the Act sball . come into operation only on the petition Of a majority .., of electors does not confer on these persons power to legislate.\n\nParliament itself enacts the condition 3nd everything which is to follow upon .the condition being fulfilled.\"\n\nIn 1883 the Judicial Committee described this sort of authority as \"ancillary to legislation~\" (See Hodge\n\nv. The Queen(3 ) a case from Canada).\n\nIn. 1919, In re The Initiati.ve and Referendum Act(~), .another C'.anadian case, the Judicial Committee indicated that. a legislature of the ·type we are considering cannot \"create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence.\"\n\n,,.\n\nIn 1944 there was another case from India, King.\n\nEmperor\n\nv. Benoarilal Sarmae).\n\nTheir Lordships\n\n(1) 51.A. 178.\n\n(2) 7 App. Cas. 829.\n\n(3) 9 App. Cas. 117 at 132.\n\n(4) [1919) A.~ 93S at 94S.\n\n(5) 72 I.A. 57.\n\n19'1\n\nlnre Tiie th/Ill IAw.r ct, lil12.\n\netc.\n\nBo#J.\n\nIn re The Deihl Law1Act,1912,\n\netc.\n\nBoie J.\n\nagain stated that the Indian Legislature cannot transfer its duty of legislation to any other authority.\n\nTwo yeats later ( 1946) there was another case from Canada, Co-operative Committee on /apanese Canadians v. Attorney-General for Canada(').\n\nTheir Lordships said there that when an executive authority (the Governor in Council in that case) acts under the authority conferred on him by this kind of legislature, he has no independent status as a law-making body and though his orders are \"law\" they are in reality laws made by Parliament' at the date of their promulgation.\n\nTheir Lordships stressed the fact that Parliament (the Canadian Parliament in that case) \"is the only legislative authority for the Dominion as a whole.\" That, in my opinion, holds good for India too.\n\nI have confined myself to British precedents and have not travelled further than the Privy Council.\n\nI have done this of set purpose partly because the British Courts have on the whole gone furthet than any other in countenancing this kind of legislation, but mainly because I am at the moment concerned with the concept of legislative power with which this country has been familiar for a hundred years prior to the present Constitution. That, to mind, was the most powerful and important factor on which our Constitution makers , had to ponder-whether and how far a thing which had been planted and taken deep root in the soil should be uprooted, pruned, restrained or left alone.\n\nAn anxious scrutiny of all the many authorities and \" books which were referred to in the arguments, and of the decisions which I have analysed here, leads me to the conclusion that it is difficult to deduce any logical principle from them.\n\nIn almost every case the decision has been ad hoc and in order to meet the exigencies of the case then before them, judges have placed their own meaning on words and phrases which might other- '° wise have embodied a principle of general application I have therefore endeavoured, as far as I possibly\n\n(1) [1947] A.C. 87 at 107.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'I' REPORTS 1121\n\ncould, to avoid the use of these disputable terms and have preferred to accept the legacy of the past and deal with this question in a practical way. My conclusion is that the Indian Parliament can legislate alone the lines of The Queen v. Burah, that is to say, it can leave to another person or body the introduction or application of laws which are or may be in existence at that time in any part of India which is subject to the legislative control of Parliament, whether those laws were enacted by Parliament or by a State Legislature set up by the Constitution. That has been the practice in the past. It has weighty reasons of a practical nature to support it and it does not seem to have been abrogated by the Constitution.\n\nBut I also consider that delegation of this kind cannot proceed beyond that and that it cannot extend to the repealing or altering in essential particulars of laws which are already in force in the area in question.\n\nThat is a matter which Parliament alone can handle.\n\nI see no reason for extending the scope of legislative delegation beyond the confines which have been hallowed for so long.\n\nHad it not been for the fact that this sort of practice was blessed by the Privy Council as far back as 1878 and has been endorsed in a series of decisions ever since, and had it not been for the practical necessities of the case, I would have held all' three Acts ultra vires.\n\nBut, so far as the latter portion of the third Act is concerned, no case was cited in which the right to repeal the existing laws of the land and substitute others for them has been upheld. That was tried in a South African case, Sir John Gorden Sprigg v. Sigcau(1), but the Privy Council held it could not be done, not indeed on any ground which is material here but tkt is the only case I know where the attempt was made and the right litigated. It is one thing to fill a void or partial vacuum. Quite another to throw out existing laws enacted by a competent authority. It is bad enough to my mind to hold that the first is not a delegation\n\n(1) [1897] A. C. 238.\n\nIn re The Delhi Law11Act,1912.\n\netc.\n\nBose J.\n\nBose J.\n\nof legislative power. But as that has been held by an authority which it is impossible now to question so far as the past is concerned, I bow to its wisdom. But as to the future, I feel that a body which has been entrusted with the powers of legislation should legislate\n\na.d not leave the decision of Important matters of principle to other minds. I am t.herefore of opinion that the power upheld by The Queen v. Burah does not extend as far as the latter portion of section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act of 1950 endeavours to carry it.\n\nI am also clear. that when Parliament has been entrusted by the Constitution with the right to enact a particular kind of legislation, as opposed to legislating generally on a particular tppic, there can be no delegation.\n\nI r~ that this docs not draw an exact line and that each case will have to be decided ori its own facts as and when it arises. I also realise that this is not strictly logical.\n\nBut that is because I have to make what I can of a legacy from the past which is based more on practical necessity than on abstract logic. I find myself obliged to steer a middle course between two conllicting principles which have been handed down from the past and which have been woven into the Indian concept of legislative power prior to the present Constitution. One permits very wide powers of delegation for sound and practical reasons despite the attempts made to disguise that fact by placing a\n\nspecial meaning on words like \"delegat.ion\" \"legislation\", \"sovereignty\" and \"abdication\".\n\nThe other holds that new legislative bodies cannOt: be set up by fettered legislatures like ours (I mean of course when they are not exercising constituent powers) and, as a corollary to that. that essentially law-making powers cannot be transferred.\n\nBoth principles are sound, and there arc weighty reasons for retaining both, as indeed the Privy Council has been at pains to do ever since 1878.\n\nBut I find it diflicult to keep them side by side and .at the same time be strictly logical. I have therefore endeavoured to give dfect to both in a practical way,\n\nS.C.lt\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1123\n\nas best I could. I realise that this will lead to differ- 'Cllces of opinion among judges in individual cases.\n\nBut that, to my mind, is the only feasible and practical way of dealing with a situation in which much confusion of thought already exists. In any event, these are the lines along which British jurisprudence has functioned for centuries and our legal and juristic foundations lie there. It has this much merit.\n\nIt helps to keep legislation and executive action on an even keel for, so long as the powers are used sparingly and with moderation, no court is likely to interfere.\n\nIt is only when advantage is taken of a doctrine based on sound practical considerations and an endeavour is made to push it further and further till the dividing line between permissible delegation of authority and virtual abdication of legislative functions, as a commonsense man in the street would understand it, oevoid of legal subtleties, becomes dangerously thin that trouble is likely to arise. ·\n\nI confess I am not enamoured of this kind of legislation.\n\nI do not like this shirTcing of responsibility, for, after all, the main function of a legislature is to legislate and not to leave that to others. Its primary duty is to weigh and consider the desirability or otherwise both of introdu, cin.g new laws and of abolishing or modifying old ones in essential particulars.\n\nBut, speaking judicially, I am unable to hold, in view of our past history and in view of the necessities of a modern State, that the matters I have set out above, subject to the limitations I have indicated, are beyond the competence of Parliament.\n\nI trust however, that these powers will be used sparingly both on grounds of principle as well as of practical expediency, for the experience of this case and the lessons of the past show only too clearly the risks involved.\n\nLegislation of this kind is liable to be call-\n\n~ eel in question at any time and it is always a gamble which way the dice will fall. This. is the . sort of case in which a stitch in time saves many nines.\n\nEven in England, where Parliament is unfettered, a Committee set up to examine the desirability of this type\n\nBose J.\n\nIn re The Delhi law• Act, 1912, etc.\n\nBose I.\n\nof legislation has recommended that the powers of Parliament in this behalf be sparingly used. The reasons. given apply with much greater force in India.\n\nMy answers to the reference are as follows :- ( 1) Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, is intra vires of the legislarure which passed it and so, also section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947.\n\n(2) Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, is also intra vires except for the concluding sentence which runs as follows :-\n\n\"and provision may be made in any enactment so extended, for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\"\n\nIn my judgment, this portion is ultra vires but as it can be separted from the rest of the Act, the remainder is good.\n\nMy answers are, however, subject to this qualification.\n\nThe power to \"restrict and modify\" does not import the power to make essential changes. It is confined to alterations of a minor character such as are necessary to make an Act intended for one area applicable to another and to bring it into harmony with laws already in being in the State, or to delete portions which are meant solely for another area. To alter the essential character of an Act or to change it in material particulars is to legislate, and that, namely the power to legislate, all authorities are agreed, cannot be delegated by a legislarure which is not unfettered.\n\nOPINION OF THE COURT.\n\nThe Court held by a majority that the prov1s1ons contained in Questions 1 and 2 are not ultra vires the \"' legislarures which passed the Act containing those provisions. As regards the section mentioned on Question 3, the first part was held to be intra vires, but the second portion, which is in the following terms :\n\n\"provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State,\" is ultra vires the Indian Parliament which passed the Act.\n\nAgent for the President of India, the State of \"Bombay, the State of Madras and the State of Mysore : P. A. Mehta.\n\nAgent for the State of Uttar Pradesh: C. P. Lal.\n\nAgent for Capt. Deep Chand and Pt. Amarnath Bhardwaj : R. S. N arula.\n\nAgent for the Ajmer Electric Supply Co. Ltd. : M. S. K. Sastri.\n\nAgent for the Municipal Committee of Ajmer, the Maiden's Hotel and Runglal Nasirabad Rajinder Narain.\n\nAgent for Shri Munshi Lal and others : Shankar Das.\n\nANGURBALA MULLICK\n\nti •\n\n. DE BAB RAT A MULLICK.\n\n[SA1Ym FAzL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA AND CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nHindu Women's Rights to Property Act (XVIII of 1937), s. 3- <, Right to shebaitship-Whether \"property\"-Applicability of Act- Widow's right to joint shebaitship with son-Construction of deeds -\"Heirs of A,\" meaning of.\n\nThe word \"property\" as used in s. 3 (l) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, includes shebaitship which is a recognised form of property under Hindu law, and there is nothing in any of the provisions of the said Act which excludes from the y scope and operation of the Act succession to shebaitship.\n\nEven assuming that the word \"property\" in Act XVIII of 1937 is to be interpreted in a narrower sense, inasmuch as succession to shebaitship follows succession to property in its ordinary or secular sense and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act,\n\n111 re The Delhi Larva A.ct, 1912,. etc.\n\n./Jose J.", "total_entities": 1457, "entities": [{"text": "747\n\nIn re THE DELHI LAWS ACT, 1912,\n\nTHE AJMER-MERW ARA (EXTENSION OF LAWS)\n\nACT, 1947\n\nAND\n\nTHE PART C STATES (LAWS) ACT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IN RE THE DELHI LAWS ACT, 1912, THE AJMER-MERWARA (EXTENSION OF LAWS) ACT, 1947 AND THE PART C STATES (LAWS) ACT, 1950", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 184, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.ania", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 213, "end_char": 219, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SAsTRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 221, "end_char": 239, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 257, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 262, "end_char": 270, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BosE JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 273, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 295, "end_char": 299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 927, "end_char": 956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 994, "end_char": 1003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the official gazette extend, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, to the Province of Delhi, or any part thereof, any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification\"."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1330, "end_char": 1339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1411, "end_char": 1429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, provided that \"The Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend to the Province of Ajmer-Merwara, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in any other Province at the date of such notification."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2405, "end_char": 2418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of a decision of the Federal Court, doubts were entertained with regard to the\n\nva\\ictity of laws delegating legislative powers to the executive Government and the President of India made a reference to the Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 143(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2425, "end_char": 2436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "FAZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2803, "end_char": 2811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and in what particulars, ultra vires the legislatures that respectively passed these laws, and for reporting to him the opinion of the Court thereon :\n\nHeld, (1) per FAZL ALI, PATANJALt SAsTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ, (KANIA.", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "PATANJALt SAsTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2813, "end_char": 2829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and in what particulars, ultra vires the legislatures that respectively passed these laws, and for reporting to him the opinion of the Court thereon :\n\nHeld, (1) per FAZL ALI, PATANJALt SAsTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ, (KANIA.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "MuKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2831, "end_char": 2840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and in what particulars, ultra vires the legislatures that respectively passed these laws, and for reporting to him the opinion of the Court thereon :\n\nHeld, (1) per FAZL ALI, PATANJALt SAsTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ, (KANIA.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2842, "end_char": 2845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and in what particulars, ultra vires the legislatures that respectively passed these laws, and for reporting to him the opinion of the Court thereon :\n\nHeld, (1) per FAZL ALI, PATANJALt SAsTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ, (KANIA.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2850, "end_char": 2854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and in what particulars, ultra vires the legislatures that respectively passed these laws, and for reporting to him the opinion of the Court thereon :\n\nHeld, (1) per FAZL ALI, PATANJALt SAsTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ, (KANIA.", "canonical_name": "BosE JJ."}}, {"text": "KANIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2860, "end_char": 2865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and in what particulars, ultra vires the legislatures that respectively passed these laws, and for reporting to him the opinion of the Court thereon :\n\nHeld, (1) per FAZL ALI, PATANJALt SAsTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and BosE JJ, (KANIA.", "canonical_name": "K.ania"}}, {"text": "MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2878, "end_char": 2885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J., and MAHAJAN J., dissenting).- Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and s. 2 of the Ajmer- Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, are wholly intra vircs.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan I."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2904, "end_char": 2913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2921, "end_char": 2941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2947, "end_char": 2951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3042, "end_char": 3051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3059, "end_char": 3079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3085, "end_char": 3089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3914, "end_char": 3919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANIA C. ].-Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and s. 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, are ultra vircs to the extent power is given to the Government to extend Acts other than Acts of the Central Legislature to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara respectively inasmuch as to that extent the Central Legislature has abdicated its functions and delegated them to the executive government, MAHAJAN J.-Thc abovesaid sections arc ultra vires in the following particulars :\n\n(i) inasmuch as they permit the executive to apply to Delhi and AjmcrMcrwara, laws enacted by legislatures not competent to make laws for those territories and which these legislatures may make within their own legislative field, and (ii) inasmuch as they clothe the executive with co-extensive legislative authority in the matter of modification of laws made by legislative bodies in India."}}, {"text": "PATANJAI.I SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Per FAZL ALI, PATANJAI.I SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAs and BoSE JJ.-The first portion of s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, which empowers the Central Government to extend to any Part C State or to \"!", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "MUKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3959, "end_char": 3968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Per FAZL ALI, PATANJAI.I SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAs and BoSE JJ.-The first portion of s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, which empowers the Central Government to extend to any Part C State or to \"!", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "BoSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3978, "end_char": 3982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Per FAZL ALI, PATANJAI.I SASTRI, MUKHERJEA, DAs and BoSE JJ.-The first portion of s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, which empowers the Central Government to extend to any Part C State or to \"!", "canonical_name": "BosE JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4008, "end_char": 4012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "MVKHERJEA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4303, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pt+\n\nKANIA C. J.\n\nMAHAJAN, MVKHERJEA and BosE JJ.-The latter portion of the said section which empowers the Central Government to make provision in any enactment extended to a Part C Stes, for repeal or amendment of any law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C States, is ultra llirn.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4618, "end_char": 4634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI and DAS JJ.-The latter portion of s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, is also intra virt:s . .", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI and DAS JJ.-The latter portion of s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, is also intra virt:s . .", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4669, "end_char": 4673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4770, "end_char": 4774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6600, "end_char": 6618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "legislative power, the Indian Legislature had no power prior to 1935 to delegate legislative power in its true sense.. Apart from the sovereign character of the British Parliament whose powers arc absolute and unlimited, a general power in the legislature to delegate legislative powers is not recognised in any sta!e."}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8262, "end_char": 8269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iv) As the courts of India arc not cornmittcci to the doctrine of separation of powers and the judicial interpretation it has received in America; there arc only two main checks in this country on the power of the legislature to delegate, these being its good sense and the principle that it should not cross the line beyond whlcli delegation amounts to\n\n1951 In,."}}, {"text": "Dtlhl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8493, "end_char": 8513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SASTIU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8862, "end_char": 8878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SASTIU J.-(i) It is now estal\\lishcd beyond doubt that the Indian Legislature, when acting within the limits cir cumscribiqg its Jcgislative power, has and was intended to have plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same nature as those of the British Parliament itself and no constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative power to a subordinate unit is to be found in the Indian Councils Act, 1861, or the Govern ment of India Act, 1935, or the Constitution pf 1950.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "Govern ment of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9303, "end_char": 9333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10697, "end_char": 10707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) The maxim dekgatus non protest dekgare is not part of the constitutional law of Indian and has no more force than a political precept to be acted upon by legislatures .in the discharge of their function of making laws, and the courts cannot strike down an Act of Parliament as unconstitutional merely because Parliament decides in a particular instance to entrust its legislative power to another in whom it has c.onfidencc or, in other words, to exercise such power through its appointed instrumentality, however repugnant such entrustmcnt may be to the democratic process."}}, {"text": "Jn re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14679, "end_char": 14709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15815, "end_char": 15832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bo SE J .-Tlie Indian Parliament can legislate along the lines of Queen v. Burah, that is to say, .it can leave to another person or body the introduction or application of laws which arc, or may be, jn existence at that time in any part of India which is subject to the legislative control of Parliament, whether those laws are enacted by Parliament or by a State Lagislature set up by the constitution."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16780, "end_char": 16789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Governor-General of India in Council acting in his legislative capacity enacted the Delhi Laws Act, 1812", "statute": "the Governor-General of India in Council acting in his legislative capacity enacted the Delhi Laws Act, 1812"}}, {"text": "Ajmer-Merwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17175, "end_char": 17188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstances which led to this Special Reference by the President and the questions referred appear fi om the full text of the reference dated 7th January, 1951, which is reproduced below :-\n\n\"W HEREAs in the year 1812 the Governor-General of India in Council acting in his legislative capacity enacted the Delhi Laws Act, 1812, section 7 of which conferred power on the Central Government by notification to extend to the Province of Delhi (that is to say,• the present State of Delhi) or any part thereof, with such restrictions and modifications at it thought fit, any enactment which was in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS in 1947 the Dominion Legislature enacted the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws} Act, 1947, section 2 of which conferred power on the Central Government by notification to extend to the Province of Ajmer- Merwara (that is to say, the present State of Ajmer), with such restrictions and modifications as it thought fit, any enactment which was in force in any other Province at the date of such notification;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS, by virtue of the powers conferred by the said sections of the said Acts, notifications were issued by the Central Government from time to time extending a number of Acts in force in the Governors' Provinces to the Province of Delhi and the Province of Ajmer-Merwara, sometimes with, and sometimes without, restrictions and modifications, and the Acts so extended and the orders, rules, by-laws and other instruments issued under such Acts were and arc regarded as valid law in force in the Province (now State of Delhi and in the Province of Ajmer-Merwara (now State of Ajmer ), as the case may be, and rights and privileges have been created, obligations and liabilities have been incurred and penalties, forfeitures and punishments have been incurred or imposed under such Acts and instruments ;\n\n\"AND WHEllEAs Parliament with the object inter .alia of making a uniform provision for extension of laws with regard to all Part C States except Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands enacted the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, section 2 of which comes power on the Central Government by notification to extend to any Part C State (other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and also confers the power on the Central Government to make provision in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Patt C State ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS section 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 has repealed section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension .of Laws) Act, 1947, but the effect of the provisos to the said section is, notwithstanding the said repeals, to continue, inter alia in force the Acts extended to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Mcrwara or the States of Delhi and Ajmer under the provisions repealed by the said section ;\n\n\"AND\n\nWHEREAS notifications have been issued by the Central Government from time to time under section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, extending Acts in force in Part A States to various Part C States sometimes."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17220, "end_char": 17229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Governor-General of India in Council acting in his legislative capacity enacted the Delhi Laws Act, 1812", "statute": "the Governor-General of India in Council acting in his legislative capacity enacted the Delhi Laws Act, 1812"}}, {"text": "Coorg", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18495, "end_char": 18500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstances which led to this Special Reference by the President and the questions referred appear fi om the full text of the reference dated 7th January, 1951, which is reproduced below :-\n\n\"W HEREAs in the year 1812 the Governor-General of India in Council acting in his legislative capacity enacted the Delhi Laws Act, 1812, section 7 of which conferred power on the Central Government by notification to extend to the Province of Delhi (that is to say,• the present State of Delhi) or any part thereof, with such restrictions and modifications at it thought fit, any enactment which was in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS in 1947 the Dominion Legislature enacted the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws} Act, 1947, section 2 of which conferred power on the Central Government by notification to extend to the Province of Ajmer- Merwara (that is to say, the present State of Ajmer), with such restrictions and modifications as it thought fit, any enactment which was in force in any other Province at the date of such notification;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS, by virtue of the powers conferred by the said sections of the said Acts, notifications were issued by the Central Government from time to time extending a number of Acts in force in the Governors' Provinces to the Province of Delhi and the Province of Ajmer-Merwara, sometimes with, and sometimes without, restrictions and modifications, and the Acts so extended and the orders, rules, by-laws and other instruments issued under such Acts were and arc regarded as valid law in force in the Province (now State of Delhi and in the Province of Ajmer-Merwara (now State of Ajmer ), as the case may be, and rights and privileges have been created, obligations and liabilities have been incurred and penalties, forfeitures and punishments have been incurred or imposed under such Acts and instruments ;\n\n\"AND WHEllEAs Parliament with the object inter .alia of making a uniform provision for extension of laws with regard to all Part C States except Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands enacted the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, section 2 of which comes power on the Central Government by notification to extend to any Part C State (other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and also confers the power on the Central Government to make provision in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Patt C State ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS section 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 has repealed section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension .of Laws) Act, 1947, but the effect of the provisos to the said section is, notwithstanding the said repeals, to continue, inter alia in force the Acts extended to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Mcrwara or the States of Delhi and Ajmer under the provisions repealed by the said section ;\n\n\"AND\n\nWHEREAS notifications have been issued by the Central Government from time to time under section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, extending Acts in force in Part A States to various Part C States sometimes."}}, {"text": "Andaman and Nicobar Islands", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18509, "end_char": 18536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstances which led to this Special Reference by the President and the questions referred appear fi om the full text of the reference dated 7th January, 1951, which is reproduced below :-\n\n\"W HEREAs in the year 1812 the Governor-General of India in Council acting in his legislative capacity enacted the Delhi Laws Act, 1812, section 7 of which conferred power on the Central Government by notification to extend to the Province of Delhi (that is to say,• the present State of Delhi) or any part thereof, with such restrictions and modifications at it thought fit, any enactment which was in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS in 1947 the Dominion Legislature enacted the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws} Act, 1947, section 2 of which conferred power on the Central Government by notification to extend to the Province of Ajmer- Merwara (that is to say, the present State of Ajmer), with such restrictions and modifications as it thought fit, any enactment which was in force in any other Province at the date of such notification;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS, by virtue of the powers conferred by the said sections of the said Acts, notifications were issued by the Central Government from time to time extending a number of Acts in force in the Governors' Provinces to the Province of Delhi and the Province of Ajmer-Merwara, sometimes with, and sometimes without, restrictions and modifications, and the Acts so extended and the orders, rules, by-laws and other instruments issued under such Acts were and arc regarded as valid law in force in the Province (now State of Delhi and in the Province of Ajmer-Merwara (now State of Ajmer ), as the case may be, and rights and privileges have been created, obligations and liabilities have been incurred and penalties, forfeitures and punishments have been incurred or imposed under such Acts and instruments ;\n\n\"AND WHEllEAs Parliament with the object inter .alia of making a uniform provision for extension of laws with regard to all Part C States except Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands enacted the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, section 2 of which comes power on the Central Government by notification to extend to any Part C State (other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and also confers the power on the Central Government to make provision in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Patt C State ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS section 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 has repealed section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension .of Laws) Act, 1947, but the effect of the provisos to the said section is, notwithstanding the said repeals, to continue, inter alia in force the Acts extended to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Mcrwara or the States of Delhi and Ajmer under the provisions repealed by the said section ;\n\n\"AND\n\nWHEREAS notifications have been issued by the Central Government from time to time under section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, extending Acts in force in Part A States to various Part C States sometimes."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18581, "end_char": 18590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19166, "end_char": 19175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19227, "end_char": 19236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19244, "end_char": 19264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19685, "end_char": 19694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Federal Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19892, "end_char": 19914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with, and sometimes without, restrictions and modifications ;\n\n\"AND\n\nWHEREAS the Federal Court of India in /atindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar( 1) held by a majority that\n\n( 1) (1949) F.C.R. S9S.\n\n19$1\n\nIn re T•e Delhi Law1Act,1912,\n\netc\n\nthe proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, was ultra .vires of the Bihar Legislature inter alia on the ground that the said proviso conferred power on the Provincial Government to."}}, {"text": "S9S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20007, "end_char": 20010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20089, "end_char": 20098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20106, "end_char": 20149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20504, "end_char": 20513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20521, "end_char": 20541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20543, "end_char": 20552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20609, "end_char": 20618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20898, "end_char": 20907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20915, "end_char": 20935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20941, "end_char": 20950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21146, "end_char": 21163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "modify an Act of the Provincial Legislature and thus amounted to a delegation of legislative power ;\n\n\"AND WHEREAS as a result of the said decision of the Federal Court, doubts have arisen regarding the validity of Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, Section 2 of the Ajmer-Marwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, and Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, and of the Acts extended to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara .and various Part C States under the said sections espccti vely, and of the orders and other instruments issued under the Acts so extended :\n\n\"AND WHEREAS the validity of Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, and of the Acts extended by virtue of the powers conferred by the said section has been challenged in some cases pending at present before the Punjab High Court, the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer, and the District Court and the Subordinate Courts in Delhi ;\n\n0 AND WHEREAS, in view of what."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21496, "end_char": 21518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is hcrcinbcforc stated, it appears to me that the following qliestions of law have arisen and arc of such nature and of such public importance that it is expedient that the opinion of the Supreme Court of India should be obtained thereon;\n\n\"Now THEREPoJtE, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by clause powers (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution, I,\n\nRajendra Prasad, President of India, hereby refer the said questions."}}, {"text": "Article 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21633, "end_char": 21644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21670, "end_char": 21685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is hcrcinbcforc stated, it appears to me that the following qliestions of law have arisen and arc of such nature and of such public importance that it is expedient that the opinion of the Supreme Court of India should be obtained thereon;\n\n\"Now THEREPoJtE, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by clause powers (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution, I,\n\nRajendra Prasad, President of India, hereby refer the said questions."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21829, "end_char": 21838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21846, "end_char": 21866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ajmer-Mcrwara (Extension 1947", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22028, "end_char": 22057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"(2) Was the Ajmer-Mcrwara (Extension 1947, or any of the provisions thereof and cular or particulars .", "canonical_name": "Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22234, "end_char": 22243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "9th. 10th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th and 30th days of April 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22428, "end_char": 22537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arguments were heard on the 9th."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22540, "end_char": 22554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the President of India."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22585, "end_char": 22597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the President of India."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22638, "end_char": 22652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Advocate-General of Bombay ( G. N.\n\nJoshi, with him) for the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22733, "end_char": 22750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "M. L. Saxena", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22778, "end_char": 22790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. L. Saxena, for the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "A. R. Somanatha Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22825, "end_char": 22845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the State of Mysore."}}, {"text": "P. S. Safeer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22930, "end_char": 22942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. Safeer, for Captain Deep Chand."}}, {"text": "Deep Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22956, "end_char": 22966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. S. Safeer, for Captain Deep Chand."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22969, "end_char": 22981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra, for Pt."}}, {"text": "Amarnath Bharadwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22991, "end_char": 23009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarnath Bharadwaj.", "canonical_name": "Amarnath Bharadwaj"}}, {"text": "M. M. Gharak_han", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23012, "end_char": 23028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Gharak_han, for the Ajmer-Electric Supply Co. Ltd.\n\nN. C. Chauerjee, (G. C. Mathur, Basant Chandra Ghose, and Tilak."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chauerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23070, "end_char": 23085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Gharak_han, for the Ajmer-Electric Supply Co. Ltd.\n\nN. C. Chauerjee, (G. C. Mathur, Basant Chandra Ghose, and Tilak."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23088, "end_char": 23100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Gharak_han, for the Ajmer-Electric Supply Co. Ltd.\n\nN. C. Chauerjee, (G. C. Mathur, Basant Chandra Ghose, and Tilak."}}, {"text": "Basant Chandra Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23102, "end_char": 23122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Gharak_han, for the Ajmer-Electric Supply Co. Ltd.\n\nN. C. Chauerjee, (G. C. Mathur, Basant Chandra Ghose, and Tilak."}}, {"text": "Tilak. Raj Bhasin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23128, "end_char": 23145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Gharak_han, for the Ajmer-Electric Supply Co. Ltd.\n\nN. C. Chauerjee, (G. C. Mathur, Basant Chandra Ghose, and Tilak."}}, {"text": "Jyoti Sarup Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23227, "end_char": 23244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jyoti Sarup Gupta and K. B. Asthana, for the <.,"}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23249, "end_char": 23262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jyoti Sarup Gupta and K. B. Asthana, for the <.,"}}, {"text": "Din Dayal Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23311, "end_char": 23326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Din Dayal Kapur, for Shri Munshilal and two others."}}, {"text": "Munshilal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23337, "end_char": 23346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Din Dayal Kapur, for Shri Munshilal and two others.", "canonical_name": "Munshi Lal"}}, {"text": "article 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23509, "end_char": 23520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23688, "end_char": 23697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23705, "end_char": 23725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23876, "end_char": 23885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Or any of the provisions thereof and in wliat particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act", "statute": "Or any of the provisions thereof and in wliat particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23956, "end_char": 23961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, mentioned in the question, runs as follows :-\n\nKania C. J.\n\n\"The Provincial Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend with such restnct10ns\n\nand modifications as it thinks fit to the Province of Delhi or any part thereof, any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification.\"", "canonical_name": "K.ania"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24454, "end_char": 24463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Or any of the provisions thereof and in wliat particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act", "statute": "Or any of the provisions thereof and in wliat particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24844, "end_char": 24853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Or any of the provisions thereof and in wliat particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act", "statute": "Or any of the provisions thereof and in wliat particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25014, "end_char": 25023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "second is in respect of its legislative power after the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26071, "end_char": 26156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26545, "end_char": 26563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The East India Company first started its operations as a trading company in India and gradually acquired political influence."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26681, "end_char": 26688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Crown in England became the legislative authority in respect of areas which had come under the, control of the East India Company."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26837, "end_char": 26847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The second is in respect of its legislative power after the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The second is in respect of its legislative power after the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "British Parl1ament", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27266, "end_char": 27284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the English Constitution the British Parl1ament with its legislative authority in the King and the two Houses of Parliament is supreme and its sovereignty cannot be challenged anywhere.", "canonical_name": "British Parl1ament"}}, {"text": "Cecil Carr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27613, "end_char": 27623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Cecil Carr in h'is book on English Administrative Law at page 15 observes : \"A more basic difference between the Constitutions of the United States and Britain is the notorious fact that Britain has to written Constitution, no fundamental statute which serves as a touchstone for all other legislation and which cannot be altered save by some specially solemn and dilatory process."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27747, "end_char": 27760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Cecil Carr in h'is book on English Administrative Law at page 15 observes : \"A more basic difference between the Constitutions of the United States and Britain is the notorious fact that Britain has to written Constitution, no fundamental statute which serves as a touchstone for all other legislation and which cannot be altered save by some specially solemn and dilatory process."}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27765, "end_char": 27772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Cecil Carr in h'is book on English Administrative Law at page 15 observes : \"A more basic difference between the Constitutions of the United States and Britain is the notorious fact that Britain has to written Constitution, no fundamental statute which serves as a touchstone for all other legislation and which cannot be altered save by some specially solemn and dilatory process."}}, {"text": "Ka11ia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28175, "end_char": 28181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C. J.\n\nKa11ia C. J.\n\nthe ordinary limits of judicial interpretation ......... ."}}, {"text": "Article 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28658, "end_char": 28669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dicey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30585, "end_char": 30590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Dicey's Law of the Constitution, 9th Edition, in considering the Constitution of France, it was observed that the supreme kgislative power under the Republic was not vested in the ordinary Parliament of two Chambers, but in a National Assembly or Congress composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate sitting together.", "canonical_name": "Dicey"}}, {"text": "France", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30932, "end_char": 30938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitutions of France which in this respect were similar to those 0f Continental polities exhibited as compared with the expansiveness or flexibility of English institutions that characteristic which was described by the author as rigid."}}, {"text": "Oxford", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31580, "end_char": 31586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They can modify or repeal in the same manner in wMch they can pass an Act enabling a company to make a new railway from Oxford to London."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31590, "end_char": 31596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They can modify or repeal in the same manner in wMch they can pass an Act enabling a company to make a new railway from Oxford to London."}}, {"text": "Kama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32487, "end_char": 32491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kama c.1."}}, {"text": "Its charter was the Indian Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32711, "end_char": 32750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "legislative Council of British India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33514, "end_char": 33550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 99, he has specifically considered the position of the legislative Council of British India prior to 1915 and stated as follows :-\"Laws are made for British India by a Legislative Council having very wide powers of Legislation."}}, {"text": "London and North Western Railway Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34008, "end_char": 34048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acts of Parliament as is the power of the London and North Western Railway Company to make byelaws .......... Now observe, that under these Acts the Indian Council is in the strictest sense a non-sovereign legislative body, and this independently of the fact the laws or regulations made by the Governor-General in Council can be annulled or disallowed by the Crown ; and note that the position of the Council exhibits all the marks or notes of legislative subordination."}}, {"text": "Imperial Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34607, "end_char": 34626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) The Council is bound by a large number of rules which cannot be changed by the Indian legislative body itself and which can be changed by the superior power of the Imperial Parliament."}}, {"text": "Indian Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35131, "end_char": 35145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These fundamental rules contain, it must be added, a number of specific restrictions on the subjects with regard to which the Council may legislate .... (3) The courts in India ........ may, when the occasion arises, pronounce upon the validity or constitutionality of laws made by the Indian Council.\""}}, {"text": "executive Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36607, "end_char": 36636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The executive Government of India was not responsible to the Indian Legislature and the composition of the Indian Legislature was such that the executive officers\n\nKania C. J.\n\nlnre T1rt Delhi Lows Act, 1912, etc."}}, {"text": "Delhi Lows Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36790, "end_char": 36810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cowell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37160, "end_char": 37166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would not be wrong, according to Mr. Cowell in his lecntre on \"Courts and Legislative Authorities in India,\" to describe the laws made in the Legislative Councils as in reality the order of Government."}}, {"text": "Morley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38715, "end_char": 38721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking in the House of Lords in December 1908 on the Bill which resulted in the Government of India Act of 1909, Lord Morley, the then Secretary of State for India, declared : \"If I were attempting to .set up a Parliamentary system in India, or if it could be said that this chapter of rules led directly or necessarily up to the establishment of a Parliamentary system in India."}}, {"text": "Central Legislative Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39155, "end_char": 39182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The constitution of the Central Legislative Council under the Regulation of November,\n\n1909, as revised in 1912, was this :\n\nOrdinary members of the Governor-General's Council, The Commander-in-Chief and the Lt.-Governor 8 Nominated members of than 28 must be officials Elected members, and The Governor-General\n\nwhom not more .. 33 .. 27\n\nThe executive government -was thus supreme and was not bound to obey or carry out the mandates of the legislature."}}, {"text": "Regulation of November,\n\n1909", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39193, "end_char": 39222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Without the consent of the executive government no Bill could be made into an Act nor an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39819, "end_char": 39911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "WI Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40834, "end_char": 40846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40941, "end_char": 40970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41173, "end_char": 41189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "result of the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42007, "end_char": 42050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Central Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42140, "end_char": 42166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Central Legislature was given power to convert itself into a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution for India, including the power to amend or repeal the Government of India Act, 1935, which till the new Constitution was adopted, was to be the Constitution of the country."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42307, "end_char": 42336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42654, "end_char": 42675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42694, "end_char": 42715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Constitution of India as adopted on the 26th of January, 1950, the executive government of the Union is vested in the President acting on the advice of the Ministers."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43221, "end_char": 43242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43641, "end_char": 43662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43763, "end_char": 43784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43856, "end_char": 43877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 257", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44467, "end_char": 44479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "re The Delhi laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45188, "end_char": 45215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K.ania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45223, "end_char": 45229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.ania C. J.\n\nIn re The Dtllti Law1 Act, 1912, etc.", "canonical_name": "K.ania"}}, {"text": "Konlo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45276, "end_char": 45281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Konlo C. J.\n\ntaken over by the State."}}, {"text": "Canada and Australia by Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46906, "end_char": 46933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kilnlo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49609, "end_char": 49615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kilnlo C. J.\n\nIn re The De/hi Law• Act, 1912,\n\netc."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49662, "end_char": 49667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C .", "canonical_name": "K.ania"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Canada", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50945, "end_char": 50968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention that the legislative power of the Indian Legislature carried with it the power of delegation, the Attorney-General relied on several decisions of the Jud\"1cial Committee of the Privy Council and decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and."}}, {"text": "Sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51678, "end_char": 51694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51752, "end_char": 51761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52377, "end_char": 52386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52833, "end_char": 52839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal issued a notification in exercise of the power conferred on him by section 9 and extended the provisions of the said Act to the territory known as the Khasi and Jaintia Hills and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil and criminal courts."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52907, "end_char": 52916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cakutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 53126, "end_char": 53144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a majority judgment the Cakutta High Court decided that the said notification had no legal force or effect In the Calcutta High Court, Mr. Kennedy, counsel for the Crown, boldly claimed for the Indian Legislative Council the power to transfer legislative functions to the Lieutenant-Gover- ."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 53216, "end_char": 53235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a majority judgment the Cakutta High Court decided that the said notification had no legal force or effect In the Calcutta High Court, Mr. Kennedy, counsel for the Crown, boldly claimed for the Indian Legislative Council the power to transfer legislative functions to the Lieutenant-Gover- ."}}, {"text": "Kennedy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53241, "end_char": 53248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a majority judgment the Cakutta High Court decided that the said notification had no legal force or effect In the Calcutta High Court, Mr. Kennedy, counsel for the Crown, boldly claimed for the Indian Legislative Council the power to transfer legislative functions to the Lieutenant-Gover- ."}}, {"text": "Indian Legislative Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53296, "end_char": 53322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a majority judgment the Cakutta High Court decided that the said notification had no legal force or effect In the Calcutta High Court, Mr. Kennedy, counsel for the Crown, boldly claimed for the Indian Legislative Council the power to transfer legislative functions to the Lieutenant-Gover- ."}}, {"text": "Markby", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53412, "end_char": 53418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nor of Bengal and Markby J. framed the question for decision as follows : \"Can the Legislature confer ."}}, {"text": "Lord Selbourne after agreeing with the High Court that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53700, "end_char": 53758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta High CoUrt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 54157, "end_char": 54176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board noticed that the majority of the Judges of the Calcutta High CoUrt based their decision on the view that the 9th section was not legislation but was a delegation of legislative power."}}, {"text": "Khasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57409, "end_char": 57414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This having been done as to the Garo Hills} what was done as to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills ?"}}, {"text": "Jaintia Hills", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57419, "end_char": 57432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This having been done as to the Garo Hills} what was done as to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills ?"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59847, "end_char": 59873, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59877, "end_char": 59888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59890, "end_char": 59910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 445", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59916, "end_char": 59927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59928, "end_char": 59951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India A.ct, 1935", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63825, "end_char": 63855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant provision of the Government of India A.ct, 1935, was in these terms :\n\n\"72."}}, {"text": "Schedule 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64614, "end_char": 64624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament of Canada", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66303, "end_char": 66323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conditional legislation of this kind is in many cases convenient, and is certainly not unusual, and the power so to legislate cannot be denied to the Parliament of Canada when the subject of legislation is with'.in its competency.\" ("}}, {"text": "Kllnio", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66849, "end_char": 66855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kllnio C. J.\n\n19'1\n\nbi re The Delhi I.ow• .ifct, 1912, etc."}}, {"text": "Canada a question about the validity of the Liquor Licences Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70114, "end_char": 70177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70236, "end_char": 70246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Canada a question about the validity of the Liquor Licences Act", "statute": "Canada a question about the validity of the Liquor Licences Act"}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71412, "end_char": 71422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71610, "end_char": 71620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73277, "end_char": 73287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73501, "end_char": 73511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "George Eduin Gray(2)", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74090, "end_char": 74110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In In re George Eduin Gray(2), the question of delegation of powers in respect of the War Measures Act, 1914, came for consideration.", "canonical_name": "George Eduin Gray(2)"}}, {"text": "War Measures Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74167, "end_char": 74189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Charles Fitzpatrick", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74374, "end_char": 74393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prov-isions there were very similar to the Defence of India Act and the Rules made thereunder in India during the W arid War I. In delivering judgment Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C. J. observed as follows :-\"The practice of authorising adm'mistrative bodies to make regulations to carry out the ob; ect of an Act instead of 1etting out all the details of the Act itself is well known and its legality is unquestioned.\""}}, {"text": "S7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75724, "end_char": 75726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "llnre The Delhi Lawa Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75768, "end_char": 75798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Reference case", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76156, "end_char": 76170, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "REFERENCE CASE", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Duff", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76175, "end_char": 76179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Chemical, Reference case('), Duff C. J. set out the true effect of the decision in the War Measures Act."}}, {"text": "Benaori Lal Sarma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78582, "end_char": 78599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The discussion in Benaori Lal Sarma's case (1) in the judgment of the Privy Council mentioned above may be usefully noted in this connection as the legislation in that case was also a war measure but was held valid as conditional legislation.", "canonical_name": "Benoari Lal' Sarma"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 79533, "end_char": 79559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An important decision of the Supreme Court of Australia may be noticed next."}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 79791, "end_char": 79814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Victorian Stevedorina and General Contracting Company Proprietary Ltd.\n\nv. Dignan( 2 ), the question whether delegation of legislative power was according to the Constitution came to be examined by the High Court of Australia."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79835, "end_char": 79844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Lawa Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80085, "end_char": 80105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gavan Duffy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80177, "end_char": 80188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the judgment of Gavan Duffy C.J. and Starke J. it was stated : \"The attack upon the Act itself was based upon the American Constitutional doctrine that no legislative body can delegate to another department of the Government or to any other authority the power either generally or specially to enact laws."}}, {"text": "Starke", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80198, "end_char": 80204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the judgment of Gavan Duffy C.J. and Starke J. it was stated : \"The attack upon the Act itself was based upon the American Constitutional doctrine that no legislative body can delegate to another department of the Government or to any other authority the power either generally or specially to enact laws."}}, {"text": "Cooley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80680, "end_char": 80686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cooley's Principles of Constitutional Law, 3rd Edition, p. 111).", "canonical_name": "Cooley"}}, {"text": "Dixon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80990, "end_char": 80995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Dixon considered the argument fully in these terms : ''The validity of this provision is now attacked upon the ground that it is an attempt to grant to the executive a portion of the legislative power vested by the Constitution in the Parliament which is inconsistent with distribution made by the Constitution of legislative executive and iudicial powers.", "canonical_name": "Dixon"}}, {"text": "Burah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83251, "end_char": 83256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of the legislation passed during the emergency of war and where the power was strongly relied upon, Dixon J. observed : \"It might be considered that the exigencies which must be dealt with under the defence power are so many, so great and so urgent and are so much the proper concern of the executive that from its very nature the power appears by necessary intendment to authorise a delegation otherwise generally forbidden to the legislature .......... I think it certain that such a provision would be supported in America and the passage in Burah's case appears to apply to it in which the Judidal Committee deny that in fact any delegation there took place .......... This does not mean that a law confiding authority to the executive will be followed, however extensive or vague the subject-matter may be if it does not fall outside the boundaries of federal power.", "canonical_name": "Burah"}}, {"text": "Roche V Kronheimer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84888, "end_char": 84906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately he said that Roche V Kronheimer(') was conclusive;\n\nMr. Justice Evatt stated that in dealing with the doctrine of the separation of legislative and executive powers \"it must be remembered that underlying the Commonwealth frame of government there is the notion of the British system of an executive wh'ich is responsible to Parliament."}}, {"text": "Evatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84939, "end_char": 84944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately he said that Roche V Kronheimer(') was conclusive;\n\nMr. Justice Evatt stated that in dealing with the doctrine of the separation of legislative and executive powers \"it must be remembered that underlying the Commonwealth frame of government there is the notion of the British system of an executive wh'ich is responsible to Parliament."}}, {"text": "Commonwealth Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 85345, "end_char": 85368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He formulated the larger proposition that every grant by the Commonwealth Parliament of authority ."}}, {"text": "U.S.A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 89907, "end_char": 89913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover in the Australian Constitution in distributing the powers among the legislative and executive authorities, the word \"vest\" is used as in the Constitution of the U.S.A. To that extent the two Constitutions have common features."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 90253, "end_char": 90298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was drawn to several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America mostly to draw a distinction between the legislative powers of the Congress in the United States of America and the legislative powers of the legislature under Constitutions prepared on the British Parliament pattern."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of U.S.A.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 90864, "end_char": 90887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noticed that several decisions of the Supreme Court of U.S.A.\n\nare based on the incompetence of the delegate to receive the power sought to be conferred on it."}}, {"text": "S. 394, 406 and 407", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92982, "end_char": 93001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ranny", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93995, "end_char": 94000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He agreed with the often cited passage from the judgment of Ranny J. of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati W,. &", "canonical_name": "Ranney"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Ohio", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 94011, "end_char": 94032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He agreed with the often cited passage from the judgment of Ranny J. of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati W,. &"}}, {"text": "Locke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94442, "end_char": 94447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Locke's Appeal(2 ), it is stated : \"The proper distinction in this."}}, {"text": "Hughes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95042, "end_char": 95048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'~\n\nIn Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan ( 3), it was observed by Hughes C.J. : ''The Congress is not permitted to\n\n(I) I Ohio St. 88.", "canonical_name": "Hughes"}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95122, "end_char": 95128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schwartz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96878, "end_char": 96886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complexity of this question of delegation of power and the consideration of the various decisions in which its application has led to the support or invalidation of Acts has been somewhat aptly put by Schwartz on American Administrative Law."}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96982, "end_char": 96990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After quoting from Wayman v. Southend (2) the observations 0£ Marshall C. J. that the line has not been exactly drawn which 'separates those important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself from those of less interest in which a general provision may be made and powers given to those who are to\n\n(I) 29S U.S. 459.", "canonical_name": "Marshall"}}, {"text": "S. 459", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97256, "end_char": 97262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 1825", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97282, "end_char": 97289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jn re The Delhi uws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97305, "end_char": 97334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kaniil", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97342, "end_char": 97348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kaniil C. I.\n\nact under such general provision to fill up details, the author points out that the resulting judicial dilemma, when the America courts finally were squarely confronted with delegation cases, was resolved by the judicious .choice of words to describe the word \"delegated power\"."}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97679, "end_char": 97685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The authority transferr.ed was, in Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase, \"softened by a quasi\", and the courts were thus able to grant the fact of delegated legislation and still to deny the name.", "canonical_name": "Holmes"}}, {"text": "Cushman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97864, "end_char": 97871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This result is well put in Prof. Cushman's syllogism :\n\n\"Major premise : Legiilative power cannot be constitutionally delegated by Congress."}}, {"text": "Supreme Courts of Canada", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 99694, "end_char": 99718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A fair and close reading and analysis of all these decisions of the Privy Council, the judgments of the Supreme Courts of Canada and Australia without stretching and straining the words and expressions used therein lead me to the conclusion that while a legislature, as a part of its legislative functions, can confer powers to make rules and regulations for carrying the enactment into operatiqn and effect, and while a legislature has power to lay do:nn the policy and principles providing the rule of conduct, and while it may further provide that on certain data or facts being found and ascqtained by an executive authority,\n\nthe operation of the Act can be extended to certain areas or may be brought into force on such determination which is described as conditional legislation the power to delegate legislative functions generally is not warranted under the Constitution of India at any stage."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100457, "end_char": 100478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kaaia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101555, "end_char": 101560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nKaaia C. J.\n\nthe British Parliament which is established as a matter of comrention and whose powers are also therefore absolute and unlimited, in any legislature of any other cc,.:.ntry such general powers of delegation as claimed by the Attorney-General for a legislature, have been recognised or permitted."}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 101572, "end_char": 101590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nKaaia C. J.\n\nthe British Parliament which is established as a matter of comrention and whose powers are also therefore absolute and unlimited, in any legislature of any other cc,.:.ntry such general powers of delegation as claimed by the Attorney-General for a legislature, have been recognised or permitted.", "canonical_name": "British Parl1ament"}}, {"text": "Kmrlo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105920, "end_char": 105925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kmrlo C. J. ·\n\nand to make adaptations which became necessary because of local conditions and nothing more."}}, {"text": "Rowland Burrows", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 106760, "end_char": 106775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, in Rowland Burrows' \"Words and Phrases\", the word \"modify\" has been defined as meaning \"vary, extend or enlarge, limit or restrict.\"", "canonical_name": "Rowland Burrows"}}, {"text": "Central Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 107979, "end_char": 107998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If power of modification so understood is permitted, it will be open to the Central Legislature in dfcct to change the whole basis of the legislation and the reason for making the\n\nlaw."}}, {"text": "/atindra Nath Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 108851, "end_char": 108870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the learned Attorney-General in the discussion of this case, I adhere to what I stated in /atindra Nath Gupta's case{1) that the power of delegation, in the sense o~ the legislature •conferring power, on either the execut:lve government or another authority, \"to lay down the policy underlying a rule of conduct\" is not permitted.", "canonical_name": "/atindra Nath Gupta"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110033, "end_char": 110054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1949] F. C.R. 595", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 110116, "end_char": 110134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110264, "end_char": 110285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110878, "end_char": 110889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110914, "end_char": 110935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110938, "end_char": 110949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111111, "end_char": 111125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112659, "end_char": 112670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113081, "end_char": 113094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113332, "end_char": 113342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113472, "end_char": 113486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113583, "end_char": 113596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113980, "end_char": 113993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "LAlws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114716, "end_char": 114731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "X.nlo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114739, "end_char": 114744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X.nlo C. J.\n\nin the Constitution of India there is no express separation of powers, it 'is clear that a legislature is created by the Constitution and detailed provisions are made for making that legislature pass laws."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 114759, "end_char": 114780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "articles 245 and 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115658, "end_char": 115678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 245 and 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115783, "end_char": 115803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115825, "end_char": 115841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118962, "end_char": 118972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Al Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 119309, "end_char": 119326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119383, "end_char": 119392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Al Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Al Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 119440, "end_char": 119446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".T.\n\nunder a Chief Commissioner and by section 2 of the Delhi Laws Act the laws in force in the Punjab continued to be operative in the newly created Province of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119856, "end_char": 119865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Al Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Al Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Moreover it enables the Provincial Government to extend an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120465, "end_char": 120527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120815, "end_char": 120831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Moreover it enables the Provincial Government to extend an Act", "statute": "Moreover it enables the Provincial Government to extend an Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121553, "end_char": 121562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122363, "end_char": 122372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123165, "end_char": 123174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123289, "end_char": 123299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123601, "end_char": 123610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "X.onla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123700, "end_char": 123706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c.\n\nX.onla C. J.\n\nanything else."}}, {"text": "Therefore if such new body says that the law in Delhi will be the same as Bombay or Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124277, "end_char": 124371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Legislature of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 126170, "end_char": 126191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Provincial Government, e.g., of Bombay, was not empowered to lay down any policy in respect of the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code nor was it authorised to select, if it liked, a law passed by the Legislature of Madras for its appl.lcation to the Province of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Legislature of the Province of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 126268, "end_char": 126305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it wanted to do so, the Legislature of the Province of Bombay had to exercise its judgment and decision and pass the law which would be enforceable in the Province of Bombay."}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126507, "end_char": 126523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126687, "end_char": 126696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central executive government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 126731, "end_char": 126759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion, therefore, to the extent section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act permits the Central executive government to apply any law passed by a Provincial legislature to the Province of Delhi, the same is ultra vircs the Central Legislature."}}, {"text": "To that extent the Central Legislature has abdicated its functions and therefore the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126888, "end_char": 126976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127078, "end_char": 127107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "That was brought about only by the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127317, "end_char": 127381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127384, "end_char": 127394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "That was brought about only by the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "That was brought about only by the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "sections 99 and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127518, "end_char": 127537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "That was brought about only by the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "That was brought about only by the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Centre", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 127607, "end_char": 127613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unde.r sections 99 and 100 there was a distribution of legislative powers between Provinces and Centre, but the word \"Province\" did not include a Chief Commissioner's Province and therefore the Central Legislature was the only law-making authority for the Chief Commissioner's Provinces."}}, {"text": "Central Legislature", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 128043, "end_char": 128062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania C. J.\n\nand the Central Legislature was removed, the powers of the Central Legislature were still as those found in the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "Central Legislature were still as those found in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128094, "end_char": 128176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128361, "end_char": 128370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Legislature were still as those found in the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Central Legislature were still as those found in the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Ajmer-Merwara Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128432, "end_char": 128455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128521, "end_char": 128530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ajmer-Merwara Act, 1947", "statute": "the Ajmer-Merwara Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "article 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128613, "end_char": 128624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ajmer-Merwara Act, 1947", "statute": "the Ajmer-Merwara Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128632, "end_char": 128653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128747, "end_char": 128758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129498, "end_char": 129509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129676, "end_char": 129685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130374, "end_char": 130383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "To the extent the Central Legislature or Parliament has passed Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 130546, "end_char": 130612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "F AZL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131961, "end_char": 131970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F AZL ALI J .-The answer to the three questions which.", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "article 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132059, "end_char": 132070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132078, "end_char": 132099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132186, "end_char": 132194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "have been referred by the President under\n\narticle 143 of the Constitution of India, depends upon the proper answer to another question which was the\n\n19S1\n\nKania C. J.\n\nFazl Ali I.\n\n19SI\n\nIn re The Delhi Law8 Act, 1912,\n\netc.", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132250, "end_char": 132253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fi1Z/ Ali J.\n\nsubject of very elaborate arguments before us and .whlch may be stated thus : Can a legislature which is sovereign or has plenary powers withln the .field assigned to it, delegate its legislative functions to an executive authority or fo another agency, and, if so, to what extent it can do so ?"}}, {"text": "Broom", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 134169, "end_char": 134174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule is so stated is Broom's Legal Maxims, and many other books, and it is also stated that in a number of cases the authority to employ\n\nagents is implied."}}, {"text": "~Imperial Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 135173, "end_char": 135193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But when acting within those limits it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the ~Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself.\" :"}}, {"text": "Ontario", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 135719, "end_char": 135726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the British North America Act enacted that there should be a Legislature for Ontario, and that • 'its Legislative Assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the Province and for Provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in section 92, it conferred powers, not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament, but authonty as plenary and as ample, within the limits prescribed by section 92, as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow."}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135896, "end_char": 135906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136092, "end_char": 136102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lnre The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 136397, "end_char": 136426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dicey dealing with the powers of the British Parliament with reference to the Septennial Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 136683, "end_char": 136775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D1cey,-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 138048, "end_char": 138055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been pointed out by D1cey,- \"the sole legal right of electors under the English Constituticn is to elect memebrs of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Aristotle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 138944, "end_char": 138953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is an old doctrine which is said to have originated from Aristotle, but, as is well-known, it was given great prominence by Locke and Montesquieu."}}, {"text": "Montesquieu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 139021, "end_char": 139032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is an old doctrine which is said to have originated from Aristotle, but, as is well-known, it was given great prominence by Locke and Montesquieu.", "canonical_name": "Montesquieu"}}, {"text": "Washington", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 140327, "end_char": 140337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Washington, in his farewell address, said :-\n\n\"The spirit of enroachinent tends to consolidate the powers of all governments in one, and thus to\n\n(I) Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws."}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140597, "end_char": 140611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "lohn Adams", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 140692, "end_char": 140702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\ncreate, whatever the form of government, a real despotism.n\n\nlohn Adams wrote on similar lines as follows :-\n\n•it is by balancing one ot these three powers against the other two that the efforts in human nature towards tyranny can alone be checked and restrained and any degree of freedom preserved.\"(')"}}, {"text": "Massachusetts", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 141076, "end_char": 141089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Massachusetts in her Constitution, adpoted in 1780,\n\nprovided that \"in the government of this commonwealth the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them ; the executive shall never exercise legislative and judicial powers or either of them ; the judicial shall never exercise legislative and executive powers or either of them ; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men."}}, {"text": "Sutherland", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142132, "end_char": 142142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule has been stated by Sutherland J. in Springer v. Government of the Phillipine Islands(') in these words :-\n\n\"It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, that unless otherwise expressly provided or inLidental to the powers conferred, the Legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power ;.", "canonical_name": "Sutherland"}}, {"text": "Willoughby", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 142513, "end_char": 142523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Willoughby's Constitution of the United States, Vol.", "canonical_name": "Willoughby"}}, {"text": "S.189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142584, "end_char": 142589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cardozo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144316, "end_char": 144323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the matter, Cardozo J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not canalized within\n\n{I) Wayman v. Southard(l82S)23 U.S. 43."}}, {"text": "S. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144485, "end_char": 144490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144552, "end_char": 144558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144571, "end_char": 144576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 144630, "end_char": 144642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.49S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146390, "end_char": 146395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ranney", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147968, "end_char": 147974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Ranney J. in Cincinnati W. & Z. R. Co. v. Clinton County Commissio11ers(4) ].", "canonical_name": "Ranney"}}, {"text": "S. 189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148057, "end_char": 148063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 230", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148076, "end_char": 148082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "re Tire Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148145, "end_char": 148173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Taft", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149829, "end_char": 149833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Taft C.J. in /. W. Hampton fr. &"}}, {"text": "S. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150012, "end_char": 150017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150030, "end_char": 150036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 394", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150048, "end_char": 150054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151008, "end_char": 151018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cmtoms Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 151026, "end_char": 151042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 152171, "end_char": 152198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Blackstone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 153399, "end_char": 153409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the course of judicial decisions or in shaping the Constitiltion, notwithstand 'ing the fact that distinguished writers like Locke and\n\nBlackstone strongly advocated it in the 17th and 18th centuries.", "canonical_name": "Blackstone"}}, {"text": "Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 155005, "end_char": 155013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States, the execu- _dve power is vested in the President, to whom, and not to the Congress, the members of the Cabinet are personally responsible and neither the President nor the members of the Cabinet can sit or vote in Congress, and they have no responsibility for initiating bills or seeking their passage through Congress."}}, {"text": "Cabinet", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 155034, "end_char": 155041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States, the execu- _dve power is vested in the President, to whom, and not to the Congress, the members of the Cabinet are personally responsible and neither the President nor the members of the Cabinet can sit or vote in Congress, and they have no responsibility for initiating bills or seeking their passage through Congress."}}, {"text": "FrJZi Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156294, "end_char": 156303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FrJZi Ali J.\n\n19Sl\n\nIn re The Delhi Law• Act, 1912\n\netc."}}, {"text": "Rich", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156651, "end_char": 156655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The divisic>n of the powers of Government is now a normal feature of all civilised constitutions, and, as ponited out by Rich J. in New South Wales v. Commonwealth(1), it is \"well-known in :all British rommunities\"; yet, except in the United States, nowhere it has been 1held that by iuelf it forbids delegation of legislative power."}}, {"text": "Parliament of the Commonwealth", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 159462, "end_char": 159492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. and Neakes v. Dignan(2), in these words :-\n\n\"On final analysis therefore, the Parliament of the Commonwealth is not competent to 'abdicate' its powers of legislat'xon."}}, {"text": "S. 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160241, "end_char": 160247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lord Haldane in Jn re the Initiative and Referendum Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 160426, "end_char": 160481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Legislature of Ontario", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 160774, "end_char": 160796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by a Provincial Legislature in Canada, could, while preserving its own capacity intact, seek the :wistance of subordinate agencies, as has been done when in Hodge v. The Queen, the Legislature of Ontario was held entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissioners authority to enact regulations relating to taverns ; but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence.\""}}, {"text": "Parliament of Great Britain", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 164146, "end_char": 164173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our present Parliament, though it may not be as sovereign as the Parliament of Great Britain, is certainly as soveign as the Congress of the United States of America and the Legislatures of other independent countries having a Federal CQnstitution."}}, {"text": "Aws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164438, "end_char": 164451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dicey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164496, "end_char": 164501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali J.\n\nto our purpose is that Dicey himself, dealing with colonial and other similar legislatures, says that \"they are in short within their own sphere copies of the Imperial Parliament, they are within their own sphere sovereign bodies, but their freedom of action is controlled by their subordination to the Parliament of the United Klngdom.''", "canonical_name": "Dicey"}}, {"text": "Parliament of the United Klngdom", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 164776, "end_char": 164808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali J.\n\nto our purpose is that Dicey himself, dealing with colonial and other similar legislatures, says that \"they are in short within their own sphere copies of the Imperial Parliament, they are within their own sphere sovereign bodies, but their freedom of action is controlled by their subordination to the Parliament of the United Klngdom.''"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164898, "end_char": 164918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Governor-General m Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 166237, "end_char": 166263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having held that the Indian Legislature was not a delegate of the Imperial Parliament and hence the maxim, delegatus non potest delegare, did not apply (See ante for the passage dealing with this point), their Lordships proceeded to state as follows :-\n\n\"Their Lordships agree that the Governor-General m Council could not by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authority, a new legislative power, not created or authorized by the Council~ Act."}}, {"text": "Canadian Temperance Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 168428, "end_char": 168457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tlte Delhi IAws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 168528, "end_char": 168553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ontario Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 170377, "end_char": 170396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same doctrine was laid down in the case of Hodge v. The Q11een(1), where the question arose as to whether the legislature of Ontario had or had not the power of entrusting to a local authority-the Board of Commissioners-the power of making regulations with respect to the Liquor Licence Act, 1877, which among other things created offences for the breach of those regulations and annexed penalties thereto Their Lordships held that the Ontario Legislature had that power, and after reiterating that the Legislature which passed the Act was not a delegate, they observed as follows :-\n\n\"When the British North America Act enacted that there should be a legislature for Ontario, and that\n\n(I) 9 App."}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170805, "end_char": 170815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171000, "end_char": 171010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171658, "end_char": 171669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deihl LoWs Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 172767, "end_char": 172787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "duties levied under the Order in Council are really levied by the authority of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 172951, "end_char": 173037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173383, "end_char": 173394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the duties levied under the Order in Council are really levied by the authority of the Act", "statute": "But the duties levied under the Order in Council are really levied by the authority of the Act"}}, {"text": "Tfie Deihl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 177066, "end_char": 177091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ai Lows Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 177125, "end_char": 177136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184515, "end_char": 184524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184532, "end_char": 184552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184910, "end_char": 184919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 185590, "end_char": 185596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that formerly it was the executive Government which was empowered to make regulations and ordinances for \"the good government of the factories and territories acquired in India\", and up to 1833, the laws used to be passed by the Governor- General in Council or by the Governors of Madras and\n\nl9S1\n\netc."}}, {"text": "Delhi Lows Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 185642, "end_char": 185662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Then came the Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 186567, "end_char": 186593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189011, "end_char": 189020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 189448, "end_char": 189467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we find that when it was enacted on the 31st December, 1947, the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted by the India (Provincial OJnstitution) Order, 1947, issued under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, was in force."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189473, "end_char": 189502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189584, "end_char": 189613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ai Lows Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189983, "end_char": 190000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190255, "end_char": 190265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ai Lows Act, 1912", "statute": "Ai Lows Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190383, "end_char": 190394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ai Lows Act, 1912", "statute": "Ai Lows Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Ajmer-Merwara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 190666, "end_char": 190679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Legislature was thus competent to legislate for Ajmer-Merwara in regard to any subject, and it had also plenary powers in the entire legislative field allotted to it- Further, at the time the Act in question was passed, the Dominion Legislature was simultaneously functioning as the Constituent Assembly and had the power to frame the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191074, "end_char": 191085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "On the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 191338, "end_char": 191389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191413, "end_char": 191429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "On the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 246( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191665, "end_char": 191680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "On the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191823, "end_char": 191837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "On the pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "articles 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192910, "end_char": 192922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192974, "end_char": 192985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193428, "end_char": 193439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 194094, "end_char": 194103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".fazl Ali J.\n\npowers and the imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities .thereof.\"", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "articles 353(b) and 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194442, "end_char": 194465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 353(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194744, "end_char": 194758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 195169, "end_char": 195183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 195952, "end_char": 195961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act , 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 195969, "end_char": 195990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196276, "end_char": 196285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act , 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act , 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196599, "end_char": 196608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act , 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act , 1912"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 201438, "end_char": 201447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 202360, "end_char": 202368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl Ali J.\n\nlaw: Tiie Dellli Law.r Act, 1912\n\netc ..\n\n\"The legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place; but that it was expedient to leave the time and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor; and also, that the laws which were or might be in force in the other territories subject to the same Government were such as it might be fit, and proper to apply to this district also; but that, as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them, could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Lieutenant-Governor.\"", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "Central or Provincial Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 203597, "end_char": 203629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "same Government\" for reasons to be stated presently) were such as it might be fit and proper to apply to this State also; but that, as it was not certain that all those laws, and every part of them, could with equal convenience be so applied, it was expedient, on that point also, to entrust a discretion to the Central or Provincial Government.\""}}, {"text": "Fuller", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 206460, "end_char": 206466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Fuller J. in Stoutenburgh v. Hennick(1) )."}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 206521, "end_char": 206527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 206596, "end_char": 206616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 206761, "end_char": 206770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Pondoland Annexation Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 206778, "end_char": 206808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cape Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 207425, "end_char": 207440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is not a word in the Act to suggest that it was intended to make the Governor a dictator, or even to clothe him with the full legislative powers of the Cape Parliament."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208817, "end_char": 208826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pondoland Annexation Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 208834, "end_char": 208864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code automatically became the State Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 210406, "end_char": 210446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 138", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 210825, "end_char": 210831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code automatically became the State Code", "statute": "Code automatically became the State Code"}}, {"text": "Faz/ Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 210899, "end_char": 210907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8-3 SC lndia/68\n\nFazl Ali J ..\n\nFaz/ Ali J.\n\nby another legislature has in some cases been held to be permissible.", "canonical_name": "Faz/ Ali"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 211314, "end_char": 211344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211383, "end_char": 211392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "The Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Our attention has been drawn Acts containing provmons similar to to several the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 212743, "end_char": 212826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 1 and 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212887, "end_char": 212903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Our attention has been drawn Acts containing provmons similar to to several the Act", "statute": "Our attention has been drawn Acts containing provmons similar to to several the Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 5 and 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212926, "end_char": 212943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Our attention has been drawn Acts containing provmons similar to to several the Act", "statute": "Our attention has been drawn Acts containing provmons similar to to several the Act"}}, {"text": "Scheduled Districts Act, 1874", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 212951, "end_char": 212980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Burma Laws Act, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213008, "end_char": 213028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213049, "end_char": 213059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Burma Laws Act, 1898", "statute": "The Burma Laws Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213069, "end_char": 213078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Burma Laws Act, 1898", "statute": "The Burma Laws Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213086, "end_char": 213116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213245, "end_char": 213254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Scheduled Districts Act, 1874", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 213401, "end_char": 213430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213888, "end_char": 213897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Scheduled Districts Act, 1874", "statute": "The Scheduled Districts Act, 1874"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213986, "end_char": 213995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Scheduled Districts Act, 1874", "statute": "The Scheduled Districts Act, 1874"}}, {"text": "Burma Laws Act, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 214225, "end_char": 214245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 214572, "end_char": 214599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Deihl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 214636, "end_char": 214656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Upper Burma", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 214693, "end_char": 214704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in any part of Upper Burma at the date of the extension.\""}}, {"text": "Thomas Carr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 216242, "end_char": 216253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Thomas Carr, who had considerable experience of dealing with legislation of the character we are concerned with, refers to \"Henry VIII clause\" in this way in his book \"Concerning English Administrative Law\" at page 44 :-\n\n\"Of all the types of orders which alter statutes, the so-called 'Henry VIII clause' sometimes inserted in big and complicated ACts, has probably caused the greatest flutter in England."}}, {"text": "Garth C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 217546, "end_char": 217556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was pointed out by Garth C.J. in Empress v. BurahC ), the legislature is \"always in a position to see how the powers, which it has conferred, are being exercised, and if they are exercised injudiciously, or otherwise than in accordance with its intentions, or if, having been exercised, the result is in any degree inconvenient, it can always by another Act recall its powers, or rectify the inconvenience.\"", "canonical_name": "Garth C.J."}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 218843, "end_char": 218857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Scheduled Districts Act, 1874", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 218907, "end_char": 218936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Burma Laws Act, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 218942, "end_char": 218962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 218968, "end_char": 219011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras City Improvement Trust Act, 1945", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 219017, "end_char": 219056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Public Health Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 219062, "end_char": 219092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kand Revenue Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 219100, "end_char": 219122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 219397, "end_char": 219405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1929, a Bill was proposed to carry out the policy of having fewer and bigger local authority in Scotland."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220360, "end_char": 220371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220549, "end_char": 220561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Road Transport Lighting Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220569, "end_char": 220602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Trade Boards Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220850, "end_char": 220872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Trade Boards Act, 1909", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220950, "end_char": 220972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 221050, "end_char": 221082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 221087, "end_char": 221097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920", "statute": "The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 224125, "end_char": 224134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Church of England", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 225081, "end_char": 225098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that Act, the Church Assembly is empowered to propose legislation touching matters concerning the Church of England, and\n\nthe legislation proposed may extend to the repeal or amendment of Acts of Parliament including the Church\n\nAssembly Act itself."}}, {"text": "Acts of Parliament including the Church", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 225171, "end_char": 225210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "is thus no real analogy between that Act and the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 225424, "end_char": 225476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hewart", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 225716, "end_char": 225722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, the provision has to be upheld, because, though it goes to the farthest limits, it is difficult to hold that it was beyond the powers of a legislature which is supreme in its own field; and all we can say is what Lord Hewart said in King v. Minister of Health(1), namely, that the particular Act may be\n\nrgarded as \"indicating the high water-mark of legislative provisions of this character,\" and that, unless the legislature acts with restraint, a stage_ may be reached when legislation may amount to abdication of legislative powers."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227250, "end_char": 227252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "re The Defhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 227257, "end_char": 227284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Fazl AliJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 227292, "end_char": 227302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazl AliJ.\n\n19S1\n\nFazl Ali J.\n\nto consult interects likely to be affected by a particular law, make actual experiments when necessary, and utilize the results of its investigations and experiments in the best way possible.", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "National Economy Act, 1931", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 228199, "end_char": 228225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "PATANJALI SAsTR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 229924, "end_char": 229940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-The President of India by an order, dated the 7th January, 1951, has been pl¢ased to refer to this Court, under' article 143(1) of th!!", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "President of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 229948, "end_char": 229966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-The President of India by an order, dated the 7th January, 1951, has been pl¢ased to refer to this Court, under' article 143(1) of th!!"}}, {"text": "7th January, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 229990, "end_char": 230007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-The President of India by an order, dated the 7th January, 1951, has been pl¢ased to refer to this Court, under' article 143(1) of th!!"}}, {"text": "article 143(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230057, "end_char": 230071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230159, "end_char": 230168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 230176, "end_char": 230196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 230357, "end_char": 230400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Was the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, or any of the provisions thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the legislature which passed the said Act?", "canonical_name": "Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230553, "end_char": 230562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230956, "end_char": 230965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 230973, "end_char": 231016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 231038, "end_char": 231055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasons for making the reference are thus set out in the letter of reference :\n\n\"And whereas the Federal Court of India in fatindra Nath Gupta v. The Provin(e of Bihar(1) held by a majority that the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, was ultra vires the Bihar Legislature inter alia on the ground that the said proviso conferred power on the Provincial Government to modify an act of the Provincial Legislature and thus amounted to a delegation of legislative power;\n\nAnd whereas as the Federal Court,\n\n(I) [I }19-50} F.C.R. 595."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 231397, "end_char": 231413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz/ Ali J.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nthe validity of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, and section 2 of the Part C States\n\n(Laws) Act, 1950, and of the Acts extended to the Provinces of Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara and various Part C States under the said sections respectively, and of the orders and other instruments issued under the Acts so extended;\n\nAnd whereas the validity of section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and / section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, and of the Act extended by virtue of the powers conferred by the said sections has been challenged in some cases pending at present before the Punjab High Court, the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer, and the District Court and the Subordinate Courts in Delhi.\"", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231455, "end_char": 231464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 231472, "end_char": 231492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231494, "end_char": 231503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231560, "end_char": 231569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231847, "end_char": 231856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 231864, "end_char": 231884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231892, "end_char": 231901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232279, "end_char": 232288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 232296, "end_char": 232316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232600, "end_char": 232609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 232964, "end_char": 232973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastrl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 235337, "end_char": 235353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19Sl\n\nPatanjali Sastrl J.\n\nIn re The Delhi uws Act, 1912, etc.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "re The Delhi uws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 235361, "end_char": 235387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "PatanjaU Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 235395, "end_char": 235410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PatanjaU Sastri J.\n\nThe question is : Was the delegation of such sweeping discretionary power to pick and choose laws made by other legislatures to operate elsewhere and to apply them to the territories in question within the competence of the Central Legislature?", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 235806, "end_char": 235813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In /atindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar('), which has led to this reference, the Federal Court of India held by a majority (Kania C. J., Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Mahajan I."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 235818, "end_char": 235827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In /atindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar('), which has led to this reference, the Federal Court of India held by a majority (Kania C. J., Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 235872, "end_char": 235881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In re The Delhi uws Act, 1912", "statute": "In re The Delhi uws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 235889, "end_char": 235932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 236541, "end_char": 236549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz!", "canonical_name": "Faz/ Ali"}}, {"text": "Jatindra Nath Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 237270, "end_char": 237289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Attorney-General, appearing on behalf of the President vigorously attacked the majority view in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case(') as being opposed alike to sound constitutional principles and the weight of authority.", "canonical_name": "/atindra Nath Gupta"}}, {"text": "Patanja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 239576, "end_char": 239583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) 5 I.A. 178\n\nPatanja/i Sastri J.\n\nPatatJ}all\n\nSastri J.\n\nhave, therefore, to examine whether the delegation of authority made in each of the impugned enactments is contrary to the tenor of the constitution under which the enactment itself was passed."}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 239586, "end_char": 239592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) 5 I.A. 178\n\nPatanja/i Sastri J.\n\nPatatJ}all\n\nSastri J.\n\nhave, therefore, to examine whether the delegation of authority made in each of the impugned enactments is contrary to the tenor of the constitution under which the enactment itself was passed.", "canonical_name": "SAsTRI"}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242642, "end_char": 242652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242839, "end_char": 242849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Imperial Parliament", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 243708, "end_char": 243727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1)\n\nHere is a clean enunciation of the English doctrine of what may be called \"supremacy within limits\"\n\nthat is to say, within the circumscribed limits of its legislative power, a subordinate legislature can do what the Imperial Parliament can do, and no constitutional limit on its power to delegate can be imported\n\n(1) 9 App."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastr;.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 243856, "end_char": 243875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastr;.J.\n\n19Si\n\nI• re The Delhi Law!", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "Patolfja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 243922, "end_char": 243930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patolfja/I StUtri J.\n\non the strength of the maxim delt:gatus non potesi delegare, because it is not a delegate."}}, {"text": "Hodge", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 244924, "end_char": 244929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same doctrine was affirmed in Powell v. Apollo Candle Co. Ltd.(\"), where, after referring to Burah's case(') and Hodge's case(3), their Lordships categorically stated : \"These two cases have put an end to a doctrine which appears at one time to have bad some currency, that a Colonial Legislature is a delegate of the Imperial Legislature.", "canonical_name": "Hodge"}}, {"text": "New South Wales", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 245325, "end_char": 245340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An objection that the legislature of New South Wales alone had power to impose the tax in question and it could not delegate that power to the Governor, was answered by saying \"But the duties levied under the Order in Council arc really levied by the authority of die Act undor which the order is issued."}}, {"text": "duties levied under the Order in Council arc really levied by the authority of die Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 245473, "end_char": 245559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shannon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 245870, "end_char": 245877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Hodge's case(\") did not involve an extensive delegation of legislative power, Shannon's case(\") did."}}, {"text": "Canada had passed a comprilsory Marketing Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 246031, "end_char": 246076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Haldane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 246432, "end_char": 246439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Haldane's dictum in what is known as the Referendum case(1) (to which a more detailed rcferc:ncc."}}, {"text": "Martin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 247372, "end_char": 247378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Within hs appointed sphere the pr.avincial legislature is as supreme as any other parliament .......... Martin C. J. appears to have disposed of this objection very satisfactorily in his judgment on the reference, and their Lordships find no occasion .", "canonical_name": "Martin C.J."}}, {"text": "Ai Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 248223, "end_char": 248240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Montesque", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 251271, "end_char": 251280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The American political scene in the eighteenth century was dominated by the ideas of Montesque and .", "canonical_name": "Montesquieu"}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 252725, "end_char": 252731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result has been that American decisions on this branch of the law consist lergely of attempts to disguise delegation \"by veiling words\" or \"by\n\ntrening it by a quasi\" (per Holmes J. in Springer v.\n\nGovernment of the Philipine Islands('). ''", "canonical_name": "Holmes"}}, {"text": "Cmhman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 252866, "end_char": 252872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This result\", says a recent writer on the subject, \"is well put in Prof. Cmhman's syllogism-\n\nMajor premise : Legislative power cannot he constitutionally delegated by Congress."}}, {"text": "Bernard Schwartz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 253262, "end_char": 253278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are instead \"administrative\" or \"quasi-legislative\"-(American Administrative Law by Bernard Schwartz, p. 20)."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254122, "end_char": 254131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 254139, "end_char": 254159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254252, "end_char": 254258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "s. 495", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254271, "end_char": 254277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254290, "end_char": 254296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "may be mentioned here that the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 254383, "end_char": 254434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254552, "end_char": 254561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It may be mentioned here that the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "It may be mentioned here that the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254909, "end_char": 254919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It may be mentioned here that the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "It may be mentioned here that the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 254927, "end_char": 254952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255736, "end_char": 255745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 255753, "end_char": 255773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 255842, "end_char": 255852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 255860, "end_char": 255885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256086, "end_char": 256095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256131, "end_char": 256141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Patanfali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 256312, "end_char": 256328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanfali Sastri J.\n\nPatanjali Sastri J.\n\nThat was an appeal by the Government from a judgment of the ma; ority of a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court holding that section 8 and 9 of Act XXII of 1869 were ultra vires the Governor- General in Council as being an unauthorised delegation of legislative power to the• Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "section 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256480, "end_char": 256495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257147, "end_char": 257156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Blackston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 258197, "end_char": 258206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge remarked that this argument was \"sound\", but met it by holding that \"it was clearly intended to restrict the Legislative Council to the exercise of functions which are properly legislative, that is, to the making of laws, which (to use Blackston's expression) are rules of action prescribed by a superior to an inferior or 0£ laws made in furtherance of those rules.", "canonical_name": "Blackstone"}}, {"text": "Garth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 258811, "end_char": 258816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garth C.J. in his dissenting opinion pointed out that \"by the Act of 1833 the legislative powers which were then conferred upon the Governor-General in Council were in the same language, and (for the purposes of the present case) to the same effot, as those given by the Councils Act in 1861; and from the time when that Act was passed, the Governor-General in Council has constantly been in the habit of exercising those powers through the instrumentality of high officials and public bodies, in whom a large discretion has been vested for that purpose.", "canonical_name": "Garth C.J."}}, {"text": "Parliament did in the Councils Act renew the powers which were gien by the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 259756, "end_char": 259834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patanjall Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 260628, "end_char": 260644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjall Sastri J.\n\nCourt was endorsed by their Lordships as the correct approach to the problem, that is to say, the court has to see whether \"what has been done is legislation within the general scope of affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition by which that power is limin:d it is not for any court to inquire further or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions\" (italics mine).", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 263227, "end_char": 263237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee, on behalf of the opposite party, submitted that the remark regarding the incompetency of the Governor-General in Council to create in India a new legislative power had reference to the subordnate agency or instrumentality to which the legislative authority was to' be delegated and thus negatived the legislature's right to delegate."}}, {"text": "ln re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 264980, "end_char": 265010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Their Lordships were of opinion that neither in fixing the time for commencement of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 267324, "end_char": 267415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 269491, "end_char": 269511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Potonjo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 269520, "end_char": 269527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Potonjo/i Sartri J.\n\n(Indian Councils Acts, 1861)."}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 269542, "end_char": 269561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Westminster", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 270624, "end_char": 270635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Holding that the order was a \"law\" made by the Parliament of Canada after Statute of Westminster their Lordships observed : \"Undoubtedly, the law as embodied in an order or regulation is made at the date when the power conferred by the Parliament of the Dominion is exercised."}}, {"text": "Parliament of the Dominion", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 270851, "end_char": 270877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Is it made after that date by the Parliament of the Dominion' That Parliament is the only legislative authority for the Dominion as a whole and it has chosen to make the law through machinery set up and continued by it for that purpose."}}, {"text": "Powell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 272285, "end_char": 272291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was regarded ill Powell's case(2) referred to above as \"laying down the general law\" and as 'putting an end\" to the false doctrine that a subordinate legislature acts as an agent or a delegate."}}, {"text": "North America Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 273067, "end_char": 273090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 273228, "end_char": 273238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "North America Act, 1867", "statute": "North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "Delhi lows Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 273766, "end_char": 273786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pata11jall Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 273794, "end_char": 273811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pata11jall Sastri J.\n\nPatanjali Sastrj J.\n\nheld entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissioners authority to enact regulations relating to taverns; but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity ; t new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastrj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 273816, "end_char": 273832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pata11jall Sastri J.\n\nPatanjali Sastrj J.\n\nheld entitled to entrust to a Board of Commissioners authority to enact regulations relating to taverns; but it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own capacity ; t new legislative power not created by the Act to which it owes its own existence.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "Selborne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 274408, "end_char": 274416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dictum, like the observation of Lord Selborne in Burah's case(2) regarding the power of the Governor-General in Council \"to create in India and arm with general legislative authority a new legislative power,\" to which reference has been made, seems to envisage the unauthorised creation of a new legislature with an independent status as a law-making body, which, for reasons already indicated, is quite different from delegation of legislative power, and my remarks in connection with that observation equally apply here."}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275150, "end_char": 275160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275425, "end_char": 275435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5, 10 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275546, "end_char": 275567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V aradachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 276093, "end_char": 276107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V aradachariar C. J .,", "canonical_name": "V aradachariar"}}, {"text": "Zafrulla Khan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 276126, "end_char": 276139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with whom Zafrulla Khan J. concerned, went elaborately into the whole question of delegation of legislative powers, and while conceding, in view of the Privy Council decisions already referred to, that the Governor- General (whose legislative power in emergencies was co-extensive with that of the Indian Legislature) could not e regarded as a delegate of the Imperial Parliament and that, therefore, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare had no application, nevertheless expressed the opinion that \"there is nothing in the above decisions of their Lordships that can be said to be inconsistent with the principle laid down in the passage from the American authority which the Advocate-General of India proposed to adopt as his own argument.\""}}, {"text": "P.atanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 278099, "end_char": 278116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, it is impossible to deny that the Ordinance-making 10-3 S. C. India/68\n\nP.atanjali Sastri J,\n\nPaton jail Sastrl J,\n\nauthority has wholly evaded the responsibility of laying down any rules or conditions or even enunciating the policy with reference to which cases are .to be assigned to the ordinary criminal courts and to the special courts respectively and left the whole matter to the unguided and uncontrolled action of the executive authorities.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "Paton jail Sastrl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 278121, "end_char": 278138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, it is impossible to deny that the Ordinance-making 10-3 S. C. India/68\n\nP.atanjali Sastri J,\n\nPaton jail Sastrl J,\n\nauthority has wholly evaded the responsibility of laying down any rules or conditions or even enunciating the policy with reference to which cases are .to be assigned to the ordinary criminal courts and to the special courts respectively and left the whole matter to the unguided and uncontrolled action of the executive authorities.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278739, "end_char": 278749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament of Westminster", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 280887, "end_char": 280912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is not, of course, the slightest doubt that the Parliament of Westminster could validly enact that the choice of courts should rest with an executive authority, and their Lordships are unable to discover any valid reason why the same discretion sho.uld not be conferred in India by the law-making authority, whether that authority is the legislature or the Governor-General, as an exercise of the discretion conferred on the authority to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of India."}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 282420, "end_char": 282426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deihl Laws Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 282440, "end_char": 282454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 282786, "end_char": 282796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Deihl Laws Act", "statute": "Deihl Laws Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule\n\nIX", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 282800, "end_char": 282812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Deihl Laws Act", "statute": "Deihl Laws Act"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 283018, "end_char": 283027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Deihl Laws Act", "statute": "Deihl Laws Act"}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 283305, "end_char": 283315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Deihl Laws Act", "statute": "Deihl Laws Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 283319, "end_char": 283361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284320, "end_char": 284330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act", "statute": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule IX", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284334, "end_char": 284345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act", "statute": "Schedule IX of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284660, "end_char": 284669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 284677, "end_char": 284697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284757, "end_char": 284767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 284775, "end_char": 284800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285042, "end_char": 285051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Dominion Legislature of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 285167, "end_char": 285196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was passed by the Dominion Legislature of India, ."}}, {"text": "section 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285247, "end_char": 285260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Indian Independenee Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 285305, "end_char": 285334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285439, "end_char": 285450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947", "statute": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285514, "end_char": 285524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947", "statute": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285775, "end_char": 285787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947", "statute": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285985, "end_char": 285996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947", "statute": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 286012, "end_char": 286022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947", "statute": "The Indian Independenee Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 287870, "end_char": 287880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 287938, "end_char": 287947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 288896, "end_char": 288921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Benoari Lal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 288927, "end_char": 288938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Herc we do not have the advantage of Privy Council decisions bearing on the question as we had in Burah's case(') on the Indian Councils Act, 1861, and Benoari Lal\n\n~I) 5 I.A. 178.", "canonical_name": "Benoari Lal' Sarma"}}, {"text": "Sarmas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 288957, "end_char": 288963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarmas case(1) on the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 288979, "end_char": 289008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 289930, "end_char": 289941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 290284, "end_char": 290295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 290391, "end_char": 290405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 246(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 290478, "end_char": 290492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 290499, "end_char": 290510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 290522, "end_char": 290551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 290853, "end_char": 290878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 290888, "end_char": 290917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 291129, "end_char": 291149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 291282, "end_char": 291293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 291584, "end_char": 291594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 292000, "end_char": 292011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Palan'aji Sastrl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 295453, "end_char": 295469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Without such a doctrine being incorporated in the Constitution and made its structural foundation, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare could have no constitutional status but could only have the force of a political precept to be acted upon by legislatures in a\n\nPalan'aji Sastrl J.\n\nPatan.ia/i Sastri J.\n\ndemocratic policy consisting of elected representatives of the people in the discharge of their function of making laws, but cannot be enforced by the court as a rule of constitutional law when such function is shirked or evaded.", "canonical_name": "Patanjali Sastr;.J."}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 296584, "end_char": 296595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Benoari Lal Sarma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 298896, "end_char": 298913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, it will be useful to recall Lord Selborne's observation in Burah's case that all that the court has to see in adjudging an enactment constitutional is \"that it violates no express condition or restriction by which the law-making power conferred on the legislature is limited, and that it is not for the court to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions,\" and as recently as 1944, the Privy Council, as we have seen in Benoari Lal Sarma's case referred to what has always been regarded as an established doctrine of English constitutional law, namely, that the Indian legislature could do, in the matter of delegating its legislative powers, what the British Parliament could do.", "canonical_name": "Benoari Lal' Sarma"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 299518, "end_char": 299527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 299535, "end_char": 299555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 299557, "end_char": 299566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 299623, "end_char": 299632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "MaluQan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 299823, "end_char": 299830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MaluQan J.\n\nMAHAJAN J.-In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (I) of article 143 of the Constitution the President of India has referred the following questions to this Court for its opinion :-\n\n(I) 'Vas section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or any of the prJJvisions thereof and in what particular or particulars and to what extent ultra vires ."}}, {"text": "article 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 299899, "end_char": 299910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 300034, "end_char": 300043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 300051, "end_char": 300071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 300435, "end_char": 300444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 302948, "end_char": 302956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first question relates to the period \\Vhen the government of this country was unitary in form and was constituted under the Indian Councils Act, 1861, as amended from time to time up to the stage of the introduction of the Morley-Minto Reforms, when the Indian Legislature achieved the status of a political debating society and when as a result of the\n\nundoing of the partition of Bengal the capital of India was transferred from Calcutta to Del11i."}}, {"text": "Del11i", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 302960, "end_char": 302966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first question relates to the period \\Vhen the government of this country was unitary in form and was constituted under the Indian Councils Act, 1861, as amended from time to time up to the stage of the introduction of the Morley-Minto Reforms, when the Indian Legislature achieved the status of a political debating society and when as a result of the\n\nundoing of the partition of Bengal the capital of India was transferred from Calcutta to Del11i."}}, {"text": "26th January\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 303172, "end_char": 303190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act with certain adaptations, remain in force till 26th January\n\n1950, when the new constitution was inaugurated."}}, {"text": "Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 303246, "end_char": 303268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Republic of India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 303917, "end_char": 303934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second question relates to the period when India had attained the status of a dominion under the Indian Independence Act, while the last question concerns the legislative competency of Parliament under the new constitution of the Republic of India."}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 306453, "end_char": 306457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Coke, \"It is so transcendent and absolute as it caniiot be confined either for causes or persons within any bounds,'' or again, as Blackstone put it, \"An act of Parliament is the exercise of ."}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 307929, "end_char": 307942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "jurist, Varadachariar J., expressed in Benoari Lal Sarma's case(2) that the constitutional position in India approximates more closely to the American model than to the English model and on this subject the decisions of the United States so far as they lay down any principle are a valuable guide on this question.", "canonical_name": "V aradachariar"}}, {"text": "[1934] F. 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Burah(') was an appeal from the High Court of Bengal, a reference was made to it and the decision therein was mentioned as laying down an apposite rule for the decision of cases arising under the British North America Act, 1867."}}, {"text": "British North America Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 318317, "end_char": 318348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 318814, "end_char": 318820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An- Act to remove the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of the tribunals established under the General Regulations and Act", "statute": "An- Act to remove the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of the tribunals established under the General Regulations and Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 319496, "end_char": 319502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An- Act to remove the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of the tribunals established 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"section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321294, "end_char": 321303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J aintia Hills", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 321650, "end_char": 321664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification extended all the provisions of the Act to the districts of Khasi and J aintia Hills."}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321787, "end_char": 321796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Council of the Governor-General of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 322121, "end_char": 322161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bengal by a majority judgment held that the notification had no legal force or effeq in removing the said territories from the jurisdiction which the High Court had previously possessed over it, inasmuch as the Council of the Governor-General of India for making laws and regulations had under its constitution, by the Councils Act, 1861, no power to delegate such authority to the."}}, {"text": "Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 322229, "end_char": 322247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 322380, "end_char": 322405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 322431, "end_char": 322441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "The Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 322890, "end_char": 322909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. 67, by section 22, gave the Governor-General in Council power for the purpose of making laws and regulations, power for repealing, amending or altering any laws or regulations whatever then in force or thereafter to be in force and to make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British or native, foreigners or others, and for all courts of justice, whatever, and for all places and things what~ ever within the said territories, and for all servants of the Government of India within the dominions of princes and states, provided always that the said Governor-General in Council shall not have the power Qf making any laws or regulations which shall repeal or in any way affect any of the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 323157, "end_char": 323166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "The Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Maltaja11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 325321, "end_char": 325330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maltaja11 J.\n\nIn re The Delhi l.Aws Act, 1912,\n\netc."}}, {"text": "Aws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 325353, "end_char": 325366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 329710, "end_char": 329724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 330473, "end_char": 330483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Aws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 334016, "end_char": 334029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "MohajanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 334037, "end_char": 334046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MohajanJ.\n\nfor a moment suggest that every time a discretion is entrusted to others there is the transfer of legislative authority."}}, {"text": "Ainslie", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 336113, "end_char": 336120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) I Tay, & Bell, 390,\n\nAinslie J. specifically considered the provisions of section 39 of Act XXIII of 1861 and the meaning of the words \"reservations\", \"limitations\" and \"provisos\" and said as follows :-\n\n\"The provisions of section 39, Act\n\nXXIII of 1861, do not affect my view of this matter."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 336166, "end_char": 336176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 336315, "end_char": 336325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 336572, "end_char": 336599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 337269, "end_char": 337279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 337490, "end_char": 337500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MahajanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 338167, "end_char": 338176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MahajanJ.\n\nMahjlmJ.\n\nproposition that amendment of a statute of the legislature itself is a matter which could form the subject of delegated legislation.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan I."}}, {"text": "Hodge", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 339445, "end_char": 339450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Hodge, was the holder of a liquor licence issued on 25th April, 1881, by the Board of Licence Commissioners for the City of Toronto under the Liquor Licence Act of the Province of Ontario in respect of the St. James Hotel.", "canonical_name": "Hodge"}}, {"text": "25th April, 1881", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 339497, "end_char": 339513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Hodge, was the holder of a liquor licence issued on 25th April, 1881, by the Board of Licence Commissioners for the City of Toronto under the Liquor Licence Act of the Province of Ontario in respect of the St. James Hotel."}}, {"text": "Toronto", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 339569, "end_char": 339576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Hodge, was the holder of a liquor licence issued on 25th April, 1881, by the Board of Licence Commissioners for the City of Toronto under the Liquor Licence Act of the Province of Ontario in respect of the St. James Hotel."}}, {"text": "was also the holder of a licence under the authority of the Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 339672, "end_char": 339745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "7th May, 1881", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 339882, "end_char": 339895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant did on the 7th May, 1881, unlawfully permit and suffer a billiard table to be used and a game of billiards to be played thereon, in his tavern during the time prohibited by the Liquor Licence Act for \"sale of liquor therein."}}, {"text": "Ontario Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 340118, "end_char": 340134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that the Ontario Assembly was not competent to legislate in regard to licences for the sale of liquor and that even if the Ontario legislature could, it could not delegate its power to Licence Commissioners."}}, {"text": "Ontario legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 340232, "end_char": 340251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that the Ontario Assembly was not competent to legislate in regard to licences for the sale of liquor and that even if the Ontario legislature could, it could not delegate its power to Licence Commissioners."}}, {"text": "sections 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 340873, "end_char": 340889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341580, "end_char": 341590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 341775, "end_char": 341785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dee Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 342466, "end_char": 342484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 345512, "end_char": 345522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 346362, "end_char": 346372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347648, "end_char": 347658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Street", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 347818, "end_char": 347824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle underlying Lord Haldane's remarks is thus stated in Street's book on the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, at page 430 -·\n\n\"The decision ."}}, {"text": "British North America Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 348373, "end_char": 348404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 350432, "end_char": 350443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 350738, "end_char": 350740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "George Edwin Gray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 351998, "end_char": 352015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of these cases is In re George Edwin Gray(').", "canonical_name": "George Eduin Gray(2)"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 352039, "end_char": 352048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "War Measures Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 352056, "end_char": 352078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 353612, "end_char": 353619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that Lord Dunedin in Rex v. 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"end_char": 361561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "any opinion on the point; while Indington J. w_as not prepared to subscribe to this view."}}, {"text": "Imperial Parliament:-", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 362142, "end_char": 362163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having examined the Canadian cases on this subject it seems pertinent at this stage to refer to a passage from Street on the Doctrine of Ultra vires, which states the true position of colonial legislatures and appositely brings out the meaning of the language used bv the Privy Council in the cases that the legislatres are not the agents of the Imperial Parliament:-\n\n\"However true it may be that colonial legislatures arc not mere agents of the Imperial Government, it is also true that they are not unfettered principals."}}, {"text": "Imperial Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 362243, "end_char": 362262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having examined the Canadian cases on this subject it seems pertinent at this stage to refer to a passage from Street on the Doctrine of Ultra vires, which states the true position of colonial legislatures and appositely brings out the meaning of the language used bv the Privy Council in the cases that the legislatres are not the agents of the Imperial Parliament:-\n\n\"However true it may be that colonial legislatures arc not mere agents of the Imperial Government, it is also true that they are not unfettered principals."}}, {"text": "Manitoba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 362713, "end_char": 362721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To do anything outside the scope of their constitution, as when the Dominion of Canada established the Province of Manitoba (1), and imperial statute is required."}}, {"text": "S42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 363558, "end_char": 363561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 363610, "end_char": 363624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 364138, "end_char": 364162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court of America, has however, never departed from the doctrine that legislative power cannot be delegated to other branches of government or to independent bodies or even back to the PC?ple."}}, {"text": "S. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367694, "end_char": 367700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367713, "end_char": 367718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 649", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367731, "end_char": 367737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 516", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367750, "end_char": 367756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367769, "end_char": 367775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "re The Delltl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 367806, "end_char": 367834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 369969, "end_char": 369975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1943] F.C.R. 96", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 369982, "end_char": 369998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371875, "end_char": 371881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 742", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371894, "end_char": 371900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 414", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371913, "end_char": 371919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Crawford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 372136, "end_char": 372144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This result has been, in my opinion, very accurately summarized by Crawford in his book on Construction of Statutes .at pages 25, 26 in the following words and represents the present state of constitutional law in that country on this subject :-\n\n\"Legislative power has been delegated, as a general rule, not so often as an effort to break down the triparte theory qf, the separation of powers, but from necessity and fior the sake of convenience."}}, {"text": "Walter Gellhorn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 375243, "end_char": 375258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his second edition on Administrative Law, at p. 110, Walter Gellhorn\n\nstates as follows :-\n\n\"Delegations of powers to alter or mo<lify statutes are, jn effect, nothing more than delgations of the dispensing, suspending or rule-making powers, or a combination thereof.", "canonical_name": "Walt.er Gellhorn"}}, {"text": "Salmond", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 375778, "end_char": 375785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by Prof. Salmond (Jurisprudence\n\n10d1 Edn."}}, {"text": "Rowland Burrow", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 375949, "end_char": 375963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rowland Burrow's Words and Phrases, the word \"modify\" has been defined as meaning \"'vary, extend or enlarge, limit or restrict.\"", "canonical_name": "Rowland Burrows"}}, {"text": "re The Delhi laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 376157, "end_char": 376184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Walt.er Gellhorn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 376922, "end_char": 376938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion, the view taken in American decisions that delegation of authority to modify an Act of the Congress is unconstitutional is fully borne out by the meaning of the expression \"modify\" though this view is not liked by Walt.er Gellhorn.", "canonical_name": "Walt.er Gellhorn"}}, {"text": "Baker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 377000, "end_char": 377005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Before concluding, it is opposite to quot.e a passage from Baker's Fundamental Law which states the principle on which the American decisions are based and which coincides with my own opinions in respect of those decisions."}}, {"text": "sections 51 and 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 379180, "end_char": 379198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 379382, "end_char": 379392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 379418, "end_char": 379429, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 379679, "end_char": 379689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 380557, "end_char": 380571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "O'Connor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 380977, "end_char": 380985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O'Connor J. said as follows:- \"Power is given in section 51 in respect of trade and commerce with other countries on taxation and there is also power to make laws incidental to the exercise of any power vested in Parliament.", "canonical_name": "O'Connor"}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 381026, "end_char": 381036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Higgins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 381565, "end_char": 381572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Higgins J. said :- \"According to my view, there is not here in fact any delegation of the law-making power.\""}}, {"text": "Dixon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 382068, "end_char": 382073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roche v. Kronheimer(' ), decided in the year 1921, was argued by Dixon (as he then was).", "canonical_name": "Dixon"}}, {"text": "question in that case concerned the validity of the Treaty of Peace Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 382096, "end_char": 382173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382184, "end_char": 382193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The question in that case concerned the validity of the Treaty of Peace Act, 1919", "statute": "The question in that case concerned the validity of the Treaty of Peace Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 383931, "end_char": 383941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 384852, "end_char": 384861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Waterside workers' Federation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 385314, "end_char": 385343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants in that case were informed that they were guilty of an offence against the Waterside Employm\"llt rights, picking up for work as a waterside worker at Melbournea person not a member of the Waterside workers' Federation, while transport workers who were members of the Federation were available for being picked up for the work at the said port."}}, {"text": "s. 394", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388804, "end_char": 388810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Deihl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 388826, "end_char": 388846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 392630, "end_char": 392659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392743, "end_char": 392753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Schedule IX", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392757, "end_char": 392768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 393294, "end_char": 393301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19S1\n\nMahajan!.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan I."}}, {"text": "sections 51 and 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393418, "end_char": 393436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 394623, "end_char": 394632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 394640, "end_char": 394667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Legislature constituted under the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 395578, "end_char": 395644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd January, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 396046, "end_char": 396063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conviction of fifteen individuals made by a special magistrate purporting to act under Ordinance II of 1942, promulgated by the Governor-General on the 2nd January, 1942, was set aside by a special Bench of the High Court at Calcutta and this decision was affirmed by the majority of the Federal Court of India."}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 396105, "end_char": 396127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conviction of fifteen individuals made by a special magistrate purporting to act under Ordinance II of 1942, promulgated by the Governor-General on the 2nd January, 1942, was set aside by a special Bench of the High Court at Calcutta and this decision was affirmed by the majority of the Federal Court of India."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 396497, "end_char": 396506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Legislature constituted under the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Legislature constituted under the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 161", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 397275, "end_char": 397292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "re The De h Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 397304, "end_char": 397330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule IX", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 397755, "end_char": 397766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sl\n\nIn re The De h Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Sl\n\nIn re The De h Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "s. 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 398124, "end_char": 398130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sl\n\nIn re The De h Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Sl\n\nIn re The De h Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Khundkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 398958, "end_char": 398966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships are in entire agreement with the view of the Chief Justice of Bengal and of Khundkar J. on this part of the case."}}, {"text": "Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 400151, "end_char": 400194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400218, "end_char": 400227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "statute": "The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 400431, "end_char": 400457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification.\""}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislative Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 400479, "end_char": 400504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification.\""}}, {"text": "11th March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 400718, "end_char": 400734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ment on the 11th March, 1948, extended by notification the life of the Act by one year."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400845, "end_char": 400854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "statute": "The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Benoari Lal' Sarma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 401071, "end_char": 401089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Privy Council in Benoari Lal' Sarma's case(2) I held the proviso void.", "canonical_name": "Benoari Lal' Sarma"}}, {"text": "(1949) F.C.R. 595", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 401389, "end_char": 401406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1945) F.C.R. 16", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 401413, "end_char": 401429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "re The Delhi lAws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 401435, "end_char": 401462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 403436, "end_char": 403465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 405822, "end_char": 405836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "MahajanJ.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 405845, "end_char": 405854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MahajanJ.\n\n19SI\n\nMahajan/.\n\nwhich I was a party.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan I."}}, {"text": "S9S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 407735, "end_char": 407738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1943] F.C.R. 96", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 409798, "end_char": 409814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 409827, "end_char": 409833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MahajanJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 409875, "end_char": 409884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MahajanJ.\n\nexercise of all power inasmuch as it is necessary to delegate for the proper discharge of all these three public duties.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan I."}}, {"text": "John Salmond", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 412170, "end_char": 412182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Sir John Salmond; \"In general, indeed, the power of legislation is far too important to be committed to any person or body of persons save the incorporate community itself.", "canonical_name": "John Salmond"}}, {"text": "Jn re The Delhi Lllws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 414298, "end_char": 414329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 415506, "end_char": 415525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is now convenient to examine the provisions of our Constitution in order to appreciate the contention of the learned Attorney-General that it has been modelled on the British system and that the Parliament of India is as omnipotent as in England and that in the matter of delegation of legislative power it is in an analogous situation."}}, {"text": "its main scheme it follows the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 415772, "end_char": 415832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "MahafanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 418665, "end_char": 418674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Can it be argued with any reason that by delegation Parliament can arm a State legislature with the law-making power on the subject of defence and that a State legisla_ture can arm Parliament with\n\n19Sl\n\nMahafanJ.\n\n19SI\n\ntc.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan I."}}, {"text": "Article 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 419740, "end_char": 419750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 53(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420500, "end_char": 420513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420606, "end_char": 420617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 420623, "end_char": 420633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421075, "end_char": 421085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 107 to 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421345, "end_char": 421364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421767, "end_char": 421778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 421941, "end_char": 421952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 422152, "end_char": 422163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Coun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 422229, "end_char": 422241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In article 140 provision has been made under which Parliament can confer on the Supreme Coun such supplemental powers as may appear to be necessary for the purpose of enabling the court more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by or under this Conititution."}}, {"text": "article 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 422747, "end_char": 422758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 422835, "end_char": 422849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "article 140 bestowing authority on Parliament for conferment of ancillary powers on the Supreme\n\nCourt Parliament obviously had authority to legislate on \"Supreme Coun\" as it is one of the subjects in the Union List."}}, {"text": "Article 145(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 422964, "end_char": 422978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maliajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 423049, "end_char": 423057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maliajan J.\n\netc."}}, {"text": "article 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423750, "end_char": 423761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423829, "end_char": 423840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 243", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423845, "end_char": 423856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423994, "end_char": 424008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 245 and 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424252, "end_char": 424272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424366, "end_char": 424377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424465, "end_char": 424476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424678, "end_char": 424689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 424962, "end_char": 424973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 349", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425334, "end_char": 425345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425432, "end_char": 425443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426150, "end_char": 426161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426442, "end_char": 426453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426517, "end_char": 426528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427468, "end_char": 427484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "scheme of the Constitution and of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 429174, "end_char": 429241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 430367, "end_char": 430396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 430813, "end_char": 430827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution therefore has made ample provision indicating bodies who would be competent to make laws for the State of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 431269, "end_char": 431298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 431331, "end_char": 431360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 431422, "end_char": 431437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1943] F.C.R. 96", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 431798, "end_char": 431814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "re The Delhi LllwJ Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 431826, "end_char": 431854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahoj1111", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 431863, "end_char": 431872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahoj1111 J.\n\n1.951\n\n11'.re The De/hi laws Act, l9!2, etc ...\n\nMahajan."}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 432688, "end_char": 432711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 432715, "end_char": 432724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Independence Act", "statute": "Indian Independence Act"}}, {"text": "Dominion Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 432768, "end_char": 432787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe Indian Independence Act by section 6 co11ferred the power of legislation on the Dominion Parliament within the ambit of the Act of 1935."}}, {"text": "Ajmer-MerWara Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 433238, "end_char": 433261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Before the Charter Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 433453, "end_char": 433475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Macaulay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 433733, "end_char": 433741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Macaulay was added as a legislative member to the executive council without a right to vote."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434244, "end_char": 434254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before the Charter Act", "statute": "Before the Charter Act"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434339, "end_char": 434349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before the Charter Act", "statute": "Before the Charter Act"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434500, "end_char": 434510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434513, "end_char": 434523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434571, "end_char": 434581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434658, "end_char": 434668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 435406, "end_char": 435431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "19.Sl", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 436207, "end_char": 436212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19.Sl\n\nMa/lajan /.\n\netc."}}, {"text": "section 5(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437409, "end_char": 437421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Scheduled Districts Act, 1874", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 437445, "end_char": 437474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437851, "end_char": 437860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874", "statute": "the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437925, "end_char": 437934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874", "statute": "the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874"}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438241, "end_char": 438247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874", "statute": "the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438545, "end_char": 438554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "second instance cited is of the Burma Laws Act, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 438583, "end_char": 438635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438641, "end_char": 438651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The second instance cited is of the Burma Laws Act, 1898", "statute": "The second instance cited is of the Burma Laws Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 439160, "end_char": 439169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The second instance cited is of the Burma Laws Act, 1898", "statute": "The second instance cited is of the Burma Laws Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 439249, "end_char": 439258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The second instance cited is of the Burma Laws Act, 1898", "statute": "The second instance cited is of the Burma Laws Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "Burma Laws Act, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 439266, "end_char": 439286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Both these important things are lacking in the Delhi Laws Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 439447, "end_char": 439508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 68 and 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 439797, "end_char": 439815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both these important things are lacking in the Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Both these important things are lacking in the Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "Inland Steam Vessels Act, 1917", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 439823, "end_char": 439853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 439856, "end_char": 439866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Inland Steam Vessels Act, 1917", "statute": "the Inland Steam Vessels Act, 1917"}}, {"text": "This certainly is no instance of the kind of legislation contained in the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 439940, "end_char": 440034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 440036, "end_char": 440045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This certainly is no instance of the kind of legislation contained in the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "This certainly is no instance of the kind of legislation contained in the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 440085, "end_char": 440095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This certainly is no instance of the kind of legislation contained in the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "This certainly is no instance of the kind of legislation contained in the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "next instance mentioned was the Cantonments Act, 1924", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 440183, "end_char": 440236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 440242, "end_char": 440251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next instance mentioned was the Cantonments Act, 1924", "statute": "The next instance mentioned was the Cantonments Act, 1924"}}, {"text": "Ma11ajanJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 440435, "end_char": 440445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J.\n\nMa11ajanJ.\n\nwhole or any.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan I."}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 440651, "end_char": 440661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The next instance mentioned was the Cantonments Act, 1924", "statute": "The next instance mentioned was the Cantonments Act, 1924"}}, {"text": "Petroleum Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 440669, "end_char": 440688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 441160, "end_char": 441180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 441364, "end_char": 441391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel appearing for the Government of Uttar Pradesh submitted a note in which an instance is mentioned of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, III of 1901, which in section 1 of subsection (2) provided that the State Government may by notification extend the whole or any part of this Act to all or any of the areas so excepted subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 441504, "end_char": 441513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 441968, "end_char": 441984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 442062, "end_char": 442072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Aircraft Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 442242, "end_char": 442254, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Two instances in this list are from the Airforce Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 442379, "end_char": 442437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 442580, "end_char": 442641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443007, "end_char": 443016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920", "statute": "The last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443045, "end_char": 443054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920", "statute": "The last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443203, "end_char": 443212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920", "statute": "The last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "Garo Hills", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 443280, "end_char": 443290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act XXII of 1869 was enacted to remove the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of tribunals established under the General Regulations."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443404, "end_char": 443413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920", "statute": "The last instance cited is from the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 443721, "end_char": 443730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 444178, "end_char": 444187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 444540, "end_char": 444542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MalzaianJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 444545, "end_char": 444555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MalzaianJ.\n\nIn re The Delhi laws Act, 1912,\n\netc."}}, {"text": "re The Delhi laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 444560, "end_char": 444587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 446330, "end_char": 446339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 446701, "end_char": 446710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 446718, "end_char": 446738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 447829, "end_char": 447838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No schedule was annexed to the Act of the enactments that were in force in any part in British India at the date of the passing of the Act", "statute": "No schedule was annexed to the Act of the enactments that were in force in any part in British India at the date of the passing of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449488, "end_char": 449497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449779, "end_char": 449788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449945, "end_char": 449954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 450089, "end_char": 450114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 450258, "end_char": 450283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 451034, "end_char": 451043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 451325, "end_char": 451334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 451532, "end_char": 451541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ajmer- Merwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 451763, "end_char": 451777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It says :\n\n''The Central Government may by notification in the official gazette extend to the province of Ajmer- Merwara with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in any other provmce at the date of such notification\"\n\nFor the reasons given for holding that sedion 7 of the Delhi Laws Act is ultra vires the constitution in two particulars, this section also is ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935, in those particular."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 452083, "end_char": 452112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 452958, "end_char": 452974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahajan I.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 453036, "end_char": 453046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan I.\n\nextended under cover oi this section to Ajmer-Mcrwara and under the power of modification by amending the ddinition of the word 'debtor' the whole policy of the Bombay Act has been altered.", "canonical_name": "Mahajan I."}}, {"text": "Timbuctoo", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 454100, "end_char": 454109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly stated, the question Is, could the Indian legislature under the Act of 1935 enact that the executive could extend to Delhi laws that may be made hereinafter by a legislature in Timbuctoo or Soviet Russia with modifications."}}, {"text": "Soviet Russia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 454113, "end_char": 454126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly stated, the question Is, could the Indian legislature under the Act of 1935 enact that the executive could extend to Delhi laws that may be made hereinafter by a legislature in Timbuctoo or Soviet Russia with modifications."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 454586, "end_char": 454595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andaman", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 454778, "end_char": 454785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third question concerns section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, which provides that-\n\n\"The Central Government may by notification in the official gazette extend to any Part C State (other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nlcobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restrictions or modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\""}}, {"text": "Nlcobar Islands", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 454790, "end_char": 454805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third question concerns section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, which provides that-\n\n\"The Central Government may by notification in the official gazette extend to any Part C State (other than Coorg and the Andaman and Nlcobar Islands) or to any part of such State, with such restrictions or modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.\""}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 456521, "end_char": 456541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukherjea/.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 456605, "end_char": 456616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuKHERJEA J.-This is a reference made by the Mukherjea/.\n\nPresident of India, under article 143(1) of the Constitution, inviting this court to consider and report to him its opinion on the three following questions :-\n\n( 1) Was section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or - any of the provisions thereof, and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which passed the said Act ?", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "article 143(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 456644, "end_char": 456658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 456788, "end_char": 456797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 456805, "end_char": 456825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 457187, "end_char": 457196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "re The Ddhl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 457287, "end_char": 457313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 457399, "end_char": 457409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mu/ch.erjea J.\n\nparticular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires\n\nthe Parliament ?"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 457662, "end_char": 457671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In re The Ddhl Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "In re The Ddhl Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 457679, "end_char": 457722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Provincial Legislature", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 457740, "end_char": 457768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to have arisen from the fact that because of the decision of the Federal Court in /atindra Nath Gupta V• The Province of Bihar('), which held the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, ultra vires the Bihar Provincial Legislature, by reason of its amounting to a delegation of its legislative powers to an extraneous authority, doubts have arisen regarding the validity of the three legislative provisions mentioned above, the legafity of the first and the second being actually called in question in certain judicial proceedings which are pending before some of the High Courts in India."}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 458133, "end_char": 458153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Visions of the group of statutes known as Indian Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 458382, "end_char": 458443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17th of September, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 458485, "end_char": 458508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi, which up till the 17th of September, 1912, w:ts a part of the province of the Punjab, was created a Chief Commissioner's Province on that date and on the following date the Governor-General's Legislative Council enacted the Delhi Laws Act (Act XIII) 1912 which came into force on and from the 1st of October, 1912."}}, {"text": "Legislative Council enacted the Delhi Laws Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 458659, "end_char": 458705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st of October, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 458760, "end_char": 458780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi, which up till the 17th of September, 1912, w:ts a part of the province of the Punjab, was created a Chief Commissioner's Province on that date and on the following date the Governor-General's Legislative Council enacted the Delhi Laws Act (Act XIII) 1912 which came into force on and from the 1st of October, 1912."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 458783, "end_char": 458792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative Council enacted the Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Legislative Council enacted the Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "Legislature of India under the provisions of the Government of Indian Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 459283, "end_char": 459362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 459420, "end_char": 459429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislature of India under the provisions of the Government of Indian Act, 1935", "statute": "Legislature of India under the provisions of the Government of Indian Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 459912, "end_char": 459921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislature of India under the provisions of the Government of Indian Act, 1935", "statute": "Legislature of India under the provisions of the Government of Indian Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Andaman and . Nicobar Islands", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 460163, "end_char": 460192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Andaman and ."}}, {"text": "Edward Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 463221, "end_char": 463232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another principle is also called in to aid in support of the rule, which is expressed in the wellknown maxim of Private Law, \"delegatus non potest delegare\", the authority for the same, being based on one of the dicta of Sir Edward Coke.", "canonical_name": "Edward Coke(1"}}, {"text": "Story", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 464953, "end_char": 464958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Story said{8)-\n\n\"But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of Government and maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense."}}, {"text": "S. 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 465366, "end_char": 465372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 525", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 465482, "end_char": 465488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dellri Lows Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 465500, "end_char": 465515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Muklerjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 465530, "end_char": 465539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muklerjea I.\n\nMukherjea J.\n\nthe other, in the slightest degree.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Willis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 466225, "end_char": 466231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Willis, the disability of the Congress to delegate its legislative powers to the executive, purports to be based upon the doctrine of separation of powers ; while its incapacity to bestow its authority upon an 'independent body like a Board or Commission is said to rest on the maxim delegatur non potest delegare(' )·\n\nAs said above, a considerable amount of flexibility was allowed in the practical applicafion of these theories even from early times.", "canonical_name": "Willis"}}, {"text": "article 53(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 469201, "end_char": 469214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 469653, "end_char": 469659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Muklrerfea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 469804, "end_char": 469814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muklrerfea J.\n\nMinisters, and this Council of Ministers, like the British Camnet, is a \"hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the State to the executive part\".", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Delhi Act XIII of 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 470115, "end_char": 470137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Executive Council of the Govemor- General", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 470305, "end_char": 470346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was the Executive Council of the Govemor- General which together with sixty additional members, of whom 33 were nominated, constituted the Govemor- General' s Legislative Oxmcil and had powers to legislate for the whole of ."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 470773, "end_char": 470802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Locke", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 472569, "end_char": 472574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This theory once popularised by _Locke and eulogized , by early American writers is not much in favour in modern times."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 472977, "end_char": 472986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 473236, "end_char": 473245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Burah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 473572, "end_char": 473577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The majority of the Judges of the Calcutta High Court upheld the contention of the respondent, Burah, that the authority conferred on the Lieutenant-Governor to extend the Act in this way was in excess of the powers of the Governor-General in Council, and 'in support of this view, one of the learned Judges relied inter alia upon the principles of the law of agency.", "canonical_name": "Burah"}}, {"text": "Mukher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 474076, "end_char": 474082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukher/ea J.\n\n\"The Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can, of course, do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe these powers.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Edward Coke(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 476131, "end_char": 476144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Edward Coke(1), \"the Power and jurisdiction of Parliament is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds..................\n\nIt hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, abrogating, repealing, reviving and expounding of laws .................. this being the place where that absolute despotic power which must in all governments reside somewhere is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms.\"", "canonical_name": "Edward Coke(1"}}, {"text": "Legislative Council of British India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 477104, "end_char": 477140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The British Parliament cannot only legislate on any subject it likes and alter or repeal any law it likes, but being both \"a legislative and a constituent assembly\", it can change and modify the so-called constitutional laws and they can be changed by the same body and in the same manner as ordinary laws ; and no act of the Parliament can be held to be unconstitutional in a British Court of Law.(2)\n\nThis sovereign character was not, and could not be, predicated of the Legislative Council of British India as it was constituted under the Indian Councils Act, even though it had very wide powers of legislation and within the scope of its authority could pass laws as important as those passed by the British Parla ment( 3)."}}, {"text": "Dieey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 478214, "end_char": 478219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) See Dieey's Law of the Consitution, p. 99 (9th Edition)."}}, {"text": "MMkherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 478274, "end_char": 478283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MMkherjea J.\n\n1\"1\n\nIa,.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 478682, "end_char": 478696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "legislative power by the British Parliament is not and cannot be a constitutional question at all in the United Kingdom, for the Parliament being the omnipotent sovereign is legally competent to do any thing it likes and no objection to the constitutionality of its acts can be raised in a court of law."}}, {"text": "Articles 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 480509, "end_char": 480521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 480548, "end_char": 480559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 213", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 480597, "end_char": 480608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 481653, "end_char": 481664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vide Crawford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 482592, "end_char": 482605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representatives of the people are\n\n( 1) Vide Crawford's Statutory Construction, p. 334 ..\n\n(') Baker's Fundamental Laws, Vol."}}, {"text": "Mukheriea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 482746, "end_char": 482755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukheriea J.\n\n/11r~ Te De/i lAws Act, 1912,\n\netc.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Aws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 482775, "end_char": 482788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukherjeo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 482799, "end_char": 482808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ Mukherjeo J.\n\nrequired to exercise wise discretion and a sound judgment, having due regard for the purposes and the needs of the executive and judicial department, the ability of the taxpayer to respond and the general public welfare.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 483795, "end_char": 483820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Acts and under the Indian Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 484178, "end_char": 484216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 484529, "end_char": 484539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts and under the Indian Councils Act", "statute": "Acts and under the Indian Councils Act"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 484709, "end_char": 484719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts and under the Indian Councils Act", "statute": "Acts and under the Indian Councils Act"}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 485110, "end_char": 485120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acts and under the Indian Councils Act", "statute": "Acts and under the Indian Councils Act"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 485262, "end_char": 485271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Indian Legislature", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 488977, "end_char": 488996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .Indian Legislature, or for the matter of that the Colonial Parliament .could, of course, do nothing beyond the limits\n\n{') Per O'Connor J. in Baxter v. All Way 8 C.L, R. 626 at 637."}}, {"text": "Colonial Parliament", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 489028, "end_char": 489047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .Indian Legislature, or for the matter of that the Colonial Parliament .could, of course, do nothing beyond the limits\n\n{') Per O'Connor J. in Baxter v. All Way 8 C.L, R. 626 at 637."}}, {"text": "Jus&ce Mukby", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 489761, "end_char": 489773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view of Mr. Jus&ce Mukby was held to be wrong hy the Privy Council in the observations mentioned above and as regards the first and the main point the Jucficial Committee pointed out that the majority of the Judges of the High Court laboured under a mistaken view of the nature and principles of legislation, for as a matter of fact nothing like delegation of legislation was attempted in the case at all."}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 491360, "end_char": 491374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Muklieriea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 491436, "end_char": 491446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muklieriea J.\n\nSUPREME COUllT REPO.RTS [1951]\n\nexpressed by Rand J. of the Supreme Court of Canada while the learned Judge was speaking about the essential character of.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Rand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 491496, "end_char": 491500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muklieriea J.\n\nSUPREME COUllT REPO.RTS [1951]\n\nexpressed by Rand J. of the Supreme Court of Canada while the learned Judge was speaking about the essential character of."}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 493091, "end_char": 493101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 495760, "end_char": 495774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukher}ea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 495782, "end_char": 495791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukher}ea J.\n\nIn re The Delhi laws Act, 1912,\n\netc.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "re The Delhi laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 495799, "end_char": 495826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mwkherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 495835, "end_char": 495844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mwkherjea J,\n\nthese decisions and none could possibly be expected in view of the fact that the pronouncements emanate from Judges in different countries acting under the influence of their respective traditional theories and the weight of opinion of their own courts on the subject.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "O'Conner", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 497542, "end_char": 497550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aim of all legislation\", said O'Conner J. in Baxter v. Ah Way(') \"is to project their minds as far as possible into the future and to provide in terms as general as possible for all contingencies likely to arise in the application of the law.", "canonical_name": "O'Connor"}}, {"text": "s1J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 497789, "end_char": 497792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tire Delh Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 504315, "end_char": 504339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 504376, "end_char": 504390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 506591, "end_char": 506596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hughes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 507383, "end_char": 507389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Panama Refining Co. v.\n\nRyan(2) Chief Justice Hughes very clearly stated \"that the Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is invested.\" \"", "canonical_name": "Hughes"}}, {"text": "section 9(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 507786, "end_char": 507798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508268, "end_char": 508277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schechter Poultry Corporation(3)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 508538, "end_char": 508570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is interesting to note that in the latter case of Schechter Poultry Corporation(3), where the legislative power w~~ held to b~ unconstitutionally delegated by the prov1s1on of section 3 of the National Industrial\n\n( 1) Vide J. w. Hampton v. U.S. 276 U.s."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508664, "end_char": 508673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 276", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508731, "end_char": 508737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 394", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508740, "end_char": 508746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508758, "end_char": 508764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 495", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508776, "end_char": 508782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 508791, "end_char": 508800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "495,\n\nCiC.\n\nMukherjee, J.\n\nMukherjea J,\n\nRecovery Act of 1933 as no definite standard was set up or indicated by the legislature, Cardozo J. agreed with the opinion of the Court and held that the delegated power of legislation which had found expression\n\nin that Code was not canalised within banks but was unconfined and vagrant. \"", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "S. 126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510880, "end_char": 510886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 414", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510918, "end_char": 510924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510995, "end_char": 511000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MukherjeQ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 513185, "end_char": 513194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MukherjeQ J.\n\nequal clearness\"(').", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Davey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 516253, "end_char": 516258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be pertinent to note that Davey, Q.C., who appeared for the Crown in support of the judgment appealed against, did not contend before the Privy Council that the Ontario legislature had full rights of delegation like the British Parliamentary and consequently its acts could not be challenged as unconstitutional."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of New South Wales", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 517114, "end_char": 517146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That case came up on appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and the question arose whether section 133 of\n\n(!)"}}, {"text": "section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517178, "end_char": 517189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukhe1jea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 517237, "end_char": 517246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17-3 S. C. India/68\n\nMukhe1jea J.\n\n19$1\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912 etc.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea I.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 517294, "end_char": 517306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea I.\n\nthe Customs Regulation Act of 1879 of the Colony, was or was not ultra vires .", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Dominion War Measures Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 518609, "end_char": 518640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dominion Parliament of Canada", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 518656, "end_char": 518685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Dominion War Measures Act, 1914, passed by the Dominion Parliament of Canada empowered the Governor-General to make \"such regulations as he may, by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war ........ deem necessary Or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada\"; and the question arose• whether such transfer of power was permitted by the British North America Act."}}, {"text": "S7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 519364, "end_char": 519366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Dominion War Measures Act, 1914", "statute": "The Dominion War Measures Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Anglin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 519522, "end_char": 519528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under consideration would impose any limitation on the authority of the Parliament of Canada to which the Imperial Parliament was not subject Anglin J. referred to the decision in Hodge v. The Queen(1) (supra) in the course of his judgment."}}, {"text": "seemed to think that the British North America Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 519624, "end_char": 519674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Idington", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 520273, "end_char": 520281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Idington and Brodeur JJ."}}, {"text": "Brodeur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 520286, "end_char": 520293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Idington and Brodeur JJ."}}, {"text": "Munitions and Supply Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 520790, "end_char": 520814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 523253, "end_char": 523263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 525107, "end_char": 525117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harvey C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 525554, "end_char": 525565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court of Appeal held the provision to be ultra vires as it constituted an unwarranted delegation of legislative authority to the Lieutenant-Governor Harvey C.J. after quoting a passage from the judg ment of the Privy Council in Hodge v. The Queen (supra), observed as follows ;-\n\n{I) (1937) 3 O.L.R .365."}}, {"text": "MukherJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 525793, "end_char": 525800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MukherJ<a J.\n\n\"It is apparent that the authority to make regu.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "Gray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 526126, "end_char": 526130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring next to the case of In re Gray, the learned Judge further observed.:-\n\n\"It is urged that ."}}, {"text": "section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 526619, "end_char": 526629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British Columbia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 527326, "end_char": 527342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Natural Products Marketing Act, which was passed by the legislature of British Columbia conferred upon the Lieutenant.-Governor in Council the power ."}}, {"text": "Manson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 527631, "end_char": 527637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manson J. declared the impugned provision to be ultr11 llires but his decision was set aside by the Court of Appeal."}}, {"text": "Martin C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 528074, "end_char": 528085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Council because it passed only the skeleton of an Act leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to clothe it with flesh and blood and thereby abdicating its function was repelled by the appellate court and Martin C.J. obstirved : \"the answer to the .submission depends upon the language .", "canonical_name": "Martin C.J."}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 529781, "end_char": 529798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 529939, "end_char": 529959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 531667, "end_char": 531676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transport Workers Act, 1928", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 531684, "end_char": 531711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cpurt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 532811, "end_char": 532816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was actually decided on the authority of a prior decision of the Cpurt in Roche v. Kronheimer(1) • There are observations of diverse character in the judgment of the learned Judges, though all of them concurred in holding that the case was concluded by earlier authorities."}}, {"text": "Tiie Delhi LllWI Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 534163, "end_char": 534189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Muklierjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 534196, "end_char": 534206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muklierjea J.\n\nMukherjea /.\n\nthe subject-matter may be, if it docs not fall outside the boundaries of Federal power.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 534731, "end_char": 534741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tiie Delhi LllWI Act, 1912", "statute": "Tiie Delhi LllWI Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 538217, "end_char": 538226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 538530, "end_char": 538541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Qws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 538588, "end_char": 538601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukherje11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 538609, "end_char": 538619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherje11 J,\n\nIn re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912,\n\netc.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea I."}}, {"text": "17th 0£ September, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 538880, "end_char": 538903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been stated already, Delhi, which was a part of the Province of Punjab, was detached from the latter and became, as the Imperial enclave, a separate province by a notification issued on the 17th 0£ September, 1912."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 539000, "end_char": 539009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qws Act, 1912", "statute": "Qws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 539036, "end_char": 539045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qws Act, 1912", "statute": "Qws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 540383, "end_char": 540393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 540399, "end_char": 540424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 541459, "end_char": 541465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems, therefore, that the legislative powers given to the Governor-General's Legislative Council were couched in the widest language possible, and as no specific subject-matter of legislation was mentioned legislation could extend to all subjects touching any person, place or thing within the Indian territory."}}, 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J. in Wayman v. 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Ryan(1) in which the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 passed during the administration of President Roosevelt was assailed on the ground of unconstitutionality."}}, {"text": "section 9(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 596351, "end_char": 596363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 596368, "end_char": 596377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 596957, "end_char": 596963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 1 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 597802, "end_char": 597818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 597930, "end_char": 597939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Agricultural Marketing Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 598371, "end_char": 598403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 598938, "end_char": 598944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Marketing Act, 1937", "statute": "Agricultural Marketing Act, 1937"}}, {"text": "S.126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 598978, "end_char": 598983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Marketing Act, 1937", "statute": "Agricultural Marketing Act, 1937"}}, {"text": "S. 414", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 599010, "end_char": 599016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Marketing Act, 1937", "statute": "Agricultural Marketing Act, 1937"}}, {"text": "Stone", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 599101, "end_char": 599106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the former, Stone J. conceded at page 145 that although fact finding often was a step in the legislative process it could nevertheless be left by the Congress to administrative officers or boards whose aid could be resorted to by Congress."}}, {"text": "Government of Philippine lslands(1)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 599387, "end_char": 599422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Holmes J. in his dissenting judgment in Springer v.\n\nThe Government of Philippine lslands(1) said:-\n\n\"It is said that the powers of Congress cannot be delegated, yet the Congress has established the Interstate Commerce Commission, which does legislative,- judicial and xecutive acts, only softened by a quasi \"\n\nThe learned Judge then concluded :-\n\n\"It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may."}}, {"text": "S.189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 600946, "end_char": 600951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "E. S.\n\nCorwin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 601431, "end_char": 601444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(E. S.\n\nCorwin, The Constitution and what it means to-day) High authority tells him that the Supreme Court of the United States has not treated the separation oi powers as a technical legal doctrine, that the doctrine was not intended to divide the branches into water-tight compartments, and that your country has achieved the control of navigation, the regulation of rail road rates, the administration of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, the allocation of wave lengths and so forth by refusing to be the slave of a sterile dogma. ("}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 601523, "end_char": 601557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(E. S.\n\nCorwin, The Constitution and what it means to-day) High authority tells him that the Supreme Court of the United States has not treated the separation oi powers as a technical legal doctrine, that the doctrine was not intended to divide the branches into water-tight compartments, and that your country has achieved the control of navigation, the regulation of rail road rates, the administration of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, the allocation of wave lengths and so forth by refusing to be the slave of a sterile dogma. ("}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 601960, "end_char": 601971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frankfurter : The Public and its Government, page 76)."}}, {"text": "S. 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 603047, "end_char": 603053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Elihu Root", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 603448, "end_char": 603458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The extent of delegation had, indeed, become so great that Elihu Root could conclude in 1916 that, because of the rise of the administrative process, \"the old doctrine of prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has virtually retired from the field and given up the fight.\""}}, {"text": "LLamar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 607150, "end_char": 607156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus the doctrine against delegation came to be confined to \"strictly and exclusively\" (per Marshall C.J.) or \"purely\" (per Day J.) or \"essential\" (pcr- Hughes C. J.) legislative power and the rest of the content of the legislative power were permitted to be delegated under the pretence that they were not really legislative power but were only power \"to fill up the\n\ndetails\" (per Marshall C. J.), or \"to ascertain and declare facts\" (per Harlan J.), or were only \"administrative powers to make rules and regulations\" (per- LLamar J. and Hughes C.J.), or \"minor matters\" (per Lamar J.).", "canonical_name": "LLamar"}}, {"text": "re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 609155, "end_char": 609182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl 1912", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 609224, "end_char": 609231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "In re The Deihl Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 610421, "end_char": 610430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Panama Refining Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 610536, "end_char": 610555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The elaborate formulation of policy purported to be made by Congress in section 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act did not t appear to the American Supreme Court which decided the Panama Refining Co.'s case to be sufficient laying down of policy so as to be constitutional whereas, as will be seen hereinafter, the mere enumeration of the different subjects with respect to which the Governor-General was given power to make rules by the Canadian Parliament in the War Measures Act, 1914, and 'by the Australian Parliament in the National Security Act, 1939, for the defence and effectual prosecution of the war, without laying down any specific policy with regard to any of those subjects, was accepted as perfectly constitutional\n\nI now pass on to the law-making power of the legislatures established by , or under the authority of the British Parliament."}}, {"text": "Australian Parliament in the National Security Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 610857, "end_char": 610913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "relevant provisions of the British North America Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 611393, "end_char": 611451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 611485, "end_char": 611494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The relevant provisions of the British North America Act, 1867", "statute": "The relevant provisions of the British North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 611617, "end_char": 611627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The relevant provisions of the British North America Act, 1867", "statute": "The relevant provisions of the British North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 611760, "end_char": 611770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The relevant provisions of the British North America Act, 1867", "statute": "The relevant provisions of the British North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "Nova Scotia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 611920, "end_char": 611931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 96; 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Eyre( 2 ) in which the powers of the legislature of Jamaica to pass an Indemnity Act after the Rebellion of 1865 came into question, Willes J., after quoting the above passage from the judgment of Baron Park, observed at page 20 :-\n\n\"We are satisfied that it is sound law, and that a confirmed Act of the local legislature lawfully constituted, whether in a settled, or conquered colony, has, as ro matters within its competence and the limits of its jurisdiction, the operation and force of sovereign\n\nCl> (1841)4 Moo.", "canonical_name": "Willis"}}, {"text": "Baron Park", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 619146, "end_char": 619156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Phillips v. 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("}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 621436, "end_char": 621445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 621516, "end_char": 621530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 621538, "end_char": 621541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\nIn re The De/6 Laws Act, 1912.", "canonical_name": "DAs"}}, {"text": "Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 621561, "end_char": 621575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 9, 1876", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 621885, "end_char": 621897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 9, 1876, Burah sent a petition of appeal from the jail to the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Kemp", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 622555, "end_char": 622559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the second question the majority of the High Court (Markby, Kemp, Ainslie and Jackson JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Jackson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 622573, "end_char": 622580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the second question the majority of the High Court (Markby, Kemp, Ainslie and Jackson JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Macpherson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 622779, "end_char": 622789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garth C. 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Collier"}}, {"text": "section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 641783, "end_char": 641794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Regulation Act, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 641802, "end_char": 641830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 642111, "end_char": 642121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Regulation Act, 1879", "statute": "the Customs Regulation Act, 1879"}}, {"text": "Constitution Act of New South Wales", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 642227, "end_char": 642262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DasJ.\n\nthe Constitution Act of New South Wales which authe>- rised only the legislature to impose and levy customs duty."}}, {"text": "Robert P. Colf1er", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 642341, "end_char": 642358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Robert P. Colf1er in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council referred to The Queen v Burah\n\nand Hodge v. The Queen to both of which he was a party.", "canonical_name": "Robert P. Collier"}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 644001, "end_char": 644011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Watson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 644059, "end_char": 644065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle that even a provincial legislature of a Dom.inion is supreme within the lin1.its assigned by section 92 of the Act of 1867 was also reiterated by Lord Watson when delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in The lJquidators of the Maritime Bank\n\nof Canda v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick(')."}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 644352, "end_char": 644362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 644381, "end_char": 644392, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 644461, "end_char": 644471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 50 and 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 644704, "end_char": 644722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 644961, "end_char": 644971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 645131, "end_char": 645141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 645254, "end_char": 645267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 646504, "end_char": 646513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conunoowcalth Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 646803, "end_char": 646827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The objection that under Chapter I, Part I, section 1 legislative power was vested in the Federal Parliament and could not be delegated was disposed of by the lcanK.d Chief Justice by saying that \".that section is merely introdw:tory to the provisions of the Constitution which deal with the lcgis~.\" To the C()lltcntion that the power of the Conunoowcalth Parliament waa less than the power exercised by the British Parliament the following answer wai given by O'Connor J. at page 639:-\n\n\"Can it be seriously contended that, in creating a legislature such as that of."}}, {"text": "George Edwin Gray(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 648167, "end_char": 648186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next case to be referred to is that of In re George Edwin Gray(1 ).", "canonical_name": "George Eduin Gray(2)"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 648190, "end_char": 648199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "War Measures Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 648203, "end_char": 648225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".April 20, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 649436, "end_char": 649451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of .the powers thus conferred, the Governor-General in .Council on .April 20, 1918, passed an Order in Council containing various regulations."}}, {"text": "regulations had the effect of amending and modifying some parts of the Military Services Act, 1917", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 649517, "end_char": 649615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Fitzpatrick", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 650207, "end_char": 650218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fitzpatrick C. J., in repelling the above ."}}, {"text": "Section 92(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 652628, "end_char": 652641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British North America Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 652645, "end_char": 652676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "On a consideration of the provisions of the British North Amerka Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 653219, "end_char": 653293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 653495, "end_char": 653505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On a consideration of the provisions of the British North Amerka Act, 1867", "statute": "On a consideration of the provisions of the British North Amerka Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 655032, "end_char": 655041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transport Workers Act, 1928", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 655049, "end_char": 655076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Acts Interpretation Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 655258, "end_char": 655287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 26, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 655784, "end_char": 655797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise: of the powers conferred by this section the Governor-General on June 26, 1931, 'issued the \"Watersiqe Employment Regulations.\""}}, {"text": "Watersiqe Employment Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 655812, "end_char": 655844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 656193, "end_char": 656202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Watersiqe Employment Regulations", "statute": "Watersiqe Employment Regulations"}}, {"text": "Lows Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 658857, "end_char": 658871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 658880, "end_char": 658883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dai J.\n\nDas J.\n\nthis sense Parliament had to preserve 'its own capacity intact', (In re Initiative and Referendum Act)\"."}}, {"text": "sections 51 and\n\n52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 660686, "end_char": 660705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament of the Commonwealth", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 661368, "end_char": 661398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His conclusion is set out at page 121 :-\n\n\"On final analysis, therefore, the Parliament of the Commonwealth is not competent to \"abdicate\" hs\n\npowers of legislation."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 664967, "end_char": 664976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 665058, "end_char": 665067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 665415, "end_char": 665424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 163 Lord Macmillan said :-\n\n\"Once it is found that a parlicular topic of legislation is among those upon 'Yhich the Dominion Parliament may competently legislate as being for the peace, order and good government of Canada or as being one of the specific subjects enumerated in section 91 of the British North America Act, their Lordships see no reason to restrict the permitted scope' of such legislation by any other consideration than is applicable to the legislation of a fully sovereign State.\""}}, {"text": "section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 665683, "end_char": 665693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 666968, "end_char": 666973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They filed a suir for a declaration that the Act was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature In the Privy Council the validity of the Act was questioned on the ground of delegation of legislative power to the Lieutcnant~Governor in Council and by the latter to the Marketing Board~.\n\nLord Atkin who delivered the judgment of the Board said at p. 722 :-\n\n\"The third objection is that it is not within the powers of the Provincial Legislatme to delegate\n\n(I) (1933) A.C. 156; A.l."}}, {"text": "Council of Australia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 668318, "end_char": 668338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41 of the National Security (Central) Regulations 1939-1940 made by the Governor-General in Council of Australia under section 5 of the National Security Act, 1933."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 668345, "end_char": 668354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act, 1933", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 668362, "end_char": 668389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 669002, "end_char": 669011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Act, 1933", "statute": "the National Security Act, 1933"}}, {"text": "Canadian War Measures Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 669019, "end_char": 669050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 669468, "end_char": 669477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Canadian War Measures Act, 1914", "statute": "the Canadian War Measures Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 669994, "end_char": 670003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Canadian War Measures Act, 1914", "statute": "the Canadian War Measures Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Jn the matter of a Reference as to Validity of Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 670343, "end_char": 670401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 670523, "end_char": 670532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn the matter of a Reference as to Validity of Regulations", "statute": "Jn the matter of a Reference as to Validity of Regulations"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 670588, "end_char": 670597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn the matter of a Reference as to Validity of Regulations", "statute": "Jn the matter of a Reference as to Validity of Regulations"}}, {"text": "this case the validity of the War Measures Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 671102, "end_char": 671154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rinfret", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 672265, "end_char": 672272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rinfret J. at page 17 observed :-\n\n\"The powers conferred upon the Governor-in- Council by the War Measures Act constitute a lawmaking authority, an authority to pass legislative enactments such as should be deemed necessary and advisable by reason of war; and, when acting within those limits, the Governor-in-Council is vested with plenary powers of legislation ;.,"}}, {"text": "Davis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 674265, "end_char": 674270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Davis J. reiterated the same principle at pp.", "canonical_name": "Davies"}}, {"text": "Kerwin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 674739, "end_char": 674745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect are the following observations of Kerwin J. at p. 30 :-\n\n\"If at any time Parliament considers that too great a power ."}}, {"text": "Section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 675661, "end_char": 675671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 675690, "end_char": 675741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 2, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 676214, "end_char": 676229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 72 as set out in the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, read witli the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, authorised the Governor-General \"in cases of emergency\" to \"make and promulgate ordinances for the peace, order and good government of British India or any part thereof\" and further provided that \"any ordinance so made shall .......... have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature ............ \" In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by this section the Governor-General on January 2, 1942, promulgated Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "section 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 676471, "end_char": 676483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "sections 5, 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 676846, "end_char": 676860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 677144, "end_char": 677154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jessore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 677340, "end_char": 677347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents, who were all policemen, had been convicted by the Special Magistrate at Jessore and sentenced to 2 years' rigorous imprisonment on charges of rioting, assault and committing prejudicial acts tending to cause disaffection in the Police force."}}, {"text": "They came up to High Court on petitions for revision and contended that the Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 677511, "end_char": 677596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 161", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 677718, "end_char": 677735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 677983, "end_char": 677994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "They came up to High Court on petitions for revision and contended that the Ordinance", "statute": "They came up to High Court on petitions for revision and contended that the Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 678002, "end_char": 678028, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 678683, "end_char": 678692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 679192, "end_char": 679206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscount Simon, who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council, disposed of the first objection at pp.", "canonical_name": "Viscount Simon"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 679387, "end_char": 679396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680062, "end_char": 680072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IX", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680076, "end_char": 680087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680444, "end_char": 680455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 681885, "end_char": 681895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "re The Delhi Urws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 684204, "end_char": 684231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jennings", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 687716, "end_char": 687724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jennings and Young in their Constitutional Laws of the British Empire (1938 Edition), at page 30 say:--:\n\n\"It has been said that a colonial legislature is 'sovereign within its powers.'"}}, {"text": "Young", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 687729, "end_char": 687734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jennings and Young in their Constitutional Laws of the British Empire (1938 Edition), at page 30 say:--:\n\n\"It has been said that a colonial legislature is 'sovereign within its powers.'"}}, {"text": "Fitz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 691553, "end_char": 691557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The answer must be that this power of delegation is \"ancillary to legislation\" as said by Lord Fitz-Gerald and, therefore, is a part of the content of the lawcmaking power 'itself."}}, {"text": "Dignan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 692590, "end_char": 692596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was stated by Evatt J. in Dignan's case(1) to be \"itself a grant of legislative power.\""}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 693712, "end_char": 693722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Legislative Council of lndi<\\", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 694993, "end_char": 695029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Burah's case(') Markby J referring to Mr. Kennedy's arguments said at p. 98 :-\n\n\"He boldly claimed for the Indian Legislative Council of lndi<\\ the power to transfer its legislative functions to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal."}}, {"text": "George Edwin Gray(1)", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 695846, "end_char": 695866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect are the following observations of Anglin J. in In re George Edwin Gray(1) at p. 176 :-\n\n\"Short of such an abdication; any limited delegation would seem to be within the ambit of a legislative jurisdiction ........ \"\n\nIf once the power of delegation is let in, where is the line of its termination to be drawn and who s to draw the line ?", "canonical_name": "George Eduin Gray(2)"}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 696707, "end_char": 696715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand in the United States the Judges under the due process clause took upon themselves the power to draw this line but, as we have seen, in 1825 Marshall C. J. acknowledged that \"the line has not been '\"\" exactly drawn\", and Lamar J. in 1914 had to admit that \"it is difficult to define the line.\"", "canonical_name": "Marshall"}}, {"text": "re Tiie Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 697379, "end_char": 697407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sa'i<l Markby", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 699248, "end_char": 699261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sa'i<l Markby J. in Burah's case(supra) at p. 101 :-\n\n\"In extreme cases the executive may suspend the operation of all laws."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 701192, "end_char": 701201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 495", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 701576, "end_char": 701582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 703311, "end_char": 703322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Iii Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 706068, "end_char": 706086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 706460, "end_char": 706469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Iii Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Iii Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 706477, "end_char": 706510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Burak", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 706766, "end_char": 706771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When referring to section 4 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, I said in my judgment in T/1e State of Bombay v.\n\nNarottamdas(') that the section was an instance of conditional legislation and that there was no delegation of legislative power to the executive, I only adopted the language used by the Privy Council in Burak' s case in the sense I have explained above.", "canonical_name": "Burah"}}, {"text": "Everything and Everybody Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 707304, "end_char": 707332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1943) F.C.R. 96", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 712730, "end_char": 712746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 5, 10 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 713585, "end_char": 713606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viscount Simon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 714793, "end_char": 714807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further:, the view of the learned Chief Justice on this point was expressly overruled by Viscount Simon who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in the appeal from that decision in the following words :-\n\nIn re The Delhi Law!", "canonical_name": "Viscount Simon"}}, {"text": "S9S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 717035, "end_char": 717038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 717191, "end_char": 717200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ProvinciaLGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 717860, "end_char": 717880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They laid particular emphasis on the power given to the ProvinciaLGovernment to, make any modification in the Act when extending its lill~ as indicating that it was a delegation of legislative power."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 719047, "end_char": 719056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 719942, "end_char": 719962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 720637, "end_char": 720657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "18, 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 720718, "end_char": 720726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, Delhi Laws Act, 1912, was passed by the Governor-General in Council on September 18, 1912."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 720729, "end_char": 720738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 720868, "end_char": 720877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 721575, "end_char": 721636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 721665, "end_char": 721675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833", "statute": "The first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833"}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 721896, "end_char": 721906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833", "statute": "The first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833"}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 722173, "end_char": 722183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833", "statute": "The first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833"}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 722552, "end_char": 722562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833", "statute": "The first- Parliamentary Act to be noted is the Charter Act, 1833"}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 722667, "end_char": 722677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 722986, "end_char": 722996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act of Parliament would be within the same territories and should be taken notice of by all Courts in the same manner as an Act", "statute": "Act of Parliament would be within the same territories and should be taken notice of by all Courts in the same manner as an Act"}}, {"text": "-Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 723062, "end_char": 723069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 66 enabled the Governors or Governors in Council of Bengal; Madras, -Bombay and Agra to propose to the Governor-General in Council drafts or projects of any law and the latter was to consider the same."}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 723074, "end_char": 723078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 66 enabled the Governors or Governors in Council of Bengal; Madras, -Bombay and Agra to propose to the Governor-General in Council drafts or projects of any law and the latter was to consider the same."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 723445, "end_char": 723455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act of Parliament would be within the same territories and should be taken notice of by all Courts in the same manner as an Act", "statute": "Act of Parliament would be within the same territories and should be taken notice of by all Courts in the same manner as an Act"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 723543, "end_char": 723553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act of Parliament would be within the same territories and should be taken notice of by all Courts in the same manner as an Act", "statute": "Act of Parliament would be within the same territories and should be taken notice of by all Courts in the same manner as an Act"}}, {"text": "By the Government of India Act, 1858", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 723591, "end_char": 723627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 723759, "end_char": 723798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 723822, "end_char": 723831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "sections 40, 43, 44, 50, 66 and 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 723841, "end_char": 723875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 724091, "end_char": 724101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 724371, "end_char": 724380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 724446, "end_char": 724456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 724499, "end_char": 724509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861", "statute": "Then came the Indian Councils Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 725687, "end_char": 725696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 725724, "end_char": 725733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 725814, "end_char": 725823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 726196, "end_char": 726205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 726287, "end_char": 726296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G'lvernor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 726571, "end_char": 726580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a close analysis it will be noticed that section 8 authorised the Lieutenant-Governor to extend to that place any law or any portion of any law ( i) now in force in the other territories subject to his government or (1i) which may hereafter be enacted by the Council (a) of the Governor-General or (b) of the said Lieutenant-G'lvernor."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 726618, "end_char": 726627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 726657, "end_char": 726666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 727098, "end_char": 727107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 727602, "end_char": 727611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 728853, "end_char": 728869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 729086, "end_char": 729095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 729154, "end_char": 729163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 729429, "end_char": 729438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 729588, "end_char": 729597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 730367, "end_char": 730376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 730735, "end_char": 730744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 731115, "end_char": 731124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 731176, "end_char": 731185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 731273, "end_char": 731289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 733508, "end_char": 733517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 733671, "end_char": 733680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Adapting the language of Lord Selbornc to the Delhi Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 733752, "end_char": 733807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 734882, "end_char": 734892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Province before actually extending it This reasoning will immediately bring the Delhi Laws Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 735695, "end_char": 735789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 736160, "end_char": 736169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Province before actually extending it This reasoning will immediately bring the Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Province before actually extending it This reasoning will immediately bring the Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "re The Delh Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 736447, "end_char": 736473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 737715, "end_char": 737725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 737770, "end_char": 737780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 739054, "end_char": 739063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India was then governed by the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 739433, "end_char": 739509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 739532, "end_char": 739561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 739570, "end_char": 739579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 739722, "end_char": 739732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 739782, "end_char": 739792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 739896, "end_char": 739906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 740021, "end_char": 740031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 740142, "end_char": 740152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 740339, "end_char": 740349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Sections 99 and 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 740456, "end_char": 740475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 740676, "end_char": 740692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 740715, "end_char": 740726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dominion Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 740756, "end_char": 740776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section ( 4) of section 100 was asfollows :- ... :\n\n\"The Dominion Legislature has power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the\n\nIn re The Delhi l.Qws Act, 1912, etc."}}, {"text": "Qws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 740861, "end_char": 740874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 741201, "end_char": 741212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qws Act, 1912", "statute": "Qws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 219", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 741260, "end_char": 741271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qws Act, 1912", "statute": "Qws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "From what I have stated it is clear that in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 741310, "end_char": 741387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 741503, "end_char": 741512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From what I have stated it is clear that in the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "From what I have stated it is clear that in the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 742026, "end_char": 742035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From what I have stated it is clear that in the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "From what I have stated it is clear that in the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 742658, "end_char": 742669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 742922, "end_char": 742931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ajmer-Merwara", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 742939, "end_char": 742952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of that the Dominion Legislature by\n\nsection 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, delegated to the Central Government the power to extend, by notification, to Ajmer-Merwara only the laws which were in force in any other Province at the date of such notification."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 743461, "end_char": 743470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 16, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 743786, "end_char": 743800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Re Question 3: Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, was enacted on April 16, 1950, after our Constitution came into force."}}, {"text": "article 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 743973, "end_char": 743983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 744053, "end_char": 744063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 73(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 744191, "end_char": 744204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 744293, "end_char": 744303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 245 and 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 744500, "end_char": 744520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 744529, "end_char": 744540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 744717, "end_char": 744733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 744978, "end_char": 744989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 745299, "end_char": 745310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 746278, "end_char": 746291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 747254, "end_char": 747261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" -\n\nOn this question I adhere to what I said in Gopalan's\n\ncase(1 )."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 747290, "end_char": 747304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 747369, "end_char": 747380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 747524, "end_char": 747535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 747647, "end_char": 747658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 246(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 747738, "end_char": 747752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 245", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 747869, "end_char": 747880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 748448, "end_char": 748457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament with respect to the Part C States is much wider than the legislative power the Dominion Legislature had under the Government of India Act", "statute": "Parliament with respect to the Part C States is much wider than the legislative power the Dominion Legislature had under the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 749050, "end_char": 749059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament with respect to the Part C States is much wider than the legislative power the Dominion Legislature had under the Government of India Act", "statute": "Parliament with respect to the Part C States is much wider than the legislative power the Dominion Legislature had under the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 749067, "end_char": 749087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 749092, "end_char": 749101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Deihl LaWa Atit, 1912", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 749199, "end_char": 749220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "· In re The Deihl LaWa Atit, 1912.;"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 749675, "end_char": 749684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 749737, "end_char": 749746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 749770, "end_char": 749779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 749787, "end_char": 749807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 749812, "end_char": 749821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 749934, "end_char": 749943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 751018, "end_char": 751027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 751461, "end_char": 751472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 753239, "end_char": 753250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 753255, "end_char": 753266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 753353, "end_char": 753364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 754423, "end_char": 754434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 353 and 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 754829, "end_char": 754849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 755977, "end_char": 755986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ajmer-Mcrwara {Extension of Laws) Act, 1947", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 756102, "end_char": 756145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Question 2 : Ajmer-Mcrwara {Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, was valid and no thereof .", "canonical_name": "Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 756237, "end_char": 756246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th September 1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 756792, "end_char": 756811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi was originally part of the province of Punjab but it was constituted into a separate province under a Chief Commissioner on the 17th September 1912 When that was done legislation was required to determine what laws were to apply in this new province."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 757026, "end_char": 757035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 757166, "end_char": 757175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Boae", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 757771, "end_char": 757775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Boae I.\n\nlnre The De/hi LIN1 Act, 1912, etc."}}, {"text": "Boie", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 757817, "end_char": 757821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Boie J.\n\nessence is legislative power, namely authority to introduce into the province new laws which were not there before."}}, {"text": "legislature which enacted the Delhi Laws Act 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 757947, "end_char": 757996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 758520, "end_char": 758530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The legislature which enacted the Delhi Laws Act 1912", "statute": "The legislature which enacted the Delhi Laws Act 1912"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 759038, "end_char": 759047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United f States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 759712, "end_char": 759738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a great divergence of opinion about this and we were taken elaborately through the views of many eminent judicial authorities and jurists in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, India, the United f States of America and the q>ntinent of Europe."}}, {"text": "Europe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 759760, "end_char": 759766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a great divergence of opinion about this and we were taken elaborately through the views of many eminent judicial authorities and jurists in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, India, the United f States of America and the q>ntinent of Europe."}}, {"text": "British Empire", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 761381, "end_char": 761395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not of course mean bv this that we are to examine the power of the British Parliament because everyone concedes that it.s powers ate legislatively absolute and that no court of law can question anything it docs : I mean examine the nature of the powers conferred by it upon other legislature, like the Governor-General tin Legislative Council, which have been created from time to time by the British Parliament in various parts of the British Empire."}}, {"text": "Iii Lows Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 762007, "end_char": 762025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 762034, "end_char": 762038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\nBose J.\n\nwould have done and in particular the Judicial Committee of the Privy Co:mciL In Croft v. Dunphy(') the Judicial Committee said, in a Canadian case :-\n\n\"In these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive that the Imperial Parliament in bestowing plenary powers on the Dominion Parliament to legislate in relation to customs should have withheld from it the power to enact provisions similar in scope to those which had long been an integral part of 1lhe Imperial customs legislation and which presumably were recognised as necessary to its eflicacy.\"", "canonical_name": "BosE JJ."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 762665, "end_char": 762675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Iii Lows Act, 1912", "statute": "Iii Lows Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "so far as the Delhi Laws Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 763029, "end_char": 763057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Their Lordships were concerned with an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 763446, "end_char": 763488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 763767, "end_char": 763776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Their Lordships were concerned with an Act", "statute": "Their Lordships were concerned with an Act"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 763907, "end_char": 763916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Their Lordships were concerned with an Act", "statute": "Their Lordships were concerned with an Act"}}, {"text": "Section\n\n8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 763963, "end_char": 763973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Their Lordships were concerned with an Act", "statute": "Their Lordships were concerned with an Act"}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 764023, "end_char": 764029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section\n\n8 enacted that :- \" \"The said Lieutenant-Governor (Bengal) may from time to lime, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette,\n\n01 [1933] A.C.156 at 161."}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 764712, "end_char": 764721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 764810, "end_char": 764819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 768324, "end_char": 768338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 768869, "end_char": 768879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 769148, "end_char": 769157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 769922, "end_char": 769931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D Lawa Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 770184, "end_char": 770200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 770896, "end_char": 770905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The D Lawa Act, 1912", "statute": "The D Lawa Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 772275, "end_char": 772284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 772497, "end_char": 772506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 773212, "end_char": 773241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 773596, "end_char": 773606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 774725, "end_char": 774735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Next comes the Indian Independence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 775501, "end_char": 775539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 775679, "end_char": 775690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Next comes the Indian Independence Act", "statute": "Next comes the Indian Independence Act"}}, {"text": "Viscowit Haldane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 776277, "end_char": 776293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See the observations of Viscowit Haldane in Att<>rney-\n\nGeneral for the Commonwealth of Australia v. The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited(1).", "canonical_name": "Viscowit Haldane"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 778019, "end_char": 778028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BDle", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 778878, "end_char": 778882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BDle J.\n\ntherefore here treading on virgin soil The legislature which passtd this A£t was the Indian Parliament, a body created, not by the British Parliament with its British concept of legislative power, but by the Constituent ASJCmbly of India which drew not only on the British model but culled from all the world that which in its wisdom it considered best fitted for this country and after adding bits of its owa, produced an amalgam which adheres to non of its models but is something fresh and in that sense uiliquc."}}, {"text": "article 249(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 780652, "end_char": 780666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 785539, "end_char": 785549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 245(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 785732, "end_char": 785746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 786030, "end_char": 786043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 786051, "end_char": 786080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jn re The Delhi Lows Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 787167, "end_char": 787191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 249(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 787657, "end_char": 787671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn re The Delhi Lows Act", "statute": "Jn re The Delhi Lows Act"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 787786, "end_char": 787797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn re The Delhi Lows Act", "statute": "Jn re The Delhi Lows Act"}}, {"text": "Article 356", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 787800, "end_char": 787811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn re The Delhi Lows Act", "statute": "Jn re The Delhi Lows Act"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 788072, "end_char": 788083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn re The Delhi Lows Act", "statute": "Jn re The Delhi Lows Act"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 788873, "end_char": 788884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 789120, "end_char": 789131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 357", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 789953, "end_char": 789964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 790767, "end_char": 790786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I so hold for another reason as well namely, that to • decide otherwise would make the government of India an exceedingly difficult matter and would put back the hands of the clock."}}, {"text": "Delhi Lowa Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 791582, "end_char": 791602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Viscount Haldane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 792726, "end_char": 792742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To use the language of Viscount Haldane in Attm-ney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia v.\n\nColonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd.(') :-\n\n\"Their Lordships are called upon to interpret the legislative compact made between the Commonwealtiland the States ....... .It is clear that any change in the\n\nexisting distribution of powers has been safeguarded in such a fashion that on a point such as that before the Board the Commonwealth Parliament could not legislate so as to alter that distribution merely of its own motion.\"", "canonical_name": "Viscowit Haldane"}}, {"text": "Cariada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 794627, "end_char": 794634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same principle was repeated in 1882 in Rusrell\n\nv~ T h, e Queen (2), a case from Cariada."}}, {"text": "Benoarilal Sarmae", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 795478, "end_char": 795495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Emperor\n\nv. Benoarilal Sarmae).", "canonical_name": "Benoari Lal' Sarma"}}, {"text": "South African", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 799421, "end_char": 799434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was tried in a South African case, Sir John Gorden Sprigg v. Sigcau(1), but the Privy Council held it could not be done, not indeed on any ground which is material here but tkt is the only case I know where the attempt was made and the right litigated."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 800403, "end_char": 800412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 804508, "end_char": 804517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 804525, "end_char": 804545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 804610, "end_char": 804619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 804677, "end_char": 804686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "the Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 806468, "end_char": 806479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the President of India, the State of \"Bombay, the State of Madras and the State of Mysore : P. A. Mehta."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 806520, "end_char": 806529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the State of Uttar Pradesh: C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "Amarnath Bhardwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 806567, "end_char": 806584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarnath Bhardwaj : R. S. N arula.", "canonical_name": "Amarnath Bharadwaj"}}, {"text": "R. S. N arula", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 806587, "end_char": 806600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarnath Bhardwaj : R. S. N arula."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 806650, "end_char": 806665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for the Ajmer Electric Supply Co. Ltd. : M. S. K. Sastri."}}, {"text": "Munshi Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 806786, "end_char": 806796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for Shri Munshi Lal and others : Shankar Das.", "canonical_name": "Munshi Lal"}}, {"text": "Shankar Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 806810, "end_char": 806821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agent for Shri Munshi Lal and others : Shankar Das."}}, {"text": "ANGURBALA MULLICK", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 806824, "end_char": 806841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ANGURBALA MULLICK\n\nti •\n\n."}}, {"text": "FAzL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 806881, "end_char": 806888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SA1Ym FAzL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA AND CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]", "canonical_name": "Fazl AliJ."}}, {"text": "MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 806890, "end_char": 806909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SA1Ym FAzL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA AND CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 806926, "end_char": 806946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[SA1Ym FAzL Au, MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN,\n\nMuKHERJEA AND CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 806967, "end_char": 806989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 807007, "end_char": 807011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 807203, "end_char": 807207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rights to Property Act", "statute": "Rights to Property Act"}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 807233, "end_char": 807261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rights to Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 807713, "end_char": 807735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}